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systematic data. To be sure, definitions may help prepare the student for examinations in which he is questioned about the conceptions he has "set in a notebook, learn'd and conn'd by rote." But there is a danger here of mistaking the verbal form for the sociological substance, of endowing the student with a rich vocabulary of sociological terms while withholding from him any working knowledge of how these terms are utilized in the analysis of social relations.

Thus we reach the third objective. The textbook should give the student a healthy acquaintance with rigorously sifted sociological facts and data, rather than a kaleidoscope of anecdotal evidence. Otherwise, the student will, understandably, come to confuse the casual observation with the more precise data which increasingly enter into the facts of sociology. Yet there is danger here too. With this concern for empirical materials, if past experience is any guide, there comes the risk that textbooks of sociology will be crowded with an excess of facts, the excess coming from the unrelatedness rather than from their numbers.

Thus a fourth objective is required: systematic theory to guide the student through what will otherwise appear to be a miscellany of facts. Whether he knows it or not, the student can describe or analyze the relations of men in association only in terms of a theoretic framework. And if this framework is to be analytically effective, it must be fashioned out of the slow cumulative experience of research going forward in the field. Even then the framework will be regarded as provisional and subject to change as experience grows. It will be limited and modest, rather than all-embracing and grandiose. The search, here and now, for the total theoretic system in which all facts promptly find their clearly ordained place has the same large challenge and the same small promise as those all-encompassing philosophical systems which have fallen into disuse. Sociology advances on solid ground as long as it focuses on what can be called theories of the middle range: theories applicable to limited sets of data, rather than to the entire spread of problems encompassed by the discipline. The hazard of evolving a single, self-sealing system of sociological thought, in which no conceivable data can be at odds with that system, can only be ignored by those who develop convenient amnesias about such systems in the sociology of the past.

If the potboiler tradition of sociological textbooks is to be brought to an end and it is not so deep a tradition that it cannot be uprooted, then the new texts must, according to our four criteria, present methods, basic concepts, sifted facts, and systematic theory. Perhaps we have still to wait for a full realization of this ideal. But approximations are not wanting. Wilson and Kolb's *Sociological Analysis*, I believe, is one such approximation.

In setting about their work, the authors of this volume have manifestly had each of these criteria in mind. And in striving to meet these criteria they have utilized the casebook method, adopted with such success by Park and Burgess in their influential textbook of a quarter-century ago. And indeed, the casebook seems particularly suited to this program. Each major part and chapter of the

book is introduced by a compact statement, written by Wilson and Kolb, of the key concepts and problems in one sphere of general sociology; these introductions are then followed by instances of sociological analysis which utilize the concepts The casebook is clearly premised on the view that concepts must earn their academic keep, that they must be put to work organizing and analyzing empirical data The data are found in excerpts drawn from contributions to the field. As the authors indicate, the excerpts serve another purpose as well. They acquaint the student with the methods of sociological research The student thus takes part vicariously in the analysis of sociological materials, rather than confining himself to the products of analysis To this extent, his first conception of sociology is less a product of faith than of experience.

Finally, in their choice of a theoretic framework the authors have made a place for a rewarding alliance between sociology and the related disciplines of social psychology and social anthropology Despite their separate emphases, these three disciplines have taken up related problems, developed supplementary findings, and adopted something of a common language This promises to result in a core of basic social science, in which the special interests of each discipline are caught up in what has come to be known as structural and functional analysis, and it is this which constitutes the theoretic frame of the present volume Utilizing the structural-functional approach throughout the book, the authors have on occasion put previously obscure problems in sharp focus (The introduction to the chapter on religion, which is founded on existing research and theory but which immensely clarifies earlier formulations, may be cited as one of several such contributions)

In planning this volume, with its close attention to recent developments in sociology, the authors clearly adhered to Bacon's precept: "Books must follow sciences, and not sciences books" Since textbooks sooner or later reflect the forward movement of a discipline, the greater the advance of that discipline, the more brief the authority of any one book. This means, of course, that textbooks are written only to be outmoded I know that the present authors wish, by virtue of advances in the field, to have their volume soon become obsolete In the meantime, this book provides an introduction to sociology designed to give the student an active insight into the structural and functional approach to the study of society

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Columbia University
January 3, 1949

PREFACE

Sociological Analysis is in some respects a novel undertaking. It is not designed for use as another book of readings. Nor is it intended as a compendium of topical excerpts. Instead, its major purposes are two: (1) to set forth a systematic organization of the field of general sociology, and (2) to facilitate the use of the case method as a more vital approach to introductory or general sociology.

Popular interest in general sociology continues to grow, and with it there is an increasing awareness of the need in the introductory course for more sociological analysis, in addition to a broad survey of the field. Because many students never go beyond the first course they often get the erroneous impression that sociology consists mostly of generalized discussion. They miss the opportunity of seeing how research and empirical analysis have come to grips with actual problems and are preliminary to the principles which finally get into the textbooks.

As a consequence there is a mounting reaction against the sterile formalism of the lecture-textbook method which casts the learner in a passive role. Effecting a pedagogic change toward more active student participation during a period of peak enrollments, however, is not an easy task. Libraries are unable to supply all the books needed by all the students; yet students can hardly be expected to purchase all the books they need to consult. As a result, the student's reading is usually limited to a basic textbook, with a few additional references, or to a text and a parallel book of readings. Neither procedure is entirely satisfactory. The former imposes a severely restricted topical coverage, where is the latter ordinarily gives the student only a smattering of widely miscellaneous excerpts.

The case book approach implies something quite different. More than three-quarters of a century ago the case method was initiated in legal education and has since become the main instructional technique in all of our leading law schools. In shifting from a text of printed lectures to actual cases (court opinions), the law student gave up his passive role of mere learner of ready-made rules, which he might or might not be able to apply as a practitioner, and began to examine directly the documents leading to final court decisions. From such a study a more realistic understanding of legal practice developed. Moreover, the use of the case method is also found in business administration, industrial sociology, and, in what is perhaps the oldest instance, the clinical method of teaching in medicine. More independent thinking and livelier classroom discussion have invariably resulted in all these fields.

It is rather ironic that so dynamic a discipline as sociology should lag in the matter of pedagogy, even though this lag is usually found only in the general or introductory course. But there the student seldom has the chance, in addition to surveying the whole field systematically, to follow through, from beginning to

end, any appreciable number of fully rounded sociological investigations or analyses; his acquaintance with sociology is more likely to be gained secondhand than firsthand.

Here the case book presentation of materials, along with lectures, classroom discussion, and textbook or other readings, appears to offer the best solution. It was with these principal considerations in view that this book was prepared.

It will be noted that the organization of material within this book was not arrived at merely by trying to synthesize the schemes of leading textbooks now in use. Our framework is not a commonplace one, but it can be used either independently to form a basic text or it can be adapted for use along with a number of the better-known textbooks. If the latter procedure is followed, it will be noted that our topical coverage includes all the major areas of sociology found in standard texts, and also that our arrangement of the twenty-three chapters permits a good deal of flexibility in the rearrangement of content. The comprehensive divisional organization of the book may be observed in the headings of the seven major parts: "Cultural Backgrounds of Social Life," "Personality and Social Structure," "Basic Aspects of Social Relations," "Social Differentiation and Stratification," "Institutional and Associational Structure of Community and Nation," "Social Interaction," "Social Disorganization and Social Change."

From the chapter headings it will be seen that certain topics sometimes included in introductory or general sociology are omitted altogether since in the opinion of the authors it is better for sociology to strive to be a logically coherent discipline than to become a catchall or hodgepodge of "social problems." Other topics will appear here in other than their conventional places.

Comparison of our selections with the sources from which they were taken will show that abridgments, deletions, and even the cutting of footnotes have been kept to a minimum. The material is neither editorialized, pointed up, nor summarized for the student: the true case method is preserved. With complete cases before him the student can observe all the subtleties (as well as crudities) and ramifications of the analyses as they were originally made. In this way he is in a better position to think the whole problem through with the author or investigator and to evaluate his conclusions.

Despite space limitations, many of the selections included are far lengthier than those found in conventional books of sociological readings — because only those selections served our set purposes. It is hoped that whatever the book may leave to be desired in the way of wide coverage of sociological topics is more than compensated for by the adequacy and distinctiveness of the selections. We do not mean to imply, however, that our selections are the only logical ones, or that all points of view or methods are represented for any one topic. This book is not intended as a substitute for the discussion coverage found in comprehensive textbooks or systematic lectures, nor is it expected entirely to replace student use of the library. Rather, we hope, as already suggested, to change the emphasis in the introductory course from "talky-talk" about sociology and sweeping generaliza-

tions concerning "social problems" to actual sociological inquiry as exemplified by outstanding cases.

It cannot be claimed that every selection is a completely successful example of sociological analysis, but each is a "case in point" with reference to some basic concern of general sociology. It should be kept in mind that the case method, as we use the term in this book, refers to what sociologists or others using sociological methods have said or done with reference to some problem, just as in law the "case" refers to what lawyers have actually said or done with reference to a legal problem. Our cases are often like those presented in medical teaching where observed facts in a given instance are described and analyzed. Although an example of the case method in social work or psychology might be used as a "case" in our sense, it should be remembered that in those fields the word refers to a research method and not to an educational device or instrument. The case method as we refer to it covers a wide variety of research techniques or methods of observation and analysis.

The materials we present are based on virtually all of the leading methods of sociological research: interviews, case histories, life histories, participant-observer studies, census analyses, various statistical and other quantitative procedures, typological methods (both historical and contemporaneous), and so on. From some points of view it might have been preferable to organize the presentation around methodological concepts, but this was not feasible in dealing broadly with the logical body of subject matter of the whole field of sociology.

The informed reader will discover that the basic concepts of structure and function were guiding principles in establishing the main outlines of this volume and in determining the choice of particular cases. We have tried to maintain a balanced perspective representing many different points of view, or schools, of sociological thought. The fact that the bulk of our material is qualitative rather than quantitative is in part a realistic anticipation of what may be expected of the average student or reader. More directly, none the less, these proportions reflect the prevailing nature of sociological literature and the fact that many significant areas of sociological inquiry have not yet proved amenable to statistical and other quantitative methods.

Sociological Analysis is on the whole not an easy book for the uninitiated. We have not hesitated to include a difficult selection if that selection did the job best. We have valued analytical worth above entertainment value, yet we have reserved no place for examples of the cult of unintelligibility or learned dullness. Consequently, most of the selections are highly readable. Case materials such as these should heighten rather than diminish the growing popular interest in sociology.

Critical comments by the authors of this volume precede each major division and chapter, and the bibliographies are annotated. These introductory remarks are intended to point up the central conceptual problems in each part and division and to assist students to see the bearing of the selections on these problems. The introductions to the major divisions of subject matter do not expatiate, of

course, upon the numerous concepts involved in the various parts under consideration, but merely indicate briefly the range of questions and problems relevant to the chapters included The chapter comments, however, locate concepts and problems more specifically and go into greater detail; these comments, it will be seen, are always tied in with the cases which have been selected Furthermore, our comments occasionally bridge gaps and clarify interrelations and logical sequences among various topics Notwithstanding the unity of treatment, every quoted item forms an independent whole and, when so desired, may be studied apart from any other item Finally, the chapter-end annotated bibliographies have been intentionally limited to titles expressly included for the purpose of contrast, amplification, or further clarification of a central problem under analysis

I. Introduction: Sociology as a Science

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Intelligent participation in modern society demands of the individual at least a basic, if nontechnical, understanding of the meaning of science. Such an understanding implies a generalized rather than a specialized knowledge and should lead to a comprehension of what the scientific mode of thought signifies and what it can and cannot be expected to do for us. The various sciences have their specialized techniques and perspectives, of course, but they share in common the basic principles of scientific method. Scientific method is in essence a way of thinking and as such imposes certain restraints upon those who would use it; likewise, its use liberates many ordinary thought processes from the fetters of ignorance and error. To appreciate what science basically signifies, one must understand the importance of the concept, of objective inquiry, and of rational experiment. It should be stressed that scientific thinking is not the only valid kind of thinking, but it may be added that there is no substitute for it in the solution of many types of problems. Certainly no other thought mode has meant as much to the rise of Western civilization in providing "a handy means by which one could put the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come out without admitting that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth."

The utility of the scientific method is at least vaguely appreciated even by those who lack the remotest understanding of what it implies. In order for it to be utilized, however, what common misconceptions and delusions must be cleared away? What is the intellectual foundation of all scientific enterprise? What terms are imposed upon sociologists no less than upon others who would engage in scientific endeavor? The answers to these basic questions found in our opening selection, Weber's "Science as a Vocation," form an appropriate part of our prologue to sociological analysis.

"Science as a Vocation" is an excellent introduction to the meaning and significance of science. Moreover, Weber does much to balance the optimism created by the demonstrated successes of the scientific approach in a wide variety of fields, and corrects mistaken ideas regarding the kind of problems it can cope with satisfactorily. There is the fallacious notion, for example, that it can be indiscriminately applied in the realm of values and ultimate ends, and that its wider application is bound to make all of us "healthy, wealthy, and wise." The role of value judgments is a particular point of confusion and dispute in the social sciences, and Weber deals with it forthrightly. His cool detachment and honest skepticism lead to conclusions about the scientific "disenchantment" of the world which

doubtless will provoke disagreement from many, but he should not be pronounced cynical by those who mistake the profound austerity of such a view. His view itself represents the essence of "objectivity." Likewise, it should be observed that he assumes no "ivory tower" perspective in stressing the utility of science for control through calculation of probable results, for wider choice of means to given, observable ends, and for a self-clarification which may indirectly lead to a firmer "morality"

Our next consideration is to note some of the principal differences among the various sciences, to set apart and compare the social sciences, and to show the particular role of sociology among them Ever since Comte, who named the discipline, there have been diverse views about the place of sociology among the sciences, and there is still no consensus as to its precise scope. Pitirim A Sorokin's "Sociology among the Social Sciences" draws the boundary lines while pointing out that in the deeper sense all science is one. He rightly maintains that sociology, like economics and political science or physics and chemistry, is a generalizing rather than an individualizing science, such as history. As a generalizing science it is concerned with the generic, or common and repeated, aspects of sociocultural phenomena. (It should be noted that this view encompasses the sociological schools of thought which view the discipline variously as a study of social groups, social actions, social processes, and so on.)

It is held that certain kinds of phenomena can be comprehended as wholes only through sociological analysis. Sorokin clinches this contention with a very apt case in point. He reviews some of the principal studies which attempt to explain the phenomenon of suicide, and then he shows how the physiographic, psychiatric, economic, and other single factor approaches or restricted perspectives have failed to yield a comprehensive explanation (satisfactory theory). He next demonstrates that the sociological approach as particularly exemplified in Emile Durkheim's classic *Le Suicide* (somewhat inadequately summarized by Sorokin) succeeds where others have fallen short.

Similar lines of analysis are indicated for the over-all study of such social phenomena as crime, revolution, and war, which, despite their varied manifestations in time and space, reveal common behavior patterns. The tendencies of the compartmentalized disciplines to regard sociocultural phenomena too atomistically are criticized. Sorokin does acknowledge the interdependence of sociology, history, economics, political science, and the other sciences, although he insists that sociology remains a special science. One's first impression is that he is setting up sociology as a sort of "master social science," but he denies this inference and asserts that it is neither an encyclopedic nor a synthetic field Sorokin also points out that sociology's theoretically high level of abstraction does not signify that it is "impractical" or merely of academic interest Indeed, one might add that as sociology becomes more theoretical it will, paradoxically, become more "practical," and that many of its present shortcomings as a science stem directly from its lack of theoretical development.

By way of summary Sorokin defines sociology as "a generalizing science of sociocultural phenomena reviewed in their generic forms, types, and manifold interconnections." He differentiates general sociology from the special sociologies such as rural sociology, criminology, the sociology of law, of religion, of the family, and so on. There are other points of view for delimiting and categorizing the field of sociology, and students should become acquainted with them Moreover, acceptance of Sorokin's over-all view of sociology does not commit one to his or any other complete set of presuppositions or conclusions; instead, it merely supplies a suitable mode of orientation for the sociologist.

Thus far in this Introduction we have been concerned with understanding what is broadly implied by the scientific mode of thought, with differentiating sociology from the other social sciences, and with suggesting divisions within the field itself. We shall now cite a case which demonstrates how sociological analysis may yield the solution of a concrete social problem

To forestall any impression, on the one hand, that sociology is concerned largely with abstruse questions of epistemology, taxonomy, and other quite ramified matters, or, on the other hand, that it consists merely of common sense knowledge "dressed up in learned jargon," let us examine a concrete development in the technique of prediction and control One of the acid tests of scientific method is its ability to make accurate predictions of future behavior and events These predictions in turn are often used for purposes of control. The tremendous practical utility of the physical sciences and the popular acclaim accorded them result in no small part from their success in these directions. Yet there is a general unawareness of similar though less extensive developments in the social sciences For example, the public at large scarcely knows about the techniques which have been developed by sociologists for predicting success or failure in marriage, for separating good risks and bad risks among convicted criminals who may be eligible for probation or parole, and so on Any number of studies might be used as cases, but we have chosen for illustrative purposes a section from the Gluecks' well-known book, *500 Criminal Careers*.

As the Gluecks mention in introducing the chapter on "Prediction and Criminal Justice," the basic idea behind this type of prediction was not originally conceived by criminologists but was borrowed from actuarial procedures developed in the insurance field Not until the 1920's were reliable statistical methods worked out for separating the sheep from the goats among prison inmates for certain types of treatment The Gluecks were among the first to devise a reasonably simple and objective instrument that could actually be used by judges and parole boards

In language that the nonstatistical minded can understand, the authors explain how important causal factors were isolated and made the basis for specialized statistical tables for predicting behavior Step by step, the authors show how such tables are constructed, demonstrating their use in individual cases and indicating some astonishing fallacies and weaknesses in existing penological practices Al-

though common sense and tradition (often entrenched in law) may be adequate guides to administrative action, in customary probation and parole procedures one sees an undeniable instance of the absurdities they can produce, and a clear-cut example of the greater utility of scientific method in a wiser choice of means. Modern criminology, as a branch of sociology, has demonstrated that, if reform and rehabilitation are the aims of criminal justice, then treatment must be made to fit the criminal rather than punishment the crime Crime is a costly phenomenon; it hardly need be argued that its curtailment through scientific methods is a matter of more than purely theoretical interest.

Professor and Mrs Glueck acknowledge that the instrument they describe is not perfect, but they rightly suggest that it represents a much more intelligent approach to the problem than the guesswork and irrelevant arguments used by lawyers and judicial and administrative bodies The instrument has since been improved and is being more widely used all the time; still, it is not yet in use everywhere — an indication of the more stubborn resistance of the public to social than to mechanical inventions.

Our introductory considerations would not be complete without a case demonstration of the wider applications of social science in general and sociology in particular to large-scale human activity Samuel A. Stouffer's "Social Science and the Soldier" shows that in war no less than in peace the social sciences have a vast significance for complexly organized projects of social engineering The contributions of the physical sciences to the recent war effort were on the whole more obvious and more spectacular, but the social sciences likewise proved their indispensability How did sociologists and psychologists sharpen "the cutting edge of American democracy" in time of crisis? What can we expect to learn "as a by-product of this practical honing job"?

In implementing our military effort social scientists were confronted with a limited number of broad problems as well as an infinite variety of specific tasks Prior to the war, little attention had been paid by social scientists in this country to problems of a military nature, but peacetime advances in social science knowledge proved to be of great value when applied to the military situation Warfare presents many problems of social organization similar to those of peaceful pursuits, so that social scientists aided the military considerably in problems of classification, training, health, and morale Especially interesting, as Stouffer presents it, was the role of research in morale activities In this connection he points out the two basic categories of research, surveys and experimental studies, and one can gather some notion of the ingenuity displayed by the researchers

The last two cases cited in the introductory chapter both demonstrate how far-reaching the implications for general welfare of the social sciences in general and of sociology in particular would be if we would only make an intelligent and more widespread use of them The importance of the sociological perspective for understanding social behavior is at last being conceived and appreciated in limited circles, and the discipline is now fully recognized in colleges and universities.

A threefold task, none the less, still remains. (1) further development of genuine sociological perspectives and modes of analysis; (2) acquisition and extension of adequate support for sociological research; and (3) attainment of the lay understanding and appreciation necessary for the application of sociological analysis to the many relevant and vital problems of contemporary society.

SCIENCE AS A VOCATION *

Max Weber

. . In our time, the internal situation, in contrast to the organization of science as a vocation, is first of all conditioned by the facts that science has entered a phase of specialization previously unknown and that this will forever remain the case. Not only externally, but inwardly, matters stand at a point where the individual can acquire the sure consciousness of achieving something truly perfect in the field of science only in case he is a strict specialist.

All work that overlaps neighboring fields, such as we occasionally undertake and which the sociologists must necessarily undertake again and again, is burdened with the resigned realization that at best one provides the specialist with useful questions upon which he would not so easily hit from his own specialized point of view. One's own work must inevitably remain highly imperfect. Only by strict specialization can the scientific worker become fully conscious, for once and perhaps never again in his lifetime, that he has achieved something that will endure. A really definitive and good accomplishment is today always a specialized accomplishment. And whoever lacks the capacity to put on blinders, so to speak, and to come up to the idea that the fate of his soul depends upon whether or not he makes the correct conjecture at this passage of this manuscript may as well stay away from science. He will never have what one may call the 'personal experience' of science. Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider, without this passion, this 'thousands of years must pass before you enter into life and thousands more wait in silence'—according to whether or not you succeed in making this conjecture, without this, you have *no* calling for science and you should do something else. For nothing is worthy of man as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion.

Yet it is a fact that no amount of such enthusiasm, however sincere and profound it may be, can compel a problem to yield scientific results. Certainly enthusiasm is a prerequisite of the 'inspiration' which is decisive. Nowadays in circles of youth there is a widespread notion that science has become a problem in calculation, fabricated in laboratories or statistical filing systems just as 'in a factory,' a calculation involving only the cool intellect and not one's 'heart and soul.' First of all one must say that such comments lack all clarity about what goes on in a factory or in a laboratory. In both some idea has to occur to someone's

* From *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and tr. by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. Copyright 1946, by Oxford University Press, New York.

mind, and it has to be a correct idea, if one is to accomplish anything worthwhile. And such intuition cannot be forced. It has nothing to do with any cold calculation Certainly calculation is also an indispensable prerequisite No sociologist, for instance, should think himself too good, even in his old age, to make tens of thousands of quite trivial computations in his head and perhaps for months at a time. One cannot with impunity try to transfer this task entirely to mechanical assistants if one wishes to figure something, even though the final result is often small indeed. But if no 'idea' occurs to his mind about the direction of his computations and, during his computations, about the bearing of the emergent single results, then even this small result will not be yielded.

Normally such an 'idea' is prepared only on the soil of very hard work, but certainly this is not always the case. Scientifically, a dilettante's idea may have the very same or even a greater bearing for science than that of a specialist Many of our very best hypotheses and insights are due precisely to dilettantes The dilettante differs from the expert, as Helmholtz has said of Robert Mayer, only in that he lacks a firm and reliable work procedure Consequently he is usually not in the position to control, to estimate, or to exploit the idea in its bearings The idea is not a substitute for work, and work, in turn, cannot substitute for or compel an idea, just as little as enthusiasm can. Both, enthusiasm and work, and above all both of them *jointly,* can entice the idea.

Ideas occur to us when they please, not when it pleases us. The best ideas do indeed occur to one's mind in the way in which Ihering describes it· when smoking a cigar on the sofa; or as Helmholtz states of himself with scientific exactitude when taking a walk on a slowly ascending street, or in a similar way. In any case, ideas come when we do not expect them, and not when we are brooding and searching at our desks. Yet ideas would certainly not come to mind had we not brooded at our desks and searched for answers with passionate devotion.

However this may be, the scientific worker has to take into his bargain the risk that enters into all scientific work Does an 'idea' occur or does it not? He may be an excellent worker and yet never have had any valuable idea of his own It is a grave error to believe that this is so only in science, and that things for instance in a business office are different from a laboratory. A merchant or a big industrialist without 'business imagination,' that is, without ideas or ideal intuitions, will for all his life remain a man who would better have remained a clerk or a technical official He will never be truly creative in organization. Inspiration in the field of science by no means plays any greater role, as academic conceit fancies, than it does in the field of mastering problems of practical life by a modern entrepreneur On the other hand, and this also is often misconstrued, inspiration plays no less a role in science than it does in the realm of art. It is a childish notion to think that a mathematician attains any scientifically valuable results by sitting at his desk with a ruler, calculating machines or other mechanical means The mathematical imagination of a Weierstrass is naturally quite differently oriented in meaning and result than is the imagination of an artist, and differs basically in quality. But the psychological processes do not differ Both are frenzy (in the sense of Plato's 'mania') and 'inspiration.' . . .

In contrast with these preconditions which scientific work shares with art, science has a fate that profoundly distin

guishes it from artistic work. Scientific work is chained to the course of progress; whereas in the realm of art there is no progress in the same sense. It is not true that the work of art of a period that has worked out new technical means, or, for instance, the laws of perspective, stands therefore artistically higher than a work of art devoid of all knowledge of those means and laws — if its form does justice to the material, that is, if its object has been chosen and formed so that it could be artistically mastered without applying those conditions and means A work of art which is genuine 'fulfilment' is never surpassed; it will never be antiquated Individuals may differ in appreciating the personal significance of works of art, but no one will ever be able to say of such a work that it is 'outstripped' by another work which is also 'fulfilment'

In science, each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be antiquated in ten, twenty, fifty years That is the fate to which science is subjected, it is the very *meaning* of scientific work, to which it is devoted in a quite specific sense, as compared with other spheres of culture for which in general the same holds Every scientific 'fulfilment' raises new 'questions', it *asks* to be 'surpassed' and outdated Whoever wishes to serve science has to resign himself to this fact Scientific works certainly can last as 'gratifications' because of their artistic quality, or they may remain important as a means of training Yet they will be surpassed scientifically — let that be repeated — for it is our common fate and, more, our common goal We cannot work without hoping that others will advance further than we have In principle, this progress goes on *ad infinitum* And with this we come to inquire into the *meaning* of science For, after all, it is not self-evident that something subordinate to such a law is sensible and meaningful in itself Why does one engage in doing something that in reality never comes, and never can come, to an end?

One does it, first, for purely practical, in the broader sense of the word, for technical, purposes. In order to be able to orient our practical activities to the expectations that scientific experience places at our disposal Good. Yet this has meaning only to practitioners. What is the attitude of the academic man towards his vocation — that is, if he is at all in quest of such a personal attitude? He maintains that he engages in 'science for science's sake' and not merely because others, by exploiting science, bring about commercial or technical success and can better feed, dress, illuminate, and govern. But what does he who allows himself to be integrated into this specialized organization, running on *ad infinitum*, hope to accomplish that is significant in these productions that are always destined to be outdated? This question requires a few general considerations

Scientific progress is a fraction, the most important fraction, of the process of intellectualization which we have been undergoing for thousands of years and which nowadays is usually judged in such an extremely negative way Let us first clarify what this intellectualist rationalization, created by science and by scientifically oriented technology, means practically

Does it mean that we, today, for instance, everyone sitting in this hall, have a greater knowledge of the conditions of life under which we exist than has an American Indian or a Hottentot? Hardly Unless he is a physicist, one who rides on the streetcar has no idea how the car happened to get into motion And he does not need to know. He is satisfied that he may 'count' on the behavior of the streetcar, and he orients his conduct according to this expectation, but he

knows nothing about what it takes to produce such a car so that it can move. The savage knows incomparably more about his tools. When we spend money today I bet that even if there are colleagues of political economy here in the hall, almost every one of them will hold a different answer in readiness to the question How does it happen that one can buy something for money — sometimes more and sometimes less? The savage knows what he does in order to get his daily food and which institutions serve him in this pursuit The increasing intellectualization and rationalization do *not,* therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives.

It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one but wished one *could* learn it at any time Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation This means that the world is disenchanted One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed Technical means and calculations perform the service This above all is what intellectualization means. . . .

What stand should one take? Has 'progress' as such a recognizable meaning that goes beyond the technical, so that to serve it is a meaningful vocation? The question must be raised But this is no longer merely the question of man's calling *for* science, hence, the problem of what science as a vocation means to its devoted disciples To raise this question is to ask for the vocation of science within the total life of humanity. What is the value of science?

Here the contrast between the past and the present is tremendous. You will recall the wonderful image at the beginning of the seventh book of Plato's *Republic:* those enchained cavemen whose faces are turned toward the stone wall before them Behind them lies the source of the light which they cannot see They are concerned only with the shadowy images that this light throws upon the wall, and they seek to fathom their interrelations Finally one of them succeeds in shattering his fetters, turns around, and sees the sun Blinded, he gropes about and stammers of what he saw The others say he is raving But gradually he learns to behold the light, and then his task is to descend to the cavemen and to lead them to the light He is the philosopher, the sun, however, is the truth of science, which alone seizes not upon illusions and shadows but upon the true being

Well, who today views science in such a manner? Today youth feels rather the reverse: the intellectual constructions of science constitute an unreal realm of artificial abstractions, which with their bony hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it But here in life, in what for Plato was the play of shadows on the walls of the cave, genuine reality is pulsating, and the rest are derivatives of life, lifeless ghosts, and nothing else How did this change come about?

Plato's passionate enthusiasm in *The Republic* must, in the last analysis, be explained by the fact that for the first time the *concept,* one of the great tools of all scientific knowledge, had been consciously discovered Socrates had discovered it in its bearing He was not the only man in the world to discover it In India one finds the beginnings of a logic that is quite similar to that of Aristotle's But nowhere else do we find this realization of the significance of the concept In

Greece, for the first time, appeared a handy means by which one could put the logical screws upon somebody so that he could not come out without admitting either that he knew nothing or that this and nothing else was truth, the *eternal* truth that never would vanish as the doings of the blind men vanish. That was the tremendous experience which dawned upon the disciples of Socrates. And from this it seemed to follow that if one only found the right concept of the beautiful, the good, or, for instance of bravery, of the soul — or whatever — that then one could also grasp its true being. And this, in turn, seemed to open the way for knowing and for teaching how to act rightly in life and, above all, how to act as a citizen of the state, for this question was everything to the Hellenic man, whose thinking was political throughout. And for these reasons one engaged in science.

The second great tool of scientific work, the rational experiment, made its appearance at the side of this discovery of the Hellenic spirit during the Renaissance period. The experiment is a means of reliably controlling experience. Without it, present-day empirical science would be impossible. There were experiments earlier, for instance, in India, physiological experiments were made in the service of ascetic yoga technique, in Hellenic antiquity, mathematical experiments were made for purposes of war technology, and in the Middle Ages, for purposes of mining. But to raise the experiment to a principle of research was the achievement of the Renaissance. They were the great innovators in *art*, who were the pioneers of experiment. Leonardo and his like and, above all, the sixteenth-century experimenters in music with their experimental pianos were characteristic. From these circles the experiment entered science, especially through Galileo, and it entered theory through Bacon, and then it was taken over by the various exact disciplines of the continental universities, first of all those of Italy and then those of the Netherlands.

What did science mean to these men who stood at the threshold of modern times? To artistic experimenters of the type of Leonardo and the musical innovators, science meant the path to *true* art, and that meant for them the path to true *nature*. Art was to be raised to the rank of a science, and this meant at the same time and above all to raise the artist to the rank of the doctor, socially and with reference to the meaning of his life. This is the ambition on which, for instance, Leonardo's sketch book was based. And today? 'Science as the way to nature' would sound like blasphemy to youth. Today, youth proclaims the opposite redemption from the intellectualism of science in order to return to one's own nature and therewith to nature in general. Science as a way to art? Here no criticism is even needed.

Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions — the 'way to true being,' the 'way to true art,' the 'way to true nature,' the 'way to true God,' the 'way to true happiness' — have been dispelled? Tolstoi has given the simplest answer, with the words: 'Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only question important for us: "What shall we do and how shall we live?"' That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives 'no' answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly.

Today one usually speaks of science as 'free from presuppositions.' Is there such a thing? It depends upon what one

understands thereby. All scientific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method are valid, these are the general foundations of our orientation in the world; and, at least for our special question, these presuppositions are the least problematic aspect of science Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is 'worth being known' In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means It can only be *interpreted* with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position towards life.

Furthermore, the nature of the relationship of scientific work and its presuppositions varies widely according to their structure The natural sciences, for instance, physics, chemistry, and astronomy, presuppose as self-evident that it is worth while to know the ultimate laws of cosmic events as far as science can construe them. This is the case not only because with such knowledge one can attain technical results but for its own sake, if the quest for such knowledge is to be a 'vocation' Yet this presupposition can by no means be proved And still less can it be proved that the existence of the world which these sciences describe is worth while, that it has any 'meaning,' or that it makes sense to live in such a world Science does not ask for the answers to such questions

Consider modern medicine, a practical technology which is highly developed scientifically The general 'presupposition' of the medical enterprise is stated trivially in the assertion that medical science has the task of maintaining life as such and of diminishing suffering as such to the greatest possible degree. Yet this is problematical. By his means the medical man preserves the life of the mortally ill man, even if the patient implores us to relieve him of life, even if his relatives, to whom his life is worthless and to whom the costs of maintaining his worthless life grow unbearable, grant his redemption from suffering. Perhaps a poor lunatic is involved, whose relatives, whether they admit it or not, wish and must wish for his death Yet the presuppositions of medicine, and the penal code, prevent the physician from relinquishing his therapeutic efforts Whether life is worth while living and when — this question is not asked by medicine Natural science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish to master life technically. It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and do wish to master life technically and whether it ultimately makes sense to do so.

Consider a discipline such as aesthetics The fact that there are works of art is given for aesthetics It seeks to find out under what conditions this fact exists, but it does not raise the question whether or not the realm of art is perhaps a realm of diabolical grandeur, a realm of this world, and therefore, in its core, hostile to God and, in its innermost and aristocratic spirit, hostile to the brotherhood of man Hence, aesthetics does not ask whether there *should* be works of art

Consider jurisprudence. It establishes what is valid according to the rules of juristic thought, which is partly bound by logically compelling and partly by conventionally given schemata Juridical thought holds when certain legal rules and certain methods of interpretations are recognized as binding Whether there should be law and whether one should establish just these rules — such questions jurisprudence does not answer It can only state If one wishes this result, according to the norms of our legal thought, this legal rule is the appropriate means of attaining it

Consider the historical and cultural sci-

ences. They teach us how to understand and interpret political, artistic, literary, and social phenomena in terms of their origins. But they give us no answer to the question, whether the existence of these cultural phenomena have been and are *worth while*. And they do not answer the further question, whether it is worth the effort required to know them They presuppose that there is an interest in partaking, through this procedure, of the community of 'civilized men' But they cannot prove 'scientifically' that this is the case, and that they presuppose this interest by no means proves that it goes without saying In fact it is not at all self-evident

Finally, let us consider the disciplines close to me sociology, history, economics, political science, and those types of cultural philosophy that make it their task to interpret these sciences. It is said, and I agree, that politics is out of place in the lecture-room It does not belong there on the part of the students If, for instance, in the lecture-room of my former colleague Dietrich Schafer in Berlin, pacifist students were to surround his desk and make an uproar, I should deplore it just as much as I should deplore the uproar which anti-pacifist students are said to have made against Professor Forster, whose views in many ways are as remote as could be from mine Neither does politics, however, belong in the lecture-room on the part of the docents, and when the docent is scientifically concerned with politics, it belongs there least of all

To take a practical political stand is one thing, and to analyze political structures and party positions is another When speaking in a political meeting about democracy, one does not hide one's personal standpoint, indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is one's damned duty The words one uses in such a meeting are not means of scientific analysis but means of canvassing votes and winning over others They are not plowshares to loosen the soil of contemplative thought; they are swords against the enemies. such words are weapons. It would be an outrage, however, to use words in this fashion in a lecture or in the lecture-room If, for instance, 'democracy' is under discussion, one considers its various forms, analyzes them in the way they function, determines what results for the conditions of life the one form has as compared with the other Then one confronts the forms of democracy with non-democratic forms of political order and endeavors to come to a position where the student may find the point from which, in terms of his ultimate ideals, he can take a stand But the true teacher will beware of imposing from the platform any political position upon the student, whether it is expressed or suggested 'To let the facts speak for themselves' is the most unfair way of putting over a political position to the student

Why should we abstain from doing this? I state in advance that some highly esteemed colleagues are of the opinion that it is not possible to carry through this self-restraint and that, even if it were possible, it would be a whim to avoid declaring oneself Now one cannot demonstrate scientifically what the duty of an academic teacher is One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the *value* of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations These are quite heterogeneous problems If he asks further why he should not deal with both types of problems in the lecture-room, the answer is because the prophet and the dem-

agogue do not belong on the academic platform

To the prophet and the demagogue, it is said, 'Go your ways out into the streets and speak openly to the world,' that is, speak where criticism is possible In the lecture-room we stand opposite our audience, and it has to remain silent. I deem it irresponsible to exploit the circumstance that for the sake of their career the students have to attend a teacher's course while there is nobody present to oppose him with criticism The task of the teacher is to serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to imprint upon them his personal political views It is certainly possible that the individual teacher will not entirely succeed in eliminating his personal sympathies He is then exposed to the sharpest criticism in the forum of his own conscience And this deficiency does not prove anything, other errors are also possible, for instance, erroneous statements of fact, and yet they prove nothing against the duty of searching for the truth. I also reject this in the very interest of science I am ready to prove from the works of our historians that whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgment, a full understanding of the facts *ceases* But this goes beyond tonight's topic and would require lengthy elucidation

I ask only How should a devout Catholic, on the one hand, and a Freemason, on the other, in a course of the forms of church and state or on religious history ever be brought to evaluate these subjects alike? This is out of the question And yet the academic teacher must desire and must demand of himself to serve the one as well as the other by his knowledge and methods Now you will rightly say that the devout Catholic will never accept the view of the factors operative in bringing about Christianity which a teacher who is free of his dogmatic presuppositions presents to him Certainly! The difference, however, lies in the following Science 'free from presuppositions,' in the sense of a rejection of religious bonds, does not know of the 'miracle' and the 'revelation.' If it did, science would be unfaithful to its own 'presuppositions' The believer knows both, miracle and revelation And science 'free from presuppositions' expects from him no less — and no more — than acknowledgment that *if* the process can be explained without those supernatural interventions, which an empirical explanation has to eliminate as causal factors, the process has to be explained the way science attempts to do And the believer can do this without being disloyal to his faith

But has the contribution of science no meaning at all for a man who does not care to know facts as such and to whom only the practical standpoint matters? Perhaps science nevertheless contributes something

The primary task of a useful teacher is to teach his students to recognize 'inconvenient' facts — I mean facts that are inconvenient for their party opinions And for every party opinion there are facts that are extremely inconvenient, for my own opinion no less than for others I believe the teacher accomplishes more than a mere intellectual task if he compels his audience to accustom itself to the existence of such facts I would be so immodest as even to apply the expression 'moral achievement,' though perhaps this may sound too grandiose for something that should go without saying

Thus far I have spoken only of practical reasons for avoiding the imposition of a personal point of view But these are not the only reasons The impossibility of 'scientifically' pleading for practical and interested stands — except in discussing the means for a firmly given and presup-

posed end — rests upon reasons that lie far deeper

'Scientific' pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other The elder Mill, whose philosophy I will not praise otherwise, was on this point right when he said· If one proceeds from pure experience, one arrives at polytheism This is shallow in formulation and sounds paradoxical, and yet there is truth in it If anything, we realize again today that something can be sacred not only in spite of its not being beautiful, but rather because and in so far as it is not beautiful You will find this documented in the fifty-third chapter of the book of Isaiah and in the twenty-first Psalm. And, since Nietzsche, we realize that something can be beautiful, not only in spite of the aspect in which it is not good, but rather in that very aspect You will find this expressed earlier in the *Fleurs du mal,* as Baudelaire named his volume of poems It is commonplace to observe that something may be true although it is not beautiful and not holy and not good Indeed it may be true in precisely those aspects But all these are only the most elementary cases of the struggle that the gods of the various orders and values are engaged in I do not know how one might wish to decide 'scientifically' the value of French and German culture, for here too, different gods struggle with one another, now and for all times to come

But enough of these questions which lead far away Those of our youth are in error who react to all this by saying, 'Yes, but we happen to come to lectures in order to experience something more than mere analyses and statements of fact' The error is that they seek in the professor something different from what stands before them They crave a leader and not a teacher But we are placed upon the plattorm solely as teachers And these are two different things, as one can readily see . .

Finally, you will put the question 'If this is so, what then does science actually and positively contribute to practical and personal "life"?' Therewith we are back again at the problem of science as a 'vocation.'

First, of course, science contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculating external objects as well as man's activities Well, you will say, that, after all, amounts to no more than the greengrocer of the American boy I fully agree

Second, science can contribute something that the greengrocer cannot methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought Perhaps you will say well, that is no vegetable, but it amounts to no more than the means for procuring vegetables Well and good, let us leave it at that for today

Fortunately, however, the contribution of science does not reach its limit with this We are in a position to help you to a third objective, to gain *clarity* Of course, it is presupposed that we ourselves possess clarity As far as this is the case, we can make clear to you the following

In practice, you can take this or that position when concerned with a problem of value — for simplicity's sake, please think of social phenomena as examples *If* you take such and such a stand, then, according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a *means* in order to carry out your conviction practically Now, these means are perhaps such that you believe you must reject them Then you simply must choose between the end and the inevitable means Does the end 'justify' the means? Or does it not? The teacher can confront you with the neces-

sity of this choice. He cannot do more, so long as he wishes to remain a teacher and not to become a demagogue He can, of course, also tell you that if you want such and such an end, then you must take into the bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all experience will occur Again we find ourselves in the same situation as before. These are still problems that can also emerge for the technician, who in numerous instances has to make decisions according to the principle of the lesser evil or of the relatively best Only to him one thing, the main thing, is usually given, namely, the end *But as soon as truly 'ultimate' problems are at stake for us this is not the case With this, at long last, we come to the final service that science as such can render to the aim of clarity, and at the same time we come to the limits of science*

Besides we can and we should state. In terms of its meaning, such and such a practical stand can be derived with inner consistency, and hence integrity, from this or that ultimate *weltanschauliche* position Perhaps it can only be derived from one such fundamental position, or maybe from several, but it cannot be derived from these or those other positions Figuratively speaking, you serve this god and you offend the other god when you decide to adhere to this position And if you remain faithful to yourself, you will necessarily come to certain final conclusions that subjectively make sense This much, in principle at least, can be accomplished Philosophy, as a special discipline, and the essentially philosophical discussions of principles in the other sciences attempt to achieve this Thus, if we are competent in our pursuit (which must be presupposed here) we can force the individual, or at least we can help him, to give himself an ***account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct.*** This appears to me as not so trifling a thing to do, even for one's own personal life Again, I am tempted to say of a teacher who succeeds in this· he stands in the service of 'moral' forces, he fulfils the duty of bringing about self-clarification and a sense of responsibility. And I believe he will be the more able to accomplish this, the more conscientiously he avoids the desire personally to impose upon or suggest to his audience his own stand

This proposition, which I present here, always takes its point of departure from the one fundamental fact, that so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted *in its own terms, it knows only of an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are* irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice Whether, under such conditions, science is a worthwhile 'vocation' for somebody, and whether science itself has an objectively valuable 'vocation' are again value judgments about which nothing can be said in the lecture-room To affirm the value of science is a presupposition for teaching there I personally by my very work answer in the affirmative, and I also do so from precisely the standpoint that hates intellectualism as the worst devil, as youth does today, or usually only fancies it does In that case the word holds for these youths 'Mind you, the devil is old, grow old to understand him' This does not mean age in the sense of the birth certificate It means that if one wishes to settle with this devil, one must not take to flight before him as so many like to do nowadays First of all, one has to see the devil's ways to the end in order to realize his power and his limitations

Science today is a 'vocation' organized in special disciplines in the service of self-

clarification and knowledge of interrelated facts. It is not the gift of grace of seers and prophets dispensing sacred values and revelations, nor does it partake of the contemplation of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe. This, to be sure, is the inescapable condition of our historical situation. We cannot evade it so long as we remain true to ourselves. And if Tolstoi's question recurs to you as science does not, who is to answer the question 'What shall we do, and, how shall we arrange our lives?' or, in the words used here tonight 'Which of the warring gods should we serve? Or should we serve perhaps an entirely different god, and who is he?' then one can say *that only a prophet or a savior can give the answers. If there is no such man, or if his message is no longer believed in, then you will certainly not compel him* to appear on this earth by having thousands of professors, as privileged hirelings of the state, attempt as petty prophets in their lecture-rooms to take over his role. All they will accomplish is to show that they are unaware of the decisive state of affairs: the prophet for whom so many of our younger generation yearn simply does not exist. But this knowledge in its forceful significance has never become vital for them. The inward interest of a truly religiously 'musical' man can never be served by veiling to him and to others the fundamental fact that he is destined to live in a godless and prophetless time, by giving him the *ersatz* of armchair prophecy. The integrity of his religious organ, it seems to me, must rebel against this.

The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.' Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental, nor is it accidental that today only within the smallest and intimate circles, in personal human situations, in *pianissimo*, that something is pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic *pneuma*, which in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together. If we attempt to force and to 'invent' a monumental style in art, such miserable monstrosities are produced as the many monuments of the last twenty years. If one tries intellectually to construe new religions without a new and genuine prophecy, then, in an inner sense, *something similar will result, but with still worse effects. And academic prophecy, finally, will create only fanatical sects but never a genuine community.*

To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him. After all, they do not make it hard for him. One way or another he has to bring his 'intellectual sacrifice'—that is inevitable. If he can really do it, we shall not rebuke him. For such an intellectual sacrifice in favor of an unconditional religious devotion is ethically quite a different matter than the evasion of the plain duty of intellectual integrity, which sets in if one lacks the courage to clarify one's own ultimate standpoint and rather facilitates this duty by feeble relative judgments. In my eyes, such religious return stands higher than the academic prophecy, which does not clearly realize that in the lecture-rooms of the university no other virtue holds but plain intellectual integrity. Integrity, however, compels us to state that for the many who today tarry for new prophets and saviors,

the situation is the same as resounds in the beautiful Edomite watchman's song of the period of exile that has been included among Isaiah's oracles:

'He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? The watchman said, The morning cometh, and also the night if ye will enquire, enquire ye return, come'

The people to whom this was said has enquired and tarried for more than two millennia, and we are shaken when we realize its fate From this we want to draw the lesson that nothing is gained by yearning and tarrying alone, and we shall act differently. We shall set to work and meet the 'demands of the day,' in human relations as well as in our vocation This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life.

SOCIOLOGY AMONG THE SOCIAL SCIENCES *

Pitirim A. Sorokin

I GENERALIZING AND INDIVIDUALIZING SCIENCES

The superorganic or sociocultural universe is studied by all the social and humanistic disciplines The question arises, therefore, how sociology differs from economics, politics, history, psychology, and other social sciences Though in a deeper sense all scientific disciplines make one indivisible science, for practical purposes a division of labor requires specialization in each discipline Physics differs from chemistry and both from biology, though the boundary lines between them are relative and overlapping Physical mechanics overlaps with geometry and mathematics, both overlap with chemistry, and all three with biology, giving us organic chemistry and mathematical physics. The difference between sociology and the other social disciplines is also relative; nevertheless, they are as distinct as physics, chemistry, and biology

Within the great team of social and humanistic disciplines that deal with the superorganic world, sociology has its own distinctive tasks and performs its functions in a manner tangibly different from that of other members of the team First, in contradistinction to history and other *individualizing* sciences, sociology is a *generalizing* science Whereas history concentrates its attention upon the study of the sociocultural phenomena that are unique and unrepeated in time and space (the United States as a distinctive nation, Christianity as a unique religion, Abraham Lincoln as a particular man, the Thirty Years' War as dissimilar from all other wars), sociology studies the properties of the superorganic that are repeated in time and space, that is to say, those common to all sociocultural phenomena (general sociology) or else to all varieties of a given class of sociocultural phenomena — to all wars, all nations, all revolu-

* P A Sorokin, *Society, Culture, and Personality,* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947, pp 6–18. Reprinted by permission of the publisher

tions, all religions, etc (special sociologies). By virtue of this generalizing quality sociology differs profoundly from history and other individualizing humanistic disciplines [1]

2. CONTRAST WITH OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES

In no less degree does the task of sociology differ from that of such generalizing social sciences as economics, political science, and the science of law Economics too is a generalizing science, in that it seeks to discover and formulate the properties, relationships, and uniformities that are repeated in time and space and are common either to all economic phenomena (such as the laws of demand and supply or of marginal utility, in general economics), or to all economic phenomena of a certain class (like Gresham's law in the special economics of money, the law of diminishing returns in the special economics of agriculture, and so on) The same can be said, with proper modifications, of any other generalizing social science

Sociology differs from such disciplines in several ways In the first place, each of these sciences deals with only one compartment of the sociocultural universe, economics with the economic compartment, politics with the political compartment Sociology deals, along its special lines, with all compartments of that universe. For instance economics studies business organizations as a variety of society, political science analyzes the state as a specific kind of society, the science of religion investigates the church as a special form of society General sociology, on the other hand, is concerned with society as a genus, with the properties and relationships that are found in any society, be it a business firm, a church, a state, a club, the family, or anything else. To take another example. Economics deals with business cycles and fluctuations; political science studies cycles and fluctuations in political life. Sociology sees cycles and fluctuations as generic social phenomena appearing in practically all social processes economic, political, artistic, religious, philosophical, and their interconnections with one another The same is true of such social processes as competition and exploitation, domination and subordination, stratification and differentiation, solidarity and antagonism, and so forth Each of these processes appears not only in single compartments of the superorganic but in practically all compartments of sociocultural life, and as such requires a study of its generic form and of the connections which each special form bears to the other special forms of the same process Such a study transcends the boundary lines of any compartmentalized discipline It demands a special science that deals with the generic form of all these phenomena and with the interrelations of all the main varieties with one another This task has been performed by sociology Schematically this may be expressed as follows Let the designated classes of social phenomena consist of the following elements and relationships

economic *a, b, c, n, m, f*
political *a, b, c, h, d, f, j*
religious *a, b, c, g, t, q*
and so on

Granting that all the other varieties of sociocultural phenomena have the same common elements and relationships, *a, b, c* — and since they all belong to the same genus of sociocultural phenomena they cannot help having them — a study of these common elements *a, b, c,* would

[1] On the profound difference between the generalizing and the individualizing sciences see H Rickert *Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* (Tubingen 1902) A Xenopol, *La théorie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1908), A Tschuprioff, *Essays in the Theory of Statistics* (St Petersburg, 1909)

comprise the first task of sociology On the other hand, an investigation of how the noncommon elements, for instance, *n, h, g,* are connected with one another — how, for instance, business cycles are related to cycles in the movement of criminality, scientific theories, suicide, artistic tastes, revolutions, etc. — this constitutes its second main task. Neither of these tasks is discharged by any of the compartmentalized social sciences, nor do either of them logically belong to such a science. They comprise the specific domain of sociology

Along with this deep difference between the tasks of sociology and those of the other generalizing social sciences stands the important difference in their fundamental presuppositions concerning the *nature of man and the interrelations of social phenomena* The compartmentalized character of economics forces it to postulate *homo economics* — the purely economic creature controlled by economic self interest and utilitarian rationality, to the utter exclusion of noneconomic religious beliefs and nonutilitarian moral convictions, of antiegotistic altruism and profitless artistic values, of nonrational mores and irrational passions In conformity with this, economic phenomena are assumed to be entirely isolated from other sociocultural phenomena and undisturbed by religious, legal, political, artistic, or moral forces In a similar one sided manner have been conceived *homo politicus* in the political realm, *homo religiosus* in the religious sphere, and so on

In contradistinction to these presuppositions, *homo socius* of sociology is viewed as a generic and manifold *homo,* simultaneously and inseparably economic, political, religious, ethical, and artistic, partly rational and utilitarian, partly nonrational and even irrational, with all these aspects incessantly influencing one another Consequently each class of sociocultural phenomena is viewed by sociology as connected with all the other classes (with varying degrees of interdependence), as influenced by and affecting the rest of the sociocultural universe In this sense sociology studies man and the sociocultural universe as they really are, in all their manifoldness — as genuine wholes, in distinct contrast to the other sciences, which, for analytical purposes, view them artificially in merely one aspect, entirely isolated from the whole.

From these two fundamental differences follow several others that distinguish the essential principles and methods of sociology from those of other social sciences.

a Theories on Cause of Suicide. The preceding discussion indicates clearly the specific functions of sociology among the various social and humanistic disciplines, as well as the cognitive importance of these functions Without a discipline performing these functions — whether it is called sociology or abracadabra — no adequate knowledge of important sociocultural phenomena is possible Even such a minor phenomenon as suicide cannot be adequately understood, especially in its causes, without a study of its occurrence in man's sociocultural universe as a whole In order to demonstrate this, as well as the functions of sociology, in concrete form, let us pause for a concise analysis of suicide and its causes The phenomenon is dealt with by biology and medicine, psychiatry, psychology, history economics, political science, law, ethics, and other biological, social, and humanistic disciplines Each of these seeks the causes in its own particular field Biologists and physicians look for them in poor health and similar biological conditions, psychiatrists, in the field of mental disease and derangement, psychologists, in this or that painful experience, such as unrequited love, disillusionment, and fear of

scandal or punishment. Geographers seek the causes in climatic and other geographic conditions; economists, in economic factors, such as poverty, depression, and bankruptcy To a certain extent each of such theories is true But none is adequate, because none can account for the whole series of fundamental properties of suicide, such as the kind of persons involved, the frequency of its distribution among various societies, periods of increase and decrease, and so on

History cannot answer these questions at all, it merely describes unique or dissimilar occurrences of suicide among various historical persons. A description of the conditions under which Seneca opened his veins is not a causal analysis and does not even attempt to be one The recording of an unhappy love affair or of a mental disease does not give the cause, for millions of persons under similar conditions have not committed suicide The same is true of any special case of suicide studied in accordance with one of these disciplines A merely atomistic or singularistic study of this or that case does not unravel its cause, for we lack the inductive conditions needed to put our finger on the real cause among hundreds of variables Suicide has to be investigated as a phenomenon recurrent in various societies and periods As such it becomes not a special case but a general process or typical phenomenon exhibited by many societies at different times When it is treated thus, we obtain the data of its frequency in various groups and periods Possessing these data, we are in a position to test the special theories of the physicians, biologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, economists, and geographers The test proves that their theories contain at best only a small part of the truth, not the whole truth

Let us take, for example, an economic interpretation of suicide causation Hurlburt's study of suicide in the United States for the years 1902–1925 appears to support the economic causes of suicide The curve of business fluctuations and the curve of suicide in the United States for these years seem to synchronize fairly well, the periods of depression being marked by an increase in suicide and the periods of prosperity by its decrease

Similar results are obtained by L. I. Dublin and B Bunzel from data of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the years 1910–1931. The coefficient of correlation between the monthly business index and the monthly suicide index during the period 1910–1931 is relatively high, namely, — 47± 05 Krose, Morselli, Durkheim, and Halbwachs have noted a similar increase in suicide during periods of depression; Halbwachs summarizes a considerable set of data, showing a similar relationship between periods of depression and suicide in Prussia, Germany, Austria, and France In Austria the crash of 1872 was attended by an increase of about 50 per cent in the suicide rate In Prussia and Germany the curve of suicide from 1881 to 1913 moved inversely to that of prices and parallel with the number of bankruptcies and financial failures [1]

Though it may appear that suicide cycles are conditioned and sufficiently explained by economic causes, somewhat more rigorous analysis shows that such an explanation is only a partial truth. First, even in these data the association of suicide and poverty or financial stress is far from convincing None of these studies yields a high coefficient of correlation between the two phenomena Thus other factors and conditions are needed to ac-

[1] W C Hurlburt, "Prosperity, Depression, and the Suicide Rate" *AJS* Vol XXXVII (1932) p 715 f L Dublin and B Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be* (New York 1933), p 102

[2] See M Halbwachs *Les Causes du suicide* (Paris 1930), pp 355–374, and other data there

count for the fluctuations of the suicide curve. Second, if economic causes were indeed the main factor of suicide, we should expect that suicide would tend to decrease in a given country, with an increase of economic well-being. The actual situation is quite otherwise. In almost all European countries real wages and the standard of living rose 200 to 300 per cent or more during the nineteenth century, especially during the second half. Yet the suicide curve in almost all these countries failed to decrease; indeed, it actually increased during that period. During the last sixty or seventy years the rate of suicide per 10,000 population has risen in Italy from 2.8 to 8.3; in France from 7 1 to 23; in England from 7.3 to 11; in Prussia from 10.6 to 20 5; in the United States from 3.18 (in 1860) to 11 9 (in 1922) In Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Germany alone it either failed to increase or else moved erratically.[4] In all these countries the standard of living improved notably from around 1840 to 1914

Such a relationship shows at once that the long-time trend of suicide is not accounted for by the economic factors of poverty and prosperity. The same conclusion appears when we examine the distribution and frequency of suicide by countries and regions Many agricultural countries, such as the Balkan States or Russia in the nineteenth century, have been poorer than many western industrial nations

[4] See the data E Ferri, "A Century of Homicides and Suicides in Europe," *Bulletin de l'Institut International de statistique,* Vol XXII, 3-a Livraison, 433 ff , W A Bunger, "Le suicide comme phenomène social," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie,* XVI (1936), pp 332–333 P A Sorokin and C Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (New York, 1929), p 179 For other data see the quoted works of Halbwachs, Dublin and Bunzel, and the literature given in these works. These rates may be uncorrected, but the correction does not change the result

And yet the suicide rate in these poorer countries has been lower than in the more prosperous ones. In the Middle Ages, Europe was poorer economically than in the nineteenth or twentieth century; yet the suicide rate of medieval Europe seems to have been very low. Furthermore, if economic prosperity were the main inhibiting factor and poverty the main cause, we should expect that poor people would regularly show a higher rate of suicide than rich people Yet the data present a very different picture. If anything, the well-to-do, especially the very rich, tend to exhibit a higher rate than the poor.[5]

These observations are sufficient to show that economic factors alone cannot explain either the distribution of suicide or its main trends and fluctuations. They explain some of its minor fluctuations, in certain periods and in certain countries (mainly industrialized and economically minded), but that is all [6]

Any theory that tries to account for the phenomenon with reference to one special factor, without due regard to the given society and culture as a whole, is equally fallacious However convincing at

[5] See the data by occupational economic classes in Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles,* Ch 7, Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology,* Ch. 3, pp 116–121, 178–179 (Minneapolis, 1932) See other data in the quoted works of Halbwachs, Bunger, Dublin and Bunzel, Durkheim, Krose, and others

[6] Though even in these minor fluctuations the causative role is due not exactly to the economic factors is such but to the social disorganization in which the depressions, bankruptcies, and sharp economic changes are one of the manifestations, and to the subsequent psychosocial isolation that follows such a disorganization This is supported by the fact that not only a sharp depression but a sudden economic prosperity is often followed by an increase of suicide On the other hand, when a sharp economic change (in either direction) does not mean social disorganization and does not lead to psychosocial isolation of individuals it does not produce an increase of suicide

first glance may be an attempted explanation of suicide in terms of physiographical factors such as the climate and the seasons, a more thorough analysis of the phenomena shows that neither the climate nor the change of season nor longitude and latitude are the real causes of social phenomena. Suicide has a fairly uniform seasonal fluctuation that reaches its maximum in May or June in the European countries, but the reason for the increase during these months is not their weather or temperature but the intensity of social life and social conflicts If the suicide curve falls to its minimum during July, August, and September, the reason again is not the climate or other physiographical factors but the relaxation of social life (vacations, etc) and a decrease in the social factors in suicide [7] Although the climate and other geographic factors may be contributing agencies, they are not the basic factors, and in no way do they explain the distribution of suicide in space or its fluctuation in time

The theories of physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists contain the same fault For a long time these men have tried to explain suicide as illness, attributing it to mental disease, disorder, or abnormality. "Suicide is always a malady and an act of mental alienation" So runs the formula [8] The principal arguments in favor of such theories are the supposedly high percentage of the mentally abnormal among the persons who commit suicide (in some cases alleged to reach almost 100 per cent), the parallel movement of suicide and mental disease, and the like. Although it is true that some of the data cited are unquestionable, the interpretation of these facts by the theory is doubtful, its claims are enormously exaggerated, and the greater part of the evidence is fallacious.

(1) The percentage of the mentally abnormal among the victims of suicide has in most cases been enormously exaggerated As the respective studies have been made more accurate, the earlier figures on the mentally abnormal have tended to decrease to as low a proportion as 10 per cent or even less.[9] (2) The nature of many a mental disease is still vague and does not lend itself to definite diagnosis. Hence a wide margin of uncertainty exists even in cases which are supposedly diagnosed as mental abnormality Not infrequently the very fact that a person has committed suicide induces an automatic diagnosis of abnormality (3) What mental state is or is not abnormal depends, with a few exceptions (such as idiocy), upon sociocultural conditions In this sense it is conditional and cannot be diagnosed in a psychiatrist's laboratory, rather it depends upon the prevalent social norms Mental processes regarded by psychiatrists as abnormal, may by various societies be considered normal — even brilliant, virtuous, saintly, inspired, or heroic. In the opinion of many psychiatrists, most of the saints and mystics of the Middle Ages were abnormal or diseased, whereas

[7] About the cosmic theories of suicide see H Morselli, *Suicide* (English tr New York, 1882), Dublin and Bunzel, *op cit*, Ch 7, J R Miner, "Suicide and Its Relation to Climatic and Other Factors," *American Journal of Hygiene*, Monographic Series No 2 (July 1922) For an excellent criticism of this interpretation see E Durkheim, *Le Suicide* Ch 3 (Paris, 1912), M Halbwachs *op cit*, Ch 4–6

[8] Bourdin, *Du suicide considéré comme maladie* (Paris, 1845), p 9 For theories of the prevalent attitude of society toward suicide see A Bayet, *Le Suicide et la morale* (Paris, 1922) Contemporary psychiatric theories are summarized in Dublin and Bunzel, Ch 22, and in Halbwachs, pp 375 ff

[9] See the data in M Halbwach's work, quoted, Ch 13, S J Krose, *Die Ursachen der Selbstmordhaufigkeit* (Freiburg, 1906) also his "Die Selbstmorde, 1893–1908" in *Vierteljahrhefte zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, Vol I (1910), p 108, Dublin and Bunzel, *op cit*, Ch 22

in the Middle Ages they were regarded as saintly or gifted, and as such were highly esteemed.[10] In view of this relativity there is reason to question the claims that such phenomena as melancholic depression, suicidal obsession, hysteria, chronic delirium, superexcitability, or even so-called insanity are necessarily forms of mental disease, for the proper standard of reference cannot be a norm per se but must be the norm of a particular culture. If a certain percentage of those who commit suicide display these traits, this does not necessarily mean that they are mentally deranged.[11] This also explains the supposedly high percentage of the mentally abnormal in those who commit suicide. (4) It does not follow from the possession of certain mental abnormalities that they are the cause of suicide. Mental diseases are often acquired rather than inherited, they result from the particular social conditions in which the victim happens to be placed. In many cases social conditions (A) generate simultaneously an increase of mental abnormality, such as melancholic depression (B), and the suicidal tendency (C). In such cases *B* is not the cause of *C*, but both *B* and *C* are effects of the common cause *A* (the given social conditions). Careful study reveals in many cases a relationship of this kind, but does not support the oversimplified interpretation characteristic of the psychiatrist's theory. (5) Decisive evidence derived from actual observation clearly contradicts the psychiatrist's theory in its exaggerated forms. The studies of Durkheim, Halbwachs, Krose, and others indicate that the countries, regions, or classes which show a higher rate of mental disease do not exhibit a higher rate of suicide, and vice versa. The relationship between these two phenomena displays no positive correlation or association. Likewise, the dynamic movement of the two curves through a period of time does not yield a concomitant variation. In most European countries both suicide and mental disease have tended to increase during the last eighty or ninety years, but their growth has been neither parallel nor mutually consistent. Furthermore, judged by the norms of psychiatry, the population of the Middle Ages was mentally more abnormal (as suggested by the waves of mental "epidemics," flagellation, mysticism, ecstasy, mass hysteria, etc.) than today's population. Yet there is no reason to believe that suicide in the Middle Ages was more frequent than now, indeed, it is reasonably certain that its rate was lower than in the nineteenth or twentieth century. Such facts disprove the exaggerated claims of psychiatric theories and show their inability to account for the essential traits of suicide, its distribution in society, or its fluctuation in time.[12]

The foregoing criticism of the psychiatric theory is applicable also, with slight changes, to the medical theories of suicide (bad health, poor sanitary conditions, and the like). We have no reason to suppose that the health of the contemporary population of the West is poorer than was that of the population of the Middle Ages. Yet

[10] For what is and what is not mental disease, and the dependence of diagnosis upon social conditions, — see the studies of A. L. Kroeber and the Shermans in A. Bentley, *Mental Disease* (New York, 1934), R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, 1934), Chs. 1–2.

[11] According to the prevalent norms of contemporary psychiatry, ideal mental health seems to be complete mental mediocrity, intellectually neither too bright nor too dull, fairly emotional, but not too emotional, etc. Most men of genius — great poets (with their Bohemian habits of intemperance), artists, mystics, founders of religions, and the like — would appear to be insane, mentally unbalanced, or abnormal. This shows the relativity of the psychiatric norms of mental health and abnormality.

[12] See data and criticism of the theory in Durkheim, *op. cit.*, Ch. 1, Halbwachs, *op. cit.*, Ch. 13.

the suicide rate has been higher in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than in the Middle Ages. Again, we are not justified in assuming that the health of Europeans or Americans at the end of the nineteenth century and during the prewar years of the twentieth century was poorer than in the years 1700–1850. At least, medical science enthusiastically asserts the progressive improvement of health, the decrease of mortality and morbidity, and the increasing duration of life in the course of the last hundred years If this is so, then an increase in the rate of suicide among this population clearly contradicts the theory of poor health as the cause of suicide. Furthermore, there is little warrant for believing that the health of the English or Germans is poorer than that of the Spanish or Italians Yet since the close of the nineteenth century the first two nations have shown a notably higher rate of suicide than the second two [13]

b. Durkheim's Explanation of Suicide. These considerations indicate that no causal theories of suicide which ignore social organization and cultural patterns can account for its essential factors. What, then, does account for its distribution in space and fluctuations in time? Durkheim seems to have answered the problem satisfactorily, at least approximately so The essence of his theory consists in regarding the total character of the respective society and culture as the cause of suicide When the entire network of social relationships is well integrated, when there is a high degree of social cohesion, people feel themselves to be vital parts of the society to which they belong and are free from a sense of psychosocial isolation or loneliness or of being "forgotten persons" Such a type of organization exerts a powerful inhibiting effect upon the tendency to commit suicide. The culture of such a society operates in the same direction Since the society is integrated, and since its unity is felt by its members, its culture is also unified Its values are accepted and cherished by all its members, being regarded as superindividual, universal, unchallengeable, and sacrosanct. Such a culture discourages suicide and becomes a potent antisuicidal factor Conversely, a society with a low degree of cohesiveness, its members being loosely attached to one another and to the group, with a confused network of social norms, with its cultural values "atomized," "relativized," devoid of universal acceptance, and a matter of mere personal preference —such a society is a potent generator of suicide, regardless of climatic conditions or the economic, psychiatric, and health conditions of its members Such is the essence of the hypothesis It views a given society and culture as a whole and endeavors thus to account for the distribution of suicide in space and time.

What are the facts that corroborate the theory? They are so numerous and so relevant that they render it more adequate and valid than any other theory of suicide (1) The factors of sociocultural cohesion and psychosocial isolation explain why, in a given society, the divorced exhibit a higher rate of suicide than the single, and the single than the married; why childless families show a higher rate than families with children, and why the greater the number of children the lower the rate of suicide Divorced persons have been the most highly isolated psychosocially (especially in the past, when divorce was a scandal entailing social ostracism). The least isolated are families with many children, whose members are bound together by the closest of ties (2) In the light of this theory it is easily compre-

[13] See the comparative rates in the quoted works of Bunger, Ferri, Halbwachs, Sorokin and Zimmerman

hensible why the rural classes show a lower rate of suicide than the urban classes; (3) why among various occupations those which are better integrated show a lower rate than the less integrated and more individualistic occupational groups; (4) why the well-to-do reveal a higher rate than the poorer people, and why an especially high rate is typical of vagabonds and other persons without any occupation or permanent ties. (5) It explains why in countries where a communal and "familistic" type of organization is preserved (as in many predominantly agricultural, only slightly industrialized or urbanized countries) the suicide rate tends to be lower than in highly urbanized, industrialized, and "individualized" countries, even though the latter may be economically better off than the former.

(6) The factors of sociocultural cohesion and psychosocial isolation demonstrate why atheists and free-thinkers (that is, persons not bound by religious ties) show a higher rate of suicide than persons affiliated with the leading religious organizations; and why among the latter the Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and the Orthodox Jews reflect a lower rate than the more free-thinking and less dogmatic Protestants. (7) It explains why throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the suicide trend has increased in most European countries (8) It shows why with the onset of major social movements (whether a popular war, revolution, or reform) the curve of suicide suddenly drops as the sense of individuality gives place to that of joint membership in a common cause, and why it rises again at the close of the movement, when the sense of social oneness fades and psychosocial isolation reappears. (9) It shows why periods of sudden shattering of the network of social relationship, as during economic crises, are followed by an increase of suicide. (10) It shows why there is a higher rate of suicide among men than among women (11) It explains the annual or daily curve of suicide. (12) It explains why, even in contemporary society, the sick and the mentally diseased exhibit a somewhat higher percentage of suicide than normal persons; sickness and abnormality often accentuate the psychosocial isolation of such persons.[14]

These and many other traits of suicide — its distribution among various groups of the population and its fluctuation in time — are all comprehensible in the light of this theory To repeat without considering the whole character of a given social organization and culture we cannot understand its frequency distribution and its dynamic aspects. A specialized, or "atomistic," approach permits, at best, an understanding of fragmentary parts — never of the entire causation Hence the cognitive necessity of viewing society as a whole, which is the standpoint of sociology

3. LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPARTMENTALIZED DISCIPLINES

What has been said of the causation of suicide applies still more pertinently to the causation of crime, revolution, war, and practically all other sociocultural phenomena. Unless they are studied as *repeated* phenomena, viewed at the same time in the matrix of the *whole* of the respective society and culture, none of them can be adequately understood or their real causes discovered For instance, if one asks why criminality in the United States shows a higher rate than in certain other nations, what are the causes of the fluctua-

[14] See the data and analysis of this theory, in the quoted works of Durkheim, Halbwachs, Sorokin and Zimmerman, Krose, and others

tions of a specific crime or of all crimes, or why the severity of punishment for various crimes now increases and now decreases, none of these questions can be properly answered without a study of crime as a recurrent factor in the general structure of the society and culture in question It can be confidently asserted that no specialized causal theory of crime — biological, psychiatric, economic, geographic, ecological, educational — can adequately account for its frequency in various societies and groups, for its fluctuation in the course of time, for its prevalent types, or even explain why certain actions are regarded as criminal while others are not The inadequacy of such one-sided theories is due precisely to their "atomistic," singularistic, and compartmentalized approach, their neglect of the generalizing approach that views society and culture as a whole This is even more true of large-scale sociocultural phenomena, such as wars and revolutions. Even compartmentalized phenomena, as studied from the standpoint of economics or political science, law or ethics, the fine arts, or history, cannot be fully understood without a consideration of the sociocultural constellation in which they recur. K. Mannheim correctly observes that — for instance, in political science — "sooner or later one is confronted with the question *why* do the countries at the same period and on the same plane of development have wholly different types of constitutions and forms of government, and *why* when the technique and constitution belonging to one country are taken over by another do they change their form in the adopting country? . . Thus the political scientist is thrown back on certain unknown entities which he labels 'the national spirit' or 'the cultural heritage of a people'" This means that it is necessary to consider society and culture as a whole. The same is true when he considers the problem of power and domination or many economic problems. ". . . It is for instance becoming increasingly evident that the choices made by individuals in their capacity as consumers are not fortuitous, but conform to certain collective standards which . . . are determined by non-economic 'social' factors. *What* social factors? To be able to answer this and similar questions, the economist, like the political scientist, seeks as it were a theory of the constants and variables in the formation of human wants." [15] Again it is necessary to go beyond the confines of a special field.

In medicine it is routine procedure for every competent physician, before diagnosing the disease of the patient, to investigate his whole organism and its life history. In the social sciences this routine unfortunately is neither established nor its necessity well understood As in medicine the specialized approach here is fruitful and reasonable only when the whole of the sociocultural universe is recognized by this or that science Otherwise it is bound to be inadequate and often misleading. In the great team of the social sciences sociology has been performing exactly this role [16]

The above gives a sufficient idea of the specific functions of sociology in the team of the social and humanistic sciences; what these functions are in concrete

[15] K Mannheim, "The Place of Sociology," *Conference on the Social Sciences Their Relations in Theory and in Teaching* (London, 1935), pp 3 ff See also M Weber, "Wirtschaftssoziologie," in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tubingen, 1922), A Lowe, *Economics and Sociology* (London, 1935)

[16] The urgency of the standpoint of the whole is increasingly recognized by biology, psychology, and other disciplines See, for instance, W Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology* (New York, 1929), R H Wheeler, "Organismic Vs Mechanistic Logic," *Psychological Review* (July, 1935).

forms; and why such a science is necessary whether it is called sociology or abracadabra.

4. SOCIOLOGY AS A SPECIAL SCIENCE

Though sociology is a generalizing science dealing with the sociocultural universe as a whole, this does not mean that it is an encyclopedic survey of all the social sciences or that it is a vague philosophical synthesis. The study of the common and current properties, relationships, and uniformities of sociocultural phenomena involves as much specialization as does a study of the unique or segmentary traits and relationships. *In spite of its generalizing nature sociology remains a strictly special science.* Though the president or treasurer of a firm deals with the company as a whole it does not follow that his work is not specialized or that he does the work of all the firm's employees, for the same reason sociology, studying the sociocultural universe as a whole, does not attempt to do the work of the other social sciences Just as the task of a treasurer or president is not impossible, so the tasks of generalizing sciences — like physics and chemistry, which deal with the repeated properties and relationships of the whole material universe, or general biology, which studies the properties and repeated relationships of the living world, and sociology, which does the same in regard to the superorganic world — these tasks do not necessarily surpass the capacity of a single science Perhaps they are more difficult than the tasks of a very narrow specialty, but that they are in no way impossible is evidenced by the very existence of such disciplines.

5 INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES

In its generalizing functions sociology depends upon the findings of other special sciences; but every science depends upon several others and the special sciences depend upon the generalizing sciences no less, rather more in fact Physics uses mathematics, mechanics, geometry, and chemistry; and each of these disciplines employs the others. It is impossible for a scholar to work upon any important problem without making use of the findings of other disciplines and scholars No special problem in physics or chemistry can be solved without a knowledge of the body of these generalizing disciplines. The same is true of special problems in biology and of the main principles of general biology. The specialized science of geology depends much more upon general physics, chemistry, and biology than these depend upon geology

Similarly, if sociology depends upon history, economics, political science and other compartmentalized social disciplines, these depend no less upon the generalizing science of sociology Generalizing sociological theories of Plato and Aristotle have exerted a great influence upon the political, economic, legal, historical, and other special sciences right up to the present moment The same is true, in various degrees, of the generalizing conclusions of the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes and Machiavelli, Ibn Khaldun and Vico, Montesquieu and Locke, Rousseau and Bossuet, Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, Hegel and Marx, Spengler, Durkheim, Tarde, Max Weber, and Pareto One can cite hundreds of historical, economic, political, anthropological, psychological . . . linguistic and even synological works written along the lines of either Augustinian (Orosius's *History*), or Thomistic, Machiavellian, Hobbesian, Hegelian, Spencerian, Comtean, or Marxian sociological principles.

Emergence of any important sociological system has invariably influenced a series of compartmentalized disciplines, in their leading principles, interpretations,

problems studied, methods and techniques of investigation. Almost all the special social and humanistic disciplines in the second half of the nineteenth century were built up along either Hegelian or Comtean-Spencerian principles. Those of more recent times have been enormously affected by Marxian sociology in economic interpretations of data, by Tardean-Durkheimian, Weberian, Paretian and Spenglerian sociological principles and methods.

Even more, the emergence of sociology as a systematic science has been followed by "sociologization" of all the special disciplines in the last few decades. Their content, methods, interpretations, including even those whose authors have been inimical to sociology, have become increasingly sociological and have led to the appearance in all these disciplines of the sociological or institutional schools in jurisprudence and history (so called social histories), in economics and political science, in anthropology and psychology (social psychology), in sciences that examine fine arts and ethics, religion and even logic. Such a "sociologization" of these disciplines is eloquent evidence of the influence of sociology upon them. The dependence between sociology and the other social sciences is mutual; it is interdependence, not a one-sided dependence of sociology upon the other sciences.[17]

As a generalizing discipline general sociology has to be somewhat abstract and theoretical, and for this reason may appear to many a "practical man" as an impractical academic preoccupation, divorced from concrete actuality and devoid of practical utilitarian value. Here as well as in all such reasonings of too practical men (who, according to Lao-tzu are the most impractical), the fallacy of their conclusion is evident. Mathematics is possibly the most abstract and theoretical of all the sciences. And yet its practical importance is unquestionable. Algebra and calculus are more abstract than arithmetic. And yet who would conclude they are less important practically than arithmetic? General theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology are much more abstract and "impractical" than a cookbook or instruction book for a Chevrolet or other automobile. And yet without theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology neither an automobile nor a good cookbook could be produced. The same is true of sociology as a gen-

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[17] If sociology has been enormously influenced by biology, then biology has also been affected by sociology in many ways. Darwin's theory of evolution and of the struggle for existence was suggested by Malthus' work. Spencer's formula of evolution or progress is still the most generally used formula of biological evolution, while several biological concepts like the division of labor and differentiation were taken from sociology. See G. Tarde, "La théorie organique des sociétés" in *Annales de l'Institut International de sociologie*, Vol. IV. In the last few decades biology has increasingly emphasized the social factors in causation of many biological phenomena, especially in the aetiology of various diseases and of transformation and modification of organisms, not to mention the emergence of various offshoots of biology, — "ecology," "animal sociology," "plant sociology," and the like. In all these respects the impact of sociology has been so considerable that several prominent biologists entitle their studies "Soziologie innerer Krankheiten," "Soziologie Geschlechtskrankheiten," "Ueber den Einfluss der Berufe auf das Herz," "Krankheit und soziale Lage," and the like. Several corresponding studies with sociological titles are to be found in the *Handbuch der soziale Hygiene* (Berlin 1926–29), all volumes, or M. Mosse and G. Tugendreich (ed.), *Krankheit und soziale Lage* (Munich, 1913). Some branches of medical science, psychiatry, for example, are becoming increasingly sociological. These and many other facts unmistakably show that biology and sociology influence one another. Later on in this work it will be shown that even mathematics, physics, and chemistry are socially conditioned in their nature and development. The sociology of knowledge has contributed to the demonstration of this condition, making these sciences aware of the psychosocial implications of many of their propositions.

eralizing, theoretical, and somewhat abstract discipline. Its practical influence — whether good or bad does not concern us here — has been rather startling. In most of the great social revolutions, reforms, and reconstructions it is sociology of this or that kind which has been the leading ideology and guide. Thus Lockean sociology played this part in the Revolution of 1688 and the establishment of the liberal democratic regime in England, the thinking of Voltaire, Rousseau, and other Encyclopedists had a similar role in the French Revolution of 1789 and subsequent years. In our own time Marxian sociology has been the driving intellectual scheme and "the gospel" of the Communist revolution in Russia, the racial sociologies of A. Gobineau, H S. Chamberlain, and others became the credo of the Nazi revolution and the Third Reich From the sociology of Confucius to that of the present the practical effects of this study have been influential (although often fallacious sociologies, unhappily, instead of the valid ones). This fact is sufficient to dispel the illusions of the too practical men in this field.

To summarize. sociology is a generalizing science of sociocultural phenomena viewed in their generic forms, types, and manifold interconnections

6. GENERAL AND SPECIAL SOCIOLOGIES

Like biology, which is divided into general and special biologies (botany, zoology, and their further subdivisions), and like economics, which is divided into general and special economics (banking and money, transportation and agriculture), sociology can also be divided into general and special sociologies *General sociology* studies (a) the properties and uniformities common to all sociocultural phenomena in their structural and dynamic aspects as well as (b) the recurring interrelationships between the sociocultural and the cosmic phenomena; the sociocultural and the biological phenomena; the various classes of sociocultural phenomena.

Structural general sociology studies (a) the structure and composition of the generic sociocultural phenomenon (corresponding to the study of the structure of a cell as a phenomenon of life or that of an atom in physics); (b) the main structural types of the groups or institutions into which human population is differentiated and stratified and their relationship to one another, (c) the main structural types of the cultural systems and their relationships with one another, (d) the structure and types of personality embedded in social groups and cultural systems

Dynamic general sociology investigates (a) recurring social processes, such as social contact, interaction, socialization, conflict, domination, subordination, adaptation, amalgamation, migration, mobility, how social systems are born, how they acquire and lose members, how they distribute these within the system, how they become organized and disorganized, and how all these processes affect the personality of the individuals involved, (b) recurring cultural processes — invention, diffusion, integration and disintegration, conversion and the accumulation of cultural traits and systems — and how they affect the personality of the individuals involved, (c) rhythms, tempos, periodicities, trends and fluctuations in social and cultural processes, together with the general problem of sociocultural change and evolution; (d) recurring sociocultural processes in persons, and how and why persons change

Special sociologies each do the same in regard to a special class of sociocultural phenomena chosen for intensive study. The most developed special sociologies are at present: sociology of population, rural sociology, urban sociology, sociology

GENERAL		SPECIAL
Structural [18]	**Dynamic**	
Theory of *a* social systems and congeries; *b* cultural systems and congeries, *c* personalities in their structural aspect, main types, and interrelations	Theory of the recurring: *a.* social processes and change, *b* cultural processes and change, *c.* personality processes and change in their types, interrelationships, rhythms, trends, and causal factors	Theory of structure and dynamics of the respective class of sociocultural phenomena studied in their generic and repeated aspects and relationship

[18] One can easily see that in this division of sociology into structural and dynamic I follow Comte's division of sociology into social statics and dynamics So far it has been the most fruitful of all the divisions

of the family, of law, of religion, of knowledge; sociology of war, of revolution, of social disorganization, sociology of crime and punishment (criminology), sociology of the fine arts, sociology of economic phenomena; and several others

In a schematic form the main divisions of sociology can be represented as above

This delineation of sociology is logically more adequate [19] and better corresponds to what sociology has actually been than other definitions, such as the science "of culture," "of society," "of human relations," "of social interaction," "of forms of social relationships," and the like These definitions are far too loose They do not point out the specific characteristics of sociology or differentiate it from other social sciences. On the other hand, the sound part of these definitions is well incorporated into the above delineation

This tabular definition presents the logical structure of sociology as a scientific discipline regardless of who carries on the studies, whether a sociologist ex-officio or historian, economist, or engineer From the fact that Sir Isaac Newton wrote his *Principia* and his *Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel* it does not follow that both works belong to the same science, one is a great treatise in mechanics, the other in theology, though both were written by the same man Likewise, many important sociological works were written by historians like F de Coulanges, by engineers like Le Play and Herbert Spencer, or mathematicians like Auguste Comte Many sociological generalizations are found in treatises on history, philosophy, economics, and other sciences And conversely, some ex-officio sociologists have written books that do not belong to

[19] Theoretical sociology studies the sociocultural universe as it is, in contradistinction from *normative* sociology, that sets forth the ideal sociocultural world as it ought to be, and from *practical, or applied* sociology which, like medicine or agronomy, consists in a scientific arrangement of the most efficient ways and means for a realization of a certain objective — elimination of poverty, war, etc Like many applied disciplines, applied sociology, or the art of social engineering, must use not only the data of sociology but of several other sciences And as with any applied discipline its validity depends upon the level of knowledge attained by theoretical sociology, as long as this is low, no successful and efficient applied social engineering is possible In this work we are concerned only with theoretical sociology On the difference between the theoretical, normative, and applied disciplines see my "Sociology and Ethics" in W F Ogburn and A Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations* (Boston, 1927) and H Poincaré, *Dernières pensées*, Ch on "Science and Ethics" (Paris, 1913).

sociology but fall into the domain of some other science. Even in textbooks of sociology one can find large portions that belong to presociology or other disciplines. This difference between the logical nature of sociology and the ex-officio authorship of a sociological study must be kept clearly in mind.[20]

[20] On sociology as a science see P A Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," and S. Rice, "What is Sociology?" both in *SF*, Vol X (1931), see there other articles on this topic in subsequent numbers K Mannheim, "The Place of Sociology," in *Conference on the Social Sciences Their Relations in Theory and Teaching* (London, 1935), R Thurnwald (ed), *Soziologie von Heute* (Leipzig, 1932), articles by A Walther, H Freyer, F Plenge, P A Sorokin, M Ginsberg, W Ogburn, R MacIver, S R Steinmetz, F Tonnies, R Thurnwald, in W Ogburn and A Goldenweiser (ed), *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations* (Boston, 1927), L von Wiese, *Sociology* (New York, 1941).

PREDICTABILITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE *

Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T. Glueck

I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Workers in the fields of criminology and penology, as well as far-sighted lawyers and judges, have occasionally conceived of the need for some prognostic instrument whereby they might be enabled to predict with reasonable certainty the future history of various types of criminal offenders[1] The probable value of such a device cannot be sufficiently emphasized It would make the process of criminal justice articulate. It would compel judges to think in terms of the future results of the dispositions they make of the cases before them for sentence. It would furnish some objective, scientific guide for their sentencing function Such an instrument would, for example, enable judges to decide, with much more wisdom than is manifest today, what types of criminals might be expected to do well on probation, which offenders are more suited to different forms of institutional control, and how to deal with various types of recidivists

A prognostic device would likewise prove of great value to a parole board in determining in a specific case whether a prisoner should be released on parole — that is, whether, according to past experience with similar cases, he will probably do well on parole and thereafter Practically, it would aid such a board in deciding whether a prisoner should be paroled for an entirely indeterminate period or only for a brief span sufficient to bridge the gap between the penal institution and unsupervised freedom It would, moreover, be of value in determining the type of parole supervision best adapted for certain cases.

In addition, such an instrument of predictability would be of great value to so-

[1] So far as we have been able to ascertain, Hornell Hart was the first person to suggest the possibility of adapting to penology the methods used in the insurance field for predictability See Hart, "Predicting Parole Success," *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. XIV, No 3 (November 1923), pp 405 et seq

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cial workers and forward-looking legislators in establishing beyond cavil the actual value of existing punitive or reformatory institutions and devices, and in suggesting practical needs and modifications. Finally, a prognostic device scientifically conceived and executed would be extremely useful in the study of crime causation and in suggesting needed experimentation with new correctional methods

Can such an instrument be devised?[2] If so, how would it actually be utilized by judges and parole boards? Would it be really practicable? Answers to these questions are attempted in the following pages

[2] See Bruce, Harno, Burgess, and Landesco, *Workings of the Indeterminate-Sentence Law and the Parole System in Illinois* (1928), Chap XXX Professor Burgess attempts to answer the question "Can scientific methods be applied to parole administration?" He presents a table of "Expectancy Rates of Parole Violation and Non-Violation" There are, however, a number of fundamental weaknesses in his device (1) While the report of the committee does not clearly indicate just how the social and criminal data on which the device is based were gathered, verified, and augmented, there appears a confession in the report that makes one wish that the raw material of that research were more reliable "Were the record more accurate, it is certain that higher correlations between various factors making for success or failure while on parole would be secured" (ibid, p 264) (2) In constructing his expectancy-rate table Professor Burgess apparently gives *equal weight* to all the factors concerned with "success" or "failure" of the offender on parole He himself elsewhere shows, however, that the twenty one factors he uses for his expectancy-rate table are not all of equal influence (ibid, Chap XXVIII) (3) The research mentioned does not study the behaviour of the exprisoners during a *post-parole* period It is one thing for a man to behave satisfactorily while under parole supervision and another for him to continue so for a reasonable period after such control has been removed (4) No prognostic devices are furnished for the use of courts, nor is their value recognized In spite of these serious defects, Professor Burgess must be credited with having made a beginning in this important field and having been among the first to recognize its possibilities

2. PROGNOSTIC TABLES

In earlier chapters we established the relationship to post-parole criminal status of each of over fifty factors as to which reliable information could be obtained The six *pre-Reformatory* factors found by that method to bear the highest relationship to the post-parole conduct of the ex-inmates of the Reformatory will now be utilized in constructing a prognostic device The procedure to be followed is indicated below:

First we set down the actual percentages of the total failures (from the point of view of post-parole criminal conduct) for each of the sub-classes of the six significant factors

1. Industrial habits preceding sentence to the Reformatory

(Coefficient, 42)

Class	Total failures
Good worker	43%
Fair worker	59
Poor worker	68

This means that only 43% of those offenders who, during their pre-Reformatory life, could be rated as *good workers*, turned out to be total failures, as judged by their post-parole criminal conduct Those who were *fair workers* contributed 59% of their number to the post-parole failures, and those who were *poor workers* contributed 68% of their number to post-parole total failures

Each of the following factors, which were used in the composition of the prognostic tables as described below, might be similarly analysed and interpreted In all of these groups of sub-classes the size of the coefficient indicates the degree of relationship between the factor as a whole and the conduct of the men during the five-year period following their discharge from parole supervision.

2. *Seriousness and frequency of pre-Reformatory crime*

(Coefficient, 36)

Class	Total failures
Serious offender	67%
Frequent minor offender	53
Occasional minor offender	35
Non-offender	21

3. Arrest for crimes preceding the offence for which sentence to the Reformatory was imposed

(Coefficient, 29)

Class	Total failures
Those with prior arrests	69%
Those without prior arrests	32

4. Penal experience preceding Reformatory incarceration

(Coefficient, 29)

Class	Total failures
Those with prior penal experience	74%
Those without prior penal experience	47

5. Economic responsibility preceding sentence to the Reformatory

(Coefficient, 27)

Class	Total failures
Economically responsible	41%
Economically irresponsible	64

6. Mental abnormality on entrance to the Reformatory

(Coefficient, 26)

Class	Total failures
None	60%
Psychopathic personality	75
Psychotic	87

These factors furnished the basis for the construction of the specialized tables for use by judges in certain situations illustrated below. For the prognostic instrument to be utilized by parole boards *in considering applications for parole, the conduct records of the prisoners while in the Reformatory must be taken into account* Other items might also have been used in this connexion, but by employing the association tables and coefficients described above we found that they bore but a slight relationship to the post-parole behaviour of our men The following factor, on the other hand, was shown to be considerably related to the post-parole criminality of the men.

7. Frequency of offences in the Reformatory

(Coefficient, 33)

Class	Total failures
One offence in four months or less	70%
One offence in more than four months, or no offences	30

For the prognostic device to be used by parole boards in continuing supervision or in changing the form of treatment, the conduct record of the men while on parole must be taken into account Other parole factors were as before disregarded for this purpose because shown to bear but a negligible relationship to the post-parole conduct of the men

8. Criminal conduct during parole

(Coefficient, 47)

Class	Total failures
Successes on parole	30%
Partial failures on parole	31
Total failures on parole	77

Finally, for the prognostic instruments to be used by judges in dealing with recidivists — that is, men who, having already passed through the existing reformatory and parole regimes, again commit crimes — the five highest post-parole factors are added to the foregoing, as follows.

9. Industrial habits following expiration of parole

(Coefficient, .59)

Class	*Total failures*
Good worker	19%
Fair worker	66
Poor worker	92

10. Family relationship following parole

(Coefficient, .58)

Class	*Total failures*
Good	10%
Fair	50
Poor	85

11. Economic responsibility following parole

(Coefficient, 53)

Class	*Total failures*
Good	6%
Fair	53
Poor	85

12 Type of home following parole

(Coefficient, 48)

Class	*Total failures*
Favourable	24%
Fair	44
Unfavourable	86

13 Use of leisure following parole

(Coefficient, 46)

Class	*Total failures*
Constructive	0%
Negative	15
Harmful	81

So much for the first step in the process of constructing predictability tables The second step consists in determining the highest score, on the one hand, and the lowest, on the other, that it was possible for a person to have on the basis of the foregoing percentages This was done by adding up all the lowest percentages listed above, which gave the lowest possible total-failure score, and then adding up the highest percentages, which yielded the highest possible total-failure score Score-classes between these two limits were then established, and each of the men involved was classified therein according to his particular score and his criminal class Table 1, which is based on the first six factors, will indicate how this was done

From Table 1 a judge, considering whether or not to sentence an offender to a reformatory, can with considerable accuracy determine the advisability of such disposition of the case before him, provided he has reliable information as to the offender's status on the six factors upon which the table is based Thus a prisoner who scores as low as 244 to 295 on these six pre-Reformatory factors has seven and a half in ten chances (75 100) of being a success in post-parole conduct, while one with as high a failure score as 396 or over has but half a chance in ten (5 7 100) of succeeding The first man also has two in ten chances (20 100) of failing only partially, and only half a chance in ten (5:100) of being a complete failure, the second has but one chance in ten (13 7· 100) of failing partially and eight out of ten chances (80 6 100) of turning out to be a complete failure.

In presenting the above illustration of a possible prognostic device to aid the courts, it should be added that we do not propose the immediate adoption of the rates of failure and success above given It is the idea and the method of prognosis in this field that concerns us, rather than the construction of a failure-rate prognostic table which might be used in the courts of Massachusetts or elsewhere tomorrow [3] It will be valuable to test the

[3] The method used in the construction of the prognostic instrument herein presented is the simplest, mathematically, that we could devise It yields as good results as a much more elaborate statistical procedure which we employed and abandoned in favour of the above The more involved statistical method consisted of (1) om-

extent of reliability of such tables by constructing them on the basis of another sample of offenders and comparing the results with those obtained herein. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the probable failure rates given in the tables are based on the Massachusetts Reformatory and parole systems essentially as they were during the period when our men were in the Reformatory, and not as they might be. They would probably need to be considerably modified in the light of experience with improved machinery of justice.

Table 2 is presented as a possible model for parole boards in determining which men to release on parole, and in obtaining some true conception of the probable length of parole supervision needed in different cases For this purpose not only the six highest pre-Reformatory factors have been used, but that factor of the Reformatory period which was found to be related higher than any other to post-parole criminality — namely, the frequency of misconduct of the men in the Reformatory.

The lowest failure-score obtainable on the basis of our figures, adding the factor of the men's behaviour in the Reformatory, is 274; the highest is 499. It will be seen that a man coming up before the parole board for consideration whose record on the seven factors involved gives him a score of between 274 and 325 has better than seven out of ten chances of being a

puting, as to each sub-class of each factor, the differences between the actual frequencies of failure and the "independence frequencies" (that is, the mathematically expected frequencies), (2) ascertaining the percentage that these differences were of the total cases in each sub-class, and (3) distributing the cases into failure-score classes on the basis of such derived percentages rather than the actual percentages of failure utilized above Upon the advice of Professor E B Wilson and Professor Ernest Hooton, the simpler method was adopted when it was ascertained that it gave results essentially similar to those derived by the much more complex statistical procedure

TABLE 1

Probable Percentages of Post-Parole Successes, Partial Failures, and Total Failures from the Standpoint of Criminality, Based on Scores on Six Most Important Pre-Reformatory Factors

(Coefficient of contingency, .45)

TOTAL-FAILURE SCORE	PROBABLE STATUS AS TO POST-PAROLE CRIMINALITY (Percentages)			
	Success	Partial failure	Total failure	Total
244–295	75.0	20 0	5 0	100
296–345	34.6	11.5	53.9	100
346–395	26.2	19.1	54 7	100
396 and over	5 7	13.7	80.6	100
Total	**20.0**	**15.6**	**64.4**	**100 ***

* Based on those cases in which information was available as to all the pertinent factors. This accounts for the fact that while the total-failure rate of the entire number of cases on which this research is based is 62 1% there are variations in the total-failure rates of the factors presented throughout this chapter and previous chapters It will be seen that some of the sub-classes of the factors analyzed above have higher failure scores than the 62.1% pertaining to the entire group of cases studied, others have lower.

TABLE 2

Probable Post-Parole Criminality Rates Based on Total-Failure Scores on Six Highest Pre-Reformatory Factors and Highest Reformatory Factor

(Coefficient of contingency, .44)

TOTAL-FAILURE SCORE	PROBABLE STATUS AS TO POST-PAROLE CRIMINALITY (Percentages)			
	Success	Partial failure	Total failure	Total
274–325	71 5	21.4	7.1	100
326–425	40 6	18 8	40 6	100
426–475	11.6	15 2	73.2	100
476 and over	4.7	12 5	82.8	100
Total	**20.9**	**15.8**	**63.3**	**100**

success in post-parole conduct, he has a two in ten chance of being at least only a partial failure, and but half a chance in ten of turning out to be a total failure. On the other hand, a prisoner whose record on the six highest pre-Reformatory factors and one highest Reformatory factor gives him a failure score totaling 476 or over, has only half a chance in ten of being a success in post-parole conduct, only one chance in ten of being a partial failure, and eight chances in ten of becoming a complete failure.

The next prognostic instrument might be utilized by parole boards in determining whether to continue parole supervision for men already on parole Of course, under the existing system a parolee's period of supervised liberty automatically ends when the maximum limit of his so-called "indeterminate" sentence is reached In the penocorrectional practice of the future, however, a completely indeterminate sentence will perhaps be found to be necessary for certain types of cases, and in that event such a prognostic device as the one submitted in Table 3 would be useful

The lowest failure-rate obtainable, when one adds to the foregoing seven factors that of the behaviour of the men while on parole, is 304, the highest is 576 It will be seen that a man already on parole whose case comes up for determination whether the parole board shall discharge him or continue his parole has seven and a half chances in ten of being a success in post-parole conduct if his record on the eight factors involved gives him a score of between 304 and 350 Such a man has two chances in ten of being at least a partial rather than a total failure, and the chances of his turning out to be a total failure are probably nil On the other hand, a man up for consideration of the parole board for the purpose mentioned whose total-failure score on the eight factors involved is 551 or over has no chance of turning out to be a success if parole supervision is removed, he has but one chance in ten of being a post-parole partial failure, and nine out of ten chances of being a complete failure The value of this prognostic device in determining which ex-prisoners require continued supervision thus becomes apparent.

The next prognostic table (Table 4) could be utilized by judges for recidivists — that is, men who, having already passed through the Reformatory and parole systems, are again convicted of crime. For this purpose the six pre-Reformatory fac-

TABLE 3

Probable Post-Parole Criminality Rates Based on Total-Failure Scores on Six Highest Pre-Reformatory Factors, Highest Reformatory Factor, and Highest Parole Factor

(Coefficient of contingency, 48)

TOTAL-FAILURE SCORE	PROBABLE STATUS AS TO POST-PAROLE CRIMINALITY (Percentages)			
	Success	Partial failure	Total failure	Total
304–350	77.7	22.3	....	100
351–400	57.2	21.4	21.4	100
401–450	45.7	22.8	31.5	100
451–500	18.7	18.7	62 6	100
501–550	9 6	14.5	75 9	100
551 and over	....	8.1	91.9	100
Total	**21.2**	**16.5**	**62.3**	**100**

tors, the highest Reformatory factor, the highest parole factor, and the five highest post-parole factors were utilized.

The lowest failure-rate obtainable, on the basis of our figures, when one adds to the foregoing eight factors the five highest post-parole factors (making a total of thirteen items on which this table is founded) is 363; the highest is 1005. It will be seen that a man who has already passed through the Reformatory and parole systems and has been finally released from parole supervision, but who again commits a crime, has nine and a half chances in ten of turning out to be a post-parole success if again subjected to the Reformatory and parole treatment, provided his total-failure score is between 363 and 575 On the other hand, a recidivist up before the judge for sentence on a new offence whose failure score totals as high as 876 or over has no chance of turning out to be a post-parole success if again subjected to the Reformatory and parole regime If his prior total-failure record is between 776 and 875, he has two chances in ten of becoming a partial failure, and nearly eight in ten chances of turning out to be a total failure If his former total-failure record is 876 or over, there is but half a chance in ten of his being even a partial failure (rather than a total failure) if he be again submitted to the Reformatory and parole routine, while the chances of his again turning out to be a total failure are as high as nine and a half out of ten.

It will be noticed that in all the prognostic tables presented there is a high coefficient of contingency. Table 4 has the extremely high coefficient of .68. These coefficients indicate the considerable relationship between the failure-score rates obtained by the men and their actual status as regards post-parole criminality.

3 USE OF PROGNOSTIC TABLES IN INDIVIDUAL CASES

To show more clearly how the prognostic instruments would actually be used by judges and parole officials, we present a number of illustrative cases showing the failure rates obtained by the men on the various factors involved The records of these men on the factors involved were, of course, not included in the computa-

TABLE 4

Probable Post-Parole Criminality Rates Based on Total-Failure Scores on Six Highest Pre-Reformatory Factors, Highest Reformatory Factor, Highest Parole Factor, and Five Highest Post-Parole Factors

(Coefficient of contingency, 68)

TOTAL–FAILURE SCORE	STATUS AS TO POST–PAROLE CRIMINALITY (Percentages)			
	Success	Partial failure	Total failure	Total
363–575	95.2	4.8	....	100
576–675	60 6	28 6	10 8	100
676–775	10 5	47.4	42 1	100
776–875	..	22 7	77.3	100
876 and over	. .	5.1	94.9	100
Total	**29.4**	**19.4**	**51.2**	**100**

tion of the tables In other words, we are about to illustrate an empirical test of the adequacy of the prognostic device described above, by taking a number of cases which were left out of consideration in framing the tables, so that we might test their workability We recognize, of course, that these tables can be adequately tested only by doing what we are about to do with hundreds of cases Our present object, however, is illustration and exposition, not verification, which latter we hope to do later with another sample of several hundred ex-inmates of the Reformatory (See Table 5)

Table 5 gives the scores actually obtained on each of the factors involved, by seven offenders The first three cases are those of men who turned out to be successes so far as their non-criminality during the five-year post-parole period is concerned. Cases four and five were partial failures, cases six and seven complete failures It will be seen that as to cases one, two, and three, no post-parole factors are given The reason is that since they were successes and presumably would again not come up before judges for new offences, it was not necessary to indicate what their scores as to the post-parole factors were Only if they again offend and are again about to be sentenced, will their scores as to the factors involved in the post-parole period related to their prior offence become relevant As to cases four, five, six, and seven, on the other hand, it is of course evident, by the fact of their having committed new offences during the post-parole period, that they are failures at obeying the law But from this fact it can by no means be concluded, as we have seen, that they were also necessarily failures in their family relationships, to cite but one of the five post-parole factors. Criminals, like other men, differ as to their behaviour with reference to matters embraced in the five post-parole factors Their record in those respects is perhaps just as important from the point of view of predicting what their future conduct will be as is the fact of their having again lapsed into criminality.

Assume, now, that cases two and three are before a judge for sentence, as, indeed, they were some six or eight years ago The judge will see that case two, whose

TABLE 5

Illustrative Case Chart of Men Who Were Post-Parole Successes, Those Who Were Partial Failures, and Those Who Were Total Failures

Factors	*Successes*			*Partial failures*		*Total failures*	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
PRE-REFORMATORY							
Industrial habits	43	43	43	59	43	59	68
Seriousness of crime	21	21	67	67	21	67	67
Prior arrest	69	32	69	69	32	69	69
Prior penal experience	47	47	74	47	47	74	47
Economic responsibility	41	41	41	64	41	64	64
Mental condition	60	60	75	75	87	87	60
Total I	**281**	**244**	**369**	**381**	**271**	**420**	**375**
REFORMATORY							
Conduct in Reformatory	30	30	30	70	30	70	70
Total II	**311**	**274**	**399**	**451**	**301**	**490**	**445**
PAROLE							
Conduct on parole	*	30	77	77	30	77	30
Total III		**304**	**476**	**528**	**331**	**567**	**475**
POST-PAROLE							
Industrial habits				66	66	92	92
Family relationship				10	50	85	85
Economic responsibility				53	53	85	53
Type of home				44	44	86	44
Use of leisure				81	81	81	81
Total IV				**782**	**625**	**996**	**830**

* No parole, served maximum sentence.

failure score is only 244 (Table 5, Total I), has seven and a half out of ten chances of being a success, so far as post-parole conduct is concerned, if put through the Reformatory and parole regimes (Table 1). Now if the judge could have before him, in addition to the prognostic instrument based on the Reformatory and parole regimes, a prediction table based on *probation,* and if that table indicated that a prisoner with the total-failure score of case two has, say, *nine* out of ten chances of succeeding if placed on probation, then, other things being equal, the court would place him on probation instead of sentencing him to a reformatory If, in addition to the prognostic tables covering the Reformatory and parole regimes and probation, our judge also had scientifically constructed tables on other forms of treatment, such as the more rigid regime of the prison, or treatment in special institutions for psychopathic, defective, or other classes, the probability of the court's doing its work intelligently would be greatly multiplied

Turning now to case three, the judge, on consulting the failure-score chart, would find that that prisoner has the score of 369. Looking next at his prognostic table (Table 1), he would see that the chances are only two and a half out of ten of case three's being a success if submitted to the Reformatory and parole regimes. If, again, our judge has a failure-rate table for probation or some other form of treatment, and the chances are found to be better for a person of the type of case three to succeed under such treatment than under the Reformatory regime, then probation or other treatment would be given precedence over sentence to the Reformatory.

Let us next consider case one from the point of view of the work of the parole board. When the prisoners were being considered by the parole board for release under supervision, case one, whose failure score was one of the lowest of the seven (311), was denied parole. He was compelled to serve his entire sentence behind prison bars, while cases four, six, and seven, with their relatively high failure scores (Total II), were permitted to spend most of their sentence in freedom on parole Since case one had such a low failure score on the six pre-Reformatory factors and the one Reformatory factor involved in the parole board's prognostic chart, the chances were seven out of ten (Table 2) that he would be the success he actually turned out to be, two in ten that he would at least be only a partial failure, and less than one out of ten that he would be a complete failure, if released on parole With this assurance, the parole board might reasonably have allowed this offender to spend most of his sentence in supervised liberty instead of behind bars, thus returning him much earlier to a normal life in the community than it actually did

Case three, who, in the long run (Total III), had the highest failure score (476) of the three men who were post-parole successes, was a psychopath and a moron, a fact that illustrates the value of psychiatric aid to the court. Knowledge of the mental condition of case three would have materially aided the judge in deciding which type of correctional treatment was best suited to the prisoner Case three had only two chances in ten, when he completed his parole, of being the success that he actually turned out to be Actually, the good result in his case is not to be attributed so much to either the Reformatory or the parole system as to the fact that almost to the end of his post-parole period case three was in the protected, supervised environment of the army. There but little initiative was required of him, his food, clothing, and lodging were furnished, and but a minimum of competitive effort on his part was sufficient.[4]

Case three illustrates the important point that prognostic devices such as those herein presented are not to be utilized blindly It is not proposed thereby to convert judges completely into the rubber stamps they are sometimes partially compelled to be by detailed, legislative prescription of penalties to be imposed for various offences. If a physician, utilizing a prognostic instrument for different combinations of symptoms as an aid to treatment, were to follow such a table blindly, he would soon find himself in trouble Such a device could only furnish support to his experience and reason, it would not be a substitute therefor Similarly, a prognostic instrument of the kind herein devised would only aid the judge in per-

[4] We have found that certain men do better under supervision, whether military or parole, than without it, others do equally well under supervision as without it There were 158 men who had army or navy careers (of which the nature of the discharge was known) which terminated before the expiration of the post-parole period

forming his sentencing task much more intelligently than he performs it today. It would not supersede the judge.

But even if busy courts were, because of the pressure of business, to found their disposition of cases entirely upon failure-rate tables, making no exceptions to suit individual peculiarities, the chances are all in favour of the conclusion that, in the long run, they would thereby do a much more constructive work, from the points of view of both society and the offender, than they are doing today.

By way of further exposition of the proposed method, we may now consider several other cases whose failure scores are indicated in Table 5. When case five (a partial post-parole failure) and case six (a total post-parole failure) were up before the judge *the first time,* he could have seen that the former's total-failure score is 271, the latter's 420 (Table 5, Total I). Consulting the prognostic chart (Table 1), he would have learned that case five had seven and a half out of ten chances of being a success if put through the Reformatory and parole regimes, two in ten chances of being a partial failure, and only half a chance in ten of turning out to be a total post-parole failure Case six, on the other hand, had only half a chance in ten of being a success, only a one and a half to ten chance of being a partial failure, and an eight to ten chance of being a total failure The judge could thus have ascertained the futility of subjecting a man like case six to the Reformatory and parole regime and could have foretold that case six would be the failure he actually turned out to be. On the other hand, the court might have tried case five on probation, if the chances of that prisoner's succeeding on probation had been found to be more favourable than his chances of success under the Reformatory and parole regimes

So, too, if the parole board had consulted the prognostic chart (Table 2) when case six was being considered for parole, it would have seen that the chances of that prisoner's being an ultimate success if released on parole were less than one-half out of ten, since his score was 490 (Table 5, Total II). It would also have seen that the chances of case five, with his score of 301, were seven out of ten that he would be a post-parole success, two out of ten that he would be a partial failure, and less than one in ten that he would totally fail.

Assume, now, that case five and case six have again been convicted after passing through the Reformatory and parole systems, and are now up before a judge for sentence. The judge will see (Table 4) that case five, whose failure score covering pre-Reformatory, Reformatory, parole, and *post-parole* factors pertaining to his previous criminality is 625 (Table 5, Total IV), has six chances out of ten of being a success if again put through the routine of Reformatory and parole, a three in ten chance of again being a partial failure, and a one in ten chance of this time turning out to be a complete failure. If prognostic tables pertaining to other forms of treatment should show a higher possibility of success, such treatment, rather than another trial in the Reformatory and on parole, would be "indicated," as the physicians say. Thus, while at first sight the method proposed herein may appear to be of service to judges only in telling them which persons *not* to commit to a certain institution, in reality the converse is also true, that is, if prognostic tables exist covering *all possible* judicial dispositions of cases, then judges will know not only where *not* to send various types of offenders, but also which of a series of possible dispositions is the most likely to result satisfactorily

Case six, a complete failure, has the extremely high failure score of 996 (Table

5, Total IV). Table 4 shows that the chances that case six will turn out a success if again subjected to the Reformatory and parole regimes are nil; the chance of his being a partial failure is one-half out of ten, while there is a nine and a half chance in ten of his continuing to be a complete failure. If, again, a failure-rate table as to some other form of treatment would indicate that for a prisoner of the type of case six there is a fairly good probability of success, then such other treatment might be tried. If the chances that case six will be a total failure under other existing forms of treatment are as high as under Reformatory and parole treatment, then *society must provide for wholly indeterminate, probably lifelong, incarceration for men of the type of case six, at least it must do so until such time as it has, by experiment, greatly improved and supplemented existing peno-correctional methods*

Examination of the history of case six shows that he has long been a chronic alcoholic. For him, therefore, indeterminate incarceration in an industrial camp or farm, with facilities for the medical and psychiatric treatment of alcoholics and an opportunity to earn at least part of a living for his family, is perhaps the most promising treatment

Case four was diagnosed by the Reformatory psychiatrist as a psychopath Difficulties of social adjustment are frequently the characteristics of this type of distorted personality When case four is up before a judge for a new offence, it will be seen that his failure score is 782 Turning to the prognostic device (Table 4), the judge will learn that there is no chance of case four's turning out a success if again subjected to the old regime, and two out of ten chances of his being a partial failure; while the chances of his total failure are somewhat greater than seven and a half in ten. Now, if there is available a specialized institution for psychopathic personalities, where good psychiatric facilities and industrial and educational opportunities are afforded, the judge, who perhaps the first time wanted to try case four under the ordinary reformatory and parole regimes before committing him for a *wholly indeterminate* period to the specialized institution for psychopaths, may now decide to send him to such an institution, unless, of course, the prognostic tables as to other forms of treatment indicate that those should first be tried

One might similarly analyse all the cases studied Sufficient explanation has, however, been made to indicate exactly the role that might be played in the scientific administration of justice by some such prognostic instruments as herein proposed

In the foregoing illustrative cases, the pre-Reformatory factor of mental condition has been shown to be of great importance in determining what type of *treatment* to apply to a particular case Is it also absolutely indispensable as an element of the *prognostic* instruments? It must be remembered in this connexion that the vast majority of criminal courts in the United States are not yet awake to the possibilities of psychiatry and psychology in the effective and humane administration of criminal justice. Many of these courts do, however, have some form of opportunity for social investigation of some of the cases that come before them for sentence [5] This service is most frequently furnished by probation officers, who are supposed to make investigations of the social conditions surrounding the accused, submitting their reports to aid the court in the proper disposition of cases

[5] See Winfred Overholser, "Psychiatric Service in Penal and Reformatory Institutions and Criminal Courts in the United States," *Mental Hygiene*, Vol XII (1928), pp 801 et seq.

Now, we have found that, at least in our cases, the efficiency of the prognostic devices herein described is hardly impaired[6] if one omits, from among the factors to be considered by the court, that of the mental condition of the accused. A possible explanation of this is that much of the individual's mental constitution is reflected and expressed in his conduct Hence, it would seem that so far as *prognosis* is concerned, courts without the services of psychiatrists can get along fairly well, provided there is careful social investigation of cases When, however, there is judicial recognition of mental disorder or distortion of personality as one of the important causes involved in the continuation of anti social conduct in certain cases, and when an intelligent disposition of those cases in the light of such findings is attempted, the services of a good psychiatrist will become indispensable to any modern judicial system

4. WEAKNESS OF EXISTING PRACTICE

In the foregoing pages we have presented instruments for rendering the work of courts and parole offices much more scientific than it is today Some reminder of the present *modus operandi* might appropriately be here given by way of contrast. The relationship between the total-failure score on the factors embraced in the preceding prognostic instruments, and post-parole criminal conduct, was found to be very high. The coefficients expressing that fact ranged from .44 to .68. In an earlier chapter it was, however, established that the coefficient expressing the relation between the type of offence committed — that is, whether it was a burglary, larceny, robbery, or sexually motivated crime — and post-parole criminal status is but .12. This coefficient is so low as to indicate only a negligible relationship between the nature of the offence and post-parole conduct. Again, the coefficient of contingency between the seriousness of the offence for which the men were sentenced to the Reformatory and their post-parole criminal record was but .05 — that is, practically nil. *But the modern disposition of cases is fundamentally based on these factors!*[7] *In other words, legislative prescription of penalties, and judicial sentencing, are founded upon considerations almost wholly irrelevant to whether or not a criminal will thereunder ultimately be a success, a partial failure, or a total failure.* Can any proof of the unscientific nature of the contemporary treatment of this problem be stronger? After all, is not one important object of punishment, even in the eyes of the most conservative, to prevent the offender from continuing in criminality? The absurdity of the existing practice is brought out by statutory provisions, of which the following is typical:

"Whoever steals, or with intent to defraud, obtains by a false pretence, or whoever unlawfully and, with intent to steal or embezzle, converts or secretes, with intent to convert, the money or personal chattel of another, whether such money or personal chattel is or is not in his possession at the time of such conversion or se-

[6] The coefficient expressing the relationship between the pre-Reformatory factors (omitting mental condition) and post parole criminality is 40, that between the pre-Reformatory factors plus the Reformatory factor and post parole criminality is 39, that between pre-Reformatory plus Reformatory and parole conduct factors, and post parole criminality, is 45; and that between all these plus the five post-parole factors, and post-parole criminality, is 69. It will be seen that these coefficients are essentially similar to those in the prognostic tables 1 to 4.

[7] Probation and the indeterminate sentence of course allow the judge and parole board some scope for individualization But essentially the limits of his discretion in this important work of sentencing offenders against the law are marked out by considerations of the kind mentioned.

creting,' shall be guilty of larceny, and shall, if the *value* of the property stolen *exceeds* $100, be punished by *imprisonment* in the state prison for *not more than five years* or by a fine of not more than $600 and imprisonment in jail for not more than two years, or, if the *value* of the property stolen *does not exceed* $100, shall be punished by imprisonment in jail for *not more than one year* or by a *fine* of not more than $300; or, if the property was stolen from the conveyance of a common carrier or of a person carrying on an express business, shall be punished for the first offense by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than 2½ years, or by a fine of not less than $50 or more than $600, or both, and for a subsequent offense by imprisonment for not less than eighteen months nor more than two and one-half years, or by a fine of not less than $150 nor more than $600, or both." [8]

The nature of the peno-correctional treatment to be imposed is made to hinge upon the value of the property that happens to have been stolen and the person or place from which it was taken, rather than upon the make-up of the offender and the probabilities of his responding to one or another form of treatment

5 SUMMARY

In the foregoing pages we have presented a series of prognostic tables and illustrative cases, indicating that it is possible to introduce scientific method into the work of criminal courts and parole boards Under the existing system, judges either are compelled to follow blindly the dictates of a legislature which has set down in advance the precise punishments to be imposed for each offence, or are governed by considerations almost entirely irrelevant to the factors which are most strongly associated with the future conduct of criminals. This practice has been demonstrated to be unscientific On the other hand, it should be obvious from the illustrations given that judicial or administrative guess-work or predilection, irrelevant argument of counsel paid to "get my client off," or at least to reduce the punishment, or other extraneous considerations would, by the intelligent use of some such device as herein described, be replaced by a truly intelligent approach toward the problem. The instrument presented in the foregoing pages is by no means a perfect one Much more research and refinement of method is needed [9] But it constitutes a step towards a scientific management of the problem of crime by courts and administrative agencies.

[8] Massachusetts General Laws (1921), Chap 266, sec 39 (italics ours).

[9] For example, although the above tables are based on an analysis of some fifty factors in the lives of the offenders studied, it may be possible to obtain many more significant factors We have had to eliminate some data regarding the pre-Reformatory careers of our men because such data could not be sufficiently verified In another research we are now conducting it is being found possible to obtain verified information on some points not included in the present work We plan to experiment further with various methods of constructing prognostic tables, since it may be that more simple and accurate devices can be invented

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE SOLDIER * *Samuel A. Stouffer*

The Army has been called "the cutting edge of American democracy" by General MacArthur The job of the soldier is to kill His training has a single ultimate purpose — to destroy the enemy But only a fraction of the armed forces in any country will meet their enemy in face to face death grip Most of the soldiers will be behind the fighting front, either in the long lines of supply and communications or patrolling areas remote from the combat zone

Thus the function of many of the soldiers becomes almost indistinguishable from the function of millions of civilians at various stages in the production lines, all of which converge in the man who bares his breast to the enemy It is like an expedition to conquer the summit of Mount Everest Only a handful of men will make camp at the upper altitudes, and even fewer will be assigned to the task of reaching the top But below that, at camp after camp, will be many upon whom the rest depend.

In speaking of the Army in modern, total war, it is important to keep in mind the fact that, except for the wearing of a uniform and the regimentation of military life, there is little to distinguish the functions and problems of many of the soldiers and civilians

This similarity has other aspects Many morale problems are shared in common Let us illustrate, in some detail, with the problem of orientation as to the aims of the war A man's orientation may be described in terms of three factors: (1) the clarity of his conception of the aims of the collective effort, (2) the evaluation he places on these aims, and (3) the degree to which he identifies his personal aims with the collective aims Pearl Harbor brought unanimity on at least this point Our side, whatever the reason, has been attacked, and we darned well better not find ourselves on the losing side at the end Possibly this is motivation enough, but it could hardly be argued that the motivation would not be stronger if the aims of the collective effort could be crystallized as sharply as in World War I and as closely identified with the personal aims of the individual

There is much cynicism to overcome. Most men of military age grew up in the midst of disillusionment about the Great Crusade of a generation ago, and their conception of the American way we are fighting to defend includes, inevitably, many bitter memories of a decade of depression The entire job experience of most young men was in the depths of depression, except as the war boom began to bring them sudden prosperity — from which millions were abruptly separated in order to don a uniform

How extensive these developments are, what specified forms they take, and what the effects of measures taken to overcome them are — all these are problems for research not only in the Army but also in civilian life

* From *American Society in Wartime* ed by W F Ogburn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943, pp 105–17 Reprinted by permission of the publisher

TWO ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TO WAR PROBLEMS

In discussing problems of the soldiers, I should like to take the liberty of limiting the discussion rather narrowly Here in this building dedicated to social science research it is particularly appropriate if we confine ourselves to considering two questions. (1) What is social science contributing to sharpening "the cutting edge of American democracy"? (2) What can social science expect to learn as a by-product of this practical honing job? In fact, I should like to limit the subject even further. Instead of speaking about social science in general, I should prefer rather to speak mainly of the social scientist trained in sociology or psychology, leaving to others the consideration of the contributions of history, economics, political science, and other disciplines

PSYCHOLOGY SINCE WORLD WAR I

In World War I a distinguished American psychologist was asked, "What can psychology contribute to winning the war?" He is reported to have replied, "Nothing." He was, of course, quite wrong World War I marked the first large-scale application of psychological tests of intelligence and vocational aptitudes. The impact of this work on psychology after the war was of tremendous importance, and techniques of psychological measurement subsequently made their influence felt everywhere in education and in industry This work also paved the way for new approaches in psychological theory The work of Dr L L Thurstone and his colleagues at the University of Chicago, and of scores of others who are laboring in the development of quantitative psychological theories, rests upon the cultural base of hundreds of man-years of experience in test construction which was given its greatest impetus in the crises of World War I This development in the measurement of intelligence and vocational aptitudes is bearing rich, practical fruit in our Army and Navy today.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY SINCE WORLD WAR I

At the time of World War I social psychology and sociology, as the journals of that period will show, had not advanced particularly far beyond the essay stage Theories flourished, but it was the practice to illustrate them with examples somewhat as a preacher illustrates his sermons rather than to submit the ideas to empirical tests There was a great deal of bandying-about of the word "science," but one does not need to engage in a controversy on the definition of science to say that at least one of the important elements of science, namely, verification, was usually missing.

The two decades after the Treaty of Versailles have been decades of unprecedented advance in sociology and social psychology. A serious effort has been made to phrase some of the theories in forms permitting at least beginnings of scientific verification At the same time, the techniques developed by statisticians, anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and others have been refined It would be silly to say that, when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, social psychologists and sociologists were ready with a set of theories and techniques perfectly adapted for aiding the Army But it is true that the accumulated experience of years of patient work has given the sociologist and social psychologist an opportunity in the war effort which he could not have taken advantage of two decades ago

Those of us who happen to be assigned to work on problems of the soldier are, of course, only a small fraction of the sociologists and psychologists who are de-

voting their professional skills to the winning of the war. As I indicated at the beginning, many of the problems of the soldier and the civilian, of the Army and of industry, have large elements in common, and there is need for the widest possible exchange of ideas among us all

THE ARMY'S RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE NEW RECRUIT

When a man is taken out of civilian life and put into uniform, the Army has at least four responsibilities (1) to fit him into an Army job which, if possible, uses his civilian skills and vocational aptitudes and interests to a maximum, (2) to teach him the specialized trade of war; (3) to guard his health, and (4) to sustain his morale

Classification. The responsibility for developing methods of testing and classification which will fit the right man into the right job is one which has been handled ably by psychologists who are experts in test construction and occupational classification. Hundreds of psychologists are working in the ground forces and in the air forces on the development and application of classification tests These tests did not always work well at first This was partly because some of the tests were imperfect, especially in the field of vocational aptitudes, but even more important is the fact that a long period of education has been necessary to make commanding officers aware of the importance of using these test results in assigning men Classification and assignment are like two blades of a pair of scissors One can say that the classification blade is now keen and sharp and that the assignment blade is getting sharper as officers have come to appreciate the importance of correct assignment. I shall not speak more of this very important work now but refer to it again in connection with the relation of job assignment to morale

Training. After the Army has classified the recruit and given him his Army assignment, there is the problem of teaching him the trade of war The Army, like all society, has gone through an industrial revolution, and the different kinds of tasks which different people learn as part of their instruction in the trade of war run into the thousands. Thus far, it cannot be said that the social psychologist, as such, has been in the position to make much of a direct contribution to the training program. Training for war is a profession, and the leaders of the military profession have developed, over decades of experience, many standardized training techniques. Nevertheless, one finds in high places in the Army many inquiring minds who doubt that a method is adequate simply because it is honored by custom These men have shown ingenuity and organizational ability in applying mass-production methods to education in certain areas relatively new in warfare, particularly those involving the use of machines Some of the teaching devices introduced, particularly motion pictures, are likely to have a lasting effect on educational techniques It is remarkable, for example, what Walt Disney can do as a pedagogue

Health It is hard to conceive how any Army could have taken more care with the health and physical well-being of its soldiers than the American Army of today In securing thousands of younger doctors in their thirties and forties, the Army has undoubtedly availed itself of medical skill with better scientific training than that of the average physician and surgeon in the general population The regularity of habits, the hard physical exercises, and the abundant food in the Army make for tough bodies The clothing and shelter of the average soldier are far superior to that of a generation ago The venereal disease rate has

been kept within bounds. The rapidity with which our citizen Army had to be built made the problem of adequate screening of psychiatric cases difficult, but there is awareness of the problem and a determination to profit by the lessons of the last war. It is too early to evaluate the contributions which psychiatry will make in this war.

Morale. Finally, the Army has the problem not only of finding the right Army job for a man, teaching him the trade of war, and safeguarding his health but also of sustaining what, for want of a better word, is usually called "morale" As the saying goes in the Army, morale is a function of command By that it is meant that every commanding officer down to the company commander is held responsible for the morale of the troops below him This must be understood in order to appreciate how the social psychologist who is brought into work with the Army can make his influence felt.

A staff officer in Washington, working on the problem of arming the mind and spirit of the soldier, has definite limits to his action His plans must be approved by and transmitted through the chain of command, which means that in many respects he can advise but not execute. However, he does have at least one route of direct impact upon the soldier through his influence on the principal military agencies of communication and information to the soldier.

ORGANIZATION OF MORALE ACTIVITIES

It was fortunate for the Army that as head of the morale activities there was appointed a leader of American business who, by his authorship of two volumes in the field of social science, had demonstrated his concern for the application of scientific knowledge to the problems of human relations This man is Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn, a member of the Social Science Research Council and a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation.

General Osborn has two main responsibilities The first is to make plans for the utilization of a soldier's leisure time, to train officers to direct leisure-time activities, to provide recreational, musical, and library equipment, and to serve as a liaison with civilian agencies such as the Red Cross and the USO His second main responsibility is to provide information to troops This he is doing through supervision of the production, in Hollywood, of motion-picture films, through the preparation of short-wave broadcasts and phonograph transcriptions for troops overseas; through supervision of a weekly Army magazine available to all soldiers, through assistance to hundreds of local camp newspapers, through the preparation of educational booklets to be read by soldiers on transports, describing the customs of the land to which they are sailing, through the preparation of foreign-language records which will teach men to speak needed key words in the language of the land of their destination, through the preparation of lectures and discussions — in fact, through every medium by which it is possible to inform and inspire our fighting men and those in training or in the services of supply

An Army Institute has been established to provide correspondence courses primarily for the hundreds of thousands of men who may be frustrated at isolated posts, and a foundation is now being laid for an adult education program which should be of tremendous significance in what may be a long-drawn-out demobilization period after victory is won

The role of research in morale activities General Osborn believes in research Slowly, he has built up in Washington a staff of sociologists and psychologists who operate under directives from the chief of

staff to study problems of the soldier, not only in order to provide guidance to General Osborn but also to be of service to any branch of the Army which wants assistance

Many and varied are the problems presented to the research staff What kind of orientation is necessary to build the most effective fighting morale? Under what conditions is hatred of the enemy or fear a desirable motivation? Should we laugh at Mussolini? What factors in Army life tend to undermine the will to fight? Should the amenities with which the soldier in training is provided be curtailed and should he start in with the same Spartan scale of living as his fellows in Guadalcanal? Or, as long as he has leaves and furloughs and sees his civilian friends enjoying the fruits of high wages, should he get, as far as possible, the best of everything? Under what conditions is "griping" in camp a healthy sign and under what conditions is it an unhealthy sign? Are there some conditions calling for tough, hardboiled leadership and others calling for fatherly leadership of soldiers? What already favorably existing attitudes can be exploited to overcome prejudices against some of our allies?

Similarly, what about the prejudices against the high wages of civilian labor? What predictions can be made about the kind of personality which will break down on the battlefield or at isolated outposts? What predictions can be made about the kind of personality which will make a good noncommissioned officer? What basis is there for thinking either that it is better to keep officers and men from the same communities together in the same outfit or better to disperse them? How about men of the same national origin, or men of about the same social class, or about the same intelligence level? How can the prestige of noncombat troops be built up?

Questions like these, challenging to the sociologist and social psychologist and frequently unanswerable even with the use of the cleverest of techniques of investigation, are mixed with other questions of a more mundane character What proportion of men complain that their pants don't fit? What suggestions do the men have for improving the service at U S O. clubs? How many boys drink beer on a typical Saturday night?

Questions and problems differ depending on the zone of operations of the soldier The soldier in training at home has different problems from the soldier on duty at remote and quiet bases on the Pacific islands, Alaska, Iceland, the Caribbean, and other isolated parts of the world Still different are the problems of the noncombat soldier in the zones of active fighting Finally, of course, special classes of problems pertain to the man with the gun face to face with the enemy in North Africa or wherever the battlefields may be

Research work surveys. The work done by this research staff falls into two categories (1) surveys and (2) experimental studies

Methods have been worked out, after a good deal of trial and error, of questioning enlisted men in an atmosphere of anonymity which produces frank and earnest answers The research staff has made studies in about eighty five camps in the Army ground forces and air forces in continental United States and at several overseas bases

The studies have covered a wide range of topics For example, it was desired to know how men in the infantry were reacting to the constant flood of publicity, much of it irresponsible, about the futility of infantrymen in an age of mechanized warfare. Careful sets of questions were prepared, and infantrymen of all types were interviewed. Working in collabora-

tion with psychologists in the office of the adjutant general, who are responsible for constructing intelligence and aptitude tests, the research staff has made extensive studies of the problems of job classification and assignment in the Army. These studies uncovered some discontent and pointed to ways of remedying it

Attempts have been made to classify the chief points of frustration felt by the soldiers in training Tests and scales have been developed to measure, as quickly and as accurately as possible, the extent of these frustrations The resulting information has been submitted to the policy-makers — in some cases with important effects on Army policy

A year ago [1941] the most frustrated group in the Army was that of the well-educated soldiers, many of whom felt they were not getting a chance to show what they could do This situation was quite understandable. The educational level of the selectees was much higher than that of the old regular Army enlisted men, but the latter, because of experience, were necessarily serving as teachers of the new recruits and as advisers to company commanders with respect to promotions Time and changes in Army policy have gone a long way toward solving this problem Many men are still frustrated, but the well-educated man now, if he has the requisite intelligence and leadership qualities, has an excellent chance to go to Officers' Candidate School and obtain a commission

New recruits coming into the Army bring with them, of course, attitudes toward the war and toward our allies which are the result of the education and information that they, like other civilians, received through the public schools, the press, the radio, and other agencies of communication These attitudes can be measured and, by applying theories of social psychology and various quantitative techniques, can be described with sufficient explicitness to serve as a valuable guide to those in charge of the information and education of the soldier

Research work experimental studies. The research work is not confined to surveys. In addition, there is being carried on a systematic program of actual experimental studies The idea of controlled experiments is not new in the Army It is used routinely in testing new weapons and other articles of equipment But it is perhaps a new, and somewhat exciting, development to see the experimental methods of natural science applied by the Army in the field of social psychology.

A motion-picture film especially prepared, let us say, to create better understanding of one of our allies is believed to have six determinable objectives The research staff designs a technique for measuring the degree to which each objective has been attained Two matched groups of men are pretested, one group sees the film, and a control group does not Both groups are restudied after a week or two, thus making it possible to measure how much influence the film has had with respect to each of the predetermined objectives Many modifications can be and have been introduced in designing the experiments. For example, a third group can see the film, followed by an informal discussion The time interval can be varied With the help of these results, advice can be given about needed changes in film material or about emphases which need to be made in the new films yet to be produced

This is one of the special fields in which experimental studies have been made or are in preparation In quite another area considerable experimental work has been done on physical conditioning, with a view to measuring effects produced by attempts to improve the physical training Extensive preparatory work is also under

way on the subject of fear, again drawing on the best social psychological knowledge available and attempting to provide a better scientific basis for teaching methods of controlling fear.

In the process of carrying out this work, the research staff has made some progress in the development of improved instruments of measurement which may be of considerable importance to research in social psychology and sociology in the future A new theory of scale construction, for example, developed out of practical needs, has given promise of wide utility.

THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST IN AN ARMY MILIEU

Research reports in the Army, because of the nature of the work, are usually confidential. This imposes an extraordinary responsibility A report in sociology or social psychology which is read at a scholarly meeting or published in a scholarly journal is always subject to the white heat of academic criticism Many are the battles that have been fought over what purports to be a contribution to social science Nothing can quite take the place of this safeguard against the inaccurate and the spurious However, any piece of research turned out by the staff of Special Service must run quite a gantlet of internal criticism and usually must pass the inspection of one or more outside critics who are sworn in as special consultants and whose responsibility it is to be as devastating as possible

In the Washington mêlée one cannot keep the Alpine detachment which is the glory of university research in times of peace There are many frustrations Questions are asked which cannot now be answered. The war cannot wait on science if science is not ready and often pays no attention even if science does have something to contribute An Army man is often justified in his suspicions of the academician. A hundred and one housekeeping problems drain off research energy which should go into clear thinking. All the agencies doing work in sociology or social psychology, such as the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, Military Intelligence, and others, have much the same experience.

Yet, amid the disappointments, the blockings, the failures, there is a solid sense of satisfaction among those of us devoted to social science when we see the accumulated research experience of our scientific disciplines operate to sharpen a little keener that "cutting edge of American democracy," now flashing into action on every continent to preserve what we hold dear.

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PART ONE *CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF SOCIAL LIFE*

CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF SOCIAL LIFE

INTRODUCTION

Man is not the only animal possessing intelligence, nor the only one living a social life, but no other species thinks conceptually and creates and transmits that something known to social scientists as culture. Therefore, any systematic effort to gain a broad understanding of human behavior must necessarily begin with culture. And because culture is that "complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society" it comprises nothing less than his entire social heritage.

Since practically all fields of formal learning touch upon the study of man's social heritage, our initial problem is to ascertain which aspects of culture are of particular interest to us. To be acquainted with the more obvious and rudimentary features of one's own culture, as is the ordinary participant or even, in a different degree, the trained journalist, historian, or literary artist, is not at all the same as understanding the mechanisms of culture *per se* — which is our task, the task of the anthropologist and sociologist.

For while there are many specialized perspectives for studying the manifold aspects of culture, only anthropology and sociology have developed anything approaching a science of culture. The first fruitful concepts and techniques of this study were developed by the cultural anthropologists because (1) they made their earliest investigations among the relatively simple, compact cultures of primitive peoples, cultures in which significant features stand out more clearly than in more complex cultures; and (2) they performed their investigations alone and without precedents — which compelled them to develop workable methods for getting at the interrelations between the various parts and the whole of the systems under observation

Sociologists for the most part have been interested in developing a "science of society" rather than a "science of culture" from data afforded by civilized societies. They have focused primarily upon social interaction, or how people mutually influence one another and form those recurring relationships which comprise society. Accordingly, sociological concern with man's social heritage has been largely incidental. Yet the general areas of inquiry of various kinds of specialists are often the same, and sociologists no less than anthropologists necessarily must take account of the ways of culture

Since our emphasis throughout this volume is on structure and function we shall regard culture neither as a self-perpetuating metaphysical or mystical entity nor merely as a special kind of behavior resulting from the social interaction of

people. Cultural patterns influence and in turn are modified by interaction. To understand broadly the anatomy and physiology of culture we shall have to consider three basic problems:

1. In separating analytically the cultural from the societal we shall have to define what is meant by culture What are the functions of culture as such? How may cultures be described and analyzed? It will be observed that certain fundamental elements or generalized patterns are common to all cultures, whereas others vary in time and place Why should this be so? What is the significance of such concepts as folkways, mores, traits, complexes, and institutions? Is the distinction between material and nonmaterial culture a valid one? The answers to these questions are not only essential to an understanding of the nature of culture but also have fundamental bearing on all human behavior.

2 Our second set of considerations has to do with the dynamics of culture. Change may occur slowly, as in primitive or relatively static cultures, or rapidly, as is the case in modern Western civilization, but no culture ever stands still How do culture traits originate, and what causes them to undergo modifications? In studying cultural dynamics we shall need to observe how the stream of culture is cumulative in time, how new traits are added to a given culture through discovery, invention, and borrowing, and the ways in which some traits and complexes change their significance and are lost or discarded Are there uniform stages of cultural development? Do all compartments of culture advance at the same rate? What are the causes of retrogression? What happens when individuals are caught between conflicting cultural forces? These problems may all be clarified through data at our disposal.

3 It is a truism of science that the biological similarities of people everywhere are much more important than their differences It is also well known that *Homo sapiens* has undergone no fundamental biological changes in several thousand years How, then, does one account for the very significant differences in human behavior, or the sharply contrasting ways of life, in various times and places? Light is thrown on this basic question through a study of the variability of culture. Possible modes of behavior in given situations are sometimes infinite in their range, and the course of action dictated in one culture may be taboo in another Cultural adjustments and adaptations, as Kluckhohn points out, are always selective, and choices are made normally in accordance with a dominant value system.

Our purpose in this section, "Cultural Backgrounds of Social Life," will be to present materials which illustrate these major concerns as well as other incidental aspects of the relevance of culture to sociological inquiry.

2. The Nature of Culture

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Culture consists of the patterns and products of learned behavior — etiquette, language, food habits, religious beliefs, the use of artifacts, systems of knowledge, and so on. Thus most of the participants in our culture shake hands, speak English, eat three meals a day, believe in a supreme being, handle money, and know simple arithmetic. Very few rub noses, converse in Sanskrit, fast regularly, profess atheism, are indifferent to money, or know higher algebra. Even though the patterns and products of culture are shared in varying degrees according to their essentiality and accessibility, culture supplies the common denominators or "way of life" of a society.

Society, which is the total complex of human relationships among the interacting members of a social system, cannot exist apart from culture. A society is always made up of persons and their groupings, and culture in turn is carried by them, but culture is not people. Culture is by definition a human production and germinates in the minds of men, but it also exists in the form of behavior patterns and objects as well as in the form of knowledge, attitudes, and values. It is no "metaphysical entity which operates itself," yet it may be studied as a reality *sui generis* without analytical regard for the human actors who receive, enact, and transmit it.

Although common human needs result in features which are common (i.e., universals) to all cultures, there is also, even within the culture of a single society, a considerable range of variation. There is a similar variation among societies; in fact, were it not for the marked contrasts between societies we would indeed have but one world-wide society, or "one world." By the same token, there would necessarily be a uniform or universal culture. Not only do cultures vary throughout the world, but also any given culture tends to change in the course of time. The people who compose a society (whether primitive or civilized) are not merely play actors familiarizing themselves with the scripts of cultures handed on to them from other times and places. While culture tends to standardize behavior, the interaction of individuals also modifies cultures, and thus in the flux of modern society the outer aspects of culture often change very rapidly. Notwithstanding this, for the common basis of understanding essential to societal survival there must be a minimum and reasonably stable common core of culture which everybody assimilates.

Human culture serves a number of purposes. It enables intelligent, well-informed individuals in modern society to draw upon the accumulated experience

of all mankind; even isolated, nonliterate peoples benefit tremendously from their orally transmitted heritage. If such transmission were not possible, each generation of *Homo sapiens* would have to start its own society anew. Historically, culture may be regarded as having its origin in interaction. Out of recurring adjustment processes tradition develops as an accepted and approved basis for common modes of behavior. As will be seen in the discussion of cultural variability, some choice must be made from the wide possible range of behavior and accepted by the majority before people can live together in a reasonable degree of harmony. Every culture must enable its adherents to solve the basic problems posed by the total environment Some problems are purely biological; others derive from the fact that man is a social animal living largely according to the dictates of a culture which itself creates most of his "needs." Group life on any appreciable and noninstinctive scale would be impossible without accepted rules, sanctions, and incentives. Even granting superior intelligence, man hardly could have risen very far above the other primates without developing culture. For the individual, culture provides ready-made adjustment patterns, generally accepted ways of thinking and acting, and stimuli as well as checks to guide his daily living. Although not all behavior is influenced by culture (see Allport, "Foundations of Personality," p. *163*), *even the individual's manner of breathing may be subject to cultural* modification.

The general nature of culture is now rather well understood by specialists, yet in some quarters social and cultural phenomena are still thought to be unsuited to scientific study It is interesting to note, therefore, that the eminent English anthropologist, Edward B Tylor, gave a satisfactory definition of culture more than three-quarters of a century ago, and clearly stated the terms for a science of culture In his essay Tylor postulated a unity of all nature in which human behavior is subject to definite sequence of cause and effect as a part of the pervading order. He was fully aware of certain metaphysical and theological prejudices against such a view, but he saw that the real difficulties in the advancement of systematic knowledge lay rather in the "enormous complexity of evidence" and "imperfection of methods of observation." Few observations made by social scientists three-quarters of a century ago have more than historical interest today, but one could hardly find in contemporary literature a better statement of the general nature of culture than Tylor's.

Tylor's observations pertain to the general characteristics of culture, however, and tell us little about how cultures may be described and compared We cannot deduce the ways of culture from biological or psychological laws, and account for cultural phenomena simply as responses to difficulties posed by the physical environment or as the outward manifestations in behavior of instincts, appetites, or impulses. There is no "instinct of pugnacity" which accounts for war; nor is the so-called acquisitive instinct a very satisfactory basis for explaining such a complicated pattern as capitalism Anthropologists and sociologists do not ignore the fact, to be sure, that human beings are after all biological entities, nor do they

overlook the influence of the natural environment in shaping culture; yet culture, as we have seen, may be studied as a "closed system" or independent realm of inquiry. Thus, units (distinct and comparable parts of a whole) called "traits" have been developed for analytical purposes. It has been noted that these cluster in meaningful groups called "complexes." A still more ramified entity may be known as a "pattern." (The preceding series of terms can be illustrated by dice as a trait, games of chance as a complex, and gambling as a pattern.)

All cultures show certain universal configurations or institutional structures such as the family or government. The ways of culture have form, function, and meaning; thus praying may assume the form of the Lord's Prayer with the supplicant in a kneeling position, repeating certain prescribed words intended to function as a supplication or entreaty, and carrying a sacred meaning or significance. Some cultures are simple, others more complicated; some are strongly cohesive or closely integrated, others are weakly held together or loosely integrated. Cultural analysis may be approached from many angles.

Some of the more important modes of analysis are set forth in Murdock's article, "The Cross-Cultural Survey," which, despite the span of years separating them, is a logical outgrowth of Tylor's earlier generalizations. Murdock summarizes in brief compass the basic assumptions of leading contemporary social scientists concerning the nature of culture. His article is important for a number of reasons. First, it shows how an organized program of co-operative research may be of great practical utility to various types of specialists by systematically classifying, analyzing, and making readily accessible the data now in scattered and inchoate form. Second, it indicates that from the vast amount of information piled up over the years pertaining to culture a high degree of agreement, in the form of certain fundamental generalizations, has been achieved about the patterns of human thought and action. Third, Murdock outlines methodological procedures for a rigorous analysis and testing of prevailing hypotheses, as well as for the formulation of new generalizations. In short, one witnesses not only a confirmation of the hope that a science of culture may be possible but also a demonstration of the actual development of such a science.

Turning now to a more limited consideration of the nature of culture, our line of analysis would hardly be adequate without reference to two very influential concepts, folkways and mores. Folkways may be loosely defined as customary ways of behaving which usually have no particular moral significance, and mores as group customs considered more important or imperative. (In terms of these concepts, institutions may be defined as organized and unified patterns of folkways and mores.) Whether for good or for ill, no other concepts have had so pervasive an influence among students of culture, nor have any other concepts become so thoroughly imbedded in popular parlance. Sumner's *Folkways* from which our selection, "Characteristics of the Mores," is taken, is primarily concrete and descriptive rather than abstractly analytical, since the book is essentially a compilation, from a loosely sociological point of view, of the customs, manners, usages, and

miscellaneous folkways and mores on which the author based his fundamental concepts of culture Sumner believed that folkways slowly accumulated in group experience over the centuries and became habitual patterns of action which, if they acquired important moral or other types of sanction, might in time be transformed into mores.

Since *Folkways* was first published in 1908, one can now evaluate it in perspective and reassess its net worth. The uncritical acceptance formerly accorded Sumner's rather oversimplified idea of the essential nature of culture may now be revised Although the folkways and the mores are still regarded as essentially sound and useful concepts, their limitations as explanatory devices have become apparent The necessary interrelation of the folkways and mores with other determining factors was not invariably taken into account by Sumner Likewise, it has become evident that Sumner overemphasized the rigidity and fixity of these cultural ways and exaggerated the amount of blind, uncritical acceptance of tradition. For instance, it is self-evident that Sumner was only partly right in his predominant idea about the mores — that it is "not possible to change them, by any artifice or device, to a great extent, suddenly, or in any essential element" He did not reconcile satisfactorily his views about persistency with his acknowledgment of change and variation, nor did he handle adequately the nonspectacular but constant and important processes of change

"Theoretical Critique of the Concept 'Mores,'" the selection from Gunnar Myrdal's outstanding recent treatise, *An American Dilemma,* will be used as a case in point to counterbalance Sumner and his uncritical followers Myrdal presents evidence to show the hidden bias and methodological shortcomings in the Sumnerian approach to culture Myrdal maintains that a point of view favoring laissez faire gives comfort to all who would remain passive in accepting the cultural *status quo,* and also that such a point of view gives specious intellectual or pseudoscientific support to all who would actively oppose cultural and social change The "Critique" is likewise useful in calling attention to a number of other dubious aspects of Sumnerian sociology which have largely escaped popular scrutiny, and for its insight into some of the realities of contemporary American culture

Although Tylor, Murdock, and Sumner are all in essential agreement with Myrdal's contention that culture is a dynamic rather than a static thing, our emphasis in this chapter must be upon the "anatomy" rather than the "physiology" of culture Our immediate interest will be restricted to what culture is rather than what it does or how it functions.

THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE *

Edward B. Tylor

Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely pervades civilization may be ascribed, in great measure, to the uniform action of uniform causes while on the other hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of development or evolution, each the outcome of previous history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the history of the future To the investigation of these two great principles in several departments of ethnography, with especial consideration of the civilization of the lower tribes as related to the civilization of the higher nations, the present volumes are devoted

Our modern investigators in the sciences of inorganic nature are foremost to recognize, both within and without their special fields of work, the unity of nature, the fixity of its laws, the definite sequence of cause and effect through which every fact depends on what has gone before it, and acts upon what is to come after it They grasp firmly the Pythagorean doctrine of pervading order in the universal Kosmos They affirm, with Aristotle, that nature is not full of incoherent episodes, like a bad tragedy They agree with Leibnitz in what he calls 'my axiom, that nature never acts by leaps (la nature n'agit jamais par saut),' as well as in his 'great principle, commonly little employed, that nothing happens without sufficient reason' Nor again, in studying the structure and habits of plants and animals, or in investigating the lower functions even of man, are these leading ideas unacknowledged But when we come to talk of the higher processes of human feeling and action, of thought and language, knowledge and art, a change appears in the prevalent tone of opinion The world at large is scarcely prepared to accept the general study of human life as a branch of natural science, and to carry out, in a large sense, the poet's injunction to 'Account for moral as for natural things' To many educated minds there seems something presumptuous and repulsive in the view that the history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of nature, that our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and the growth of plants and animals

The main reasons of this state of the popular judgment are not far to seek There are many who would willingly accept a science of history if placed before them with substantial definiteness of principle and evidence, but who not unreasonably reject the systems offered to them, as falling too far short of a scientific standard Through resistance such as this, real knowledge always sooner or later

* E B Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Brentano's, New York, 1924, pp 1–6 Reprinted by permission of the publisher and Coward-McCann, Inc

makes its way, while the habit of opposition to novelty does such excellent service against the invasions of speculative dogmatism, that we may sometimes even wish it were stronger than it is. But other obstacles to the investigation of laws of human nature arise from considerations of metaphysics and theology. The popular notion of free human will involves not only freedom to act in accordance with motive, but also a power of breaking loose from continuity and acting without cause — a combination which may be roughly illustrated by the simile of a balance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed of the faculty of turning by itself without or against its weights This view of an anomalous action of the will, which it need hardly be said is incompatible with scientific argument, subsists as an opinion patent or latent in men's minds, and strongly affecting their theoretic views of history, though it is not, as a rule, brought prominently forward in systematic reasoning Indeed the definition of human will, as strictly according with motive, is the only possible scientific basis in such enquiries Happily, it is not needful to add here yet another to the list of dissertations on supernatural intervention and natural causation, on liberty, predestination, and accountability We may hasten to escape from the regions of transcendental philosophy and theology, to start on a more hopeful journey over more practicable ground. None will deny that, as each man knows by the evidence of his own consciousness, definite and natural cause does, to a great extent, determine human action. Then, keeping aside from considerations of extra-natural interference and causeless spontaneity, let us take this admitted existence of natural cause and effect as our standing-ground, and travel on it so far as it will bear us It is on this same basis that physical science pursues, with ever-increasing success, its quest of laws of nature. Nor need this restriction hamper the scientific study of human life, in which the real difficulties are the practical ones of enormous complexity of evidence, and imperfection of methods of observation.

Now it appears that this view of human will and conduct as subject to definite law, is indeed recognized and acted upon by the very people who oppose it when stated in the abstract as a general principle, and who then complain that it annihilates man's free will, destroys his sense of personal responsibility, and degrades him to a soulless machine He who will say these things will nevertheless pass much of his own life in studying the motives which lead to human action, seeking to attain his wishes through them, framing in his mind theories of personal character, reckoning what are likely to be the effects of new combinations, and giving to his reasoning the crowning character of true scientific enquiry, by taking it for granted that in so far as his calculation turns out wrong, either his evidence must have been false or incomplete, or his judgment upon it unsound Such a one will sum up the experience of years spent in complex relations with society, by declaring his persuasion that there is a reason for everything in life, and that where events look unaccountable, the rule is to wait and watch in hope that the key to the problem may some day be found. This man's observation may have been as narrow as his inferences are crude and prejudice, but nevertheless he has been an inductive philosopher 'more than forty years without knowing it' He has practically acknowledged definite laws of human thought and action, and has simply thrown out of account in his own studies of life the whole fabric of motiveless will and uncaused spontaneity. It is assumed here that they should be just so thrown

out of account in wider studies, and that the true philosophy of history lies in extending and improving the methods of the plain people who form their judgments upon facts, and check them upon new facts. Whether the doctrine be wholly or but partly true, it accepts the very condition under which we search for new knowledge in the lessons of experience, and in a word the whole course of our rational life is based upon it

'One event is always the son of another, and we must never forget the parentage,' was a remark made by a Bechuana chief to Casalis the African missionary. Thus at all times historians, so far as they have aimed at being more than mere chroniclers, have done their best to show not merely succession, but connexion, among the events upon their record Moreover, they have striven to elicit general principles of human action, and by these to explain particular events, stating expressly or taking tacitly for granted the existence of a philosophy of history. Should any one deny the possibility of thus establishing historical laws, the answer is ready with which Boswell in such a case turned on Johnson· 'Then, sir, you would reduce all history to no better than an almanack' That nevertheless the labours of so many eminent thinkers should have as yet brought history only to the threshold of science, need cause no wonder to those who consider the bewildering complexity of the problems which come before the general historian. The evidence from which he is to draw his conclusions is at once so multifarious and so doubtful, that a full and distinct view of its bearing on a particular question is hardly to be attained, and thus the temptation becomes all but irresistible to garble it in support of some rough and ready theory of the course of events. The philosophy of history at large, explaining the past and predicting the future phenomena of man's life in the world by reference to general laws, is in fact a subject with which, in the present state of knowledge, even genius aided by wide research seems but hardly able to cope. Yet there are departments of it which, though difficult enough, seem comparatively accessible. If the field of enquiry be narrowed from History as a whole to that branch of it which is here called Culture, the history, not of tribes or nations, but of the condition of knowledge, religion, art, custom, and the like among them, the task of investigation proves to lie within far more moderate compass We suffer still from the same kind of difficulties which beset the wider argument, but they are much diminished The evidence is no longer so wildly heterogeneous, but may be more simply classified and compared, while the power of getting rid of extraneous matter, and treating each issue on its own proper set of facts, makes close reasoning on the whole more available than in general history.

THE CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEY *

George Peter Murdock

For a number of years, the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University has been conducting a general program of research in the social sciences, with particular reference to the areas common to, and marginal between, the special sciences of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry In 1937, as one of the specific research projects on the anthropological and sociological side of this program, the Cross-Cultural Survey was organized.

A year of previous experience in collaborating with other social scientists in research and discussion had made it clear to the anthropologists associated with the Institute that the rich resources of ethnography, potentially of inestimable value to workers in adjacent fields, were practically inaccessible to them Working in the laboratory, the clinic, or the community, the psychologists, sociologists, and others made frequent requests of the cultural anthropologists for comparative data on various aspects of behavior among primitive peoples. Sometimes they wanted perspective, sometimes suggestions, sometimes a check on their own scientific formulations In trying to assist them, the anthropologists found that they could usually cite a limited number of cases from their own knowledge and give an impressionistic judgment as to the general status of ethnography on the question For scientists, however, this was often not enough. What guarantee was there that the remembered cases were representative, or the impressions valid? What was needed was access to a dependable and objective sample of the ethnographic evidence Only rarely was it possible to refer the seeker to an adequate summary of the evidence, in the great majority of instances, he could satisfy his scientific curiosity only by resorting to the vast descriptive literature itself and embarking on a research task of discouraging magnitude

An actual example will illustrate the difficulty Several years ago, a group of physiologists, working in the laboratory, had come to a series of conclusions with respect to the relationship between periodicity of eating and bodily health as reflected in measurements of weight, stature, etc. It occurred to them that the literature of anthropology should contain data by which their conclusions might be independently tested, and they referred to the author for advice He was able to tell them that ethnographers customarily report the relevant data on eating habits —the number of meals per day, their temporal spacing, the degree of regularity or irregularity in eating, etc —and that physical anthropologists present the pertinent somatological information Since the material had been gathered, it could be assembled and the crucial correlations drawn. To have done so, however, would have required several months of research, since the data had nowhere been summarized and it would have been necessary to ransack an immense amount of descriptive literature to assemble it Understandably enough, the physiologists were discouraged from undertaking this promising but formidable task

Other sciences have systems of abstracts, bibliographical aids, and quantities of sec

* *American Sociological Review*, June, 1940, pp 361-70 Reprinted by permission of the author

ondary collections, by means of which the researcher can quickly track down the pertinent data and acquaint himself with previous research on any subject. With a few notable exceptions,[1] anthropology lacks such aids. Its materials are widely scattered in descriptive reports, an immense number of which must be scanned if adequate information is desired on any particular topic. The factual data of sociology are in a similarly chaotic condition. It became apparent, therefore, that if these sciences were to be brought to bear effectively in the cooperative research program of the Institute, a representative sample of the cultural materials on the various societies of the world needed to be organized for ready accessibility on any subject. The Cross-Cultural Survey was developed, in part to fill this need, in part to facilitate a distinctive type of scientific research which will be described below.

The first problem was to devise a standard system of classification for the arrangement and use of the collected materials. After six months of preliminary research, with the aid of helpful suggestions from about a hundred anthropologists, sociologists, and other specialists, the author and five collaborators published the *Outline of Cultural Materials*. Although this manual has proved of some incidental utility in field research it was in no sense designed for such a purpose. It was written solely as a guide for organizing and filing our abstracted cultural materials, and for facilitating reference to the data already classified and filed.

Since the publication of the manual, in 1938, the staff of the Cross-Cultural Survey has been engaged in the actual assembling of materials. To date, the descriptive data on nearly a hundred cultures have been abstracted, classified, and filed. It is hoped ultimately to assemble and organize all the available cultural information on several hundred peoples, who will be adequately distributed with regard to geography and fairly representative of all major types and levels of culture. Although primitive cultures will preponderate numerically, because they reveal the widest range of human behavioral variations, there will be a fair representation of the historical civilizations of the past, of modern folk cultures, and of the communities studied by contemporary sociologists.

For each of the cultures analyzed, the entire literature is covered, including manuscript materials when available. In some instances, more than a hundred books and articles have been combed for a single tribe or historical period. All material in foreign languages has been translated into English. The information, if of any conceivable cultural relevance, is transcribed in full — in verbatim quotations or exact translations. The object has been to record the data so completely that, save in rare instances, it will be entirely unnecessary for a researcher using the files to consult the original sources. Mere abstracts are deemed unsatisfactory and are resorted to only in exceptional cases, when the information is excessively detailed or technical. The *Outline of Cultural Materials* is not a "trait list," nor are the files confined to data on the items listed in it. These items are merely suggestions as to the kinds of material to be filed — or sought — under a particular heading, and they make no pretense of

[1] Useful for special purposes are the massive collections of Frazer, Sumner and Keller, Thurnwald, and Westermarck, such classic monographic studies as those of Hahn on domestic animals, Nieboer on slavery, Schurtz on age groupings, and Steinmetz on punishment and such recent special treatises as that of Clements on theories of disease. These compilations, however, do not lend themselves to the determination of "adhesions" in Tylor's sense, i.e., correlations within a culture indicative of functional relationships, and thus have but limited use in the testing of scientific hypothesis.

being exhaustive. Special pains are taken to preserve intact the functional relationships of the data. Wherever division according to the categories of the manual would be arbitrary, or would destroy the context, the original account is preserved intact and is filed in one place, with a carbon copy or a cross-reference slip under each other category to which the information is pertinent. Each file, moreover, contains a short synopsis of the total culture to which any note can be referred for context.

The collection of organized and classified materials in the files of the Cross-Cultural Survey should prove useful in nearly every type of research which anthropologists and other social scientists have hitherto pursued. If an investigator wishes to study a particular culture, he will find all the data, from whatsoever source, organized conveniently for his use If he is interested in a topic, he can run through the material under one or more headings for as many cultures as he likes, and secure his information in a mere fraction of the time required to comb the sources for himself. If he desires to test an hypothesis, he can similarly examine the material under two or more categories and obtain a quantitative check in the form of a correlation. A cross-cultural test of the physiologists' hypothesis on the periodicity of eating, alluded to above, could, for example, probably now be made with not more than two days of research Even regional or distributional studies are possible for areas, like the Gran Chaco of South America, on which the files approach completeness. The Cross-Cultural Survey, in short, should prove useful in a wide variety of scientific researches for which ready access to a body of organized cultural data is needed It is intended, of course, to make the material generally available on a cooperative basis. Recent users of the files include — to cite but a few examples — a sociologist analyzing social classes, a psychologist interested in adolescent problems, and a psychiatrist seeking a cultural definition of insanity.

In addition to its practical objective of facilitating diverse forms of social science research, the Cross-Cultural Survey has a special theoretical objective. It is organized so as to make possible the formulation and verification, on a large scale and by quantitative methods, of scientific generalizations of a universally human or cross-cultural character. Sociologists and most other social scientists regard the establishment of generalizations or "laws," i e, verified statements of correlations between phenomena, as their primary aim, but anthropologists tend to shy away from theory, as Kluckhohn [2] has pointed out, and to confine themselves to historical rather than scientific interpretations of their subject matter Nevertheless, it seems premature to conclude that anthropology cannot be made a science until, using all known safeguards, we have made at least one serious and systematic attempt to formulate scientific generalizations about man and culture which will withstand a quantitative test Anthropology has many objectives. That envisaged by the Cross-Cultural Survey is not intended to supplant the others, nor does it lay claim to greater importance It is simply regarded as legitimate, promising, and opposed by no insuperable theoretical obstacles.

The plan rests, at bottom, on the conviction that all human cultures, despite their diversity, have fundamentally a great deal in common, and that these common aspects are susceptible to scientific analysis. Its theoretical orientation may be expressed in a series of seven basic assumptions. These are not claimed to be original, since many of them are shared by all

[2] C Kluckhohn, "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies" *Philosophy of Science*, VI (1939), 328–344.

social scientists, and all of them by many.

1. *Culture Is Learned.* Culture is not instinctive, or innate, or transmitted biologically, but is composed of habits, i e, learned tendencies to react, acquired by each individual through his own life experience after birth. This assumption, of course, is shared by all anthropologists outside of the totalitarian states, but it has a corollary which is not always so clearly recognized. If culture is learned, it must obey the laws of learning, which the psychologists have by now worked out in considerable detail. The principles of learning are known to be essentially the same, not only for all mankind but also for most mammalian species Hence, we should expect all cultures, being learned, to reveal certain uniformities reflecting this universal common factor

2. *Culture Is Inculcated.* All animals are capable of learning, but man alone seems able, in any considerable measure, to pass on his acquired habits to his offspring We can housebreak a dog, teach him tricks, and implant in him other germs of culture, but he will not transmit them to his puppies They will receive only the biological inheritance of their species, to which they in turn will add habits on the basis of their own experience The factor of language presumably accounts for man's preeminence in this respect At any rate, many of the habits learned by human beings are transmitted from parent to child over successive generations, and, through repeated inculcation, acquire that persistency over time, that relative independence of individual bearers, which justifies classifying them collectively as "culture." This assumption, too, is generally accepted by anthropologists, but again there is an underestimated corollary. If culture is inculcated, then all cultures should show certain common effects of the inculcation process Inculcation involves not only the imparting of techniques and knowledge but also the disciplining of the child's animal impulses to adjust him to social life That there are regularities in behavior reflecting the ways in which these impulses are thwarted and redirected during the formative years of life, seems clear from the evidence of psychoanalysis, e g., the apparent universality of intrafamily incest taboos.

3. *Cultural Is Social.* Habits of the cultural order are not only inculcated and thus transmitted over time, they are also social, that is, shared by human beings living in organized aggregates or societies and kept relatively uniform by social pressure They are, in short, group habits. The habits which the members of a social group share with one another constitute the culture of that group This assumption is accepted by most anthropologists, but not by all Lowie,[3] for example, insists that "a culture is invariably an artificial unit segregated for purposes of expediency . . There is only one natural unit for the ethnologist — the culture of all humanity at all periods and in all places . . ." The author finds it quite impossible to accept this statement To him, the collective or shared habits of a social group — no matter whether it be a family, a village, a class, or a tribe — constitute, not "an artificial unit" but a natural unit — a culture or subculture To deny this is, in his opinion, to repudiate the most substantial contribution which sociology has made to anthropology If culture is social, then the fate of a culture depends on the fate of the society which bears it, and all cultures which have survived to be studied should reveal certain similarities because they have all had to provide for societal survival. Among these cultural universals, we can probably list such things as sentiments of group cohesion, mechanisms of social control, organi-

[3] R H Lowie, *The History of Ethnological Theory*, 235–236, New York, 1937

zation for defense against hostile neighbors, and provision for the perpetuation of the population

4. *Culture Is Ideational* To a considerable extent, the group habits of which culture consists are conceptualized (or verbalized) as ideal norms or patterns of behavior. There are, of course, exceptions, grammatical rules, for example, though they represent collective linguistic habits and are thus cultural, are only in small part consciously formulated Nevertheless, as every field ethnographer knows, most people show in marked degree an awareness of their own cultural norms, an ability to differentiate them from purely individual habits, and a facility in conceptualizing and reporting them in detail, including the circumstances where each is considered appropriate and the sanctions to be expected for nonconformity Within limits, therefore, it is useful to conceive of culture as ideational, and of an element of culture as a traditionally accepted idea,[4] held by the members of a group or subgroup, that a particular kind of behavior (overt, verbal, or implicit) should conform to an established precedent These ideal norms should not be confused with actual behavior In any particular instance, an individual behaves in reponse to the state of his organism (his drives) at the moment, and to his perception of the total situation in which he finds himself In so doing, he naturally tends to follow his established habits, including his culture, but either his impulses or the nature of the circumstances may lead him to deviate therefrom to a greater or lesser degree. Behavior, therefore, does not automatically follow culture, which is only one of its determinants. There are norms of behavior, of course, as well as of culture, but, unlike the latter, they can be established only by statistical means Confusion often arises between anthropologists and sociologists on this point The former, until recently, have been primarily preoccupied with ideal norms or patterns, whereas sociologists, belonging to the same society as both their subjects and their audience, assume general familiarity with the culture and commonly report only the statistical norms of actual behavior A typical community study like *Middletown* and an ethnographic monograph, though often compared, are thus in reality poles apart To the extent that culture is ideational, we may conclude, all cultures should reveal certain similarities, flowing from the universal laws governing the symbolic mental processes, e g., the worldwide parallels in the principles of magic

5 *Culture Is Gratifying.* Culture always, and necessarily, satisfies basic biological needs and secondary needs derived therefrom Its elements are tested habitual techniques for gratifying human impulses in man's interaction with the external world of nature and fellow man[5] This assumption is an inescapable conclusion from modern stimulus-response psychology. Culture consists of habits, and psychology has demonstrated that habits persist only so long as they bring satisfaction Gratification reinforces habits, strengthens and perpetuates them, while lack of gratification inevitably results in their extinction or disappearance. Ele-

[4] From the point of view of behavioristic psychology, of course, an idea is merely a habit of a special sort, a tendency to react with implicit linguistic or symbolic behavior rather than with overt muscular responses The underlying mechanisms e g , of learning, are similar if not identical Fundamentally, therefore, our fourth assumption should be subsumed under our first — that culture is learned — as a special case thereof In view of the importance of symbolic, especially linguistic, behavior in man, however, it has seemed advisable to segregate the ideational point for separate exposition

[5] The only exceptions are partial and temporary ones, with respect to elements of culture in the process of dying out or being supplanted

ments of culture, therefore, can continue to exist only when they yield to the individuals of a society a margin of satisfaction, a favorable balance of pleasure over pain.[6] Malinowski has been insisting on this point for years, but the majority of anthropologists have either rejected the assumption or have paid it but inadequate lip service. To them, the fact that culture persists has seemed to raise no problem, it has been blithely taken for granted. Psychologists, however, have seen the problem, and have given it a definite answer, which anthropologists can ignore at their peril. If culture is gratifying, widespread similarities should exist in all cultures, owing to the fact that basic human impulses, which are universally the same, demand similar forms of satisfaction. The "universal culture pattern" propounded by Wissler[7] would seem to rest on this foundation.

6. *Culture Is Adaptive.* Culture changes, and the process of change appears to be an adaptive one, comparable to evolution in the organic realm but of a different order.[8] Cultures tend, through periods of time, to become adjusted to the geographic environment, as the anthropogeographers have shown, although environmental influences are no longer conceived as determinative of cultural development. Cultures also adapt, through borrowing and organization, to the social environment of neighboring peoples. Finally, cultures unquestionably tend to become adjusted to the biological and psychological demands of the human organism. As life conditions change, traditional forms cease to provide a margin of satisfaction and are eliminated, new needs arise or are perceived, and new cultural adjustments are made to them. The assumption that culture is adaptive by no means commits one to an idea of progress, or to a theory of evolutionary stages of development, or to a rigid determinism of any sort. On the contrary, one can agree with Opler,[9] who has pointed out on the basis of his Apache material, that different cultural forms may represent adjustments to like problems, and similar cultural forms to different problems. It is probable, nevertheless, that a certain proportion of the parallels in different cultures represent independent adjustments to comparable conditions.

The conception of cultural change as an adaptive process seems to many anthropologists inconsistent with, and contradictory to, the conception of cultural change as an historical process. To the author, there seems nothing inconsistent or antagonistic in the two positions — the "functional" and the "historical," as they are commonly labeled. On the contrary, he believes that both are correct, that they supplement one another, and that the best anthropological work emerges when the two are used in conjunction. Culture history is a succession of unique events, in which later events are conditioned by earlier ones. From the point of view of culture, the events which affect later ones in the same historical sequence are often, if not usually, accidental, since they have their origin outside the continuum of culture. They include natural events, like floods and droughts, biological events, like

[6] Culture is gratifying, of course, not in an absolute but in a relative sense. To a slave, for example, the submission and drudgery demanded by his status are not actually pleasant, relative, however, to the painful alternative of punishment or death for rebellious behavior, observance of the cultural requirements of his status is gratifying or "reinforcing." Agricultural labor, again, may not be enjoyable in itself, but it is gratifying because it brings rewards, e.g., in food.

[7] C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, 73–79, New York, 1923.

[8] See A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, New York, 1915.

[9] M. E. Opler, "Apache Data concerning the Relation of Kinship Terminology to Social Classification," *Amer. Anthropol.*, n.s., XXXIX (1937) 207–208.

epidemics and deaths; and psychological events, like emotional outbursts and inventive intuitions. Such changes alter a society's life conditions. They create new needs and render old cultural forms unsatisfactory, stimulating trial and error behavior and cultural innovations. Perhaps the most significant events, however, are historical contacts with peoples of differing cultures, for men tend first to ransack the cultural resources of their neighbors for solutions to their problems of living, and rely only secondarily upon their own inventive ingenuity. Full recognition of the historical character of culture, and especially of the role of diffusion, is thus a prime prerequisite if a search for cross-cultural generalizations is to have any prospect of success It is necessary to insist, however, that historical events, like geographic factors, exert only a conditioning rather than a determining influence on the course of culture Man adjusts to them, and draws selectively upon them to solve his problems and satisfy his needs.

7. *Culture Is Integrative.* As one product of the adaptive process, the elements of a given culture tend to form a consistent and integrated whole. We use the word "tend" advisedly, for we do not accept the position of certain extreme functionalists that cultures actually are integrated systems, with their several parts in perfect equilibrium. We adhere, rather, to the position of Sumner[10] that the folkways are "subject to a strain of consistency with each other," but that actual integration is never achieved for the obvious reason that historical events are constantly exerting a disturbing influence Integration takes time — there is always what Ogburn[11] has called a "cultural lag" — and long before one process has been completed, many others have been initiated In our own culture, for example, the changes wrought in habits of work, recreation, sex, and religion through the introduction of the automobile are probably still incomplete. If culture is integrative, then correspondences or correlations between similar traits should repeatedly occur in unrelated cultures Lowie,[12] for example, has pointed out a number of such correlations

If the seven fundamental assumptions outlined above, or even any considerable proportion of them, are valid, then it must necessarily follow that human cultures in general, despite their historical diversity, will exhibit certain regularities or recurrences which are susceptible to scientific analysis, and which, under such analysis, should yield a body of scientific generalizations A primary objective of the Cross-Cultural Survey is to formulate and test generalizations of this sort.

The first methodological step will be the logical elaboration of hypotheses From whatever source derived — from generalizations advanced by anthropologists and sociologists, from psychological theory, or from leads found in the material — the hypotheses will be subjected to rigorous logical analysis and worked over into a series of basic postulates and testable theorems. By this procedure, the most effective of scientific methods, all logical or deductive operations are performed prior to the empirical test, there remain no fallible logical steps to be taken after the inductive labor is completed — a weakness which has vitiated much comparative anthropology

The second step will be the verification of the theorems A postulate can stand only if every theorem derived from it checks with the facts, if even a single one fails in this test, the postulate falls. The

[10] W G Sumner, *Folkways*, 5–6, Boston, 1906.

[11] W F Ogburn, *Social Change*, 200, New York, 1922.

[12] R H Lowie, *Primitive Society*, New York, 1920

verification will be quantitative. In scientific anthropology, it would seem, there is safety in numbers Only if one deals with a large number of cases can one expect to encompass all the significant causal factors, occurring in various permutations and combinations, estimate by statistical means their relative efficacy, and segregate by their quantitative preponderance the universal or cross-cultural factors from the local or historical ones. In testing each theorem, it is intended to use an adequate number of cases, preferably at least two hundred tribes if possible, selected from the files as the fairest sample feasible of all known cultures In so far as possible, they will be chosen in equal numbers from all continents and all culture areas, including a representative selection of historical and modern civilizations Each theorem will be posed to all the cases in terms of an anticipated correlation between two traits or aspects of culture, and the positive and negative results will be tabulated and expressed in terms of some reliable statistical coefficient If, for each of a set of theorems, the coefficients obtained are positive in sign and significant in quantity, the postulate in question will be regarded as tentatively verified.

The third step will be a critical analysis of the results from an areal or distributional point of view A valid cross-cultural hypothesis should hold true in any area If, however, some areas are discovered to yield negative coefficients, while other areas with a larger total number of cultures yield positive coefficients, it must be concluded that the apparent statistical confirmation of the hypothesis is fictitious and accidental, and the hypothesis must either be rejected entirely or modified and tested again. To survive, therefore, any generalization will have to pass two tests —a quantitative statistical one and an analytical historical one.

The fourth step will be a detailed examination of all exceptional or negative cases. To a valid scientific principle, there are no exceptions, apparent exceptions are always due to the intrusion of another countervailing principle Thus, water always obeys the law of gravity, which causes it to flow downhill. In all cases where water moves in the opposite direction, as in osmosis, capillary attraction, evaporation, the siphon, and the hydraulic ram, the law of gravity is still in operation but its influence is counteracted by some other force or principle Similarly, a valid cultural principle should have no real exceptions This makes it important to examine carefully all seeming exceptions If countervailing factors are not found, the principle becomes suspect One example may be cited from ethnography The functional association of an Omaha type of kinship system with patrilineal sibs appears to be a valid cultural principle, yet Wagner [13] has reported an Omaha system for the Yuchi, who are known to have had matrilineal sibs Eggan cites evidence, and Speck [14] agrees with him, that the Yuchi formerly possessed a Crow type of kinship system, which is functionally associated with matrilineal sibs, and that they shifted to an Omaha system only in relatively recent times in consequence of close contacts with Central Algonkian tribes like the Shawnee, who are patrilineal and possess kinship systems of Omaha type Presumably, the Yuchi have changed too recently for the integrative process to have run its course Thus, the apparent exception is not a real one, and the principle is not negated An hypothesis, all of whose seeming exceptions can

[13] G Wagner, "Yuchi," *Handbook of American Indian Languages*, III, 339–340, New York, 1934

[14] F G Speck, "Eggan's Yuchi Kinship Interpretations," *Amer Anthropol*, n s, XLI (1939), 171–172

be explained in some such fashion as this, may be regarded as finally validated — subject always, of course, to correction as new evidence comes in

The Cross-Cultural Survey, it may be said in conclusion, is designed to contribute in several ways to scientific research in the disciplines concerned with cultural phenomena It can answer specific questions of fact with a minimum of time-wasting labor. It can reveal gaps in the ethnographical record and thus suggest what groups should be restudied and what hitherto unreported data should be gathered in the field It can subject existing theoretical hypotheses about collective human behavior to a quantitative test, and can be used to formulate and verify new social science generalizations In short, it should prove helpful in nearly every type of research requiring an organized and classified body of cultural materials

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORES *

William Graham Sumner

The mores have the authority of facts The mores come down to us from the past. Each individual is born into them as he is born into the atmosphere, and he does not reflect on them, or criticise them any more than a baby analyzes the atmosphere before he begins to breathe it. Each one is subjected to the influence of the mores, and formed by them, before he is capable of reasoning about them It may be objected that nowadays, at least, we criticise all traditions, and accept none just because they are handed down to us If we take up cases of things which are still entirely or almost entirely in the mores, we shall see that this is not so There are sects of free-lovers amongst us who want to discuss pair marriage They are not simply people of evil life. They invite us to discuss rationally our inherited customs and ideas as to marriage, which, they say, are by no means so excellent and elevated as we believe. They have never won any serious attention. Some others want to argue in favor of polygamy on grounds of expediency They fail to obtain a hearing Others want to discuss property In spite of some literary activity on their part, no discussion of property, bequest, and inheritance has ever been opened Property and marriage are in the mores. Nothing can ever change them but the unconscious and imperceptible movement of the mores Religion was originally a matter of the mores It became a societal institution and a function of the state It has now to a great extent been put back into the mores Since laws with penalties to enforce religious creeds or practices have gone out of use any one may think and act as he pleases about religion Therefore it is not now "good form" to attack religion. Infidel publications are now tabooed by the mores, and are more effectually repressed than ever before They produce no controversy Democracy is in our American mores It is a product of our physical and economic conditions It is impossible to discuss or criticise it It is glorified for

* W G Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn & Company, Boston, 1906, pp 78–108 Reprinted by permission of the publisher

popularity, and is a subject of dithyrambic rhetoric No one treats it with complete candor and sincerity. No one dares to analyze it as he would aristocracy or autocracy He would get no hearing and would only incur abuse. The thing to be noticed in all these cases is that the masses oppose a deaf ear to every argument against the mores. It is only in so far as things have been transferred from the mores into laws and positive institutions that there is discussion about them or rationalizing upon them The mores contain the norm by which, if we should discuss the mores, we should have to judge the mores. We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and breathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe, and they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The justification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition, custom, and habit The mores contain embodied in them notions, doctrines, and maxims, but they are facts They are in the present tense They have nothing to do with what ought to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not now

Blacks and whites in southern society In our southern states, before the civil war, whites and blacks had formed habits of action and feeling towards each other They lived in peace and concord, and each one grew up in the ways which were traditional and customary The civil war abolished legal rights and left the two races to learn how to live together under other relations than before. The whites have never been converted from the old mores Those who still survive look back with regret and affection to the old social usages and customary sentiments and feelings The two races have not yet made new mores Vain attempts have been made to control the new order by legislation. The only result is the proof that legislation cannot make mores. We see also that mores do not form under social convulsion and discord. It is only just now that the new society seems to be taking shape. There is a trend in the mores now as they begin to form under the new state of things. It is not at all what the humanitarians hoped and expected The two races are separating more than ever before. The strongest point in the new code seems to be that any white man is boycotted and despised if he "associates with negroes" Some are anxious to interfere and try to control. They take their stand on ethical views of what is going on It is evidently impossible for any one to interfere We are like spectators at a great natural convulsion The results will be such as the facts and forces call for We cannot foresee them They do not depend on ethical views any more than the volcanic eruption on Martinique contained an ethical element All the faiths, hopes, energies, and sacrifices of both whites and blacks are components in the new construction of folkways by which the two races will learn how to live together As we go along with the constructive process it is very plain that what once was, or what any one thinks ought to be, but slightly affects what, at any moment, is The mores which once were are a memory Those which any one thinks ought to be are a dream The only thing with which we can deal are those which are

The mores are unrecorded A society is never conscious of its mores until it comes in contact with some other society which has different mores, or until, in higher civilization, it gets information by literature The latter operation, however, affects only the literary classes, not the masses, and society never consciously sets about the task of making mores. In the early stages mores are elastic and plastic; later they become rigid and fixed. They seem

to grow up, gain strength, become corrupt, decline, and die, as if they were organisms. The phases seem to follow each other by an inherent necessity, and as if independent of the reason and will of the men affected, but the changes are always produced by a strain towards better adjustment of the mores to conditions and interests of the society, or of the controlling elements in it. A society does not record its mores in its annals, because they are to it unnoticed and unconscious. When we try to learn the mores of any age or people we have to seek our information in incidental references, allusions, observations of travelers, etc. Generally works of fiction, drama, etc., give us more information about the mores than historical records. It is very difficult to construct from the Old Testament a description of the mores of the Jews before the captivity It is also very difficult to make a complete and accurate picture of the mores of the English colonies in North America in the seventeenth century. The mores are not recorded for the same reason that meals, going to bed, sunrise, etc., are not recorded, unless the regular course of things is broken.

Inertia and rigidity of the mores We see that we must conceive of the mores as a vast system of usages, covering the whole of life, and serving all its interests; also containing in themselves their own justification by tradition and use and wont, and approved by mystic sanctions until, by rational reflection, they develop their own philosophical and ethical generalizations, which are elevated into "principles" of truth and right. They coerce and restrict the newborn generation. They do not stimulate to thought, but the contrary. The thinking is already done and is embodied in the mores They never contain any provision for their own amendment. They are not questions, but answers, to the problem of life. They present themselves as final and unchangeable, because they present answers which are offered as "the truth" No world philosophy, until the modern scientific world philosophy, and that only within a generation or two, has ever presented itself as perhaps transitory, certainly incomplete, and liable to be set aside to-morrow by more knowledge. No popular world philosophy or life policy ever can present itself in that light It would cost too great a mental strain. All the groups whose mores we consider far inferior to our own are quite as well satisfied with theirs as we are with ours The goodness or badness of mores consists entirely in their adjustment to the life conditions and the interests of the time and place Therefore it is a sign of ease and welfare when no thought is given to the mores, but all cooperate in them instinctively The nations of southeastern Asia show us the persistency of the mores, when the element of stability and rigidity in them becomes predominant. Ghost fear and ancestor worship tend to establish the persistency of the mores by dogmatic authority, strict taboo, and weighty sanctions. The mores then lose their naturalness and vitality. They are stereotyped. They lose all relation to expediency. They become an end in themselves. They are imposed by imperative authority without regard to interests or conditions (caste, child marriage, widows). When any society falls under the dominion of this disease in the mores it must disintegrate before it can live again In that diseased state of the mores all learning consists in committing to memory the words of the sages of the past who established the formulae of the mores. Such words are "sacred writings," a sentence of which is a rule of conduct to be obeyed quite independently of present interests, or of any rational considerations.

Persistency. Asiatic fixity of the mores is extreme, but the element of persistency

in the mores it is always characteristic of them. They are elastic and tough, but when once established in familiar and continued use they resist change. They give stability to the social order when they are well understood, regular, and undisputed. In a new colony, with a sparse population, the mores are never fixed and stringent. There is great "liberty." As the colony always has traditions of the mores of the mother country, which are cherished with respect but are never applicable to the conditions of a colony, the mores of a colony are heterogeneous and are always in flux That is because the colonists are all the time learning to live in a new country and have no traditions to guide them, the traditions of the old country being a hindrance Any one bred in a new country, if he goes to an old country, feels the "conservatism" in its mores He thinks the people stiff, set in their ways, stupid, and unwilling to learn. They think him raw, brusque, and uncultivated He does not know the ritual, which can be written in no books, but knowledge of which, acquired by long experience, is the mark of fit membership in the society

Persistency in spite of change of religion Matthews saw votive effigies in Mandan villages just like those which Catlin had seen and put into his pictures seventy years before[1] In the meantime the Mandans had been nearly exterminated by war and disease and the remnant of them had been civilized and Christianized The mores of the Central American Indians inculcate moderation and restraint. Their ancient religion contained prescriptions of that character, and those prescriptions are still followed after centuries of life under Christianity[2] In the Bible we may see the strife between old mores and a new religious system two or three times repeated. The so-called Mosaic system superseded an older system of mores common, as it appears, to all the Semites of western Asia. The prophets preached a reform of the Jahveh religion and we find them at war with the inherited mores.[3] The most striking feature of the story of the prophets is their antagonism to the mores which the people would not give up Monotheism was not established until after the captivity.[4] The recurrence, vitality, popularity, and pervasiveness of traditional mores are well shown in the Bible story. The result was a combination of ritual monotheism with survivals of ancient mores and a popular religion in which demonism was one of the predominant elements. The New Testament represents a new revival and reform of the religion The Jews to this day show persistency of ancient mores. Christianity was a new adjustment of both heathen and Jewish mores to a new religious system The popular religion once more turned out to be a grand revival of demonism. The masses retained their mores with little change. The mores overruled the religion Therefore Jewish Christians and heathen Christians remained distinguishable for centuries. The Romans never could stamp out the child sacrifices of the Carthaginians[5] The Roman law was an embodiment of all the art of living and the mores of the Roman people It differed from the mores of the German peoples, and when by the religion the Roman system was brought to German people conflict was produced. In fact, it may be said that the process of remolding German mores by the Roman law never was completed,[6] and that now the German mores have risen against the Roman

[1] *Amer Anthrop* IV, 3
[2] *Globus* LXXVII 130
[3] "Religion of Israel," Hastings, *Dict*, Supp vol
[4] Tiele, *Relig in Alterthum*, I, 295
[5] *Ibid*, 242
[6] Stammler, *Stellung der Frauen*, 3

law and have accepted out of it only what has been freely and rationally selected. Marriage amongst the German nations was a domestic and family function. Even after the hierocratic system was firmly established, it was centuries before the ecclesiastics could make marriage a clerical function [7] In the usages of German peasants to-day may be found numerous survivals of heathen notions and customs.[8] In England the German mores accepted only a limited influence from the Roman law The English have adopted the policy of the Romans in dealing with subject peoples. They do not meddle with local customs if they can avoid it. This is wise, since nothing nurses discontent like interference with folkways The persistency of the mores is often shown in survivals, — senseless ceremonies, whose meaning is forgotten, jests, play, parody, and caricature, or stereotyped words and phrases, or even in cakes of a prescribed form or prescribed foods at certain festivals . . .

Variability. No less remarkable than the persistency of the mores is their changeableness and variation. There is here an interesting parallel to heredity and variation in the organic world, even though the parallel has no significance. Variation in the mores is due to the fact that children do not perpetuate the mores just as they received them The father dies, and the son whom he has educated, even if he continues the ritual and repeats the formulae, does not think and feel the same ideas and sentiments as his father The observance of Sunday, the mode of treating parents, children, servants, and wives of husbands, holidays, amusements; arts of luxury; marriage and divorce; wine drinking — are matters in regard to which it is easy to note changes in the mores from generation to generation, in our own times. Even in Asia, when a long period of time is taken into account, changes in the mores are perceptible. The mores change because conditions and interests change. It is found that dogmas and maxims which have been current do not verify; that established taboos are useless or mischievous restraints; that usages which are suitable for a village or a colony are not suitable for a great city or state, that many things are fitting when the community is rich which were not so when it was poor, that new inventions have made new ways of living more economical and healthful. It is necessary to prosperity that the mores should have a due degree of firmness, but also that they should be sufficiently elastic and flexible to conform to changes in interests and life conditions. A herding or an agricultural people, if it moves into a new country, rich in game, may revert to a hunting life. The Tunguses and Yakuts did so as they moved northwards [9] In the early days of the settlement of North America many whites "Indianized", they took to the mode of life of Indians. The Iranians separated from the Indians of Hindostan and became agriculturists. They adopted a new religion and new mores Men who were afraid of powerful enemies have taken to living in trees, lake dwellings, caves, and joint houses Mediaeval serfdom was due to the need of force to keep the peasant on his holding, when the holding was really a burden to him in view of the dues which he must pay He would have run away if he had not been kept by force In the later Middle Ages the villain had a valuable right and property in his holding Then he wanted security of tenure so that he could not be driven away from it. In the early period it was the duty of the lord to kill the game and protect the peasant's crops In the later period it became the monopoly right of the lord to kill game Thus the

[7] Friedberg, *Recht der Eheschliessung*

[8] *Ztsft f. Volkskunde,* XI, 272.

[9] Hiekisch, *Thugusen,* 31, Sieroshevski, *Yakuty,* I, 415

life conditions vary. The economic conjuncture varies. The competition of life varies. The interests vary with them. The mores all conform, unless they have been fixed by dogmas with mystic sanctions so that they are ritual obligations, as is, in general, the case now in southeastern Asia. The rights of the parties, and the right and wrong of conduct, after the mores have conformed to new life conditions, are new deductions. The philosophers follow with their systems by which they try to construe the whole new order of acts and thoughts with reference to some thought fabric which they put before the mores, although it was found out after the mores had established the relations In the case in which the fixed mores do not conform to new interests and needs crises arise. Moses, Zoroaster, Manu, Solon, Lycurgus, and Numa are either mythical or historical culture heroes, who are said to have solved such crises by new "laws," and set the society in motion again The fiction of the intervention of a god or a hero is necessary to account for a reconstruction of the mores of the ancestors without crime.

Mores of New England The Puritan code of early New England has been almost entirely abandoned, so far as its positive details are concerned, while at the same time some new restrictions on conduct have been introduced especially as to the use of spirituous liquors, so that not all the changes have been in the way of relaxation. The mores of New England, however, still show deep traces of the Puritan temper and world philosophy Perhaps nowhere else in the world can so strong an illustration be seen both of the persistency of the spirit of the mores and of their variability and adaptability The mores of New England have extended to a large immigrant population and have won large control over them. They have also been carried to the new states by immigrants, and their perpetuation there is an often-noticed phenomenon. The extravagances in doctrine and behavior of the seventeenth-century Puritans have been thrown off and their code of morals has been shorn of its angularity, but their life policy and standards have become to a very large extent those of the civilized world.

Revolution. In higher civilization crises produced by the persistency of old mores after conditions have changed are solved by revolution or reform. In revolutions the mores are broken up. Such was the case in the sixteenth century, in the French Revolution of 1789, and in minor revolutions A period follows the outburst of a revolution in which there are no mores. The old are broken up; the new are not formed. The social ritual is interrupted The old taboos are suspended New taboos cannot be enacted or promulgated They require time to become established and known The masses in a revolution are uncertain what they ought to do. In France, under the old regime, the social ritual was very complete and thoroughly established. In the revolution, the destruction of this ritual produced social anarchy. In the best case every revolution must be attended by this temporary chaos of the mores It was produced in the American colonies. Revolutionary leaders expect to carry the people over to new mores by the might of two or three dogmas of political or social philosophy The history of every such attempt shows that dogmas do not make mores Every revolution suffers a collapse at the point where reconstruction should begin. Then the old ruling classes resume control, and by the use of force set the society in its old grooves again. The ecclesiastical revolution of the sixteenth century resulted in a wreck whose discordant fragments we have inherited It left us a Christendom, half of which is obscurantist and half sci-

entific; half is ruled by the Jesuits and half is split up into wrangling sects. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century was reversed when it undertook to reconstruct the mores of the English people. The French revolutionists tried to abolish all the old mores and to replace them by products of speculative philosophy. The revolution was, in fact, due to a great change in conditions, which called for new mores, and so far as the innovations met this demand they became permanent and helped to create a conviction of the beneficence of revolution Napoleon abolished many innovations and put many things in the old train again. Many other things have changed name and face, but not character. Many innovations have been half assimilated. Some interests have never yet been provided for.

Possibility of modifying mores. The combination in the mores of persistency and variability determines the extent to which it is possible to modify them by arbitrary action. It is not possible to change them, by any artifice or device, to a great extent, or suddenly, or in any essential element; it is possible to modify them by slow and long-continued effort if the ritual is changed by minute variations The German emperor Frederick II was the most enlightened ruler of the Middle Ages He was a modern man in temper and ideas. He was a statesman and he wanted to make the empire into a real state of the absolutist type All the mores of his time were ecclesiastical and hierocratic. He dashed himself to pieces against them Those whom he wanted to serve took the side of the papacy against him He became the author of the laws by which the civil institutions of the time were made to serve ecclesiastical domination. He carried the purpose of the crusades to a higher degree of fulfillment than they ever reached otherwise, but this brought him no credit or peace. The same drift in the mores of the time bore down the Albigenses when they denounced the church corporation, the hierarchy, and the papacy. The pope easily stirred up all Europe against them. The current opinion was that every state must be a Christian state according to the mores of the time. The people could not conceive of a state which could answer its purpose if it was not such. But a "Christian state" meant one which was in harmony with the pope and the ecclesiastical organization. This demand was not affected by the faults of the organization, or the corruption and venality of the hierarchy. The popes of the thirteenth century rode upon this tide, overwhelming opposition and consolidating their power. In our times the state is charged with the service of a great number of interests which were then intrusted to the church. It is against our mores that ecclesiastics should interfere with those interests. There is no war on religion. Religion is recognized as an interest by itself, and is treated with more universal respect than ever before, but it is regarded as occupying a field of its own, and if there should be an attempt in its name to encroach on any other domain, it would fail, because it would be against the mores of our time. . . .

Dissent from the mores, group orthodoxy. Since it appears that the old mores are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and needs to which they were adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth, and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to healthful life, it follows that free and rational criticism of traditional mores is essential to societal welfare We have seen that the inherited mores exert a coercion on every one born in the group It follows that only the greatest and best can react against the mores so as to modify them It is by no means to be inferred that every one who sets himself at war

with the traditional mores is a hero of social correction and amelioration The trained reason and conscience never have heavier tasks laid upon them than where questions of conformity to, or dissent from, the mores are raised. It is by the dissent and free judgment of the best reason and conscience that the mores win flexibility and automatic readjustment Dissent is always unpopular in the group Groups form standards of orthodoxy as to the "principles" which each member must profess and the ritual which each must practice. Dissent seems to imply a claim of superiority. It evokes hatred and persecution. Dissenters are rebels, traitors, and heretics We see this in all kinds of subgroups Noble and patrician classes, merchants, artisans, religious and philosophical sects, political parties, academies and learned societies, punish by social penalties dissent from, or disobedience to, their code of group conduct The modern trades union, in its treatment of a "scab," only presents another example. The group also, by a majority, adopts a programme of policy and then demands of each member that he shall work and make sacrifices for what has been resolved upon for the group interest He who refuses is a renegade or apostate with respect to the group doctrines and interests. He who adopts the mores of another group is a still more heinous criminal. The mediaeval definition of a heretic was one who varied in life and conversation, dress, speech, or manner (that is, the social ritual) from the ordinary members of the Christian community The first meaning of "Catholic" in the fourth century was a summary of the features which were common to all Christians in social and ecclesiastical behavior, those were Catholic who conformed to the mores which were characteristic of Christians [10] If a heretic was better than the Catholics, they hated him more. That never excused him before the church authorities. They wanted loyalty to the ecclesiastical corporation Persecution of a dissenter is always popular in the group which he has abandoned. Toleration of dissent is no sentiment of the masses. . . .

Antagonism between an individual and the mores. The case of dissent from the mores, which was considered above, is the case in which the individual voluntarily sets himself in antagonism to the mores of the society There are cases in which the individual finds himself in involuntary antagonism to the mores of the society, or of some subgroup to which he belongs. If a man passes from one class to another, his acts show the contrast between the mores in which he was bred and those in which he finds himself The satirists have made fun of the parvenu for centuries. His mistakes and misfortunes reveal the nature of the mores, their power over the individual, their pertinacity against later influences, the confusion in character produced by changing them, and the grip of habit which appears both in the persistence of old mores and the weakness of new ones. Every emigrant is forced to change his mores. He loses the sustaining help of use and wont He has to acquire a new outfit of it. The traveler also experiences the change from life in one set of mores to life in another The experience gives him the best power to criticise his native mores from a standpoint outside of them In the North American colonies white children were often stolen by Indians and brought up by them in their ways Whether they would later, if opportunity offered, return to white society and white mores, or would prefer to remain with the Indians, seems to have depended on the age at which they were captured. Missionaries have often taken men of low civilization out of the society in which they were born, have educated

[10] Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* (3d ed), I, 319

them, and taught them white men's mores. If a single clear and indisputable case could be adduced in which such a person was restored to his own people and did not revert to their mode of life, it would be a very important contribution to ethnology. We are forced to believe that, if a baby born in New England was taken to China and given to a Chinese family to rear and educate, he would become a Chinaman in all which belongs to the mores, that is to say, in his character, conduct, and code of life.

THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT "MORES" *

Gunnar Myrdal

We must voice our grave skepticism toward the simple explanatory scheme concerning the role of valuations in social life typified by William Graham Sumner's concepts, "folkways" and "mores"[1] Since his time these concepts — or one of their several synonyms — have been widely used by social scientists and have, in particular, determined the approach to the Negro problem. The formula will be found to be invoked with some regularity whenever an author expresses his attitude that changes will be slow, or, more particularly, that nothing practical can be done about a matter. It is closely related to a bias in social science against induced changes, and especially against all attempts to intervene in the social process by legislation. The concept of mores actually implies a whole social theory and an entire *laissez-faire* ("do-nothing") metaphysics, and is so utilized.

Leaving aside for the present the political connotations of Sumner's construction, and focusing our interest only on its usefulness as a scientific tool, our main criticism is the following: By stowing the commonly held valuations into the system of mores, conceived of as a homogeneous, unproblematic, fairly static,[2] social entity, the investigator is likely to underestimate the actual difference between individuals and groups and the actual fluctuations and changes in time He is also likely to lose sight entirely of the important facts, that even within a single individual valuations are operative on different planes of generality, that they are typically conflicting, and that behavior is regularly the outcome of a moral compromise.

It might be that Sumner's construction contains a valid generalization and offers a useful methodological tool for studying primitive cultures and isolated, stationary folk-communities under the spell of magic and sacred tradition It might even be that the most convenient definition of such a folk-culture is the applicability of the theory of folkways and mores. The

[1] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (1911, first edition 1906)

[2] Sumner recognized a "strain toward consistency" within the mores because of conflicting principles, but his main emphasis — and the same is true when the concept is used by contemporary writers — is always upon stability, inertia, and resistance against induced change

* Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1944, pp 1031–34. Reprinted by permission of the publisher

theory is, however, crude and misleading when applied to a modern Western society in process of rapid industrialization, moving in swift trends rippled by indeterminate cyclical waves: a society characterized by national and international mobility, by unceasing changes and differentiations of all valuations and institutions, by spreading intellectualization, by widening intellectual communication and secularization, by ever more daring discussion even of fundamentals and intimacies, and by a consequent virtually universal expectation of change and a firm belief in progress. If Sumner's construction is applied to such a society, except as a contrast conception to mark off some remaining backward cultural isolates which are merely dragged along and do not themselves contain the active factors of social dynamics, it is likely to conceal more than to expose. It conceals what is most important in our society the changes, the conflicts, the absence of static equilibria, the lability in all relations even when they are temporarily, though perhaps for decades, held at a standstill The valuation spheres, in such a society as the American, more nearly resemble powder-magazines than they do Sumner's concept of mores

VALUATION DYNAMICS

In our view, changes in valuations — of the type known as "revolutions," "mutations," or "explosions" — are likely to occur continuously in modern society "Stability," or rather lack of change, when it reigns, is the thing which requires explanation Individual persons in modern society are in the same sort of labile equilibrium as the molecules of explosives Their valuations are inconsistent, and they are constantly reminded of the inconsistency Occasionally the moral personalities of individuals burst, and a modification and rearrangement of the valuations in the direction of a more stable equilibrium is accomplished.

Since similar influences work upon all individuals in the society, the cumulative results include continuous changes of "public opinion." Such changes are "intentional," in a sense, and part of a democratic development. The trend of opinions and changes in institutions in a democracy — "the reforms" — usually have their core in the cumulation of such valuation explosions in the minds of people. When the inconsistency between people's valuations is large and has effectively been exposed, the change might occasionally be sudden and quite big, and we speak then of a social revolution But the more evolutionary social changes, if they are dissected into their elements, are not very different except in magnitude

The history of every nation and of every community, in fact, of every group, is, in one sense, the record of the successive waves of such opinion explosions Even societies have their catharses and, like individuals, they have them almost all the time It is the weakness, not only of the static and fatalistic traditions in social science attached to the great names of Marx and Sumner, but of our common tendency to look for explanations in terms only of natural forces and material trends, that we blind ourselves to the dynamics of opinion as it develops from day to day; or, in any case, we become inclined to deal with human opinions more as the result of social change than as part of the cause of it.

By stressing that opinions are not passive elements in the social process, we have, of course, not meant to make them altogether independent of material forces The very fact that opinions to an extent are opportunistic implies that they will change as a result of every other change in social environment Changes in the technique of production, of communica-

tion and of consumption force individual and group revaluations. But so, also, does spread of knowledge, as well as moral discussion and political propaganda. Ideas have a momentum of their own; they are partly primary causes in the social process; or rather, they are integral factors in an interdependent system of causation. . . .

Before leaving the subject of social dynamics, we must qualify our remarks to recognize the existence of social statics. By stressing the instability of valuations we do not deny that there is an enormous amount of resistance to change There *is* a great deal of practically mechanistic causation in human life, almost completely divorced from valuations. People do strive to keep their valuation conflicts under control They want to keep them off their minds, and they are trained to overlook them. Conventions, stereotypes, and convenient blind spots in knowledge about social reality do succeed in preserving a relative peace in people's conscience Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that there are only a few hours a day free from the business of living, and that there are so many "pleasant" things to do during these few hours Most people, most of the time, live a routine life from day to day and do not worry too much. If it could be measured, the amount of both simple and opportune ignorance and unconcernedness about social affairs would undoubtedly be greater than the amount of knowledge and concern

But to stress these things is not to invalidate the dynamic theory we have presented. Modern people *do* have conflicting valuations, and the spread of knowledge and the increase of interrelations *are* more and more exposing them Changes in the material environment also keep minds from becoming settled If we call the relative absence of change in modern society "stability," we must recognize that it is not such as is envisaged in the theory of the folkways and mores. There is *instability* at bottom, a *balancing of forces in conflict with each other,* and there is continuously the possibility of rapid, and even induced, change, the direction of which is not altogether predetermined by trends and natural forces

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Gillin, J L and Gillin, J P, *An Introduction to Sociology,* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942 More so than do most introductory textbooks in sociology, this text shows that cultural factors must be of direct rather than merely incidental concern in sociological analysis Note especially Chapters 6 and 7

2 Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man,* D Appleton-Century, New York, 1936 There is no better introduction to the study of society and culture than this well-known book It is cited here for its incisive chapters (6, 16, 17, 20–26) on various aspects of culture

3 Malinowski, Bronislaw, "Culture as a Determinant of Behavior," *Factors Determining Behavior,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1937, pp 133–68 Using concrete materials for illustrative purposes, Malinowski demonstrates the existence of laws of culture and shows how culture satisfies the organic needs of man, gives rise to instrumental imperatives, and implies the integrative principles of knowledge, religion, ethics, and magical technique

4 Parsons, Talcott, "The Position of Sociological Theory," *American Sociological Review,* April, 1948, pp 156–64 This article is useful in indicating the place of the concept of culture among the components of systematic sociological theory

5 Sirjamaki, John, "Culture Configurations in the American Family," *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1948, pp 464–70 Certain concepts or generalizations we have dealt with pertaining to the nature of culture are brought into the focus of a familiar setting in this article, which analyzes the American family from a point of view not commonly used by sociologists

6 White, L A, "Culturological Vs Psychological Interpretations of Human Behavior," *American Sociological Review,* December, 1947, pp 686–98 The author supplies an antidote for widely held and mistaken psychological interpretations of human behavior He attempts to refute

leading anthropologists and sociologists as well as others who regard culture simply as a dependent variable

7 Wissler, Clark, *Man and Culture,* Thomas Y Crowell Company, New York, 1923 Relevant for its generalized discussion of the meaning of culture, the form and content of culture, and the relation of culture to man, this book defines and illustrates such concepts as trait, complex, area, universal pattern, and other analytical terms of basic importance.

8 See also Lowie, "Theory of Culture," p 87 Benedict, "The Diversity of Cultures," p 120, Malinowski, "The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis," p 168, Linton, "Status and Role," p 211 Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," p 223, Tomars, "Rural Survivals in American Urban Life," p 371, Heberle, "A Sociological Interpretation of Social Change in the South," p 804

3. Cultural Change

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Most sociologists have long since abandoned the quest for remote cultural origins and along with it the evolutionary perspective which assumed a neatly arrayed development of culture in universal stages from lower to higher forms. Such speculation may be of interest and possible significance but it has no immediate relevance to distinctly sociological problems Sociological interest in cultural dynamics is primarily structural and functional rather than historical, and for our purposes it is sufficient to postulate that culture must have begun when man developed symbols.

As was noted earlier, culture is a dynamic rather than a static entity, and hence it undergoes changes as it spreads in space and shows modifications with the passage of time. The cumulative nature of culture, or its tendency toward greater mass and complexity, has been widely commented on, particularly with regard to the progressive acceleration of this tendency in the growth of factual knowledge and the increased rate of technological advancement. It has also been observed that many known cultures no longer exist as entities; most of the twenty-one civilizations described in Toynbee's *A Study of History,* for example, are extinct. Yet many of the basic features of these bygone cultures survive in other cultures, so that some cultural traits and complexes outlast the societies which originated them.

Why does culture change? Although numerous single factors may account for minor changes in culture, seldom may the cause for a major change be traced solely to one point. The movement of culture in space and time is affected by so many circumstances, as Lowie points out in his "Theory of Culture," that its course can not be predicted with any certainty. Alterations in the natural environment, such as soil erosion, climatic shifts, and depletion of resources may cause a culture to deviate from what would have been its normal course Changes in population density, in age distribution, epidemic diseases, and various other biological and demographic factors may bring about cultural modifications. Many of these causes of change may come into existence independently of the culture itself, but once effected, such circumstances produce what Lowie calls retrogression (reversion to a lower cultural or living level), or else they result in compensatory gains through ingenious adaptations.

Culture itself generates changes. Inventions and discoveries are both causes and results of change and illustrate the thesis that the complex aspects of culture usually stand in a mutual rather than a one-sided relationship. Some cultural changes are purely fortuitous (i.e., the result of historical accidents), others are deliberately

induced, and still others — unless deliberately forestalled — come as normal but usually unforeseen and uncontrolled developments. Many cultural ways have no relation whatsoever to the biological needs of man and some are actually inimical to individual well-being and societal survival. (Consider warfare, which appears to be a concomitant of nationalism.) On the whole, however, the basic features of culture serve useful and generally approved ends, and cultural change is certainly not haphazard.

Lowie's article bears principally upon the question: How does culture change? In discussing the idea of progress he points out that advancement is discernible only in certain spheres where goals can be specified and the degree of their attainment objectively appraised. Thus, for supporting a dense population farming is clearly superior to hunting and a mixed economy to farming, in most regions. But can it be claimed that the same logic applies in those spheres where purposes are more diffuse? Is cubism superior to realism in art? Is the contemporary cultural patterning of the modern family desirable or undesirable? If one must evaluate whole cultures, what conclusions are to be reached concerning the fact that the Pygmy hunters of Africa are monogamous and monotheistic, while their economically and technologically advanced Negro neighbors are not? Lowie's conclusion is that "progress can be objectively established only for the rational aspects of culture," and that in these fields mankind as a whole has advanced, but that for the nonrational aspects subjective estimates only are possible.

When he takes up certain other aspects of cultural dynamics, Lowie unfortunately uses the misleading term, "Psychological Problems," with regard to the distinctly anthropological and sociological problems he analyzes in the processes of diffusion, parallelism, and stability. His demonstrations of these processes, however, are valid in showing how new elements get into a culture. Also, his remarks on individual variability indicate that individual members of primitive societies as well as those of civilized societies are not culturally controlled marionettes, but that skeptics, deviants, and innovators exist among the participants in all cultures.

The frequently quoted excerpt from Linton illustrates incisively the results of the process of diffusion. Linton shows that in our society borrowing as a form of diffusion is more important than independent discovery and invention as a source of cultural elements, and suggests that this is true of all existing cultures. Diffusion occurs in both time and space, and is certain to take place "wherever two societies and cultures have been brought into contact." The short selection we have included here does not specify how this happens, but our third selection, Gillin's "Parallel Cultures and the Inhibitions to Acculturation in a Guatemalan Community" does give a detailed description and analysis of the coincidence of two cultures within the same limited area.

Such coincidence has occurred repeatedly. In Gillin's article the two peoples are American Indians and Ladinos (individuals of Spanish descent), and thus exemplify the world-wide problem of European-native cultural relations. Gillin shows that, despite much overlapping of traits, the two configurations of culture

are distinguishable, and through objective procedures, conveyed in the statistics presented, he rather precisely indicates the amount and kind of acculturation. Modes of dress, food habits, and lexical evidence are used as the principal indexes.

Contrary to the prevailing notion that relatively simple native cultures yield at all points under the impact of more advanced cultures, Gillin's observations and conclusions indicate that acculturation takes place only under certain specified conditions. This, the main significance of his findings, answers the question as to why after several centuries of contact the process of acculturation has not proceeded further He presents carefully drawn-up theorems which state in brief that a group will not discard satisfactory old customs and will not accept and perform new customs unless the latter are adequately tied in with existing or induced wants, and unless they are more satisfying than the older customs. Still another qualifying factor is that if the obstacles to acculturation are not removed the two sets of customs will persist indefinitely.

Gillin points out that a number of customs are exchanged between the two groups, but that nearly all of them are "actional" customs (uses of objects which require no verbal interpretation), especially among the Indians, most of whom cannot take on customs whose use requires literacy Gillin also shows in this study how it is possible, by using fairly precise methods of investigation and working out definite formulas, to determine the conditions necessary for effecting or preventing the accomplishment of a specified objective As the author states, "on the basis of such analysis, cultural 'planning' or 'engineering' might well be possible, not only in theory, but also in practice"

To avoid the erroneous impression that culture contact and interpenetration are confined to what occurs between simple and complex cultures, however, it should be stated that similar processes occur between highly advanced cultures. Many Western ways penetrated Japan prior to World War II, and the process has been rapidly accelerated by military occupation since the war Or, to use another contemporary example, central Europe is now a focal point of rival efforts for the penetration of political forms into highly advanced cultures.

In addition to the consideration of why and how culture changes and the processes which facilitate or retard the introduction of new elements, there are basic problems concerning the direction and rate of cultural change Linear hypotheses of cultural development (e.g, universal stages, progress, simplicist evolutionary schemes) have never been fully substantiated by data and apparently cannot be proved scientifically. Lowie and others have pointed out various fallacies in such hypotheses Such notions necessarily imply a known and desirable objective for culture *per se,* and further, that by and large civilization has moved, is moving, and will move in the direction of this objective Likewise, there have been those who have tried to prove that culture moves in a cyclical manner, or that it observes certain rhythms, periodicities, and other regularities. Certain sequences and periodicities in special compartments of culture (e g, fashion) have been demonstrated, but for whole patterns of culture such theories are highly speculative.

Problems concerning the rate of cultural change in the large and the relative integration in rate of change of its various components have on the whole been dealt with in a less philosophic and more matter-of-fact way. In attempting to break down the varied aspects of culture and to establish their differential rates of change, Ogburn and others have tried to draw a distinction between material culture and nonmaterial culture. Ogburn's contention that the material culture always changes more rapidly than the nonmaterial and hence often creates a maladjustment known as a "lag" has attracted a great amount of attention and has had a widespread and influential though largely uncritical acceptance among social scientists. The theory appears to be very plausible until one examines it closely (see Merton's article in the list of annotated references for this chapter). To avoid the difficulties inherent in the somewhat illogical dichotomy of material and nonmaterial culture, use of the term "civilization" has been suggested The term would be applied to those aspects of culture (e g, technology) where ends are empirically observable and criteria of means are specifically definable A Weber, MacIver, Merton, and others employ the term civilization largely in this sense, but since this special meaning may be confused with the everyday use of the word we shall avoid it.

Most anthropologists and sociologists prefer to continue using the term culture in the conventional, technical sense, and to consider civilization as a highly developed, complex kind of culture In spite of frequent ambiguities in application of the terms material and nonmaterial culture, or civilization and culture, these special terminologies may be useful in noting the differential rates of change among the various aspects of culture From this it does not follow, of course, that there are no other distinctions of any importance in cultural dynamics or that the problems of cultural change are all to be explained by the simple and sometimes inappropriate "lag theory" No culture is ever perfectly integrated, and change is often uneven among the various aspects, but the "whys" and "hows" of cultural change are hardly less complex than the nature of culture itself.

THEORY OF CULTURE *

Robert H. Lowie

Laws of Sequence. The fact that we can draw reasonable inferences as to the nature of the past and the comparative age of different phenomena does not mean that we are able to reconstruct the entire history of human civilization in all its details That would be possible only if culture developed uniformly according to a fixed law This, however, is contrary to experience Certain events do, indeed,

* Robert H Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,* Enlarged Edition (New York Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1940), pp 371–381 Reprinted by permission of the publisher

presuppose others, but frequently we can not reverse the proposition and infer that a certain consequence is bound to follow a particular antecedent Thus, bronze work is inconceivable except after experience with stone and other materials, but a Bronze Age is not an inevitable step, as shown by the instance of the Negroes who passed directly from stone to iron. This example is easily explained by contact with a people of blacksmiths who taught the stone-using Negroes to forge iron tools

Here we have the typical sort of disturbance which plays havoc with any long-range scheme of sequence Human societies have learnt from one another since very early times. As a result, even if there were a natural tendency for culture to pass through the same stages everywhere, that tendency would be constantly deflected by intrusive influences To take a hackneyed example, only through contact with more southerly peoples could the Indians of North Dakota have come to raise maize. Again, the Japanese may ultimately have developed along the same lines as Westerners, but there is no proof whatsoever that they would have done so. All we know is that their modern progress is due to intercourse with Europe and America.

It is particularly dangerous to infer a law of sequence from the events of a brief period Thus during the Nineteenth Century the literate nations of the world seemed to be evolving towards a greater measure of democracy and internationalism. This was, of course, largely due to the example of certain Western nations whose prestige impressed a similar pattern on others. But, even assuming that there was a general democratic trend, we see today in many countries the most violent reaction against the principles of democracy and cosmopolitanism.

Because of the extraordinary complexity of the relevant phenomena, regularities in culture history are very limited, and accordingly prediction becomes extremely hazardous.

Progress and Retrogression. The question of historical laws merges into that of progress. In how far are we warranted in recognizing an upward trend in human history? In order to answer this question we must first understand the crucial term. We rightly say that farming is superior to hunting because the purpose of an economic system is to provide a secure and ample food supply, and agriculture is potentially able to do that while hunting is not. Similarly, an iron ax chops down a tree more effectively than a stone hatchet does. Again, our control of nature has expanded through the accumulation of knowledge. Summarizing, we may say that in the strictly rational sphere of existence man has advanced because there the aims envisaged are clear and he has succeeded in accomplishing them, on the whole, more effectively with the lapse of time An outstanding factor in such development has been the possibility of specialization, which itself rests on an economic organization that permits some men to devote less time than their fellows to the production of food and other necessaries

But while it holds true that as a whole humanity has progressed from the early Old Stone Age in the rational phases of culture, particular eras and areas have experienced a decline. Impoverished Lapp herders have had to turn back to fishing, some Plains Indians have given up farming completely in favor of more intensive hunting. Sometimes there is only partial loss, with compensatory gains, as when South American Indians who migrate into a stoneless area lose the art of chipping but substitute others; or when Polynesians discard the bow for warfare while developing a series of other weapons.

Such instances of decadence, complete or partial, once more militate against the acceptance of a uniform law of development. All we can say is that mankind as a unit has in the long run progressed in technology and knowledge, but that geographical or other factors may arrest advancement and even cause actual loss in particular cases

Far more debatable is the question of progress in art, social organization, religion, and morality In these important fields there is no ascertainable norm that would be accepted by all men Everything hinges on whether the purpose of a feature is defined once and for all time. The purpose of an ax is to fell trees; but what is the purpose of art, communal life, belief, marriage? No tree chopper prefers a stone to an iron blade if he wants to accomplish his task as quickly and painlessly as possible, but whether a picture of living forms should aim at anatomical accuracy or ignore that for other kinds of aesthetic effect is a matter of taste Similarly, thinkers of equal prominence have written for and against democracy, while religious and ethical preferences are notoriously colored by personal attitudes. For example, the doctrine of the greatest good for the greatest number is spurned by philosophers with an aristocratic bias

One curious fact, however, may be noted with regard to religion and ethics. If we judge by those standards which are at least common among ourselves, there has not been a steady approach to them from their antithesis On the contrary, the simplest tribes often come closer to our norms than do peoples of intermediate complexity The Pygmy hunters of Africa, for instance, are monogamous and have monotheistic leanings, while their economically and technologically superior Negro neighbors practice polygamy and ancestor-worship

To sum up, progress can be objectively established only for the rational aspects of culture. In these fields the backward developments of particular epochs and peoples are outweighed by the advancement of mankind as a whole In the nonrational departments subjective estimates alone are possible, and if our norms are treated as definitive, there still is no regular sequence through earlier stages.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

In the immediately preceding sections the historical aspects of culture have been stressed, but actually every one of its phenomena is at the same time historical inasmuch as it is placed in time, and psychological because it is accompanied by mental processes of human beings. The very topics often treated as wholly historical may just as well receive attention with psychological emphasis.

Diffusion. Diffusion is not automatic when two groups come together, but selective hundreds of features might be borrowed, but only some are chosen The Japanese have taken over our science, not our ethics or our art, for their ancient equivalents were too deeply rooted. In general, if it fully meets their needs people prefer their indigenous feature to an innovation. The difference in reaction to the same possible loan often lies in the native equivalents. The Maori eagerly substituted the potato for their sweet potato as a manifestly superior crop, while the Chinese clung to rice as a more palatable and nutritious diet

The failure to adopt a trait may be due to sheer inability While friction matches have been readily taken over by primitive peoples, they can not, of course, borrow the match industry, which requires a much higher technological plane. On the other hand, people borrow an item if they can readily assimilate it to prior notions. Because the Polynesians reveled in pedigrees, the Hawaiians, to the astonishment

of early missionaries, committed to memory the genealogical tables in the Bible "and delight to repeat them as some of the choicest passages in Scripture." The Quechua of Bolivia assimilate the Holy Virgin to their old female Earth deity, and credit her with the invention of coca-chewing, while Brazilian aborigines identify Christ and St. Peter with Sun and Moon, respectively.

Such assimilation is never wholly passive and may involve considerable originality. The loan of the idea of riding a mount leads to experimentation and novel results; some Siberian varieties of reindeer are weak-backed, hence must be ridden by straddling the shoulders. Glazing spread to China from the West, but on this basis Chinese artificers created their wholly original porcelain. In about 1888 Wovoka, a Paviotso prophet, promised his tribe a reunion with their dead and for that purpose organized the Ghost Dance; by 1890 his restive and warlike disciples on the Plains had converted the message into a gospel for the destruction of the whites. In contemporary politics, the Germans have copied Mussolini's Fascist principles but have fused them with a race creed originally lacking in their model. Thus diffusion often implies a creative synthesis.

Psychic Unity. If diffusion is unintelligible without the mental processes of the recipients, the same holds for a uniform law of sequence. Only if human groups are at least roughly similar in psychology would similar results flow from the same causes. On the other hand, a certain "psychic unity of mankind" is quite as essential for diffusion, for the borrowers must grasp to some extent what they are to receive.

Psychic unity is thus a presupposition on either theory, and precisely because it underlies all cultural happenings it cannot explain *particular* phenomena, such as the sporadic occurrence of similar features in remote areas. If cross-cousin marriage in Fiji and in central California is due to psychic unity, we should have to suppose that these Californians are mentally nearer to the Fijians than to Northern Californians, an absurd assumption. Thus psychic unity is useless for interpreting specific facts of culture history, being rather a general postulate for all of them.

Parallelism versus Diffusion. Some scholars try to explain all resemblances between peoples by diffusion; they assume that man is basically so uninventive that he advances only by a lucky fluke that is most unlikely to be duplicated elsewhere.

The dogma of human uninventiveness monstrously exaggerates the correct view that men do not spontaneously and everywhere achieve adequate adjustments to their environment. The solitary instance of the bitter manioc suffices to disprove it, but there are many similar cases in which particular tribes must be hailed as the inventors because the trait in question occurs nowhere else on the face of the globe. Thus, in pre-Columbian times, though similar trees occurred also in Africa and Asia, only certain South Americans knew the properties of rubber, making balls and syringes from this material.

In addition, we have seen that borrowing may precipitate a truly creative process.

What the dogmatists overlook completely is that into many parallels the question of originality does not enter at all. Moieties, for instance, result simply when the clans of a tribe are reduced to two, and this is bound to happen if the original number of clans is small, so that a resemblance may evolve in remote areas without any creative act of the imagination.

Language provides convincing instances. The Greeks and the Shoshone Indians had a dual number, though no pos-

sible connection can be traced between their tongues, and when rice came to the notice of the Tsimshian (British Columbia) and the Crow (Montana), tribes in no way related, they independently labeled the new food "looking like maggots." But such analogies are precisely the essence of mythological concepts if two remote peoples can each hit on such a simile as the one just quoted, they are also able independently to compare the disappearance of the sun in an eclipse to that of a hero in a monster's maw

The primitive Messianic cults of the historic period yield incontrovertible evidence. Springing up in the most remote parts of the world, they display a welding of Christian and native beliefs, with remarkable resemblances in detail Thus Wovoka was identified with Christ, as had been a South American counterpart on the upper Rio Negro in about 1850, and a South African Messiah The return of the dead loomed large in the Papuan movement of 1919 no less than in the North American uprising of 1890, and so forth These several cults did not spread from one continent to another, they represent incontrovertibly independent developments with independent assimilation of Christian ideas

The sane position, then, with reference to the general moot problem is to shun a uniform explanation and to judge each case on its merits There has been plenty of diffusion in the history of culture, but there are likewise unchallengeable instances of independent development Accordingly, in any concrete instance either alternative is equally respectable until special evidence inclines the balance

Stability and Change. The strong conservatism of human societies has for its counterpart the indubitable fact that changes have occurred To ask why these antagonistic principles exist is to face a psychological question

One of the contributions made by anthropology to psychology is the proof that individual behavior is largely determined by the tribal norms In modern slang, a culture "conditions" its participants so that they react not merely as they would by virtue of their congenital make-up, but according to the dictates of the social standards A Plains Indian, whether naturally foolhardy or not, risks his life to gain glory, a Northwest Californian, even if not a congenital miser, craves wealth as the means to prestige, and so forth. Much that was once reckoned part of the original nature of man is now seen to be socially determined Thus the Toda exhibit no "parental instinct," ignoring any consideration of who the actual progenitor might be in favor of a ceremony for determining legal fatherhood.

Behavior, then, can not be satisfactorily understood either from what is instinctive in the whole of mankind or from the individual's mental character, we must also take into account the society that has molded him

But mere emphasis on this point is insufficient, for it would overlook two obvious considerations First, the norms did not exist from the beginning of the universe, hence there was a time when they were unable to influence individuals Secondly, the norms do change, which would be impossible if they merely rubber stamped the several members of a community We are thus led to the question of individual variability

Individual Variability In regard to its population a primitive tribe exhibits as many differences among its members as a civilized country Even so rude a people as the Ona, without professional artisans, have bunglers and recognized masters at arrow chipping, and the Crow know very well which storytellers are supreme in the control of style and plot.

As a matter of fact, without such indi-

vidual variations no culture would long continue as a going concern, for the conditions of life are such that automatic repetition can not go on forever. Assume a community prescribing marriage with the daughter of a mother's brother. What happens, then, if a young man's mother has only sisters? The "rubber-stamped" citizen would be utterly stumped by such a contingency, while a bolder spirit finds an easy solution: if the mother has no brother, she has at least a kinsman in the same generation, who by legal fiction can be counted as a brother. Thus, he extricates his family from a dilemma while still bowing to the established rules of matrimony. Actually, the Hopi treat particular clans as the trustees of particular ceremonials, so that when a clan passes out of existence, then, the ceremonial might also be supposed to lapse. But being unwilling to forego their sacred performances, the Hopi consolidate diminishing clans or hit upon other makeshifts Such devices, however, are possible only if there is an Indian of superior ingenuity to conceive them and at the same time of sufficient force of character to impress his ideas upon his tribesmen

With reference to its code any fair-sized community is bound to have its martinets and its outlaws. The average member neither flouts tradition at all costs nor follows its guidance through thick and thin he compromises, rendering obeisance to fine principles in the abstract and finding excellent excuses for doing as he pleases in concrete circumstances. The Burmese are Buddhists, hence must not take the life of animals. Fishermen are threatened with dire punishment for their murderous occupation, but they find a loophole by not literally killing the fish. "These are merely put out on the bank to dry, after their long soaking in the river, and if they are foolish and ill-judged enough to die while undergoing the process it is their own fault." Such sophistry is evidently the product of a mind of more than common subtlety. It represents the acme of what psychiatrists call "rationalization," i e., a *secondary* justification for behavior whose real motives are of a far less creditable character. When so convenient a theory had once been expounded, it naturally became the apology of the whole guild of fishermen.

In this case the importance of individual variations is inferred, in other instances the evidence is direct Theoretically, a Crow Indian ought to die young, fighting against the enemy, and old age was constantly represented to boys as a burdensome condition. But bravery, though universally exalted, was of course distributed like any other human trait in this tribe. there were madcaps and cravens, along with a majority of average men eager to be as brave as they dared without risking their necks The tales of adventure recounted by the Crow warriors themselves strikingly display the whole gamut of possible values some men attained the ideal, others shrank from its implications.

Among the same people visions were considered all-important, but while some individuals by virtue of their mental make-up were repeatedly blessed, others were congenitally unsuited for such revelations notwithstanding repeated trials Clearly the vision seeking norm had been established by individuals naturally disposed to enjoy such intercourse with the supernatural and possessed of such prestige that their example set the style. That is to say, an idiosyncrasy grew into a tribal pattern In recent times the Crow are known to have changed ritual because some influential tribesman had been so directed in a revelation. Here there is direct evidence not only of individual differences, but of an alteration in the social legacy due to such deviation.

Another type of deviant may flavor culture and, in special circumstances, exert an influence. Even in the simpler tribes there are skeptics, men who not merely circumvent the norms of their community, but at least secretly challenge them Some Caribou Eskimo confided to Rasmussen that they considered certain of their shamans humbugs, indeed one informant who had vainly undergone suffering to gain a revelation rejected the whole of the shamanistic system.

Whenever there is ample evidence on a major religious movement, such as the Ghost Dance, we get glimpses of all possible forms of temperament — the enthusiastic leader, the fervent disciple, the lukewarm opportunist, and the unbeliever. It is the interaction of these several types of personality that makes a cultural system a live reality Individual variability is thus of genuine importance for the maintenance as well as the modification of social life.

DIFFUSION *

Ralph Linton

The service of diffusion in enriching the content of individual cultures has been of the utmost importance There is probably no culture extant to-day which owes more than 10 per cent of its total elements to inventions made by members of its own society Because we live in a period of rapid invention we are apt to think of our own culture as largely self-created, but the role which diffusion has played in its growth may be brought home to us if we consider the beginning of the average man's day. The locations listed in the following paragraphs refer only to the origin points of various culture elements, not to regions from which we now obtain materials or objects through trade.

Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties

* Reprinted from *The Study of Man*, by Ralph Linton Copyright, 1936, by D Appleton-Century Company, Inc

around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a canteloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India. After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandinavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo-China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American

The foregoing is merely a bit of antiquarian virtuosity made possible by the existence of unusually complete historic records for the Eurasiatic area. There are many other regions for which no such records exist, yet the cultures in these areas bear similar witness to the importance of diffusion in establishing their content. Fairly adequate techniques have been developed for tracing the spread of individual traits and even for establishing their origin points, and there can be no doubt that diffusion has occurred wherever two societies and cultures have been brought into contact.

PARALLEL CULTURES AND THE INHIBITIONS TO ACCULTURATION IN A GUATEMALAN COMMUNITY *

John Gillin

In view of the forward steps currently being made in the understanding and analysis of rural communities in the United States, it may be of interest to broaden the view for comparative purposes by considering briefly a type of community situation not uncommon in certain parts of Latin America. This will also afford us an opportunity to consider certain problems in cultural dynamics which have not been fully discussed previously

The type of Latin American community to which I refer is characterized by the functioning of two cultures, rather than one, and by social distinction between the respective practitioners of the two cultures involved. This is not by any means the only type of rural community to be found in Latin America, but it is not uncommon, especially where an Indian element is involved I myself have seen numerous communities of this general type, not only in Guatemala, but also in Ecuador and Peru. In the typical case the situation is not something recent or new, but on the contrary, the parallel cultures have existed cheek by jowl for several hundred years, and daily primary contact between the respective practitioners is the general rule.

The case I propose to discuss is the town of San Luis Jilotepeque in Eastern Guatemala A full ethnographic account of the cultures involved is now in preparation, and in this place I can only suggest the content of the cultural configurations and their elements San Luis Jilotepeque is a town or pueblo of about 3500 persons and the capital of a township with a total population of about 7500 The town is situated in the Department of Jalapa, Eastern Guatemala, about 150 kilometers (ca. 100 miles) almost due east of Guatemala City by road. Geographically, it is comparatively isolated from any significant radiating center of European culture, if one takes into consideration the means of travel and communication commonly available in this part of the world The official census data do not check with the writer's test counts made in the field, but in the town, at least, about one-third of the population is Ladino and two-thirds Indian. The proportion of Ladinos is probably slightly less in the township as a whole.

These two groups (Indians and Ladinos) are described in conversation and in local official documents as *razas* (races) or *castas* (castes) "Passing" from the Indian to the Ladino group is practically impossible within the community, although the illegitimate child of an Indian woman by a Ladino man may be considered a Ladino if reared in his father's household Although the Ladinos admit in confidence that they probably have some Indian blood, "away back," they maintain that they are now a different "race" from the Indians and publicly identify themselves

* Reprinted by permission from *Social Forces*, October, 1945, pp 1–14

with a white racial type. To the eye of the objective observer the difference in physical type between Ladino and Indian is in many cases not readily discernible, but the chances are that the Ladinos probably do have more "white" genes than the Indians — not enough, however, to provide ready identification by physical feature alone in the majority of cases.

Each of these two groups has its own culture or set of customs Although there are certain patterns common to the two cultures — there is some overlapping — the two configurations of custom are clearly distinguishable, as we shall see The native language of the Indians is identified as Pokomám, one of the Maya languages Whatever their culture was at the time of the Spanish Conquest, it is obviously not a "pure" aboriginal culture at the present time, but has absorbed a number of European elements. The Ladinos, on the other hand, profess to be the representatives of European culture, although in fact this Ladino configuration also seems to be a mixture — Spanish colonial, indigenous, and modern European elements are all readily identifiable upon analysis. It is in many respects a typical Latin American Creole culture However, the fact that the Ladinos are in possession of certain modern European patterns means that they are the channel through which one would expect European cultural elements to be presented or exhibited to the Indians . . .

In Table 1 a partial list of cultural elements and their distribution between the two groups is set down Full discussion and description of these elements and their functioning awaits the longer monograph previously mentioned It should not be understood that the patterns attributed to a given culture are necessarily practiced at all times and by everyone belonging to the group identified with that culture For example, when we attribute the

TABLE 1

Partial Summary Table of Cultural Patterns and Their Distribution

Type of patterns	*Exclusive to Indian Culture*	*Exclusive to Ladino Culture*	*Practiced by both groups*
Language	*Pokomám*		*Spanish*
Clothing female	Flowing white cloth head covering Braided "native" hair dress Multiple strand bead necklaces Cotton blouse pattern Wrap-around skirt to ankles, of native-woven material (from W Guatemala) and design Belt for skirt, native weave and design (from W Guatemala) Bare leg Bare foot Native-made textiles and textile designs (from W Guatemala)	Black lace head covering (church and formal) European style of hairdress Single-strand bead necklaces, thin chain and pendant necklaces Other European dress patterns (in addition to cotton one-piece dress) Coats and topcoats Stockings or socks Shoes Facial cosmetics Brassières Corsets	One-piece cotton dress Underslip Shawls Factory-made textiles

TABLE I (continued)

Partial Summary Table of Cultural Patterns and Their Distribution

Type of patterns	*Exclusive to Indian Culture*	*Exclusive to Ladino Culture*	*Practiced by both groups*
Language	*Pokomám*		*Spanish*
Clothing male	Straw hat pattern Short white trousers and tailless shirt for work	Shoes and socks Felt hat Different straw hat pattern Pocket watch Necktie	Sandals Bare foot Shirt, jacket, and trousers of European pattern
Clothing children	Stocking caps of old stockings pulled down over eyes as protection from "evil eye" — for babies No underpants for toddlers up to age 9 or 10	Bonnets of European pattern Underpants for toddlers	Diapers — for babies
Dwelling*	Pole walls Dirt floors	Plastered walls Cement or tile floors	Bajareque walls (wattle-and-daub) Adobe walls
Foods**	"Hot" and "cold" magical classification of foods Far higher proportion of aboriginal foodstuffs, e g, tendency to rely on beans for proteins Calabash plates and wooden spoons for eating	Oatmeal Far higher proportion of "European" foodstuff e g, tendency to rely on meats, eggs, and dairy products for proteins	All other foods (coffee and tortillas almost universal) Factory made china, glass and metal containers and utensils Native pottery cooking pots and containers
Industries	Straw hats — men and women Cord mesh bags — men and women Grinding stones — men Stone water filters — men Wooden combs — men Fish nets — men Pottery water jars — women Pottery baking pans — women Pottery censers — women Pottery candle sticks — women Pottery cooking pots — women Yellow dye making	Commercial tailoring Commercial dressmaking	Adobe making Tile making

* A statistical study of the distribution of house types will be found in John Gillin, "Houses, Food, and the Contact of Cultures in a Guatemalan Town", *Acta Americana*, 1 (1943), pp 349–52

** Ibid, pp 352–59.

TABLE 1 (continued)

Partial Summary Table of Cultural Patterns and Their Distribution

Type of patterns	*Exclusive to Indian Culture*	*Exclusive to Ladino Culture*	*Practiced by both groups*
Language	*Pokomám*		*Spanish*
Economic occupations or statuses	Farm laborer (honorable) General laborer Share cropper Itinerant peddler	Farm laborer (dishonorable) Storekeeper Pharmacist Landlord School teacher Paid political jobs Rentier Blacksmith Slaughterer Pool hall operator	Farm laborer Barber Domestic servant (female) Landowner (estimated 70% of land owned by Ladinos)
Transportation within township	Afoot for persons Human back, for goods	Horse-back or mule-back for persons	Donkeys for goods, no wheeled vehicles
Formal education	Average less than one year of primary school basic literacy not established for either sex	Average six years of schooling, basic literacy established for both sexes	Local three-year primary school unsegregated
Economic patterns	Verbal contract and credit arrangements	Bookkeeping records Documentary credit instruments and contracts	Use of Guatemalan currency Transactions in barter and kind
Social organization	Classificatory kinship terminology (Pokomám)	Particularizing-classificatory kinship terminology (Spanish)	Ceremonial kinship (compadre system) Official monogamy
Political statuses and patterns	Lowest three of six municipal councilmen Unpaid, obligatory, rotating municipal servants Pattern of Principal Men settling disputes among Indians	Intendente Municipal treasurer Telegrapher-postmaster Highest three of six municipal councilmen School board members Policemen Sentiment of nationalism	Voter for congressional representative (at least in theory) Taxpayer Subject to central government laws
Religious statuses and patterns	Principal Men of town (Principales del Pueblo) Sacristan of church Medicine men (pacheros) Mayor domos of saints' days Membership in semireligious clubs (confradías) for men, and office-holding therein	Priest Organized prayer, singing, and service functions in church by women Burial in vault or in grave with monument Skeptical, secular attitude, especially by men	Equal status as members of Catholic Church Interest and participation in fiestas

TABLE I (continued)

Partial Summary Table of Cultural Patterns and Their Distribution

Type of patterns	*Exclusive to Indian Culture*	*Exclusive to Ladino Culture*	*Practiced by both groups*
Language	*Pokomám*		*Spanish*
Religious statuses and patterns (*cont'd*)	Care of sacred Catholic images Agricultural ceremonies Burial without monument Believing attitude		
Leisure time patterns	Braiding and sewing straw hats Costume dances at fiestas Confradía meetings Wooden drum, chirimía, pipa (musical instruments) No concept of boredom	Table pool Basketball Football Couple dancing (European type) Plays and vodvil turns Reading for pleasure (rare) Card playing Boredom a major preoccupation	Marimba (xylophone) playing Playing instrument in brass band Drinking Participation in fiestas
Patterns of social intercourse between Indian and Ladino	Respectful and deferential patterns toward Ladino, e.g., touching hat when meeting, stepping off sidewalk when Ladino approaches Always use "don" or "señor" when addressing Ladino, or alluding to one Ladino in presence of another May *not* eat in Ladino house or enter socially Sex relations with Ladinos rare and not patterned Family does not retaliate openly against Ladino seducer of Indian woman	Commanding or patronizing patterns toward Indians Indians addressed by first name or as "boy," etc May eat in Indian house and enter socially Use of threats of bodily punishment, lynching, etc., to Indians Heavier "legal" punishments handed Indians than to Ladinos Male sex relationship with Indian woman expected and patterned Male relatives of woman retaliate against Indian who has had sex relations with her Permissible public ridicule of Indians Alleged Indian traits publically deprecated in presence of Indians, e.g., alleged "lower" physical type, ignorance, lack of refinement, etc	Spanish language in conversation Intermarriage disapproved Shake hands only with members of same group

use of coats and topcoats to Ladino women, we do not mean that Ladino women wear these items all the time or even that all Ladino women actually possess them. We do mean that practically no Indian woman ever wears or possesses such articles of dress and furthermore that she would not wear them if she possessed them Statistical counts were made in the field of certain cultural items. Tabulated counts of the distribution of house types and food customs have been published elsewhere,[1] and further tabulated material on women's costumes, men's jackets, and men's footwear will be provided later in this paper. Distribution of other patterns was determined by the usual ethnographic field methods of personal observation and interview. In all cases where the distributions have been based on count, the following rule has been applied in Table 1, where less than five percent of one group is found to be practicing a given pattern, such pattern has been assigned to the culture of the other group Where five or more percent of one group is practicing a given pattern it is classified as "common to both cultures"

I trust that it has been made sufficiently clear that the Indian and Ladino cultures differ in "content" The differences between the two cultures are even more strikingly brought out if one considers the two respective configurations as wholes The Indian culture displays a seemingly higher degree of integration within itself than does the Ladino culture In an excellent article Tumin[2] has characterized the former as "sacred" and the latter as "secular," on the grounds that the content of the Indian culture, in contrast to the Ladino is knit together, as it were, by a more or less pervading set of magical and religious beliefs which lend an air of divine sanction to many, if not all, Indian cultural activities.[3] Another way of putting this is to state that the Indian culture shows a higher degree of consistency of all types[4] However, these matters with respect to Jilotepeque must be discussed elsewhere. Our concern up to this point has been to suggest some of the evidence for the view that two cultures exist and function within this community.

It may properly be asked if this situation can rightly be considered a "community" or whether it is actually two communities. This raises the question of the general validity of the formal definitions of this concept frequently found in sociology textbooks. If common locality, geographical limitation, and functional cooperation toward certain common aims are to be considered the diagnostic characteristics of a community, we shall have to admit that Jilotepeque is one, albeit a community with a relatively low degree of total solidarity. As the situation is at present organized, the Indians cannot live without the Ladinos, and vice versa. This

[1] John Gillin, "Houses, Food, and the Contact of Cultures in a Guatemalan Town," *Acta Americana*, 1 (1943), pp 344–59

[2] Melvin Tumin, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious a Re-evaluation," *American Sociological Review*, 10 (1945), pp 199–207

[3] I am disinclined to use the labels "sacred" and "secular" when applied to whole cultures in the sense that "sacred" is the only proper designation for cultures showing a high degree of integration and "secular" the only proper designation for cultures showing a low degree of integration I am unwilling to admit, at present, that "sacred" and "secular" are the *only* two types of polarities applicable to cultural integration These terms and the associated concepts seem to commit us to a single principle of cultural integration, namely, "faith in the supernatural," "belief in divine power" or something similar, whereas analysis and investigation may, and seem to, show that other equally significant principles are operative Cf Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1941), especially pp 353–54

[4] John Gillin, 1944, "Cultural Adjustment," *American Anthropologist*, 46 (1944), pp. 429–47, 443–44

fact is best brought out by considering the patterns of culture which are common to both groups — the overlapping elements The fact that a considerable number of traits is shared by the two cultures forms the basis for community cooperation. Certain others are cooperatively organized on a reciprocal basis by such mechanisms as the "master-servant" relationship

The common or overlapping traits may be viewed from two points of view (1) the degree to which they represent acculturation of one culture by the other; (2) the degree to which one group practices the traits or participates in their functioning.

With respect to acculturation of Indians by Ladinos, let us consider the one-piece cotton dress of European style which is worn by Indian women to some extent and by Ladino women as everyday costume universally This trait is shared by both groups, whereas the Indian woman's typical costume, or *vestido,* as specified in Table 1, is never worn by Ladino women. In order to obtain some measure of the extent to which the one-piece cotton dress has been taken over into Indian culture, a count was made of the costume of all Indian women observed at random in the town on three different days during the months of August and September, and the results are tabulated in Table 2 It will be seen that, of a total of 2541 Indian women observed, nearly two-thirds (62 6 percent) were wearing Indian costume and slightly more than one-third (37 3 percent) were wearing the cotton dress. It is also to be seen that the preadolescent girls are garbed much more frequently in the cotton dress than are women — 45 1 of the girls aged 5–14 years were observed in the cotton dress, as compared with only 23 5 percent of women over 14 years of age We shall return to this trait later At this point, it is sufficient to note that the European trait (cotton dress) has made, we might say, a 23 5 percent penetration or infiltration of the Indian culture on the adult level.

On the same three days on which the dress count was made, observations were recorded at random concerning the footwear of Indian and Ladino men. These observations are tabulated in Table 3 It will be noted that shoes are not worn by Indian men (the 5 men observed were all recently discharged army conscripts) and verbal statements universally indicate that the wearing of shoes is regarded as a Ladino caste-mark or prerogative. With respect to footwear the interesting feature is the extent of acculturation of the Ladinos by the Indians. Sandals and the bare foot are definitely Indian culture traits, yet it is to be remarked that, of 268 Ladino men observed, 58 3 percent were wearing sandals and 11.2 percent were barefoot. To be sure, the incidence of these traits was considerably higher among the Indian men, but it is clear that for some reason the traits had also been taken over in a significant degree by the Ladinos.

Another indication of acculturation of Europe upon the Indian culture is to be seen in the penetration of Spanish words, or perversions of them, into the local Pokomám vocabulary Here we may mention a preliminary study of 319 words taken at random from the local Pokomám vocabulary in ordinary usage for describing objects or customs of ethnographic interest Fifty-five words, or 17 percent of the total vocabulary, are indubitably Spanish or corruptions of Spanish for which no equivalent Pokomám terms are in use. In addition 9 more are probable derivations from Spanish, giving a total of 64 words, or 20 percent, as of Spanish or probably Spanish derivation. Although the claim can be made that the total vocabulary of 319 words is a random sample, I should not wish to press this claim

nor the resulting percentages too far. Possibly my own interest in acculturation led me to insist on terms for possibly introduced traits, while leading me to slight many other terms.[5] However, I think it worthy of note that so large a proportion of Spanish lead words referring to affairs of everyday life should occur in a vocabulary collected in the course of an ethnographic study, and this fact can legitimately be used as an "index" of acculturation. Practically all Indians speak both Spanish and Pokomám (the latter among themselves and in their homes), but Ladinos speak only Spanish.

It may be instructive to list some of the cultural objects for which Spanish loan words are used. All of these words refer to items which we know were introduced to native American culture following the Spanish Conquest. (I shall give only the English equivalents here.) (1) Fruits and plants: apple, banana, plantain, peach. (2) Clothing: jacket, pants, finger ring, man's shirt, undershirt, shoes. (3) Horse complex: horse, mule, bit, rein, lazo, jackass. (4) Cattle complex: cow, heifer, male calf, ox. (5) House complex: chair, bench, door, lock, ridgepole, ridgepole support, roof tiles, toilet, window, rafter. (6) Miscellaneous objects: crowbar, cross, casting net, eating fork, hoe, religious image, steel knife, machete, matches, mirror, razor, machine, silver, spoon, table. (7) Social status and organization: market, compadre, principal man, councilman (regidor), rich person, saint, whore.

This lexical evidence indicates acculturation, but it is not to be relied upon as a full index of introduced traits. For example, in respect to the horse complex, in spite of a large number of Spanish loan words, apparently native terms are nevertheless used for "pack saddle," "riding saddle," and "tail strap." We know very well from other evidence that these items were parts of the horse complex when it was introduced by Europeans. Although "silver" is named with a probably corrupted Spanish term, the term for "iron" seems to be strictly native. Although various types of cattle are spoken of in Spanish corruptions, the general terms "calf" and "cattle" are apparently purely native. "Chair" is borrowed from Spanish, but the word for "armchair" is native; "compadre" is Spanish, but the term for "padrino" (godfather) is native; "rich person" is Spanish, but the term for "poor person" is native. These inconsistencies in the incorporation of Spanish words for introduced cultural traits are doubtless in part attributable to details of the acculturation process during the colonial period which are now mostly unrecoverable.

The local Spanish has in turn been enriched by the incorporation of native American terms into its vocabulary (particularly terms referring to native American plants, agricultural processes, and food products), but very few of those in use in Jilotepeque are derived from Pokomám. The native loan words in Spanish are derived from native languages of the whole of the Spanish American colonial empire.

The foregoing material is perhaps sufficient to indicate a certain type of relatively "objective" evidence which we may adduce in support of our view that some degree of acculturation has been achieved between the two cultures present in San Luis Jilotepeque. But, if the two cultures have absorbed *some*thing from each other, why has the process not gone any further than it has after several centuries of contact? Especially, since the local Ladinos represent a culture found throughout most of Guatemala, not to say

[5] A more extensive study is now under way, based upon a larger vocabulary. In all cases the terms have been checked with several informants and by eavesdropping on native conversations.

most of Latin America, why is it that the Ladino culture has not long ago absorbed the Indian customs or extinguished them? Let us briefly state a few postulates concerning cultural changes and examine the material in their light.

We may take the position that a culture is an organization of custom-patterns[6] and that the customary actions whereby the patterns are manifested are learned and practiced as habits by the individuals comprising the society or group which possesses the culture in question. On the basis of general behavior theory,[7] therefore, we are justified in analyzing the learning, performance, and preservation or extinction of customary activities according to the same basic principles which apply to habits in the individual, provided we as social scientists are careful to analyze correctly the significant elements of the social and cultural situations involved. We may then translate the principles involved into terms ("transformation equations") which are meaningful on the social level and proceed with our analysis

On this basis, then, we may consider a few simple theorems which may be informally stated as follows (1) If a new custom is to be introduced into the customary activity of a social group it must be adequately presented, i e, stimulus value must be sufficient to evoke a response. (2) Acceptance of the new custom depends upon the degree to which its performance lowers (satisfies) the drive or drives motivating this type of activity in the potentially accepting group, i e, a new response becomes habitual only if it lowers some type of drive. (3) Previously non-existing drives of the acquired or secondary type (i e., not of the innate type) may be established in a social group (e g, a group to which a new custom is presented) by manipulating the conditions of its activity,[8] and new customs may be functionally related to the lowering of such "new" drives (4) If a new custom is related to the lowering of the same drive or group of drives hitherto lowered by an already existing custom, the displacement of the "old" custom by the "new" one is accomplished only when the latter lowers the drive or drives involved more quickly or more completely than the "old" custom.

In other words, a group will not discard an old custom so long as it is satisfying to the wants and desires under which the group is operating Likewise, a group will not learn and perform a new custom unless it is adequately presented, or unless it is more satisfying to existing wants and desires than previously practiced customs, or unless the conditions of customary activity in the group are changed Among the significant changes which may occur in conditions, we have mentioned the establishment of previously nonexisting drives of the acquired type

I am aware of the fact that this language may appear somewhat suited to many social scientists It possesses the virtue, however, of being rooted in experimental evidence in psychology[9] and it

[6] See John Gillin, "Cultural Adjustment," *American Anthropologist*, 46 (1944), pp 429–447

[7] See C L Hull, *Principles of Behavior, An Introduction to Behavior Theory* (New York Appleton-Century Co, 1943) For a more "popular" interpretation of certain of these principles, see Neal F Miller and John Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1941) For an excellent review of these principles as they may be applied to the individual personality, see O H Mowrer and Clyde Kluckhohn, "Dynamic Theory of Personality," in *Personality and Behavior Disorders* (J McV Hunt, ed) (New York Ronald Press), especially pp 69–85

[8] See John Gillin, "Acquired Drives in Culture Contact," *American Anthropologist*, 44 (1942), pp 545–554

[9] An accepted principle of the general theory of science holds that, wherever possible, the con-

has the quality of not committing us to implications or judgments of extraneous values before the data are examined (without prejudicing the possible scientific evaluation of the situation *after* the data have been analyzed).

Let us now turn again to the Indian group in Jilotepeque and view its cultural behavior in the light of these principles Limited by space, we shall undertake here only a preliminary and suggestive analysis. First, as regards presentation of new items, it would appear superficially that this had been adequate in all respects, considering the close contact between the members of the two groups. However, presentation of the European aspects of Ladino culture is not complete in at least one important respect If we notice in Table 1 the differences in formal educational patterns and the resulting patterns of literacy, we see that Indian children receive only one or two years of schooling, and that Indian adults are either illiterate or use written symbols with difficulty. All Ladinos, on the other hand, are "basically literate" at the least, that is, they read and write without difficulty, although the pattern of reading for pleasure is not much practiced, the use of written symbols as tools is well established Thus it is that the Indian culture actually lacks the complex of literacy, and consequently many European traits whose thorough presentation depends upon this channel of transmission lack stimulus adequacy for the Indian culture. Likewise, lack of formal education renders the Indians relatively inept in the verbal use of Spanish and limits the effectiveness of that language for cultural transmission. Although all Indians use Spanish, their vocabularies are limited and the concepts (symbolic customs) back of many Spanish words (representational customs)[10] are either not understood or are inconsistent with one another and with other cultural patterns. Nationality means nothing to the Indians; modern styles are unknown except as infrequently exhibited by local Ladino women; the hierarchical organization of the Church and the approved interpretation of its dogmas are beyond their ken for the lack of the symbolic customs and apparatus through which they might be presented, written contracts and commercial dealings based on documentary credit instruments cannot find a fully functioning place in the Indian configuration. When Guatemala declared war at the side of the United States, a proclamation to this effect was read in the plaza. According to most of the Indians, this was the first intimation they had had that a war was going on anywhere As for the United States, many of the Indians of my acquaintance were uncertain as to where this country was situated, to say nothing of the type of people who lived there It is obvious that, to consider no other instances, the stimulus-presentation of Ladino culture has not been by any means complete as regards the Indian group in Jilotepeque and that the Indians have been to a degree isolated from Ladino culture, despite their close contacts with Ladinos.

On the other hand, not a few customs have been exchanged back and forth across the culture line by both groups. Practically all of these are "actional" customs requiring no verbal or literary interpretation, for example, most foods are common to the two groups, although the Indians statistically trend toward indigenous foods and the Ladinos toward those introduced from Europe Coffee (from the Ladinos), however, is universal among the Indians and, on the other

clusions of one level of analysis should be incorporated into the postulational system of any other level of analysis to which they apply

[10] See Gillin, "Cultural Adjustment," *American Anthropologist*, 46 (1944), pp 431–33.

hand, tortillas (an Indian pancake made of maiz meal) are universal among the Ladinos. Agricultural tools of iron and of European design have been accepted by the Indians, while the principal crops (maiz and beans) and methods of agriculture (including the digging-stick tool) have been accepted by the Ladinos. Handmade pottery cooking containers are accepted by the Ladinos, while the Indians have taken over the use of china, glass, and metal containers from the Ladinos The Indians have taken over the actional patterns of the Catholic religion, and especially the veneration of images In all these cases, the customs involved possess, aside from their reward value, a high degree of stimulus sufficiency

Let us now consider the situation from the point of view of cultural drives We shall take it for granted that both Indians and Ladinos are possessed of the usual innate primary drives, it is the cultural or acquired drives in which we are interested What do Indians *want*? For people do not *do* anything unless they *want* something. We remember that a want (acquired drive) is developed in the individual members of a group by similar training under similar socio-cultural conditions. With respect to the Indians of Jilotepeque it is difficult to say how these drives have been changed since the advent of the Spaniards, because we lack full records of the cultural motivations current in aboriginal times. It is possible, however, to determine certain acquired drives operative at present and to assess their influence upon the transfer of culture We shall discuss only two types

Although a certain amount of bartering of goods and service goes on, it is clear that the desire to possess money is as firmly established among the Indians as among the Ladinos The Indian money-drive, however, differs from that of the Ladinos both in intensity and in kind Among the Indians it is based closely upon innate drives of hunger and pain. An Indian wants money to buy food, shelter, and clothing, and to avoid the actual physical punishment which is involved in failure to pay taxes, rents, and other obligations Among the Ladinos the same components are involved (except perhaps the component of pain, for a Ladino is seldom physically punished for failure to make payments), but in Ladino society the money-drive is much more complicated, for it is closely allied with the Ladino drive for prestige Thus a typical Ladino is driven by a desire for money, not only to satisfy his basic necessities, but also because conditions are so arranged in his culture that his prestige is to a large extent determined by the amount of his accumulated wealth, which, of course, is acquired in exchange for money The Ladino, therefore, wants not only "change in hand" but also expensive clothing, an expensive house, tracts of land and herds of cattle too large for him to care for himself, for these things confer status, power, prestige among Ladinos

Prestige among Indians on the other hand is differently defined and the motivating drive consequently takes a different form. Accumulated wealth confers little prestige within the Indian group, except that a certain minimum of elegance is patterned for the *vestido* (Indian costume) of one's wife and female dependents. Even in this, however, the uniformity of style in the Indian women's native costume sets a definite limit to the money which can be invested in it, in contrast to the expensively changing fashions available to the Ladino women which are capable of absorbing almost unlimited amounts of money Among the Indians a man and his family gain prestige for skill in agriculture and the native crafts and for knowledge of socially beneficent

rituals concerned with the supernatural. A knowledge of ritual confers power, and it is only unusually wise and experienced middle aged or older men who are chosen as Principales, the highest status in Indian society. Thus, desire for skill, knowledge, and supernatural power, as defined within the culture, constitute (some of) the components of the prestige drive among the Indians. Money cannot buy them, and the desire for prestige is not appreciably associated with the desire for money

One may say, speaking of money-desire, that the "levels of aspiration" of the two groups differ, but this seems to me to be taking a somewhat ethnocentric point of view on our part. It is true that, considering money from the point of view common to our culture, the Indians "do not seem to be very ambitious" But we have to recognize the fact that, psychologically speaking, the culturally conditioned wants or drives operative in the two groups are distinct Looking at it from the more abstract point of view of pattern-analysis we see that the goals and orientations [11] are differently defined in the two cultures

Thus I believe that we may say that one of the most powerful of the culturally acquired or conditioned drives for an Indian is what we may call the desire for positive relations with the supernatural (which is not conceived of entirely in strictly orthodox Catholic terms) This is a very inadequate description of this motivation, but its instigating influence is widespread throughout the Indian customs. Failure to achieve this desire may produce direct punishments, such as crop failure, and may raise all types of culturally conditioned anxieties, such as those of health, prestige, security of status, subsistence, etc. Among the Ladinos a similarly pervasive drive is the desire for wealth, which is to be found as at least one of the motivations in a wide variety of Ladino cultural activities. It even enters into the picture of religious activities, for, as defined in the local Ladino culture, the ability to pay for the services of a priest, for novenas and masses for the soul, and for the intervention of saints tends to supplant the necessity for personal experience and social cooperation in the rituals (some of which are not Catholic at all), personal service to the saints' images, and personal knowledge of the supernatural which are such fundamental aspects of Indian religious life.

In a sense one might say that, for the Indian, power is something one has to ingest — something one has to get inside him by personal and social effort. For the Ladino, power is something one can buy and hang on one like a badge; this is not the only way one can achieve Ladino power and prestige, but it is one of the surest ways

It is obvious that, in the light of the postulates previously enunciated, certain customs which have the effect of satisfying Ladino drives, do not have this effect for Indians and, therefore, we cannot expect the Indians to take them over into their culture so long as their drives remain unchanged.

We cannot leave the subject of acquired drives without mentioning certain culturally conditioned anxieties which have been established in the Indian group A glance at the list of customs will show that the Ladinos have monopolized for themselves the principal political statuses and patterns of the community together with the instruments of force which pertain to them — control of the military and the police and of firearms. This is the technique of conquerors almost everywhere and the Ladinos have inherited these patterns from the Spanish. Anxiety is an acquired drive based upon anticipation of specific punishments, and customs may of course be based upon their ability

[11] See Gillin

to lower this drive or to avoid its rise. The development of "government anxiety" (fear of punishment if certain prescribed lines of conduct are not followed) is apparently present in all communities which have constituted political authorities backed up by the use of force Thus there is some anxiety of this type among the Ladinos in Jilotepeque Nevertheless, the distribution of punishments is unequal as between the two groups. Even now the Indians are more heavily punished for infractions of the political and other patterns than are Ladinos, and the weight of such punishments was, according to all the evidence, much heavier in the past

The result is the development in the Indians of a certain anxiety with respect to Ladinos, which together with direct punishment itself inhibits the development of certain Ladino customs in the Indian group This anxiety tends to generalize from Ladino political officials to all Ladinos Indian boys and girls, for example, have not adopted basketball, because they are kicked off the court bodily when they venture to participate in a game A few such punishments when the individual is young are sufficient to establish an anxiety drive which will motivate him to avoid participation in any Ladino customs which may involve punishment for an Indian Thus, no adult Indian ventures to dance at the occasional couple-dances organized by the Ladino group, no Indian dares to walk into the pool parlor, pay his fee, and acquire skill in this game, no Indian attempts to order a Ladino around or even to talk to one without the practice of certain customs of respect Pain and anxiety, then, serve as inhibitors of acculturation The ability of the Ladinos to arouse these drives forms the basis of certain differential distributions of privilege within the community although it should be made clear that this factor applies to certain customs, not to all.

For example, the ownership of land and domestic animals is rewarding to Indians as well as Ladinos, yet about 70 percent of the land is owned by Ladinos, although an Indian does not have to fear punishment if he also becomes a landowner. An Indian does not have to feel anxious about wearing a suit jacket, yet on one Sunday, of a total of 511 Indian men observed at random, only 24 4 percent were wearing jackets, while of a total of 264 Ladinos, 40 1 percent were wearing jackets (Table 4) These tabulated counts confirm other observations There are, in other words, certain common customs which can be properly included within the culture of both groups and in the practice of which both are trained, yet participation is unequally divided in favor of the Ladino We may say in these cases that the custom in question has been adequately presented to the Indians, its performance satisfies desires of the Indians, the custom is acquired by the Indians and not extinguished by competing customs aiming to avoid punishment, but that conditions are so arranged that the Indians do not perform it freely How may we describe such conditions?

Unfortunately we lack the historical data necessary to describe in detail the way in which the present unequal distribution of land came about, but we can interpret the present distribution as one of the socio-cultural conditions affecting acculturation or transfer of customs in Jilotepeque in these days With the relation between the supply of land and the size of the Indian population as it is, a goodly proportion of the Indians are, under these conditions, unable to practice the complex of customs summed up in the status of land owner Most Indians in the community have learned these customs symbolically, but have been unable to practice them actionally Thus there is no lack of

fantasying along culturally patterned lines about what one would do if he did own a milpa (corn patch), how he would manage the cutivation and the labor, the ways in which he would dispose of the product, etc, but actional customs cannot be performed by such Indians, because an essential prerequisite, namely, the acquisition of land itself, cannot be performed On the level of habit-formation we are familiar with the principle that any configuration of conditions which renders an otherwise correct response unperformable diminishes the strength of the habit in which the response is involved. On the cultural level we say that any organization of conditions which diminishes the opportunity for the practice of action customs will militate against the dissemination of such customs. It thus appears that the complex known as land owning has been accepted by Indian culture in its symbolic aspects, but full performance of its actional patterns is inhibited.

Among the Indians, subsistence drives and money drives are strong motivators for the land owning complex. Since the latter is unperformable for many Indians, they have been forced to adopt certain other customs to satisfy these drives, even though partially or not so well. The Indian may become either a farm laborer or a sharecropper working for a Ladino. The plentiful supply of Indian labor, among other factors, has permitted the fixing of certain cultural conditions of reward for such activities. For farm labor the standard rate of pay is 10 cents per day, plus one meal. This, at local prices,

TABLE 2

Incidence of Clothing Types Worn by Indian Women and Girls

Based on random observations for three separate days during August and September, 1942

	Number	Percent
Wearing Indian costume		
Age 5–14	507	19 9
Age over 14	1085	42 5
Total	*1592*	*62 6*
Wearing one-piece cotton dress		
Age 5–14	617	23 8
Age over 14	332	13 5
Total	*949*	*37 3*
Subjects 5–14		
Wearing Indian costume	507	45 1
Wearing one-piece cotton dress	617	54 9
Total	*1124*	*100 0*
Subjects over 14		
Wearing Indian costume	1085	76 5
Wearing one-piece cotton dress	332	23 5
Total	*1417*	*100 0*
Total of subjects observed	**2541**	**100 0**

TABLE 3

Incidence of Footwear of Ladino and Indian Men

Based on random observations for three separate days during August and September, 1942

	LADINOS		INDIANS	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Wearing shoes	82	30 5	5	0 5
Wearing sandals	156	58 3	738	81.4
Barefoot	30	11.2	164	18 1
Total subjects observed	**268**	**100.0**	**907**	**100 0**

TABLE 4

Incidence of Jackets of Ladino and Indian Men

Based on random observations on one day (Sunday) in September, 1942

	LADINOS		INDIANS	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Wearing jackets	106	40 1	125	24.4
Not wearing jackets	158	59 9	386	75 6
Total subjects observed	**264**	**100 0**	**511**	**100 0**

is barely sufficient to pay for food and shelter for a man with a family. The reward for farm labor is essentially the same for a man who works land on shares. The monetary reward of these customs, therefore, is not sufficient to lower completely the money drive, even in the modest form in which it exists among the Indians, and the other drives associated with it.

Still other customary activities must be practiced to satisfy these drives. It is largely for this reason that the native "industries" listed in our Table 1 are so energetically practiced and so firmly retained in the Indian culture The goods made are sold for money, and individuals of both sexes and all ages work steadily at these crafts when not occupied with agricultural or household tasks Men sitting about the house are almost always braiding straw hats. Women are constantly at work making pottery in moments spared from household duties. The famous decorated water jars of Jilotepeque, for example, have a good deal of artistic interest, but the Indian woman is not primarily motivated by the aesthetic effect She sends the husband or son out "on the road" about once a month, with a huge carrying rack loaded with pots on his back, to walk to San Salvador to sell them The supply of pots is so great in Jilotepeque and its region that they bring only two or three cents apiece, whereas a single specimen may bring 10 or even 15 cents in the neighboring country A man usually comes back from one of these trips with one or two dollars. Other native products are similarly manufactured and peddled, and both the manufacturing and the peddling customs have flourished among the Indians, goaded on by their need for cash There is no conflict between these customs and Ladino customs; in fact the Ladinos buy and use some of the items of Indian manufacture, such as pottery products, water filters, grinding stones, etc, and thus reward the Indians for continuing to practice their crafts

It might be remarked that the desire for reward (money) is so strong among the Indians that the incessant practice of the craft activities leaves little time for them to develop either the symbolic concepts or the actional customs of "leisure time" and "boredom" as defined in Ladino culture, even if punishment and anxiety were not involved

Not even all of these activities (labor and crafts) produce monetary rewards for the Indians in quantities which are available to Ladinos from certain customs which are reserved for them alone· paid political jobs, professional positions, storekeeping, etc, in addition to their undue share of the land owning As regards suit jackets, then, many a man lacks the funds to buy and wear one of these items, even when attired in his Sunday best. The cultural desire is established among the Indians — they are "sold" on the idea that a jacket is a desirable article of apparel — but a complex of socio-cultural conditions inhibits the full practice of the customs necessary to satisfy the desire

A somewhat different concatenation of factors, also involving money, is involved in the Indian woman's costume The original Indian pattern apparently required no clothing for the woman above the waist At the present time Indian women working in the privacy of their own houses and in secluded washing places along the river wear nothing above the waist. However, Ladino law and regulations, enforced by punishments, have decreed that women be covered from neck to calf when appearing in public Thus an anxiety has been created which must be relieved by the practice of some custom of clothing Two alternatives are now present in the Indian culture the one-piece cotton dress and the *vestido*. The

cotton dress has the advantage that it costs only one to two dollars in comparison with fifteen to twenty dollars for a *vestido*. Either one will lower the anxiety associated with public nakedness, but only the *vestido* also tends to satisfy certain other drives associated with status and attraction of the opposite sex. Indian swains regard with favor marriageable girls possessing *vestidos*, not those in cotton dresses Married women without *vestidos* suffer from social disparagements (punishments) of various kinds meted out by other Indian women and their husbands Thus it is that the cotton dress is a mere utility garment, adopted as an alternative on account of its lower cost This also explains why preadolescent girls, to whom marriage and full social status considerations do not fully apply, are garbed in cotton dresses more frequently than adult women The jacket is a custom of high desirability which Indian men cannot fully adopt because of lack of funds, the cotton dress is a custom of comparatively low desirability which is grudgingly adopted, again for lack of funds.

SUMMARY

A more complete analysis of many other customs in Jilotepeque could be carried on for several hundred pages Enough has perhaps been said to suggest how, on the basis of dynamic psychosocial principles, we may begin to understand how two groups of people can live side by side in the same community for centuries without achieving cultural amalgamation Unless the *conditions* of the learning and performance of customs in this community are significantly changed, this situation will persist indefinitely We also begin to arrive at a firm basis for a "functionalist" view in cultural studies, when we consider the manner in which a configuration of stimuli may evoke a cultural response or several of them; how various drives may unite in motivating a single custom, how a number of customary responses may be interrelated through their abilities to satisfy a single group of motivations, how the rewarding of one drive will often provide the stimulus for the performance of a following custom; and so on.

We have described a Guatemalan community inhabited by two social groups, each in possession of a distinct culture Although the customs of the two cultures dovetail and overlap at certain points with cooperative effect, the discreteness of the two configurations has been maintained We have directed attention to the question Why has the Indian culture not absorbed more Ladino elements? We have attempted, by a brief consideration of certain customs, to illustrate in a preliminary way the following factors which seem to have inhibited Indian acculturation (1) inadequate stimulus value of certain Ladino patterns, (2) persistence of certain cultural (acquired) drives among the Indians which Ladino customs are not adjusted to reward, (3) direct punishment inflicted on Indians who attempt to practice certain Ladino customs, (4) the development of anxiety on the part of Indians toward Ladinos and certain of their patterns, (5) arrangement of socio-cultural conditions which render the performance of specific Ladino customs impossible by Indians, (6) failure of certain Ladino customs to reward specific Indian drives (cf No. 2).

If this type of formulation is correct and if it were carried out in detail, it would presumably be possible to predict the changes in conditions necessary to effect full acculturation of Indians or of Ladinos, or whatever other goal might be considered desirable On the basis of such analysis, cultural "planning" or "engineering" might well be possible, not only in theory, but also in practice.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF CULTURAL LAG *

William Fielding Ogburn

This rapidity of change in modern times raises the very important question of social adjustment Problems of social adjustment are of two sorts One concerns the adaptation of man to culture or perhaps preferably the adapting of culture to man. The other problem is the question of adjustments, occasioned as a result of these rapid social changes, between the different parts of culture, which no doubt means ultimately the adaptation of culture to man. This second problem of adjustment between the different parts of culture is the immediate subject of our inquiry

The thesis is that the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others, and that since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. For instance, industry and education are correlated, hence a change in industry makes adjustments necessary through changes in the educational system Industry and education are two variables, and if the change in industry occurs first and the adjustment through education follows, industry may be referred to as the independent variable and education as the dependent variable Where one part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of culture The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material, but may exist for a considerable number of years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment It is desirable to reduce the period of maladjustment, to make the cultural adjustments as quickly as possible

The foregoing account sets forth a problem that occurs when there is a rapid change in a culture of interdependent parts and when the rates of change in the parts are unequal The discussion will be presented according to the following outlines. First the hypothesis will be presented, then examined and tested by a rather full consideration of the facts of a single instance, to be followed by several illustrations. Next the nature and cause of the phenomenon of cultural maladjustment in general will be analyzed The extent of such cultural lags will be estimated, and finally the significance for society will be set forth

A first simple statement of the hypothesis we wish to investigate now follows A large part of our environment consists of the material conditions of life and a large part of our social heritage is our material culture These material things consist of houses, factories, machines, raw materials, manufactured products, foodstuffs and other material objects In using these material things we employ certain methods. Some of these methods are as simple as the technique of handling a tool But a good many of the ways of

* From *Social Change* by William Fielding Ogburn Copyright 1922 by B W Huebsch, Inc By permission of The Viking Press, Inc , New York.

using the material objects of culture involve rather larger usages and adjustments, such as customs, beliefs, philosophies, laws, governments. One important function of government, for instance, is the adjustment of the population to the material conditions of life, although there are other governmental functions. Sumner has called many of these processes of adjustments, mores. The cultural adjustments to material conditions, however, include a larger body of processes than the mores; certainly they include the folk ways and social institutions These ways of adjustment may be called, for purposes of this particular analysis, the adaptive culture The adaptive culture is therefore that portion of the non-material culture which is adjusted or adapted to the material conditions Some parts of the *non-material culture are thoroughly adaptive* culture such as certain rules involved in handling technical appliances, and some parts are only indirectly or partially so, as for instance, religion The family makes some adjustments to fit changed material conditions, while some of its functions remain constant The family, therefore, under the terminology used here is a part of the non-material culture that is only partly adaptive. When the material conditions change, changes are occasioned in the adaptive culture. But these changes in the adaptive culture do not synchronize exactly with the change in the material culture. There is a lag which may last for varying lengths of time, sometimes, indeed, for many years.


An illustration will serve to make the hypothesis more clearly understood. One class of material objects to which we adjust ourselves is the forests. The material conditions of forestry have changed a good deal in the United States during the past century. At one time the forests were quite plentiful for the needs of the small population. There was plenty of wood easily accessible for fuel, building and manufacture. The forests were sufficiently extensive to prevent in many large areas the washing of the soil, and the streams were clear. In fact, at one time the forests seemed to be too plentiful, from the point of view of the needs of the people. Food and agricultural products were at one time the first need of the people and the clearing of land of trees and stumps was a common undertaking of the community in the days of the early settlers. In some places, the quickest procedure was to kill and burn the trees and plant between the stumps When the material conditions were like these, the method of adjustment to the forests was characterized by a policy which has been called exploitation Exploitation in regard to the forests was indeed a part of the mores of the time, *and describes a part of the adaptive culture* in relation to forests.

As time went on, however, the population grew, manufacturing became highly developed, and the need for forests increased But the forests were being destroyed. This was particularly true in the Appalachian, Great Lakes and Gulf regions. The policy of exploitation continued. Then rather suddenly it began to be realized in certain centres of thought that if the policy of cutting timber continued at the same rate and in the same manner the forests would in a short time be gone and very soon indeed they would be inadequate to supply the needs of the population It was realized that the custom in regard to using the forests must be changed and a policy of conservation was advocated The new policy of conservation means not only a restriction in the amount of cutting down of trees, but it means a more scientific method of cutting, and also reforestation. Forests may be cut in such a way, by selecting trees according to their size, age and location, as to yield a large quantity of timber and

yet not diminish the forest area. Also by the proper distribution of cutting plots in a particular area, the cutting can be so timed that by the time the last plot is cut the young trees on the plot first cut will be grown. Some areas when cut leave a land which is well adapted to farming, whereas such sections as mountainous regions when denuded of forests are poorly suited to agriculture. There of course are many other methods of conservation of forests. The science of forestry is, indeed, fairly highly developed in principle, though not in practice in the United States. A new adaptive culture, one of conservation, is therefore suited to the changed material conditions.

That the conservation of forests in the United States should have been begun earlier is quite generally admitted We may say, therefore, that the old policy of exploitation has hung over longer than it should before the institution of the new policy. In other words, the material conditions in regard to our forests have changed but the customs of the use of forests which once fitted the material conditions very well have hung over into a period of changed conditions These old customs are not only not satisfactorily adapted, but are really socially harmful. These customs of course have a utility, since they meet certain human needs, but methods of greater utility are needed There seems to be a lag in the mores in regard to forestry after the material conditions have changed Or translated into the general terms of the previous analysis, the material conditions have changed first, and there has been a lag in the adaptive culture, that is, that culture which is adapted to forests The material conditions changed before the adaptive culture was changed to fit the new material conditions

This situation may be illustrated by the figure Line 1 represents the material conditions, in regard to forests in the United States. Line 2 represents the adaptive culture, the policy of using the forests The continuous lines represent the plentiful forests, with the sparse population and the mores of exploitation, the dotted lines, the new conditions of forests which are small in relation to the population and the new policy of conservation The space between *a* and *b* represents the period when the old adaptive culture or mores exists with the changed material



conditions, and is a period of maladjustment

It is difficult to locate exactly the points *a* and *b*. Consider first the location of point *b*, or the time of the change from the policy of exploitation to the policy of conservation The policy of conservation of forests certainly did not begin prior to 1904, when the first National Conservation Congress met. It was during Roosevelt's administration that many active steps in the direction of conservation were taken Large areas of national forest lands were withdrawn from public entry Gifford Pinchot was very active in spreading the gospel of conservation, and the House of Governors called by President Roosevelt was in large measure concerned with programmes of conservation About this time many books and articles in magazines and periodicals were written on the subject The conservation movement can hardly be said to have started in any extensive manner before this time It is true that, earlier, papers had been read on the

subject before scientific societies and there had been some teaching of scientific forestry, but prior to this time the idea of forest conservation was little known and the movement was certainly not extensive Nor had the government taken any significant steps in a genuine policy of conservation Indeed it might be argued with some success that we have not yet adopted fully a policy of conservation For a great many of the private holdings are still exploited in very much the same old way. Reforestation is still largely a matter of theory in the United States It is true that the government has taken a number of steps to preserve the forests but the conservationists are far from being satisfied with the progress of the movement to date. Certainly we have not attained the high mark maintained in western Europe.

It is also difficult to locate point *a*, that is, to determine when we should have started the conservation movement Some features of conservation probably should have been instituted perhaps early in the last century. Thus the allotment of permanent forest areas might very well have been done coincidently with the extension of our domain, and the destruction of forests on land little suited to agriculture might have been prevented as the population spread to these new regions. At the time of the Civil War the population had become quite large, and shortly afterward the era of railroad-building set in followed by a great development of industry, insuring large population and concentration It was at this time that the wonderful forests of the Great Lakes region were cut down, and the cuttings in the Appalachian regions increased greatly Some close observers saw at that time what development of population and industry would take place, but the relation of the forests to such a condition was not appreciated. If scientific forestry had been applied then, many of the unnecessarily wasted forests would still exist and now be furnishing lumber There would not have been such a washing of soil and the danger of floods would have been less While some methods of forest conservation might have been applied to advantage shortly after colonial days, the proper time for more extensive developments of conservation was probably in the era following the Civil War. The population was becoming large; the west was being settled, the Pacific coast had been reached, the territorial boundaries had been fixed, industries, railroads, factories, corporations, trusts were all growing with rapidity. The east was in greater need of conservation of forests than the Pacific Northwest or Alaska, nevertheless very probably for the whole country, though its stages of development were unequal, an extensive conservation movement should have been instituted about the middle of the last half of the nineteenth century It would seem, therefore, that there has been a lag of at least a quarter of a century in changing our forestry policy.

The foregoing discussion of forestry illustrates the hypothesis which it is proposed to discuss It is desirable to state more clearly and fully the points involved in the analysis. The first point concerns the degree of adjustment or correlation between the material conditions and the adaptive non-material culture. The degree of this adjustment may be only more or less perfect or satisfactory; but we do adjust ourselves to the material conditions through some form of culture; that is, we live, we get along, through this adjustment The particular culture which is adjusted to the material conditions may be very complex, and, indeed, quite a number of widely different parts of culture may be adjusted to a fairly homogeneous material condition Of a particular cultural form, such as the family or govern-

ment, relationship to a particular material culture is only one of its purposes or functions. Not all functions of family organizations, as, for instance, the affectional function, are primarily adaptive to material conditions

Another point to observe is that the changes in the material culture precede changes in the adaptive culture This statement is not in the form of a universal dictum Conceivably, forms of adaptation might be worked out prior to a change in the material situation and the adaptation might be applied practically at the same time as the change in the material conditions But such a situation presumes a very high degree of planning, prediction and control The collection of data, it is thought, will show that at the present time there are a very large number of cases where the material conditions change and the changes in the adaptive culture follow later. There are certain general theoretical reasons why this is so, but it is not desirable to discuss these until later For the present, the analysis will only concern those cases where changes in the adaptive culture do not precede changes in the material culture Furthermore, it is not implied that changes may not occur in non-material culture while the material culture remains the same Art or education, for instance, may undergo many changes with a constant material culture

Still another point in the analysis is that the old, unchanged, adaptive culture is not adjusted to the new, changed, material conditions. It may be true that the old adaptive culture is never wholly unadjusted to the new conditions There may be some degree of adjustment But the thesis is that the unchanged adaptive culture was more harmoniously related to the old than to the new material conditions and that a new adaptive culture will be better suited to the new material conditions than was the old adaptive culture Adjustment is therefore a relative term, and perhaps only in a few cases would there be a situation which might be called perfect adjustment or perfect lack of adjustment.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Hart Hornell, "Technological Acceleration and the Atomic Bomb," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1946, pp 277–93 Although some of the material in this article is irrelevant to present concerns, it contains some very interesting data on the cultural acceleration theory and attempts to reduce them to statistical formulations

2 Herskovits, M J, *Acculturation The Study of Culture Contact*, J J Augustin, New York, 1938. Herskovits discusses the analytical problems involved in the study of acculturation, reviews and evaluates some of the leading studies made by others, and suggests directions for further research

3 Malinowski Bronislaw *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1945 Bearing the subtitle, "An Inquiry into Race Relations in Africa," this posthumous publication of various papers by Malinowski concerning culture contact and change deals mainly with "the contact situation in terms of stresses and strains, of conflict and cooperation, and of compromise and passive resistance" in showing how new forms evolve in which members of both cultures participate

4 McVoy, L C, "Patterns of Diffusion in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1940, pp 219–27 Using diffusion data from a civilized rather than a primitive society, the author tests three hypotheses (1) that inventions spread from certain centers in concentric circles, (2) that this spread is modified by population density, urbanization, wealth, and other factors, (3) that diffusion takes place in a cyclical pattern, both temporally and spatially

5 Merton, R K, "Civilization and Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, November–December, 1936, pp 103–13 This article points out the errors involved in the concepts of material and nonmaterial culture, some weaknesses of the lag concept of change, and suggests uses of the terms "culture" and "civilization"

6 Ogburn, W F, "The Influence of Invention and Discovery," *Recent Social Trends*, McGraw-Hill Book Company New York, 1933, pp

122–66. This study shows how inventions and discoveries, which are themselves cultural products, lead to further changes in culture Influences of radio and the telephone are given detailed treatment and some significant generalizations are set forth concerning invention as a mode of cultural innovation

7 Rose, Edward, "Innovations in American Culture," *Social Forces,* March, 1948, pp 255–72 Although the rather elaborate statistical procedures of this inquiry conceal a certain amount of subjectivity in the use of basic concepts, it is an interesting attempt to treat cultural innovations in a quantitative way in their relation to place and period

8 See also Sumner, "Characteristics of the Mores," p. 72; Tomars, "Rural Survivals in American Urban Life," p 371; Burgess, "The Growth of the City," p 407, Gilmore, "The Old New Orleans and the New A Case for Ecology," p 414, Harvard Committee, "The Impact of Social Change on Education in the United States," p 632, Heberle, A Sociological Interpretation of Social Change in the South," p. 804.

4. Cultural Variability

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

A striking paradox of culture — contrasting cultures as well as any single culture — is its uniformity and diversity. This can be illustrated in the matter of language. Language is a prerequisite for and essential component of culture, and all languages, no matter how different in particulars, exhibit common phonetic principles and fulfill the same basic functions of articulation and communication. Yet languages differ greatly in range and scope, structure and function. Though the organic apparatus of speech is the same for all peoples, speech is not a direct biological function and must be learned according to a prescribed pattern. As is the case with other aspects of culture, a common language is a unifying influence, whereas linguistic differences tend to create barriers within and between cultures. National units and language units are not always identical, as may be seen in Switzerland, and even more notably, none of the major languages today follow racial lines. Furthermore, there are subforms of language (argot, jargon, and dialect) for subgroupings within a culture, and comparable to other subforms in matters of dress, food habits, and so on. Similarities of language are often found among contiguous areas (e.g., French, Spanish, and Italian; Chinese, Cambodian, and Tibetan), but the same language (e.g., English or Spanish) may be diffused into widely separated regions. This same observation may be made of many other cultural forms. Just as there is no universal language, there is similarly no universal set of food habits, religious practices, or pattern of family life.

Granting the existence of both uniformity and variability in culture, how are these dual characteristics to be explained? Let us first consider the matter of uniformity, since its causes are more self-evident. Human beings as biological organisms impose certain minimum demands on any culture. In addition to fundamental biological needs, which are the same the world over, the physical environment, to be at all habitable, must offer minimum features for exploitation, although it also sets objective limitations upon accomplishment. Ubiquitous aspects of rudimentary group life pose some problems for which all cultures must devise solutions. Still another cause for universal elements (and this point is speculative) may be that all cultures stem from one original pattern and hence show certain immanent and deeply imbedded characteristics.

It has been pointed out by Malinowski and others that many culture forms are determined or at least strongly influenced by function. (Goldenweiser calls this the "principle of limited possibilities" — see item 5 under Annotated References.) For instance, no matter how whimsical the desired design may be, seagoing crafts

must be buoyant. Throughout the world people may and do eat an astonishing variety of things, but with only minor and occasional exceptions most of the stuff ingested must be "digestible, nourishing, and non-poisonous." It is no accident that knives are universally made of hard substances having sharp edges, nor is it surprising, with adult responsibility and care for dependent children a necessary condition for survival of the species, that some form of marriage and the family is universal. To be sure, the functional interpretation breaks down at many points, but it is nevertheless highly applicable in explaining the uniformities of culture.

Variability in culture, however, often cannot be accounted for in terms of a functional analysis. The explanation of cultural ways as simply adjustment mechanisms between the biological organism and the geographic or physical environment is more often than not misleading and fallacious From one point of view, indeed, it may even be said that all strictly human actions are culturally determined As Benedict's "The Diversity of Cultures" shows, institutions do not keep as close to biological needs and impulses as is commonly imagined and much that is attributed to innate "human nature" is really a product of cultural influence. Likewise, as Kluckhohn mentions, in "The Navaho View of Life," adjustments and adaptations are always selective and usually more than one solution is possible.

Benedict's article delineates how the environment and human imagination provide an incredible number of leads which a society may follow, as is testified by the many ideas of property, the different gods, and the varying dogmas from one culture to another. Among various cultures the same trait may have different degrees of emphasis or elaboration; some societies ignore completely what others consider fundamental; and no culture can incorporate all possible traits, any more than one language can use all possible speech sounds. In illustrating variability Benedict asserts that monetary values may be made basic or hardly recognized, and that in the gamut of variability among cultures, "one builds an enormous cultural superstructure upon adolescence, one upon death, and one upon afterlife." Her principal analyses are of adolescence, warfare, and marriage as cases in point, and she concludes that few of the practices involved in any of these complexes stem from man's so-called original nature. It is interesting to note how, in her findings, she refutes fallacious notions about instinctive and purely psychological motivations for the various practices described and analyzed, and in her conclusion, she states that changes may be disquieting and may involve losses because of disjunctions inherent in the process of change regardless of the character of the forms displaced. This article not only offers proof of the variability of culture in important respects, but also shows (1) the logical necessity for variability when definite selection must be made from a wide range of possibilities; (2) the possibility of varying responses to what may appear to be a common stimulus but what are actually different stimuli because of different meanings attached; and (3) how some practices may run counter to biological impulses and have no value for survival.

Although the influence of culture upon personality, or socialization, is beyond our immediate scope in this section, it is relevant here to include a case which demonstrates what happens when a particular society becomes subjected to the antithetical variabilities of two cultures. The material included in "An Indian's Soliloquy" is of particular interest since in this case a participant rather than an outside observer gives his own insights. Here one may ascertain directly the impact of conflicting attitudes, values, and practices and their disruptive effects Here too is an exemplification of the complete dependence of the individual upon his familiar culture and the sense of loss when it becomes shattered.

Kluckhohn's article likewise indicates, but much more elaborately and analytically, what happens to a people torn between two sets of standards. While stressing some of the same points made by Benedict, Kluckhohn's main emphasis is upon the importance of value systems· the culture of the Navahos is founded upon one set of values and that of the white Americans upon another Each way of life is based upon its own assumptions about the purpose of human existence, and there may therefore be entirely different culturally induced motives for doing the same things. The kinds of personalities developed within a culture depend upon the personal traits admired; among the Navahos, for instance, personal excellence is a value but personal success (in the white American sense) is not On the other hand, personal cleanliness is not valued by the Navahos as it is by us—perhaps because we have modern plumbing. In setting forth the basic premises or unstated assumptions of Navaho culture, the author shows how disorientation develops when these assumptions begin to lose ground under attack from a competing set of assumptions Social disorganization, i.e, the absence of generally accepted standards of behavior, ensues with the breakdown of the culture and brings in its train a loss of predictability and hence of dependability in personal relations. The main usefulness of Kluckhohn's materials, however, is not in showing the occasional disrupting effects of culture contacts, but in demonstrating the role of values in determining uniformity within a culture and variability between cultures

It should be clear by now that culture is the principal variable shaping the forms of human behavior. This is quite contrary to the notion that Negroes are "naturally musical," the Chinese "unemotional," the Germans "instinctively belligerent," and so on. Neither biology nor psychology can be invoked to explain either the alleged or the real differences in behavior which find their true origins in cultural conditioning. Likewise, when it is known that some peoples relish certain insects as staple articles of diet whereas others are repelled by the idea of eating any kind of insects, it is tautological merely to explain these different habits on the basis of isolated likes and dislikes. The ways of culture are seen in their full significance as parts of patterns, not as single traits

The tendency to think of our own ways as "natural" or as "expressing human nature" springs largely from ethnocentrism, or the tendency to regard all other cultures from the standpoint of our own A good antidote for this attitude lies in

the perspective acquired by looking at the ways of contrasting cultures, both primitive and civilized. Such a contrast, between complex cultures, may be found in the Lederer and Lederer-Seidler study, *Japan in Transition*. In our chapter from this book, "Conventional Forms," the authors show how the Japanese hold as tremendously important — even to the point of ritualization — certain modes of behavior which to Americans are utterly insignificant. Extreme conventionality, lack of spontaneity, careful stylization, and stereotyping characterizes much of Japanese behavior, where extreme individuality characterizes ours. The analysis, however, makes it quite evident that cultural conditioning rather than any innate Japanese propensity toward formalization is the causal factor.

Our analysis of cultural variability would be incomplete without some materials concerning our own culture, and the kind of perspective desired may be obtained by looking at its over-all pattern through the eyes of a trained observer who is a nonparticipant. Such a point of view is afforded by the contemporary impressions of the European writer, Richard Muller-Freienfels. Three aspects of American culture impress him most: (1) American adulation of quantity or sheer magnitude; (2) technicalization and mechanization of life; and (3) standardization or typicalization of life These characteristics, he contends, are in part conditioned by the large size of the culture area — thus our lack of cultural differentiation. Muller-Freienfels concludes by referring to these dominant features somewhat mystically as a "rationalization of the soul," by which he means the concentration of intellect on utilitarian ends, and in proclaiming the epitomization of the American mentality in the machine.

All of the cases we have cited show the importance of cultural variability and imply the necessity for understanding its significance as a background of social life. Certain universals and particulars have been noted and accounted for, and some of the effects of variability upon participants have been suggested Aside from the intellectual perspective which a knowledge of cultural variability may yield, such knowledge should result in a more rational attitude toward the ways of other cultures and the changes occurring within our own.

THE DIVERSITY OF CULTURES *

Ruth Benedict

A chief of the Digger Indians, as the Californians call them, talked to me a great deal about the ways of his people in the old days He was a Christian and a leader among his people in the planting of peaches and apricots on irrigated land, but when he talked of the shamans who had transformed themselves into bears be-

* Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1934, pp. 21–37. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

fore his eyes in the bear dance, his hands trembled and his voice broke with excitement It was an incomparable thing, the power his people had had in the old days. He liked best to talk of the desert foods they had eaten. He brought each uprooted plant lovingly and with an unfailing sense of its importance. In those days his people had eaten 'the health of the desert,' he said, and knew nothing of the insides of tin cans and the things for sale at butcher shops It was such innovations that had degraded them in these latter days.

One day, without transition, Ramon broke in upon his descriptions of grinding mesquite and preparing acorn soup. 'In the beginning,' he said, 'God gave to every people a cup, a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life' I do not know whether the figure occurred in some traditional ritual of his people that I never found, or whether it was his own imagery It is hard to imagine that he had heard it from the whites he had known at Banning, they were not given to discussing the ethos of different peoples At any rate, in the mind of this humble Indian the figure of speech was clear and full of meaning 'They all dipped in the water,' he continued, 'but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now. It has passed away'

Our cup is broken. These things that had given significance to the life of his people, the domestic rituals of eating, the obligations of the economic system, the succession of ceremonials in the villages, possession in the bear dance, their standards of right and wrong—these were gone, and with them the shape and meaning of their life. The old man was still vigorous and a leader in relationships with the whites He did not mean that there was any question of the extinction of his people But he had in mind the loss of something that had value equal to that of life itself, the whole fabric of his people's standards and beliefs. There were other cups of living left, and they held perhaps the same water, but the loss was irreparable It was no matter of tinkering with an addition here, lopping off something there. The modelling had been fundamental, it was somehow all of a piece. It had been their own

Ramon had had personal experience of the matter of which he spoke. He straddled two cultures whose values and ways of thought were incommensurable It is a hard fate In Western civilization our experiences have been different We are bred to one cosmopolitan culture, and our social sciences, our psychology, and our theology persistently ignore the truth expressed in Ramon's figure.

The course of life and the pressure of environment, not to speak of the fertility of human imagination, provide an incredible number of possible leads, all of which, it appears, may serve a society to live by There are the schemes of ownership, with the social hierarchy that may be associated with possessions, there are material things and their elaborate technology, there are all the facets of sex life, parenthood and post-parenthood, there are the guilds or cults which may give structure to the society, there is economic exchange, there are the gods and supernatural sanctions Each one of these and many more may be followed out with a cultural and ceremonial elaboration which monopolizes the cultural energy and leaves small surplus for the building of other traits Aspects of life that seem to us most important have been passed over with small regard by peoples whose culture, oriented in another direction, has been far from poor Or the same trait may be so greatly elaborated that we reckon it as fantastic

It is in cultural life as it is in speech; selection is the prime necessity The numbers of sounds that can be produced by

our vocal cords and our oral and nasal cavities are practically unlimited. The three or four dozen of the English language are a selection which coincides not even with those of such closely related dialects as German and French The total that are used in different languages of the world no one has ever dared to estimate But each language must make its selection and abide by it on pain of not being intelligible at all A language that used even a few hundreds of the possible —and actually recorded—phonetic elements could not be used for communication On the other hand a great deal of our misunderstanding of languages unrelated to our own has arisen from our attempts to refer alien phonetic systems back to ours as a point of reference We recognize only one *k* If other people have five *k* sounds placed in different positions in the throat and mouth, distinctions of vocabulary and of syntax that depend on these differences are impossible to us until we master them We have a *d* and an *n*. They may have an intermediate sound which, if we fail to identify it, we write now *d* and now *n*, introducing distinctions which do not exist The elementary prerequisite of linguistic analysis is a consciousness of these incredibly numerous available sounds from which each language makes its own selections

In culture too we must imagine a great arc on which are ranged the possible interests provided either by the human age-cycle or by the environment or by man's various activities A culture that capitalized even a considerable proportion of these would be as unintelligible as a language that used all the clicks, all the glottal stops, all the labials, dentals, sibilants, and gutturals from voiceless to voiced and from oral to nasal Its identity as a culture depends upon the selection of some segments of this arc Every human society everywhere has made such selection in its cultural institutions. Each from the point of view of another ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies. One culture hardly recognizes monetary values; another has made them fundamental in every field of behaviour. In one society technology is unbelievably slighted even in those aspects of life which seem necessary to ensure survival; in another, equally simple, technological achievements are complex and fitted with admirable nicety to the situation. One builds an enormous cultural superstructure upon adolescence, one upon death, one upon after-life

The case of adolescence is particularly interesting, because it is in the limelight in our own civilization and because we have plentiful information from other cultures. In our own civilization a whole library of psychological studies has emphasized the inevitable unrest of the period of puberty It is in our tradition a physiological state as definitely characterized by domestic explosions and rebellion as typhoid is marked by fever There is no question of the facts They are common in America The question is rather of their inevitability

The most casual survey of the ways in which different societies have handled adolescence makes one fact inescapable even in those cultures which have made most of the trait, the age upon which they focus their attention varies over a great range of years. At the outset, therefore, it is clear that the so-called puberty institutions are a misnomer if we continue to think of biological puberty The puberty they recognize is social, and the ceremonies are a recognition in some fashion or other of the child's new status of adulthood This investiture with new occupations and obligations is in consequence as various and as culturally conditioned as the occupations and obligations themselves If the sole honourable duty of man-

hood is conceived to be deeds of war, the investiture of the warrior is later and of a different sort from that in a society where adulthood gives chiefly the privilege of dancing in a representation of masked gods In order to understand puberty institutions, we do not most need analyses of the necessary nature of *rites de passage,* we need rather to know what is identified in different cultures with the beginning of adulthood and their methods of admitting to the new status Not biological puberty, but what adulthood means in that culture conditions the puberty ceremony.

Adulthood in central North America means warfare. Honour in it is the great goal of all men The constantly recurring theme of the youth's coming of-age, as also of preparation for the warpath at any age, is a magic ritual for success in war They torture not one another, but themselves they cut strips of skin from their arms and legs, they strike off their fingers, they drag heavy weights pinned to their chest or leg muscles Their reward is enhanced prowess in deeds of warfare

In Australia, on the other hand, adulthood means participation in an exclusively male cult whose fundamental trait is the exclusion of women. Any woman is put to death if she so much as hears the sound of the bull roarer at the ceremonies, and she must never know of the rites. Puberty ceremonies are elaborate and symbolic repudiations of the bonds with the female sex, the men are symbolically made self sufficient and the wholly responsible element of the community To attain this end they use drastic sexual rites and bestow supernatural guaranties.

The clear physiological facts of adolescence, therefore, are first socially interpreted even where they are stressed But a survey of puberty institutions makes clear a further fact puberty is physiologically a different matter in the life cycle of the male and the female. If cultural emphasis followed the physiological emphasis, girls' ceremonies would be more marked than boys'; but it is not so The ceremonies emphasize a social fact the adult prerogatives of men are more far reaching in every culture than women's, and consequently, as in the above instances, it is more common for societies to take note of this period in boys than in girls.

Girls' and boys' puberty, however, may be socially celebrated in the same tribe in identical ways Where, as in the interior of British Columbia, adolescent rites are a magical training for all occupations, girls are included on the same terms as boys Boys roll stones down mountains and beat them to the bottom to be swift of foot, or throw gambling sticks to be lucky in gambling, girls carry water from distant springs, or drop stones down inside their dresses that their children may be born as easily as the pebble drops to the ground.

In such a tribe as the Nandi of the lake region of East Africa, also, girls and boys share an even handed puberty rite, though, because of the man's dominant rôle in the culture, his boyhood training period is more stressed than the woman's Here adolescent rites are an ordeal inflicted by those already admitted to adult status upon those they are now forced to admit. They require of them the most complete stoicism in the face of ingenious tortures associated with circumcision The rites for the two sexes are separate, but they follow the same pattern In both the novices wear for the ceremony the clothing of their sweethearts During the operation their faces are watched for any twinge of pain, and the reward of bravery is given with great rejoicing by the lover, who runs forward to receive back some of his adornments For both the girl and boy the rites mark their *entree* into a new sex status the boy

is now a warrior and may take a sweetheart, the girl is marriageable. The adolescent tests are for both a premarital ordeal in which the palm is awarded by their lovers.

Puberty rites may also be built upon the facts of girls' puberty and admit of no extension to boys. One of the most naive of these is the institution of the fatting-house for girls in Central Africa In the region where feminine beauty is all but identified with obesity, the girl at puberty is segregated, sometimes for years, fed with sweet and fatty foods, allowed no activity, and her body rubbed assiduously with oils. She is taught during this time her future duties, and her seclusion ends with a parade of her corpulence that is followed by her marriage to her proud bridegroom. It is not regarded as necessary for the man to achieve pulchritude before marriage in a similar fashion

The usual ideas around which girls' puberty institutions are centred, and which are not readily extended to boys', are those concerned with menstruation The uncleanness of the menstruating woman is a very widespread idea, and in a few regions first menstruation has been made the focus of all the associated attitudes. Puberty rites in these cases are of a thoroughly different character from any of which we have spoken. Among the Carrier Indians of British Columbia, the fear and horror of a girl's puberty was at its height. Her three or four years of seclusion was called 'the burying alive,' and she lived for all that time alone in the wilderness, in a hut of branches far from all beaten trails. She was a threat to any person who might so much as catch a glimpse of her, and her mere footstep defiled a path or a river She was covered with a great headdress of tanned skin that shrouded her face and breasts and fell to the ground behind. Her arms and legs were loaded with sinew bands to protect her from the evil spirit with which she was filled. She was herself in danger and she was a source of danger to everybody else.

Girls' puberty ceremonies built upon ideas associated with the menses are readily convertible into what is, from the point of view of the individual concerned, exactly opposite behaviour. There are always two possible aspects to the sacred: it may be a source of peril or it may be a source of blessing In some tribes the first menses of girls are a potent supernatural blessing. Among the Apaches I have seen the priests themselves pass on their knees before the row of solemn little girls to receive from them the blessing of their touch. All the babies and the old people come also of necessity to have illness removed from them. The adolescent girls are not segregated as sources of danger, but court is paid to them as to direct sources of supernatural blessing Since the ideas that underlie puberty rites for girls, both among the Carrier and among the Apache, are founded on beliefs concerning menstruation, they are not extended to boys, and boys' puberty is marked instead, and lightly, with simple tests and proofs of manhood.

The adolescent behaviour, therefore, even of girls was not dictated by some physiological characteristic of the period itself, but rather by marital or magic requirements socially connected with it. These beliefs made adolescence in one tribe serenely religious and beneficent, and in another so dangerously unclean that the child had to cry out in warning that others might avoid her in the woods The adolescence of girls may equally, as we have seen, be a theme which a culture does not institutionalize Even where, as in most of Australia, boys' adolescence is given elaborate treatment, it may be that the rites are an induction into the status of manhood and male participation in tribal

matters, and female adolescence passes without any kind of formal recognition.

These facts, however, still leave the fundamental question unanswered Do not all cultures have to cope with the natural turbulence of this period, even though it may not be given institutional expression? Dr. Mead has studied this question in Samoa There the girl's life passes through well-marked periods Her first years out of babyhood are passed in small neighbourhood gangs of age mates from which the little boys are strictly excluded The corner of the village to which she belongs is all-important, and the little boys are traditional enemies. She has one duty, that of baby-tending, but she takes the baby with her rather than stays home to mind it, and her play is not seriously hampered A couple of years before puberty, when she grows strong enough to have more difficult tasks required of her and old enough to learn more skilled techniques, the little girls' play group in which she grew up ceases to exist She assumes woman's dress and must contribute to the work of the household It is an uninteresting period of life to her and quite without turmoil Puberty brings no change at all.

A few years after she has come of age, she will begin the pleasant years of casual and irresponsible love affairs that she will prolong as far as possible into the period when marriage is already considered fitting. Puberty itself is marked by no social recognition, no change of attitude or of expectancy Her pre-adolescent shyness is supposed to remain unchanged for a couple of years. The girl's life in Samoa is blocked out by other considerations than those of physiological sex maturity, and puberty falls in a particularly unstressed and peaceful period during which no adolescent conflicts manifest themselves Adolescence, therefore, may not only be culturally passed over without ceremonial; it may also be without importance in the emotional life of the child and in the attitude of the village toward her.

Warfare is another social theme that may or may not be used in any culture. Where war is made much of, it may be with contrasting objectives, with contrasting organization in relation to the state, and with contrasting sanctions. War may be, as it was among the Aztecs, a way of getting captives for the religious sacrifices Since the Spaniards fought to kill, according to Aztec standards they broke the rules of the game. The Aztecs fell back in dismay and Cortez walked as victor into the capital.

There are even quainter notions, from our standpoint, associated with warfare in different parts of the world For our purposes it is sufficient to notice those regions where organized resort to mutual slaughter never occurs between social groups Only our familiarity with war makes it intelligible that a state of warfare should alternate with a state of peace in one tribe's dealings with another The idea is quite common over the world, of course But on the one hand it is impossible for certain peoples to conceive the possibility of a state of peace, which in their notion would be equivalent to admitting enemy tribes to the category of human beings, which by definition they are not even though the excluded tribe may be of their own race and culture

On the other hand, it may be just as impossible for a people to conceive of the possibility of a state of war Rasmussen tells of the blankness with which the Eskimo met his exposition of our custom. Eskimos very well understand the act of killing a man. If he is in your way, you cast up your estimate of your own strength, and if you are ready to take it upon yourself, you kill him. If you are strong, there is no social retribution. But

the idea of an Eskimo village going out against another Eskimo village in battle array or a tribe against tribe, or even of another village being fair game in ambush warfare, is alien to them All killing comes under one head, and is not separated, as ours is, into categories, the one meritorious, the other a capital offence

I myself tried to talk of warfare to the Mission Indians of California, but it was impossible Their misunderstanding of warfare was abysmal They did not have the basis in their own culture upon which the idea could exist, and their attempts to reason it out reduced the great wars to which we are able to dedicate ourselves with moral fervour to the level of alley brawls. They did not happen to have a cultural pattern that distinguished between them

War is, we have been forced to admit even in the face of its huge place in our own civilization, an asocial trait. In the chaos following World War I all the wartime arguments that expounded its fostering of courage, of altruism, of spiritual values, gave out a false and offensive ring. War in our own civilization is as good an illustration as one can take of the destructive lengths to which the development of a culturally selected trait may go If we justify war, it is because all peoples always justify the traits of which they find themselves possessed, not because war will bear an objective examination of its merits.

Warfare is not an isolated case From every part of the world and from all levels of cultural complexity it is possible to illustrate the overweening and finally often the asocial elaboration of a cultural trait Those cases are clearest where, as in dietary or mating regulations, for example, traditional usage runs counter to biological drives. Social organization, in anthropology, has a quite specialized meaning owing to the unanimity of all human societies in stressing relationship groups within which marriage is forbidden No known people regard all women as possible mates. This is not in an effort, as is so often supposed, to prevent inbreeding in our sense, for over great parts of the world it is an own cousin, often the daughter of one's mother's brother, who is the predestined spouse The relatives to whom the prohibition refers differ utterly among different peoples, but all human societies are alike in placing a restriction No human idea has received more constant and complex elaboration in culture than this of incest. The incest groups are often the most important functioning units of the tribe, and the duties of every individual in relation to any other are defined by their relative positions in these groups These groups function as units in religious ceremonials and in cycles of economic exchange, and it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of the rôle they have played in social history

Some areas handle the incest tabu with moderation. In spite of the restrictions there may be a considerable number of women available for a man to marry In others the group that is tabu has been extended by a social fiction to include vast numbers of individuals who have no traceable ancestors in common, and choice of a mate is in consequence excessively limited This social fiction receives unequivocal expression in the terms of relationship which are used Instead of distinguishing lineal from collateral kin as we do in the distinction between father and uncle, brother and cousin, one term means literally 'man of my father's group (relationship, locality, etc) of his generation,' not distinguishing between direct and collateral lines, but making other distinctions that are foreign to us. Certain tribes of eastern Australia use an extreme

form of this so-called classificatory kinship system. Those whom they call brothers and sisters are all those of their generation with whom they recognize any relationship There is no cousin category or anything that corresponds to it; all relatives of one's own generation are one's brothers and sisters.

This manner of reckoning relationship is not uncommon in the world, but Australia has in addition an unparalleled horror of sister marriage and an unparalleled development of exogamous restrictions. So the Kurnai, with their extreme classificatory relationship system, feel the Australian horror of sex relationship with all their 'sisters,' that is, women of their own generation who are in any way related to them Besides this, the Kurnai have strict locality rules in the choice of a mate. Sometimes two localities, out of the fifteen or sixteen of which the tribe is composed, must exchange women, and can have no mates in any other group Sometimes there is a group of two or three localities that may exchange with two or three others Still further, as in all Australia, the old men are a privileged group, and their prerogatives extend to marrying the young and attractive girls The consequence of these rules is, of course, that in all the local group which must by absolute prescription furnish a young man with his wife, there is no girl who is not touched by one of these tabus Either she is one of those who through relationship with his mother is his 'sister,' or she is already bargained for by an old man, or for some lesser reason she is forbidden to him

That does not bring the Kurnai to reformulate their exogamous rules They insist upon them with every show of violence Therefore, the only way they are usually able to marry is by flying violently in the face of the regulations They elope As soon as the village knows that an elopement has occurred, it sets out in pursuit, and if the couple are caught the two are killed. It does not matter that possibly all the pursuers were married by elopement in the same fashion. Moral indignation runs high. There is, however, an island traditionally recognized as a safe haven, and if the couple can reach it and remain away till the birth of a child, they are received again with blows, it is true, but they may defend themselves After they have run the gauntlet and been given their drubbing, they take up the status of married people in the tribe

The Kurnai meet their cultural dilemma typically enough. They have extended and complicated a particular aspect of behaviour until it is a social liability They must either modify it, or get by with a subterfuge And they use the subterfuge They avoid extinction, and they maintain their ethics without acknowledged revision. This manner of dealing with the *mores* has lost nothing in the progress of civilization The older generation of our own civilization similarly maintained monogamy and supported prostitution, and the panegyrics of monogamy were never so fervent as in the great days of the red-light districts Societies have always justified favourite traditional forms When these traits get out of hand and some form of supplementary behaviour is called in, lip service is given as readily to the traditional form as if the supplementary behaviour did not exist.

Such a bird's-eye survey of human cultural forms makes clear several common misconceptions In the first place, the institutions that human cultures build up upon the hints presented by the environment or by man's physical necessities do not keep as close to the original impulse as we easily imagine These hints are, in reality, mere rough sketches, a list of bare facts. They are pin-point potentialities, and the elaboration that takes place

around them is dictated by many alien considerations. Warfare is not the expression of the instinct of pugnacity. Man's pugnacity is so small a hint in the human equipment that it may not be given any expression in inter-tribal relations. When it is institutionalized, the form it takes follows other grooves of thought than those implied in the original impulse. Pugnacity is no more than the touch to the ball of custom, a touch also that may be withheld.

Such a view of cultural processes calls for a recasting of many of our current arguments upholding our traditional institutions. These arguments are usually based on the impossibility of man's functioning without these particular traditional forms. Even very special traits come in for this kind of validation, such as the particular form of economic drive that arises under our particular system of property ownership. This is a remarkably special motivation and there are evidences that even in our generation it is being strongly modified At any rate, we do not have to confuse the issue by discussing it as if it were a matter of biological survival values. Self-support is a motive our civilization has capitalized. If our economic structure changes so that this motive is no longer so potent a drive as it was in the era of the great frontier and expanding industrialism, there are many other motives that would be appropriate to a changed economic organization Every culture, every era, exploits some few out of a great number of possibilities. Changes may be very disquieting, and involve great losses, but this is due to the difficulty of change itself, not to the fact that our age and country has hit upon the one possible motivation under which human life can be conducted. Change, we must remember, with all its difficulties, is inescapable. Our fears over even very minor shifts in custom are usually quite beside the point. Civilizations might change far more radically than any human authority has ever had the will or the imagination to change them, and still be completely workable. The minor changes that occasion so much denunciation today, such as the increase of divorce, the growing secularization in our cities, the prevalence of the petting party, and many more, could be taken up quite readily into a slightly different pattern of culture. Becoming traditional, they would be given the same richness of content, the same importance and value, that the older patterns had in other generations.

The truth of the matter is rather that the possible human institutions and motives are legion, on every plane of cultural simplicity or complexity, and that wisdom consists in a greatly increased tolerance toward their divergencies. No man can thoroughly participate in any culture unless he has been brought up and has lived according to its forms, but he can grant to other cultures the same significance to their participants which he recognizes in his own.

AN INDIAN'S SOLILOQUY *

B. W. Aginsky

While doing field research in northern California with an Indian group which had suffered a great deal under the disruptive influences of Spanish and Americans, I became familiar with an old Indian man well over one hundred years of age. He had lived through a period which encompassed the days before any whites had come into his territory, the Spanish raids, the white massacres, the herding of his people upon reservations, and the variegated civilized tortures accompanying these deprivations. One day after a long period of discussion concerning the changing family situation he talked eloquently for a period of about two hours As soon as it was possible I returned to my headquarters and recorded what he had said in as close an approximation as I could

An old Pomo Indian once said to me: "What is a man? A man is nothing. Without his family he is of less importance than that bug crossing the trail, of less importance than the sputum or exuviae. At least they can be used to help poison [1] a man. A man must be with his family to amount to anything with us If he had nobody else to help him, the first trouble he got into he would be killed by his enemies because there would be no relatives to help him fight the poison of the other group. No woman would marry him because her family would not let her marry a man with no family. He would be poorer than a newborn child, he would be poorer than a worm, and the family would not consider him worth anything. He would not bring renown or glory with him He would not bring support of other relatives either. The family is important. If a man has a large family and a profession [2] and upbringing by a family that is known to produce good children, then he is somebody and every family is willing to have him marry a woman of their group It is the family that is important In the white ways of doing things the family is not so important The police and soldiers take care of protecting you, the courts give you justice, the post office carries messages for you, the school teaches you Everything is taken care of, even your children, if you die, but with us the family must do all of that.

"Without the family we are nothing, and in the old days before the white people came the family was given the first consideration by anyone who was about to do anything at all That is why we got along We had no courts, judges, schools, and the other things you have, but we got along better than you We had poison, but if we minded our own business and restrained ourselves we lived well. We were taught to leave people alone. We were taught to consider that other people had to live We were taught that we would suffer from the devil, spirits, ghosts, or other people if we did not support one another. The family was everything, and no man ever forgot that. Each

[1] Sorcery — black magic

[2] Specialized occupation requiring years of training and preparation Some of the specializations are deer-hunter, gambler, doctor, and money manufacturers

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1940, pp 43–44 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

person was nothing, but as a group joined by blood the individual knew that he would get the support of all his relatives if anything happened He also knew that if he was a bad person the head man of his family would pay another tribe to kill him so that there would be no trouble afterward and so that he would not get the family into trouble all of the time.

"That is why we were good people and why we were friends with the white people when they came. But the white people were different from us. They wanted to take the world for themselves My grandfather told me that the white people were homeless and had no families. They came by themselves and settled on our property They had no manners. They did not know how to get along with other people They were strangers who were rough and common and did not know how to behave But I have seen that these people of yours are even worse. They have taken everything away from the Indians, and they take everything away from one another They do not help one another when they are in trouble, and they do not care what happens to other people. We were not like that We would not let a person die of starvation when we had plenty of food. We would not bury our dead with no show. We would kill another person by poisoning him if he was an enemy, but we would not treat a stranger the way they treat their own brothers and sisters. Your people are hard to understand. My brother lived with your people for twenty years, and he said that he was used to you, but he cannot understand yet why you people act as you do. You are all the same in one way. We are all the same in another. What is wrong with you? The white people have the land. They own the courts, they own everything, but they will not give the Indians enough money to live on It is hard to understand

"With us the family was everything. Now it is nothing We are getting like the white people, and it is bad for the old people We had no old peoples' homes like you. The old people were important. They were wise. Your old people must be fools."

THE NAVAHO VIEW OF LIFE *

Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton

THE NAVAHO VIEW OF LIFE

In our survey of The People's way of life, the least tangible but by no means the least important subject has been reserved for the last The problems the Navahos face and the techniques they have developed for coping with them — their material technology and their ways of handling human relations and of dealing with superhuman forces — have been considered. Through the survey of their language in the last chapter, the view of life which lies behind the special character of the Navaho adaptation was partially revealed This subject must now be further amplified in more direct and explicit terms

* Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Leighton, *The Navaho*, Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1946

Adjustments and adaptations are always selective Almost always more than one solution is objectively possible The choices which a people make and the emphasis they give to one problem at the expense of others bear a relationship to the things they have come to regard as especially important. All people have to eat to survive, but whether they eat to live or live to eat or live and eat is not fixed by uncontrollable forces Even if they live to eat, there will be choices as to what they eat No society utilizes all the foods present in the environment which can be handled by the available technology For example, neither Navahos nor white people commonly eat snake flesh although it is perfectly nutritious The external facts —important though these always are— are not the only determinants of what people do

The way of life which is handed down as the social heritage of every people does more than supply a set of skills for making a living and a set of blueprints for human relations Each different way of life makes assumptions (and usually somewhat different assumptions) about the ends and purposes of human existence, about what human beings have a right to expect from one another and from the gods, about what constitutes fulfillment or frustration Some of these assumptions are made explicit in so many words in the lore of the folk, others are tacit premises which the observer must infer by finding consistent trends in deed and word

All of the specific things which The People approve or disapprove cannot be mentioned Many of these have already been stated or implied But the central directions of Navaho goals and values need to be indicated. It must, however, always be remembered that in this respect also The People are in a transitional stage They are torn between their own ancient standards and those which are urged upon them by teachers, missionaries, and other whites. An appreciable number of Navahos are so confused by the conflicting precepts of their elders and their white models that they tend, in effect, to reject the whole problem of morality (in the widest sense) as meaningless or insoluble For longer or shorter periods in their lives their only guide is the expediency of the immediate situation One cannot play a game according to rule if there are sharp disagreements as to what the rules are The incipient breakdown of any culture brings a loss of predictability and hence of dependability in personal relations The absence of generally accepted standards of behavior among individuals constitutes, in fact, a definition of social disorganization

A stable social structure prevails only so long as the majority of individuals in the society find enough satisfaction both in the goals socially approved and in the institutionalized means of attainment to compensate them for the constraints which ordered social life inevitably imposes upon uninhibited response to impulse In any way of life there is much that to an outside observer appears haphazard, disorderly, more or less chaotic But unless most participants feel that the ends and means of their culture make sense, disorientation and amorality become rampant Synthesis is achieved partly through the overt statement of the dominant conceptions and aspirations of the group in its religion and ethical code, partly through unconscious apperceptive habits, habitual ways of looking at the stream of events

In this chapter an attempt will be made to describe not only Navaho ethics and values but also some of those highest common factors that are implicit in a variety of the doings and sayings of The People. In the not distant past these recurrent themes, these unstated premises, gave a

felt coherence to life in spite of social change, in spite of the diversity of institutions, in spite of differences in the needs and experiences of individuals. These distinctly Navaho values and premises still do much to regulate group life and to reconcile conflicts and discrepancies. But the basic assumptions of The People are now under attack from a competing set of assumptions. The majority of Navahos no longer feel completely at home and at ease in their world of values and significances, and an appreciable minority are thoroughly disoriented This chapter will portray the Navaho view of life in its integrated form as still held by most older people and many younger ones, for probably no Navaho alive today is completely uninfluenced by this set of conceptions of the good life, of characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting, although it should be remembered that many younger people partly repudiate some of these notions and find themselves in an uneasy state between two worlds.

NAVAHO "ETHICS"

In no human group is indiscriminate lying, cheating, or stealing approved Cooperation is of course impossible unless individuals can depend upon each other in defined circumstances. Societies differ in how they define the conditions under which lying or stealing is forgivable or tolerable or even perhaps demanded In their general discussions The People make virtues of truth and honesty, much as white people do. In the advice fathers give their children, in the harangues of headmen at large gatherings, these two ideals never fail to be extolled

The difference in the presentation of these ideals by whites and Navahos lies in the reasons advanced. The Navaho never appeals to abstract morality or to adherence to divine principles. He stresses mainly the practical considerations: "If you don't tell the truth, your fellows won't trust you and you'll shame your relatives. You'll never get along in the world that way." Truth is never praised merely on the ground that it is "good" in a purely abstract sense, nor do exhortations ever take the form that the Holy People have forbidden cheating or stealing Certain other acts are commanded or prohibited on the basis that one or more of the Holy People did or did not behave in similar fashion, but never in the modes which would seem "natural" to Christians "Do this to please the Holy People because they love you," or "Don't do this because the Holy People punish wrong-doing" The Navahos do most definitely believe that acts have consequences, but the nature of the consequence is not wrapped up in any intrinsic "rightness" or "wrongness" of the act itself. In the matters of truth and honesty, the only appeal to the sentiments (other than those of practicality and getting along with relatives and neighbors) which Navaho "moralists" permit themselves is that of loyalty to tradition. The old Navaho way was not to lie, to cheat, or to steal. The prevalence of such vices today, they say, is due to white corruption. So much for theory

When it comes to practice, it is harder to put the finger on the differences between Navaho and white patterns One gets the impression that Navahos lie to strangers with fewer qualms than the average well-socialized white adult would feel. (However, the white adult's easy acceptance of "white lies" must not be overlooked) There are also occasions on which stealing seems to be condoned "if you can get away with it" Again, though, a qualification must be entered; in many parts of the Navaho country, one can leave an automobile containing valuable articles unlocked for days and return to find not a single item missing. Thefts oc-

cur chiefly in the areas under strongest white influence, especially at "squaw dances" frequented by ne'er-do-well young men who are souls lost between the two cultures. There is undoubted evidence that white contact brings about — at least in the transitional generations — some breakdown in the moralities This much, however, seems to be a distinctive part of the native attitude: a Navaho does not spend much time worrying over a lie or a theft when he is not found out; he seems to have almost no "guilt" feelings; but if he is caught he does experience a good deal of shame.

Offenses more strongly condemned are those which threaten the peaceful working together of The People Incest and witchcraft are the worst of crimes Murder, rape, physical injury, and any sort of violence are disapproved and punished, but some of the penalties seem relatively light to white people. By Navaho custom, murder, for instance, could be compounded for by a payment of slaves or livestock to the kin of the victim To this day the Navaho way of dealing with violent crimes against the person is not ordinarily that of retaliation or even of imprisonment of the offender but of levying a fine which is turned over, not to "the state," but to the sufferer and his family to compensate for the economic loss by injury or death — a custom bearing marked resemblance to the old Teutonic wergild, or "blood money."

The positive behaviors which are advocated center on affectionate duty to relatives, pleasant manners to all, generosity, self-control. It has already been pointed out that the widest ideal of human conduct for The People is "to act to everybody as if they were your own relatives." A courteous, nonaggressive approach to others is the essence of decency. Polite phrases to visitors and strangers are highly valued. If an English-speaking Navaho wishes to speak approvingly of another Navaho with whom he has had a chance encounter, he is likely to say, "He talks pretty nice." Generosity is uniformly praised and stinginess despised. One of the most disparaging things which can be said of anyone is, "He gets mad like a dog." Women will be blamed for "talking rough" to their children. The Navaho word which is most often translated into English as "mean" is sometimes rendered "he gets mad pretty easy" In short, one must keep one's temper; one must warmly and cheerfully do one's part in the system of reciprocal rights and obligations, notably those which prevail between kinfolk.

NAVAHO "VALUES"

Health and strength are perhaps the best of the good things of life for The People If you aren't healthy, you can't work, if you don't work, you'll starve Industry is enormously valued A family must arise and be about their tasks early, for if someone goes by and sees no smoke drifting out of the smokehole it will be thought that "there is something wrong there, somebody must be sick" In enumerating the virtues of a respected man or woman the faithful performance of duties is always given a prominent place. "If you are poor or a beggar, people will make fun of you. If you are lazy, people will make fun of you."

By Navaho standards one is industrious in order to accumulate possessions — within certain limits — and to care for the possessions he obtains Uncontrolled gambling or drinking are disapproved primarily because they are wasteful The "good" man is one who has "hard goods" (turquoise and jewelry mainly), "soft goods" (clothing, etc), "flexible goods" (textiles, etc), and songs, stories, and other intangible property, of which ceremonial knowledge is the most important. An old

Navaho said to W. W. Hill, "I have always been a poor man I do not know a single song" The final disrespect is to say of a man, "Why, he hasn't even a dog"

A good appearance is valued, while this is partly a matter of physique, figure, and facial appearance, it means even more the ability to dress well and to appear with a handsome horse and substantial trappings.

However, as Adair [1] says

"This display of wealth is not a personal matter as much as it is a family matter. It is not 'see how much money I have,' but 'see how much money we have in our family.'"

Thus possessions are valued both as providing security and as affording opportunities for mild ostentation But to take the attainment of riches as the chief aim of life is universally condemned This is a typical pronouncement by a Navaho leader·

"The Navaho way is just to want enough to have enough to eat for your family and nice things to wear sometimes We don't like it when nowadays some of these young men marry rich girls for their money and waste it all right away The old people say this is wrong You can't get rich if you look after your relatives right You can't get rich without cheating some people Cheating people is the wrong way That way gets you into trouble. Men should be honest to get along"

Many skills carry prestige. We have spoken of the ability to dance, to sing, to tell stories. Skill at speaking is important and is expected of all leaders "He talks easy" is high praise. Conversely, "He doesn't talk easy. He just sits there," is a belittling remark. Training in certain occupations is emphasized a man will spend all the time he can spare from subsistence activities in order to learn a ceremonial, grandmothers and mothers are expected to teach young girls to weave Knowledge is power to Navahos as to other peoples, but the kinds of knowledge which are significant to the Navaho are naturally limited by his technology and his social organization. The skillful farmer or stockman is admired So also is he who excels at cowboy sports, but the runner comes in for his meed of praise too, even though this skill is today of minimum social utility.

Personal excellence is thus a value, but personal "success" in the white American sense is not The Navaho lack of stress upon the success goal has its basis in childhood training but is reinforced by various patterns of adult life. A white man may start out to make a fortune and continue piling it up until he is a millionaire, where a Navaho, though also interested in accumulating possessions, will stop when he is comfortably off, or even sooner, partly for fear of being called a witch if he is too successful This statement represents tendency rather than literal fact, for a few Navahos have in this century built up fortunes that are sizable even by white standards The attitudes of the Navaho population generally toward these *ricos* are very mixed. Envy, fear, and distrust of them are undoubtedly mingled with some admiration. But there is almost no disposition for parents to hold these individuals up as models to their children No elder says, "If you work hard and intelligently you might get to be rich as Chee Dodge"

Navaho ideas of accumulation are different from those of whites Riches are not identified so much with a single individual as with the whole extended fami

[1] Adair, John, *The Navajo and Pueblo Silversmiths* (Norman, Okla. University of Oklahoma Press, 1944).

ly and "outfit." Indeed the social pressure to support and share with relatives has a strong leveling effect. The members of a well-off family must also spend freely, as in the white pattern of "conspicuous consumption." But all wealth is desired for this purpose and for security rather than as a means of enhancing the power and glory of specific individuals The habit of whites in the Navaho country of attributing full control of the incomes of *rico* families to the male head of the family is a falsification, a projection of white ways. As a practical matter, he does not have the same freedom as a white millionaire to dispose of his fortune.

That individual success is not a Navaho value is reflected also in the avoidance of the types of leadership which are familiar in white society To The People it is fundamentally indecent for a single individual to presume to make decisions for a group Leadership, to them, does not mean "outstandingness" or anything like untrammeled power over the actions of others Each individual is controlled not by sanctions from the top of a hierarchy of persons but by lateral sanctions It will be remembered that decisions at meetings must be unanimous To white persons this is an unbelievably tiresome and time-wasting process. But it is interesting to note that experiments with "group decision" in war industry have shown that the greatest increases in production have been attained when all workers in a unit concurred Majority decisions often brought about disastrous results (In passing it may be remarked that these experiments offer perhaps another lesson for the government in its dealings with The People when the groups of workers were allowed to set their own goals, far more was achieved than when they were asked to strive for goals set by management)

Some personal values which bulk large among whites have a place among The People which is measured largely by the degree of white influence Cleanliness, for instance, is an easy virtue where there is running water, but where every drop must be hauled five miles washing is an expensive luxury Navaho social and economic life is not geared to fine points of time scheduling If a Singer says he will arrive "about noon," no one takes it amiss if he appears at sundown, though an arrival a day or more late would call for explanation Work is not, as it is in our Puritan tradition, a good thing in itself. The Navaho believes in working only as much as he needs to

In sum, the Navaho concept of "goodness" stresses productiveness, ability to get along with people, dependability and helpfulness, generosity in giving and spending "Badness" means stinginess, laziness, being cruel to others, being destructive. The concept of value stresses possessions and their care, health, skills which are practically useful. Concerning all of these topics The People are fully articulate Such sentiments are enunciated again and again in the oral literature, in formal addresses, and in ordinary conversation.

SOME PREMISES OF NAVAHO LIFE AND THOUGHT

To understand fully the Navaho "philosophy of life" one must dig deeper The very fact that The People find it necessary to talk about their "ethical principles" and their values suggests that not everybody lives up to them (any more than is the case in white society) But many characteristically Navaho doings and sayings make sense only if they are related to certain basic convictions about the nature of human life and experience, convictions so deep-going that no Navaho bothers to talk about them in so many words These unstated assumptions are so completely taken for granted that The

People take their views of life as an ineradicable part of human nature and find it hard to understand that normal persons could possibly conceive life in other terms.

Premise I. Life Is Very, Very Dangerous

This premise is of course distinctive only in its intensity and its phrasing. All sensible human beings realize that there are many hazards in living, but to many whites, Navahos seem morbid in the variety of threats from this world and from the world of the supernatural which they fear and name. Of course this is largely a point of view. To some detached observers it might seem more healthy to worry about witches than about what you will live on when you are old or about the dreadful consequences of picking up some germ. Whites also tend to personify evil forces. They found relief in "discovering" that World War I was all due to J. P Morgan All human beings doubtless have the tendency to simplify complex matters because this gives the gratifying illusion of understanding them and of the possibility of doing something about them.

However, while this is clearly not a matter of black or white, The People do have a more overwhelming preoccupation than whites with the uncertainty of life and the many threats to personal security. The great emphasis laid upon "taking care of things," upon the industry and skills necessary for survival, and upon the ceremonial techniques bear witness to this There are five main formulas for safety.

Formula 1: Maintain orderliness in those sectors of life which are little subject to human control By seeming to bring the areas of actual ignorance, error, and accident under the control of minutely prescribed ritual formulas, The People create a compensatory mechanism. As we saw in Chapter V, these prescriptions are partially negative and partially positive. The Navaho conceives safety either as restoration of the individual to the harmonies of the natural, human, and supernatural world or, secondarily, as restoration of an equilibrium among nonhuman forces.

This is achieved by the compulsive force of order and reiteration in ritual words and acts. The essence of even ceremonial drama is not sharp climax (as whites have it) so much as fixed rhythms The keynote of all ritual poetry is compulsion through orderly repetition. Take this song which the Singer of a Night Way uses to "waken" the mask of each supernatural supposed to participate in the rite.

"He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs.
Among the lands of dawning, he stirs, he stirs;
The pollen of the dawning, he stirs, he stirs;
Now in old age wandering, he stirs, he stirs,
Now on the trail of beauty, he stirs, he stirs;
He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs.

"He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs.
Among the lands of evening, he stirs, he stirs;
The pollen of the evening, he stirs, he stirs;
Now in old age wandering, he stirs, he stirs;
Now on the trail of beauty, he stirs, he stirs;
He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs.

"He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs
Now Talking God, he stirs, he stirs,
Now his white robe of buckskin, he stirs, he stirs,
Now in old age wandering, he stirs, he stirs;

Now on the trail of beauty, he stirs, he stirs.
He stirs, he stirs, he stirs, he stirs." [2]

The song goes on like this for many verses. To white people it has a monotonous quality, but infinite repetitions in an expected sequence seem to lull the Navaho into a sense of security.

Formula 2 Be wary of non-relatives. This is, to some extent, the obverse of the centering of trust and affection upon relatives. If one feels thoroughly at home and at ease when surrounded by one's kin, it is natural that one should distrust strangers In white society (and probably in all others) there is a distrust of strangers, members of the "out-group" But the Navaho fears also the other members of his own people who are not related to him Hence antiwitchcraft protection must always be carried to a "squaw dance" or any other large gathering. This tendency to be ill at ease when beyond the circle of one's relatives is a truly "primitive" quality and is characteristic, to varying degrees, of most nonliterate folk societies.

This formula is closely related to the preceding one; if one wins security by reducing the uncharted areas of the nonhuman universe to familiar patterns, it is natural that unfamiliar human beings should be regarded as threats.

Formula 3 Avoid excesses. Very few activities are wrong in and of themselves, but excess in the practice of any is dangerous. This is in marked contrast to the puritanical concept of immorality To Navahos such things as sex and gambling are not "wrong" at all but will bring trouble if indulged in "too much" Even such everyday tasks as weaving must be done only in moderation Many women will not weave more than about two hours at a stretch; in the old days unmarried girls were not allowed to weave for fear they would overdo, and there is a folk rite for curing the results of excess in this activity. Closely related is the fear of completely finishing anything as a "spirit outlet," the basketmaker leaves an opening in the design; the weaver leaves a small slit between the threads; the Navaho who copies a sandpainting for a white man always leaves out something, however trivial, the Singer never tells his pupil quite all the details of the ceremony lest he "go dry" Singers also systematically leave out transitions in relating myths

This fear of excess is reflected also in various characteristic attitudes toward individuals There is, for example, a folk saying "If a child gets too smart, it will die young" The distrust of the very wealthy and very powerful and the sanctions and economic practices which tend to keep men at the level of their fellows have already been mentioned

Formula 4 When in a new and dangerous situation, do nothing If a threat is not to be dealt with by ritual canons, it is safest to remain inactive If a Navaho finds himself in a secular situation where custom does not tell him how to behave, he is usually ill at ease and worried The white American under these circumstances will most often overcompensate by putting on a self-confidence he does not in fact have. The American tradition says, "When danger threatens, do something." The Navaho tradition says, "Sit tight and perhaps in that way you may escape evil."

Formula 5 Escape This is an alternative response to Formula 4, which The People select with increasing frequency when pressure becomes too intense. Doing nothing is not enough safety lies in flight This flight may take the form of leaving the field in the sheer physical

[2] Dyk, Walter, recorder, *Son of Old Man Hat, A Navaho Autobiography* (New York Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938)

sense. Navahos have discovered that they don't get very far by trying to resist the white man actively; so they scatter. The white man then cannot deal with them as a group — he can't even locate and exhort or admonish or punish them as individuals. Escape may be this sort of passive resistance or it may be simple evasion, as when a Navaho woman, who was otherwise fairly happy in a government hospital, left it rather than ask for one kind of food which she desperately missed Had she asked, it would have been given her, but she found it simpler to leave Flight also takes the even more unrealistic form of addiction to alcohol or of indiscriminate sexuality In effect, the Navaho says, "My only security is in escape from my difficulties."

These types of behavior in the face of danger are documented by the following episode related by a fifth-grader in one of the boarding schools

"We look down to the river, we saw a lot of cows at the river My brother said, 'I am not scared of those cows that are at the river' Soon the cows were going back up the hill We just climb up on a big tall tree and sit there The cows come in closer and closer We stay on the tree Soon they come under the tree. My brother and I were so scared that we just sit there and not move. Soon my brother start crying When the cows go away we laugh and laugh. My brother said, 'The cows were scared of me' I said, 'They are not scared of you' We say that over and over Soon my brother got angry, then we fight in the sand After we fight we go home"

Premise 2. Nature Is More Powerful than Man

Navahos accept nature and adapt themselves to her demands as best they can, but they are not utterly passive, not completely the pawns of nature. They do a great many things that are designed to control nature physically and to repair damage caused by the elements. But they do not even hope to master nature. For the most part The People try to influence her with various songs and rituals, but they feel that the forces of nature, rather than anything that man does, determine success or failure of crops, plagues of grasshoppers, increase of arroyos, and decrease of grass If a flood comes and washes out a formerly fertile valley, one does not try to dam the stream and replace the soil; instead one moves to a floodless spot. One may try to utilize what nature furnishes, such as by leading water from a spring or stream to his fields, but no man can master the wind and the weather This is similar to the attitude toward sex, which is viewed as part of nature, something to reckon with, but not a thing to be denied

Many white people have the opposite view, namely, that nature is a malignant force with useful aspects that must be harnessed, and useless, harmful ones that must be shorn of their power. They spend their energies adapting nature to their purposes, instead of themselves to her demands They destroy pests of crops and men, they build dykes and great dams to avert floods, and they level hills in one spot and pile them up in another Their premise is that nature will destroy them unless they prevent it, the Navahos' is that nature will take care of them if they behave as they should and do as she directs

In addition to all the other forces which make the acceptance of the current program of soil erosion control and limitation of livestock slow and painful, this premise plays an important and fundamental part To most Navahos it seems silly or presumptuous to interfere with the workings of nature to the extent that

they are being told to do. Besides, they believe it won't bring the benefits the white people promise If anything is wrong these days, it is that The People are forgetting their ways and their stories, so of course anyone would know that there would be hard times. It has nothing to do with too many sheep

Premise 3 The Personality Is a Whole

This assumption also must be made explicit because white people so generally think of "mind" and "body" as separable units The whole Navaho system of curing clearly takes it for granted that you cannot treat a man's "body" without treating his "mind," and vice versa In this respect Navahos are many generations ahead of white Americans, who are only now beginning to realize that it is the patient, not the disease, which must be treated Successful physicians who understood "human nature" have acted on this premise always, but it has found verbal expression and acceptance only recently, at present it is receiving the most publicity in the specialty known as "psychosomatic medicine"

Premise 4 Respect the Integrity of the Individual

While the individual is always seen as a member of a larger group still he is never completely submerged in that group There is an area of rigidity where what any given person may and may not do is inexorably fixed, but there is likewise a large periphery of freedom This is not the "romantic individualism" of white tradition, but in many respects the Navaho has more autonomy, more opportunity for genuine spontaneity than is the case in white society Rights of individuals, including children, over their immediately personal property, are respected to the fullest degree, even when their wishes run counter to the obvious interests of the family or extended family White people seeking to purchase a bow and arrow that they see in a hogan are surprised to have the adult refer the question to the five-year-old who owns the toy and whose decision is final If a youngster unequivocally says he does not want to go to school or to the hospital, that is, in most families, the end of it. Husbands and wives make no attempt to control every aspect of the behavior of the spouse Although individuals are not regarded as equal in capacity or in all features of the treatment that should be accorded them, still the integrity of every individual is protected from violation at the hands of more powerful people

Where survival is held to depend on cooperation, the subordination of the individual to the group is rigorously demanded Such interdependence is felt to exist in all sorts of ways that are not, from the white point of view, realistic Success in hunting is thought to depend as much upon the faithful observance of taboos by the wife at home as upon the husband's skill or luck in stalking game The individualism which expresses itself in social innovation is disapproved as strongly as is that which expresses itself in too obtrusive leadership The following quotation (which, incidentally, is also a nice illustration of Navaho logic) brings out the Navaho feeling exactly.

"You must be careful about introducing things into ceremonies One chanter thought that he could do this He held a Night Chant He wanted more old people so he had the dancers cough and dance as old people. He also wanted an abundance of potatoes so he painted potatoes on the dancers' bodies He desired that there should be a great deal of food so he had the dancers break wind and vomit through their masks to make believe that they had eaten a great deal. They surely

got their reward. Through the coughing act a great many of the people got whooping cough and died In the second change many of the people got spots on their bodies like potatoes only they were measles, sores and smallpox. In the part, where they asked for all kinds of food, a lot died of diarrhea, vomiting and stomach aches. This chanter thought that he had the power to change things but everyone found out that he was wrong. It was the wrong thing to do and today no one will try to start any new ceremonies. Today we do not add anything." [3]

On the other hand, where autonomy does not seem to threaten the security of established practices or the needful cooperative undertakings, individuality is not only permitted but encouraged Men and women feel free to vary their costumes to suit their temperaments, to experiment with variations in house style and other technological products, to break the day's routine with trips and other diversions spontaneously decided upon, while displays of jewelry, saddles, and horses bring admiration more than disapproval He who makes up a new secular song or coins a new pun or quip wins many plaudits. Unity in diversity is the Navaho motto.

Premise 5. Everything Exists in Two Parts, the Male and the Female, Which Belong Together and Complete Each Other

With the Navaho this premise applies to much more than biology. The clear, deep, robins-egg-blue turquoise they call male, and the stone of a greenish hue they call female The turbulent San Juan River is "male water," the placid Rio Grande "female water" The mountains of the north where harsh, cold winds blow are "male country," the warm open lands of the south "female country" There are male rains and female rains, the one hard and sudden, the other gentle; there are male and female chants, male and female plants are distinguished on the basis of appearance, the male always being the larger. The supernaturals, as seen in the sandpaintings or mentioned in the songs and prayers, are nearly always paired, so that if Corn Boy appears, one can be sure that Corn Girl will soon follow.

Premise 6. Human Nature Is Neither Good nor Evil—Both Qualities Are Blended in all Persons from Birth On

The notion of "original sin" still lurks in white thinking But the premise that children are "born bad" and have to be beaten into shape seems completely absent from the Navaho view. On the other hand, white "liberals" act upon the assumption that human beings can be educated into almost complete perfection, that if ignorance is removed people will act in full enlightenment Similarly, at least, some Christian groups hold that "grace" can permanently transform the wayward into paragons of virtue The Navaho assumption is that no amount of knowledge and no amount of "religious" zeal can do more than alter somewhat the relative proportions of "bad" and "good" in any given individual

Premise 7 Like Produces Like and the Part Stands for the Whole

There are two "laws of thought" almost as basic to Navaho thinking as the so-called Aristotelian "laws of thought" have been in European intellectual history since the Middle Ages. Of course, *similia similibus curantur* has been important in the thinking of most human groups since the Old Stone Age or ear-

[3] Hill, Willard W., "Stability in Culture and Pattern," *American Anthropologist*, XLI (1939), 258–260

lier; but among whites this principle is now largely relegated to the realm of folk belief, whereas among The People it still dominates the thought of the most sophisticated members of the society

Let a few examples do for many Because the juice of the milkweed resembles milk it is held to be useful in treating a mother who cannot nurse her infant Since the eagle can see long distances, the diviner who does star-gazing must rub a preparation which includes water from an eagle's eye under his own eyelids Witchcraft performed over a few hairs from an individual is as effective against the owner of the hairs as if done upon his whole person. In chants small mounds of earth stand for whole mountains

Premise 8 What Is Said Is to Be Taken Literally

As has been pointed out in the last chapter, the easy ambiguities, the fluidities of English speech are foreign to the Navaho. There is little "reading between the lines," little exercise of the imagination in interpreting utterances A student was asking about a girl who was said by a white person to be feeble-minded He asked, "Can so-and-so's daughter speak?" The Navaho replied very positively, "Yes." Observation showed that the girl uttered only unintelligible sounds When this was later thrown back at the original informant he countered, "Well, she does speak — but no one can understand her." And this was said without a smile or even a twinkle in the eye

Similarly, a Navaho will seldom take it upon himself to attribute thoughts or sentiments to others in the absence of very explicit statements on their part White workers among The People find it irritating when they ask, "What does your wife (or brother, etc) think about this?" and get the reply, "I don't know. I didn't ask her." Their supposition is that spouses or close relatives or intimate friends have enough general knowledge of each other's opinions to answer such questions with reasonable accuracy even if there has been no discussion of this precise point But the Navahos do not see it this way

Premise 9 This Life Is What Counts

Because the Christian tradition is so prevalent in white society, it is necessary to bring this premise out explicitly. The People have no sense whatsoever that this life is a "preparation" for another existence Indeed, except for the (by no means universally accepted) view that witches and suicides live apart in the afterworld, there is no belief that the way one lives on this earth has anything to do with his fate after death. This is one reason why morality is practical rather than categorical While the Navaho feels very keenly that life is hard, his outlook is quite foreign to that of "Life is real, life is earnest, and the grave is not the goal" White life is so permeated with the tradition of Puritanism, of "the Protestant ethic," that much Navaho behavior looks amoral or shiftless

Another reason would seem to be that Navahos do not need to orient themselves in terms of principles of abstract morality They get their orientations from face-to-face contacts with the same small group of people with whom they deal from birth to death In a large, complex society like modern America where people come and go and where business and other dealings must be carried on by people who never see each other, it is functionally necessary to have abstract standards which transcend an immediate concrete situation in which two or more persons are interacting

CONVENTIONAL FORM *

Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler

In the Far East the problem of form includes not only what we regard as "externals" but the cultural pattern itself. A study of its significance provides a convenient key to the real nature of this race, provided we learn to recognize the point beyond which it cannot be understood.

At the very outset the newcomer is impressed with the fact that the life of the Far East is governed in the most thorough-going fashion by stereotyped conventions. He notices this as soon as he sets foot in the country, and his contacts with the people confirm his first impression. In everything a prescribed form has to be followed. When he is received into a Japanese home, for example, he gets out of the carriage and approaches the house by way of the garden, the paper partitions of the house are pushed back and the hostess greets the guest on her knees. She actually kneels on the mat, bending the upper part of her body far forward and touching her head to the ground, thus signifying her reverence for the guest. She is surrounded by her retainers, her servants, and her children. After the guest has removed his shoes he is led to the interior of the house, with its delicate charm and gay simplicity, and there he is constantly aware of long-fixed conventions. He senses immediately that any spontaneous gesture or sentiment would be out of place. The Westerner, of course, has his conventions too, but he does not restrain himself to anywhere near the same degree, and even on the occasion of a first meeting the conventions do not prevent him from expressing the feelings of the moment or his spontaneous personal sentiments.

The external appearance of the Japanese on the street expresses very little of their personalities. Their manner of walking is affected by the wooden sandals (geta) which they all wear, and their external appearance is governed to a great degree by their clothes, which are stereotyped and virtually devoid of the personal note. The kimono is essentially the same whether for men or for women; the only variations in design and color are for the purpose of differentiating between age and rank, or between types of occasion. Thus the human figure is seen in a set flow of line, which leads in turn to a set manner of very deliberate movement. But it is the manner of walking on the geta sandals that produces the greatest standardization. When we consider how much of an individual's personality and temperament and state of mind may be expressed in his peculiarities of walking, we realize what an important form of expression is closed to the Japanese.

It is a commonplace that the Oriental's expression is inscrutable, that his range of expression seems limited. There must be mobility of countenance over a period of decades to give to a face its peculiar character. The cast of the human physiognomy may strike us as something fixed, but in reality it has been shaped by an endless succession of involuntary motions. And it is precisely such motions, springing from the unconscious, that are de-

* Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler, *Japan in Transition*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938 pp. 93–100. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

nied to the Japanese He is accustomed to repress himself to the utmost His countenance is not lifeless, but it is as though the lines in which it is set were prescribed in advance.

Many of the basic conventions which we encounter in Japanese daily life are concentrated in the home. The typical Japanese house consists of a greater or smaller row of rooms, which are arranged evenly, one behind the other, with soft mats on the floor There is no furniture, for it would injure the soft mat floor No one is allowed to set foot indoors with heavy soled shoes; he must wear either felt socks (*tabi*) or straw sandals (*zori*) The colors of the rooms are subdued and delicately harmonized In contrast to the rambling collection of rooms in an Occidental house, the component parts and outlines of the Japanese dwelling are well integrated Western architecture, whether in the arrangement or in the shape of the rooms, is an abundance of expressive movements which have assumed form The more we learn to appreciate the workings of the unconscious mind, the more the various types of architecture tell us about the men who built the houses The same is true of furniture The entire history of medieval and modern Europe may be read from the beds, the chests, and especially from the various kinds of chairs In them are expressed our desires, our ambitions, our style of movement, in short, our character The Japanese house has none of this power of expression It is set back, wherever possible, in a garden or park Like the palace and the temple, instead of dominating the street it recedes as unobtrusively as possible into the background of trees

A house, as the setting for life, exercises a day-to-day influence on the behavior of the people In the Japanese house there is no opportunity for abrupt moving about. The rooms are separated by movable partitions set in carefully polished grooves, and since these partitions are very delicately constructed everyone upon entering or leaving the room must be very guarded in his movements The Japanese never has a chance to leap suddenly to his feet or to pound on the table, or even to slam a door These possibilities of giving vent to one's feelings do not of course create a type, but they are reflections of a type A human being in part creates the milieu in which he moves, and in turn it creates him and molds him into a particular form His conduct bears inevitably a close relationship to the milieu as a whole

The dearth of spontaneous movement is evident even in those activities particularly designed to give play to spontaneity The tea room, for example, as it has gradually come to assume classic form, represents a stereotyping of spontaneity itself A certain irregularity is deliberately intended Whereas a small, intimate room usually contains three, four, or six mats, the tea room contains four and one half, a deliberately unconventional number. The arrangement of the windows and of the niches is carefully asymmetrical But the unconventionality, once the desirable form is found, must be kept within a very definite framework. Paradoxical as it may sound, even an unconventional room must follow a stereotyped pattern

The language is likewise stereotyped The various social classes speak according to a prescribed form, and no other form is permissible Every class has its own set way of addressing its equals, its inferiors, and its superiors The style of address varies also according to the degree of personal intimacy and to the kinship relation within the family The women speak in a special manner of their own, which becomes progressively more refined in sentence structure and phraseology as one ascends the social scale We have al-

ready seen that nuances of style become thoroughly stereoptyed in the script. In the same way, for all its inner movement, art becomes conventionalized as its symbols take on a set form. The art of the ink painting, even though it is susceptible of growth, easily develops into a school. Its media of expression show a marked tendency to become stereotyped for the very reason that it takes the most disciplined stroke to produce the desired effect And yet the sensitive eye can detect the personal touch of the great artist even in a classic, stereotyped motif, such as the flight of birds or the fluttering of the bamboo tree

Even suicide must be performed according to convention. This is most strikingly revealed in the samurai ceremonial As the privileged noble caste, the samurai has its own peculiar and exclusive form of suicide Seppuku, or what is commonly called hara-kiri, is not only a duty but a privilege, from which all persons who are not of samurai rank are excluded It is a solemn act, with a horrendous climax demanding almost superhuman self-control. The precise weapon, the exact spot into which it is to be plunged, and all the other gruesome details of this ghastly self-execution are minutely set down And if it is not carried through in this prescribed fashion and, wherever possible, at a prescribed place, the suicide fails of its proper significance. Even for the wife of the samurai the form of suicide is precisely set down. Care must be taken, for example, that when her limbs become lax her body shall not assume an unseemly position. In the Japanese myth, too, everything proceeds according to rule. In the typical scene from the historical play the hero destroys himself under the slowly falling petals of the cherry blossoms in the evening sun. Only in this classic form does the sacrifice bring atonement for heinous sins. Even a crime against the imperial house can be expiated in this way and, his crime expiated, the rebel is transformed into the hero of a noble revolt.

This predominance of established, stereotyped conventions raises the very difficult and involved question of originality. In the Far East nothing is valued simply because it is new or original. But, more to the point, originality once accepted immediately becomes standardized This of course is not limited to the Far East Werther, for example, by articulating in striking form a contemporary current of feeling, unleashed an epidemic of suicides But if he had not been presented with the creative understanding of an artist he would never have become a model. In Japan, much more often than in the West, startling actual events will find a host of imitators A few years ago a pair of lovers went together to their death in particularly dramatic circumstances Their motives were gone into by the press in the greatest detail, since the Japanese public, once the veil of privacy has been withdrawn, is no respecter of the personal or the intimate. There were revealing interviews with the surviving husband and with his favorite mistress The whole problem of the position of the Japanese woman in the family and in society, as well as the more personal ramifications of the immediate situation, were treated extensively and without a trace of reserve. As a result of all this discussion other suicides of a similar nature began to take place. Hardly a week passed without several such cases being reported. In another case a student who had failed to pass his examination threw himself into the famous Kegon waterfall near Chuzenji. Whereupon there developed an epidemic of suicides at the same spot, with the result that the newspapers called on the government to station a special detachment of police at the waterfall. This rec-

ommendation was quite serious, for where the motivation for an act is the same, there is a feeling it should be carried through in exactly the same form. If the possibility of suicide in this particular form is precluded, the act in any form is robbed of its value and becomes, in fact, psychologically impossible Here as elsewhere form and content become integrated

The standardization of Oriental life is deeply rooted in the subjugation of the individual. The entire people is organized into closely knit family groups which give rise to countless conventions, binding the individual in every aspect of his life and narrowly circumscribing the area of individual activity. Like the Chinese, the Japanese cannot live as an individual, cannot conceive of himself as an individual with his own separate sphere of existence Within the group structure into which he is born he must look upon every convention as something partaking of the nature of law It is inconceivable to him to question it or disturb it in any way. The rigid conventions cannot be broken down until the individual is set free, and so long as the close-knit family exists this emancipation is possible only in a few isolated cases.

The Westerner, whether unconsciously or idealistically, cherishes the genuine, the spontaneous, the elemental, which for him are synonymous with the personal To the Easterner, however, the "natural" man, the unadorned handiwork of nature, is abhorrent Such a person is a barbarian, one who does not know how to behave, who, particularly in a difficult situation, will do the wrong thing. The conduct of the barbarian will never be able to establish a new form. Man has dignity only when he is a gentleman Particularly in China, in the Confucian ethics, the idea of the gentleman is extraordinarily developed. In Japan the samurai attitude, as prescribed in the Bushido code of honor, is still the ideal of the entire people, even outside the old samurai caste It is, of course, a model only for general conduct. In the more specific items of behavior each individual will be guided by the forms of his own social group, but each one will strive, like the samurai, to conduct himself as befits his status He will even know when it is permissible to surrender to his more violent emotions. A separate creation of new forms by the individual, especially by the average man, is out of the question Only the nobleman and the wise man are responsible for finding the correct form for the new problems which inevitably arise in the course of cultural evolution. All that is expected of the everyday individual is to know the code and to conduct himself in accordance with it What is required is neither instinct nor personal feeling, but the knowledge of what is correct.

All spontaneity of expression is therefore excluded Correct behavior is guaranteed by the fact that nothing is done spontaneously, that the prescribed thing is done in the prescribed way Nothing is ever allowed just to happen, as we would say in the West But it should be remembered that the Japanese, and to an even greater extent probably the Chinese, is subject to powerful emotions Restraint has become almost a second nature, but he has been forced to become thus a civilized being in order not to remain permanently the creature of his passions The only way the Oriental can live in society is by subjecting himself to established form — like the legendary and historical knights of southern Japan who were able to live together in harmony and concord only if they forced themselves into strong armor, which denied them any freedom of movement Over the course of countless generations the discipline of established forms has gradually built up an

effective restraint of temper

Knowing all this we are in a better position to understand those curious contradictions which we constantly encounter in characterizations of the Oriental In one breath we are told of his agile hypermobility and in the next of his unbounded apathy Both descriptions are justified It depends on which aspect of his character we are considering He will be violently disturbed in his innermost nature by something which meets his own experience But an untiring self-mastery is required of him. It will turn rich natures deep into themselves and produce a capacity for suffering which quietly consumes the personality and which in many cases leads ultimately to acts of desperation — inarticulate tragedies in the main, with gruesome exits But on the other hand anything that finds no echo in his inner experience will leave him phlegmatic and unmoved It is as if nothing more could penetrate into those inner depths, flowing and undetermined, immeasurably submerged.

THE MECHANIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION OF AMERICAN LIFE *

Richard Müller-Freienfels

As the first characteristic of the external image of America I laid stress on its different dimensions, on the massive, quantitative, gigantic nature of this world as compared with Europe What we learned in school, but never quite realized, is here demonstrated by an object-lesson on the largest scale America is not a country, like Germany, France, or San Marino, but a *continent* Even an inhabitant of Berlin feels a little provincial when he realizes, on studying the timetable, that in crossing this country one's watch must repeatedly be set back, since when it is noon or midnight in New York, it is eleven o'clock in Chicago, ten o'clock in Denver, and nine o'clock in San Francisco. In America they will ask you on your arrival in New York "I suppose you will take in the Yellowstone Park and California?"— as though a man traveling from London to Berlin were asked whether he would not include in his journey an excursion to Leningrad and to Egypt Spatially considered, the distance from New York to San Francisco is much greater than the distance from London to Leningrad, but psychically speaking the distance is trifling No frontiers lie between them, the same language is spoken from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and there is no need to visit the moneychanger It is truly a continent that the traveler is crossing, but it is also a country, and *one* country of stupendous dimensions Its provincial cities are larger than many European capitals; its lakes are small seas, wider in area than a European kingdom, its agricultural land is not divided up into small parcels, but the cornfields cover the plains like a shoreless ocean Everything has other dimensions

* Richard Muller-Freienfels, *Mysteries of the Soul,* tr by Bernard Miall, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, London, 1929, pp 245-61 (*passim*) Reprinted by permission of the publisher and Alfred A Knopf, Inc.

than with us the coins are four or five times the size of European money, and compared with the newspapers, the great "dailies" of London, Paris, and Berlin seem small and insufficient In short, we find that even in everyday things of secondary importance other quantitative notions prevail

It may perhaps be objected that these great dimensions are something external The American found his great country ready made! True, but he has not divided it, he has not made frontiers of mountains and rivers! That he has built up this vast country into a unity — that is his achievement And though the many-storied sky-scrapers of New York may have been a sheer necessity, though the concentration of commercial life on the narrow island may have forced the houses upwards, since the mighty arms of the Hudson prevented them from spreading laterally, as elsewhere in the world, this necessity is absent in Chicago, in Detroit, and in all the other centres in which sky-scrapers are being built today Here the Americans have imitated New York, not because they were compelled to do so, but because they delight in largeness, as a matter of taste — or the want of taste, as Europeans may possibly feel

And here is the decisive point *Quantity, in America, is not a fact as with us, it is a value* To say that something is large, massive, gigantic, is in America not a mere statement of fact, but the highest commendation It is true that this may be so in Europe, but here the contrary valuation obtains as well, here small and graceful and modest things have a special value, while mere bulk may be felt as a defect, and colossal things are often regarded as crude, vulgar, and unqualitative All this the American can hardly understand The idyllic frame of mind which sees positive value in small and restrained and limited things is un-American, and occurs only as a reaction against Americanism, while in many European peoples it is a positive characteristic. In America everything big is blindly accepted Magnitude, in the purely external sense of largeness, sets the standard of value . . .

The second chief characteristic of Americanism is the technicalization or mechanization of life Not that we Western Europeans are deficient in technique, but nowhere is it so obtrusive as in America In Europe it is a servant — at least, in theory — but in America it is the almost undisputed despot of life The decisive point is not the existence, but the different valuation of technical methods and knowledge In Europe — at least, in intellectual circles — such terms as "mechanical" or "machine-made" are employed as terms of censure, which are opposed to "organic" or "artistic" In the same way the word "technique" seems often to savor of the superficial, unintellectual, and inartistic The average American sets an absolute and positive value on technique In the American cities it is not only the finished wares that are displayed in the stores, if possible they are actually manufactured before the eyes of the passing crowd You will see the pressing-machine at work in the shop-windows stretching, folding, and pressing a suit of clothes in the course of a few minutes, cigar-makers will show anyone who cares to linger before their windows how cigars are made by hand and machine, or you may see — and this is quite an appetizing sight — how sweets and pastry are made and cooked by neat and pretty young women Technique is not, as it should be in theory, a means to an end, but is becoming an end in itself. The clatter of machinery, which we find disturbing, is music to the true American ear Only by the fact that he does not inwardly rebel against it can we explain the fact that the American's nerves do not

suffer from noise like those of the European, who is distressed by these things because he inwardly protests against them.

In a purely external sense, the mechanization of life is conditioned by the size of the country. To be sure, we Europeans too have need of our railways, telegraphs, and telephones, but in America these are far more essential if the different parts of the Continent are to be connected. A vast network of railways covers the land, the telegraph and the telephone, both largely American inventions, have reached a high degree of development The air-mail is a necessity, not a kind of sport, as with us Above all, the motor-car is not a luxury, but an article of everyday utility, which is obvious from the shabby condition of most of the cars one sees The majority of the railways, whether above or below ground, are single lines for one-way traffic, and there are separate tracks for the express trains In the dwelling-houses people ascend to their apartments not by the stairs, but by elevators; in the larger buildings there are frequently a dozen or more lifts at the inmates' disposal, and they may even be divided into express and local elevators.

In the eyes of the American all these things have a positive value The average European takes his guest to the ancient churches of his city, he shows you streets and localities that have a sentimental interest; it will seldom occur to him to invite you to visit the slaughter-house or a car factory. In Chicago the slaughter-houses are regarded as the thing best worth seeing, and after them the factories, docks, etc. It is not that we Europeans never inspect a dock or a factory, but we do so out of curiosity, or as a matter of unemotional interest, and not in a spirit of almost religious respect, as does the genuine American In the country I was repeatedly taken to see wireless apparatus, which reproduced the great variety of messages with a considerable amount of noise. *What* was heard, whether Beethoven or jazz music, did not interest my hosts in the least; all that they considered was the technique of transmission and reception — technique as an end in itself

This general mechanization of life is, of course, due to the co-operation of a number of factors. The lack of domestic servants, which I shall presently consider as a social factor, has of necessity resulted in the mechanization, even in the home, of many tasks which in Europe are performed by human labor While visiting American acquaintances who lived in the country I was repeatedly led into the kitchen by my hostess, where she showed me her laboratory Mechanical contrivances did the work of washing and drying plates and dishes, electrical machines prepared the inevitable ice-cream; and there were cooking appliances and vacuum-cleaners with refinements quite unknown to us All these things are devised for "comfort," but American comfort is not what we call comfort in Europe To us the word conveys a sense of ease and cosiness. The American railway-cars, with their spaciousness and their convenient corridors, which enable one to pass through the whole train more readily than is possible on most European expresses, are entirely comfortable, but they are not "cosy" . .

Everyone who has visited the United States will be able to recall similar characteristics, all of which go to prove the same thing, namely, that the whole of life has been mechanized in a far greater degree than with us. Psychologically speaking, all these traits may be referred to an intellectual attitude on the part of the American, which is not indeed unknown in Europe, but is found in purer form in America, and this attitude may be described as the rationalization of the soul By rationalization I mean the prev-

alence of practical thinking, of the concentration of the intellect on the practical, useful, and efficient, and the obverse of this attitude is the repression and suppression of all that is merely agreeable, emotional, and irrational in the personality. This rationality, as a form of thinking and willing, expresses itself in constructions and instruments and machines which impress the purposeful will of humanity, with the aid of the inorganic forces of Nature, on the outer world The machine is above all the typical creation and manifestation of the utilitarian and practical reason. It is pure practicality, embodied rationality

Even organic and intellectual life are mechanized in accordance with the ideal of the rationally operating machine A cow or a pig, which the German peasant will regard as a personality, and for which he often feels affection, is in America a machine for producing meat and leather How should any personal relation to the animal be possible when animals are "produced" by the thousand? Even man himself is becoming mechanized, is considered solely with regard to his performance What are the holders of the great athletic titles but machines for boxing, playing baseball, or running? And the workers in the factories? They too are machines, which indefatigably exercise the same function, a function rationally acquired, without any personal relation to the thing which they are making How should the individual worker have any personal relation to his work when he is only one of thousands, who are all co-operating in a task which he cannot survey as a whole? Strictly speaking, the factory worker is not even a complete machine, but only a portion of a machine, with no more independence than a cog-wheel or driving-belt. Taylorism and Fordism are the systematic accomplishment of this mechanization of the human being. . .

The mathematization and technicalization of life is connected inextricably with a further trait of Americanism — with the *typicalization,* or, to use the American expression, the *standardization* of life Nowadays one may also call this *Fordization,* since Mr. Ford is regarded as peculiarly representative of his country. Standardization is a consequence of mass-production, mathematization, and mechanization, for it implies the unlimited mass-production — for the most part by mechanical means — of a definite type of product The most importunate result of this process is the Ford car that rattles along every street.

This standardization will be obvious even to anyone crossing the continent There are, of course, great differences in different parts of the States, yet they are trifling as compared with the uniformity which exists by their side. As compared with the special characteristics of German or Italian landscapes, in which every village almost, and at all events every town of any size, has an individuality of its own, the differences between American cities are trifling At all events, an observant eye will note the conspicuous appearance of the same features everywhere, in spite of obvious differences. This typification will be seen in the most prominent features as well as in the least conspicuous If you go shopping you will everywhere find the same standard wares in the window All the men seem to be clothed by the same tailor, and all the women seem to have bought their hats at the same shop As a matter of fact, they buy the same things in different shops Everything reaches a most respectable standard, but everywhere this standard has the effect of a leveling, a standardization

The most remarkable thing is that even the people impress one as having been standardized. All these clean-shaven men,

all these girls, with their doll-like faces, which are generally painted, seem to have been produced somewhere in a Ford factory, not by the dozen but by the thousand. In no other country are the individuals reduced to such a dead-level as in the United States, and this appears all the more remarkable when we reflect that nowhere is there such a disorderly mixture of races and peoples as in this Eldorado of the needy and adventurous of all countries. And yet, surprisingly enough, after a few years as a rule, and certainly after a few generations, the immigrant, whether he was English, German, Russian, Syrian, or Greek, has become "an American." And this transformation affects even his features! We can understand that as regards his clothing and other externals he will do his best not to look a "greenhorn", but it is not so easy to understand that even the member of such a race as the Jewish, which has preserved its type for thousands of years, will after a little while impress one as being not a Jew but an American. And if this transformation affects the features, which would seem to be independent of the will, it is naturally far more perceptible in the bearing and behavior, in speech and accent, and in social manners

As in the case of "quantification" and mechanization, so in that of typification we are confronted by a different valuation. In Europe, time out of mind, people have preferred to maintain a distance, and therefore a difference, between races and classes and other social groups, and even between individuals Distance, uniqueness, and originality are European values, which are foreign to the American His values are the very reverse of these· adherence to type, agreement, similarity. In the Middle Ages the classes were divided by dress, custom, and many other characteristics; there was no intercourse between them Even in Europe time has brought many changes; even in Europe the bourgeois is victorious, and noblemen and peasants alike wear bourgeois clothes. Nevertheless, these differences persist, even though they may not be visible, the spirit of caste still survives, classes and professional groups still regard one another with disfavor; the educated man looks down on the man of the people, and the man of the people is resentful of education; the officer has a special standing, and so forth In America these differences do not exist. There the only difference that counts is a man's quantitative achievement and success, which in the last resort is expressed in dollars. Here is a marshal's baton which everyone carries in his knapsack. It does not matter how he makes his way; whether he succeeds as a professor, or a merchant, or an artisan, there is only the one method of valuation. There are no insuperable barriers, such as that of noble birth. If a man fails in one calling, he adopts another. No one looks down on a man who fails as a professor and then becomes a hotel-keeper, provided he is successful. This lack of social discrimination impresses the newcomer. People treat one another with a peculiarly equalitarian politeness, which to us often seems an obtrusive cordiality, but which is an attribute of the type, not of the individual The American sees in his neighbor not a certain Mr. M—— or Mrs. N——, but simply an impersonal being, with whom he can exchange opinions, or rather the usual phrases, concerning the weather or the last glove-fight This reduction of all to a dead-level has of course its advantages, but it deprives life of much that is desirable, and, above all, of a perception of personal quality.

Just as the American does not discriminate between the professions, so he has no perception of all those factors that in Europe separate, differentiate, and discriminate. What of the political parties, for ex-

ample? In Europe they are divided by their social and political ideals. There are, of course, political differences in America, but in the first place they are very few, and in the second they are very slight The European is surprised to find how little difference there is between the tendencies of the two principal parties, the Republicans and the Democrats Men change their party without conscientious scruples, and they are not therefore accused of moral weakness Even religion does not create such radical divisions as in Europe, although the number of sects and confusions is far greater than with us But there is no "Center" party, as in Germany; no anti-Semitism as we understand it, no instinctive feeling of enmity against other ethnological species. Even such associations as the Ku-Klux-Klan do not attack any particular group of opponents, but simply wage war on all that is un-American — that is, on all that is not typical If a thing is untypical it is worthless Further, the difference between the sexes is not so great as it is — or used to be — with us Women do not constitute a down-trodden caste, they are so dominant that some Europeans have spoken of gynocracy Even the young girl behaves with an independence which is startling to the European, and seems to him "unfeminine", and conversely, he often detects feminine traits in the American man In both cases he is mistaken, the sexes have not interchanged their roles, it is only that the differences are not so extreme Even age does not constitute a social difference in the States While with us the relation of adults to children (like that of the husband to the wife) is from the sociological point of view very like that of master and servant, in America youth enjoys much more extensive rights The result may often be regarded by the European as a lack of respect, disobedience, and libertinism, but it is not so regarded in America, since the adult does not ask for respect and subordination Human typification finds an aesthetic expression in an "ideal beauty," which is propagated daily in a thousand magazines, cinemas, and theatres, and in which all the characteristic differences of race, sex, age, and class have completely disappeared.

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PART TWO *PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE*

PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

Although it is the unexpected behavior of our associates which most forcibly commands our attention, their anticipated actions are far more important in our daily lives. The average man expects his employer to pay him, his wife and children to respect and love him, and his friends to demonstrate a high degree of loyalty toward him. In these and in countless other ways he *assumes* a large measure of predictability in the actions of his associates. Yet he ordinarily gives no thought to the factor of predictability as such, and certainly is unaware that consistency in the personality of his associates accounts in large measure for this uniformity of behavior.

Sociologists and others who attempt to explain the existence of regularity in social behavior, however, find underlying continuity in the actions of all human beings. This continuity or pattern of life is designated by the term *personality*. Personality consists of the more or less organized totality of attitudes, ideas, and habits of the individual. Since the observable behavior of the person is intelligible only within this context, the nature of personality must be discerned in order to account either for uniformities or inconsistencies of behavior. Many of the overt acts of the child in play, for example, seem senseless and inconsistent until we apprehend the ideas, habits, and attitudes underlying them and giving them meaning. Hence, the study of personality is one of the most important fields of sociological analysis.

Our definition of personality implies that within the person tendencies to act exist both prior to and after the overt responses to which they give rise. These tendencies are called *attitudes*. From the sociological point of view, the core of the personality is composed of these tendencies as they interrelate with one another. This formulation indicates the central role of the concept "attitude" in personality analysis.

Although the conceptualization of personality in terms of attitudes implies that it develops through learning and experience, such a position does not deny the importance of *original nature* (biologically inherited traits and characteristics). Through the genes — the submicroscopic entities which carry inherited characteristics — the individual receives his basic physical structure and capacities. Although personality cannot be explained on the basis of this inheritance, neither can it be understood apart from original nature. Thus without the biologically inherited capacities to learn language and other complex forms of behavior, neither culture nor personality would be possible. The child needs a social environment

in order to learn to talk, but he also requires the brain structure which makes language possible.

Once the importance of original nature in relation to the development of personality is grasped, the second problem is to describe the way in which the individual develops the attitudes that make it possible for him to participate in the social life of the group. The process involved — *socialization* — is one in which attitudes become rooted in the personality through interaction among individuals. The child, through his relation with his parents, takes over their attitudes toward religion, food, politics, and practically every other sphere of life or form of activity. His early acts do not derive from attitudes but from the existence of biological tensions. From the very beginning, however, attitudes begin to develop on the basis of his experience with the activities of others, until eventually he is equipped with a set of tendencies to respond which manifest themselves in his relations with others.

The third problem in understanding personality is concerned with the character of the attitudes which are developed While some attitudes are unique (peculiar to the person holding them) most of the person's attitudes are directly derived from those shared by the members of the group. It will be recalled from an earlier chapter that these shared ideas, habits, and attitudes constitute the culture of the group. Those aspects of the culture which define the behavior of the members of the group in their relations with one another are *organized* into attitude complexes. These complexes are called *social roles* The student in school, for example, is called upon to act in certain ways in relation to the teacher, and develops a complex of attitudes which result in the appropriate actions An understanding of the ways in which roles become part of the network of attitudes in the personality is fundamental because through them the person organizes his own overt behavior and anticipates the actions of others.

The final problem we shall discuss in relation to personality has to do with those persons who have developed attitudes which are not compatible with each other or with the attitudes of others and which make it impossible for them to function effectively in group living Such persons have *disorganized personalities* In discussing this last problem we shall not be concerned with all the causes of personality disorganization, but only with those causes which grow out of the individual's relations with his fellows.

5. Original Nature

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The nature of original nature has long been a controversial subject among students of human behavior. Today, through the medium of scientific investigation, we are beginning to develop a few ideas about original nature which can be tested and verified, and to understand something of its significance for personality and society. Although any current definition is subject to criticism, we may eventually be able to give original nature precise definition.

For the time being we shall define original nature as the totality of characteristics possessed by the organism at birth plus those which later develop through the process of biological maturation. (Maturation is a biological process dependent on the normal processes of physiological growth and change and is not related directly to the social environment.) Defined in such a manner, original nature can be regarded as the product of the interaction between the biological inheritance of the individual, his prenatal environment, and the processes of physiological growth.

Lists of characteristics composing original nature show some variation, but there is considerable agreement among sociologists and psychologists concerning its essential features. For convenience the characteristics can be reduced to six major categories: (1) the physical and skeletal structure; (2) reflexes (simple responses to stimulation such as the eyeblink and knee jerk); (3) drives (strong impulses to act based on physiological needs and tensions within the organism, but not linked at birth with the activities which will allay the needs and tensions, e.g., the hunger drive in which contraction of the walls of the stomach produces tension and random movements but no specific food-seeking activities); (4) intelligence and capacities (general and specific learning abilities based mainly on the plasticity of the nervous system); (5) temperament (characteristics of the general mode of response fast-slow, excitable-lethargic); and (6) mass movement (undirected and unstructured movement of the total organism).

These elements of original nature are the organic foundation of personality. They limit the character of the attitudes, habits, and ideas which develop from the individual's participation in group life, and they impose upon culture the need to provide attitudes and behavior patterns to assist in the satisfaction of basic organic needs (in every culture man must eat, sleep, reproduce, and so forth). But the most important function of these elements is to provide a vast range of potential behavior patterns which the group and its culture can draw upon in shaping the personality of the individual. On the basis of this plastic original nature, the

individual develops a personality reflecting the attitudes and behavior patterns shared by the members of his particular subgroup in society. A Negro child reared among Chinese can and will develop the personality structure typical of Chinese society, provided, of course, that skin color and other physical criteria are not used by the group to place the Negro child in a different category of persons.

Original nature offers these potentialities for development, but their realization is dependent upon the interaction of original nature with the group and with culture. A few characteristics not present at birth develop later through the process of maturation, but they are similar to those present at birth in that they too must be shaped and patterned by the participation of the individual in society before they become part of personality

This point of view concerning original nature is relatively recent, and even today it must struggle against popular misconceptions which confuse original nature and human nature. When someone says, "You can't change human nature," it is almost certain that he conceives the basic elements of personality to be composed of biologically inherited tendencies to act If he takes culture into consideration at all it is either as something growing out of biologically inherited instincts (tendencies to act in specific ways toward specific situations and environments), or as a set of rules, external to the person, which society has developed to control savage original nature In the first view, culture exists but determines nothing; in the second, it may control the wishes, desires, and other instinctual tendencies to act, but in so doing it succeeds at most in laying a thin veneer of cultural traits over the powerful and specific impulses of genuine human nature (original nature).

The selection from Hobbes presents this point of view very clearly Hobbes believed that at one time men lived in a state of nature in which their "natural" personalities were free to express themselves. The relations between men were those of conflict, the war of all against all characterizing the state of nature Motivated by their passion for security, itself a part of original nature, mutually antagonistic individuals came together and created a social order to prevent the use of force and fraud in the struggles of its members. The instincts (passions in Hobbes' terminology) of the individual and the rules of society conflict with one another, and the individual accepts the latter under duress or because of his fear of the hostile behavior of others.

Variants of this idea continued to develop long after the death of Hobbes, even among sociologists and psychologists. Adopting instinct as one of their major concepts, they contended that either society and culture were the direct product of instinct (for example, the form and function of family life were believed to result from a combination of sex and parental instincts), or culture was external to man and designed to control his instinctive impulses In neither case did they attach much importance to the idea that ways of behaving can become part of the core of personality through learning. It was not until the twentieth century that social scientists began to explore the effects of learning and social life on the formation of personality, although the roots of this type of analysis go far back in history.

As so often happens in intellectual controversies, the social scientists, emphasizing the social background of personality, went too far in their rejection of instinct theory. For a time some denied the importance of original nature altogether But such overemphasis could not long endure: too many facts collected through experiment and observation contradicted it. A feeble-minded person, for example, cannot learn very complex forms of behavior, even though such forms are required by the culture Today we are finally approaching a balanced appreciation of original nature and social environment as interactional factors producing personality.

There are still extremists, however The psychoanalyst who has remained completely faithful to the basic ideas of Freud continues to place his major emphasis on instincts as the basic elements in personality (See the article by Fenichel, cited in Annotated References, in which he explains the character of the dramatic actor through the instinct of exhibitionism) Extreme behaviorists now and then give the impression that learning can account for all of personality, and orthodox followers of Marx still insist that personality is purely a historical product shaped by the relations of economic production.

In contrast to such extremism, the excerpt from Allport's book on personality presents a balanced and systematic account of the character and significance of original nature The selection is useful because it shows the relationships *among* the elements of original nature and also describes concisely *each* element In addition, Allport sharpens the implicit distinction we have drawn between instinct and drive He points out that instinct is essentially self-sufficient, it combines three elements· the tension, the tendency to act in such a way as to relieve the tension by securing whatever is necessary, and the tendency to utilize or consume the elements which will relieve the tension. A drive, on the other hand, must be linked to specific goals and modes of action through learning, and is supplemented and to some extent supplanted by other forms of motivation as the child is socialized

The Allport article defines the difference between instinct and drive; the short excerpt from Malinowski describes the difference by showing how drives become modified in personality development and take on socially determined characteristics Malinowski shows, for example, that the culturally determined co-operative behavior necessary to satisfy the needs related to the biological hunger drive changes the general character of the drive itself into something more specific Hunger becomes, in a particular society, an appetite for roast beef and mashed potatoes served hot at 6 00 P M The very physiological process which lies at the heart of the hunger drive is conditioned to occur at certain times and in relation to a limited number of foods.

From the close relationship between the group and culture in shaping personality, sociologists have long inferred that isolation of the infant from society would prevent the growth of original nature into human nature Because of their inability to carry on experiments in social isolation and the obvious lack of cases of isolation in everyday life, they have had a difficulty in testing this hypothesis Frequently cited stories of feral men (wild children who are supposed to have been reared by animals) are very exciting but fail to constitute adequate scientific proof

Recently, however, there have been discovered a few genuine cases of isolation. Davis, in his article, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," describes the personalities of two socially isolated girls. The selection is important because it deals with data which test the sociological hypothesis concerning isolation and, in general, confirm the basic elements of the hypothesis. On the basis of such evidence it would appear that apart from society original nature cannot become human nature. The elements of original nature are necessary conditions of personality, since the potentialities they offer are the only foundation upon which personality can be built; but they are not the sufficient conditions, for without the process of socialization they must remain unrealized potentialities.

OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY AND MISERY *

Thomas Hobbes

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind; as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend as well as he For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.

And as to the faculties of the mind—setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after somewhat else—I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share

From this equality of ability, ariseth

* *Leviathan*, Part I, Chap XIII (Originally published in 1651)

equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies, and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition, second, diffidence; third, glory.

The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle, the second, to defend them, the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For *war* consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known, and therefore the notion of *time* is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is *peace*.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is

no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things, that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade and destroy one another; and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied, when going to sleep, he locks his doors, when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed, of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors, and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world· but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into a civil war

But though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbors, which is a posture of war But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men

To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place Where there is no common power, there is no law where no law, no injustice Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no *mine* and *thine* distinct, but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long as he can

keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in, though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason

The passions that incline men to peace are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature whereof I shall speak more particularly in the two following chapters.

FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONALITY * *Gordon W. Allport*

THE BEGINNINGS OF PERSONALITY

The newborn infant *lacks* personality, for he has not yet encountered the world in which he must live, and has not developed the distinctive modes of adjustment and mastery that will later comprise his personality He is almost altogether a creature of heredity In fact, if it were not for two complicating considerations we might equate the observable equipment of the neonate with the endowment of his inheritance The complicating considerations are, first, the probable existence of *pre-natal learning,* and secondly, the fact that some aspects of inheritance are latent and require time for their *maturation*

Regarding prenatal learning little needs to be said, for however many adaptive responses the child may learn *in utero,* he does not learn them in the environment in which he must live, and it is only with the distinctive adjustments to the *post natal* world that the problem of personality is concerned For our purposes, therefore, the congenital and the hereditary equipment of the child may both be regarded together as the one primordial source of personality, observable, in part, in the stream of activity at birth

Less easily disposed of is the problem of maturation Not every inherited tendency is observable at birth Throughout life there is a subtle procession of ripening events, so much obscured by the effects of training that no one can tell just what develops in response to maturation and what comes from teaching This problem will be considered in some detail in the next chapter, but its existence makes it difficult for us to formulate an initial account of the "Givens" of personality, as a starting point for a genetic theory of development But since, in spite of the difficulty, a beginning must be made, an *approximate* schedule of the equipment of the infant at birth is offered in Figure 1

The origin of the stream of activity here portrayed may be viewed either as a manifestation of a vitalistic urge (*Horme, Will, Elan Vital*), or of an equally mysterious though more scientific sounding principle of "Protoplasmic Irritability" Some Original Cause or Source of Animation is assumed explicitly or implicitly by all biological and psychological sciences

* From *Personality A Psychological Interpretation* by Gordon W Allport Copyright, 1937, by Henry Holt and Company, Inc Reprinted by permission of the publisher

FIGURE 1

The Beginnings of Personality: The Situation at Birth

A LIFE PRINCIPLE (Vitalistic Postulate) or PROTOPLASMIC IRRITABILITY (Mechanistic Postulate)

reflected in

A STREAM OF ACTIVITY

differentiated at birth into

MASS ACTION (Gross patterns of movement, often called "random activity"), *e g.*, extension, retraction, indeterminate squirming, accompanying vocalization, etc.

SPECIFIC REFLEXES breathing, sucking, swallowing, digestive and eliminative sequences, grasping, sneezing, Babinski, etc

set into motion and sustained through

SIMPLE SENSITIVITY (stimulation of extroceptive, introceptive, or proprioceptive sense organs)

SEGMENTAL DRIVE (tensions), *e g*, hunger, thirst

[GOAL-SEEKING PROCESSES instincts, needs, entelechy]

employing

INNATE INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT sensory capacities, nervous plasticity and retentivity (INTELLIGENCE), glandular and chemical tonicity (TEMPERAMENT), muscular and skeletal structure (PHYSIQUE); special capacities, skills, and sexual functions, to mature later

ADAPTIVE MECHANISMS (potentialities for modification of the stream of activity), *e g.*, maturation, conditioning, integration, inhibition, differentiation, and all other agencies for modifying behavior during the course of the individual's interaction with his environment

Life exists "in individual forms This fact, unexplained and perhaps inexplicable, is the starting point for these sciences.

Recent studies of early infancy make a convenient distinction between two manifestations of the observable stream of activity.[1] There is, first of all, a type of diffuse, massive movement involving large regions of the body Owing to the basic physiological opposition of flexor and extensor muscle patterns (which have the original property of inhibiting each other while they are active) this mass action can frequently be characterized either as retraction (abience) or as extension (adience), while some of the random squirming that takes place, as in twisting, thrashing, pounding movements, makes such complex use of the musculature that it cannot readily be classified either as retractive or extensive

From one study of the first ten days of life we are given the following picture·

"The infant maintains continuous body movement with such speed and excessiveness that the experimenter, even when using a specially devised code, cannot keep up with the infant The body squirms, twists, rolls, and bends The back arches, the hips sway, and the head rolls from side to side or is thrown back. The arms slash vigorously and the legs are kicked in exaggerated extensor thrusts or are flexed sharply at ankle, knee and hip Hands, feet, toes and fingers are in continuous movement. Sucking and smacking sounds frequently occur, while loud crying is usually coincident with mass activity. All of this activity is more or less simultaneous and comes and goes with periodicities which appear in intervals of a few seconds to several minutes." [2]

The same investigator reports that mass activity of this type is especially prominent just previous to nursing, and occurs also from a flatulent condition, during regurgitation, intestinal disturbances, defecation and micturation.[3] That this diffuse and random movement is especially marked when there are ascertainable organic tensions is a fact of considerable importance for the theory of motivation.

In addition to these gross patterns of movement, so difficult to characterize, there exist many specifically adaptive responses, such as movement of the eyes toward a light, sucking, swallowing, withdrawal of a limb from noxious stimuli The exact number of these specific reflexes is difficult to determine owing to their frequent organization into complex chains or into such large patterns or groups that their appearance approaches mass action itself The operation of these reflexes is discussed in other texts [4] Their importance for *personality* consists chiefly in the raw material they provide for the operation of two of the principal mechanisms of growth, *viz*, *conditioning* and *integration.*

What is it that sets the stream of activity into motion, that sustains it until it lapses or changes? This is the problem of *motivation,* and there is no problem in psychology more difficult to handle The special portion of Figure 1, devoted to this topic, therefore will need much more thorough discussion But before settling into it attention should be called to the two other "Givens" underlying the development of personality

First, there is the *innate individual*

[1] Cf E Dewey, *Behavior Development in Infants,* 1935 K C Pratt, "Specificity and Generalization of Behavior in Newborn Infants A Critique" *Psychol Rev* 1934 41, 265–284

[2] O C Irwin, *Genet Psychol Monog*, 1930, 8, pp 59 f

[3] O C Irwin, *loc cit*, and *J Comp Psychol*, 1932, 14, 429–445

[4] *E g*, J B Watson, *Behaviorism,* 1924, pp 90–103, and F H Allport, *Social Psychology,* 1924, Chap III

equipment of physique, and temperament, and general intellectual capacity including the highly complex abilities and talents that later become manifest Such constitutional endowment has many facets, and the part it plays in personality, as already indicated, is complex indeed. The question of temperament alone, intricately tied as it is to the chemical functions of the body, is as important as it is baffling Take, as an example, that subtle constitutional quality commonly called energy, vitality, or "pep" In various studies of leadership, of popularity, and of personal happiness this temperamental quality has been found to be decidedly significant In common speech it is often equated with "personality" What the precise physical counterpart of vigorous and vital activity may be one does not know, though certain glands, especially the hypophysis, the adrenals, the gonads and the thyroid are thought to have more to do with it than certain others [5]

Or take the case of the normal speed of movement (likewise an aspect of temperament, or of one phase of temperament, *viz*, *motility*). One investigator studied the normal rates of tapping of twins, of brothers and sisters, and of parents [6] The results show a striking correspondence in normal tapping speeds among related individuals, monozygotic twins being closest, dizygotic twins and siblings less, parents and offspring next, while unrelated individuals had only a chance correspondence with one another Such a finding is, of course, precisely what would be expected if heredity played an appreciable part in this basic form of activity, one of many of the tap-roots of personality.

[5] Cf P. Richter, *Amer J Orthopsychiatry*, 1932, 2, 345–354, D J Ingle, *Psychol Rev*, 1935, 42, 466–479

[6] Ida Frischeisen-Kohler, *Char. & Pers*, 1933, 1, 301–313

The remaining "Given" in Figure 1 consists of *adaptive mechanisms* that make it possible for the infant to vary his responses, to learn, and to bring his rich innate equipment into the most effective interaction with the demands of his environment These mechanisms are not structures, they are merely instruments of growth, types of modifiability of which the nervous system is capable It is capable of organizing its segmental responses into higher and more complex units through integration; of differentiating its diffuse, mass responses into more refined and successfully adaptive movements It is capable of maturing, of being conditioned, of learning In the following chapters all these instruments of growth will be considered in detail

MOTIVATION

In the central portion of Figure 1 there appears an entry in brackets Goal-seeking Processes instincts, needs, entelechy The brackets call attention to the fact that this "Given" is often regarded as a superfluous assumption Psychologists dispute as to whether the equipment of the newborn infant does or does not include a system of latent purposes Does the primordial stream of activity contain within itself *directions* which determine its own course of development? Is there in the infant, for example, a latent propensity that will later lead him to *construct*, and another to *acquire*, one to *mate*, another to *imitate*, another to *seek companionship* of his fellows? The instinct theory asserts that there are such propensities operating "prior to experience and independent of training" An instinct "determines its possessor to perceive (to pay attention to) any given object of a certain class and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behavior in relation to that ob

ject."[7] Since it is obviously impossible to discern any such elaborately purposive dispositions in the conduct of the newborn infant, it has been necessary for propondents of the instinct doctrine to lean heavily on the theory of maturation which holds that this providential equipment of goal-seeking processes must take time to ripen, and that throughout life the instincts, one after another, come of age

In recent years it has become common to reject this somewhat extravagant portrayal of human purposes It seems to many psychologists to violate unnecessarily the requirement of parsimony in a scientific theory. Are there not many individuals who live their entire lives lacking some of these instincts, failing, for example, to become acquisitive, constructive, pugnacious, or parental in their behavior? Is it not simpler to account for these types of interest if and when they are present, than to assume that "instincts" are common to a species and then be forced to explain away the many exceptions where the "instincts" fail to put in an appearance?

Yet in one form or another many contemporary theories of personality are instinct-theories They view personality as a matter of individual modification of universal instincts or common needs A collector of vases is but showing a special modification or extension of his acquisitive instinct, an altruist is following the instincts of self-abasement and gregariousness (perhaps with a little of the parental propensity thrown in) But are not the purposes of different people far too diverse and too numerous to be traced to a few primal motives shared by all the species? Are the directions of striving after all innately determined? Is it not necessary to allow for the learning of *new* motives and for the acquisition of *novel* interests as personality matures? When people do seek the same goals may the fact not be explained by the more parsimonious assumption that similarly constructed individuals living in similar environment, influenced by similar culture, *would* develop similar goals and employ similar modes of obtaining them?

If so, then instincts would evaporate They would turn out to be nothing more than constellations of emotion, habit, and foresight, better called *sentiments* or *interests,* and regarded as acquired rather than innate. Learning would then serve not merely as a way of extending and modifying purposes, but also of *creating* them. And the fact that many of these purposes are fairly common to mankind could be readily explained without recourse to a hypothesis of racial inheritance.

The question of instincts in animals should not confuse the issue, for there is such flexibility in learning, in making and breaking habits, and so much insight, foresight, and delay in response, that human goals must be viewed as different in kind from the stereotyped objectives of lower animals.

Rejecting the instinct hypothesis it becomes necessary to provide an alternative. A beginning, but only a beginning, may be made in the theory of Drive A drive is defined as a vital impulse which leads to the reduction of some segmental organic tension It has its origin in an internal organic stimulus of peculiar persistence, growing characteristically stronger until the organism acts in such a way as to alleviate the accumulating tension

The doctrine of drive is a rather crude biological conception often employed as a factotum by psychologists with a simple mechanistic outlook The hypothesis herewith offered is that the doctrine, while inadequate to account for *adult* motivation, does none the less offer a suitable portray-

[7] W McDougall, *Outline of Psychology,* 1923, p 116

al of the motives of *young infants*, and for that reason serves very well as the *starting point* for a theory of motivation. After the level of infancy is passed primitive segmental drive rapidly recedes in importance, being supplanted by the more sophisticated type of motives characteristic of the mature personality, and commonly represented by such terms as *interest, sentiment, value, trait, ambition, attitude, taste*, and *inclination*. Obviously none of these motives are found full-fledged in the new-born child.

THE GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS *

Bronislaw Malinowski

I. PERSONALITY, ORGANIZATION, AND CULTURE

It might seem axiomatic that in any sociological approach the individual, the group, and their relations must remain the constant theme of all observations and argument The group, after all, is but the assemblage of individuals and must be thus defined — unless we fall into the fallacy of "group mind," "collective sensorium," or the gigantic "Moral Being" which thinks out and improvises all collective events Nor can such conceptions as individual, personality, self, or mind be described except in terms of membership in a group or groups — unless again we wish to hug the figment of the individual as a detached, self-contained entity We can, therefore, lay down as an axiom — or better, as an empirical truth — that in field work and theory, in observation and analysis, the *leitmotiv* "individual, group, and their mutual dependence" will run through all the inquiries.

But the exact determination of what we mean by "individual," or how he is related to his "group," the final understanding of the terms "social organization" or "cultural determinism" presents a number of problems to be discussed I would like to add that over and above individual mental processes and forms of social organization it is necessary to introduce another factor, which together with the previous ones makes up the totality of cultural processes and phenomena. I mean the material apparatus which is indispensable both for the understanding of how a culturally determined individual comes into being and, also, how he co-operates in group life with other individuals.

In what follows I shall discuss some of these questions from the anthropological point of view Most of my scientific experiences in culture are derived from work in the field. As an anthropologist I am interested in primitive as well as in developed cultures The functional approach, moreover, considers the totality of cultural phenomena as the necessary background both of the analysis of man and that of society. Indeed, since in my opinion the relation between individual and group is a universal motive in all prob-

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1939, pp 938–46 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press.

lems of sociology and comparative anthropology, a brief survey of the functional theory of culture, with a special emphasis on our specific problem, will be the best method of presentation.

Functionalism differs from other sociological theories more definitely, perhaps, in its conception and definition of the individual than in any other respect The functionalist includes in his analysis not merely the emotional as well as the intellectual side of mental processes, but also insists that man in his full biological reality has to be drawn into our analysis of culture The bodily needs and environmental influences, and the cultural reactions to them, have thus to be studied side by side

The field worker observes human beings acting within an environmental setting, natural and artificial, influenced by it, and in turn transforming it in co-operation with each other. He studies how men and women are motivated in their mutual relations by feelings of attraction and repulsion, by co-operative duties and privileges, by profits drawn and sacrifices made. The invisible network of social bonds, of which the organization of the group is made up, is defined by charters and codes — technological, legal, customary, and moral — to which every individual is differentially submitted, and which integrate the group into a whole Since all rules and all tribal tradition are expressions in words — that is, symbols — the understanding of social organization implies an analysis of symbolism and language Empirically speaking the field worker has to collect texts, statements, and opinions, side by side with the observation of behavior and the study of material culture.

In this brief preamble we have already insisted that the individual must be studied as a biological reality We have indicated that the physical world must be part of our analysis, both as the natural milieu and as the body of tools and commodities produced by man. We have pointed out that individuals never cope with, or move within, their environment in isolation, but in organized groups, and that organization is expressed in traditional charters, which are symbolic in essence.

II. THE INDIVIDUAL ORGANISM UNDER CONDITIONS OF CULTURE

Taking man as a biological entity it is clear that certain minima of conditions can be laid down which are indispensable to the personal welfare of the individual and to the continuation of the group. All human beings have to be nourished, they have to reproduce, and they require the maintenance of certain physical conditions: ventilation, temperature within a definite range, a sheltered and dry place to rest, and safety from the hostile forces of nature, of animals, and of man. The physiological working of each individual organism implies the intake of food and of oxygen, occasional movement, and relaxation in sleep and recreation The process of growth in man necessitates protection and guidance in its early stages and, later on, specific training

We have listed here some of the essential conditions to which cultural activity, whether individual or collective, has instrumentally to conform It is well to recall that these are only minimum conditions — the very manner in which they are satisfied in culture imposes certain *additional requirements* These *constitute* new needs, which in turn have to be satisfied. The primary — that is, the biological — wants of the human organism are not satisfied naturally by direct contact of the individual organism with the physical environment Not only does the individual depend on the group in whatever he achieves and whatever he obtains, but the group and all its individual members depend on the development of a material

outfit, which in its essence is an addition to the human anatomy, and which entails corresponding modifications of human physiology.

In order to present our argument in a synoptic manner, let us concisely list in Column A of the table on page 171 the basic needs of the individual Thus "Nutrition (metabolism)" indicates not only the need for a supply of food and of oxygen, but also the conditions under which food can be prepared, eaten, digested, and the sanitary arrangements which this implies. "Reproduction" obviously means that the sexual urges of man and woman have to be satisfied, and the continuity of the group maintained The entry "Bodily comforts" indicates that the human organism can be active and effective only within certain ranges of temperature, that it must be sheltered from dampness and drafts; that it must be given opportunities for rest and sleep "Safety" again refers to all the dangers lurking in the natural environment, both for civilized and primitive· earthquakes and tidal waves, snowstorms and excessive insolation, it also indicates the need of protection from dangerous animals and human foes "Relaxation" implies the need of the human organism for a rhythm of work by day and sleep at night, of intensive bodily exercise and rest, of seasons of recreation alternating with periods of practical activity. The entry "Movement" declares that human beings must have regular exercise of muscles and nervous system "Growth" indicates the fact that the development of the human organism is culturally directed and redefined from infancy into ripe age.

It is clear that the understanding of any one of these entries of Column A brings us down immediately to the analysis of the individual organism. We see that any lack of satisfaction in any one of the basic needs must necessarily imply at least temporary maladjustment. In more pronounced forms, nonsatisfaction entails ill-health and decay through malnutrition, exposure to heat or cold, to sun or moisture, or destruction by natural forces, animals, or man. Psychologically the basic needs are expressed in drives, desires, or emotions, which move the organism to the satisfaction of each need through systems or linked reflexes

The science of culture, however, is concerned not with the raw material of anatomical and physiological endowment in the individual, but with the manner in which this endowment is modified by social influences When we inquire how the bodily needs are satisfied under conditions of culture, we find the systems of direct response to bodily needs which are listed in Column B And here we can see at once the complete dependence of the individual upon the group each of these cultural responses is dependent upon organized collective activities, which are carried on according to a traditional scheme, and in which human beings not merely co-operate with one another but continue the achievements, inventions, devices, and theories inherited from previous generations.

In matters of nutrition, the individual human being does not act in isolation, nor does he behave in terms of mere anatomy and unadulterated physiology, we have to deal, instead, with personality, culturally molded Appetite or even hunger is determined by the social milieu Nowhere and never will man, however primitive, feed on the fruits of his environment He always selects and rejects, produces and prepares. He does not depend on the physiological rhythm of hunger and satiety alone, his digestive processes are timed and trained by the daily routine of his tribe, nation, or class He eats at definite times, and he goes for his food to his table. The table is supplied from the kitch-

Synoptic Survey of Biological and Derived Needs and Their Satisfaction in Culture

A	B	C	D	E	F
Basic needs (individual)	*Direct responses (organized, i e, collective)*	*Instrumental needs*	*Responses to instrumental needs*	*Symbolic and integrative needs*	*Systems of thought and faith*
Nutrition (metabolism)	Commissariat	Renewal of cultural apparatus	Economics	Transmission of experience by means of precise, consistent principles	Knowledge
Reproduction	Marriage and family				
Bodily comforts	Domicile and dress	Charters of behavior and their sanctions	Social control		
Safety	Protection and defense			Means of intellectual emotional and pragmatic control of destiny and chance	Magic Religion
Relaxation	Systems of play and repose	Renewal of personnel	Education		
Movement	Set activities and systems of communication				
Growth	Training and apprenticeship	Organization of force and compulsion	Political organization	Communal rhythm of recreation exercise and rest	Art Sports Games Ceremonial

en, the kitchen from the larder, and this again is replenished from the market or from the tribal food-supply system

The symbolic expressions here used — "table," "kitchen," etc — refer to the various phases of the process which separates the requirements of the organism from the natural sources of food supply, and which is listed in Column B as "Commissariat" They indicate that at each stage man depends on the group — family, club, or fraternity And here again we use these expressions in a sense embracing primitive as well as civilized institutions, concerned with the production, preparation, and consumption of nourishment The raw material of individual physiology is found everywhere refashioned by cultural and social determinism The group has molded the individual in matters of taste, of tribal taboos, of the nutritive and symbolic value of food, as well as in the manners and modes of commensalism, Above all, the group, through

economic co-operation, provides the stream of food supply.

One general point which we will have to make throughout our analysis is that the relation is not of the individual to society or *the* group Even in matters of commissariat a number of groups make their appearance. In the most primitive society we would have the organization of food-gatherers, some institutions through which the distribution and apportionment of food takes place, and the commensal group of consumers — as a rule, the family. And were we to analyze each of these groups from the point of view of nutrition, we would find that the place of the individual in each of them is determined by the differentiation as to skill, ability, interest, and appetite.

When we come to the cultural satisfaction of the individual impulses and emotions of sex and of the collective need for reproduction, we would see that human beings do not reproduce by nature alone The full satisfaction of the impulse, as well as the socially legitimate effect of it, is subject to a whole set of rules defining courtship and marriage, prenuptial and extra-connubial intercourse, as well as the life within the family (Col B, "Marriage and family"). The individual brings to this, obviously, his or her anatomical equipment, and the corresponding physiological impulses. He also contributes the capacity to develop tastes and interests, emotional attitudes and sentiments Yet in all this the group not only imposes barriers and presents opportunities, suggests ideals and restrictions, and dictates values, but the community as a whole, through its system of legal rules, ethical and religious principles, and such concepts as honor, virtue, and sin, affects even the physiological attitude of man to woman Take the most elementary physical impulse, such as the attraction of one sex by another. The very estimate of beauty and the appreciation of the bodily shape is modified by traditional reshaping: lip plugs and nose sticks, scarification and tattooing, the deformation of feet, breasts, waist, and head, and even of the organs of reproduction. In courtship and in selection for marriage such factors as rank, wealth, and economic efficiency enter into the estimate of the integral desirability and value of one mate for the other. And again the fullest expression of the impulse in the desire for children is affected by the systems of legal principle, economic interest, and religious ideology, which profoundly modify the innate substratum of human physiology.

Enough has been said to point out that here once more any empirical study of the reproductive process in a given culture must consider both the individual, the group, and the material apparatus of culture The individual, in this most personal and subjective concern of human life, is submitted to the influence of tradition which penetrates right down to the processes of internal secretion and physiological response The selective business of choice and of mating are constantly directed and influenced by the social setting The most important stages (i e, marriage and parenthood) have to receive a social hallmark in the contract of marriage The legitimacy of the fruits of their bodily union depends upon whether they have conformed or not to the systems evolved in the community by traditional dictates

Yet here once more we do not deal with the group and the individual, but we would have to consider a whole set of human agglomerations· the group of the two principal actors (i e, marriage), the prospective family, the already developed families of each mate, the local community, and the tribe as the bearer of law, tradition, and their enforcement.

We must survey the other items of Column B more rapidly. The whole cul-

tural system which corresponds to the necessity of keeping the human organism within certain limits of temperature, to the necessity of protecting it from the various inclemencies of wind and weather, obviously implies also the parallel consideration of individual and group. In constructing and maintaining even the simplest habitation, in the keeping of the fire alive, in the upkeep of roads and communications, the individual alone is not enough He has to be trained for each task in technological and co-operative abilities, and he has to work in conjunction with others.

From the biological point of view the group acts as an indispensable medium for the realization of individual bodily needs. The organism within each culture is trained to accommodate and harden to certain conditions which might prove dangerous or even fatal without this training

Here, therefore, we have again the two elements the molding or conditioning of the human anatomy and physiology by collective influences and cultural apparatus, and the production of this apparatus through co-operative activities Safety is achieved by organized defense, precautionary measures, and calculations based on tribal knowledge and foresight

The development of the muscular system and the provision of movement are again provided for by the training of the individual organism and by the collective production of means of communication, of vehicles of transport, and of technical rules which define their use. The physical growth as guided by the influence of the group on the individual shows directly the dependence of the organism upon his social milieu It is also a contribution of the individual to the community in that it supplies in each case an adequate member of one or several social units.

FINAL NOTE ON A CASE OF EXTREME ISOLATION *

Kingsley Davis

Early in 1940 there appeared in this *Journal* an account of a girl called Anna [1] She had been deprived of normal contact and had received a minimum of human care for almost the whole of her first six years of life. At that time observations were not complete and the report had a tentative character. Now, however, the girl is dead, and, with more information available, it is possible to give a fuller and more definitive description of the case from a sociological point of view

Anna's death, caused by hemorrhagic jaundice, occurred on August 6, 1942 Having been born on March 1 or 6,[2] 1932, she was approximately ten and a half years of age when she died The previous report covered her development up to the age of almost eight years, the present one recapitulates the earlier period on the basis

[1] Kingsley Davis, "Extreme Social Isolation of a Child," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLV January, 1940), 554–65

[2] The records are not clear as to which day

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1947, pp 432–37 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press (The materials of this paper will be incorporated in a book tentatively entitled *Social Inequality*, by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore, to be published by Rinehart & Company, Inc)

of new evidence and then covers the last two and a half years of her life.

EARLY HISTORY

The first few days and weeks of Anna's life were complicated by frequent changes of domicile It will be recalled that she was an illegitimate child, the second such child born to her mother, and that her grandfather, a widowed farmer in whose house her mother lived, strongly disapproved of this new evidence of the mother's indiscretion This fact led to the baby's being shifted about.

Two weeks after being born in a nurse's private home, Anna was brought to the family farm, but the grandfather's antagonism was so great that she was shortly taken to the house of one of her mother's friends At this time a local minister became interested in her and took her to his house with an idea of possible adoption He decided against adoption, however, when he discovered that she had vaginitis. The infant was then taken to a children's home in the nearest large city This agency found that at the age of only three weeks she was already in a miserable condition, being "terribly galled and otherwise in very bad shape" It did not regard her as a likely subject for adoption but took her in for a while anyway, hoping to benefit her. After Anna had spent nearly eight weeks in this place, the agency notified her mother to come to get her. The mother responded by sending a man and his wife to the children's home with a view to their adopting Anna, but they made such a poor impression on the agency that permission was refused Later the mother came herself and took the child out of the home and then gave her to this couple It was in the home of this pair that a social worker found the girl a short time thereafter The social worker went to the mother's home and pleaded with Anna's grandfather to allow the mother to bring the child home. In spite of threats, he refused. The child, by then more than four months old, was next taken to another children's home in a near-by town A medical examination at this time revealed that she had impetigo, vaginitis, umbilical hernia, and a skin rash

Anna remained in this second children's home for nearly three weeks, at the end of which time she was transferred to a private foster-home. Since, however, the grandfather would not, and the mother could not, pay for the child's care, she was finally taken back as a last resort to the grandfather's house (at the age of five and a half months). There she remained, kept on the second floor in an attic-like room because her mother hesitated to incur the grandfather's wrath by bringing her downstairs

The mother, a sturdy woman weighing about 180 pounds, did a man's work on the farm She engaged in heavy work such as milking cows and tending hogs and had little time for her children Sometimes she went out at night, in which case Anna was left entirely without attention Ordinarily, it seems, Anna received only enough care to keep her barely alive She appears to have been seldom moved from one position to another Her clothing and bedding were filthy She apparently had no instruction, no friendly attention

It is little wonder that, when finally found and removed from the room in the grandfather's house at the age of nearly six years, the child could not talk, walk, or do anything that showed intelligence She was in an extremely emaciated and undernourished condition, with skeleton-like legs and a bloated abdomen She had been fed on virtually nothing except cow's milk during the years under her mother's care

Anna's condition when found, and her subsequent improvement, have been de-

scribed in the previous report. It now remains to say what happened to her after that.

LATER HISTORY

In 1939, nearly two years after being discovered, Anna had progressed, as previously reported, to the point where she could walk, understand simple commands, feed herself, achieve some neatness, remember people, etc. But she still did not speak, and, though she was much more like a normal infant of something over one year of age in mentality, she was far from normal for her age

On August 30, 1939, she was taken to a private home for retarded children, leaving the county home where she had been for more than a year and a half In her new setting she made some further progress, but not a great deal In a report of an examination made November 6 of the same year, the head of the institution pictured the child as follows

"Anna walks about aimlessly, makes periodic rhythmic motions of her hands, and, at intervals, makes guttural and sucking noises She regards her hands as if she had seen them for the first time It was impossible to hold her attention for more than a few seconds at a time — not because of distraction due to external stimuli but because of her inability to concentrate She ignored the task in hand to gaze vacantly about the room Speech is entirely lacking Numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made with her in the hope of developing initial sounds I do not believe that this failure is due to negativism or deafness but that she is not sufficiently developed to accept speech at this time. . . . The prognosis is not favorable."

More than five months later, on April 25, 1940, a clinical psychologist, the late Professor Francis N. Maxfield, examined Anna and reported the following large for her age; hearing "entirely normal"; vision apparently normal, able to climb stairs; speech in the "babbling stage" and "promise for developing intelligible speech later seems to be good" He said further that "on the Merrill-Palmer scale she made a mental score of 19 months. On the Vineland social maturity scale she made a score of 23 months." [3]

Professor Maxfield very sensibly pointed out that prognosis is difficult in such cases of isolation "It is very difficult to take scores on tests standardized under average conditions of environment and experience," he wrote, "and interpret them in a case where environment and experience have been so unusual" With this warning he gave it as his opinion at that time that Anna would eventually "attain an adult mental level of six or seven years" [4]

The school for retarded children, on July 1, 1941, reported that Anna had reached 46 inches in height and weighed 60 pounds She could bounce and catch a ball and was said to conform to group socialization, though as a follower rather than a leader Toilet habits were firmly established Food habits were normal, except that she still used a spoon as her sole implement She could dress herself except for fastening her clothes Most remarkable of all, she had finally begun to develop speech She was characterized as being at about the two-year level in this regard She could call attendants by name and bring in one when she was asked to. She had a few complete sentences to express her wants The report concluded that there was nothing peculiar about her, except that she was feeble-minded — "probably congenital in type" [5]

A final report from the school, made on June 22, 1942, and evidently the last re-

[3] Letter to one of the state officials in charge of the case

[4] *Ibid*

[5] Progress report of the school

port before the girl's death, pictured only a slight advance over that given above. It said that Anna could follow directions, string beads, identify a few colors, build with blocks, and differentiate between attractive and unattractive pictures. She had a good sense of rhythm and loved a doll. She talked mainly in phrases but would repeat words and try to carry on a conversation. She was clean about clothing She habitually washed her hands and brushed her teeth. She would try to help other children She walked well and could run fairly well, though clumsily. Although easily excited, she had a pleasant disposition.

INTERPRETATION

Such was Anna's condition just before her death It may seem as if she had not made much progress, but one must remember the condition in which she had been found One must recall that she had no glimmering of speech, absolutely no ability to walk, no sense of gesture, not the least capacity to feed herself even when the food was put in front of her, and no comprehension of cleanliness. She was so apathetic that it was hard to tell whether or not she could hear. And all this at the age of nearly six years Compared with this condition, her capacities at the time of her death seem striking indeed, though they do not amount to much more than a two-and-a-half-year mental level One conclusion therefore seems safe, namely, that her isolation prevented a considerable amount of mental development that was undoubtedly part of her capacity. Just what her original capacity was, of course, is hard to say, but her development after her period of confinement (including the ability to walk and run, to play, dress, fit into a social situation, and, above all, to speak) shows that she had at least this much capacity — capacity that never could have been realized in her original condition of isolation.

A further question is this: What would she have been like if she had received a normal upbringing from the moment of birth? A definitive answer would have been impossible in any case, but even an approximate answer is made difficult by her early death. If one assumes, as was tentatively surmised in the previous report, that it is "almost impossible for any child to learn to speak, think, and act like a normal person after a long period of early isolation," it seems likely that Anna might have had a normal or near-normal capacity, genetically speaking On the other hand, it was pointed out that Anna represented "a marginal case, [because] she was discovered before she had reached six years of age," an age "young enough to allow for some plasticity"[6] While admitting, then, that Anna's isolation *may* have been the major cause (and was certainly a minor cause) of her lack of rapid mental progress during the four and a half years following her rescue from neglect, it is necessary to entertain the hypothesis that she was congenitally deficient.

In connection with this hypothesis, one suggestive though by no means conclusive circumstance needs consideration, namely, the mentality of Anna's forebears. Information on this subject is easier to obtain, as one might guess, on the mother's than on the father's side. Anna's maternal grandmother, for example, is said to have been college educated and wished to have her children receive a good education, but her husband, Anna's stern grandfather, apparently a shrewd, hard-driving, calculating farmowner, was so penurious that her ambitions in this direction were thwarted Under the circumstances her daughter (Anna's mother) managed, despite having to do hard work on the farm, to complete the eighth grade in a country school Even so, however, the daughter

[6] Davis, *op cit*, p 564

was evidently not very smart. "A schoolmate of [Anna's mother] stated that she was retarded in school work; was very gullible at this age, and that her morals even at this time were discussed by other students." Two tests administered to her on March 4, 1938, when she was thirty-two years of age, showed that she was mentally deficient. On the Stanford Revision of the Binet-Simon Scale her performance was equivalent to that of a child of eight years, giving her an I.Q. of 50 and indicating mental deficiency of "middle-grade moron type."[7]

As to the identity of Anna's father, the most persistent theory holds that he was an old man about seventy-four years of age at the time of the girl's birth. If he was the one, there is no indication of mental or other biological deficiency, whatever one may think of his morals. However, someone else may actually have been the father.

To sum up, Anna's heredity is the kind that *might* have given rise to innate mental deficiency, though not necessarily.

COMPARISON WITH ANOTHER CASE

Perhaps more to the point than speculations about Anna's ancestry would be a case for comparison. If a child could be discovered who had been isolated about the same length of time as Anna but had achieved a much quicker recovery and a greater mental development, it would be a stronger indication that Anna was deficient to start with.

Such a case does exist. It is the case of a girl found at about the same time as Anna and under strikingly similar circumstances. A full description of the details of this case has not been published, but, in addition to newspaper reports, an excellent preliminary account by a speech specialist, Dr. Marie K. Mason, who played an important role in the handling of the child, has appeared.[8] Also the late Dr. Francis N. Maxfield, clinical psychologist at Ohio State University, as was Dr. Mason, has written an as yet unpublished but penetrating analysis of the case.[9] Some of his observations have been included in Professor Zingg's book on feral man.[10] The following discussion is drawn mainly from these enlightening materials. The writer, through the kindness of Professors Mason and Maxfield, did have a chance to observe the girl in April, 1940, and to discuss the features of her case with them.

Born apparently one month later than Anna, the girl in question, who has been given the pseudonym Isabelle, was discovered in November, 1938, nine months after the discovery of Anna. At the time she was found she was approximately six and a half years of age. Like Anna, she was an illegitimate child and had been kept in seclusion for that reason. Her mother was a deaf-mute, having become so at the age of two, and it appears that she and Isabelle had spent most of their time together in a dark room shut off from the rest of the mother's family. As a result Isabelle had no chance to develop speech, when she communicated with her mother, it was by means of gestures. Lack of sunshine and inadequacy of diet had

[7] The facts set forth here as to Anna's ancestry are taken chiefly from a report of mental tests administered to Anna's mother by psychologists at a state hospital where she was taken for this purpose after the discovery of Anna's seclusion. This excellent report was not available to the writer when the previous paper on Anna was published.

[8] Marie K. Mason, "Learning To Speak after Six and One-Half Years of Silence," *Journal of Speech Disorders*, VII (1942), 295–304.

[9] Francis N. Maxfield, "What Happens When the Social Environment of a Child Approaches Zero." The writer is greatly indebted to Mrs. Maxfield and to Professor Horace B. English, a colleague of Professor Maxfield, for the privilege of seeing this manuscript and other materials collected on isolated and feral individuals.

[10] J. A. L. Singh and Robert M. Zingg, *Wolf-Children and Feral Man* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), pp. 248–51.

caused Isabelle to become rachitic Her legs in particular were affected; they "were so bowed that as she stood erect the soles of her shoes came nearly flat together, and she got about with a skittering gait." [11] Her behavior toward strangers, especially men, was almost that of a wild animal, manifesting much fear and hostility. In lieu of speech she made only a strange croaking sound In many ways she acted like an infant. "She was apparently utterly unaware of relationships of any kind When presented with a ball for the first time, she held it in the palm of her hand, then reached out and stroked my face with it Such behavior is comparable to that of a child of six months" [12] At first it was even hard to tell whether or not she could hear, so unused were her senses Many of her actions resembled those of deaf children

It is small wonder that, once it was established that she could hear, specialists working with her believed her to be feeble-minded Even on nonverbal tests her performance was so low as to promise little for the future. Her first score on the Stanford-Binet was 19 months, practically at the zero point of the scale On the Vineland social maturity scale her first score was 39, representing an age level of two and a half years [13] "The general impression was that she was wholly uneducable and that any attempt to teach her to speak, after so long a period of silence, would meet with failure." [14]

In spite of this interpretation, the individuals in charge of Isabelle launched a systematic and skilful program of training It seemed hopeless at first The approach had to be through pantomime and dramatization, suitable to an infant. It required one week of intensive effort before she even made her first attempt at vocalization Gradually she began to respond, however, and, after the first hurdles had at last been overcome, a curious thing happened. She went through the usual stages of learning characteristic of the years from one to six not only in proper succession but far more rapidly than normal In a little over two months after her first vocalization she was putting sentences together Nine months after that she could identify words and sentences on the printed page, could write well, could add to ten, and could retell a story after hearing it Seven months beyond this point she had a vocabulary of 1,500–2,000 words and was asking complicated questions. Starting from an educational level of between one and three years (depending on what aspect one considers), she had reached a normal level by the time she was eight and a half years old In short, she covered in two years the stages of learning that ordinarily require six [15] Or, to put it another way, her I Q trebled in a year and a half [16] The speed with which she reached the normal level of mental development seems analogous to the recovery of body weight in a growing child after an illness, the recovery being achieved by an extra fast rate of growth for a period after the illness until normal weight for the given age is again attained

When the writer saw Isabelle a year and a half after her discovery, she gave him the impression of being a very bright, cheerful, energetic little girl She spoke well, walked and ran without trouble, and sang with gusto and accuracy Today she is over fourteen years old and has passed the sixth grade in a public school Her teachers say that she participates in all school activities as normally as other children Though older than her classmates,

[11] Maxfield, unpublished manuscript cited above

[12] Mason, *op cit*, p 299

[13] Maxfield, unpublished manuscript

[14] Mason, *op cit*, p 299.

[15] *Ibid*, pp 300–304

[16] Maxfield, unpublished manuscript.

she has fortunately not physically matured too far beyond their level.[17]

Clearly the history of Isabelle's development is different from that of Anna's In both cases there was an exceedingly low, or rather blank, intellectual level to begin with In both cases it seemed that the girl might be congenitally feeble-minded. In both a considerably higher level was reached later on But the Ohio girl achieved a normal mentality within two years, whereas Anna was still marked inadequate at the end of four and a half years This difference in achievement may suggest that Anna had less initial capacity. But an alternative hypothesis is possible

One should remember that Anna never received the prolonged and expert attention that Isabelle received The result of such attention, in the case of the Ohio girl, was to give her speech at an early stage, and her subsequent rapid development seems to have been a consequence of that "Until Isabelle's speech and language development, she had all the characteristics of a feeble-minded child' Had Anna, who, from the standpoint of psychometric tests and early history, closely resembled this girl at the start, been given a mastery of speech at an earlier point by intensive training, her subsequent development might have been much more rapid [18]

The hypothesis that Anna began with a sharply inferior mental capacity is therefore not established Even if she were deficient to start with, we have no way of knowing how much so Under ordinary conditions she might have been a dull normal or, like her mother, a moron Even after the blight of her isolation, if she had lived to maturity, she might have finally reached virtually the full level of her capacity, whatever it may have been That her isolation did have a profound effect upon her mentality, there can be no doubt. This is proved by the substantial degree of change during the four and a half years following her rescue.

Consideration of Isabelle's case serves to show, as Anna's case does not clearly show, that isolation up to the age of six, with failure to acquire any form of speech and hence failure to grasp nearly the whole world of cultural meaning, does not preclude the subsequent acquisition of these Indeed, there seems to be a process of accelerated recovery in which the child goes through the mental stages at a more rapid rate than would be the case in normal development Just what would be the maximum age at which a person could remain isolated and still retain the capacity for full cultural acquisition is hard to say Almost certainly it would not be as high as age fifteen, it might possibly be as low as age ten Undoubtedly various individuals would differ considerably as to the exact age

Anna's is not an ideal case for showing the effects of extreme isolation, partly because she was possibly deficient to begin with, partly because she did not receive the best training available, and partly because she did not live long enough Nevertheless, her case is instructive when placed in the record with numerous other cases of extreme isolation This and the previous article about her are meant to place her in the record It is to be hoped that other cases will be described in the scientific literature as they are discovered (as unfortunately they will be), for only in these rare cases of extreme isolation is it possible "to observe *concretely separated* two factors in the development of human personality which are always otherwise only analytically separated, the biogenic and the sociogenic factors" [19]

[17] Based on a personal letter from Dr Mason to the writer, May 13, 1946

[18] This point is suggested in a personal letter from Dr Mason to the writer, October 22, 1946

[19] Singh and Zingg, *op cit*, pp xxi–xxii, in a foreword by the writer

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Dennis, Wayne, "The Significance of Feral Man," *American Journal of Psychology*, July, 1941, pp. 425–32 This article describes the shaky foundations of the theories that have been developed around the wolf-children of India and other feral men

2 Fenichel, Otto, "On Acting," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, April, 1946, pp 144–60 Fenichel accounts for the personality of the dramatic actor as being the product of the general sexual drive (libido) and of the instinct of exhibitionism He is an orthodox psychoanalyst and still conceives personality as being composed basically of instincts

3 Kardiner, Abram, *The Individual and His Society*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939, pp 107–250, 291–351 Kardiner and his associates have modified the older psychoanalytic doctrine so that dynamic drives instead of instincts are the earliest motivating forces of the individual It is their contention that these drives are dynamic and that some forms of culture are the product of these drives in interaction with other aspects of culture The pages cited contain analyses of Marquesan and Tanala cultures and basic personality types

4. McDougall, William, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, W Luce and Company, Boston, 1926, pp 47–92 In this section of his social psychology, McDougall describes what he conceives to be the basic instincts of man and the activities to which they give rise This work is one of the last social psychologies written using the concept of instinct

5 Maslow, A H, "A Theory of Motivation," in *Twentieth Century Psychology*, ed by P L Harriman, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1946, pp 22–48 Maslow has written in brief scope one of the best systematic analyses of the levels of human motivation This article is extremely useful if considered in conjunction with the Allport reading.

6 Young, Kimball, *Social Psychology*, F S Crofts and Company, New York, 1946, pp 77–92 The character and significance of original nature for personality development are described in this section of Young's text

7 See also Thomas, "The Regulation of the Wishes," p 185, Horney, "Culture and Neurosis," p 248, Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," p 592

6. The Socialization of Personality

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Man is not born human. His human nature and personality, while based on his original nature, are the product of his participation in the life of social groups. Through his relationships with others, the individual acquires the ideas, habits, and attitudes composing the core of his personality The term *socialization* is used to designate this process by which social interaction results in the formation of personality.

Some investigators lay stress on the uniqueness of each personality developed in this manner, and, indeed, the sociologist does not deny that differences in original nature and in social experience build unique personalities, for no two personalities are ever identical The sociologist must, none the less, by the very nature of his discipline, emphasize those aspects of personality which enable the individual to participate in the activities of his family and community and through which these groups are to some extent able to predict and control his actions Through socialization the individual becomes much more than a unique personality. He becomes a person, i e., a functioning member of society: his behavior typically falls well within the limits of tolerance established by the culture, his goals and purposes are approximately those attributed to him by the group, and he is able to act in accord with the culturally patterned relationships by which he and others can achieve their individual and collective ends.

To know all this as an abstract proposition, however, is not necessarily to understand the precise character of the process of socialization. Such understanding can be secured only by focusing our attention on the general course of personality development as it begins in the random, diffuse responses of the infant and proceeds — always within a matrix of social relations — through different levels to the complex personality structure of the socialized member of the family and community The readings in this chapter have been selected to supply this focus

The first selection, a brief excerpt from W. I Thomas's book, *The Unadjusted Girl,* gives general orientation and a basis for discussing the earliest stages of socialization. In summary, the major points of the Thomas selection are these. (1) action flows from the meaning which the actor (individual) attaches to the situation; (2) these meanings — definitions of the situation — are determined by the attitudes formed on the basis of past experience and related to the situation in which the actor finds himself; (3) although the child is psychologically capable of forming his own definitions, he is born into a group which has already defined most general situations and has developed appropriate rules of action, so that he

adopts these rather than forms his own spontaneous assessments. In general, the whole process of socialization can be correctly perceived from this perspective.

In the first stage of socialization the child learns to manage the tensions set up by the drives of his original nature, and in so doing he is forced to accept, without any possible chance of real resistance, because of his helplessness, the group definitions of the situation; i.e., he must learn to adapt his activity to that of adults He does this by eliminating actions which either do not bring results or bring painful ones, and by fixing attitudes in his personality which result in the repetition of actions producing pleasurable feelings. These latter attitudes issue into action when the appropriate situation presents itself, e.g., when the parent is ready to feed the child and picks him up, the child responds with sucking and other movements required for eating. The attitudes and habits so developed are linked with his internal drives and overtly express themselves in the content and pattern of his actions.

The satisfactions accruing from the tender handling by the mother in these dependent relationships, together with the frustration of drives sometimes involved in the formation of socially determined habits, such as those which result from toilet training, produce general drives and attitudes of affection and aggression. These drives and attitudes will be culturally patterned to focus upon various persons in the social world The affectional attitudes are usually directed toward the parents and other members of the family, and the aggressive attitudes toward outsiders

In the second stage of socialization the child is likely to develop spontaneous definitions which conflict with those of the parents This is largely the result of his having achieved a certain degree of independence in moving around and handling objects and of being able to explore certain aspects of his environment without parental guidance or intervention Through such explorations he can and does develop new tendencies to respond which are not tied into his social relations with adults. It is apparently the conflict of these definitions with those of the parents which leads Thomas to the erroneous belief that the child cannot develop his own definitions

As an example, let us suppose that the exploring child encounters a soft, sweet, white object on the kitchen table. Previously any such object within his reach was his food, consumed with parental approval. Acting on this definition he consumes the cake mother has prepared for dinner; the painful aftermath forces him to redefine the situation. The next time he encounters a cake on the table, and leaves it untouched, his action conforms to *his mother's* definition of the situation —a child should not help himself to sweets and spoil her plans for dinner. Yet the action results from *his* definition of the situation —to consume a soft, sweet, white object found on the table is likely to be painful. In this example Thomas's formulation of what takes place must be rephrased to state that while the child's definition is still spontaneous, it is the definition of a social situation including the probable reactions of the mother.

The illustration above also includes the beginnings of the third stage of socialization in which the definitions of other members of the group are actually taken over and *internalized* into the personality of the child. The child cannot anticipate the probable reactions of the mother unless in some way her tendencies to act have become a part of his personality. The excerpt from G. H Mead's, *Mind, Self, and Society* deals in considerable detail with the elements involved in this process.

According to Mead, the key to the child's internalization of the attitudes of others is to be found in language. When the child learns to talk, the parents can make comprehensible their definitions of various situations In talking to him about a certain act they can call out in him the same response which the act elicits in them. By describing acts and objects they can often call out in the child *attitudes toward situations which he has not yet experienced.* For instance, the use of language weighted with unfavorable connotations when speaking of other racial and ethnic groups can develop strong prejudices in the child and prepare him to act in an unfavorable manner when he comes into contact with members of such groups In the same manner the parents can exert influence on the child's attitudes toward such far-off events as choice of career and mate

Ability to use language is the basic condition for internalization of the attitudes of others, and some attitudes are developed in the child simply through conversation with the parents. Yet systematic and organized internalization takes place through the acting out in overt behavior and in fantasy the behavior of others The child in his play frequently takes the part of the mother, father, brother or sister, mailman, grocer, and others with whom he has come into contact, i.e , he talks and acts the way he has seen them talk and act In so doing he sets into motion two processes within the personality First, he calls out in himself through this symbolic and overt play the attitudes of the others Second, he responds as himself to those attitudes of others which have been directed toward him and in so doing fuses his own tendencies to act with those of others The results of these processes are twofold. He becomes self-conscious through taking the attitudes of others toward himself, and he builds up an organized set of responses to the attitudes of the others.

In the beginning of the process of internalization, the attitudes taken over are still identified with the person from whom they were adopted, and the self which is developed in relation to them is a self related to that person. Thus the child has a series of selves, each one related to another person with whom he interacts. He participates, however, in social groups whose members' attitudes are reciprocally related and serve as a basis for co-operative behavior within the group Mead points out that the clearest illustration of such participation is the organized team game Here the principles of playing together, i e., the objectification of the system of shared attitudes, define the activities of each member of the team, and each person must hold in his mind the attitudes of each of the others as they relate to all the other members and to him Since all the members do the same, the result is

the organization of their attitudes and actions into the unified whole which constitutes team play.

The same sort of organized system of attitudes is to be found in the family, except that not all its aspects are discernible to the child. Nevertheless, the child is able to fuse the major aspects of the attitudes of the other members of the family into a unified whole and to develop his own attitudes and responses in relation to this generalized configuration. In this process many internalized attitudes become so deeply ingrained in the personality that the child forgets they are the attitudes of others and, hence, they become his own. Instead of reflecting on what the others expect of him, he now expects the appropriate behavior of himself. Also, the responses to these internalized expectations of others may become so habitual that the child acts in many situations without calling out in himself the attitudes of others. In other situations, however, particularly when his own responses are not firmly fixed or when the situation possesses some new aspects, his actions will continue to be self-conscious in that he will call out in himself the attitudes of others to define the situation and his own place in it before he acts.

Piaget, the author of our last selection, "Rules of the Game," has done much important research in the field of personality development. With painstaking care he has observed the behavior of small children and attempted to derive generalizations concerning the growth of their ability to reason, their view of the world, and their moral judgments His concern has been to relate these aspects of personality growth to the social environment of the child. In the present selection he describes the various stages of personality growth involved in acquiring social rules of the game. Thus we return to the game as an illustration of the process of socialization.

In the first stage we find the child engaged in forming spontaneous, nonsocial definitions of a situation in which he is confronted with marbles. In the second stage the child becomes aware of the existence of rules, but adjusts to them purely in terms of his own purposes. The third and fourth stages of acquiring rules are excellent illustrations of the internalization of the attitudes of others. In the fourth stage particularly, in which the children take great interest in discussing the rules and working out their application to concrete situations, we can see the process of internalization at work. In laying stress on the rules of the game in this manner, the child takes them over into his personality and develops the appropriate set of responses to them, the latter composing his "self" for the game situation Here within the microcosm of the game is repeated the process of personality and self development which occurs in the macrocosm of the family and the larger community

THE REGULATION OF THE WISHES *

William I. Thomas

One of the most important powers gained during the evolution of animal life is the ability to make decisions from within instead of having them imposed from without. Very low forms of life do not make decisions, as we understand this term, but are pushed and pulled by chemical substances, heat, light, etc, much as iron filings are attracted or repelled by a magnet. They do tend to behave properly in given conditions—a group of small crustaceans will flee as in a panic if a bit of strychnia is placed in the basin containing them and will rush toward a drop of beef juice like hogs crowding around swill—but they do this as an expression of organic affinity for the one substance and repugnance for the other, and not as an expression of choice or "free will." There are, so to speak, rules of behavior but these represent a sort of fortunate mechanistic adjustment of the organism to typically recurring situations, and the organism cannot change the rule

On the other hand, the higher animals, and above all man, have the power of refusing to obey a stimulation which they followed at an earlier time Response to the earlier stimulation may have had painful consequences and so the rule or habit in this situation is changed We call this ability the power of inhibition, and it is dependent on the fact that the nervous system carries memories or records of past experiences At this point the determination of action no longer comes exclusively from outside sources but is located within the organism itself.

Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call *the definition of the situation.* And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions.

But the child is always born into a group of people among whom all the general types of situation which may arise have already been defined and corresponding rules of conduct developed, and where he has not the slightest chance of making his definitions and following his wishes without interference Men have always lived together in groups Whether mankind has a true herd instinct or whether groups are held together because this has worked out to advantage is of no importance Certainly the wishes in general are such that they can be satisfied only in a society But we have only to refer to the criminal code to appreciate the variety of ways in which the wishes of the individual may conflict with the wishes of society And the criminal code takes no account of the many unsanctioned expressions of the wishes which society attempts to regulate by persuasion and gossip

There is therefore always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him. The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first, and society to a

* W I Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl,* Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1923, pp 41–44 Reprinted by permission of the publisher

utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its member to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this and more of *new experience*. And organized society seeks also to regulate the conflict and competition inevitable between its members in the pursuit of their wishes. The desire to have wealth, for example, or any other socially sanctioned wish, may not be accomplished at the expense of another member of the society, —by murder, theft, lying, swindling, blackmail, etc

It is in this connection that a moral code arises, which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation. In practice the abuse arises first and the rule is made to prevent its recurrence Morality is thus the generally accepted definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.

The family is the smallest social unit and the primary defining agency. As soon as the child has free motion and begins to pull, tear, pry, meddle, and prowl, the parents begin to define the situation through speech and other signs and pressures· "Be quiet," "Sit up straight," "Blow your nose," "Wash your face," "Mind your mother," "Be kind to sister," etc This is the real significance of Wordsworth's phrase, "Shades of the prison house begin to close upon the growing child" His wishes and activities begin to be inhibited, and gradually, by definitions within the family, by playmates, in the school, in the Sunday school, in the community, through reading, by formal instruction, by informal signs of approval and disapproval, the growing member learns the code of his society.

In addition to the family we have the community as a defining agency At present the community is so weak and vague that it gives us no idea of the former power of the local group in regulating behavior Originally the community was practically the whole world of its members It was composed of families related by blood and marriage and was not so large that all the members could not come together, it was a face-to-face group I asked a Polish peasant what was the extent of an "*okolica*" or neighborhood — how far it reached. "It reaches," he said, "as far as the report of a man reaches — as far as a man is talked about" And it was in communities of this kind that the moral code which we now recognize as valid originated The customs of the community are "folkways," and both state and church have in their more formal codes mainly recognized and incorporated these folkways

The typical community is vanishing and it would be neither possible nor desirable to restore it in its old form It does not correspond with the present direction of social evolution and it would now be a distressing condition in which to live. But in the immediacy of relationships and the participation of everybody in everything, it represents an element which we have lost and which we shall probably have to restore in some form of cooperation in order to secure a balanced and normal society, — some arrangement corresponding with human nature

PLAY, THE GAME AND THE GENERALIZED OTHER *

George Herbert Mead

We were speaking of the social conditions under which the self arises as an object. In addition to language we found two illustrations, one in play and the other in the game, and I wish to summarize and expand my account on these points I have spoken of these from the point of view of children We can, of course, refer also to the attitudes of more primitive people out of which our civilization has arisen A striking illustration of play as distinct from the game is found in the myths and various of the plays which primitive people carry out, especially in religious pageants The pure play attitude which we find in the case of little children may not be found here, since the participants are adults, and undoubtedly the relationship of these play processes to that which they interpret is more or less in the minds of even the most primitive people. In the process of interpretation of such rituals, there is an organization of play which perhaps might be compared to that which is taking place in the kindergarten in dealing with the plays of little children, where these are made into a set that will have a definite structure or relationship At least something of the same sort is found in the play of primitive people. This type of activity belongs, of course, not to the everyday life of the people in their dealing with the objects about them — there we have a more or less definitely developed self-consciousness — but in their attitudes toward the forces about them, the nature upon which they depend, in their attitude toward this nature which is vague and uncertain, there we have a much more primitive response, and that response finds its expression in taking the role of the other, playing at the expression of their gods and their heroes, going through certain rites which are the representation of what these individuals are supposed to be doing The process is one which develops, to be sure, into a more or less definite technique and is controlled, and yet we can say that it has arisen out of situations similar to those in which little children play at being a parent, at being a teacher — vague personalities that are about them and which affect them and on which they depend. These are personalities which they take, roles they play, and in so far control the development of their own personality This outcome is just what the kindergarten works toward It takes the characters of these various vague beings and gets them into such an organized social relationship to each other that they build up the character of the little child [1] The very introduction of organization from outside supposes a lack of organization at this period in the child's experience Over against such a situation of the little child and primitive people, we have the game as such.

The fundamental difference between the game and play is that in the latter the child must have the attitude of all the others involved in that game. The attitudes of the other players which the par-

[1] ["The Relation of Play to Education," *University of Chicago Record*, I (1896–97), 140 ff.]

* Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, edited by Charles W Morris Copyright 1934 by The University of Chicago Used by permission

ticipant assumes organize into a sort of unit, and it is that organization which controls the response of the individual. The illustration used was of a person playing baseball. Each one of his own acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response. We get then an "other" which is an organization of the attitudes of those involved in the same process.

The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other" The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community.[2] Thus, for example, in the case of such a social group as a ball team, the team is the generalized other in so far as it enters — as an organized process or social activity — into the experience of any one of the individual members of it.

[2] It is possible for inanimate objects, no less than for other human organisms, to form parts of the generalized and organized — the completely socialized — other for any given human individual, in so far as he responds to such objects socially or in a social fashion (by means of the mechanism of thought, the internalized conversation of gestures) Any thing — any object or set of objects, whether animate or inanimate, human or animal, or merely physical — toward which he acts, or to which he responds, socially, is an element in what for him is the generalized other, by taking the attitudes of which toward himself he becomes conscious of himself as an object or individual, and thus develops a self or personality. Thus, for example, the cult, in its primitive form, is merely the social embodiment of the relation between the given social group or community and its physical environment — an organized social means, adopted by the individual members of that group or community, of entering into social relations with that environment, or (in a sense) of carrying on conversations with it, and in this way that environment becomes part of the total generalized other for each of the individual members of the given social group or community.

If the given human individual is to develop a self in the fullest sense, it is not sufficient for him merely to take the attitudes of other human individuals toward himself and toward one another within the human social process, and to bring that social process as a whole into his individual experience merely in these terms; he must also, in the same way that he takes the attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward one another, take their attitudes toward the various phases or aspects of the common social activity or set of social undertakings in which, as members of an organized society or social group, they are all engaged; and he must then, by generalizing these individual attitudes of that organized society or social group itself, as a whole, act toward different social projects which at any given time it is carrying out, or toward the various larger phases of the general social process which constitutes its life and of which these projects are specific manifestations. This getting of the broad activities of any given social whole or organized society as such within the experiential field of any one of the individuals involved or included in that whole is, in other words, the essential basis and prerequisite of the fullest development of that individual's self, only in so far as he takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs toward the organized, co-operative social activity or set of such activities in which that group as such is engaged, does he develop a complete self or possess the sort of complete self he has developed And on the other hand, the complex co-operative processes and activities and institutional functionings of organized human society are also possible only in so far as every individual involved in them or belonging to that society can take the general attitudes of all other such individuals with reference to these processes and activities and insti-

tutional functionings, and to the organized social whole of experiential relations and interactions thereby constituted — and can direct his own behavior accordingly.

It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, i.e., that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members, for it is in this form that the social process or community enters as a determining factor into the individual's thinking In abstract thought the individual takes the attitude of the generalized other[3] toward himself, without reference to its expression in any particular other individuals; and in concrete thought he takes that attitude in so far as it is expressed in the attitudes toward his behavior of those other individuals with whom he is involved in the given social situation or act But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward himself, in one or another of these ways, can he think at all, for only thus can thinking — or the internalized conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking — occur. And only through the taking by individuals of the attitude or attitudes of the generalized other toward themselves is the existence of a universe of discourse, as that system of common or social meanings which thinking presupposes at its context, rendered possible.

The self-conscious human individual, then, takes or assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social group or community (or of some one section thereof) to which he belongs, toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in which that group or community as such is engaged; and as an individual participant in these social projects or co-operative enterprises, he governs his own conduct accordingly In politics, for example, the individual identifies himself with an entire political party and takes the organized attitudes of that entire party toward the rest of the given social community and toward the problems which confront the party within the given social situation, and he consequently reacts or responds in terms of the organized attitudes of the party as a whole He thus enters into a special set of social relations with all the other individuals who belong to that political party; and in the same way he enters into various other special sets of social relations, with various other classes of individuals respectively, the individuals of each of these classes being the other members of some one of the particular organized subgroups (determined in socially functional terms) of which he himself is a member within the entire given society or social community. In the most highly developed, organized, and complicated human social communities — those evolved by civilized man — these

[3] We have said that the internal conversation of the individual with himself in terms of words or significant gestures — the conversation which constitutes the process or activity of thinking — is carried on by the individual from the standpoint of the "generalized other" And the more abstract that conversation is, the more abstract thinking happens to be, the further removed is the generalized other from any connection with particular individuals It is especially in abstract thinking, that is to say, that the conversation involved is carried on by the individual with the generalized other, rather than with any particular individuals Thus it is, for example, that abstract concepts are concepts stated in terms of the attitudes of the entire social group or community, they are stated on the basis of the individual's consciousness of the attitudes of the generalized other toward them, as a result of his taking these attitudes of the generalized other and then responding to them And thus it is also that abstract propositions are stated in a form which anyone — any other intelligent individual — will accept.

various socially functional classes or subgroups of individuals to which any given individual belongs (and with the other individual members of which he thus enters into a special set of social relations) are of two kinds. Some of them are concrete social classes or subgroups, such as political parties, clubs, corporations, which are all actually functional social units, in terms of which their individual members are directly related to one another The others are abstract social classes or subgroups, such as the class of debtors and the class of creditors, in terms of which their individual members are related to one another only more or less indirectly, and which only more or less indirectly function as social units, but which afford or represent unlimited possibilities for the widening and ramifying and enriching of the social relations among all the individual members of the given society as an organized and unified whole The given individual's membership in several of these abstract social classes or subgroups makes possible his entrance into definite social relations (however indirect) with an almost infinite number of other individuals who also belong to or are included within one or another of these abstract social classes or subgroups cutting across functional lines of demarcation which divide different human social communities from one another, and including individual members from several (in some cases from all) such communities. Of these abstract social classes or subgroups of human individuals the one which is most inclusive and extensive is, of course, the one defined by the logical universe of discourse (or system of universally significant symbols) determined by the participation and communicative interaction of individuals; for of all such classes or subgroups, it is the one which claims the largest number of individual members, and which enables the largest conceivable number of human individuals to enter into some sort of social relation, however indirect or abstract it may be, with one another — a relation arising from the universal functioning of gestures as significant symbols in the general human social process of communication.

I have pointed out, then, that there are two general stages in the full development of the self At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by an organization of the particular attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates with them. But at the second stage in the full development of the individual's self that self is constituted not only by an organization of these particular individual attitudes, but also by an organization of the social attitudes of the generalized other or the social group as a whole to which he belongs These social or group attitudes are brought within the individual's field of direct experience, and are included as elements in the structure or constitution of his self, in the same way that the attitudes of particular other individuals are, and the individual arrives at them, or succeeds in taking them, by means of further organizing, and then generalizing, the attitudes of particular other individuals in terms of their organized social bearings and implications. So the self reaches its full development by organizing these individual attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes, and by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and the others are all involved — a pattern which enters as a whole into the individual's experience in terms of these organized group attitudes which, through the mechanism of his central nervous system, he takes toward himself, just as he takes the individual attitudes of others

The game has a logic, so that such an organization of the self is rendered possible. there is a definite end to be obtained, the actions of the different individuals are all related to each other with reference to that end so that they do not conflict, one is not in conflict with himself in the attitude of another man on the team If one has the attitude of the person throwing the ball he can also have the response of catching the ball The two are related so that they further the purpose of the game itself They are interrelated in a unitary, organic fashion. There is a definite unity, then, which is introduced into the organization of other selves when we reach such a stage as that of the game, as over against the situation of play where there is a simple succession of one role after another, a situation which is, of course, characteristic of the child's own personality The child is one thing at one time and another at another, and what he is at one moment does not determine what he is at another That is both the charm of childhood as well as its inadequacy. You cannot count on the child, you cannot assume that all the things he does are going to determine what he will do at any moment He is not organized into a whole The child has no definite character, no definite personality.

The game is then an illustration of the situation out of which an organized personality arises In so far as the child does take the attitude of the other and allows that attitude of the other to determine the thing he is going to do with reference to a common end, he is becoming an organic member of society He is taking over the morale of that society and is becoming an essential member of it He belongs to it in so far as he does allow the attitude of the other that he takes to control his own immediate expression What is involved here is some sort of an organized process That which is expressed in terms of the game is, of course, being continually expressed in the social life of the child, but this wider process goes beyond the immediate experience of the child himself The importance of the game is that it lies entirely inside of the child's own experience, and the importance of our modern type of education is that it is brought as far as possible within this realm The different attitudes that a child assumes are so organized that they exercise a definite control over his response, as the attitudes in a game control his own immediate response In the game we get an organized other, a generalized other, which is found in the nature of the child itself, and finds its expression in the immediate experience of the child And it is that organized activity in the child's own nature controlling the particular response which gives unity, and which builds up his own self

What goes on in the game goes on in the life of the child all the time He is continually taking the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those who in some sense control him and on whom he depends He gets the function of the process in an abstract sort of a way at first It goes over from the play into the game in a real sense He has to play the game The morale of the game takes hold of the child more than the larger morale of the whole community The child passes into the game and the game expresses a social situation in which he can completely enter, its morale may have a greater hold on him than that of the family to which he belongs or the community in which he lives There are all sorts of social organizations, some of which are fairly lasting, some temporary, into which the child is entering, and he is playing a sort of social game in them It is a period in which he likes "to belong," and he gets into organizations which come into existence and pass out of existence He becomes a something which can function in

the organized whole, and thus tends to determine himself in his relationship with the group to which he belongs. That process is one which is a striking stage in the development of the child's morale. It constitutes him a self-conscious member of the community to which he belongs.

Such is the process by which a personality arises. I have spoken of this as a process in which a child takes the role of the other, and said that it takes place essentially through the use of language. Language is predominantly based on the vocal gesture by means of which co-operative activities in a community are carried out. Language in its significant sense is that vocal gesture which tends to arouse in the individual the attitude which it arouses in others, and it is this perfecting of the self by the gesture which mediates the social activities that gives rise to the process of taking the role of the other. The latter phrase is a little unfortunate because it suggests an actor's attitude which is actually more sophisticated than that which is involved in our own experience. To this degree it does not correctly describe that which I have in mind We see the process most definitely in a primitive form in those situations where the child's play takes different roles. Here the very fact that he is ready to pay out money, for instance, arouses the attitude of the person who receives money, the very process is calling out in him the corresponding activities of the other person involved. The individual stimulates himself to the response which he is calling out in the other person, and then acts in some degree in response to that situation. In play the child does definitely act out the role which he himself has aroused in himself. It is that which gives, as I have said, a definite content in the individual which answers to the stimulus that affects him as it affects somebody else. The content of the other that enters into one personality is the response in the individual which his gesture calls out in the other.

We may illustrate our basic concept by a reference to the notion of property. If we say "This is my property, I shall control it," that affirmation calls out a certain set of responses which must be the same in any community in which property exists It involves an organized attitude with reference to property which is common to all the members of the community One must have a definite attitude of control of his own property and respect for the property of others Those attitudes (as organized sets of responses) must be there on the part of all, so that when one says such a thing he calls out in himself the response of the others He is calling out the response of what I have called a generalized other. That which makes society possible is such common responses, such organized attitudes, with reference to what we term property, the cults of religion, the process of education, and the relations of the family. Of course, the wider the society the more definitely universal these objects must be. In any case there must be a definite set of responses, which we may speak of as abstract, and which can belong to a very large group Property is in itself a very abstract concept. It is that which the individual can control himself and nobody else can control. The attitude is different from that of a dog toward a bone. A dog will fight any other dog trying to take the bone. The dog is not taking the attitude of the other dog. A man who says "This is my property" is taking the attitude of the other person The man is appealing to his rights because he is able to take the attitude which everybody else in the group has with reference to property, thus arousing in himself the attitude of others

What goes to make up the organized self is the organization of the attitudes which are common to the group. A person

is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community into his own conduct. He takes its language as a medium by which he gets his personality, and then through a process of taking the different roles that all the others furnish he comes to get the attitude of the members of the community. Such, in a certain sense, is the structure of a man's personality. There are certain common responses which each individual has toward certain common things, and in so far as those common responses are awakened in the individual when he is affecting other persons he arouses his own self The structure, then, on which the self is built is this response which is common to all, for one has to be a member of a community to be a self. Such responses are abstract attitudes, but they constitute just what we term a man's character. They give him what we term his principles, the acknowledged attitudes of all members of the community toward what are the values of that community. He is putting himself in the place of the generalized other, which represents the organized responses of all the members of the group. It is that which guides conduct controlled by principles, and a person who has such an organized group of responses is a man whom we say has character, in the moral sense.

It is a structure of attitudes, then, which goes to make up a self, as distinct from a group of habits We all of us have, for example, certain groups of habits, such as the particular intonations which a person uses in his speech This is a set of habits of vocal expression which one has but which one does not know about. The sets of habits which we have of that sort mean nothing to us; we do not hear the intonations of our speech that others hear unless we are paying particular attention to them. The habits of emotional expression which belong to our speech are of the same sort. We may know that we have expressed ourselves in a joyous fashion but the detailed process is one which does not come back to our conscious selves There are whole bundles of such habits which do not enter into a conscious self, but which help to make up what is termed the unconscious self

After all, what we mean by self-consciousness is an awakening in ourselves of the group of attitudes which we are arousing in others, especially when it is an important set of responses which go to make up the members of the community. It is unfortunate to fuse or mix up consciousness, as we ordinarily use that term, and self-consciousness Consciousness, as frequently used, simply has reference to the field of experience, but self-consciousness refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the others of the group Consciousness and self-consciousness are not on the same level A man alone has, fortunately or unfortunately, access to his own toothache, but that is not what we mean by self-consciousness

I have so far emphasized what I have called the structures upon which the self is constructed, the framework of the self, as it were Of course we are not only what is common to all each one of the selves is different from everyone else, but there has to be such a common structure as I have sketched in order that we may be members of a community at all. We cannot be ourselves unless we are also members in whom there is a community of attitudes which control the attitudes of all. We cannot have rights unless we have common attitudes. That which we have acquired as self-conscious persons makes us such members of society and gives us selves Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves No hard-and-fast line can be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our

own selves exist and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as such into our experience also. The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group; and the structure of his self expresses or reflects the general behavior pattern of this social group to which he belongs, just as does the structure of the self of every other individual belonging to this social group.

THE RULES OF THE GAME *

Jean Piaget

THE PRACTICE OF RULES THE FIRST TWO STAGES

We need not dwell at any length upon the first stage, as it is not directly connected with our subject At the same time, it is important that we should know whether the rules which come into being previous to any collaboration between children are of the same type as collective rules.

Let us give a handful of ten marbles to a child of three years and four months and take note of its reactions:

Jacqueline has the marbles in her hands and looks at them with curiosity (it is the first time she has seen any); then she lets them drop on to the carpet After this she puts them in the hollow of an arm-chair. "*Aren't they animals?* — Oh, no — *Are they balls?* — Yes" She puts them back on the carpet and lets them drop from a certain height. She sits on the carpet with her legs apart and throws the marbles a few inches in front of her She then picks them up and puts them on the arm-chair and in the same hole as before (The arm-chair is studded with buttons which create depressions in the material) Then she collects the lot and lets them drop, first all together, then one by one After this she replaces them in the arm-chair, first in the same place and then in the other holes. Then she piles them up in a pyramid· "*What are marbles?* — What do you think? — . . ." She puts them on the floor, then back on to the arm-chair, in the same holes — We both go out on to the balcony she lets the marbles drop from a height to make them bounce

The following days, Jacqueline again places the marbles on the chairs and arm-chairs, or puts them into her little saucepan to cook dinner Or else she simply repeats the behaviour described above

Three points should be noted with regard to facts such as these In the first place, the lack of continuity and direction in the sequence of behaviour The child is undoubtedly trying first and foremost to understand the nature of marbles and to adapt its motor schemas to this novel reality. This is why it tries one experiment after another throwing them, heaping them into pyramids or nests, letting them drop, making them bounce, etc But once it has got over the first moments of astonishment, the game still remains incoherent, or rather still subject to the whim of

* Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child,* Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc , 1932, pp 19–49 Reprinted by permission of the publisher and Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Company, Ltd London.

the moment. On days when the child plays at cooking dinner, the marbles serve as food to be stewed in a pot On days when it is interested in classifying and arranging, the marbles are put in heaps in the holes of arm-chairs, and so on In the general manner in which the game is carried on there are therefore no rules

The second thing to note is that there are certain regularities of detail, for it is remarkable how quickly certain particular acts in the child's behaviour become schematized and even ritualized The act of collecting the marbles in the hollow of an arm-chair is at first simply an experiment, but it immediately becomes a motor schema bound up with the perception of the marbles After a few days it is merely a rite, still performed with interest, but without any fresh effort of adaptation

In the third place, it is important to note the symbolism [1] that immediately becomes grafted upon the child's motor schemas These symbols are undoubtedly enacted in play rather than thought out, but they imply a certain amount of imagination the marbles are food to be cooked, eggs in a nest, etc

This being so, the rules of games might be thought to derive either from rites analogous to those we have just examined or from a symbolism that has become collective Let us briefly examine the genesis and ultimate destiny of these modes of behaviour

Genetically speaking, the explanation both of rites and of symbols would seem to lie in the conditions of preverbal motor intelligence When it is presented with any new thing, a baby of 5 to 8 months will respond with a dual reaction, it will accommodate itself to the new object and it will assimilate the object to earlier motor schemas. Give the baby a marble, and it will explore its surface and consistency, but will at the same time use it as something to grasp, to suck, to rub against the sides of its cradle, and so on. This assimilation of every fresh object to already existing motor schemas may be conceived of as the starting point of ritual acts and symbols, at any rate from the moment that assimilation becomes stronger than actual accommodation itself With regard to ritual acts, indeed, one is struck by the fact that from the age of about 8 to 10 months all the child's motor schemas, apart from movements of adaptation in the real sense, give rise to a sort of functioning in the void, in which the child takes pleasure as in a game Thus, after having contracted the habit of pressing her face against her parents' cheeks, crumpling up her nose and breathing deeply the while, Jacqueline began to perform this rite as a joke, crumpling up her nose and breathing deeply in advance, merely suggesting contact with another person's face, but without, as before, expressing any particular affection by the act Thus from being actual, and incorporated in an effective adaptation this schema has become ritualized and serves only as a game [2] Or again, Jacqueline in her bath is engaged in rubbing her hair, she lets go of it to splash the water Immediately, she repeats the movement, touching her hair and the water alternately, and during the next few days the schema has become ritualized to such an extent that she cannot strike the surface of the water without first outlining the movement of smoothing her hair [3] In no way automatic, this rite is a game that amuses her by its very regularity Anyone observing a baby of 10 to 12 months will notice a number of these rites which undoubtedly anticipate the rules of future games.

[1] We use the term "symbol" in the sense given to it in the linguistic school of Saussure, as the contrary of sign A sign is arbitrary, a symbol is motivated It is in this sense, too, that Freud speaks of symbolic thought

[2] Age 10 months

[3] Age 12 months

As for symbols, they appear towards the end of the first year and in consequence of the ritual acts. For the habit of repeating a given gesture ritually, gradually leads to the consciousness of "pretending." The ritual of going to bed, for instance (laying down one's head and arranging the corner of the pillow with the hundred and one complications which every baby invents), is sooner or later utilized "in the void," and the smile of the child as it shuts its eyes in carrying out this rite is enough to show that it is perfectly conscious of "pretending" to go to sleep. Here already we have a symbol, but a "played" symbol. Finally, when language and imagery come to be added to motor intelligence, the symbol becomes an object of thought The child who pushes a box along saying "tuff-tuff" is assimilating in imagination the box's movement to that of a motor-car· the play symbol has definitely come into being

This being so, can one seek among rites and symbols for the origin of the actual rules of games? Can the game of marbles, with its infinite complexity both with regard to the actual rules and to all that relates to the verbo-motor system of signs in use — can the game of marbles, then, be conceived simply as the result of an accumulation of individual rites and symbols? We do not think that it can We believe that the individual rite and the individual symbol constitute the substructure for the development of rules and collective signs, its necessary, but its not sufficient condition. There is something more in the collective rule than in the motor rule or the individual ritual, just as there is something more in the sign than in the symbol.

With regard to motor or ritualistic rules, there can be no doubt that they have something in common with rules in the ordinary sense, namely the consciousness of regularity. When we see the delight taken by a baby of 10 to 12 months or a child of 2–3 in reproducing a given behaviour in all its details, and the scrupulous attention with which it observes the right order in these operations, we cannot help recognizing the *Regelbewusstsein* of which Buhler speaks. But we must distinguish carefully between the behaviour into which there enters only the pleasure of regularity, and that into which there enters an element of obligation. It is this consciousness of obligation which seems to us, as to Durkheim [4] and Bovet,[5] to distinguish a rule in the true sense from mere regularity.

Now this element of obligation, or, to confine ourselves to the question of the practice of rules, this element of obedience intervenes as soon as there is a society, *i.e.* a relation between at least two individuals. As soon as a ritual is imposed upon a child by adults or seniors for whom he has respect (Bovet), or as soon, we would add, as a ritual comes into being as the result of the collaboration of two children, it acquires in the subject's mind a new character which is precisely that of a rule. This character may vary according to the type of respect which predominates (respect for the senior or mutual respect) but in all cases there enters an element of submission which was not contained in the rite pure and simple.

In actual fact, of course, there is every degree of variety between the simple regularity discovered by the individual and the rule to which a whole social group submits itself Thus during the egocentric stage we can observe a whole series of cases in which the child will use a rule as a mere rite, to be bent and modified at will, while at the same time he already tries to submit to the common laws. Just as the child very soon acquires the use of

[4] *L'Education Morale*

[5] "Les Conditions de l'Obligation de la Conscience," *Année Psychol*, 1912

language and of the abstract and general concepts while retaining in his attitude to these much that still belongs to egocentric modes of thought and even to the methods peculiar to symbolic and play thought, so under the rules that are imposed upon him, he will for a long time contrive (in all good faith, needless to say) to maintain his own fantasy in the matter of personal decisions But this factual continuity between ritual and rule does not exclude a qualitative difference between the two types of behaviour.

Let us not, however, anticipate what will be said in our analysis of the consciousness of rules, but return to the matter of ritual The individual rite develops quite naturally, as we have just shown, into a more or less complex symbolism Can this symbolism be regarded as the starting point of that system of obligatory verbo-motor signs which are connected with the rules of every collective game? As with the previous problem, we believe that the symbol is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the appearance of signs. The sign is general and abstract (arbitrary), the symbol is individual and motivated If the sign is to follow upon the symbol, a group must therefore strip the individual's imagination of all its personal fantasy and then elaborate a common and obligatory imagery which will go hand in hand with the code of rules itself.

Here is an observation showing how far removed are individual rites and symbols from rules and signs, though moving towards these realities in so far as collaboration between children becomes established.

Jacqueline (after the observations given above) is playing with Jacques (2 years, 11 months and 15 days), who sees marbles for the first time I Jacques takes the marbles and lets them drop from a height one after another. After which he picks them up and goes away. II. Jacques arranges them on the ground, in a hollow and says, *"I'm making a little nest."* Jacqueline takes one and sticks it in the ground in imitation III. Jacques also takes one, buries it and makes a mud-pie above it He digs it up and begins over again. Then he takes 2 at a time which he buries Then 3, 4, 5 and up to 6 at a time, increasing the number of marbles systematically each time by one Jacqueline imitates him she first puts one marble down and makes a mud-pie over it, then two or three at random and without adopting a fixed system of progression IV Jacques puts all the marbles on a pile, then he places an india-rubber ball besides them and says *"That's the Mummy ball and the baby balls."* V He piles them together again and covers them up with earth which he levels down Jacqueline imitates him but with only one marble which she covers up without levelling the earth She adds *"It's lost,"* then digs it up and begins over again.

This example shows very clearly how all the elements of individual fantasy or symbolism remain uncommunicated, as soon as the game takes on an imaginative turn each child evokes its favourite images without paying any attention to anyone else's It will also be observed how totally devoid of any general direction are the ritualized schemas successively tried. But as soon as there is reciprocal imitation (end of II and whole of III) we have the beginnings of a rule each child tries to bury the marbles in the same way as the other, in a common order only more or less successfully adhered to In bringing out this aspect, the observation leads us to the stage of egocentrism during which the child learns other peoples' rules but practises them in accordance with his own fantasy.

We shall conclude this analysis of the

first stage by repeating that before games are played in common, no rules in the proper sense can come into existence. Regularities and ritualized schemas are already there, but these rites, being the work of the individual, cannot call forth that submission to something superior to the self which characterizes the appearance of any rule.

The second stage is the stage of *egocentrism* In studying the practice of rules we shall make use of a notion which has served on earlier occasions in the descriptions we have given of the child's intellectual behaviour; and, in both cases, indeed, the phenomenon is of exactly the same order. Egocentrism appears to us as a form of behaviour intermediate between purely individual and socialized behaviour Through imitation and language, as also through the whole content of adult thought which exercises pressure on the child's mind as soon as verbal intercourse has become possible, the child begins, in a sense, to be socialized from the end of its first year. But the very nature of the relations which the child sustains with the adults around him prevents this socialization for the moment from reaching that state of equilibrium which is propitious to the development of reason. We mean, of course, the state of cooperation, in which the individuals, regarding each other as equals, can exercise a mutual control and thus attain to objectivity. In other words, the very nature of the relation between child and adult places the child apart, so that his thought is isolated, and while he believes himself to be sharing the point of view of the world at large he is really still shut up in his own point of view. The social bond itself, by which the child is held, close as it may seem when viewed from outside, thus implies an unconscious intellectual egocentrism which is further promoted by the spontaneous egocentrism peculiar to all primitive mentality.

Similarly, with regard to the rules of games, it is easy to see, and greater authorities than ourselves [6] have already pointed out that the beginnings of children's games are characterized by long periods of egocentrism. The child is dominated on the one hand by a whole set of rules and examples that are imposed upon him from outside. But unable as he is, on the other hand, to place himself on a level of equality with regard to his seniors, he utilizes for his own ends, unaware even of his own isolation, all that he has succeeded in grasping of the social realities that surround him.

To confine ourselves to the game of marbles, the child of 3 to 5 years old will discover, according to what other children he may happen to come across, that in order to play this game one must trace a square, put the marbles inside it, try to expel the marbles from the square by hitting them with another marble, start from a line that has been drawn beforehand, and so on But though he imitates what he observes, and believes in perfect good faith that he is playing like the others, the child thinks of nothing at first but of utilizing these new acquisitions for himself He plays in an individualistic manner with material that is social. Such is egocentrism.

Let us analyse the facts of the case.

MAR (6) [7] seizes hold of the marbles we offer him, and without bothering to make a square he heaps them up together

[6] Stern in his *Psychology of Early Childhood* notes the identity of the stages we have established in children's conversations with those he has himself established with regard to play, pp 177 and 332

[7] The numbers in brackets give the child's age The words of the child are in italics, those of the examiner in Roman lettering Inverted commas mark the beginning and end of a conversation reported *verbatim* All the subjects are boys unless the letter G is added, indicating that the subject is a girl.

and begins to hit the pile. He removes the marbles he has displaced and puts them aside or replaces them immediately without any method. "Do you always play like that? — *In the street you make a square.* — Well, you do the same as they do in the street. — *I'm making a square, I am.*" (He draws the square, places the marbles inside it and begins to play again.) I play with him, imitating each of his movements. "Who has won? — *We've both won.* — But who has won most? . . " — (Mar does not understand.)

BAUM (6½) begins by making a square and puts down three marbles, adding "*Sometimes you put 4, or 3, or 2.* — Or 5? — *No, not 5, but sometimes 6 or 8* — Who begins when you play with the boys? — *Sometimes me, sometimes the other one* — Isn't there a dodge for knowing who is to begin? — *No.* — Do you know what a coche is? — *Rather!*" But the sequel shows that he knows nothing about the coche and thinks of this word as designating another game. "And which of us will begin? — *You* — Why? — *I want to see how you do it.*" We play for a while and I ask who has won. "*The one who has hit a mib,*[8] *well, he has won.* — Well! who has won? — *I have, and then you.*" We begin again. He takes two, I none. "Who has won? — *I have* — And I? — *You've lost.*"

LOEFF (6) often pretends to be playing with Mae, of whom we shall speak later. He knows neither how to make a square nor to draw a coche. He immediately begins to "fire" at the marbles assembled in a heap and plays without either stopping or paying any attention to us. "Have you won? — *I don't know. I think I have* — Why? — *Yes, because I threw the mibs* — And I? — *Yes, because you threw the mibs.*"

DESARZ (6) "Do you play often? — *Yes, rather!* — With whom? — *All by myself.* — Do you like playing alone best? — *You don't need two. You can play only one.*" He gathers the marbles together without a square and "fires" into the heap.

Let us now see how two children, who have grown accustomed to playing together, set about it when they are left alone. They are two boys of whom one (Mae) is a very representative example of the present stage, while the other (Wid) stands at the border line between the present stage and the next. The analyses of these cases will be all the more conclusive as the children in question are no mere beginners at the game.

MAE (6) and WID (7) declare that they are always playing together. Mae tells us that they both "*played again, yesterday.*" I first examine Mae by himself. He piles his marbles in a corner without counting them and throws his shooter into the pile. He then places 4 marbles close together and puts a fifth on top (in a pyramid). Mae denies that a square is ever drawn. Then he corrects himself and affirms that he always does so. "How do you and Wid know which is to begin? — *One of the two throws his shooter and the other tries to hit it. If he hits it, he begins.*" Mae then shows us what the game consists in: he throws his shooter without taking into account the distances or the manner of playing ("Piquette"), and when he succeeds in driving a marble out of the square he immediately puts it back. Thus the game has no end. "Does it go on like that all the time? — *You take one away to make a change* (he takes a marble out of the square, but not the one that he has touched). *It'll only be finished when there's only one left* (he 'fires' again twice). *One more shot, and then you take one away.*" Then he affirms

[8] English equivalent for "marbre." Trans.

"every third shot you take one away." He does so. Mae removes a marble every third shot independently of whether he has hit or missed, which is completely irregular and corresponds to nothing in the game as habitually played, or as we have seen it played in Neuchâtel or Geneva. It is therefore a rule which he has invented then and there but which he has the impression of remembering because it presents a vague analogy with what really happens when the player removes the marble he has just "hit" (touched). This game of Mae's is therefore a characteristic game of the second stage, an egocentric game in which "to win" does not mean getting the better of the others, but simply playing on one's own.

Wid, whom I now prepare to question and who has not assisted at Mae's interrogatory, begins by making a square. He places 4 marbles at the 4 corners and one in the middle (the same disposition as Mae's, which was probably a deformation of it). Wid does not know what to do to decide which is to begin, and declares that he understands nothing of the method which Mae had shown me as being familiar to both of them (trying to hit one's partner's shooter). Wid then throws his shooter in the direction of the square, knocking out one marble which he puts in his pocket Then I take my turn, but fail to touch anything He plays again and wins all the marbles, one after the other, keeping them each time He also declares that when you have knocked a marble out, you have the right to play another shot straight away After having taken everything he says. *"I've won."* Wid therefore belongs to the third stage if this explanation is taken as a whole, but the sequel will show that he takes no notice of Mae's doings when they are playing together. Wid stands therefore at the boundary line which separates the stage of egocentrism from the stage of cooperation.

I then tell Mae to come into the room and the two children begin to play with each other. Mae draws a square and Wid disposes the marbles in accordance with his habitual schema. Mae begins (he plays "Roulette" whereas Wid most of the time plays "Piquette") and dislodges four marbles. *"I can play four times, now,"* adds Mae. This is contrary to all the rules, but Wid finds the statement quite natural So one game succeeds another. But the marbles are placed in the square by one child or the other as the spirit moves them (according to the rules each must put his "pose") and the dislodged marbles are sometimes put straight back into the square, sometimes retained by the boy who has won them. Each plays from whatever place he chooses, unchecked by his partner, and each "fires" as many times as he likes (it thus often happens that Mae and Wid are playing at the same time).

I now send Wid out of the room and ask Mae to explain the game to us for a last time. Mae places 16 marbles in the middle of the square. "Why so many as that? —*So as to win.*— How many do you put down at home with Wid? —*I put five, but when I'm alone, I put lots.*" Mae then begins to play and lodges a marble which he puts on one side. I do the same The game continues in this way, each playing one shot at a time without taking the dislodged marbles into account (which is contrary to what Mae was doing a moment ago) Mae then places five marbles in the square, like Wid. This time I arrange the five marbles as Mae himself had done at the beginning of the interrogatory (four close together and one on top) but Mae seems to have forgotten this way of doing things. In the end Mae plays by taking away a marble every three shots, as before, and says to us: *"It's so that it should stop."*

We have quoted the whole of this example in order to show how little two children from the same class at school, living in the same house, and accustomed to playing with each other, are able to understand each other at this age. Not only do they tell us of totally different rules (this still occurs throughout the third stage), but when they play together they do not watch each other and do not unify their respective rules even for the duration of one game. The fact of the matter is that neither is trying to get the better of the other. each is merely having a game on his own, trying to hit the marbles in the square, *i.e.* trying to "win" from his own point of view.

This shows the characteristics of the stage. The child plays for himself His interest does not in any way consist in competing with his companions and in binding himself by common rules so as to see who will get the better of the others His aims are different. They are indeed dual, and it is this mixed behaviour that really defines egocentrism. On the one hand, the child feels very strongly the desire to play like the other boys, and especially like those older than himself, he longs, that is to say, to feel himself a member of the very honourable fraternity of those who know how to play marbles correctly But quickly persuading himself, on the other hand, that his playing is "right" (he can convince himself as easily on this point as in all his attempts to imitate adult behaviour) the child thinks only of utilizing these acquisitions for himself· his pleasure still consists in the mere development of skill, in carrying out the strokes he sets himself to play. It is, as in the previous stage, essentially a motor pleasure, not a social one. The true "socius" of the player who has reached this stage is not the flesh and blood partner but the ideal and abstract elder whom one inwardly strives to imitate and who sums up all the examples one has ever received.

It little matters, therefore, what one's companion is doing, since one is not trying to contend against him It little matters what the details of the rules may be, since there is no real contact between the players. This is why the child, as soon as he can schematically copy the big boys' game, believes himself to be in possession of the whole truth. Each for himself, and all in communion with the "Elder": such might be the formula of egocentric play.

It is striking to note the affinity between this attitude of children of 4 to 6 in the game of marbles and the attitude of those same children in their conversations with each other For alongside of the rare cases of true conversation where there is a genuine interchange of opinions or commands, one can observe in children between 2 and 6 a characteristic type of pseudo-conversation or "collective monologue," during which the children speak only for themselves, although they wish to be in the presence of interlocutors who will serve as a stimulus Now here again, each feels himself to be in communion with the group because he is inwardly addressing the Adult who knows and understands everything, but here again, each is only concerned with himself, for lack of having dissociated the "ego" from the "socius."

These features of the egocentric stage will not, however, appear in their full light until we come to analyse the consciousness of rules which accompanies this type of conduct.

THE PRACTICE OF RULES. THIRD AND FOURTH STAGES

Towards the age of 7–8 appears the desire for mutual understanding in the sphere of play (as also, indeed, in the conversations between children) This felt need for understanding is what defines the third stage. As a criterion of the ap-

pearance of this stage we shall take the moment when by "winning" the child refers to the fact of getting the better of the others, therefore of gaining more marbles than the others, and when he no longer says he has won when he has done no more than to knock a marble out of the square, regardless of what his partners have done As a matter of fact, no child, even from among the older ones, ever attributes very great importance to the fact of knocking out a few more marbles than his opponents Mere competition is therefore not what constitutes the effective motive-power of the game. In seeking to win the child is trying above all to contend with his partners *while observing common rules*. The specific pleasure of the game thus ceases to be muscular and egocentric, and becomes social. Henceforth, a game of marbles constitutes the equivalent in action of what takes place in discussion in words a mutual evaluation of the competing powers which leads, thanks to the observation of common rules, to a conclusion that is accepted by all.

As to the difference between the third and fourth stages, it is only one of degree The children of about 7 to 10 (third stage) do not yet know the rules in detail. They try to learn them owing to their increasing interest in the game played in common, but when different children of the same class at school are questioned on the subject the discrepancies are still considerable in the information obtained It is only when they are at play that these same children succeed in understanding each other, either by copying the boy who seems to know most about it, or, more frequently, by omitting any usage that might be disputed. In this way they play a sort of simplified game. Children of the fourth stage, on the contrary, have thoroughly mastered their code and even take pleasure in juridical discussions, whether of principle or merely of procedure, which may at times arise out of the points in dispute.

Let us examine some examples of the third stage, and, in order to point more clearly to the differentiating characters of this stage, let us begin by setting side by side the answers of two little boys attending the same class at school and accustomed to playing together (The children were naturally questioned separately in order to avoid any suggestion between them, but we afterwards compared their answers with one another)

BEN (10) and NUS (11, backward, one year below the school standard) are both in the fourth year of the lower school and both play marbles a great deal They agree in regarding the square as necessary. Nus declares that you always place 4 marbles in the square, either at the corners or else 3 in the centre with one on top (in a pyramid). Ben, however, tells us that you place 2 to 10 marbles in the enclosure (not less than 2, not more than 10)

To know who is to begin you draw, according to Nus, a line called the "coche" and everyone tries to get near it whoever gets nearest plays first, and whoever goes beyond it plays last Ben, however, knows nothing about the coche you begin *"as you like* —Isn't there a dodge for knowing who is to play first? —*No.* —Don't you try with the coche? —*Yes, sometimes.* —What is the coche? — . . (he cannot explain)." On the other hand, Ben affirms that you "fire" the first shot at a distance of 2 to 3 steps from the square. A single step is not enough, and *"four isn't any good either"* Nus is ignorant of this law and considers the distance to be a matter of convention.

With regard to the manner of "firing," Nus is equally tolerant According to him you can play "piquette" or "roulette," but *"when you play piquette everyone must play the same When one boy says*

that you must play roulette, everyone plays that way." Nus prefers roulette because "*that is the best way*"; piquette is more difficult. Ben, however, regards piquette as obligatory in all cases He is ignorant, moreover, of the term roulette and when we show him what it is he says "*That is bowled piquette!* [Fr., Piquette roulée] *That's cheating!*"

According to Nus everyone must play from the coche, and all through the game When after having shot at the square you land anywhere, you must therefore come back to the coche to "fire" the next shot Ben, on the contrary, who on this point represents the more general usage, is of opinion that only the first shot should be fired from the coche after that "*you must play from where you are*"

Nus and Ben thus agree in stating that the marbles that have gone out of the square remain in the possession of the boy who dislodged them This is the only point, this and the actual drawing of the square, on which the children give us results that are in agreement

When we begin to play, I arrange to stay in the square (to leave my shooter inside the enclosure). "*You are dished* [Fr., cuit], cries Ben, delighted, *you can't play again until I get you out!*" Nus knows nothing of this rule Again, when I play carelessly and let the shooter drop out of my hand, Ben exclaims "*Fan-coup*" to prevent me from saying "coup-passé" and having another shot Nus is ignorant of this rule

At one point Ben succeeds in hitting my shooter He concludes from this that he can have another shot, just as though he had hit one of the marbles placed in the square. Nus in the same circumstances does not draw the same conclusions (each must play in turn according to him) but deduces that he will be able to play the first shot in the next game

In the same way, Ben thinks that everyone plays from the place the last shot has led him to and knows the rule that authorizes the player to change places, saying "*du mien*" or "*un empan,*" whereas Nus, who has certainly heard those words, does not know what they mean.

These two cases, chosen at random out of a class of 10-year-old pupils, show straight away what are the two differential features of the third stage. 1° There is a general will to discover the rules that are fixed and common to all players (cf the way Nus explains to us that if one of the partners plays piquette "*everyone must play the same*") 2° In spite of this there is considerable discrepancy in the children's information. Lest the reader should think the above examples exceptional, here are, on the same point, the answers of another child from the same class

ROSS (11, I) "*First, everyone puts two marbles on the square. You can make the square bigger when there are more playing.*" Ross knows the method of the coche for knowing who is to begin Like Nus, he allows both roulette and piquette He also allows what is not only contrary to all established usages but also to the sense of the words, a way of playing which he calls "femme-poussette" which consists in carrying one's hand along with the marble as one throws it (push stroke in billiards) Now this is always forbidden, and the very word that Ross has deformed says so — "fan-poussette" According to Ross, you play from the place you have reached with the last shot, and when you have won a marble you have the right to another shot straight away To change your place you must say "du mien" *If a stone gets in your way, you say 'coup-passé' and have another shot If it slips* [if the marble slips out of your hand] *you say 'laché'* [Engl., 'gone']. *If you don't say that, you can't have an-*

other turn. It's the rules!" Ross here stands midway between Nus and Ben. Finally, Ross knows of a rather peculiar custom which is unknown to Nus and Ben. *"If you stay in the square you can be hit and then he picks up the marbles* [= If your shooter stays inside the square and is touched by your opponent's shooter, he is entitled to all the marbles in the square]. *He* (the opponent) *can have two shots* [to try and hit the shooter in question] *and if he misses the first he can take* [at the second shot] *the shooter from anywhere* [though of course only from the outside of the square] *and make the marbles go out* [= take them]" This rule has generally only been described to us by children of the fourth stage, but the rest of Ross' interrogatory is typically third stage.

Such then is the third stage. The child's chief interest is no longer psycho-motor, it is social. In other words, to dislodge a marble from a square by manual dexterity is no longer an aim in itself. The thing now is not only to fight the other boys but also and primarily to regulate the game with a whole set of systematic rules which will ensure the most complete reciprocity in the methods used. The game has therefore become social. We say "become" because it is only after this stage that any real cooperation exists between the players. Before this, each played for himself. Each sought, it is true, to imitate the play of older boys and of the initiated, but more for the satisfaction, still purely personal, of feeling himself to be a member of a mystical community whose sacred institutions are handed down by the elders out of the remote past, than from any real desire to cooperate with his playmates or with anyone else. If cooperation be regarded as more social than this mixture of egocentrism and respect for one's seniors which characterizes the beginnings of collective life among children, then we may say that it is from the third stage onwards that the game of marbles begins to be a truly social game.

As yet, however, this cooperation exists to a great extent only in intention. Being an honest man is not enough to make one know the law. It is not even enough to enable us to solve the problems that may arise in our concrete "moral experience." The child fares in the same way during the present stage, and succeeds, at best, in creating for himself a "provisional morality," putting off till a later date the task of setting up a code of laws and a system of jurisprudence. Nor do boys of 7 to 10 ever succeed in agreeing amongst themselves for longer than the duration of one and the same game, they are still incapable of legislating on all possible cases that may arise, for each still has a purely personal opinion about the rules of the game.

To use an apter comparison, we may say that the child of 7 to 10 plays as he reasons. We have already[9] tried to establish the fact that about the age of 7 or 8, precisely, that is to say, at the moment when our third stage appears, in the very poor districts where we conducted our work,[10] discussion and reflection gain an increasing ascendency over unproved affirmation and intellectual egocentrism. Now, these new habits of thought lead to genuine deductions (as opposed to primitive "transductions") and to deductions in which the child grapples with a given fact of experience, either present or past. But something is still lacking if deduction is to be generalized and made completely

[9] *J R*, chap IV

[10] We take this opportunity of reminding the reader of what has not been sufficiently emphasized in our earlier books, viz that most of our research has been carried out on children from the poorer parts of Geneva. In different surroundings the age averages would certainly have been different

rational: the child must be able to reason formally, *i.e.* he must have a conscious realization of the rules of reasoning which will enable him to apply them to any case whatsoever, including purely hypothetical cases (mere assumptions). In the same way, a child who, with regard to the rules of games, has reached the third stage, will achieve momentary coordinations of a collective order (a well ordered game may be compared on this point to a good discussion), but feels no interest as yet in the actual legislation of the game, in the discussions of principle which alone will give him complete mastery of the game in all its strictness. (From this point of view the juridico-moral discussions of the fourth stage may be compared to formal reasoning in general.)

It is, on an average, towards the age of 11 or 12 that these interests develop. In order to understand what is the practice of rules among children of this fourth stage let us question separately several children from the same class at school, and we shall see how subtle are their answers, and how well they agree with one another.

RIT (12), GROS (13) and VUA (13) often play marbles. We questioned them each separately and took steps to prevent them from communicating to each other during our absence the contents of our interrogatory.

With regard to the square, the "pose," the manner of throwing, and generally speaking all the rules we have already examined, these three children are naturally in full agreement with each other. To know who is to play first, Rit, who has lived in two neighbouring villages before coming to town, tells us that various customs are in usage. You draw a line, the coche, and whoever gets nearest to it plays first. If you go beyond the line, either, according to some, it does not matter, or else "*there is another game when you go beyond the line, you play last.*" Gros and Vua know only of this custom, the only one that is really put into practice by the boys of the neighbourhood.

But there are complications about which the younger boys left us in the dark. "*Whoever,* according to Gros, *says 'queue' plays second. It's easier because he doesn't get 'hit'* [= if a player's shooter lands near the square, it is exposed to hits from the other players]." In the same way, Vua tells us that "*whoever says 'queue de deux' plays last.*" And he adds the following rule, also recognized by Gros "*When you are all the same distance from the coche whoever cries 'egaux-queue' plays second*" (the problem is therefore to play sufficiently soon still to find marbles in the square, but not first, for fear of being hit).

On the other hand, Gros tells us: "*Whoever takes out two* [two of the marbles placed inside the square, *i.e.* the equivalent of the player's 'pose'] *can say 'queue-de-pose' In that way he can play second from the coche in the next game.*" And Vua: "*When there are two outside* [when two marbles have been knocked out of the square] *you can dare to say 'queue-de-pose,' and you can play second from the coche again in the second game.*" Rit gives us the same information.

This is not all. According to Rit, "*If you say 'deux-coups-de-coche' you can have two shots from the line If you say 'deux-coups-d'empan' you play the second shot from where you are You can only say that when the other* [= the opponent] *has made up his pose* [= has won back as many marbles as he had originally deposited in the square]." This rule is observed in the same way by the other two children.

In addition, there is a whole set of rules, unknown to the younger boys, which bear upon the position of the marbles in the

square. According to Gros, "*The first boy who says 'place-pour-moi'* [Engl, place-for-me] *does not have to place himself at one of the corners of the square,*" and "*the one who has said 'places-des-marbres'* [Engl, place-for-the-marbles] *can put them down as he likes in a 'troyat'* (all in a heap) *or at the four corners.*" Vua is of the same opinion and adds: "*If you say 'place-pour-toi-pour-tout-le-jeu'* [Engl., your-place-for-the-whole-game] *the other chap* [the opponent] *must stay at the same place.*" Rit, who knows both these rules, adds the further detail that "*you can't say 'place-pour-moi' if you have already said 'place-pour-toi.'*" This gives some idea of the complications of procedure!

Our three legal experts also point the measures of clemency in use for the protection of the weak. According to Vua, "*If you knock out three at one shot and there's only one left* [one marble in the square] *the other chap* [the opponent] *has the right to play from half-way* [half-way between the coche and the square] *because the first boy has made more than his 'pose'*" Also "*The boy who has been beaten is allowed to begin*" According to Gros, "*If there is one marble left at the end, the boy who has won, instead of taking it, can give it to the other chap.*" And again, "*When there's one boy who has won too much, the others say 'coujac,' and he is bound to play another game.*"

The number of shots at the disposal of each player also gives rise to a whole series of regulations on which the three boys lay stress, as before, in full agreement with each other. For the sake of brevity we refer the reader on this point to the general rules outlined in Section I.

There is only one point on which we saw our subjects differ. Rit, who, it will be remembered, has known the game in three different districts, told us that the boy whose shooter stays inside the square may generally come out of it. He added, it is true, that in some games the player in such a plight is "dished" [Fr., brulé], but this rule does not seem to him obligatory. Vua and Gros, on the contrary, are of the opinion that in all cases "*when you stay inside the square you are dished.*" We think we may confuse Vua by saying, "Rit didn't say that! — *The fact is,* answers Vua, *that sometimes people play differently. Then you ask each other what you want to do.* — And if you can't agree? — *We scrap for a bit and then we fix things up.*"

These answers show what the fourth stage is Interest seems to have shifted its ground since the last stage Not only do these children seek to cooperate, to "fix things up," as Vua puts it, rather than to play for themselves alone, but also — and this undoubtedly is something new — they seem to take a peculiar pleasure in anticipating all possible cases and in codifying them. Considering that the square game is only one of the five or ten varieties of the game of marbles, it is almost alarming in face of the complexity of rules and procedure in the square game, to think of what a child of twelve has to store away in his memory These rules, with their over-lapping and their exceptions, are at least as complex as the current rules of spelling. It is somewhat humiliating, in this connection, to see how heavily traditional education sets about the task of making spelling enter into brains that assimilate with such ease the mnemonic contents of the game of marbles But then, memory is dependent upon activity, and a real activity presupposes interest

Throughout this fourth stage, then, the dominating interest seems to be interest in the rules themselves For mere cooperation would not require such subtleties as those attending the disposition of the mar-

bles in the square ("place-pour-moi," "place-des-marbres," "place-pour-toi-pour-tout-le-jeu," etc). The fact that the child enjoys complicating things at will proves that what he is after is rules for their own sake. We have described elsewhere [11] the extraordinary behaviour of eight boys of 10 to 14 who, in order to throw snowballs at each other, began by wasting a good quarter-of-an-hour in electing a president, fixing the rules of voting, then in dividing themselves into two camps, in deciding upon the distances of the shots, and finally in foreseeing what would be the sanctions to be applied in cases of infringement of these laws Many other facts analogous to this could be culled from tudies that have been made on children's societies.

In conclusion, the acquisition and practice of the rules of a game follow very simple and very natural laws, the stages of which may be defined as follows 1° Simple individual regularity 2° Imitation of seniors with egocentrism 3 Cooperation 4° Interest in rules for their own sake.

[11] *J. R.*, p 96.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Cooley, C H, *Human Nature and the Social Order,* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1902, pp 136–231 This section of Cooley's famous book contains many speculative and observational insights into the social nature of the self and personality which have become part of the systematic sociological theory of socialization

2 Dewey, John, *Human Nature and Conduct,* Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1922, pp 13–88 Dewey shows clearly the social origins of habits in this part of his essay on social psychology Together with the works of Cooley and Mead, the theories developed by Dewey have served as the basic framework within which sociologists have analyzed the interrelations of culture, personality, and society

3 MacIver, R M, *Social Causation,* Ginn and Company, Boston, 1942, pp 291–350 The concept "dynamic assessment," described by MacIver is fundamentally similar to Thomas's "definition of the situation" As indicated by the term "dynamic" the author stresses the determinative power of these interrelated attitudes in their function of ordering social reality for the actor

4 Orlansky, Harold, "Destiny in the Nursery," *Commentary,* June, 1948, pp 563–69 The theory that the specific character of the modes of early toilet training and feeding practices determine completely the structure of personality has received a great deal of stress in some quarters This article critically reviews these theories in light of the available evidence and finds them guilty of ignoring other basic factors in personality formation

5 Shaw, C R, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931, esp pp 53–76 This whole book is a study in the socialization of the personality of a delinquent boy The pages cited are concerned particularly with the early period of the extra-familial forms of socialization which created the patterns of delinquent behavior

6 Venable, Vernon, *Human Nature, The Marxian View,* Alfred A Knopf, New York, 1946, pp 74–150 Venable has brought together from various sources Marx's analysis of personality structure The pages listed above are devoted to an account of the role which the relations of production, economic classes, and the division of labor have in shaping personality

7 See also Weber, "The Concept of Social Relationship," p 268, Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," p 592, Waller, "The Separate Culture of the School," p 625, Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," p 771, and item 3, Annotated References, p 180

7. Social Roles

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

In the course of becoming human the individual develops his personality and his self by internalizing the attitudes of others and then relating his own responses to these attitudes. Although we have applied this formulation only to the socialization of the child, it is obviously just as applicable to the adult when he becomes a member of a new social group. In both instances, the process is characterized by the person's learning what is expected of him and what he can expect of others.

Culture generally organizes these expectations regarding behavior into an articulated whole, composed of the interrelated *norms* (social rules) defining the basic *social positions* in the group. Our culture, for example, so defines the four basic social positions in the family: father, mother, son, and daughter; these positions exist independently of the persons who occupy them. The distinction is even more easily made in formalized groups. The presidency of a highly organized club serves as an illustration, since it is obvious that the office exists so long as it is defined by a set of rights and obligations which any occupant of the office will be expected to carry out.

As indicated, it is the function of the person occupying the position to carry out the rights and obligations associated with it. This collection of rights and duties is a social *status* (this definition differs slightly from the one to be used in the section concerning social stratification, since in the latter instance considerations of prestige and invidious distinction are involved), and in carrying them out the person is playing a social *role*. A *role* is defined as a pattern of behavior corresponding to a system of rights and duties and associated with a particular position in a social group. Since we have already spoken of these patterns as being articulated with one another, it is only necessary to add that such organization of social roles makes it possible for the group to function as a unit and the members to realize their individual and collective goals.

In the internalization of the attitudes of others, the individual most often takes over those attitudes which define his own role in the group. In the early stages of participation in a social group, an individual's social role is external to him and exists only in the expectations of others. In order to secure the approval of the group and to achieve his own objectives the person must inform himself as to the nature and character of these expectations. This is usually not difficult, since the other members are anxious for him to learn his role as soon as possible, and hence they informally and repeatedly depict it for him in their conversation and overt behavior. Through the process of socialization, the individual incorporates these

expectations into his personality and thus establishes his role and its relations to the roles of others.

Although a person's participation in the activities of any social group requires that he learn to play the appropriate social role, the degree to which roles are internalized varies widely. Since the role exists first of all in the expectations of others, it is possible for the novitiate to acquire only that bare minimum of attitudes and habits necessary for an adequate overt performance of the role. If his actions conform satisfactorily to the expectations of others, they are not likely to inquire too deeply into his motives and attitudes. In the military forces during wartime, many draftees do not internalize all the attitudes supposedly associated with the overt aspects of their role; rather, they learn what is expected of them in the way of overt behavior and comply well enough to keep out of the guard house most of the time.

At the other extreme we frequently find people who take over completely the entire system of attitudes and motives typically associated by the culture with the overt behavior required of the role. In close-knit groups based on affectional bonds the person's social role typically becomes an integral part of his personality. A husband not only learns what is expected of him in behavior toward his wife and children, but also in large measure incorporates the attitudes of affection and care supporting such behavior.

Every person plays many different roles during his lifetime. Some are played at different times and others simultaneously. In his early years the person plays the social role of child, internalizing the attitudes appropriate for that role and in addition incorporating many of the ideas, habits, and attitudes on which his future roles will be based. At the same time he plays other social roles in the school, the play group, the gang, and other groups of which he is a member. As an adult he will ordinarily establish a family of his own and in it will play the combined role of husband and father. Simultaneously he will be performing his occupational role, his church role, and whatever other roles are required by his various group memberships. With the maturing of his children and their departure from home, he makes the gradual transition into the social roles available to the old person.

Some of the many roles which any person plays during his lifetime are associated with statuses which he has been able to choose; other roles are tied to statuses assigned to the person on the basis of some characteristics defined as significant by the culture, such as age, sex, kinship relation, or class position. Thus the infant son has little choice in regard to whether he will assume the status and role of son. The position is assigned to him on the basis of his kinship relation to his parents and his sex. As an adult, however, in our society he is theoretically free to choose the occupational status and role he desires to make his own. While there are many restrictions on this choice, it is clear that a different principle is involved.

Statuses open to individual choice are called *achieved statuses*, those assigned on the basis of age, sex, class, or some other criterion are termed *ascribed*. The selection here included from Linton's *Study of Man* is especially relevant for its

discussion of ascribed and achieved social positions and roles. Utilizing definitions of status and role similar to the ones we have employed, Linton discusses the general theory of social roles in terms of the distinction between ascribed and achieved positions. He describes the various criteria (such as age and sex) supplying bases for the ascription of positions and roles. The bases used are not necessarily functionally related to the type of role which the position requires. Thus the fact that a boy is the son of a king has little bearing on whether he will be a competent monarch himself. Linton believes that most positions are assigned on the implicit assumption that anyone properly trained can carry out the associated role, and that the function of the criteria of ascription is simply to designate people for position and role as early as possible, in order that training may begin The assignment of position on the basis of ascription assures the society that all roles will be played even though some may be played in mediocre manner, whereas a system of achieved positions may select the best capacities but leave many of the positions unfilled.

Even more significant for the analysis of personality is the stabilizing function Linton assigns to ascribed positions and roles. He believes that in a system of ascribed positions the person is seldom called upon to play a role for which he is not prepared, nor is he likely to prepare for a role and then fail to achieve the position that will give him the right to play it. Linton makes no value judgment concerning ascribed positions as compared with achieved positions, but suggests that the student make his own judgment. To this should be added the reflection that there must be more investigations of achieved positions and roles before any judgment is made — investigations directed toward discovering whether the characteristics Linton believes to be associated with them are typically present.

Whether social roles are associated with ascribed or achieved positions, the fact that a person plays several roles simultaneously and several more in sequence during his lifetime creates a problem of *role organization* The organization of roles played simultaneously is fundamentally similar to the larger organization of roles in the society to permit the adequate functioning of the participants in relation to one another. Just as incompatible social roles of different interacting people disrupt social relations, so also do incompatible roles played by the same person If for example the school requires the boy to eat lunch at 1.00 and the family requires him to eat it at 12 00, one system of social relations or the other will be disrupted. This is essentially what would happen if the school required the teacher to teach at 8:00 and the boy to attend class at 7 00. In the one case the incompatible roles are demanded of the same person, and in the other of different persons, but in both cases the results are the same.

When we come to social roles following one another in time, however, where the conflict is not so evident, we find that there is not the same group pressure to integrate them. While there is a strain created by the attempt to play contradictory social roles in sequence, the tension created is primarily within the person. If he can reorient his behavior, there is no objective structural reason why contradictory

roles cannot be played. If a person has been trained to submit to authority and then is transferred into a role where he must exercise authority over others, he will probably experience considerable difficulty, but there will be no existing contradiction in the expectations of others. All of them will be expecting him to carry out his role as a ruler.

In short, contradictory roles in sequence are not as obviously disruptive as those which must be played simultaneously. We find many examples of integrated societies, therefore, in which the person is required to play sequences of contradictory roles during the course of his life. The second and last selection of this chapter, Ruth Benedict's article, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," discusses this problem as it relates to our culture. She has selected as the focus of her attention the breaks between the social role of the male child and the social role of the father in certain societies (including our own) She finds that there are at least three areas of discontinuity between these two roles (1) fathers are expected to be responsible, while children are trained in irresponsibility; (2) the adult male is expected to be dominating and aggressive, but the boy is trained in submissiveness to parents; (3) attitudes toward sex inculcated in childhood interfere with the sexual role of the adult male

Comparing our practices with those of other societies, Benedict is able to show that these discontinuities are purely cultural and do not reflect any innate biological characteristics Particularly to those people who would trace the roots of the submission-dominance contradiction to the biological root of infant dependence, she demonstrates conclusively that there are societies in which biological dependence does not result in the submission of children Discontinuities in social roles are not rooted in original nature; they are determined by the culture. Even so, these disjunctions are important sources of personality conflict, as we shall see in the next chapter.

STATUS AND ROLE *

Ralph Linton

In the preceding chapter we discussed the nature of society and pointed out that the functioning of societies depends upon the presence of patterns for reciprocal behavior between individuals or groups of individuals. The polar positions in such patterns of reciprocal behavior are technically known as *statuses.* The term *status,* like the term *culture,* has come to be used with a double significance. *A status,* in the abstract, is a position in a particular pattern It is thus quite correct to speak of each individual as having many statuses, since each individual participates in the

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expression of a number of patterns. However, unless the term is qualified in some way, *the status* of any individual means the sum total of all the statuses which he occupies. It represents his position with relation to the total society. Thus the status of Mr. Jones as a member of his community derives from a combination of all the statuses which he holds as a citizen, as an attorney, as a Mason, as a Methodist, as Mrs. Jones's husband, and so on.

A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties. Since these rights and duties can find expression only through the medium of individuals, it is extremely hard for us to maintain a distinction in our thinking between statuses and the people who hold them and exercise the rights and duties which constitute them. The relation between any individual and any status he holds is somewhat like that between the driver of an automobile and the driver's place in the machine. The driver's seat with its steering wheel, accelerator, and other controls is a constant with ever-present potentialities for action and control, while the driver may be any member of the family and may exercise these potentialities very well or very badly.

A *role* represents the dynamic aspect of a status. The individual is socially assigned to a status and occupies it with relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role. Role and status are quite inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles. Just as in the case of *status*, the term *role* is used with a double significance. Every individual has a series of roles deriving from the various patterns in which he participates and at the same time *a role*, general, which represents the sum total of these roles and determines what he does for his society and what he can expect from it.

Although all statuses and roles derive from social patterns and are integral parts of patterns, they have an independent function with relation to the individuals who occupy particular statuses and exercise their roles. To such individuals the combined status and role represent the minimum of attitudes and behavior which he must assume if he is to participate in the overt expression of the pattern. Status and role serve to reduce the ideal patterns for social life to individual terms. They become models for organizing the attitudes and behavior of the individual so that these will be congruous with those of the other individuals participating in the expression of the pattern. Thus if we are studying football teams in the abstract, the position of quarter-back is meaningless except in relation to the other positions. From the point of view of the quarter-back himself it is a distinct and important entity. It determines where he shall take his place in the line-up and what he shall do in various plays. His assignment to this position at once limits and defines his activities and establishes a minimum of things which he must learn. Similarly, in a social pattern such as that for the employer–employee relationship the statuses of employer and employee define what each has to know and do to put the pattern into operation. The employer does not need to know the techniques involved in the employee's labor, and the employee does not need to know the techniques for marketing or accounting.

It is obvious that, as long as there is no interference from external sources, the more perfectly the members of any society are adjusted to their statuses and roles the more smoothly the society will function. In its attempts to bring about such adjustments every society finds itself caught on

the horns of a dilemma. The individual's formation of habits and attitudes begins at birth, and, other things being equal, the earlier his training for a status can begin the more successful it is likely to be. At the same time, no two individuals are alike, and a status which will be congenial to one may be quite uncongenial to another. Also, there are in all social systems certain roles which require more than training for their successful performance. Perfect technique does not make a great violinist, nor a thorough book knowledge of tactics an efficient general The utilization of the special gifts of individuals may be highly important to society, as in the case of the general, yet these gifts usually show themselves rather late, and to wait upon their manifestation for the assignment of statuses would be to forfeit the advantages to be derived from commencing training early

Fortunately, human beings are so mutable that almost any normal individual can be trained to the adequate performance of almost any role Most of the business of living can be conducted on a basis of habit, with little need for intelligence and none for special gifts Societies have met the dilemma by developing two types of statuses, the *ascribed* and the *achieved* *Ascribed* statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities They can be predicted and trained for from the moment of birth The *achieved* statuses are, as a minimum, those requiring special qualities, although they are not necessarily limited to these They are not assigned to individuals from birth but are left open to be filled through competition and individual effort. The majority of the statuses in all social systems are of the ascribed type and those which take care of the ordinary day-to-day business of living are practically always of this type.

In all societies certain things are selected as reference points for the ascription of status. The things chosen for this purpose are always of such a nature that they are ascertainable at birth, making it possible to begin the training of the individual for his potential statuses and roles at once. The simplest and most universally used of these reference points is sex Age is used with nearly equal frequency, since all individuals pass through the same cycle of growth, maturity, and decline, and the statuses whose occupation will be determined by age can be forecast and trained for with accuracy Family relationships, the simplest and most obvious being that of the child to its mother, are also used in all societies as reference points for the establishment of a whole series of statuses. Lastly, there is the matter of birth into a particular socially established group, such as a class or caste The use of this type of reference is common but not universal. In all societies the actual ascription of statuses to the individual is controlled by a series of these reference points which together serve to delimit the field of his future participation in the life of the group

The division and ascription of statuses with relation to sex seems to be basic in all social systems All societies prescribe different attitudes and activities to men and to women. Most of them try to rationalize these prescriptions in terms of the physiological differences between the sexes or their different roles in reproduction. However, a comparative study of the statuses ascribed to women and men in different cultures seems to show that while such factors may have served as a starting point for the development of a division the actual ascriptions are almost entirely determined by culture Even the psychological characteristics ascribed to men and women in different societies vary so much that they can have little physiological basis. Our own idea of women as

ministering angels contrasts sharply with the ingenuity of women as torturers among the Iroquois and the sadistic delight they took in the process. Even the last two generations have seen a sharp change in the psychological patterns for women in our own society. The delicate, fainting lady of the middle eighteen-hundreds is as extinct as the dodo.

When it comes to the ascription of occupations, which is after all an integral part of status, we find the differences in various societies even more marked. Arapesh women regularly carry heavier loads than men "because their heads are so much harder and stronger" In some societies women do most of the manual labor, in others, as in the Marquesas, even cooking, housekeeping, and baby-tending are proper male occupations, and women spend most of their time primping Even the general rule that women's handicap through pregnancy and nursing indicates the more active occupations as male and the less active ones as female has many exceptions Thus among the Tasmanians seal-hunting was women's work. They swam out to the seal rocks, stalked the animals, and clubbed them Tasmanian women also hunted opossums, which required the climbing of large trees.

Although the actual ascription of occupations along sex lines is highly variable, the pattern of sex division is constant. There are very few societies in which every important activity has not been definitely assigned to men or to women Even when the two sexes cooperate in a particular occupation, the field of each is usually clearly delimited Thus in Madagascar rice culture the men make the seed beds and terraces and prepare the fields for transplanting The women do the work of transplanting, which is hard and back-breaking. The women weed the crop, but the men harvest it. The women then carry it to the threshing floors, where the men thresh it while the women winnow it. Lastly, the women pound the grain in mortars and cook it

When a society takes over a new industry, there is often a period of uncertainty during which the work may be done by either sex, but it soon falls into the province of one or the other In Madagascar, pottery is made by men in some tribes and by women in others. The only tribe in which it is made by both men and women is one into which the art has been introduced within the last sixty years. I was told that during the fifteen years preceding my visit there had been a marked decrease in the number of male potters, many men who had once practiced the art having given it up. The factor of lowered wages, usually advanced as the reason for men leaving one of our own occupations when women enter it in force, certainly was not operative here The field was not overcrowded, and the prices for men's and women's products were the same Most of the men who had given up the trade were vague as to their reasons, but a few said frankly that they did not like to compete with women. Apparently the entry of women into the occupation had robbed it of a certain amount of prestige. It was no longer quite the thing for a man to be a potter, even though he was a very good one.

The use of age as a reference point for establishing status is as universal as the use of sex All societies recognize three age groupings as a minimum child, adult, and old. Certain societies have emphasized age as a basis for assigning status and have greatly amplified the divisions Thus in certain African tribes the whole male population is divided into units composed of those born in the same years or within two- or three-year intervals However, such extreme attention to age is unusual, and we need not discuss it here.

The physical differences between child and adult are easily recognizable, and the passage from childhood to maturity is marked by physiological events which make it possible to date it exactly for girls and within a few weeks or months for boys. However, the physical passage from childhood to maturity does not necessarily coincide with the social transfer of the individual from one category to the other. Thus in our own society both men and women remain legally children until long after they are physically adult In most societies this difference between the physical and social transfer is more clearly marked than in our own The child becomes a man not when he is physically mature but when he is formally recognized as a man by his society. This recognition is almost always given ceremonial expression in what are technically known as puberty rites. The most important element in these rites is not the determination of physical maturity but that of social maturity Whether a boy is able to breed is less vital to his society than whether he is able to do a man's work and has a man's knowledge. Actually, most puberty ceremonies include tests of the boy's learning and fortitude, and if the aspirants are unable to pass these they are left in the child status until they can For those who pass the tests, the ceremonies usually culminate in the transfer to them of certain secrets which the men guard from women and children

The passage of individuals from adult to aged is harder to perceive There is no clear physiological line for men, while even women may retain their full physical vigor and their ability to carry on all the activities of the adult status for several years after the menopause. The social transfer of men from the adult to the aged group is given ceremonial recognition in a few cultures, as when a father formally surrenders his official position and titles to his son, but such recognition is rare. As for women, there appears to be no society in which the menopause is given ceremonial recognition, although there are a few societies in which it does alter the individual's status Thus Comanche women, after the menopause, were released from their disabilities with regard to the supernatural. They could handle sacred objects, obtain power through dreams and practice as shamans, all things forbidden to women of bearing age

The general tendency for societies to emphasize the individual's first change in age status and largely ignore the second is no doubt due in part to the difficulty of determining the onset of old age However, there are also psychological factors involved The boy or girl is usually anxious to grow up, and this eagerness is heightened by the exclusion of children from certain activities and knowledge Also, society welcomes new additions to the most active division of the group, that which contributes most to its perpetuation and well-being Conversely, the individual who enjoys the thought of growing old is atypical in all societies Even when age brings respect and a new measure of influence, it means the relinquishment of much that is pleasant We can see among ourselves that the aging usually refuse to recognize the change until long after it has happened

In the case of age, as in that of sex, the biological factors involved appear to be secondary to the cultural ones in determining the content of status There are certain activities which cannot be ascribed to children because children either lack the necessary strength or have not had time to acquire the necessary technical skills However, the attitudes between parent and child and the importance given to the child in the family structure vary enormously from one culture to another. The status of the child among our Puritan

ancestors, where he was seen and not heard and ate at the second table, represents one extreme. At the other might be placed the status of the eldest son of a Polynesian chief All the *mana* (supernatural power) of the royal line converged upon such a child. He was socially superior to his own father and mother, and any attempt to discipline him would have been little short of sacrilege. I once visited the hereditary chief of a Marquesan tribe and found the whole family camping uncomfortably in their own front yard, although they had a good house built on European lines. Their eldest son, aged nine, had had a dispute with his father a few days before and had tabooed the house by naming it after his head. The family had thus been compelled to move out and could not use it again until he relented and lifted the taboo. As he could use the house himself and eat anywhere in the village, he was getting along quite well and seemed to enjoy the situation thoroughly.

The statuses ascribed to the old in various societies vary even more than those ascribed to children In some cases they are relieved of all heavy labor and can settle back comfortably to live off their children In others they perform most of the hard and monotonous tasks which do not require great physical strength, such as the gathering of firewood In many societies the old women, in particular, take over most of the care of the younger children, leaving the younger women free to enjoy themselves. In some places the old are treated with consideration and respect; in others they are considered a useless incumbrance and removed as soon as they are incapable of heavy labor. In most societies their advice is sought even when little attention is paid to their wishes This custom has a sound practical basis, for the individual who contrives to live to old age in an uncivilized group has usually been a person of ability and his memory constitutes a sort of reference library to which one can turn for help under all sorts of circumstances.

In certain societies the change from the adult to the old status is made more difficult for the individual by the fact that the patterns for these statuses ascribe different types of personality to each This was the case among the Comanche, as it seems to have been among most of the Plains tribes. The adult male was a warrior, vigorous, self-reliant, and pushing. Most of his social relationships were phrased in terms of competition. He took what he could get and held what he had without regard to any abstract rights of those weaker than himself Any willingness to arbitrate differences or to ignore slights was a sign of weakness resulting in loss of prestige The old man, on the other hand, was expected to be wise and gentle, willing to overlook slights and, if need be, to endure abuse It was his task to work for the welfare of the tribe, giving sound advice, settling feuds between the warriors, and even preventing his tribe from making new enemies Young men strove for war and honor, old men strove for peace and tranquillity. There is abundant evidence that among the Comanche the transition was often a difficult one for the individual Warriors did not prepare for old age, thinking it a better fate to be killed in action. When waning physical powers forced them to assume the new role, many of them did so grudgingly, and those who had strong magic would go on trying to enforce the rights which belonged to the younger status. Such bad old men were a peril to young ones beginning their careers, for they were jealous of them simply because they were young and strong and admired by the women. The medicine power of these young men was still weak, and the old men could and did kill them by malevolent magic. It

is significant that although benevolent medicine men might be of any age in Comanche folklore, malevolent ones were always old.

Before passing on, it might be well to mention still another social status which is closely related to the foregoing. This is the status of the dead We do not think of the dead as still members of the community, and many societies follow us in this, but there are others in which death is simply another transfer, comparable to that from child to adult When a man dies, he does not leave his society; he merely surrenders one set of rights and duties and assumes another. Thus a Tanala clan has two sections which are equally real to its members, the living and the dead. In spite of rather half-hearted attempts by the living to explain to the dead that they are dead and to discourage their return, they remain an integral part of the clan They must be informed of all important events, invited to all clan ceremonies, and remembered at every meal. In return they allow themselves to be consulted, take an active and helpful interest in the affairs of the community, and act as highly efficient guardians of the group's mores They carry over into their new status the conservatism characteristic of the aged, and their invisible presence and constant watchfulness does more than anything else to ensure the good behavior of the living and to discourage innovations In a neighboring tribe there are even individual statuses among the dead which are open to achievement Old Betsileo men and women will often promise that, after their deaths, they will give the living specific forms of help in return for specified offerings. After the death of one of these individuals, a monument will be erected and people will come to pray and make offerings there If the new ghost performs his functions successfully, his worship may grow into a cult and may even have a priest. If he fails in their performance, he is soon forgotten.

Biological relationships are used to determine some statuses in all societies The mere fact of birth immediately brings the individual within the scope of a whole series of social patterns which relate him to his parents, either real or ascribed, his brothers and sisters, and his parents' relatives The biological basis for the ascription of these family statuses is likely to blind us to the fact that the physiological factors which may influence their content are almost exactly the same as those affecting the content of sex and age statuses. While there is a special relationship between the young child and its mother, based on the child's dependence on nursing, even this is soon broken off After the second year any adult woman can do anything for the child that its mother can do, while any adult male can assume the complete role of the father at any time after the child is conceived Similarly, the physiological factors which might affect the statuses of uncle and nephew, uncle and niece, or brother and sister are identical with those affecting the relations of persons in different age or sex groupings. This lack of physiological determinants may be responsible in part for the extraordinarily wide range of variation in the contents of the statuses ascribed on the basis of biological relationships in various societies

Actually, the statuses associated with even such a close biological relationship as that of brother and sister are surprisingly varied In some societies the two are close intimates In others they avoid each other carefully and cannot even speak to each other except in the presence of a third party who relays the questions and answers In some systems the eldest child ranks the others regardless of sex and must be respected and obeyed by them In others the question of dominance

is left to be settled by the children themselves, while in still others the youngest child ranks all those who preceded him. Practically every possible arrangement is represented in one society or another, suggesting that we have here a free field for variation, one in which one arrangement will work quite as well as another. The same sort of wide variation is found in the content of all the other statuses based on blood relationship with the exception of those relating to mother and child, and even here there is a fair degree of variation. There are a number of societies in which there is a more or less conscious attempt to break up the child's habits of dependence upon the mother and to alienate the child from her in order to bring it into closer association with its father's relatives. The child is taught that its mother really is not a member of the family, and hostility between mother and child is encouraged.

Not only do the statuses assigned by different societies to persons standing in the same blood relationships vary markedly, but there is also a high degree of variation in the sorts of blood relationship which are recognized and used as reference points for the assignment of status. Some societies, like our own, tend to recognize only close relatives and to be vague as to the reciprocal rights and duties of any relationship more remote than first cousin Others select the line of the mother or the father and utilize relationships in this line to remote degrees while ignoring all but the closest relationships in the other line. In a very few cases, relationship in both lines is recognized to remote degrees, with a consequent assignment of status Where this is the case the statuses based on relationship may actually include a whole tribe and determine the mutual rights and duties of all its members. Thus in certain Australian groups recognized blood relationships are extended to include not only the whole tribe but numerous individuals in other tribes as well It is said that when a stranger visits such a tribe the old men investigate his genealogy until they find some point in common with one of the genealogies within their own group. When such a point of contact has been established, they can determine the relationship of the newcomer to all the various members of their own group and assign him a series of statuses which immediately fit him into the social body If they are unable to find such a common point of relationship, they usually kill the stranger simply because they do not know what else to do with him. They have no reference points other than blood relationships by which statuses might be assigned to him.

There is another type of biologically conditioned relationship which is recognized in practically all societies. This is the relationship arising from the more or less continuous sexual association of individuals, i e, marriage The real importance of such associations lies in their continuity, in social recognition, and in the new series of blood relationships to which they give rise through the offspring which they produce Casual or temporary sexual associations usually receive only a negative recognition from society, being ignored when not actually reprehended Patterns may be developed to govern the behavior of individuals in such casual associations, but these patterns are usually extremely limited in their scope. They only affect the individuals who are directly involved and do not establish new statuses for the members of the families to which the contracting parties belong Marriage, on the other hand, always establishes a series of such statuses. Thus the parents of a man and his mistress do not become parties to any reciprocal pattern of rights and duties, while the parents of a man and his wife always

do become parties to such a pattern.

While relationships arising from sexual association are intrinsically different from those deriving from blood relationships, the two types have become interrelated in all societies. Blood relationships are everywhere used as reference points for delimiting the group of individuals within which marriage relationships may be contracted. This regulation is usually of a negative sort, certain blood relatives being prohibited from marrying but at the same time permitted freedom of choice among individuals not standing in these relationships. However, there are a fair number of societies in which such regulations assume a positive aspect In such societies a man is not only forbidden to marry certain female relatives, such as his mother or sister, but is also enjoined to marry within a particular group of female relatives, as his mother's brother's or father's sister's daughter In some cases these prescriptions are so strong that a man may have no alternatives except to marry a particular woman or remain a bachelor

The causes which underlie such limitations on marriage, technically known as incest regulations, are very imperfectly understood Since these regulations are of universal occurrence, it seems safe to assume that their causes are everywhere present, but biological factors can be ruled out at once Close inbreeding is not necessarily injurious Even when hereditary defects in the strain may make it so, its deleterious results require a long time to manifest themselves. Moreover, the average uncivilized group is small and rarely marries with outsiders Within a few generations the heredity of its members becomes so uniform that there is little if any biological difference between marriage with a first cousin and marriage with a fourth cousin Neither are purely social explanations of incest regulations altogether satisfactory, since the forms which these regulations assume are extremely varied. The prohibition of marriage between mother and son is the only one universally present Marriage between father and daughter is permitted in at least one society, the Azande, while several societies have recognized or even required marriage between brother and sister. This last seems to occur mainly in small ruling groups and seems to be designed to keep privilege and rank rigidly within the group Thus in Hawaiian royal families brother and sister were required to marry and to cohabit until an heir had been born, although after this they might separate It seems possible that there are certain psychological factors involved, but these can hardly be strong enough or constant enough to account for the institutionalization of incest regulations. This is proved by the fact that cases of incest between all the prohibited degrees do occur in all societies and that all societies have certain preventive regulations which would be unnecessary if the rules were self-enforcing Incest regulations, once developed, are a valuable tool for preventing conflicts in the statuses held by individuals, but it is a little hard to imagine their invention for this purpose They have probably originated from a combination of all these factors.

The bulk of the ascribed statuses in all social systems are parceled out to individuals on the basis of sex, age, and family relationships However, there are many societies in which purely social factors are also used as a basis of ascription There seems to be a general tendency for societies to divide their component individuals into a series of groups or categories and to ascribe to such categories differing degrees of social importance. Such divisions may originate in many different ways They may grow out of individual differences in technical skill or other abilities, as in the case of craft groups or the

aristocracies of certain Indian tribes, membership in which was determined by the individual's war record. They may also originate through the conscious formation of some social unit, such as the first college fraternity or the first business men's club, which is usually followed by the formation of a series of similar units organized upon nearly the same lines. Lastly, such divisions may originate through the subjugation of one society by another society, with the subsequent fusion of both into a single functional unit, as in the case of Old World aristocracies deriving from conquest. Even when the social divisions originate in individual differences of ability, there seems to be a strong tendency for such divisions to become hereditary The members of a socially favored division try to transmit the advantages they have gained to their offspring and at the same time to prevent the entry into the division of individuals from lower divisions. In many cases these tendencies result in the organization of the society into a series of hereditary classes or castes. Such hereditary units are always used as reference points for the ascription of status.

The factor of social class or caste rarely if ever replaces the factors of sex, age, and biological relationship in the determination of status Rather, it supplements these, defining the roles of individuals still more clearly Where the class system is strong, each class becomes almost a society in itself It will have a series of sex, age, and relationship statuses which are peculiar to its members. These will differ from the statuses of other classes even when both are determined by the same biological factors. Not only is the commoner debarred from the occupation of aristocratic statuses, but the aristocrat is similarly debarred from the occupation of common statuses. It may be mentioned in passing that this arrangement is not always entirely to the advantage of the members of the upper class. During the nineteenth century the aristocratic prohibition against engaging in trade condemned many aristocrats to genteel poverty.

Feudal Europe offers an excellent example of the ascription of statuses on the basis of social class. A man born into the noble class could look forward to being a bachelor, in the technical sense of a boy beginning his training for knighthood, a squire, and lastly a knight and lord of a manor. The performance of the roles connected with the final status required a long and arduous training both in the use of arms and in administration. The woman born into the same class could also look forward to being lady of a manor, a task which entailed special knowledge and administrative ability fully on a par with that of her husband. A man born into the peasant class could look forward only to becoming a tiller of the soil. He would pass through no statuses corresponding to those of bachelor or squire, and although he might be trained to the use of weapons, these would be different weapons from those used by the knight. The woman born into this class could only look forward to becoming a simple housewife, and her necessary training for this status was limited to a knowledge of housekeeping and baby-tending. The third class in medieval society, the burghers, also had its own series of statuses, the boy looking forward to becoming first an apprentice and then a master training apprentices in turn All these divergent, class-determined statuses were mutually interdependent, and all contributed to the successful functioning of medieval society. The noble provided protection and direction, the peasant provided food, and the burgher took care of trade and manufactures.

Ascribed statuses, whether assigned ac-

cording to biological or to social factors, compose the bulk of all social systems. However, all these systems also include a varying number of statuses which are open to individual achievement. It seems as though many statuses of this type were primarily designed to serve as baits for socially acceptable behavior or as escapes for the individual All societies rely mainly on their ascribed statuses to take care of the ordinary business of living Most of the statuses which are thrown open to achievement do not touch this business very deeply. The honored ones are extremely satisfying to the individuals who achieve them, but many of them are no more vital to the ordinary functioning of the society than are honorary degrees or inclusions in "Who's Who" among ourselves.

Most societies make only a grudging admission of the fact that a limited number of statuses do require special gifts for their successful performance. Since such gifts rarely manifest themselves in early childhood, these statuses are, of necessity, thrown open to competition At the same time, the pattern of ascribing all vital statuses is so strong that all societies limit this competition with reference to sex, age, and social affiliations Even in our own society, where the field open to individual achievement is theoretically unlimited, it is strictly limited in fact No woman can become President of the United States Neither could a Negro nor an Indian, although there is no formal rule on this point, while a Jew or even a Catholic entering the presidential race would be very seriously handicapped from the outset Even with regard to achievable statuses which are of much less social importance and which, perhaps, require more specific gifts, the same sort of limited competition is evident It would be nearly if not quite impossible for either a woman or a Negro to become conductor of our best symphony orchestra, even if better able to perform the duties involved than anyone else in America At the same time, no man could become president of the D A.R , and it is doubtful whether any man, unless he adopted a feminine *nom de plume,* could even conduct a syndicated column on advice to the lovelorn, a field in which our society assumes, *a priori,* that women have greater skill

These limitations upon the competition for achieved statuses no doubt entail a certain loss to society Persons with special talents appear to be mutants and as such are likely to appear in either sex and in any social class At the same time, the actual loss to societies through this failure to use their members' gifts to the full is probably a good deal less than persons reared in the American tradition would like to believe Individual talent is too sporadic and too unpredictable to be allowed any important part in the organization of society Social systems have to be built upon the potentialities of the average individual, the person who has no special gifts or disabilities Such individuals can be trained to occupy almost any status and to perform the associated role adequately if not brilliantly The social ascription of a particular status, with the intensive training that such ascription makes possible, is a guarantee that the role will be performed even if the performance is mediocre. If a society waited to have its statuses filled by individuals with special gifts, certain statuses might not be filled at all. The ascription of status sacrifices the possibility of having certain roles performed superlatively well to the certainty of having them performed passably well

When a social system has achieved a good adjustment to the other sectors of the group's culture and, through these, to the group's environment, it can get along very well without utilizing special gifts.

However, as soon as changes within the culture or in the external environment produce maladjustments, it has to recognize and utilize these gifts The development of new social patterns calls for the individual qualities of thought and initiative, and the freer the rein given to these the more quickly new adjustments can be arrived at. For this reason, societies living under new or changing conditions are usually characterized by a wealth of achievable statuses and by very broad delimitations of the competition for them. Our own now extinct frontier offered an excellent example of this Here the class lines of the European societies from which the frontier population had been drawn were completely discarded and individuals were given an unprecedented opportunity to find their place in the new society by their own abilities.

As social systems achieve adjustment to their settings, the social value of individual thought and initiative decreases Thorough training of the component individuals becomes more necessary to the survival and successful functioning of society than the free expression of their individual abilities Even leadership, which calls for marked ability under conditions of change, becomes largely a matter of routine activities. To ensure successful training, more and more statuses are transferred from the achieved to the ascribed group, and the competition for those which remain is more and more rigidly delimited. To put the same thing in different terms, individual opportunities decrease. There is not an absolute correlation between the degree of adjustment of a social system to its setting and the limitation of individual opportunity Thus if the group attaches a high value to individual initiative and individual rights, certain statuses may be left open to competition when their ascription would result in greater social efficiency. However, well-adjusted societies are, in general, characterized by a high preponderance of ascribed over achieved statuses, and increasing perfection of adjustment usually goes hand in hand with increasing rigidity of the social system.

Americans have been trained to attach such high values to individual initiative and achievement that they tend to look down upon societies which are rigidly organized and to pity the persons who live in them However, the members of a society whose statuses are mainly prescribed are no less happy than ourselves and considerably more at peace It would never occur to an orthodox Hindu that he was to be pitied because he could not change his caste His whole life is arranged and oriented in terms of caste, and if he ever envies the members of other castes the emotion is on a par with our own envy of some animal's obvious comfort or satisfaction. His religion provides him with rationalizations of the whole system and with an explanation of his presence in the caste as a result of his soul's evolutionary status It also holds out the hope of a better position in his next incarnation if his work in this is properly done As a caste member his social and even emotional needs are amply provided for. There are even a small series of achievable statuses open to him if he is ambitious He may become a member of the caste's governing body or the best goldsmith in a group of goldsmiths, admired by those whose admiration is based on a thorough knowledge of the work In any struggle for advancement he knows exactly who his competitors are and what it is he wants to attain He is much less likely to be disappointed than a man living under our own system, where every other man may be a rival and where the limits for ambition are not socially defined.

In India the idea of ceremonial pollution makes social intercourse between the

castes difficult; but in societies which have strong class lines, without this idea, the presence of classes actually makes for ease of social intercourse. Here also, classes serve to delimit fields of competition. Where there can be no rivalry in vital matters and no social climbing, snubbing becomes unnecessary and indeed meaningless. Social status is something fixed and understood by both parties, so it can be ignored under circumstances where it has no direct bearing Members of different classes can form friendships which are the stronger because their interests can never clash and they can evaluate each other as human beings with a clarity unclouded by fear of rivalry. Membership in a rigidly organized society may deprive the individual of opportunities to exercise his particular gifts, but it gives him an emotional security which is almost unknown among ourselves. Which of these is best or which makes for the greatest happiness to the greatest number the reader must decide for himself.

CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN CULTURAL CONDITIONING *

Ruth Benedict

All cultures must deal in one way or another with the cycle of growth from infancy to adulthood Nature has posed the situation dramatically on the one hand, the new-born baby, physiologically vulnerable, unable to fend for itself, or to participate of its own initiative in the life of the group, and, on the other, the adult man or woman Every man who rounds out his human potentialities must have been a son first and a father later and the two roles are physiologically in great contrast, he must first have been dependent upon others for his very existence and later he must provide such security for others. This discontinuity in the life cycle is a fact of nature and is inescapable Facts of nature, however, in any discussion of human problems, are ordinarily read off not at their bare minimal but surrounded by all the local accretions of behavior to which the student of human affairs has become accustomed in his own culture For that reason it is illuminating to examine comparative material from other societies in order to get a wider perspective on our own special accretions The anthropologist's role is not to question the facts of nature, but to insist upon the interposition of a middle term between "nature" and "human behavior", his role is to analyse that term, to document local man-made doctorings of nature and to insist that these doctorings should not be read off in any one culture as nature itself Although it is a fact of nature that the child becomes a man, the way in which this transition is effected varies from one society to another, and no one of these particular cultural bridges should be regarded as the "natural" path to maturity

From a comparative point of view our culture goes to great extremes in empha-

* Reprinted by permission from *Psychiatry*, May, 1939, pp 161–67

sizing contrasts between the child and the adult. The child is sexless, the adult estimates his virility by his sexual activities; the child must be protected from the ugly facts of life, the adult must meet them without psychic catastrophe, the child must obey, the adult must command this obedience. These are all dogmas of our culture, dogmas which in spite of the facts of nature other cultures commonly do not share In spite of the physiological contrast between child and adult these are cultural accretions

It will make the point clearer if we consider one habit in our own culture in regard to which there is not this discontinuity of conditioning With the greatest clarity of purpose and economy of training, we achieve our goal of conditioning everyone to eat three meals a day. The baby's training in regular food periods begins at birth and no crying of the child and no inconvenience to the mother is allowed to interfere. We gauge the child's physiological make-up and at first allow it food oftener than adults, but, because our goal is firmly set and our training consistent, before the child is two years old it has achieved the adult schedule From the point of view of other cultures this is as startling as the fact of three-year old babies perfectly at home in deep water is to us. Modesty is another sphere in which our child training is consistent and economical; we waste no time in clothing the baby and in contrast to many societies where the child runs naked till it is ceremonially given its skirt or its pubic sheath at adolescence, the child's training fits it precisely for adult conventions

In neither of these aspects of behavior is there need for an individual in our culture to embark before puberty, at puberty or at some later date upon a course of action which all his previous training has tabued. He is spared the unsureness inevitable in such a transition.

The illustration I have chosen may appear trivial, but in larger and more important aspects of behavior, our methods are obviously different. Because of the great variety of child training in different families in our society, I might illustrate continuity of conditioning from individual life histories in our culture, but even these, from a comparative point of view, stop far short of consistency and I shall therefore confine myself to describing arrangements in other cultures in which training which with us is idiosyncratic, is accepted and traditional and does not therefore involve the same possibility of conflict. I shall choose childhood rather than infant and nursing situations not because the latter do not vary strikingly in different cultures but because they are nevertheless more circumscribed by the baby's physiological needs than is its later training Childhood situations provide an excellent field in which to illustrate the range of cultural adjustments which are possible within a universally given, but not so drastic, set of physiological facts.

The major discontinuity in the life cycle is of course that the child who is at one point a son must later be a father. These roles in our society are strongly differentiated, a good son is tractable, and does not assume adult responsibilities; a good father provides for his children and should not allow his authority to be flouted In addition the child must be sexless so far as his family is concerned, whereas the father's sexual role is primary in the family The individual in one role must revise his behavior from almost all points of view when he assumes the second role.

I shall select for discussion three such contrasts that occur in our culture between the individual's role as child and as father 1 responsible — non-responsible status role, 2 dominance — submission; 3. contrasted sexual role It is largely upon

our cultural commitments to these three contrasts that the discontinuity in the life cycle of an individual in our culture depends.

1. RESPONSIBLE — NON-RESPONSIBLE STATUS ROLE

The techniques adopted by societies which achieve continuity during the life cycle in this sphere in no way differ from those we employ in our uniform conditioning to three meals a day They are merely applied to other areas of life. We think of the child as wanting to play and the adult as having to work, but in many societies the mother takes the baby daily in her shawl or carrying net to the garden or to gather roots, and adult labor is seen even in infancy from the pleasant security of its position in close contact with its mother. When the child can run about it accompanies its parents still, doing tasks which are essential and yet suited to its powers, and its dichotomy between work and play is not different from that its parents recognize, namely the distinction between the busy day and the free evening. The tasks it is asked to perform are graded to its powers and its elders wait quietly by, not offering to do the task in the child's place. Everyone who is familiar with such societies has been struck by the contrast with our child training Dr Ruth Underhill tells me of sitting with a group of Papago elders in Arizona when the man of the house turned to his little three-year old granddaughter and asked her to close the door The door was heavy and hard to shut The child tried, but it did not move Several times the grandfather repeated, "Yes, close the door" No one jumped to the child's assistance No one took the responsibility away from her On the other hand there was no impatience, for after all the child was small They sat gravely waiting till the child succeeded and her grandfather gravely thanked her. It was assumed that the task would not be asked of her unless she could perform it, and having been asked the responsibility was hers alone just as if she were a grown woman.

The essential point of such child training is that the child is from infancy continuously conditioned to responsible social participation while at the same time the tasks that are expected of it are adapted to its capacity The contrast with our society is very great A child does not make any labor contribution to our industrial society except as it competes with an adult, its work is not measured against its own strength and skill but against high-geared industrial requirements Even when we praise a child's achievement in the home we are outraged if such praise is interpreted as being of the same order as praise of adults The child is praised because the parent feels well disposed, regardless of whether the task is well done by adult standards, and the child acquires no sensible standard by which to measure its achievement The gravity of a Cheyenne Indian family ceremoniously making a feast out of the little boy's first snowbird is at the furthest remove from our behavior At birth the little boy was presented with a toy bow, and from the time he could run about serviceable bows suited to his stature were specially made for him by the man of the family Animals and birds were taught him in a graded series beginning with those most easily taken, and as he brought in his first of each species his family duly made a feast of it, accepting his contribution as gravely as the buffalo his father brought. When he finally killed a buffalo, it was only the final step of his childhood conditioning, not a new adult role with which his childhood experience had been at variance

The Canadian Ojibwa show clearly what results can be achieved. This tribe

gains its livelihood by winter trapping and the small family of father, mother and children live during the long winter alone on their great frozen hunting grounds. The boy accompanies his father and brings in his catch to his sister as his father does to his mother; the girl prepares the meat and skins for him just as his mother does for her husband. By the time the boy is 12, he may have set his own line of traps on a hunting territory of his own and return to his parent's house only once in several months — still bringing the meat and skins to his sister. The young child is taught consistently that it has only itself to rely upon in life, and this is as true in the dealings it will have with the supernatural as in the business of getting a livelihood. This attitude he will accept as a successful adult just as he accepted it as a child.[1]

2 DOMINANCE — SUBMISSION

Dominance — submission is the most striking of those categories of behavior where like does not respond to like but where one type of behavior stimulates the opposite response. It is one of the most prominent ways in which behavior is patterned in our culture. When it obtains between classes, it may be nourished by continuous experience; the difficulty in its use between children and adults lies in the fact that an individual conditioned to one set of behavior in childhood must adopt the opposite as an adult. Its opposite is a pattern of approximately identical reciprocal behavior, and societies which rely upon continuous conditioning characteristically invoke this pattern In some primitive cultures the very terminology of address between father and son, and more commonly, between grandfather and grandson or uncle and nephew, reflects this attitude. In such kinship terminologies one reciprocal expresses each of these relationships so that son and father, for instance, exchange the same term with one another, just as we exchange the same term with a cousin. The child later will exchange it with his son. "Father — son," therefore, is a continuous relationship he enjoys throughout life. The same continuity, backed up by verbal reciprocity, occurs far oftener in the grandfather-grandson relationship or that of mother's brother-sister's son. When these are "joking" relationships, as they often are, travellers report wonderingly upon the liberties and pretensions of tiny toddlers in their dealings with these family elders. In place of our dogma of respect to elders such societies employ in these cases a reciprocity as nearly identical as may be. The teasing and practical joking the grandfather visits upon his grandchild, the grandchild returns in like coin; he would be led to believe that he failed in propriety if he did not give like for like. If the sister's son has right of access without leave to his mother's brother's possessions, the mother's brother has such rights also to the child's possessions. They share reciprocal privileges and obligations which in our society can develop only between age mates.

From the point of view of our present discussion, such kinship conventions allow the child to put in practice from infancy the same forms of behavior which it will rely upon as an adult, behavior is not polarized into a general requirement of submission for the child and dominance for the adult.

It is clear from the techniques described above by which the child is conditioned to a responsible status role that these depend chiefly upon arousing in the child the desire to share responsibility in adult life. To achieve this little stress is laid upon obedience but much stress upon ap-

[1] Landes, Ruth, *The Ojibwa Woman*, Part 1, Youth — Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, Volume XXXI.

proval and praise Punishment is very commonly regarded as quite outside the realm of possibility, and natives in many parts of the world have drawn the conclusion from our usual disciplinary methods that white parents do not love their children. If the child is not required to be submissive, however, many occasions for punishment melt away; a variety of situations which call for it do not occur. Many American Indian tribes are especially explicit in rejecting the ideal of a child's submissive or obedient behavior Prince Maximilian von Wied who visited the Crow Indians over a hundred years ago describes a father's boasting about his young son's intractability even when it was the father himself who was flouted, "He will be a man," his father said He would have been baffled at the idea that his child should show behavior which would obviously make him appear a poor creature in the eyes of his fellows if he used it as an adult. Dr. George Devereaux tells me of a special case of such an attitude among the Mohave at the present time. The child's mother was white and protested to its father that he must take action when the child disobeyed and struck him. "But why?" the father said, "he is little. He cannot possibly injure me." He did not know of any dichotomy according to which an adult expects obedience and a child must accord it If his child had been docile he would simply have judged that it would become a docile adult — an eventuality of which he would not have approved

Child training which brings about the same result is common also in other areas of life than that of reciprocal kinship obligations between child and adult There is a tendency in our culture to regard every situation as having in it the seeds of a dominance — submission relationship Even where dominance — submission is patently irrelevant we read in the dichotomy, assuming that in every situation there must be one person dominating another. On the other hand some cultures, even when the situation calls for leadership do not see it in terms of dominance — submission. To do justice to this attitude it would be necessary to describe their political and especially their economic arrangements, for such an attitude to persist must certainly be supported by economic mechanisms that are congruent with it But it must also be supported by — or what comes to the same thing, express itself in — child training and familial situations

3. CONTRASTED SEXUAL ROLE

Continuity of conditioning in training the child to assume responsibility and to behave no more submissively than adults is quite possible in terms of the child's physiological endowment if his participation is suited to his strength Because of the late development of the child's reproductive organs continuity of conditioning in sex experience presents a difficult problem So far as their belief that the child is anything but a sexless being is concerned, they are probably more nearly right than we are with an opposite dogma But the great break is presented by the universally sterile unions before puberty and the presumably fertile ones after maturation This physiological fact no amount of cultural manipulation can minimize or alter, and societies therefore which stress continuous conditioning most strongly sometimes do not expect children to be interested in sex experience until they have matured physically This is striking among American Indian tribes like the Dakota; adults observe great privacy in sex acts and in no way stimulate children's sexual activity There need be no discontinuity, in the sense in which I have used the term, in such a program if the child is taught nothing it does not

have to unlearn later. In such cultures adults view children's experimentation as in no way wicked or dangerous but merely as innocuous play which can have no serious consequences. In some societies such play is minimal and the children manifest little interest in it. But the same attitude may be taken by adults in societies where such play is encouraged and forms a major activity among small children This is true among most of the Melanesian cultures of Southeast New Guinea; adults go as far as to laugh off sexual affairs within the prohibited class if the children are not mature, saying that since they cannot marry there can be no harm done.

It is this physiological fact of the difference between children's sterile unions and adults' presumably fertile sex relations which must be kept in mind in order to understand the different mores which almost always govern sex expression in children and in adults in the same culture A great many cultures with preadolescent sexual license require marital fidelity and a great many which value pre-marital virginity in either male or female arrange their marital life with great license Continuity in sex experience is complicated by factors which it was unnecessary to consider in the problems previously discussed. The essential problem is not whether or not the child's sexuality is consistently exploited — for even where such exploitation is favored in the majority of cases the child must seriously modify his behavior at puberty or at marriage Continuity in sex expression means rather that the child is taught nothing it must unlearn later If the cultural emphasis is upon sexual pleasure the child who is continuously conditioned will be encouraged to experiment freely and pleasurably, as among the Marquesans; [2] if emphasis is upon reproduction, as among the Zuni of New Mexico, childish sex proclivities will not be exploited for the only important use which sex is thought to serve in his culture is not yet possible to him. The important contrast with our child training is that although a Zuni child is impressed with the wickedness of premature sex experimentation he does not run the risk as in our culture of associating this wickedness with sex itself rather than with sex at his age. The adult in our culture has often failed to unlearn the wickedness or the dangerousness of sex, a lesson which was impressed upon him strongly in his most formative years.

[2] Ralph Linton, class notes on the Marquesans

DISCONTINUITY IN CONDITIONING

Even from this very summary statement of continuous conditioning the economy of such mores is evident. In spite of the obvious advantages, however, there are difficulties in its way. Many primitive societies expect as different behavior from an individual as child and as adult as we do, and such discontinuity involves a presumption of strain

Many societies of this type however minimize strain by the techniques they employ, and some techniques are more successful than others in ensuring the individual's functioning without conflict. It is from this point of view that age-grade societies reveal their fundamental significance Age-graded cultures characteristically demand different behavior of the individual at different times of his life and persons of a like age-grade are grouped into a society whose activities are all oriented toward the behavior desired at that age. Individuals "graduate" publicly and with honor from one of these groups to another Where age society members are enjoined to loyalty and mutual support, and are drawn not only from the local group but from the whole tribe as among the Arapaho, or even from other tribes as among the Wagawaga of South-

east New Guinea, such an institution has many advantages in eliminating conflicts among local groups and fostering intratribal peace. This seems to be also a factor in the tribal military solidarity of the similarly organized Masai of East Africa. The point that is of chief interest for our present discussion however is that by this means an individual who at any time takes on a new set of duties and virtues is supported not only by a solid phalanx of age mates but by the traditional prestige of the organized "secret" society into which he has now graduated Fortified in this way, individuals in such cultures often swing between remarkable extremes of opposite behavior without apparent psychic threat. For example, the great majority exhibit prideful and nonconflicted behavior at each stage in the life cycle even when a prime of life devoted to passionate and aggressive head hunting must be followed by a later life dedicated to ritual and to mild and peaceable civic virtues [3]

Our chief interest here, however, is in discontinuity which primarily affects the child In many primitive societies such discontinuity has been fostered not because of economic or political necessity or because such discontinuity provides for a socially valuable division of labor, but because of some conceptual dogma The most striking of these are the Australian and Papuan cultures where the ceremony of the "Making of Man" flourishes In such societies it is believed that men and women have opposite and conflicting powers, and male children, who are of undefined status must be initiated into the male role In Central Australia the boy child is of the woman's side and women are tabu in the final adult stages of tribal ritual The elaborate and protracted initiation ceremonies of the Arunta therefore snatch the boy from the mother, dramatize his gradual repudiation of her. In a final ceremony he is reborn as a man out of the men's ceremonial "baby pouch" The men's ceremonies are ritual statements of a masculine solidarity, carried out by fondling one another's *churingas,* the material symbol of each man's life, and by letting out over one another blood drawn from their veins After this warm bond among men has been established through the ceremonies, the boy joins the men in the men's house and participates in tribal rites [4] The enjoined discontinuity has been tribally bridged

West of the Fly River in southern New Guinea there is a striking development of this Making of Man cult which involves a childhood period of passive homosexuality Among the Keraki [5] it is thought that no boy can grow to full stature without playing the role for some years Men slightly older take the active role, and the older man is a jealous partner The life cycle of the Keraki Indians includes, therefore, in succession, passive homosexuality, active homosexuality and heterosexuality The Keraki believe that pregnancy will result from post-pubertal passive homosexuality and see evidence of such practices in any fat man whom even as an old man, they may kill or drive out of the tribe because of their fear The ceremony that is of interest in connection with the present discussion takes place at the end of the period of passive homosexuality This ceremony consists in burning out the possibility of pregnancy from the boy by pouring lye down his throat, after which he has no further protection if he gives way to the practice There is no tech-

[3] Henry Elkin, manuscript on the Arapaho

[4] Spencer, B, and Gillen, F J, *The Arunta,* Macmillan, N Y, 1927 (2 vols) Róheim, Geza, Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types, *Internat J Psychoanal* 1932, 13 1–224 — in particular, Chapter III, on the Aranda, The Children of the Desert

[5] Williams, Francis E, *Papuans of the Trans-Fly,* Oxford, 1936

nique for ending active homosexuality, but this is not explicitly tabu for older men; heterosexuality and children however are highly valued. Unlike the neighboring Marindanim who share their homosexual practices, Keraki husband and wife share the same house and work together in the gardens.

I have chosen illustrations of discontinuous conditioning where it is not too much to say that the cultural institutions furnish adequate support to the individual as he progresses from role to role or interdicts the previous behavior in a summary fashion. The contrast with arrangements in our culture is very striking, and against this background of social arrangements in other cultures the adolescent period of *Sturm und Drang* with which we are so familiar becomes intelligible in terms of our discontinuous cultural institutions and dogmas rather than in terms of physiological necessity. It is even more pertinent to consider these comparative facts in relation to maladjusted persons in our culture who are said to be fixated at one or another pre-adult level It is clear that if we were to look at our social arrangements as an outsider, we should infer directly from our family institutions and habits of child training that many individuals would not "put off childish things"; we should have to say that our adult activity demands traits that are interdicted in children, and that far from redoubling efforts to help children bridge this gap, adults in our culture put all the blame on the child when he fails to manifest spontaneously the new behavior or, overstepping the mark, manifests it with untoward belligerence. It is not surprising that in such a society many individuals fear to use behavior which has up to that time been under a ban and trust instead, though at great psychic cost, to attitudes that have been exercised with approval during their formative years. Insofar as we invoke a physiological scheme to account for these neurotic adjustments we are led to overlook the possibility of developing social institutions which would lessen the social cost we now pay, instead we elaborate a set of dogmas which prove inapplicable under other social conditions

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Hiller, E T, *Social Relations and Social Structures,* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947, pp 331–614 Hiller, in this section of his text, analyzes the structure of society in terms of the characteristics and interrelations of social roles This is probably the most complete description of various classes of social roles available in one volume.

2 Hughes, E C, "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status," *American Journal of Sociology,* March, 1945, pp 353–59 Contradictions between social roles sometimes grow out of peripheral elements rather than central elements Hughes describes some of the contradictions among the roles which the individual is called upon to play in a highly mobile society and finds that frequently it is the peripheral elements which are involved

3 Komarovsky, Mirra, "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles," *American Journal of Sociology,* November, 1946, pp 184–89 The conflict between the adult roles of the American woman are described in this article The basic contradictions are between the pressures pushing the woman in the direction of a career and those pointing toward homemaking

4 Linton, Ralph, "Age and Sex Categories," *American Sociological Review,* October, 1942, pp 589–603 Drawing on cross-cultural materials, Linton examines the range of variation among different cultures in the utilization of age and sex categories for the ascription of social position and role

5 Schuetz, Alfred, "The Stranger An Essay in Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1944, pp 499–507 Schuetz explores the problems facing the stranger in any group the inability to predict the responses of others and a lack of knowledge as to how to conduct himself in relation to others In order to participate in the life of the group he must be assigned a position and role and learn to act accordingly

6 Znaniecki, Florian, "The Impact of War on Personality Organization," *Sociology and Social*

Research, January–February, 1943, pp. 171–80 Under conditions of stress changes occur in the culture of a society modifying the character of the social roles defined by the culture Znaniecki summarizes a group of studies by his students showing the effect of war on some of the more typical social roles of our society

7 See also Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p 5, Mead, "Play, the Game and the Generalized Other," p 187, Green, "The Middle-Class Male Child and Neurosis," p 236, Horney, "Culture and Neurosis," p 248, Gouldner, "Attitudes of 'Progressive' Trade Union Leaders," p 575, Cottrell, "Of Time and the Railroader," p 579, Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," p 592, Waller, "The Separate Culture of the School," p 625, Cuber, "Marginal Church Participants," p 674.

8. Social Aspects of Personality Disorganization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

In an earlier chapter a socialized person was defined as a functioning member of society whose behavior typically falls well within the limits of tolerance established by the culture, whose goals and purposes are those attributed to him by the group, and who is able to act in accord with the culturally patterned relationships by which he and others can achieve their individual and collective ends. If we apply these criteria to the people about us, we will probably find that most of them can be considered successfully socialized. We are all familiar, however, with some people whose behavior departs from what we consider normal, whose goals and aspirations are in conflict with what is considered legitimate, and who seem unable to participate in the ordinary affairs of social life.

Closer scrutiny discloses that some of these deviants are members of social groups whose cultural patterns conflict with those of the larger community. If they are able to function effectively as members of such groups, they must be considered organized personalities, even though their behavior deviates widely from what we or the larger community deem normal. Some individuals, however, are unable to participate effectively in any social group. The failure may manifest itself in psychic conflict, withdrawal from the real world, and in overconforming or deviant behavior. Such people are examples of *personality disorganization*. If the degree of disorganization is relatively slight, so that the person is only partly handicapped, he is termed a neurotic; if he is basically incapacitated for social life he is considered psychotic.

The disorganized personality has been the object of study for several scientific disciplines, including sociology, social psychology, abnormal psychology, and psychiatry. It is not surprising, therefore, to find various interpretations of personality disorders. Since a complete description of all these interpretations is beyond the scope of this chapter, we shall concern ourselves with those which are most relevant to the conception of the person as an actor attempting to carry out the social roles assigned to him, i.e., to those of the sociologists and the culturally oriented psychoanalysts. In centering our attention on the findings of these two disciplines, we shall be forced to neglect investigations of the effects of physical lesions, organic deterioration, and lack of native intelligence on personality disorganization. It is enough to say that the evidence these investigations have presented indicates the important part these causes play

While the sociologist and the analyst agree on the general definition of person

ality disorganization and on the importance of social relations as a causal factor, their emphases naturally tend to differ. The sociologist ordinarily looks for those roots of personality disorder which are found in the lack of integration among the roles the person plays or between the roles of one person and those of other participants in the social group. The analyst pays somewhat more attention to the behavior content of the roles in its relation to fundamental needs and drives of human beings.

In studying social roles the sociologist has observed several types of recurrent phenomena which lead to considerable strain and conflict within the personality and often to personality disorganization. Of these, three seem to be of greatest importance. The first, and perhaps the most frequent, is the attempt on the part of a person to play, simultaneously or sequentially, incompatible social roles. In the last chapter we saw how contradictions in the sequence of roles which the person is expected to play may create a considerable degree of tension by requiring a complete reordering of ideas, habits, and attitudes before the second role can be played. Even more severe than the tensions generated in this manner are those which arise when the person is required to play conflicting roles at the same time Here he is faced with a sheer impossibility. Under such circumstances, failure to act arouses the censure of everyone, including himself, and yet acting involves the violation of at least one set of expectancies concerning his behavior which he and others hold. Imagine for a moment the situation of a child whose parents are in conflict. It is likely that each parent will expect the undivided affection, respect, and admiration of the child. Here the child's family role has broken into two roles, one to be played in relation to the mother, the other in relation to the father The two roles are incompatible and the child is torn between two sets of requirements. It is not surprising that it is to conflicts of this kind that personality disorders in children can frequently be traced

A second source of personality strain is found where behavior performed as defined by a social role does not earn the reward promised by that role The man who has been taught that if he is hard-working and honest he will always have a steady job experiences considerable shock when he is handed a pink slip because the shop is shutting down. If the experience is repeated often enough, he is likely to become thoroughly disorganized. Similarly, personality disorganization is frequently found when a person, taught to desire certain values, is unable to carry out the approved behavior patterns which lead to the attainment of those values. Thus many people, possibly because of lack of native intelligence or because of membership within a group prohibited by society from performing the approved role (e.g., Negroes in American society), are unable to compete successfully for economic values in our society.

The third significant source of personality disorganization is the frustration which occurs when a person finds that his correct role behavior is not met by the expected reciprocal actions on the part of his associates. This cause of personality disorganization is obviously related to the second, since the achieving of one's

goals is usually dependent upon the predictable co-operation of other members of the group. There is the additional shock, however, of having people behave in an unexpected manner. All of us are occasionally subjected to such reaction from others, but when the process repeats itself time and time again personality disorganization is an almost certain result. Personal security is largely rooted in the familiar behavior of others toward one's self, and the removal of such predictability turns the person loose in a completely bewildering world.

Arnold Green, in his article "The Middle-Class Male Child and Neurosis," makes an acute analysis of the factors making for neuroses in the members of the middle-class American family All of the conditions tending to produce personality disorders are present to a greater or lesser degree in this social group. The father, the mother, and the child are each required to play contradictory social roles. The father, in his social role as father, is expected to love and cherish his child, and to spend a considerable amount of time, effort, and money in carrying out his obligations to him. Yet, in his role as a businessman seeking success and status, the father must view the child as a direct menace to his ambitions. Hence the father is torn by ambivalent attitudes toward his child, and in extreme cases may develop a neurosis on the basis of this ambivalence. The mother is no better off according to Green's portrait, for modern culture in defining the role of women has tended to devalue those activities she is expected to carry out as housewife and mother Finally, the child is expected to become an aggressive, independent, competitive personality, and yet is typically exposed to the necessity of acquiescing meekly to the authority of the parents.

The strain of being unable to achieve goals through the appropriate behavior and the insecurity generated by the unpredictable responses of others are both present in the love relations of the child with his parents. He is taught to value and desire the love of his parents, and to expect it as a predictable response from them. Nevertheless, he finds that love is frequently withdrawn, either as a form of punishment or, what is more bewildering, for no apparent reason at all.

The excerpt from Karen Horney's book, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,* is important both for its similarities to Green's article and its differences. She also deals with the genesis of neurosis in the middle class, but does so from the perspective of the cultural analyst. Her emphasis falls on the content of the roles as causal factors, rather than on the contradictory or unintegrated relations between roles. In so doing she places the process of competition at the center of her analysis, for she believes that practically all social roles in American life involve competitive activities in relation to others. In carrying out his normal activities the person develops attitudes of hostility toward others and in turn he is regarded with animosity These perpetual feelings of hostility and the anticipation of failure which is also engendered by competition create strong fears in the person and lead to shaky self-esteem, a strong sense of isolation, and a desperate need for affection. These personality characteristics are present in all normal members of our society, and when heightened they produce neuroses and psychoses.

There are obvious and important similarities between the two perspectives. Horney, for example, recognizes the significance of cultural contradictions when she speaks of the contrast between the competitive ethic and the Christian ethic of brotherly love. Her emphasis on the fear of failure and the consequences of failure may be tied in with the theory of goal frustration. Yet, there is an additional emphasis going beyond cultural relativity. She believes, together with other cultural analysts, such as Erich Fromm, that the content of the culture (as well as its organization) is a significant causal factor The cultural analysts hold, therefore, that a culture containing social roles which make it impossible to satisfy basic love, friendship, a productive relationship to the world, and security needs will produce more disorganized personalities than a culture containing roles which satisfy such needs. All of the evidence is not in, and certainly further research within both perspectives needs to be done.

In summary we can say that personality disorganization is most likely to occur in societies and groups where persons typically play contradictory social roles, are confronted with frequent failure to achieve their goals, and are subjected to consistently unpredictable behavior on the part of others In addition, there may be a greater tendency to personal disorganization where the content of the social roles makes it difficult to satisfy the needs for affection, security, confidence, and friendship. This theory can be utilized by the analyst in his efforts to arrive at the specific configuration of conditions leading to disorganization of an individual, or it can be used by the sociologist for explaining and predicting the rates of disorganization to be found in different societies and cultures

We live in a society possessing many different subcultures and many areas of social life characterized by differing degrees of cultural integration. Consequently there are possibilities of exploring the differences in rates of personality disorganization among these differentiated areas of our society Faris and Dunham have exploited this possibility in their study, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas,* from which the last selection of this chapter was taken.

The authors of this study have compared the rates of psychosis for different areas within the city of Chicago These areas are not simply geographic spaces but possess populations leading different sorts of lives These areas are dependent for their existence upon some of the basic economic and social processes in American society, but within them there occur processes which vary from area to area Toward the center of the city around the fringes of the business district in what is called the zone of transition we find that the people live almost without reference to some important aspects of the culture of American society As we move away from the center of the city we find an increasing degree of cultural integration and stability. In the zone of transition we find most of the statistical indices of social disorganization, such as high rates of disease, crime, and unemployment In the outer zones of the city these rates drop significantly

On the basis of this characterization of the natural areas we should expect to find, according to the social theory of personality disorganization, that the inci-

dence of mental disease and other forms of personality disorganization would be highest in the areas near the center of the city and lower in the other zones. The study by Faris and Dunham actually offers considerable support for this theory in that mental disorders, plotted by residences of patients prior to their admission to public and private hospitals, are highest near the center of the city and decrease regularly toward the periphery. The highest incidence of alcoholic psychosis and of drug-addiction cluster near the center of the city, the former in the foreign-born and central rooming house areas and the latter in the hobo and rooming house areas.

Such studies are in their early stages, particularly because of the still unsatisfactory methods of classifying various mental disorders. But the fact remains that these studies do demonstrate a relationship between social factors and personality disorganization. Further research may modify our generalizations considerably, but the causes of personality disorganization outlined in this chapter will probably remain significant.

THE MIDDLE-CLASS MALE CHILD AND NEUROSIS *

Arnold W. Green

In another publication,[1] Erich Fromm's and Karen Horney's use of general-cultural data to explain neurosis was criticized It was pointed out that while these two analysts have a concept of cultural neurosis (Horney) and pathological normalcy (Fromm), from which "the culture" is suffering, at the same time a clinical picture of neurosis is presented without reference to culture — the going awry of personal relationships, particularly of the child-in-family. While in her earlier work in this country Dr Horney found love-frustration the key to the individual etiology of neurosis,[2] later, and indicating Dr. Fromm's influence, the key became the arbitrary imposition of authority within the family of orientation.[3]

[1] Arnold W Green, "Sociological Analysis of Horney and Fromm," *American Journal of Sociology* (1946) 51 533–540

[2] *Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (W W Norton & Co, N Y, 1937, xii and 299 pp) page 30· The "basic evil is invariably a lack of genuine warmth and affection" Since "love" represents a not too radical departure from "libido" and "Oedipus," it is not surprising that the initial revolt against Freudian theory should find Freudian-trained analysts huddling close to the fence of familiar pastures See, for example, Adolph Stern, "Psychoanalytic Therapy in the Borderline Neuroses," *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* (1945) 14 190–198 Stern finds "affect hunger," especially in the relationship of mother and child, the root of borderline neuroses The revolt probably stems more from a distaste of the moral nihilism implicit in Sigmund Freud's theoretical structure, rather than primarily from a rejection of the theory itself

[3] *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (W W Norton & Co, N Y, 1939, 313 pp), pp 75–76 Fromm's position remains more theoretically consistent In *Escape from Freedom* (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc, N Y, 1941, ix and 305 pp) institutional authority as developed in a historical frame-

* *American Sociological Review*, February, 1946, pp 31–41 Reprinted by permission of the author.

Two things are being attempted in this paper: first, by a brief discussion of the socialization process taking place in a specific Polish-industrial community to demonstrate the inadequacy of a clinical etiology of neurosis in terms of either love-thwarting or the arbitrary exercise of authority; second, to explain in sociological terms the context in which "lack of genuine love" and "authority" operate to produce neurotic symptoms.

I

Sinclair Lewis failed to "see" Sauk Center until he had spent some time at Yale and in New York. Similarly, to evaluate what parts the "lack of genuine love" and "arbitrary authority" in themselves play in the etiology of neurosis a comparison should be made of their effects in different contexts.[4]

The author spent his childhood and young adulthood in a Massachusetts industrial village of some three thousand population, most of which is made up of immigrant Poles and their native-born children. It was previously pointed out how the middle-class norms governing courtship and marriage do not apply within this local Polish colony.[5] This is also true of parent-child relationships.

The local Polish parents emigrated before marriage from farm villages and small towns in Poland. While the old familistic tradition has been slowly deteriorating in rural Poland for several decades, enough of that tradition was brought with them so that their expectations of their American-born children's conduct reflected an alien peasant system of values.

An outstanding feature of peasant family life, in contradistinction to that of modern middle-class family organization, is the stress placed upon rules and work-functions rather than personal sentiment; and parental authority is excessive by the standards of any comparable segment of the American population.[6] These rules of conduct and this parental authority are out of place in the American industrial slum. Second-generation Poles participate

work is designated as the cause of both neurosis and "normal escapes" in modern western culture, as for the *individual* ecology of neurosis and "pathological normalcy," Fromm points to the experience of irrational authority in the family of orientation: see "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," *Amer. Sociol. Rev.* (1944) 9: 380–384.

[4] This seems to conform to Robert M. MacIver's dictum ". . . any effective causal enquiry should be addressed to a specific difference between comparable situations." Page 85 of *Social Causation* (Ginn & Co., 1942, x and 414 pp.). The question might be raised that "comparable situations" are not being dealt with here, but both Fromm and Horney use "the family" and "the modern family" as generic terms, without differentiation according to class, ethnic group, etc.

[5] Arnold W. Green, "The 'Cult of Personality' and Sexual Relations," *Psychiatry* (1941) 4: 343–348.

[6] "In all the relations between parents and children the familial organization leaves no place for merely personal affection. Certainly this affection exists, but it cannot express itself in socially sanctioned acts. The behavior of the parents toward the children and the contrary must be determined exclusively by their situations as family members, not by individual merits or preferences" (W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Knopf, N. Y., 1927, Vol. 1, p. 94). In other words, parental authority, while usually unleavened with "love," is based not so much on personal caprice (Fromm's "irrational authority") but mutual respect for common rules of behavior and labor functions within the household unit.

Respect, not love, is the tie that binds in the peasant family. And within a rigid set of rules, parental authority is almost absolute. "... a rebellious child finds nowhere any help, not even in the younger generation, for every member of the family will side with the child's parents if he considers them right, and everyone will feel the familial will behind him and will play the part of a representative of the group" (*ibid.*, pp. 91–92). If the male child's will is considered, it is not because of respect for his individual personality, but because of the increasing power and control the child will assume, he will finally assume the father's place as head of the household.

in a social world outside the home which their parents, because of language difficulties and previous conditioning, are incapable of sharing or even of understanding. As bewildered parents attempt to enforce old-world standards they are met with the anger and ridicule of their children. In answer to this, the parents have final recourse to a kind of authority which was unsanctioned in Poland a vengeful, personal, irrational authority, which no longer finds support in the future hopes and ambitions of the children; and this new authority is no longer controlled by both parents' families and a cohesive community But this personal authority will not suffice to curb their wayward progeny, who have little respect for their parents as persons, and who soon come to learn that their "American" playmates are not subjected to anything like it in their homes.

It is through this tragically antagonistic, mutually distrustful clash of wills that the relations of parents and children tend to be lacking in "love" (which is alien to the peasant *mores* anyway). At the same time, there is plenty of "irrational authority" In exasperation and fear of losing all control over their Americanized youngsters, parents apply the fist and whip rather indiscriminately. The sounds of blows, screams, howls, vexatious wails of torment and hatred are so commonplace along the rows of dilapidated millhouses that the passer-by pays them scant attention. *But those children do not become neurotic.*[7] Why? Because parental authority, however harsh and brutal, is, in a sense, casual and external to the "core of the self." The Polish parents do not have the techniques and opportunity to *absorb the personality* of the child In the first place, the child has many models of behavior to adopt both within the family (five to eight children are, in estimate,

[7] The author is no psychiatrist, and the reader may wonder at the foolhardiness of making such a statement Yet in the overt behavior of an entire generation in the village, whom the author has intimately known as children, adolescents, and young adults, there was no expression of anxiety, guilt-feelings, rigidity of response, repressed hostility, and so on, the various symptoms described by Horney as characteristic of the basic neurotic character structure. It is impossible to check directly on the reasons for rejection at the local induction center, yet a Polish informant has assured me there is no known case of army rejection because of psychoneurosis within the local Polish community

Of course, the argument might be raised that only a psychiatrist could discover the unconscious personality conflicts which were present There is no adequate answer to this charge, just as there is no adequate answer to the orthodox Freudian's charge that only a Freudian can criticize classical psychoanalysis because only a Freudian can understand it Admittedly, this is no water-tight rebuttal, about all that can be said here is that the total description of the socialization process taking place in the local Polish community at least leaves open the door to the possibility that many who experienced it did not become neurotic And it is pertinent to remember that analysts have knowledge of only upper middle-class and upper-class behavior

According to Horney the neurotic develops one of three trends, or some combination of them masochistic (making the self small and insignificant), narcissistic (appearing unduly significant to one's self and insatiably craving admiration from others) and perfectionistic (need for others' recognition of the self's infallibility, particularly moral infallibility) These trends are all accessible to direct observation within a field of personal interaction, without psychoanalytic techniques The only personality-trend in these Polish youngsters which resembles any of Horney's formulations is the narcissistic, it is not so much "neurotic," however, as sheer crass egocentrism According to middle-class standards the socialization process has simply been left uncompleted, with but an elementary self- and social-awareness resulting And it is *because* these youngsters remain egocentric, with little identification of self with others, that they are spared such neurotic symptoms as anxiety and guilt-feelings This does not mean they are never unhappy and miserable far from it, but these feeling-states have nothing in common with the neurotic trends and symptoms described by psychoanalysts, which are all dependent upon intensive identification.

modal in the Polish section of the village) and outside. Siblings present a more or less united front in their rebellion against their parents. Parent-avoidance techniques are easily acquired because of the parents' halting use of English and the fact that both parents, typically, work in the local factory, leaving the younger children to the daytime supervision of older children, which frequently results in no supervision at all The open woods and fields are close at hand and the children roam far The homes are not particularly clean, nor do they contain bric-a-brac or furniture of any value, so that the local Polish child is spared the endless admonitions which bedevil the middle-class child not to touch this or that

The children also develop a tolerant or openly malicious contempt for their parents as stupid, unknowing of American ways, concerning which the children regard themselves authorities By and large, the parents are obstacles to be avoided, or circumvented wherever possible. And while the resulting lack of identification with the parents virtually obviates demonstrations of affection, it also saves the children from feelings of guilt and repressed hostility [8] The training of the child becomes, then, casual, haphazard, "free" in a sense, very similar to the training received in many primitive tribes, except for the negative other-regarding attitude of parent and child so typical in the village.

II

The claim has been made that "lack of love" and "irrational authority" do not, in and of themselves, cause the development of neurotic symptoms. These phenomena do operate, however, in individual etiologies of neurosis, but only within a certain context The term "personality absorption" has already been used. Per-

[8] Demonstrations of affection are not altogether lacking, but they have little in common with the definitions of parent-child love found in the middle-class women's magazines A fairly common positive attitude is a fleeting, rather grimly humorous appreciation of the other's alleged shortcomings On occasions where an expression of sentiment would seem to be appropriate, such as a funeral within the family, parents and children are clumsy, awkward, embarrassed with one another Too many avenues of approach have been sealed off in the past Relations with parents tend to improve as the children become economically independent, while extremely rare, it does happen occasionally that a father and his grown son may be observed drinking beer together at one of the tables in the Polish Club It must be remembered that while the local Polish community is an industrial slum, it is also a rural community, and there is sufficient cohesiveness within it to enforce at least the outward appearance of intra-family solidarity, this is not experienced to any great degree, however, until the children reach young adulthood, and only if they take up residence within the community

No claim is being made that the early training of all Polish youth in this community is exactly alike, nor that the attitudes of parents and children toward one another are exactly duplicated from family to family It is here that the "subjective element" in insight (where the observer himself constructs patterns of behavior, at least in part, or merely interprets field-conjuncture?) and in the participant observer technique becomes potentially dangerous a single description of a behavior type or development is applied to various individual personalities, families, situations And so, in the local Polish community, there is the boy who cripples his father in a fist-fight, runs away from home never to return, another lad, married and raising a family of his own, wistfully wishes he "had gotten to know the old folks better" One girl leaves home at sixteen to become a prostitute, another delays marriage to care for an ailing mother Thus reality, compressed into a single formulation, becomes distorted

This is not the place for justification of abstraction I am convinced, however, that if another observer could spend many years in the village, and find some means of participating in the life of a large number of families representing all groups, as did the author, he would agree that the training of any second-generation Polish child would deviate but slightly from the above general description, while the training of any lower middle-class Protestant child would deviate from that description to a marked degree.

sonality absorption is the physical and emotional blanketing of the child, bringing about a slavish dependence upon the parents. It is personality absorption, in conjunction with factors other than lack of love or irrational authority, that produces a certain type of neurosis.

To delineate the kind of socialization which maximizes personality absorption, it will be necessary to conceive of a parental type which simultaneously occupies several population segments: native-white, Protestant urban, college-educated, middle-class.[9] The training of children born to parents who can thus be characterized, is so experientially consistent it has a certain range of predictive value.

Now, how can we define the middle-class child's situation?[10] It has already been said that his personality is "absorbed,"[11] and to the extent that it has been absorbed, he is in danger of developing neurotic symptoms. But why is it absorbed?

Perhaps the best way to view his social conditioning is to consider his parents, and their position in relation to him.[12] The father's work takes him far from the place of residence, where most of his associates are only slightly less strangers to him than they are to his family. He is a white-collar worker. As a salesman, office worker, minor bureaucrat, or professional man, his job-techniques revolve around manipulating the personalities of others, instead of tools. Since he has internalized the supreme middle-class value, individual success, he tries to use his associates as means to further his career, in fact, he has himself been conditioned to view his associates, education, hobbies, intellectual interests, in terms of their possible value to his career.[13] On the job he views himself not so much as functionally associated with others in a common purpose, as a self-contained unit establishing "contacts" with others. His work relations are not defined in fixed terms of status and role to the extent that they were in the past for he is on the move, or views himself in that way. He has, then, a well-developed tendency to view his re-

[9] The problem here is defining "middle-class" in such a way as to maximize psychological relevance. Robert S. Lynd has defined middle class as that class which is off the economic floor (objective) and conceives of itself as going places (subjective). For present purposes this can be revised as follows: the middle class is that class whose members have welded their attitudes and value into a life long striving toward an improvement of personal socio-economic position within the class structure. By this definition the lower class then becomes made up of those who acquiesce to inferior status and the upper class those with an assured superior status. The only "objective criterion" which can be admitted in conjunction with the foregoing definition of middle class is that a given person not be permanently blocked in his striving by reason of race, color, ethnic-group, which are essentially caste elements.

[10] Not only has "middle-class" been loosely defined, but also the claim is not being made that all middle-class children are equally affected by the ideal-type conditioning described, which is a deliberate exaggeration of the factor-conjunction which maximizes personality-absorption. In individual cases there will be different combinations of the factors enumerated, as well as deviations from individual factors.

[11] Fromm's formulation of the "pseudo self" must not be confused with "personality absorption." Fromm views the self as having a dynamism of its own, apart from its social context; the pseudo self arises when the self accepts the ideas, values, and goals of others as its own. The present author accepts no such demarcation of self and social: the self is derived within the given social context, personality absorption occurs when that context is narrowed for the child to include little more than one or two adults.

[12] Peculiarly enough, parents are viewed either as constant factors or as the villains in the piece in most discussions of "individual factors" in neurosis. But it is rather important to find out what there is to being a modern middle-class parent that fertilizes the soil of the child's neurosis however the individual seed may be planted. It will not suffice to dismiss the matter with "the parents' own neuroses" as does Horney.

[13] See Arnold W. Green, "Duplicity," *Psychiatry* (1943) 6: 411–424.

lations with others *in terms of what he, as a mobile, displaced person, can get out of them.*

Yet the modern middle-class father cannot use his *child* in the new sense of manipulating others to his own advantage, nor, be it noted, in the ways available in the past. In the old rural-familistic system, the child served well three predominant interests of the father: he would soon work on the farm, or during the earlier days of the industrial revolution, in the factory, become an economic asset to the father, in other words, he would provide economic security in the father's old age,[14] and finally, he would provide psychological security by preserving the family name, a form of this-worldly immortality in a society which made the family the primary repository of most social values

In terms of dollars alone, the cost of raising a modern middle-class child represents a serious threat to the personal ambition of the father[15] At the very time when, in terms of his primary success-goal, he should have time and money available for further study if a professional man, money for clothes, entertaining, household furniture and an automobile for purposes of presenting a "front" in any event, at this time when his career is in its initial and hence its crucial stage, the presence of the child represents a diversion of energy and funds, so long, of course, as the career remains his primary goal A certain degree of ambivalence directed toward the child is inevitable. Not the depth, but the present height of the middle-class birth-rate is the noteworthy phenomenon, indicating an amazing vitality of the old rural-familistic values which find little support in modern social structure.

With the advancing individuation of modern society, not only has individual success become a supreme value, but also individual, hedonistic enjoyment The child again presents an interference with most of the recreation available to the middle-class father, for whether commercialized (movies, sports events, plays) or social (golf, bridge, tennis, dinner parties), these are designed not for family-wide participation, but individual- or couple-participation

In conjunction with the above factors, the growing middle-class emphasis upon "scientific child care"[16] and the child's higher education further increase the father's duties and obligations, while his rights steadily diminish What emerges from his total situation is an ambivalence toward his child which is more or less widespread, though very rarely admitted, even with confidantes[17] Finally, children

[14] This obligation, as an individual experience, is fast passing See Robert M Dinkel, "Attitudes of Children Toward Supporting Aged Parents," *Amer Sociol Rev* (1944) 9 370–379 The government bureaus are planning old-age assistance benefits on the assumption that an increasing proportion of the aged will fail to secure support from their children See W S Woytinsky, *Labor in the United States* (Social Science Research Council, Washington, 1938, xxii and 33 pp)

[15] Basing their estimates on a family income of $2,500, Dublin and Lotka figure that the parents spend between $9,180 and $10,485 in rearing a child through the age of 18 (Quoted in Kingsley Davis "Reproductive Institutions and the Pressure for Population," *Sociological Rev* (1937) 29 1–18 — a British publication)

[16] The child must not be spanked, parents should be "patient" with him, his ego-growth must not be curbed, etc The assumption of much of the child-care literature seems to be that the parents have a combined culinary, nursing, and psychiatric function, and nothing more But note that in a mobile, industrial, specialized job-world, with its emphasis upon contractual relations, that cooks, nurses, and psychiatrists are paid for what they do

[17] It would be impossible to ascertain directly the extent of this ambivalence Asking a man whether or not he approves of the Bretton Woods Proposal differs from asking him whether he loves his little daughter — to be indicated on a

interfere with the companion and partner roles of husband and wife, which are more and more displacing the traditional patriarchal and housewife-and-mother roles [18]

And how about the mother? She enters marriage and perhaps bears a child with no definite role and series of functions, as formerly. Her old role within the patriarchal family, with its many functions, its economic and emotional security, its round of community participations, is lost, but no well-defined role has taken its place She feels inferior to men because comparatively she has been and is more restricted [19] If she works after marriage she faces sex discrimination on the job and perhaps her husband's criticism if his traditional role of bread-winner is important to him.

Half-seriously she prepared for a career prior to marriage, half-seriously because a career is regarded by most middle-class girls as insurance against the grim possibility they will not be married; through a "good" marriage (the folk phrase "she married well" refers not to personality adjustment but to the bank balance and career prospects of the husband) the middle-class girl attains far more status than is possible through a career of her own. But the period of phantasy dalliance with a career, or an embarkation upon one, leave her ill-fitted for the drudgery of housecleaning, diapers, and the preparation of meals The freedom which the urban apartment and modern household devices have brought the middle-class housewife has been commonly misinterpreted as well as exaggerated. While the Victorian housewife had more work to do, that work was part of a well-integrated system of household and community activities. While the modern middle-class housewife has more leisure-time than either her mother or grandmother, she must still work at a number of household jobs for which she has not been trained, which are usually not an essential part of her value-system, and which are isolated from her social activities. One sociologist has expressed this dilemma facetiously: half her working day is spent doing something she does not like, the rest is spent thinking up ways of getting even with her husband The resulting boredom frequently leads to a period of indecision early in the marriage over whether to have children or resume the career. This internal conflict has been well-expressed by Thompson:

"In the present economic situation in the United States increase of population is not desired. The fact that small families are the rule is one of the factors driving women out of the home Now that they are not in the home a kind of vicious circle is formed, for it is no longer convenient to be occupied in the home by one or two children. Much conflict centers here, for it is one of the problems of the culture which as yet has no generally satisfactory solution. Individual women have worked out ways of having both children and a career, but most women still do one

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ten-point scale It differs, first, because Bretton Woods is relatively extraneous to the core of the self and is publicly defined as something upon which one may express a wide divergence of opinion, and, second, because a man's attitude toward his daughter is made up of a series of personal experiences, some delightful, others not, all complicated by a cultural compulsive to repress consciousness of ambivalence toward one's own children Recall George Babbitt of course he *loved* his wife, Myra, and sometimes he almost liked her!

[18] See Willard Waller, *The Family* (Cordon, N Y, 1938, 621 pp)

[19] The extent of the actual emancipation of women has been commonly exaggerated Within all classes in our culture, as in all other cultures, women are trained to regard themselves as inferior to men in some degree It is usually desired that the first child shall be a boy, by wife as well as husband

or the other; and in either case there are regrets and often neurotic discontent . . . the problem is not solved by going to the other extreme and trying to prove one's adequacy by having a child or two The women of past generations had no choice but to bear children Since their lives were organized around this concept of duty, they seldom became aware of dislike of the situation . . . Nowadays, when women have a choice, the illusion is to the effect that unwanted children are less common, but women still from neurotic compulsion bear children they cannot love." [20]

And so it is inevitable that the child shall be viewed with some degree of ambivalence by both father and mother, for he represents a direct interference with most of the dominant values and compulsions of the modern middle class career, social and economic success, hedonistic enjoyment. There is some doubt that *under modern middle-class conditions,* children automatically bring husband and wife closer together [21]

To return to the consideration of the middle-class child. Personality absorption takes place against a background of parental ambivalence The mother has little to do, in or out of the home; she is her single child's sole companion [22] Modern "scientific child care" enforces a constant supervision and diffused worrying over the child's health, eating spinach, and ego development, this is complicated by the fact that much energy is spent forcing early walking, toilet training, talking, because in an intensively competitive milieu middle class parents from the day of birth on are constantly comparing their own child's development with that of the neighbors' children The child must also be constantly guarded from the danger of contacting various electrical gadgets and from kicking valuable furniture The middle class child's discovery that the living room furniture is more important to his mother than his impulse to crawl over it unquestionably finds a place in the background of the etiology of a certain type of neurosis, however absurd it may appear

Under constant supervision, with limited play area in a house touching other homes on all sides, or in an apartment, and lacking companions, the child's physiological expansiveness, fed by his boredom, persists in getting him into trouble screaming, running around the apartment, upsetting daddy's shaving mug, rending teddy-bear in two, emptying his milk on

[20] Clara Thompson, "The Role of Women in This Culture," *Psychiatry* (1941) 4 1–8, p 6

[21] See Ernest W Burgess and Leonard S Cottrell, Jr, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (Prentice Hall, Inc, N Y, 1939) xv + and 472 pp), esp page 413. In their sample they found a slight negative correlation between number of children and self rating of marital adjustment Lewis M Terman, *et al*, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (McGraw Hill, N Y, 1938, xiv and 474 pp) apparently remain unaware that their characterization of "Happily married women," derived from statistical manipulations, is a classic statement of the middle class Victorian housewife and mother role If 'happiness' for married women must be something founded in a fading tradition the future looks black Fortunately, Terman and associates have probably not established isolable unit factors instead sifted elements out of a total middle class cultural setting which is rapidly changing, *i e*, their 'factors' may not be applicable in the immediate future

[22] The addition of one more child, which is the outside limit in most middle class homes probably does nothing to diminish the possibility of the first child s developing a neurosis *if* there is an appreciable gap in their ages, because of the likelihood of sibling rivalry See David M Levy *Maternal Overprotection* (Columbia University Press, N Y 1943 ix and 417 pp) Levy s valuable monograph has not been used in the present discussion because Levy conceives of the overprotective mother as a person who has voluntarily renounced the world and all its works to devote her entire life to the sacred cause of her own child the 'middle class mother' is here conceived as a type which has not resolved a conflict between "duty and individualism The latter is much more common

the rug to observe what pattern will be formed. This "trouble" is all a matter of definition. Similar behavior, in modified form, would not be interpreted in primitive society as "trouble," and neither would it be by Polish parents in the community above described.

Already the parents have made "love" of supreme importance in their relation to the child, theirs for him and his for them, partly because of the love-complex of our time, which is particularly ramified within the middle class,[23] and partly as a compensation for the many sacrifices they have made for the child, long debated before and after its arrival *The child's need for love is experienced precisely because he has been conditioned to need it* That the need is biological seems unlikely [24]

Now, the more ambivalent the parents are toward the child, the more seriously is the "trouble" he causes them interpreted. He should not act in such a way because of the sacrifices they have made in his behalf, and the least he can do is show his gratitude by "loving" them in turn, *i.e.*, keeping out of "trouble." When the trouble inevitably occurs, *the most effective punishment imaginable is the threat to withdraw their love from him* He "needs" that love because his personality has been absorbed by these two persons, because he has been conditioned to have a slavish-emotional dependence upon them. *Not the need for parental love, but the constant threat of its withdrawal after the child has been conditioned to the need, lies at the root of the most characteristic modern neurosis.* Mamma won't like you if you don't eat your spinach, or stop dribbling your milk, or get down from that

[23] Children are being more and more regarded by young middle class couples as a symbol of *romantic* consummation "And soon we'll be three," the popular song goes, the child is, then, considered more in terms of being a product of wedded egos than of having an integral place of his own in a family unit Also, as parents no longer secure economic good and security from children, the affectional element is stepped up to give the parents a reason for having children In fact, William F Ogburn has made affection his only hope for preserving our present family form

[24] Margarethe Ribble, in "Disorganizing Factors of Infant Personality," *American Journal of Psychiatry* (1941) 98 459–463, says "There is a necessity for a long and uninterrupted period of consistent and skillful 'psychological mothering' by one individual This must continue at least until speech is well developed and the child has acquired a feeling of self-security and voluntary control of his body equilibrium It seems that the tone of the gastro-intestinal tract in this early period depends in some special way on reflex stimulation from the periphery Thus the touch of the mother has a definite, biological implication in the regulation of the breathing and nutritive functions of the child" (page 463) Two things should be noted here while a certain amount of handling during infancy by one person may be necessary, that person need not be the biological mother, and it would be difficult to measure the extent of the need.

There are several excellent empirical studies of the socialization process now available and in all of them a great deal is made of the child's need for love and affection But in every single instance studied the child had either been early conditioned to regard love as the most important thing in the world, or had had the opportunity of observing other youngsters receiving something which he did not have This is not to deny that some affirmation of personal ties to others in primary-group relationships, if not a biological need, is at least universal, but it is doubtful that it need be the type of parent child love discussed in such studies Primitive children brought up in large dwelling-units among many kinsmen, in a sense spread thin their affection over a wide area, and this affection is relatively less in total intensity as well Polish children, in the village above described, receive short shrift from their mothers when they begin to walk, and even during infancy there is little dandling and cooing, in fact, after weaning, the child is most frequently literally handed over to the eldest daughter who gives the child the strictest minimum of attention Among the siblings there is little demonstrativeness there is, however, the fierce loyalty of an in-group on the defensive, this loyalty comprises the principal matrix for the imposition of the actual moral code by which they live Describing "genuine love" *in and of itself* as a necessity for preventing neurosis is sociologically naive.

davenport. To the extent that a child's personality has been absorbed, he will be thrown into a panic by this sort of treatment, and develop guilt-feelings to help prevent himself from getting into further trouble. In such a child a disapproving glance may produce more terror than a twenty-minute lashing in little Stanislaus Wojcik.

The threat of love-withdrawal is usually the mother's technique for controlling the child. At first the father may threaten to withdraw love, but as the child grows older the father finds a more subtle control — the expression of disapproval The child is limited to his parents for modelling his behavior. While very young, he wants to set the table and sweep the floor "like mummy" In a few years standards of manly conduct are imposed and he wants to do things "like daddy." The father now controls him through the child's new self-conception, and it is not so much the use of "authority" as threatening the child's self-respect.[25] The child is not a person who amounts to very much, how does he ever expect to get along when he gets old enough to go to school, or join the Boy Scouts, or go to college, or get a job? Again, to the extent that the child's personality has been absorbed, he will be made to feel small, insignificant, unworthy And, feeling absorbed, caught and helpless, must propitiate these combined god-monsters that he needs so desperately. Hence anxiety, guilt-feelings, the sense of inferiority; seek security at all costs for he is living alone and afraid, in a world he never made.[26]

As for authority, its exercise generates neurotic symptoms only under two conditions, both of which must be present; close identification of the child with at least one parent, the effective blocking-off of all avenues of authority-avoidance for twenty-four hours of the day. Neither of these conditions is met in the Polish homes described, and thus while the authority wielded by Polish parents is far more "irrational" (as defined by Fromm) than that likely to be encountered in many middle-class homes, neuroses are not developed. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Fromm's differentiation between rational and irrational authority has much psychological relevance. The *child* is hardly in a position to understand when authority is ". . . based on the competency of the person in authority to function properly with respect to the task of guidance he has to perform . ." [27] and when it is ". . . based on the power which the authority has over those subjected to it and on the fear and awe with which the latter reciprocate" [28] Perhaps the Polish children do not experience irrational authority exactly as defined by Fromm, for while they fear parental authority they also are hostile toward and contemptuous of their parents, and thus

[25] I am immeasurably indebted to Dr Franklin J Shaw, for long stimulating conversations about his work at the University of New Hampshire Psychological Clinic He states that male students seeking psychotherapy invariably recall ridicule and ego-attacks by the father during the period of first testing male roles

As for the "authority" formulation, is it not possible that it may be subsumed under "love withdrawal"? From the child's point of view, even corporal punishment becomes unbearable primarily because it represents the father's withdrawal of love and support During adolescence, authority as such does become a problem for the child, but the "normal" child suffers from it then as much, and oftentimes more, than does the neurotic

[26] All middle-class children certainly do not become neurotic But to the extent that their experience approaches the polar type described, they will tend to This picture is often exaggerated by the parents' own unacknowledged hostile impulses toward the child, stemming from the individualistic values and strivings described

[27] Erich Fromm, "Individual and Social Origins of Neurosis," *American Sociological Review* (1944) 9 380–384, page 381

[28] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

are not in awe of them. Nevertheless, the important differentiation is not between rational and irrational authority but the extent to which any parental authority succeeds in absorbing the child's personality, *which is itself dependent upon factors other than the imposition of arbitrary authority.*

Yet when we have used the term "personality absorption" we have not by any means explained a neurosis etiology The personality of the middle-class girl of the late nineteenth century was "absorbed" by her parents, she was subjected to the demands of "love" and unquestioning obedience, at least ideally, nevertheless, the rate of neurosis under those conditions was probably not too high, as nearly as can be judged at this later date Why? Because she was not faced with inconsistent expectations of conduct on the part of others and herself Because love and obedience were integrated within a role which changed relatively slightly from childhood into adolescence, courtship, and finally into marriage In other words, her initial goals and self conceptions were constantly re enforced with each new life experience

The modern middle-class child on the other hand, particularly the boy, who has found surcease from anxiety and guilt by blind obedience and "love" for his parents, is not allowed to stabilize his relationships with others on that basis His play group, which may be denied him until he has reached school age, makes him feel a certain shame and inadequacy in attempting to approach its members with familiar techniques "[29] He also early discovers that he is involved in competition with others, as an individual with his contemporaries, and as a representative of his family unit with other families

If the abstraction "ours is a competitive society" is translated into terms of what happens to the child born to modern middle-class parents, it becomes quite relevant to the present discussion. Before the child has developed a real self awareness he becomes part of a process of invidious comparison with other families he uttered his first word two months earlier than the Jones' boy, he weighed so many pounds at the end of his first year. At Sunday School he received the Bible for perfect attendance, at public school his grades in arithmetic were higher than two thirds of the other members of the class He may take piano lessons in view of the day when Mrs Smythe's pupils will be on public exhibition before the parents of the neighborhood Everything he accomplishes or fails to accomplish becomes an inevitable part of the family's attempt to maintain or improve its standing in the community.

But effective competition demands a certain degree of independence, firmness of purpose, perhaps aggressiveness Even for the "normal" middle class child the transition from submission to some degree of independent behavior is made difficult [30] And for the child whose personality has been absorbed, an especially exacerbated conflict arises He is expected to

[29] The play group has immeasurable sociological significance for it is secondary in importance only to the family of orientation in the socialization process Unfortunately, the only good empirical studies of the play group available are of institutionalized children or slum children whose gang behavior is regarded as a social problem

[30] See Ruth Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," *Psychiatry* (1938) 1 161–167 On page 161 appears this statement

"From a comparative point of view our culture goes to great extremes in emphasizing contrasts between the child and the adult The child is sexless, the adult estimates his virility by his sexual activities, the child must be protected from the ugly facts of life, the adult must meet them without psychic catastrophe the child must obey, the adult must command this obedience"

"do things," to accomplish, perhaps to lead in some endeavor, like other children, but his earliest social conditioning was dependence, submission, inferiority, his accomplishments, if any, are on a god-scale — in phantasy. He is desperately attempting to stabilize all later relationships on the basis of his earliest conditioning Any pressure to compete only exaggerates his anxiety, guilt, and feelings of inadequacy. Life in the modern middle-class home insures that he shall feel that pressure.

There are, then, three elements in the etiology of what has been called the most characteristic neurosis of modern society — personality absorption, the reiterated threat to withdraw a love which has been made of paramount importance, a conflict between the resulting initial adjustment of submissive propitiation and the later assumption of goals of achievement and roles of independent action

The child is not able to establish an integrated self-conception Propitiation has meant obedience and "love" for the parents, leading to a compulsive repression of self-will But he soon discovers that propitiation, in the sense of meeting new parental expectancies, means exhibiting independence, self-assertiveness, aggressiveness, *outside* the home The father, as the child's mediator of the outside male world, rather than the mother, makes this demand uncompromisingly which may, incidentally, be one of the unsuspected sources of the so-called oedipus complex. This seems more than likely since male neurotics often recall facing the father's ridicule of their first fumbling efforts to meet the father's expectations of "manly" conduct.

With the new conflicting expectations on the part of parents and contemporaries, the child's anxiety reaches new heights, a *double set of guilt-feelings appears where previously there was only one* at first he felt guilty only if he failed to love and obey, and his guilt could be assuaged by the propitiation of submission, now, however, the god-monsters will be appeased only by a combination of submission in his role of child-in-family, and assertiveness in his play-group, school-pupil, and other roles enacted outside of home An integration of these conflicting roles is impossible. His conception of himself becomes one of abject failure Any striving is painful for it violates the initial submissive adjustment. But he feels equally guilty for not making the effort to achieve This is a key to much of his contradictory and self-blocking behavior his desire to be the last man in the last regiment and his desire to conquer the world, his demand that everyone shall love him, and his settled conviction that no one could love a person as base as he, his inability to erect a hierarchy of values, his endless debate over the value of his own goals He is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't He is embraced by a psychological Iron Maiden any lunge forward or backward only impales him more securely on the spikes.

CULTURE AND NEUROSIS *

Karen Horney

Each individual analysis offers new problems even to the most experienced analyst. In each patient he finds himself confronted with difficulties he has never encountered before, with attitudes which are hard to recognize and still harder to explain, with reactions which are far from transparent at first sight. Looking back at the intricacy of the neurotic character structure, as described in the preceding chapters, and at the many factors involved, this variety is not surprising. Differences in inheritance and in the experiences a person has gone through during his life, particularly in his childhood, produce a seemingly boundless variation in the construction of the factors involved.

But, as pointed out at the beginning, in spite of all these individual variations the crucial conflicts around which a neurosis grows are practically always the same. In general they are the same conflicts to which the healthy person in our culture is also subject It is something of a truism to say that it is impossible to distinguish clearly between neurotic and normal, but it may be useful to repeat it once more. Many readers, confronted by conflicts and attitudes that they recognize in their own experience, may ask themselves Am I neurotic or not? The most valid criterion is whether or not the individual feels handicapped by his conflicts, whether he can face them and deal with them directly.

When we have recognized that neurotic persons in our culture are impelled by the same underlying conflicts, and that in a diminished degree the normal person is also subject to them, we are confronted again with the question that was raised at the beginning: what are the conditions in our culture which are responsible for the fact that neuroses center around these particular conflicts I have described, and not others?

Freud has given this problem but limited consideration; the reverse side of his biological orientation is a lack of sociological orientation, and thus he tends to attribute social phenomena primarily to psychic factors and these primarily to biological factors (libido theory) This tendency has led psychoanalytical writers to believe, for example, that wars are caused by the working of the death instinct, that our present economic system is rooted in anal-erotic drives, that the reason the machine age did not start two thousand years ago is to be found in the narcissism of that period.

Freud sees a culture not as the result of a complex social process but primarily as the product of biological drives which are repressed or sublimated, with the result that reaction formations are built up against them. The more complete the suppression of these drives, the higher the cultural development. Since the capacity for sublimation is limited and since the intensive suppression of primitive drives without sublimation may lead to neurosis, the growth of civilization must inevitably imply a growth of neurosis Neuroses are the price humanity has to pay for cultural development.

The implicit theoretical presupposition

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underlying this train of thought is a belief in the existence of biologically determined human nature, or more precisely, a belief that oral, anal, genital and aggressive drives exist in all human beings in approximately equal quantities. Variations in character formation from individual to individual, as from culture to culture, are due, then, to the varying intensity of the suppression required, with the additional qualification that this suppression affects the different kinds of drives in varying degrees.

Historical and anthropological findings do not confirm such a direct relation between height of culture and the suppression of sexual or aggressive drives The error consists primarily in assuming a quantitative instead of a qualitative relation. The relation is not between quantity of suppression and quantity of culture but between quality of individual conflicts and quality of cultural difficulties. The quantitative factor cannot be disregarded, but it can be evaluated only in the context of the entire structure.

There are certain typical difficulties inherent in our culture, which mirror themselves as conflicts in every individual's life and which, accumulated, may lead to the formation of neuroses. Since I am not a sociologist I shall merely point out briefly the main trends which have a bearing on the problem of neurosis and culture

Modern culture is economically based on the principle of individual competition The isolated individual has to fight with other individuals of the same group, has to surpass them and, frequently, thrust them aside The advantage of the one is frequently the disadvantage of the other. The psychic result of this situation is a diffuse hostile tension between individuals. Everyone is the real or potential competitor of everyone else. This situation is clearly apparent among members of the same occupational group, regardless of strivings to be fair or of attempts to camouflage by polite considerateness. It must be emphasized, however, that competitiveness, and the potential hostility that accompanies it, pervades all human relationships. Competitiveness is one of the predominant factors in social relationships. It pervades the relationships between men and men, between women and women, and whether the point of competition be popularity, competence, attractiveness or any other social value it greatly impairs the possibilities of reliable friendship. It also, as already indicated, disturbs the relations between men and women, not only in the choice of the partner but in the entire struggle with him for superiority It pervades school life And perhaps most important of all, it pervades the family situation, so that as a rule the child is inoculated with this germ from the very beginning The rivalry between father and son, mother and daughter, one child and another, is not a general human phenomenon but is the response to culturally conditioned stimuli It remains one of Freud's great achievements to have seen the role of rivalry in the family, as expressed in his concept of the Oedipus complex and in other hypotheses. It must be added, however, that this rivalry itself is not biologically conditioned but is a result of given cultural conditions and, furthermore, that the family situation is not the only one to stir up rivalry, but that the competitive stimuli are active from the cradle to the grave.

The potential hostile tension between individuals results in a constant generation of fear — fear of the potential hostility of others, reinforced by a fear of retaliation for hostilities of one's own Another important source of fear in the normal individual is the prospect of failure The fear of failure is a realistic one because, in general, the chances of failing are much greater than those of succeed-

ing, and because failures in a competitive society entail a realistic frustration of needs. They mean not only economic insecurity, but also loss of prestige and all kinds of emotional frustrations.

Another reason why success is such a fascinating phantom is its effects on our self-esteem. It is not only by others that we are valued according to the degree of our success; willy-nilly our own self-evaluation follows the same pattern. According to existing ideologies success is due to our own intrinsic merits, or in religious terms, is a visible sign of the grace of God; in reality it is dependent on a number of factors independent of our control — fortuitous circumstances, unscrupulousness, and the like Nevertheless, under the pressure of the existing ideology, even the most normal person is constrained to feel that he amounts to something when successful, and is worthless if he is defeated. Needless to say, this presents a shaky basis for self-esteem.

All these factors together — competitiveness and its potential hostilities between fellow-beings, fears, diminished self-esteem — result psychologically in the individual feeling that he is isolated Even when he has many contacts with others, even when he is happily married, he is emotionally isolated. Emotional isolation is hard for anyone to endure, it becomes a calamity, however, if it coincides with apprehensions and uncertainties about one's self.

It is this situation which provokes, in the normal individual of our time, an intensified need for affection as a remedy. Obtaining affection makes him feel less isolated, less threatened by hostility and less uncertain of himself Because it corresponds to a vital need, love is overvalued in our culture It becomes a phantom — like success — carrying with it the illusion that it is a solution for all problems. Love itself is not an illusion — although in our culture it is most often a screen for satisfying wishes that have nothing to do with it — but it is made an illusion by our expecting much more of it than it can possibly fulfill. And the ideological emphasis that we place on love serves to cover up the factors which create our exaggerated need for it. Hence the individual — and I still mean the normal individual — is in the dilemma of needing a great deal of affection but finding difficulty in obtaining it.

The situation thus far represents a fertile ground for the development of neuroses. The same cultural factors that affect the normal person — leading him toward a shaky self-esteem, potential hostile tension, apprehensiveness, competitiveness entailing fear and hostility, enhanced need for satisfactory personal relations — affect the neurotic to a higher degree and in him the same results are merely intensified — a crushed self-esteem, destructiveness, anxiety, enhanced competitiveness entailing anxiety and destructive impulses, and excessive need for affection.

When we remember that in every neurosis there are contradictory tendencies which the neurotic is unable to reconcile, the question arises as to whether there are not likewise certain definite contradictions in our culture, which underlie the typical neurotic conflicts It would be the task of the sociologist to study and describe these cultural contradictions It must suffice for me to indicate briefly and schematically some of the main contradictory tendencies

The first contradiction to be mentioned is that between competition and success on the one hand, and brotherly love and humility on the other On the one hand everything is done to spur us toward success, which means that we must be not only assertive but aggressive, able to push others out of the way On the other hand we are deeply imbued with Christian ideals

which declare that it is selfish to want anything for ourselves, that we should be humble, turn the other cheek, be yielding For this contradiction there are only two solutions within the normal range to take one of these strivings seriously and discard the other, or to take both seriously with the result that the individual is seriously inhibited in both directions

The second contradiction is that between the stimulation of our needs and our factual frustrations in satisfying them For economic reasons needs are constantly being stimulated in our culture by such means as advertisements, "conspicuous consumption," the ideal of "keeping up with the Joneses" For the great majority, however, the actual fulfillment of these needs is closely restricted. The psychic consequence for the individual is a constant discrepancy between his desires and their fulfillment.

Another contradiction exists between the alleged freedom of the individual and all his factual limitations. The individual is told by society that he is free, independent, can decide his life according to his own free will, "the great game of life" is open to him, and he can get what he wants if he is efficient and energetic In actual fact, for the majority of people all these possibilities are limited What has been said facetiously of the impossibility of choosing one's parents can well be extended to life in general — choosing and succeeding in an occupation, choosing ways of recreation, choosing a mate The result for the individual is a wavering between a feeling of boundless power in determining his own fate and a feeling of entire helplessness

These contradictions embedded in our culture are precisely the conflicts which the neurotic struggles to reconcile· his tendencies toward aggressiveness and his tendencies toward yielding; his excessive demands and his fear of never getting anything, his striving toward self-aggrandizement and his feeling of personal helplessness The difference from the normal is merely quantitative. While the normal person is able to cope with the difficulties without damage to his personality, in the neurotic all the conflicts are intensified to a degree that makes any satisfactory solution impossible

It seems that the person who is likely to become neurotic is one who has experienced the culturally determined difficulties in an accentuated form, mostly through the medium of childhood experiences, and who has consequently been unable to solve them, or has solved them only at great cost to his personality We might call him a stepchild of our culture.

THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ALCOHOLIC PSYCHOSES AND DRUG ADDICTS IN THE ZONE OF TRANSITION *

Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham

There is a wide range of difference in psychiatric opinion upon the etiology of the so-called alcoholic psychoses [1] Early writers as Kraepelin and Féré stressed hereditary factors in the use of alcohol. Later writers such as Noyes [2] emphasize a homosexual basis. Myerson [3] recognizes social factors but at the same time lays a great deal of emphasis on what he terms individual peculiarity. Henry [4] finds in various degrees of personality stability an index of the amount of alcohol which a person might take without harm to himself. Other writers feel that the use of alcohol is merely the symptom of underlying psychosis and does not in itself provide the etiological basis for a psychosis. Schneider and Potlisch on the basis of their research and clinical experience lean toward this view [5] DeFursac, while he accepts in a small degree hereditary factors, emphasizes that they are of slight importance as compared to the social factors [6] Henderson and Gillespie attempt to summarize much of this prevailing opinion as to the consequences of the use of alcohol.

"The role of alcohol is responsible for only a comparatively small proportion of certifiable cases of mental disorder. . . . There is a considerable number of minor mental conditions either of a transient or permanent nature, due to alcohol, which do not reach mental hospitals, but are responsible for much of the homicidal and sexual crimes, and for a considerable portion of the suicides Alcohol is more commonly a symptom than a cause of mental disorder of a serious and long standing kind." [7]

These statements, in brief, constitute a sample of the prevailing opinion as to the factors behind the alcoholic disorders If, as some psychiatrists believe, social factors are significant in these psychoses, it might be expected that some insight as to their

[1] It is, of course, well recognized that within this group of psychoses there are several different reaction types with distinctive enough symptoms for clinical differentiation A distribution of a sample of alcoholic psychoses indicating the different types, made at the beginning of this study, showed an absence of differential distribution as to type The following types were included in this distribution delirium tremens, Korsakow's psychosis, acute and chronic hallucinosis, acute and chronic paranoid trend, alcoholic deterioration, and other reaction types

[2] A. P. Noyes, *A Textbook of Psychiatry* (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1928), p 244

[3] A Myerson, *The Inheritance of Mental Disease* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co, 1925), p 35

[4] G W Henry, *Essentials of Psychiatry* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co, 1925), p 70

[5] Quoted from W A White, *Outlines of Psychiatry* (Washington, D C Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co, 1918), p 283

[6] See A J Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry* (6th ed, New York John Wiley & Sons, 1927), p 220

[7] D K Henderson and R D Gillespie, *A Text Book of Psychiatry* (Cambridge Oxford University Press, 1927), p 46.

* R. E. L. Faris and H W Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas,* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939, pp. 110–23 Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

nature could be gained through a study of the distribution of persons diagnosed as having an alcoholic psychosis.

COMMUNITY RATES FOR ALCOHOLIC PSYCHOSES

During the period of 1922–31, 1,930 patients were admitted to the state hospitals from Chicago and given a diagnosis of alcoholic psychosis Of these cases 1,652 were males and 278 were females This extreme preponderance of males is typical of the sex ratio in the United States for these psychoses [8] The community rates for the alcoholic psychoses per 100,000 adult population range from zero in Communities 9 and 10, a high rental residential area, to 554 in Community 28a, a hobohemia and rooming house district. The median rate is 71 and the average rate is 116, indicating a definite skewness in the distribution of rates

The configuration formed by the rates is shown in Map I and is similar to that of the total insanity and the schizophrenic series [9] The high rates are clustered in and near the central parts of the city and the low rates are in the outlying residential districts A slight rise in the South Chicago region, similar to the schizophrenic configuration, is also noticeable. The foreign-born and central rooming-house areas appear to have the highest rates

The cases of alcoholic psychoses are mostly between the ages of thirty five and sixty four years, the peak age being forty-five to fifty four years They come from a low income group as measured by monthly rentals In fact, over half of the cases corrected for the population factor come from communities where the median monthly rental is $23 41 or less The alcoholic psychoses come from the communities with the lowest monthly rentals as compared to any of the principal psychoses [10]

The effect of group customs on these rates is shown by the position of two communities which include many Russian Jews in their population These two communities, 24c and 29, have much lower positions in the rank order of rates for this series than in the schizophrenic rank order of rates The Russian Jews contribute their quota of cases to the schizophrenic rates but not to the alcoholic rates, nor, as will be seen in the following chapter, to the general paralysis rates In Community 24e only one of the thirty patients with alcoholic psychoses is Jewish and in Community 29 only one of the thirty-seven is Jewish [11]


Additional evidence concerning the distribution of these psychoses as well as their relationship to nativity can be seen in Table 1, which gives the data by nativity and race as distributed in the eleven housing areas The rates by sex according to nativity are not presented in this table because the small number of female cases

[8] See *Mental Patients in State Hospitals* (Washington, D C Bureau of the Census 1928), p 12

[9] It is interesting to note that the correlation by local communities between the schizophrenic rates and the alcoholic psychoses rates is 86 ± 03 There is, however, no intention to claim that this similarity of distribution indicates that the alcoholic psychoses are related to schizophrenia, but only that the high rates for these psychoses and schizophrenia occur fairly consistently in the same communities In this respect, it might be significant to note that both of these disorders are often spoken of as "escapes" from reality From unpublished studies of alcoholism in Chicago (in the possession of the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago) it is known that it is in these areas that the high incidence of chronic alcoholism is found A spot map showing residence of cases of deaths due to alcoholism shows this similar distribution

[10] See Table 86 in Appen B [in *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*]

[11] For further evidence of this lack of alcoholism among the Jews see Henderson and Gillespie, *op cit* p 45 also Rosanoff *op cit*, p 14, and B Malzberg, "The Prevalence of Mental Disease among Jews," *Mental Hygiene*, XIV (October, 1930), 926–46



MAP 1

Alcoholic Psychosis Rates in Chicago, 1922–1931. Per 100,000 Adult Population

Estimated 1927 population

TABLE 1

Area Rates for Alcoholic Psychoses According to Nativity and Race, 1922–34

Area	Native white of native parentage		Native white of foreign or mixed parentage		Foreign-born white		Total white*		Negro		Other races		Total (all classes)	
	No	Rate	No	Rate	No	Rate	No	Rate	No	Rate	No	Rate	No	Rate
1. Single home $50+	16	2 3	31	2 5	58	5 5	110	3 7	3	9 6			113	3.7
2. Single home $50—	16	6 6	21	4 6	105	14 4	144	10 1	3	27 8			147	10.1
3 Two-flat $50+	13	3 0	28	3 9	31	4 4	77	4 1					77	4.1
4 Two-flat $50—	41	6.7	120	8 3	290	14.3	462	11 3	8	17 5	1	5.6	471	11.3
5. Apt (n -b)	40	2 3	59	3 2	70	4 4	179	3 5	6	60.4			185	3.6
6 Hotel, etc	35	4 5	16	2 9	25	5 9	81	4 6	3	18 2			84	4.8
7. Apt (two-flat)	29	7 4	111	14 5	314	21 5	460	17 6	7	26 1	6	10 2	473	17.5
8 Apt (f -b)	4	6 7	24	11.6	40	4 8	69	6 3	3	68 5	1	130.4	73	6.6
9. Apt (Negro)	22	30.5	14	23 6	49	47 9	101	43 2	272	16 3	3	17 2	376	19.6
10. Tenement	24	12 1	78	25 4	254	35 4	362	29 6	9	29.5	2	8 0	373	29.2
11. Rooming	79	29.7	72	38 5	104	41 6	267	38 0	19	56.4	4	28.0	290	38 6
City total	**319**	**5.8**	**574**	**7.4**	**1,340**	**13.5**	**2,312**	**10.0**	**333**	**17.7**	**17**	**10.4**	**2,662**	**10.6**

* Includes "White of Unknown Parentage," and this accounts for corrected figures in total cases

makes such rates extremely unreliable. It is significant to point out, however, that the rates for the two sexes follow a similar pattern and distribution in the different housing areas.

From an examination of the distribution of these rates by areas within the different nativity and racial groups, it can easily be seen that the high rates consistently occur in the rooming-house and Negro areas in the zone of transition at the center of the city. It is significant to note that the rates for native white of native parentage and for foreign-born white in Area 9, the Negro apartment-house area, are somewhat higher than the rates for these groups in the rooming-house areas (10 and 11). It will be remembered that this fact also stood out in the schizophrenic series. This would seem to imply that persons when living in communities which are populated not primarily by persons of their own nationality or race are more liable to certain forms of mental disorder than when they are living in other communities where the majority of the people are like themselves as to race or nationality. Additional evidence on this point is seen in the Negro rates. The rate for Negroes within their own area (9) is considerably lower than the rates for native white of native parentage, native white of foreign or mixed parentage, and foreign-born white within this area. In fact the Negro rate in this area with one exception is the lowest rate for Negroes as compared to any of the other areas of the city. In addition, it is interesting to note that the rate for foreign-born persons within Area 8, which is primarily populated by other foreign-born persons, is one of the lowest rates for this group. Attention should also be directed to the fairly high rates for the foreign-born white in areas 2 and 4, the single home and two-flat area and the two-flat and single home area, both with rentals under $50. This possibly indicates a certain social and economic striving on the part of the more ambitious foreign-born to push out into the better areas which are inhabited primarily by the native-born. While they may be able to stand the economic strain in these areas, they apparently find it impossible to make a cultural adjustment to the social life about them, and this inability may be reflected in the average high rates for alcoholic psychoses in these areas.

TABLE 2

Percentage of Alcoholic Psychoses and the Percentage of the Population in Each Fourth of the Sixty-Eight Communities Grouped on the Basis of the Magnitude of the Rates

Quartile grouping	*Cases in each quartile*	*Population in each quartile*
Fourth or upper	49 0%	17 8%
Third	28 0	25 3
Second	15 3	28 3
First	7 7	28 6
Total	100 0	100 0

Table 2 shows that the extent of concentration by communities in the distribution of alcoholic psychoses is great. The bulk of the cases are in fact concentrated more heavily at the center of the city than in the schizophrenic series.[12]

Some additional evidence in relation to the type of area with which high rates for alcoholic psychoses are associated is shown when these rates are correlated with certain indices of community disorganization The same indices are used as in the schizophrenic series, and the resulting coefficients of correlation are to be seen in Table 3

None of these correlation figures are unusually high or low but fall in an inter-

[12] See ch iii [in *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*].

mediate range. High rates for alcoholic psychoses apparently occur equally in communities characterized by mobility as well as those characterized by predominance of foreign-born persons and Negroes. The striking differences found when these indices were correlated with the different types of schizophrenia are not in evidence here.

TABLE 3

Relationships Between the Rates for Alcoholic Psychoses and Certain Selected Social Indices by Communities

Rates for alcoholic psychoses with	Pearson R	*Standard error*
Percentage of home-ownership	— 42	± 09
Percentage of lodging-house and hotel residents	.45	± 09
Percentage of foreign-born plus Negroes	48	± 09


The use of other indices of social life brings out rather strikingly the close identification of these psychoses with the zone of transition Here it is significant to note that of the total cases of alcoholic psychoses in the period between 1922 and 1934, inclusive, only 4 per cent of the cases were admitted to private hospitals and 96 per cent to state hospitals. These psychoses, if real mental disorders, evidently affect people almost entirely on the lower income levels. The following additional correlation figures by the 120 subcommunities also attest to this fact The alcoholic psychoses rate correlates with the percentage of the population on relief .72± .04, with median monthly rental and home-valuation −.66± .05, with the percentage of the native-born population of German and Scandinavian parentage −53± 07, and with the percentage of the foreign-born German and Scandinavian population −.38± .07. The third correlation figure indicates that these psychoses are negatively related to communities with a high percentage of native-born. The German and Scandinavian people represent the oldest nativity groups in the city The latter correlation figure tends to show that the foreign-born of these two nativity groups live in poorer sections of the city as compared to the native-born and as a result are more closely related to the incidence of alcoholic psychoses.

COMMUNITY RATES FOR DRUG ADDICTION (WITHOUT PSYCHOSES)

The drug addiction series is in some respects comparable to the alcoholic series. Especially is this true in regard to the sex ratio. Of the 772 cases of drug addiction without psychoses used in this study, the majority are male, the ratio being 308 males to 100 females or actually 583 males and 189 females Often similar theories are used to explain drug addiction as are used to explain the alcoholic psychoses. When drug addiction is found with a psychotic condition it is possibly a case where the use of drugs is superimposed upon an already existing psychotic base Unlike the alcoholic psychoses, most of the cases of drug addiction which come to the state hospitals are voluntary admissions,[18] and therefore represent a definite selective group

The distribution of rates for this series is shown in Map II The rates range from zero in numerous subcommunities to 68.2 in Community 74, the central business district and hobo area. Because of the relatively small number of cases the chance fluctuation of rates is considerable. The median rate is 0.85 and the average rate is 2 83

[18] E M Ward, "A Study of Voluntary Commitments," *Collected and Contributed Papers* (Elgin State Hospital, Chicago Paramount Press, Inc, December, 1932), pp. 156–68.



MAP II

Sub-Communities, Based on Census Tracts of Chicago

There appears to be a general concentration in and near the center of the city The highest rates are in the hobo and rooming-house districts although some high rates appear in the apartment and apartment-hotel districts. The age spread of these cases is wide, with a peak age group of thirty-five to forty-four years There are fewer married cases than single in all nationality groups. The highest rates are among the native-born whites, and the lowest group, the foreign-born white, has rates roughly one-tenth of those of the native-born whites Negroes and other races are intermediate.

TABLE 4

Area Rates for Drug Addiction (Without Psychoses) 1922–34

Area	No of cases	Rate
1 Single home $50+	25	6
2 Single home $50−	9	5
3 Two-flat $50+	23	11
4 Two-flat $50−	42	7
5 Apt (n-b)	75	12
6 Hotel, etc	84	39
7 Apt (two-flat)	41	11
8 Apt (f-b)	17	11
9 Apt (Negro)	68	28
10 Tenement	62	35
11 Rooming	326	364
City total	772	23

The rates for the different areas of the city are to be seen in Table 4 As can be seen from this table, by far the highest rate occurs in the central rooming-house area. All of the other areas have extremely low rates, although the hotel and apartment-hotel area (6) has the second highest rate which might be expected from the character of the distribution pattern by subcommunities.

It is noted that almost 50 per cent of the cases are in the hobo and rooming-house areas at the center of the city. Like persons with alcoholic psychoses, drug addicts come mainly from the zone of transition where it is, of course, easier to obtain an in-group solidarity and maintain contacts with other addicts and "dope" peddlers This is attested by a correlation figure of .61± .06 by the eleven areas when these two series are taken together. This figure drops to 48± .07 when the rates of the two series are correlated by the 120 subcommunities This low correlation figure is caused by the insufficient number of cases in the drug addiction series for the computation of reliable subcommunity rates.

As might be expected from the area analysis of rates, the concentration of cases in this series is unusually marked. More than three fourths of all the cases are to be found in the upper quartile This concentration is shown in Table 5

TABLE 5

Percentage of Drug Addicts (Without Psychoses) and the Percentage of the Population in Each Fourth of the 120 Subcommunities Grouped on the Basis of the Magnitude of the Rates

Quartile grouping	Cases in each quartile	Population in each quartile
Fourth or upper	76 7%	24 1%
Third	14 5	26 2
Second	7 5	26 0
First	1 3	23 7
Total	100 0	100 0

This ecological and statistical evidence shows that the alcoholic psychoses have their highest rates in and near the center of the city In this sense the patterns of their rates are quite similar to those patterns found in the schizophrenic series but unlike the patterns found in the manic-depressive series In the alcoholic psychoses the rates by housing areas for the dif-

ferent nativity classifications indicated that there was some relationship between liability to the psychosis and the fact that the person does not live in a community primarily populated by his own nativity or racial group. The distribution of drug addicts, while representing a definite selection of cases, shows a pattern similar to the alcoholic psychoses. Not only do high rates occur in the zone of transition but also the bulk of the cases are to be found in this zone. The fact that the next highest rate for drug addiction is in the apartment-hotel and hotel area would seem to indicate that drug addicts tend to select the more mobile areas of the city where their habits and activities are less likely to be scrutinized.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Dollard, John, *et al*, *Frustration and Aggression*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1939 The authors have made a detailed study of the rooting of aggression in the frustration of basic wishes and desires The connection has been oversimplified but the account is still extremely valuable.

2 Dunham, H W, "The Social Personality of the Catatonic Schizophrene," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1944, pp 508–18 This article is based on the life-histories of 42 catatonics It reveals the pattern of a highly developed consciousness of self which results in anxiety, seclusiveness, overconformity to community mores, strong home attachment, and other personality traits which make it difficult for the catatonic to participate in social life

3 Faris, R E L, "Reflections of Social Disorganization in the Behavior of a Schizophrenic Patient," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1944, pp 134–41 Based on a thoroughgoing study of a single life-history, this article shows the linkage between severe life problems and the development of psychosis It indicates also the way in which a disorganized social environment heightens the personality conflict growing out of the life problems

4 Freud, Sigmund, *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, tr by A A Brill, Modern Library, New York, 1938 This is a comprehensive selection from the writings of the leader of the psychoanalytic school It is important for us because these writings constitute the source of the thinking of the cultural psychoanalysts who have gone beyond Freud.

5 Fromm, Erich, *Man for Himself*, Rinehart & Company, New York, 1947, esp pp 218–44 Fromm, a culturally oriented psychoanalyst, develops in these pages a theory of ethics based on the conception that there are certain basic needs in the nature of man which must be fulfilled by any social order if the personality of its members is to be organized and integrated

6 Landis, Carney, and Page, J D, *Modern Society and Mental Disease*, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1938 The authors give a compact statistical picture of our "mentally diseased" population showing distribution according to age, marital status, residence, and various population groups

7 Woodward, J W, "The Relation of Personality Structure to the Structure of Culture," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1948, pp 637–51 Woodward, a social psychologist, uses some of the concepts of psychoanalysis to show how they furnish a basis for the understanding of the relation of personality and culture Such an approach also involves a reinterpretation of the analytic concepts within a social frame of reference.

8 Young, Kimball, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, F S Crofts and Company, New York, 1940, esp pp 708–82 This book is noteworthy because of its wide coverage of various types of personal-adjustment problems, all of them interpreted within a consistent, though eclectic, sociological frame of reference The pages cited contain specific discussions of the neurotic and psychotic in our society

9 See also Davis, "Final Note on a Case of Extreme Isolation," p 173, Mead, "Play, the Game and the Generalized Other," p 187, Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," p 771, Fuller and Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," p 780, Sutherland, "White-Collar Criminality," p 788.

PART THREE *BASIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS*

BASIC ASPECTS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The study of culture and personality, while necessary for a well-rounded picture of social life, may be considered somewhat peripheral to sociological analysis, since these topics form the central areas of investigation for other disciplines. Culture is described and analyzed by the anthropologist, and personality is one of the major fields of research for the social psychologist When we come to deal with *social relations* as such, however, we approach the center of the sociological field, for whatever else the sociologist may be interested in, he is always concerned with the web of relations men weave in their interaction with one another. Those writers who call sociology the science of society are simply indicating rather loosely its basic subject matter, because the generic use of the term "society" points to the existence of social relations.

Social relations exist whenever people behave in ways determined by their mutual awareness of one another. Thus these relations are the content of man's everyday life with his fellows. The mother feeding the child, the boss issuing orders and the worker obeying them, the soldier and the enemy engaged in hand-to-hand combat, all these — if viewed in regard to the way each member of the pair behaves towards the other member — are social relations If a social relation or complex of social relations is shaped by a set of culturally defined rights and duties shared by the participants, we shall term such a relation or relations a *social system*. The social relation between husband and wife, for example, is a social system, for it is determined in large measure by agreement on the social role each should play in the home. This system is in turn part of the larger social system of the family.

Our first problem in the analysis of social relations is to be certain that we understand both the nature of the concept and the phenomena to which it refers Consequently, the first chapter of this Part is devoted largely to the development of a precise definition of social relations, to a brief description of certain basic types of relations, and to the methods by which they can be studied A second concept of equal importance, *social group,* will also be dealt with in this chapter, since it is in the social system known as the group that we find most of the social relations with which we are concerned

Not all social relations are social systems; neither are they always parts of larger systems such as social groups. Some social relations, even though existing within large social groups, are not organized by the systems of rights and obligations of those groups. These relatively unstructured relations compose the field of *collec-*

tive behavior. They range from the fleeting contacts of people in areas of city life somewhat removed from social control to vast networks of relations among people mutually oriented by reason of their interest in some controversial problem. These latter unstructured groupings are called *publics,* and together with *crowds* have been given the greatest amount of attention in this field of relatively unordered relations. Our second problem, then, will be to describe and analyze these complexes of social relations, paying particular attention to crowds and publics.

Our third problem has to do with the large inclusive social systems usually denoted when we speak of "a community" or "a society." It is within such groupings that the unstructured relations mentioned above are usually found. In addition, they include large numbers of other social groups and social relations which have grown up within them and to which they bring a greater or lesser degree of order through the control exerted by their culture patterns. These groups range in size from the small local community to the nation, which is the largest effective form of society existing today. Our fundamental problem is to determine the typical modes of organization through which these social systems order their constituent subgroups and nongroup relations. Sociologists have generally distinguished two types, based on markedly contrasting modes of social organization We shall make an analysis of these types under the classification of *associational* and *communal societies.*

Our final problem in connection with the basic characteristics of social relations will be to describe some of the *demographic* and *ecological* aspects of societies Every society has a social population which includes all persons who play social roles in the system. It is the demographer's task to describe and analyze these social populations. His first interest is in the processes through which populations grow and decline. Consequently he studies birth rates, death rates, and other factors such as immigration which directly relate to the size of population. Second, he describes the composition of populations in terms of age, sex, educational level, occupation, and so forth. Finally, he tries to determine the ways in which changes in the population affect society, and also the ways in which societal change may affect the size or composition of the population.

The research efforts of the demographer and the ecologist tend to overlap, but a distinction can be drawn if one emphasizes the ecologist's interest in the spatial distribution of people, groups, and nongroup relations within the framework of the community. Most of the research in human ecology has been done in urban communities and has revealed the existence of orderly patterns in the location of social systems in different areas of the city. It is upon this spatial aspect of the work of the ecologist that we shall focus our attention.

Many other aspects of social relations are examined in this book, but the selections in this section were chosen to describe the *basic* aspects of social relations, i.e., those aspects which must be understood before it is possible to proceed to a more detailed analysis of social structure.

9. Social Relations and the Social Group

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Our preliminary definition of *social relations* stated that they exist whenever people behave in patterned ways determined by their mutual awareness of one another. Max Weber has defined the concept more specifically as "the behavior of a plurality of actors in so far as the action of each takes meaningful account of that of the others and is oriented in those terms." It is therefore apparent that social relations are almost infinite in number and extremely varied in character Within a given situation, sociological analysis may be directed toward a mere quantitative enumeration of relations, or, as is more often the case, it may attempt to get at their more significant aspects by describing them as hostile or solidary, isolated or incorporated in larger systems, reciprocal or nonreciprocal, transient or long-lived. In any of these instances, the social relationship "consists entirely and exclusively in the probability that there will be . . . a meaningful course of social action."

It is not necessary here to detail the nature of social relations, because, after carefully defining the concept in the terms quoted above, Weber, in the excerpt we have selected from *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* discusses various aspects of social relations Particularly important is his emphasis on the fact that the social relationship consists of the likelihood, based on the awareness of the actors of the existence and behavior of each other, that there will be some more or less predictable form of social interaction. The character of the awareness and the social actions which develop from it are dependent upon the actors' definitions of the situation, i e, the meanings which the actors attach to the situation and to their acts. Thus two people who define each other as friends will direct their acts toward one another in ways based on this definition This will occur not in just one instance of action but in many instances; the social relation is a roughly predictable *pattern* of action

We must remember from our earlier discussion of social roles, however, that in a highly organized social system the statuses themselves, as systems of rights and duties, define the situation for purposes of action. All we need to know, then, is that the actor is aware of his role and has *some* motive for performing it. There need not be a complete internalization of the role, and hence the predictable aspects of the act lie in the system of social roles rather than in the personality of the actor. (Prediction is based on the *social* role and not on the individual personality.) It will be recalled that we used the illustration of the soldier in wartime obeying orders and carrying out his social role without deeply internalizing it. For purposes

of prediction we need not know the precise significance of the role to the soldier; the only important thing is that he have some motive for playing it. In such a highly organized system as the army, the social role may entail one or more of a wide range of motives on the part of the soldier — fear, anger, ambition, patriotism, or habitual acceptance — and so long as any one of these motives supports the role the social relationship will exist. It is important that we understand this relation between role and motive.

In addition to the other characteristics which Weber discusses — that social relations may be of long or short duration, reciprocal or nonreciprocal meaning — we should also note that they may be *informal* or *formal*. In some intimate social relations, such as friendship pairs, the mutually shared definitions of the situation may reveal themselves implicitly and informally in the actions of the participants. Thus friends who are quarreling when someone intervenes, may, without exchanging a word with each other, turn upon the third party as an outsider. In other social relations we find the situation formally defined by a highly developed and objectified set of rules, as in the relations between officers and enlisted men in the armed forces. Yet one should be careful to note that informal relations are sometimes controlled by a cultural system of rights and obligations, even when this fact is by no means obvious. In such instances, the cultural definition of the situation has become so deeply ingrained in the personalities of the participants that there is no need for a set of formal rules Social relations in the family, for example, are largely culturally determined yet informal in character The social roles of the mother, father, and children are part of their personalities and so are not wholly defined by formalized norms.

Formally defined social relations are much easier to locate and describe than those which are informal. Yet informal ones are fully as important for sociological analysis, and techniques have been developed for observing and analyzing them. Lundberg's "The Sociography of Some Community Relations" is highly relevant here. It describes informal relations existing within larger social structures, and depicts some of the methods used in studying informal relations.

The Lundberg-Lawsing study has to do with friendship relations in a small community. Interviews rather than direct observation constituted the major source of data. Interviewers questioned chiefly the housewives of the community and asked them to name their friends. The data were then mapped and charted to reveal the friendship constellations in the community Much significant material was gathered, even though this technique has its limitations. Indeed, this study is useful for its exposition of the general methodology from which the authors derived their techniques, an important consideration since sociological data are no more reliable than the techniques through which these data are obtained.

In this study the investigator was concerned with social relations within a small village — in itself a rather large social system. Sociologists are interested in the description and analysis of these larger systems of social relations and hence devote considerable effort to the study of *social groups* as such. A social group may be

defined as any system of social relationships in which the members are united by a sense of emotional solidarity, of common purpose, or of both, and share a culture which defines their social roles and the standards by which members are differentiated from nonmembers.

Since social groups differ markedly from one another, it is essential to classify the major *types* of social groups. There are many methods of classifying groups, depending upon the purposes of the classifier. In keeping with the focus of this book, the particular system of classification we shall employ has been chosen because of its emphasis upon structural and functional differences. Our basic division is between *societies* and *associations*. A society is a social group within which the members share the basic elements and conditions of a common life. It is an inclusive group encompassing other social groups and relations. It links these groups and relations to one another through its institutions (systems of rules), which function as basic culture complexes defining the relations within and between social groups. A society may be a small village community, an urban community, a region, or, today, a nation. It is the matrix of social relations within which other forms of social life develop.

An association, on the other hand, is much more limited in scope. It is organized around a limited set of interests or values which people believe they can obtain or enjoy through concerted action. The values around which associations develop are varied: they may be emotional and affectional, as are those which lie at the root of family life, or they may be relatively rational and purposeful, as are those present in business organization. At one extreme of size the association may be a pair, at the other a giant corporation, a state, or a universal church. A third set of groupings, *social classes*, should also be mentioned here since such groupings form an extremely important part of social structure. They are more limited than a society, and less limited than associations, although not as highly organized. They are the product of the processes of differentiation and stratification, and will be dealt with at length in the section concerned with those processes.

Also not to be overlooked is the subclassification of associations into *primary* and *secondary groups*. This distinction is determined by the difference between social relations based on a shared emotional conviction of belonging together and those involving a more rational and purposeful orientation of the participants. The family is an example of the primary group, and the factory an example of the secondary group. The selection from Cooley, taken from his classic statement regarding the primary group, is important for an understanding of this type of social system. Here Cooley contrasts the emotional solidarity of the primary group with the more rational, impersonal characteristics of the secondary group. (Cooley never uses the term secondary but does mention the characteristics which we define as secondary in this chapter.) He points to the primary group, particularly the family, as the matrix of social relations through which the individual becomes the socialized person and upon which the person can depend throughout life for emotional support, and he describes the social interaction within it as "face-to-

t Faris (see item 2 in Annotated References) indicates that many large ups in which face-to-face interaction is impossible, such as certain types of religious organizations and revolutionary political parties, possess all the other characteristics of the primary group and should be considered as members of that class.

While the classification of social groups into society-association, and primary-secondary categories is basic for the purposes of this book, it should be mentioned that other subclassifications can and will be made. Sociologists have emphasized such characteristics as voluntary-involuntary membership, degree of organization, degree of domination by leaders, and degree of dependence or independence in relation to other groups as criteria of classification. All of these, as well as some which have not been mentioned here, are important, and will be discussed more fully as occasion arises in connection with the specific analysis of the structure of society.

The article by Hartshorne which concludes the chapter exemplifies the use of the concept *group* and the elements contained in its definition as a means of studying particular social systems. Hartshorne studies the college group as a small society or community, since it contains all the conditions necessary for a common life within a limited time span. He stresses the importance of informal relations in the college community, indicating that complete comprehension cannot be secured unless these relations are given their appropriate place in the analysis. The article is also useful for its statement of some of the nonquantitative methods which must be used in studying social relations and social groups.

The selections in this chapter reveal three of the basic characteristics of sociological analysis: careful definition and classification, the development of adequate research techniques, and the carrying out of concrete studies devoted to the analysis and description of actual social relations and social groups. It is on the basis of materials defined, gathered, and analyzed in this manner, that the concrete analyses of social structure which follow in later chapters are based.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP * *Max Weber*

The term 'social relationship' will be used to denote the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms The social relationship thus *consists* entirely and exclusively in the existence of a *probability* that there will be, in some meaningfully understandable sense, a course of social action For pur-

* From Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, tr. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Copyright 1947 by Oxford University Press, New York.

poses of definition there is no attempt to specify the basis of this probability

1. Thus, as a defining criterion, it is essential that there should be at least a minimum of mutual orientation of the action of each to that of the others. Its content may be of the most varied nature; conflict, hostility, sexual attraction, friendship, loyalty, or economic exchange. It may involve the fulfilment, the evasion, or the denunciation of the terms of an agreement, economic, erotic, or some other form of 'competition', common membership in national or class groups or those sharing a common tradition of status In the latter cases mere group membership may or may not extend to include social action; this will be discussed later The definition, furthermore, does not specify whether the relation of the actors is 'solidary' or the opposite

2 The 'meaning' relevant in this context is always a case of the meaning imputed to the parties in a given concrete case, on the average or in a theoretically formulated pure type — it is never a normatively 'correct' or a metaphysically 'true' meaning Even in cases of such forms of social organization as a state, church, association, or marriage, the social relationship consists exclusively in the fact that there has existed, exists, or will exist a probability of action in some definite way appropriate to this meaning It is vital to be continually clear about this in order to avoid the 'reification' of these concepts A 'state,' for example, ceases to exist in a sociologically relevant sense whenever there is no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented social action will take place This probability may be very high or it may be negligibly low. But in any case it is only in the sense and degree in which it does exist or can be estimated that the corresponding social relationship exists It is impossible to find any other clear meaning for the statement that, for instance, a given 'state' exists or has ceased to exist.

3. The subjective meaning need not necessarily be the same for all the parties who are mutually oriented in a given social relationship; there need not in this sense be 'reciprocity.' 'Friendship,' 'love,' 'loyalty,' 'fidelity to contracts,' 'patriotism,' on one side, may well be faced with an entirely different attitude on the other. In such cases the parties associate different meanings with their actions and the social relationship is in so far objectively 'asymmetrical' from the points of view of the two parties. It may nevertheless be a case of mutual orientation in so far as, even though partly or wholly erroneously, one party presumes a particular attitude toward him on the part of the other and orients his action to this expectation This can, and usually will, have consequences for the course of action and the form of the relationship A relationship is objectively symmetrical only as, according to the typical expectations of the parties, the meaning for one party is the same as that for the other. Thus the actual attitude of a child to its father may be at least approximately that which the father, in the individual case, on the average or typically, has come to expect A social relationship in which the attitudes are completely and fully corresponding is in reality a limiting case But the absence of reciprocity will, for terminological purposes, be held to exclude the existence of a social relationship only if it actually results in the absence of a mutual orientation of the action of the parties. Here as elsewhere all sorts of transitional cases are the rule rather than the exception.

4 A social relationship can be of a temporary character or of varying degrees of permanence. That is, it can be of such a kind that there is a probability of the repeated recurrence of the behaviour which corresponds to its subjective mean-

ing, behaviour which is an understandable consequence of the meaning and hence is expected. In order to avoid fallacious impressions, let it be repeated and continually kept in mind, that it is *only* the existence of the probability that, corresponding to a given subjective meaning complex, a certain type of action will take place, which constitutes the 'existence' of the social relationship. Thus that a 'friendship' or a 'state' exists or has existed means this and only this: that we, the observers, judge that there is or has been a probability that on the basis of certain kinds of known subjective attitude of certain individuals there will result in the average sense a certain specific type of action. For the purposes of legal reasoning it is essential to be able to decide whether a rule of law does or does not carry legal authority, hence whether a legal relationship does or does not 'exist' This type of question is not, however, relevant to sociological problems.

5. The subjective meaning of a social relationship may change; thus a political relationship, once based on solidarity, may develop into a conflict of interests In that case it is only a matter of terminological convenience and of the degree of continuity of the change whether we say that a new relationship has come into existence or that the old one continues but has acquired a new meaning It is also possible for the meaning to be partly constant, partly changing.

6 The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in a social relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims which the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners, on the average and approximately. The more rational in relation to values or to given ends the action is, the more is this likely to be the case There is far less possibility of a rational formulation of subjective meaning in the case of a relation of erotic attraction or of personal loyalty or any other affectual type than, for example, in the case of a business contract.

7. The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon by mutual consent. This implies that the parties make promises covering their future behaviour, whether toward each other or toward third persons. In such cases each party then normally counts, so far as he acts rationally, in some degree on the fact that the other will orient his action to the meaning of the agreement as he (the first actor) understands it In part, they orient their action rationally to these expectations as given facts with, to be sure, varying degrees of subjectively 'loyal' intention of doing their part But in part also they are motivated each by the value to him of his 'duty' to adhere to the agreement in the sense in which he understands it. This much may be anticipated.

THE SOCIOGRAPHY OF SOME COMMUNITY RELATIONS *

George A. Lundberg and Margaret Lawsing

The explanation of social groupings and their behavior as groups is generally regarded as the basic problem of sociology. Accordingly, any comprehensive social theory must provide a logically consistent description of this phenomenon. All systematic thinkers on the subject have recognized this need and they have usually advanced, therefore, some generalized principle, such as gregarious instincts, consciousness of kind, class consciousness, etc The main difficulty with these theories has been that they have posited within the individual or the group some mechanism, itself unexplained or only implicitly accounted for, by which the observed behavior was to be explained This approach is in striking contrast to that which physical science has found so useful, namely, that the behavior of any particle or aggregate is to be explained mainly in terms of the structure of the field within which it operates The swing toward this position in sociology is evidenced by the increasing emphasis upon the situation (of which the individual or the group under consideration is always a part) rather than upon the individual characteristics of the behaving entity [1]

Geographers and ecologists have given one type of recognition to the situational interpretation of social behavior At first these studies emphasized chiefly the purely geographic, structural, and spatial relationships of the community The mapping and charting of these features admittedly provided a useful framework within which to interpret many aspects of community behavior Fortunately, the technique of symbolizing on paper such facts as area, direction, topography, channels of communication, land utilization, economic areas, etc, by maps and airplane photographs is widely accepted and understood There are several reasons for the general understanding of this kind of symbolic representation. In the first place, in its most elementary forms, it is a kind of picture-writing Secondly, the cartographic and photographic types of representation have thus far been applied chiefly to those aspects of the community which are conspicuously incorporated in the so-called material culture, for the objective study of

[1] This is a position which has been much emphasized in recent years by Gestalt psychologists, although they have shown a tendency to make fallacious assumptions regarding the nature of the "situation as a whole" See G A Lundberg, "Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *Amer Sociol Rev*, Feb 1936 The position has also been emphasized for some decades by sociologists, e g, in the writings of W. I Thomas and L L Bernard A brief statement of the field-theoretical position here taken will be found in G A Lundberg, "The Demographic and Economic Basis of Political Radicalism and Conservatism," *Amer Jour Sociol*, 32, Mar 1927, 724–725 (footnote) For a fuller application of the theory, see G A Lundberg, "Public Opinion from a Behavioristic Viewpoint," *Amer Jour Sociol*, 36, Nov 1930, 387–405 By far the fullest and ablest exposition of the theory as well as applications of it to sociology will be found in J F Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, McGraw-Hill, 1936

* *American Sociological Review*, June, 1937, pp 318–35 Reprinted by permission of G. A Lundberg

which our techniques have always been more highly developed. As a result, we ascribe to those aspects of the community which can be depicted or represented by the simpler cartographic methods a "tangibility," "concreteness" and "reality" which we withhold from aspects for which we have not yet developed objective symbolic techniques [2]

The next step after mere mapping in the process of describing the community was to convert behavior itself into symbolic indexes which can in turn be represented in geometric, isometric, isotypical, or gradient terms.[3] Thus birth, death, disease, and delinquency rates or any other behavior phenomena can be computed for local areas and the relationship of such phenomena to these regions can be shown by lines representing gradients or other geometric devices. A line on the same map representing the declining delinquency rate from the center of the city toward the periphery, denotes a phenomenon just as actual, observable and meaningful as a line representing the main street. Yet such is the degree of our unfamiliarity with such abstractions as rates, that we feel the line representing the street has a certain "reality," legitimacy, and relevance to the "true" representation of a community which it is felt the delinquency gradient has not. Both types of lines represent both a structural and a functional phenomenon. At present, many of these behavior phenomena have not yet been metricized. Until they are reduced to metric units we may deal with them by topological constructs, which may be an intermediate step toward metrical statement.[4] The correlation [5] of these various indexes when worked out for *all* the relevant aspects of community behavior would represent all the description and explanation of the life of a community which science can attain For this description, multiplied and generalized, would say in a more precise and verifiable fashion all that is factually valid in all the wordy and obscure treatises we now have on the community.

The aspect of the community which this approach seems to neglect is the so-called "human" psychological factors of social interaction itself Hence the next step is to invent objective devices for the representation of these processes which are at present dealt with largely in the language of literature and philosophy

It will be observed that the transition in the technique of representation from an ecological spot or rate map of delinquency to the organization or functional chart represents merely a transition (a) from geographic to social space representation and (b) from the relatively pictorial technique of the delinquency map to a perhaps more abstract form of symbolic representation of the behavior depicted by the functional chart. That is, the lines in an organization chart do not correspond to roads, railways, etc in geographic space but represent relationships in social space,[6]

[2] For a development of this position, namely, that tangibility, concreteness, etc are not characteristics inherent in data but merely words describing the degree to which we have developed objective symbolic techniques of dealing with such data, see G A Lundberg, "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *Amer. Sociol Rev*, Oct 1936, 703–723

[3] See C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*, Univ of Chicago Press, 1929 Elsa S Longmoor and E F Young, "Ecological Interrelationships of Juvenile Delinquency and Population Mobility," *Amer. Jour Sociol*, Mar 1936, 598–610

[4] See J F Brown, *op cit*, 476 ff Also K Lewin, *Principles of Topological Psychology*, McGraw-Hill, 1936, Part II

[5] The term correlation is here used in its broadest sense See G A Lundberg, "Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *op cit*, 41–43

[6] We use the term "social space" in the Riemannian sense, i e, as a mathematical (geometric) construct defined as a manifold in which positional relationships of *any kind* may be ex-

such as the relation of the mayor to subordinate officials, just as a political boundary or a delinquency gradient represents a behavior phenomenon relating two areas of a city in geographic space In both cases the lines stand fundamentally for behavior phenomena, which are the concern of science. In the same way, purely topological representations are merely other literary methods of representing relations. These points are made for the benefit of those who feel that any other language than the customary philosophical terminology of discussing the subtler community relations is "artificial," "cold," rigid, and lacking in color. All symbolic representation of behavior is "artificial" in exactly the same way The coldness, rigidity, and lack of color of the topological symbolism may be the best reason for its superiority as scientific language It is, in fact, because philosophical vocabulary is so suffused with subtle and varied emotional tones and meanings that it turns out to be largely useless in scientific discourse and tends to be supplanted by geometric and other mathematical symbols.[7] It is significant to note how well other sciences get along in explaining the most intricate phenomena without any of the type of language alleged to be so essential in sociology.

Next below the formal, official, or latent organization of the whole community is a network of so called private groups — families, religious bodies, clubs, fraternities, etc These have a considerable degree of formal organization and permanence, but are usually thought of as relatively selective and "voluntary" instead of inclusive and automatic in their membership[8] Also, they are more limited and specialized in the type of interests which give rise to them This level of community organization is usually regarded as less "tangible" than the formal political organization of the whole community The feeling that these informal groupings are less tangible is due to the relative absence of objective and systematic information about them and the relatively unstable and shifting nature of most of them. Attempts to study and chart this level of community structure are, however, becom-

pressed From this point of view we may employ spatial constructs to depict relationships quite independent of direction or distance These may be relationships of connection, position, or any other properties of a qualitative, non metrical nature According to Riemann, spaces may be constructed of any dimensions and properties provided they are logically consistent He also showed that the properties of a space may be dependent upon the dynamics of processes within that space Topology is the geometry of such spaces may therefore be of great importance to [illegible] is a solution of the controversy over quantitative *vs* qualitative methods That is qualitative (as yet non metricized) relationships may through topological constructs be rendered about as objective as quantitative or metrical constructs If so present objections to qualitative operations and terms would disappear The use of spatial constructs and terms with reference to social relationships is of course very ancient and merely reflects the fact that relational thinking tends to structure itself in spatial terms *Cf* J F Brown, 'On the Use of Mathematics in Psychological Theory,' *Psychometrica*, Mar 1936 77–90 See also P A Sorokin *Social Mobility* Chap 1 Harpers, 1927, for a good non mathematical statement of the same point Algebraic description should, of course, supersede the geometric as soon as possible

[7] As an illustration of the ambiguity of the language used in current sociological discussion see my discussion, *Amer Jour Sociol*, Mar 1937, of an article by H L Jensen and Mr Jensen's reply in which he insists that his article means to him exactly the opposite of what it means to me For another conspicuous illustration see the controversy between John Dewey and R M Hutchins in *The Social Frontier* Feb–Mar 1937 (G L)

[8] The family is probably an exception to this statement But it is for present purposes classified among the so called voluntary associations arising from drives of relatively widespread and permanent distribution and hence sociologically comparable to the religious, fraternal recreational and socio economic organizations that make up the bulk of the 'voluntary' associations of a community

ing increasingly objective.[9] This is notably true of studies of family structure, function and behavior.

Finally, there is underlying these private and more or less "voluntary" social groupings the tremendously intricate and elementary network of informal social nuclei which we describe in such terms as affinities, friendships, love affairs, cliques, gangs, etc These are at present the least tangible social units because of their informal, transitory, private and frequently secret character, as well as their occasionally illicit and sometimes illegal nature These groupings are not structurally enshrined in any of the objective forms usually accompanying other forms of social organization such as written constitutions, buildings, and other "material" paraphernalia, and they are charged with no formal functions by the larger community Yet the basic nature of these nuclei and their profound influence in determining especially the functioning of the more formal structures has always been recognized. The influence of these alignments is what we rely upon "insiders," "dopesters," and gossips to convey to us, since objective and official accounts of the behavior of the generally recognized social groups contain no mention of these underlying influences. Yet it is admitted that the generally recognized behavior of a community can in a given case be adequately explained only if these basic alignments are understood. Behind all present objective explanations of community behavior, therefore, there is always an aura of data, at present largely in the form of gossip, because of its subjective form, which we all feel constitutes the "real" explanation of what takes place. In the same way, the clever leader knows that the success of any program must take into consideration the cultural, psychological, emotional, and other clique alignments, especially of "key" people, the existence of which may not be consciously recognized by the people concerned, and certainly not admitted by them Failure to take these alignments into consideration is generally recognized as a tactical blunder, lack of tact, diplomacy, etc. The objective study of these elementary social nuclei[10] is, therefore, quite basic both to understanding and intelligent control of the community

The exploitation of these subtle forms of social nucleation has thus far been left largely to novelists, journalists, and other artists The intangibility of the phenomenon to be described, it has been felt, is such that only the allegedly subtler insights of the artist can adequately appreciate and portray these intricate, personal, and hidden social currents of attraction and repulsion. Sociologists have also attempted to capture and portray the phenomenon through life histories, diaries, detailed case studies, and more general treatises of the type of *Middletown* With all of this literature, from the most impressionistic poem or novel to the better sociological treatises of the type mentioned, the scientist has no quarrel In the

[9] See Mirra Komarovsky, "A Comparative Study of the Voluntary Organizations of Two Suburban Communities," *Publ Amer Sociol Soc*, Vol 27, May 1933 Also G A Lundberg, *et al Leisure*, Columbia University Press, 1934, chap. v, F. S. Chapin, *op cit*, chap xviii

[10] The concept of social nucleation has hitherto been employed macroscopically in ecology chiefly to refer to that process through which centers of interaction develop in social aggregates, such as metropolitan areas and geographic regions Within a region or a metropolitan area for example, the population tends to subdivide and become multinucleated in a complex of centers that are economically and socially integrated in a larger regional unity R D McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* McGraw Hill, 1933 49 F S Chapin also uses the term to describe certain institutions as 'nucleated' (family, church, etc) as contrasted with 'diffused symbolic' institutions (art, law, science, etc) *Op cit*, 13

first place, he recognizes that science in its more remote reaches probably merges with art and in all its phases relies on many artistic techniques. In the second place, the scientist is ever on the lookout for suggestions which may be formulated into profitable hypotheses for investigation by the more formal, objective, and rigorous methods upon which science relies for the verification of hypotheses. It is this last step which is the *sine qua non* of science but not a requirement in art To be sure, the artist, too, seeks a type of verification in the response of people to his product. Such corroboration in art consists of evoking in people the feeling that this artistic account "rings true." The trouble with this "feeling" as a verification of scientific fact is that it is subjective and that the novelist's account frequently rings true not to any demonstrable fact but to the current stereotypes of the reader or of the public Hence it is that a large part of the social scientist's task must be to develop techniques by which the allegations of artists and philosophers can be verified and objectively demonstrated or refuted

The present paper is mainly concerned with the problem of representing more objectively some of these community nuclei which are at present considered the subtler and more intangible facts of community structure, and which have hitherto, therefore, been left chiefly to literary and philosophic exploitation Such terms as subtlety, complexity, and intangibility should be recognized as being not inherent characteristics of data but merely words describing the degree of our adjustment to certain aspects of phenomena, i e, the stage of development of our techniques of dealing with them.[11] If we take this view, then the principal task of science, today as in the past, is undoubtedly to objectify[12] the subtle and intangible and so to make possible verification of the type generally recognized in science.

The basic assumption of ecologists and others who have attempted to chart the community is that the structures which they depict represent the channels along which flows the energy or force which we must postulate as behind all activity. This assumption also meets the common objection to the ecologist's technique, that it does not portray the dynamic interactions which are the essence of social activity. Just as the trend of development has been from mapping geographic features to the spatial representation of group behaviors of the more obvious (i e, formally recorded) type, so the next step is to develop techniques of representing in their significant relationships the subtler (i e, as yet imperfectly understood) energy currents or forces that animate and define a community These patterns are here regarded as existing in social space as well as in geographic space. It has become highly conventional and useful to represent the latter by charts, maps, and other geometric devices The adequate representation of relationships in social space may likewise be greatly facilitated by a kind of sociography or psychological geography We proceed now to review some attempts at more objective and intensive analysis of these "subtle," elementary societary phenomena

II

The more detailed and objective studies of societal grouping on its more elementary levels have been up to the present

[11] See G A Lundberg, "The Thoughtways of Contemporary Sociology," *op cit* Also, Read Bain, "The Concept of Complexity in Sociology," *Social Forces*, Dec. 1929 and Mar 1930

[12] Chapin (*op cit*) has already made notable contributions toward objectifying some of the basic theoretical viewpoints of Cooley and has also brought together a great deal of relevant data bearing upon the theory.

largely confined to observations of the spontaneous groupings of school children and other institutional populations [18] Thus, it has been observed that babies at ages from 20 to 28 weeks first begin to react noticeably toward each other, without selectivity, however, except on a basis of physical proximity. That is, societal proximity or distance correlates highly with physical proximity or distance. At ages from 40 to 42 weeks, babies begin to show signs of selective responsiveness on other bases than physical proximity. Other studies have dealt with the spontaneous assortive groupings of young children when turned into a school yard or into a play room. Among children sufficiently developed linguistically to make verbal choices, more complete studies have been made of groupings of school children based on mutual or one-sided attractions and repulsions.

The next step forward in studies of this kind has been taken by Moreno in undertaking to chart the attraction-repulsion patterns of an entire institutional community.[14] Moreno asked all the members of the State Training School for Girls at Hudson, New York, to indicate their choices, in order from one to five, of the members of the community with whom each would like to occupy the same house The choices were confidential and it was definitely understood that they would become the basis for a reassignment to different houses This is a closed community with a population of between five and six hundred. The girls live in sixteen cottages each with a housemother Tabulation of the choices of desired housemate, including housemothers, revealed an intricate set of sociological nuclei of five principal types. (1) The most elementary and definite nucleus was the mutual first choice of two or more individuals among themselves This might be represented by figures of couples, triangles, squares, circles, or figures of more intricate dimensions (2) Then there were the patterns most simply represented by chains of a non-mutual character, as, for example, when A chooses B, B chooses C, and C chooses A Such chains might, of course, consist of any number of individuals (3) A third type of configuration resulted from a clustering of a large number of choices around a single individual, to some of which this "star" may respond by mutual choice, to others by indifference, and to others by repulsion. (This information regarding indifference and repulsion was secured through separate private interviews) (4) A fourth type of nucleation, of great practical significance, was the phenomenon of the powerful as contrasted with the popular individual, and the phenomenon of indirect influence Thus, an individual may be the object of a large number of choices by people relatively isolated from the rest of the community The center of such a cluster of choices may be very popular with his immediate group but may not

[18] J L Moreno, *Who Shall Survive? A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations,* Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, Washington, D. C., 1934, 23 ff., 373 ff. See also, D. Thomas, A M Loomis, and R Arrington, *Observational Studies of Social Behavior,* Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, 1933; Ruth Arrington, *Interrelations in the Behavior of Young Children,* Child Development Monographs, No 8 Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932, W I Newstetter, and M J Feldstein, *A Brief Summary of the Wawokiye Camp Research Project, 1931–32* (mimeographed), Western Reserve University. A similar study of the students of Bennington College on the basis of their choices of house mates and their spontaneous groupings at meals in the college dining-rooms has just been completed by Theodore Newcomb and Mary Steele

[14] *Op cit* The specific data referred to in the preceding paragraph are also taken from this source It may be noted in passing that the attraction-repulsion phenomenon was taken as basic not only for sociology, but for all other sciences, by L F. Ward. See his *Pure Sociology,* p. 89.

have very much influence in the community because of the limited contacts of his admirers On the other hand, an individual chosen by only a few may wield a powerful indirect influence by virtue of the extensive connections of the few popular persons for whom he is a center of attraction Thus, Moreno cites one case, herself chosen by only four individuals, all of whose attraction she reciprocates But these four are in their turn chosen by nearly one hundred individuals This seems to be the sociological position of the "power behind the throne" and the "dark horse" who wields the real power through the personalities of popular nominal leaders As Moreno has pointed out, "the distribution of power in large groups depends upon the intricate distribution of emotional currents An individual who is in control and can steer the course of one of these currents can wield an immense potential influence out of all proportion to his immediate following" Finally, (5) there is the isolated individual, chosen by nobody, although he may choose some other persons [15] Such individuals are almost certain to be maladjusted and to cause maladjustment in any group with which they have to live Sometimes, to be sure, such individuals, not chosen by anyone as housemates, may, however, be chosen as desirable work companions, so that isolation is always with reference to a criterion. The completely isolated individual would be one who was not chosen by anyone as an associate in any of the activities or relations of a community. Such an individual could not be very sensitive to the behavior standards of the community because he is cut off from the currents which constitute the pressures by which these standards become operative on the individual, and hence he would almost certainly be a social problem.

Now the individuals attracted to another individual regarded as a nucleus [16] together with the individuals to which this nucleus is attracted, any or all of which attractions may or may not be mutual, may be regarded as a social atom [17] with reference to any social interest, i e, any adjustment need. Thus, each individual, provided he is not socially isolated, is the nucleus of one or more social atoms according to the number of relationships in which he is the center of attraction. He may at the same time be the nucleus of one or more atoms and part of the electronic system of other atoms. These atomic structures may therefore overlap in a tremendous intricacy of interrelationship, each individual being at the same time part of numerous diverse structures, but in various degrees of completeness or intensity [18]

As was to be expected, Moreno found that a knowledge of the societal energy patterns of his community enabled him to explain events which occurred, such as a series of runaways, and, what is more important, it also enabled him to organize the community so as to relieve tensions and cause the virtual disappearance of certain types of maladjustment He also suggests the applicability of these methods in the social as well as in the physical planning of other than institutional communities, for example, such as those projected by the Resettlement Administration In this connection the question at once arises. How possible is it to carry on in an un-

[15] The five general types of grouping summarized above are, of course, subject to extensive variation, elaboration, and sub-classification See Moreno, *op cit*, 114–133, 147 ff

[16] The nucleus is here defined merely as the center of converging societal currents

[17] Atom is here defined as in other sciences, namely, as the smallest behavior unit with which it is possible to deal in the existing stage of development of knowledge and technology.

[18] See F S Chapin, *op cit*, Ch 16. Also, "Measuring the Volume of Social Stimuli," *Social Forces*, 4, Mar 1926, 479–495

controlled, open, and ordinary community such studies as Moreno and others have carried on with conspicuously successful results in schools and among other institutional groups? In short, can the informal and private affinities and nucleations of an ordinary community be discovered and charted with any degree of accuracy, and if so, what does this elementary and basic societary structure reveal?

As a first attempt to answer this question we undertook a complete house to-house canvass of a small Vermont village [19] Ninety four per cent of the families gave the desired information, the wife being most frequently the source of the information secured [20] The bulk of the interview consisted of (1) scoring the living room according to the Chapin scale, designed to measure socio economic status, (2) securing certain additional information regarding occupation, family size, general housing conditions and kinds of reading matter This information is not relevant to the present report and will therefore not be analyzed at this time (3) In the course of the interview, or at its conclusion, the person interviewed was asked to name her most intimate friends in the community,[21] after having been assured that this, in common with other information secured, would be kept strictly confidential.

It is recognized, of course, that the results secured and analyzed in part below are merely verbal testimony of friendship groupings voluntarily contributed by the persons interviewed [22] Under these conditions we would be likely to miss (1) illicit friendships, love affairs, and other attachments not approved by the community or otherwise embarrassing to the reporting individual. This would include all so-called subconscious attachments, if any. (2) The friendship patterns reported would not be complete for the whole community because other members of the family than the housewife would be members of other groups which we did not attempt to chart This is perhaps more true of the children than of the father in a community of this kind, and less true of either than it would be in a large urban community (3) We did not attempt to secure the negative or repulsion patterns for fear of compromising the success of the whole study The results secured, however, may be said to represent a highly reliable account of the friendship nuclei of the housewives of this village *as they were willing to have the investigator know these relationships* in the fall of 1936 As such, the purely verbal nature of the behavior studied is significant from some points of view, even if we make no assumption whatever as to its correlation with other friendship behavior (4) Finally, it is recognized that the results secured represent only the general friendship patterns as regards perhaps primarily recreational or prestige association, i e,

[19] Population about 1000, area about one sq mi Businesses and services two furniture factories, two dry goods stores two general stores three confectionery stores, four grocery stores three barber shops, one bank, one real estate office, two garages, one grist mill, two filling stations (plus five pumps in connection with other stores), one plumbing shop, one heating shop, four churches one school, one doctor, one fire station

[20] Since a village of this type merges gradually with the surrounding country, a number of families outside of the village limits are included in our data Two hundred fifty-six families were successfully interviewed out of a possible 272 in the area canvassed

[21] Information as to friends, visiting, and social correspondence with persons outside the community was also gathered, but is not here analyzed.

[22] Corroboration of the verbal testimony was attempted through interviews with certain local people after the main field work had been completed and also through a study of the social columns of the local newspaper While the groupings thus revealed are less complete than those secured through the interviews, they corroborate, as far as they go the interview results

"social" in the limited sense of the "visiting" type of association One's friends are usually chosen with reference to special types of association Thus, Moreno, for example, found that girls would sometimes choose different companions for work associates than for housemates We secured in this study perhaps primarily the "social" type of patterns [23] These are, however, very spontaneous and basic forms of social nucleation. They represent, perhaps, the individual's own estimate of his social status.

The primary objective of this study has not been so much to arrive at reliable facts and generalizations about this particular community as to suggest an approach to certain subtle social phenomena We are, for example, not concerned over the accuracy of the Chapin scale as a measure of socio-economic status [24] We used it merely as an illustration of how scales *of any kind* measuring perhaps a great variety of family and personality variables could be profitably used in the interpretation of social groupings

Of 256 persons successfully interviewed, only 3 cases of completely isolated persons were found (Twenty nine others admitted no friends in the village, but mentioned friends in the adjoining area. Thirteen of these 29 were also mentioned as friends by others in the village) All of these three isolated cases were older people without relatives, some of them with organic defects, such as deafness They were very eager for contacts and urged the interviewers to come back for further visiting.

Forty-six persons gave only one other person as their friend, and in 13 of these cases the choice was mutual. Only one of these pairs (men) was exclusive in the sense that neither member made any other choices, though both were chosen by several others. (See Chart II, M 1 and M 19) All of the other 12 pairs were women. More complicated forms of triangles (e g., Chart II, S 10, W 10 and W 16) and other patterns of the various types classified above wait upon further analysis These groupings are not commonly themselves isolated but have one or more ties with other similar groups

At the opposite extreme from the isolated persons stands the "star" or the person who is the object of a large concentration of choices The most conspicuous

[23] The term "friendship," like most other sociological terms, is too general and vague a category to allow conclusions as to just what relationships it covers in a given case In the present study, the person interviewed was asked to name confidentially her best friends in the community The aim was to secure the names spontaneously volunteered in response to what appeared to be a casual inquiry at the end of an interview dealing entirely with other matters If further interpretation was requested, the interviewer explained that what was desired was the names of people with whom "social" visiting for other than business or professional reasons most frequently took place The problem of the interpretation of this verbal behavior in terms of other behavior remains, of course But this is true of all behavior It takes on meaning in proportion as it is related to some larger pattern, and verbal behavior is not in this respect unique

[24] As a matter of fact, this scale yielded highly discriminating results as judged by standards secured in other communities and other reliable criteria on this community Each living-room was scored independently by two investigators If the score on the first or objective part of the scale varied, the discrepancy was reconciled by reference to the actual facts On the second, or subjective part, the score of the two investigators was averaged The scores in the village ranged from 28 to 260, with a mean of 120 and a median of 118 As a check upon the degree to which a more limited cultural homogeneity rather than general socio-economic status may be the basis of the groupings found, we rated one hundred families on the cultural content of the periodicals taken, as determined by the Morgan-Leahy scale of the cultural content of general interest magazines, *Journ. of Ed Psy*, Oct 1934, 540 ff The relationship of this index to the groupings found remains to be explored Correlation of the scores of the Morgan-Leahy scale and the Chapin scale yielded a coefficient of $+.47 \pm .07$




CHART I

"Friendship" Constellation in a Village. Each person is represented by a circle. The letter and the first number in the circle is the code symbol of the person. The second number is that person's score of socio-economic status on the Chapin scale. Each arrow represents a choice made or received according to the direction of the arrow. Mutual choices are represented by double-headed arrows.




CHART II

" Friendship " Constellation centering on a physician (M 1) and a barber (M 19) (For meaning of symbols see Chart I).

of these cases, with her satellites, is depicted in Chart I (M 31). She is the "lady bountiful" of the village — a widow of about 60 years, old and reputable family, wealthy, and generous in her donations to all village undertakings, from uniforms for the fire department to the major charities Her donations are apparently the chief basis for her prestige This person was mentioned as a friend by 17 people, most of them with heavy social ramifications of their own Yet the "star" herself mentioned only one person (a physician and politician, not among the 17 satellites) as her friend. The intricacy of the interrelationships among the satellites as shown in the lower part of the constellation indicates a very definite clique of high social potential (i.e., number and mutuality of choices). Two mutual triangles converge upon B 7 (a banker's wife) who has in addition a group of five satellites whose choices she does not reciprocate. These satellites are recipients of a total of 21 choices by persons outside of the constellation here depicted The satellites of the main star, M 31, receive from the outside a total of 46 designations as friends The magnetic power of M 31 in the community as well as the high interaction among her satellites depicted in the lower part of Chart I indicates a societal structure which would have to be considered in the description and explanation of a great many aspects of this community's behavior.

In Chart II we have a relationship suggesting the survival of the ancient connections between the barber's trade and the physician's profession. A physician (M 1) and a barber (M 19) indicate each other as friends and mention no others The physician, however, is the recipient of eight direct choices from his satellites who in turn receive a total of 26 choices from other people in the community The barber likewise receives six direct choices from his satellites, who are together the recipients of 26 choices from others When we consider all of the major characters in the constellation from the point of view of the number of times they are chosen as friends directly and indirectly (by one remove) we find a constantly decreasing volume of incoming social currents as we proceed from the center of the diagram toward the periphery, as in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Person	No of choices rec'd Direct	Indirect	Total
M 1	8	26	34
M 19	6	26	32
B 12	6	15	21
W 16	4	8	12
S 10	3	8	11
W 10	2	4	6

Thus the central mutual pair (M 1, M 19) receives a total of 66 choices; the other mutual pair (B 12, W 16) receives a total of 33, the mutual triangle (W 16, S 10, W 10) totals only 29 such choices

Only 4 of the 23 individuals represented in Chart II are also represented in Chart I While they are connected in various ways along the periphery they represent two well-defined social constellations with a total of 46 individuals representing about a sixth of the total families in the village

If none of the people represented in Charts I and II chose any friends outside

of the individuals represented in each chart respectively (i.e., if there were no arrows pointing toward the boundary of the chart), each group could be said to be highly nucleated, self sufficient, independent, clannish, etc, by which is meant a high degree of social cohesion and (if many mutual choices appear) interaction between the members of the constellation. Actually, however, a great many of the individuals represented in these charts also mentioned friends outside of the circles here charted If we consider these outgoing stimuli in the form of choices made rather than choices received as in Table 1, we get, for Chart II, the result shown in Table 2

TABLE 2

Person	No of choices made			No. of choices rec'd (direct and indirect)	Choices rec'd minus choices made
	Direct	Indirect	Total		
M 1	1	0	1	34	33
M 19	1	0	1	32	31
B 12	6	13	19	21	2
W 16	6	13	19	12	7
S 10	7	18	25	11	14
W 10	3	17	20	6	14

The surplus of choices received over the choices made (incoming over outgoing stimuli) may be regarded as a sort of index of the degree of cohesion or nucleation of any social segment. If the social bonds of a number of individuals with each other are no greater than with individuals outside of the aggregation considered (i.e, if choices received equal choices made, in the present illustration), there is no reason for regarding the population studied as nucleated or otherwise defined as against the larger population of which they are a part If, on the other hand, there is a surplus of incoming over outgoing choices of friends, we may regard the population within which such surplus obtains as centered or nucleated around the individuals upon which the greatest surplus of incoming choices are directed The situations depicted in both of the accompanying charts represent, therefore, highly nucleated constellations as contrasted with a random selection of individuals within the village More extensive tests of the operation of this principle need to be made and are under way. In the meantime, we tentatively suggest as a measure of social cohesion, interaction, or degree of social nucleation in a group of individuals, the following generalized statement Social cohesion varies with the preponderance of stimuli coming into and exchanged between the individuals in a group over the stimuli directed outside the group, i e., incoming stimuli plus interaction (mutuals) equals degree of nucleation The adequate measurement of these social currents is therefore the central problem. The technique here employed represents, of course, only one type of interstimulation or social bond.

The fragmentary data reviewed above raise the question as to what may be the basis, or bases, of any social nucleation in a population such as is here under consideration In the cases here reviewed, socio-economic status, professional or political status were clearly present To test the general hypothesis as to whether people tend to name as friends persons of higher socio-economic status than themselves, we compared the choices made with the

scores of the persons choosing and being chosen on the Chapin living-room scale. A glance at Chart I shows that in the cases of the three principal "stars," all except one (27 out of 28) of the persons naming these "stars" as friends have a lower socio-economic score than the "star" chosen. The choices are seven to one in the direction of higher socio-economic scores among the satellites. Excluding mutuals (which cancel each other) there are in fact only three choices in the entire chart (of 29) in the direction of lower socio-economic status and one of these (Pr 11) represents too slight a difference to be significant. Including the mutuals, the proportions are 35 to 9 Chart II reveals the same tendency but in a less striking manner.

As was to be expected, the tendency to choose friends of higher socio-economic status varies with the socio-economic level of the chooser, as shown in Table 3.

These results are of course in part due to the fact that the person at the very bottom of the socio-economic scale would necessarily choose friends of higher status, and the person at the very top would necessarily choose friends of lower status. This principle would tend to operate in all groups to the extent that the limits are approached.[25] To correct this tendency and to discover the inclination to choose friends with higher socio-economic status when the total numbers from which choices may be made is about even above and below the chooser, we studied separately the median group with scores ranging from 93 to 143, i e 25 points immediately above and 25 points immediately below the median (118). This group, consisting of more than one-third of all persons in the study and located in the middle of the socio-economic distribution, di-

TABLE 3

Socio-economic score	No of cases	Average no of choices per chooser	Percentage of choices made in direction of higher scores than those of choosers	Standard errors (per cent)
0– 49	13	2 4	97	—
50– 74	26	2 1	75	8 5
75– 99	51	2 3	81	5 5
100–124	54	1 9	66	6 5
125–149	50	2 7	50	7 1
150–174	36	2 0	36	8 0
175–199	13	1 5	50	—
200–and up	13	2 0	15	—

[25] This does not mean, of course, that all the differences noted in Table 3 are necessarily to be explained by the operation of this principle of pure chance It is reasonable that the groups of lower socio-economic status should be deliberately more concerned to associate themselves with persons of higher status, as is indicated in the behavior of the median group as noted in these pages The average number of choices made does not vary significantly with socio-economic status, but the average number of choices received varies uniformly and directly with socio-economic score Some of the percentages in Table 3 are, of course, based on too few cases to be significant. The Standard Errors given are computed by Yule's formula $\sigma_p = \sqrt{pq/n}$ (*An Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, p 262) The differences between the percentages in adjacent groups in the middle of the distribution are also not statistically significant by the formula $\sigma_{diff} = \sqrt{\sigma_{p_1}^2 + \sigma_{p_2}^2}$.

rected 60% of their choices of friends in the direction of higher socio-economic status. There is a tendency for choices to cluster in the classes nearest to that of the chooser, but skewed in this median group toward the side of rising scores.

Space does not permit a more complete analysis at this time of the personalities, occupations, family relationships, and other factors which influence or determine the constellations noted, or of others in the remainder of the population. The complete pattern for the village and its full interpretation will be published later.[26] In the meantime it may be pointed out that the type of analysis attempted above with respect to the relationship of socio-economic status to social groupings could be extended to include any or all other factors as well, especially when adequate scales for the measurement of these factors have been constructed If comprehensively carried out such analyses should yield generally valid conclusions regarding the bases of social nucleation in different cultures.

III

CONCLUSION

This paper considers the community (1) from the spatial point of view, merely as a certain kind of segment of the social universe. (2) From the dynamic point of view, the community is regarded as a system of energy operating within a field of force, in time Energy is defined, as in any science, as *that which* produces observable manifestations of interaction The field of force, as in any science, is merely that segment of the universe which for given purposes of study, with the sensory and symbolic apparatus we command at present, we find it convenient or relevant to define as the situation in which we are interested Similarities and differences (of characteristics or positions), attractions and repulsions (imbalances of whatever sort) within this total system determine the vigor and the direction of the flow of this energy. These differences may be of any kind — social-spatial (status), temporal (e g , age), sexual, economic, esthetic, temperamental, developmental, or any other. The imbalances may vary in degree from intensest hate to the vaguest dislike, and from fervid love to a vague and even subconscious affinity Their character, degree, intensity, size (or any other measure), direction, and duration determine the resulting societal configurations in a community, and hence at any given moment, the organization and social functioning of the community. For this energy flow *constitutes* both the behavior and the structure of the community, as of all other observable phenomena [27]

From this point of view, *any* social group may be regarded as a system of energy flowing through intersecting channels, eddying around every person and between persons in myriads of forms in different sizes, degrees, directions, and durations These dynamics stand in the same relation to the more obvious social events that the atomic structure of matter stands to our understanding of the events of the "physical" world It is on the basis of these different forms, sizes, intensities, and durations that we undertake to distinguish between different types of human groupings, such as crowds, mobs, publics, neighborhoods, communities, states, etc. These nucleations of energy constitute the societal structure of social groups, and when objectively symbolized they are in every respect as observable, objective, and measurable data as are the physical, geographic,

[26] To appear in *Sociometry*.

[27] Behavior or function is merely a series of changing structures and structure is merely a persistent function *Cf* A Carrel, "The New Cytology," *Science*, 73, Mar 20, 1931, 298, also G. E. Coghill, "The Neuro-Embryologic Study of Behavior, Principles, Perspective, and Aim," *Science*, 78, Aug 18, 1933, 137.

and ecological representations of the community.

Superimposed upon this fundamental energy pattern which constitutes the present functioning of any community there will be a multitude of more or less dormant or surviving patterns representing past channels of energy flow which may be either relatively stable or disintegrating. They are like the bayous and channels along which the river no longer flows, or flows only sluggishly or intermittently. These are frequently the established but non-functioning institutions, vested thoughtways, and the material culture in which they are enshrined. These grooves and channels of past energy flow are, of course, part of the situation which determines the present generation and flow of social energy. The scientific problem with respect to the community, therefore, becomes the problem of formulating the laws of social gravity or the description of how social energy develops and distributes itself in space (both geographic and social) and time (siderial or social).[28]

It cannot be emphasized too earnestly that the impasses of science are nearly always solved by a departure from the accepted categories and frames of reference. This does not mean that the existing data or principles are abandoned or destroyed. They merely become special cases of the broader theory and are translated into the new categories required by the new theory. In approaching the community as here outlined, we do not propose to ignore any significant observation of community life which previous students, whether ancient or modern, have made. We merely propose to translate these observations into a set of concepts and symbols which lend themselves to a representation of their true position in a complex so intricate as to be impossible to represent adequately in the language of folk lore.

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[28] For the benefit of those who consider the introduction of terms and categories from other sciences as *prima facie* invalid, attention is called to the fact that none of these terms are here used as *substitutes* for sociological hypotheses, or as *proof* of any sociological principle. They are introduced solely because they happen to be the most explicit terms which exist in the English language for the designation of the behavior phenomena and relations here under discussion. The terms are not used as analogies or as an attempt to "imitate" other sciences, although there is no objection to such imitation if it leads to desired results. The objection to the adoption of terms from the other sciences is based on the fallacious notion that these terms stand primarily for object matter whereas actually they are basically definable in all sciences only as names for *behavior relationships* and as such are as properly to be used in one field as in another when they serve our purpose, just as the same verbs may properly be used in physics and in romantic poetry. Since the ultimate justification for any selection of terms, symbols, and hypotheses will depend upon the results we get with them, the question of their *origin or present uses with reference also to other* phenomena is simply irrelevant. Nor does the present inadequacy of previous historical attempts to adopt terms and orientations of other sciences in sociology disprove the possible value of such departures. It was the reliance of Comte, Spencer, and Ward on the categories of other sciences, *even such as there were at that time* which made possible the generally conceded contributions of these men. Inasmuch as the physics, biology, and psychology of their day have since undergone revolutionary modifications, it is not to be wondered at if their sociological formulations based on pre-Einsteinian and pre-functional behavioristic biology and psychology do not appear to have great utility for present-day sociologists. The important fact to bear in mind is that the other sciences, imperfect as they were at the time, still provided an orientation for sociology vastly superior to the then existing methods of talking about societal phenomena.

PRIMARY GROUPS *

Charles Horton Cooley

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit The individual will be ambitious, but the chief object of his ambition will be some desired place in the thought of the others, and he will feel allegiance to common standards of service and fair play So the boy will dispute with his fellows a place on the team, but above such disputes will place the common glory of his class and school

The most important spheres of this intimate association and cooperation — though by no means the only ones — are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals. The best comparative studies of the family, such as those of Westermarck [1] or Howard,[2] show it to us as not only a universal institution, but as more alike the world over than the exaggeration of exceptional customs by an earlier school had led us to suppose Nor can anyone doubt the general prevalence of play-groups among children or of informal assemblies of various kinds among their elders. Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at any time been essentially different

As regards play, I might, were it not a matter of common observation, multiply illustrations of the universality and spontaneity of the group discussion and cooperation to which it gives rise The general fact is that children, especially boys after about their twelfth year, live in fellowships in which their sympathy, ambition, and honor are engaged even more, often, than they are in the family Most of us can recall examples of the endurance by boys of injustice and even cruelty, rather than appeal from their fellows to parents or teachers — as, for instance, in the haz-

1 *The History of Human Marriage.*
2 *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*

* C H Cooley, *Social Organization*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1929, pp 23–31 (*passim*)
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ing so prevalent at schools, and so difficult, for this very reason, to repress. And how elaborate the discussion, how cogent the public opinion, how hot the ambitions in these fellowships

Nor is this facility of juvenile association, as is sometimes supposed, a trait peculiar to English and American boys; since experience among our immigrant population seems to show that the offspring of the more restrictive civilizations of the continent of Europe form self-governing play-groups with almost equal readiness. Thus Miss Jane Addams, after pointing out that the "gang" is almost universal, speaks of the interminable discussion which every detail of the gang's activity receives, remarking that "in these social folk-motes, so to speak, the young citizen learns to act upon his own determination." [3]

Of the neighborhood group it may be said, in general, that from the time men formed permanent settlements upon the land, down, at least, to the rise of modern industrial cities, it has played a main part in the primary, heart-to-heart life of people Among our Teutonic forefathers the village community was apparently the chief sphere of sympathy and mutual aid for the commons all through the "dark" and middle ages, and for many purposes it remains so in rural districts at the present day In some countries we still find it with all its ancient vitality, notably in Russia, where the mir, or self-governing village group, is the main theatre of life, along with the family, for perhaps fifty millions of peasants.

In our own life the intimacy of the neighborhood has been broken up by the growth of an intricate mesh of wider contacts which leaves us strangers to people who live in the same house. And even in the country the same principle is at work, though less obviously, diminishing our economic and spiritual community with our neighbors. How far this change is a healthy development, and how far a disease, is perhaps still uncertain.

Besides these almost universal kinds of primary association, there are many others whose form depends upon the particular state of civilization, the only essential thing, as I have said, being a certain intimacy and fusion of personalities In our own society, being little bound by place, people easily form clubs, fraternal societies and the like, based on congeniality, which may give rise to real intimacy Many such relations are formed at school and college, and among men and women brought together in the first instance by their occupations — as workmen in the same trade, or the like. Where there is a little common interest and activity, kindness *grows like weeds by the roadside.*

But the fact that the family and neighborhood groups are ascendant in the open and plastic time of childhood makes them even now incomparably more influential than all the rest

Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations, but form a comparatively permanent source out of which the latter are ever springing Of course they are not independent of the larger society, but to some extent reflect its spirit, as the German family and the German school bear somewhat distinctly the print of German militarism. But this, after all, is like the tide setting back into creeks, and does not commonly go very far. Among the German, and still more among the Russian, peasantry are found habits of free cooperation and discussion almost uninfluenced by the character of the state, and it is a familiar and well-supported view that the village commune, self-governing as regards

[3] *Newer Ideals of Peace*, 177

local affairs and habituated to discussion, is a very widespread institution in settled communities, and the continuator of a similar autonomy previously existing in the clan. "It is man who makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the commune seems to come directly from the hand of God." [4]

In our own cities the crowded tenements and the general economic and social confusion have sorely wounded the family and the neighborhood, but it is remarkable, in view of these conditions, what vitality they show, and there is nothing upon which the conscience of the time is more determined than upon restoring them to health.

These groups, then, are springs of life, not only for the individual but for social institutions. They are only in part moulded by special traditions, and, in larger degree, express a universal nature The religion or government of other civilizations may seem alien to us, but the children or the family group wear the common life, and with them we can always make ourselves at home. . . .

The view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society,* a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us — though that enters into it — and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.

If this view does not recommend itself to common sense I do not know that elaboration will be of much avail. It simply means the application at this point of the idea that society and individuals are inseparable phases of a common whole, so that wherever we find an individual fact we may look for a social fact to go with it. If there is a universal nature in persons there must be something universal in association to correspond to it.

What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups? Surely not an attribute of the separate individual — supposing there were any such thing — since its typical characteristics, such as affection, ambition, vanity, and resentment, are inconceivable apart from society. If it belongs, then, to man in association, what kind or degree of association is required to develop it? Evidently nothing elaborate, because elaborate phases of society are transient and diverse, while human nature is comparatively stable and universal. In short the family and neighborhood life is essential to its genesis and nothing more is.

Here as everywhere in the study of society we must learn to see mankind in psychical wholes, rather than in artificial separation We must see and feel the communal life of family and local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations of something else And perhaps we shall do this best by recalling our own experience and extending it through sympathetic observation What, in our life, is the family and the fellowship, what do we know of the we-feeling? Thought of this kind may help us to get a concrete perception of that primary group-nature of which everything social is the outgrowth.

[4] De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* vol I, Ch. 5.

UNDERGRADUATE SOCIETY AND THE COLLEGE CULTURE *

Edward Y. Hartshorne

The dynamics of the undergraduate social system and the role of its informal cultural norms in the socialization of American college students form an area of scientific inquiry important for college administrators, college teachers — especially of the social sciences — and undergraduates themselves.

In the following paper, which aims to provide an outline of "the sociology of college life," two methodological biases will be obvious. The approach will be both *cultural* and *functional*. Many studies of "undergraduate adjustment" have sought for their data almost wholly in the physiology or psychology of the individual at the time he reaches college. Important though these background factors may be, however, they acquire diagnostic significance only in terms of the *interaction* between the individual personality and the values and conflicts inherent in the culture of the college community This college culture, in turn, is in part a microcosm of the larger national and international community, in part a sub-culture with its own indigenous features. Secondly, many studies have sought to "lift" this or that element of college life out of its context and study it in isolation from other factors in the situation with which it is functionally interdependent Such studies overlook the fact that the college community, like any social community, is a social *system,* in which the various constituent elements can be treated "in suspension" only at the risk of grave misunderstanding.

A well-rounded study of the college social system will require reports at three stages of analysis: (1) on the demographic processes involved — selection, training, and subsequent disposition of personnel, (2) on the formal organization and material equipment of the college, which may be called its "official culture"; and (3) on the informal "unofficial culture" of the students, developed by them in their process of adjusting to the official culture. Much of the information on the first two topics will be available to the outside observer provided with adequate powers to consult official records and make supplementary investigations using orthodox procedures. Information on the last topic, which concerns the student's own definition of the college situation, can be obtained only from students with a sociological or socio-psychological orientation, and trained as participant observers

1. *Population Data* Preliminary data in this category should cover (a) student backgrounds, (b) composition of the student body, and (c) distribution of graduates.

The college "generation" is only four years. Actually, however, the temporal horizon of any individual student spans seven annual class-groups: his own, the three ahead of him when he is a freshman, and the three behind him when he is a senior. Since every class-group inherits

* *American Sociological Review,* June, 1943, pp 321–31. Reprinted by permission of Mrs. Edward Y. Hartshorne.

from its predecessors, by direct personal contact over three years, and indirectly over an indefinite period, there is ideal generational continuity to transmit the cultural heritage No link is lost.

2. *Formal Organization and Material Equipment.* Against this background the investigator can then sketch in the distribution of the population in formal terms: classes, fields of concentration, courses, residence, rank-groups, and participation in other officially recognized curricular and extra-curricular activities. For the sociologist, such formal organization and participation data are valuable in large part as background for understanding the informal behavioral and attitudinal patterns which constitute the unofficial college culture Some compilations of statistics about undergraduate organizational participation appear rather to hang in the air, since they are not related to the college culture or the college social system.

Many ostensibly functional organizations are dominated by cliques or other informal groupings with common backgrounds — such as being graduates of the same school — which cliques then proceed to select new members, not according to their functional qualifications, but according to their personal or social acceptability in terms of the informal group standards Knowing this, candidates frequently seek to meet both sets of requirements Eventually, if the process continues, the informal or latent function of the group may come to be as important as the ostensible or formal function Statistical analyses of membership patterns may throw light on these latent functions of formal organizations and thus suggest areas for further study by more sensitive, qualitative methods If student sociological reporters can be found to prepare informal group studies of representative publications, musical clubs, athletic teams, social fraternities, dormitories, and similar groupings, much time can be saved

For the over-all picture of membership *versus* non-membership, however, there is no substitute for the arduous process of census tabulations, using class year-books or official records as source material. Colleges appear to differ rather strikingly in the extent of student participation, in the number and size of extra-curricular organizations, and in the degree of concentration of student leadership These differences undoubtedly reflect the cultural values of the various colleges as such.

A further aspect of the "official college" which plays an important role in structuring its social life is its material equipment, its physical plant. The President of a small eastern college recently announced, when the war prevented the completion of a new set of college buildings and campus, that he had something more important to offer the institution than new buildings, namely "a new educational philosophy" But the architecture of college buildings, their grouping, and their setting within the larger community — city, town, or village — may have implications for informal student culture equal in importance to a college president's educational philosophy.

Students who live at home, or in boarding houses, clearly inhabit a *different* social world from that of the "dorm" student Each tends, or fails, to develop associations with his next-door neighbors from the mere fact of proximity and availability for joint recreation or work A dormitory with large, barrack-like rooms, housing numerous students within the same four walls, will tend to create a different style of living from a dormitory with private single or double rooms and with many separate entries

"At a certain girl's college, the dormitories are divided into three or four 'floors,' each with fifteen or twenty single rooms,

a common lavatory and wash-tubs, and a common telephone. There is only one common entry to the building At a nearby boy's college the new dormitories have ten to fifteen separate 'entries,' each with eight or ten separate suites, each suite having its own latch-key and a private bathroom for one to six students. This difference in architecture clearly fosters a greater degree of 'adult' independence at the men's college and a greater degree of social interdependence, at least on each floor, at the girls' college If a girl has a date her whole floor shares that knowledge They also know if she fails to 'get a date.' Thus the architectural plan sometimes contributes to the pressure on the 'wall-flower,' who in not infrequent cases will feel constrained to accept any 'date' as a *faute de mieux* rather than undergo the silent censure of her floor-mates, or will even in extreme cases resort to subterfuge. This particular pressure (undoubtedly for other reasons as well) appears to be absent, or almost absent at the men's college."

The existence of a common path between dormitory and class-room or other gathering place such as an "eating joint" may also affect social patterns If the commuting involves a bus or train ride the effects may be even stronger.

Technological factors such as heating, lighting, plumbing, and transportation undoubtedly affect social patterns profoundly Contrast a college fifty years ago with the same college today. The morning trip to the pump on cold winter days probably broke down barriers of reserve and created bonds of solidarity results quite beyond the potentialities of our "improved" plumbing system The current effects of gas-rationing are a dramatic case in point

3. *Informal Organization and Unofficial Cultural Patterns* The basic demographic and formal organization data, indispensable though they are, would give but a meager picture of undergraduate culture and social structure were they not supplemented by studies of various types of informal student groupings These are the social bearers of the unofficial undergraduate culture and thus function as socialization agencies at the primary group level, comparable in importance to the family or the play-group in the home community.

In the college community, the cultural data concern the college and its traditions, student possessions, artistic and literary creations, attitudes, norms and values. While they are observable only in the behavior, feelings, and fantasies of individuals, their existence does not depend on the particular population of students in the college at any given time

The "Harvard accent," for example, may be modified slightly by each generation of students, but it is not created by them; it lives through them, but also existed before their appearance on the scene and endures after their departure It constitutes part of the college culture along with the buildings and the curriculum. What is true of speech is also true of norms governing dress, study, humor, sportsmanship, recreation, dating, eating, and the like. This college "culture" is no less important as an indicator of the individual's behavior — in fact, it is frequently more so — than the physiometric, psychometric, and anthropometric indices stressed by some investigators.

While the college has its own peculiar structural features, it frequently reflects trends in the larger social setting Thus two main elements in pre-Pearl Harbor American college culture — socio-political irresponsibility, and the cult of success, with its resultant competitive strains and frustrations — derive from basic characteristics of western culture as a whole. Waller's illuminating study of "the rating and

dating complex" on the college campus is only one particular manifestation of traits common to our entire culture: acquisitiveness, competitiveness, the emphasis on feminine sexual attractiveness, and the cult of success. The reasons for its particularly intense expression on the campus are to be found in the *differentia specifica* of college society: the age selection, the "parasitic" existence in a sort of socio-political vacuum, and the pressures and frustrations resulting from rival competitions: for strictly academic distinctions, which are geared in with eventual occupational adjustment, and for more purely social prestige and success.

As far as laws, rules, norms, etc., are concerned it is most important to distinguish "official" statements from "unofficial" interpretations, both by officers of the institution and by the students. Complex situations sometimes arise where a given set of rules, believed to be enforced by parents and by the general public, are known not to be enforced by college officials and by students. The actual violations of the rules, or of the intent of the rules, could never be admitted publicly; yet tacitly the institution seems to recognize, by permitting the violation, that the deviant patterns are more to be desired than some of the consequences of a stricter enforcement or even of a revision of the rules.

At the other extreme from institutional rules and regulations are the norms governing informal patterns of behavior in intimate groups, such as those governing personal comments by one student about another, especially critical comments Each intimate group has what might be called a threshold of criticism. Members will accept from other members critical remarks which, if expressed by an "outsider," would elicit violent indignation, since not merely the individual member's but the whole group's integrity would be impugned. Maintenance of a "solid front," as in marital "solidarity," not only protects the members but sometimes imposes harsh sanctions on them if they violate group confidences to "outsiders"

Informal group norms also govern individual behavior in competitive situations There is pressure for "success," but too much success brings with it certain penalties, notably increased social distance between the winner and the losers Hence the paradox that the most unpopular girl may be the one who has just won a popularity contest What is gained comes not merely as a reward for the winner but as a rebuff for those who fail to win. Furthermore, the normal distribution curve automatically places those who "distinguish themselves," either by success or by failure, in a minority group Thus many individual students actually refrain from doing as well as their aptitudes would allow, for the simple reason that they don't wish to put a barrier between themselves and their less able friends If such an individual *does* achieve some distinction, then he tends to excuse himself by claiming that the exam was easy, or that he did well by some stroke of luck — never as a result of ability or of hard work Far from priding himself on having studied for the test, he will deprecatingly remark, "Why, I never even cracked a book!"

Concealment of honorific *symbols* occurs with respect to "social" distinction. Members of exclusive social clubs are often under oath never to tell an outsider that they are club members. If there are insignia of membership, such as watch charms or neck-ties, it is considered bad taste to wear them — although "social climbers" are expected to display imitations of the real thing! Like football sweaters worn with the letter turned in and Phi Beta Kappa keys kept in bureau drawers, even the symbols of "social" achievement are concealed in order to pre

vent disruption of other friendship bonds.

In other words, where status is being *achieved,* informal student norms tend to discourage too much achievement; where status is *ascribed,* or already attained, or wherever invidious distinctions are unavoidable for other reasons, student norms tend to suppress at least the tangible symbols of differential honorific status. Norms such as these are the mechanisms which maintain democracy in the informal intimate group. In larger student aggregates, or as between one clique or group and another, symbols of status difference, together with open competition, frequently appear. Some campuses even tolerate, and occasionally nurture, well developed caste systems.

The presence of numerous informal groupings, competitive and non-competitive, reflects the segmentalization of student public opinion. The individual conforms to, and is constrained by, not student norms in general, but those of a particular group or clique. A four-floor dormitory housing sixty girls, for example, had fairly well developed clique cultures at each end of each floor, where architectural segregation bred common interests. An even more isolated pent-house on the roof developed an even more "exclusive" brand of socio-cultural pattern Incoming freshmen who chose their rooms by the usual criteria of price, location and size soon discovered that the *social structure* of the dormitory introduced a very different set of considerations and hastened to shift their room if the local clique culture proved too uncongenial.

Norms such as those of informal groups, of fundamental importance in understanding student life, can be studied only by means of student life-history documents, interviews or participant observation Other aspects of the student's "culture," such as his personal possessions, can be readily observed by the attentive outsider, but their systematic study requires the compilation of student property inventories and data on expenditures, food-habits, and time-budgets. Inventories of the contents of students' rooms can lead to very interesting insights, especially if comparative data are available.

The non-human contents of student rooms consist primarily of four classes of objects· personal apparel; food and drink; equipment for living, working and playing, and decorations.

Clothing and personal style are important indicators of social status and personality adjustment, especially where there is a marked caste system among the students. Differential command over the amenities of food and especially drink in one's own room may also play an important role in the informal social life of the campus. Closely related are habits of "stepping out" for afternoon or late evening snacks National beverage habits undoubtedly modify student life in this particular. Imagine Oxford without tea, the German university without beer, or the mid-western campus without the corner drugstore!

Equipment for living and working tends to be rather standardized, room for self-expression appearing only in semi-luxury objects When it comes to playing equipment, however, there is more opportunity for status differentiation, especially in recondite fields such as polo, lacrosse, falt-boating, rock-climbing or skiing

Decorations proper, that is non-utilitarian objects of aesthetic or sentimental value to the occupant, are readily distinguished in terms of their function in social adjustment. In the corner stands a grandfather clock or some other "heirloom"; on the wall is a picture of a yacht; from the book-shelves comes the dull glow of fine leather bindings The casual visitor may be instructed by his host as his eye wanders curiously around the room, but the objects in general convey their own message: the

owner is a man of family and wealth — or a very good impostor! Coming back to such a room after a tiring day the occupant can relax into a calm state of security His possessions confirm his sense of self-confidence

Here again, as in the case of sports, the more *recherché* the object the greater the vicarious prestige shed upon its owner Etchings, paintings, statuettes, phonograph collections, all may serve to "place" the occupant Let the unskillful imitator beware, however, for he readily exposes himself as the mere collector, the ostentatious clown, the tasteless plutocrat — in short, as the *parvenu* or *arriviste* of the student world.

A special study should be made in this connection of the visibility of symbols of ancestral status Mention has been made of heirlooms Photographs and portraits of familial antecedents bear direct testimony of one's family social status, while an occasional genealogical chart or "coat-of-arms," or even a copy of *The Social Register,* may indicate a certain degree of individual insecurity which can be overcome only by constant visible reminders of the "unassailable social position" of one's kin group — at least in former times

Informal Student Groups No analysis of undergraduate culture would be complete, however, without supplementing mere inventories of culture traits by participant observer studies of the role of informal groups, revealing this culture in its matrix of group life, and showing the dynamic processes of socialization and acculturation which go on constantly behind the façade of the official college.

Informal clique groups, usually of 3–7 members, structure every large social unit, such as a dormitory, in undergraduate society In a positive sense the informal, intimate friend-group provides the chief area for individual expression for each member; it satisfies the wishes for response, recognition, security and new experience, it is the closest equivalent to the family in the new strange world away from home. For freshmen, membership in such a group serves to cushion the traumatic experience of the first prolonged separation from parents Later on, group membership protects those who "belong" from the shocks and rebuffs of the impersonal, crowd-like aspects of the larger college community. No one who "has" such a group need ever fear being a "wallflower," a social reject. As one college girl has put it·

"Every member is sure of recognition by the group, which will, in turn, be recognized by outsiders We are assured of invitations to visit each others' houses, and to dinner parties before dances. We can count on being invited to all the teas, bridge parties, theatre parties, etc , that go on . There is no sense of inferiority within the group There, each individual's talents are recognized, each one is loved for her own sake, genuine friendship is the basis for our solidarity, friendship which may grow over three or four years . ."

On the negative side, the nucleation of every dormitory society into a multiplicity of such closely-knit cliques inevitably leaves a certain number "outside," more intensely outside, indeed, than they would be in an undifferentiated mass of mutual strangers. At common dormitory activities, such as dances, one may check this hypothesis by tabulating the table reservations and comparing the composition of dinner-dance groups with the dormitory clique structure inevitably the larger parties are dominated or even monopolized by the principal cliques, and while the more sociable rejects band together into unstable associations "for appearance's sake," the least sociable ones retreat to the solitude of their rooms or the library, and to com-

forting rationalizations on the superiority of the studious life.

Informal groups thus provide positive values for members which could scarcely be obtained in any other way. In part they do this by restraining and controlling their members' behavior. Participation has its rewards, but the price one must pay is rigid adherence to the group code of values. The penalty is simple and final ostracism. By discouraging deviant behavior the informal group thus serves to train individuals in the subtler techniques of "getting along" with other people; in adjusting to various types of difficult social situations — that is, "getting by"; and in "getting ahead" in the world by making friends and influencing people It is from the informal group, not from the formal curriculum, that the college student learns the folkways of American adult society Even the formal extra-curricular organizations function largely through the control of informal cliques within them Fraternities and similar organizations are often too large to function as cliques of the sort described, but their dominant culture-patterns may be established and enforced by a clique-like inner circle.

Certain of the influences of the informal group may be disfunctional, complicating rather than facilitating the individual's adjustment to the larger college society and non-college community Group restraints on "too much distinction" may serve to maintain mediocrity and to discourage effort Or, group standards of sexual prowess may force the backward individual to undertake a succession of "conquests" which may retard or permanently destroy his chances for eventual marital adjustment [1]

Note on participant observer reports on informal groups in college Students who wish to try their hand at a "field" study of their own social world may find the following outline of some value It should be used in conjunction with Florence Kluckhohn's essay on the participant-observer role [2] Since their best asset as reporters will be their hearty and undisturbed participation in the group life they are to study, they will have to learn the first rule of scientific observation Never let your subject know he is being observed.

OUTLINE FOR REPORTS ON INFORMAL GROUPS

I *Objective Characteristics of Group Members*

Ethnic background, religious affiliation, occupation of parents, residence, school background, field of concentration, age, and sex

II *Social Personality of Individual Members*

A. Role in family group

B Other pre-college roles — e g , in school, in church, in community and various formal and informal community organizations (Revealing personality documents characterizing the pre-college social personality are diaries and letters written during the half-year just preceding college entrance)

C Future expectancies and levels of aspiration with respect to socio-economic status, occupation, marriage, etc

D Role in informal group in college

III *Origins of the Group*

A Out of which pre-existing nuclear elements has the group developed? Motives for joining, and for remaining a member of the group.

B Crises or critical experiences which have served to crystallize group or sub-group solidarity

C General lines of growth or evolution of the informal group.

[1] Cf the hero's case in Wells Lewis, *They Still Say No*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1939

[2] *American Journal of Sociology*, November 1940

IV. *Characteristics of the Informal Group in College*

A. Common activities
B. Rough time budget for group and component members, showing duration of face-to-face interaction and other activities
C. Intra group stratification, with comments on the ranking process and criteria used (Each member of the group may be asked to rank the other members privately, indicating rank order and criteria Then the several rankings can be compared and any consistent emphases noted Certain "sociometric" devices may be of value here)
D. Groups within the larger group — pairs, triads, and other combinations of group members other than in the form of the total group Here it would be interesting to compare the numerically possible number of such combinations with the actual combinations in existence This will raise the question as to the origin of these intra group associations
E. Symbols of group solidarity problems of the newcomer and the reaction of the group as in group *versus* out group, collaboration in common tasks and in rejection of unwanted outsiders
F. Modes of reconciliation of conflict between work lines (remunerative or academic) and standards of sociability.
G. Definition of group culture· appropriate common interests, common taste in dress, books, movies, etc, common "style" of humor, stereotypes, private group vocabulary, and group conversation level, group definitions of appropriate behavior in various types of activity, e g, the amount of emotionality permitted to be expressed between members of the group when together or when in pairs or triads, or when with members of the other sex if group is composed of one sex only

V *Functions of the Group*

A. Internal functions
1 Self-protection manifestations What does the group do to protect and assist its members (i) in competing for grades, (ii) in competing for dates, and (iii) in other competitive situations?
2. Mutual molding of social roles and ultimately of social personalities within the group Distinction between positive and negative effects i e, Are there some respects in which membership in the informal group works to the disadvantage of the individual in his or her relation to the larger college society?

B External functions
The place of the group in the next largest social unit — for example, the dormitory floor or entry, or the dormitory as a whole, or the class, or the college, or the community, or the society at large Are there any specific out groups toward which this group adopts a specific behavior pattern (a) other informal groups in college, (b) groups or individuals of other ages (younger or older members of the family, parents, or other adults such as teachers or leaders of one sort or another)? Is the group on the whole functional or disfunctional in its effect on student adjustment at the various levels?

Other Sources. The preceding pages have outlined three areas of study which should be covered by a comprehensive "sociology of college life": the undergraduate population, the official college culture, and the unofficial college culture. They have suggested the crucial role of the participant observer in collecting data in at least the last of these three areas, which is the heart of the matter What other types of sources may be used?

If we assume a knowledge of the general culture and social system within

which the college exists, in addition to Participant Observation Data, then, the relevant source materials fall into three main classes. *primary life-history data,* "primary" because furnished directly by actors in the situation being studied, *secondary life-history data,* furnished by non-participant observers; and *fiction,* which, if well founded in fact, may be extremely valuable. Insofar as fiction deals with "what might have been as being probable or possible," in Aristotle's phrase, it can lay claim, along with the generalizing social sciences, to scientific generality, as contrasted with History, which merely recounts "what has been."

Primary life-history data may be divided into casual and systematic, the distinction resting on whether the writer or speaker was being intentionally autobiographical.

Casual notes, student scribblings on walls and desks or in the margins of books, may, if systematically studied, throw some light on the college social system. Among other things, such notes on desks may reveal escape fantasies during tedious recitation periods; scribblings on lavatory walls are crude sexual sublimations; an occasional profane attack on a local status figure ("Prof" to him) may release tensions generated over long months of helpless subordination to a faculty taskmaster.

Casual conversation. Techniques similar to those employed by the "Mass Observation" organization in England may be used to study behavior and attitudes throughout a college day, during exam weeks, at a football game, a dance, or a student political rally.

Public utterances (speeches, essays, term papers, poetry, limericks, college songs) constitute a third type of primary casual life-history data. Freshman English themes, especially when not explicitly intended as autobiographical, are sometimes enlightening and always available. All types of student publications may be examined with profit, especially if a long series is available. The *Harvard Crimson* and *Harvard Lampoon* have been appearing for more than fifty years. Even a cursory study of these reveals much about constants and variables in the Harvard social system.

Diaries, still another type of Primary source material, may be extremely illuminating, especially on problems of personal adjustment. Here we are given insight into the individual student's unpremeditated "definition of the situation." Of the two kinds of diaries — the objective, daily, factual record, and the subjective, sporadically written, introspective and frequently cathartic or self-justificatory document — it is the latter which is of particular value, although a faithfully kept *day-by-day record may be useful for certain statistical purposes.*

It would be a considerable shock to most college teachers if they could see themselves, and their lectures and courses, as they appear in the diaries of their students. The student would be caught in the act of "defining the situation" not *qua* student, for whom taking college courses is the be-all and end-all of existence, but simply as a normal, frequently perplexed adolescent, struggling to adjust to a difficult world in which listening to Professor X's lectures is one more problem added to many others, such as fixing up the room, getting an allowance increase out of the old man, finding time to learn (surreptitiously) how to dance, recovering from a cold, improving one's tennis, not letting one's neighbor's jibes get under one's skin, and above all "getting by" without flunking Professor X's course.

Diaries covering the half-year before and the half-year after college entrance give clear evidence on the nature of that "transition experience." Many diarists let their diaries lapse in the latter half of the

freshman year· the world has begun to move too swiftly. The place of the diary as a cathartic for psychic strains is taken by new intimate friends of either sex, ties with whom are consolidated as the second college year gets under way Persistence in diary-writing in later years is a rough indicator of maladjustment.

Wherever they are available, *group diaries* constitute a highly illuminating type of source material One of the better known undergraduate publications at a large eastern university has for many years kept such a group diary — a sort of chronic complaint book in which any board member who chooses can air his views on the state of the publication, the other board members, or the world in general. Feuds which might otherwise disrupt group unity are fought out on the pages of this book, which, with its neutrality and defenselessness, bears the brunt of the argument Looking back over the shelves of this group diary — several volumes have accumulated each year — one finds a fairly faithful reflection of the unrestrained fantasy life of one active undergraduate organization, with all its ideals, its hates, its obscenities, its witticisms, and its group culture-values laid bare

Still another, as yet largely unexplored documentary source for studying college society is the *student letter,* and, taken in conjunction with it, the *parental letter* Both the writing of these letters and the reading of the replies may constitute activities of prime importance in the adjustment of the student

While all sorts of incidental functions may be performed by the *courtship letter,* such as the imparting of news or the arranging of *rendez-vous,* the chief "adjustmental" function seems to be the conveying to each correspondent of assurance from the other that someone believes in him, has faith in him, loves him and will not "let him down" The college courtship letter is one long exemplification of Arnold's "Dover Beach". "Love, let us be true to one another " The mood is only occasionally anxiety over the ultimate uncertainties of life, as in Arnold's poem, however. It is mainly expressive of a desire to escape from the pressures and strains of economic struggle, parental interference, college requirements and social restraints in general.

In one series of almost daily letters from a college girl to her fiancé in another college written during a six-month interval (in 1940) the following recurring themes were noted

(1) Assurance of love, and of confidence in the ability and future success of the other, expressed most frequently by terms of endearment, (2) assurance of confidence in the firm basis of their mutual attachment ("Nothing can change our love"); (3) gratitude for beautiful shared experiences, both in reminiscence and in anticipation, (4) praise of partner; (5) complaints about lonesomeness during enforced separation and gratitude for the compensatory satisfactions to be found in letter-writing and letter-reading, (6) fantasies about future married life, children, home, etc , (7) desire for public recognition of their love, as in marriage, (8) expression of feelings of importance attached to physical symbols of their relationship, such as the engagement-ring and other "tokens of love," (9) pride and feeling of security in one's status as fiancé(e) and spouse-to-be, (10) concern over the well-being of the other, (11) items of personal news selected to please the absent lover, (12) modest self praise, (13) fear of boring the other or of otherwise falling short of his or her expectations, (14) resentment against home community and family, which are contrasted with their own "ideal" relationship, (15) anxiety over possible rivals and other threats to their love relation, (16) general news, not "per-

sonal" (extensive introduction of this in the letters gives rise to guilt-feelings and fears of boring the other); (17) reproofs, injunctions, and general advice; (18) pleas for forgiveness for past errors and other short-comings; (19) vows and promises (e.g., never to quarrel); (20) anxiety over the uncertain future, especially in view of the unsettled political situation, (21) pleas for favors a visit, more letters, and other attentions and tokens of his or her regard; (22) deprecations of job and college work in contrast to supreme importance of *their* relationship; (23) anxiety over contraceptive methods and possible pregnancy; (24) expressions of psychic security and general euphoria — attributed to their relationship, (25) planning social engagements and secret *rendezvous* for sexual purposes

The following is a sample complete letter, dated January 21, 1940·

"My darling Tom,

I have thought about you constantly since we parted last night I missed you before we said goodnight, I was blue on the train, and now I long to see you.

"It is consoling, however, to think that no matter how hellish this week is going to be, it is, after all, a week composed of just six days and not one more until we see each other again On the seventh day we will be in each other's arms again — which is where we both belong and which is where we are always going to stay

"My faith and confidence in you hasn't lessened a bit since last night Gosh, lamb, to me you are the one super-human among all humans Maybe I'm silly to adore you so completely, but I don't think so and I know that I always shall You're my Tom, and I just know that you can whip that history. This isn't a pep talk, I'm just trying to show you the 'sure' feeling that I have in my heart that you can do it.

"God, Tom, but I do love you. I get that desperate feeling that I can't tell you that *enough* to even half-way express myself. All I can say is that I love you, and hope that you can feel the tenderness, the faith, and the confidence that there is in my heart for you.

"I'm praying for you, and loving you, my dearest lamb, and loving you every second we are not together

Marjory."

The courtship letter is a documentary link in a relatively *symmetrical* relationship. the functions for the writer are roughly equivalent to the functions for the reader, although there may be a certain amount of boy-girl role differentiation. By way of contrast, the child-parent relationship is clearly asymmetrical; the functions of the letters exchanged will therefore vary for the parent and for the child, for the writer and for the receiver Moreover, as in the courtship letter, there is not strict equivalence between intention and effect some of the aims which the mother intends to accomplish by writing letters to her daughter at college may not, as a matter of fact, be accomplished; while certain other effects on the daughter, of which the mother may not be aware, may result from the reading The effect on the daughter-reader may thus vary to some extent independently of the intentions of the moth er-writer and *vice versa*

Since, however, there may be considerable reciprocity of function, it is useful to discriminate certain functions of the mother-daughter letter *for the mother,* since the mother's attitudes inevitably impinge on the daughter in college Among these functions for the parent are. (1) opportunity to feel useful and of service to the daughter by transmitting maternal values thought to be prerequisite for "successful adjustment" with respect to college work, health, psychic security, making friends

and contacts, cooking, clothing, engagement and marriage, etc., (2) opportunity to ask for and to receive response from daughter; (3) opportunity to express gratitude and appreciation for daughter's response, (4) self-praise, and especially pride in family and children, (5) sharing confidential information, (6) general projection of ego by recounting daily doings, attitudes, achievements, etc; (7) opportunity for catharsis in crises, e g, after death of husband or birth of first grandchild.

These various functions of letter-writing for the parent should be considered in conjunction with various rhetorical techniques or devices for attaining the desired ends: for example, solicitous inquiry about well-being of daughter, assurance of affection and esteem, conveying sense of the daughter's secure status in the eyes of the mother, praise; advice, ranging all the way from pure enlightenment to conscious propaganda

The functions for the receiver of the letters depend, of course, upon the attitude of the receiver toward the sender If the attitude is a hostile one, whatever the qualities of the original letters, they will have little or no effect If the attitude is favorable, the effect will be to enhance the daughter's general orientation and socialization, that is, the acquisition of the values of her parent in all the phases of her life covered by the letters In the present instance, which is probably atypical, the letters appear to have been sent almost daily. Obviously the total effect of this bombardment of parental values, day after day, granted the favorable attitude on the part of the daughter, must have been considerable. In fact it was probably equal, if not superior, to the total effect of all the teachers heard by the daughter while she was in college If such be the case, then "college" may be regarded as a relatively minor factor in the modification of attitudes which derive primarily from the child-parent relationship. College educators sometimes tend to take a wholly unwarranted, one-sided view of the situation insofar as they assume that parental attitudes are of importance only as a minor influence in the adjustment of the child to college In many cases the college is peripheral to the family as an educative influence, rather than the other way around.

The parental letter thus sheds considerable light on the perpetuation of pre-college influences in the college culture as experienced by the undergraduate. Students letters to their parents — which there is no space to analyse here — give evidence of the same fact The decreasing frequency of child-parent (as opposed to parent-child) letters in the course of the four college years neatly documents the role of the college in the "weaning process"

Systematic primary life-history data, written with definite autobiographical intent, may range all the way from bare *curricula vitae* and responses to *schedules, questionnaires, polls,* and various kinds of *psychological tests,* to statements made in the course of free association and other types of *interviews and sociologically "controlled" life-history documents.*

The usual interview methods may be supplemented in this field by use of the *group interview* If the investigator can acquire sufficient status within a student group, he may, perhaps with the help of a colleague, use the situation as an opportunity for "drawing out" the students. Occasionally, if barriers of social distance can be broken down — a little beer will help — group euphoria will elicit statements and unconscious revelations of attitude difficult to secure in any other way.

Probably the most generally useful type of documentary source available is the *sociologically directed student life-history.* It should include data on pre-college as well as college adjustments, and incorporate ci-

tations from letters of all sorts, diaries, themes and other writings, as well as participant observation data covering phases of the writer's formal and informal group contacts in the college community.

Secondary life-history data, recorded by nonparticipant observers, include (a) all measurements, photographs, and other "objective" records, (b) status-determining documents and certificates, (c) case records by specialists such as teachers, deans, social workers and physicians, (d) college histories and biographies, and (e) other sociological and psychological studies of the institution.

Wider Development of this Research A comprehensive sociology of college life such as has been described in this paper will inevitably be restricted, by scarcity of materials, to the study of local institutions, especially that in which the investigator himself teaches. Eventually, however, by such devices as a central student life-history archive, it should be possible to overcome provincialism and work toward a national and even international scope

A second type of expansion of the field should work in the direction of including other elements peripheral to the student world but constituting with it the world of higher education The social functions of college professors, college administrators, academic associations, learned journals, publishing businesses, philanthropic foundations, libraries, museums, and the like, should be explored. Outside the generally recognized sphere of "higher education," the many media of mass communication and public entertainment such as the press, the radio, the movies, sports, and the powerful influences on the formation of opinions should also be studied These will enable us to understand the wider cultural setting of undergraduate society.

More formidable, though not insuperable, are the problems of cross-cultural investigation in this field. Still, without comparative data from other periods and other cultures, it will be difficult to disentangle the constants from the variables in the American college social system The analysis of the social role of the student in various types of society, and his relation to the sacred and the learned professions, is one of the many fascinating fields of exploration awaiting investigation. Only the completion of such studies can provide the basis for a comparative sociology of education on a structural, institutional, cultural and functional foundation comparable to Max Weber's *Religions-soziologie*

Utility. Who is to benefit by the accumulation of all this information? The sociologist surely, since such studies are his stock in trade The college administrator hopefully, since they should open his eyes to new problems and methods The social science teacher as well, since he may come to know his students better by understanding the culture in which they live, and may be able, by employing some of the methods of investigation suggested here, to train his students in techniques of careful, cautious, and competent field observation Last of all, the social science students themselves should benefit, since, by learning how to understand their own social world, they may be able to achieve to some extent that 'reality principle," that measure of self knowledge, detachment and objectivity, which is a prerequisite for all the studies of man

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Blumer Herbert, *An Appraisal of Thomas and Znaniecki's "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* Social Science Research Council, New York, 1939, pp 3–82 This well known critique of the classic Thomas and Znaniecki study points out many of the difficulties involved in attempting to study social relations through the use of the personal document and life history meth-

od. It emphasizes particularly the difficulty in making more than plausible hypotheses concerning the meaning of the documents

2 Faris, Ellsworth, The Primary Group Essence and Accident, in his *The Nature of Human Nature*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1937, pp 36–45 As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Faris makes a sympathetic but cogent critique of Cooley's concept of the primary group, attacking particularly the latter's emphasis on face to face interaction

3 Hughes, E C, "The Knitting of Racial Groups in Industry," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1946, pp 512–19 This article is concerned with informal relations in an industrial plant The investigators directly observed and charted the overt and linguistic behavior of the employees, and supplemented these data with materials gathered by the use of the interview technique In this way the observers were able to detect and describe the informal relations of racial groups within the plant

4 MacIver, R M, *Society*, Rinehart and Company, New York 1937 pp 4–18, 236–51 These sections of MacIver's systematic textbook in sociology set forth the concepts of group society social relationship, community, and association Our conception of social relation id social groups is closely related to that of MacIver

5 Moreno, J L, *Who Shall Survive?* Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company Washington, D C, 1934 *Who Shall Survive?* is still the most comprehensive volume organized around the methods and techniques of sociometry Through the use of sociographic mapping of social relations and skilled use of observation and interview methods, the sociometrists have probably made the most complete study of quantitative aspects of social relations in relatively small groups

6 Sanderson, Dwight, "Group Description *Social Forces* March, 1938, pp 309–19, and "A Preliminary Group Classification Based on Structure, *Social Forces*, December, 1938 pp 196–201 Using structural criteria Sanderson has, in these two articles, elaborated a conceptual framework for the classification and description of social groups which goes far beyond most of the forms of classification proposed by other American sociologists

7 Wilson, Logan, "Sociography of Groups,' in *Twentieth Century Sociology*, ed by Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert Moore, Philosophical Library, New York, 1945, pp 139–71 A concise, systematic review of the efforts of research through which social groups might be studied is to be found in this article It is also a reference source for concrete monographic studies of social groups

8 See also Linton "Status and Role p 211, Davis and Moore, Some Principles of Stratification p 434 Becker, Four Types of Religious Organization p 655 Glick The Relation Between Position and Status in the Assimilation of Chinese in Hawaii, p 704

10. Collective Behavior

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

In the almost incredibly complex structures of modern national and urban societies, there are many forms of social relations which are relatively unorganized or unstructured by the cultural norms of the society or its large and powerful associations. These forms may be composed of such transitory contacts as occur among city dwellers as they hurry to and from work: for brief seconds they become aware of the activities of others, adjust their own behavior quickly, and pass on. On the other hand, such unordered mutual orientations of action may form vast networks of social relations among some of the members of a national society or an urban community Occasionally these relations begin to take on group characteristics, which later disappear as the relationships dissolve Less often the group attributes continue to develop so that the relations are built into complex and formal systems. Many of our religious associations, for example, began as unstructured social movements and later developed into permanent groups.

The term *collective behavior,* strictly defined, includes all social relations, but it has come to be used for the designation of noninstitutionalized and relatively unstructured social interaction Students of collective behavior have concentrated on the description of these forms, particularly *crowds, publics,* and *social movements.* They have also set forth the manner in which social movements have become part of the highly organized elements of society. In this chapter, however, we shall concern ourselves only with the description and analysis of publics and crowds.

Publics develop around controversial issues. They are found in complex societies which possess an institutional and associational structure permitting of argument and discussion as a method of arriving at the provisional settlement of such issues There is not just one public in a society but many publics, one for every controversy which arises and attracts the attention of a sizable number of people Thus in American society when Congress is in session, there is a public for every controversial bill that receives any amount of attention: a foreign policy public, a housing public, a civil rights public, and so forth. Obviously these groupings overlap in membership but they are separate and distinct units. A public, then, is made up of people with a common interest in a particular controversial issue

The members of a public are oriented toward one another in two ways. In the first place each member is oriented toward the others by the fact that he and they are members of a society and hence share some common beliefs and practices. (It is conceivable that publics exist within large associations, but there has been little

investigation of this possibility.) Sometimes the society or one of the large associations acting as its agent may offer means for the registering of public opinion, so that a provisional settlement can be reached in a controlled and orderly manner. Thus many of the conflicts which arise within the national society become political issues, and public opinion concerning them is registered at the polls.

Second, the members of a public are mutually oriented through their interest in the issue and through the discussion and agitation concerning it. This interaction takes place among members of the same society and involves relatively peaceful agreement and disagreement. Some of the relations so developed will involve direct face-to-face discussion, as in the arguments among friends and acquaintances, but most of them will be carried on through such indirect media of communication as the radio and the newspaper The article by Alfred McClung Lee, "Public Opinion in Relation to Culture," considers the indirect media; it brings out the role of the newspaper and radio in shaping public opinion, and at the same time shows that newspaper opinion should not be confused with public opinion As he points out, a public is often divided in proportions almost opposite to those of the division in the ranks of newspapers.

The basic function of a public is to develop opinion concerning the controversial issue Public opinion is always divided opinion, and consists of the summation of the individual points of view in regard to the issue When the points of view coalesce so that all members of the public agree, the matter has passed from the realm of public opinion and entered that of consensus. Unless some method is provided for reaching consensus or for registering public opinion so that the issue may be provisionally settled, the controversy may continue until the issue drops from attention or results in overt and violent conflict. Even when public opinion is registered, the controversy may continue after a temporary settlement has been agreed upon Thus in a democratic society, even though a law is passed settling an issue for the moment, the issue may still remain an object of controversy and the law may be changed at a later time.

The Lee article is a valuable summary of the knowledge we possess concerning publics and public opinion, although Lee's definition of a public would identify it with any large-scale association If we supplement his article with the definition already developed, however, his discussion serves to amplify and refine our description of publics. Particularly useful is his description of the manner in which public opinion is formed. He shows that such opinion is based primarily on the culture of the various groups with which the members of a public are affiliated. Since controversial issues usually involve conflict of group interests, people's attitudes toward a controversy are in large measure determined by the position of the various groups to which they belong. In some controversies, of course, opinions are confused by the fact that the different groups to which people belong have different definitions of the issue Thus a person who is a member of a union and also of an organization which is anti-union may have difficulty in forming an opinion about a strike taking place within the community

Propaganda also has an important role in shaping public opinion. Groups involved in a controversy, in addition to controlling the opinions of their own members, invariably attempt to influence the opinions of other members of a public. In a society such as ours where issues are continually arising, there is a constant struggle for the control of public opinion. Since, as Lee indicates, interaction in a public is almost always indirect, the efforts of these groups include the use of propaganda.

The influence of propaganda in shaping public opinion must be viewed against the cultural background from which the various members of a public view an issue. Lee shows very clearly that propaganda cannot be considered the sole determinant of public opinion. The fundamental characteristic of propaganda is the deliberate manipulation of symbols to secure a desired response. If symbol manipulation is to be effective, the propagandist must relate his efforts to the already existing attitudes of the members of a public. He is most fortunate when the facts of the controversy are not directly accessible to the members of a public, for then the use of various tricks of the trade, combined with a thorough knowledge of the attitudes of the people, is very likely to yield him some measure of control Problems may be created for him, however, by competing propagandas or by factual knowledge and analytical ability on the part of the members of a public.

The second selection in this chapter, Robert K. Merton's analysis of bond appeals is a case study of a propaganda drive to sell war bonds. It depicts two important aspects of the use of propaganda· (1) the establishment in the listener's mind of nonexistent relations, when he does not have the background of experience or information to be critical; (2) the connecting of such relations with primary group attitudes to motivate people toward carrying out desired action. In the all-day radio broadcast by Kate Smith the major appeals related the buying of bonds to the shortening of the war, "backing up the boys," and the making of sacrifices. Actually the buying of bonds does not in itself shorten a war, nor is their purchase necessary for supplying munitions to the front The buying of bonds is a means of reducing inflationary pressures in a war economy and of modifying the distribution of financial obligations making up the national debt. Lacking this information, listeners centered their attention on the emotional ties between the people at home and the men at the front. It is interesting to note that the public stereotype of Kate Smith as a primary group figure (a mother image) and her sacrifice in making the broadcast were both involved in the motivations leading to the buying of bonds. This case fully illustrates the potential irrationality present in the social relationships composing a public.

Despite the frequent departures from rationality present in public behavior, some investigators believe that there is an inherent tendency toward rationality in the public. No such assumption can be made, however, concerning the crowd This spatially limited form of collective behavior is irrational in almost every aspect. It consequently possesses many elements which contrast sharply with those of the public.

Sociologists have studied several types of crowds, including the *casual crowd* (a collection of people on the street with a common object of attention), the *conventional crowd* (a football crowd), the *expressive crowd* (a jitterbug crowd), and the *active crowd* (a lynching crowd). Most empirical analyses have been concerned with the active crowd An active crowd may emerge spontaneously in a crisis situation, out of a conventional crowd under conditions of stress, or it may actually be encouraged in certain societies as an acceptable means of dealing with violations of community norms, as has been historically true in the case of lynching mobs in some areas of the country Whether purely spontaneous or culturally sponsored, the active crowd always has the same fundamental characteristics. It begins with an exciting event (or sometimes with the mere rumor of an exciting event) which violates the expectations of the members of a community or of a certain segment of a community In this sense there is *always* a cultural background for the emergence of a crowd If there is a cultural tradition of crowd behavior, as in the culture of the old West when horse thieves were caught, or if the event is sufficiently shocking (i e , at odds with the mores), excitement begins to spread. As it does, members of the community or a portion of them, usually selected on a social class basis, begin to interact with one another in a direct, highly emotional manner. Through gestures, tone of voice, and actual content of speech they heighten the emotional excitement of each participant As the crowd begins to form, a universal feeling of anonymity, combined with the emergence of attitudes deeply buried in the personality, develops (It is this point which LeBon and Freud, earlier analysts of crowd behavior, singled out for special emphasis) Self-appointed leaders arise and channel the energies of the crowd in the direction it is already moving. The attention of the members is centered increasingly on a single object and purpose. At a certain pitch of emotional tension the crowd acts. It may continue to act for some time until the emotional level drops The crowd then dissolves and self-awareness returns to its members.

While crowd action is frequently condemned, such condemnation seems usually to be merely superficial in the community in which the crowd has formed Either because of a cultural tradition of crowd action or because of the shock of the event which brought the crowd into existence, the members of crowds usually go unpunished Moreover, the behavior which takes place in the crowd does not grow out of attitudes spontaneously generated in the activity of the crowd itself These attitudes have usually been present for a long time, although often deeply repressed. Even the gathering of the crowd itself may be due to these attitudes much more than to the incident which serves as the precipitating factor. In any event, the crowd situation serves as a means of releasing attitudes into overt action. The attitudes themselves, however, are either a part of the culture pattern of the community, or they have been created alike in each individual through a series of kindred frustrations. Thus the crowd, although not structured in form or organization by the norms of the culture, is a product of the community and its systems of social relations.

All these generalized aspects of the crowd are present in Durward Pruden's case study of a lynching mob. Here the various elements of crowd behavior are described in concrete terms. The picture drawn is not pleasant but it confirms and illustrates the aspects of crowd action that have been discerned in their systematic relations by sociological analysis. Particularly important is the depiction of the manner in which a lynching mob is rooted in the life of a community. The mob in this lynching was recruited largely from lower-class members of the community whose economic position had seriously deteriorated with the decline of Leeville as an economic center. Consequently there had grown up sharp attitudes of antagonism between the lower-class whites and the Negro population. The rape was probably only an occasion for the violence which followed; the attitudes leading to the violence had developed long before. The attitudes of other segments of the community are also significant, since here we find illustrated the unwillingness of the rest of the community to condemn a lynching in strong terms. Although the leading newspaper criticized the mob, the other associations in the community issued at most only mild verbal criticism None of the members of the mob were punished except for one boy who was charged with arson, and he was released before he served his sentence For good or for ill, the lynching crowd was a part of the life of Leeville

In closing our discussion of collective behavior, one observation stands out: while the relations and the processes which occur in the various forms of collective behavior are not patterned into an organized unit by the culture of the society, all of our discussion points to the inseparability of collective behavior, or at least of crowds and publics, from the larger structure of society. Both publics and crowds are rooted in the social structure and must be understood within that context

PUBLIC OPINION IN RELATION TO CULTURE *

Alfred McClung Lee

Public opinion is the label for a scientific conception, but it is also a catchphrase of great popular power that has been worn smooth and nondescript by generations of political moralists and politicians. The term is only recently beginning to emerge, through the work of careful investigators, from the propagandistic mists that have enveloped it.

In the political realm, the catchphrase has come to suggest two radically different viewpoints in this country Speaking of public opinion, Abraham Lincoln [1] as-

[1] Nicolay, J G, and Hay, John [eds], *The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, New York, Century (1894) 1 422

* Reprinted by permission from *Psychiatry*, February, 1945, pp 49–61.

serted in one of his debates with Stephen A Douglas, "With it, nothing can fail, against it, nothing can succeed." And Woodrow Wilson [2] evidently had a similar conception in mind when he said, "Directly exercised, in the oversight of the daily details and in the choice of the daily means of government, public criticism is of course a clumsy nuisance, a rustic handling of delicate machinery But as superintending the greater forces of formative policy alike in politics and administration, public criticism is altogether safe and beneficent, altogether indispensable" Quite contrary were the positions assumed by Alexander Hamilton and Herbert C Hoover Hamilton [3] is frequently quoted as stating before the Federal Constitutional Convention on 18 June 1787, "The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God, and, however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true to fact. The people are turbulent and changing, they seldom judge or determine right." Hoover [4] was even more explicit when he noted, "The crowd only feels it has no mind of its own which can plan. The crowd is credulous, it destroys, it consumes, it hates, and it dreams — but it never builds." The Lincoln-Wilson attitude, echoing that of Paine and Jefferson, is that of those who have faith in democracy and democratic processes. The Hamilton-Hoover standpoint is that of those who distrust or have contempt for democracy and place their faith in the authoritarian control of society by the élite they admire — to which they belong or hope to belong

[2] Padover, S K [ed], *Wilson's Ideals*, Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942 (151 pp), p 35

[3] Lodge, Henry C [ed], *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, New York, G P Putnam's Sons (1885) 1 382

[4] Hoover, Herbert, *American Individualism*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday Page, 1922 (72 pp), p 24

Why is there such a struggle over the catchphrase, public opinion, and its definition or characterization? What is a public? What is a public opinion, objectively considered? How does a public come to conclusions, to the formulation of opinions? What is the relation of a public opinion to the culture and subcultures of social groups? And when public opinions are formed, how can one come to know accurately about them? In this outline of a theory of public opinion in relation to culture and subcultures, some consideration will be given to the theoretical implications raised by each of these questions.

The discussion of public opinion as a significant political and social force dates back to the eighteenth century and is associated with the rise of middle-class democracy [5] Public opinion became one of a large collection of fetish words and phrases and conceptions that grew with the expanding grasp of democratic folkbeliefs upon the minds of the peoples of Europe and America during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Significantly enough, the others included "freedom of the press" [6] as well as "prog-

[5] Wilhelm Bauer traces approximate equivalents to the term to much earlier periods, to conceptions of the ancient Greeks and Romans, but the ideas associated with the term did not attain striking popular acceptance until the period indicated above See Bauer, Wilhelm, Public Opinion *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, Macmillan (1934) 12 669–674 For more comprehensive treatment, see his *Die öffentliche Meinung und ihre geschichtlichen Grundlagen*, Tubingen, Mohr, 1914 (535 pp), and *Die öffentliche Meinung in der Weltgeschichte*, Wildpark-Potsdam, Athenaion, 1930 (403 pp) In English, a standard work is Albig, William, *Public Opinion*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939 (486 pp)

[6] For a historical analysis of this catchphrase, see Lee, Alfred M , Freedom of the Press Services of a Catch Phrase Murdock, G P [ed], *Studies in the Science of Society*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937 (xxii and 555 pp); pp 355–375

ress,"[7] "freedom of assembly," "freedom of speech,"[8] "freedom of religion,"[9] "liberty," "equality," and others.

Of these ideas, especially public opinion and freedom of the press are intimately and peculiarly linked in their history, and this contributes to the difficulties even today in distinguishing between public opinion and press opinion. When, about 1440–1450, one or more inventors found a way to substitute individual printing types cast in metal for such primitive printing surfaces as hand engraved wood blocks,[10] they injected a new and disturbing factor into Western society The invention of typography, frequently miscalled the "invention of printing," furnished an easy means of disseminating novel ideas on the growing supply of paper, even though those in authority did take steps to cope with this threat to doctrines that sanctioned their special privileges. A Bull of Pope Alexander VI in 1501 condemned unlicensed printing, and the governments of Germany, France, and England instituted their own kinds of censorship in 1529 and shortly thereafter These efforts failed, however, to dam the flow of ideas stimulated by printing and by the other forces of the Renaissance[11] Even with the limited press runs possible until the nineteenth century, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and books provided such a powerful stimulus to popular discussions that, in the absence of an adequate means of suppressing them, control of the press became regarded as essential to the success of the more dominating political leaders.[12] From this, it was then but a short step for newspaper proprietors to be emboldened to announce that their journals reflected public opinion — or, at least, a broad conception of the "public interest" As one recent spokesman[13] for the newspaper industry has phrased it, "But, in the mass, newspaper opinion is public opinion Conspicuous exceptions in which the ballot box has repudiated the newspapers do not invalidate the principle"

But considerable evidence that the voice of the press is not at all times the voice of the people now exists Dean Frank L Mott,[14] in a study of newspaper support for presidential candidates throughout United States history, came to the conclusion, "There seems to be no correlation, positive or negative, between the support of a majority of newspapers during a campaign and success at the polls" Then he confronts his readers with a list of presidents elected with majority opposition from the press which includes Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin D Roosevelt, and a list of presidents supported by the press that recently consists of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover To

[7] Bury, John B, *The Idea of Progress An Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth* London, Macmillan, 1920 (377 pp)

[8] Chafee, Jr Zechariah, *Free Speech in the United States* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941 (xiv and 634 pp)

[9] Clinchy, Everett R, *All in the Name of God* New York, John Day, 1934 (194 pp)

[10] McMurtrie, Douglas C, *The Golden Book* New York, Covici Friede, 1927 (xiv and 410 pp), chapter 8 and pp 393–395

[11] Bury, John B, *A History of Freedom of Thought* New York, Henry Holt, 1913 (256 pp) This account is amplified from an American standpoint and brought up to date in Whipple, Leon, *Story of Civil Liberty in the United States* New York, Vanguard Press, 1927 (322 pp), and reference footnote 8

[12] On press control and justifications of press control in the United States, see Lee, Alfred M, *The Daily Newspaper in America The Evolution of a Social Instrument* New York, Macmillan, 1937 (xvi and 797 pp) — in particular, Chapters 6 to 8, 10, 12, 16, and 17

[13] Flint, Leon N, *The Conscience of the Newspaper* New York, Appleton Century, 1925 (470 pp) pp 297–298

[14] Mott Frank L, Newspapers in Presidential Campaigns *Public Opinion Quart.* (1944) 8 348–367, pp 358 and 361 quoted

protect the press from a charge of a lack of representativeness, Mott asserts, "To say yes to the local majority is usually the path of least resistance for a newspaper But to place an editor or publisher under obligation to follow the majority in the expression of opinion would be an intolerable tyranny." This is, of course, a reflection of the Hamilton-Hoover theory of public opinion.

Mott, in his talk of "correlation," neglects to observe that when the people of the United States were presented with a reasonably clear issue of property rights *versus* human rights, they voted for the latter, when the issues of the election were successfully obscured by some such extraneous issue as Prohibition, or when there was no particular issue of any fundamental sort, the newspapers and the electorate agreed In this whole matter, the campaigns of Franklin D Roosevelt against Landon, Willkie, and Dewey have been quite instructive, studied as they have been in considerable detail [15]

The increasing popular conviction during this century that the press is not representative of reader interests in a politico-economic sense began with the "muckrackers" [16] of the years before World War I But the conviction deepened during the 1930's as a result of such factors as the growth of radio broadcasting, the Depression following 1929, the various 'muckrakings' of the press,[17] and the work of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis,[18] and of such polling organizations as George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion [19] Optimistic newspaper and magazine statements concerning the trend of the country's business conditions in the newspapers of 1929–1932 were followed by a brief "honeymoon" during which President Roosevelt did not have the open antagonism of the press, but in 1934–1945 the daily and weekly newspapers frequently pulled one way and the New Deal — usually with majority support — pulled another.[20] These events nur-

[15] Doan, Edward N, Willkie Received Unparalleled Newspaper Circulation Support *Journalism Quart* (1941) 18 137–145 Bird, George L, Newspaper Monopoly and Political Independence *Journalism Quart* (1940) 17 207–214

[16] Regier, Cornelius C, *The Era of the Muckrakers,* Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1932 (254 pp) For an example, see Irwin, Will, The American Newspaper *Collier's* (1911) 46 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, and 47 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19

[17] For outstanding instances, see Sinclair, Upton, *The Brass Check,* Pasadena, The Author, 1920 (445 pp) Bent, Silas, *Ballyhoo The Voice of the Press,* New York, Boni and Liveright, 1927 (398 pp) Seldes, George, *Freedom of the Press,* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1935 (380 pp), and *Lords of the Press* New York, Julian Messner, 1938 (viii and 408 pp) Ickes, Harold L, *America's House of Lords,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1939 (xi and 140 pp)

[18] Formally suspended its regular program 29 October 1941, for the duration of the war, see *Propaganda Analysis* (1937–1942) 1–4 This Institute sought to study all propaganda objectively and to make popular analytical devices available to students and thoughtful citizens. See particularly American Common Sense and We Say Au Revoir *Propaganda Analysis* (1941–1942) 4 Nos 8 (8 pp) and 13 (8 pp)

[19] This organization makes private polls of public opinion which are reported in articles syndicated to the press, for a description and justification of the project, see Gallup, George, and Rae, Saul F, *The Pulse of Democracy The Public-Opinion Poll and How It Works,* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1940 (x and 336 pp) For summaries of poll reports, see Bruner, J S, *Mandate from the People,* New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944 (278 pp) Lydgate, W A, *What America Thinks,* New York, Thomas Y Crowell, 1944 (xi and 167 pp) Cantril, Hadley, and others, *Gauging Public Opinion,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944 (xiv and 318 pp)

[20] For a useful commentary upon public opinion in connection with the President's proposal to enlarge the U S Supreme Court, see Roper, Jr, Elmo B, Neutral Opinion on the Court Proposal *Public Opinion Quart* (1937) 1 17–20 For broader but brief treatments of the general subject, see Brant, Irving, The Press and Political Leadership

tured skepticism about the press's pretensions to popular representation. The President, the leaders of the rising American Newspaper Guild, other labor leaders, and many writers capitalized on these increasing doubts. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis contributed to this differentiation of press and public opinion by equipping its members and through them a wide audience of school pupils and college students with popular analytical devices and an "I'm from Missouri" spirit. The American Institute of Public Opinion and other similar organizations did valuable service by furnishing the American public with its first reasonably satisfactory measures of public opinion on somewhat more precise issues than are provided by elections. This, too, yielded estimates that differed from those gathered by newspaper reporters through random interviews and edited by "deskmen" vividly aware of their publisher's conception of the "public interest," or at least carefully schooled in that conception.

The trials of the 1930's and the four *F.D.R.* elections thus gave the United States a somewhat more sophisticated view of the catchphrase, public opinion, and a somewhat greater respect for the societal force that may be so labeled. Public opinion was no longer worshipped — as by the French in their Revolution of 1789 — "as a sort of beneficent deity, which in the mythology of both rulers and subjects was to bring them surcease from their social and political travail" [21] Nor, on the other extreme, do many believe any more that public opinion is best revealed by some such authority as a newspaper editor or other political philosopher, a political leader or a business "giant." Even though the term as a catchphrase labels a protean stereotype, variously viewed and defined by different advocates, most Americans would agree that something known as public opinion is somehow the best possible guide to national policy. As the American Institute of Public Opinion [22] has demonstrated upon the basis of its polls, "it is not difficult to find individual cases of ignorance, stupidity, and apathy" among the expressions of average public opinion that it has gathered. But this organization's staff is satisfied that such "are the exception, not the rule." It is led, in other words, to a position resembling that of Wilson rather than that of Hoover, as suggested at the outset. "The analysis of public-opinion trends indicates that a man may not be able to decipher a Congressional appropriation bill, but he can tell whether or not he approves of the objects for which it is to be passed, a man may not be able to understand the technological causes of unemployment, but he knows what it means to be out of work, and his experience will contribute to the solution of the general problem, and a man may not grasp the subtle details of diplomacy, but he can tell whether or not the main principles of

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Social Education (1938) 2 3–10 White, William Allen, The Newspaper and Rights of Property. Bird, G L, and Merwin, F E [eds], *The Newspaper and Society,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1942 (xviii and 627 pp), pp. 83–89

[21] **Bauer,** Wilhelm, Public Opinion *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* New York, Macmillan (1934) 12:673.

[22] Gallup, George, and Rae, Saul F , *The Pulse of Democracy,* reference footnote 19, pp 287–288. The position of the American Institute of Public Opinion is stated and defended in Part III of this book, entitled Evaluations, especially in the chapters on Is There a Band-Wagon Vote? and The Average Opinion of Mankind See also, for a briefer statement, Gallup, George, Testing Public Opinion, in Public Opinion in a Democracy *Supplement Public Opinion Quart* (1938) 2 8–14 For critical assessments of polling generally, see the symposium on The Public Opinion Polls Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde *Public Opinion Quart* (1940) 4 212–284, and Gosnell, Harold F, and de Grazia, Sebastian, A Critique of Polling Methods. *Public Opinion Quart.* (1942) 3:378–390.

his country's foreign policy conform to his standards of judgment." Gallup and others working in opinion measurement assume that they furnish a reasonably direct and unbiased average of public opinion on significant issues. This assumption is popularly accepted, but difficulties with it are to be outlined.

This is about as far as a popular conception of public opinion can be taken. To go beyond the definition implied in the foregoing frequently leads to optimistic or pessimistic conjectures For example, James Bryce [23] said in 1888, in the course of a long discussion of public opinion, that an advanced stage in the evolution of its control over government "would be reached if the will of the majority of the citizens were to become ascertainable at all times, and without the need of its passing through a body of representatives, possibly even without the need of voting machinery at all." The opinion poll is thought by many partially to satisfy this need, to have "added another device to the kit of tools available to make the popular form of government workable." [24] This *promise* may be rather encouraging to some from the standpoint of popular politics, of faith in democracy as a philosophy of government, but it still leaves much yet to be desired in the search for a more adequate conception of public opinion The device, in the hands of a pressure group or other special interest, might also be used to present incorrect estimates of popular desires.

To arrive at a somewhat more accurate conception of public opinion, albeit one that might well be not so useful for the purposes of practical politics as the ones implied in the foregoing, an attempt will be made to define terms a little more precisely than popular usage now requires.

In the first place, what is meant by the "public" part of public opinion? With the exception of intimate or "private" groups, such as the immediate family, a public is a group of any size in which the members are more or less conscious of common interests Popular usage more commonly attaches the word, public, chiefly as *the* public, to the larger groupings of mankind, such as the "general body of mankind, or of a nation, state, or community, the people, indefinitely, as, the American *public,* also, a particular body or aggregation of people; as, an author's *public* . . . a clientele or an audience" [25] Without attempting too precise a differentiation, it is probably useful to call smaller aggregates — including the most intimate ones — groups, and the aggregates other than intimate or "private" ones, publics A group thus may be a mob, a gang, an audience, the members of a trade union locally or nationally, a company of soldiers, or the employees of a business corporation. A public may be an audience, a mob, the population of a hamlet or city, the people of a country, the membership of a professional society or trade union in a district, a nation, or throughout the world, the readers of a newspaper, the listeners to a radio program, the subscribers to a pressure group program, or those practising some craft or profession.

To summarize, *the* public is a protean conception that refers to people generally or to the people living in some geographi-

[23] Bryce, James, *The American Commonwealth,* 2nd ed rev , London, Macmillan (1891) 2 250 — Part 2 of Volume 2 239–364, is entitled Public Opinion For a thoughtful reassessment of Bryce's observations and conclusions in this field, see Wilson, Francis G , James Bryce on Public Opinion Fifty Years Later *Public Opinion Quart* (1939) 3 420–435

[24] Gosnell, Harold F., The Polls and Other Mechanisms of Democracy *Public Opinion Quart* (1940) 4 224–228, p 224.

[25] *Webster's New International Dictionary* [2nd ed], Springfield, Mass., Merriam Co. (1934), p 2005

cal area. It is a common catchword in political and economic struggle and competition. *A* public, as a more scientific term, is a group that includes persons outside an intimate circle. It is a social area of communication that may be defined by any common, non-intimate, group-making interest or interests; on matters outside of such common interests, it need not achieve unanimity of sentiment or opinion. Thus, in many respects, a public is a social area of interaction.[26]

Individual men, women, and children belong to variable numbers of these groups and publics. Persons, too, reflect in their patterns of habitual thought the folkways, mores, and morals of the general society in which they live and also the specializations and adaptations of such folkways and mores within the groups and publics to which they belong.[27]

What is an "opinion?" An opinion, in ordinary usage, is a "belief stronger than impression, less strong than positive knowledge, settled judgment in regard to any point; a notion or conviction founded on probable evidence; a belief; a view; a judgment"[28] The words that differentiate this definition from one for habit patterns or belief patterns are these: "in regard to any point" This "point" is not generalized, it refers to the specific event, question, physical object, person, or theory that has occasioned the person to "form an opinion" — that is, to select or, in rare instances, to deduce "originally" a judgment concerning it.

In discussing such a mental process as opinion-formation, "modern psychology has taught us . . . that men are rational only fragmentarily, sporadically, and with great difficulty, . . . that they are not free, but heavily and coercively conditioned by their past and by their surroundings, and . . . that in capacity they run the gamut from imbecility to genius."[29] It is difficult to come to a novel conclusion It is much easier to select a likely explanation for a new situation or event or person or theory from the experience and idealizations of one's groups or society — recorded in the folkways, mores, and morals; in other words, to select an explanation or judgment from one's "own" patterns of belief that group-membership and society-membership have grafted upon one's mental structure.[30] Lacking such ready-made opinion derived from the folkways, it is still much easier to accept the opinion of a trusted leader than it is to "dope it out" oneself People "are influenced greatly by both majority and expert opinion on social and political issues," but the "influence of the majority seems to be more marked than

[26] Fairchild, H P [ed], *Dictionary of Sociology*, New York, Philosophical Library (1944), p. 240

[27] The literature on publics, groups, and social structure is naturally vast See in particular, Cooley, Charles H , *Social Organization*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909 (xvii and 426 pp) Park, Robert E , and Burgess, Ernest W , *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1924 (xxiii and 1040 pp) — chapters 3, 12, 13 Eldridge, Seba, Social Organzation Book 3 Davis, Jerome, and Barnes, Harry E [eds], *An Introduction to Sociology*, Boston, D C Heath, 1931 (xviii and 1065 pp), pp 593–696, in particular chapter 3. Murphy, Gardner, Murphy, Lois B , and Newcomb, T M , *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed ; New York, Harper, 1937 (xxii and 555 pp.), chapter 8 Waller, Willard, *The Family;* New York, Dryden Press, 1938 (621 pp), chapters 3 and 4 Klineberg, Otto, *Social Psychology*, New York, Henry Holt, 1940 (xii and 570 pp), chapter 12. Young, Kimball, *Sociology A Study of Society and Culture*, New York, American Book Company, 1942 (x and 1005 pp) — in particular, chapter 2

[28] Reference footnote 25, p 1708.

[29] Lynd, Robert S , Democracy in Reverse *Public Opinion Quart* (1940) 4 218-23, p 219 quoted

[30] Compare the conceptualization of membership-character in Brown, J F , *Psychology and the Social Order*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936 (xiv and 529 pp), chapters 3 and 4

that of the expert."[31] Thinking begets and is begotten by uncertainty, anxiety, fear, shock, need; ready solutions for a problem, in the form of an opinion as to belief or action, make for self-confidence, even though of a shallow and fragile sort and sometimes quite expensive.[32] Stated otherwise, the situation amounts to this. "It is not possible . . . for human beings to respond to every stimulus-event with complete and intelligent discrimination. People have neither the time, the knowledge, the inclination, nor the requisite intelligence for meeting adequately the subtle and varied demands of their intricate environments. The best they can do is to classify the events of life and to respond to them, not on their own individual merit, but according to their assumed membership. Clichés are made to cover the facts of life."[33] Regardless of the potential rewards for clearheaded, independent analyses of the facts of a situation and the formation upon them of really sensible opinions, the comforts of traditional dogma are usually too attractive for all but a few intellectuals to forego.

Psychologists apparently prefer to think in terms of "attitude" rather than of "opinion," to write of a "social attitude" or a "common attitude" rather than of a "public opinion." These conceptions should not be confused, they are somewhat different. To quote an accepted psychological definition, an attitude is a "mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related."[34] A "common attitude" or a "social attitude," as an attitude common to a group, is thus a close approximation of a folkway, which is a common and customary way of doing something or thinking about something.[35] Attitudes other than social attitudes include other mental products of individual and group experience, phantasy, and mistaken inference. From the standpoint of a "public," therefore, the social attitudes or folkways or culture account for the similarities among the mental sets of the persons composing a public.

An opinion, in the instance of a person, is the product of the specific "point" eliciting an opinion, the person's cultural background, as it relates to the "point" and as it is weighted by the current situation, including especially recent, vivid incidents bearing upon the "point;" and his individual experiences, to the extent to which they differ from the usual experiences in his group and society. On the other hand, in the case of a public,

[31] Allport, Gordon W., Attitudes — chapter 17 Murchison, Carl [ed.], *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, Worcester, Mass., Clark University Press, 1935 (1195 pp.), pp. 798–844, inc. in 798–843. Allport is summarizing the findings of Marple, C. H., The Comparative Susceptibility of Three Age Levels to the Suggestion of Group Versus Expert Opinion. *J. Social Psychol.* (1933) 4: 176–186. See also Prescott, D. A., *Emotion and the Educative Process*, Washington, American Council on Education, 1938 (xviii and 323 pp.), especially chapter 2.

[32] The opinions offered to the German people as solutions for their problems by the late Wilhelm Hohenzollern and more recently by Adolf Hitler are illustrations, on the grand scale. See Robinson, J. H., *The Mind in the Making*, New York, Harper, 1921 (235 pp.), pp. 33, 31, 93. And Ward, C. H., *Builders of Delusion*. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1931 (381 pp.).

[33] Allport, Gordon W., Attitudes. reference footnote 31, p. 813. See also viewpoints of Dunlap, Knight, *Habits: Their Making and Unmaking*. New York, Liveright, 1932 (x and 326 pp.), and Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion*. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1922 (x and 427 pp.).

[34] Allport, Gordon W., Attitudes. reference footnote 31, p. 810. Folsom, J. K., *The Family*, New York, John Wiley, 1934 (604 pp.), p. 39, calls an attitude that "involves potential *emotional* reactions centered about some object" a sentiment or sentiment-attitude.

[35] Sumner, W. G., *Folkways*, Boston, Ginn, 1907 (v and 692 pp.), pp. 2–4.

a public opinion or a group opinion is the product of: the "point" eliciting an opinion; the public's common cultural background, as it relates to the "point" and as it is weighted by the current situation, including especially recent vivid incidents bearing upon the "point;" the cultural background of any dominant or sizable groups within the public, and, frequently, the characteristics of such opinion crystallizing or forming mechanisms as leadership, controlled communication instrumentalities and chance combinations of ideas.

In other words, social attitudes or folkways or cultures are relatively static conceptions. They are common factors in the mental sets of persons They prepare the minds of group members to deal with *classes* of problems or situations. Public opinion is a more dynamic notion; it is a specific formula that relates folkways and the other factors to a *specific* problem [36] An opinion is public or common to a public because of the determining influences of common factors, such as those just outlined. The differences in the lists of factors given as determinants of individual and of public opinions suggest reasons for the range of minor variations in individual judgments in contrast with the generalized formulas that satisfactorily summarize or at least characterize the opinions of broad publics.

What is meant more specifically by a public's common cultural background, as it relates to the "point" and as it is weighted by the current situation, including especially recent, vivid incidents bearing upon the "point?" Of what significance in studying public opinion are the specialized folkways of groups? And what are some of the characteristics of such opinion crystallizing or forming mechanisms as leadership and controlled communication instrumentalities? In the balance of this paper, an effort is made to explore briefly partial answers to each of these questions.

Abraham Lincoln [37] discerned that public opinion, "on any subject, always has a 'central idea,' from which all its minor thoughts radiate." He referred to "the equality of man" as one such "central idea" When one speaks of a public's "common cultural background," it is well to realize that that generalized background is largely organized for ideological purposes about such central ideas or sentiments,[38] that such central ideas, sentiments, or "cultural premises" are frequently not consistent logically with one another and are usually ambivalent, and that current events — especially those that might be called "traumatic social events" — shift the weights given to various central ideas [39] In making a list of "the as-

[36] For a discussion, in a different usage, of "static" and "dynamic" *public opinion* see Bauer, Wilhelm, Public Opinion *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* New York, Macmillan (1934) 12 670 See also the theory of public opinion as a product of the modern *Gesellschaft* in Tonnies, Ferdinand, *Kritik der offentlichen Meinung* Berlin, Springer, 1922 (583 pp) And see Albig, William, *Public Opinion* McGraw Hill, 1939 (xiii and 486 pp.) — especially chapter 1.

[37] Reference footnote 1 1 225

[38] Elsewhere, I defined "sentiment" thus "Generalized patternings of emotion, thought, and action, the culturally and physiologically determined major premises underlying folkways, mores, and institutions in a group, class, or society Psychologically complex emotional biases and canalizations of emotional drive Frequently ambivalent Sometimes, as in the case of mother love, it includes such a range of factors as fear, joy, sorrow, and anger, all related to the pattern of the sentiment Like the Freudian id or subconscious, individuals are rarely able to define their own sentiments with any accuracy and candor Not only are their sentiments not always understood on a verbal plane by individuals but the description of many actual sentiments in such terms is taboo ' Reference footnote 26, p 270.

[39] Contrast this analysis, which is purposely brief and somewhat oversimplified with Pareto's highly patterned theory of residues and sentu-

sumptions by which we Americans live," as sentiments or "cultural premises" might also be called, "one runs at once into a large measure of contradiction and resulting ambivalence. This derives from the fact that these overlapping assumptions have developed in different eras and that they tend to be carried over uncritically into new situations or to persist in long diminuendos into the changing future."[40] Examples of such "cultural premises" are the following

First

a Honesty is the best policy.
But
b Business is business, and a business man would be a fool if he didn't cover his hand
c A job is a job, and a worker would be a fool if he didn't look out for 'No. 1.'

Second

a Capital and Labor are Partners.
But
b It is bad policy for any business man to pay higher wages than he has to[41] "We business men have to stick together."
c It is bad policy to work for wages lower than the union can get us "We workers have to stick together"

Third

a All men are created equal.
But
b Some men are just born leaders; others are just born 'ne'er-do-wells.'
c Men who've had some 'breaks shouldn't get ahead any faster than the rest of us; seniority should mean a lot.

The statements labeled *a* in each case are *moral* premises, in other words, central ideas defined by the moral idealizations or morals of our society The *b* and *c* statements are *moretic* premises, that is to say, central ideas defined by the mores of a group or class the *b* series by entrepreneural and managemental groups, and the *c* series by workers of the sort of factory employees.

The bombing of Pearl Harbor on Sunday, 7 December 1941, illustrates the type of "traumatic social event" that "changes everything," that rearranges the weightings popularly given to such "cultural premises"—in these cases, moral premises—as·

We must defend America first. If we mind our own business, other nations will have to mind theirs

Great Britain is our sister Democracy. Her battle lines are our battle lines. She is fighting our war for us.

There is a Yellow Peril. But the Japs will never dare to attack us.

Just as people had said, "Because we must defend America first, therefore we must . . ," the Pearl Harbor event turned people to saying, "Because the Japs bombed Pearl Harbor, therefore we must . . " In short, outstanding events as well as central ideas become stereotyped premises upon which whole configurations of public opinions in part depend

A public's cultural background is naturally much more complex than a dis-

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ments See Pareto, Vilfredo, *The Mind and Society* [trans by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston], New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935 (4 volumes) — Volume 3

[40] Lynd, Robert S, *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Science in American Culture*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939 (x and 268 pp), p 59 See also Ogburn, William F, *Social Change*, New York, Viking, 1928 (365 pp), and Lynd, Robert S, and Lynd, Helen M, *Middletown in Transition* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1937 (xviii and 604 pp) — chapter 12

[41] Adapted and amplified from Lynd, Robert S, *Knowledge for What?*, reference footnote 40, p 61

cussion of cultural premises would suggest, and a public's current situation also comprises a mutual awareness of a vast number of more or less recent incidents. It is merely thought useful to stress here the rôles played by sentiments and traumatic social events.

The degree to which the folkways of various groups within a culture differ and hence cause members of the groups to feel moretically justified in having divergent opinions is not evident to many people. The previous discussion of moral and moretic premises suggests, in general terms, the situation The army, for example, "has a culture which differs sharply from that of the larger group" The "soldier's morality condones a great many things which are not permitted in civil life."[42] Lincoln Steffens furnishes another illustration in one of his many contrasts of the folkways and mores of the college-bred with those of the politi cal specialist. He tells of "a political boss of the old school in a progressive city who was finally beaten by the reformers there and had a city council of young, college bred gentlemen" In reply to a taunt that he had "a majority of gents for aldermen," the boss retorted, "Yes, . . . and I been a damn fool all these years Why, say, those nice boys will put over for nothing for me deals the old gang used to make me pay and pay high for." In commenting upon this Steffens pointed out, "That's England, and France, Europe, and our future That is why, I think, the English can see our corruption and not their own" The individualism and the interest in power through representation and through the bartering of special privileges that are common to the political specialist are what Steffens was contrasting with the "formed minds, which . . . do innocently what the fine intelligent captains of industry and empire makers . . . want done"[43]

The folkways, mores, and morals of the general society, the larger public, thus frequently exhibit themselves as being paralleled in constituent groups by somewhat different patterns These specialized folkways and mores are rendered ex pedient by the necessities or apparent necessities of the group's vocational, religious, ideological, or whatever other objectives This cultural ambivalence accounts for the apparent inconsistency between the statement, "Capital and Labor are Partners," and the others given with it in preceding paragraphs This contrast, because of the fact that American over all culture admits of only one code of "right," is one of the things labeled by the term, hypocrisy[44]

As long as there are groups with differ ing interests — a concomitant of complex social life — cultural multivalence or hy pocrisy in this sense is inevitable As people mature in Anglo American culture, they gradually learn something concerning this multivalence and come to see its rôles, and this educational process is associated with some of the most difficult

[42] Waller, Willard [ed], *War in the Twenti eth Century* New York Dryden Press, 1940 (xi and 572 pp) — War and Social Institutions by Willard Waller, pp 478–532, pp 519, 523 quoted See also Waller, Willard, *Veteran Comes Back* New York, Dryden Press, 1944 (xiii and 316 pp), and Roucek, Joseph S Social Attitudes of the Soldier in War Time *J Abnormal and Social Psychol* (1935) 30·164–174

[43] Steffens, Joseph Lincoln, *The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1931 (xi and 884 pp) pp 707–708 See also Salter, John T *Boss Rule Portraits in City Politics* New York Whittlesey House 1935 (xi and 270 pp) and Salter, John T [ed], *The American Politician* Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press, 1938 (xiv and 412 pp) Kent Frank R , *Political Behavior* New York, William Morrow, 1928 (342 pp)

[44] See the discussion of the ' dual nature of our world " in Institute for Propaganda Analysis American Common Sense *Propaganda Analysis* (1941–42) 4, No 8 (8 pp) 2–4

adaptive experiences of adolescence and youth. From a dynamic standpoint, this is the background for the statement, "Only if it is used to refer to a variety of opinions of numerous self-conscious and articulate citizen groups does the concept of public opinion as a positive force accord with the facts of the contemporary scene"[45] In other words, "there must be . . . many *publics*, before the general public can act intelligently,"[46] in the sense of aggregates of people sensitized to a "point" in terms of their group interests.

With public opinions depending so largely upon such event and folkway factors as are previously discussed, what is the rôle of opinion forming mechanisms? These mechanisms are so complex that they cannot be treated in detail here, but a few comments on them from a general standpoint are probably appropriate to relate them to the present discussions.

The American Institute of Public Opinion has discovered, through its polling experiences, that "events and actions are infinitely more potent factors in influencing the formation of opinion than mere desire to imitate one's fellow citizens."[47] Since reports of such events and actions are furnished by daily and weekly newspapers, radio stations, public speakers, magazines, trade and class periodicals, school teachers, and other media for "thought leadership," the nature of these instruments of "social vision" has become highly significant in this interrelated world.

One spokesman[48] for the newspaper industry regards it as "unfortunate" that "a few specialists in the field of public opinion prefer to make the press a scapegoat or a whipping boy, and to slight the difficult task of integrating public-opinion manifestations with the whole social and historical fabric of the day." This viewpoint overlooks the fact that, even though press opinions probably influence few people, more than "a few specialists" are concerned with the fact that competition is rapidly disappearing among the reportorial media — in the daily newspaper, weekly newspaper, and *combined* press-radio fields[49] The significance of the situation was summarized by William Allen White[50] in his presidential address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in these terms.

"But we, we newspaper people, editors and owners, because of our large property investment, have taken the side of property unconsciously in many cases That unconscious attitude toward the property which is the investment in our business is what makes us seem to be unfair to those who are seeking these new reforms in property rights"

[45] Blaisdsell, D C, and Greverus, Jane, *Economic Power and Political Pressures* — half title Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No 26, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941 (x and 222 pp), p 46 See Herring, E P, *Group Representation Before Congress* Washington, Brookings Institution, 1929 (xviii and 309 pp), and Rosen, S McK, *Political Process* New York, Harper, 1935 (188 pp)

[46] Sanderson, Dwight, *The Rural Community*, Boston, Ginn, 1932 (ix and 723 pp) p 644

[47] Statement by George Gallup quoted by Casey, Ralph D, The Press, Propaganda, and Pressure Groups *The Annals* (1942) 219:66–75, p 69.

[48] Casey, Ralph D, reference footnote 47, p 69

[49] For a statistical study of trends, see *Affidavits Filed in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment*, U S A, Plaintiff *v* The Associated Press *et al*, Defendants, District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, 25 May 1943 (309 pp), especially pp 76–170 Neurath, Paul, One-Publisher Communities Factors Influencing a Trend *Journalism Quart* (1944) 21 230–242

[50] White, William Allen, The Newspaper and Rights of Property Bird, George L, and Merwin, Frederic E (eds), *The Newspaper and Society*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1942 (xvii and 627 pp), pp 83–89, p 88 quoted

In other words, control of these media of communication is passing more and more into the hands of local monopolies, and those controlling these monopolies assume that their own group version of social morality — mores and morals — is that of their whole community or at least that best suited to their whole community. Thus events are seen through the frame of reference — the culture system — of the successful business group, and it "is inevitable that the managing editor and the editorial writers who want to hold their jobs take their professional views and get their professional slant from their boss, the man who signs the payroll check." [51] Possibly even more significant than the dominance of a single group's interests and culture system is the manner in which exclusive group-membership tends to prevent the established 'in-group' from understanding the interests, culture, and needs of 'out-groups.'

As more extensive considerations of the press, radio, motion pictures, public lecture series, and other media would indicate, all such communication devices have characteristics similar to those suggested here for the owners and operators of newspapers and press-radio units, more or less complicated by government commissions and by audiences. It is for this reason that the more personalized media of communication frequently perform a most powerful rôle in society in suggesting opinions to publics, and it is also for this reason that such a struggle takes place at times for the control of education, political party structure — for example, the C I O. Political Action Committee in the 1944 election campaign — youth organizations, and trades unions. Education, as a means of cultural reproduction, must naturally remain in the "right hands." [52] Other personalized media which are not so subject to unified control include the addresses of political candidates over the radio and in person, pamphlets, general public speakers, professional politicians, in some cases ministers, grocers, barbers, and others. These media, too, have the value of being more easily refreshed than the highly institutionalized ones through the use of new personalities, personalities that stand for solutions to new problems. They are also sufficiently diverse to reflect more readily different group interests

References are made at various points in this paper to polls of public opinion, such as those conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion, the Office of Opinion Research at Princeton University, Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, the Crossley Poll, and the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver Are the methods that these organizations use the most accurate ones for obtaining a picture of public opinion on some specific point? What are the weaknesses of such methods, in general? Are there other methods of sampling public opinion that should be developed in order to obtain assessments more adequately?

Politicians, professional gamblers, and newspapermen do not depend alone upon the so-called Gallup type of polls, in which a cross-section of the public is asked for whom they will vote Only to James A. Farley could Senator Carter Glass [53] of Virginia address the following sentence after the 1936 Presidential elec-

[51] White, William Allen, Publishers Menace Their Own Freedom Reference footnote 50, p 70, reprinted from a pamphlet of the Chicago *Times*, 2 July 1939, pp 23–27 Compare MacDougall, Curtis D, *Newsroom Problems and Policies*, New York, Macmillan, 1941 (x and 592 pp.) — chapter 6.

[52] See Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Propaganda in the Schools, and Propaganda Over the Schools. *Propaganda Analysis* (1938–1939) 2, No. 8 (8 pp) and (1941–1942) 4, No 4 (16 pp)

[53] Letter quoted in Farley, James A, *Behind the Ballots: The Personal History of a Politician*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1938 (392 pp), p 327. See also pp. 184–185

tion: "When you predicted that Roosevelt would carry 46 of the 48 states everybody, including myself, was incredulous; but you hit the mark precisely, as you did in 1932." Farley's public predictions were subsequently not as dependable, chiefly because he apparently came to use them to bring voters onto a losing "band wagon." Many similar examples of successful prediction by non-pollers may be given, however In connection with the 1944 Presidential election, for example, J. A. Wechsler, national editor of *PM*, predicted that Roosevelt would receive 438 electoral votes — he received 432 — in contrast with the American Institute of Public Opinion figure of 292, the Crossley poll's 354, and the prediction by *Newsweek* upon the basis of a poll of 118 political writers of 249 electoral votes for Roosevelt [54]

How do such observers make predictions that are at times so much more exact than the polls? Is it sheer luck? What factors do they apparently take into consideration that the pollers neglect?

Opinion polls reveal the opinion which social sanctions permit persons to express to a comparative stranger. The "political scout" technique, to give a label to the informal methods used by politicians, professional gamblers, and newspaper political analysts, goes beyond such open statements of opinion and attempts — with varying degrees of success — to weigh the intensity of feelings, the behavioristic evidences of probable reactions under given sets of conditions, the nature of the sentiments and events or probable events involved. It bases estimates upon the observations and experiences of natural social leaders of significant groups Rather than an individualistic, psychological technique, such as attitude or opinion measurement, it is a sociological technique that utilizes shrewd estimates of social organization, status, leadership, and adherence to group patterns of belief and action. The public opinion polls of the traditional sort tend, in short, to measure the currency of overt opinions, but the "political scout" method recognizes the ambivalence of sentiments, attempts to estimate its significance and that of events, and aims at a reasonably accurate estimate of the intensity of social cleavages.

Obvious weaknesses in the political scout technique are recognizable. Although it fits more closely certain sociological criteria for an adequate public opinion measuring device — the recognition of society's complex group structure, the group determination of sentiments and opinions, the fundamental rôles of sentiments and events — it is less 'pat' than a poll It is hard to quantify. It is less easy to demonstrate in advance of an event to be predicted the adequacy of the procedures employed But it might be refined and made to grow in significance.

The *Literary Digest* polls, reasonably accurate in the Presidential elections of 1920–1932, stumbled in 1936 and "elected" Landon rather than Roosevelt. A shift in the character of the issues thus discredited the *Digest* poll and greatly weakened the prestige of that periodical. In a Presidential election that made an issue between the haves' and the 'have-nots,' a mail ballot to the 'haves' had little predictive value Gallup predicted the probable error of the *Digest* poll within one percent on 12 July 1936.[55] This was *before* the *Digest* began to mail out its ballots! If Gallup himself should not prepare for possible further changes in popular issues, however, he might find himself one day in a position as embarrassing as was that of the *Digest* after the 1936

[54] Brandt, R P, St Louis *Post-Dispatch*, as quoted in *PM*, 13 November 1944, p 5.

[55] Gallup, George, and Rae, Saul F, *The Pulse of Democracy*, reference footnote 19, chapters 3 and 4, especially p 47

election. If deeply felt ideological differences should come to play a greater rôle in American politics, his question-and-answer technique may not be adequate to "smoke out" answers to questions which will predict probable voting or other behavior.

Some experts in polling realize this danger and are engaged in experimentation with measurements of the intensity and of the breadth of opinion. As Daniel Katz [56] of the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research has noted, "A knowledge of the intensity of an opinion as well as its direction is necessary for both accurate understanding and prediction;" and he added that this problem is thus "perhaps one of the most basic questions in the measurement of public opinion" Through the use of batteries of related questions, Hadley Cantril and Frederick Mosteller [57] of the same organization showed how "frames of reference . . . relatively firmly rooted" in "personal values" are responsible for their obtaining "essentially the same results" from various different types of questioning. This is possibly a step towards defining sentiments more accurately and towards a better recognition of their rôle.

Another point with regard to the opinion polls: as they stand now, their chief test in terms of predicted behavior is the election. But there is a relatively close similarity between answering a question and pulling a voting-machine lever. It is a much longer step between expressing a socially-expected tolerant opinion and being considerate of another's religious or racial characteristics in terms of actual deeds than it is between expressing an opinion and voting. Polls have predicted elections. They have also been useful in the making of consumer-acceptance tests of proposed advertisements, cartons, and products, as afterwards demonstrated by sales behavior.[58] But should such instances of predictability also sanction estimates of probable *behavior* in fields somewhat more remote from a question-and-answer exercise? This is a question that has not been faced adequately. It is a highly significant one [59]

What can public opinion do? Does it express a "common will" that makes itself effective sooner or later, through its very dynamics, in public policies, in the policies governing political, economic, and other social institutions? The laws of a land have a close relationship to the folkways of the land's dominant groups, as applied to specific problems in terms of opinion. The law "is forever adopting new principles from life at one end," but "it always retains old ones from history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off." [60] Or, more broadly, from the standpoint of administration, "leaders are such because they voice the convictions which have become established and because they propose measures which will realize interests of which the society has become conscious" [61] What is meant, more specifi-

[56] Cantril, Hadley, and research associates, *Gauging Public Opinion*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944 (xiv and 318 pp) — The Measurement of Intensity. chapter 3, pp 51–65, pp 51 and 65 quoted

[57] The Use and Value of a Battery of Questions Reference footnote 56; chapter 4: pp 66–73, p 73 quoted.

[58] See the brief summary of such experience in Advertising Research Foundation, *Copy Testing*, New York, Ronald Press Co, 1939 (vi and 131 pp)

[59] See Waller, Willard, and Lee, Alfred M., *Opinion Analysis and National Morale*, New York, National Association of Public Relations Counsel, mimeographed, 1942 (5 pp)

[60] Holmes, Jr, Oliver Wendell, *The Common Law*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co, 1923 (xvi and 422 pp), p 36

[61] Reference footnote 35, p. 118.

cally, when one speaks of society becoming "conscious" of its interests? What is this "common will?" As Judge Learned Hand [62] has said, "what we mean by a common will is no more than that there shall be an available peaceful means by which law may be changed when it becomes irksome to enough powerful people who can make their will effective We may say, if we like, that meanwhile everybody has consented to what exists, but this is a fiction They have not, they are merely too inert or too weak to do anything about it"

In the economic realm, public opinion has also been recognized by the public relations movement in business as a factor to be reckoned with, at least to be placated or confused As one public relations counselor [63] has asserted, "the activities of business are now controlled, not only by government, but by even a more powerful force known as 'the public interest,' which in turn rests upon another invisible influence — that of an omnipotent 'public opinion'" And, as two other such counselors [64] stated, "Public opinion is the raw product with which public relations counsel works." What such pleaders for special interests do about public opinion cannot be treated in the available space [65]

A significant factor in what can be done about public opinion is popular inertia. In the governmental field, "politicians must be alert to sense the dangers of proceeding faster than the inertia of the electorate permits, and equally alert to seize the exact moment for successful action" [66] Popular inertia is at once the balance wheel in society that impedes unwarranted experimentation and at the same time a stumbling block to those who would eliminate costly and even painful evidences of cultural lag [67]

The problems of making public opinion ever more directly influential in the formation of political, economic, and other social policies are challenges to democracy that the present generation of Americans is trying, in various ways, to meet Democracy provides a way of life sufficiently flexible to remain in fair adjustment to life conditions, but to preserve that way of life, it is necessary to be constantly alert to discover new and more effective ways of making popular opinions dominate social policy, of assuring that the people and popular leadership shall not become impatient of the free play of the "talking-over process" [68] This viewpoint places less emphasis upon the "enlightenment of the electorate," because that expression always appears to imply some absolute scale of "enlightenment," such as in an extreme case Paul J Gobbels has administered for the German Nazis, it stresses communication from "above" The American viewpoint has traditionally placed primary emphasis —

[62] Hand, Learned, Is There a Common Will? *Michigan Law Rev* (1926) 23 50

[63] Bachelor, Bronson, *Profitable Public Relations,* New York, Harper, 1938 (xii and 252 pp), p xi

[64] Jones, John P, and Church, David McL, *At the Bar of Public Opinion A Brief for Public Relations,* New York, Inter-River Press, 1939 (xx and 181 pp), chapters 9–15, p 55

[65] Lee, Alfred M, Public Relations Counseling as Institutional Psychiatry *Psychiatry* (1943) 6 271–279

[66] Reference footnote 45, *Economic Power and Political Pressures,* p 64

[67] For a case study, see Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Health and the Doctors *Propaganda Analysis* (1941–1943) 4 No 11 (16 pp), especially pp 14–15, see also Ogburn, W F, *Social Change,* New York, Huebsch, 1922 (viii and 365 pp)

[68] Cooley, Charles H, Angell, Robert C; and, Carr, Lowell J, *Introductory Sociology,* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933 (xii and 516 pp), pp 344–52 See also reference footnote 8, chapter 15, Free Speech Today

as did Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson — upon communication from the rank-and-file to the leaders As American society becomes increasingly complex, with a tendency towards more rigid societal forms, this type of communication needs constant attention to be preserved.

THE BOND APPEALS: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS *

Robert K. Merton

BONDS' SECULAR OR SACRED?

Of the wide range of appeals that might have been utilized to persuade Americans to buy war bonds, the Smith drive selected a battery especially suited to her public personality and her audience. Analyzing her broadcasts, one is immediately struck by two omissions In the first place, *nothing* was said about bonds as a *sound investment*, a nest egg of security, or a promise of good things to be bought after the war. In general, bond campaigns have tried to appeal to both patriotism and economic self interest. Nine per cent of radio spot announcements in one national campaign, for example, dwelt upon the theme of "future security" But this was evidently felt to be too materialistic and mercenary a view, and one out of accord with the dedicated spirit in which a Smith audience would buy bonds. By omitting this argument, the authors of her scripts were able to avoid the strain and incompatibility between the two main lines of motivation· unselfish, sacrificing love of country and economic motives of sound investment. The conflict between the "sacred" area of patriotism and the "profane" area of private gain [1] occurs repeatedly, as informants make abundantly clear

"We don't buy bonds as an *investment.*"

"I don't think it's *patriotic* to buy bonds What's patriotic in saving money and getting more for it? *It's my duty.* They're asking for little and giving us more in return The boys are doing the

1 Deriving his conceptions from Emile Durkheim, at least one social psychologist has clearly expressed this conflict "Now, the worlds of ordinary and Nationalistic things are different and incompatible In the first, we seek our own welfare, in the second we sacrifice it These two kinds of life are almost mutually exclusive We cannot give ourselves to the ideal being (the fatherland) to whom the cult is addressed, and to ourselves and our own interests at the same time When we think of Nationalistic (or sacred) action the idea of self-seeking (or profane) action is excluded, something within us opposes the conflicts caused by the mixture of the two Nationalistic discourses consist of professions of devotion to the fatherland, exhortations to the same, praise of the fatherland, professions of readiness to sacrifice oneself for the fatherland, stories of the culture heroes or saints of Nationalism who have sacrificed themselves for the fatherland" F Creedy, *Human Nature Writ Large a Social Psychologic Survey and Western Anthropology* (Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press, 1939), p 166

* R K. Merton, *Mass Persuasion,* Harper & Brothers, New York, 1946, pp. 45–64. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

noble work. We're just giving a few lousy dollars, if you'll excuse me."

Smith helped to resolve the conflict by greatly strengthening *one* of the two appeals, patriotism and sacrifice for country, and omitting the other. She appealed only to "higher" sentiments, to emotions that lay within the "sacred" area. One result, of course, was the rejection of her whole line of argument by some listeners who had been motivated in their bond purchases by the investment theme, and believed that theirs was the more realistic reasoning.

"I believe that bonds should be bought as a result of planning and thought. I try to buy a certain amount each year, over and above each drive They take the form of an annuity You get a fair amount of interest *It's a good sound investment*—the best there is"

But for many people the buying of war bonds is not like buying goods and services, or even like buying railroad bonds or preferred stocks It is, rather, more nearly analogous to the monetary collections made in church which are thought of not as the wherewithal for the bread and butter of the minister, but rather as an "offering" To tinge such contributions with commercialism would profane the sentiments centered about war bonds,[2] which have been termed "sacred" as compared with the more secular attitudes involved in the purchase of material goods for one's self Patriotic feelings, like religious feelings, are usually, to those experiencing them, beyond the realm of the controversial, and any exhortation to contribute money in either of these fields would be tainted were it spoken of in terms of material advantages accruing to the contributor.

It is not surprising, then, that there is at times considerable resentment of those war bond promotions which offer premiums to the purchasers. In accord with the atmosphere of her campaign, Smith made no such offers. To determine the extent to which such bonuses are deemed compatible with the social symbolism of war bonds, this question was asked of the 978 persons constituting the cross-section poll: "Do you think that it is a good idea to give things to people who buy bonds?" The responses exhibit a clear cut division, indicating a cleavage in the symbolic overtones of war bonds Fifty per cent were definitely opposed in principle to premiums, bonuses and other such inducements, and many of the remainder thought it a good idea only for "other people" who might not buy otherwise[3] The former sentiment is aptly expressed by women interviewed at length "*You don't sell your patriotism—that's how I feel—I don't want any prizes for my money.*" "*I don't like bribing people,* that's one thing I don't like If people can afford to get $50,000 worth of bonds they should get them without nylon stockings" "You don't have to give away

[2] " an object is socially sacred when it provokes in members of the group an attitude of reverence and when it can be profaned in the eyes of social opinion, by being connected with some other object" (W I Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* [New York A A Knopf, 1927], p 1868) And again "Since the idea of the sacred is always and everywhere separated from the idea of the profane in the thought of men, and since we picture a kind of logical chasm between the two, the mind irresistibly refuses to allow the two corresponding things to be confounded, or even to be put in contact with each other, for *such a promiscuity, or even too direct a contiguity, would contradict too violently the association of these ideas in the mind The sacred thing is par excellence that which the profane should not touch and cannot touch with impunity*" (Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* [New York Macmillan, 1915], p 40)

[3] For further statistical data on this point, see Appendix C, Table VI [in *Mass Persuasion*]

things with bonds. I think a lot of them make too much of an effort by offering things, giving things away, kissing people . . . a lot of people make fools of themselves. You don't have to do that to buy war bonds." And they definitely approved of the fact that Smith offered no such rewards. For some, it served further to mark her off from others engaged in the same activity:

"Sophie—[in making an appeal for bonds] could not have meant what she was saying. She had to offer a prize for buying—*she couldn't really believe in the mere act of buying, then, could she?*"

"On one broadcast, each star competed to see who could offer the highest inducement to buy. *I liked it that Kate Smith didn't offer any inducement*"

Such appeals appear to many to be incongruent with the sentiments involved in war bond buying. You do not sell your patriotism, as the previously quoted informant remarked, you give it gladly, and you give it not to the person who offers you the most in return, but to a person who herself harbors such high-minded sentiments.[4]

The other striking omission from the Smith appeals was the realistic economic purpose of the war bond drive as an *anti-inflation measure*. Nothing was said about the rise in consumer income and the scarcity of goods for civilian consumption. Listeners were not told of the billions of dollars in excess purchasing power which, if it were not invested, might be tempted to competitive bidding and to black markets. Thus an opportunity for education in vital present-day economics was surrendered in favor of large, delusive statements[5] which of course others besides Smith were using.

"Buy a bond and bring the boys back."

"You can shorten this war, you know. Each of you in your heart knows that you can."

In view of the prevalence of such appeals, it is small wonder that a nation-wide poll at the time of the Third War Loan found four of every five persons unaware of the possible function of war bonds in curbing inflation. The chief theme implied that unless people bought bonds the nation would be short of money to purchase the military supplies needed to win the war. Thus, in order to utilize a potent motive—the drive to win the war—the Smith broadcasts indulged in questionable economic education. For a manipulated public opinion in a fascist state, where only immediate results need be taken into account, this might be of little consequence, but in a democracy the quality of public understanding is not irrelevant.

A minority of our informants, who understood the economic purposes of bonds, responded unfavorably to Smith's efforts to import "sentimental and emotional" reasons. It was this group, generally the more educated informants, who felt that manipulative techniques rather than rational arguments were being employed. The appeal to sentiment was identified

[4] Nonetheless, it appears that premiums (auctions, free tickets for movies, sports, and other special events) have led to a widespread purchase of bonds. It would be instructive, though beyond the scope of this study, to learn if such purchases for a premium led to acute guilt feelings. The commercial ethos is not easily integrated with "disinterested sacrifice."


[5] The *Minute Man's Manual* for the Fifth Bond Drive recognized the need for correct information on this point by saying for the benefit of the volunteer bond salesmen: "Don't say 'If you don't buy bonds the boys won't get equipment,' because half of the people know better!" On this cogently pragmatic basis, the *Manual* was intended to curb the versatile war bond salesman who would exploit widespread fears and anxieties in his excessively thorough devotion to high patriotic purpose.

with "manipulation." But in place of making Smith the target for resentment, they bolstered their own self-esteem by pointing to her drive as an unfortunate proof that it "took something like this to get the American people to buy bonds" almost exclusively upon six major themes.

Keynoting her appeals was the theme of *sacrifice* to which Smith devoted fully half her broadcast time. Twenty-six per cent went to stories of the *sacrifices of service* men, almost as much, 20 per cent, to the

CHART 1

What Smith said: Time Distribution of Themes



If Smith had nothing to say about bonds as sound investments or as a curb to inflation, what did she talk about? The answer to this question goes beyond casual impressions. The content of Smith's broadcasts was analyzed into recurrent themes and the proportion of time devoted to each of these was taken as a crude measure of comparative emphases. As the following chart shows, she dwelt sacrifices of civilians and 5 per cent to the sacrifice of one civilian in particular, namely, Kate Smith herself.

Sixteen per cent of all Smith had to say dwelt upon the theme of *participation*, setting forth the view that the bond campaign was a common enterprise in which all of us could shuffle off our private egoisms and take part in a massive communal effort. Direct appeals to the fam-

ilies of servicemen accounted for 6 per cent of her broadcast time; a *familial* theme which defined war bonds as a means of getting the boys back home.

Whereas these themes dealt with bond-buying in general, the others were directly concerned with the Smith bond drive in particular Twelve per cent of her time was devoted to the *competition* theme, which urged listeners to help Smith surpass her earlier bond sale records and to help their own community outdo others in purchasing bonds from her. The *facilitation* theme, accounting for 7 per cent, reminded her hearers of the ease with which they could telephone their bond pledges And the *personal* theme, in which Smith conversationally referred to her private feelings and aspirations, was casually interwoven into 6 per cent of her broadcasts The script writers presumably felt that this distribution of themes would prove effective. How did it actually work out?

THE THEME OF SACRIFICE

Somewhere in *Mein Kampf* Hitler remarks that the strength of a movement must be judged more by the sacrifices it can demand than by the perquisites it can offer A deep and far-reaching type of human behavior not enough studied by the social psychologist is symbolized by the effort of Prometheus to serve mankind at whatever cost to himself [6]

The attempt to fan into active flame the readiness of listeners to sacrifice for the war effort followed three lines Foremost was *the sacrifice which the boys were making "over there."* The listener was urged to do as much for them as they were ready to do for us.

"Now they are braving swamps and jungles, risking illness and wounds, pain and death . . . *staking their lives so that you and I may never know the horrors of a blitz or a bombing* . . . nor the tragedy of torture and deliberate starvation. Because our boys' hands are at the throat of the enemy far from home, you and I can sleep in our beds with little fear of sudden death from the skies Because our boys pin the enemy down far across the world, strange ships do not enter our ports and enemy guns and tanks do not rumble through our streets and across our fields"

Generalities fail to promote empathy and vicarious experiences To induce these, the Smith broadcasts moved quickly from the abstract to the concrete, from the general to the specific individual

"Could you say to Mrs. Viola Buckley *Mrs. Viola Buckley whose son Donald was killed in action* . that you are doing everything you can to shorten the war . . . that you are backing up her son to the limit of your abilities?"

The second sort of appeal was based upon the *sacrifices which other civilians were making.*

"This mother has given one son, and she knows each night when she goes to bed that the other son is doing the same tough job and running the same terrible risk She knows too that her youngest will soon go away and leave her to fight for his country *What are you doing compared with what this mother has done?* Are you backing the attack? Are you really, honestly now, in your heart, are you really seeing to it that her sons have the best fighting equipment and plenty of it? Are you buying luxuries or are you turning those dollars you don't need into war bonds?"

[6] But the German sociologist Weber had a word for it *Wertrationalitat,* i e , action arising from the conviction of its unquestionable value, irrespective of consequences Certain types of sacrifice, heroism, martyrdom exemplify this kind of conduct

It will be noticed that listeners were thus led to invidious comparisons of themselves with a bereaved parent. Another account — and a most effective one[7] — inviting comparative self-appraisals by listeners was that of a legless veteran of World War I who bought bonds with the money he had been saving for years to buy artificial limbs.

"Early yesterday morning a man who had lost both legs in the war called in and said he wanted to buy a bond He wanted to buy a bond with the money he had been saving for years to buy himself a pair of artificial limbs . . . . *making the supreme sacrifice,* giving up the dream he had cherished for years, the dream of walking once again As he said himself 'My limbs can wait, but this war can't'

What sacrifice are you or I or any of us making that would in any way compare with the self-sacrifice of this magnificent person? Surely, if a legless veteran can give up his dream of a lifetime, then we can give a little extra money to buy another bond Don't delay, call Circle 6-4343 and give WABC your order for the biggest bond you can afford, or even more than you can afford Will you buy a bond?"

Once again, the act of buying a bond is redefined It is imbued with pathos It celebrates self-sacrifice Removed from the plain and unadorned context of transactions in the market-place, the bond purchase is sanctified as a sacrificial rite

Never explicit, but insistently in the background, was the third theme of sacrifice The Smith broadcasts repeatedly reminded listeners that *she herself was making no small sacrifice.* This was no mere indulgence in exalted expressions of sentiment. hers too was a sacrificial act Throughout the presumed ordeal of an all-day broadcast, reminiscent perhaps of the dogged persistence of our men on the battlefield, Smith too was "carrying on."

"Hello, everybody, this is Kate Smith again. . . . *Let me tell you it has been a long grind . . sitting here since 8 o'clock yesterday morning* urging each and every American to join in Columbia's great war bond drive and buy at least one bond today and tonight . . ."

Nor did many listeners object that Smith's sacrifice was hardly to be put in the same category with the first two. Such objections were largely precluded by the intimate and personal quality of Smith's relation to her audience. Many people who were not much moved by the sentimental stories were tremendously impressed by the fact that a sacrificial offering of devotion was being made by Smith right at that moment and almost in their own living room As we shall see in a later chapter, her implied sacrifice played a large part in reinforcing the convictions of listeners that she — unlike other war bond spokesmen — was really sincere

This triangulation of sacrifice, this three-cornered pressure — the boys' sacrifice, other listeners' sacrifice, Smith's sacrifice manifested in the marathon — developed in many listeners a strong sense of unworthiness and guilt They felt compelled to do something more to keep self-esteem Only by matching the sacrifices of the other three — converting the triangle into a square, as it were — could tension be relieved In the words of one informant who seized upon all three components of the sacrifice-triangle in her account of the Smith marathon:

[7] The effectiveness of this anecdote is attested by an immediate and sharp rise in the number of telephone pledges following its use on two occasions during the marathon Moreover, this story was more frequently cited by our informants than any other presented by Smith The consistency between objective sales results and our interviews support the validity of our interview data.

"I was moved *when she described a boy dying on the battlefield.* She was telling about him from childhood up and telling how a bond could maybe save him Of course, *I thought of my own boy.* That was the most impressive. *Also the story of the legless man. That was a beautiful sacrifice.* I'd have been heartbroken with all the pleading and *knowing Kate was sacrificing her time* if I hadn't bought the bond."

Then, after the purchase, there was strong evidence of catharsis. Duty had been done and guilt swept away

"After I called up, I felt good *I felt that I had done something real on the phone I got it, and just to bring the boys home"*

THE PARTICIPATION THEME

One of the compelling elements of this campaign was the sense of joining with others in a common effort Not often in modern life do citizens experience the togetherness of the old-fashioned barn-raising, cornhusking, or quilting bee The war, of course, and the bond drive as a whole invited participation, but these were so broad and impersonal that it was hard to derive much social response and satisfaction from what one did. The Smith war bond drive provided an occasion for joining in something specific, immediate and dramatic. It provided surcease from individuated, self-centered activity and from the sense that the war is too big for the individual's effort to count.

Smith's appeal was couched in terms of "we," "our," and "us." She brought her listeners in as co-workers.

"We can do it *together* . . *We* can put this greatest of all war bond drives across"

It is necessary to consider this appeal against the background of psychological isolation which characterizes so much of life for so many people. Some psychiatric observers have concluded that neuroses are often due to an extreme separation of "I" from "they." The psychological isolate feels insecure — the person who thinks and feels and acts in terms of "we" is strengthened Gangs, teams, clubs, lodges, and innumerable other organizations register our efforts to escape from the egocentric into a sense of social participation But being enlisted as a group member — even being physically in the presence of others — is no guarantee of social integration One may still be preoccupied with questions of how he looks, what impression he is making on others, what others think of him, and other egocentric concerns

Some of the elation which bond buyers reported as they went back to their radios after telephoning an order undoubtedly arose from the sense of having been caught up in a common enterprise. Informants repeatedly testify to the satisfaction of participating in an emotionally significant joint endeavor [8] It is clearly evident in the remark of a housewife, as she turned from the telephone:

"Well, Dad, we *did* something I was part of the show"

Another reports this gratification even more explicitly.

"We felt that others had been impressed and bought a bond. And the fact that *so many people felt the same way made me feel right — that I was in the right channel."*

[8] "The most intangible and subtle of incentives is that which I have called the condition of communion. . . . It is the feeling of personal comfort in social relations that is sometimes called solidarity, social integration, the gregarious instinct, or social security . . It is the opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support in personal attitudes" C I Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 148

Thus, the bond purchase was not merely an isolated transaction; it was part of an ongoing common enterprise. It represented not merely a stake in the war, but a stake in the communal undertaking directed by Smith. And, in many instances, once having bought a bond, people continued to listen to the radio drive, thus obtaining vicarious satisfaction from what *others were doing in the same enterprise*. Such continued listening *after* the bond purchase was not "compulsive," but was maintained by the flow of gratification stemming from the success of a joint endeavor in which one was participating.

THE FAMILIAL THEME

One of the chief loci of emotional relationships in our society is the family. Parental concern for children is firmly institutionalized. It is reinforced by precept, example, myth and sanction. Subject to variation though it may be, the emotional involvement of parents with their children is a firmly rooted and dependable source of motivation. It is imbued with pathos — "that glamour of sentiment which grows up about the pet notion of an age and people and which protects it from criticism."[9] In their management of pathos, Smith's script writers seized upon this culturally emphasized devotion of mothers and fathers to their offspring and related it to other pathos-laden sentiments: sacrifice, courage, death, patriotism.

Nor was the appeal invariably in terms of "your own son"; not all listeners have children or close relatives in the armed forces. Within a context of sympathy, even those listeners without sons in service were to some extent guided into taking the role of another, into responding in the same fashion as a deprived parent or sibling.

"This is Kate Smith again, asking you to buy a war bond in support of the American boys fighting far from home. It's not as if those boys were strangers to us. *They are our sons . . . and our neighbor's sons.* They are the boys from down the road . . . the grocery boy, the office boy, the garage mechanic . . . each and every one of them is a face and a voice that we remember and love. *Those boys are our own boys* and they have the greatest right in the world to our support."

"That's what war bonds are to every one of us, a chance to buy our boys back. *We've all of us got boys we want back, sons or sweethearts or brothers or husbands or just friends, kids we knew from down the block.* We want them back, all of them, and here, today, is our chance to do something about it."

Listeners repeatedly referred to a particularly effective appeal quoting a man from Utica who had just received word *from the War Department that his son* would not come back.

"Why, you'd give the whole fifteen million yourself to buy your boy back, if you had it, wouldn't you? I know I would. I'd be glad to. I'd give everything all my money or my health or my own life . . . to buy that now. You see, I got a telegram from Washington this morning. *My* boy isn't coming back."

Whatever the validity of the promise that the purchase of war bonds would bring the boys home sooner and safer, it is clear that many listeners were more effectively motivated by this than by any other appeal. No other reason for buying a bond so fully evoked deep-rooted sentiments as that embodied in the slogan — BONDS WILL SAVE LIVES!

[9] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn, 1906), p. 180. For the special case of the "pathos of parenthood," see Willard Waller, *The Family* (New York: Cordon, 1938), pp. 462–463.

This theme, however, had a differential effect on various sectors of audience. It proved particularly effective among those listeners with a son, grandson, brother or husband in the armed services. Of the sixty informants in this category, 82 per cent spontaneously referred to the bonds-will-save-lives theme, in contrast to only 40 per cent of those with no close relatives in the armed forces The interviews clearly manifest the differences between the general sense of obligation felt toward "the boys" and the very immediate and personal sense of emotional involvement of parents with their particular boy and his welfare. Such personal relationships converted an abstraction into an emotional reality. The response of mothers to this theme are typified by reports such as these:

"I wanted to see the war done with and have all the boys back *My oldest son told me he wouldn't be home any more* and he didn't know where he was going. Kate Smith talked about bringing them back home by buying more bonds *and I made up my mind right away.*"

"I was thinking, 'God knows, *maybe my son will be over there soon.*' The way she talks when she tells this makes you feel you just gotta do something *She said if we help them, they'll come home quicker, many will be saved.* I said to my friend, 'Kate Smith, she had me in tears on the radio. I'm gonna buy a bond.' Anything we can spare we gotta give."

"I said to my daughter — 'buy it off Kate Smith. *Maybe that'll be the bond that will bring your brother home.*'"

These appeals were also meaningful for those with more distant, but emotionally close, kin in the armed forces.

"Her appealing manner and after all, *we all have relatives in the service. It was in their interest that I bought it. I have a number of cousins in the service* and I correspond with all of them. It hit home, the questions she spoke on the radio. She really brought it right to your door. Everyone has someone in the service they want to do something for."

The theme found its most typical and complete expression in portraying the desperate fears and glorious sacrifices of American mothers Although these sentiments of course affected fathers as well, the Smith broadcasts were in general not directly addressed to men in her audience "She always mentioned the mother and the family side, sitting home and waiting for the boys," said a male informant who was largely unmoved by her appeals "I always imagine her appeal as strictly feminine . . . I'm not a Crosby fan, but his appeals seem to be very masculine, man to man"

The sex-linked character of her appeals probably kept the total of bond pledges below what it might have been For, in many families, it is the husband's role to make decisions on comparatively large investments such as those represented by war bonds "*You more or less leave the bonds to the man of the family,*" we are told by the wife of a salesclerk "Saving stamps and collecting fats and scrap — those appeal more to the housewife." "*It's my husband's money, anyway,*" explains another housewife "He signs the checks, so of course we discuss buying bonds. *He decides when to buy* because he knows when he can afford it."

Had her script writers considered this definition of sex roles, Smith might have substantially increased her bond sales by directing appeals to men This, it appears, would have served to rescue many lost pledges as well as to initiate additional pledges. For, often, Smith had persuaded women to buy a bond during the course

of the day only to have them wait until evening to consult with their husbands who subsequently vetoed the decision. If these persuaded-but-unpledged women failed to swell the total of bond sales, it was because their husbands were not reached by the Smith appeals. "I would have been willing to cut down on food money and other things so that I could buy the bond," explains a devoted Smith fan, "but John wouldn't approve When he came home, I said, 'Don't you think we ought to squeeze out another bond?' But he said, 'It'll be oversubscribed.'"

THE PERSONAL THEME

However, the Smith broadcasts emphasized primarily not the larger social unit, but the direct, intimate you and I There were many expressions of this type in her broadcasts.

"*You* can help *me* send this war drive over the top."
"*You and I* might send this way over the top."

Her public personality and her reputation led listeners to accept Smith as part of the homely affairs of their daily life.

"It seems that she's sitting in your kitchen and talking to you. *The way it would be with a friend.*"

"She's spontaneous, her speech isn't forced It's natural, *makes me feel that I'm talking to my neighbor over the washline.*"

The sense of intimacy implied in sharing the kitchen and the washing is further fostered by Smith's use of the form of direct address. "Are *you* buying luxuries?" This "you" was taken by many listeners in the direct personal sense

"She was speaking *straight to me.*"

"You'd think she was a personal friend. *I feel she's talking to me.*"

The intimacy is carried still further because it goes to the interior, central layers of the personality. While cold logic and pleasant entertainment operate on the periphery of the self, the emotions with which Smith was concerned — love, hate, sacrifice, conscience — penetrate deep into the center.[10] She prepared the way for this approach to the inner recesses of her listeners by offering them first the confidence of her own aspirations.

"Hello, everybody . . . this is Kate Smith again *Will you help me to make a dream come true?* It's an amazing dream . . a stupendous dream . . . a dream that may be out of reach . . . but it's a dream I know can be true today *if we all* — everyone of us . . do our part"

The conviction of Smith's sincerity helped establish this personal relationship. Others may read lines, "Kate reaches the heart."

"With others, when they say something, you know it's what their agent has written down. With Kate Smith — *she just talks what she thinks.*"

"I don't like the actresses — not like her, so convincing I don't think that addresses are like that — *too much play up in their game You don't go with your heart. She was always calling you back, your heart.*"

Later — in Chapters 4 and 6 — we shall try to discover why sincerity was so generally attributed to Smith The point here is simply that, for reasons yet to be explained, listeners experienced an emotional resonance, their inner self was in tune with that of Smith Empathy prevailed.

[10] As we have noted, this is, perhaps, one of the several advantages of the sociopsychological study of real life situations Laboratory experiments in social psychology often lack the presumed emotional involvement of subjects in the experimental situation

Another technique which served to create this sense of intimacy was to anticipate and speak about possible unfavorable feelings on the part of listeners.

"'I'm pestering you,' she said, 'but let's put this over for all of us.'"

Such periodic remarks, addressed directly to the listener and commenting on his putative feelings, served to *personalize* the entire appeal and to symbolize utter sincerity. The ostensible clarification of feelings, both Smith's and the listener's, was the very stuff of a heart-to-heart, intimate conversation. As one listener explained:

"I felt she was talking to me. . . The thing that really made me pick up the phone [to order a bond] was when she said, *'You're probably sick of listening to me, and I'm sick of talking about it, too, but I can't stop'* I bought it then"

This is communication plus. It is accommodation not only to what is said by the other person, but also to what would normally be left unsaid. The widespread feeling that Smith is "a very understanding person" may well arise from skill in anticipating and verbalizing the unspoken mood of the listener. The fact that she felt free to anticipate negative reactions is of the greatest importance. Only where the ties are strong can one cheerfully recognize and accept hostile feelings. Smith's procedure testifies to her personal security and to the strength of rapport which she presupposed between herself and the listener, a presupposition fully borne out by responses such as this:

"I cried all day. At the end she always said, 'You may be tired of me, but I've got to keep going' *I laughed when I heard that—as if anyone could get tired of her.*"

It is not surprising that, with so much emphasis on intimate personal communication, many listeners went to the telephone between broadcasts, expecting to talk directly with Smith herself. As we shall see, for some listeners the desire to speak to Smith on the telephone was actually a motivating factor in the bond purchase. It is true that in one broadcast early in the day, Smith had explained that this would be impossible.

"I wish I could ask you to telephone me, so that I could talk to each one of you personally and thank you for buying a war bond for America. But I can't do that today. Because during this CBS War Bond Day I'm going to appear on so many CBS programs that I won't have time to talk to each one of you individually."

Some who had missed this warning telephoned, hoping to hear Smith's voice in the answering "Hello." More interesting psychologically were others who converted a wish into an expectation. They knew she was not accessible, but when they called they could not quite rid themselves of a half-hope that somehow the personality that had come with such warmth over the radio into the kitchen would respond to the heartfelt wish of the listener now telephoning as Smith had requested. Just as they knew they could not let her down, they fancied she could not let them down.

"I really thought Kate would answer the phone *I just had the feeling she would,* but I guess it was impossible. I could hear how busy the switchboard was and she was on every fifteen minutes."

In a few instances the friendly, almost personal atmosphere generated by Smith's broadcasts was felt to contrast sharply with the impersonal and matter-of-fact remarks of those who answered the tele-

phone. The abrupt shift in mood occasioned resentment A few were led to question the authenticity of the human interest stories Smith told about purchasers of bonds, since the questions asked in taking telephone orders were brief and impersonal.

"I remember the story about the man who sacrificed his artificial legs I'd already called up and I wondered how she had got the story, because the young woman I'd talked to *was so businesslike.* Just asked me my name and address . There was another story about an old lady . . I was curious where they got those stories because nobody talked to Kate Smith. . . . *It made me slightly skeptical.*"

But for most the sense of rapport with Smith increased after they had pledged their bond For them, the telephone conversation was merely an interlude, and they returned to the radio to experience a continued communion between their idol and themselves This was manifest in the previously cited instance of the girl who felt that Smith's song was a response to her purchase The bond pledge was often experienced as virtually a personal contact with the radio star

"My daughter was wildly excited after she had made the phone call, and when some of her friends came in afterwards, she ran about the room from one to the other crying, '*I bought a bond from Kate Smith!*'"

A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF A TEXAS LYNCHING *

Durward Pruden

PART I. THE STORY OF THE LYNCHING

One Saturday morning in the spring of the early 1930's the Negro laborer on a white man's farm near Leeville,[1] Texas, came to his employer's house to collect his wages On being told by the farmer's wife that her husband had gone to town and had not left the wages, the Negro, disappointed, left the house, but returned shortly with a shotgun, forced the woman into her bedroom, and assaulted her several times Fearing that the woman's five-year old son in the back yard might give an alarm, the Negro went to look for him, but first tied his victim to the bed, telling her he would return soon She broke loose and fled across a field to a neighbor's house where the sheriff was telephoned Meanwhile, some men came walking along the road, and the Negro fled toward a creek bottom

Although the above is the commonly accepted story of the crime, there are other versions, as is frequently the case in charges of this nature Most of the Leeville Negroes and some whites believe that no assault occurred Medical records show that the illicit relationship did occur

The Arrest and Beginnings of Mob Action

One deputy sheriff came to the scene and arrested the Negro, who, it is claimed, fired at him. The Negro confessed,

[1] Fictitious names are used throughout the article The population of Leeville is 15,000

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agreed to plead guilty, waived all rights, and was secreted in a jail in a town some miles distant from Leeville. The next Monday night a small group of men and boys loitered near the Leeville jail. By Tuesday many exaggerated versions of the details of the assault were being repeated on the street. Tuesday night a large group of boys and men appeared at the jail and demanded the Negro. They refused to leave until the sheriff allowed some of their leaders to go through the jail and see that the Negro was not there. There were no more attempts at mob action until the next Friday, the date set for the trial.

The Attempt at Trial

On the morning of the trial many people came to the Leeville business center, both local residents and others from farms and small communities of the adjacent trading area. The judge refused to change venue, but had four Texas Rangers present to guard the court The Rangers took the Negro into the courthouse early in the morning before the crowd gathered. All morning, as the jury was being selected, the crowd around the courtyard and in the courthouse halls grew larger and more belligerent. Just as the situation was hanging in the balance between an orderly trial and a riot, a rumor was circulated that the governor of the state had telegraphed the Rangers not to shoot anyone in trying to protect the Negro Although the rumor was untrue, yet it was accepted by the mob and so encouraged its members as to make the Rangers practically helpless without extensive bloodshed. The precipitating event which changed the huge, curious crowd into a vicious and active mob, was the bringing of the woman from the hospital to the courthouse in an ambulance, and carrying her on a stretcher through the crowd into the courtroom. This was about 1 o'clock After that the mob went wild. It broke in the courtroom, and was repeatedly driven back by the Rangers, with drawn guns and tear gas. Several shots were fired The judge at last decided to change venue, and the Negro was hurried into the second-floor, fireproof vault room of the district clerk's office.

Burning the Courthouse

When the mob saw that the Rangers were determined to hold the courthouse, they determined to burn it A group of teen age boys, led by an excited and vociferous woman dressed in red, broke out the courthouse windows with rocks, threw gasoline in, and fired the building about 2 30 in the afternoon The fire department used its ladders to carry the people from the second floor courtroom There was some objection to the rescuing of the judge, county attorney, sheriffs, and Rangers, but, finally, all were removed except the Negro in the district clerk's vault As the firemen tried to fight the blaze during the afternoon, the mob cut the fire hose and sometimes attacked the firemen

The Battle with the Soldiers

The Rangers, who had left the courthouse, telephoned the governor for assistance, and about 4 P M. a small detachment of National Guards arrived from a neighboring town. They marched around the falling ruins of the courthouse, saw that they were too far outnumbered to restore order, and returned home About 6 P M. a larger unit of 52 soldiers from a large city to the south arrived. Leaving a detachment to garrison their headquarters at the county jail three blocks west of the courthouse, the remainder deployed around the smoldering courthouse ruins to push the crowd back from the hanging walls. As darkness fell, the spirit of the

mob became uglier. They reasoned that if the governor would not let the Rangers shoot at them, he surely would not let soldiers shoot either. They began to abuse the soldiers, and soon a pitched battle ensued in which the troops were forced to retreat the three blocks back to the jail, followed by the angry mob throwing bricks, rocks, pieces of timber, chunks of concrete, broken bottles, sticks of dynamite, etc Several soldiers were badly cut and beaten, others had their rifles taken from them, and some of the mobsters received minor bullet wounds Reinforced by their comrades at the jail the troops made a determined stand there and started shooting into the air. The mob then withdrew and returned to the courthouse square to open the vault and get the Negro, about whose condition there was much speculation.

From around 8 P M. to midnight various efforts were made to open the upper room of the great two story steel and cement vault. A gigantic crowd packed the entire square and side streets Finally, the mob leaders confiscated an acetylene torch; and, working from the top of a ladder, were able to open a hole large enough to insert dynamite and blow out a hole which the mob leader entered and threw out the dead body of the Negro.

The corpse was dragged behind a Ford roadster containing two young men and two girls to the Negro business section, a distance of seven blocks Thousands of people followed in a frenzied midnight parade, yelling, singing, tooting horns of automobiles. At an important corner in the Negro section the body was drawn up to the limb of a cottonwood tree in front of a Negro drug store. The store was forcibly entered and ransacked, the money and valuables pocketed, confections passed out to the crowd, and the furniture and furnishings piled under the Negro's body for fuel. Some versions have it that the leader unsexed the Negro in the presence of the crowd of men, women, and children before lighting the fire The crowd gave a mighty cheer as flames enveloped the Negro's body. After the burning of the body some of the crowd — the onlookers — went home, but the more vicious elements continued ransacking and burning with gasoline the Negro business places including a hotel, drug store, two cafes, two barber shops, two dentists' offices, a doctor's office, two undertaking establishments, an Odd Fellows' Hall, a Knights of Pythias building, a theater, a lawyer's office, a life insurance office, a cleaning and pressing shop, and several residences They swore that they would "run all the damn niggers out of Leeville." Many of the remaining mob were very drunk. The fire department was not permitted to put any water on the fires except on nearby property owned by whites.

Exodus of the Negroes

Meanwhile all of Leeville's 2,000 Negro inhabitants were under cover. Some were given refuge by white friends and employers in Leeville; the others, with their old people, their sick, their babies and children, hurried away in old automobiles, wagons, buggies, on mules, and by foot. Some reached Negro friends in adjacent cities, less fortunate individuals spent a harrowing night in ditches, ravines, clumps of bushes, under houses or bridges, etc

Martial Law

About 1 o'clock Saturday morning 150 more National Guards arrived with machine guns, rifles, side arms, and tear gas. They, together with the previously mentioned soldiers at the jail, were at last able to break the mob and disperse it. At 3 A.M. more troops arrived. At dawn the soldiers

had the town under control with machine guns mounted at strategic points. Martial law was declared and arrests began During the next few days there were continual rumors that the mob would reassemble on the outskirts of town at dark, make a new march against the soldiers, and complete their avowed job of burning all Negro dwellings and driving their occupants out of town permanently. The armed force was increased to 419 men and more arms were brought in, but nothing more of importance occurred. A notice was found tacked on a white employer's office door warning him to fire his Negro workers and engage whites. Warnings to leave town were discovered on some Negro dwellings A military court of investigation turned over 29 persons and 600 typewritten pages of confidential evidence to the civil authorities, who indicted 14 men and boys They were removed to jail in the large metropolitan city to the south; a citizens' committee to maintain order was organized, and the troops left Leeville after being there nine days.

Legal Dispositions

After many seemingly unnecessary delays on the part of the Leeville county attorney, the rioters were brought to trial in the aforementioned metropolitan city, where, to the surprise and chagrin of the judge, a jury of urban men could not be found who would agree to convict even if the defendants were proved guilty On another change of venue to the state capital city, one young man was finally given a two-year term for arson. This was more than a year after the lynching. The defendant was already at odds with the law on other charges. Before ending his sentence he was released by the governor on petition of Leeville citizens on account of the illness of his mother The other 13 men were never tried

Aftermath

Race relations in Leeville continued very strained for many months. The Negro citizens (most of whom returned) were abused and persecuted severely before the situation became normal again

PART II. CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Economic Decadence and Negro Competition

Government and financial statistics show that although Leeville had at the beginning of the century been a leading Texas city financially, industrially, and culturally, yet during the decade preceding this riot it definitely lost ground in population as well as in business, and at the time of the lynching was feeling the pinch of economic decadence severely

Negroes are not allowed in many communities near Leeville, and in that city they are excluded from work at most industrial institutions, having to content themselves with what money sifts down from the wealthier whites for such odd jobs as car washing, lawn mowing, shoe shining, and day labor on the farms In spite of this situation the more ambitious Negroes had managed to accumulate some property, and several had become quite prosperous Meanwhile, due to the economic decadence, many of the poorer whites were having financial difficulties Proof of their resentment of the propertied Negroes is shown in the riot by the destruction of Negro property, the plans to burn all Negro homes, the mob slogan of "run all the niggers out of Leeville," the posting of notices on the Negro shacks warning the occupants to leave, the notice on the establishment of a white employer warning him to discharge Negro help and employ whites, and the period of persecution of the Negroes during the months immediately after the lynching It seems safe to say that in Leeville

the racial attitude of the wealthier whites is still paternalistic, while the poor whites hate the Negro as an economic competitor, whose color furnishes a good attacking point.

Attitudes Relating to the Lynching

Individuals Individual attitudes toward the lynching were of three rather distinct types based on the economic status of the individual

A On the whole, the wealthier people, who did not compete with the Negro but used him for odd jobs, disapproved heartily of the lynching, not for intellectual or humanitarian reasons, particularly, but because (1) they emotionally preferred to have law and order, (2) they hated to see their town receive the consequent adverse publicity

B Generally speaking, the middle class economic group disapproved of the affair not because of the loss of life involved but because it distressed them to see property destroyed. Many of them were present at the lynching as "observers," and a few became excited enough to lend moral support to the actual lynchers. Their usual comment was, "I blame the judge When he saw the terrible mob, he should have ordered the sheriff to start back to the jail with the Negro Then the mob could have got him without burning the courthouse"

C. The lowest economic group, who compete with the Negro, furnished the actual mob and will be discussed later in this article

Churches The attitude of the Leeville churches was colored by the economic factor Pastors of the four largest churches, which are attended principally by the wealthier and the middle economic groups, condemned the lawlessness. Pastors of the outlying churches — in the poorer districts around the cotton mill, railroad shops, etc. — avoided discussion of the lynching because they knew that many of their members were in sympathy with it. One pastor on the east side of town, who was bold enough to censure the mob from his pulpit, was immediately waited upon by a committee of his members and advised to refrain from further mention of the subject if he expected to retain his position

The Press Although the Leeville daily paper undoubtedly contributed to the rise of the mob by carrying detailed stories of the crime, and by publishing the rumor about the Rangers being ordered not to shoot, yet this effect seems to have been an inadvertent one arising from the usual newspaper practices. On the other hand, after the lynching occurred, the editor continually condemned the mob caustically, saying editorially the next day

"The mob is never right. It is always wrong, and unreasonable, and dangerous —Leeville's name has been dishonored by the people of her own county It will take a generation to outlive the stain on her honor, if it ever can be done"

Small weeklies in the nearby villages confined themselves, for the most part, to reporting only the news items about the lynching

Officials The Rangers undoubtedy did their best to protect their prisoner against unusual handicaps On the whole, the sheriff's force did its duty, especially up until the courthouse was fired. The young National Guardsmen showed unusual discipline in their fights with the crowd, and they and their officers did an excellent piece of work during the period of martial law in ferreting out the mobsmen and turning them over to the civil authorities

It is highly probable that the judge refused to change venue in the first place

because he little suspected that such an outrage could occur in Leeville. But some of his fellow citizens believe that he was interested in the political advantage of a notorious trial.

The county attorney was courageous in helping protect the Negro before the trial. But he seemed interested primarily in another death penalty for his record and in a widely publicized case in which he would be cast in a popular role. He obtained the help of a man who lived near the assaulted woman to point out veniremen from her community, enabling him to select a biased jury. Furthermore, it seems that it was not necessary for him to have the woman brought to court to get a conviction, because the death penalty was, in his words, "a cinch"; and the trial, had it been completed, would have been another "legal lynching." He became heated in talking to the writer about the Negro and referred to him as a "damn black son-of-a-b——."

The city firemen at first made an effort to extinguish the courthouse fire, but, after the riot, failed almost unanimously to help identify mob members who cut their hose and attacked them.

The city police made practically no effort either during or after the lynching to help uphold law and order. During the lynching they confined most of their activity to directing traffic It is, perhaps, significant to note that the assaulted woman was a relative of one of the most popular policemen.

Attitudes Reflected by Degree of Cooperation with Military Investigation. During the next few days after the outbreak the military authorities conducted a thorough investigation court. All public spirited citizens were invited to give them information and were promised secrecy. Practically none of the real community leaders as pastors, teachers, attorneys, college alumni, bankers, and big business men took advantage of this opportunity to help punish the mob members. The records of this court show that practically all of the 64 people not suspected of complicity who testified before the court were given specific individual orders to appear, and a few were brought in forcibly by the officers. Twenty-three were cooperative; the cooperation of 10 others was doubtful; and 31 were plainly evasive, either because of sympathy for the mob, or fear of retribution from mob members. Witness after witness answered under oath that he had been in the crowd all day, that he had lived all his life in and around Leeville and thus knew most of its inhabitants, and yet he could not remember having recognized anyone among the thousands of people present during the day. Particularly was this the attitude of all but a few of the city firemen and policemen.

The Mob Personnel

Perhaps there should be some distinction made between the terms "crowd" and "mob" In the great crowd of thousands of curious spectators there were three types:

A Many fine citizens who opposed the lawlessness, but dared not do anything about it — mostly of the upper economic group.

B. Many more who did not participate, but were either indifferent or in favor of the lynching — mostly of the middle economic group.

C. The active mob — mostly of the lowest economic group who may be said, in general, to compete with the Negro.

The Active Mob

A compilation of data on the men and boys charged or suspected by the military authorities, and some others revealed by private investigation, gives a fairly accu-

rate sample of the active mob. Table I classifies 58 of these individuals by occupational status:

TABLE I

Active Mob Members Classified by Occupational Status

Do not work, or do odd jobs	8
Unemployed teen age boys	6
High School boys	5
Total unemployed	19
Mill and factory workers	7
Road workers	4
Truck driver	1
Shrubbery worker at nursery	1
Total common laborers	13
Farmers and farm-hands	8
Total farmers	8
Mechanics	4
Welder-plumber	1
Cement worker	1
Bricklayer	1
Railroad switchman	1
Total skilled laborers	8
Grocery store operator	2
Filling station operator	1
Dry goods store operator	1
Total owners of small businesses	4
Gin operator	1
Advertising manager of a department store	1
Bank clerk (a youth)	1
Total salaried people	3
Fruit peddler	1
Banjo player and singer	1
Insurance agent	1
Total miscellaneous	3

At least 11 of the active participants in the riot were known to have had previous police records. Nine had been in the hands of the law for stealing, fighting, or bootlegging (this was before repeal). Two were under suspended sentence for stealing; and one, a hobo, had spent 12 years as an inmate of an insane asylum.

Pertinent Facts About the Most Active Lynchers[2]

The acknowledged leader of the mob was a man 40 years old who could neither read nor write, and had no particular profession, but occasionally did a little cattle trading and "bronc bustin" in rodeos. He drank a great deal, and was described by officers as "a rough and ready bully." He had been before the courts several times as a bootlegger. With his wife and little daughter he lived in a shabby part of town near some Negro shanties. He owned no property, and belonged to no church. The wife provided most of the family's support by taking in washing. His attitude at the opening of the vault was described as that of a great benefactor — a protector of womanhood — doing his duty in a brave and dramatic manner. A few years after the lynching he was killed in a drunken brawl on a South Texas sheep ranch.

The boy who was given the two-year prison term was 17 years old, his father was dead, and his mother was a low paid worker at a shirt factory. At an early age he began truanting from school, stealing chickens, coming into the hands of the police, and was eventually brought before the courts for cattle stealing. At this time he had returned from prison and had again been before the courts for stealing.

One of the men who helped open the vault later had trouble with a farmer because he raped the farmer's wife Another committed suicide some years after the lynching, indicating emotional instability. Still another mob member was an inebriate; and the hobo member, at the time of the lynching, was sleeping in a city park and confessed that his breakfasts consisted of bread and milk stolen early in the

[2] For detailed case studies of mob members see complete thesis, Durward Pruden, "A Sociological Study of a Texas Lynching," Southern Methodist University, 1935.

morning from various grocery stores. He had often been picked up for vagrancy in other cities following his release from the insane asylum. An 18 year old boy who fought the firemen was described by those who knew him as "a sort of a half-wit." Only one of the 14 indicted owned a home.

The five high school participants are all described by school officials as problem boys, "overgrown and hungry for notoriety." The mother of one was a prostitute, and the father of one (a city fireman) committed suicide recently. Two boys from fairly well fixed homes were involved.

A summation of the evidence about the personnel of the mob indicates that the active leaders and participants — mostly from the lowest economic group — included:

(1) Some vicious criminals.
(2) Many teen age, excitable youths, impatient at restraints of the law.
(3) Many propertyless, uneducated, unattached men of the domino parlor clientele type.

A Mixed-Race Sexual Theory

The question has often been raised why white men and sometimes white women become so insanely infuriated at sex relations, either forced or voluntary, between Negro men and white women There is usually no intense excitement when a white man rapes a white woman Such a case recently occurred in the county where murder as well as rape was committed. Yet the white culprit received an orderly trial When a Negro man assaults a Negro woman in Leeville, the customary penalty is a fine of $12.50. Furthermore, the investigation disclosed that some of the young white boys and older loafers of Leeville patronize Negro prostitutes, and some of the white farm laborers arrange illicit relations with rural Negro women.

In the light of these facts the following theory — not a proved conclusion — is suggested: It is a well known tenet of Freudian psychology that when a human mind contains some thought material which is repulsive to the morals of the group, such material is forcibly relegated to deep corners of the subconscious mind to make the consciousness more comfortable Buried in the subconscious, these thoughts struggle for release and expression. Many times they evade the social censor of consciousness by finding expression in reversed forms or indirect activities Could it be that these men of the lowest (and sometimes the highest) social strata become so infuriated at a Negro's rape of a white woman because of the guilty enjoyment they have received from socially disapproved sex play with Negro women? Or, again, do they have an almost subconscious curiosity as to whether or not their own white women folk would likewise enjoy mixed-race sex relations? Or yet again, perhaps they have had mental imageries and reveries of obtaining satisfying sex experiences by assault, near-assault, or seduction methods, and, therefore, have a subconscious resentment against the Negro's doing what they, themselves, dare not, or, perhaps, have not had the opportunity to do Furthermore, could it be that these loud and boisterous women taking leading parts in lynchings of Negroes are giving indirect expression to subconscious reveries they themselves may have had of such mixed-sex relations?

Final General Conclusion

The rape case was only an excuse for overt conflict that would eventually have come anyhow, because of the irritation of the poor whites at the increased prosperity of the business and professional Negroes The lynching, however, was more than an economic struggle at the bottom. It

was aided and abetted by the passive attitude, indifference, or open approval of the upper economic classes, and was therefore, a community phenomenon.

SOURCES

1 Hundreds of interviews with the people of Leeville and surrounding territory, National Guard Officers, sheriff's force, and other officials

2 Two volumes of secret testimony taken by the Military Court of Investigation

3 Files of newspapers of Leeville and the near by city dailies, including some Negro papers

4 Pamphlets, books, and other data published by the Commission on Interracial Cooperation

5 For further sources and complete bibliography, see Durward Pruden, *op cit.*

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Albig, William, *Public Opinion*, McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1939 The analysis of public opinion and publics in this book is made against the background of modern complex societies In addition to the discussion of the nature, conditions, and media of opinion formation, there is a certain degree of integration of the material within a genuinely sociological frame of reference

2 Blumer, Herbert, "Collective Behavior," in *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* ed by Alfred McClung Lee, Barnes and Noble, Inc, New York, 1946, pp 167–222 This generalized account of collective behavior has served as a theoretical base for a great deal of the research which has been done in the field of crowd and public behavior The approach utilized emphasizes the possible transition of collective behavior into institutionalized patterns

3 Cantril, Hadley, 'The Lynching Mob,' in his *The Psychology of Social Movements*, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1941, pp 78–122. Although there is a somewhat unsatisfactory theoretical account of crowd behavior in this chapter, there are two good descriptions of actual lynch mobs The data for one of these portrayals are drawn from the Pruden study

4 Clark, C D, "The Concept of the Public," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, March, 1933, pp 311–20 Clark's conceptual analysis of the term public has had considerable influence on subsequent formulations His emphasis on the idea that there is not one but many publics has been of particular importance

5 Hartshorne, E Y, "Reactions to the Nazi Threat A Study of Propaganda and Culture Conflict. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter, 1941, pp 625–39 The author describes the nature of propaganda, and then analyzes the character of the factors making for acceptance or rejection of the propaganda Whereas most studies concentrate on propaganda and the propagandist, this study focuses attention primarily on the recipient

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7 Lazarsfeld P F, Berelson, Bernard, and Gaudet, Hazel, *The People's Choice*, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, New York, 1944, esp pp 56–64, 137–58 This is a study of the factors determining votes in the presidential election of 1940 The first pages cited deal with the results of cross pressures on the individual when he makes his choice The last pages cited are concerned with the role of social groups and particular individuals in influencing voting behavior

8 Lazarsfeld P F, and Merton, R K, "Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda, *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences* Series II, December, 1943 pp 58–79 This article reviews the results of the authors' propaganda studies made during the war It is primarily concerned with the war propaganda, its effects, and its shortcomings (as propaganda) The article is also useful as a reference source for other empirical propaganda studies

9 Raper, A F, *The Tragedy of Lynching*, University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill, 1933 esp pp 59–467 The statistical data in this book are now somewhat out of date, but the descriptions of several types of lynching mobs are still extremely useful

10 Young, Kimball, "Mass Behavior," in his *Social Psychology*, F S Crofts and Company, New York, 1946, pp 385–522 This is a thorough treatment of the general field of collective behavior, and is particularly useful for its synthesis and analysis of the more recent studies

11 See also MacIver, "The Multi Group Society,' p 366 DeGre, "Freedom and Social Structure, p 521, Merton Social Structure and Anomie, p 771 Lee, 'Techniques of Social Reform An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive," p 812, Abel, 'The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," p 827

11. Societies: Communal and Associational Types

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Since the vast majority of all social relations and social systems are to be found within *communities* or *societies,* it is important to understand clearly what these latter terms signify. The layman knows, of course, that he lives in a community and is a member of society, and he is also aware that there are other communities and societies, some different from and some like his own The sociologist identifies communities and societies somewhat as the layman does (i.e., community as a local group and society as a larger unit including communities), but he also uses these terms interchangeably in some respects. Thus, a community is thought of as a local society, and the larger society, or nation, in turn has many of the characteristics of a community. Furthermore, the sociologist conceives of communities and societies as both containing and being comprised of all the social relations and social systems within their physical boundaries, as well as ordering these systems into a functioning whole. (Hence we shall use the word community to denote a local society.)

Although a few social relations and systems cut across and exist between national societies, there is at present no social unit larger than the national society within which social life has been enduringly ordered as a whole. Moreover, most social life is experienced within the local community, i e., the village, town, or city. For the average person the community or local society is the macrocosm of social existence. It is therefore self-evident that primary and secondary associations, collective behavior, and other aspects of social relations cannot be understood apart from their location in the larger networks of the local community and, in some cases, of the national society. Our task in this chapter is to describe and analyze some of the basic aspects of community or societal organization as a background for the understanding of social groups and relations as functioning elements in a society. By classifying national societies and local communities into two basic categories, *communal* and *associational,* a fundamental structural distinction is indicated (i.e., a distinction between two different modes of social organization).

Let us examine the bases of this distinction by pointing out certain societal contrasts. All of us are familiar with the small town, removed from the affairs of the world and leading its peaceful existence year after year with little change to mark the passage of time. At the other extreme, we have also been exposed to, indeed we cannot avoid, the large metropolis with its variegated population and its rapid pace of social and cultural change. At first glance it might seem that the funda-

mental difference among communities lies in the degree to which they are urban or rural. A longer historical perspective, however, reveals that there have been many large cities which, despite their greater size and complexity, more closely resembled the isolated village than the modern metropolis. The structural difference goes deeper than size or complexity, for it involves the basic modes of social organization and the tempo of social change. In the *communal society* (e.g., the isolated village) the component relations are structured into a rigidly unified whole by the inflexible, unchanging, and all-powerful culture pattern. The culture pattern of the *associational society* (e.g., the changing metropolis), on the contrary, is in a process of continuous change. Its major aspects are modified and developed not by the society as a unit but by some of its constituent associations. The universal norms (e.g., monogamous marriage, private property) of the associational society underlie and to some extent channel and guide the cultures of the associations and other groupings, but, unlike the universal norms of the communal society, they do not integrate the culture into a rigid unity.

In the typically isolated communal society, cultural and social change occurs very slowly. When approved means of achieving culturally defined goals have become adequate to their purpose, and there is no introduction of new goals or techniques from the outside, the culture becomes relatively static. The child learns to desire the same things, follow the same procedures, and relate himself to others in the same way as did his ancestors. The culture of the community defines the social roles of the members and relates them to one another in a tightly articulated manner, so that a person never comes into contact with anyone toward whom he does not know how to behave. The prescriptions of the culture are highly specific, and leave little leeway to the individual or the association for the development of independent systems of roles. These prescriptions become so deeply ingrained in the personality that for the most part they become habits and their mere performance results in satisfactions independent of the goals toward which they are ostensibly directed.

The communal society may be small and relatively simple, as in some primitive tribes, or, as we have seen, it may be large and complex, as in some medieval cities. If the communal society is small, the social roles of the members will be defined by universal norms familiar to the members of the community so that each member will be acquainted with all the behavior practices of the other members. If the society is differentiated and complex, the universal norms of the community set a framework within which a highly organized system of specialized roles develops. In this case the individual will be familiar with the universals, but may know the roles of others only if they impinge directly on him. Thus in feudal society the peasant was familiar with his own role, with the role of the lord as it related to the peasant, and with a system of universals shared with the lord which outlined and justified the hierarchical pattern of roles. Such a complex society can be just as tightly organized and inflexible as the organization of the simpler communal society.

The detailed characteristics of the communal society in its simpler form are set forth by Robert Redfield in his article, "The Folk Society." He notes the basic characteristics already mentioned and shows how they are related to subsidiary aspects of social organization in the simple communal society. Particularly important for characterizing the folk society are the following points. (1) There is very little division of labor except between men and women. (2) Except for the family, which is the basic unit of social organization, there is an absence of differentiated associations (3) The people of the small community are well known to one another. (4) Social control is largely exercised through folkways and mores, enforced by the informal pressure of the community. (5) There is an extremely strong sense of unity binding the community together. (6) The community is economically self-sufficient.

The last two characteristics are also typical of the complex communal society; the first four less so. In the complex communal society there is a greater division of labor as well as more class differentiation There are some associations. some professional groups as well as organized churches and perhaps the state. While the individual is well acquainted with the people with whom he typically associates, he is not familiar with all the people of the community, particularly those of markedly higher or lower social ranking. Finally, in the complex communal society there is some control of behavior through law; the laws, however, are closely related to the systems of folkways and mores and tend not to change any more rapidly than do these forms of social control.

While the associational society possesses a certain degree of unity — otherwise it could not be considered a society — it is of a different order from that of the communal society. The associational society is undergoing rapid social and cultural change, and consequently there cannot be the rigid articulation of social structure which occurs in the communal society Culture universals exist, to be sure, but instead of serving to organize the associations and other social relations into a co-ordinated system, the most they can do is to preserve a sense of unity, keep the changes of the culture within certain broad channels, and serve as a basis for reconciling conflict and maintaining order in those areas where it is necessary that social order be present. It is the associations of the associational society which bring about changes and develop their own norms in order to control the behavior of their members.

MacIver, in the excerpt from his book, *The Web of Government,* indicates two types of associations which grow up within the associational community. One type develops around values experienced directly in the primary group interaction which takes place within the association itself. Such values as religion, art, literature, friendship, and so forth, are the basis for such associations These associations, according to MacIver, do not need to be co-ordinated into a single system. The function of the associational community and its universals is to encourage and protect diversity in these realms of activity.

On the other hand, MacIver points out, there are values such as those of eco-

nomic activity which, because of extensive division of labor, can be achieved only by organizing men into complex systems of social relations. While the associational principle is still operative in these cases, it takes a different form; the society encourages the economic associations to align themselves in a system by developing in its culture a more or less organized set of approved ends and means leading to a system of purposeful and rational relations (contractual relations) among the economic groups. Where this is not sufficient the society develops more direct forms of control

The relation of the society to these two forms of associational structure involves the maintenance of social order In the noneconomic realm society must prevent the encroachment of one group upon another, and in the economic realm (as well as the political), it must assure the continued functioning of the complex systems so that the participants can achieve their goals The associational society, however, cannot exercise this control directly through folkways and mores. The family can still pass on these norms to the individual, but all of the associational structures are likely to develop patterns which will lead to conflict Thus a religious association may develop doctrines of salvation which lead to conflict with other religious groups; and in economic groups, differences of interest may bring conflict between employer and worker In order to prevent these conflicts, or at least to keep them from tearing apart the fabric of the social order, the society exercises control through the state and its application of legislative and administrative law.

Another characteristic of the associational society is that while the society itself becomes more loosely structured, with various centers of social and cultural organization, the component associations tend to become very complex and tightly structured This is particularly true in the economic and political spheres, which develop modes of social organization that are much more specialized and tightly articulated than those in the communal society. Thus the giant corporation, the giant labor union, and the state itself tend to become highly bureaucratic.

The individual in an associational society has very few fixed positions and statuses It is left to him to seek out and compete for his own positions In the field of values which are not structured by the culture of the society as a whole, he has a wide range of choice (The necessity of choice may impose psychological stresses and strains on individuals in such a society, and in these cases, as Fromm has shown, individuals may actually seek "escape from freedom") Thus in religion, art, literature, recreation, and even in family life the individual can usually find a group of people who will accept his point of view, no matter how bizarre While his possibilities are more restricted in the economic and political realms, he still has the choice of a wide variety of associations and of positions within the associations In some areas of life he may lead a highly disciplined existence, as when he works for a mass-production corporation, while in other areas he may be a member of voluntary associations very loosely organized and permitting a wide range of behavior. An individual may even pursue his interests alone, although this usually involves at least fleeting and transitory relations with others. Many of

the social relations he forms will be based on rational purpose rather than a feeling of solidarity, and he may find difficulty in satisfying his need of primary group affection.

Most associational societies of the past seem to have been midway points in the transition from one form of communal society to another. Certain aspects of our contemporary society seem to indicate movement toward a new form of communal society, particularly the increasing dominance of political and economic organizations with their vast bureaucratic structures, which offer possibilities for unifying the society into one dominated by a single association. On the other hand, the continued intensity of technological change, the existence of general democratic beliefs, and other dynamic factors in the contemporary scene may bear out MacIver's contention that we have developed a multi-group associational society and must learn to live in it. If MacIver's contention is valid it is obvious that we still have some distance to travel before we have a fully developed associational structure.

The articles by Tomars and Komarovsky indicate two areas in which a full associational development is lacking. Tomars's article, "Rural Survivals in American Urban Life," indicates that many of the elements of our previous communal culture have survived in the modern urban community. To the extent that these survivals find expression in religion, friendship, recreation, and other forms of associational life in which the individual is more or less free to pursue his own interests, they may not be of much significance — unless they tend to deny equal privileges to other associations. On the other hand, the survival of communal culture in the areas of political and economic life — and Tomars indicates communal traits do survive there — can only bring about resistance to the experimental changes which are necessary to integrate these activities into the associational social structure.

Komarovsky's article, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," shows a different sort of lag in the development of the associational society. If the needs of the individual are not satisfied within one inclusive social group, they must be satisfied through associations devoted to specific values or by individual search The study shows that while the middle- and upper-class members of our society do find satisfactions in such voluntary associations, the lower-class urban dweller lacks such affiliations. It is difficult to assess the significance of this condition, for the worker's family and his church, if they are still communal in character, may contain his complete range of interests. On the other hand, as these associations become more specialized — and they inevitably must in the associational society — the individual will be able to satisfy his needs only through the mass forms of commercial recreation and entertainment offered him. Under such circumstances the impersonal quality and the fleeting character of his social relations will create a personality alienated from the social structure and submerged in an unstructured mass of similar personalities. Thus we may expect increased personality disorganization and increased susceptibility to exploitation by skilled propagandists who

have developed techniques for manipulating the mass personality. The mass thus created and manipulated may well serve as the base upon which a communal society operating through the totalitarian state may come into existence.

In this brief discussion it has been possible to touch only upon the main characteristics of the associational society. There is still a great deal that we do not know about the structure and functions of the associational society which is our world today.

THE FOLK SOCIETY *

Robert Redfield

Understanding of society in general and of our own modern urbanized society in particular can be gained through consideration of the societies least like our own· the primitive, or folk, societies [1] All societies are alike in some respects, and each differs from others in other respects, the further assumption made here is that folk societies have certain features in common which enable us to think of them as a type — a type which contrasts with the society of the modern city.[2]

This type is ideal, a mental construction. No known society precisely corresponds with it, but the societies which have been the chief interest of the anthropologist most closely approximate it The construction of the type depends, indeed, upon special knowledge of tribal and peasant groups The ideal folk society could be defined through assembling, in the imagination, the characters which are logically

[1] Neither the term "primitive" nor any other is denotative, and none has sufficient generally accepted precise meaning to allow us to know in just what characters of a society to discover the degree to which it is or is not "primitive," "simple," or whatever The words "nonliterate" or "preliterate" do call attention to a particular character, literacy, but understanding is still required as to when a society is "literate" and as to what form or degree of literacy has significance There are head-hunting tribes, in other respects as primitive as were the Pawnee Indians in the seventeenth century, that have knowledge of writing In certain Mexican villages most children and many adults have formal knowledge of the arts of reading and writing, but in most other respects these village societies are much more like tribal societies than they are like our western cities

The word "folk," which will be used in this paper, is no more precise than any other It is used here because, better than others, it suggests the inclusion in our comparisons of peasant and rustic people who are not wholly independent of cities and because in its compounds, "folklore" and "folk song," it points, in a rough way, to the presence of folklore and folk songs, as recognized by the collector of such materials, as a sign of a society to be examined in making up the characterization of the ideal type with which we are here concerned But the question of the word to be used is of small importance

[2] The reader may compare the conception developed in this paper with the ideal "sacred society" characterized by Howard Becker in "Ionia and Athens" (Ph D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1930), pp 1–16, with similar conceptions developed in chapter 1 of *Social Thought from Lore to Science* by Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker (Boston, New York D. C Heath & Co, 1938), and with the application of the conception in *The Sociology of the Renaissance* by Alfred von Martin (London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, Ltd, 1945)

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1947, pp 293–308 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press

opposite those which are to be found in the modern city, only if we had first some knowledge of nonurban peoples to permit us to determine what, indeed, are the characteristic features of modern city living. The complete procedure requires us to gain acquaintance with many folk societies in many parts of the world and to set down in words general enough to describe most of them those characteristics which they have in common with each other and which the modern city does not have.

In short, we move from folk society to folk society, asking ourselves what it is about them that makes them like each other and different from the modern city So we assemble the elements of the ideal type. The more elements we add, the less will any one real society correspond to it As the type is constructed, real societies may be arranged in an order of degree of resemblance to it. The conception develops that any one real society is more or less "folk." But the more elements we add, the less possible it becomes to arrange real societies in a single order of degree of resemblance to the type, because one of two societies will be found to resemble the ideal type strongly in one character and weakly in another, while in the next society strong resemblance will lie in the latter character and not in the former This situation, however, is an advantage, for it enables us to ask and perhaps answer questions, first, as to whether certain characters tend to be found together in most societies, and then, if certain of them do, why

Anyone attempting to describe the ideal folk society must take account of and in large degree include certain characterizations which have been made by many students, each of whom has been attentive to some but not to all aspects of the contrast between folk and modern urban society. Certain students have derived the characterization from examination of a number of folk societies and have generalized upon them in the light of contrast provided by modern urban society; the procedure defined above and followed by the writer. This is illustrated by Goldenweiser's characterization of five primitive societies. He says that they are small, isolated, nonliterate, that they exhibit local cultures; that they are relatively homogeneous with regard to the distribution of knowledge, attitudes, and functions among the population, that the individual does not figure as a conspicuous unit; and that knowledge is not explicitly systematized.[3]

In other cases the students have compared the state of certain societies at an early time with the same, or historical descendant of the same, society at a later time In this way Maine arrived at his influential contrasts between society based on kinship and society based on territory, and between a society of status and one of contract [4] In the case of this procedure, as in the case of the next, broad and illuminating conceptions are offered us to apply to folk societies as we contrast them with modern urban society We are to find out if one of the contrasting terms is properly applicable to folk society and the other term to modern urban society

In the work of still other students there is apparent no detailed comparison of folk with urbanized societies or of early society with later, rather, by inspection of our own society or of society in general, contrasting aspects of all society are recognized and named. This procedure is perhaps never followed in the unqualified manner just described, for in the instances about to be mentioned there is evidence that folk or ancient society has been compared with modern urbanized society Nevertheless, the emphasis placed by men

[3] A A Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York Alfred A Knopf, 1922), pp 117–18

[4] Henry Maine, *Ancient Law* (London J Murray, 1861)

of this group is upon characteristics which, contrasting logically, in real fact coexist in every society and help to make it up Here belongs Tonnies' contrast between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft,* or that aspect of society which appears in the relations that develop without the deliberate intention of anyone out of the mere fact that men live together, as contrasted with that aspect of society which appears in the relations entered into deliberately by independent individuals through agreement to achieve certain recognized ends [5] Comparable is Durkheim's distinction between that social solidarity which results from the sharing of common attitudes and sentiments and that which results from the complementary functional usefulnesses of the members of the group In the "social segment" — the form of society existing in terms of "mechanical solidarity" — the law is "repressive", in the "social organ" — the form of society existing in terms of "organic solidarity" — the law is "restitutive." [6]

It may be asked how closely the constructed type arrived at by any one investigator who follows the procedure sketched above will resemble that reached by another doing the same It may be supposed that to the extent to which the real societies examined by the one investigator constitute a sample of the range and variety of societies similar to the sample constituted by the societies examined by the other, and to the extent that the general conceptions tentatively held by the one are similar to those held by the other, the results will be (except as modified by other factors) the same For the purposes of understanding which are served by the method of the constructed type, however, it is not necessary to consider the question The type is an imagined entity, created only because through it we may hope to understand reality Its function is to suggest aspects of real societies which deserve study, and especially to suggest hypotheses as to what, under certain defined conditions, may be generally true about society. Any ideal type will do, although it is safe to assert that that ideal construction has most heuristic value which depends on close and considered knowledge of real folk societies and which is guided by an effective scientific imagination — whatever that may be

II

"The conception of a 'primitive society' which we ought to form," wrote Sumner, "is that of small groups scattered over a territory" [7] The folk society is a small society There are no more people in it than can come to know each other well, and they remain in long association with each other Among the Western Shoshone the individual parental family was the group which went about, apart from other families, collecting food, a group of families would assemble and so remain for a few weeks, from time to time, to hunt together, during the winter months such a group of families would form a single camp [8] Such a temporary village included

[5] Ferdinand Tonnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1st ed, 1887), trans and ed by Charles P Loomis as *Fundamental Concepts of Sociology* (New York, Cincinnati, etc American Book Co, 1940)

[6] *Émile Durkheim on the Division of Labor in Society,* a translation by George Simpson of *De la division du travail social* (New York Macmillan Co, 1933), Howard Becker, "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences," *American Sociological Review,* V, No 1 (February, 1940), pp 40–55, reprinted in Harry Elmer Barnes, Howard Becker, and Frances Bennett Becker (eds), *Contemporary Social Theory* (New York D Appleton-Century Co, 1940), Part I

[7] W G Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston Ginn & Co, 1907), p 12

[8] Julian Steward, *Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Sociopolitical Groups* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bull 120 [Washington Government Printing Office, 1938]), pp 230–34

perhaps a hundred people. The hunting or food-collecting bands considered by Steward, representing many parts of the world, contained, in most cases, only a few score people [9] A Southwestern Pueblo contained no more than a few thousand persons.

The folk society is an isolated society. Probably there is no real society whose members are in complete ignorance of the existence of people other than themselves; the Andamanese, although their islands were avoided by navigators for centuries, knew of outsiders and occasionally came in contact with Malay or Chinese visitors.[10] Nevertheless, the folk societies we know are made up of people who have little communication with outsiders, and we may conceive of the ideal folk society as composed of persons having communication with no outsider.

This isolation is one half of a whole of which the other half is intimate communication among the members of the society. A group of recent castaways is a small and isolated society, but it is not a folk society; and if the castaways have come from different ships and different societies, there will have been no previous intimate communication among them, and the society will not be composed of people who are much alike.

May the isolation of the folk society be identified with the physical immobility of its members? In building this ideal type, we may conceive of the members of the society as remaining always within the small territory they occupy. There are some primitive peoples who have dwelt from time immemorial in the same small valley, and who rarely leave it.[11] Certain of the pueblos of the American Southwest have been occupied by the same people or their descendants for many generations. On the other hand, some of the food-collecting peoples, such as the Shoshone Indians and certain aborigines of Australia, move about within a territory of very considerable extent, and there are Asiatic folk groups that make regular seasonal migrations hundreds of miles in extent.

It is possible to conceive of the members of such a society as moving about physically without communicating with members of other groups than their own Each of the Indian villages of the midwest highlands of Guatemala is a folk society distinguishable by its customs and even by the physical type of its members from neighboring villages, yet the people are great travelers, and in the case of one of the most distinct communities, Chichicastenango, most of the men travel far and spend much of their time away from home.[12] This does not result, however, in much intimate communication between those traveling villagers and other peoples The gipsies have moved about among the various peoples of the earth for generations, and yet they retain many of the characteristics of a folk society

Through books the civilized people communicate with the minds of other people and other times, and an aspect of the isolation of the folk society is the absence of books The folk communicate only by word of mouth, therefore the communication upon which understanding is built is only that which takes place among neighbors, within the little society itself The folk have no access to the thought and experience of the past,

[9] Julian Steward, "Economic and Social Basis of Primitive Bands," *Essays in Anthropology Presented to A L Kroeber* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1936), pp 341–42.

[10] A R Radcliffe-Brown, *The Andaman Islanders* (Cambridge At the University Press, 1933), pp 6–9

[11] A. L. Kroeber, *Handbook of Indians of California* (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bull 78 [Washington Government Printing Office, 1925]), p 13

[12] Robert Redfield, "Primitive Merchants of Guatemala," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, I, No 4, pp 42–56.

whether of other peoples or of their own ancestors, such as books provide. Therefore, oral tradition has no check or competitor. Knowledge of what has gone before reaches no further back than memory and speech between old and young can make it go, behind "the time of our grandfathers" all is legendary and vague. With no form of belief established by written record, there can be no historical sense, such as civilized people have, no theology, and no basis for science in recorded experiment. The only form of accumulation of experience, except the tools and other enduring articles of manufacture, is the increase of wisdom which comes as the individual lives longer, therefore the old, knowing more than the young can know until they too have lived that long, have prestige and authority.

The people who make up a folk society are much alike Having lived in long intimacy with one another, and with no others, they have come to form a single biological type. The somatic homogeneity of local, inbred populations has been noted and studied Since the people communicate with one another and with no others, one man's learned ways of doing and thinking are the same as another's Another way of putting this is to say that in the ideal folk society, what one man knows and believes is the same as what all men know and believe Habits are the same as customs. In real fact, of course, the differences among individuals in a primitive group and the different chances of experience prevent this ideal state of things from coming about. Nevertheless, it is near enough to the truth for the student of a real folk society to report it fairly well by learning what goes on in the minds of a few of its members, and a primitive group has been presented, although sketchily, as learned about from a single member. The similarity among the members is found also as one generation is compared with its successor. Old people find young people doing, as they grow up, what the old people did at the same age, and what they have come to think right and proper. This is another way of saying that in such a society there is little change.

The members of the folk society have a strong sense of belonging together. The group which an outsider might recognize as composed of similar persons different from members of other groups is also the group of people who see their own resemblances and feel correspondingly united Communicating intimately with each other, each has a strong claim on the sympathies of the others Moreover, against such knowledge as they have of societies other than their own, they emphasize their own mutual likeness and value themselves as compared with others. They say of themselves "we" as against all others, who are "they," [18]

Thus we may characterize the folk society as small, isolated, nonliterate, and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity Are we not soon to acknowledge the simplicity of the technology of the ideal folk society? Something should certainly be said about the tools and toolmaking of this generalized primitive group, but it is not easy to assign a meaning to "simple," in connection with technology which will do justice to the facts as known from the real folk societies. The preciseness with which each tool, in a large number of such tools, meets its needs in the case of the Eskimo, for example, makes one hesitate to use the word "simple." Some negative statements appear to be safe secondary and tertiary tools — tools to make tools — are relatively few as compared with primary tools, there is no making of artifacts by multiple, rapid, machine manufacture; there is little or no use of natural power.

[18] Sumner, *op. cit.*, pp 13–15.

There is not much division of labor in the folk society: what one person does is what another does. In the ideal folk society all the tools and ways of production are shared by everybody. The "everybody" must mean "every adult man" or "every adult woman," for the obvious exception to the homogeneity of the folk society lies in the differences between what men do and know and what women do and know These differences are clear and unexceptional (as compared with our modern urban society where they are less so). "Within the local group there is no such thing as a division of labor save as between the sexes," writes Radcliffe-Brown about the Andaman Islanders. ". . . Every man is expected to be able to hunt pig, to harpoon turtle and to catch fish, and also to cut a canoe, to make bows and arrows and all the other objects that are made by men"[14] So all men share the same interests and have, in general, the same experience of life

We may conceive, also, of the ideal folk society as a group economically independent of all others: the people produce what they consume and consume what they produce. Few, if any, real societies are completely in this situation; some Eskimo groups perhaps most closely approach it Although each little Andamanese band could get along without getting anything from any other, exchange of goods occurred between bands by a sort of periodic gift-giving.

The foregoing characterizations amount, roughly, to saying that the folk society is a little world off by itself, a world in which the recurrent problems of life are met by all its members in much the same way. This statement, while correct enough, fails to emphasize an important, perhaps the important, aspect of the folk society. The ways in which the members of the society meet the recurrent problems of life are conventionalized ways; they are the results of long intercommunication within the group in the face of these problems; and these conventionalized ways have become interrelated within one another so that they constitute a coherent and self-consistent system Such a system is what we mean in saying that the folk society is characterized by "a culture." A culture is an organization or integration of conventional understandings It is, as well, the acts and the objects, in so far as they represent the type characteristic of that society, which express and maintain these understandings In the folk society this integrated whole, this system, provides for all the recurrent needs of the individual from birth to death and of the society through the seasons and the years. The society is to be described, and distinguished from others, largely by presenting this system.

This is not the same as saying, as was said early in this paper, that in the folk society what one man does is the same as what another man does. What one man does in a mob is the same as what another man does, but a mob is not a folk society. It is, so far as culture is concerned, its very antithesis.[15] The members of a mob (which is a kind of "mass") each do the same thing, it is true, but it is a very immediate and particular thing, and it is done without much reference to tradition It does not depend upon and express a great many conventional understandings related to one another. A mob has no culture. The folk society exhibits culture to the greatest conceivable degree. A mob is an aggregation of people doing the same simple thing simultaneously. A folk society is an organization of people doing many different things successively as well

[14] Radcliffe-Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 43

[15] Herbert Blumer, "Mass Behavior and the Motion Picture," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XXIX, No. 3 (August, 1935), pp. 115–27

as simultaneously. The members of a mob act with reference to the same object of attention The members of a folk society are guided in acting by previously established comprehensive and interdependent conventional understandings; at any one time they do many different things, which are complexly related to one another to express collective sentiments and conceptions. When the turn comes for the boy to do what a man does, he does what a man does, thus, though in the end the experiences of all individuals of the same sex are alike, the activities of the society, seen at a moment of time, are diverse, while interdependent and consistent.

The Papago Indians, a few hundred of them, constituted a folk society in southern Arizona Among these Indians a war party was not so simple a thing as a number of men going out together to kill the enemy It was a complex activity involving everybody in the society both before, during, and after the expedition and dramatizing the religious and moral ideas fundamental to Papago life [16] Preparation for the expedition involved many practical or ritual acts on the part of the immediate participants, their wives and children, previously successful warriors, and many others While the party was away, the various relatives of the warriors had many things to do or not to do — prayer, fasting, preparation of ritual paraphernalia, etc These were specialized activities, each appropriate to just that kind of relative or other category of person So the war was waged by everybody. These activities, different and special as they were, interlocked, so to speak, with each other to make a large whole, the society-during-a-war-expedition And all these specialized activities obeyed fundamental principles, understood by all and expressed and reaffirmed in the very forms of the acts — the gestures of the rituals, the words of songs, the implied or expressed explanations and admonitions of the elders to the younger people. All understood that the end in view was the acquisition by the group of the supernatural power of the slain enemy This power, potentially of great positive value, was dangerous, and the practices and rituals had as their purposes first the success of the war party and then the draining-off of the supernatural power acquired by the slaying into a safe and "usable" form

We may say, then, that in the folk society conventional behavior is strongly patterned it tends to conform to a type or a norm These patterns are interrelated in thought and in action with one another, so that one tends to evoke others and to be consistent with the others Every customary act among the Papago when the successful warriors return is consistent with and is a special form of the general conceptions held as to supernatural power We may still further say that the patterns of what people think should be done are closely consistent with what they believe is done, and that there is one way, or a very few conventional ways, in which everybody has some understanding and some share, of meeting each need that arises [17] The culture of a folk society is, therefore, one of those wholes which is greater than its parts Gaining a livelihood takes support from religion, and the relations of men to men are justified in the conceptions held of the supernatural world or in some other aspect of the culture Life, for the member of the folk society, is not one activity and then another and different one; it is one large activity out of which one part may not be separated without affecting the rest

[16] Ruth Underhill, *The Autobiography of a Papago Woman* ("American Anthropological Association, Memoirs," No 46 [1936])

[17] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York D Appleton-Century Co , 1936), chap xvi, esp p 283

A related characteristic of the folk society was implied when it was declared that the specialized activities incident to the Papago war party obeyed fundamental principles understood by all. These "principles" had to do with the ends of living, as conceived by the Papago. A near-ultimate good for the Papago was the acquisition of supernatural power. This end was not questioned; it was a sort of axiom in terms of which many lesser activities were understood. This suggests that we may say of the folk society that its ends are taken as given. The activities incident to the war party may be regarded as merely complimentarily useful acts, aspects of the division of labor. They may also, and more significantly, be seen as expressions of unquestioned common ends The folk society exists not so much in the exchange of useful functions as in common understandings as to the ends given. The ends are not stated as matters of doctrine, but are implied by the many acts which make up the living that goes on in the society. Therefore, the morale of a folk society—its power to act consistently over periods of time and to meet crises effectively is not dependent upon discipline exerted by force or upon devotion to some single principle of action but to the concurrence and consistency of many or all of the actions and conceptions which make up the whole round of life. In the trite phrase, the folk society is a "design for living"

What is done in the ideal folk society is done not because somebody or some people decided, at once, that it should be done, but because it seems "necessarily" to flow from the very nature of things There is, moreover, no disposition to reflect upon traditional acts and consider them objectively and critically. In short, behavior in the folk society is traditional, spontaneous, and uncritical. In any real folk society, of course, many things are done as a result of decision as to that particular action, but as to that class of actions tradition is the sufficient authority. The Indians decide now to go on a hunt; but it is not a matter of debate whether or not one should, from time to time, hunt.

The folkways are the ways that grow up out of long and intimate association of men with each other, in the society of our conception all the ways are folkways. Men act with reference to each other by understandings which are tacit and traditional. There are no formal contracts or other agreements The rights and obligations of the individual come about not by special arrangement, they are, chiefly, aspects of the position of the individual as a person of one sex or the other, one age-group or another, one occupational group or another, and as one occupying just that position in a system of relationships which are traditional in the society The individual's status is thus in large part fixed at birth; it changes as he lives, but it changes in ways which were "foreordained" by the nature of his particular society The institutions of the folk society are of the sort which has been called "crescive"; they are not of the sort that is created deliberately for special purposes, as was the juvenile court. So, too, law is made up of the traditional conceptions of rights and obligations and the customary procedures whereby these rights and obligations are assured, legislation has no part in it.

If legislation has no part in the law of the ideal folk society, neither has codification, still less jurisprudence. Radin has collected material suggesting the limited extent to which real primitive people do question custom and do systematize their knowledge.[18] In the known folk societies they do these things only to a limited extent. In the ideal folk society there is no objectivity and no systematization of knowledge as guided by what seems to be

[18] Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1927).

its "internal" order. The member of this mentally constructed society does not stand off from his customary conduct and subject it to scrutiny apart from its meaning for him as that meaning is defined in culture Nor is there any habitual exercise of classification, experiment, and abstraction for its own sake, least of all for the sake of intellectual ends There is common practical knowledge, but there is no science.

Behavior in the folk society is highly conventional, custom fixes the rights and duties of individuals, and knowledge is not critically examined or objectively and systematically formulated, but it must not be supposed that primitive man is a sort of automaton in which custom is the mainspring It would be as mistaken to think of primitive man as strongly aware that he is constrained by custom Within the limits set by custom there is invitation to excel in performance There is lively competition, a sense of opportunity, and a feeling that what the culture moves one to do is well worth doing "There is no drabness in such a life It has about it all the allurements of personal experience, very much one's own, of competitive skill, of things well done."[19] The interrelations and high degree of consistency among the elements of custom which are presented to the individual declare to him the importance of making his endeavors in the directions indicated by tradition The culture sets goals which stimulate action by giving great meaning to it[20]

It has been said that the folk society is small and that its members have lived in long and intimate association with one another It has also been said that in such societies there is little critical or abstract thinking. These characteristics are related to yet another characteristic of the folk society· behavior is personal, not impersonal A "person" may be defined as that social object which I feel to respond to situations as I do, with all the sentiments and interests which I feel to be my own; a person is myself in another form, his qualities and values are inherent within him, and his significance for me is not merely one of utility. A "thing," on the other hand, is a social object which has no claim upon my sympathies, which responds to me, as I conceive it, mechanically, its value for me exists in so far as it serves my end In the folk society all human beings admitted to the society are treated as persons, one does not deal impersonally ("thing-fashion") with any other participant in the little world of that society. Moreover, in the folk society much besides human beings is treated personally The pattern of behavior which is first suggested by the inner experience of the individual — his wishes, fears, sensitivenesses, and interests of all sorts — is projected into all objects with which he comes into contact Thus nature, too, is treated personally the elements, the features of the landscape, the animals, and especially anything in the environment which by its appearance or behavior suggests that it has the attributes of mankind — to all these are attributed qualities of the human person.[21]

In short, the personal and intimate life of the child in the family is extended, in the folk society, into the social world of the adult and even into inanimate objects It is not merely that relations in such a society are personal, it is also that they are familial The first contacts made as the infant becomes a person are with other persons, moreover, each of these first per-

[19] A A Goldenweiser, "Individual, Pattern and Involution," *Essays in Honor of A L Kroeber* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1936), p 102

[20] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston and New York Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934)

[21] Ruth Benedict, "Animism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*

sons, he comes to learn, has a particular kind of relation to him which is associated with that one's genealogical position. The individual finds himself fixed within a constellation of familial relationships. The kinship connections provide a pattern in terms of which, in the ideal folk society, all personal relations are conventionalized and categorized All relations are personal. But relations are not, in content of specific behavior, the same for everyone. As a mother is different from a father, and a grandson from a nephew, so are these classes of personal relationship, originating in genealogical connection, extended outward into all relationships whatever. In this sense, the folk society is a familial society. Lowie [22] has demonstrated the qualification that is to be introduced into the statement of Maine [23] that the primitive society is organized in terms of kinship rather than territory It is true that the fact that men are neighbors contributes to their sense of belonging together. But the point to be emphasized in understanding the folk society is that whether mere contiguity or relationship as brother or as son is the circumstance uniting men into the society, the result is a group of people among whom prevail the personal and categorized relationships that characterize families as we know them, and in which the patterns of kinship tend to be extended outward from the group of genealogically connected individuals into the whole society. The kin are the type persons for all experience.

This general conception may be resolved into component or related conceptions. In the folk society family relationships are clearly distinguished from one another. Very special sorts of behavior may be expected by a mother's brother of his sister's son, and this behavior will be different from that expected by a father's brother of his brother's son Among certain Australian tribes animals killed by a hunter must be divided so that nine or ten certain parts must be given to nine or ten corresponding relatives of the successful hunter — the right ribs to the father's brother, a piece of the flank to the mother's brother, and so on.[24] The tendency to extend kinship outward takes many special forms. In many primitive societies kinship terms and kinship behavior (in reduced degree) are extended to persons not known to be genealogically related at all, but who are nevertheless regarded as kin Among the central Australians, terms of relationship are extended "so as to embrace all persons who come into social contact with one another. . . In this way the whole society forms a body of relatives." [25] In the folk society groupings which do not arise out of genealogical connection are few, and those that do exist tend to take on the attributes of kinship Ritual kinship is common in primitive and peasant societies in the forms of blood brotherhood, godparental relationships, and other ceremonial sponsorships [26] These multiply kinship connections, in these cases the particular individuals to be united depend upon choice Furthermore, there is frequently a recognizedly fictitious or metaphorical use of kinship terms to designate more casual relationships, as between host and guest or between worshipper and deity.[27]

[22] Robert H Lowie, *The Origin of the State* (New York· Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1927), pp 51–73.

[23] Maine, *op cit*

[24] A W Howitt, *The Native Tribes of Southeastern Australia* (New York Macmillan Co, 1904), p 759

[25] A R Radcliffe-Brown, "Three Tribes of Western Australia," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XLIII, pp 150–51

[26] Benjamin Paul, "Ritual Kinship With Special Reference to Godparenthood in Middle America" (Ph D thesis, University of Chicago, 1942)

[27] E C Parsons, *Notes on Zuni*, Part II ("American Anthropological Association, Memoirs," Vol IV, No 4 [1917]).

The real primitive and peasant societies differ very greatly as to the forms assumed by kinship. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognize two main types In one of these the connection between husband and wife is emphasized, while neither one of the lineages, matrilineal or patrilineal, is singled out as contrasted with the other In such a folk society the individual parental family is the social unit, and connections with relatives outside this family are of secondary importance Such family organization is common where the population is small, the means of livelihood are by precarious collection of wild food, and larger units cannot permanently remain together because the natural resources will not allow it But where a somewhat larger population remains together, either in a village or in a migratory band, there often, although by no means always, is found an emphasis upon one line of consanguine connection rather than the other with subordination of the conjugal connection [28] There results a segmentation of the society into equivalent kinship units These may take the form of extended domestic groups or joint families (as in China) or may include many households of persons related in part through recognized genealogical connection and in part through the sharing of the same name or other symbolic designation, in the latter case we speak of the groups as clans Even in societies where the individual parental family as an independent economic unit, as in the case of the eastern Eskimo, husband and wife never become a new social and economic unit with the completeness that is characteristic of our own society. When a marriage in primitive society comes to an end, the kinsmen of the dead spouse assert upon his property a claim they have never given up [29]

On the whole, we may think of the family among folk peoples as made up of persons consanguinely connected. Marriage is, in comparison with what we in our society directly experience, an incident in the life of the individual who is born, brought up, and dies with his blood kinsmen In such a society romantic love can hardly be elevated to a major principle

In so far as the consanguine lines are well defined (and in some cases both lines may be of importance to the individual) [30] the folk society may be thought of as composed of families rather than of individuals It is the familial groups that act and are acted upon There is strong solidarity within the kinship group, and the individual is responsible to all his kin as they are responsible to him. "The clan is a natural mutual aid society. . . . A member belongs to the clan, he is not his own, if he is wrong, they will right him; if he does wrong, the responsibility is shared by them" [31] Thus, in folk societies wherein the tendency to maintain consanguine connection has resulted in joint families or clans, it is usual to find that injuries done by an individual are regarded as injuries against his kinship group, and the group takes the steps to right the wrong The step may be revenge regulated by custom or a property settlement A considerable part of primitive law exists in the regulation of claims by one body of kin against another The fact that the folk society is an organization of families rather than an aggregation of individuals is further expressed in many of

[28] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York D Appleton-Century Co, 1936), p 159

[29] Ruth Benedict, "Marital Property Rights in Bilateral Societies," *American Anthropologist*, XXXVIII, No 3 (July–September, 1936), pp 368–73

[30] Peter Murdock, "Double Descent," *American Anthropologist*, XLII (new ser), No 4, Part I (October–December, 1940), pp 555–61.

[31] Edwin W Smith and Andrew Murray Dale, *The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia* (London Macmillan & Co, Ltd, 1920), I, p 296

those forms of marriage in which a certain kind of relative is the approved spouse. The customs by which in many primitive societies a man is expected to marry his deceased brother's widow or a woman to marry her deceased sister's husband express the view of marriage as an undertaking between kinship groups. One of the spouses having failed by death, the undertaking is to be carried on by some other representative of the family group. Indeed, in the arrangements for marriage — the selection of spouses by their relatives, in bride-price, dowry, and in many forms of familial negotiations leading to a marriage — the nature of marriage as a connubial form of social relations between kindreds finds expression.

It has been said in foregoing paragraphs that behavior in the folk society is traditional, spontaneous, and uncritical, that what one man does is much the same as what another man does, and that the patterns of conduct are clear and remain constant throughout the generations. It has also been suggested that the congruence of all parts of conventional behavior and social institutions with each other contributes to the sense of rightness which the member of the folk society feels to inhere in his traditional ways of action. In the well-known language of Sumner, the ways of life are folkways; furthermore, the folkways tend to be also mores — ways of doing or thinking to which attach notions of moral worth. The value of every traditional act or object or institution is, thus, something which the members of the society are not disposed to call into question, and should the value be called into question, the doing so is resented. This characteristic of the folk society may be briefly referred to by saying that it is a sacred society. In the folk society one may not, without calling into effect negative social sanctions, challenge as valueless what has come to be traditional in that society.

Presumably, the sacredness of social objects has its source, in part, at least, in the mere fact of habituation; probably the individual organism becomes early adjusted to certain habits, motor and mental, and to certain associations between one activity and another or between certain sense experiences and certain activities, and it is almost physiologically uncomfortable to change or even to entertain the idea of change. There arises "a feeling of impropriety of certain forms, of a particular social or religious value, or a superstitious fear of change." [32] Probably the sacredness of social objects in the folk society is related also to the fact that in such well-organized cultures acts and objects suggest the traditions, beliefs, and conceptions which all share. There is reason to suppose that when what is traditionally done becomes less meaningful because people no longer know what the acts stand for, life becomes more secular.[33] In the repetitious character of conventional action (aside from technical action) we have ritual, in its expressive character we have ceremony; in the folk society ritual tends also to be ceremonious, and ritual-ceremony tends to be sacred, not secular.

The sacredness of social objects is apparent in the ways in which, in the folk society, such an object is hedged around with restraints and protections that keep it away from the commonplace and the matter-of-fact.[34] In the sacred there is alternatively, or in combination, holiness and dangerousness. When the Papago Indian returned from a successful war expedition, bringing the scalp of a slain

[32] Franz Boas, *Primitive Art* (Oslo, 1927), p 150

[33] Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p 364

[34] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926).

Apache, the head-hairs of the enemy were treated as loaded with a tremendous "charge" of supernatural power; only old men, already successful warriors and purified through religious ritual, could touch the object and make it safe for incorporation into the home of the slayer Made into the doll-like form of an Apache Indian, it was, at last, after much ceremonial preparation, held for an instant by the members of the slayer's family, addressed in respect and awe by kinship terms, and placed in the house, there to give off protective power.[35] The Indians of San Pedro de la Laguna, Guatemala, recognize an officer, serving for life, whose function it is to keep custody of ten or a dozen Latin breviaries printed in the eighteenth century and to read prayers from one or another of these books on certain occasions No one but this custodian may handle the books, save his assistants on ceremonial occasions, with his permission Should anyone else touch a book he would go mad or be stricken with blindness Incense and candles are burnt before the chest containing the books, yet the books are not gods — they are objects of sacredness[36]

In the folk society this disposition to regard objects as sacred extends, characteristically, even into the subsistence activities and into the foodstuffs of the people. Often the foodstuffs are personified as well as sacred "'My granduncle used to say to me,' explained a Navajo Indian, '"if you are walking along a trail and see a kernel of corn, pick it up. It is like a child lost and starving" According to the legends corn is just the same as a human being, only it is holier . . . When a man goes into a cornfield he feels that he is in a holy place, that he is walking among Holy People . . . Agriculture is a holy occupation. Even before you plant you sing songs. You continue this during the whole time your crops are growing You cannot help but feel that you are in a holy place when you go through your fields and they are doing well'"[37] In the folk society, ideally conceived, nothing is solely a means to any immediate practical end All activities, even the means of production, are ends in themselves, activities expressive of the ultimate values of the society.

III

This characterization of the ideal folk society could be greatly extended. Various of the elements that make up the conception could be differently combined with one another, and this point or that could be developed or further emphasized and its relations shown to other aspects of the conception For example, it might be pointed out that where there is little or no systematic and reflective thinking the customary solutions to problems of practical action only imperfectly take the form of really effective and understood control of the means appropriate to accomplish the desired end, and that, instead, they tend to express the states of mind of the individuals who want the end brought about and fear that it may not be. We say this briefly in declaring that the folk society is characterized by much magic, for we may understand "magic" to refer to action with regard to an end — to instrumental action — but only to such instrumental action as does not effectively bring about that end, or is not really understood in so far as it does, and which is expressive of the way the doer thinks and feels rather than adapted to accomplishing the end. "Magic is based on specific experience of emotional states . . . in which

[35] Underhill, *op cit*, p 18

[36] Benjamin Paul, unpublished MS

[37] W W Hill, *The Agricultural and Hunting Methods of the Navaho Indians* ("Yale University Publications in Anthropology," No. 18 [New Haven Yale University Press, 1938]), p. 53.

the truth is revealed not by reason but by the play of emotions upon the human organism . . . magic is founded on the belief that hope cannot fail nor desire deceive." [38] In the folk society effective technical action is much mixed with magical activity What is done tends to take the form of a little drama; it is a picture of what is desired.

The nature of the folk society could, indeed, be restated in the form of a description of the folk mind This description would be largely a repetition of what has been written in foregoing pages, except that now the emphasis would be upon the characteristic mental activity of members of the folk society, rather than upon customs and institutions. The man of the folk society tends to make mental associations which are personal and emotional, rather than abstractly categoric or defined in terms of cause and effect. ". . . Primitive man views every action not only as adapted to its main object, every thought related to its main end, as we should perceive them, but . . . he associates them with other ideas, often of a religious or at least a symbolic nature. Thus he gives to them a higher significance than they seem to us to deserve" [39] A very similar statement of this kind of thinking has been expressed in connection with the thinking of medieval man, the description would apply as well to man in the folk society:

"From the causal point of view, symbolism appears as a sort of short-cut of thought Instead of looking for the relation between two things by following the hidden detours of their causal connections, thought makes a leap and discovers their relation, not in a connection of cause or effects, but in a connection of signification or finality Such a connection will at once appear convincing, provided only that the two things have an essential quality in common which can be referred to a general value . . Symbolic assimilation founded on common properties presupposes the idea that these properties are essential to things. The vision of white and red roses blooming among thorns at once calls up a symbolic association in the medieval mind for example, that of virgins and martyrs, shining with glory, in the midst of their persecutors. The assimilation is produced because the attributes are the same· the beauty, the tenderness, the purity, the colours of the roses are also those of the virgins, their red color that of the blood of the martyrs But this similarity will only have a mystic meaning if the middle-term connecting the two terms of the symbolic concept expresses an essentiality common to both; in other words, if redness and whiteness are something more than names for physical differences based on quantity, if they are conceived of as essences, as realities The mind of the savage, of the child, and of the poet never sees them otherwise" [40]

The tendency to treat nature personally has recognition in the literature as the "animistic" or "anthropomorphic" quality of primitive thinking, and the contrast between the means-ends pattern of thought more characteristic of modern urban man and the personal thought of primitive man has been specially investigated [41]

[38] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Magic, Science and Religion," in *Science, Religion and Reality*, ed Joseph Needham (New York Macmillan Co, 1925), p. 80

[39] Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York: Macmillan Co, 1938), p. 226.

[40] J Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (London Arnold & Co, 1924), pp 184–85 This "symbolic" kind of thinking is related to what Lévy-Bruhl called "participation" (see L Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* [New York Alfred A Knopf, 1925], esp chap ii)

[41] Hans Kelsen, "Causality and Retribution,"

In the foregoing account no mention has been made of the absence of economic behavior characteristic of the market in the folk society. Within the ideal folk society members are bound by religious and kinship ties, and there is no place for the motive of commercial gain. There is no money and nothing is measured by any such common denominator of value. The distribution of goods and services tends to be an aspect of the conventional and personal relationships of status which make up the structure of the society goods are exchanged as expressions of good will and, in large part, as incidents of ceremonial and ritual activities. "On the whole, then, the compulsion to work, to save, and to expend is given not so much by a rational appreciation of the [material] benefits to be received as by the desire for social recognition, through such behavior." [42]

The conception sketched here takes on meaning if the folk society is seen in contrast to the modern city The vast, complicated, and rapidly changing world in which the urbanite and even the urbanized country-dweller live today is enormously different from the small, inward-facing folk society, with its well-integrated and little-changing moral and religious conceptions At one time all men lived in these little folk societies For many thousands of years men must have lived so, urbanized life began only very recently, as the long history of man on earth is considered, and the extreme development of a secularized and swift-changing world society is only a few generations old.

The tribal groups that still remain around the edges of expanding civilization are the small remainders of this primary state of living. Considering them one by one, and in comparison with the literate or semiliterate societies, the industrialized and the semi-industrialized societies, we may discover how each has developed forms of social life in accordance with its own special circumstances. Among the polar Eskimos, where each small family had to shift for itself in the rigors of the arctic environment, although the ties of kinship were of great importance, no clans or other large unilateral kinship groups came into existence The sedentary Haida of the Queen Charlotte Islands were divided into two exogamous kinship groups, each composed of clans, with intense pride of descent and healthy rivalry between them Among the warring and nomadic Comanche initiative and resourcefulness of the individual were looked on more favorably than among the sedentary and closely interdependent Zuni. In West Africa great native states arose, with chiefs and courts and markets, yet the kinship organization remained strong; and in China we have an example of slow growth of a great society, with a literate élite, inclosing within it a multitude of village communities of the folk type Where cities have arisen, the country people dependent on those cities have developed economic and political relationships, as well as relationships of status, with the city people, and so have become that special kind of rural folk we call peasantry [43] And even in the newer parts of the world, as in the United States, many a village or small town has, perhaps, as many points of resemblance with the folk society as with urban life.

Philosophy of Science, VIII, No 4 (October, 1941), pp 533–56, and Kelsen, *Society and Nature* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1944)

[42] Raymond Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori* (New York E P Dutton & Co, 1929), p 484 See also, Firth, *Primitive Polynesian Economy* (London George Routledge & Sons, 1939), esp chap. x, "Characteristics of a Primitive Economy"

[43] Robert Redfield, "Introduction," in Horace Miner, *St Denis A French-Canadian Parish* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1940).

Thus the societies of the world do not range themselves in the same order with regard to the degree to which they realize all of the characteristics of the ideal folk society. On the other hand, there is so marked a tendency for some of these characteristics to occur together with others that the interrelations among them must be in no small part that of interdependent variables. Indeed, some of the interrelations are so obvious that we feel no sense of problem. The smallness of the folk society and the long association together of the same individuals certainly is related to the prevailingly personal character of relationships. The fewness of secondary and tertiary tools and the absence of machine manufacture are circumstances obviously unfavorable to a very complex division of labor. Many problems present themselves, however, as to the conditions in which certain of these characteristics do not occur in association, and as to the circumstances under which certain of them may be expected to change in the direction of their opposites, with or without influencing others to change also.

A study of the local differences in the festival of the patron village saint in certain communities of Yucatan indicates that some interrelationship exists in that case.[44] In all four communities, differing as to their degrees of isolation from urban centers of modifying influence, the festival expresses a relationship between the village and its patron saint (or cross) which is annually renewed In it a ritual and worship are combined with a considerable amount of play. The chief activities of the festival are a novena, a folk dance, and a rustic bullfight. In all four communities there is an organization of men and women who for that year undertake the leadership of the festival, handing over the responsibility to a corresponding group of successors at its culmination. So far the institution is the same in all the communities studied. The differences appear when the details of the ritual and play and of the festal organization are compared, and when the essential meanings of these acts and organizations are inquired into. Then it appears that from being an intensely sacred act, made by the village as a collectivity composed of familially defined component groups, with close relationship to the system of religious and moral understandings of the people, the festival becomes, in the more urbanized communities, chiefly an opportunity for recreation for some and of financial profit for others, with little reference to moral and religious conceptions.

In the most isolated and otherwise most folklike of the communities studied the organization of the festival is closely integrated with the whole social structure of the community The hierarchy of leaders of the community, whose duties are both civil and religious, carry on the festival. It is the chiefs, the men who decide disputes and lead in warfare, who also take principal places in the religious processions and in the conduct of the ceremonies The community, including several neighboring settlements, is divided into five groups, membership in which descends in the male line The responsibility for leading the prayers and preparing the festal foods rests in turn on four men chosen from each of the five groups The festival is held at the head village, at the shrine housing the cross patron of the entire community. The festival consists chiefly of solemnly religious acts· masses, rosaries, procession of images, kneeling of worshipers. The ritual offerings are presented by a special officer, in all solemnity, to the patron cross, certain symbols of divinity are brought from the temple and exposed to the kneeling people as the offerings are made The transfer of the responsibility to

[44] Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan.*

lead the festival is attended by ceremony in an atmosphere of sanctity: certain ritual paraphernalia are first placed on the altar and then, after recitation of prayers and performance of a religious dance, are handed over, in view of all, from the custodians of the sacred charge for that year to their successors.

In the villages that are less isolated the festival is similar in form, but it is less well integrated with the social organization of the community, is less sacred, and allows for more individual enterprise and responsibility These changes continue in the other communities studied, as one gets nearer to the city of Merida In certain seacoast villages the festival of the patron saint is a money-getting enterprise of a few secular-minded townspeople The novena is in the hands of a few women who receive no help from the municipal authorities, the bullfight is a commercial entertainment, professional bullfighters being hired for the occasion and admission charged, the folk dance is little attended. The festival is enjoyed by young people who come to dance modern dances and to witness the bullfight, and it is an opportunity to the merchants to make a profit What was an institution of folk culture has become a business enterprise in which individuals, as such, take part for secular ends

The principal conclusion is that the less isolated and more heterogeneous communities of the peninsula of Yucatan are the more secular and individualistic and the more characterized by disorganization of culture. It further appeared probable that there was, in the changes taking place in Yucatan, a relation of interdependence among these changing characteristics, especially between the disorganization of culture and secularization "People cease to believe because they cease to understand, and they cease to understand because they cease to do the things that express the understandings." [45] New jobs and other changes in the division of labor bring it about that people cannot participate in the old rituals; and, ceasing to participate, they cease to share the values for which the rituals stood. This is, admittedly, however, only a part of the explanation.

The conception of the folk society has stimulated one small group of field workers to consider the interdependence or independence of these characteristics of society. In Yucatan isolation, homogeneity, a personal and "symbolic" view of nature, importance of familial relationships, a high degree of organization of culture, and sacredness of sanctions and institutions were all found in regular association with each other. It was then reported that in certain Indian communities on or near Lake Atitlan in Guatemala this association of characteristics is not repeated.[46] As it appeared that these Guatemalan communities were not in rapid change, but were persisting in their essential nature, the conclusion was reached that "a stable society can be small, unsophisticated, homogeneous in beliefs and practices," have a local, well-organized culture, and still be one "with relationships impersonal, with formal institutions dictating the acts of individuals, and with family organization weak, with life secularized, and with individuals acting more from economic or other personal advantage than from any deep conviction or thought of the social good" It was further pointed out that in these Guatemalan societies a "primitive world view," that is, a disposition to treat nature personally, to regard attributes as entities, and to make "symbolic" rather than causal connections, coexists with a tendency for relations between man and man to be impersonal

[45] *Ibid*, p 364.

[46] Sol Tax, "Culture and Civilization in Guatemalan Societies," *Scientific Monthly*, XLVIII (May, 1939), p. 467.

commercial, and secular, as they tend to be in the urban society [47]

These observations lead, in turn, to reconsideration of the circumstances tending to bring about one kind of society or one aspect of society rather than another. The breakdown of familial institutions in recent times in Western society is often ascribed to the development of the city and of modern industry. If, as has been reported, familial institutions are also weak in these Guatemalan villages, there must be alternative causes for the breakdown of the family to the rise of industry and the growth of the city, for these Guatemalan Indians live on or near their farms, practice a domestic handicraft manufacture, and have little or nothing to do with cities. It has been suggested that in the case of the Guatemalan societies the development, partly before the Conquest and partly afterward, of a pecuniary economy with a peddler's commerce, based on great regional division of labor, together with a system of regulations imposed by an élite with the use of force, may be the circumstances that have brought about reduction in the importance of familial institutions and individual independence, especially in matters of livelihood.[48]

The secular character of life in these highland villages of the Lake Atitlan region is not so well established as in the individuated character of life, but if life is indeed secular there, it is a secularity that has developed without the influence of high personal mobility, of the machine, and of science. In a well-known essay Max Weber showed how capitalistic commercialism could and did get along with piety in the case of the Puritans [49] So it may appear that under certain conditions a literate and, indeed, at least partly urbanized society may be both highly commercial and sacred — as witness, also, the Jews — while under certain other conditions an otherwise folklike people may become individualistic, commercial, and perhaps secular. It is, of course, the determination of the limiting conditions that is important

[47] Sol Tax, "World View and Social Relations in Guatemala," *American Anthropologist*, XLIII, No 1 (new ser). (January–March, 1941), pp 27–42.

[48] Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, pp 365–67

[49] Max Weber, "Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism," cited in Kemper Fullerton, "Calvinism and Capitalism," *Harvard Theological Review*, XXI, pp. 163–95.

THE MULTI-GROUP SOCIETY *

Robert M. MacIver

Our main argument to this point is that the relation of man to the many groups and forms of organization to which he is more nearly or more distantly, more deeply or more superficially, attached is not solved by making one of these, whether the state or any other, the sole or inclusive object of his devotion, the one social focus of his being. There are other forms of order than the simple uni-centered order There is the order of the balance and inter-adjustment of many elements The conception of the all-inclusive all-regulating state is as it were a pre-Copernican

* From Robert M MacIver, *The Web of Government*. Copyright, 1947, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission

conception of the social system. It appeals to the primitive sense of symmetry As we explore more deeply the social universe we must discard it and frame a conception more adequate to social reality In this exploration we learn, among other things, to understand better the nature of the multi-group society of modern man

With this theme we shall deal here very briefly We start from the fact that men have many different kinds of interest, that some of these are universal, in the sense that they are pursued by all men everywhere — all seek alike the satisfaction of certain elementary needs — while some are particular, making appeal to some men and not to others Now since organization conveys power men learn to join with others so as to pursue their interests more effectively, each for each as well as each for all Some of these interests are purely distributive, as are most economic interests These we may speak of as like interests. The benefits of organization then accrue to each separately, so that the proceeds become private dividends, privately enjoyed by each Other interests are *common,* in such wise that what each receives does not divide the product of the collectivity or lessen the benefits available to all the rest. To this class belong our cultural interests, the advance of knowledge, the exploration of art, of thought, of literature, of religion, and so forth While the individual explorer or creator may receive particular awards, honors, or emoluments, the things that he explores or creates are potentially for all men The wells of knowledge and of inspiration are not less full for the number who drink of them When a man makes shoes it is for private use When he makes a work of art or literature it is generally available, in one way or another, for the enjoyment of those who care for it

Thus we can distinguish two types of organization, according to the nature of their product, leaving aside those that are intermediate or that in some manner combine both functions. Let us consider particularly the character of the second type. The cultural interests of men are exceedingly diverse and they exist on every level from the highest to the lowest. Many men have many minds. Children subjected to the same conditions and to the same influences react in very different ways The attitudes of every group differ from the attitudes of every other. There is much incompatibility of outlook, of opinion and belief, of interpretation, of enjoyment, of the whole realization of life. Different men find very different sustenance within the fields of culture In the seeking of this sustenance they are most themselves, most alive, most creative. Whether the sustenance be refined or vulgar, ample or meager, it is always that through which man seeks fulfillment. Everything else on earth is for the spirit that is in man nothing but apparatus or mechanism.

To satisfy this need men weave manifold relationships with their fellows These extend from the give-and-take of love or comradeship through informal neighborly groupings for recreation, gossip, and so forth, up to the world-wide religious brotherhoods There are two conclusive reasons why the numerous organizations thus engendered cannot be co-ordinated, over any range of territory great or small, under the aegis of the state One is that the various organizations of the same cultural species are not only dissimilar in viewpoint, in method, in system of values, but actually antipathetic, alien, or hostile to one another in these respects. The differences are not reconcilable, nor are they so unimportant that they could be omitted from some universal charter or creed that would seek to embrace the different faiths within a single organizational fold. There are schools and styles in every form of art,

in every field of cultural expression. The followers of any one abjure the other schools and styles. They take delight in their own, in the difference itself. Religions may alike proclaim the brotherhood of man or the fatherhood of God, but each has its own conception of the fatherhood. To co-ordinate them all into one would be to destroy their characteristic qualities, to drain them of their vitality. Co-ordination could be imposed only by sheer compulsion, and there is essential truth, even if the statement be too strongly worded, in the comment of the absolutist Hobbes, "Belief and unbelief never follow men's commands." Here we reach the second reason why neither the state nor any other form of organization can be all-embracing. Every way of life and every way of thought is nourished from within It is the conviction that counts, the habit of mind, the devotion to a cause, the impulse to artistic expression, the congeniality of the group. It cannot be controlled from without, it cannot be directed by an indifferent or alien power. The creative force of all culture lies in its own spontaneity It is killed by compulsion, reduced to a lifeless mechanism. Only the arrogance of the tyrant or of the dogmatist denies this truth The dogmatist, secure in his own faith, would refuse other men the right to theirs, blindly seeking to destroy in them the same spirit of devotion from which he nourishes his own being.

This truth was appreciated by T. H. Green, Hegelian though he was. In his *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* he put forward the thesis that the state should not command the doing of things the value of which depends on the spirit in which they are performed and not on the mere externals of performance. This thesis is relevant to the whole area of cultural pursuits, though of course there arise marginal issues. We may put forward as a corollary of this thesis the further point that wherever actions are of such a kind that the performance of them by one group in one manner or style does not impede the performance of them by other groups in a diverse or contradictory manner or style such actions should not be on intrinsic grounds subject to co-ordination by the state or any other collectivity. When we say "on intrinsic grounds" we mean that, for example, no one should be forbidden to worship in his own way because the ruling powers entertain a religious objection to that form of worship If however the worship involved, say, head-hunting or any other interference with the liberties of other men or any infringement of a criminal law that itself was not motivated by religious considerations but only by regard for public safety, then the performance would be subject to ban or control on extrinsic grounds. Our formula applies to the whole business of the expression of opinion, to the great realms of art and of thought in every form. One man is not precluded from advancing his opinion because another man has a contrary opinion. One man is not prevented from worshipping his own God because another man worships a different kind of God. Thus the objective conditions of public order do not demand uniformity in the cultural realm.

There is some contrast here between the cultural realm and the realm presided over by the organizations that fall predominantly within our second type. Economic activities, for example, cannot be left to the free arbitrament of individuals and groups without serious interference with public order. Thus an employer cannot lower the wages of his employees below the prevailing rate without seriously affecting the business of other employers who may have more concern for the welfare of their workers He cannot extend the hours of labor without doing harm to

his fellow employers as well as to his employees. He cannot "run his own business in his own way" as though it were a private imperium islanded from the rest of the world. No more can a man rightly claim to use his property in any way that seems good to him. His property not only is the fruit of the co-operative labor of many men but also it is the potential if not the actual source of the livelihood of others If he neglects it, lets it run to waste or ruin, or actually destroys it he is injuring his fellows. He does the same thing if, say, he buys a patent from an inventor so as to prevent its exploitation, for the sake of his own greater profit But there is no end of such examples The economic order is a vast network of interdependence.

It might be claimed that a like statement could be made concerning the cultural order A man cannot ventilate his opinions, cannot write a popular novel, cannot even worship his God without having some influence somehow on others But there is a crucial difference One man influences another in this manner because the other is freely responsive to that influence. We may adjudge the influence good or bad We may condemn and oppose it That also is our right Opinions and creeds are forever in conflict Every man must find and respond to his own There is no other way save compulsion, and we have already shown how alien and perilous that is Moreover, with respect to economic relations the effect of one man's action on that of another is external and even automatic The effect is measurable. We have a common standard, an objective index Economic advantage, economic prosperity, has the same meaning for all men, even though some are more devoted to it than others. Thus the main objections that apply to the control of opinion are not relevant here. There is in fact only one relevant limit to specific economic controls, and that is precisely the consideration how far such controls conduce to the general economic welfare, how far they are efficient, how far they may go without restraining the spirit of initiative and enterprise, the spring of energy, vision, and responsibility, without which organization degenerates into the wasteful routine of bureaucracy.

Let us return, however, to our first conclusion, that the many cultural organizations of society have not and cannot have any one focus, cannot without losing their identity and their function be amalgamated and absorbed as mere departments of the state Now we face the question of the interadjustment of all these organizations, and of the groups who maintain them, within the ordered yet free life of the community Here is the essential problem of our multi-group society.

In every range and at every stage of social life this problem exists In the simplest societies it is embryonic, and it reaches its full proportions only in the ambit of the modern nation In the world of Western civilization it first became acute when various religious groups broke away from the universalism of the mediaeval church The assumption that every community, every state, must have a single religion had a tremendous hold over the minds of most men Only the sheer impossibility of maintaining this assumption at length persuaded them that they could live decently together, as members of one community, with those who professed a different faith Centuries of persecution, war, and civil strife were needed to achieve this result Manifestations of the old intolerance persist in the more liberal states while new forms of it, not associated with a religious principle, have appeared in some other states and shown a virulence not surpassed by the most extreme instances of earlier times The full requirement of cultural liberty

has rarely, if ever, been realized In democratic countries it is now *politically* established. These countries have advanced far since the days when the king of one of them announced that he would "make the extirpation of the heretics his principal business." Gradually they passed from persecution to toleration and from toleration to the position that a man's religion is no concern of the state. The Edict of Nantes in 1598 was the first acknowledgment of a Roman Catholic government that "heretics" should be accorded civil rights, but even as late as 1776 the greatest of French radicals could assert that it was "impossible for men to live at peace with those they believe to be damned" In Protestant countries Roman Catholics were at length "tolerated," but it was only in 1819 that even England admitted them to citizenship As for Jews, they have suffered longer and more grievously from persecution and the denial of civil rights than those who professed any other religion.

The principle set out in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, that no law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of religion has in effect been accepted by most democratic countries as well as by some others that cannot be placed in that category. But the problem of the multi-group society is not solved merely by the formal recognition of equality before the law. Such equality can exist while nevertheless minority groups or groups in an inferior economic or social position may be subject to such discrimination that they are practically excluded from participation in the life of the community. An outstanding example is the situation of the Negroes in the United States, particularly in the South. Other groups suffer discrimination to different degrees. The Jewish people are exposed to it but so in a measure are various ethnic groups, especially those of Eastern European countries, while yet stronger disabilities are applied against the Chinese, the Japanese, and the people of India. If we add to these groups the American Indians, the Filipinos, the Mexicans and other Latin-Americans we get the picture of a country constitutionally dedicated to the equality of men that nevertheless exhibits a complex pattern of rifts and fissures ramifying across the life of the community.

In different countries the problem takes different shapes. While in the United States minority groups are dispersed throughout the population, in some other countries they have a territorial locus, as in the Balkan area Sometimes ethnic differences are associated with differences of religion Often the disadvantaged groups occupy an inferior economic status Not infrequently there is political as well as social and economic discrimination. This situation is found in its extreme form in colonial possessions, where the usual relation of majority and minority is reversed in favor of a dominant alien group.

Under all conditions the discrimination of group against group is detrimental to the well-being of the community Those who are discriminated against are balked in their social impulses, are prevented from developing their capacities, become warped or frustated, secretly or openly nurse a spirit of animosity against the dominant group. Energies that otherwise might have been devoted to constructive service are diverted and consumed in the friction of fruitless conflict. The dominant group, fearing the loss of its privileges, takes its stand on a traditional conservatism and loses the power of adapting itself to the changing times The dominated, unless they are sunk in the worse apathy of sullen impotence, respond to subversive doctrines that do not look beyond the overthrow of the authority they resent. Each side conceives a false image

of the other, denying their common humanity, and the community is torn asunder.

There is no way out of this impasse, apart from revolution, except the gradual readjustment of group relations in the direction of equality of opportunity — not merely of legal equality Since this readjustment requires the abandonment of habits and traditions, the breaking of taboos, the reconstruction of the distorted images cherished by each group of the other, and the recognition that the narrower interests and fears and prides that stimulate discrimination and prejudice are adverse to the common good and often empty or vain, its achievement can be effected only through the arduous and generally slow processes of social education. The sense of community, dissipated by the pervading specialization of interests, needs to be reinforced The common values of the embracing culture need to be reasserted and again made vital The provision of equality of opportunity will not of itself bring about any such result It will serve chiefly by removing a source of division that stands obdurately in the way of social cohesion Only when this obstacle is removed can the positive values of the multi-group society be cultivated — if we have the wisdom to seek and to find them

The sense of the need of community, if not the sense of community, is still alive and seeks embodiment. It is witnessed to by men's devotion to the nation and by their attachment to some local community they feel — or once felt — to be their home But these bonds do not satisfy the need, do not sufficiently provide the experience of effective solidarity The nation is too wide and too diverse The local community is too heterogeneous, if it is large, or too limited, if it is small. Often the attachment to it is nostalgic or merely sentimental So the unit gropes for a more satisfying unity, seeking to recover the spirit of co-operative living that animated the uni-group society Sometimes men seek to recover it by methods that would re-impose the old order on the new. They would restore the myth of the uni-group society, they would make the all-inclusive state the sufficient focus of our moral and spiritual being, they would even, as totalitarians, ruthlessly co-ordinate out of existence our cultural heterogeneity But there is no road back The course of civilization is as irreversible as time itself. We have left behind the one-room social habitation of our ancestors We have built ourselves a house of many mansions Somehow we must learn to make it ours.

RURAL SURVIVALS IN AMERICAN URBAN LIFE*

Adolph S. Tomars

It has become a sociological truism to point out that the salient fact about our society has been its rapid change from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society Our American statistics show a shift from approximately 12 5% of the population living in communities of 2,500 and over in 1850 to 56 5% in 1940 Similarly, during the same period the proportion of people living in cities of

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100,000 or over increased from 5.1% to 28.8%. The significance of the change extends beyond the statistics when we consider the spread of urban influences to the rural portions of an urbanized society, so that we can speak of our society as predominantly urban.

Implicit in any process of cultural change is the retention of past cultural elements side by side with present culture Since folkways and mores are essentially ways of adaptation to a given environment, it is axiomatic that there are rural folkways and mores and urban folkways and mores, each responsive to the conditions of a rural or urban environment.

It is here assumed that the rural-urban distinction is a scientifically valid one. Certainly there is a vast body of sociological analysis to attest to the reality of the rural as a type of society set off from the urban type, whether this be expressed in terms of primary group versus secondary group organization (Cooley, Brunner and Kolb), sentimental versus rational attitudes (Shaler and others), isolated-sacred versus accessible-secular structures (Wiese-Becker), communal versus associational groupings (MacIver), or in terms of a host of other sociological distinctions.

We may then define as rural or urban, practices and beliefs which tend to imply folkways and mores of the rural type or the urban type in some marked degree. Any society which has shifted so rapidly from rural to urban, as our American society has, must then be regarded as compounded of a mixture of rural and urban practices.

The retention of older practices and beliefs in a changing society is usually studied under the rubric of "survivals," and we should certainly expect to find rural survivals in our urban society Survivals have been variously defined, but the central core of the concept seems clear. A survival may be roughly defined as any practice or belief which was fairly well adapted to formerly existing conditions but is retained under changed conditions to which it is no longer well adapted, and where other and more efficient adaptations are possible.

Survivals are not isolated practices and beliefs; they cover large areas of social life. In any changing society, at any given time, a very large part of the culture, possibly the largest part, is made up of survivals This fact is inherent in the nature of social change.

It seems almost over-obvious, when a society such as ours has changed so swiftly from a rural to an urban one, that a very large part of our culture must be considered as composed of rural survivals [1] The full implications of this have yet to be adequately drawn and elaborated in concrete research Rural survivals have been taken into account only here and there when they are found involved in specific institutional problems or "cultural lags," as in the problems connected with the emancipation of women Actually they are imbedded in the very texture of daily life, and, indeed, in daily urban life.

We may regard as a rural survival any practice or belief, even though existing in great cities, which exemplifies rural rather than urban folkways and mores, i e , folkways and mores which are better adapted to the conditions of rural life than of urban living The number of such survivals found even in the most urbanized portions of our urban society is surprisingly large, and this fact has not received the attention it deserves in the analysis of our culture. Rural sociologists have been concerned largely with the urbanization of the countryside. Urban sociologists have

[1] When the change is in the other direction, as in the early Dark Ages of Western Europe, the survivals would naturally be urban in character.

stressed the development of new urban mores rather than the rural mores which persist side by side with them. What has not been stressed, and needs to be, is research in the analysis of rural survivals as we find them here and now, existing as an important element of our urban world, in its great cities as well as in its countryside. The study of this important body of survivals ranging through our social fabric is essential to any realistic understanding of the ethos of our culture.

The remainder of this paper will attempt to indicate some of the various fields that seem to offer promise for research of this type, and will undertake a very brief preliminary analysis of some selected samples drawn from these fields If we are looking for examples of rural survivals in daily urban behavior, our ways of eating, dressing, living and talking, certainly offer a host of illustrations We may select a few practices and beliefs which are suggestive when analyzed from this point of view.

Rural survivals in housing and living arrangements are widespread and involve some deep-seated attitudes in American life That living in a single family house is better than living in a multi-family dwelling seems to be a common belief in the United States Its rural background in the farmhouse homestead is obvious There is a close connection here with the related mores of home ownership, and here also the rural antecedents are clear The self-respecting farmer of the past was the owner-farmer; living in someone else's house carried the lower status of tenancy, or, lower still, dependency.

These mores display remarkable tenacity, even where congestion and high land values impose the multiple dwelling Living in an apartment still carries the connotation of "living in someone else's house." The private house is the preferred way of living, and when owned, the ideal way. Young urban couples begin to save up for the "home of their own" which real estate interests advertise to them Now, there are probably a number of sound reasons for wishing to purchase a "private" dwelling — desire for more space, privacy, quiet, air, economy, primary relationships, etc Some of these reasons have been overrated, as many a home owner has found out But however this may be, the strength of the rural mores of the family home and home ownership are undoubtedly powerful factors in the situation

Sometimes they are the only apparent reason. This comes out most clearly when families move out of apartments to private homes in certain types of so-called suburban "developments" — really suburban slums, as Mumford has termed them — where the houses are as crowded together as apartments, the neighborhood just as congested, and the room space frequently smaller than in comparably priced apartments The satisfaction must lie in the achievement of conformity to the mores of right living This is the right way, the American way — actually a survival of the rural American way — to live in one's own home, with one's own taxes to pay, one's own mortgage to lift, etc

The city apartment itself, in its functioning and even in its physical structure, contains a large number of rural survivals We may cite one, not of itself very important, but significant Although we are beginning to get away from it, it is still the standard practice that a living room is not complete unless it contains a fireplace For our rural ancestors, lacking central heating, the fireplace was the spot about which the family gathered to keep warm, and quite naturally all sorts of sentiments came to be attached to the family hearth Our modern urban world has de-

veloped central heating, yet the ubiquitous fireplace remains. Not in its original utilitarian form, of course, but with slight modification. With heat provided from other sources, an ornamental imitation fireplace has become the usual practice. In old-fashioned apartments these were built in; in modern apartments they are additional equipment, usually installed by the tenant as part of the furnishings.

It may be argued that this imitation fireplace is purely decorative This is entirely true The question we must ask is. why should a decorative room furnishing take the form of a fireplace, especially in a period which boasts of a functional esthetic? The only answer is the persistence of a rural survival, and the human inertia that makes it easier to adapt old forms to new functions, however indifferently, than to devise new forms to fit new functions. Indeed, survivals of this type often reach the heights of absurdity Who has not seen the misplaced ingenuity of imitation fireplaces, replete with imitation logs, red electric lights and a revolving mechanism to make them flicker, so that a highly imaginative person could conceivably achieve a nostalgic identification with his rural forbears

Rural survivals are interfused throughout the whole range of our daily practices and beliefs. The ways in which they pervade our ways of living and thinking can be studied in every field of social life One of the most promising fields for the analysis of rural survivals in our society is found in the study of popular proverbs. We learn these proverbs in our youth, repeat them sententiously, and pass them on to our children. They represent our folk wisdom, and express some of our most widely accepted folkways and mores. When analyzed from this point of view, most of our popular proverbs betray their rural origin by their linguistic form With respect to their meaning, many of them are equally applicable to rural and urban life, but a surprisingly large number seem to exemplify rural rather than urban folkways and mores They are expressive of rural wisdom. Analysis of some of the best known examples can throw this into relief.

We have space here to consider only one proverb, a very homely one that almost everyone has been taught when young — "early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise." The meaning is quite literal and indubitably quite true for the farmer who must rise with the dawn and necessarily retire early A farmer who began his work at a late hour would hardly be conceivable Urban conditions may be very different, it may be desirable for some to keep quite different hours, yet all indications point to the persistence of a widespread belief in the virtue of early rising

Let anyone who does not think that this belief is still retained in a literal sense observe the large number of people who maintain that there are peculiar restorative values in the hours of sleep before dawn If in writing a popular novel or scenario it is desired to portray a character as upright and honest, it will be necessary to depict him as an early riser A character introduced still in bed at 10 o'clock in the morning is clearly a villain, a profligate or at least an idler. Persons in positions of public trust must be early risers, or at least have their constituents believe this The public official who is at his desk bright and early at 8 in the morning is obviously a conscientious and trustworthy public servant

When we consider how the man in high office must conform to accepted behavior patterns, many of which are rural survivals, this brings us to another field, perhaps the most significant for the study of rural survivals This is the study of our ideal personality stereotypes, of the ideal

behavior and characteristics deemed proper for a man It is difficult to study in the abstract the characteristics that define the good and proper type of man in any society. It is best to consider some specific role which is presumed to embody the ideal. Thus the study of the behavior and characteristics expected of the man in high office lends itself well to such analysis. We can profitably take for this purpose the highest office of the land, the presidency The president, the man who fills this office, must be believed to conform to the nation's ideal of what a man should be, and to a high degree, otherwise he could not be elected By bringing the ideal to a focus in the type expected to fill this high office, we may be in a better position to see how much of this ideal-type represents a rural type, and how many of its characteristics are rural survivals.

From this point of view we then ask what must a man be and do in order to be elected president and to play the role well in the public eye? Naturally, we are not concerned with the legal and political aspects of this question Nor do we mean such obvious unwritten social qualifications as those which demand that the president shall be male, white, Christian and Protestant We are concerned with other specific social qualifications for the role, many of which may seem absurdly simple to note and even ludicrous, but are extremely revealing for our purposes. They are large in number and we can take notice here of only a few significant ones

To begin with we may ask where must a president be born? We find that he is expected to be born on a farm, or failing that, a small town will do if necessary This is understandable when we remember that until quite recently the average American was either himself a farmer, or lived in a city but was born on a farm. Most city people were transplanted country folk, at the most only one generation removed from the soil A city man, city-bred for many generations was the rare exception. A "real honest-to-goodness man" was born and raised on a farm or in a small town, and this stereotype has remained, a rural survival stereotype to which a president, as the embodiment of a "real" American, must conform.

It is interesting to observe that even in the modern period of maximum urbanization all our recent presidents have managed to get themselves born on a farm or identified with rural life. Coolidge was a dirt-farmer, Hoover "the farm boy who made good," and Franklin D Roosevelt is the country squire of Hyde Park who smilingly gives as his occupation — farmer.

The importance of such a qualification comes out clearly when we study the behavior of candidates for the presidency, or for the nomination Much of this behavior would be incomprehensible unless understood in terms of the survival of rural mores The last election of 1940 is instructive on this point We may recall that a leading contender for the Republican nomination — Thomas E Dewey of New York — made an ostentatious trip to the small town of Owosso, Michigan, ostensibly to visit his folks, The purpose of this was clearly to remove the stigma of the great city, to show that Mr Dewey, although District Attorney of New York City, was really a small town boy When the nomination was won by Wendell Willkie of New York, almost the first action of the candidate was to repair to the small town of Elwood, Indiana There the utilities magnate, now a homely small town citizen, initiated his campaign from his own front porch in the simple tradition of the past His opponent, the president, was unfortunately detained much of the time in the White House on urgent

matters, but at appropriate intervals he, too, conducted his campaign from the porch at Hyde Park, amid the simple surroundings of country life.

The amusements and relaxations of a president must be simple and "wholesome." He may, it is true, attend the theatre now and then, but his preferences and tastes should be for outdoor pastimes and for sports close to nature. These are the recreations of a "real" man, i.e., a rural man. Thus it has become a part of the presidential ritual that the president must go fishing, presumably whether he enjoys it or not

It is scarcely necessary to point out that emphasis upon rural values carries with it corresponding scorn for many urban values. The presidential qualifications we are here listing may not be found in such works as Laski's study of the American Presidency. It is precisely such elements as these that make so much of American political behavior unintelligible to the foreign observer. The political scientist may regard these details too trivial for serious consideration. But they cannot be regarded as trivial by the sociologist They are the very stuff of social life, symbols of deep-seated values. And if the political scientist is sociologically minded, he will realize that the outcome of an election turns as much upon details such as these as upon the concrete political issues of a campaign.

Practical politicians are practitioners of applied sociology who have learned the importance of manipulating the symbols of social values down to the smallest detail. They do not need to be told of the importance of rural survivals; they know them intuitively and use them expertly.

One further illustration may suffice. There is the matter of the president's clothes. As first official of the land the president must be well dressed; he must even observe sartorial protocol in his various activities. But he must somehow convey the impression that he does not like to be dressed-up. A "real" man, i.e., a rural man, does not feel comfortable in elegant clothes; he is no dandy, but "just folks."

Sociologists have long recognized that our ideal of the good old fashioned woman — the womanly woman — is a rural type to which the modern woman, emancipated by urbanism, can no longer adequately conform. Yet, curiously, sociologists have been much less aware of the extent to which our American ideal of the manly man has remained a rural concept The president is expected to embody to a high degree the stereotype of the manly man. If the necessities of his office dictate sartorial elegance he must make it plain that he would much prefer to go about in baggy trousers and a comfortable old sweater if he only could. Obviously, most of the time he cannot be a "real" man, a regular fellow, in this matter of clothes, except in one respect, his hat. He can cling to an old well-worn hat on many occasions. This is all the more important because on certain formal occasions he must wear a particularly hateful symbol of urban aristocracy — the top hat — an object of long standing opprobrium and ridicule for all right-thinking Americans On other occasions he can redeem his manhood by wearing an old and somewhat shabby head covering Thus the president's hat becomes the sartorial symbol of the traditional rural virtues The definitive sociological monograph on the hat as a social symbol has yet to be written; it would provide an important addition to our analysis of the mechanisms of social control.

The importance of such a significant detail as the symbolic value of the president's hat is again emphasized at election time. It is a detail which Franklin D. Roosevelt has mastered completely. In

his three election campaigns an observer with an eye for such matters could discover the appearance each time of an almost incredibly battered and decrepit object which can only be described as a candidate's campaign hat. It was prominent at every public appearance during the campaign of 1940. Its vote-getting power defies estimate by our present techniques of measurement, but it must have been great indeed It will be observed that Mr. Willkie's managers astutely conceded that their candidate could never rival the Rooseveltian campaign hat, and devised a brilliant counterstroke. The Republican candidate campaigned entirely hatless and with unruly rumpled hair Here was a manly man indeed Although the president won the campaign, Mr. Willkie won a secure place in the hearts of Americans. Since the election it may be noted that the president's old hats are not quite so decrepit, Mr. Willkie permits himself to be photographed with a hat and seems to find no difficulty whatever in keeping his hair neatly groomed.

Again it should be remembered that stress upon rural characteristics and values always implies its obverse — the deprecation of urban traits and values This comes into perfect focus if we take the figure of the president once more, this time as seen by his detractors We can study the significance of rural survivals by noting how urban characteristics are marked for derision Here we may point to an excellent field for such analysis — the political cartoon In the cartoon caricature certain features are deliberately selected for their symbolic social value, thus providing already highly selected samples for sociological analysis This field has been curiously neglected by social investigation.

The caricature of the president has become the chief feature of the political cartoon in anti-New Deal newspapers. What are the characteristics singled out in the anti-Roosevelt cartoon? Of course there are many, but we may confine ourselves to one detail which significantly indicates anti-urban bias in terms of the ideal concept of the real man.

This detail is the way in which the cartoon will depict the president as a smoker. In spite of certain religious groups, tobacco smoking has generally been recognized in the rural tradition as a manly attribute. But a real man smokes a pipe. The cigar is also manly What the caricature emphasizes, in seeking to portray the president as a mawkish figure, is the form of smoking which bears the stamp of the effete urbanite — the dainty cigarette. But this is not all. There is something more damning — the cigarette holder — effeminate symbol of the urban intelligentsia and literati. No Roosevelt caricature fails to include the cigarette holder prominently displayed, and the more violently anti-New Deal the policy of the paper, the longer the holder becomes Newspaper opposition to Roosevelt will undoubtedly become a subject for considerable study. Investigators will compare editorial policies. It may be suggested that if they will turn to the cartoons in which the president is lampooned, they will find in the length of that cigarette holder about as accurate an index of editorial opposition as any statistical technique could devise.

We have indicated in these samples how rural survivals reveal themselves in every aspect of our life. They pervade our ideals, our daily practices and beliefs, expressing themselves in countless details of dress, deportment and opinion, which, when analyzed, reveal deep-seated attitudes and values governing our behavior and our basic conceptions of human personality A very broad area of research is indicated for the study of rural survivals.

As research in modern rural survivals

is developed, it is altogether likely that we will come to feel more and more that our modern urbanism, for all the transformation it has wrought, is nevertheless still a thin veneer over a deep-rooted ruralism. Ogburn's "cave-man in the modern city" may be an exaggeration, but "the rural man in an urban civilization" may give us important clues for understanding our behavior. We must grasp the extent of the rural element in our civilization if we are to understand the ethos of that civilization.

Finally, we can see also how this applies to our present concern with national morale in wartime. To deal with the problem of national morale, to control and direct that morale, we must comprehend more fully the ethos of our society, we must understand its contradictory as well as its unifying aspects, and we must be able to distinguish and assess its superficial elements from the elements which are deep-rooted in tradition We must recognize that the American way of life, which we are defending, is in many of its most basic human manifestations still the rural American way

The wide variety of things, from fan dancers to social workers, educational activities and race-relations research, which are denounced by congressmen as "frills and fads" have one thing in common — they are all urban products Again and again we have seen rural prejudices and biases serve as stumbling-blocks for progressive measures, impeding the development of new collective social machinery and social reforms important in peace time and even more important in wartime. Here our rural survivals are a source of backwardness in facing the problem of war and war morale in an urban civilization.

But we should recognize another side to this picture Some of our complex urban and intellectualized values must recede into the background in wartime and may even become sources of weakness in morale, while many of the simpler rural elements, especially the rugged values of our frontier heritage, will come to the fore and become sources of strength Thus we may confront a crowning paradox of our urban world It may well be that in the severe ordeal before us, it will be the rural element surviving in our culture that will play a major role in seeing us through the crisis.

THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS OF URBAN DWELLERS *

Mirra Komarovsky

This is a study of organized group affiliations of 2,223 adult residents of New York City. The study is focused on *class* differences but it also contains some data on sex, religious, and other factors in extent and pattern of participation.

Studies of social participation published during the past decade or two dealt large-

* *American Sociological Review,* December, 1946, pp. 686–98. Reprinted by permission of the author

ly with rural areas and smaller communities.[1] The organized life of *urban* residents is a relatively unexplored area of research despite the frequent allusions in sociological literature to the importance of voluntary associations as the distinctive feature of contemporary social structure.

We are all familiar with the stereotype of the urban dweller. He is a man who no longer identifies himself with the primary groups such as the neighborhood or the large kinship unit. Instead he plays with one group, prays with another, joins the third one for economic reasons, and still a fourth one for civic ends, and so on.

If the results of this study are representative of the City as a whole, this stereotype has to be revised It describes, statistically speaking, the deviant rather than the mode. The old neighborhood, the larger kin group might have broken down but they have not been replaced by the specialized voluntary groups to nearly the extent usually assumed.

Sixty per cent of working class and 53% of white collar men in this study did not have a single organized group affiliation with the exception, perhaps, of a Church. Throughout this study general Church membership was not counted as an organized group affiliation, while membership in any Church society or club was included The figures for the women are even more striking 88% of labor and 63% of white collar women were without any affiliations.

Indeed, in all occupational classes, male or female, earning under $3,000 and other than professional, that is *in the bulk of the City's population, the unaffiliated persons constituted a majority*. Conversely, it is only when we reach the business classes earning $3,000 and the professional classes that the majority is found to be organized. It is thus a relatively small section of our population which the noted historians, Charles and Mary Beard, described when they said of the 20th century "The tendency of Americans to unite with their fellows for varied purposes — a tendency noted a hundred years earlier by de Tocqueville — now became a general mania . . . It was a rare American who was not a member of four or five societies." [2] This present study confirms a hypothesis which the writer suggested in an earlier paper to the effect that social participation in urban communities follows a ⌒ curve [3] The mode is at "no affiliations" with a sharp drop to membership in one and a steady decline as the number of affiliations increases.

The fact is that in the study of associations, as in some other areas (that of the family, for example), we have tended to derive our generalizations from studies of the middle and upper classes Important as these are in setting the tone of our culture the portrayal of our society has thereby been distorted We need to recognize differences in participation in our institutions on the part of various classes and

[1] *Social Participation Differences Among Tenure Classes* by C Arnold Anderson, Bryce Ryan Rural Soc, Vol 8, No 3, September, 1943. *Social Organizations in a Small City* by F A Bushee *American Journal of Sociology* Vol 51, November, 1945, *Socio-Economic Circumstances about Adult Participation* by A A Kaplan (Ph D) Teachers College, Columbia Univ, Contributions to Education, No 889, *Social Life of a Modern Community* by W L Warner Yale University Press, 1941. See also series of the *Culture of a Contemporary Rural Community Rural Life Studies*, U S Dept of Agriculture, *Social Participation of Rural Young Married Couples* by W W Smith, Jr, Cornell University Agri Exp Stat Bul 812, *Income and Social Participation* by William G Mather *American Sociological Review*, Vol 6, No. 3 *The Family and Individual Social Participation* by W A Anderson *American Sociological Review*, Vol 8, No 4

[2] *The Rise of American Civilization*, N Y, Macmillan, 1927, Vol 2, pp 730–731.

[3] *A Comparative Study of Voluntary Organizations of Two Suburban Communities*. Public of A S S, Vol XXVII, No 2, May, 1933.

we need to study the subcultures of the lower socio-economic classes.

The Method

The questionnaire which supplied the data for this study consisted of one long sheet calling for a list of all organizations, clubs, unions, churches, and other societies to which the respondent belonged. It provided space for describing the character of the organization and the place of meetings. The respondent was also asked to indicate at the bottom of the page his occupation, income, religion, education, nativity, sex, and age. No signature was required.

These questionnaires were distributed to employed persons at their place of work in 1934–35. Among those co-operating were the office workers of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the sales staff of R. H. Macy's department store, nurses and physicians of two hospitals, employees of several factories and others. In smaller concerns the employees were approached individually. Sometimes, the project director was allowed to explain the study at a meeting of the employees In other concerns the management distributed the questionnaires, each of which had an explanatory note and a stamped envelope addressed to Columbia University. The employees could either mail the unsigned questionnaires directly or place the sealed envelope into a box provided by us All questionnaires distributed in a given concern had the same code number. Some concerns refused to co-operate. Including only those who agreed to accept the blanks the proportion of returns varied




CHART I

Percentage Belonging to One or More Associations by Class and Sex

from 17% to 78%. Of the total number of distributed questionnaires 29% were returned. A dozen or so were filled out flippantly or abusively.

The Sample

A composite picture of each of the major economic classes in our sample would yield the following types:

company. He earns more and is better educated than the unskilled worker. The man is more likely than not to be over 30, married, and is either Catholic or Jewish.

This is the most peculiarly selected of all the occupational groups in our sample because some 120 returns came from one unionized clothing concern. The employ-

TABLE 1

Percentage of Men in Various Economic Classes Belonging to Specified Number of Associations

CLASS	No of cases	NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS None	One group	Two groups	Three groups	Four groups	Five groups	Six groups	Seven and over	TOTAL
Unskilled	146	68*	25	6	5	5	—	—	—	100
Skilled	314	56	33 4	8 4	1 6	6	—	—	—	100
All labor	460	60	30 6	7 6	1 3	5	—	—	—	100
White collar										
under $3000	304	53	30 2	10 5	4	1 3	7	—	.3	100
Business										
$3000 to $10,000	67	33	30	19	7 5	6	1 5	—	3	100
Professional										
Under $3000	149	31 5	23	15	16	9 4	1 3	2 7	1 3	100 2
$3000 to $5000	96	15 6	13 5	23	13 5	14 6	5 2	5 2	9 4	100
$5000 and over	50	2	6	8	18	10	12	4	40	100
All professional	295	21 4	17	16	16	11	4 4	3 7	10 5	100

* Percentage of unskilled men without any affiliations

The Unskilled (347 cases, 146 men and 201 women). The unskilled worker is a dishwasher, laundry worker, or a packer earning about $1,000 a year. He has at best only an elementary school education The woman worker is likely to be single and under 30 years, the man may be older and married. Both are most likely to be Catholic.

The Skilled and Semi-skilled (382 cases, 314 men and 68 women). The skilled worker is a printer, a clothing worker, a driver of a milk distributing ers were foreign born who frequently belonged to a Landsmanshaften in addition to the union. By virtue of this selection the skilled group shows a high rate of participation

The White Collar (744 cases, 304 men and 440 women) The woman is a stenographer or a salesgirl earning under $3,000 a year She has attended high school, is under 30 and single. The man is a bookkeeper, filing clerk, or a salesman usually with a high school education and also earning under $3,000. He is as likely as

not to be married and is under 30 years as frequently as 30 and over The three religious faiths were about equally represented in this group.

Nurses (219 women nurses) The nurse in our sample was predominantly single, Protestant and in her late 20's or early 30's.

ECONOMIC CLASSES AND THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION

Economic classes defined in terms of occupation and income differ greatly in extent of participation The contrasts are striking.

Chart I presents the proportion of men and women in various classes belonging to one or more associations Let us look at the men first At the one extreme is the unskilled worker *only 32 out of 100 belong to any organizations* and, conversely 68% are without any affiliations with the possible exception of a Church congregation (see p 381) The Professional man earning $5,000 and over is at the other end *98% of these professional men list one or more affiliations* and only 2% fail to list any

The classes in between show a consistently increasing rate as we go up the eco-

TABLE 2

Percentage of Women in Various Economic Classes Belonging to Specified Number of Associations

CLASS	No of cases	NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS None	One group	Two groups	Three groups	Four groups	Five groups	Six groups	Seven and over	TOTAL
Unskilled	201	91	8	1	—	—	—	—	—	100
Skilled	68	75	21	4	—	—	—	—	—	100
All labor	269	88	11	1	—	—	—	—	—	100
White collar										
Under $3000	440	63 5	17	10 9	5	1 4	9	1 4	—	100 1
Business										
$3000 and over	23	56 5	13	17 4	4 4	4 4	4 4	—	—	100 1
Nurses										
Professional	219	39	14	17	8 7	11 5	6 4	3 2	—	99 8
Under $3000	55	29	18 2	21 8	14 6	5 5	3 6	3 6	3 8	99 9
$3000 to $5000	81	12 4	13 5	22	20	3 7	6 2	3 7	18 5	100
$5000 and over	10	—	10	30	10	10	—	—	40	100
All professional	146	17 8	15	22 6	17 1	4 8	4 8	3 4	14 4	99 9

The Professional (441 cases, 295 men and 146 women) The professional man is a teacher, doctor or engineer with incomes varying from $2,000 to over $15,000 a year. The professional woman is usually a teacher, single and earning under $3,000.

The professional persons in our sample were equally divided as between Protestants and Jews with only a few Catholics.

The Business Class (90 cases, 67 men and 23 women). This small group consists of salesmen and business executives who earn $3,000 or over.

nomic scale. 44% of the skilled, 47% of the white collar, 67% of the business men and 68% of the professional earning under $3,000 have one or more affiliations. The professional earning $3,000 to $5,000 is highly organized 84% belong, and finally, as was already stated, practically all the most highly paid professionals are organized.

Class differences in the participation rates of women are even greater. As seen in Chart I, the rates are 9% for the unskilled women, 25% for the skilled, 37% for the white collar, 44% for the business women, 61% for the nurses, 71% for the professionals earning under $3,000, 88% for professionals earning $3,000 to $5,000 and 100% for the small group of professional women with an income of $5,000 and over It is, incidentally, just this sharper class differential in the participation of women which may account for some puzzling contradictions in various studies concerning the relative organization of men and women Thus, for example, Bushee [4] found women to be predominant in Boulder organizations while in Middletown men exceeded women in the ratio of 2 to 1. A different class composition of the two communities as indicated in the 1940 Census may explain this contrast

The same story of class differences in participation is told by more detailed participation statistics (in Tables 1 and 2) These tables give the proportion of men and women, respectively, belonging to specified numbers of associations by economic classes. The three indices of the extent of participation a) percentage belonging to at least one organization, b) the average, and c) the maximum number of groups per person were consistently correlated in the comparison of some 15 economic subgroups of men and women. Note that only 1% of the unskilled, but 85% of the highest paid professional men belong to 3 or more groups.

THE RELIABILITY OF CLASS DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION

Class differences in participation are generally found to persist even when certain other factors are held constant in so far as the number of cases permits such break-downs.[5]

In the case of the women every religious group shows without exception the correlation between class and participation noted for the group as a whole The participation rates of the men present the same general picture By and large, within each religious group the higher the economic class the greater the participation.

The most outstanding exception is the fact that among the Jews, the skilled worker is more highly organized than the white collar man. Even the skilled workers from other than the unionized clothing shop had a somewhat higher participation rate than the clerks, the rates being 47% and 43%, respectively It is, however, only the young Jewish white collar men who are "under-organized," those over 30 are similar to the non Jews of the same age group.

This departure from the positive correlation between occupational status and participation was also found by Goldhamer in Chicago He says "Whereas among Protestants and Catholics working persons belong to fewer associations than white collar — among the Jews the relationship is reversed." [6]

As Goldhamer suggests many of the Jewish workers are foreign born and join

[4] Frederick A Bushee, "Social Organization in a Small Town" *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1945

[5] Limitation of space made it impossible to include tables giving participation figures by sex, economic class and religion

[6] Herbert Goldhamer, "Some Factors Affecting Participation in Voluntary Associations" Ph D thesis, University of Chicago, 1943, p. 54

Landsmanshaften and other fraternal organizations. But these associations no longer attract their children who, furthermore, are perhaps less inclined to join the typical "Social and Athletic" clubs of the native youth.[7]

The pattern of class differences is on the whole not changed by taking the age factor into account. The Jewish labor-white collar differential appears again as the exception. The identical organization rate of the Protestant white collar and professional under 30 is another exception. Included among the Protestant professionals was a group of young draftsmen who appear to be less highly organized than other professionals.

To establish class differences in participation is not in itself to explain them Groups defined in terms of occupation and income differ also in other respects which may, perhaps, be the decisive ones in this connection

Income, important as it obviously is, does not tell the whole story We have seen that the professional man earning between $2,000 and $3,000 participates more than the business man with a *higher* income Here the immediate occupational demands of a profession furnish the answer, if we are to judge by the kinds of groups the two classes belong to. The excess of the professional's participation is found to be due to the strictly occupational societies As for the other groups, the business man holds his own; in fact, he has many more masonic and fraternal affiliations.

But the need to join an occupational association fails to explain the superiority of the white collar employee over the skilled worker. It is, of course, the latter who has more occupational, i.e. union affiliations The deficit in union affiliations of the white collar person is more than made up by his excess in others, notably religious, military-patriotic, and Greek letter (non college) fraternities.

Is it in the superior education of the white collar employees that the explanation lies? The majority of them have gone to high school. Participation is positively correlated with education in all but the Jewish group because the highly organized immigrants often lack high school education. It is interesting that the superior participation of the white collar man appears only among the high school graduates. Our filing or shipping clerk with only an elementary school background does not differ much from the working man.

Superior education of the white collar man is one of the factors but again, it doesn't explain why he has more affiliations than even those skilled workers who have also gone to high school.

The answer must, no doubt, be sought in the whole complex we call "higher social class" Superior education and home background create interests which find outlets in cultural and hobby clubs Social proximity to upper classes engenders imitation of them as in the Greek letter fraternities and sororities Furthermore, the pattern of joining, having become established in the middle classes, tends to perpetuate itself. Many associations have a middle class membership This discourages the lower classes just as it attracts the middle class persons to whom membership in, say, a masonic or a civic association becomes a symbol of status.[8] It is possible, incidentally, that the working class associations, the union and the fraternal club, are less specialized and

[7] Another exception to the positive correlation of class and participation lies in the slightly higher participation of the lower paid Catholic professional in comparison with those earning $3,000 and over The number of cases is too small to make the difference significant

[8] See "Family Social Participation and Social Status Self-Rating," W. A Anderson, *American Sociological Review*, June, 1946, p 253 ff

perform a number of functions for which the white collar persons join several organizations.

A fuller understanding of participation will be gained by considering, also, the kinds of associations found in these various classes.

THE ASSOCIATION PATTERN OF ECONOMIC CLASSES

Each class has its peculiar pattern of associations.[9] A resumé of "class profiles" will precede a more detailed statement of our results.

Class Profiles. Our male unskilled worker (the elevator operator or the dish washer) if he belongs to associations at all (and only 32% do), joins a "Social and Athletic Club" and, later in life a fraternal lodge Over 60% of all affiliations of unskilled workers were in these two groups. Much less frequently appears a trade union, a neighborhood political club, or a religious society.

The skilled worker (a clothing operator or a printer) divides his participation between two groups 76% of his memberships are in a union and a fraternal lodge. Now and then a masonic order and a political club appear in the picture but all other groups are rare.

The salesmen and the office clerks with a high school education differ from all the rest in one respect. Their participation is spread over a wider range of associations. The absence of occupational groups in the white collar class means that it is the more variable leisure time interests which create its organized life. Nevertheless, some associations are favored. Fraternal lodges, social clubs, and religious societies comprise 49% of the total affiliations. Next, in the order of frequency, come masonic, political, fraternities, the Y's, military-patriotic, and economic groups. The few "cultural" memberships are usually in some artistic hobby clubs such as a choral or a dramatic society. This list describes the activities of about one half of the white collar men — the other half has *no affiliations whatsoever.*

Our business man who earns from $3,000 to $5,000 belongs to a fraternal and a masonic organization — 43% of his total affiliations were with these two An occasional economic, social, and a cultural group completes the picture

The organized life of the professional man is dominated by his profession. The strictly professional societies comprise 50% of his total affiliations. Cultural and "occupational clubs" come next but they, too, often reflect professional interests

Over one-third of the cultural affiliations are, obviously, adjuncts to the profession of the respondent Thus, a teacher may join the American Association for the Advancement of Science or the Child Study Association to support these organizations and receive their publications.

Other cultural affiliations are of a more general nature. Some are face-to-face memberships in a current events club or a "little theatre" group Others are impersonal affiliations with a cultural agency (say, the Museum of Modern Art) which give the members a preferential access to its resources often without any contact with other members.

The "occupational clubs" ("Men's Faculty Club," "The Lawyers' Club," "Chemistry Teachers' Club") provide for sociability and recreation but they, too, are joined in the interests of one's profession and career

Add to the professional, cultural, and occupational clubs — the alumni and Greek letter fraternities and you have

[9] Associations were classified on the basis of their explicitly stated objectives, as inferred from their names or remarks of the respondents There were no major difficulties in grouping associations into the few broad categories used in the study The deciding criterion in the classifications was always the dominant explicitly stated objective

about 75% of the total affiliations of the professional men

The remaining 25% of his memberships are spread over all the other groups. The *average* membership in these other groups is also higher for the professional than for the other classes, with few exceptions to be noted below.

and a cultural club constitute 44% of the total affiliations. Political clubs come next, then sororities and civic groups The rest of the affiliations are distributed fairly evenly among the other groups.

Just as with the professional men some 50% of all the affiliations of professional women are in occupational groups Cultural come next, then civic, then occupational clubs and alumni associations This leaves about 20% of affiliations among all the other groups

TABLE 3

Affiliations in Specified Kinds of Associations as Percentage of the Number of Men in Each Economic Class

	Labor					*All*	*Professional*		
	Unskilled	*Skilled*	*All labor*	*White collar*	*Business*	*professional*	*Under $3000*	*$3000–$5000*	*$5000 & over*
No. of Cases	145	314	460	305	67	296	149	97	50
Economic	3	32	23	39	13	127	69	156	246
Political	4	45	4	49	45	85	74	10	8
Civic	—	1	7	13	3	10	6	11	18
Minority Protection	—	—	—	—	3	14	13	—	4
Masonic	—	5	35	53	165	78	4	8	18
Fraternal	10	31	24	15	43	95	88	8	14
Cultural	—	6	4	22	13	20	12	32	18
Religious	3	19	22	89	45	44	47	2	8
Military-Patriotic	7	1	9	39	3	54	34	4	14
Social	17	35	78	13	12	10	54	7	30
Sport	13	6	9	19	45	3	34	3	2
Greek Letter	—	—	—	46	15	14	17	10	10
YMCA-YMHA	13	1	1	5	3	4	8	—	2
Alumni	—	—	—	4	45	85	74	12	4
Hobby	—	—	—	.7	—	—	13	—	2
Boy Scouts	7	—	2	7	—	4	7	—	—
Country Club	—	—	—	—	15	14	13	—	4
Occupational Clubs	—	—	—	—	15	17	88	23	30
Miscellaneous	27	—	1	16	75	17	7	2	4

The unskilled *woman* worker belongs to very few associations, but just as with the unskilled male worker, a social club and a fraternal lodge come first with religious and Y.W.C.A. affiliations next.

The skilled woman belongs to a trade union and a church society with occasional memberships in a social or political club.

Membership in a church society is the dominant mode of participation for the white collar woman. This, a social club,

A detailed comparison of class patterns of participation is presented in Tables 3 and 4. The index used is the total number of memberships in specified associations as a percentage of the number of persons in a given class If 460 workers listed 112 fraternal memberships the rate would be 24. This does not always mean that 24%

of the workers belonged to fraternal orders because some may have had more than one membership. It is for this reason that the rate may exceed 100 in some cases.

Table 3 reveals that the working men have a relatively high rate of participation in occupational and fraternal groups and collar women The latter, even as the white collar men, exceed the other classes in religious and social clubs, the Y's, and Girl Scouts. White collar women are closer to the professional women with regard to fraternal and Greek letter societies than was the case with the men Otherwise the picture is much the same.

TABLE 4

Affiliations in Specified Kinds of Associations as Percentage of the Number of Women in Each Economic Class

	Labor					All	Professional	
	Unskilled	Skilled	All labor	White collar	Nurses	professional	Under $3000	$3000–$5000
No of cases	**201**	**68**	**269**	**437**	**219**	**126**	**55**	**81**
Economic	5	15	4	3	83	125	78	142
Political	5	3	1	6	23	12	127	10
Civic	—	—	—	5	1	20	9	25
Minority Protection	5	—	1	5	—	47	5	37
Masonic	—	—	—	5	1	15	18	12
Fraternal	2	—	1	24	1	1	18	—
Cultural	—	—	—	7	2	31	218	33
Religious	1	4	2	15	2	95	72	10
Military Patriotic	—	—	—	5	3	24	18	25
Social	2	3	2	9	—	7	9	5
Sport	—	—	—	34	1	4	36	37
Greek Letter	—	—	—	55	—	64	9	37
YWCA–YWHA	1	—	1	3	4	24	36	12
Alumni	—	—	—	3	—	143	163	11
Hobby	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Girl Scouts	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—
Country Club	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Womans Club	—	—	—	16	1	88	9	75
Occupational Clubs	—	—	—	16	—	135	36	186
Miscellaneous	1	1	1	18	5	–	—	—

a low rate in all the rest White collar exceeds the other classes in religious and social clubs, the "Y's," and Boy Scouts Its participation in military patriotic, masonic and fraternal groups differs little from that of the professionals

In all the other groups the professional class has the highest rate of participation.

Class differences in women's organizations are very similar with only a few exceptions. Working women have somewhat fewer "fraternal" affiliations than white

OTHER FACTORS IN THE EXTENT AND PATTERN OF PARTICIPATION

The data hitherto examined for their bearing upon class differences throw light also on other factors

Sex Certain generalizations emerge concerning *sex differences in participation* (It must be borne in mind that the women were all gainfully employed)

1 Sex differences were greatest at the bottom and diminish as we go up the oc-

cupational scale (see Chart I).

2. In the lowest economic classes organized group life is apparently carried on largely by men, while in the upper classes it is about equally divided between the sexes. Contrast the following rates: *unskilled labor,* 9% of women and 32% of men have affiliations; *skilled labor,* 25% of women and 44% of men, *professional,* 82% of women and 79% of men.

3. In the white collar and professional classes marital status and age combine into an intricate pattern of influences giving sometimes to men and, at other times, to women a higher rate of participation

There is some, though not conclusive, evidence that *in the working classes* women participate less in associations than do men irrespective of age and marital status A breakdown by marital status was not possible for this group But, if anyone, it is the older single women who may equal the participation rate of men We find, however, that the rate for women over 30 (⅔ of whom were single) is only 13% as compared with 51% for the men over 30. It is doubtful that upon marriage an employed working class woman would increase her affiliations She will not have the leisure for it and such money as is available for memberships is more likely to go to the man.

As to the single woman several facts are reflected in her low rate of participation. She is less likely than the man to belong to a union; she marries young and her late teens and early 20's are occupied with courtship and informal social activities; there doesn't seem to be an equivalent of the typical boys' "Social and Athletic Club" in her life

The picture changes as we turn to the white collar and professional classes. Here there are various groups of women more active in associations than the corresponding groups of men Thus, for example, the white collar women 30 and over (and by and large single) are more organized than the men 30 and over, the rates being 52% and 45% respectively. The same is true of the older professional women.

Are these conclusions concerning sex differences supported by existing studies?

The Lynds[10] found that working class women participated much less than working class men. But, in contrast to our findings, even the Middletown business class women participated less than the men But that sample was small and the difference may or may not be significant

Goldhamer's[11] results, on the whole, are in agreement with ours He too finds that, among the semi skilled and the white collar persons, women at all ages have a lower average membership than the men. Professional women, on the other hand, have a slightly higher membership rate.

Goldhamer also found that married men are more active in associations than single men while among women it is the single who are the "joiners" In an excellent table giving average membership by age, marital status, and sex, Goldhamer refines this generalization in one important respect. It is true largely for the older age groups — those over 30 It is only then that the single become the extremes — the men, very inactive and the women, very active In the young age group the married of both sexes participate somewhat less than the single Perhaps this is natural in view of the responsibilities in the early years of marriage Why the woman who remains single, and not the man, should seek outlets in participation is hard to say Goldhamer suggests that singleness in men is symptomatic of a more deviant personality.

The participation of housewives, even as of gainfully employed women, goes up

[10] Lynd, Robert S and Helen M, *Middletown, A Study in Contemporary American Culture,* N Y Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1929.

[11] *Ibid*

with increasing income and, again, the sex differences diminish as we move up the scale. In *Leisure, A Suburban Study* [12] the housewife with the income under $5,000 has only 1.9 memberships per person to 2 7 of her husband. In the $10,000 and over income class the housewife participates almost as much as her husband, average is 2 9 affiliations and her husband's 3.0.

In the pattern of affiliations, as in the extent, sex differences are again larger for the lower economic classes. (See Tables 3 and 4) Women workers have generally a lower rate of participation than men workers and that covers every kind of group with the exception of the religious ones

The white collar men still have the edge over the women in fraternal, masonic, military-patriotic societies,[13] but their participation is about equal to that of women in economic, political, sport, Greek letter societies and social clubs (if the women's affiliations in social groups are added to the affiliations in the Women's club). Women actually exceed the men in religious, cultural, and civic and philanthropic groups.

The professional men earning under $3,000 still exceed the women of the same class in the patronage of fraternal, masonic, military-patriotic organizations They also have a higher membership in occupational clubs. As in the preceding comparisons the women exceed the men in religious and cultural affiliations. They have also a somewhat higher membership rate in social, political, civic and alumni groups. Membership in sport and occupational societies is about the same.

The better paid professional men consistently with other classes exceed the women in masonic and fraternal and Greek letter societies. The women exceed the men in religious and civic affiliations. As for the rest, the men and women in this particular occupational group are very much alike. The Women's club is of course a special case.

Certain sex differences are thus consistent throughout the whole population. Women have invariably more religious affiliations from the lowest to the highest economic class Beginning with the white collar class the participation in civic and philanthropic societies is more intensive. The rate for cultural groups is also higher for women with the exception of better paid professional men.

Men on the other hand exceed the women consistently in fraternal, masonic, military-patriotic associations Men have also more occupational affiliations but only below the professional level The professional men list more Greek letter societies than the professional women but for the white collar class the men and women rates are very similar.

The higher organization of the nurses is due largely to their participation in occupational and alumni associations. In all the rest they have as a matter of fact very low membership rates Their rates are lower than those of the white collar women for every kind of group with the exception of social and Y.W. to which they belong as frequently as do the clerks.

The greater participation of women in religious and cultural societies was also reported for two suburban communities by Lundberg [14]

Religion. Religion is less important than economic class as a factor in participation The similarity in the rates of the three religious groups within each

[12] Lundberg, Komarovsky, McInerny, Columbia University Press, 1934, p 131.

[13] Most military-patriotic societies are male associations, such as Veterans of the Foreign Wars or the American Legion, but women belong to auxiliaries of these groups Furthermore, such organizations as the D A R were included under this heading

[14] *Op cit*, p 143

class is quite striking. This is certainly true of the Protestants and the Catholics; both men and women Jews differ from the others in two respects: the high organization of the skilled and the "under organization" of the young white collar men (see p. 383). Furthermore, the Jewish professional men have the highest rate of the three, perhaps, because there were relatively more teachers and fewer engineers among them.

Our findings are in disagreement with Goldhamer's with regard to the Catholics whom he found less highly organized in every occupational group, male and female. The *kinds* of groups Catholics belong to we, also, found distinctive. No explanation suggests itself for this difference between Chicago and New York studies.

As to the pattern of association some religious differences stand out very clearly.[15] The Catholic men have a greater proportion of political and religious affiliations than any other group and this superiority exists in every economic class It will be noted that such organizations as Knights of Columbus were classed with fraternal orders and not with religious groups; therefore, their high rate of participation in religious groups is all the more striking. The Catholic group has no participation in the masonic orders. It has a consistently lower rate in civic and cultural associations. It is only the Catholic white collar man who compares favorably with the other religions in cultural affiliations

The Protestant group exceeded the other two in cultural affiliations and to some extent in military and patriotic societies. Protestants of every class have a lower rate of participation in fraternal orders than non Protestants.

[15] Limitations of space prevent the inclusion of tables giving affiliations in specified groups by religion, class, and sex.

The Jewish group is as active as the Protestant in civic groups but is more akin to the Catholics in the frequency of fraternal orders. Every class of Jews is below the other religions in sport and religious affiliations.

The relation of religion to the patterns of affiliations of women was similar to that of men in the following respects the Protestant women, even as the Protestant men, were superior in cultural, military, sport, occupational clubs, and Greek letter fraternities. They, too, had a lower membership in fraternal orders The Catholic women had more numerous religious affiliations and among the professional — fewer civic and occupational memberships The Jewish women had a high rate in civic associations and a low rate in sport and religious associations

On the other hand, women did not exhibit the pattern discovered among the men with regard to political affiliations The superiority found among the Catholic men did not exist among the women Catholic women have a slightly higher participation in fraternal organizations than the Jewish women.

DEPRESSION AND PARTICIPATION

The data for this study were collected in 1934–35 What was the influence of the depression upon participation? To what an extent do our results reflect the economic plight of the middle 30's?

The answer to these questions comes from one section of our original schedule which reads as follows: "If you have resigned from any organizations because of the depression list their names below."

Depression had cut down participation in associations despite the fact that our collaborators were all employed at the time of the study Total number of resignations constituted 10 per cent of the 2952 memberships held by the group as a

whole prior to the depression

It is interesting to note that the skilled workers and the nurses relinquished fewer memberships than any other classes, 7 per cent and 6 per cent respectively Both of these groups limit their participation largely to instrumental associations (unions, mutual benefit and professional societies). As long as they can hold on to their jobs they are not likely to drop such memberships. The proportion of resignations was almost identical for the unskilled, the white collar and the professional classes (12 per cent, 12 per cent and 11 per cent) and higher for the businessmen — 15 per cent.

How much has our index of participation, i e , the proportion of persons with one or more memberships, been affected by the depression? Not as much as might be expected from the preceding paragraphs Apparently persons with *numerous* memberships were more likely to drop some than those who had only one. While the total per cent of resignations was 10 per cent, the decline in per cent of affiliated persons varied from 2 per cent to, at the most, 4 per cent The largest change was for white collar men, 51 per cent of whom belonged prior to the depression instead of the 47 per cent at the time of the study.

Let us turn now from the extent to the pattern of retrenchment Hardest hit were the more expensive associations and other leisure time groups lacking in any sentimental or ideological significance They were the country clubs, the athletic clubs, the Y's and the Women's clubs All of those lost 20 per cent or more of their memberships Next come associations which lost from 10 per cent to 20 per cent of their memberships social, civic, political, masonic, cultural The least vulnerable, as might have been expected were the occupational groups, and for less obvious reasons, religious and Greek letter fraternities and sororities.

CONCLUSION

This and other studies of voluntary associations have hitherto been concerned with the establishment of broad differentials in participation in terms of the familiar social categories of class, religion, nativity, sex, age and so forth. The time is ripe for a more refined analysis which would reveal the "why" and the "what of it" of these broad differences Thus, for example, while we have suggested certain hypotheses to account for class differences, they remain to be tested Another group of casual factors to be explored is that of personality variables

That the majority of citizens remain completely outside the stream of organized social life is significant but its implications, also, require a more refined study. The frequent assumption that the nonparticipants are necessarily "isolated," "rootless," "barred from complete realization of personality" needs to be examined Indeed it may be supposed that many social and recreational organizations in the city recruit their membership largely from those who are, in fact, isolated and lonely and who seek satisfactions which other segments of the population find more fully in unorganized social relations of a neighborhood, a gang, or a strong family unit Similarly, we cannot assume that members of cultural associations are necessarily better informed or more interested in self-cultivation Some interests may be pursued singly through individual utilization of cultural resources of a community Non membership in other associations, however, no doubt implies that sections of our population are cut off from channels of power, information, growth, and a sense of participation in purposive social action.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1. Becker, Howard, and Myers, R. C., "Sacred and Secular Aspects of Human Sociation," *Sociometry*, August and November, 1942, pp 207–29, 355–70. This article summarizes and contrasts the characteristics of sacred and secular societies which correspond to our communal and associational societies Also important is the series of diagnostic questions which can be used to determine the degree of sacredness or secularity of a particular society

2 Kolb, W L, "The Objective Possibility of an Organized Secular Society," *Southwestern Journal*, Fall, 1946, pp. 161–69. While most pictures of the associational society tend to depict it as disorganized, this article distinguishes between two aspects of empirical associational societies and indicates that one of these aspects, the growth of broad societal norms, serves as an organizing factor.

3. MacIver, R M, *Society*, Rinehart and Company, New York, 1937, pp 474–84. This chapter on the broad process of social change describes the development of the modern associational society and the way in which it differs from the older uni-centered communal society.

4 Mannheim, Karl, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc, New York, 1940, pp 58–75 In these pages Mannheim deals with the mass aspects of modern associational society, laying particular stress on the fact that the rational organization of human activities in the economic field decreases the individual rationality of the person both in the economic sphere and in other unorganized spheres of life.

5 Meadows, Paul, "Planning in Mass Society and in Differentiated Society," *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, April, 1944, pp. 17–35. The analysis of Mannheim cited in the reference above is partially challenged by Meadows who emphasizes the importance of differentiated associations in the associational society as the offset to the lack of structured relations present in some areas

6 Redfield, Robert, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1941, pp. 19–57. Within the area of the Yucatan peninsula Redfield describes four communities a city, a town, a village, and a tribe, revealing different degrees of the presence of associational characteristics as contrasted with communal characteristics Here within a range of a few miles are exemplified the two major forms of social organization as well as intermediary types

7 Tumin, Melvin, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious a Re evaluation," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1945, pp 199–207 Tumin recasts the associational-communal classification within a distinctly evaluative frame of reference as implied by the title of his article On the basis of contrasting two ethnic groups in Guatemala, Ladino and Indian, he draws the conclusion that communal society is superior to associational society.

8. See also· Myrdal, "Theoretical Critique of the Concept 'Mores'," p 80, Linton, "Status and Role," p 211, DeGré, "Freedom and Social Structure," p 521, Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," p 557, Drucker, "The Industrial Reality of the Twentieth Century," p 567, Parsons, "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," p 592, Cuber, "Marginal Church Participants," p 674, Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," p 771, Heberle, "Sociological Interpretation of Social Change in the South," p. 804, Lee, "Techniques of Social Reform An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive," p 812

12. Societies: Demographic and Ecological Elements

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Just as the original nature of the individual is the raw material of personality, so is the population of a society the raw material from which its component social relations and social systems are shaped Society consists of social relations, and social relations demand the participation of people; hence any society is compelled to develop its social systems and assign its social roles on the basis of the population available to it. The size and characteristics of a population, however, are not simply biological givens for the society — rather, the relation between them is reciprocal. To illustrate: trade and industry cannot flourish in sparsely populated areas, nor can a hunting or a fishing economy support a dense population. In other words, population density or the concentration of people in cities is both a cause and a result of a highly commercialized and industrialized society. Changes in the size and composition of a population force changes in social structure, but so also do changes in social structure produce modification in the population. Thus a reduction in the birth rate, one determinant of the size of the population, will bring about a modification of social roles to meet the changing size of the population wives are more frequently employed outside the home, mothers become more active in nondomestic affairs, husbands and fathers are less authoritarian, and the roles of children are changed. Yet a reduction in the birth rate itself is more likely to reflect a shift in the cultural importance attached to having children than a purely biological reduction in the capacity to reproduce.

In the concrete social world, people always exist as members of a society and never simply as an agglomeration of biological organisms waiting to be organized into a society It is none the less a valuable research procedure to abstract from the concrete social world those data which are classified under the heading of population. The task of gathering, classifying, describing, and analyzing these population data falls to the *human demographer* Through the use of census materials, vital statistics, and other sources, he is able to describe the size and composition of a society's population, to break these figures down for communities and regions within the larger society, and to trace through time the changes in population numbers and makeup. On the basis of his quantitative description of population, he also attempts to explain the changes and to assess their significance for the national society and its communities In so doing, his work shades by imperceptible degrees into that of the analytic sociologist.

For our purposes it is possible to characterize the work of the demographer as

consisting of the description and analysis of data falling into four categories: (1) the size of population and trends in population growth of a society and its component communities; (2) the age and sex composition of the population; (3) the composition of the population according to socially significant and socially *derived* characteristics such as family status, educational level, skills, and religious affiliation; and (4) the distribution of the population spatially (according to size and geographic location of community) and the migration or movement of people from place to place.

It is manifestly impossible to detail all of the results of population study in this chapter, but the selection we have chosen, Joseph J. Spengler's "Population and Per Capita Income," reveals the effect of certain changes in population on the economic structure of a society This study, however, should not be thought of as applying without qualification to the economic activities of all societies, for the author makes many assumptions which are valid primarily in capitalist societies.

Spengler assumes that the economic activities of a society are carried out rationally for the purpose of deriving the greatest economic income possible. According to this reasoning (which we shall necessarily have to oversimplify), the members of society have an adequate knowledge of market conditions, produce goods at the lowest possible cost, and consume those goods which bring the maximum satisfaction. Under these conditions, which are some of the assumptions of analytic economics, Spengler explores the effects of population changes on the economy. His major conclusions are as follows. (1) When all of the factors of production are being used to their fullest capacity an increase in the supply of labor (if labor is viewed as a fixed fraction of the population) lowers per capita income (2) Different rates of natural increase (surplus of births over deaths) in different groups of the society are likely to result in too many people playing some economic roles and not enough people playing others. This imbalance of occupational distribution also results in decreased per capita income (3) As a population grows it offers, up to a certain point, a larger market for goods and services, and hence makes it possible to realize the economies of division of labor and improved organization Such economies raise per capita income (4) Aging of the population (i.e., changes in the age composition resulting in increasing percentages of older people in the society) increases the relative size of the working population for a while but may later reduce it This obviously may upset the interoccupational balance and force changes in the ways in which jobs are distributed and wages paid for the work done It also produces the noneconomic danger of power concentration in the hands of old people (5) The rate of population growth affects the possibilities of full employment through its relation to the distribution of income, to the use of savings, and to the amount of capital invested in durable goods.

This summary does scant justice to the article but does indicate the close relationship between the economic order of a society and its population. This same reciprocal relation holds between population and all areas of social life; that is,

changes in the population condition the social structure, and the latter in turn influences population trends.

Whereas the demographer deals with the relations between society and population, the *human ecologist* is concerned with man's adaptation to physical space, particularly as this adaptation reveals itself in the geographic distribution of social relations and social systems In other words, the description of characteristic types of adaptation within various areas of the community and the explanation of different modes of adaptation are the tasks of ecology. Most ecological research has centered around the description and analysis of spatial aspects of social systems in the large urban community, rather than those found in smaller towns or in the open country (We have already seen one example of urban ecological research in the study by Faris and Dunham, which showed that the forms of social relations most likely to produce personality disorganization are located near the centers of large cities.)

The problems of ecology are simple enough on the descriptive level, for even superficial inquiry shows that the distribution of modes of behavior is not random throughout the community but manifests some degree of uniformity within an area as well as a lack of uniformity between areas or neighborhoods Through the use of mapping techniques this order can be readily depicted. Thus, as we shall see presently, American cities typically reveal a zonal order. In every city, zones of the same type contain many of the same forms of social life. The fundamental question is an analytic one· What determines the existence of orderly spatial distribution of social relations? The answer lies in the value system of the culture. Every society, and each of its component social systems, must put the land at its disposal to various uses (always including subsistence and habitation). But once the problem of sheer biological existence is solved (and very often before it is solved), the use of land which shall predominate depends upon the way the society ranks its various goals and activities. Where religious values predominate, religious systems will preempt the most desirable land, and the other social systems must perforce adapt themselves accordingly. In a militaristic society, the use of the land will be primarily determined by the needs of war-making

In our own society the predominant system of values is pecuniary in character· making money and establishing status by conspicuous expenditure receive precedence over most other goals in life Consequently, in American cities, the first claim upon land is exercised by those who bid for its use in economic enterprise, and the second claim by those who have the financial means to buy it for residential purposes. (See Part Four for a detailed discussion of the relation between class position and place of residence) All social groups and classes compete for living space, of course, but the economically weak and socially less privileged compete by adapting themselves to these other factors which set the basic land and rental values. In our society the individual locates his place of business and his residence *primarily* in terms of what he can afford and *secondarily* in terms of what is desirable within these limits.

The article by Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," is an idealized description of the generalized patterns and processes of urban growth in our industrial society. (The description is idealized in the sense of excluding all of the variations of the pattern as they are found in different urban centers; idealization here does not refer to describing something in glowing terms.) The importance of his discussion lies primarily in his zonal hypothesis concerning city growth. According to this hypothesis, the ecological processes — which if our earlier analysis is correct are the resultants of economic and residential evaluations of land in pecuniary terms — distribute business and residences through five circular zones. The center zone is the main business district, reflecting the process of centralization in which economic organizations, particularly retail stores, locate at the points of greatest accessibility to customer traffic. Within the zone other business organizations locate according to their needs and their ability to compete.

The second zone, the zone of transition, has its land values determined by its future prospects of being absorbed into the business center but possesses very little residential value It becomes the residential zone of the bottom social and economic classes, including hobos, petty criminals, and other social derelicts Historically it has also been the zone of first generation immigrant settlement. Here have operated the processes of invasion and succession as ethnic groups have climbed the class ladder; one set of immigrants has given place to another as the latter took its place in the economic structure. As will be seen in later chapters these processes have now tended to slow down.

The third zone, the zone of workingmen's homes, marks the beginning of the basing of land values on residential uses, although the worker still calculates the value of his residential location in terms of its proximity to his job His primary concern is to have short time-cost distance to his work and cheap rent. The fourth zone of upper-middle-class homes and apartments definitely derives its land values from its residential uses, particularly its degree of exclusiveness and number of zoning restrictions. The fifth or commuter's zone reveals a drop in land values, but necessitates the use of modern means of transportation in order to reach the center of the city. While these zones are primarily plotted on a business and residential basis, other associations such as churches and schools locate in these areas to serve the people living there. Within each zone there is a further sorting of social systems according to various criteria such as ethnic affiliation, type of economic enterprise (including the various forms of commercial vice), and specialized forms of residences such as rooming houses serving selected segments of the population.

Despite some severe criticism and the prospect of modification by future research, the zonal hypothesis will probably endure in part as a valid descriptive generalization about the ecological organization of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century city. Again it must be emphasized that this pattern of organization is historically relative, not only in the sense that it is the product of certain technological developments and improvements in transportation, but also in the

extent to which the spatial patterning is dependent upon economic purposes. The zonal organization of the city reflects the contractual culture of capitalism with its tremendous stress on economic values

The article by Harlan Gilmore, "The Old New Orleans and the New: A Case for Ecology," shows that in the historic American past other elements of the cultural system were determining factors in creating the spatial pattern of the community. The ecological organization of the Creole community, with the location of the best homes near the center of the city, indicates that within the city values other than those of economic production were most important in determining the spatial location of social systems Not that subsistence elements were missing, but the culture pattern of economic activity was entirely different and did not reflect a competitive struggle for land use The article is valuable also for its depiction of how this ecological pattern was eventually broken down by streams of immigration and the growth of capitalist culture As Gilmore points out, however, even today there are certain aspects of ecological organization which have resisted the demands of economic production

While demographic and ecological aspects of society are perhaps more easily discernible than those which directly concern the nature and organization of the society's component social systems, we have found that they can be explained only by referring them to the social structure and the culture of the society. Although earlier chapters have served to give us some generalized ideas about society and social structure, the sections which follow on stratification and on institutional and associational structure will render more concrete our conception of the basic structure of society They will show the interrelations of both social classes and associations as they are governed by the institutions of the society and of its various component groups.

POPULATION AND PER CAPITA INCOME *

Joseph J. Spengler

Our main purpose in what follows is to trace the effect of population changes upon economic conditions as measured by per capita income Inasmuch as the subject is complicated, simplicity of treatment is achieved at the expense of rigor

"Nothing is gained . by pretending that [Nature's action] is simple"[1] The relationships between the population factor and other of the variables making up the societal universe can be treated in terms of one-at-a-time analysis, but not with as much completeness as one would like For the societal universe is a

[1] A Marshall, *Principles of Economics* (8th ed., London, 1920), p x

* Reprinted by permission from *The Annals* January, 1945, pp 182–92.

system of mutually interacting variables, acted upon also by external conditions not readily comprehensible within such a system. Each of these variables, of which the population factor is one, is both a cause and an effect. A change in any one mode (e.g., natality, mortality) of the population factor, if not counterbalanced by a change in external conditions, will be accompanied by a compensatory change in some other mode of the population factor, or by a change in other of the variables composing the system, or by a combination of such changes. The change, or changes, consequent upon an initial modification of the population factor, therefore, will react upon the population factor itself. Repercussions will end when the system has ingested the initial change and its consequences.

Suppose we consider the functional relationship between population factor *a* and some other variable *b*. If *a* is modified, action will be exerted upon *b* through a number of paths, some direct and some circuitous and not readily perceptible Moreover, *b*, having been modified in consequence of the assumed initial modification of *a*, acts in turn through a number of paths upon *a* and produces further modification in *a*. One-at-a-time analysis cannot serve, therefore, to disclose completely the functional relationship existing between *a* and *b* because the *ceteris paribus* assumption does not and cannot be made to hold. Whence the "effect," which the social scientist pretends to trace to an initial modification of *a*, may differ markedly from that which in reality was produced — particularly if he ignores interactions between the given societal system, defined as coterminous with a given geographical area, and other societal systems coterminous with other geographical areas. Moreover, even if the "effect" is traced with considerable accuracy, it by no means follows that upon a subsequent occasion an identic modification of *a* will set up an identic chain of repercussions.

Real income (or net output) *per caput* is governed, in a given economy, by a number of interrelated factors, subject to the influence of the population factor, of which we shall discuss the following ratio of population to the productive factors (i e, equipment, land, and natural resources) used jointly with labor in the creation of goods and services; occupational composition of the population, pattern of consumer demand; the extent to which the economies associated with improved organization, with specialization and the division of labor, with large-scale production, and with agglomeration, are being realized, trading relations with other economies, age composition of the population, and fullness of employment.[2]

RATIO OF POPULATION TO PRODUCTIVE FACTORS

An increase in the ratio of labor [3] to the complex of productive factors used jointly with labor is accompanied, when the whole of this complex has been set to work and other conditions remain unchanged, by a diminution in the average output per unit of labor input, and, therefore, by a corresponding relative diminution in income *per caput* [4] For since pro-

[2] Lack of space prevents consideration of the effect exercised upon income by political and cultural progress, the qualitative composition of the population, and the state of the industrial arts, of which the last two are among the most important of the determinants of income Each of these factors is related to the population factor

[3] It is assumed, here and elsewhere unless otherwise indicated, that determinants of income other than the one under examination are unaffected, that labor and the factors used with it are homogeneous, and that the labor force constitutes a fixed fraction of the population

[4] Sufficient factor divisibility to exclude an initial stage of increasing average returns for labor is assumed Accordingly, average output per

duction is a joint and co-operative process to which both labor and other productive factors contribute, and labor is not, directly or indirectly, a perfect substitute for the other factors of production, labor becomes less well equipped when it increases faster than the (first-grade) factors used in combination with it: whence average output per unit of labor input falls. If labor were a perfect substitute for the other factors, production would not be a joint process, and average output per unit of labor input would not fall If, on the contrary, labor were not, within limits, an imperfect substitute for the factors combined with it, additional increments of labor would be employable and productive only on condition that additional increments of the complex of nonlabor factors were available for combination with the additional increments of labor.

The complex of productive factors used jointly with labor may be divided roughly into five categories (1) land, measured in terms of area and viewed as a situs for habitation and for agricultural and other productive activities; (2) nondepletable natural resources whose supply is essentially fixed, (3) depletable and nonreplaceable natural resources, (4) natural resources which are replaceable and whose supply is augmentable, and (5) equipment—i e, machinery, buildings, etc.

The supplies of (1) and (2), in use and /or available for use, are practically fixed quantities in any given economy, that of (3) is a diminishing quantity, those of (4) and (5) are susceptible, within limits, of increase Land, measured in terms of productive power, is augmentable, within limits, through conversion into it of labor, of resources with which labor has been mixed (e.g., fertilizers), and of fixed and circulating capital consisting in part of labor (e g, drainage and irrigation systems, counteragents to erosion, improvements in terrain, and so forth).[5]

If the labor supply continues to grow after the whole of the complex of factors used with labor has been brought into use, average output per unit of labor input will fall The rate of fall will depend upon (a) the *substitutability* of labor for the factors with which it is combined, and the rate of decline in this substitutability, and (b) the *convertibility* of labor into the factors with which it is used, and the rate of decline in this convertibility. Of course, given perfect substitutability, recourse to convertibility is unnecessary.[6]

Substitutability of Labor

The rate at which average output per unit of labor input falls as labor input increases depends upon the rate at which the marginal output of labor falls, and this depends upon the substitutability, direct or indirect, of labor for the factors with which it is combined. In agriculture

unit of labor input does not fall until all first-grade factors, employable with labor, have been brought into use, and part of the total net product is imputable to these factors

[5] Technological progress (i e, improvement in the state of the industrial arts) may augment (3) by rendering utilizable that which has not been utilizable or it may increase the efficiency with which (3) is used In general, it operates to break the fetters imposed upon production either by the limitedness of resources or by restrictions upon competition It may operate also to increase the rate at which (3) is used up In sum, it participates on both sides in the race between exhaustion of resources, on the one hand, and the replenishment of resources through discovery and recovery, on the other

[6] If only one of the factors used with labor, say land, has been brought fully into use, the deficiency in its supply may be relieved in part by substituting for it, or converting into it, units of other factors (e g, equipment, chemical compounds) not yet fully in use Moreover, an increase in numbers may be offset in part by increasing the rate of consumption of category (3) natural resources, such offset, however, is purchased *ceteris paribus* at the expense of a subsequent reduction in output and income.

the direct substitutability of labor for the factors (especially land) used jointly with it appears to be less, and more subject to decline,[7] than in manufactures; it falls to zero when the ratio of labor to land passes a certain point.[8]

Labor may also be substituted indirectly for the factors used with it in agriculture by converting it into capital, or by substituting it for capital, and in turn substituting the capital for (say) land. While indirect substitutability is subject to limitations, it may be more effective than direct substitutability in slowing down the fall in output per worker in agriculture. In American manufactures as a whole, about three-fourths of the output of which is imputable to labor, labor is directly substitutable for equipment, and substitutability falls slowly; a one per cent increase in the ratio of labor to equipment is accompanied by a decline of one-fourth of one per cent in the average output of labor.[9] If, with other conditions and assumptions the same, only one-half of the output were imputable to labor, the corresponding decline would be one-half of one per cent; while if nine-tenths were imputable to labor, the decline would approximate one-tenth of one per cent. For a closed economy as a whole, factor supplies being given, substitutability is governed primarily by the ruling technical conditions and by the over-all pattern of consumption

Convertibility of Labor

The supply of each of the five factors used with labor may be increased, within limits, by converting labor into it. This convertibility diminishes, however, with the increase in the relative supply of labor, if other limitations become operative. For example, while labor is not very convertible, directly or indirectly, into landed area, it is convertible, especially indirectly, into landed productive power, for it may be embodied in equipment, or mixed with resources, that are transformable into land. The fixity of landed area, however, limits this convertibility and subjects it to diminution Labor does not appear to be significantly convertible into the factors included in categories (2) and (3) But it is readily convertible into equipment, something like three-fourths of whose cost in this country consists of labor, and it is convertible, in lesser measure, into augmentable natural resources. It is to be noted, however, that an increase in the supply of any factor, accomplished by converting labor into it, is purchased at the

[7] Satisfactory data are lacking, but the following figures are suggestive Suppose the return on $100 of capital in manufactures, or of agricultural property in agriculture — i e , the "marginal product" — is $6 In 1929, in manufactures, the ratio of average remuneration per employee ($1,492) to this supposed $6 "marginal product" was 249 to 1 In agriculture, per worker net product *imputable* to *labor* (i e , net output per worker minus the assumed 6 per cent allowance on agricultural property used per worker) was $581; the ratio of this per worker rate of return to the assumed rate of return on property was 95 to 1 The corresponding ratio was 132 to 1 in the Pacific Coast area where agricultural property per worker approximated $9,670, and 62 to 1 in the East South Central states where agricultural property per worker approximated only $1,920. These data are taken or computed from C A. Bliss, *The Structure of Manufacturing Production* (New York, 1939), p 19, and John D. Black, "Agricultural Population in Relation to Agricultural Resources," *The Annals,* Vol 188 (Nov. 1936), pp 205–217.

[8] In densely populated China, J L Buck's data suggest, the marginal product of labor falls to zero when the ratio of labor to land is increased beyond 0.25 man per acre. See *Land Utilization in China* (Chicago, 1937), Chap IX, Tables 9, 11, 12, 16 C. Clark finds output per agricultural worker to vary inversely with the square root of the number of agricultural workers per unit of farm land See *The Economics of 1960* (London, 1942), pp 35–36.

[9] See P H Douglas, *The Theory of Wages* (New York, 1934), pp 143–58, also C Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940), Chap XI.

expense of current *consumable* output, if the labor so used could have been employed in the creation of *consumable* goods and services.

Analysis along preceding lines suggests that continued growth of population exercises greatest pressure upon output per worker in realms of production founded predominantly upon land and upon nonreplaceable or nonaugmentable natural resources It exercises least pressure in realms of production in which the role of land, natural resources, and equipment is small, and intermediate pressure in those in which the principal agent other than labor is equipment. The occasional tendency to increasing returns, and the constant tendency to progress technologically, apparently do not operate to eliminate these differences in sensitivity to population growth, they may, if they operate with greater force in some than in other realms of production, increase or decrease these differences in sensitivity If an economy can overcome, by external exchange or other means, the restraints imposed by land and natural resources, it can free itself in considerable measure of the income-depressing influence exercised by population growth If an economy experiences a diminution in numbers and labor supply, and in consequence can abandon *inferior* land and resources and reduce the ratio of labor to the complex of factors used with labor, it should also experience, after productive processes have been appropriately reorganized, an increase in output *per caput.*

OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION

Labor is not, as we have heretofore assumed, a homogeneous factor It consists of subfactors, which are, at best, imperfectly substitutable, one for another. In the longer run and within the limits set by qualitative interpersonal differences, the quantity of any one such subfactor can be augmented, through training and recruitment, at the expense of other subfactors. The composition of the total labor supply can thus be kept adjusted to the requirements of the economy.

Differential natural increase may depress output per worker by increasing interoccupational imbalance. Average output is at a maximum when the respective marginal product of each labor subfactor used with labor, is the same in all uses If natural increase is higher in population groups whence come most of certain labor subfactors, and if at the same time worker training and redistribution programs do not suffice properly to distribute this excess, the actual productivity of these labor subfactors falls below what it otherwise would be Moreover *ceteris paribus,* the greater the difference in group rates of natural increase, the greater is the cost of attaining the appropriate distribution of workers among occupations Generalizing, other things equal, that set of differences in natural increase which, given as desideratum the maximization of average output, minimizes the cost of labor redistribution and recruitment, is the most advantageous on *purely economic* grounds [10]

Disguised unemployment may be said to exist when labor subfactors are employed less advantageously than they are capable of being employed, given their training and aptitudes, it varies, therefore, with the time allowed for adjustment It originates primarily in restraints

[10] Differential increase may affect the qualitative composition of the population through the media of biological and/or cultural heredity Qualitative composition exercises more influence upon income in a complex than in a simple economy At one extreme, policy formation and the effectuation of technological progress appear to require sharper and better trained minds than formerly At the other, the increase in the complexities and responsibilities attendant even upon simpler occupations is rendering more difficult the employment of low-grade individuals

upon competition and mobility, and secondarily in general population pressure and in uncompensated and marked intergroup differences in natural increase. It depresses output *per caput*. Its net effect upon population growth, if depressive, is much less depressive than that of complete unemployment, and varies with time and country.

With the progress of an economy in per capita income, secondary industry becomes more important than primary, and, eventually, tertiary industry may become more important than primary and secondary.[11] This trend, which, while largely traceable to consumption tendencies, is influenced also by differences in the ease with which specific employments may be entered, is of significance for population study. First, since equipment and/or land and resources are relatively less important in tertiary than in secondary industry, and less in secondary than in primary industry, population growth exercises a less and less depressive effect upon income *per caput* as a nation's occupational and industrial structure becomes less primary in character (see Ratio of Population to Productive Factors, *supra*). Second, since tertiary products are largely consumed at home, the external trading relations of an advanced economy, unless it is dependent upon imported foodstuffs and raw produce, decline in relative importance (see External Trading Relations, *infra*) Third, since production becomes less resource-oriented, the location of complexes of economic activities and population is attended by an increase in freedom (see Economics of Specialization, *infra*) Fourth, since higher fertility is associated with primary rather than with secondary and tertiary occupations, the net effect upon fertility is depressive, other things equal.

[11] Agricultural, pastoral, forest, fishing and hunting industries are included under primary, manufacture, electric power production, mining, building and construction, under secondary, other economic activities, under tertiary See C Clark, *The Economics of 1960* (London, 1942) and *Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, 1940)

PATTERN OF CONSUMPTION

The pattern of consumption, within an economy, becomes adjusted, in some measure, to its resources and population patterns; for, insofar as circumstances permit, a population tends to consume more largely of goods that are relatively plentiful and, therefore, relatively low priced This consumption adjustment becomes less significant as income *per caput* rises, for in consequence consumer freedom of choice increases, and the population comes to view more of the "cheap" goods and services as "inferior," and to curtail their consumption In theory, modification of the pattern of consumption offers relief to economies in which the ratio of labor to the factors employed with labor is high, for shifts from goods and services embodying relatively little labor to those embodying relatively much labor operates to raise output *per caput* and to decelerate its decline as the relative amount of labor increases In reality, however, densely populated *closed* economies are not free to make such change, and when they do, it is generally to *waste* labor;[12] for they must first satisfy their more pressing requirements which cannot be fashioned largely out of labor Wealthy economies, in contrast, can indulge in such consumption To them that hath shall be given.

Consumption and population are related in other ways Thus the consumption pattern of a population is conditioned by its age composition Again, when the consumption pattern is making for a small family system, the latter in turn

[12] E g, see H G Moulton, *Japan* (Washington, 1931), pp 398–99.

generates changes in the consumption pattern which re-enforce the trend toward small families. And again, when because per capita income is high, consumer freedom of choice is great, a larger portion of consumer demand is volatile and hard to anticipate than when consumer freedom is restricted, in consequence existing tendencies to unemployment are strengthened, other things equal [13]

ECONOMICS OF SPECIALIZATION

Population growth serves, up to a point, to provide a larger market for goods and services, and, therefore, to make possible in greater measure division of labor and specialization, realization of economies of scale and improved organization, and development of inventive tendencies implicit in such expansion. Consequently, in industries which benefit from such expansion, the resulting increase in output per *over-all* unit of input more than counterbalances the diseconomies which are occasioned in other industries Population growth exercises this efficiency-increasing effect only up to the point where numbers, together with income, provide a market sufficient to permit both the realization of these economies and a more economic interindustry fit The population required will be large or small, other things equal, as optimum-size industrial and plant units are large or small What the economically desirable number of people is, we do not know with precision There is every reason to suppose, however, that we have long since passed it in the United States and in the larger European economies Any increase beyond this number tends, under most conditions, to reduce income *per caput*, or to counterbalance in whole or in part the income-increasing forces at work in the economy, if it does not have this effect immediately, it does endanger future income by hastening the depletion of nonreplaceable resources.

Increases in *per capita* income issue also, up to a point, out of the geographic concentration of population which permits realization of the economies and waste-avoidance associated with the agglomeration of economic activities. Complexes of economic activities may be resituated or newly established; but they remain complexes and force concentration of numbers. And in so doing they generate conditions unfavorable to natural increase — conditions for which, as yet, satisfactory counterbalancing social arrange ments have not been discovered

EXTERNAL TRADING RELATIONS

If, in an economy, the substitution ratio between (say) labor and land, or between capital and land, is unfavorable to labor and to capital, it may be improved, other than by technological progress, in one or both of two ways If labor emigrates, the economy's requirement of landed products is reduced, the pressure of labor and of capital upon land is relaxed, and the substitution ratio is improved, with the result that output *per caput* increases If labor does not or cannot emigrate in person, it may emigrate by proxy in the form of exports embodying relatively large amounts of labor It may be converted into or substituted for equipment, in conjunction with which it is employed to fabricate goods and services which are exchanged for the landed products of economies relatively better supplied with land. The substitution ratio of labor for land is thus improved and output *per caput* rises. If there is opportunity neither for emigration nor for trade with other economies, relief may be obtained, if at all, only through technological progress. If, on the contrary, land and/or natural resource deficiencies are resolved, and the economy is

[13] See also Fullness of Employment, *infra*

large enough, in terms of territory and population, to permit full realization of economies of scale, etc, the income-increasing effect of additional increments of external exchange declines.

AGE COMPOSITION

Output *per caput* is affected in at least four ways by the age composition of a population, and so long as a population's age composition has not become stabilized, by the changes taking place in the age composition. (1) As the rate of population growth falls, potential productive capacity *per caput* increases, other things equal, up to the point where the relative number of persons of productive age, weighted by age and occupational attributes, is at a maximum. (2) As population growth falls, it may become more difficult to maintain interoccupational balance because the ratio of new workers to the existing labor force falls. But this difficulty is easily surmounted, even in a declining population, given planning For short-run population changes are predictable with precision And, given a satisfactory occupational composition, little interoccupational transference of workers is necessary since, if new recruits are not added, the number of workers attached to any given occupation usually declines (through death and retirement) more than three times as fast as the total population by which the demand for the occupation's services is conditioned (3) Because of changes under way in the age composition of the working force proper, present methods of job allocation and remuneration are in need of modification, lest absolute or disguised unemployment ensue. (4) The methods employed to select economic and political leaders must be modified in a manner suited to allow, in the future, a sufficient number of places to those under (say) fifty; otherwise, given *both* present methods of selection and prospective changes in age composition, too much power may pass into the hands of gerontocrats with a Struldbruggian incapacity for fashioning or selecting economic and political policies suited to the needs of the times.[14]

FULLNESS OF EMPLOYMENT

Population growth acts upon three factors by which the level of employment is conditioned the degree of equality with which income is distributed, the nature and volume of offsets to savings; and the consumption-investment structure of the economy [15]

Equality in Distribution of Income

When a population is growing slowly, or not at all, while some of the factors used jointly with labor are increasing more rapidly, the imputed product of labor rises If it rises sufficiently, and the distribution of output is based upon productivity, the relative share of income going to labor increases Under these circumstances, and with income and property ownership distributed much as at present, income tends to become distributed more evenly And when income is distributed more rather than less evenly, it is easier, as a rule and within limits, to maintain practicably full employment

Volume of Offsets to Savings

Suppose real income, consumption, and saving to vary in relation to one another as follows·

[14] See Joseph J Spengler, "Population Movements, Employment, and Income," *Southern Economic Journal*, Vol V (1938), pp 142 ff , "Some Effects of Changes in the Age Composition of the Labor Force," *ibid* , Vol VIII (1941), pp 157 ff "Population Trends and the Future Demand for Teachers," *Social Forces*, Vol XIX (1941), pp 465 ff

[15] The level of employment, in turn, affects the rate of population growth, inasmuch as natality and nuptiality are higher, other things equal, when employment is great than when it is low

Income	50	60	70	80	90	100
Consumption (1)	52	58	65	71	76	80
Saving (1)	−2	2	5	9	14	20
Consumption (2)	55	59	67	74	80	85
Saving (2)	−5	1	3	6	10	15

Suppose, also, that the level of employment corresponds with that of income, and that 100 represents the attainable maximum for income and employment Given income = 100, and the corresponding Consumption (1) = 80, an offset (largely investment) of 20 is required to restore to the income stream the associated saving of 20, whereas, given Consumption (2), an offset of but 15 is required to balance saving, if the offset falls short of the saving associated with an income of 100, income will fall to the level at which the consequently lower amount of saving is offset

In the nineteenth century, when population was growing rapidly, the equipping of new increments of population absorbed something like one half of the then volume of savings, Hansen has estimated Today, with a rate of population growth that is much lower and that is approaching a zero or a negative value, a smaller and diminishing amount of investment is required to equip the smaller and diminishing increment of population Accordingly, given the rate of (investment stimulating) invention and the rates at which money may be borrowed, the maintenance of employment calls for one or the other, or a combination, of two policies (a) private and public enterprise must provide new offsets to savings to take the place of those which heretofore have been supplied through the provision of physical capital for additions to the population, (b) income *after taxation* must be distributed more evenly, or increased consumption must otherwise be facilitated; for then a smaller proportion of income is saved and, consequently, a smaller volume of offsets is required to return savings to the income stream.[16] For example, suppose that, in our numerical illustration above, the offsets associated with an income of 100 fall from 20 to 15 in consequence of a fall in population growth. Either 5 additional units must be added to the 15 in order that the 20 units of saving may be offset; or, through the introduction of changes in consumption pattern and greater equality of income distribution, Consumption (2) may be substituted for Consumption (1), with the result that saving falls to 15 units, which amount the 15 units of offsets can absorb It is, of course, silly to suggest that, unaided by increased work on the part of the stork, an economy cannot maintain employment at a practicable maximum level Even if increased activity on the part of the stork might serve temporarily to push up the level of employment, it could no longer acomplish this effect when the population of the economy had been carried to the maximum level, a level of which few populations today fall far short

Consumption — Investment Structure

The bulk of the net output of an economy may be divided roughly into four parts: (a) that devoted to *current* necessary consumption, (b) that devoted to current consumption which, according to prevailing cultural standards, is considered less necessary or unnecessary to individual welfare, (c) that devoted to shorter lived durable consumer goods, some of which resemble (a) in terms of necessity, and some of which resemble (b); and (d) that devoted to producers' durable capital and to longer-lived consum-

[16] Inasmuch as the supply of human effort is governed by the elasticity of the demand for income in terms of effort, the system of taxation must take this into account Otherwise the diminution of unemployment will be purchased at the expense of a diminution of effort, especially on the part of those possessed of rarer talents

ers' durable goods (e.g., housing). In an economy in which per capita income is high and the population is growing slowly or not at all, (d) will tend to be relatively smaller than in an economy in which population is growing and population pressure is not great enough to restrict the formation of (d) to a very small fraction of total output. The production of (d) is subject, especially in an economy in which the distribution of (d) through time is not carefully planned, to considerable fluctuation, the effects of which are transmitted primarily to (b) and (c). It is probable, therefore, that as population growth falls to zero and in consequence (d) diminishes in relative magnitude, the tendency to unemployment will be less [17] than when population was growing; that the economy will be more stable, and that consumable income will constitute a larger fraction of total output.[18]

CONCLUSION

Our analysis in the preceding section suggests that, if man could free his productive activities of the restraints imposed by land and most natural resources, he would be free of a considerable part of the depressive effect exerted by population growth upon *over-all* per capita income, and of a somewhat smaller part of the depressive effect exerted upon currently *consumable* output per capita. In this man has not generally succeeded, for science has not yet completely broken the fetters imposed by the niggardliness of nature; it has not delivered man and his growth from the restraints imposed by agriculture, nor has it freed modern industry of dependence upon those natural resources whose supplies are fixed or being depleted.

Nor has cultural change everywhere clipped the wings of the stork and released mankind from the clutches of the Malthusian Devil Income data, supported by nutrition studies, suggest that the incomes of more than half the world's population are in the neighborhood of bare subsistence The population of the world falls, Thompson finds, into three groups· I, comprising 21 per cent, has natality and mortality under control, II, comprising 21 per cent, is bringing natality and mortality under control, III, comprising 58 per cent, has neither mortality nor natality under "reasonably secure control." In 1925–34, C. Clark's studies suggest, group I received about 58 per cent of the world's income, II, about 24 per cent, III, something like 18 per cent.

The security of the food supply, even of some of the better situated nations, may be endangered by population growth About three-fifths of the population in group I have to import part of their agricultural raw materials and food requirements With a minor exception, all of the peoples in group II were able, before 1939, to produce, in terms of product value, either more agricultural products than they consumed, or nearly as much as they re-

[17] This diminution in tendency to unemployment may be offset somewhat by increases in the magnitudes of (b) and (c) in relation to that of (a), since the demand for and production of (b) and (c) are more volatile than the demand for and production of (a) However, with the passage of time, greater proportions of the output presently included under (b) and (c) may take on the necessitarian character of (a)

[18] This result will become manifest only after transition of the population from a growing to an essential stationary state, for during the transition period, adjustment to a lower level of investment, together with the effect of the operation of the deceleration principle and the transient worsening of expectations, will increase tendencies to unemployment. See Joseph J Spengler, "Population Movements, Employment, and Income," *op cit*, "Some Effects of Changes in the Age Composition of the Labor Force," *op cit*, "Population Trends and the Future Demand for Teachers," *op cit*, and "Population Movements and Economic Equilibrium in the United States," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol XLVIII (1940), pp 153 ff

quired. If, however, population continues to grow in these countries, and consumption standards improve, agricultural export surpluses will shrink and, in a number of instances, disappear. In group III we find the countries of Asia (other than Japan and Russia), much of Africa, and the Western Hemisphere (except Canada, the United States, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina). Here population growth and the need for greater per capita consumption, together with limitations imposed by climate and disease, may operate to prevent the development of great agricultural surpluses for export, at worst, increased consumption may wipe out such surpluses as exist

Gradual redistribution of the occupied population of the world among employments could increase per capita income considerably At present, about three-fifths of the world's occupied population is engaged in primary industry Given technological knowledge, equipment, and organization such as are found in the most advanced countries, this proportion probably could be reduced without loss of output to about one-fourth, thus releasing about one-third for employment in secondary and tertiary industry. Yet, even granted the capital formation and other conditions prerequisite to such gradual shift, widespread misery will persist unless population growth is brought under control, especially in group III countries, and the increase, diffusion, and spread of technological knowledge continues. For the arable land of the world probably cannot, under present conditions, support in comfort much more than 2 5 billion (if that many), to which level the present 2 1 billion would soon grow, were the reproductive potentials of group III countries allowed free rein. The countries composing groups I and II, especially the former and selected countries in the latter, therefore have a common interest in the imposition of effective restraints upon these reproductive potentials, an interest which should find expression in any plan for world economic and/or political organization.

THE GROWTH OF THE CITY *

Ernest W. Burgess

The outstanding fact of modern society is the growth of great cities Nowhere else have the enormous changes which the machine industry has made in our social life registered themselves with such obviousness as in the cities. In the United States the transition from a rural to an urban civilization, though beginning later than in Europe, has taken place, if not more rapidly and completely, at any rate more logically in its most characteristic forms.

All the manifestations of modern life which are peculiarly urban — the skyscraper, the subway, the department store, the daily newspaper, and social work — are characteristically American The more subtle changes in our social life, which


* R E Park, E W Burgess, and R D McKenzie, *The City*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1925, pp. 47–58 Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

circumference of the inner zone, the present business district. The present boundaries of the area of deterioration were not many years ago those of the zone now inhabited by independent wage-earners, and within the memories of thousands of Chicagoans contained the residences of the "best families." It hardly needs to be added that neither Chicago nor any other city fits perfectly into this ideal scheme. Complications are introduced by the lake front, the Chicago River, railroad lines, historical factors in the location of industry, the relative degree of the resistance of communities to invasion, etc.

Besides extension and succession, the general process of expansion in urban growth involves the antagonistic and yet complementary processes of concentration and decentralization. In all cities there is the natural tendency for local and outside transportation to converge in the central business district. In the downtown section of every large city we expect to find the department stores, the skyscraper office buildings, the railroad stations, the great hotels, the theaters, the art museum, and the city hall Quite naturally, almost inevitably, the economic, cultural, and political life centers here The relation of centralization to the other processes of city life may be roughly gauged by the fact that over half a million people daily enter and leave Chicago's "loop" More recently sub-business centers have grown up in outlying zones. These "satellite loops"

CHART I

The Growth of the City



do not, it seems, represent the "hoped for" revival of the neighborhood, but rather a telescoping of several local communities into a larger economic unity. The Chicago of yesterday, an agglomeration of country towns and immigrant colonies, is undergoing a process of reorganization into a centralized decentralized system of local communities, coalescing into sub-business areas visibly or invisibly dominated by the central business district The actual processes of what may be called centralized decentralization are now being studied in the development of the chain store, which is only one illustration of the change in the basis of the urban organization [2]

Expansion, as we have seen, deals with the physical growth of the city, and with the extension of the technical services that have made city life not only livable, but comfortable, even luxurious Certain of these basic necessities of urban life are possible only through a tremendous development of communal existence Three millions of people in Chicago are dependent upon one unified water system, one giant gas company, and one huge electric light plant Yet, like most of the other aspects of our communal urban life, this economic co-operation is an example of co-operation without a shred of what the "spirit of co-operation" is commonly thought to signify The great public utilities are a part of the mechanization of life in great cities, and have little or no other meaning for social organization

Yet the processes of expansion, and especially the rate of expansion, may be studied not only in the physical growth and business development, but also in the consequent changes in the social organization and in personality types How far is the growth of the city, in its physical and technical aspects, matched by a natural but adequate readjustment in the social organization? What, for a city, is a normal rate of expansion, a rate of expansion with which controlled changes in the social organization might successfully keep pace?

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DISORGANIZATION AS PROCESSES OF METABOLISM

These questions may best be answered, perhaps, by thinking of urban growth as a resultant of organization and disorganization analogous to the anabolic and katabolic processes of metabolism in the body. In what way are individuals incorporated into the life of a city? By what process does a person become an organic part of his society? The natural process of acquiring culture is by birth. A person is born into a family already adjusted to a social environment — in this case the modern city The natural rate of increase of population most favorable for assimilation may then be taken as the excess of the birth-rate over the death-rate, but is this the normal rate of city growth? Certainly, modern cities have increased and are increasing in population at a far higher rate However, the natural rate of growth may be used to measure the disturbances of metabolism caused by any excessive increase, as those which followed the great influx of southern Negroes into northern cities since the war In a similar way all cities show deviations in composition by age and sex from a standard population such as that of Sweden, unaffected in recent years by any great emigration or immigration. Here again, marked variations, as any great excess of males over females, or of females over males, or in the proportion of children, or of grown men or women, are symptomatic of abnormalities in social metabolism

Normally the processes of disorganiza-


[2] See E H Shideler, *The Retail Business Organization as an Index of Community Organization*

tion and organization may be thought of as in reciprocal relationship to each other, and as co-operating in a moving equilibrium of social order toward an end vaguely or definitely regarded as progressive. So far as disorganization points to reorganization and makes for more efficient adjustment, disorganization must be conceived not as pathological, but as normal Disorganization as preliminary to reorganization of attitudes and conduct is almost invariably the lot of the newcomer to the city, and the discarding of the habitual, and often of what has been to him the moral, is not infrequently accompanied by sharp mental conflict and sense of personal loss. Oftener, perhaps, the change gives sooner or later a feeling of emancipation and an urge toward new goals.

In the expansion of the city a process of distribution takes place which sifts and sorts and relocates individuals and groups by residence and occupation. The resulting differentiation of the cosmopolitan American city into areas is typically all from one pattern, with only interesting minor modifications Within the central business district or on an adjoining street is the "main stem" of "hobohemia," the teeming Rialto of the homeless migratory man of the Middle West [8] In the zone of deterioration encircling the central busi-

CHART II

Urban Areas



[8] For a study of this cultural area of city life see Nels Anderson, *The Hobo*, Chicago, 1923

ness section are always to be found the so-called "slums" and "bad lands," with their submerged regions of poverty, degradation, and disease, and their underworlds of crime and vice Within a deteriorating area are rooming-house districts, the purgatory of "lost souls." Near by is the Latin Quarter, where creative and rebellious spirits resort. The slums are also crowded to overflowing with immigrant colonies — the Ghetto, Little Sicily, Greektown, Chinatown — fascinatingly combining old world heritages and American adaptations Wedging out from here is the Black Belt, with its free and disorderly life The area of deterioration while essentially one of decay, of stationary or declining population, is also one of regeneration, as witness the mission, the settlement, the artists' colony, radical centers — all obsessed with the vision of a new and better world

The next zone is also inhabited predominatingly by factory and shop workers, but skilled and thrifty This is an area of second immigrant settlement generally of the second generation It is the region of escape from the slum, the *Deutschland* of the aspiring Ghetto family For *Deutschland* (literally "Germany") is the name given, half in envy, half in derision, to that region beyond the Ghetto where successful neighbors appear to be imitating German Jewish standards of living But the inhabitant of this area in turn looks to the "Promised Land" beyond, to its residential hotels, its apartment-house region, its "satellite loops," and its "bright light" areas

This differentiation into natural economic and cultural groupings gives form and character to the city For segregation offers the group, and thereby the individuals who compose the group, a place and a role in the total organization of city life. Segregation limits development in certain directions, but releases it in others These areas tend to accentuate certain traits, to attract and develop their kind of individuals, and so to become further differentiated

The division of labor in the city likewise illustrates disorganization, reorganization, and increasing differentiation The immigrant from rural communities in Europe and America seldom brings with him economic skill of any great value in our industrial, commercial, or professional life. Yet interesting occupational selection has taken place by nationality, explainable more by racial temperament or circumstance than by old-world economic background, as Irish policemen, Greek ice-cream parlors, Chinese laundries, Negro porters, Belgian janitors, etc

The facts that in Chicago one million (996,589) individuals gainfully employed reported 509 occupations, and that over 1,000 men and women in *Who's Who* gave 116 different vocations, give some notion of how in the city the minute differentiation of occupation "analyzes and sifts the population, separating and classifying the diverse elements" [4] These figures also afford some intimation of the complexity and complication of the modern industrial mechanism and the intricate segregation and isolation of divergent economic groups. Interrelated with this economic division of labor is a corresponding division into social classes and into cultural and recreational groups From this multiplicity of groups, with their different patterns of life, the person finds his congenial social world and — what is not feasible in the narrow confines of a village — may move and live in widely separated, and perchance conflicting, worlds. Personal disorganization may be but the failure to harmonize the canons of conduct of two divergent groups.

If the phenomena of expansion and metabolism indicate that a moderate degree

[4] Weber, *The Growth of Cities*, p 442

of disorganization may and does facilitate social organization, they indicate as well that rapid urban expansion is accompanied by excessive increases in disease, crime, disorder, vice, insanity, and suicide, rough indexes of social disorganization But what are the indexes of the causes, rather than of the effects, of the disordered social metabolism of the city? The excess of the actual over the natural increase of population has already been suggested as a criterion The significance of this increase consists in the immigration into a metropolitan city like New York and Chicago of tens of thousands of persons annually. Their invasion of the city has the effect of a tidal wave inundating first the immigrant colonies, the ports of first entry, dislodging thousands of inhabitants who overflow into the next zone, and so on and on until the momentum of the wave has spent its force on the last urban zone The whole effect is to speed up expansion, to speed up industry, to speed up the "junking" process in the area of deterioration (11).

THE OLD NEW ORLEANS AND THE NEW: A CASE FOR ECOLOGY *

Harlan W. Gilmore

New Orleans is sufficiently different from the general run of American cities to make it an interesting laboratory for studying ecological principles evolved on the basis of data from other cities. Its topography, on casual observation, appears to be rather similar to that of Chicago or of any number of plains cities. Yet in certain respects its topography is very different, and uniquely, it has been changed fundamentally during the history of the city. In its population history it has shown evidence of the processes of accommodation and assimilation of minority groups characteristic of other cities plus long standing patterns of accommodation of racial groups which assimilated very slowly or not at all As a result of these complex factors, ecological maps of New Orleans look like a crazyquilt to sociologists acquainted with the ecology of conventional American cities Actually, however, the city is not without an ecological pattern and this pattern is not difficult to see once the city's topography and history of ethnic groups are understood

As was said above, the topography of the city is in some respects typical but in other respects it is unique The city is located on a strip of land roughly five to seven miles wide between Lake Ponchartrain on the north and the Mississippi River on the south Though eighty miles from the gulf, this land, like all land in the area, was built up by a long process of sedimentation. Therefore, in contrast to inland areas, the higher land is found along streams or where streams once existed while the lowest land is found farther away from streams Thus, while the land may appear to be perfectly flat, a contour map shows that the land ranges from fifteen feet above to two feet below mean gulf-level

* *American Sociological Review*, August, 1944, pp 385–94 Reprinted by permission of the author.

The highest land in the city is found along the river and ranges from five to fifteen feet above mean gulf-level. Passing north from the river, the altitude declines to two feet below gulf-level. The low area, call this Esplanade Ridge. This ridge divides the city into what may be conceived as two saucers sitting edge to edge, the other edges being formed by Metairie Ridge and the high land along the river.




CHART I

Residential Areas
(Adapted from drawing by H W Gilmore)

however, is transversed by "ridges" where bayous are or have been Thus there is Metairie Ridge, two feet above sea-level running east and west almost parallel with the river and about half way between the river and the lake There is also a ridge about two feet above gulf-level, running north-south from the end of Bayou St John to the river, passing the lower end of the French Quarter We will call this Esplanade Ridge. This ridge divides the city into what may be conceived as two saucers sitting edge to edge, the other edges being formed by Metairie Ridge and the high land along the river. Each saucer is two feet below sea-level at its center and is from two to fifteen feet above sea-level at its periphery Until relatively modern times the centers of these saucers were swamps and habitation was feasible only along the rims of the saucers. It is in terms, therefore, of the struggle of the nationality groups for residential space around the edges of the saucers that the ecology of the city is to be understood.

CREOLE NEW ORLEANS

New Orleans, of course, was settled by the French. Presumably the particular site was selected because they wanted an inland water route to the gulf coast of the present state of Mississippi where they already had a settlement at Biloxi Such a route was available through Bayou St John, Lake Ponchartrain and a series of lakes and bayous which link this lake to the gulf. A short and easy portage between the river and Bayou St John was provided by Esplanade Ridge which was already in use for this purpose by the Indians when the French explorations and settlement were made The settlement originated at the junction of Esplanade Ridge and the river and as it expanded it did so mostly to the west where the land was higher than it was to the east. This is the area that is now known as the French Quarter.

Like the settlers in most colonies, the early French settlers of New Orleans were a rather motley lot. They came from various walks of life and various stations in France and probably are not to be considered as coming primarily from any particular social element of the homeland. After a period of frontier hardship, however, they began to be moulded into a quite distinctive and homogeneous group. The French government followed a very liberal policy of land grants to individuals with the result that most of the early settlers became big land holders This policy was continued by the Spanish government when this territory passed into the hands of that nation. Thus under both France and Spain, there was a tendency for government officials and military personnel sent out to the colony to acquire sizeable land holdings usually without having to purchase them. On these holdings the French established plantations worked with slave labor and rapidly attained prosperity on this basis. Most of them, however, continued to live in the city particularly during the winter and if they lived on their plantations at all they did so in the summer. Their city life was based almost as much on slave labor and the labor of free Negroes as was their plantation life. Thus at the time of the Louisiana Purchase there were twice as many Negroes as whites in the city As time went on these French plantation owners came to refer to themselves as Creoles and they will be so referred to in the remainder of this paper. The term itself does not refer to land ownership but merely to unmixed descendants of French or Spanish settlers.

This prosperous, land-endowed group, plentifully supplied with colored labor, and gathering in the city for a winter of leisure, made a very favorable situation for an elegant social life. The city being also the colonial capital made this almost inevitable. Such a development seems to have taken place in a large way from 1743 when the great marquis, Pierre François de Riguod, Marquis de Vaudreuil, came as governor of Louisiana He and his wife were accustomed to life in the royal courts of Europe and apparently sought with considerable success to set up a similarly pretentious society in New Orleans Once established, this pattern was continued by succeeding governors, French and Spanish, with the exception of a brief period under General ("Bloody") O'Reilly who was sent by Spain to suppress a revolt against Spanish rule.

Spanish rule does not seem to have altered the situation in any significant way The Spanish made no attempt to colonize New Orleans or Louisiana They did make a half-hearted attempt to teach Spanish in the colony but it attained very indifferent success. For the most part, Spanish officials and military men seem to have found the Creole social life much

to their taste and to have been accepted by the Creoles into that social life. Thus they came nearer being assimilated by the Creoles than the reverse In reality many of them did marry Creoles and others received land grants, established plantations and became part of the Creole aristocracy.

Thus, prior to the Louisiana Purchase, the city was dominated by this Creole landed aristocracy centered around the colonial capital. It was a typical Estate pattern. The emphasis was on inherited wealth in the form of land There was a law of primogeniture with the surplus sons placed in professions or the government service and stress was laid on social life or leisure time pursuits instead of occupational attainment .

In addition to the Creoles and the Negroes, there were other nationality groups in the city prior to the nineteenth century A number of Germans had come to the Louisiana territory during the John Law boom in the 1720's and after unsuccessful attempts at settlement on the Arkansas River had settled in the vicinity of New Orleans Also French immigrants came from Santo Domingo as a result of slave uprisings and from France as a result of the French Revolution during the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century Most of these groups were unable to get large land grants and hence did not become plantation owners In large part they seem to have become dairymen and truck gardeners though many of them also became artisans There were also, of course, some representatives of numerous other nationalities but they can be ignored in an ecological study

With this information before us, let us try to get a picture of the city at the time of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 It contained only 8,475 population (census of 1805) and covered a correspondingly small area The heart of the city was what is now known as the French Quarter, bounded by Canal Street, Rampart Street, Esplanade Avenue and the river In this area were the government buildings, what business there was and the homes of the Creoles The slaves were housed on the premises of their owners so far as possible Since most of the Negroes, whether free or slave, were employed in service around the homes of the Creoles, and hours were long and travel was by foot, the Creoles desired them to live close to their homes Thus those who could not be quartered on the premises formed a residential fringe around the Creole section Outside this Negro zone was the immigrant truck gardening and dairying zone, the latter using land which was too swampy for residence or cultivation but usable as pasture. On the high land adjacent to the river and east of the city this trucking zone expanded into a considerable area Outside of this area were plantations wherever the land was high enough to permit cultivation Thus there were plantations along Bayou St John and along the river on both sides of the city.

CREOLE-AMERICAN CONFLICT

Up to the Louisiana Purchase the infiltration of Americans into New Orleans had been small They came in and out with the shipping and there were some permanent residents but in some degree immigration of Americans had been held back by unfavorable Spanish laws. With the Louisiana Purchase, however, the dam was breached and the tide began to flow. Thus within the five year period from 1805–1810 there was a 125 per cent increase in the white population of the city, and a large part of this increase undoubtedly was American

These incoming Americans were a sharp contrast to the polished, wealthy Creoles with their elegant social life

While as a group the Americans who came to New Orleans were perhaps not as crude as the American frontiersman in the open country, certainly they had among them many who were just that crude. In fact the river men who floated down the Mississippi on barges and were known locally as the Kentucks were just as crude and rough and ready as the frontiersmen in any part of the country Thus in New Orleans, the spreading American frontier ran into a culture which, on a basis of manners and fine appearance at least, was superior to its own; the only case of its kind in American history.

The difference in degree of cultural refinement, however, was not the only difference between the Creoles and the Americans. The Creoles, it will be remembered, laid stress on family tradition, hereditary wealth, leisure and social position. The American, on the other hand, had as his sun god the self-made man The individual who had been born free and equal, had through his own initiative, industry and thrift gained wealth or success, was the man to be worshiped whether he was the son of a prince, a millionaire, a beggar, a criminal or a simple frontier woodchopper Thus the two had basically different social philosophies as well as social systems; neither understood the philosophy of the other and neither was much impressed if he did understand Also the fact that the Creoles were Catholic whereas most of the Americans were Protestant did little to foster mutual affection Language differences of course increased these tensions, and furthermore, the question which language would be the official language, was an issue of serious moment.

On the basis of their culture, their wealth and their numbers in a more normal situation, the Americans might have been expected to have assumed the role of a minority group but, as usual, New Orleans was not a normal situation. The Americans were representatives of the nation which had just purchased Louisiana and now controlled the government and they were in no psychological mood to be a minority group Nor was the government in any mood to insist on their playing a minority role Thus from the beginning, to the tune of much conflict, overt and covert, with the Creoles, they were forced by the factors of the situation into a position somewhat better than that of a minority group.

The course of events brought a rapid improvement in their situation The passage of the Louisiana Territory into the hands of the United States ended all barriers to commerce on the Mississippi River and brought a rapid commercial development in New Orleans. The Creoles with their philosophy of hereditary wealth and leisurely social life, had never had much taste for the make or break drive for efficiency characteristic of the commercial world and they did not take to it now Since most of the tillable land was already held by the Creoles, most of the Americans had little chance of establishing themselves as landlords. In any event, the uncertainties, the big stakes and the competition of the business world, had a natural appeal to the worshipers of the self-made man, and they rapidly took over the competitive area as their special domain

Thus the port figures for the first six months of 1803 show that the shipping was already largely in American hands even before the Louisiana Purchase. Of the 153 cargo ships entering the Mississippi during that period 93 were American, 58 were Spanish and only 2 were French[1] Similarly, Vincent Nolte who visited New Orleans in 1806, three years after the Purchase, informs us that the mercantile system was made up of four

[1] *Annals of Congress, Seventh Congress — Second Session*, Washington, 1851, p. 1525.

or five French establishments founded during the French rule, three Scotch counting-houses, one German concern and eight or ten commission houses lately opened by young American merchants from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore.[2]

This near-monopoly on the thriving commerce of the port city rapidly brought prosperity to the Americans and along with it brought a rapid increase in their numbers. With their nationality status thus backed by wealth and numbers, the Americans increasingly challenged the Creoles for the leadership role, culture or no culture, and the struggle between the two groups grew in severity and bitterness.

ECOLOGY OF THE OLD NEW ORLEANS

This struggle made inevitable an ecological separation of the two groups The first Americans did live and have their business in the French Quarter but the crowded conditions plus the Creole-American struggle brought growing pressure for them to go elsewhere Being so heavily engaged in commerce, it was imperative that they stay on the high land along the river but the fact that they moved west instead of east of the French Quarter was perhaps the result of the Marigny affair

"About 1822 two Americans, James H Caldwell and Samuel J. Peters, planning to develop a succession of warehouses and cotton presses and other important enterprises (hotel, gas works and water works, etc), approached Bernard de Marigny with a proposition to buy the whole of his extensive property along the Elysian Field Section The Creole was extremely unwilling to deal with the Americans, whom he disliked intensely, but was finally persuaded to do so, for a stipulated sum. When the necessary legal documents had been drawn up to conclude the sale, Mrs. Marigny failed to appear at the notary's office Her signature was necessary to ratify the sale and Marigny used her absence as an excuse to prevent the sale Infuriated, Mr Peters is said to have cried out to the Creole: 'I shall live, by God, to see the day when rank grass shall choke up the streets of your old faubourg'

" . . Outraged but not discouraged, the two pioneers tranferred their interests above Canal Street. They felt that the Americans would be glad to congregate there since they would be separate from those whom they regarded as their oppressors. With the assistance of other local American capitalists a considerable part of the holdings of Jean Gravier was purchased "[3]

Whether or not this event is a full explanation, at any rate from about this time on an American section did grow rapidly to the west of the French Quarter Into this section moved both American residents and American business. This movement was particularly rapid in the early 30's and a survey made by a local newspaper in 1834 showed that about three fifths of the "merchants," two fifths of the "retailers" and four fifths of the "brokers" were by that time in the American section[4] Thus the city quickly evolved a pattern with the business section around Canal Street as the center, the Creole section to the east and the American residential section to the west of this Each of these residential areas had Negro slaves living on the premises and a horseshoe shaped fringe of Negro residences around it with the open side of the horseshoe being towards the business sec-

[2] *Biographical and Historical Memories of Louisiana*, Chicago, 1892, I, p 30

[3] Klein, Selma L., *Social Interaction of the Creoles and Anglo-Americans in New Orleans, 1803-1860*, M A Thesis, Department of Sociology, Tulane University, 1940, pp 35-36

[4] *The Bee*, May 29, 1835

tion. Outside of this was the trucking-dairying zone.

The strife which produced this residential segregation was manifest in a severe degree in political circles. The Creoles, considering themselves the settlers of Louisiana, felt the government belonged to them, and the Americans, considering that they had purchased Louisiana, felt the government was theirs. The Creoles had been accustomed to use government positions to support their sons who could not inherit land under primogeniture, and the Americans had no inclination to use tax funds to support Creole families. In contrast the Americans wanted the government to build all sorts of facilities which would be of aid to commerce, and the Creoles were not interested in being taxed to bring prosperity to the Americans. These differences were so great that as the two factions attained near equality numerically and financially one government could no longer contain them. Thus in 1836 New Orleans was divided into three municipalities, having one mayor but for all practical purposes having separate governments. In the center was the Creole city bounded on the east by Esplanade Avenue and on the west by Canal Street. To the east of it was the immigrant truck-gardening city and to the west of the Creole section was the American municipality. In all three cases the river was the southern boundary and the lake was the northern boundary.

This separation of the city into three municipalities practically established Canal Street and Esplanade Avenue as national boundary lines It became a matter of honor and of loyalty to one's cause to live on the proper side of these streets, those who moved into enemy territory were viewed askance if not actually as deserters. And after more than a century these definitions have by no means disappeared.

With this division the American municipality launched an almost extravagant program of public improvements. Old wharves were improved and new ones were built, streets were paved, public schools were developed and public buildings were constructed Accompanying this was a growing prosperity and a rapid inflow of white population Thus the white population in the whole city (three municipalities combined) increased from 21,281 in 1830, to 59,519 in 1840, and 91,431 in 1850. Meanwhile there were no more Negroes in the city at the end of this period than at the beginning

A significant part of this influx of white population was Irish workmen The growth in commerce and shipping brought laboring jobs and the public works program of the American municipality meant the need for many workmen To meet these needs there was virtually no local labor supply There were not enough free Negroes, slaves were too expensive, and the immigrants were happily employed in their crafts and agricultural pursuits. As a result, outside laborers were brought in and these for the most part were Irish immigrants.

This growth in population with the influx of a new immigrant element brought an expansion and reshuffling of the residential areas in the American section With their mounting wealth the American elements were in a position to move farther out and build themselves new homes. South was the river, north were the swamps, and to the east were the business section and Creole land Their logical move, therefore, was toward the strip of higher land adjacent to the river, and this move they made, developing a pretentious residential section with large homes and spacious grounds. This section has since been known as the Garden District. At the time it was built, it equaled or surpassed anything the Creoles

possessed either in the city or on their plantations, and doubtless served to give the Americans a psychological compensation for their lack of "culture" and family background as compared with the Creoles

This move of the Americans meant that the Negro residential fringe and the truck-gardening zone had to be invaded and pushed out farther It was the beginning of a process which continued up to relatively recent times both in the Creole and American sections While in both cases the invasion did take place, the succession was not completed, particularly with reference to the Negro residences, for in all of the older sections of the city today there are scattered small groups of Negro residences which are remnants of a once solid Negro residential zone Also in moving out the Americans deserted their old residences Since the Irish were working for the Americans, they were not welcomed in other sections of the city, and being laborers, they needed no land to cultivate Thus they were glad enough to get the discarded residences and New Orleans gave birth to what has since been known as the Irish Channel

As the city grew, the Creole area, being adjacent to the central business section, tended to deteriorate and this, with a natural increase in Creole population, created pressure for that group to move out also If the Americans had their fate sealed as to where they might move, so also did the Creoles To move east meant crossing the national boundary line of Esplanade Avenue and invading the immigrant truck-gardening section and this would violate their pride and honor To the west was Canal Street, the central business section and the unthinkable American section Their only recourse was to move out Esplanade Ridge to Bayou St John, and here today New Orleans has lovely old homes which are a product of this period. The migration process in this area was similar to that in the American section with some significant differences The invasion process was about the same but the tendency of the Creoles to stay in the French Quarter in spite of deterioration was much greater Thus there resulted an extraordinarily large number of what in other cities would be called marooned families, and there are in that area today many homes which are still owned and occupied by descendants of the families who originally built them

Due to administrative and financial difficulties, the three municipalities were recombined into one in 1855, but by that time the ecological pattern was firmly fixed Esplanade Avenue and Canal Street were made and the Creole section limited to Esplanade Ridge while the American section was confined to its ridge west of the city

The strips of habitable land on these ridges were rather narrow and any tendency of these residential areas to widen was quickly checked by the swamps or the river Therefore, expansion could only take place by building farther and farther out along these ridges Such building, however, meant greater and greater distances from the central business section, and greater distance meant serious inconvenience when travel was by walking, bicycle or horse and buggy In the American section, where the growth had been the greatest, the distances became so great as practically to reach the toleration point. Thus further expansion was made with a minimum of land and a minimum of added distance This was done by making the yards inconveniently small and building the houses close together Economically, of course, this was reflected in very high land values

The immigrant truck-gardening section to the east of the city seems to have had, by comparison, relatively few growing

pains. Being engaged in agriculture, the residents were not densely settled and, as the city developed, the population turned more and more to non-agricultural occupations There was little accretion to this area by migration, and the rate of natural increase was not enough to take up for residential uses the land which was thrown out of cultivation Thus while other sections were crying for land, this section had land to spare As a result, land in this section became a quicksand for real estate speculators who knew land but did not know New Orleans For the same reason there was a plentiful supply of land on that side of town for military uses during the First and Second World Wars.

Thus up to the early part of this century the basic ecological pattern of the city was T-shaped The T was formed by the intersection of Esplanade Ridge and the ridge running along the river. The French Quarter (original French settlement) was approximately at the intersection of this T. The immigrant truck-gardening area was at the east end of the cross bar and on the west end were the central business section, the Irish Channel and the Garden District (American section), respectively The newer Creole area was on the leg of the T, Esplanade Ridge, running vertically to the river All of these were long narrow rectangular shaped areas, strung out along the top of the ridges, flanked on both sides by the swamps or the river The American section and the Creole area were fringed by horseshoe shaped residential areas for Negroes and outside of these was a truck-gardening and dairying zone. The latter used land which was dry enough to cultivate or pasture but too low for residential use.

THE NEW ECOLOGY

During the present century several developments have been taking place which have been materially altering this ecological pattern About 1910 the city began to attain success in a long effort at artificial drainage of surface water. The city had early used canals and drainage ditches to hasten the flow of water from the ridges to the swamps Then in the latter part of the last century it tried canals with windmill powered pumps to drain lower sections These pumps were found inadequate and in 1903 they were replaced by electric-powered centrifugal pumps These were an improvement but still did not have the capacity necessary for a city with the heavy rainfall which New Orleans has Finally in 1917 a large screw type of electric pump, something like a ship's propeller installed in a large pipe, was developed and this proved adequate to the task With these pump developments went a gradual improvement in surface and underground drainage facilities From small beginnings this system was thus expanded until today it has a pumping capacity of 16½ billion gallons per day (24 hours), enough water to cover eighty square miles of land one foot deep As a result, the water level was gradually lowered until by the 1930's all of the former swamp areas were as effectively drained as the higher areas

The development of this drainage system ecologically had the effect of changing the topography of the city In virtually no place in the city is the change of altitude sudden enough that there is any visible difference between high land and low land With drainage, therefore, the land, for ecological purposes, is perfectly flat and as far as topography is concerned it is all equally desirable for building purposes Hence the barrier which the swamps had formerly been to residential expansion was now removed and the residential areas began to respond accordingly. The American section most strikingly turned squarely north away from the river and di-

rectly toward the center of a former swamp. Thus during the past two decades, census tracts which are in this former swamp area, show population increases of from 700 to 1400 per cent The Creole section correspondingly, spread out in both directions from the Bayou St. John area, though the population pressure here was not nearly so great as in the American section.

About the time these drainage developments were taking place transportation developments were in process which also had marked effects on the ecological pattern So far as this city is concerned probably the most important transportation development was the street car Like other social developments, this one cannot be very specifically dated Horse-drawn cars and steam "dummies," of course, date well back into the past century The successful electric car was not developed until about 1885 and its effect on the ecology of the city was not very evident until well into the present century While the street car aided greatly in relieving pressures in the American and Creole sections, probably its most pronounced effect was on the Negro residential fringe With the street car available it was no longer necessary for the Negroes to live so close to where they worked In other words, the electric street car made the Negro residential fringe obsolete. As a result, this fringe began to disappear. In its stead, large Negro residential areas began to develop back towards the central business section in the formerly swampy areas between the white residential sections This concentration has in turn attracted to these areas schools and other facilities for Negroes which are an incentive for more Negroes to move there

The automobile which had such profound effects on most American cities had a relatively small effect on New Orleans. It augmented the effect of the street car in a number of ways but since it was not commonly used by Negroes and other poor elements in the population, it created no new trends related to these residential areas The only part of the city where there was sufficient residential pressure to make a demand for residential suburbs was the American side of the city, and here the outlying areas were so swampy that this was impractical. There did develop on the west end of Metairie Ridge over in an adjoining parish a suburb known as Metairie However, the 1940 census still showed New Orleans as ranking among the lowest cities in the country in the proportion of its population living in the metropolitan area outside the official city.

In general, the drainage system, the street car and the automobile combined, have created a tendency for New Orleans to shift from its former ecological pattern to a zone system similar to that recognized in other cities However, this pattern is by no means yet completed and it seems likely it will not soon be completed. Vast areas of the city are still socially taboo to large elements of the population and these do not conform to a symmetrical zone pattern In addition, on the American side of the city, the drainage did not provide enough land to bring the price of building lots down to what would be considered elsewhere as "reasonable." Therefore, building new homes is still expensive and as a result old ones are not recklessly discarded Consequently the "nice" old residential areas do not deteriorate except under the greatest of duress. And by the time the natural pressures for deterioration have become sufficiently great these areas have accumulated enough tradition to make them antiques. Thus the French Quarter is now protected by special legislation designed to prevent invasion and deterioration. Under this protection it has actually been undergoing

a restoration with middle and upper class Americans moving in. Correspondingly the Garden District has tenaciously remained respectable The 1940 rent map shows that this district is still one of the high rent areas of the city. Very high order rooming houses are about the only degradation it has yet suffered and to date it has not needed special legislation to protect it. However, should that necessity come, its antiquity is such that it will doubtless be museumized in the legislative halls.

In summary, the ecological pattern of New Orleans up to the present century was primarily the result of its topography This pattern was set by the ridges and limited by the swamps and the river In the historical process, sections of these ridges were occupied by the different nationality groups and came to be considered their special domain Due to the ethnic conflicts and status differences between these nationality groups the social definitions of these areas became very strong and highly emotionalized As a result of the division of the city into three municipalities in 1836 Canal Street became the accepted boundary line between the American section and the Creole section and Esplanade Avenue became the dividing line between the Creole area and the immigrant area With the development of the drainage system during the present century the swamps disappeared and this land became as well drained as the ridges. Therefore, with the land being so nearly flat, today there is no visible difference between the low land and the high Thus for all practical purposes topography as an ecological factor has disappeared except for outer limits set by the Mississippi River, Lake Ponchartrain and outlying swamps. In this situation the ecological pattern is tending to respond to modern transportation facilities and develop in the direction of a symmetrical zone pattern. The social definitions of the different areas carried over from the previous era, however, are proving very strong and resistant to change. This resistance is further increased by the fact that suitable land is not available for developing extensive suburbs which would make inevitable the deterioration of the old areas Therefore, the old areas tend to be preserved and occupied by the same groups as formerly, and wherever necessary protective legislation is provided to facilitate this preservation.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Bowers, R V, "Ecological Patterning of Rochester, New York," *American Sociological Review,* April, 1939, pp 180–89 The author applies the Burgess zonal hypothesis to the city of Rochester and discovers that with topographic and other modifications considered, the hypothesis is confirmed and is useful for explaining the distribution of social systems in the city

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3 Gettys, W F, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Social Forces,* May, 1940, pp 469–76 According to Gettys, re-evaluation of the theory of human ecology is needed, particularly among those who have identified the field most closely with that of biological ecology

4 Heberle, Rudolf, "Social Factors in Birth Control," *American Sociological Review,* December, 1941, pp 794–805 The decline in the fertility of industrial countries is traced to particular social classes, which in turn are motivated by goals which require the limitation of family size This study is a clear account of the influence of social structure on population

5 Hollingshead, A B, "Human Ecology," in *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology,* ed by Alfred McClung Lee, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1946, pp 66–118 A thorough review of the principles of human ecology is contained in these pages The viewpoint differs from that of

our book in that the ecological processes are treated as nonsocial in character, and economic competition is regarded as a biosocial principle

6 Landis, P H, *Population Problems*, American Book Company, New York, 1943, pp 31–48 Various population theories are criticized in terms of their purely biological character, and the author puts forward a sociocultural frame of reference for interpreting population data

7 Notestein, F W, "Class Differences in Fertility," *The Annals*, November, 1936, pp 26–36 This is another study revealing the differential rates of natural increase in various social and occupational classes in the United States In general it confirms the sociological interpretations of population restriction in industrial societies

8 Thomas, D S, *Social and Economic Aspects of Swedish Population Movements*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941, esp pp 304–17 The student interested in population problems will find this entire study of population movements in Sweden extremely rewarding Especially recommended for its relevance to our analysis is the chapter concerning the relation between business cycles and population migration from rural to urban areas

9 See also Faris and Dunham, "The Concentration of Alcoholic Psychoses and Drug Addicts in the Zone of Transition," p 252, Sibley, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification," p 642, Glick, "The Relation between Position and Status in the Assimilation of Chinese in Hawaii," p 704.

PART FOUR *SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION*

SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

Social differentiation and stratification are universal characteristics of human society. Since no society can ignore the effects on social participation of individual variations in sex, age, intelligence, and certain other inherent traits of its members, these differences necessarily become bases of distinctive roles or functions. The social significance attached to such differences varies in time and space (see the selections by Linton, Benedict, and Parsons, pp. 211, 223, and 592), and hence the roles of old persons, for example, are not identical in all societies, but the biological differences which decisively affect behavior are recognized everywhere and are systematically incorporated into social structure. In addition, the structure of any society also reflects (as well as determines) many acquired differences among persons. This is what is meant by social differentiation. Our concern in this section, however, is not with all of the many kinds of social differentiation, but principally with the special type known as social stratification.

Differentiation is a necessary but not a sufficient cause for stratification, and the latter mode of grouping or ranking is in accordance only with certain criteria. Thus to know whether an individual is male or female, adolescent or aged, intelligent or stupid, gives some clues as to what roles may and may not be played in our society but no clues whatever to the position with regard to social stratification. The status gradations implied in stratification refer to groupings of individuals in similar socioeconomic circumstances and include both sexes, all ages, and many degrees of intelligence. According to such criteria as family background, education, and wealth, individuals are stratified in terms of an esteem and prestige hierarchy. We shall direct our attention in the following chapters toward the two principal forms of stratification in our society, social classes and ethnic groupings.

Although it stands to reason that the biological range of individual differences is more limited in small, homogeneous societies than in large, heterogeneous societies, this factor alone is not sufficient to account for the universally higher degree of stratification of the latter. Likewise, it does not explain the different kinds of stratification to be found in various complex societies. Aside from the more conspicuous ethnic or racial differences (which are never of any importance *per se*) among the members of some societies than of others, it is probable that the range of innate differences is very much the same in all societies. The differences which set individuals apart from one another, as has been stated, are acquired as well as inherited, and both sorts of differences must be systematically evaluated and organized by any society in relation to its activities. This consideration gives

rise to the question: What kinds of differences are commonly used as the main bases of valuation? This question has many answers, but the following criteria have been abstracted from a comparative study of numerous social systems: (1) membership in a kinship unit (by birth or marriage); (2) personal qualities (sex, age, beauty, intelligence, ethnic origin, and so forth); (3) achievements; (4) possessions; (5) authority; and (6) power. (For an elaboration, see Parsons's article listed under Annotated References.)

Varying uses have been made of these criteria. Medieval European society, for instance, was one of "estates" rather than classes; differences in opportunities, privileges, and duties were largely fixed from birth in a racially homogeneous population, and were set forth in both public and private law. In a caste society (typically heterogeneous racially) stations in life are acquired entirely by descent, remain within the caste during the life of the individual, and are unaffected by personal worth or achievement in so far as movement to a higher caste is concerned. Our own social system is one in which the individual's original position as determined by the position of his parents may be altered by later achievement or lack of achievement. It is thus for most of its members neither an estate system nor a caste system, but in theory an "open-class" system with free movement between classes.

It will be noted that up to this point we have commented on (1) the distinction between social differentiation and stratification, (2) the criteria which may become bases of differential valuation, and (3) the varying emphases placed upon these criteria. The materials we shall refer to bear upon these considerations, but sociological inquiry is also concerned with many other aspects of social stratification A great deal of attention has been given to problems concerning the origins of human inequality, to the historical development of equalitarian and inequalitarian societies, to varying forms of status (ranging from slavery to hereditary aristocracy), and to the study of class conflict, class consciousness, class struggle, and so forth The literature on Marxian theory alone is quite voluminous. Since space limitations prevent our going into all of these matters, it should be noted here that our analyses are given with the following major objectives in view.

1. To show the functional basis of stratification and its relation to the major social institutions, as well as its relation to certain societal conditions and external circumstances.

2. To set forth some fundamental principles of stratification and to illustrate their operation in American society, from the point of view of "subjective" aspects of class reflected indirectly in attitudes and values, and of "objective" aspects directly observable in such features as the standard of living and varying modes of overt behavior.

3. To place within their proper context some problems of our own social order which arise from incongruities of differentiation and stratification. Within a supposedly open-class system these include the conflict of class and caste principles, barriers to social mobility, and other basic disjunctions.

13. Social Classes in Community and Nation

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The average person is well aware of the existence of a class system in this country and has certain loosely formulated standards for identifying individuals as members of the so-called upper, middle, and lower classes If such distinctions did not exist in the minds of the members of society, it would be difficult to say in what respect social classes "exist." Since the man of the street is prone to take our class system for granted, however, he may lack explicit awareness of the technicalities involved in defining social classes, differentiating them, and accounting for their existence. Class affiliation is reflected in an individual's behavior, his possessions, and in various other ways, to be sure, but these manifestations are not always so readily apparent as those features denoting an individual's sex or age Likewise, social classes are neither groups nor associations in the strict sense of these terms Yet they are very definitely something more than mere statistical categories or purely theoretical constructs In short, many aspects of the phenomena of social class are not readily perceived by the untrained observer, and hence require careful sociological analysis Fortunately, sociological theory has in recent years given considerable attention to social class, and some of the more basic analytical problems have already been clarified.

Let us look first at the matter of criteria or the preliminary problem of definition. One way to put the question is to ask what determines class membership. According to the Marxian conception, ownership or nonownership of the means of production is crucial. Other definitions stress standard of living or style of life; others, possession of a common ideology or set of attitudes toward the system of economic organization Still others play down economic determinants and emphasize "universal principles of intellectual superiority and inferiority." Max Weber's theory is more eclectic and stresses the external standard of living and accessibility to cultural opportunities along with accessibility to and possession of economic means. Weber's definition is quite satisfactory if it is borne in mind that for a class system to function there must be some consciousness of kind or sharing of sentiments among members of the same class, as well as a sharing of some common values by all classes if the system is to work at all.

In the main, the preceding criteria refer to lines of cleavage making for class differences and to the symbols identifying the position of individuals in the hierarchy of classes. It may be noted further that class stratification initially places an individual in the social position occupied by his parental family, even though he may later shift to a higher or lower class stratum. In an open-class system such as

ours, there is extensive movement or social mobility between strata, and *theoretically* the position any individual finally occupies is the result of his own achievement or lack of it. If equality of opportunity were a reality rather than an ideal, class differences and the division of labor (always closely related to any system of stratification) would reflect perfectly the range of intrinsic individual differences (e.g., intelligence, special aptitudes, or what not) they were supposed to reflect. In actuality, this is never the case.

Our initial basic problem is not to explain how individuals get into particular class positions, however, but to explain why stratification exists and what principles govern its functioning. Social stratification is a universal feature of all complex societies, and we have already observed elsewhere that cultural and social universals never occur simply as a result of historical accidents or purely fortuitous circumstances. An incisive analysis of the functional necessity for stratification is given in our first selection, "Some Principles of Stratification." Here the authors, while describing the varieties of inequality and the factors which give rise to them, are chiefly concerned with making clear that some system of stratification is necessary in order to get certain jobs performed. Not all jobs are equally important or pleasant, human abilities are far from being equal, and hence the rights and perquisites which are distributed in a society must be unequal; this, according to Davis and Moore, necessitates stratification and is "precisely what stratification means." They go on to show the major societal functions in relation to stratification, the variations in systems of stratification, and the external conditions responsible for varying degrees and kinds of stratification. Finally, a caution is issued with regard to the danger of using one or two criteria and ignoring others in classifying whole societies under such rubrics as caste, feudal, or open-class.

Davis and Moore's analysis is essentially sound, but it is so largely preoccupied with the functional interrelations of stratification and the division of labor that it omits explaining the existence of positions of high social prestige which have no such functional basis. Although our own society is less replete with such statuses than other societies (notably those having hereditary aristocracies), it should be stated that membership in kinship units, personal qualities for which the possessors can claim no credit (or deserve no "blame"), fortuitous wealth, and other matters of pure chance are utilized upon occasion to fill positions of prestige and importance. Despite this limitation in its purview, the Davis and Moore article is an excellent introduction to and generalized treatment of social stratification.

A second basic problem we have chosen for sociological analysis is how the system of stratification actually operates in contemporary American society, and how class position affects social behavior and *vice versa*. Space limitations prevent the presentation of materials which would encompass all segments of our society, but Mills's data on the stratification and political position of small-business and white-collar strata give important clues to middle-class behavior in representative American cities, and the data given by Useem, Tangent, and Useem further illustrate the

stratification of American society by refuting the cherished myth that small towns and rural areas of this country are "classless."

As in the Davis and Moore analysis, the Mills study stresses occupational determinants in class assignment and behavior. This coincidence of emphasis is not merely a matter of similarity in points of view but more primarily reflects the inescapable importance of occupation in our system of stratification. Mills's article also demonstrates empirically the well-known thesis that the lack of class consciousness in America is a prime factor in keeping our society from becoming more rigidly stratified. It should be added, of course, that some degree of actual social mobility is another factor.

Most Americans like to think of themselves as being middle class, but the fact is that objective criteria of income, education, occupation, and other standards do not bear out this belief. The belief as such is attested, none the less, in the "false consciousness" of small-business and white-collar workers through their lack of awareness of an identification with their real material interests. Constituting a stratum of varied mentalities, they waver between upper and lower strata which are becoming more rigid and class conscious. Lacking political awareness and organization (despite increased numbers in recent years) for implementing their interests, they are often ground between the upper and the nether millstones and thus become hapless victims in a power conflict.

The "false consciousness" or lack of class consciousness of the middle class, however, is not to be found when one examines the lower strata and the upper strata of our society As a case in point we shall refer to a situation where one would least expect this to be true, a small farm-trade community in South Dakota. Here one sees how in only two generations class differentiation has become quite pronounced and class consciousness clearly evident in all sorts of social behavior The effects of stratification on the total pattern of community life are empirically demonstrated in considerable detail and from the perspective of a variety of factors. Although the authors of "Stratification in a Prairie Town" certainly go too far in stating of their community that "there is not a single set of habits and customs that encompass the total population" (*vide* monogamy, monotheism, and countless lesser practices and beliefs of any American community), they do prove conclusively the tendency of differentiation to result in stratification and, in turn, the pervasive influence of stratification upon social interaction.

As was stated earlier, social stratification goes beyond mere social differentiation. Stratification always is based upon invidious distinctions and implies differential valuations of esteem and prestige. Most of the literature on the subject arrives at this conclusion through logical reasoning coupled with casual illustration rather than through any systematic empirical inquiry. North and Hatt's "Jobs and Occupations· A Popular Evaluation" is useful for our purposes not only for the respects in which it complements our other data on occupational stratification but also for its very interesting findings about how and from whom various occupations get their different degrees and kinds of prestige. Here one may ascertain

tance in inducing people to seek the positions and fulfil the essential duties.

If the rights and perquisites of different positions in a society must be unequal, then the society must be stratified, because that is precisely what stratification means. Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons. Hence every society, no matter how simple or complex, must differentiate persons in terms of both prestige and esteem, and must therefore possess a certain amount of institutionalized inequality.

It does not follow that the amount or type of inequality need be the same in all societies. This is largely a function of factors that will be discussed presently.

THE TWO DETERMINANTS OF POSITIONAL RANK

Granting the general function that inequality subserves, one can specify the two factors that determine the relative rank of different positions In general those positions convey the best reward, and hence have the highest rank, which (a) have the greatest importance for the society and (b) require the greatest training or talent. The first factor concerns function and is a matter of relative significance; the second concerns means and is a matter of scarcity.

Differential Functional Importance. Actually a society does not need to reward positions in proportion to their functional importance. It merely needs to give sufficient reward to them to insure that they will be filled competently. In other words, it must see that less essential positions do not compete successfully with more essential ones. If a position is easily filled, it need not be heavily rewarded, even though important. On the other hand, if it is important but hard to fill, the reward must be high enough to get it filled anyway. Functional importance is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient cause of high rank being assigned to a position.[3]

Differential Scarcity of Personnel. Practically all positions, no matter how acquired, require some form of skill or capacity for performance. This is implicit in the very notion of position, which implies that the incumbent must, by virtue of his incumbency, accomplish certain things.

There are, ultimately, only two ways in which a person's qualifications come about: through inherent capacity or through training. Obviously, in concrete activities both are always necessary, but from a practical standpoint the scarcity may lie primarily in one or the other, as well as in both Some positions require innate talents of such high degree that the persons who fill them are bound to be

[3] Unfortunately, functional importance is difficult to establish To use the position's prestige to establish it, as is often unconsciously done, constitutes circular reasoning from our point of view There are, however, two independent clues. (a) the degree to which a position is functionally unique, there being no other positions that can perform the same function satisfactorily, (b) the degree to which other positions are dependent on the one in question Both clues are best exemplified in organized systems of positions built around one major function Thus, in most complex societies the religious, political, economic, and educational functions are handled by distinct structures not easily interchangeable In addition, each structure possesses many different positions, some clearly dependent on, if not subordinate to, others In sum, when an institutional nucleus becomes differentiated around one main function, and at the same time organizes a large portion of the population into its relationships, the *key* positions in it are of the highest functional importance The absence of such specialization does not prove functional unimportance, for the whole society may be relatively unspecialized, but it is safe to assume that the more important functions receive the first and clearest structural differentiation.

rare. In many cases, however, talent is fairly abundant in the population but the training process is so long, costly, and elaborate that relatively few can qualify. Modern medicine, for example, is within the mental capacity of most individuals, but a medical education is so burdensome and expensive that virtually none would undertake it if the position of the M.D. did not carry a reward commensurate with the sacrifice.

If the talents required for a position are abundant and the training easy, the method of acquiring the position may have little to do with its duties There may be, in fact, a virtually accidental relationship But if the skills required are scarce by reason of the rarity of talent or the costliness of training, the position, if functionally important, must have an attractive power that will draw the necessary skills in competition with other positions. This means, in effect, that the position must be high in the social scale — must command great prestige, high salary, ample leisure, and the like.

How Variations Are to Be Understood. In so far as there is a difference between one system of stratification and another, it is attributable to whatever factors affect the two determinants of differential reward — namely, functional importance and scarcity of personnel. Positions important in one society may not be important in another, because the conditions faced by the societies, or their degree of internal development, may be different. The same conditions, in turn, may affect the question of scarcity, for in some societies the stage of development, or the external situation, may wholly obviate the necessity of certain kinds of skill or talent. Any particular system of stratification, then, can be understood as a product of the special conditions affecting the two aforementioned grounds of differential reward.

MAJOR SOCIETAL FUNCTIONS AND STRATIFICATION

Religion. The reason why religion is necessary is apparently to be found in the fact that human society achieves its unity primarily through the possession by its members of certain ultimate values and ends in common. Although these values and ends are subjective, they influence behavior, and their integration enables the society to operate as a system. Derived neither from inherited nor from external nature, they have evolved as a part of culture by communication and moral pressure. They must, however, appear to the members of the society to have some reality, and it is the role of religious belief and ritual to supply and reinforce this appearance of reality. Through belief and ritual the common ends and values are connected with an imaginary world symbolized by concrete sacred objects, which world in turn is related in a meaningful way to the facts and trials of the individual's life. Through the worship of the sacred objects and the beings they symbolize, and the acceptance of supernatural prescriptions that are at the same time codes of behavior, a powerful control over human conduct is exercised, guiding it along lines sustaining the institutional structure and conforming to the ultimate ends and values

If this conception of the role of religion is true, one can understand why in every known society the religious activities tend to be under the charge of particular persons, who tend thereby to enjoy greater rewards than the ordinary societal member. Certain of the rewards and special privileges may attach to only the highest religious functionaries, but others usually apply, if such exists, to the entire sacerdotal class.

Moreover, there is a peculiar relation between the duties of the religious official

and the special privileges he enjoys. If the supernatural world governs the destinies of men more ultimately than does the real world, its earthly representative, the person through whom one may communicate with the supernatural, must be a powerful individual. He is a keeper of sacred tradition, a skilled performer of the ritual, and an interpreter of lore and myth. He is in such close contact with the gods that he is viewed as possessing some of their characteristics. He is, in short, a bit sacred, and hence free from some of the more vulgar necessities and controls.

It is no accident, therefore, that religious functionaries have been associated with the very highest positions of power, as in theocratic regimes Indeed, looking at it from this point of view, one may wonder why it is that they do not get *entire* control over their societies. The factors that prevent this are worthy of note.

In the first place, the amount of technical competence necessary for the performance of religious duties is small Scientific or artistic capacity is not required Anyone can set himself up as enjoying an intimate relation with deities, and nobody can successfully dispute him. Therefore, the factor of scarcity of personnel does not operate in the technical sense.

One may assert, on the other hand, that religious ritual is often elaborate and religious lore abstruse, and that priestly ministrations require tact, if not intelligence. This is true, but the technical requirements of the profession are for the most part adventitious, not related to the end in the same way that science is related to air travel. The priest can never be free from competition, since the criteria of whether or not one has genuine contact with the supernatural are never strictly clear. It is this competition that debases the priestly position below what might be expected at first glance. That is why priestly prestige is highest in those societies where membership in the profession is rigidly controlled by the priestly guild itself. That is why, in part at least, elaborate devices are utilized to stress the identification of the person with his office — spectacular costume, abnormal conduct, special diet, segregated residence, celibacy, conspicuous leisure, and the like In fact, the priest is always in danger of becoming somewhat discredited — as happens in a secularized society — because in a world of stubborn fact, ritual and sacred knowledge alone will not grow crops or build houses Furthermore, unless he is protected by a professional guild, the priest's identification with the supernatural tends to preclude his acquisition of abundant worldly goods.

As between one society and another it seems that the highest general position awarded the priest occurs in the medieval type of social order. Here there is enough economic production to afford a surplus, which can be used to support a numerous and highly organized priesthood, and yet the populace is unlettered and therefore credulous to a high degree. Perhaps the most extreme example is to be found in the Buddhism of Tibet, but others are encountered in the Catholicism of feudal Europe, the Inca regime of Peru, the Brahminism of India, and the Mayan priesthood of Yucatan On the other hand, if the society is so crude as to have no surplus and little differentiation, so that every priest must be also a cultivator or hunter, the separation of the priestly status from the others has hardly gone far enough for priestly prestige to mean much. When the priest actually has high prestige under these circumstances, it is because he also performs other important functions (usually political and medical).

In an extremely advanced society built on scientific technology, the priesthood tends to lose status, because sacred tradition and supernaturalism drop into the

background. The ultimate values and common ends of the society tend to be expressed in less anthropomorphic ways, by officials who occupy fundamentally political, economic, or educational rather than religious positions Nevertheless, it is easily possible for intellectuals to exaggerate the degree to which the priesthood in a presumably secular milieu has lost prestige When the matter is closely examined the urban proletariat, as well as the rural citizenry, proves to be surprisingly godfearing and priest-ridden No society has become so completely secularized as to liquidate entirely the belief in transcendental ends and supernatural entities Even in a secularized society some system must exist for the integration of ultimate values, for their ritualistic expression, and for the emotional adjustments required by disappointment, death, and disaster

Government. Like religion, government plays a unique and indispensable part in society. But in contrast to religion, which provides integration in terms of sentiments, beliefs, and rituals, it organizes the society in terms of law and authority Furthermore, it orients the society to the actual rather than the unseen world

The main functions of government are, internally, the ultimate enforcement of norms, the final arbitration of conflicting interests, and the overall planning and direction of society, and externally, the handling of war and diplomacy To carry out these functions it acts as the agent of the entire people, enjoys a monopoly of force, and controls all individuals within its territory.

Political action, by definition, implies authority An official can command because he has authority, and the citizen must obey because he is subject to that authority For this reason stratification is inherent in the nature of political relationships.

So clear is the power embodied in political position that political inequality is sometimes thought to comprise all inequality But it can be shown that there are other bases of stratification, that the following controls operate in practice to keep political power from becoming complete (a) The fact that the actual holders of political office, and especially those determining top policy must necessarily be few in number compared to the total population (b) The fact that the rulers represent the interest of the group rather than of themselves, and are therefore restricted in their behavior by rules and mores designed to enforce this limitation of interest (c) The fact that the holder of political office has his authority by virtue of his office and nothing else, and therefore any special knowledge, talent, or capacity he may claim is purely incidental, so that he often has to depend upon others for technical assistance

In view of these limiting factors, it is not strange that the rulers often have less power and prestige than a literal enumeration of their formal rights would lead one to expect

Wealth, Property, and Labor Every position that secures for its incumbent a livelihood is, by definition, economically rewarded For this reason there is an economic aspect to those positions (e g, political and religious) the main function of which is not economic. It therefore becomes convenient for the society to use unequal economic returns as a principal means of controlling the entrance of persons into positions and stimulating the performance of their duties The amount of the economic return therefore becomes one of the main indices of social status.

It should be stressed, however, that a position does not bring power and prestige *because* it draws a high income. Rather, it draws a high income because it is functionally important and the available personnel is for one reason or another

scarce. It is therefore superficial and erroneous to regard high income as the cause of a man's power and prestige, just as it is erroneous to think that a man's fever is the cause of his disease.[4]

The economic source of power and prestige is not income primarily, but the ownership of capital goods (including patents, good will, and professional reputation). Such ownership should be distinguished from the possession of consumers' goods, which is an index rather than a cause of social standing In other words, the ownership of producers' goods is, properly speaking, a source of income like other positions, the income itself remaining an index. Even in situations where social values are widely commercialized and earnings are the readiest method of judging social position, income does not confer prestige on a position so much as it induces people to compete for the position. It is true that a man who has a high income as a result of one position may find this money helpful in climbing into another position as well, but this again reflects the effect of his initial, economically advantageous status, which exercises its influence through the medium of money.

In a system of private property in productive enterprise, an income above what an individual spends can give rise to possession of capital wealth. Presumably such possession is a reward for the proper management of one's finances originally and of the productive enterprise later. But as social differentiation becomes highly advanced and yet the institution of inheritance persists, the phenomenon of pure ownership, and reward for pure ownership, emerges. In such a case it is difficult to prove that the position is functionally important or that the scarcity involved is anything other than extrinsic and accidental. It is for this reason, doubtless, that the institution of private property in productive goods becomes more subject to criticism as social development proceeds toward industrialization. It is only this pure, that is, strictly legal and functionless ownership, however, that is open to attack; for some form of active ownership, whether private or public, is indispensable.

One kind of ownership of production goods consists in rights over the labor of others. The most extremely concentrated and exclusive of such rights are found in slavery, but the essential principle remains in serfdom, peonage, encomienda, and indenture. Naturally this kind of ownership has the greatest significance for stratification, because it necessarily entails an unequal relationship.

But property in capital goods inevitably introduces a compulsive element even into the nominally free contractual relationship. Indeed, in some respects the authority of the contractual employer is greater than that of the feudal landlord, inasmuch as the latter is more limited by traditional reciprocities. Even the classical economics recognized that competitors would fare unequally, but it did not pursue this fact to its necessary conclusion that, however it might be acquired, unequal control of goods and services must give unequal advantage to the parties to a contract.

Technical Knowledge. The function of finding means to single goals, without any concern with the choice between goals, is the exclusively technical sphere. The explanation of why positions requiring great technical skill receive fairly high rewards is easy to see, for it is the simplest case of the rewards being so distributed as to draw talent and motivate training.

[4] The symbolic rather than intrinsic role of income in social stratification has been succinctly summarized by Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, 45 841–862, May, 1940.

Why they seldom if ever receive the highest rewards is also clear· the importance of technical knowledge from a societal point of view is never so great as the integration of goals, which takes place on the religious, political, and economic levels. Since the technological level is concerned solely with means, a purely technical position must ultimately be subordinate to other positions that are religious, political, or economic in character.

Nevertheless, the distinction between expert and layman in any social order is fundamental, and cannot be entirely reduced to other terms. Methods of recruitment, as well as of reward, sometimes lead to the erroneous interpretation that technical positions are economically determined. Actually, however, the acquisition of knowledge and skill cannot be accomplished by purchase, although the opportunity to learn may be The control of the avenues of training may inhere as a sort of property right in certain families or classes, giving them power and prestige in consequence Such a situation adds an artificial scarcity to the natural scarcity of skills and talents. On the other hand, it is possible for an opposite situation to arise. The rewards of technical position may be so great that a condition of excess supply is created, leading to at least temporary devaluation of the rewards Thus "unemployment in the learned professions" may result in a debasement of the prestige of those positions Such adjustments and readjustments are constantly occurring in changing societies; and it is always well to bear in mind that the efficiency of a stratified structure may be affected by the modes of recruitment for positions The social order itself, however, sets limits to the inflation or deflation of the prestige of experts an over-supply tends to debase the rewards and discourage recruitment or produce revolution, whereas an under-supply tends to increase the rewards or weaken the tension between different systems of competition with other societies.

Particular systems of stratification vary in any one system's status with a wide range with respect to the degree of variation. This range is perhaps most evident in the proportion of technically competent to the whole degree of specialization Extreme division of labor tends to create many specialties without high prestige since the training is short and the required native capacity relatively small On the other hand it also tends to accentuate the high position of the true experts — scientists, engineers, and administrators — by increasing their authority relative to other functionally important positions. But the idea of a technocratic social order or a government or priesthood of engineers or social scientists neglects the limitations of knowledge and skills as a basis for performing social functions. To the extent that the social structure is truly specialized the prestige of the technical person must also be circumscribed.

VARIATION IN STRATIFIED SYSTEMS

The generalized principles of stratification here suggested form a necessary preliminary to a consideration of types of stratified systems, because it is in terms of these principles that the types must be described. This can be seen by trying to delineate types according to certain modes of variation For instance, some of the most important modes (together with the polar types in terms of them) seem to be as follows.

(a) *The Degree of Specialization* The degree of specialization affects the fineness and multiplicity of the gradations in power and prestige It also influences the extent to which particular functions may be emphasized in the invidious system, since a given function cannot receive much emphasis in the hierarchy until it has achieved structural separation from the other functions Finally, the amount of

of selec-
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l mobility,
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tion with the sacred
leaving greater scope for
ular preoccupations, a great de-
nent, and rise in status, of economic
and technological positions seemingly
takes place. Curiously, a concomitant rise
in political position is not likely, because
it has usually been allied with the reli-
gious and stands to gain little by the de-
cline of the latter. It is also possible for
a society to emphasize family functions —
as in relatively undifferentiated societies
where high mortality requires high fer-
tility and kinship forms the main basis of
social organization Main types *Familis-
tic, Authoritarian* (*Theocratic* or sacred,
and *Totalitarian* or secular), *Capitalistic.*

(c) *The Magnitude of Invidious Dif-
ferences.* What may be called the amount
of social distance between positions, tak-
ing into account the entire scale, is some-
thing that should lend itself to quantita-
tive measurement. Considerable differ-
ences apparently exist between different
societies in this regard, and also between
parts of the same society. Polar types
Equalitarian, Inequalitarian.

(d) *The Degree of Opportunity* The
familiar question of the amount of mobil-
ity is different from the question of the
comparative equality or inequality of re-
wards posed above, because the two cri-
teria may vary independently up to a
point. For instance, the tremendous di-
vergences in monetary income in the
United States are far greater than those
found in primitive societies, yet the equal-
ity of opportunity to move from one
rung to the other in the social scale may
also be greater in the United States than
in a hereditary tribal kingdom. Polar
types: *Mobile* (open), *Immobile* (closed).

(e) *The Degree of Stratum Solidarity.*
Again, the degree of "class solidarity"
(or the presence of specific organizations
to promote class interests) may vary to
some extent independently of the other
criteria, and hence is an important prin-
ciple in classifying systems of stratifica-
tion. Polar types. *Class organized, Class
unorganized.*

EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

What state any particular system of
stratification is in with reference to each
of these modes of variation depends on
two things (1) its state with reference
to the other ranges of variation, and (2)
the conditions outside the system of strati-
fication which nevertheless influence that
system. Among the latter are the follow-
ing.

(a) *The Stage of Cultural Develop-
ment.* As the cultural heritage grows, in-
creased specialization becomes necessary,
which in turn contributes to the enhance-
ment of mobility, a decline of stratum
solidarity, and a change of functional em-
phasis.

(b) *Situation with Respect to Other
Societies.* The presence or absence of open
conflict with other societies, of free trade
relations or cultural diffusion, all influ-
ence the class structure to some extent. A
chronic state of warfare tends to place em-
phasis upon the military functions, es-
pecially when the opponents are more or
less equal Free trade, on the other hand,
strengthens the hand of the trader at the
expense of the warrior and priest Free
movement of ideas generally has an equal-
itarian effect. Migration and conquest cre-
ate special circumstances

(c) *Size of the Society.* A small society

limits the degree to which functional specialization can go, the degree of segregation of different strata, and the magnitude of inequality.

COMPOSITE TYPES

Much of the literature on stratification has attempted to classify concrete systems into a certain number of types This task is deceptively simple, however, and should come at the end of an analysis of elements and principles, rather than at the beginning. If the preceding discussion has any validity, it indicates that there are a number of modes of variation between different systems, and that any one system is a composite of the society's status with reference to all these modes of variation. The danger of trying to classify whole societies under such rubrics as *caste, feudal,* or *open class* is that one or two criteria are selected and others ignored, the result being an unsatisfactory solution to the problem posed The present discussion has been offered as a possible approach to the more systematic classification of composite types.

THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN MIDDLE-SIZED CITIES *

C. Wright Mills

The problems which the middle classes pose for the social scientist are typically metropolitan in character and nation-wide in scope White-collar workers in particular, are thought of in connection with big cities, and most recent discussions of the middle classes as a whole focus either upon the nation or upon the metropolis The sociology and politics of these strata in middle-sized [1] cities may nevertheless be worthy of study.

Such cities are convenient units for empirical analyses, they offer a point of contrast for information and theory dealing with nations or with big cities, and despite the fact that many large problems may be more sharply posed in national and metropolitan areas, some of the issues of politics and social structure take on fresh meaning and reality when translated into the concrete terms of smaller and more readily understood units.

If one keeps in mind the "place" of the middle sized city in the nation and in relation to various city-size groups, it is a convenient point of anchorage for more extensive analysis of stratification, politics, and ideology The position of the U S. middle classes cannot be fully determined without attention to those living among the 15 million people who in 1940 resided in the 320 middle-sized cities

[1] Middle-sized cities include those between 25,000 and 100,000 population Middle classes include the smaller business and the white-collar people The small business stratum includes retail, service, wholesale, and industrial proprietors employing less than 100 workers (In the present data from Central City, the small business men employ far fewer, on the average 2 to 4) The white-collar strata include families in the salaried professions and minor managerial positions, clerks and stenographers and bookkeepers, salesmen in and out of stores, and foremen in industry.

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STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL MENTALITY

A city's population may be stratified (a) objectively in terms of such bases as property or occupation or the amount of income received from either or both sources. Information about these bases may be confined to the present, or may include (b) the extractions, intermarriages, and job histories of members of given strata Such "depth stratification" adds a time dimension to the contemporary objective bases of stratification. Subjectively, strata may be constructed according to who does the rating· (c) each individual may be asked to assign himself a position, (d) the interviewer may "intuitively" rate each individual, or (e) each individual may be asked to stratify the population and then to give his image of the people on each level [2]

Properly designed studies in stratification will use both objective and subjective criteria· indeed, one of the key problems of stratification theory is to account for such discrepancies as may thus appear.

The general problem of stratification and political mentality has to do with the extent to which the members of an objectively defined stratum are homogeneous in their political alertness, outlook and allegiances, and with the degree to which their political mentalities and actions are in line with the interests demanded by the juxtaposition of their objective position and their accepted values.

Irrational discrepancies between the objectively defined bases of a stratum, the subjectively held policies of its members and their commonly accepted values do not necessarily point to problems of method. They may indicate the "false consciousness" of the stratum we are examining.[3] Lack of structural unity and of political direction are symptoms of the many problems covered by this term that have as yet only been touched by modern empirical research.

Political mentalities may or may not be closely in line with objectively defined strata, but a lack of correspondence is a problem to be explained — in terms of the homogeneity of the situation of the stratum, the social relations between its members, the reach and content of the mass media and of the informal networks of communication that lie along each stratum, etc

In examining the stratification and politics of the white-collar and small business strata in middle-sized cities, we are concerned with whether or not each of them is a homogeneous stratum, with the degree and the content of political consciousness that they display, and with whether they reveal any independence of policy, or are politically dependent upon the initiative and ideologies of other strata.

The objective stratification of the U. S. middle-sized city has fallen into a rather standardized pattern. It will naturally vary from one city to another in accordance with the degree and type of industrialization and the extent to which one or two very large firms dominate the city's labor market. But the over-all pattern is now fairly set

When the occupations of a cross section of married men in Central City [4] are

[2] In the present paper, we are not concerned with the intuitive ratings of interviewers, and space will not permit us to utilize fully the quantitative data available.

[3] "False consciousness," the lack of awareness of and identification with one's objective interests, may be statistically defined as the deviant cases, that is, those which run counter to the main correlations in a table for example, the rich who vote Socialist, the poor who vote Republican. "Objective interests" refer to those *allegiances and actions* which would have to be followed if the *accepted values* and desires of the people *involved in given strata situations* are to be realized

[4] A mid-western city of 60,000 population selected as "the most typical" on the basis of 36 statistical indicators gathered on all mid-western

coded in 24 groups and ranked according to average family income, five strata are crystallized out: between each of them there is a "natural" break in average income whereas the average incomes of the occupations making up each income stratum are relatively homogeneous These strata, with their average weekly income (August, 1945), are as follows:

(1) Big Business and Executives	$137.00
(2) Small Business and Free Professionals	102.00
(3) Higher White-collar [5]	83 00
(4) Lower White collar [6]	72 00
(5) Wage Workers [7]	59.00

These strata fall objectively into the "old" (1 and 2) and the "new" middle classes (3 and 4). Both these classes, however, are definitely split by income, and this split, as we shall see, is also true of other variables

There is one point on which both objective and subjective methods of strata construction give similar results Of all the strata in the middle-sized city, the small businessmen and the white-collar workers occupy the most ambiguous and least clearly defined social position (a) The images which observers on other objective levels of the city ascribe to these occupational groups seem to vary the most widely and to be the least precise, (b) Correspondingly, in terms of a great many attributes and opinions, the white-collar people and, to a lesser degree, the smaller businessmen are the least homogeneous strata. Both in the subjective images held of various strata and in their objective attributes, the city is polarized; the small businessmen and the white-collar workers make up the vaguer and "somewhere in between" strata.

I. THE SMALL BUSINESS STRATUM

Its Social Composition and Prestige

When we ask people in the several objectively defined strata to discuss the position and rank of the small businessman, a fundamental difference occurs between the ranking given him by upper-class and that given him by lower-class observers [8]

To the lower-class observer, little businessmen are very often the most apparent element among "the higher-ups" and no distinctions are readily made between them and the "business" or "upper-class" in general. Upper-class observers, on the other hand, place the little businessmen — especially the retailers — much lower in the scale than they place the larger businessmen — especially the industrialists Both the size and the type of business influence their judgment.

In fact, two general images are held of small businessmen by upper-class people They correspond to two elements of the upper class (a) The socially new, larger, industrial entrepreneurs rank small business rather low because of the *local* nature of these little businessmen's activities Such upper-class people gauge prestige to a great extent by the scope of a business and the social and business "connections" with members of nationally known firms These criteria are opposite to the status-by-old-family-residence frequently used by the second upper-class element (b) The old family rentier ranks the smaller busi-

cities of 50–80,000 population On the over-all index for all cities of 100, Central City was 99

[5] Salaried professional and semi-professional, salesmen, government officials, minor managerial employees, income range $80 00 to $87 00

[6] Government protection and service, clerks, stenographers and bookkeepers, foremen, income range $71 00 to $76 00

[7] Due to wartime "up-grading" there are in this sample very few "manual laborers", these make about $14 00 less than the skilled and semi-skilled average.

[8] These remarks are based on 45 open-ended interviews in Central City, a baby sample within the parent sample, and some 60 random interviews in 6 other middle-sized cities.

nessmen low because of his feeling about their background and education, "the way he lives." And, as we shall see, the smaller businessmen cannot often qualify with these standards.

Both upper-class elements tend to stress a Jewish element among the smaller business stratum (although there are very few Jewish families among the smaller businessmen in Central City) and both more or less agree with the blend of "ethical" and "economic" sentiment expressed by an old-family banker: "The independent ones are local operators, they do a nice business, but not nationally Business ethics are higher, more broad-minded, more stable among industrialists, as over against retailers. We all know that"

But wage-worker families do not know all that. They ascribe power and prestige to the small businessman without really seeing the position he holds within the upper strata "Shopkeepers," says a lower-class woman, "they go in the higher brackets Because they are on the higher level. They don't humble themselves to the poor."

(a) The social composition and (b) the actual power position of the small business stratum help us to understand these ambiguous images.

(a) Since they earn about the same average income as the free professionals, the small businessmen are in the Number Two income bracket of the city But they are not at all similar to the other high income groups in occupational, intermarriage and job histories. In these respects, the free professionals are similar to the big business owners and executives, whereas the smaller businessmen crystallize out as a distinct stratum different from any other in the population.[9]

Almost three-fourths of the small businessmen are derived from the upper half of the occupational-income hierarchy. Yet this relative lack of mobility is not the only, nor necessarily the most relevant point at hand: when we compare small business with other occupations of similar income level, we notice that they contain the greatest proportion of ascending individuals now in the higher income brackets· 18% of those who are urban-derived had wage-worker fathers and 9% had low-income white-collar fathers Thus 27% come from the lower groups The free professional and big businessmen, on the other hand, do not include any individuals who derive from wage-worker or low income white-collar.

Slightly more than half of these small businessmen have married girls whose fathers were in the upper-half of the income-occupation ranks. About 40% of them married daughters of wage workers; the remaining married into the lower income white-collar stratum This 40% cross with wage workers is well over three times greater than for any other of the occupational groups in the higher income brackets

The job histories of these little businessmen reveal the same basic pattern Only one out of five of them was in a job as high as small business at the time of their marriage (their average age is now around 48) whereas almost half of them were working for wages at that time. Well over half (57%) did wage work for their first full-time job.

In contrast, all the free professionals were professionals by the time they married, and three-fourths of the salaried pro-

[9] The figures on small businessmen which are given below are quite small in an area sample of 882 homes we caught 37 small businessmen No per cents from such a small base are given unless they are significant according to critical ratios Nevertheless, the results should be taken with a grain of salt, and caution exercised in any further use made of them in reality, we are here dealing with qualitative materials

fessionals — who make on the average $13.00 a month less than the small businessmen — were in their present jobs when married. At the bottom of the society we find the same type of rigidity: 9 out of 10 of all grades of labor were wage workers at their time of marriage.

There is rigidity at the bottom and at the top — except among small businessmen who, relative to comparable income groups, have done a great deal of moving up the line.

Almost twice as high a proportion of the big business and free professional men have graduated from high school as is the case for small businessmen, despite the fact that the small businessmen are slightly younger Moreover, the wives of small businessmen rank fourth in education, just above laborers' wives, in our five-fold occupation-income strata; over half of their wives never finished high school, as compared with only one-fourth of the wives of men in comparable income groups.

The small businessmen are of the generally upper ranks only in income, in terms of occupational origin, intermarriage, job history, and education, more of them than of any other occupational group of such high income are "lower class." A good proportion of them have rather close biographical connections with the wage-worker strata These findings help us explain the difference between the images held of them by members of the upper and of the lower strata. The upper class judges more on status and "background", the lower more by income and the appearances to which it readily leads.

(b) The ambiguous prestige of small business people has to do with power as well as with "background" the small businessmen, especially in cities dominated by a few large industrial firms, are quite often "fronts" for the larger business powers. They are, civically, out in front busily accomplishing all sorts of minor projects and taking a lot of praise and blame from the rank and file citizenry. Among those in the lower classes who, for one reason or another, are "anti-business," the small business front is often the target of aggression and blame, but for the lower-class individual who is "pro-business" or "neutral," the small businessmen get top esteem because "they are doing a lot for this city"

The prestige often imputed to small business by lower-class members is based largely on ascribed power, but neither this prestige nor this ascribed power is always claimed, and certainly it is not often cashed in among the upper classes by small businessmen The upper-class businessman knows the actual power setup, if he and his clique are using small businessmen for some project, he may shower public prestige on them, but he does not "accept" them and he allows them only such "power" as he can retain in his control.

Organization Power of Small Business

The centers of organizational life for the top are the Chamber of Commerce and the service clubs, and for the bottom, the several trade unions. There are vast differences in their scope, energy, and alertness to chances to play the larger civic role The Chamber of Commerce is more compact and disciplined in its supporting strata and more widely influential in its infiltration and attempted manipulations of other voluntary associations. It is, in many towns, a common denominator of other voluntary organizations. Its hands, either openly *via* "committees," or covertly *via* "contacts," are in all "community" affairs of any political consequence. But the trade unions do not typically reach out beyond themselves, except when their leaders are included in projects sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce.

If both CIO and AFL unions operate

in a city, the Chamber of Commerce can very often play them off against one another; usually the old AFL men are quite flattered by being included in Chamber of Commerce committees which thus build them up before the citizenry as representing "labor" in this town. The younger CIO men are confronted with the choice of following this older route of compromised inclusion or of playing the lone wolf, in which case they rest their civic chances entirely upon their strictly union success.

The organization of the Small Business Front is quite often in the hands of the Chamber of Commerce; and many of the hidden wires behind the scene are manipulated by the local bank setup, which is usually able to keep The Front in line whenever this is considered necessary by large industrial firms. The political and economic composition of a well-run Chamber of Commerce enables the organization to borrow the prestige and power of the top strata; its committee includes the "leaders" of practically every voluntary association, including labor unions, within its organizations and through its contacts, it is able virtually to monopolize the organizing and publicity talent of the city. It can thus identify its program with the unifying myth of "the community interest."

This well-known constellation of power underpins the ambiguity of prestige enjoyed by small businessmen, and provides the content of their ideology and political efforts.

Ideologies of Small Business

The ideology of small businessmen rests upon their identification with business as such. They are well organized, but "their" organizations are pretty well under the thumb of larger businesses and the banks. The power of big business is exercised by means of threats "to leave town," by simply refraining from participation in various organizations, by control of credit sources, and by the setting up and using of small businessmen as fronts. The small businessmen, nevertheless, cling to the identity: "business is business." They do not typically see, nor try to act upon, such differences as may exist between the interests of big and little business. The benefits derived from "good relations" with the higher-ups of the local business world, and the prestige striving, oriented towards the big men, tend to strengthen this identification, which is organized and promoted by their associations.

One of the best contemporary sources of information on small business ideology is provided by the field hearings of the SWPC [10] These are "gripe sessions" usually held in local hotels in the presence of a congressman or his delegate. A rough content analysis of these discussions, occurring during the late war, reveals that the bull's-eyes of the small businessman's aggression are labor and government. The attitude toward "labor" magnifies its power· "We know that labor, at the present time, has the upper hand They tell us what to do." And the resentment is quite personalized. "Think of the tremendous wages being paid to laboring men . . . all out of proportion to what they should be paid . . . a number of them have spoken to me, saying they are ashamed to be taking the wages." And another one says: "I had a young man cash a check at the store on Monday evening for $95.00. . . . Another case . . . made a total of $200.00 for 30 days . . . We would not class him as half as good as our clerks in our store. . . . Naturally to hire men today to do this common labor we are going to have to compete with (war factories)." "A man has to run

[10] See, e g , *Hearings*, Senate Small Business Committee, S Res 298 (76th Congress), Part 6.

short-handed or do the work himself."

Toward government, the attitude is resentment at its regulations and at the same time many pleas for economic aid and political comfort. The only noticeable talk against big business is in such governmental statements, by staff members of Senate committees, as the definition of a small businessman is one who "hasn't got an office or a representative in Washington." The independent little businessman believes: "We are victims of circumstances. My only hope is in Senator Murray, who, I feel sure, will do all in his power to keep the little businessman who, he knows, has been the foundation of the country [etc] . . . We all know no business can survive selling . . . at a loss, which is my case today, on the new cost of green coffee"

"Small business . . . what is it?" asks the manager of a small business trade association. "It is American Business . . . it is the reason we have an American Way" Such phrases as "the little businessman who has built up, by sweat, tears and smiles, a business . . " underline the importance placed by this stratum on its own virtue. The ideology of and for small business thus carries self-idealization to the point of making it the content of nationalism

The attitude towards "government" is blended with a self-estimate of virtue the criterion of man is success on Main Street "Another thing that I resent very much is the fact that most of these organizations are headed by men who are not able to make a success in private life and have squeezed into WPA [sic] and gotten over us and are telling us what to do, and it is to me very resentful. And all these men here know of people who head these organizations, who were not able to make a living on Main Street before."

This ideology apparently rests to some extent upon a sense of insecurity For example, in Central City, the wives of low income businessmen worry about "how the postwar situation will affect you and your family" more than any other strata, although they are followed closely by the lower white-collar people. Sixty per cent of the low income business people worry a great deal, as against 45% of those of higher income. The small business families are apparently aware that they make up the margins of free private enterprise. And — in view of their ascent — perhaps they remember that everything that goes up can come down.

It is also of interest to notice that the wives of smaller businessmen are not nearly so sure as one might expect that "any young man with thrift, ability and ambition has the opportunity to rise in the world, own his own home, and earn $5,000 a year" In Central City [11] only 40% of them believe it, as against 68% of the higher income business people. They are still, however, a good deal more optimistic than the low income white-collar people (26%) who are the most pessimistic stratum in the city About 37% of the wage workers' wives, regardless of income, are optimistic of the climb.

II. THE WHITE COLLAR STRATA

Social Composition and Images of White-Collar People

The lower classes sometimes use the term, "white-collar," to refer to everybody above themselves Their attitude varies from the power-class criterion· they are "pencil pushers" who "sit around and don't work and figure out ways of keeping wages cheap," to the social-pragmatic criterion· "The clerks are very essential. They are the ones who keep the

[11] We first asked this ascent question in general, then we followed it up with "Could he do it in (Central City)?" The optimism of all strata dropped greatly when the question was brought closer home to them

ball rolling for the other guy. We would be lost if we didn't have the clerks." This latter attitude may be slightly more frequent among those workers whose children have become clerks.

The upper classes, on the other hand, never acknowledge the white-collar people as of the top and sometimes place them with laborers. An old upper-class man, for instance, says: "Next after retailers, I would put the policemen, firemen, the average factory worker and the white-collar clerks." Interviewer. "You would put the white-collar people in with the workers?" "Well, I think so I've lived in this town all my life and come to bank every day but Sunday, and I can't name five clerks downtown I know."

The white-collar people are split down the middle by income, extraction, intermarriage, job history, and education Of the men in the higher of the two white-collar income classes, 61% are derived from the upper-half of the extraction-income hierarchy, as compared with 49% of the lower white-collar men who are from the upper half by extraction.[12]

The *urban* origins of the several occupations of the higher white-collar stratum are homogeneous as regards extraction; but the lower white-collar stratum of urban origin contains occupations of quite different extraction which cancel out into a misleading average: The clerks are closer in origin to the higher white-collar as a whole, about 50% being from the upper half, whereas the foremen are quite like labor,[13] only 25% being from the upper half.

In intermarriage, job mobility and education similar situations exist: members of the higher white-collar bracket are homogeneous in intermarriage: about half of them have married women whose fathers were in the upper half of the hierarchy. The lower white-collar stratum is split. the women whom clerks marry are similar in background to the wives of the upper white-collar. Foremen, on the other hand, show a tendency to marry more along the lines that the labor strata follow; yet they marry small businessmen's daughters in about the same proportion (27%) as clerks, minor managerials and salaried professionals, thus forging another link between small businessmen and the laboring class.

The salesmen and the salaried professionals have not experienced much job mobility 6 out of 10 of them were in higher white-collar at the time of their marriage In the lower white-collar, again foremen stand out as exceptions 67% of them were wage workers at their time of marriage and 75% worked for wages in their first full-time job.

Whereas the formal education of the clerks is similar to that of higher white-collar (only 5 to 11% of high white-collar and clerks never going beyond grade school), 40% of the foremen have never gone beyond grade school; this places them educationally only a little above skilled workers

The lower white-collar is thus not a homogeneous stratum by extraction, intermarriage or job history some of the occupations in it are sociologically affiliated with labor and some with the occupations we have ranked by income as higher white-collar.

The white-collar people are, as we have seen, split by income But the images held of them as a whole seem to be drawn from the occupations belonging to the lower half of the white-collar income level. The upper white-collar people, especially the

[12] There are 117 families in our higher white-collar group, and 92 in the lower In the general origin table, farm owners are put with the upper half, farm tenants and laborers with the lower half

[13] The cases of government protection and service were too few to permit a reliable calculation.

salesmen, tend to merge with the sponge term, "business," and are thought of as "businessmen" by many members of the upper class Most upper-class people derive their images of the white-collar people largely from stereotypes of "the clerk."

The ambiguous rank of the small businessman is explained by his social origin and by the "power" which is ascribed to him by the lower but denied to him by the upper. The ambiguous position of the white-collar worker, on the other hand, rests less upon *complications* in, and pressures on his power position than upon his absence of power They have no leaders active in civic efforts, they are not, as a stratum, represented in the councils; they have no autonomous organizations through which to strive for such political and civic ends as they may envision, they are seldom, if ever, in the publicity spotlight as a group. No articulate leaders in these cities appeal directly and mainly to white-collar people or draw their strength from white-collar support.

The few organizations in which white-collar employees predominate — the Business and Professional Women's Clubs, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the YWCA — are so tied in with business groups as such, that they have little or no autonomy Socially, the lower white-collar is largely on "the Elk level" and the higher white-collar usually is in the No 2 or 3 social clubs, in both these situations they form part of a "middle-class mingling" pattern They are "led," if at all, by salesmen and other such "contact people" who are themselves identified with "business."

The organized power of the middle-sized city does not include any autonomous white-collar unit Which way the unorganized white-collar people will swing politically and which of the two civic fronts they will support seems to depend almost entirely upon the strength and prestige of autonomous labor organizations within the city, a point to which we shall return.

White-Collar Ideologies

The ideology of the white-collar people rises rather directly out of their occupations and the requirements for them. They are not a well defined group in any other readily apparent sense This ideology is not overtly political, yet by political default, it is generally "conservative" and by virtue of the aspects of occupation which it stresses, it sets up "social" distinctions between white-collar and labor and makes the most of them.

Those white-collar people in middle-sized cities, for example, who "contact the public" exhibit the psychology of people working a small and personally known market from within small and moderate-sized firms. In this respect, they are the typological opposites of salesgirls in metropolitan department stores who work a mass public of strangers. Fifty-three small merchants and salespeople in Central City,[14] almost unanimously knew personally the people they served and were very "happy" about their work. Their attitude towards this work is seldom material It rests upon a communalization between buyer and seller 63% spontaneously mentioned enjoyment at contacting their public, which is twice as high as for any other single reason for liking their work.

This general ideology has four discernible contents: (a) the idea that they are *learning about human nature,* which is mentioned by about one-fourth of them; (b) the feeling that they *borrow prestige*

[14] Twelve were small business operators, ⅔'s are women, about ½ of the total have finished high school The implicit contrast with metropolitan salesgirls is anchored on quotitional materials gathered over several years by Mr James Gale, "Types of Macy Salesgirls," seminar paper, University of Maryland, Graduate School.

from their customers; sometimes the prestige source includes the merchandise itself or the store, but its center is normally the customer; (c) the opposite of prestige borrowing. the feeling of *power in manipulating the customer's appearance and home;* this is more apparent, of course, among cosmetic and clothing sellers; (d) The idea of *rendering service:* about one-fourth speak explicitly in terms of an ideology of service, which is interwoven in various ways with the other contents.

These key elements in the occupational ideology of salespeople in medium-sized cities, (1) rest upon the facts of a small and personally known market; (2) in emphasizing just this contact aspect of their work, the white-collar people seize upon precisely an occupational experience which wage workers do not and cannot have; they make a fetish of "contacts", and (3) the ideology, as a whole and in its parts, is either neutral or pro-business in orientation.

Similar ideological analysis of other occupations making up our two white-collar strata reveal similar tendencies Nothing in the direct occupational experience of the white-collar people in middle-sized cities propels them towards an autonomous organization for political or civic power purposes. The social springs for such movements, should they occur, will be elsewhere.

The direct appeal to higher wages, through collective action, which the trade unions hold out, is in tension with these occupational ideologies.

"I can't understand why they don't organize," says a business agent for an old-line union. "They got a high school education or more Looks to me like they'd be the ones to organize, not the man in the ditch with fourth grade education But it seems to work out just the other way. . . . The solution is to come down to earth and realize that the prestige of thi would-be manager and assistant manage is camouflage for cheap wages. The glor of the idea of the name takes the place o wages . . . that's all I can figure out." [1]

Such a contrast between status and clas interest, which is rather typically knowr by alert trade union men, leads us to ex pect that only if labor gets civic power and prestige will the white-collar people in these cities string along So long as their occupational ideology and status claims remain as they are, they will not make a "class fight," although they will try to share in the results, if those who make it for them win out.

White-Collar Politics

In the general polarization of the middle-sized city's stratification, the top and the bottom are becoming more rigid 73% of the upper half of the income-occupation scale is descended from the upper half There is also a rather distinct polarization in organization life, in ideological loyalty, and in political tendency.

There are no available symbols which are in any way distinctly of the white-collar strata Contrary to many expectations, these middle groups show no signs of developing a policy of their own. Neither in income nor mentality are they unified. The high white-collar are 40% more Republican than their lower white-collar colleagues.

They do not feel any sharp crisis specific to their stratum. They drift into acceptance of and integration with a business run society punctuated by "labor troubles." In these cities, it may be pretentious to speak of "political tendencies" among

[15] There are of course other reasons, besides status claims and occupational ideologies for the difficulties of unionizing white-collar workers, see C Wright Mills, "The White Collar Unions: A Statistical Portrait and an Outline of Their Social Psychology" (forthcoming).

white-collar workers. And such problems as the relations of party, trade union, and class cannot even be posed: The white-collar people are not a homogeneous class; they are not in trade unions; neither major party caters specifically to them, and there is no thought of their forming an independent party.

Insofar as political and civic strength rests upon organized economic power, the white-collar workers can only derive such strength from "business" or from "labor." Within the whole structure of power, they are dependent variables. They have no self-starting motor moving them to form organizations with which to increase their power in the civic constellation. Estimates of their political tendencies in the middle-sized cities, therefore, must rest upon larger predictions of the manner and outcome of the civic struggles of business and labor.

Only when "labor" has rather obviously "won out" in a city, if then, will the lower white-collar people go in for unions. If the leaders of labor are included in compromise committees, stemming from Chamber of Commerce circles, then such white-collar groups as exist will be even more so.

Lenin's remark that the political consciousness of a stratum cannot be aroused within "the sphere of relations between workers and employers" holds doubly true for white-collar employees in these cities. Their occupational ideology is politically passive. They are not engaged in any economic struggle, except in the most scattered and fragmentary way. It is, therefore, not odd that they lack even a rudimentary awareness of their economic and political interests. Insofar as they are at all politically available, they form the rear guard either of "business" or of "labor"; but in either case, they are very much rear guard.

Theories of the rise to power of white-collar people are generally inferred from the facts of their numerical growth and their indispensability in the bureaucratic and distributive operations of mass society. But only if one assumes a pure and automatic democracy of numbers does the mere growth of a stratum mean increased power for it. And only if one assumes a magic leap from occupational function to political power does technical indispensability mean power for a stratum.

When one translates such larger questions into the terms of the middle-sized American city, one sees very clearly that the steps from growth and function to increased political power include, at a minimum, political awareness and political organization. The white-collar workers in these cities do not have either to any appreciable extent.

STRATIFICATION IN A PRAIRIE TOWN *

John Useem, Pierre Tangent, and Ruth Useem

While social stratification is characteristic of all societies, its form and meaning in any particular society vary with prevailing values and operative social forces [1] Evidence accumulates that a type of stratification new to the towns and rural areas of the country is rapidly taking place.[2] Heretofore social positions were contingent upon individual achievements and opportunities for climbing the social ladder were thought to be open to everyone; recent years have witnessed a curtailment of social circulation and a division of society into fixed social classes in many of the communities of the prairie states.

The earlier traditions of the Great Plains were those common to the recent frontier culture much neighborliness, informality in social interaction, indifference to ancestors, evaluation of persons in terms of their immediate roles in the social order Although there were differences with regard to the means of attaining desired ends, the ends themselves were never questioned the family was patriarchal; the church, fundamentalistic, the school, an unlimited good, and belief in Jeffersonian democracy, axiomatic The only requisites for social acceptability were adherence to established institutions and conformance to the mores. Advancement in status was achieved by work, "good horse sense," and ownership of land Public assistance for an able bodied person was regarded as an absurdity because little wealth was required to become an entrepreneur and any man could secure a freehold Social life was leisurely, being a combination of frontier and old world rural patterns.[3]

The past two decades have witnessed profound upheavals in the Great Plains drought, heavy mortgages, tax delinquencies, farm foreclosures, business failures, and exodus of populations.[4] There is an increasing tendency for towns to be composed of a smaller entrepreneur class and a larger submerged group composed of ex-farmers, unemployed farm and town workers and stranded itinerants. While doctors, school teachers, craftsmen, and retired farmers still live in towns, they are proportionately fewer in number and less significant in community life The impact of these changes has led to the development of communities sharply di-

[1] See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 631–640, 1922, P A Sorokin, *Social Mobility*, 12–17, New York, 1927 Talcott Parsons, 'An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification, *Amer J Sociol*, 1940, 45 841–862, and Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* 113–131, New York, 1936

[2] See Roy H Holmes, *Rural Sociology* 73–75, New York, 1932, T Lynn Smith, "Trends in Community Organization and Life," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1940, 1.325–344, Paul Landis, *Rural Life in Process*, 285, New York, 1940 Grace Browning, *Rural Public Welfare*, 333, Chicago, 1941, Edgar Schmiedeler, 'Will History Repeat in Rural America? *Rur Sociol*, 1941, 6 291–299, Carl C Taylor, "Rural Life," *Amer J Sociol* 1942, 47 841–853

[3] See, for example, Everett Dick, *The Sod-House Frontier* New York, 1937

[4] *The Northern Great Plains* National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D C, 1940 R S Kifer and H L Stewart, *Farming Hazards in the Drought Area* W P A Research Monograph VI, Washington, D C, 1938, and Allen D Edwards, "The Sociology of Drought," *Rur Sociol* 1939, 4 190–202.

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vided into distinct strata [5] The present generation has experienced a shift in the system of assigning status from evaluating an individual according to personal achievements to ranking by family affiliation Climbing the ladder has practically ceased. Today it requires capital beyond the means of the lower class to secure a commercial farm or to open a business enterprise with any promise of success Nearly every major area of interaction has been affected because social relations in prairie towns continue to be face-to-face and social institutions are shared by the total population

In order to examine group life in the context of the newer mode of stratified living, a South Dakota town, Prairieton, was selected for study This is not a typical town in the sense of an average community, but it is typological because the nascent forms of social stratification are found in sharper focus [6]

Prairieton today is primarily a farm trade center with a population of 3500 largely of second generation Scandinavian immigrants and families from Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa It is located in the heart of small grain agriculture, there are no industries in the immediate locality, and the nearest city is fifty miles away Prairieton was an early center of settlement in one phase of the westward movement and steadily increased in numbers during the past eighty years By 1920, it ceased to fall in the census definition of a rural community and in the last decade grew 17 per cent. This increase is due not to a high birth rate but rather to the influx of farmers forced off their lands during drought and depression years and small-scale merchants as the service area of the town has expanded through the demise of nearby smaller trade centers. Prairieton contains three major strata a low status group consisting largely of ex-farmers, former farm hands, and unskilled laborers, a middle class made up of small shopkeepers, craftmen, retired farmers, and professional people, and an elite composed of the locally successful entrepreneurs and large land holders.

In this study, the two most distinct, polar strata are examined the elite, locally referred to as "the Tops," live on top of a bluff on the east side of town, the low status group, called by Prairietoners "the Bottoms," are concentrated on the flats below the western portion of town [7] From each of these two strata was drawn a sample of twenty-two families and the forty-four households were then interviewed. These samples covered about 25 percent of Bottoms families and 50 percent of Tops families [8]

[5] See J M Gillette, "Socio-Economic Submergence in a Plains State," *Rur Sociol*, 1940, 5 57–68

[6] For a recent statement of this approach, see Howard Becker, "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1940, 5 40–56

[7] A list of household heads was presented to ten persons in various strata of the population a minister, a teacher a banker, a businessman, a farmer, a "relief," a common laborer, a social worker, and two housewives of different social rank These judges independently ranked the family heads in terms of their social position in the community This procedure for delineating social classes is similar to that used by Edgar A Schuler in his study, "Social and Economic Status in a Louisiana Hills Community," *Rur Sociol*, 1940, 5 69–85, and George Lundberg, "Measurement of Socio-Economic Status," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1940, 5 29–39

[8] The schedule used contained sections adapted from F S Chapin, *Measurement of Social Status by the Use of the Social Status Scale, 1933*, Minneapolis, 1933 and *A Social Participation Scale, 1937*, Minneapolis, 1938, from Emory S Bogardus, "A Social Distance Scale," *Sociol and Soc Res*, 1933, 17 265–271, from E D and M B Hinckley, "Attitude Scales for Measuring the Influence of the Work Relief Program," *J of Psych*, 1939, 8 115–124, and items added by the authors to elicit other information.

NATURE OF CLASS DIFFERENTIATION

The elite comprise a stable and integrated class with rigid criteria of membership. One important qualification for inclusion is coming from a family that has had high status in the community for a number of years. Newcomers with "good family background" or reputation of high status in another community may be warmly welcomed but are rarely accepted immediately as functioning members of the class.[9] Permanency of occupation is another requisite; persons who frequently shift their field of enterprise are regarded as on the fringe. To be seen with the "right" people and to engage in acceptable activities are important. Violation of expected roles subjects individuals to considerable comment until a redefinition is worked out. Deviant personalities, however, are not rejected, e g, an eccentric old maid and a doddering man are highly respected members because of their family backgrounds.

Duration of residence, occupational history, and family background are not regarded by the Bottoms class as significant criteria for membership. Far more important to them are such traits as being neighborly and using simple direct speech forms. Persons are excluded whose behavior is similar to that of the outgroup or who too often associate with them.

The development of classes is a comparatively recent phenomenon since both upper and lower classes stem from pioneer farm people not more than two generations ago. Younger members of the two classes, however, are children of parents with similar social positions in the community and there is no instance in the last generation of a person born in a Bottoms family becoming a member of the elite class, or the reverse. This low vertical mobility means that there is very little marked rearrangement of positions. Death and migration upon retirement are the principal unsettling factors among the upper stratum. Lower class workers never voluntarily retire. They eventually become unemployable and continue to live at home with the help of grown children and public assistance.

Although stratification extends far beyond economic roles, class lines are especially sharp in occupational status. The male heads of the sample Tops families are entrepreneurs, heads of Bottoms families are common laborers; none of the former have been on relief; all of the latter have received public assistance.

The ascendent class is more secular while the lower, by reason of economic restrictions and social isolation, is more rural. Part of this difference is explained by the extensive mobility of the Tops, all of whom visit a large city at least once a month, as compared with the sample Bottoms group, seventeen of whom never go to a metropolitan center (C R =8 46) [10]

[9] Earl H. Bell in "Social Stratification in a Small Community," *Scientific Monthly*, 1934, 38 157–164, reports a similar norm in an Iowa town.

[10] Tests of significance (C R and "t") are used to test the hypothesis that the two sample strata could have been drawn from a single parent population The values in each case are inserted in the body of the paper A value of 2 50 or more for either C R or "t" indicates that the two samples could not have come from a homogeneous population

The significance of difference between frequencies is calculated by the following formula

$$C R = \frac{f_1 - f_2}{\epsilon_D},$$

where f_1 and f_2 = frequencies in Strata I and II,

$$\epsilon_D = \sqrt{\epsilon_{f_1}^2 + \epsilon_{f_2}^2}, \quad \epsilon_f = \sqrt{\frac{n}{n-1}(f)\left(1 - \frac{f}{n}\right)}$$

n = number in sample.

For the significance of difference between means, the following formula was used

$$t = \frac{\overline{X}_1 - \overline{X}_2}{\sqrt{\sigma_x^2\left(\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}\right)}},$$

The average lower class person in the course of a lifetime has traveled within a radius of but 145 miles from Prairieton; in contrast, the average for upper class individuals is 1100 miles. Some of the former have been less than 25 miles from town in their entire lives; all but three of the latter have been more than a hundred miles away from Prairieton in all directions. Not only does the low ranking stratum have a smaller volume of interaction outside the town but also less variety. Thus, when members do go visiting away from the community, they more often go to places similar to their home town than do the Tops.

Within the community, Bottoms social interaction takes place within the confines of a small geographical area, the neighborhood, of which all families are a functional part. In contrast to this, Tops households are distributed over a wide area and interspersed are middle-class homes Twenty of the high and but six of the low ranking families exchange visits with friends outside of the immediate neighborhood (C.R. = 5.51); only half of the former and all of the latter visit often with their neighbors (C.R. = 3.26). In general, mutual aid is far more common among the low status people. For example, they care for each other's children, trade household implements and tools, and exchange personal services twice as often as the elite (C.R. = 4 25). Turning to a next-door neighbor for advice is a common pattern of Bottoms life, whereas among the upper class few ever seek or give aid to members of their neighborhood (C.R. = 2.90).

where

$$\sigma_x^2 = \frac{\sum_{1}^{N_1} X_1^2 - N_1\bar{X}_1^2 + \sum_{1}^{N_2} X_2^2 - N_2\bar{X}_2^2}{(N_1 - 1) + (N_2 - 1)},$$

X_1 and X_2 = values of variates in Strata I and II, $\bar{X}_1$ and $\bar{X}_2$ = means of Strata I and II, N_1 and N_2 = number in Strata I and II.

For the lower class, the family is a far more pivotal institution, being not only a larger unit [11] but also the core of social life. It is the unit around which are built visiting patterns, work, recreation, and other institutional activities. High prestige families are segmentalized, each member having his own social ties.

As might be anticipated, differences in external symbols of status such as property and costume are considerable. Most of the Bottoms group live in two-room shacks without electricity and running water and with only the bare essentials of household equipment. The mean score on Chapin's Living Room Scale is 27.41 with a range from 2 to 76 [12] Only six of this stratum own their homes and these have an average assessed valuation of $355. Although fifteen of the sample have cars, they were all bought second or third hand, average 12 years old, and four fifths are Fords and Chevrolets. Heads of households own one suit of clothes and equally few other items of personal adornment which were bought several years ago and reflect rural standards of "presentability." Every Tops family is a home-owner and the average assessed value of property on

[11] The average Tops household consists of husband, wife, and two children. The average Bottoms home has another child and usually several other relatives, such as grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins In several cases, included in the family unit are "shirt-tail relations," and "old friends of the family"

[12] Chapin found in his research with the scale that those whose score fell below 24 were so entirely lacking in the bare necessities of life as to be considered "destitute" The average for the entire lower stratum exceeds this by a scant three points, and twelve cases were found to be located below 24 points Further, there were six cases in the 25–49 point category which Chapin designates as a "poverty, relief case" classification Three more cases miss this grouping by the slim margin of but a single point, scoring 50. The remaining case, 76 points, is just barely ranked in the lower third of the "middle class" which ranges from 75–149 points.

those interviewed hold that the Bottoms occupy their low status because they are innately shiftless, lazy, and unintelligent. Among members of the lower class sample, there is unanimity that Tops rank high by reason of other than personal assets, such as luck, "pull," inheritance of wealth, and educational opportunities not available to others. Twenty-one of the high ranking stratum and only three of those of low status believe people are wealthy because of native ability (C.R. = 9.35). The same proportion of each class feel that high prestige has been won through open competition.

Attitudes toward self-dependency correlate with positions in the local community. All twenty-two of the subordinate class believe every man has a right to a job and enough money to care adequately for his family, whereas only thirteen of the ascendent group agree with this (C R. = 3 81). Three fourths of the Tops feel any able man who wants a job can find it without going on relief, but only one Bottoms person concurs. Half of the upper class think local people are on W.P.A because they are not capable of holding a job in private employment, but only one of the lower class sample accepts this as true (C R. = 4 25). Three fourths of the elite hold that the law of survival of the fittest should not be interfered with by supporting lower class families. Not one of the Bottoms sample agrees with this doctrine.

In their characterization of the personal attributes of members of the other stratum, those with high prestige show greater conformance than do those of low rank. Tops people are in complete agreement that the lower class lacks ambition, spend money unwisely and fails to make full use of opportunities. Furthermore, two third believe the Bottoms are mentally dull, have low moral standards, drink too much, are irreligious, behave in an ill-mannered fashion, and fail to appreciate those who try to help them. More than half maintain that persons of low status fail to treat the upper class with proper respect and "don't seem to know their place."

While there is no single trait which all the lower class feels the Tops possess, two thirds declare they "try to show off," act as if they were inherently better than others, drink to excess, fail to live up to the religious teachings of their churches, use too much profanity and have easy jobs More than half also claim that the elite are not well-behaved, are unkind and unsympathetic to the less fortunate, "try to run everybody else's business," and discriminate against Bottoms people.[21] It is evident that each class regards the other as the greater deviant from the community norms of behavior. One of the frequent control devices is describing members of the ingroup who vary from accepted conduct as acting like the out group Parents, especially, use this strategem in disciplining children.

Twenty of the twenty-two upper class sample believe Bottoms children are les

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the community makes it receptive to those ideologies that bolster its social structure When asked to identify such figures as Darwin, Adam Smith, Spencer, and Malthus, few could identify either the men or their writings, and yet nearly all have embodied the popularized doctrines of these men into their rationale See C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," *Amer Sociol. Rev.*, 1940, 5 904–914.

[21] As one Bottoms man put it, "East side people are not better than us — they merely go to church to pretend they are good Christians, but they don't live that way during the week Their conduct is not as good as that of most of the Bottoms people, but they are smoother in their way and have enough pull and money to cover things up when they happen I would rather deal with Bottoms people — they are more honest and dependable — maybe it's because they don't have enough education and money and influence to be able to cheat you"

intelligent than their own [22] and seventeen, that they are poorly disciplined. Twelve of the lower class sample hold the opposite to be the case. These stereotypes regarding members of the outgroup are not confined to adults alone Boys and girls from Tops families by the age of ten think Bottoms children their own age are "tough, stink, and dumb"; the latter label upper class children as "sissies, smart-alecks, and stuck up." Parents of both strata make it a point to their young to avoid intimacy with children from the other stratum. To insure this isolation, town leaders have built two separate playgrounds and two grade schools.

Each class indicates a preference for restricting its interaction as far as possible to its own stratum However, it is revealing to note that the degree of ingroup preference is much greater among the elite than among the lower class Thus, while all twenty-two of the Tops desire their children to marry within their own class, only five of the Bottoms express a similar wish (C R. = 8 46) [23] Nineteen of the high status class and only four of those of low status say they do not want members of the other stratum in their clubs (C R. = 6 00). Fifteen of the former and but six of the latter do not enjoy companionships of persons from the outgroup (C R = 2 91) The Tops ingroup preference extends even to church membership, nineteen wanting most of the congregation to be composed of their own class as compared to five of the Bottoms (C R = 5 38). Since the section of town in which a person lives is important for social standing, none of the upper class would permit their children to reside in the area of Bottoms residences Some of the lower class feel that if their children could live in the better section of town their chances of success would be greater.[24] As one interviewee expressed it, "I hope my children will live on the Tops some day because they'll have better opportunities and be treated equally and fairly" Although all but eight of the lower class parents would like to see their children have higher status, such a rise is not desired should it be accompanied by assuming characteristic behavior patterns of the Tops As for themselves, however, the lower prestige people prefer to stay where they are, where people are "friendly and helpful," and where "no one acts like they're better than other folks" [25] The elite believe that all Bottoms people are envious of their position and aspire to enter their class.

Though it cannot be said that each status class has developed fixed personality types, there are definite signs pointing in that direction From infancy on, children are conditioned to certain modes of behaving both in reference to their own class and to the outgroup. By adulthood, each has a full set of techniques for living in a stratified community For example, Bottoms people, believing they have personal qualities equal to those of the Tops and yet being aware that their low status precludes sharing the advantages of the high prestige people, are overtly aggressive, uninhibited in speech, sensitive to any slight discrimination, and especially resentful of any obvious "philanthropic"

[22] A Tops person commented on Bottoms children, "Their children are below par With the kind of parents they have, the children have no knowledge of the better and don't seem to want to improve themselves"

[23] Fifteen others had no decided preference and two hoped to have their children marry into Tops families E T Hiller found a similar pattern in another low status rural group *Houseboat and River-Bottoms People*, 134, Urbana, 1939

[24] Eight would like to see their children live on the east-side, eight preferred their children to live on the Bottoms and six said it didn't make any difference

[25] Only one person from the twenty-two sample Bottoms families desired to move into the neighborhood of the Tops.

areas, towns are generally small and preserve much of their rural background.[36] Simmel has suggested that the more intimate the relationship between groups with diverse interests, the more intense the conflict when it does occur.[37] While members of polar strata in cities have few face-to-face relations and accept a hierarchal order as inherent, rural people have few traditions and techniques to sustain such a pattern.

It is conceivable that the present tendencies may be but a phase in a larger development, that conditions external to the region may reshape its future, or that internal reforms may bring this about. In any event, it is evident that further analysis of community life in this area, whether it be oriented toward theory or social action, must take into account the structure of a stratified society.

have long provided a norm for such a social structure See Allison Davis, Burleigh B Gardner and Mary R Gardner, *Deep South A Study of Social Class and Color Caste in a Southern City*, Chicago, 1941

[36] See, for example, E Wight Bakke, *Citizens Without Work*, 85–106, New Haven, 1940, a case study of a community in which a stratified order readily fits into the preexisting social structure

[37] Georg Simmel, "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," *Amer. J Sociol*, 1902, 8.164.

JOBS AND OCCUPATIONS: A POPULAR EVALUATION*

Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt

A man's job — occupying nearly one-third of his daily life — is more than just a means of livelihood or an outlet for his creative energy, it is a vital influence on his existence even beyond working hours His social position, his economic welfare, and even his daily habits are all determined by the kind of job he holds. On what basis *do* people choose their work? On what basis *should* they choose it? These are questions which each individual must answer for himself, not only to his own personal satisfaction, but — considering the importance of balanced employment to the national economy — to the benefit of society as a whole.

This spring, National Opinion Research Center interviewers approached a nation-wide cross-section of Americans with a battery of questions designed to explore some of the basic public attitudes regarding occupations The survey — conducted in cooperation with the College Study of Intergroup Relations, the Graduate School of Ohio State University, and an agency of the federal government — yielded new data of special interest to persons concerned with both the specific and general problems of employment and vocational guidance The most important findings are presented in the following sections

WHAT ARE THE BEST JOBS?

Highly specialized training and a considerable degree of *responsibility for the public welfare* appeared to be the chief factors making for job-prestige When

* *Opinion News*, September 1, 1947, pp 3–13 (*passim*) Reprinted by permission of the authors (The material in this paper represents an incomplete and tentative analysis of the data which will be more extensively analyzed in a forthcoming volume by the authors)

people were asked to evaluate 90 different jobs at all occupational levels, they gave the best ratings to positions involving these two points. Supreme Court Justice was most often given the highest rating by the American public, physician and state governor tied for second place Unskilled, low-paid, and "dirty" jobs, involving little public responsibility — generally work of the service or labor type, were considered the least desirable occupations by most people. Shoe shiner, street sweeper, and garbage collector rated lowest in the public evaluation

that card would you pick out for him?"

One further caution was suggested to the respondents

"Try not to judge a job according to your own opinion of some one person you know who has such a job."

The people interviewed were asked to evaluate each of the 90 occupations as "excellent," "good," "average," "somewhat below average," or "poor" — in accordance with a five-point rating scale A copy

> For each job mentioned, please pick out the statement that best gives *your own personal opinion* of the *general standing* that such a job has
>
> 1 *Excellent* standing
> 2 *Good* standing
> 3 *Average* standing
> 4 *Somewhat below average* standing
> 5 *Poor* standing
> X. I don't know where to place that one

How the Ratings Were Made

To randomize the order in which the occupations were presented to respondents for rating (in order to eliminate bias), interviewers varied the order in which four "blocks" of 22 or 24 occupations were read off to the respondents To familiarize those interviewed with the rating process, a trial example, "*Railroad brakeman,*" was used for practice (but not reported)

"Now I am going to ask you how you would judge a number of occupations For example, a *railroad brakeman* Which statement on this card best gives *your own personal opinion* of the *general standing* of a *railroad brakeman?* What number on

of the card just above was handed each respondent

Ranking the 90 occupations was made possible by a procedure devised to translate the percentaged ratings on each of the jobs into a single general score When the "Don't know" answers were excluded, the scoring theoretically allowed a maximum of 100 points for any job receiving only "excellent" ratings, and a minimum of 20 points for work that was unanimously rated as "poor." Actually, of course, none of the jobs fell in either of the extreme categories.

A list of the 45 occupations comprising the upper half of the ranking, arranged according to relative score, appears on pages 466 and 467.

Totals on Occupation Ratings **

Occupation	Excellent	Good	Average	Somewhat below average	Poor	Don't know	Score
U S Supreme Court Justice	83%	15%	2%	*%	*%	3%	96
Physician	67	30	3	*	*	1	93
State Governor	71	25	4	*	*	1	93
Cabinet member in the federal government	66	28	5	1	*	6	92
Diplomat in the U S Foreign Service	70	24	4	1	1	9	92
Mayor of a large city	57	36	6	1	*	1	90
College professor	53	40	7	*	*	1	89
Scientist	53	38	8	1	*	7	89
United States Representative in Congress	57	35	6	1	1	4	89
Banker	49	43	8	*	*	1	88
Government scientist	51	41	7	1	*	6	88
County judge	47	43	9	1	*	1	87
Head of a department in a state government	47	44	8	*	1	3	87
Minister	52	35	11	1	1	1	87
Architect	42	48	9	1	*	6	86
Chemist	42	48	9	1	*	7	86
Dentist	42	48	9	1	*	*	86
Lawyer	44	45	9	1	1	1	86
Member of the board of directors of a large corporation	42	47	10	1	*	5	86
Nuclear physicist	48	39	11	1	1	51	86
Priest	51	34	11	2	2	6	86
Psychologist	38	49	12	1	*	15	85
Civil engineer	33	55	11	1	*	5	84
Airline pilot	35	48	15	1	1	3	83
Artist who paints pictures that are exhibited in galleries	40	40	15	3	2	6	83
Owner of factory that employs about 100 people	30	51	17	1	1	2	82
Sociologist	31	51	16	1	1	23	82
Accountant for a large business	25	57	17	1	*	3	81
Biologist	29	51	18	1	1	16	81
Musician in a symphony orchestra	31	46	19	3	1	5	81
Author of novels	32	44	19	3	2	9	80
Captain in the regular army	28	49	19	2	2	2	80
Building contractor	21	55	23	1	*	1	79
Economist	25	48	24	2	1	22	79
Instructor in the public schools	28	45	24	2	1	1	79
Public school teacher	26	45	24	3	2	*	78
County agricultural agent	17	53	28	2	*	5	77
Railroad engineer	22	45	30	3	*	1	77
Farm owner and operator	19	46	31	3	1	1	76
Official of an international labor union	26	42	20	5	7	11	75

Totals on Occupation Ratings (cont'd)

Occupation	Excellent	Good	Average	Somewhat below average	Poor	Don't know	Score
Radio announcer	17	45	35	3	*	2	75
Newspaper columnist	13	51	32	3	1	5	74
Owner-operator of a printing shop	13	48	36	3	*	2	74
Electrician	15	38	43	4	*	1	73
Trained machinist	14	43	38	5	*	2	73

* Less than 0.5%

** Based on an average of 2,900 interviews when all "No answer" responses were excluded

What Type of Job Is Best?

When the occupations were classified by groups, the eight government offices on the list rated highest with an average score of 90.8. Professional and semi-professional work ranked next in the people's estimation with an average of 80.6 points. In the professional group — which included one-third of all the occupations on the list and covered a wide range of jobs — scores ranged from a high of 93 points (physicians) down to a relatively low 52 points (night club singers). Within the group, the highest average rating was given to the eight scientific occupations which — with the exception of economist * — consistently rated above the average scores for professional and semi-professional work.

Ranking lowest in the evaluation, the six non-farming laboring jobs on the list scored an average of 45.8 points.

Opposite is the complete comparison.

RATING DIFFERENCES* BY POPULATION GROUPS

By Section of the Country

People in all four sections of the country — the Northeast (New England and Middle Atlantic states), the Midwest, the West (Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast States), and the South — were in substantial agreement in their evaluations of most occupations. However, there were some consistent differences: non-farm laborers

Classification	Number of occupations	Average score
Government officials **	8	90.8
Professional and semi-professional workers	30	80.6
Proprietors, managers, and officials (except farm)	11	74.9
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	6	68.2
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	7	68.0
Farmers and farm managers	3	61.3
Protective service workers	3	58.0
Operatives and kindred workers	8	52.8
Farm laborers	1	50.0
Service workers (except domestic and protective)	7	46.7
Laborers (except farm workers)	6	45.8

** The census classifies some of these officials as professional and others as managerial

* It is suspected, but not established, that the relatively low rating of economist may have resulted partially from the term's connotations as "efficiency expert" or "penny pincher."

rated relatively lower in the Midwest and South; professionals and semi-professionals and government officials — most highly regarded in the Northeast — received their lowest ratings in the Midwest. In some instances, ratings of specific jobs varied markedly from section to section. For instance:

County judges, psychologists, sociologists, economists, and *bartenders* rated relatively HIGHER in the Northeast

Bookkeepers rated HIGHER in the South

Farm hands rated HIGHER in the West.

Scientists and *lawyers* rated LOWER in the South.

Railroad conductors rated LOWER in the Northeast

Share croppers rated LOWER in the South and Midwest.

Priests rated HIGHER in the Northeast and LOWER in the Midwest

By Size of Place

As the size of the place decreased, general job-ratings became progressively lower. The average rating for all jobs in cities was 70.8; in rural areas it was 68 8 The size factor — which probably accounted for some of the sectional differences — also produced a number of logical comparisons in the rating of specific jobs·

Metropolitan residents — as might be expected — gave HIGHER ratings to vocations associated with "sophisticated" tastes (such as *artist, musician in a symphony orchestra, author of novels, singer in a night club,* and *bartender*); to communications occupations (*radio announcer, newspaper columnist, reporter on a daily newspaper*); to scientific occupations, and to *priest* Rural and small-town dwellers gave HIGHER ratings to such occupations as *farm owner and operator, railroad conductor,* and *mail carrier.*

By Respondent's Occupation

The prestige factor seemed to have a marked effect on the way in which different types of workers rated occupations For instance, when a person rated his own job or one closely related to it, his evaluation was almost always considerably HIGHER than the average evaluation of the position Some of the other differences unskilled laborers and domestic and service workers rated almost all of the occupations somewhat HIGHER than did persons in more specialized vocations and those engaged in farming, farmers and non-farm laborers gave scientific jobs and work associated with "sophisticated" tastes evaluations relatively LOWER than the average evaluation of such occupations.

By Age

Young people generally ranked most jobs slightly LOWER than their elders did It is perhaps more significant, however, that the ratings of the three age groups were remarkably parallel throughout Here are some of the few significant comparisons Rated progressively HIGHER by the younger age groups were *official of an international labor union, local official of a labor union, radio announcer, chemist,* and *singer in a night club.* The job of *bartender* — rated LOWEST by the older age group — received its HIGHEST ratings from persons 21–39 years of age Rated HIGHER by those 40 and over than by younger people were the educational occupations (*college professor, public school teacher* and the analogous *instructor in the public schools,* and *playground director*). Unglamorous but relatively secure jobs (such as *janitor, plumber, garbage collector, mail carrier, railroad engineer, railroad conductor, county judge,* and *ac-*

countant) also received their HIGHEST evaluations from the older age group. *Undertaker* — scored LOWEST by persons 14–20 — was rated progressively HIGHER by the older age groups.

By Sex

Contrary to expectations, men and women seldom differed very much in rating the relative standing of specific jobs Women, however, assigned slightly HIGHER scores, on the average, to almost every type of work. Ranking MARKEDLY HIGHER in the feminine evaluation were these occupations educational and social welfare work, vocations associated with the arts, religious work, and protective and personal service jobs.

In only a few instances were the masculine scores above the feminine evaluations Particularly significant examples of this were *bartender* and *owner of a factory employing about 100 people,* which rated considerably higher among men than among women.

By Education

Respondents were divided into four educational groups — a special group of those still in school plus the three groups no longer in school persons with some college training, those who had attended high school, and those who had not gone beyond the eighth grade

The ratings of the 14–20 age level and the in-school educational group were closely parallel, inasmuch as they included about the same group of respondents. Comparatively HIGHER ratings were given by both groups to such occupations as *official in an international labor union, local official of a labor union, radio announcer, chemist,* and *singer in a night club* Rated relatively LOWER were *janitor, plumber, mail carrier, railroad engineer, railroad conductor, county judge,* and *accountant.*

Among those no longer in school, the ratings of the three educational levels generally followed a consistent and logical pattern The evaluations of the high school-educated — comprising the intermediate educational level — struck a median between the ratings of the most and least educated groups. As might be expected, professional occupations — particularly the scientific jobs — were rated HIGHER by the college-educated, skilled jobs (such as *carpenter*) and operative work (such as *railroad conductor, railroad engineer, county judge, building contractor,* and *local official in a labor union*) were rated HIGHER by persons with only grammar school training.

By Economic Level

The economic levels — which generally paralleled the educational groups — registered a similar pattern of responses. Wealthy and prosperous people — holding about the same views as the college-educated — gave HIGHER ratings to scientific occupations and those associated with the fine and lively arts The poorer economic group showed more respect for skilled and semi-skilled jobs, the two union positions, service workers, and such miscellaneous jobs as *policeman, captain in the regular army, accountant for a large business, county judge, railroad conductor, college professor, owner-operator of a printing shop, mail carrier, tenant farmer,* and *restaurant cook* . . .

FACTORS CONDITIONING JOB EVALUATION

What Makes a Job "Excellent"?

A *high income* was most frequently mentioned by the public as the most important criterion for an "excellent" job. Almost as many people, however, felt that a job should be judged in terms of its *necessity* and *service to humanity. Social*

older were also included in the in-school group.

The first question below was asked as a preliminary to further inquiries regarding people's occupational plans for the future, those in the "labor force" were then asked the second question below.

The occupational distribution of working men generally followed a balanced pattern, but the working women tended to cluster in a few specific jobs—as operative or service workers, clerical or sales personnel, and professional workers. The disproportionately high percentage of

Last week, were you working, (keeping house), (going to school),[2] or what?

	Males	*Females*	*Total*
Working for pay or profit or doing unpaid family work on farm or in business	71%	25%	47%
Looking for work	3	1	2
Had job or business, but did not work	5	1	3
Keeping house	*	60	31
Going to school	13	11	12
Permanently unable or too old to work	3	1	2
Retired or voluntarily idle	5	1	3
Other main activity	*	*	*
Total interviewed	100%	100%	100%

* Less than 0.5%

[2] The question closely paralleled the Census' Monthly Report on the Labor Force procedure in determining major activity. A difference between the Center's and the Census' procedure in asking for major activity is that the Center asked respondents 14 years or older only their own major activity during the week previous to the survey, the Census MRLF procedure involves gathering data from all members of the household who are 14 and older.

What kind of work do you do?

The results, combined in Census major occupation groups	*Males*	*Females* [3]	*Total*
Professional and semi-professional	9%	17%	11%
Farmers and farm managers	13	2	10
Proprietor, managers, and officials (except farm)	17	8	14
Clerical, sales, and kindred	14	34	20
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	15	2	12
Operatives and kindred workers	17	10	15
Domestic service workers	*	10	3
Protective service workers	1	—	1
Service workers (except domestic and protective)	5	14	7
Farm laborers and foremen	3	2	2
Laborers (except farm)	6	1	5
Total in "Labor Force"	100%	100%	100%

[3] Since the tabulation of females' occupations is based on only 400 interviews (the total number of women respondents in the Labor Force), the figures in this column have a less high degree of statistical reliability than the percentages for males.

women in professional work may perhaps be explained by the fact that there is probably more incentive than with other occupations to make this type of vocation a life-time career, even after marriage . .

ARE OCCUPATIONS "INHERITED"?

Occupations do tend to run in families. According to NORC findings, the bulk of employees in any specific type of work are persons who are following in their father's occupational footsteps The same tendency also applied to the relationship between the respondent's work and that of his paternal grandfather, although — understandably — to a less marked degree. This last comparison, however, must be interpreted with caution, since 24% of respondents were unable to report the occupation of their paternal grandfather. By contrast, only 2% could not name their father's main occupation. The Center asked·

The process of American urbanization is clearly charted in the responses of the different age groups For instance, while only 22% of the respondents under 20 reported their father's main occupation as farming, 45% of those over 55 years of age were the children of farmers or farm laborers

What is (was) your father's main occupation? What is (was) *His* father's (respondent's paternal grandfather's) main occupation?

FATHER'S OCCUPATION	Professional	Business	White collar	Skilled	Semi-skilled	Service	Farm	Non-farm labor	Don't know
All those interviewed	7%	16%	8%	17%	11%	3%	31%	5%	2%
Respondent's occupation									
Professional people	23	24	10	13	5	5	17	2	1
Business men	4	31	9	18	8	3	25	2	*
White-collar workers	9	23	15	21	10	3	16	3	*
Skilled workers	3	7	4	30	14	5	29	7	1
Semi-skilled workers	2	11	6	19	19	3	32	7	1
Domestic and personal service workers	4	6	3	20	12	8	28	12	7
Farmers	2	2	2	3	4	*	84	3	—
Non-farm labor	3	12	—	9	17	1	32	19	7
GRANDFATHER'S OCCUPATION									
All those interviewed	6%	8%	2%	9%	5%	2%	42%	2%	24%
Respondent's occupation									
Professional people	12	13	3	7	7	1	36	1	20
Business men	4	17	3	8	6	1	43	1	17
White-collar workers	7	10	4	13	6	1	31	1	26
Skilled workers	1	8	3	13	9	2	35	3	26
Semi-skilled workers	3	5	1	8	6	1	46	5	25
Domestic and personal service workers	2	5	2	5	4	2	41	4	35
Farmers	6	2	*	4	2	*	73	2	11
Non-farm labor	3	4	—	4	6	—	34	6	43

* Less than 0.5%

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1. Davis, Kingsley, "A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1942, pp 309–21. As a companion piece for the selection we have included from the same author, this article gives clear-cut definitions of such basic concepts as position, station, stratum, class, caste, and estate Its purpose is primarily one of formal classification.

2 Form, W H, "Status Stratification in a Planned Community," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1945, pp 605–13 During the political regime of the New Deal the federal government founded the town of Greenbelt, Maryland as a planned community to provide housing and other services for low-salaried federal employees. It was envisioned as a "nonstratified society", this article describes and accounts for the rather complex status structure which developed within a few years

3 Harrison, Tom, "Notes on Class Consciousness and Class Unconsciousness," *The Sociological Review*, July-October, 1942, pp 147–64 Based on information obtained by Mass Observation, this study shows the effects of class position on knowledge and opinion, social aspirations, and general attitudes toward public issues in Great Britain

4 Lowie, R H, "Social Classes," *The German People*, Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1945, pp 55–102 Contrasting the class system of Germany prior to 1914 with that of the United States and of England, the author gives many illuminating descriptive details concerning the attitudes and style of life of the German aristocracy, the middle classes, the working class, the peasants, artisans and tradesmen, with special attention to the Jews as a somewhat "distinct class"

5 Moore, W E and Williams, R M, "Stratification in the Ante-Bellum South," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1942, pp 343–51 Aside from the intrinsic interest of this study for its sociological presentation of historical data concerning an important segment of our own society during a past era, it is useful as a background for understanding some of the sources of uncertainty, instability, and conflict in our present system of stratification

6. Parsons, Talcott, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1940, pp 841–62 This systematic and comprehensive treatment of stratification focuses on the bases of differential valuation leading to the hierarchical arrangement of social classes and shows how moral attitudes toward ranking afford a normative orientation in terms of respect, disapproval, or indignation

7. Schneider, Joseph, "Social Class, Historical Circumstances and Fame," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1937, pp 37–56 This empirical study uses data from the English *Dictionary of National Biography* in an effort to prove, among other things, that (1) social origin limits the kind of eminence a person may achieve, and (2) the relative number of men of genius produced by the English working class since 1800 is not due to any biological deterioration but to the curtailment of opportunity

8 Timasheff, N S, "Vertical Social Mobility in Communist Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1944, pp 9–21 The effects of revolution upon social stratification are traced through four phases distinguished by varying criteria of social prestige, and it is demonstrated how the rate of social mobility slows down as communist society in turn becomes stratified

9. See also Green, "The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis," p 236, Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," p 378, Gilmore, "The Old New Orleans and the New A Case for Ecology," p 414, McWilliams, "Does Social Discrimination Really Matter?," p 500, Michels, "Oligarchic Tendencies in Political Parties," p 546, Sibley, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification," p 642, Pope, "Patterns of Denominational Developments· Churches and Sects," p 658.

14. Ethnic Aspects of Social Stratification

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Like all democracies, American society is ideally conceived in terms of an open-class system in which there is equality of opportunity, freedom of social movement, and a distribution of members according to understood and accepted principles of worth. Social stratification is assumed to take the form of a pyramid based upon the division of labor, income, education, and other well-known demarcations, and few persons are disturbed by the fact that the largest number of individuals is to be found toward the bottom of the pyramid. Human abilities and efforts, as well as the wide variety of societal functions, being what they are, it is readily perceived that some such hierarchical arrangement is inevitable Although it is recognized that innumerable individual instances of discrepancy between personal worth and class position do occur, by and large it is felt that members of our society are free to rise or fall on their own merits, and exceptions are not attributed to any structural impediments or other basic faults and incongruities in the system itself.

The foregoing view represents American democracy not only as it is supposed to be, but also as it is actually experienced by a great many members of our society. If this interpretation were correct in all of its inferences, however, most of the problems we shall confront in this chapter would not exist In the first place, it must be acknowledged that there is a hiatus between our democratic ideals and some of our practices In the second place, the structure of American society cannot be accurately depicted as a simple or single pyramid in which everyone is ranked along the same continuum. There are various other errors in the view set forth For many individuals and groupings equality of opportunity and freedom of social movement are in fact limited structurally (i.e., not just fortuitously or without design), and the amount of movement or mobility between social classes is probably overestimated in lay opinion. Then there is also the incongruity of a caste system alongside a class system. The underlying fallacy of the whole interpretation is not so much its oversimplified and idealized perspective, as the erroneous assumption that the same criteria or standards of evaluation are applied to everybody in the same way.

In a supposedly individualistic society this inconsistency of evaluation is especially evident in the treatment of certain "racial" minorities or ethnic groupings whose members are categorized without reference to any personal qualities they may or may not possess. So-called race problems in our society, it may be observed, really have nothing to do directly with the biological facts about race, and the alleged inferiorities or superiorities of different peoples have never been sci-

entifically demonstrated. Yet prejudices undeniably exist as social facts and are reflected in our system of stratification. Moreover, once these prejudices are formally recognized and incorporated in the system, it tends to reinforce and magnify the prejudices themselves.

Some of the basic anomalies of our system of stratification cannot be understood, therefore, without reference to ethnic prejudice, and vice versa. Although biological and psychological factors have been conjured to account for race problems, it is now realized in scientific circles that most of these problems are closely related to social structure. (Myrdal's much-discussed work, *An American Dilemma,* stresses this more recent type of analytical inquiry into the sources of friction and causes of conflict.) When social discrimination and exploitation are studied in relation to stratification it becomes clear that these processes are not the spontaneous reactions of individuals to other individuals. Instead, it is evident that ethnic discrimination is socially induced and is reinforced by certain features of our system of stratification.

Let us examine the bases of this contention by first looking into the matter of caste. It simply does not occur to many Americans that we have a caste system in this country which in some respects is more binding on its members than the caste system of India. For the colored tenth of our population this system imposes drastic restrictions on freedom of physical and social movement. Barriers are enforced in the South, and to some extent in other parts of the country, for all persons classified as Negroes and, regardless of the cultural characteristics they may possess, members of this ethnic grouping are confined within the boundary lines of their caste. Since Negroes are denied the opportunities open to members of the upper caste, it is no wonder that most members of the colored caste are culturally inferior, but this deliberately induced inferiority in turn becomes a further basis for stigmatizing them as "racially inferior." Since caste identification is pinned to color, orientals, Mexicans, and other ethnic groupings also are often made the object of structurally determined discrimination, but our only completely developed caste system is for Negroes.

How did this caste system come about and what are its functions? As everyone knows, Negroes were first brought into this country as slaves; following their emancipation a caste system was developed as a means of keeping them in subordinate position, and also as a device for minimizing conflict between the two races — at the expense, of course, of those relegated to the inferior status. Political forms, economic inequalities, occupational opportunities and disabilities, educational differences, and all manner of social discriminations were and are functionally related to this structure. It is a key factor in the life of both white and colored in the South, and is increasingly becoming a problem for our whole society.

Difficulties increase as old definitions lose their force, and uncertainties are reflected in behavior. Although originally established to maintain social order, the caste system today is a main cause of intergroup hostility throughout the country, but especially in the South, where most Negroes still reside. More and more mem-

bers of the colored caste are refusing to "stay put," and tensions and conflicts are becoming more frequent. Despite the impact of cultural and social change, however, the system itself remains in force.

Some of the basic problems of class and caste are thrown into sharp focus in Allison Davis's article, "Caste, Economy, and Violence." Within very brief compass this study brings together the results of systematic inquiry into the actual functioning of the system in the Deep South and summarizes its most important features. One may ascertain what class and caste mean for the participants, how behavior is defined, the sanctions which enforce prescribed forms of behavior, and the dogmas behind law and custom. Analysis is coupled with description to indicate factors which have prevented the full extension of the caste system and to show the points at which it yields most readily—even though violence is a frequent adjunct of attempts to modify the structure itself. It is interesting to note that two principles, the sanctity of private property and free competition, have always interfered to some extent and are increasingly interfering with the complete sway of the caste system. It is also shown that the caste system can be maintained in all of its features only in those areas where colored people are "thoroughly subordinated economically, occupationally, and socially."

The caste system is a clear-cut structural device for the deliberate subordination of an ethnic grouping, and certainly there can be no very appreciable improvement in the over-all status of Negroes as long as this incongruity of a democratic society remains in effect. Less overt but more pervasive and subtle is the discrimination structurally induced and widely practiced in our society with reference to certain other ethnic groupings Among the minorities who have been stigmatized from time to time are to be included practically all Americans not of Anglo-Saxon ancestry and Protestant affiliation The "Old Americans" were in the main our first settlers and their descendants, as well as later arrivals of the same ethnic stock, still constitute a numerical majority of the population Their temporal and numerical advantages enabled them to establish their own criteria of stratification. Hence it is not altogether surprising that later arrivals possessing different cultural and social backgrounds should have been regarded and treated as inferior

How these later arrivals fared may be seen in Elin L Anderson's empirical study of a New England community. The situation described contrasts in many ways with that to be found in the Deep South, where the whites, although stratified into classes among themselves, are mostly of homogeneous "old stock," similar religious affiliation, and common cultural background. In the New England community depicted, as in many other American communities, ethnic groupings among the whites show a very close correlation with class position. Both economic status and religious affiliation are closely bound up with ethnic or nationality origin so that the individual's social position in the community may in large part actually depend on whether he is of English, Irish, German, Italian, Scandinavian, Jewish, Asiatic, or other descent. (It may be interposed that even outside the South, Negroes are almost invariably given the lowest valuation of any ethnic category)

The chapter we have chosen from Anderson's book *We Americans,* observes in rather close detail how ethnic cleavages are reflected in the "social life" of the community by showing how the pattern of family life, friendship circles, club memberships, and other groupings tend to form along lines of ethnic division The Yankees or Old Americans think of themselves as "charter members" of the community and, forgetting the competitive advantages they enjoy as members of the upper strata, like to fancy their dominance in terms of family traditions, qualities of character, and civic leadership. Their style of life in turn is one of studied simplicity, as is betokened in some of their possessions—"old silver, old china, and old furniture." Their attitude toward the style of life of other people, even the more prosperous, is expressed in their disdain for black glass and modern chromium, as well as for other forms of display not in accord with tradition. In short, the Old Americans "belong."

What places do other ethnic elements find in the community? Despite their prosperity, intellectuality, high standards of living, and support of the general cultural activities of the community, the Jewish minority is highly self-contained and many of its members adhere to the rituals of their tradition This is in part a result of pressure exerted from within the group and in part from without, since deviants cannot readily find other groups to turn to outside their own Anderson notes also that the French-Canadians, while having no well-organized group life among themselves, still make some use of their native language Of the various ethnic groupings the Irish appear to be most completely assimilated, and they are often found on the same economic levels with the Old Americans, yet many still form their intimate associations largely within their own groups.

Anderson's study shows the importance of family and tradition, as well as of ethnic differences, in the system of stratification. Although common standards exist in this community and in many other communities, the ethnic principle of stratification tends to be emphasized—even though the original reasons for its existence have disappeared. And its persistence, in turn, maintains cleavages which add to the difficulty of individual movement across class lines. Closely tied to these ethnic differences are the religious differences, so that within the confines of this relatively small community may be witnessed a maze of interlocking factors making up the total system of stratification.

Our final case in point shows how ethnic aspects of social stratification may in certain circumstances override all other considerations. Carey McWilliams's outspoken article, "Does Social Discrimination Really Matter?" goes to the heart of the problem of anti-Semitism in our society by developing the thesis that discrimination against Jews is not merely the result of private and personal prejudice but reflects an organized policy of social ostracism This is accomplished through our system of stratification, moreover, in spite of the fact that Jews are not a homogeneous racial, religious, or cultural group and have no special visibility (distinctive appearance) in the sociological sense.

In addition, while the average social status of Jews, as indicated by objective

criteria, is higher in most respects than that of any other ethnic minority in our society, they occupy the marginal position of a people who have not been fully integrated into our social system This is true even for those who from the point of view of wealth, social grace, and culture, as McWilliams correctly points out, meet the canons of social acceptability The discrimination against Jews, to be sure, is not reflected in law or political forms, nor is it overtly incorporated in class principles, and hence it often assumes covert and subtle guises McWilliams's analysis delineates clearly some of the typical situations in which it is asserted and the circumlocutions it may undergo He also shows why exclusiveness is most pronounced in the middle and upper classes where group competition is more decisive Although the author overemphasizes economic determinants, and assigns too much importance to wealth and power as criteria for eligibility in exclusive clubs and other "prestige" organizations, he demonstrates very effectively why Jews are collectively discriminated against and how this serves to limit their social mobility and to undermine their competitive position.

It should be remembered that the readings in this chapter were chosen deliberately to illustrate the incongruities and disjunctions manifested in our system of stratification and its relations to the ethos of our nation Such statements are not, however, implied condemnations of the basic idea of American democratic society, but merely indications that structural and functional factors stand in the way of its more complete realization

CASTE, ECONOMY, AND VIOLENCE* *Allison Davis*

Caste in the Deep South integrates into one system all aspects of white-Negro behavior social, sexual, economic, political, educational, religious, legal, associational, and recreational The basic subsystem — caste — is a rigid stratification, maintained by physical, social, and psychological punishments and rewards Everywhere in the South, caste establishes and maintains an endogamous and socially separate system of white-Negro relationship in which by birth the Negroes are all of lower, and the whites all of higher, status. This social caste system is more rigid than that described in the classic literature on Hindu castes

All white or colored institutions of the southern community, including the church, the school, and the courts, systematically organize and defend the caste system The only institution which is not completely so organized is the economic The purpose of this paper is to distinguish caste in the area[1] studied from so-

[1] The counties specified in this article are those which were reported on in detail in Allison Davis,

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1945, pp 7–16 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press

cial class and similar types of hierarchical relationships, to define the legal and customary sanctions of caste status, to describe the integration of the basic institutions into the largest system — that of color caste — and to state a theory of violence as a reaction to the breakdown of caste in the economic sphere

I

Color caste in Old and Rural counties is a system of relationships which prevents intimate social participation between white and Negro persons It is maintained by *endogamous* sanctions for each color group and by the associated negative sanctions upon *familial* or *clique* participation of whites with Negroes Since caste in this society denies legal or customary recognition to sexual relationships between white and Negro people, no individual, white or Negro, can change his caste status by marriage [2]

Nor can any person change his caste in Old and Rural counties by changing his occupation, or his religion, as is true in some other caste societies in the world. Even the absence in a "Negro" of the physical caste marks of pigmentation, conformation of the face, and hair form does not make him a member of the white caste Caste status is determined by a legal and social definition of "blood" or kinship; it is therefore inherited from one's parents. If both of an individual's parents were not socially defined as "white," he is a "Negro" (lower caste), even if he is indistinguishable — as a physical type — from many of the upper-caste members. In the great majority of cases, however, a person's caste status can be defined at once by the inhabitants upon the basis of his skin color and hair form alone.

The basic caste marks of "blood" and physical appearance and the fundamental endogamous rule operate within the economic, occupational, educational, political, and social hierarchies so as to assure the great majority of whites a rank superior to Negroes. Thus the system of regulating marriage is strengthened by controls which subordinate Negroes to whites in all the institutions of the society and, consequently, establish a very strongly defined ranking of the two groups.

SOCIAL CLASS

The form which color-caste stratification has assumed in Old and Rural counties appears unusual to the comparative ethnologist, because it includes a system of social classes *within each caste*. The Negro or white person is born into a social class just as he is born into a color caste. As here conceived, caste and class are both systems for limiting and ranking social participation, but they differ in the degree to which they permit an individual to change from his birth rank *Caste,* in the area studied, categorically prevents marriage or intimate social participation outside of one's color *birth group* Within a color group, furthermore, *class* restricts marriage and participation to those individuals identified by symbols and behavior as of a similar kind and rank

Unlike caste, however, class stratification allows an individual to change his birth rank and his group of intimate participants in his lifetime by changing his class-typed participation, behavior, and symbols. He may also marry outside his class.

Burleigh B Gardner, and Mary R Gardner, *Deep South* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1941)

[2] In the legal and customary rigidity of the endogamous control, the color-caste taboo here described appears to be more inviolable than the endogamous rule of most Hindu castes See Professor Warner's survey of the evidence on this point in W. Lloyd Warner and Allison Davis, "A Comparative Study of American Caste," *Race Relations and the Race Problem,* ed Edgar T. Thompson (Durham, N C Duke University Press, 1939), pp 219–29.

As here conceived, therefore, and as defined in another study of this society,[3] a social class is the largest group of people whose members have intimate social access to each other. A class is composed of families and cliques These units likewise are evaluated by the class members in a hierarchy of rank. The interrelationships between families and intimate cliques in such informal activities as visiting, dancing, receptions, teas, parties, fish-fries, and larger informal affairs constitute the structure of a social class. A person is a member of that social class within which most of his intimate participation occurs.

Not all the members of a color caste in Old and Rural counties, therefore, possess equal rank and similar ranges of participation. Within the Negro and white castes, all individuals are further stratified by their caste members into a social class hierarchy. Whereas there is a chance that they may move out of their class, there is no possibility, as the system now operates, that they may change their color-caste membership or participation Through physical birthmarks an individual is assigned his caste position, whether he is white or Negro, he also dies in his birth caste.

LEGAL AND CUSTOMARY SANCTIONS OF CASTE

This system of defining white-Negro rank is not termed "caste" by the inhabitants The white group refers to this complex of sanctions as "the color line," "white supremacy," "controlling the Negroes," "race superiority" and "race inferiority," and "keeping this a white man's country." Negroes use such protective euphemisms when talking to whites as "race relations" or "getting along with the white people"; in their own organizations they speak of "race prejudice," "the oppression of Negroes," and "racial injustice." In these expressions the natives refer to the societal controls which make whites superordinate as a group and Negroes subordinate. When these sanctions of rank are examined by the anthropologist, they are seen to have the essential characteristics of a caste system. They define the behavior of both whites and Negroes in such a way as to make their caste rank and prestige universally clear. They operate upon both groups In all white-Negro relationships they restrict the behavior of both individuals, that is, a white person, as well as a Negro, has a well-defined caste role which he must accept For learning and maintaining the appropriate caste behavior, an individual of either the Negro or the white group is rewarded by approval and acceptance from his caste; if he violates the controls, he is punished physically, economically, socially, or legally, depending upon the seriousness of the infraction

Although both the white and the Negro society support the caste system, these sanctions assure high status and privileges to the white individual, and the opposite to the Negro, in all mixed relationships. The relative prestige of the castes is socially defined by color sanctions with respect to occupation, wages, public gatherings, politics, and education It is this complex of privileges, socially and biologically evaluated, which establishes the superordinate rank of the white, and the subordinate rank of the Negro, group

The caste controls range from the taboos upon Negro-white marriage and intimacy to those upon the most detailed points of Negro-white etiquette.[4] The basic sanctions in Old and Rural counties will be listed here in decreasing order of inviolability Infringement by a Negro of any of these, even those concerning deference, is punished by death, whipping, expulsion

[3] Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, *op cit*, chaps iii–xi.

[4] Extensive illustration of the evidence gathered on caste sanctions is given in *ibid*, chap ii.

from the county, or socioeconomic penalties. Whites, though seldom controlled by physical means, are stigmatized and economically punished by their own caste for violating any of these taboos.

Marriage between whites and Negroes is prohibited by a law which is rigidly observed and enforced, thus supporting the cultural rule of endogamy. By law, also, the offspring of Negro-white unions must be defined as Negroes. Any individual with one Negro ancestor is therefore a Negro, *no matter what number of white* ancestors he may have had. "Blood" is thus defined so as to prevent mobility across caste lines Associated with the rule of endogamy is the rule of separate group-seating of whites and Negroes in all public carriers and assemblages. This control is also legalized.

In maintaining the separate and endogamous nature of white-Negro relationships, the informal social controls are elaborately systematized, so as to prevent what the whites call "social equality." Not only are family and kinship relations legally and culturally interdicted between Negroes and whites but a white and a Negro may not visit as intimates. Thus clique relationships are likewise prevented between members of different color groups With the taboo upon visiting are taboos upon eating or drinking together, dancing, playing cards, and upon all other types of intimacy. All these controls operate to support the endogamous restriction, by making intimate social access impossible.

When Negro-white sexual unions occur, they must therefore take place outside of the white, and usually of the Negro, family. Such unions are permitted only in the case of a white man and a Negro woman. In this area of sexual and social relationships, Negro-white unions are not regarded as establishing "social equality"; the same attitude is maintained with regard to association between Negro and white criminals, gamblers, or "low-life" persons. Although the white and Negro societies disapprove of all these types of association, the whites permit them because they are not a threat to the white family or social class system and are, therefore, not a violation of the endogamous ("legal marriage") caste taboo.

The socially separate, endogamous, superordinate-subordinate system of Negro-white relationships is further maintained by well-defined restrictions upon face-to-face *participation* These *controls* establish an etiquette in all Negro-white contacts, they prescribe masterful or condescending behavior for the white and deferential behavior for the Negro. Caste etiquette varies slightly according to the class position of the white and Negro interacting in the face-to-face relationship; except in the case of the Negro-customer-white-salesman relationship, however, these modifications in etiquette never violate the masterful role of whites and the deferential role of Negroes Even in this commercial relationship, white salesgirls in Old City address all upper-class colored women, except one, by their first names only.

Whites in this area must not shake hands with Negroes or address them as "Mr," "Miss," or "Mrs" They address all Negroes either as "girl" or "boy" or by their first names. On the other hand, Negroes must address all whites honorifically. Even an upper-class Negro planter or physician will always address a lower-class white as "Mr.," "Mrs," or "Miss," whereas whites will not address Negroes in this way, although they may address them as "Professor" or "Doctor" The few exceptions to these rules are limited to Negro domestics who may address their white employers by their first names plus the honorific form, such as "Miss Alice" or "Mr. John," and to some upper middle-class whites who occasionally address

a Negro as "Mr." or "Mrs."

Deference to whites by Negroes also includes a conciliating and often whining tone in speaking, removal of the hat, and acquiescence to statements or demands by the whites.[5] An absolute taboo prevails against any Negro's contradicting, cursing, or shouting angrily at any white In the more isolated communities of the area, caste deference requires that a Negro shall not wear expensive, "dressy" clothes on weekdays, shall not smoke cigars in the presence of whites, and shall drive his automobile to the side of the road at once to allow a white driver to pass.

The roles of deference for Negroes and of dominance for whites are supported by both physical and psychosocial punishments In preventing what the whites call "social equality," caste etiquette ranks below only endogamy and social separateness in universality and inviolability In certain contexts the smallest lapse in deference by a Negro may be punished by beating or death.

The whites place all Negroes into two categories "good Negroes" and "bad Negroes." The former type meticulously observes the rules of deference; the latter type is slow, "sullen," or "sassy" or "smart" toward whites. Negroes, however, use the term "good Negro" to refer to a Negro who is more deferential than the white society requires Like the whites, they employ the term "bad Negro" to mean a Negro who openly violates caste etiquette, but there is usually an implication of social approval in the Negro usage

The masterful role of whites and the deferential role of Negroes, learned and maintained as specific behavior patterns and reinforced by powerful sanctions, extend into every type of Negro-white relationship They underlie the patriarchal "gift" pattern of white behavior toward Negroes in governmental, court, and economic relations and the begging, clowning, flattering, or subservient behavior of the Negroes. Within these caste-typed roles, Negroes and whites have their *modus vivendi*. The caste subordination of Negroes, which is enforced by the complex of legal, political, economic, educational, and social restrictions placed upon them, still allows the deferential Negro to attain certain limited rewards within his lower-caste status The Negro "leader," minister, or school principal depends upon the patronage of whites to maintain Negro institutions like the school, or the church The behavior of the effective Negro in this community is directed toward maneuvering the white into accepting more fully a patriarchal relationship to the Negro, both the Negro servant and the Negro leader thus attempt by flattery, cunning, and deference to compel the powerful white individual to act out his patriarchal role

CASTE DOGMAS

The sanctions of endogamy, social separateness, and white mastery and Negro deference are likewise supported by dogmas in each color group. The most general dogmas of whites in Old and Rural counties concerning the reasons for the subordination of Negroes are that Negroes are inherently childish, primitively sexual, and, except for a few unusual individuals, incapable of intellectual and emotional maturity (socialization) on the level achieved by whites These secular teachings are supported by the religious dogma that Negroes are inherently faithful, subservient, humble, and otherworldly. Within the Negro caste, the individual is taught that the whites as a group are superior in skills and power, extremely dangerous, all-powerful, and sinful. Negro

[5] Scratching the head and shuffling the feet, as if in indecision, are also deferential gestures of most Negroes in this area.

ministers and leaders express this dogma as follows: Since whites are all-powerful, Negroes should avoid aggressive behavior toward the individuals and toward the white community as a whole, the successful accommodation of Negroes to whites requires their being deferential to whites and working conscientiously for them; Negroes have many invidious characteristics which account for white domination; and Negroes should develop their own Negro society more fully by "race loyalty" to Negro businesses, professional men, and leaders.[6]

Thus the dogmas of each caste positively sanction the separate, ranked, and endogamous relationship. Since the Christian dogma of the brotherhood of man and the democratic dogma of the inherent equality of all men before the law and state are also a part of Negro culture, however, the complete acceptance of caste dogma by Negroes includes only the inviolability of caste endogamy and social separateness Although Negroes necessarily accept caste-ranking controls also, there is abundant evidence of psychological conflict over this categorical subordination

The caste sanctions and teachings vary slightly according to age, sex, class, and rural-urban groups. For example, in Old and Rural counties, social separateness is less strictly enforced among very young children; also caste controls are more elaborate and severe in rural than in urban communities and in towns than in cities Under all conditions, however, the basic restrictions upon marriage, public gatherings, social intimacy, and etiquette operate to maintain the superordinate-subordinate relationships of whites and Negroes and to make this ranking unchangeable and dependent upon birth.

[6] A detailed analysis of the operation of color-caste and class controls in the Negro church and associations in Old and Rural counties and in New Orleans has been prepared for the Carnegie Corporation by the writer, under the title, *The Negro Church and Associations in the Lower South: A Research Memorandum.*

CASTE AND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

All other systems of behavior within the society of Old and Rural counties are adjusted in some degree to the caste system. In formal organization, the caste sanctions are most rigidly applied in the political and governmental systems, the organization and functioning of the courts, the educational system, the church and associations, and in organized recreation. In local government, only whites vote or hold state, county, or municipal offices Only six Negroes in Old City had been allowed to register as voters in national elections, these registered Negroes admitted they did not vote, because they felt, as a leading Negro professional man said, that government was "the white man's business." In the rural counties, no Negro was registered. No Negroes were registered as voters in state or municipal elections, nor had any been a candidate for any county or municipal office since Reconstruction. The white officers in charge of registration and elections stated to one of the white interviewers that the whites prevented Negroes from registering as voters by intimidation and, if necessary, by violence.

In all law courts all judges, court officers, lawyers, and juries are white persons Criminal cases involving a white and a Negro are almost invariably decided in favor of the white, even if he has been the attacker Civil cases between Negroes and whites, involving damage to person or property, may be won by a Negro, especially if the white party to the suit is an insurance company or nonlocal corporation. Negroes very rarely sue local whites, however Murder of a white by a Negro is always punished by death, whereas the murder of a Negro by a white is seldom punished by the courts. Attacks by Ne-

groes upon Negroes usually are very slightly punished, even in the case of murder.

The educational and associational institutions of the community are all segmented into white and Negro structures Negro public schools are markedly inferior to white in teaching staff and in equipment, the per capita appropriation by the school board for Negroes is only a fraction of that for whites. The salaries of Negro teachers are lower than those for whites in parallel status The churches and associations have either all-Negro or all-white membership, the only exceptions anywhere in the surrounding area are in certain labor unions in the building trades and in the Spiritualist and Sanctified churches All other Protestant and Catholic churches exhibit a quite rigid form of segregation The highest authority in the Episcopal church, the bishop, stated to a white interviewer the caste policy of his church as follows

"I think that the only solution of the situation is for Negroes to develop independently of the whites They must recognize the situation as it is and conform to it They must work out their own destiny without attempting social equality"

The Catholic bishop likewise stated the acceptance of the caste structure of the community by his church

"Actually we adapt ourselves to local conditions Not only because the Negroes usually have a separate church but also because we feel it is better for them to have their own They also prefer to have a separate church and request it."

Negro-white relationships, therefore, conform to a caste structure in the formal organizations of the society, as well as in the family, social clique, and more informal relationships. The only structure which does not exhibit this sharp dichotomy is the economic organization of the society Although color-caste sanctions operate as occupational taboos to a high degree, the economic structure is not caste-segmented upon an all-or-none color basis, as are the political and religious structures. That is, economic status does not follow color status with the well-nigh perfect correlation formed in regard to political and legal status.

II

In certain fields, notably in storekeeping, contracting, farming, and professional service to colored persons, the economic system is still sufficiently "free" in competition to prevent the rigid application of caste taboos Although a large proportion of colored proprietors and contractors, lacking adequate capital, have been unable to compete successfully, the economic system has maintained a small group of colored persons of relatively high status It has thus prevented the full development of caste — that development in which *all* members of the lower caste are legally, or by virtue of unbreakable custom, below *all* members of the upper caste in wages, occupational status, and the value of property owned

The evidence establishes the following relationship between the systems of color caste and of economic stratification in the area studied In general, the economic status of Negroes is inferior to that of whites; nevertheless, economic behavior openly conflicts with caste dogma at times, such as when white landlords accept Negro farm tenants in preference to white The distribution of economic status is strongly bimodal for color, nevertheless, both Negroes and whites occupy every sort of occupational status — from landlord to day laborer The same distribution is observed for economic status as measured by landownership, amount of cotton produced, and fertility of soil cultivated.

A study of income, savings, property ownership, and occupations has revealed the marked statistical tendency of economic and occupational status to follow caste lines; together with an actually wide intra-caste spread of economic status. With regard to the first system of behavior, that is, the economic-class stratification *within* each color caste, the chief determinants are considered to be the laws and customs of a "freely competitive" economy, the differential control and fertility of land, the differential availability of credit, and powerful economic-class dogmas and antagonisms.

The second characteristic of economic stratification, namely, the great preponderance in higher economic status of whites over Negroes, is related to the operation of the direct primary caste sanctions, which enable the white landlord to subordinate the Negro tenant even more effectively than the white tenant by law, by custom, and, if necessary, by force. The primary caste controls likewise assure the white landlord a marked competitive advantage over the Negro landlord with regard to the purchase of land, the command of credit, and the securing of tenants. In the urban society, moreover, direct caste sanctions operate to exclude Negroes from practically all preferred occupational status.

The crucial observation remains, however, that some few Negroes enjoy higher economic symbols and rank than many whites. This skew in the relationship between color caste and economic status is observed as a conflict between economic behavior patterns in a competitive system and caste patterns, deriving from a system of social stratification based upon marks of color and "blood." The criteria of status in the two systems are essentially different. A Negro landlord enjoys the economic functions and symbols of a person in the higher positions of the economic hierarchy he may even have a white tenant working for him. But in social relationships, even with his white tenant, he is lower caste. The existence of these two systems is historically demonstrated by the position of free Negroes in the period of slavery. Most free Negroes actually possessed higher economic status than the chattel slaves and than some "poor whites." Like the slaves, however, they were lower caste, that is, members of a socially separate, endogamous, and subordinated group

In so far as the present economic system has prevented the full extension of the caste system, it appears to have been operating upon two principles that of the sanctity of private property and that of free competition This latter aspect of the national economic and legal structures gives rise to the presence in Old County of nonlocal factories and sawmills. These manufacturing firms hire labor as cheaply as they can get it, with the result that in industries where white workers have not been able to establish caste taboos, colored workers are employed to do much the same type of labor as whites. They may even be preferred to white workers, because they can be hired for a lower wage

These nonlocal industries not only tend to disrupt caste relations in labor but they put into the hands of colored workers money which the local white storekeepers are extremely anxious to obtain Since money has the highest value in the economic system, it causes white middle- and lower-class storekeepers to wait upon colored patrons deferentially Money thereby increases the difficulties of adjusting caste, which seems to be essentially a structure of pastoral and agricultural societies, to a manufacturing and commercial economy. This money economy likewise leads the group of entrepreneurs and middlemen to whom it has given

rise — the most powerful group in the production of cotton because they control credit and therefore production — to be unmindful whether they buy cotton from a colored or white farmer, whether they sell food, automobiles, and clothes to one or the other, whether they allow nonlocal industries to subordinate the lower economic group of whites to the lower group of colored workers. They care principally about increasing their money Even the local white farmowners prefer colored tenants to white, because they can obtain higher profits from the former From the point of view of the white lower group, such behavior is a violation of caste It indicates a fundamental conflict between the economic system and the caste dogma

In the second place, the principle of the sanctity of private property has generally operated to prevent the expropriation of colored owners Even during the period of slavery, free colored persons were allowed to own property in Old City and in the state generally This right was not taken from them during the twenty years immediately preceding the Civil War, when the legislature severely restricted their behavior in other respects At the close of the Civil War, the same reactionary legislature which passed the so-called "Black Code" in Mississippi, providing "apprentice" laws, *granted* to freedmen the right to own property in incorporated towns and cities Since that time, colored owners have not been expropriated, except in isolated cases of terrorization To expropriate colored property owners would be to violate the most fundamental principle of the economic system and to establish a precedent for the expropriation of other subordinated groups, such as the lower economic group of white people, Jews, Italians, and "foreign" ethnic groups of all kinds.

It is necessary to point out, however, that the modification of the caste system in the interests of the profits of the upper and middle economic groups of white people by no means amounts to an abrogation of caste in economic relationships The economic interests of these groups would also demand that cheaper colored labor should be employed in the "white-collar" jobs in business offices, governmental offices, stores, and banks In this field, however, the interests of the employer group conflict not only with those of the lower economic group of whites but also with those of the more literate and aggressive middle group of whites A white store which employed colored clerks, for example, would be boycotted by both these groups The taboo upon the employment of colored workers in such fields is the result of the political power and the purchasing power of the white middle and lower groups As a result of these taboos in the field of "white-collar" work, the educated colored person occupies a well-nigh hopeless position in Old County

The superior political power of the middle and lower groups of white people consequent upon the disfranchisement of the colored population, has enabled them to establish a caste barrier to the employment of colored clerical workers in municipal, state, and federal governmental offices The inability of these white groups to extend caste taboos so as to prevent colored persons from owning real estate and from competing with white skilled and unskilled labor may be attributed to the fact that the rights of private property and of a free labor market for the planter and the manufacturer are still sacred legal rights in Old County

A more detailed knowledge of the caste system as it exists in economic settings which differ from the old plantation economy of Old County would enable one to define the degree of subordination of the lower caste according to the type of econ-

omy. A tentative hypothesis might be advanced that the physical terrorization of colored people is most common in those areas where their general economic status is highest In the "newer" agricultural, oil-producing, and manufacturing sections of Mississippi and of the South in general, where relatively large groups of colored people are economically superordinate to relatively large groups of white people, open racial conflict and terrorization seem to be at their height Such conflict results from the fact that in many economic symbols, such as clothes, automobiles, and houses, a relatively large number of colored people are superior to many of the poorer whites. The white society, as a whole, often resorts to terrorization to reassert the dogma of caste and to indicate that in physical and legal power over the life and limb of colored people, at least, the caste sanctions are effective

In the Mississippi Delta, where white and colored farm tenants are competing at an increasing rate, and in a mill-town society, a sawmill society, or an oil-mining society, where similar competition exists, most of the white men *work* for a living, as contrasted with the white planters in Old County — and work in daily contact with colored men, even though the former may be termed "supervisors" Here, where most white men, dressed in overalls or work clothes, are almost as poor as the colored workers and occupy approximately the same occupational level, it is most difficult to maintain the caste lines with the rigidity and authority which the dogma demands. In such a community, therefore, the white population continually must resort to terrorization in order to impress the colored group with the fact that *economic* equality, or even superiority on the part of the latter, is not *real* equality or superordination, in other words, that caste exists all along the line, as the myth demands, and that actually *any* white man, no matter how poor or illiterate, is superordinate to any colored man, and must be treated with the appropriate deference.

In the old plantation areas in South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, on the other hand, where almost all the colored people are families of poverty-stricken tenants and almost all the white people are families of owners or of large landlords, caste is almost "perfect" economically and socially, and therefore relatively little terrorization of the lower caste is needed to support it In fine, where caste is most fully extended there is little need for violence, because the colored people are thoroughly subordinated economically, occupationally, and socially When the castes are in economic competition as laborers and tenants, however, violence and conflict seem to be at their height

THE COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL LIFE *

Elin L. Anderson

The democratic principles laid down by the founders of this country apparently die hard in a Puritan community When a stranger first comes to Burlington, he may well be impressed by the friendly atmosphere which pervades the business section of the city During the working day it would seem that Burlington is such a small world that nearly everyone knows everyone else The cheery greetings on the street corners — "Hello, Charlie," "Good morning, Tom" — give the impression that people meet on a friendly basis unaffected by class distinctions Moreover, the brief conversations overheard between the man who shines shoes and his customer, the clerk serving behind the counter and the restaurant manager, or the plumber, automobile salesman, newspaper man, and stockbroker who happen to share a table at lunchtime, convince one that these greetings are more than merely 'Hail fellow, well met," and are indeed the result of a certain knowledge and some appreciation of the life of each individual in the community

With the end of the working day, however, something of this informality of acquaintanceship ceases Some of the same people who greet each other informally in the morning give a more formal nod over their wives' shoulders if by chance they happen to meet in the evening at a movie, town concert, or lecture This slight increase of formality affords a key to the bases of class distinctions which exist beneath the surface appearance of a fairly unified social world

The actual division of Burlington's social life into a maze of classes and cliques is arbitrarily based on three kinds of differences apart from natural differences of interest There is, first of all, the division based on differences in economic status which separate the community into two main groups — the working class and the business and professional class A second large division is created by differences in religion which separate the community into the two main camps of Catholicism and Protestantism, each with its own social stratification along economic lines The third division is based roughly on ethnic differences which serve to enhance the divisions based on religion or economic status and also to create division within the religious worlds or the economic levels.

Much of the ethnic division is understandable The first and deepest relationships of each individual are connected with his family and those close to him Throughout his childhood he is in a particular environment where certain modes of behavior and of thought are common; the standards of this first social world become deeply ingrained in him, and ever afterward he tends naturally to seek his friends among those whose traditions and standards are most like his own. These persons are likely to be of the same ethnic group as he is, as well as of the same economic level and religious group.

In considerations of American society, which is noted for its mobility, the force of this unit in continuing into the second and third generation to determine the so-

* Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Elin L. Anderson, *We Americans A Study of Cleavage in An American City*, Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1937

cial world is sometimes neglected, yet something of the power of the ethnic group in providing a complete social life was revealed in the answers of the representatives of every group to the question "Of what nationality are your friends?" Among the 459 persons who were asked this question, the greatest proportion conscious of this group loyalty were of Old American, French-Canadian, and Jewish stock respectively Of these the Old Americans are the most exclusive group. Eighty-seven per cent of those interviewed stated that they had intimate friends only among their own people The only group nearing this degree of exclusiveness is the one usually considered most self-sufficient — the Jewish group. Seventy-four per cent of the Jews said that their social world was confined exclusively to their own group The French Canadians, always considered the most clannish, were less so than either the Old Americans or the Jews. Only 60 per cent of their number claimed friends only among their own people.

In contrast to these three groups, the Italians, and especially the Germans and the Irish, felt that they included to a greater extent other people in their social world. Forty-three per cent of the Italians chose their friends exclusively within their own group, but only 21 per cent of the Germans and 23 per cent of the Irish did so.

Since so much of the deeply personal life of each individual in Burlington is confined within the ethnic group, it is important to know the activities of these groups. By analyzing them it should be possible to discover the extent to which activities are alike, and are unlike, behind ethnic fronts. To what extent do the social opportunities circumscribed within the ethnic worlds satisfy the social aspirations of the people? How rigid are the ethnic divisions within our society? What, in short, does the social life of each group mean, not only to the people of each group, but also to the community in general?

The social life of the Old Americans sets the social tone of the community They are the charter members of society, and the rules that they make governing social intercourse are the rules that all others would follow The activities of the Old Americans do not differ markedly from those of other groups, but their level of approach, it is felt, is on a higher plane, along with every other group, for example, the Old Americans go to the movies, but they go only to the "better" movies. They dance, but they do not attend public dances unless they sponsor them themselves. They play cards, but, as one French woman said "Whereas the Old Americans play contract, the Irish play auction, and the French Canadians play whist." Through emulation this distinction is breaking down, but it indicates how the sense of social distance pervades the recreational activities of the people.

Within the group called Old American, forming as it does almost a caste, there are innumerable subdivisions and groupings based on curious social distinctions Old American "Society" is composed of persons whose security of position derives from a complex of factors, including ethnic heritage, religious affiliation, a certain amount of wealth, a degree of educational advantage, subscription to certain standards of morality, and a record of long residence in the country or, even better, in the community These are the people, living usually on the upper slope of the hill, augmented by socially acceptable persons connected with the University, that the community has in mind when it speaks of Old Americans, though they are really a small group behind the unity of Old America

Although economically comfortable, members of this group like to believe that money is an unimportant factor in their position, but that instead their society is built on family traditions, qualities of character, civic leadership. Perhaps for this reason the group is conspicuously unostentatious in its manner and possessions Only infrequently, when a ballet or play comes to town, are there chauffeured automobiles before the theatre or auditorium, then, Burlington is a little surprised to discover how many of its inhabitants can afford such luxuries; otherwise ostentation is not the manner of display of Burlington's leading social group Their way of life is one of studied simplicity — old silver, old china, old furniture No modern chromium or black glass invades Burlington's best homes It is even rare for the women of this group to dress conspicuously well The Jewish women, who are perhaps Burlington's best-dressed women, often comment with amazement on the lack of smartness and sophistication in the dress of many of the leading Old Americans A French-Canadian maid, however, arrived intuitively at an explanation with which the economist Thorstein Veblen would have agreed She was telling her Old American employer that she needed a new coat for the spring The Old American responded "I don't see why you need another coat Why, I am going to wear this same spring coat I've worn for six years" The French-Canadian maid replied "You can afford to do so You don't need to prove who you are by dressing well The only way anyone can judge me is by the clothes on my back" . .

To the community at large, this group gives two different impressions The newcomer who is "accepted" by them is likely to express surprise at their difference from what he had expected. Instead of being cold or aloof, as Vermonters are reputed to be, they are hospitable, warm, and only slightly reserved. As long as the stranger meets the basic conventions and social codes required of good society, he finds a good deal of freedom and independence of expression. To such a newcomer Burlington seems one of the most delightful of residential cities. To the others within the community, however, who remain "outsiders," the Yankee group presents a different front. Some persons find it difficult to believe that its members are ever anything other than very well-mannered, but aloof and impersonal. They are baffled by their formalism and by the complex method of evaluation which determines whether or not people "belong". . .

The clubs and societies to which the Old Americans belong set standards for the community The social life of the group is more highly organized than that of any other except the Jewish Eighty per cent of the men belong to clubs, some to as many as seven Seventy-seven per cent of the women belong to clubs, some to as many as eight A considerable number of these clubs are exclusively Old American and are expressive of class distinctions to an extent not found among other ethnic groups in the community . .

A few exclusive clubs which have long been a part of the social life of Old American "Society" continue to demonstrate the separatism of the Old Americans Many of these clubs have been gradually beaten in upon by individuals from other ethnic groups or from other social classes in the community, but some still stand intact against such invasion

Prominent among these are the many organizations of military origin The presence of the Army Post within five miles is a strong influence in keeping these organizations alive and may be partially re-

sponsible for the fact that they are at present increasing in number Membership in the longer established ones, such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Society of Colonial Wars in the State of Vermont, and the Daughters of the Union Veterans of the Civil War, demands long residence in the country. The Daughters of the American Revolution is perhaps the most active of these particular patriotic societies. Its interest in patriotism and national defense is kept alive by the enthusiasm of the women whose husbands have been identified with the military post or have held high position in the Army. The Citizenship Committee is ever anxious to find new directions for its activities. It visits the courts when immigrants become citizens and presents each new citizen with a flag and with a book on citizenship. Its members visit the schools, particularly on patriotic occasions, and they show especial interest in the parochial schools To them all they give flags and prizes — to the child who writes the most acceptable essay on citizenship, or, in the elementary school, to the child who, in the judgment of his teachers and fellow pupils, has deported himself in a manner becoming an ideal citizen In addition to this, they are concerned with remembering the important patriotic holidays in the year, preserving historical spots, and seeing to it that old graveyards are kept in order. . . .

The Jewish world is as distinct as is the Old American. The Jews are so traditionally a self-contained group that the impression prevails in Burlington that "they like to be by themselves," and whether or not this is true, the belief is a comforting one to those who are not anxious to see the Jews included to any extent in the general social life of the community.

There are, however, some curious contradictions in the social life of the Jews. In appearance and manner they are like every other group in the community, their women are the most smartly dressed, they play bridge, dance, and golf, as a group they are second only to the Old Americans in the support they give to the cultural activities of the city The manager of one of the circulating libraries in town said. "The taste of the Jews is better than that of any other group, including the Old Americans They are more curious intellectually, and they are not so afraid of finding a new idea in a book." Yet, within their own world their social life centers around religious rituals characteristic of Jewish tradition There are adaptations made, it is true, to the demands of our complex civilization, but the old forms, though modified, persist Thus, in keeping with modern medical trends, babies are born in hospitals rather than at home, and circumcision, performed a week later, does not assume quite the same festive character as it did when it took place at home, but parties are held in the hospitals, the godfather and godmother proudly display the new baby, and the mother is visited in her hospital room by relatives and friends

At about six years of age, immediately after the public school day is over, boys and girls attend the Hebrew Free School, where they learn the language and customs and the religious beliefs of their people In the few families who no longer keep kosher house, this first sending of their children to the Hebrew School is a time of conflict The young boy returns to argue with his mother that pork is unclean, that she shouldn't have bacon for breakfast, that she should have two sets of dishes, one for foods containing milk and one for foods containing meat Leaders of the group may lament the fact that all the children of the community do not come for as many years as they should to Hebrew Free School, but with only a few

exceptions, all parents send their children there at least for a short period prior to their reaching the age of thirteen This represents the age at which the boys are admitted to manhood and is again a festive occasion. There is a great deal of preparation of foods for days in advance Practically the entire Jewish community is invited, gifts are presented to the boy, he chants a section of the Bible, makes a brief speech, and thus becomes an adult member of the Jewish congregation

Weddings are observed with only a few minor changes in the traditional manner. With few exceptions they are held either in the synagogue or in a hall The wedding ceremony takes place beneath a canopy, and even though the bride's veil be but a brief, transparent one, the ceremony of unveiling her and revealing her to the groom is included The rabbi beseeches the newly married couple to remember that though they may not be able to live up to all the Jewish customs in this western world, they should remember that they are Jews and abide by certain of the most important customs at least Feasting and usually dancing follow Throughout life, in most cases, the couple abide by the dietary laws of the group, and the husband performs the obligations in the synagogue becoming to the head of the household There are a few families who no longer adhere to these customs, but these few — even though some of them may be the leading members of the group — are looked at askance, especially by the older members, who frequently refuse to break bread in their homes because they are "unclean"; and the very smallness of the group enables such group pressure to be keenly felt At a death the members of the Holy Society keep watch and pray until the time of burial. A movement to alter the burial procedure to embalming and use of a casket was opposed; funeral processions are conducted according to the old tradition.

In addition to these ritual aspects of their lives, the Jews have many social organizations to keep alive the spirit and the law of Judaism For the 215 families there are more than thirteen clubs serving their group exclusively. Most of the group belong to three clubs, but some to as *many as nine*. . . .

In spite of the high degree of organization within the Jewish group, the forces for disintegration that affect every ethnic group in America are at work. One significant indication is the decline in the use of Yiddish in the home Only four of the fifty-seven Jewish householders interviewed — and these four all of the first generation — speak nothing but Yiddish at home In thirteen homes, the parents speak Yiddish almost entirely, but the children speak both Yiddish and English; in ten homes Yiddish and English are used interchangeably, while in thirty English is the language generally spoken, although Yiddish is occasionally used. Among the second generation of this group, the English language has almost entirely supplanted the Yiddish, which is used only to express favorite idiomatic phrases

The change in language is only one indication of other changes that are taking place In spite of the many organizations and the ritual of their daily life, the pressure occasioned by living in a community where Jewish customs frequently conflict with more general ones makes it impossible for many people to keep their customs as they might wish Among the younger generation, for example, dietary customs observed in the home may be neglected outside it Many Jewish traditions are maintained in symbolic rather than in literal form On the other hand, pressures from both within and without

the group keep the Jew in the main to his traditional role. As one leading Jewish woman explained, "The Gentile community expect that I keep kosher house. They take it for granted that I would not eat pork, and I feel that it is my duty therefore to prove to them that I am a good Jew even if these customs do not necessarily mean anything much to me any more" At the same time, the group is so small that it, too, exerts considerable pressure on its wayward members. This is possible in a community where, if the members of one group deviate from its customs or break its taboos, they cannot easily find another group to accept them or make them feel at home.

Thus the struggle for freedom of thought and independence within the Jewish group is similar to, but more intense than, that within the Old American. It is a conflict within a family, based on differences in the importance attached to forms. A real change in one's way of life to a completely different form of conduct is achieved at too great a price for most people. Recently, in addition, recognizing that being Jewish is still a "problem" in the world, many Jews have come closer to their traditional ways in order that the integrity of the group may be a safeguard against the possible time when they may be reminded by the community that they are a group apart. Hence, forms are frequently preserved after the content has ceased to have meaning. . . .

In marked contrast to the urban, highly organized Jewish social life is the social life of the French Canadians. No other group is less organized; only some 46 per cent of the men and 39 per cent of the women belong to any clubs. Organization has never, in the past, been a feature of their lives. Many look back wistfully to a day when their social life was intimate and gay and satisfactorily self-contained. In every family there was someone who could play a fiddle, someone who could dance a jig; all could sing. When neighbors gathered, which they did more frequently than they do now, it was not long before someone would strike up the fiddle; and young and old would dance and sing. On Sunday after church many of them spent the rest of the day in a park near Archibald Street, bringing their lunches and all their children. But, along with every other group, the French Canadians have been affected by the change in the type of amusements and the substitution of the automobile and the moving picture for neighborhood visits. As one woman lamented, "We don't know our neighbors any more. They own a car, we own a car Whenever my husband has spare time, we take a little trip in our car. We don't go calling" The music of professional radio artists now replaces the less skillful, if more enthusiastic, efforts of their own people This mechanization of music affects even those who have no radios On a Saturday night on North Street, many French-Canadian men, women, and children are to be seen standing silently outside a beer garden through whose open windows come the strains of the latest hill-billy songs.

In spite of these social changes, however, there are forces which contribute to preserving a distinct French-Canadian social life. For example, with their radios they are able to tune in on French stations in Canada, and so to maintain their identification with their own race to an extent not permitted other groups of foreign heritage. The automobile means that they are only three or four hours from Montreal and the French settlements of Canada. In addition, they are able to keep alive their interest in the culture of their own people through subscription to the various papers which speak for the whole

French-Canadian group, such as *L'Union, Le Travailleur,* and *La Presse,* even though their local paper, *Le Patriote Canadien,* the first French-Canadian newspaper in the United States, has long since been discontinued.

Yet there are many indications that the daily social life of the French-Canadian Americans is becoming progressively less different from that of their fellow Americans. Old-timers recall the days when the twenty-fourth of June, the day of Saint Jean Baptiste, the patron saint of the French Canadians, was a gala day with parades through the streets of the city and speeches rife with such phrases as "the great and glorious French-Canadian race." This celebration, however, has entirely died down except within the French-Canadian community of Lakeside, where an attempt at a parade around the square is still made on that day. French Canadians themselves account for this decline by a decline in nationality interest among those of French-Canadian descent and in part by the half-amused criticism and lack of appreciation shown by the citizens as a whole toward this celebration. . . .

One of the chief disintegrating influences is the loss of the distinctive language With the increased use of radios this may not progress so rapidly as it did before it was possible to listen to French throughout the day. Today, however, only 9 per cent of the representative group interviewed in detail speak only French in the home. In an additional 12 per cent of the homes the parents speak French almost entirely but the children speak both English and French or only English; in 34 per cent of the homes both languages are used to an equal extent; while in the remaining 45 per cent, English is the predominant, and usually the only, language. This increasing use of English not only indicates an already extensive contact with other groups, but seems to point to a future in which the sense of social separation of ethnic groups will not be enhanced by a difference in language

Coincident with this gradual loss of language, many of the second- and third-generation Americans of the French-Canadian group, particularly among those who have achieved some degree of economic security, lose most of the peasant qualities characteristic of the group as a whole, and qualities considered to be more French predominate Gentleness and simplicity remain, but to these are added an element of quiet sophistication and gentility. This is partially the result of an increased interest in France and an appreciation on a higher level of the traditions and manners of that remote homeland A certain reserved pride seems to take the place of the feeling of inferiority characteristic of those whose position in the community is less assured

The fact that a relatively small proportion of the French-Canadian social life is organized has a twofold effect on the French Canadian's position in respect to the social life of the community It means that there are few mediums through which the French Canadian can be reached when any social project of the community as a whole is contemplated, but on the other hand, the difficulty experienced in maintaining a nationalistic society or in forming new nationalistic societies for those of French-Canadian stock perhaps indicates a closer approach to the more general American life than either the French Canadians would care to admit or the other ethnic groups have been able to see Within their own group, the French Canadians are having to make innumerable adjustments between their tendency toward ethnic integrity and the environmental forces compelling them to

identify themselves with the life of America

The Italians, although they are more self-contained than either the Germans or the Irish, are more consciously determined to become an acceptable element in the community than perhaps any other small group. Not until recently has their social life been organized on any ethnic basis, perhaps because the few families from the northern part of Italy were slow to become willing to work with the more numerous families from the southern part. In 1933, however, the Twin City Italian Club was organized, and since its organization has flourished At present renting a clubhouse in the Italian neighborhood, it has already bought a lot on which it plans to build Very significantly, the monthly programs of this club, instead of being devoted to the glory of Italy, put emphasis on the fact that the Italians here are all American citizens . . .

The club, however, serves primarily the needs of the men of the group The women are expected to attend only at social functions There is still a strong conservative feeling that the women should remain at home and find their recreation in embroidering and crocheting as their mothers did in Italy. They may visit with each other in the evenings, but their main social expression is expected to be within the family; since the families are fairly large, few of the women have time for much activity outside.

The impact of American life has nevertheless penetrated into the Italian home through the men, who feel it in their working world, and the children, who feel it in the schools. In regard to language alone, in only eight of the homes of the thirty-six families interviewed is Italian alone spoken. All of these homes are of first-generation householders In eleven of the homes, although the parents speak Italian, the children either speak Italian to their parents and English among themselves, or only English at all times. In seven of the homes, both parents and children speak English and Italian interchangeably. In ten, English is the language used, although Italian may be spoken occasionally.

This loss of language is partially the result of the smallness of the group. Throughout the day the contacts of its members are largely with members of other groups. To their small number may also be laid the fact that the Italians do not have the same social expression that larger groups in the city find. Their feast days may be celebrated within the homes, but the group is far too small to indulge in the gala celebrations that make the lives of their compatriots in other cities more colorful. These things contribute to their desire to be identified with the larger American community, and to find therein a social expression which their limited number prevents them from finding alone. By a majority of the other ethnic groups, however, the Italian is still held suspect, and as long as this attitude of prejudice persists it is doubtful if he will be permitted to make a contribution to the social life of the community as colorful as he is capable of.

The social activities of the Germans have been organized around the Goethe Lodge of the German Order of Harugari, a branch of a mutual aid organization for all Germans in America. For the older Germans this club was the very center of their life, but in the second generation it has been increasingly difficult to preserve German culture as zealously as the first generation strove to do The Germans are among the groups most rapidly assimilated; although by choice many of them prefer to live their social life within their own group. They identify themselves, however, in thought at least, with

the larger community so quickly that by the second generation English is spoken almost exclusively, and even in the first generation no one speaks German exclusively. In addition, they are considered by the other ethnic groups among the most socially acceptable of all. These factors combine to produce a broad interest that extends beyond the group, so that those who regret the slackening of interest in the club can do very little about it. . . .

Of all the social worlds in the community, that of the Irish is the most completely denationalized. For them the original barrier of language did not exist, and so, although they are separated from Old American society, the barriers are socio-religious rather than ethnic Behind these barriers the social pattern of their life is very similar to that of the Old Americans Certainly there is a leading social set among the Irish as there is among the Old Americans. At times they join with members of the Old American group, but this is almost always at large impersonal bridge parties, teas, or other similar functions. The more personal social life of each is behind the walls of its own group The conservative Old American may recognize the fact that many of the Irish are on the same economic level as himself, but the Irish "top" society is not quite comparable with the same level of Old American society. Occasionally Old Americans are heard to point out certain individuals within the Irish group who now would be acceptable in Old American society, commenting at the same time that that is a possibility that has only occurred within the last ten or fifteen years. But the Irish, meanwhile, recognizing that the doors are slightly ajar, are somewhat less interested than they were in getting through They prefer to build their own social life, at least until the doors are opened wide.

The remark of one Irish woman, who has been considered acceptable in Old American society, illustrates this. "Like everybody else in town, I used to think it would be nice to be a member of Burlington's high society, but after I had been made welcome in the finest homes on the hill I discovered that I preferred my relatives and friends I had known since childhood, and, as I got older, to watch their children come along Being a member of Society has ceased to have any meaning to me"

The other side of the picture is that as the Old Americans hold aloof from any deeply personal social life with the Irish, the Irish in turn seem equally aloof from the French Canadians. The door of the Irish elite social life is not open to many of the elite from the French-Canadian world

No truly nationalistic organization now represents the unity of the Irish group in Burlington The Hibernian Society, organized in 1900 as a mutual aid society for Irish immigrants, was not able to last through the World War An Irishman explained this by saying that "there was no time then to root just for the Irish." Perhaps as a substitute for such nationalistic organizations the Irish have acquired recognized leadership in such religious organizations as the Knights of Columbus, which they established in the community for all Catholics In general, as a group, they are the leaders of Catholic social life as the Old Americans are of the community social life

Thus does the ethnic group define the social world for many people It answers specific needs and supplies the individual with a group, the values of which are known and established, and within which he finds the same sense of support that he finds in his family But beyond this, the distinctions between group and group are, to a large extent, purely formal. The

social organizations of the French Canadians, the Germans, the Italians, and the Irish are quite similar. They answer few distinctly ethnic needs. Rather is there a striving toward standardization, an attempt to achieve a pattern of behavior that shall be indistinguishable from what they consider to be good American society. Yet in spite of this, the separation persists, even expressing itself in such simple social gestures as going to the moving pictures· members of every group find amusement at the movies, but they find it at different movie houses, two of which serve primarily the French-Canadian and other less established economic groups, and two primarily the Old Americans, the Irish, and the University students.

This persistence of a formal pattern of separation after its reason for existence has largely disappeared has two effects on the community On the one hand, it gives the community an appearance of stability which derives from the individual's sense of security in his daily social life On the other hand, it makes for social inertia because of the tendency to place a premium upon conformity to the mores of a small group When an individual attempts to reach outside of his own group, the weight not only of his own group but also of the community at large is to some extent set against him. Under such pressure, many personalities which would expand in a friendlier atmosphere have become warped and little, jealous and thwarted. The energy that might go into leadership, if their society placed value on qualities other than conformity, becomes dissipated and drawn off into fruitless discussion and criticism. That this compulsion exists in the community even today is to be seen in the extent to which people agreed, disagreed, or were uncertain about the following statement "One is criticized by one's own nationality group if one mixes freely with people of other nationalities in the community." The fact that one half of the whole group interviewed agreed with the statement and an additional one tenth were uncertain is an interesting reflection of the strength of this social taboo.

The variation of the power of this force among the several groups is of still further interest. The French Canadians are apparently most conscious of this form of group pressure, for almost two thirds of their number agreed with the statement. The Old Americans were a close second; over one half—55 per cent—registered their assent The Irish, the Germans, and the Jews are all about equally conscious of the pressure of their groups, two fifths of each group agreeing with the statement. On the other hand, among the Italians, who are almost entirely of the first generation, only one fourth agreed.

The feeling that there is a social taboo against making friends among other ethnic groups increases rather than decreases with each generation Forty-one per cent of the first generation feel it, 49 per cent of the second, and 55 per cent of the third This varies from group to group, but only the Irish show a marked decrease in consciousness of this taboo from one generation to the next. The general increase, however, may not mean that the social pressure is any greater, but merely a greater consciousness of the taboo as the individual first comes in contact with a social world larger than that of his group

In opposition to this taboo, innumerable forces tend to offset the pressure making for the social separation of groups. One of these forces is the very nature of the development of the social life within each group. Behind barriers, the social life of each tends to develop along very similar lines. As these similarities become more and more apparent, the barriers of ethnic separation tend to break down. New

groups based on a larger interest or a different interest are formed either as substitutes for the ethnic world or to hold the equal or even greater interest of the individual

The first new basis for an enlarged social world is likely to be one which embraces ethnic and even class differences within a single powerful unit of culture Usually this unit is religious French Canadians, Irish, and Italian discover that in spite of their differences they are bound together by a strong force — their common religion The formal expression of this is best seen in such organizations as the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic Daughters of America — societies which combine representatives of all the Catholic ethnic groups in the name of their religion .

Though it may seem that religious affiliation should not play an important part in determining the limits of social life, yet it was found that for a considerable number of Burlingtonians social horizons are bounded by the barriers which separate the three main religious groups, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Throughout, this was more true of the women than of the men This limitation appears in the following percentages, which represent the membership of the persons in each group in clubs either directly connected with a church or limited in membership to one religious or ethnic group

In the Jewish group, 59 per cent of the men's membership in clubs, and 78 per cent of the women's, is confined to Jewish organizations If membership in the Jewish branch of the Knights of Pythias is added to that in other exclusively Jewish fraternal organizations, 71 per cent of the male membership may be considered as limited to clubs identified with the Jewish group For the French Canadians whose social life is organized, 69 per cent of the men's membership, and 86 per cent of the women's, is in clubs confined to French Canadians exclusively or Catholics exclusively For the Italians, 70 per cent of the men's membership, and 83 per cent of the women's, is confined in the same manner

The Irish, the Germans, and the Old Americans show greater freedom in their choice of social organizations Among the Irish, 52 per cent of the men's membership, and 68 per cent of the women's, is confined to church or religious-fraternal organizations Among the Germans, 37 per cent of the men's membership, and 53 per cent of the women's, is confined to clubs exclusively national. The membership in church organizations raises this percentage slightly. It was more difficult to determine for the Old Americans which organizations belonged exclusively to their ethnic or religious group, since many clubs, although identified with either the Old American group or with American Protestantism, are intended to serve all qualified persons living in the community The extent of Old American membership in organizations, some of which include only Old Americans, all of which include only Protestants, may, however, be noted· 20 per cent of the membership of men, and 43 per cent of the membership of women, is confined to organizations connected with the church

Thus, for the community as a whole, more than 53 per cent of the men's membership, and more than 68 per cent of the women's, is in clubs which do not include representatives of all ethnic groups in the community but are limited to people of one ethnic group or at most one religious group

The organization of the social life of the city reflects the very important part ethnic and religious affiliations still play in determining the social life in an American community When an individual

must choose between membership in a club identified with his ethnic or religious group and membership in the same kind of club aiming to serve qualified members of all groups, his loyalty to his immediate group determines his choice. These organizations reflect the power of the group over the individual which was well expressed in an experience recounted by a Jewish woman Once, she said, she was surprised and pleased when, making a casual remark to an Old American whom she had previously considered aloof and cold, she was rewarded with a response immediate and warm, yet she knew that although the invisible barriers of ethnic difference had thus fallen once, the next time the two women met they would be up again, since each woman would be aware of the eyes of the community on them, they would feel that both the Old American and the Jewish groups were watching to see how far they would go As another woman explained it "The town is too small and too large It is so small that everybody knows when a person gets friendly with another, but it is not small enough for everybody to be friendly with everybody else" How, in practice, the group can exercise its taboo is indicated by the remark of an Old American business man "When a newcomer arrives in town, we are not friendly immediately. We wait and see whom he picks out as his friends. If he picks out the wrong ones, he's finished as far as the right ones are concerned."

Faced with such silent but powerful opposition on the part of the group, it is small wonder that only the extraordinary individual is able to form deep friendships across ethnic, religious, or class lines, since by doing so he runs the risk of being held suspect by his own group. On the other hand, the person who yields to the pressure toward conformity finds compensation for the lack of mobility in the added sense of security and "belongingness" given him In addition, the very fact that in a community of this size almost everyone knows, even though not intimately, everyone else, helps to maintain faith in the democratic tradition. If, however, the divisions which exist at present — economic, religious, or ethnic — should become more rigid, the vitality of the community's social life would decrease proportionately, and the individual's faith in America's traditional social mobility would die If the community wishes to avoid this, it must somehow either continue to keep doors open between group and group, or, should this prove impossible, it must break down the barriers which have developed in its life

DOES SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION REALLY MATTER? *

Carey McWilliams

With few exceptions, leaders of American Jewry seem to regard "social discrimination" as an insignificant manifestation of prejudice, hurtful, annoying, vexatious, but not really important. "It is a happy chance for the American Jew," wrote Ralph Philip Boas, "that his age-long persecution has either ended or has degener-

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ated into petty social discrimination in this country."

Underlying this view, one can detect certain assumptions: that social discrimination is merely an anachronistic survival, that it has no real function in the scheme of prejudice, and that it can never lead to more serious discriminations "The barrier is social," said Meyer S Isaacs, "it cannot disturb the civil rights, the political equality of all Americans"

Just as Jews have discounted the importance of social discrimination, so well-disposed Gentiles have labelled it a social eccentricity — something to be shrugged off, to be laughed at But is it really only snobbery, detached from social, economic, and political realities? Social discrimination is habitually rationalized as "freedom of association" It reflects, one is told, merely the gregarious impulse of individuals of similar tastes, interests, and backgrounds to associate together By implication, only the morbidly sensitive would think of assigning important political and social effects to so harmless and "human" a tendency, and in fact it is considered bad form to raise the issue The trustees of the university club in the average American city would be highly indignant if it were suggested that the exclusion of Jews should be regarded as a significant manifestation of anti-Semitism.

Yet even the most casual inspection of any American community is sufficient to establish that social discrimination not only fosters prejudice in many ways, but is closely related to more basic discriminations

In most American cities, the reins of social control can usually be traced to a particular "prestige" club or similar institution This is not to imply, of course, that the club actually exercises a decisive influence in the community, its membership constitutes a profile of the dominant elements But the omissions from the membership will also indicate which groups occupy a secondary or subordinate role in community affairs Almost universally the social club is a mechanism by which ruling or dominant elements establish, solidify, and perpetuate their hold on social leadership. It is precisely for this reason that membership is invested with a premium value and is regarded as highly desirable

In *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (1941), a study of "Yankee City," Dr Lloyd Warner and his associates found, for example, that institutions of this sort help to maintain higher and lower ranking in the community, that they function as a mechanism for placing people in the class hierarchy; and that they serve to impede movement out of the middle class into the upper class In short, they organize, regulate, and guide the course of upward social mobility. The selective policies of such institutions have, of course, a dual effect they impede upward movement for the groups excluded, but they smooth the way for those included. "The self-made man finds club life one of the best ways of entry into the ruling classes," says Dr Crane Brinton of Harvard in his article on "Clubs" in *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. And Dr Warner reports of Yankee City: "If a man were accepted by one of the upper class clubs, his position in the society became higher and more secure However, this same association, by refusing to admit certain individuals who wished to join it, might prevent their rise into a higher society than they at that time occupied"

"Prestige" institutions show little concern with the "innate congeniality of like-minded persons" Existing to protect the positions of power and influence held by their members in the community, they concentrate on organizing social power by exclusion The more groups that can be excluded, the less power will have to

be shared. This is exactly what is implied by the term "exclusive": the function of an exclusive institution is to exclude The impersonal hotel-like atmosphere of the club completely belies the premise of congeniality and comradery In Los Angeles, where I live, everyone knows that the Athletic Club is less exclusive than the University Club and that the latter is less exclusive than the California Club. Initiation fees, dues, and eligibility rules neatly correlate with the measure of exclusiveness. "The largely non-overlapping groups," wrote Dr Robert S. Lynd in *Middletown,* "carefully selected for prowess in business, highly competitive, and constituting a hierarchy in the prestige their membership bestows, exemplify more than do churches or lodges the prepotent values of the dominant group of business men of the city"

However, institutions of this sort do more than symbolize the exclusion of certain groups: they organize the distribution of the best social and economic positions As an anonymous Jewish writer observes, "it is natural that men whose social life is spent together should desire to be associated together in business. . . . *This consideration . . . will arise in concerns where social life is well developed,* as in banks, where the officers are apt to belong to clubs of one kind or another" (*The Atlantic Monthly,* October, 1924, emphasis added). The lodge of the small town is much less likely to be exclusive than the city club, for the hierarchy of the clubs reflects the hierarchy of the large, impersonal, corporate enterprise — position in one is linked up with, and makes easier the achievement of, position in the other The professional groups in particular are drawn to these aggregates of social power, for they are well aware of the fact that higher social position not only attracts clientele but becomes an important measure of professional standing.

Apart from considerations of this order it is quite apparent, as Dr. Lynd has observed in *Civilization and Group Relationships,* "that the overwhelmingly dominant criterion of significant likeness in our culture is likeness in wealth" In nearly all social clubs today, regardless of their origins, the culturally desirable intricate interplay of human likenesses and differences is little valued Our social system is one in which "both the joining and the aims of organizations are not free and spontaneous but controlled by the need to muscle in on an apparatus of power which controls life chances in the culture" That the aims of organization are stated in other terms should not be permitted to conceal a reality so unmistakable.

In a society verbally devoted to democratic ideals, invidious distinctions are often masked, for even the rich acknowledge allegiance to these same ideals Still and all, in our kind of social order, what passes for society will be seen to be based on wealth in its own right The very absence of a landed gentry and titles of nobility, coupled with the pervasiveness of democratic shibboleths, compels the moneyed classes in this country to emphasize a rigid social exclusiveness as a means of protecting economic and political power. Indeed, social exclusiveness takes on a peculiar significance in a nominally democratic society, for it is entirely arbitrary and therefore impenetrable. Thus it is that where prestige has been based on the aristocratic concept, as in Great Britain, the Jew is more likely to win his place by achievement, as witness the careers of Disraeli, Sir Herbert Samuels, and Viscount Reading. The situation is not quite the same in the United States.

"In the United States," writes David Riesman of the University of Chicago, "the locus of social power is not personified in a hereditary aristocracy. There is no feudal hierarchy, no established church, little military tradition, save in the South.

Social prestige in the sense of dominating the American scene is attached to the big industrialists whose names or companies are household words. the Fords, the DuPonts, the Eugene Graces. A satellite glow attaches to the navy, the bishopric, the plantation owners, and the diplomatic services . . Every one of these rosters is conspicuously clear of Jews The intellectual professions, in which Jews share. doctors, lawyers, professors, the civil service as a whole, have no accepted social place, even as compared with Europe" (*Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1942).

In a democracy, social discrimination requires the exclusion of *groups*, since the comparative fluidity of the social structure makes the exclusion of *individuals* both difficult and awkward From the point of view of wealth, social grace, and culture, individual Jews clearly meet the canons of social acceptability. nor can they be distinguished racially Hence they must be excluded as a group, by name, as a matter of policy.

Moreover, to be effective, such exclusion must be practiced in *all institutions* in which membership confers high social positions It would never do, of course, for the prestige town club to accept Jews if the equivalent country club excluded them The policy of exclusion must, therefore, embrace the entire domain of social life as well as the outlying precincts which the socially elite have determined to preempt, namely, the fashionable hotels, resorts, residential districts, etc It is not surprising, then, that the exclusion of Jews from clubs, hotels, summer resorts, and residential districts in the United States, according to Salo W. Baron and other observers, is more widespread than it was in Germany before 1933

It is absurd, therefore, to regard social discrimination as an unorganized, private, personal prejudice A policy of systematic exclusion is a phenomenon of an entirely different order. Discrimination against *groups* can only be effective if it is adhered to as a matter of policy throughout the whole gamut of social life This implies consensus, which in turn implies *organization*. If it were simply a question of some individuals liking and others not liking Jews, one would expect a clear diversity in practice, but the practice, at certain levels of society, is uniform, consistent, and well-nigh universal

It is revealing that *at one time* a few Jews belonged to many "prestige" clubs. Where Jews were present on the scene before the community started to grow — before the status lines were sharply drawn — they were often taken into membership with a naive unawareness of their Jewishness or a marked indifference to the fact Jesse Seligman was a founder, at one time a vice-president, of the Union League Club of New York, but his son was blackballed for membership in 1893 In some cities, the exclusionist policy dates from the First World War; in others it did not emerge until the late 30's, while in some cases, of course, it became apparent at a much earlier date By and large, however, the tendency to exclude Jews became more pronounced during the 20's For example, the trustees of a Milwaukee club requested the resignation of eight or ten Jewish charter members in 1928 In almost every case, the edge of exclusion has been deliberately sharpened by an insulting exception for "those now in good standing." Even where the membership has passed from father to son, either by long standing custom or by express provision, the new policy has pointedly excluded the son.

How this policy has been adopted can be illustrated by one of many similar cases. The Gipsy Club is perhaps the outstanding prestige organization in Huntington, West Virginia, a city of about 90,000 population with a small Jewish community which is nearly as old as the city itself.

For many years a few Jews were members of the club. Descendants of old Jewish families, they were, for the most part, well-educated, wealthy professional men. In 1939 the by-laws of the club were amended to read that only "gentlemen of non-Jewish origin" should be eligible for membership with the usual exception of those then in good standing. The Jewish members offered to resign and to provide formal assurances that no further Jewish applications would be filed, if the amendment were withdrawn Needless to say, the offer was rejected and the amendment adopted.

The meaning is clear: drawing a line *after* Jews were once accepted indicates a studied and systematic scheme of exclusion. What the bar reflects, in other words, is not so much a prejudice against Jews, as a desire to augment social power by excluding one of the few *groups* whose exclusion finds sanction in the *mores.*

Of the various "white" groups, Jews are about the only element that can be readily excluded from the category of the socially acceptable They are not Christians, they are mostly late-comers; and they often occupy a special niche in the economy Other ethnic groups would unquestionably have been excluded were it not for the curiously mixed character of the American population and the peculiar geographical concentration of minority elements. Where Scandinavian immigrants, for example, have been settled and concentrated since an early date, it has been difficult to exclude them as individuals have prospered and acquired status. Admitted to upper class symbols in one community, the bar against Scandinavians would lose its snobbish effectiveness elsewhere.

It should be noted, too, that while the Negro cannot be accepted because he is regarded as a member of an inferior race, this charge is practically never raised against the Jew. This tacit admission of racial and cultural equality outlines the purpose of exclusion more sharply. Social discrimination, involving the unequal treatment of equals, directly implies "an alteration in competitive power of those presumed to possess a freely competitive status" (*Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*), and lays bare the meaning of exclusion. Other ethnic groups have also been denied access to social power in relation to their numbers and wealth; but, over the years, it has been impossible to exclude these groups, *as groups,* with anything like the effectiveness with which Jews have been excluded.

The exclusion of Jews from "Greek-letter" fraternities and sororities parallels their exclusion from social clubs and is similarly motivated It is silly to speak of college fraternities as though they were the end-product of some instinctive process by which like-minded individuals are sorted into special categories Freshmen are rushed for the most specific and tangible reasons social standing, wealth, family connections, special talents, athletic ability, and so forth Fraternities, like clubs in later years, are the pools and generators of social power and prestige· those with it enter them, those entering them, heighten their potency Social alliances formed in college naturally tend to carry over into adult life.

After four years in prep school and four years in college, the average non-Jewish student has been thoroughly instructed in the function of prejudice. Most students go to college, as John Berryman has pointed out in a memorable short story, with "a gently negative attitude toward Jews" which they have "ingathered from the atmosphere of an advanced heterogeneous democratic society" But this "gently negative attitude" is soon made self-conscious and crystal-clear by social discrimination. If social discrimination repre-

sented a personal aversion to Jews, then it is interesting to speculate on how Vincent Sheean, with no prior familiarity with Jews, made the mistake of joining a Jewish fraternity at the University of Chicago (an experience vividly described in *Personal History*) I once made a similar mistake when, after being pledged to a fraternity, I innocently proposed the name of a Jewish friend My education in social life was as swift and unforgettable as Sheean's.

The exclusionist policies of the college fraternities are, like those of the social clubs, rationalized as "freedom of association" Speaking at the annual meeting of the National Interfraternity Conference in New York on December 1, 1946, Dr H E Stone, Dean of Students at the University of California, said

"It is no accident that specific demands have been made to break all racial bars to fraternity membership and that specific cases have arisen to force the issue

"The mass strikes, the effort for economic domination of the individual, the new race pressures and the opposition to secret selective associations are off-springs and outgrowths of a philosophy of 'social action' deeply imbedded in a host of government agencies and taking its root in Marxian concepts"

Here, by clear implication, a challenge to the exclusionist policies of the fraternities is correlated with an attack on the economic system, one can only surmise, therefore, that Dean Stone considers secret selective associations a prop to economic privilege

The exclusion practiced by fraternities and sororities is, in turn, closely related to the admission of students and the selection of faculty University instructors and administrative officials are often members of fraternities which practice exclusion. Noting this fact, Heywood Broun once shrewdly suggested that "part of student prejudice might be traced to professorial or presidential policy" It cannot be denied that Jews have had a difficult time securing faculty appointments, that particular departments, in many institutions, have been traditionally closed to them, and that advancement has been retarded by anti Semitic prejudice. This pattern of discrimination, in turn, is part of a much larger pattern to be found in the secondary schools, both public and private.

Social discrimination in American colleges and universities is also related to the more basic discrimination implicit in the quota system The exclusion of Jews from fraternities and sororities seems to have preceded the rise of the quota system In any case, it is apparent that social discrimination supports and buttresses the quota system

What is not so apparent is that the quota system represents the logical extension of a basic discrimination against Jews in the economy A year or so ago, Dr Albert Sprague Coolidge of Harvard testified before a legislative committee that "we know perfectly well that names ending in 'berg' or 'stein' have to be skipped by the board of selection for scholarships in chemistry" For it seems that years ago the university had entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" to this effect with the chemical industry, which supplied the funds for the scholarships and which happens to be rigidly exclusionist Thus the one exclusion re-enforces the other. In fact, if one keeps in mind, as Charles Beard has pointed out, that the tycoons of American industry were largely of North European stock, mainly English and Scotch-Irish, and of Protestant background, then it is clear that social discrimination must have as one of its major effects the containment of the Jews within a ghetto-like segment of the economy.

Blunt, overt, and utterly lacking in finesse, the extent of discrimination against

racial "minorities" in the United States can be measured statistically However, discrimination against the Jew as businessman, as doctor, as lawyer, as salesman is often hard to identify and is generally passed off as merely another manifestation of "competition" The higher one ascends on the social and economic ladder, the less overt and the more urbane does the pattern of discrimination become. The most significant discrimination against Jews occurs at the middle- or upper-class level where group competition is most apparent Hence it is not surprising that one study shows that high extremes in anti-Semitic attitudes belong to the middle socio-economic class, or that the score on anti-Semitic attitudes among university students should increase directly with the amount of the father's income This peculiarity of the distribution of anti-Semitic attitudes is surely significant

Most forms of social discrimination reflect — in the sense in which Durkheim once said that myth imitates society, not nature — the anomalous position that Jews occupy in the American economy Without citing the evidence, it can be said that Jews do not figure significantly in either commercial or investment banking, that their participation in the insurance business is negligible, and that, in general, they are a distinctly minor factor in American finance With the exception of waste products — symbol of exclusion rather than a badge of influence — they have been systematically excluded from the heavy industry segment of the economy Equally non-"Jewish," according to the *Fortune* survey of 1936, are such industries as coal, auto, rubber, chemical, shipping, transportation, ship-building, petroleum, aviation, railroading, private utilities, lumber, agriculture, mining, dairy farming, food processing, and the manufacture of heavy machinery The garment industry excepted, Jewish participation in the "light industries" field is largely restricted to the distribution end. Here the important fact to be noted is that — apparel goods excepted — Jews have been rigidly excluded from the important "chains."

Generally speaking, the businesses in which Jews are influential are those in which a large risk-factor is involved, those peripheral to the economy; new businesses and those originally regarded as unimportant, and businesses which have traditionally carried a certain amount of social stigma, such as the amusement and liquor industries Not being able to penetrate the key industries — those that have a decisive influence on the economy — they have been compelled to occupy the interstitial positions In short, it is not the volume of business they control or their success or failure which is important, but rather the relationship of so-called Jewish businesses to the total economy

The fact that Jewish businesses are essentially marginal has manifold collateral ramifications "The most important office law business in America," reads the *Fortune* survey, "such as the law business incidental to banking, insurance, trust-company operation, investment work, railroading, patents, admiralty, and large corporation matters in general is in the hands of non-Jewish firms many of which, even though they have numerous Jewish clients, have no Jewish partners"

If Jews can be isolated socially and economically, their competition can often be turned into a positive advantage For example, in Los Angeles, the credit end of the retail jewelry business is largely controlled by Jews, the "cash" stores by non-Jews Since risks and losses are greater, the credit stores must emphasize volume and to increase volume they are driven to cut prices In this situation the cash stores can use anti-Semitism as a variety of advertising and can capitalize prejudice in

the form of higher prices. If the cash stores were to absorb the credit stores, a certain amount of competition and some unfavorable trade conditions might be eliminated But it is extremely doubtful that the cash stores *would want* to absorb the credit stores even if they had the power to do so, for it is to their advantage to maintain the present relationship

Just as Jewish businesses *are marginal*, so Jews constitute a marginal class in America In socio-economic terms, they are in the middle of the middle class The *trading group among them is* almost three times larger than the national average, the professional group about twice the national average, while agriculture claims only about one per cent of the gainfully employed There can be no doubt, therefore, that a large section of American Jewry is concentrated in the lower-middle and upper-middle classes Furthermore, Jews have come to occupy, as Jacob Lestchinsky has observed, "a redundant position between the Anglo-Saxon and the other ethnic groups," particularly those which have not yet developed their own middle class Thus the pattern of social discrimination clearly reflects an economic reality While it has been impossible to subordinate Jews, in the sense that Negroes and Mexicans have been subordinated, it has been possible to isolate them economically, or, to put it another way, to exclude them from key control positions in the economy. In a thoroughly subordinated minority, social discrimination is unnecessary It would never occur to the average fraternity, any more than it would occur to the trustees of the California Club in Los Angeles, that they should bar Negroes by express provision But Jews, who occupy parallel status positions and who cannot be distinguished racially, require a special policy of exclusion to maintain the monopoly on social power The effect — and the function — of this exclusion is to contain them within certain segments of the economy

And, of course, this successful economic containment makes the social discrimination all the easier to justify. For the types of businesses in which Jews are concentrated fail to invest ownership with social power and prestige These businesses, as Mr Riesman has pointed out, lack the *artisan beginnings, the long identification* with certain family names, and the intimate relationship to a particular community which have placed so many American industrial families at the top of the social pyramid Clothing stores and motion picture theaters are not nearly so impressive as mines and mills, factories and railroads To keep the Jew in his corner, so to speak, it has been necessary to divest him of social power, once divested of this power — or denied access to it — his economic position makes it impossible for him to recapture or to acquire it

Political life issues from social life, as John Berryman has said, "like a somatic dream" A group occupying a weak or exposed social position is a group that invites economic and political, as well as social discrimination Certainly the anti-Semitic agitator seeks to exploit the cleavage which social discrimination makes visible No one knows better than the anti-Semite that the Jews have failed to enter the citadels of power and that their economic position is exposed. The agitation of the anti-Semite is premised upon the assumption that this cleavage exists, otherwise he would be as much in awe of Jews as he so obviously is of the tycoons who control American industry

Finally, social discrimination completes the circle it begins by imprinting indelibly throughout the whole society the very prejudiced attitudes that permit it to be born "The erection of such barriers (in social institutions)," Dr Monroe Deutsch has written, "tends to create or accentu-

ate in the minds of some of our so-called first citizens a feeling that Jews *per se* are a separate and more or less segregated and undesirable group If you decline to let a man eat beside you in a club, merely because he is a Jew, you are certainly helping to drive a nail into the wall of exclusion. In discussing the situation in Nazi Germany the point has often been made that those who, though not members of the party, nevertheless accepted the acts of the Nazis and helped perpetuate them in power cannot avoid sharing responsibility for the horrible deeds that were perpetrated by those whom they supported in office I wonder whether the members of some of our exclusive clubs (*exclusive* in the proper use of the term) are not, unthinkingly (it may be), in spirit aligning themselves with Father Coughlin and Gerald L K Smith"

The failure of both Jews and Gentiles to admit the importance of social discrimination — to see that it has a function — is to be explained by the tendency in American culture to deny the existence of realities which conflict with our equalitarian ideals "Democracy of feeling is expected of us," as Charles Horton Cooley once said, "and if we do not have it we usually simulate it" Thus we rationalize social discrimination as "freedom of association" or the right to select associates The folk-belief that any American can become a millionaire and therefore eventually entitled to practice some form of social discrimination has, in effect, robbed this type of exclusion of its edge As long as Jews are given a theoretical right to enter any trade, business, or profession, and their civil rights are safeguarded, they are almost powerless to object to a form of discrimination which they, in turn, are also privileged to practice in a limited way should they so desire

Those who minimize the importance of social discrimination overlook the fact that, our equalitarian pretenses to the contrary notwithstanding, the upper classes are still the upper classes Practices that they initiate are imitated by other groups and the old adage of "monkey sees, monkey does," becomes most pertinent The snobbishness of the "prestige" club is often reflected in the service clubs and in the civic organizations, and, embodied in these institutions, comes to be accepted as part of the natural order of the universe I find it significant that in Minneapolis, where social discrimination has been most pronounced, there should also be a strong current of anti-Semitism in the labor movement To be properly understood, anti-Semitism in the United States should be studied from the top down and not from the bottom up The business executive who achieves the Nirvana of membership in the X Club, selects for his junior executives men who are ascending the socio-economic ladder in the same fashion Seeing how the system works, the junior executives apply exclusionist policies in the selection of their assistants, often without being told to do so

It is for this reason that Jews encounter the most persistent discrimination, as employees, in precisely those sectors of the economy whose top levels link up with the centers of social power Thus Jews have always experienced great difficulty in securing "white collar" office or clerical jobs in insurance companies, banks, private utilities, and heavy industry This social discrimination in the end works not merely to exclude Jews from the "plums" of our economic order but from bread-and-butter jobs in large areas of employment.

The effect of this "closed shop" attitude on the part of the industrial and financial giants is to intensify the pressure of Jewish applicants for jobs in those businesses which have pursued a less systematic policy of exclusion, and to re-double the pressure to enter the free professions.

These pressures, in turn, perpetuate the marginal economic position of the Jews Issues of this kind take on, furthermore, in ever-increasing gravity as more of the national economic life falls within the orbit of exclusive trusts and monopolies

That social discrimination *is* important is fully realized by those who practice it, despite their pious disclaimers and innocent assurances. A year or so ago, Judge Harry Hollzer, long a distinguished and highly respected federal district court judge, died in Los Angeles Judge Hollzer was one of the leaders of the Jewish community A meeting to plan a memorial in his honor was called at the California Club "There we were," as one of the members present told me, "planning a memorial for Judge Hollzer in a club which would have refused his application for membership It occurred to me, as we sat there at luncheon, talking about Harry Hollzer, that the best way we could have honored him, if we had really wanted to honor him, would have been to eliminate a certain section from the by-laws For a moment, I thought of suggesting this as a memorial, and then I glanced around at those present and a good impulse was inhibited

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Harlan, H H, "Some Factors Affecting Attitude Toward Jews," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1942, pp 816-27 Using the reactions of college students to hypothetical situations in which anti-Semitism finds expression in action, this study gives some significant correlations with various aspects of class position (as well as other factors), and bears out McWilliams' contention about the greater prevalence of prejudice of this type among the middle and upper classes

2 Hill, M C, "Basic Racial Attitudes Toward Whites in the Oklahoma All-Negro Community," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1944, pp 519-23 The particular point of interest in this article is the range of attitudes expressed toward whites by different social classes of Negroes

3 Koenig, Samuel, "Ethnic Groups in Connecticut Industry," *Social Forces*, October, 1941, pp 96-105 Class differentiation was not a direct concern of this statistical study but it is relevant for our purpose because it demonstrates ethnic stratification in the division of labor and a marked parallelism between occupational lines and class lines

4 Lobb, John, "Caste and Class in Haiti," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1940, pp 23-35 In Haitian society as in our own there are to be found both the class and caste principles of social organization, with the *elite* and the *noirs* being clearly delineated There is here, ascent of the social ladder is hindered by many unsolved social problems, but present indications are that caste demarcations are in the process of being broken down

5 Lynd, R S, "Planned Social Solidarity in the Soviet Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1945, pp 184-97 Although this article tends to ignore differences between the basic premises underlying the system of stratification in the United States and in the Soviet Union and hence makes certain deductions about the control of cleavages which could not be applied in this country, it should be read for a cross-cultural comparison with the data presented in the New England community study

6 Warner, W L and Lunt, P S, "The Ethnic Minorities of Yankee City," *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, Vol II), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941, pp 211-26 This particular chapter of Warner's volume shows the class positions of ten different ethnic minorities in a Northeastern city and presents facts to bear out the hypothesis that the average class status of a group is associated with the length of time it has been in the city Certain demographic characteristics and behavior patterns are also noted in relation to varying positions in the class hierarchy

7 Wilson, Logan and Gilmore, Harlan, "White Employers and Negro Workers," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1943, pp 698-705 Based on data obtained from 175 firms employing 8,306 Negroes in a large southern city, this study sets forth the conditions under which Negroes find employment, the kinds of jobs to which they are relegated, and the attitudes behind the discriminatory practices of white employers

8 See also Pruden, "A Sociological Study of a Texas Lynching," p 335, Gilmore, "The Old New Orleans and the New A Case for Ecology," p 411, Myrdal, "Accommodating Leadership," p 696

PART FIVE *INSTITUTIONAL AND ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY AND NATION*

INSTITUTIONAL AND ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY AND NATION

INTRODUCTION

Every society has at the core of its culture a system of ultimate values around which the consensus of the society is organized. In our own society, for example, we have developed such ultimate values as the dignity of the individual, equality of opportunity, "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and growth of the free personality. Such ultimate values serve as a basis for establishing a hierarchy of intermediate values to which the members of the society can legitimately aspire, such as adequate housing, free public education, the ballot, and a living wage. Further, these ultimate values are expressed in the organization of a system of social norms which define the rights and the obligations of the individual in his relations with others. Thus in our society we have rules defining freedom of speech and worship, selective service laws, traffic regulations, table manners, rules of the job, and so on. It is this total system of ultimate values, hierarchically arranged goals, and normative rules of conduct which create social order and make it possible for the society to function as a unit and the individual to achieve his purposes.

While ultimate ends and intermediate goals help to secure adherence to the rules of a society, it is the latter which directly condition the interrelated and organized activities of the members and give form to their social relations. These rules define social statuses and determine which members of the society will play the roles associated with the statuses. In addition, they organize the statuses and roles in relation to one another so that in general the purposes of the group and the individual can be realized simultaneously. The term *institution* is used to designate these rules.

Institutions pattern the activity of human beings in such a way as to assist individuals in realizing the values they have taken over from the culture and at the same time to make it possible for the functional needs of society to be met. The most fruitful way of classifying the forms of institutionally regulated action is in terms of this latter functional role of guaranteeing the survival of society. If a society is to survive there are at least five basic functional needs to be fulfilled: (1) Social order must be secured not only by the existence of folkways, mores, and institutions (see Chapter 2), but also by a system of authority which applies sanctions to the violators of the normative code. (2) There must be provision for the fulfillment of basic subsistence needs of members of the society and for the re-

newal of the material apparatus through which objects meeting such needs are produced. (3) The population must be renewed as its members die off, and consequently some activities must be organized around reproduction and the care of offspring. (4) Children must be inducted into the culture of the society and trained both in its value systems and its skills. (5) There must be some system of ritual actions in which the ultimate value system is periodically reaffirmed. (This is the basic *societal* function of religious activity.) There are other functional needs, such as the needs for recreation and the expansion of knowledge, but these five are basic.

To serve its functional needs each type society has its own institutions which shape the activities of its members. In the simple communal society these activities take place either within the family or on a community-wide basis. All members of the society are familiar with the rules by which they are governed. Moreover, in the simple communal society activities interweave with one another so that it is only by a process of analytic abstraction that we can speak of them as being separate patterns. The complex communal society is distinguished from the simple communal society by a certain degree of differentiation of institutional activities and the growth of some distinct associations

In the associational society, on the other hand, these activities become clearly differentiated from one another and form the centers around which various specialized associations are organized. The state, with its subsystems of political parties, governing bodies, and so forth, arises out of the community as an agency preserving order largely through the application of statutory law and sanctions Economic associations develop and perform the function of producing and distributing goods and services. The family remains as an important association continuing to perform the function of child care and socialization, while the school takes over the more formal aspects of the educative and socializing function. Finally, religious activity becomes divided among various churches, each with its own interpretation of the ultimate value system of the community (With this splintering of religious activity, the function of reaffirming the ultimate value system of society is taken over to some extent by the state through the growth of nationalistic symbolism.)

In this Part we shall examine the manner in which each of these five functions is performed in the simple communal society, the complex communal society, and the associational society. As indicated above, a particular *type* of association is connected with each function in the associational society, but we shall find, particularly in the performance of political and economic functions, that the functional needs are fulfilled not by a single association but by a system of interrelated associations. (Thus, in an associational society, a host of small businesses, corporations, and commercial houses interact with one another to fulfill the economic needs of society.) It is appropriate therefore to treat these problems under the headings of political, economic, family, educational, and religious organization, rather than simply to use the concepts state, corporation, family, school, and church.

In addition to describing and analyzing the internal organization of each of the fields of social activity, we shall also trace their interrelations with one another so that society can be pictured as an organized whole In this way the fundamental aspects of the social structure will become clear, as will the basic differences of social organization in communal and associational societies.

15. Political Organization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Political organization has its roots in the need for social order. Unlike family, economic, educational, or religious organization, however, it is barely discernible in the simple communal society. For the most part the folkways, mores, and institutions of such a society are self-enforcing Tightly articulated with one another, and deeply ingrained in the personalities of all the members of the society, they control behavior through the mechanisms of habit, conscience, and community pressure. The same thing is of course true to some extent in modern associational society. Most of us, as adults at least, do not need an enforcing agency to see that we eat three meals a day, wear proper clothing, shake hands in the correct fashion, and marry only one person at a time Yet there are other areas of behavior in modern society where conformance to rules is certainly based on the threat of external enforcement. The average American's attitude toward traffic laws, for example, seems somewhat less than one of respect and awe One of the major differences between the simple communal society and the associational society is the fact that more areas of behavior in the associational society need enforcing agencies to support the rules, and, one might also say, more people need such forms of authority.

Despite the self-enforcing character of the cultural norms of the simple communal society, the germ of political control is present Where does it exist? In the family and in the community there are social roles which involve the exercise of legitimate authority resting ultimately on the sanctions of physical force and through which the behavior of the society's members may be controlled and conflicts settled. In Australian tribes, for example, judicial power was vested in the old men They handed down decisions on murder, sorcery, infringement of marriage regulations, and betrayal of secret ceremonies. Punishment usually took the form of wounding, but not killing, the guilty party with spears (cf Annotated References, item 5) The institutional regulations of primitive society which define the use of authority or which are enforced by authority (such as those carried out by the Australian council of elders) can be regarded as political institutions; they are not, however, *legal* institutions, i e, rules which are separate and distinct from the traditional institutions of the community. Such rules appear only when the state emerges from the matrix of the associational or complex communal society.

What, then, is the state and how does it come into being? The first part of the question can be simply answered for our purposes. The state is the basic political

association of both the complex communal society and the associational society. Its basic function is to maintain social order, and to meet that need the state is organized into a governmental structure and a body of rank-and-file citizens. It is not identical with the society, for citizenship is only one of the roles that the members of the society play. The state is a part of society, not the whole of it.

The determination of how and when the state comes into existence is a little more difficult. It exists wherever there are the following conditions: a governmental system, a distinction between legal norms (laws) and community norms, and a separation between areas of life controlled by law and those not so controlled. The problem is to determine just when these conditions are fulfilled. In feudal society, for example, there were political authorities, with a distinction between the spheres of these persons and the priestly hierarchy. Yet the rule of tradition was so strong that a genuinely distinct legal system could hardly be said to exist.

With the appearance of the *law-making function*, such as occurred with the rise of absolute monarchies in Europe, the existence of the state is incontrovertibly established. While the appearance and continued existence of the state points to social change, the society need not be associational in character. If the state attempts to create traditions where they are lacking, to enforce those which are present, and to render permanent a closed system of social stratification, the social order will be communal in character so long as the state is successful in its attempts. Despite their differences, these factors link together the absolute monarchies of the early modern era and the contemporary totalitarian states. The monarchies failed in their attempt to maintain a complex communal society; it remains to be seen whether the totalitarian states will be successful in their efforts to create one.

More often than not the appearance of the state heralds the beginning of an associational era, for the complexity of the problem of social order in such a period is one of the most important factors in bringing forth a powerful state. Why is the problem of social order in an associational society so complex? There are several reasons, among which the most important are the following. First, community-wide institutions and systems of values (i.e., those norms shared by all) no longer specifically order social relations in the major spheres of life. For example, practically all the members of our society share a set of broadly Christian beliefs, but our specific religious behavior is determined largely by the particular religious associations — Baptist, Catholic, Presbyterian, and so forth — to which we belong. Second, rather than specifying social relations, the community-wide institutions encourage diversity and autonomy. Our belief in tolerance is not simply an acceptance of behavior practices with which we disagree, but is based on the premise that behavior differences are highly desirable. (It should be noted, of course, that we are more ready to demand the right of nonconformity for ourselves than to grant it to others, and that in recent years this tendency appears to have been strengthened.) Third, even in those spheres where there must be a highly integrated social order, individualism and diversity are stressed. Thus in the economic realm our institutions promote the growth of activity motivated by a desire

for the largest personal income possible. Such norms substitute competition and contractual co-operation for uniformity and traditional co-operation.

These individualistic institutions of the associational society are not self-enforcing and certainly do not bring order out of their own functioning. Rather, they tend to produce confusion, competition, and conflict. Unless controlled they result in the breakdown of the society's consensus. This task of preserving order falls to the state, but the manner in which the state performs this function differs in the various spheres of social life.

In the noneconomic realm each association demands independence but tends to deny this right to others. Religious tolerance, for example, has to be guaranteed by the state, for there is considerable historical evidence that a lack of such control would result in a struggle for religious dominance Whether this is an inevitable tendency of group life or simply a carry-over from the communal society, the state must act to prevent the encroachment of group on group.

In the economic realm the functions of the associational state are somewhat different. To use the terminology of sports, it acts as rule-maker, umpire, and substitute. As a rule-maker, it develops a complex system of property and contract institutions which regulate the competitive relations of economic associations. As umpire, it prevents the infringement of property rights and corrects certain violations of the mores. Thus the state provides redress for the person who has been swindled by a stock promoter, or prevents employers from working their employees under needlessly dangerous conditions Finally, as a substitute, it may be called upon to perform economic services (e.g., mail delivery) which are not or cannot be provided adequately by private associations.

In international relations the state attempts to preserve an order favorable to its own national society. The national society is the largest *inclusive* social system in the world today, and hence the relations among states are not ordered by any widely effective rule of law. When the interests of national societies conflict, the function of the state is to settle these conflicts or to carry on war It is a truism that problems of international anarchy, diplomacy, and war are among the most crucial confronting the world today.

Since the end of the nineteenth century Western civilization has developed a complex of new relations and problems which vitally affect the functions of the state. The economic structure now comprises giant associations whose conflicts with one another create severe tensions in the social order and whose control of the economic realm makes economic insecurity and mass unemployment recurrent features of modern society. The *political* question posed concerns the role of the state in solving the problems of the *economic* order.

The state is handicapped in reaching a solution because of its own limited nature. It is restricted by the institutions of the society and by its own legal institutions. In the economic realm our almost universal belief in laissez-faire economics has restricted the state. This is reflected in the legal institutions setting forth the manner in which and the degree to which the government can regulate business

Thus our institutions are designed to prevent the fusion of economic and political power, and with good functional reason since such fusion might well doom the associational structure On the other hand, if the concentration of economic power tears the social fabric apart, the associational society is likewise doomed.

Turning to the structure of the associational state, we find that it is democratically organized in contrast with those states which are part of or are attempting to create a complex communal society In a society where there are conflicting interests, these interests can be reconciled only if the state serves as a political arena in which battles can be fought bloodlessly Consensus underlies political activities within the state, since the state is composed of members of the society in their social roles as citizens This consensus extends, however, only to the acceptance of the ultimate value system of the society and to the acceptance of the state as an arbitrator of their conflicting interests The laws of the state result from conflict and compromise rather than consensus They relate to consensus only in the sense that all are willing to abide by the laws so long as they are free to agitate for changes

This type of political organization develops its own set of political roles, of which the role of the *politician* is most important The social function of the politician is to promote compromise and provisional agreement among the contending groups of the associational society He and his organization, the political party, are indispensable in minimizing social strife There are limits, however, to the ability of the politician to bring about compromise. If other parts of the social system fail to function effectively, the competing and conflicting social groups lose their willingness to compromise, and the democratic system is likely to be overthrown The only hope for the associational society when such crucial problems arise is the acceptance of a workable solution by a decisive majority. This requires political leaders who wish to solve problems as well as hold office, and who adhere to the basic value system of the society and to democratic political institutions. It also requires that the people remain skeptical of the leaders' aims, motives, and intentions, for hero worship of leaders (while they are living) constitutes a definite threat to the structure of the associational society by inducing attitudes of servility and dependence which lead ultimately to an acceptance of authoritarianism

The selections in this chapter have been chosen for the light they throw on the structure and functions of the associational state The article by Gerard DeGré, "Freedom and Social Structure," serves as a background against which the functions of the state can be more clearly understood DeGré shows that freedom — defined as the ability to act with a minimum of external constraint and a maximum of predictability in the consequences of one's actions — is present to the highest degree in the associational society, provided that that society is able to maintain an equilibrium of power among its component associations and to create social order in their relations with one another Freedom decreases as the society moves in the direction of atomization The society loses its consensus, and the individual is no longer a member of social groups but part of an unstructured

amorphous mass. At the other extreme freedom disappears when power becomes over-concentrated in the hands of a few associations. We have seen that there are certain sectors of our society where mass relations may already exist, as in the private lives of the lower social classes. Large concentrations of power have developed in the economic sector and if fused with political power may be able to destroy freedom. They threaten such destruction even prior to fusion. These tendencies toward the mass society and toward totalitarianism are the major problems of the associational state. It must find a way of curbing the power of other associations and of preventing the trend toward mass society without at the same time becoming so powerful that it destroys the freedoms of the associational society, and in particular its own political freedoms.

The magnitude of this problem is emphasized in E Pendleton Herring's essay on "Logomachy and Administration" Herring believes that much of the political conflict about the relation of the state to the economic order is a battle of words, or a "logomachy." As an example he shows that various interests have used the word freedom to defend diametrically opposed points of view. Thus labor unions and employers do not mean the same thing when they speak of freedom. Notwithstanding this, he recognizes beneath the cloak of ideology the existence of a genuine problem, a problem for which the associational society as yet has no solution which will permit it to retain its associational structure The problem is immediately posed, as we have already indicated, by the tremendous concentration of economic power and the conflicts between the groups which possess this power The answer of the conservative members of the associational society, namely to utilize the state as the means of restoring the conditions of free competition, is inapplicable to the present stage of development of the associational society's economic and industrial structure. Equally fallacious, although not so obviously so, is the proposal to have the state control or take over economic activities in their totality. This is true whether the proposals come from the right or the left. Herring believes that the modes of democratic government — and he develops his argument with an excellent description of the nature of the democratic process, including the role of political parties — are not fitted at present to the task of administering and managing industries. Our central problem — the establishment of efficient and responsible management in both private and public enterprise — cannot be solved simply by turning over industry to government either in part or in its totality If there is an answer, Herring believes, it will be found through experiment, not through the application of dogma.

The final selection, the last chapter of Robert Michels's book, *Political Parties,* indicates some of the reasons for dispersing power and limiting the power of the state It is also important for its formulation of certain basic generalizations concerning bureaucracy. These generalizations have served as a springboard for the many contemporary analyses that have been stimulated by the ever increasing importance of political and economic bureaucracy. The leaders of any association or society, according to Michels, concentrate power in their own hands. This is true,

even though the ideology of the group or society is democratic in character. Therefore democracy is an impossibility. If this thesis is taken to mean that in all social groups power *tends* to concentrate in the hands of leaders, it is probably valid. Yet the rank and file may still exercise some measure of control over their leaders. Through a system of institutions it is possible to keep the elites in different sectors of society from coalescing, and to make it necessary for those who rule to compete with one another for the allegiance of the people. In any society there will be those who rule and those who are ruled, but the former can be and have been made increasingly responsible to the latter. There can be little doubt but that the associational society has come closest to checking the dominance of elites. So long as it can remain organized and can solve its problems — particularly its economic problems — it offers more freedom and more power to the rank and file. If it fails to solve its problems — and it well may — it will be superseded by the complex communal society in which the individual will be controlled not by the community, not by the church, not even by the complex economic organizations, but by the modern streamlined totalitarian state.

FREEDOM AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE * *Gerard DeGré*

The problem of freedom is an old one, but for free men its importance is such that it can bear periodical re-examination. The term itself is ambiguous, for it has been used in many senses, not only by the philosophers but by practical statesmen as well. The discussion of freedom has often been involved with the idea of free will, at other times it has referred more concretely to freedom of action within society. The questions connected with free will and determinism are primarily problems for metaphysics and ethics and, in the main, only normative answers can be given to them. The conditions which are conducive to freedom of social action, however, are more amenable to historical and sociological investigation, and it is this relationship which will provide the basis for discussion.

From the sociological standpoint the problem of freedom is primarily a problem of social structure. This means that it is a legitimate task for the sociologist to inquire into the socio-historical conditions, particularly the structure of power relationships present in various types of societies, which are most closely correlated with freedom of social action. A thorough study would, of course, require an intensive historical research into the fluctuation of freedom under the impact of changing forms of political, economic and social organization. But even a preliminary presentation of the question requires some working definition of freedom that will lend itself to some degree of objectivity of treatment. The problem therefore resolves itself into two main topics for analysis: the nature of freedom, and the

* *American Sociological Review*, October, 1946, pp. 529–36. Reprinted by permission of the author.

consideration of the forms of social structure which are conducive to freedom.

It may be said that the amount of freedom that an individual possesses is measured by the number of things he can do without interference from others. In this sense his freedom is a function of someone else's freedom, for this other person's concrete freedoms may be such that they tend to inhibit the freedom of action of the first individual. If Van Wyck has the freedom to levy assessments on the produce of Jones, then Jones does not have the freedom to dispose of the product of his labor as he sees fit. If Jones joins with Smith and Muller and Larski, then he may be able to limit and institutionalize the amount of assessments so that the economic relationship to Van Wyck becomes much more predictable It then becomes much more possible for Smith to plan his course of economic action. The freedom of any concrete individual or group, therefore, would appear to be a *resultant* of his or their position *vis à vis* other persons or groups. This paper will attempt to show that freedom flourishes most when the relationships of groups are in a relative equilibrium determined by a reciprocity and accommodation necessitated by each group having to take into account in its action the interests, values and power of other groups. This is true according to the degree to which the various groups are relatively equal to one another, thereby insuring the improbability of any one group attaining a monopoly of control over the rest.

Freedom may be defined in terms of the *probability* that specific groups or individuals can formulate their ends of conduct and initiate a course of action with a minimum degree of constraint from other persons, and with a high degree of predictability of the consequences of their acts within the institutional and associational structure of the community. In other words, it is determined by the degree to which persons, distributively or collectively, can plan a course of action without arbitrary and unpredictable interference. The essence of freedom, therefore, is its *rationality,* in the sense that it is defined according to the *predictability* of the probable expectations tied up with a course of action.

It must not be forgotten, however, that predictability in itself does not exhaust completely the meaning of freedom. For although the essential rationality of freedom implies the ability of the agent to plan his actions with reference to his probable expectations, the range of action may be severely limited by the institutional structure of society, so that even if the agent can count on the relative stability of the state-ways and *mores,* his action may be inhibited by the socio-juridical structure of a narrow, authoritarian state. The rationality of freedom implies, therefore, not only the relative predictability of the future, it implies, as well, the ability to plan and act with a minimum degree of external constraint Both of these aspects of freedom are implied in the popular definition in terms of the degree to which "man is the master of his own destiny."

II

Man, as a political animal, lives his life in groups, and the concrete freedoms which he enjoys derive their sustenance and vitality from the backing of his group *vis à vis* other groups. The romantic, highly individualized conception of freedom, so popular in the literature of the nineteenth century, and useful as it may be in motivating individual thought and action, fails, nevertheless, to provide a realistic theory of freedom which can do justice to the sociological and historical roots of social action. Romanticism provides an ideal of freedom rather than an explana-

tion or analysis. In its emphasis on the ideal of personal autonomy, Romanticism brushes aside the problem of the situational determination of freedom

A normative philosophy can operate with such concepts as those of Romanticism, for its purpose is not to explain reality, but rather to motivate action in the light of the ideals or norms which it establishes. Sociology, however, has as its end the explanation of socio-historical reality, and must therefore set a different course when it embarks upon an exploratory cruise This does not imply that the purpose of motivating men's action is any less worthy than the venture of explaining or understanding it, it merely implies that the two problems are different in their conception and resolution, and that the problem of explanation logically precedes the problem of motivation For it is only after we have determined the conditions under which freedom can thrive that we can expend our efforts towards the realization or maintenance of these conditions

A sociological theory of freedom, therefore, must take as its starting point the *socius*, that is, the individual as a member of a group, class, or social type, rather than the abstract individual-as-such that forms the nucleus of Romanticism.

Studies in the field of the sociology of knowledge[1] have demonstrated that the idea of freedom is itself conditioned by the group membership of the individual For the conservative, freedom usually means the freedom to exercise his prerogatives and to conduct his affairs with a minimum of interference from the state or other organized groups Although at first glance this conception might not seem to run contrary to our general definition of freedom, in practice it tends to violate social freedom to the degree to which it refuses to recognize the claims of other groups to free action In other words, it recognizes freedom only *for its own class,* and endeavors to keep other social strata subordinated to its will.

The revolutionist, on the other hand, defines freedom primarily in terms of freedom from the restrictions and prerogatives of a strongly intrenched dominant class, and, in its revolutionary fervor, calls for the destruction of that class. This is as true of the ascendant bourgeoisie in its struggle against the feudal aristocracy as it is of the revolutionary proletariat of our day

A little reflection makes it clear that both of these groups are operating with a *particularistic* conception of freedom, for they both define freedom in terms of their own class interest The unreconstructed conservative and the reactionary admit freedom as a good only for their own group, and wish to deny it to others just as soon as they feel that their class interests are threatened The revolutionist, in reaction to this situation, wishes to deny the very basis of freedom to the dominant group, that is, their continued existence.

A *pluralistic* or *total* definition of freedom must take into account the interests and aspirations of all societal groupings, economic, political and cultural Because of this, the methodological standpoint of an objective social philosophy must be *moderate,* in spite of the personal political predilections of the investigator.

If the degree of freedom is dependent upon the relative absence of external constraint, it will be correlated also with those societal conditions which tend to limit the power of social groups in relationship to one another The problem of freedom, therefore, is primarily a problem of the group structure of society. We

[1] Cf Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia,* New York Harcourt, Brace & Co , 1936, esp pp 244–246 Also Mannheim's "Das konservative Denken," *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* vol 57, pp. 90 ff

governments have rooted out the vestiges of any opposition, not only from other class alignments, but from within their own "classless" stratum as well. In Fascist societies it has been the government party machine and bureaucracy itself which has achieved the greatest monopoly of force and control the world has ever seen

In most of these cases political dominance has been achieved through a disproportionate degree of economic control of certain groups as compared to the other groups within a society The source of the initial advantage may have been due originally to conquest, e g, early feudalism Sometimes it has been the result of greater technical competence as in the case of Rome. Perhaps in most cases it has been due to the fact that certain groups were strategically situated historically to take full advantage of a changing economic situation, and the lack of enterprise, interest or imagination of other more firmly intrenched strata; e g, the bankers and merchants of Renaissance Florence *vis à vis* the old Florentine aristocracy.[5]

Although it would be difficult to overestimate the importance of economic control in determining the structure of power relationships, this should not blind us to the relevance of ideological and political factors as well. The fact that certain political doctrines may be considered extremely useful by particular groups in furthering their own ends does not mean necessarily that the parties expressing these doctrines are the "tools" of these groups The political party, rather, may be their accomplices and eventually their masters A case to the point is Nazi Germany where the National Socialist party eventually achieved dominance over the economic interests which originally backed them in their ascent to power At other times, ecclesiastical, military, ideological or charismatic groups have attained strategic positions in the distribution of power relationships which enabled them to dominate politically the historical situation in spite of a relatively secondary economic position.

Inasmuch as the amount of power of any specific group is restricted by the social pressure which other groups can bring against it, it follows that a hyper individualized or atomized society is in greater danger of falling under the dominance of the first organized group that comes along than is a society where various units of possible resistance already exist. A society split into too large a number of tiny conflicting groups, as well, will find it difficult to organize a significant opposition in case of need On the other hand, when one or two groups have obtained control of the social structure, the resulting oligarchy is in a position to dominate the majority for its own purposes The optimum condition for freedom, therefore, lies somewhere midway between totalitarianism at one extreme and atomized individualism at the other.

IV

In order to visualize the relationship between freedom and social structure just described, a graphic device may prove useful The optimum condition for freedom may be represented by the high point of a bell-shaped curve, the decline of the probability of freedom in the directions of both atomism and totalitarianism is indicated by the declining slopes to the left and right of the medial distribution (Fig 1)

In this statistical analogy the horizontal ordinate represents a continuum from a completely disorganized social structure (atomism) to the absolutely regimented society (totalitarianism) The intervening steps represent degrees of group organiza-

[5] Cf. Alfred Von Martin, *Sociology of the Renaissance*, New York Oxford University Press, 1944.

tion and concentration. The vertical ordinate represents the varying degrees of probability that free institutions will be present in relationship to the underlying social inter-group structure

Thus the minimal degree of group integration (extreme individualism) is correlated with a low degree of freedom and would be illustrative of Hobbes' "war of all against all" This provides the first type of our projected classification, and may be designated as *atomistic.* Historical types tending to fall within this area of the curve are anarchy, frontier democracy, and the magic-ridden, cut-throat competitive economy of Dobu [6]

The minoral degree of societal integration is characterized by the shattering of society into a multitude of small competing groups, resulting in a relatively low degree of social stability which in turn can pave the way for dictatorship and the monolithic state. It is characterized by a multiplication of small groups. many autonomous economic organizations, a large number of competing sects, a multiparty system where no one party can achieve a parliamentary majority or significant minority, and a society lacking a basic consensus concerning its ends, institutions or organization In the world-political sphere we have the example of the Holy Roman Empire and the Italian City States which were at the mercy of unified national powers. Societal types are more difficult to find, although in certain respects the French political scene during the thirties approximated this condition. To designate a *multiparute* system an alternative botanical term suggests itself: *multifid*, cloven into many segments.

The high, medial segment of the curve




FIG. 1

Variations of Freedom in Relation to Systems of Power Relationship

[6] Cf Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture,* New York Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

represents the optimum condition for the development and maintenance of freedom. It is the *pluralist* society characterized by the presence of large, well integrated groups representing significant divisions of interests and values. The various groups are limited in their power by the fact that the interests of other groups must be taken into account. The power of the state is limited by the power of organized public opinion and large special interest groups, the pressure exercised by business interests is counter balanced by the forces of organized labor, both management and labor must take into account the interests of an integrated consumers' movement and other public agencies, no one religious group possesses a monopoly of spiritual values, and the various religious groups learn to accommodate themselves to one another; religious thought is denied absolute sovereignty over ideas by the presence of independent secular thought maintained by a free press, free universities, free literary movements, learned societies and organized scientific research. In the sphere of production, a pluralist society might allow for the operation of more than one form of economic organization, not only corporations and single entrepreneurships, but worker owned cooperatives and state organized collectives as well Probably no community has ever achieved the optimum degree of pluralist organization, but the United States of America, Great Britain and Sweden may be considered as illustrative of societies tending to approximate the conditions of a pluralist society The problem of the citizenry of these states is to extend the equilibrating democratic forces which tend to secure the pluralistic conditions of freedom, while combating the twin dangers of monolithic totalitarianism and atomistic individualism. In this connection it must be stressed that a consensus must exist amongst the various groups concerning the relative desirability and validity of the underlying institutional structure. This consensus exists to the degree to which the groups are convinced that they can realize their aims within the framework of the society as a going order Without this basic agreement, the pluralist society degenerates into a conflict society of warring strata, classes, organizations and pressure groups

The ancient term, *oligarchy,* may be retained to designate the declining slope of our hypothetical curve The chief index is the increasing concentration of power into the hands of specific vested interests; irrespective of whether these interests are aristocratic, bourgeois, military, proletarian, ecclesiastic or bureaucratic It is inevitable, perhaps, that this tendency will manifest itself at critical historical junctures and revolutionary periods The role of the moderate (if he keeps his head) during these periods is to provide a critical oasis during the transition, while adapting himself realistically to the logic of events and the pattern of history. This means that the role of the moderate is a progressive rather than a reactionary one, but that, at the same time, he cannot share the fanaticism of the extreme left any more than he can that of the extreme right, and still be the carrier of general human and cultural values the dignity of man, individual responsibility, judicial impartiality, the preference of persuasion to force, in a word, all of the *values* which make him prefer freedom to domination In normal times, the moderate or pluralist will tend to support those social strata which have not as yet achieved relative equality of status within the society

Located at the bottom of our declining slope is the *totalitarian* society. It is totalitarian precisely because it has systematically destroyed all independent groups and autonomous opinion. It resembles the atomistic society in that the individual

again operates without the backing of any group of his own. It differs from the atomistic society, however, in the fact that this time the atomized individual faces the full power of an omnipotent Leviathan state. Because of this it might be preferable to label the process as "massification" rather than "atomization" For while "atomization" takes place more or less spontaneously, "massification" is the product of the deliberate policy of the totalitarian state to destroy all possible social groups which could some day challenge its authority [7]

The purpose of constructing the hypothetical curve was to provide a frame of reference within which the relationship of freedom and social structure might be shown as a continuum The curve, obviously, does not represent an experimentally derived frequency distribution It might be described as an "ideal typical" curve, arbitrarily divided into five segments, each segment representing a formal "pure type" of social structure On the basis of this ideal typical distribution it is then possible to define societal types more precisely, and to locate roughly on the curve historically given social structures. The curve serves as a reminder, as well, that freedom is a matter of degree, rather than an "all-or-none" affair, and that it is correlated with the structure of group relationships present in society

v

In the sphere of action, the citizen who values freedom would, if he agreed with these considerations, adopt a flexible policy calculated to support those socio-historical trends which appeared to be conducive to a pluralistic social structure He would be suspicious of social movements which called for the abolition of traditional freedoms and the establishment of absolute control by some one group or stratum over the community He would find himself in opposition to those who would maintain at all cost the *status quo* in spite of the changes made necessary by new historical conditions, realizing the dangers inherent in an explosive socio-historical situation He would give support to those groups which were struggling to achieve a greater equality of status, influence or power, so that the disproportionate power of other groups would be lessened All of these policies would have as their end the maintenance and extension of freedom through a democratic equilibrium of forces, guaranteed by the mutual accommodation of relatively equal interest groups, maintained by a basic consensus, realistically oriented to historical conditions and trends, and motivated by a liberal pluralistic ideology of good will, fair play, compromise and progress.

[7] Cf Emil Lederer, *The State of the Masses*, New York Norton, 1940 According to Alfredo Poviña *Historia de la Sociologia Latinoamericana* Mexico 1941, the Argentine positivist, Jose Maria Ramos Mejia, has given a penetrating account of the role of unorganized masses in paving the way for dictatorship in his *Las Multitudes Argentinas* (1899) and *Rosas y su Tiempo* (1907)

LOGOMACHY AND ADMINISTRATION *

E. Pendleton Herring

To practice politics is to seek power. This goal is approached as areas of influence are established. The leader must make his influence the dominant one in the lives of his followers. Hence the political method seeks to minimize the differences existing among those appealed to; it tends to ignore internal conflicts and to direct attention to the "agreed-upon" Thus it exalts the lowest common factor or introduces extraneous factors about which a new mutual loyalty is constructed. It does not provide a method designed primarily to consider the substantive merits of public issues.

When legislators are debating about rights or when people seek common principles through government, the political method of exhortation, of debate, and of persuasion answers a need. But the symbols of popular government lose meaning if we try to apply them to the concrete problems of management with which governmental officials are faced today.

The language of political debate is so utterly removed from reality that opposing sides can use the same symbolic terms in justification of completely divergent governmental acts. "Independence," "freedom," "individualism," are endangered we are told (a) unless the government curbs the power of great corporations over the citizen or (b) unless the government ceases its interference in "private" affairs. Ours is a tyranny of logomachy.

The current trend is to foist upon government, an agency heretofore largely concerned with the residua of social conflict, primary problems of human management Government is being asked not merely to prevent anti-social acts it is being called upon for positive action. What basis is there for such faith?

Under industrialism, society has moved from the anarchy of competition with the state maintaining a hands-off policy to the present condition of competitive enterprise in a few fields and monopolistic management in others Politicians are called upon to meet demands from both fields Can a positive program along the whole range of social problems be projected in the public interest when a common economic basis seems lacking?

The government is to an increasing extent affecting the day-to-day life of the individual In doing so, it impinges upon jurisdictions already established The great repositories of power are those institutions [associations] that determine the routine behavior of men. For want of a better term, they might be called power-units. The church and the merchant guilds of the Middle Ages were clearly such units. Today great industrial organizations, labor unions, professional associations, etc, perform a similar function within their respective fields

The exercise of control over the actions of individuals has for the most part been conducted through non-state agencies The government intervenes (a) where parties in conflict are strong and rich enough to go to court, (b) where one party is influential enough to secure favorable action by the legislature or the executive, and (c) where a violation of mores or existing

* *Journal of Social Philosophy*, January, 1937, pp 95–117 Reprinted by permission of the author

laws brings officialdom into action This last contingency, however, is an end product The statutes and precedents enforced in (c) are the crystallizations resulting from (a) and (b)

The routine activities of men in a democracy are determined by power-units lying beyond the ambit of official control Government in the *broad* sense is the direction of these routines Government in the *legal* sense is the institutionalization of the desires of politically effective power-units. The extension of governmental activity means that the administrative function is removed from private power-units and centralized under officials These officials may themselves develop into a power-unit In an effort to prevent this, we hedge these men about with restrictions that limit their discretion at the cost of administrative efficiency, to the end, it is assumed, that we may thus live under a government of laws and not of men

In a democracy there is a great decentralization of authority, the forces fixing the routines of men and women are disparate and fluid. By a legal fiction the state may be said to possess final authority, but actually the extent to which it serves as a power-unit depends on the relative strength of the many competing power-units Law is not a power in itself, but rather a channel through which social forces choose to seek their objectives There seems to be a growing tendency to use governmental forms as the most effective means of social control Authority thus becomes centralized In Italy and Germany, the eggs of power have been placed in one basket and a cormorant's brood hatched

Under any *régime*, symbols, slogans and principles are enunciated by leaders in order to create loyalty to state authority The mass of citizens associate these ideas with certain political processes A strong tendency to cherish the process develops even though in time it may cease to be the best means of absolving social conflicts Symbols may thus serve to obscure reality and may indeed become much more influential than the demands of actual practice They are familiar Facts may be confused and strange Political action is stimulated more readily by pointing to accepted symbols than by attempting to analyze concrete reality

Thus efforts at direct remedial legislation may be cried down as unconstitutional especially by those not immediately affected Reformers are faced with the task of reconciling new facts with an old philosophic foundation Revolutionaries turn to new symbols They embrace a novel set of abstractions with such ardor that they are willing to upset the existing system in order to exalt new theories of the state. The more severe the crisis, the greater the tendency to ignore the facts and the stronger is the urge to embrace a new ideology Symbols may influence, restrain or stimulate action they can not persist as the ultimate determinant

Power, itself, always escapes any fixed institutional or ideological framework In practice officials must discover ways for getting things done Since they must pay at least lip service to the ideology of the state under which they work, they can not always pursue the most direct course. The elastic pragmatism of Fascism provides excellent conditions for direct action but no check to tyranny The principles of popular government restrict the sphere of officialdom so greatly that under our constitution it has been necessary to build an enormously elaborate and expensive party system in order that the system may function at all

On the other hand, the ideology surrounding the administration of industrial affairs is characterized by axioms encouraging the greatest freedom This is illustrated, for example, by our reference to

commercial activity as business *enterprise*. Such an ideology accords with the actual facts only in certain fields Management in monopolistic industries should perhaps be regulated according to concepts that limit rather than encourage individualism Where essential services, whether under the government or private industry, are offered on a "take-it-or leave-it" basis, the bureaucracies in control of such enterprises should be held socially responsible

It is obvious that the ideology at present surrounding state administrative action is so restrictive that inefficiency and red-tape result The old symbols do not readily apply to the expansion of the state into new fields of management These symbols do not encourage and promote the spirit of business enterprise under the aegis of governmental management A new ideology is needed for developing an attitude of governmental enterprise and business-like management of public affairs This will not be attained simply by extending the jurisdiction of officialdom We are too bound down by a fear of bureaucracy Advance in this field is handicapped by out-worn theories and half-baked hopes Those holding to traditional concepts have no solutions for our present problems Those entertaining the hopes have had little experience with the concrete problems of management

At the present juncture one camp defends business enterprise, another extols social responsibility It is a war of ideologies, a battle of abstractions One side fixes attention on a day that is passing, the other focuses on a condition that has never existed. With the aspirations of either, no one can cavil; but a solution will not lie in the reconciliation of irreconcilable phrases. Rather we must experiment with new forms and discover new symbols to win general acceptance for the institutions that prove useful.

The central problem is that of establishing effective areas of management and administration on a large scale This applies to both government and industry The curse of bigness lies in the administrative difficulties that it imposes If *efficient* and *responsible* administration can be established over large fields of human activity, it does not matter greatly whether the managers are officials or private individuals

We criticize governmental administration most frequently for its inefficiency Great corporations are attacked, on the other hand, because those in control underestimate their responsibility toward their employees, their stockholders or the public they serve But we seldom approach this situation as a purely administrative problem of finding the most direct way of accomplishing a concrete result Left-wing critics advocate government control of big business, conservatives decry governmental interference If this same energy could be expended along constructive lines, we might discover ways of bringing a better sense of public responsibility into the private corporation and of introducing improved methods of management into public enterprise

As we have noted, power does not flow from the state alone There are many ways of governing the behavior of men and of corporate persons other than through the passage of laws In the control of economic enterprise, the possibilities of stockholders' protective committees, of industrial unionism, of consumers' cooperatives, have yet to be fully explored To those heralding the on-coming of the fascist state, the democrat can reply, "We have not yet begun to fight" The growth of the mixed corporation may have a profound effect upon the relations between the government and economic enterprise Official representation on boards of directors offers a means of supervising private

management, especially in those cases where the government has given large subsidies or extensions of credit As one student of business has observed

"Corrective, or . . . discriminatory-taxation, would seem to furnish an efficacious plan for curbing corporate growth within limits satisfactory to public opinion, just as government operation of power plants puts a brake on the rates of private companies and heavy inheritance taxes provide a check for self-perpetuating fortunes swollen by fortuitous conditions beyond the ken of the original founders" [1]

To talk of government control versus private enterprise is to create a deceptive dichotomy For the "government to take over business" at the present time would be equivalent to business taking over the government "Government" is not something apart Government control of business means in essence that such interests as the consumer, the worker, or the farmer now unrepresented in the management of industrial enterprise turn to political channels for securing a share of control Certain power-units, finding a *frontal* attack upon other power-units either futile or inexpedient, turn to the political process The ideology of popular government makes it easy for numerically strong interests to appeal to the "rights of the people" in seeking a legal sanction for promoting their own interests. The symbols of competitive capitalism provide the industrialist with a conventionally acceptable rejoinder. The ideology of both sides is removed from the concrete problem of discovering how best to conduct great economic activities so as to accord with the technical criteria of good management

Economic experience has proved that certain industrialists cannot be left to discover their own best advantage and yet at the same time render optimum service to the public On the other hand, the problem of effective administration is not solved merely by instituting what is called government control Men are governed not simply by legally recognized authorities but by a multitude of power-units as well To centralize industrial management in the hands of officials would make them the focal points of conflicts now widely distributed over the social fabric This arrangement would concentrate rather than remove conflicts It would mean simply the closer association of existing power-units with the political process This process in a democratic state is encrusted with symbols inappropriate for dealing with problems of management Democratic government was not designed for the conduct of economic enterprise but rather for the protection of individual rights against encroachment by the state. Before we venture far into new fields, it is well to reckon with the nature of the political process under democracy.

Social control, whether official or unofficial, has always been decentralized in the United States The growth of corporations, however, has gathered power into larger units Within its jurisdiction, the great business combine is a kind of "corporate-state" It is bureaucratic to a high degree It tends to be irresponsible It is organized for action and all is sacrificed to profit making (This is not necessarily identical with the most efficient operation since huge profits may be made at times by financial operations that run counter to the dictates of good management) The corporation reflects the good as well as the bad qualities of unified disciplinary action The existence of such power-units in a community pledged to democratic government is a paradox that may be more than the state can bear. Professor Arnold states

[1] Arthur D. H Smith, *Men Who Run America*, p 322.

"In that control over our affairs by a governing force usually referred to as business, we permit great employers almost absolute power over the livelihood of perhaps the greater percentage of our population, and allow them to use this power without even giving reasons for their action. We do this through a slogan which clothes our great employers with a mystical sanction not differing in effect from the divine right of kings."[2]

Popular government can not be said to exist in a society where the state possesses the outward forms of "free government" but where the daily actions of men are dominated in fact by a churchly hierarchy, by an industrial oligarchy, or by a political machine. The student of government has given some attention to the first and last of these conditions, but the extent to which human activities are falling under the influence of a small group of bankers and entrepreneurs can not be neglected We are prone to regard the controls imposed by the state through official channels as somehow implicitly restrictive, while the control imposed by men upon each other in economic life is considered a part of the nature of things

As Professor Corwin has said, the Supreme Court regards it as an infringement of liberty for the federal government to require railroads to pay their employees a pension, while it is not an infringement of the employee's liberty to be told that membership in a union disqualifies him from employment The employee, if he does not like such conditions, is always free to starve. There are statutes forbidding suicide, but there is no law against starvation if done quietly and decently.

This contrast between the views toward official versus private "government" has a solid historical background Never since the rise of modern statehood have there been such great power-areas dissociated so clearly from social control. While pluralistic in the number of its control-centers, the Middle Ages was yet dominated by an ideology of intellectual universalism and a theology of Christian unity The present age is one of chaotic values and of disparate authorities Authorities in the industrial world acknowledge no value save their own power and expansion. They determine what we shall eat, when we shall sleep, and even what we must think They challenge any effort at control They use the forms and ideals of responsible popular government for the protection of their own privileges

Popular government grew as a protest against kingship, as a method of calling to account the limited ruling class which regarded public office as its private preserve When Jacksonian Democracy nipped an official oligarchy in the bud by killing off rule by the gentry, it opened the door to the machine politician The sons of the "gentry" and those who subsequently composed the ranks of the "nice people" (and some not so nice) turned their attention to business and the economic development of the nation. Statecraft was not something to which the well-brought up youth devoted his life. Politics was a tangential activity to the successful practise of law or the conduct of business Regulation by the government was resented and all the more bitterly by those who held politicians beneath contempt

We have experimented with devices for insuring a wider participation in government. Although attempts such as the initiative and referendum have not proved entirely satisfactory, they do demonstrate our willingness to seek ways for making popular government more responsive. Once government is recognized as *not* confined to agencies labelled official and political, we can search for means of obtaining a higher sense of social responsibility on the

[2] *Symbols of Government*, p. 217

part of business.

The battles for popular government have never been easy victories, but they have been worth fighting The path to freedom today does not lie in eliminating statutory restrictions, the old irksome disabilities in this field have been repealed It lies rather in bringing under control those forces which most directly affect our private lives Only to a limited degree are these forces "official"

The problem is to discover an ideology appropriate to present needs The divine right of kings is no more fantastic a doctrine than that of the equality of men That both are faiths based on fictions does not make them any the less useful if the times demand such a symbol When supernatural sanctions were those most conducive to order, the developing nation-state drew strength from the majesty that hedged the king and thus counteracted the forces threatening united authority Order was the first need of the community When industry was battling scarcity, any interference with productive forces by kings or ministers was cried down The barons of business made their empire, and to challenge their rights became *lèse majesté* The admiration and fear of the peasant for the protecting overlord found its parallel in the public attitude toward the men who wrested with nature and conquered the wealth of forests, mines and marts of trade, who jousted with each other in the financial lists and won the golden accolade of riches

But the extremes to which the concept of personal rights has gone is well illustrated by Professor Arnold

"As business organizations grew after the Civil War, they gradually began to use for their support the ancient symbols of freedom and liberty, until, in the quaint poetic fancy of our day, the United States Steel Company has become an individual whose powerful organization must be protected at all hazards from tyranny The freedom of the press has come to mean the non-interference with great chains of newspapers, pouring out propaganda, even though under no stretch of the imagination can it be said to be the free opinion of those who actually write it Liberty of individuals to live unmolested by the power of overlords has become confused with the liberty of great industrial overlords to hold in their uncontrolled discretion the livelihood of individuals"[3]

A modern Declaration of Independence would read that all men are created unequal and that the courts have but aggravated the doings of nature The existence of great industrial power-units together with the numerous other social and economic hierarchies makes the problem of democratic government essentially one of adjusting their resultant differences The task, never easy, is made all the more difficult by the undemocratic "government" prevailing within the power-units that must be reconciled From these centers emerges an impatience with the democratic method itself

Within this growing wilderness of conflict and confusion, our political parties have undertaken the task of keeping the official government going "When the constitution was signed and adopted and the document was safely locked away," writes Professor McLaughlin, "there remained still unprovided for the two supreme jobs of democracy — the placing in office of the men whom the people wish to have in office and the transferring of the people's desires into legislation and administration" And he continues, "In any study of the party, we should see that the important thing is not in its principles, but the fact that it exists at all and that it is used as a means of conducting public

[3] *Symbols of Government*, p 238

affairs, of doing — or failing to do — the tremendously difficult job of carrying on popular government "[4]

The accomplishment of party government lies in the ability it has shown for reducing warring interests and conflicting classes to manageable form Parties try to establish some kind of working accord to minimize dissension among their followers and to win a wide support Democracy can continue so long as such a working harmony is struck among the demands of various groups It is not a question of establishing conditions of equality and justice, but rather of hitting a more or less acceptable balance

If the meek have not inherited the earth, they have at least overrun its habitable portions The mass of men will accept vast social inequalities before being moved to conjoint protest Tyranny or dictatorship results where one official interpretation of the public interest and the good life is imposed by governmental authority Democracy allows different views on this point It assumes that the *public interest* lies in the promotion and adjustment of special interests into a working compromise that is ever forming and re-forming To be *democratic,* this compromise must preserve these conditions under which people may align themselves freely behind leaders All must recognize that the authority of these leaders is contingent upon the acceptance of constitutionally declared limits In this fluidity of leaders and their varying interpretation of the public interest lies the vitality of democracy

One might wish for a more apparent purpose and direction in this democratic flux; or that efficiency and economy characterize democratic action But the democratic process may be true to itself and be neither efficient, practical, profitable, just or moral It need accord with none of the canons of religion, morals, economics or philosophy except as these standards are effectively exemplified in the community itself.

In contrast, Plato viewed politics and ethics as inseparable Social justice was thus individual morality writ large Plato used political theory as a magnifying glass for the closer scrutiny of how man should be guided toward the good life He was not concerned with the best management of what is Nor was he concerned with examining the materials that lay about him. His was the magnificent adventure of seeking the ideal stored up in heaven The student seeking to understand the nature of the democratic state of today must proceed differently

The physician, for example, may be aware of the moral implications of social diseases, but he does not treat syphilis as a question of good or evil He seeks an understanding of its nature and then attempts to eradicate its effects by any workable means If malaria will cure the complaint, he does not reason that because two wrongs never make a right two diseases can never bring health To urge a similar approach to politics is not to exalt a Machiavellian method

In his effort to be realistic, Machiavelli underestimated the force of moral judgment in politics He regarded mankind as inherently evil and selfish By discounting the power of ideals, he erred in his analysis of the political process Morals are as much the stuff of politics as are overt acts Ethical standards are a part of the "raw material" of political science just as much as laws, elections and ward-heelers If we analyze corruption in politics from a scientific viewpoint, we note both a set of facts described by the moralist as corrupt and a set of values applied by the moralist in forming his judgment

Under a democratic government no one group can insist that it is the sole cus-

[4] *Constitutional History of the United States,* pp. 402, 403.

todian of general ethical values. Nevertheless, a great parade of virtue is made by some, and various power-units attempt to exceed their jurisdictions in the name of universal morality The political party is less prone to such dogmatism than any other important power-unit

If the party is to be strong, it must sink its roots deeply in the community and draw its sustenance from many different sources To refer to the party organization as "the machine" is hardly a happy simile It suggests something artificial, mechanical, unyielding and automatic Yet, as we know, there is nothing more natural than party organization Were the machines destroyed tomorrow, new ones would shortly arise Far from being unyielding, the political machine is pre-eminently human It springs from the community life, it is nurtured by the strengths and weaknesses of the locality, it is guided in accordance with wayward human wills If neglected, it dies, but the more it is tended, the sturdier it grows The political machine might better be called the party "plant"

The machine politician has exacted a high price for his services, but he can not be regarded as entirely unworthy of his hire He has treated government as a problem of mechanics rather than as a question of morals The reformer is prone to waste his time in designs for "good government" The politician takes the pieces that are at hand, whether good, bad, or indifferent, and attempts to combine them in some sort of working relationship His product is no better than his materials and often worse, but it usually runs The reformer seeking to build a party of the "better elements" spends all his energies in collecting his materials and even then seldom gets enough pieces to complete his task

The further government penetrates into business, the more is the public interest institutionalized. Certain private interests will always be found at variance with the official interpretation As these points of friction are increased, the tasks of the politician are multiplied His most important function is the reconciliation of the legally established order with what private interests want or with what is practical Hence extending the field of governmental action enlarges the opportunity for political brokerage No final solution is ever reached by passing a law Discretion must be vested in someone for adjusting governmental institutions to human needs Our choice lies between vastly increasing the discretionary powers of the bureaucracy or leaving the field to the machine politician The British have been willing to entrust themselves to a ruling class of able civil servants We have left the actual running of the government to a class of people who are less "high minded" and able but who are more representative of the masses

As government assumes more responsibility for the direct management of economic affairs, technicians rather than politicians are needed A high degree of freedom for the managers is necessary But official action is hedged about with verbalisms of the past that bear no direct relation to exigent problems Business administrators had the freedom they desired under *laissez faire* Some abused their power, others achieved admirable results There were no commercial traditions to restrain experimentation But as the consequences of their activities brought far-reaching social effects, the state intervened. Yet it came trailing clouds of concepts that impeded effective management Before we carry this extension any further, we should reckon carefully with the nature of the political process

The over-simplification and dramatization of issues are the concomitants of popular government The economic reality is too difficult to grasp in its entire complex

ity. Its ramifications are too wide and rest too unevenly upon the lives of different people. The process of analysis is very difficult for even those most directly affected. When we turn to the political manipulation of economic problems, we must submit to the limitations inherent in the means employed. In order to move men in the mass, the art of generalization must be used As Sir Henry Maine points out, this involves stressing certain facts and ignoring others. The facts stressed must be such as to form an attractive picture It need have little resemblance to reality Economic reality is usually complex, confused, multifarious Economists who spend all their time studying this complexity emerge with different theories concerning it. Theirs is not the stuff of politics. Their analyses are incapable of moving men to action. The call to action must be simple, clear and dynamic It must arouse hope and enthusiasm It rests upon faith that a new order will emerge or upon the belief that the old order is worth preserving. A survey of *all* the facts is not conducive to a confident pronouncement of what is right. The conclusions of science are always tentative, but the politician must be sure of his ground if he is to convince others that he alone can lead them to the promised land.

When economic problems, therefore, are approached from the political angle they undergo a metamorphosis They are treated either in terms of what should be or in terms of what has been The radical reformer offers a generalized program which he guarantees as a cure of the economic maladjustment causing pain in the body politic His cure must be simple and straightforward, if it is to be politically effective It it can not be grasped by the unsophisticated mind, it is worthless for political purposes If it is incapable of firing the imagination of its adherents, it is useless. It must have an emotional as well as a rational appeal. But panaceas of this sort by their very nature differ from the situation they are intended to rectify. They are significant to the extent that they indicate that something is wrong. As symptoms of a basic disorder, we can not afford to ignore them As solutions for this discontent we can not afford to embrace them

The existence of social discontent means that one group demands a change and that another fears alterations of the *status quo.* This latter group, however, can be no more realistic than the former In both groups there are individuals who, because of their special knowledge or strategic position, are able to see the full implications of a particular maladjustment, but such persons can never be sufficiently numerous to be politically effective without the support of great numbers who must act upon faith rather than certain knowledge To get the support of this great mass of the "inevitably ignorant," simplification is essential To those of conservative temper, simple panaceas are abhorrent Such persons take their stand upon fundamental principles They are guided in their reaction by these accepted maxims rather than by an objective scrutiny of the new situation. The factors in the new situation are always so numerous, so illusive, and often so technical that it is impossible to construct a clear picture But principles serve to bring order into this confusion Both the panaceas of the reformers and the principles of the conservatives are symbolic. They represent a transfer of attention from the booming, buzzing confusion of reality to the solace of the simple and familiar They do not, however, advance us very far toward the adjustment of the underlying difficulties of society that were the occasion of this search for facile solutions

Among our radical organizations, it is not the groups with the most logically

consistent economic criticisms that have the largest followings The Communist Party has 26,000 enrolled members and the Socialist Party only about 40,000 Yet Father Coughlin was able to gather 20,000 enthusiastic supporters in the Cleveland Stadium and talk of delivering the vote of his 9,000,000 radio listeners Despite the exaggerated claims made by the N U S J and the Townsend movement, the fact remains that we have in the United States two markedly different types of protest groups. Their dissatisfaction with conditions is mutual, but their appeal is fundamentally different The methods of Townsend and Coughlin illustrate strikingly how economic problems must be simplified if mass support is desired Whence come such great followings? An observer at the 1936 N U S J convention stated·

"Everywhere was evidence that Coughlin's power comes altogether from the accumulated effect of his weekly broadcasts Invariably, delegates began 'I've been listening for four years' Or it would be two years, or, shamefacedly, only six months They were people to whom a $10 radio was their only luxury, their great comfort Week after week, Coughlin has explained that their depression-born poverty is not their fault, that it has been caused by evil, mysterious forces, international bankers, the Rothschilds, the Communists He has told them, crudely, and flatly, 'God wants you to have more money.'"[5]

The appeal of the Communists and Socialists is basically different from that of Coughlin or Townsend They approach political questions as economic problems They analyze, they reason They proceed logically from assumptions that they are at great pains to justify and defend Theirs is the intellectual approach Those who can grasp their theories are few, those who are stirred by their logic are fewer If they win support, it is *despite* the popular I Q; the rabble-rousers have their legions *because* they appeal to the great mental lowlands of the nation.

The Communist Party as a matter of policy limits its membership to persons of proved fidelity They belong to the cult because they have studied and embraced its doctrines There are many sympathizers who are not members, but the whole movement is outside the main current of American life. Their vocabulary has no meaning for the mass This is of no great concern to the party They argue that when conditions are ripe for revolution a disciplined organization ready to act is of crucial importance The mass will follow its lead

The Socialists are the party of sweet reasonableness Their attitude is humanitarian and intellectual They wish to convince by evidence and argument. They are less given to exhortation They may preach, but they are not evangelical That their leader is a former Presbyterian clergyman is not without significance Nice people are easily moved by the arguments of this group A respectable note of dissent can be struck by casting one's vote for Norman Thomas Students of government and of economics can see in the Socialist platform the promise of comforting remedial action. But the language of intellectual analysis is not the tongue of the man in the street. He takes fright at the simplifications of socialist or communist theory that reach his ears If he is hungry enough, he may support a demagogue who promises liberal pensions for all, but he is more likely to follow the political traditions of his grandfather.

Politics to the average citizen is a game in which men struggle with each other for office One's sympathies are attracted to the personalities on one side or the other. Is the candidate sincere? Does he seem

[5] *New Republic*, August 26, 1936, p. 74

honest and well-meaning? Will he keep his promises? Who are his friends? Are they trustworthy people? What will the candidate do for me? Is he "my kind"? Does he stand for the same general social values and traditions that I cherish? These are the crucial questions in any campaign How they are answered will vastly affect current international, industrial, agricultural and similar public matters But the voter does not approach these problems directly these questions can not be met thus by popular government. If discussed in language that carries meaning to the masses, all touch with reality is lost The voter assumes that by placing in office men who reflect his own standards and viewpoints these questions will be treated much as he would have them treated were he competent to understand and to act directly.

This means that the economic reality is presented in a refracted light through the prism of political personality (And it is not surprising that under the circumstances we often chase rainbows) All this is implicit in the nature of the democratic process We describe it here not to condemn but rather to note its consequences

Where decisions involving social relations are made by men dependent upon popular support, these men will act so as to retain this support They would be foolish, indeed, to undermine their own foundations Their standards for judgment are thus not "what is the most economical" or "what is the most direct" or "what is the most logical, moral, artistic, or sensible" way to perform their public duties They must ask themselves — what is the way that will most please the people who maintain me in my office? If the public is moral, logical, business-like and alert, the behavior of public officials will reflect this attitude If special interests prove that *they* are the real powers, then politicians will reflect their standards. The politician is a politician only so long as he holds power — be it governmental or unofficial — and this power always has a base.

The necessity that men in public office reflect the basis upon which they stand has certain consequences when men in such positions are given managerial duties An engineer is guided in his operations by the nature of his materials His standards for action are intrinsic in the physical properties with which he works A doctor's primary task is to cure his patient, not to please him If he fails too often, his medical career is over A politician's primary task is to please his supporters If he fails too often, his political career is over Where the politician is acting in a representative capacity, all goes well But when he is functioning in an administrative capacity, conflicts arise For example, an elective public health officer has two *different* sets of criteria for action He must follow the canons of medicine in order to protect public health, but he may lose his position altogether if he ignores the rules of politics (The elements of drama in this have not been lost on playwrights and novelists But what are its implications for the social scientist?)

As the governmental area of jurisdiction spreads under the aegis of democracy, we bring under political standards more and more technicians We establish great areas of a politico-managerial sort Can these be reconciled with democracy? Democracy wants officials who please Will it allow them to please simply by being efficient in their techniques? Their techniques can not be generally understood and intelligently judged by the voter He can only judge results Sometimes this is an accurate test and sometimes not

When a technical field is brought under governmental control in a democracy, its management must be guided by two sets of criteria. Conflict between these standards is not inevitable, though always pos-

sible Sometimes we are willing to have technicians manage public concerns in accordance with what is technically sound, sometimes not Whenever government advances into such fields it runs into the vested interests already in occupancy The ensuing struggle becomes a political fight

Is it socially desirable to adjust so many human relationships through the political process? In private practice, doctors can compete with doctors under professional criteria When the state extends its jurisdiction over medical affairs, physicians are then drawn into politics They must seek to influence voters and politicians They must place less emphasis on medical technique and more on political methods Their primary concern becomes not the advancement of therapy but the protection of their privileges as physicians The new situation calls for talents of persuasion, of cajolery, of eloquence for polemics rather than therapeutics Physician does not discuss with physician, rather medical politicians compete one with the other to win public support and professional approbation When the government undertakes managerial work in a technical field, administrators are subject to attack from the vested interests already there and from the lay public The administrator can not with impunity ignore the criticism of the ignorant nor of those selfishly interested when they are politically powerful.

This may mean that government will always be handicapped in securing the best managerial talent Large corporations can employ very competent men and give them great discretion So long as they make dividends, no questions are asked They have full scope for exercising their technical and administrative powers They are subjected to little public scrutiny and almost no personal criticism This type of men usually finds politics distasteful Their desire is to "produce the goods" For their psychological needs they do not require public acclaim

In public life we find men of a different stripe They must have social approbation, and they will go to great lengths to win favor Such politicians are our tribal medicine men of today They make politics a process of popular wish-fulfillment Where this develops into a systematic effort at national hypnosis and self-deception as it seems to in presidential campaigns, the results are bound to be unfortunate We awaken with a national headache more than ready to throw out the rascals who failed to live up to their impossible promises and substitute another group making promises identical with those the first group were unable to keep We charge our political leaders with insincerity roguery and ineptitude But they won power because they offered the public the *hocus pocus it demanded*

The political magic of our major parties is of two kinds — the fairy wand variety and the charm and incantation sort This latter type always leaves the sorcerer with an alibi Unfriendly elements may intervene and counteract his power Thus a wart can be removed by cutting a notch in a hickory stick and secretly burying the stick When the stick has rooted, the wart vanishes But if the wart lingers for a wearisome period, it is because the stick is a long time in rooting Republican Party politicians prefer the magic of charms and incantations They are seldom left without an excuse when faced with apparent failure There was no witch-doctor more given to incantation than Mr Hoover The Democratic Party leaders tend to rely upon the fairy wand method They staked their all on the silver wand of 16 to-1 and again on the League of Nations Mr Roosevelt often tapped his wand but the cash customers (and the multitude with free passes) grew restive waiting for the appearance of the more abundant life. The politician with the

wand must produce the miracle or hurry from the hall. If we insist that the politician symbolize the wishful thinking of the public, he must continue to specialize in sham.

The fundamental danger to democratic government is not public indifference but rather too great a reliance upon political institutions Social adjustments should be made as directly as possible by those affected. Large-scale organization means that the decisions involving such adjustments are passed along to those higher up. This reliance upon government means that officers of the state are expected to meet in increasing measure duties once regarded as personal or local responsibilities

"There ought to be a law" — this has long been the reaction to social difficulties. It has been taken as the way to solve moral questions and with very unsatisfactory consequences More and more we turn to governmental agencies as the *only* way or the *best* way of solving economic problems. On some matters the force of the state is essential — this is true when the area of management is so wide that only the state can encompass it. A conflict of political jurisdictions may necessitate control by the higher federal authority Moreover, we know that economy of production is often increased by large-scale organization. Government must be constituted so as to carry with competency the burdens placed upon it But the placid acceptance of the thought that "government" can somehow achieve ends that we have failed to attain through other means results not only in disappointment concerning these immediate objectives but also in disillusionment concerning the governmental method as such The reaction of some persons is to regard politics as inherently inefficient. Others blame democracy and see in a dictatorial form greater promise of effective action.

The justification of democracy does not lie in any particular institution. Its framework must be altered to suit changing needs The heart of the democratic ideal is its recognition of the right of men to disagree in their prescriptions for treating the body politic. Authoritarianism lies at one pole, democracy at the other About this latter pole experimentation and freedom of discussion is deemed possible. How can a science of politics ever develop unless under its penumbra? Students of government may insist upon an objective approach that is unrelated to any political philosophy, but this scientific attitude is only possible under a democratic system

Confusion will always be found under a democratic régime. It is the result of a system that tolerates many viewpoints and different value judgments. It is also inevitable that charges of social injustice will often be heard Those stressing the values of business may be irked by the behavior of those adhering to the canons of art or religion Pure science posits values incompatible with pure utility. Individual realization may conflict with community achievement. What is the ultimate basis for judgment? Tolerance becomes the only escape from dismay

If the government is regarded as the chief means of attaining social ends, powerful groups may attempt to identify one scheme of values with the general welfare Once in power such a group would have the readiest control over the instruments of coercion — the army, navy and the police If we place the making of all important decisions over social affairs in the hands of the government, those capturing the government could wield sufficient power to render life intolerable to their opponents Confronted by this possibility, the members of an opposing party will war to the death They would be forced to take a profound interest in government When political questions become the cen-

tral problems of the individual's life, toleration in such affairs is difficult if not impossible. The analogy to the history of religious toleration is close When religion dominated society, men could not afford to tolerate heresy. Europe was torn by religious wars for generations. With the opening up and exploration of the new world, man's preoccupation with the next world gradually grew less Success in the conquest of nature through exploration and science may have turned attention from the supernatural Whatever the complex of causes may have been, toleration in religion did not come while religion was the central problem in life If we develop in such a way that social salvation is thought to lie only through political institutions, the toleration of differing political creeds may similarly be disallowed When men believe that their whole future depends upon the outcome of an election, they will not await the counting of the ballots to learn the result.

The problem of democratic statesmen is not that of formulating true principles but rather the establishment and maintenance of leadership When certain new proposals threaten the privileges, property or prestige of the intrenched parties and when these parties are dominated by a clique of such privileged persons, these individuals will strive to use the government to maintain their position The Federalists threatened secession and even violence when confronted with a shift in the alignment of political forces They effected merely the death of their own party, however, by their refusal to accept a new order The slave-owners dominating the Democratic Party held to their stand-pat policies and went down to defeat but only after a bloody war Fortunately this is not the ordinary course of politics The die-hards do not line up on one side and the future-minded on the other Only the partisan sees a political alignment of sheep and goats.

This is not an argument to the effect that our two major parties are indistinguishable The nucleus of leaders associated with each party gives a characteristic spirit to the organization. Thus in general the Republican Party has received more support from moneyed interests than has the Democratic Party, but it does not follow from this that the G. O P is the inevitable guardian of Big Business. Industrialists feel safer when on the winning political side Since reconstruction days the Republican Party has offered more security than the Democratic Party to men who must be mindful of the actions of the Federal government In turn, business support has affected the policies of the party and done much to insure victories On the whole, Republican politicians have been engaged as middlemen more often than Democrats in the adjustment of business interests with those of farmers, laborers, consumers, etc The industrialist does not profit invariably by a conservative attitude toward politics Business men may at any time demand legislation that is radically new or privileges that are unprecedented. Much New Deal legislation came at their behest when disaster threatened.

It is our party system as a whole that swerves from left to right and back again. Wilson and Hughes were both hailed as liberals in 1916 Cox and Harding were colorless candidates from the same state. Davis and Coolidge reflected a conservative viewpoint Time has but emphasized the basic similarity between Hoover and Smith No realistic politician is going to let any other group of politicians reap the harvest of a nation-wide swing to either left or right The confusion of American politics can not be reduced to an alignment between Liberal and Conservative parties The issues approach a median line with one party slightly more toward the left or the right than the opposing party No

political party in this country can afford to be avowedly "conservative." In the United States one must be liberal and progressive or nothing It is the liberals who want a conservative-liberal alignment with all persons of progressive tendencies on their side. Such leaders strive to attract under their banner all those likely to support views more radical than the policies of the established party. But no party can corner the market on new and attractive ideas Our parties must go with the current of opinion Here lies voting strength.

This uncertainty of political direction reflects the diversity in our society It provides no convincing evidence of a course pre-determined by economic forces It shows rather a conflict of such forces A slight change in economic stringency causes a swing toward the left; another shift bringing a degree of "prosperity" throws the balance toward the right But even so the full political implications of economic maladjustment are not felt, partly because the meaning of these disorders is imperfectly comprehended and partly because men are not motivated by economic factors alone.

We live in a society where economic enterprise is partly competitive and partly administered under virtually monopolistic conditions. To most of those concerned with the interpretation of social affairs, the absence of competition is not brought home by direct personal realization. Newspaper men, authors, professors, all experience a sharp sense of professional rivalry. Their weak position with reference to their employers seldom comes to the forefront of their minds. Yet it is this group of the "articulate" who observe, report and translate the meaning of human activity for the rest of society.

Where even a partial comprehension of social forces is so difficult, caution would advise against dogmatism in the political realm. Only the toleration possible under democracy provides the scope necessary for experimentation At the same time, the very diversity of the nation provides a protection for democracy by reducing the possibility of any one dogma winning national acceptance or any single gang of political racketeers grasping control.

Nevertheless, men whose motives can not be questioned continue to argue that the state must eventually take upon itself the guidance of social destiny Our thesis offers this reply Centering the management of human affairs under government officials means shifting control from private power-units to state agencies that are dominated under democracy by concepts and traditions foreign to immediate practical administrative problems The result is likely to be a sacrifice either of efficiency or of democracy The need is to discover by experimentation forms that will protect both these endangered values There is a wide administrative area today but partially explored. Exhortations for governmental operation or for nonintervention will never bring us to a satisfactory solution. Laissez-faire is already discredited and governmental dominance of economic activities leads to a totalitarian state. The only system that points to lasting progress in the management of human relations is one that releases imagination, fosters experimentation and encourages the scientific spirit. Democracy has come closest to approximating such conditions

At the present juncture, we must guard against an artificial reduction of economic forces into two sharply opposed camps We can not afford to put our faith in political dogmas setting forth an inevitable trend of history Political medicine-men strive for power by promising to promote the interests of one class at the expense of the rest of us But man does not live through class alone This concept does not lead to a clear elucidation of existing social relationships.

To use the concept of class as a tool of analysis is to emphasize restriction Class encompasses the aspiration of men as well as their actions It describes a static condition It places men in a category and insists upon the reality of the classification despite the volition of the individual The idea of "class" does not accord so nearly with our observations of social relations as does the concept of "interest" This latter admits of infinite variation, of fluidity Men grouped according to their interests vary in degree and intensity of interest as well as in kind The bases of such groups can shift and change, form and converge

To reduce the manifold interrelations of man with man into an alignment between capital and labor is to disregard the maze of interests existing and to impose a diagram of the economic system that reads a simple dichotomy into situations vastly more chaotic The Marxian analysis of class is not an effort to discover what is It is the establishment of a logical preliminary for ushering in a system of what should be What *should* be, *can* be, they argue, if we eliminate class conflict through the victory of the proletariat If class conflicts were eliminated, the problem of governance would be simple indeed In a one class state, criteria for determining action are in terms of the welfare of this class But we do not have a one class state, and we can not simplify our problem by eliminating the classes whose existence creates the need for adjustment Ease in the administration of the political and economic order is not an end in itself The goal of government is to meet the demands of men with conflicting interests and to offer a working compromise

Soviet Russia is not succeeding where democracy has failed The Soviets have not yet been confronted with the basic problem with which our economy is struggling Russia's task has been the industrialization of the country It is dogmatically asserted that this is *the* way to promote the general welfare Want has long been a spectre, and many Russians are eager to catch up with the rest of the machine world As the Soviets solve the problem of production, they will find that the problem of distributing an economic surplus has far different political implications from that of fighting scarcity Even pirates will co-operate in the acquisition of wealth, conflicts arise over division of the loot

It seems not unlikely that in both Russia and this country the conquest of poverty is technically possible, but the terms of the distribution of wealth can never be made automatic The political question remains the problem, in Professor Lasswell's phrase, of "who gets what, when, and how" Only a totalitarian state can fix a formula and only by force and centrally-controlled propaganda can it be maintained Rigid formulae and inflexible institutions soon lose touch with reality Under any system, the politician must intervene to temper the rigidity of law to the weakness of man

The problem of politics must be approached through the study of concrete situations rather than through the assertion of abstract principles, through a scientific rather than a logistic or moralistic attitude of mind Hope lies not in the formulae of Marxism, the slogans of Fascism, or even the traditional symbolism of democracy, but in experimentation Understanding can come only through a patient, unending effort to put the pieces that lie before us into working combinations The goal of politics is not the defense of formulae but the establishment of conditions under which men will possess the optimum opportunity to realize their conception of the good life This at best can never be more than a partial realization; but so long as the assumptions of democracy hold, we will regard the struggle as preferable to the ordered life

He who places all his faith upon the state to achieve what man has failed to secure through other agencies invests the government with mystic qualities that belie its human basis Whether a social problem should be managed by the state or by private enterprise depends upon the development of the appropriate forms of administration It is not a question to be decided *a priori* through the abstract political principles proffered by millennium-mongers.

OLIGARCHIC TENDENCIES IN POLITICAL PARTIES *

Robert Michels

Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life Consequently it is not the task of science to inquire whether this phenomenon is good or evil, or predominantly one or the other But there is great scientific value in the demonstration that every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy We are now aware that the law of the historic necessity of oligarchy is primarily based upon a series of facts of experience Like all other scientific laws, sociological laws are derived from empirical observation In order, however, to deprive our axiom of its purely descriptive character, and to confer upon it that status of analytical explanation which can alone transform a formula into a law, it does not suffice to contemplate from a unitary outlook those phenomena which may be empirically established; we must also study the determining causes of these phenomena Such has been our task.

Now, if we leave out of consideration the tendency of the leaders to organize themselves and to consolidate their interests, and if we leave also out of consideration the gratitude of the led towards the leaders, and the general immobility and passivity of the masses, we are led to conclude that the principal cause of oligarchy in the democratic parties is to be found in the technical indispensability of leadership

The process which has begun in consequence of the differentiation of functions in the party is completed by a complex of qualities which the leaders acquire through their detachment from the mass At the outset, leaders arise *spontaneously*, their functions are *accessory* and *gratuitous* Soon, however, they become *professional* leaders, and in this second stage of development they are *stable* and *irremovable*

It follows that the explanation of the oligarchical phenomenon which thus results is partly *psychological*, oligarchy derives, that is to say, from the psychical transformations which the leading personalities in the parties undergo in the course of their lives. But also, and still more, oligarchy depends upon what we may term the *psychology of organization itself*, that is to say, upon the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law

* Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, Hearst's International Library, New York, 1915, pp. 400–08.

of political parties (the term "political" being here used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: "It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy."

Every party organization represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis. We find everywhere electors and elected. Also we find everywhere that the power of the elected leaders over the electing masses is almost unlimited. The oligarchical structure of the building suffocates the basic democratic principle. That which *is* oppresses *that which ought to be*. For the masses, this essential difference between the reality and the ideal remains a mystery. Socialists often cherish a sincere belief that a new *élite* of politicians will keep faith better than did the old. The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion to which the great majority of democrats, and in especial the working-class masses of the German-speaking lands, cleave with so much tenacity and confidence, is an illusion engendered by a false illumination, is an effect of mirage. In one of the most delightful pages of his analysis of modern Don Quixotism, Alphonse Daudet shows us how the "brav' commandant" Bravida, who has never quitted Tarascon, gradually comes to persuade himself, influenced by the burning southern sun, that he has been to Shanghai and has had all kinds of heroic adventures.[1] Similarly the modern proletariat, enduringly influenced by glib-tongued persons intellectually superior to the mass, ends by believing that by flocking to the polls and entrusting its social and economic cause to a delegate, its direct participation in power will be assured.

The formation of oligarchies within the various forms of democracy is the outcome of organic necessity, and consequently affects every organization, be it socialist or even anarchist. Haller long ago noted that in every form of social life relationships of dominion and of dependence are created by Nature herself.[2] The supremacy of the leaders in the democratic and revolutionary parties has to be taken into account in every historic situation present and to come, even though only a few and exceptional minds will be fully conscious of its existence. The mass will never rule except *in abstracto*. Consequently the question we have to discuss is not whether ideal democracy is realizable, but rather to what point and in what degree democracy is desirable, possible, and realizable at a given moment. In the problem as thus stated we recognize the fundamental problem of politics as a science. Whoever fails to perceive this must, as Sombart says, either be so blind and fanatical as not to see that the democratic current daily makes undeniable advance, or else must be so inexperienced and devoid of critical faculty as to be unable to understand that all order and all civilization must exhibit aristocratic features.[3] The great error of socialists, an error committed in consequence of their lack of adequate psychological knowledge, is to be found in their combination of pessimism regarding the present, with rosy optimism and immeasurable confidence regarding the future. A realistic view of the mental condition of the masses shows beyond question that even if we admit the possibility of moral improvement in man

[1] Alphonse Daudet, *Tartarin de Tarascon*, Marpon et Flammarion, Paris, 1887, p. 40.

[2] Ludwig von Haller, *Restauration der Staatswissenschaften*, Winterthur, 1816, vol. i, pp. 304 *et seq.*

[3] Werner Sombart, *Dennoch!* *ed. cit.*, p. 90. Cf. also F. S. Merlino, *Pro e contro il Socialismo*, *ed. cit.*, pp. 262 *et seq.*

kind, the human materials with whose use politicians and philosophers cannot dispense in their plans of social reconstruction are not of a character to justify excessive optimism. Within the limits of time for which human provision is possible, optimism will remain the exclusive privilege of utopian thinkers

The socialist parties, like the trade unions, are living forms of social life As such they react with the utmost energy against any attempt to analyse their structure or their nature, as if it were a method of vivisection When science attains to results which conflict with their apriorist ideology, they revolt with all their power Yet their defence is extremely feeble Those among the representatives of such organizations whose scientific earnestness and personal good faith make it impossible for them to deny outright the existence of oligarchical tendencies in every form of democracy, endeavour to explain these tendencies as the outcome of a kind of atavism in the mentality of the masses, characteristic of the youth of the movement The masses, they assure us, are still infected by the oligarchic virus simply because they have been oppressed during long centuries of slavery, and have never yet enjoyed an autonomous existence The socialist regime, however, will soon restore them to health, and will furnish them with all the capacity necessary for self government Nothing could be more anti scientific than the supposition that as soon as socialists have gained possession of governmental power it will suffice for the masses to exercise a little control over their leaders to secure that the interests of these leaders shall coincide perfectly with the interests of the led This idea may be compared with the view of Jules Guesde, no less anti-scientific than anti Marxist (though Guesde proclaims himself a Marxist), that whereas Christianity has made God into a man, socialism will make man into a god [4]

The objective immaturity of the mass is not a mere transitory phenomenon which will disappear with the progress of democratization *au lendemain du socialisme* On the contrary, it derives from the very nature of the mass as mass, for this even when organized, suffers from an incurable incompetence for the solution of the diverse problems which present themselves for solution — because the mass *per se* is amorphous, and therefore needs division of labour, specialization, and guidance. "L'espèce humaine veut être gouvernée, elle le sera J'ai honte de mon espèce," wrote Proudhon from his prison in 1850 Man as individual is by nature predestined to be guided, and to be guided all the more in proportion as the functions of life undergo division and subdivision To an enormously greater degree is guidance necessary for the social group

From this chain of reasoning and from these scientific convictions it would be erroneous to conclude that we should renounce all endeavours to ascertain the limits which may be imposed upon the powers exercised over the individual by oligarchies (state, dominant class, party, etc) It would be an error to abandon the desperate enterprise of endeavouring to discover a social order which will render possible the complete realization of the idea of popular sovereignty In the present work, as the writer said at the outset, it has not been his aim to indicate new paths But it seemed necessary to lay considerable stress upon the pessimist aspect of democracy which is forced on us by historical study We had to inquire whether, and within what limits, democracy must remain purely ideal, possessing no other value than that of a moral criterion which renders it possible to appreciate the varying degrees of that oligarchy which

[4] Jules Guesde, *Le Probleme et la Solution* Libr du Parti Socialiste, Paris, p 17

is immanent in every social regime In other words, we have had to inquire if, and in what degree, democracy is an ideal which we can never hope to realize in practice A further aim of this work was the demolition of some of the facile and superficial democratic illusions which trouble science and lead the masses astray Finally, the author desired to throw light upon certain sociological tendencies which oppose the reign of democracy, and to a still greater extent oppose the reign of socialism

The writer does not wish to deny that every revolutionary working-class movement, and every movement sincerely inspired by the democratic spirit, may have a certain value as contributing to the enfeeblement of oligarchic tendencies The peasant in the fable, when on his death-bed, tells his sons that a treasure is buried in the field After the old man's death the sons dig everywhere in order to discover the treasure They do not find it But their indefatigable labour improves the soil and secures for them a comparative well-being The treasure in the fable may well symbolize democracy Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate search But in continuing our search, in labouring indefatigably to discover the indiscoverable, we shall perform a work which will have fertile results in the democratic sense We have seen, indeed, that within the bosom of the democratic working-class party are born the very tendencies to counteract which that party came into existence Thanks to the diversity and to the unequal worth of the elements of the party, these tendencies often give rise to manifestations which border on tyranny We have seen that the replacement of the traditional legitimism of the powers-that-be by the brutal plebiscitary rule of Bonapartist parvenus does not furnish these tendencies with any moral or aesthetic superiority. Historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy If laws are passed to control the dominion of the leaders, it is the laws which gradually weaken, and not the leaders Sometimes, however, the democratic principle carries with it, if not a cure, at least a palliative, for the disease of oligarchy When Victor Considérant formulated his "democratico-pacificist" socialism, he declared that socialism signified, not the rule of society by the lower classes of the population, but the government and organization of society in the interest of all, through the intermediation of a group of citizens, and he added that the numerical importance of this group must increase *pari passu* with social development This last observation draws attention to a point of capital importance It is, in fact, a general characteristic of democracy, and hence also of the labour movement, to stimulate and to strengthen in the individual the intellectual aptitudes for criticism and control We have seen how the progressive bureaucratization of the democratic organism tends to neutralize the beneficial effects of such criticism and such control None the less it is true that the labour movement, in virtue of the theoretical postulates it proclaims is apt to bring into existence (in opposition to the will of the leaders) a certain number of free spirits who, moved by principle, by instinct, or by both, desire to revise the base upon which authority is established Urged on by conviction or by temperament, they are never weary of asking an eternal "Why?" about every human institution Now this predisposition towards free inquiry, in which we cannot fail to recognize one of the most precious factors of civilization, will gradually increase in proportion as the economic status of the masses undergoes improvement and becomes more stable, and in proportion as they are admitted more effectively to the advantages of civi-

lization. A wider education involves an increasing capacity for exercising control. Can we not observe every day that among the well-to-do the authority of the leaders over the led, extensive though it be, is never so unrestricted as in the case of the leaders of the poor? Taken in the mass, the poor are powerless and disarmed vis-à-vis their leaders Their intellectual and cultural inferiority makes it impossible for them to see whither the leader is going, or to estimate in advance the significance of his actions It is, consequently, the great task of social education to raise the intellectual level of the masses, so that they may be enabled, within the limits of what is possible, to counteract the oligarchical tendencies of the working-class movement

In view of the perennial incompetence of the masses, we have to recognize the existence of two regulative principles: —

1. The *ideological* tendency of democracy towards criticism and control;

2. The *effective* counter-tendency of democracy towards the creation of parties ever more complex and ever more differentiated — parties, that is to say, which are increasingly based upon the competence of the few.

To the idealist, the analysis of the forms of contemporary democracy cannot fail to be a source of bitter deceptions and profound discouragement Those alone, perhaps, are in a position to pass a fair judgment upon democracy who, without lapsing into dilettantist sentimentalism, recognize that all scientific and human ideals have relative values. If we wish to estimate the value of democracy, we must do so in comparison with its converse, pure aristocracy. The defects inherent in democracy are obvious. It is none the less true that as a form of social life we must choose democracy as the least of evils The ideal government would doubtless be that of an aristocracy of persons at once morally good and technically efficient. But where shall we discover such an aristocracy? We may find it sometimes, though very rarely, as the outcome of deliberate selection, but we shall never find it where the hereditary principle remains in operation Thus monarchy in its pristine purity must be considered as imperfection incarnate, as the most incurable of ills; from the moral point of view it is inferior even to the most revolting of demagogic dictatorships, for the corrupt organism of the latter at least contains a healthy principle upon whose working we may continue to base hopes of social resanation It may be said, therefore, that the more humanity comes to recognize the advantages which democracy, however imperfect, presents over aristocracy, even at its best, the less likely is it that a recognition of the defects of democracy will provoke a return to aristocracy Apart from certain formal differences and from the qualities which can be acquired only by good education and inheritance (qualities in which aristocracy will always have the advantage over democracy — qualities which democracy either neglects altogether, or, attempting to imitate them, falsifies them to the point of caricature), the defects of democracy will be found to inhere in its inability to get rid of its aristocratic scoriae On the other hand, nothing but a serene and frank examination of the oligarchical dangers of democracy will enable us to minimize these dangers, even though they can never be entirely avoided.

The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves They break ever on the same shoal They are ever renewed This enduring spectacle is simultaneously encouraging and depressing When democracies have gained a certain stage of development, they undergo a gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit, and in many cases also the aristocratic forms, against which at the outset they struggled so fiercely. Now new ac

cusers arise to denounce the traitors; after an era of glorious combats and of inglorious power, they end by fusing with the old dominant class; whereupon once more they are in their turn attacked by fresh opponents who appeal to the name of democracy It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end.

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4 Lenin V I, *State and Revolution* rev tr, International Publishers, New York, 1932 pp 7–20 This book by the famous Russian revolutionary leader sets forth the Marxist theory of the state which runs counter to the theory we have developed According to Lenin the state is always the instrument of domination used by the ruling economic class Under such a theory it is obvious that the associational state is an impossibility

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9 See also Hobbes, 'Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery, p 160 Lee, Public Opinion in Relation to Culture, p 508 MacIver, The Multi Group Society, p 366 Abel, The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," p 827, Hook 'Law, Freedom and Human Action,' p 831

16. Economic Organization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

All societies must provide food, clothing, and shelter for their members Consequently institutions which govern men's search for and production of the material necessities of life are found the world over. These institutions define the elements of the natural environment which can be used for food, clothing, and shelter; they encompass the knowledge of techniques which can be used in securing and producing goods, and, finally, they govern the relationships of men to one another as they carry out subsistence activities. In this field of human endeavor, as in others, there is no "natural" order, order is built through a system of interrelated institutions.

Economic institutions in simple or complex communal societies do not typically define the behavior of men in accordance with the theory of analytic economics Production is generally for use by the producer rather than for sale on the market There is little emphasis on maximizing economic income or on using the most rational techniques for securing income. Thus the American oil companies, when they first went into Mexico, found the productiveness of the native workmen very unsatisfactory, for the Mexicans would work for a few days, accumulate a little pay, and then disappear until the money was exhausted. These workmen were not motivated by a limitless desire for economic goods. Only as Mexican society has become increasingly associational in character, partly through the ardent efforts of American salesmanship, have the Mexican oil workers gradually relinquished their traditional standard of living and become enamored of the products of mass industry

The economic patterns of such communal societies order the activities of men in such a way as to further their adherence to the society's ultimate value system, and not to secure a rational, efficient adaptation of man to nature. Every society has its conception of the good life, and this need not include the highest possible level of living from the purely economic point of view. The Arapesh of New Guinea, for example, place great value upon social contacts and friendship, and their economic activities are carried out in such a way as to make possible the securing of such values They wander around the countryside looking for social contacts, and plant their crops in other men's fields for the sake of companionship.

In a complex communal society, dominated by one association or by an alliance of several, economic activity may be governed by the purposes of the dominant groups. Such purposes may involve a maximization of economic income for the elite members of the society, or economic activity may be guided to assist in the

fulfillment of some purpose which the elite have assigned to the entire society. Thus in the modern complex communal societies dominated by totalitarian states, economic activity is organized largely for the maximization of the war efficiency of the state.

In contrast to the economic systems of communal societies, the economic relationships of the associational society are separated from the other major areas of social life, are divorced in certain respects from the ultimate value system of the society, and dominate the rest of the life of the society. We have seen that the underlying norms of the associational national society have served to encourage the free development of various types of associations. This has been done, however, with a normative insistence on preserving the freedom and happiness of all, and on adhering to the basic values of the society. This same normative regulation has *not* been present in the economic realm Here the individual has had but one duty to look out for his own interests in the most rational way possible short of the use of force and fraud (Not too much attention has been paid to this latter qualification of economic freedom) This emphasis upon self-interest has been itself a normative command justified in terms of the common welfare, for it was believed that through the rational pursuit of self-interest the economic good of all members of the community would be achieved. The associational state formulated a complex system of legal institutions defining the rights of property owners and the rules of contract relations, and within this legal framework it was expected that there would arise a self-regulating economic system. Even the worker was viewed as a businessman whose intent was to sell his labor at the highest price possible Production and distribution were to be regulated by the market, i e , by the myriad economic decisions of small competitors, each making his own choices on the basis of calculated self-interest No single decision of any one competitor could significantly influence the market, but the unintended consequences of all decisions would result in a maximization of income for the community and the national society.

There can be no doubt but that an elaborate economic system developed within the framework of these institutions, and that parts of this system corresponded to the expectations of the participants in the associational society. Nevertheless, the economic system in modern associational societies soon began to reveal structural differences that pointed to new patterns of economic organization Expanding markets and the growth of technology resulted in the appearance of large-scale economic associations The corner grocery store gave way to the chain store, the local machine shop to the giant industrial plant, and the town bank to a tremendous financial organization Through World War I, approximately, it seemed as if the associational economic structure would come to be dominated by banks In this country, for example, the populists of the Western states were greatly exercised over the "control" by Wall Street, and even today echoes of populist propaganda are occasionally heard in the outpourings of political parties. More recent changes, however, indicate that the large-scale industrial corporation is the

fundamental power center of those modern economic systems which still function under free-market economic institutions.

As a countermeasure to the pressure that these giant economic organizations exercise on the labor market, the labor union has developed Although unions were sometimes organized under ideologies which threatened the transformation of the social order, in most cases as they entered into the intricacies of economic action they became rivals of the corporation for control of the labor market within the old institutional framework. Through the growth of the corporation and the union, the economic structure took the form of an administered sector of social life instead of one which was self-regulating Instead of being dominated by one power center, however, it was regulated by several Since the interests of these power centers frequently conflict, struggles among them produce great strain in the total system Thus in many of the basic centers of economic life, such as coal and steel, the nation is frequently threatened, through strikes or lockouts, with complete economic paralysis. These conflicts, in addition to the recurrent economic crises, which seem to become intensified as the economic structure becomes more rigid, are constant threats not only to the stability of the economic order but also to the whole associational society.

It has been indicated that the system of economic institutions became separated from the ultimate value system of the associational society, and in time came to dominate the other areas of social life, thus divorcing *them* in large measure from the ultimate value system. Social status and social classes have come to be organized primarily around positions in the occupational structure The achievement of one's ends in any sphere of life is dependent upon one's success in the economic struggle. Art, literature, music, education, and recreation tend to be valued not for themselves but for what they will bring in the market. Family life and religion are in a high degree appendages of the economic system. As will be shown in a later chapter, two of the basic functions of the modern family are to aid the husband in his struggle for occupational success and to exemplify through its style of living the status to which the occupational triumphs of the husband entitle it. Further, it will be shown in some detail that modern religious organizations are closely tied into the system of social stratification, which is in turn dependent upon the occupational order.

In the middle and upper classes (and to a lesser degree in the lower classes) this economic structuring of all social values was supported by the development of appropriate competitive and aggressive attitudes toward the struggle for wealth and status; and while the older middle class of small independent businessmen is now dwindling rapidly, opportunities for social climbing are still present in the bureaucratic structure of the industrial corporation. This new middle class of experts, specialists, and managers is accessible to those who are able to participate in the educational system long enough to acquire specialized skills.

Although the worker has been considerably influenced by the open-class ideology, which has assured him of opportunities to advance up the status ladder, he

has actually been tied into the occupational structure by economic necessity rather than by a system of status opportunities. Because of the difficulty of acquiring the appropriate skills, the worker finds the channels of advancement at least partially closed to him. (There is some indication that they are becoming increasingly closed. See the Warner and Low citation in Annotated References.) The functionally rational division of labor developed within the structure of the corporation requires less and less complex skills on the part of the worker as worker. The skill is largely transferred to the machine and the organized use of machines. Thus the typical worker, as Drucker puts it, is a sloppy machine in the giant industrial bureaucracy and has no chance to learn the skills required in upper reaches of the bureaucracy. He is strictly disciplined on the job and is forced to adapt the rest of his life pattern to the job. He is subject to fears of unemployment and other forms of economic insecurity, and his leisure time is primarily a matter of participating in the commercial mass culture of our day: the movies, pulp magazines, petty gambling, and so forth. On the job he has little opportunity to do independent thinking except of a daydreaming variety, and on the outside he is continually bombarded by the propaganda of various groups competing for his allegiance. It is small wonder that he reveals some of the aspects of the mass personality. While there is no doubt that the union has raised his standard of living and improved his working conditions, it has not solved his problems of social living and social status. Indeed, some unions have taken on many of the characteristics of industrial bureaucracies themselves, so that the worker is exposed to two rigid disciplines instead of one. Other unions, however, have broadened their efforts to include the provision of companionship, recreation, and social status for their members.

It is obvious from this analysis that further changes are pending in the economic order of the associational society, and that they will have widespread repercussions throughout the social order. Indeed, several associational national societies have already attempted changes by instituting a totalitarian communal society. One nation, Russia, seems to have skipped the associational stage altogether and to be in the process of moving from an agricultural communal society into an industrial one. Two nations, England and the United States, are still well enough integrated to be able to try to guide the future industrial society into modified associational channels, but at present there are no guaranteed solutions for the problems raised in this or the preceding chapter. The basic problem is to modify the economic structure without embracing the totalitarian state.

Any solution of the present predicament of associational society within the associational framework demands three prerequisites. First, the problem must be recognized as going beyond purely economic terms. Not merely levels or standards of living, but also considerations of the status and function of the individual in the social structure are involved. Second, the problem cannot be solved through the expedient of concentrating economic power in a centralized state. This does not necessarily mean that socialization or state control of some industries will be com

pletely rejected, but that there must be emphasis placed on the necessity for a pluralistic distribution of centers of power; i.e., that there must continue to be independent centers of economic power such as unions, private businesses, and cooperatives. Third, the solution must be founded on the ultimate value system of the associational society and the political institutions of such a society; i.e., the democratic, limited state.

The selections in this chapter bear directly on one or another of the basic characteristics of the existent associational economic structure. In his article, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," Karl Polanyi examines the consequences of the divorce between the economic beliefs and the ultimate value system of the associational society. Economic man, with his motivations of hunger and gain, comes to be regarded as natural man. Land and labor, or as Polanyi puts it, nature and man, become commodities. The system of markets is isolated from the rest of the social structure and in time engulfs the social structure itself, whereupon economic determinism becomes a valid mode of social analysis Polanyi points out that societies of the past had no such economic organization, and that in some way or another the economic system must be brought under the control of society and its ultimate value system He recognizes that securing the continuation of freedom in this reorganized society poses a problem, but he believes that those who doubt the possibility of a solution are conditioned by a belief in economic determinism, and that institutional guarantees of freedom are compatible with any economic system It would still seem, however, that he underestimates the importance of a pluralistic distribution of power in the maintenance of a free institutional system.

The selection from Peter F. Drucker's book, *The Future of Industrial Man,* describes in considerable detail two basic aspects of the industrial reality of our time — the managerial and the organizational elements of the modern industrial corporation. (In calling the corporation an "institution," he means what we designate by "association") In the first part of his analysis he maintains that economic power today is largely concentrated in the hands of industrial managers, he goes on to assert that this power is no longer rooted in the ownership of property and hence is illegitimate. (This does not mean "illegal" but rather unjustified by the institutions of the society.) More important, for our purposes, is his account of the organization of mass production units and its effects on the worker. Particularly relevant is his analysis of the way in which the worker loses both social status and function in the industrial order.

We have already indicated that labor unions in the associational economic structure take on the characteristics of businesses and that the leaders become businessmen. Alvin W. Gouldner's provocative study of the "Attitudes of 'Progressive' Trade-Union Leaders" indicates that these leaders are subject to great pressures to become "business" unionists The economic norms of the associational society are deeply imbedded in their own personalities, and when they marry, their families tend to reinforce these norms rather than those of the "progressive" union.

The final selection, W. F. Cottrell's "Of Time and the Railroader," demonstrates the way in which the whole life of the worker is shaped by his job. The railroader is generally a skilled workman and hence is not comparable to the semi-skilled worker in the industrial plant. His occupation does, however, illustrate the dominance of the job in modern life The planning of work on the railroad does not consider the needs of the worker. Rather the railroads primarily seek efficiency in transporting commodities and the crucial considerations are those of time and speed The railroader therefore must adapt himself to the time system of the railroad. This system is rigid but it is not definite, i.e., the railroader has to be on the job *exactly* when he is needed, but the times when he will be needed vary from day to day Consequently he cannot time-plan his other activities and is often unable to participate in the associational life of his community, which is planned on a different time schedule altogether Cottrell shows clearly the increasing dependence of the railroader, and to some extent of his family, on those mass forms of recreation and activity which can be utilized at *any* time

All of the selections emphasize that the problem of organizing life in an industrial society is one for which we have as yet no associational solution. As Polanyi puts it: "Behind the fading fabric of competitive capitalism there looms the portent of an industrial civilization, with its paralyzing division of labor, standardization of life, supremacy of mechanism over organism, and organization over spontaneity. . . . This is the abiding concern."

OUR OBSOLETE MARKET MENTALITY *

Karl Polanyi

The first century of the Machine Age is drawing to a close amid fear and trepidation Its fabulous material success was due to the willing, indeed the enthusiastic, subordination of man to the needs of the machine.

Liberal capitalism was in effect man's initial response to the challenge of the Industrial Revolution In order to allow scope to the use of elaborate, powerful machinery, we transformed human economy into a self-adjusting system of markets, and cast our thoughts and values in the mold of this unique innovation.

Today, we begin to doubt the truth of some of these thoughts and the validity of some of these values Outside the United States, liberal capitalism can hardly be said to exist any more How to organize human life in a machine society is a question that confronts us anew Behind the fading fabric of competitive capitalism there looms the portent of an industrial civilization, with its paralyzing division of labor, standardization of life, supremacy of mechanism over organism, and organization over spontaneity Science itself is haunted by insanity This is the abiding concern

No mere reversion to the ideals of a

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past century can show us the way We must brave the future, though this may involve us in an attempt to shift the place of industry in society so that the extraneous fact of the machine can be absorbed. The search for industrial democracy is not merely the search for a solution to the problems of capitalism, as most people imagine It is a search for an answer to industry itself. Here lies the concrete problem of our civilization.

Such a new dispensation requires an inner freedom for which we are but ill equipped. We find ourselves stultified by the legacy of a market-economy which bequeathed us oversimplified views of the function and role of the economic system in society If the crisis is to be overcome, we must recapture a more realistic vision of the human world and shape our common purpose in the light of that recognition

Industrialism is a precariously grafted scion upon man's age-long existence The outcome of the experiment is still hanging in the balance. But man is not a simple being and can die in more than one way. The question of individual freedom, so passionately raised in our generation, is only one aspect of this anxious problem In truth, it forms part of a much wider and deeper need — the need for a new response to the total challenge of the machine.

THE FUNDAMENTAL HERESY

Our condition can be described in these terms:

Industrial civilization may yet undo man But since the venture of a progressively artificial environment cannot, will not, and indeed, should not, be voluntarily discarded, the task of adapting life *in such a surrounding* to the requirements of human existence must be resolved if man is to continue on earth No one can foretell whether such an adjustment is possible, or whether man must perish in the attempt. Hence the dark undertone of concern

Meanwhile, the first phase of the Machine Age has run its course It involved an organization of society that derived its name from its central institution, the market This system is on the downgrade Yet our practical philosophy was overwhelmingly shaped by this spectacular episode Novel notions about man and society became current and gained the status of axioms Here they are:

As regards *man*, we were made to accept the heresy that his motives can be described as "material" and "ideal," and that the incentives on which everyday life is organized spring from the "material" motives Both utilitarian liberalism and popular Marxism favored such views

As regards *society*, the kindred doctrine was propounded that its institutions were "determined" by the economic system This opinion was even more popular with Marxists than with liberals

Under a market-economy both assertions were, of course, true. *But only under such an economy* In regard to the past, such a view was no more than an anachronism In regard to the future, it was a mere prejudice Yet under the influence of current schools of thought, reinforced by the authority of science and religion, politics and business, these strictly time bound phenomena came to be regarded as timeless, as transcending the age of the market

To overcome such doctrines, which constrict our minds and souls and greatly enhance the difficulty of the life-saving adjustment, may require no less than a reform of our consciousness.

THE MARKET TRAUMA

The birth of laissez faire administered a shock to civilized man's views of himself, from the effects of which he never quite

recovered. Only very gradually are we realizing what happened to us as recently as a century ago.

Liberal economy, this primary reaction of man to the machine, was a violent break with the conditions that preceded it. A chain-reaction was started — what before was merely isolated markets was transmuted into a self-regulating *system* of markets. And with the new economy, a new society sprang into being

The crucial step was this labor and land were made into commodities, that is, they were treated *as if* produced for sale Of course, they were not actually commodities, since they were either not produced at all (as land) or, if so, not for sale (as labor).

Yet no more thoroughly effective fiction was ever devised By buying and selling labor and land freely, the mechanism of the market was made to apply to them There was now supply of labor, and demand for it, there was supply of land, and demand for it. Accordingly, there was a market price for the use of labor power, called wages, and a market price for the use of land, called rent Labor and land were provided with markets of their own, similar to the commodities proper that were produced with their help.

The true scope of such a step can be gauged if we remember that labor is only another name for man, and land for nature The commodity fiction handed over the fate of man and nature to the play of an automaton running in its own grooves and governed by its own laws

Nothing similar had ever been witnessed before. Under the mercantile regime, though it deliberately pressed for the creation of markets, the converse principle still operated. Labor and land were not entrusted to the market; they formed part of the organic structure of society. Where land was marketable, only the determination of price was, as a rule, left to the parties, where labor was subject to contract, wages themselves were usually assessed by public authority Land stood under the custom of manor, monastery, and township, under common-law limitations concerning rights of real property, labor was regulated by laws against beggary and vagrancy, statutes of laborers and artificers, poor laws, guild and municipal ordinances In effect, all societies known to anthropologists and historians restricted markets to commodities in the proper sense of the term

Market-economy thus created a new type of society The economic or productive system was here entrusted to a self-acting device An institutional mechanism controlled human beings in their everyday activities as well as the resources of nature

This instrument of material welfare was under the sole control of the incentives of hunger and gain — or, more precisely, fear of going without the necessities of life, and expectation of profit So long as no propertyless person could satisfy his craving for food without first selling his labor in the market, and so long as no propertied person was prevented from buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, the blind mill would turn out ever-increasing amounts of commodities for the benefit of the human race Fear of starvation with the worker, lure of profit with the employer, would keep the vast establishment running

In this way an " economic sphere " came into existence that was sharply delimited from other institutions in society Since no human aggregation can survive without a functioning productive apparatus, its embodiment in a distinct and separate sphere had the effect of making the " rest " of society dependent upon that sphere This autonomous zone, again, was regulated by a mechanism that controlled its functioning. As a result, the market mechanism

became determinative for the life of the body social. No wonder that the emergent human aggregation was an "economic" society to a degree previously never even approximated "Economic motives" reigned supreme in a world of their own, and the individual was made to act on them under pain of being trodden under foot by the juggernaut market

Such a forced conversion to a utilitarian outlook fatefully warped Western man's understanding of himself

HUNGER AND GAIN ENTHRONED

This new world of "economic motives" was based on a fallacy Intrinsically, hunger and gain are no more "economic" than love or hate, pride or prejudice No human motive is *per se* economic There is no such thing as a *sui generis* economic experience in the sense in which man may have a religious, aesthetic, or sexual experience These latter give rise to motives that broadly aim at evoking similar experiences In regard to material production these terms lack self-evident meaning

The economic factor, which underlies all social life, no more gives rise to definite incentives than the equally universal law of gravitation Assuredly, if we do not eat, we must perish, as much as if we were crushed under the weight of a falling rock. But the pangs of hunger are not automatically translated into an incentive to produce. Production is not an individual, but a collective affair If an individual is hungry, there is nothing definite for him to do. Made desperate, he might rob or steal, but such an action can hardly be called productive. With man, the political animal, everything is given not by natural, but by social circumstance. What made the 19th century think of hunger and gain as "economic" was simply the organization of production under a market economy.

Hunger and gain are here linked with production through the need of "earning an income" For under such a system, man, if he is to keep alive, is compelled to buy goods on the market with the help of an income derived from selling other goods on the market. The name of these incomes — wages, rent, interest — varies according to what is offered for sale use of labor power, of land, or of money, the income called profit — the remuneration of the entrepreneur — derives from the sale of goods that fetch a higher price than the goods that go into the producing of them Thus all incomes derive from sales, and all sales — directly or indirectly — contribute to production The latter is, in effect, *incidental to the earning of an income* So long as an individual is "earning an income," he is, automatically, contributing to production

Obviously, the system works only so long as individuals have a reason to indulge in the activity of "earning an income" The motives of hunger and gain — separately and conjointly — provide them with such a reason These two motives are thus geared to production and, accordingly, are termed "economic" The semblance is compelling that hunger and gain are *the* incentives on which any economic system must rest

This assumption is baseless. Ranging over human societies, we find hunger and gain not appealed to as incentives to production, and where so appealed to, they are fused with other powerful motives

Aristotle was right man is not an economic, but a social being He does not aim at safeguarding his individual interest in the acquisition of material possessions, but rather at ensuring social good will, social status, social assets. He values possessions primarily as a means to that end His incentives are of that "mixed" character which we associate with the endeavor to gain social approval — productive efforts are no more than incidental to

this. *Man's economy is, as a rule, submerged in his social relations.* The change from this to a society which was, on the contrary, submerged in the economic system was an entirely novel development.

FACTS

The evidence of facts, I feel, should at this point be adduced

First, there are the discoveries of primitive economics Two names are outstanding Bronislaw Malinowski and Richard Thurnwald They and some other research workers revolutionized our conceptions in this field and, by so doing, founded a new discipline The myth of the individualistic savage had been exploded long ago Neither the crude egotism, nor the apocryphal propensity to barter, truck, and exchange, nor even the tendency to cater to one's self was in evidence But equally discredited was the legend of the communistic psychology of the savage, his supposed lack of appreciation for his own personal interests (Roughly, it appeared that man was very much the same all through the ages Taking his institutions not in isolation, but in their interrelation, he was mostly found to be behaving in a manner broadly comprehensible to us) What appeared as "communism" was the fact that the productive or economic system was usually arranged in such a fashion as not to threaten any individual with starvation His place at the camp fire, his share in the common resources, was secure to him, whatever part he happened to have played in hunt, pasture, tillage, or gardening

Here are a few instances Under the *kraalland* system of the Kaffirs, "destitution is impossible whosoever needs assistance receives it unquestioningly" (L P Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century,* 1934) No Kwakiutl "ever ran the least risk of going hungry" (E M. Loeb, *The Distribution and Function of Money in Early Society,* 1936). "There is no starvation in societies living on the subsistence margin" (M J Herskovits, *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples,* 1940) In effect, the individual is not in danger of starving unless the community as a whole is in a like predicament It is this absence of the menace of individual destitution that makes primitive society, in a sense, more humane than 19th century society, and at the same time *less "economic"*

The same applies to the stimulus of individual gain Again, a few quotations: "The characteristic feature of primitive economics is the absence of any desire to make profits from production and exchange" (R Thurnwald, *Economics in Primitive Communities,* 1932) "Gain, which is often the stimulus for work in more civilized communities, never acts as an impulse to work under the original native conditions" (B Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* 1930) If so-called economic motives were natural to man, we would have to judge all early and primitive societies as thoroughly unnatural

Secondly there is no difference between primitive and civilized society in this regard Whether we turn to ancient city-state, despotic empire, feudalism, 13th-century urban life, 16th century mercantile regime, or 18th century regulationism — invariably the economic system is found to be merged in the social Incentives spring from a large variety of sources, such as custom and tradition, public duty and private commitment, religious observance and political allegiance, judicial obligation and administrative regulation as established by prince, municipality, or guild Rank and status, compulsion of law and threat of punishment, public praise and private reputation, insure that the individual contributes his share to production

Fear of privation or love of profit need

not be altogether absent. Markets occur in all kinds of societies, and the figure of the merchant is familiar to many types of civilization. But isolated markets do not link up into an economy. The motive of gain was specific to merchants, as was valor to the knight, piety to the priest, and pride to the craftsman The notion of making the motive of gain universal never entered the heads of our ancestors. At no time prior to the second quarter of the 19th century were markets more than a subordinate feature in society

Thirdly, there was the startling abruptness of the change Predominance of markets emerged not as a matter of degree, but of kind. Markets through which otherwise self-sufficient householders get rid of their surplus neither direct production nor provide the producer with his income This is only the case in a market-economy where *all* incomes derive from sales, and commodities are obtainable exclusively by purchase A free market for labor was born in England only about a century ago. The ill-famed Poor Law Reform (1834) abolished the rough-and-ready provisions made for the paupers by patriarchal governments The poorhouse was transformed from a refuge of the destitute into an abode of shame and mental torture to which even hunger and misery were preferable. Starvation or work was the alternative left to the poor. Thus was a competitive national market for labor created Within a decade, the Bank Act (1844) established the principle of the gold standard; the making of money was removed from the hands of the government regardless of the effect upon the level of employment. Simultaneously, reform of land laws mobilized the land, and repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) created a world pool of grain, thereby making the unprotected Continental peasant-farmer subject to the whims of the market

Thus were established the three tenets of economic liberalism, the principle on which market economy was organized: that labor should find its price on the market; that money should be supplied by a self-adjusting mechanism; that commodities should be free to flow from country to country irrespective of the consequences — in brief, a labor market, the gold standard, and free trade A self-inflammatory process was induced, as a result of which the formerly harmless market pattern expanded into a sociological enormity.

BIRTH OF A DELUSION

These facts roughly outline the genealogy of an "economic" society Under such conditions the human world must appear as determined by "economic" motives It is easy to see why.

Single out whatever motive you please, and organize production in such a manner as to make that motive the individual's incentive to produce, and you will have induced a picture of man as altogether absorbed by that particular motive. Let that motive be religious, political, or aesthetic, let it be pride, prejudice, love, or envy, and man will appear as essentially religious, political, aesthetic, proud, prejudiced, engrossed in love or envy Other motives, in contrast, will appear distant and shadowy since they cannot be relied upon to operate in the vital business of production The particular motive selected will represent "real" man.

As a matter of fact, human beings will labor for a large variety of reasons as long as things are arranged accordingly Monks traded for religious reasons, and monasteries became the largest trading establishments in Europe The Kula trade of the Trobriand Islanders, one of the most intricate barter arrangements known to man, is mainly an aesthetic pursuit. Feudal economy was run on customary lines With the Kwakiutl, the chief aim of industry seems to be to satisfy a point of

honor. Under mercantile despotism, industry was often planned so as to serve power and glory. Accordingly, we tend to think of monks or villeins, western Melanesians, the Kwakiutl, or 17th-century statesmen, as ruled by religion, aesthetics, custom, honor, or politics, respectively

Under capitalism, every individual has to earn an income If he is a worker, he has to sell his labor at current prices, if he is an owner, he has to make as high a profit as he can, for his standing with his fellows will depend upon the level of his income Hunger and gain — even if vicariously — make them plough and sow, spin and weave, mine coal, and pilot planes Consequently, members of such a society will think of themselves as governed by these twin motives

In actual fact, man was never as selfish as the theory demanded Though the market mechanism brought his dependence upon material goods to the fore, "economic" motives never formed with him the sole incentive to work In vain was he exhorted by economists and utilitarian moralists alike to discount in business all other motives than "material" ones On closer investigation, he was still found to be acting on remarkably "mixed" motives, not excluding those of duty towards himself and others — and maybe, secretly, even enjoying work for its own sake

However, we are not here concerned with actual, but with assumed motives, not with the psychology, but with the ideology of business *Not on the former, but on the latter, are views of man's nature based* For once society expects a definite behavior on the part of its members, and prevailing institutions become roughly capable of enforcing that behavior, opinions on human nature will tend to mirror the ideal whether it resembles actuality or not.

Accordingly, hunger and gain were defined as "economic" motives, and man was supposed to be acting on them in everyday life, while his other motives appeared more ethereal and removed from humdrum existence. Honor and pride, civic obligation and moral duty, even self respect and common decency, were now deemed irrelevant to production, and were significantly summed up in the word "ideal Hence man was believed to consist of two components, one more akin to hunger and gain, the other to honor and power The one was "material," the other "ideal", the one "economic," the other "non-economic", the one "rational," the other "non-rational" The Utilitarians went so far as to identify the two sets of terms, thus endowing the "economic" side of man's character with the aura of *rationality* He who would have refused to imagine that he was acting for gain alone was thus considered not only immoral, but also mad

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

The market mechanism moreover created the delusion of economic determinism as a general law for all human society

Under a market-economy, of course, this law holds good Indeed, the working of the economic system here not only "influences" the rest of society, but determines it — as in a triangle the sides not merely influence, but determine, the angles

Take the stratification of classes Supply and demand in the labor market were *identical* with the classes of workers and employers, respectively. The social classes of capitalists, landowners, tenants, brokers, merchants, professionals, and so on, were delimited by the respective markets for land, money, and capital and their uses, or for various services. The income of these social classes was fixed by the market, their rank and position by their income

This was a complete reversal of the

secular practice In Maine's famous phrase, "contractus" replaced "status", or, as Tonnies preferred to put it, "society" superseded "community", or, in terms of the present article, *instead of the economic system being embedded in social relationships, these relationships were now embedded in the economic system*

While social classes were directly, other institutions were indirectly determined by the market mechanism State and government, marriage and the rearing of children, the organization of science and education, of religion and the arts, the choice of profession, the forms of habitation, the shape of settlements, the very aesthetics of private life—everything had to comply with the utilitarian pattern, or at least not interfere with the working of the market mechanism But since very few human activities can be carried on in the void, even a saint needing his pillar, the indirect effect of the market system came very near to determining the whole of society It was almost impossible to avoid the erroneous conclusion that as 'economic" man was "real" man, so the economic system was "really" society

SEX AND HUNGER

Yet it would be truer to say that the basic human institutions abhor unmixed motives. Just as the provisioning of the individual and his family does not commonly rely on the motive of hunger, so the institution of the family is not based on the sexual motive

Sex, like hunger, is one of the most powerful of incentives when released from the control of other incentives That is probably why the family in all its variety of forms is never allowed to center on the sexual instinct, with its intermittences and vagaries, but on the combination of a number of effective motives that prevent sex from destroying an institution on which so much of man's happiness depends Sex in itself will never produce anything better than a brothel, and even then it might have to draw on some incentives of the market mechanism An economic system actually relying for its mainspring on hunger would be almost as perverse as a family system based on the bare urge of sex

To attempt to apply economic determinism to all human societies is little short of fantastic. Nothing is more obvious to the student of social anthropology than the variety of institutions found to be compatible with practically identical instruments of production Only since the market was permitted to grind the human fabric into the featureless uniformity of selenic erosion has man's institutional creativeness been in abeyance No wonder that his social imagination shows signs of fatigue It may come to a point where he will no longer be able to recover the elasticity the imaginative wealth and power, of his savage endowment

No protest of mine, I realize, will save me from being taken for an "idealist" For he who decries the importance of "material" motives must, it seems, be relying on the strength of "ideal' ones Yet no worse misunderstanding is possible Hunger and gain have nothing specifically "material" about them Pride, honor, and power, on the other hand, are not necessarily "higher" motives than hunger and gain

The dichotomy itself, we assert, is arbitrary Let us once more adduce the analogy of sex Assuredly, a significant distinction between "higher" and "lower" motives can here be drawn Yet, whether hunger or sex, it is pernicious to *institutionalize* the separation of the "material' and "ideal" components of man's being As regards sex, this truth, so vital to man's essential wholeness, has been recognized all along, it is at the basis of the institution of marriage. But in the equally stra

tegic field of economy, it has been neglected. This latter field has been "separated out" of society as the realm of hunger and gain. Our animal dependence upon food has been bared and the naked fear of starvation permitted to run loose. Our humiliating enslavement to the "material," which all human culture is designed to mitigate, was deliberately made more rigorous. This is at the root of the "sickness of an acquisitive society" that Tawney warned of And Robert Owen's genius was at its best when, a century before, he described the profit motive as "a principle entirely unfavorable to individual and public happiness"

THE REALITY OF SOCIETY

I plead for the restoration of that unity of motives which should inform man in his everyday activity as a producer, for the reabsorption of the economic system in society, for the creative adaptation of our ways of life to an industrial environment.

On all these counts, laissez-faire philosophy, with its corollary of a marketing society, falls to the ground It is responsible for the splitting up of man's vital unity into 'real' man, bent on material values, and his "ideal" better self It is paralyzing our social imagination by more or less unconsciously fostering the prejudice of "economic determinism"

It has done its service in that phase of industrial civilization which is behind us At the price of impoverishing the individual, it enriched society Today, we are faced with the vital task of restoring the fullness of life to the person, even though this may mean a technologically less efficient society. In different countries in different ways, classical liberalism is being discarded On Right and Left and Middle, new avenues are being explored British Social-Democrats, American New Dealers, and also European fascists and American anti-New Dealers of the various "managerialist" brands, reject the liberal utopia Nor should the present political mood of rejection of everything Russian blind us to the achievement of the Russians in creative adjustment to some of the fundamental aspects of an industrial environment.

On general grounds, the Communist's expectation of the "withering away of the State" seems to me to combine elements of liberal utopianism with practical indifference to institutional freedoms As regards the withering State, it is impossible to deny that industrial society is complex society, and no complex society can exist without organized power at the center Yet, again, this fact is no excuse for the Communist's slurring over the question of concrete institutional freedoms

It is on this level of realism that the problem of individual freedom should be met No human society is possible in which power and compulsion are absent, nor is a world in which force has no function Liberal philosophy gave a false direction to our ideals in seeming to promise the fulfillment of such intrinsically utopian expectations

But under the market system, society as a whole remained invisible Anybody could imagine himself free from responsibility for those acts of compulsion on the part of the State which he, personally, repudiated, or for unemployment and destitution from which he, personally, did not benefit. Personally, he remained unentangled in the evils of power and economic value In good conscience, he could deny their reality in the name of his imaginary freedom.

Power and economic value are, indeed, a paradigm of social reality Neither power nor economic value spring from human volition, non-cooperation is impossible in regard to them. The function of

power is to insure that measure of conformity which is needed for the survival of the group: as David Hume showed, its ultimate source is opinion — and who could help holding opinions of some sort or other? Economic value, in any society, insures the usefulness of the goods produced, it is a seal set on the division of labor. Its source is human wants — and how could we be expected not to prefer one thing to another? Any opinion or desire, no matter what society we live in, will make us participants in the creation of power and the constituting of value No freedom to do otherwise is conceivable An ideal that would ban power and compulsion from society is intrinsically invalid. By ignoring this limitation on man's meaningful wishes, the marketing view of society reveals its essential immaturity.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

The breakdown of market-economy imperils two kinds of freedoms· some good, some bad.

That the freedom to exploit one's fellows, or the freedom to make inordinate gains without commensurable service to the community, the freedom to keep technological inventions from being used for the public benefit, or the freedom to profit from public calamities secretly engineered for private advantage, may disappear, together with the free market, is all to the good.

But the market-economy under which these freedoms thrived also produced freedoms that we prize highly Freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of meeting, freedom of association, freedom to choose one's job — we cherish them for their own sake. Yet to a large extent they were by-products of the same economy that was also responsible for the evil freedoms.

The existence of a separate economic sphere in society created, as it were, a gap between politics and economics, between government and industry, that was in the nature of a no man's land. As division of sovereignty between pope and emperor left medieval princes in a condition of freedom sometimes bordering on anarchy, so division of sovereignty between government and industry in the 19th century allowed even the poor man to enjoy freedoms that partly compensated for his wretched status.

Current scepticism in regard to the future of freedom largely rests on this There are those who argue, like Hayek, that since free institutions were a product of market-economy, they must give place to serfdom once that economy disappears There are others, like Burnham, who assert the inevitability of some new form of serfdom called "managerialism."

Arguments like these merely prove to what extent economistic prejudice is still rampant For such determinism, as we have seen, is only another name for the market-mechanism It is hardly logical to argue the effects of its absence on the strength of an economic necessity which derives from its presence And it is certainly contrary to Anglo-Saxon experience Neither the freezing of labor nor selective service abrogated the essential freedoms of the American people, as anybody can witness who spent the crucial years 1940–1943 in these States Great Britain during the war introduced an all-round planned economy and did away with that separation of government and industry from which 19th-century freedom sprang, yet never were public liberties more securely entrenched than at the height of the emergency In truth, we will have just as much freedom as we will desire to create and to safeguard There is no *one* determinant in human society Institutional guarantees of personal freedom are compatible with any economic system

In market society alone did the economic mechanism lay down the law.

MAN VS. INDUSTRY

What appears to our generation as the problem of capitalism is, in reality, the far greater problem of an industrial civilization. The economic liberal is blind to this fact In defending capitalism as an economic system, he ignores the challenge of the Machine Age Yet the dangers that make the bravest quake today transcend economy The idyllic concerns of trust-busting and Taylorization have been superseded by Hiroshima Scientific barbarism is dogging our footsteps The Germans were planning a contrivance to make the sun emanate death rays We, in fact, produced a burst of death rays that blotted out the sun Yet the Germans had an evil philosophy, and we had a humane philosophy In this we should learn to see the symbol of our peril

Among those in America who are aware of the dimensions of the problem, two tendencies are discernible some believe in elites and aristocracies, in managerialism and the corporation They feel that the whole of society should be more intimately adjusted to the economic system, which they would wish to maintain unchanged This is the ideal of the Brave New World, where the individual is conditioned to support an order that has been designed for him by such as are wiser than he Others, on the contrary, believe that in a truly democratic society, the problem of industry would resolve itself through the planned intervention of the producers and consumers themselves Such conscious and responsible action is, indeed, one of the embodiments of freedom in a complex society But, as the contents of this article suggest, such an endeavor cannot be successful unless it is disciplined by a total view of man and society very different from that which we inherited from market-economy.

THE INDUSTRIAL REALITY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY *

Peter F. Drucker

The representative social phenomena of the industrial system of our time are the mass-production plant and the corporation The assembly line is the representative material environment, the corporation is the representative social institution The large-scale plant has taken the place of the rural village or of the trading town of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The corporation has replaced the manor and the market as the basic institution in and through which the material reality is organized socially And corporation management has become the decisive and representative power in the industrial system.

The corporation is usually considered an *economic* institution But what economic function does the corporation fulfill that could not just as well be discharged by a partnership? The creation of credit requires a bank But whether a

* P F Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man*, The John Day Company, New York, 1942, pp 74–112 (*passim*) Reprinted by permission of the publisher

big plant is individually or corporately owned makes no difference in its productivity, its economic efficiency or profitability. Nor does the institution of the corporation fulfill any technological function. . . .

The old corporations based their authority upon the delegation of power by the political government The new, modern corporation, the corporation which rules our industrial reality, based its authority originally upon the delegation of the individual property rights by individual citizens It came to power as an institution of the independent social sphere of the nineteenth century, the sphere in which individual property rights gave social status and function, and generated legitimate power

The modern corporation is thus a *political* institution, its purpose is the creation of legitimate power in the industrial sphere. . . .

Very few institutions in history have been as successful as the corporation. It is hardly necessary to point out the tremendous political and social power of corporation management Before the introduction of the present war economy the executive of a big corporation in any of the industrial countries had more power over the lives and the livelihood of a greater number of people than most of the political authorities proper. The decisions of big business management regarding prices and wages, working hours and output, shaped and molded the lives of millions of people, and, ultimately, of the whole community.

But contrary to the assumptions of the contract theory, the managerial power in our industrial system is no longer based upon the property rights of the individual. It is not derived from these property rights, not controlled or limited by the holder of these rights, not responsible to them In the modern corporation the decisive power, that of the managers, is derived from no one but from the managers themselves, controlled by nobody and nothing and responsible to no one It is in the most literal sense unfounded, unjustified, uncontrolled and irresponsible power. . . .

The process by which ownership in the corporation has been divorced from management and control has been most publicized in the United States where Berle and Means [1] in their famous book more than a decade ago first portrayed it as a movement characteristic and typical of modern industrialism Subsequent studies, especially one by Marshal E. Dimock,[2] have shown that the development has been gathering momentum during the depression years American political and economic thinking alone has understood the full implications of the process But American actual developments — up to America's formal entry into war — had seemingly not progressed as far in the direction of the divorce of ownership and control as had developments in prewar England and pre-Hitler Germany. . . .

The corporation has become an autonomous social entity — in no way different today from, for instance, a city or any other political entity There can be no rights of property in an autonomous organic social entity since it must be conceived of as existing independent of, and before, the members. There can only be rights against such an entity claims, and rights within it: governmental authority The stockholder today actually only owns a claim, the management exercises authority But on what basis does this authority rest if there is no longer the basis of individual property rights?

The abdication of individual property rights as a basis of social power is the

[1] Berle and Means *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*

[2] In No 11 of the T N E C monographs

central institutional change of our times It has already had tremendous consequences.

In the first place, the development of the corporation to an autonomous social entity which exercises power by its own authority, has made meaningless the discussion between capitalism and socialism —at least in the terms and with the assumptions that have been traditionally used. Both orthodox capitalism and orthodox socialism assume not only that property is a legitimate basis of power, but also that property *is* social power Neither can admit the possibility of a divorce under which social power would become independent of property, and property would become socially powerless Both the orthodox capitalist and the orthodox Marxist start with the axiom that property is socially constitutive They differ only on who should own But they agree that the ownership of property must decide the nature and structure of society and of social power — precisely because they agree on the nature and political meaning of property In their discussions of property, Locke, Adam Smith and Hamilton are a good deal more "Marxist" than Marx

But ownership today is not socially constitutive The form in which property is owned does no longer decide who wields the power We have seen this quite clearly in the two revolutions of our times. The Communist nationalization of private property did not result in the equality that would have followed had the capitalist-socialist assumptions been true The concentration of power in government hands and the totalitarianism of the regime had nothing to do with the nationalization of property The Soviet system is based on the transfer of total control to the government which could just as well —if not better — have been effected without any change in the legal title of ownership

This has been proved by the second revolution of our times — that of the Nazis They have made no legal changes in the property sphere Yet they have abolished private initiative, private social power and the "free enterprise" system as effectively as have the Communists. Nobody at all familiar with the Nazi system would maintain that it is "capitalism" in any political sense of the word Yet it maintained private property and profits as legal fictions — simply because these institutions do not matter politically in the industrial system They were easier to maintain than to destroy, especially as their destruction would not have increased the efficiency of the total control of the party-state

Since the war started, every belligerent country has learned the lesson the Nazis have taught property does not matter politically All that matters is control, which today is divorced from and independent of property rights Total political control is the essence of modern war economics. And while it makes property rights politically meaningless and nonexistent, it does not and need not change or eliminate property.

For the future this means that the basic political issues will center on control and not, as in the past, on property We can see that clearly in contemporary economic and political thinking We no longer talk about the "private property system" but about "free enterprise" and "private initiative" . .

This brings us to the final and most important conclusion from our analysis: Managerial power today is illegitimate power It is in no way based upon a fundamental principle accepted by society as a legitimate basis of power. It is not controlled by such a principle nor limited by it And it s responsible to no one Individual property was a fundamental prin-

ciple accepted by society as a legitimate basis of social and political power The limitations, controls, and responsibilities of management were those set or imposed by the individual shareholders exercising jointly and severally their individual property rights. Western society is still willing to accept individual property rights as a good title to legitimate power. But today managerial power is independent of, uncontrolled by, and not responsible to the shareholders. And there is no other fundamental principle to take the place of individual property rights as a legitimate basis for the power which management actually wields.

Altogether, our industrial economy has become split into two parts A "real" economy of plants, mills, machines, managers and workers, and a "symbol" economy of negotiable securities, legal titles and empty ownership rights. The "real" economy is organized in "going concerns"—the significantly vague term American jurisprudence has coined for something that really does not fit into the legal system of property rights The "going concern" is taken to exist outside and beyond the property rights of the shareholders and to be unaffected by the fluctuations and fortunes of the market Everywhere we find economic policy today based on the assumption that the "going concern" must be maintained and strengthened, even at the price of jettisoning both stockholders and the price system of the market The "symbol" economy, on the other hand, is of the market. In it are observed the nineteenth-century assumptions regarding the position of property.

But only in the "real" economy is there social power and control The "symbol" economy gives wealth; but wealth by itself no longer confers social power. The rulers in the "real" economy might have to be content with a good income and they might never accumulate large fortunes. But they, and they alone, have power. Yet their power rests in no way upon the symbols of property rights and ownership. Only in legal fiction is the "real" economy still dependent upon, and directed by, the symbols. Actually, the "symbol" economy has become a powerless appendix to the "real" economy—if there is any connection at all.

Lest I be misunderstood. this is *not* an attack upon modern management. On the contrary, there has never been a more efficient, a more honest, a more capable and conscientious group of rulers than the professional management of the great American corporations today The power they wield is theirs not because they usurped it, but because the stockholder has relinquished his rights and his duties Most of the corporation executives I know are unhappy in their positions of uncontrolled and nonresponsible social power which they did not seek, but into which they have been pushed.

A clear indication of their acute discomfort can be seen in their attempts to develop a legitimate basis for their power in "service" The campaign to have the services rendered by management to the community, rather than the property rights of the stockholders, accepted as a basis of managerial rule was by no means all hypocrisy or supersalesmanship Most of the managers took it seriously

However, honesty, efficiency and capability have never been and never will be good titles to power The questions whether power is legitimate or illegitimate, whether a ruler is a constitutional ruler or a despot lie altogether on a plane different from that of personal qualities Bad qualities can vitiate a good title. But good personal qualities can never remedy the lack of title Nor is the despot against his will any less a despot All that is likely to result from his attempts to shirk the

power that has been thrust upon him, is timidity and insecurity which only aggravate the situation A good man on a usurper's throne will probably rule for a shorter time than the bandit who does not care about the title as long as he has the power, at least the bandit will act and will fight for his power. . . .

The answer to the illegitimacy of present-day managerial rule is not to "turn the rascals out" — there are not many anyhow — but to make the ruling power in the industrial system a legitimate power

Unless and until this is done, the industrial system will have no legitimate power.

II

If the corporation is the representative social institution and if management is the decisive social power, mass production in big units is the representative social form of our society The big centralized concentrated mass-production unit may not be quantitatively in the majority — neither in the number of workers employed nor in the volume of output. Yet the attempt to use these quantitative measurements for the qualitative purpose of proving that ours is actually still a "small unit" technology is ridiculous in the extreme It does not matter what the statistical averages are The big mass-producing unit may statistically be an isolated case, as in England before 1939 It may be less efficient technically than the small or medium-sized factory. The big automatic mechanized plant may even be economically unprofitable. But mechanized mass production in big units is the technological form of industrial production which matters most, politically and socially.

Mass production is the "ideal type" of modern industrial production which directly or indirectly molds all our concepts, methods and aims of industrial production altogether It would be but slight exaggeration to say that our whole industrial society changed basically on the day, thirty-five years ago, when Henry Ford first used the assembly-line method consciously as a radically new system of production Certainly since then no industrial country has ever been the same, even in Europe where the assembly line itself was very slow in gaining ground

The new mass-production system carries all the technological and economic momentum; it is the dynamic force in our techno-economic engine

If we analyze this representative system of industrial production, we shall find that its new basic feature is not a new use of, or approach to, machinery There is no difference in the treatment of the inanimate tools of production. When we call the new system "automatic" or "mechanized," we do not mean that the machines have become automatic or mechanical What has become automatic and mechanical is the worker

The great innovation of modern industry is a vision a vision of the worker as an efficient, automatic, standardized machine Whether the credit for this vision should go to Henry Ford, to Taylor, or to the behaviorist psychologists is a moot point Like all great discoveries, it was probably made at the same time by different people working and thinking independently Around 1900, the whole emphasis of industry changed Up till then, for a hundred and fifty years, the most skilled, the most highly trained worker was the most efficient, the most productive, the most valuable worker. Suddenly, the very qualities which made the good craftsman — understanding of the process, knowledge of all its phases, initiative, the personal touch, etc — became obstacles to efficiency and productivity Uniformity, absence of any personal relationship to the

work, specialization on one unskilled manipulation, subdivision of the work into particles without comprehensible cohesion became the new way to maximum productivity and efficiency.

It may be said that the era before mass production was just as much based upon the unskilled, mechanized laborer as our present productive system. All the descriptions of the mills in Manchester, Liverpool or Glasgow in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution emphasize the almost dehumanized hordes of starved, illiterate, dispossessed semi-savages from Ireland and Scotland who slaved on the early power spindles and power looms But this was not efficient labor — no more so than are today the illiterate, unskilled labor in Malayan rubber plantations, or the Negroes in the cotton fields of the *American South The unskilled workers* of the early industrial stage were so inefficient that they could be used economically only at starvation wages They were employed only because skilled, self-respecting workers could not be obtained

Most manufacturers in the century before 1914 or 1929 firmly believed that a more highly skilled, more individualist worker would be a better worker They were forever starting trade schools or endowing polytechnical institutes Actually, all during the nineteenth century there was a definite trend away from the unskilled, automatic worker to the craftsman. If there ever should be a statistical investigation of the development of labor skills during the nineteenth century, it will certainly show that at the close of the century the proportion of unskilled, automatic workers was much lower than it had been at the beginning

Today, however, the automatic mechanized worker is the most efficient worker, producing the most per unit of labor. There is not only a rapid trend toward the complete mechanization of all but a few workers which has been greatly accelerated by the Depression and by the present war. There is also a prestige attached to it, to go automatic is to be progressive. The most convincing examples of the change are in the old industries — the same industries which started a hundred and fifty years ago with human automata but had managed to develop their own craftsmen in the meantime As old, as efficient and as specialized an industry as the New York garment industry has, since the Depression, suffered greatly from the competition of a new, fully mechanized, automatic clothing industry in St Louis and Kansas City The fact that women's wear seems least amenable to standardization in view of the rapid fashion changes in the United States, apparently proved no obstacle to the assembly-line process

It is sometimes argued that the mechanization and automatization of the worker in modern mass-production industry is but a transitory stage to the complete elimination of manual labor An automatic steel strip mill or an automatic plate-glass plant operates seemingly without manual labor at all A handful of highly skilled operators on control boards — junior executives rather than workers — do the work formerly performed by hundreds or thousands of skilled manual workers What has happened is not that the former manual laborers have now become skilled control-board operators. Today, only the former foremen are left while the former laborers have disappeared Whether they have become the victims of technological unemployment, or whether they are now human automata serving machines producing far more than they ever could have produced in the old way, is immaterial for our point Even the assumption of the "technocrats" of 1933 memory does not invalidate our argument For if it should really be true that a consistent application

of modern mass-production methods would produce a superabundance of goods, practically without any labor, then the former industrial worker would no longer have status and function in the productive process. And a society like ours, which sees social status and function predominantly in status and function in the economic process, could not integrate the functionless industrial worker — even though it might be able to supply him abundantly with goods.

That the employed worker in modern mass-production industry has no social status and function is usually overlooked by modern writers who have been taught that nothing counts in social life except income and economic wealth But even they have noticed the social and political problem of the *unemployed* worker in modern society.

The mass unemployment of the "long armistice" was an entirely new phenomenon In no previous depression was there any chronic unemployment Indeed, if we accept the results of recent research, there was no unemployment at all in the most severe business crisis of the nineteenth century, that of 1873 But even when there was unemployment it was the last of the crisis phenomena to come, and the first to go In the past, unemployment had always disappeared long before the recovery showed in higher stock and commodity prices or in bigger industrial profits. In the last Depression, however, the unemployment problem improved last — if it improved at all

Actually, the most frightening thing about the industrial unemployment of the last twenty years was that it persisted through the periods of recovery, and, indeed, of high prosperity There remained an irreducible core of unemployment in the Germany of 1927, the England of 1935, the United States of 1937 — all years of record or near-record industrial activity. This is not just a sign of economic dislocation. It is a most serious symptom of social disruption For unemployment is not only an economic catastrophe It is a social disfranchisement The unemployed has lost his livelihood as well as his status and function in society He is an outcast — for a man who has no function and no status, for whom society has no use and nothing to do, has been cast out

We all know that unemployment cannot be cured by economic relief. In countries where the "dole" was almost as high as the wages of unskilled labor, the social effects of unemployment showed almost as fully as in countries where there was no organized relief at all Above all, the unemployed disintegrated socially He lost his skills, he lost his morale, he became apathetic and asocial The unemployed may be bitter at first, resentment is still a form of participation in society, if only in protest But soon society becomes too irrational, too incomprehensible to the unemployed even for rebellion He becomes bewildered, frightened, resigned, and sinks finally into an apathy which is almost a living social death.

During the twilight periods of high business activity with high unemployment which characterized the industrial countries during the recent past, any social worker with experience could point out the chronically unemployed from among the Saturday evening crowd in an industrial town They were not necessarily dressed more shabbily than the others, they did not look any more underfed than many of the employed workers in the crowd But they had an unmistakable air of bewilderment, of defeat and blind purposelessness that set them apart fully as much as if they had belonged to another race. And in a sense they did. Around them had grown an invisible wall separating them from the members of a society

which had cast them out. Not only the unemployed but society too felt this wall. Social intercourse between employed and unemployed ceased gradually. They frequented different taverns and different poolrooms, hardly intermarried and generally kept to themselves There are no more tragic and no more frightening pages in the whole literature of chronic unemployment than those which tell of the destruction through unemployment of man's most basic community: the family Many a fully unemployed family maintained its social unity, its social cohesion and its social strength — but hardly any partly unemployed family survived as a functioning community Unemployed father and employed children, unemployed children and employed father, unemployed brother and employed sister — became separated by a wall of mutual suspicion and mutual incomprehensibility, which neither love nor necessity could breach.

If there is any further proof needed for the social meanings of unemployment, it is provided by the gambling of the unemployed in all industrial countries The popularity of football pools and dog races in England or of the "numbers game" in the United States cannot be explained by the desire of the unemployed to make a few pennies the only way they could The unemployed knew that they were bound to lose as well as any sermonizing editorial writer calculating the odds But blind, unreasoning chance appeared to the unemployed the only operative force in this world and in this society, only chance made sense. And football pools or numbers games were seemingly the only rational conduct in a society without other rationality, without meaning, sense, function and integrating power

It is absolutely certain that we shall have to prevent a recurrence of large-scale chronic unemployment after this war. Otherwise, we shall surely disintegrate into chaos or tyranny. But it is not enough to find productive work for the unemployed, though it is the first thing to do.

However, this would only solve the problem of economic security and not that of social function and status, which is a problem of the employed worker as well as of the unemployed The social problem of the industrial worker in the modern industrial system may be likened to an iceberg Unemployment is the part that shows above the water But the real bulk, the real danger, lies below waterline It is the increasing lack of function and status of the employed worker We may get rid of the obvious danger the unemployment But unless we also attack the much greater, though less obvious, problem of the social function of the employed worker, we will founder

We do not have to examine the consequences of automatic mass production to arrive at the conclusion that the worker in modern industry lacks social status and function as an individual Denial of the existence of an individual with social status and function is really the essence of the new approach In mass production technology the worker is only one sloppily designed machine To bring this human machine to the full mechanical and automatic efficiency which its Maker apparently failed to achieve is the main aim of the new science of "human engineering" That means, however, that the individual must cease to exist The new technique demands standardized, freely interchangeable, atomic labor without status, without function, without individuality It demands graded tools But there is no relationship between the worker's function as part of a precision machine which the present-day industrial system assigns to him, and any individual purpose From the point of view of the system the individual worker functions only, makes sense only, is rational only when he ceases to be a member of society

From the point of view of the individual worker the society of the mass-production age does not and cannot make sense at all

Certainly the unskilled laborer did not hold such an enviable position in the productive system of yesterday The wheelbarrow pusher in a steel plant, the sewing-machine operator in a garment sweatshop, the Irish navvies in a railroad construction gang, had a hard life indeed, much harder than the mechanized assembly-line worker of today But the unskilled worker of the last generation was an inferior Often he was a recent immigrant from central or southern Europe (in the United States), from Ireland or Russia (in England), from Bohemia or Poland (in Germany and France) He did not speak the language and he came from countries that were considered "backward" Or the unskilled worker of yesterday was the individual failure, the "shiftless and thriftless," of the early capitalist society. That those workers were not integrated into society could be rationally explained

Above all, the unskilled worker of the nineteenth century was an auxiliary He was necessary to help the real workers, but none of the skilled people would have called him a worker. He brought materials to the skilled people He carted off their semifinished or finished products, or he performed a type of labor which, like digging the soil, was basically preindustrial in technique. The real worker was a craftsman with all the craftsman's pride, understanding, skill and status No one could be prouder, more self-respecting and more firmly aware of his relationship to society than an old-line printer, railroad engineer or machinist

But in the new system the unskilled mechanized worker is the real worker The skilled craftsmen have become the auxiliaries who prepare and lay out the job but who do not do it themselves The productive labor is that of the man on the assembly line who, standing rigidly all day, holds in his outstretched hand a paint brush which automatically draws a red line on the flanks of slowly passing automobile bodies He neither understands how an automobile works nor does he possess any skill which could not be acquired by everyone within a few days He is not a human being in society, but a freely replaceable cog in an inhumanly efficient machine

ATTITUDES OF "PROGRESSIVE" TRADE-UNION LEADERS *

Alvin W. Gouldner

It has been frequently noted that it is difficult for social movements to retain their original value-systems after they are formally organized and have developed professional leaders. Robert Michels has formulated an "iron law of oligarchy" according to which the leaders, gradually developing a taste for office and power, become an organized minority who assume control This increasingly oligarchical control, Michels held, conduces to the warping of the organization's value-system Michels attributed this process mainly to an internal factor, namely, growth in

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1947, pp 389–92 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press

size of the organization. He and his followers neglect analysis of the manner in which this, as well as other factors internal to the organization, interact with external factors — the various ties of individuals to outside claims, pressures, and ideologies — in producing this effect.[1]

In a study of trade-union leaders in New York City we gathered data pertinent to this problem We, however, were concerned with the way in which external elements — in the social and cultural structures — play a role in modifying the leader's attitudes and values.

From the point of view of the way in which they regard their offices — and it is only this aspect of the union leader's value-system which we shall discuss — two polar types of trade-union leaders have been discerned One of these, sometimes called the "business unionist," sees himself as the middleman involved in the sale of the union member's labor power to the employer As such, he is very much subject to the same motivations as any other entrepreneur He conceives of his office principally in terms of the pecuniary rewards, the security, and the prestige it affords him Like other "captains of industry" he feels impelled to seek out and capture his own "main chance"

We have called the antithesis of this type the "progressive" leader. For about a year we studied the latter type in a single trade-union in New York City. (It must be emphasized that, at best, our findings refer *only* to unions possessing the value-system indicated below) While we have, during this time, employed three distinct research methods· (1) participant observation, (2) depth interviews, and (3) standard questionnaire techniques, the following report is based only on the first two methods

Briefly, we found that the progressive union leader's attitudes toward his office are distinguished by the following concepts·

a) The trade-union office as a "calling." The union is viewed as that institution through which the progressive leader works for his "principles" and for "humanity" The progressive leader believes that his own goals are qualitatively different from those of the ordinary worker's in that they are superpersonal.

b) Leader's responsibility The progressive leader places the greatest importance upon the fulfilment of those obligations which he has voluntarily undertaken or which inhere in his office "Responsible" is the verbal status symbol used to commend behavior which manifests such an attitude

c) Inner union leadership. The progressive leader believes that the offices in his union should be occupied by people who have ascended from the rank and file Moreover, it is believed best that the leader possess the same objective characteristics, for example, ethnic origin, religion, and class origin, found among the union subgroup which he leads "Pigeons can't lead ducks," say some leaders — but this is more practice than a rule.

d) Diffidence and indifference to personal importance "Modesty," "humility," and other forms of self-effacement are deemed necessary virtues to be manifested by the progressive leader during the daily conduct of interpersonal relations A "bad" leader is sometimes one who "thinks he's God" A desire to "get ahead" or to be a "big shot" or any open manifestation of a wish to use the union office as a means of climbing in the union hierarchy is frowned upon by the progressive leader.

To some extent these norms are at vari-

[1] See Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (New York Hearst's International Library, 1919), and Philip Selznick, "An Approach to the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Sociological Review*, VIII (1943), 47–59.

ance with those which are dominant in our society. To work for one's "ideals" or to work for "others," to belittle personal success and ascendancy — all these union norms implicitly contradict one of the basic elements in our culture, which, as Robert S Lynd states, "stresses individual competitive aggressiveness as the basis of individual and collective security"[2] As a consequence, the system into which these interrelated norms are integrated is subjected to an unrelenting pressure which, because it is often exercised through the most innocent and commonplace channels, is all the more effective

The union is not isolated from the larger society in which it finds itself The union leader was born into this larger society and matured in a family, neighborhood, and school, all of which accepted the premises of this society The progressive leader cannot, of course, wish out of existence the norms he learned to accept in youth simply because they are now inconsistent with those prevailing in the union Thus, the norms of the larger society become more or less repressed, in a sense "encysted," within the personality of the union leader They can be and are, however, reactivated under certain conditions which are neither accidental nor idiosyncratic

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN ATTITUDE MODIFICATION

In the beginning, the leading participants in the union were young men and women who had no families of their own and who were willing to subordinate their extra-union activities to work in the union As the union grew older and more powerful, the entire wage structure in industry advanced Along with it, and in rather strict proportion, came the salaries of their leaders.

[2] *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1939), p 71

Marriages in the union became quite common and, at the present time, the modal union leader is married and has a child or two Primarily oriented toward their relations either with the employers or with the rank and file, the union leaders did not suspect that developments of this character could profoundly affect their union

It was not, after all, within the union's recognized province to define the new roles which their leaders undertook For want of any other definition, however, the leaders tended to accept the culturally normative definitions of the roles of husband and father One of the obligations inhering in this definition of the husband's role is that of being a "good provider" Another, which is being increasingly accepted, is that the husband must also be a "companion" This is especially the case with the type of marriages to which the progressive leader is disposed These obligations are, however, satisfied by the progressive leader only with the greatest difficulty Often, as we shall note, the demands placed upon him in his roles of husband-father and union leader are mutually exclusive

The standards the progressive leader implicitly uses in assaying his own "job satisfaction" are a corollary of the general conception he has of his office As such, they do not permit him to evaluate his position as the ordinary worker does, emphasizing wages and hours But these, nevertheless, are precisely the criteria thrust upon him in his role as husband and father

The typical developments are as follows

a) Strains are induced in the leader's family life This is partially verified by the plethora of rumors among union leaders about the many marriages which have been taxed and severed due to the conflicting demands of union and family life.

As one union leader declared, "At one time wives wouldn't allow their husbands to go to work on the union staff, it was so hard I know Even today, I have a great many difficulties with my wife because of the hours I put into my union work." Not only are the hours of work long, but the leader's activity is concentrated in the evening hours, when members come to the union building for their meetings The discontent thus engendered can be alleviated either by relinquishing or by redefining the family roles or the union official's role

b) Once having become a mother, and often before then, the union leader's wife tends to enact that role in the culturally approved way This implies that she can no longer work but must, instead, keep house for her husband Meeting her neighbors while sunning the baby or shopping reinforces within her the approved definition of her rights as a wife She commences to wonder why her husband (who, after all, is such an important man, being an official) does not "come home at the hours that other men do"

c) His wife increasingly expects him to provide for his family in a middle-class fashion She herself no longer works and contributes to the upkeep of their household Thus it is that the union leader may be impelled to re-evaluate his attitudes toward two key factors — wages and hours, and, as these are part of his entire pattern of attitudes toward his office, the whole scheme may have to be basically reorganized.

Most union leaders are, to some extent, aware of the changes which have been wrought in their conception of their office by their assumption of new roles. "The standards of leadership have changed," said one of them; "It once meant having to give your whole life to the union. Today, most of us do not."

Another leader stated it thus: "Personal relations among the staff members have decreased. Before, most of our members were not married. . . . We used to stay down together for the socials on Saturday night and afterwards go to a bar together. As a consequence, there is less of a morale on the staff And, without that, your job becomes a job"

The situation is somewhat eased by a tendency toward marriage between union members One of the first questions asked of a leader when he announces a forthcoming marriage is, "Is she a union member?" If the union leader marries a "good" union member, his office then becomes the focal point of his life, being the source both of his material necessities and of the status which he has in union and family.

To the extent that his wife was, and continues to be, a participant in union activities or to the extent that she identifies herself with them, the union leader will be less subject to the pressures of the cultural norms For the most part, however, intermarriage among union members merely retards the wife's propensity to function as a "transmission belt" for the dominant social values

The disorganization of the progressive leader's concept of his office and of his normative system is also prepared for by minor, day-to-day frustrations and tensions to which he is subjected Moments of stress may precipitate his adoption of the usual criteria of success which focus largely on wages and hours We thus find progressive union leaders making the following remarks:

"Occasionally, I feel that I am making a sacrifice I might have my evenings free also. I feel that way especially when I get a bawling out."

"Whenever I have a quarrel with Dick or whenever I get annoyed over some petty thing, I always remember my petty salary and I start kicking myself I have to take an awful lot for what I'm getting."

The criteria of job satisfaction which are more or less repressed by the progressive leader may often be reactivated by what are relatively minor frustrations Because the ordinary criteria provide a ready and familiar alternative, they continually threaten the union's own system of values

All these disorganizing elements seem to exercise their influence within the limits of the whole social structure For example, an increase in economic prosperity increases the utility and the prestige of the social norms and fosters their appreciation in the union leader

During the recent war, when the labor market was relatively favorable to the worker and when much publicity was devoted to the high salaries allegedly being made by war workers, the progressive union leader was likely to pay more attention to his own salary As one of the newer union leaders remarked

I was getting along quite well in business before I came to the union It took me a month before I joined the staff to make up my mind whether I should come At one time, a staff position was the most coveted one; it doesn't seem that way any longer

"Then there's the financial angle At my previous job I was doing quite well, the boss liked me very much I got increases in pay without even asking for them . I had a perspective [*sic*] there, but, in this respect, the union offers me no perspective You know how small the union salaries are, even today"

The progressive leader who feels he has the ability to succeed in terms of the socially current norms finds it relatively difficult to adjust to the union's values The war, of course, increased the union leader's and member's expectations of attaining the socially approved economic status in the socially approved way — by working for a private employer Consequently, staff positions were no longer as coveted as they had been

OF TIME AND THE RAILROADER *

W. F. Cottrell

The fourth dimension has been a subject for everything from highly abstract and critical thinking to fantastic imagination It has served to modify fixed points in an established science and to support time worn religions Likewise, calculations in which time is taken as an aspect of all other measurements have imposed new restrictions on human behavior

That the centuries have witnessed a modification in the concept of time, Sorokin [1] has adequately demonstrated There is no need for us to raise the question as

[1] Sorokin and others *Social and Cultural Dynamics* Vol 2, 413–428, New York, 1937 A further development of the concept of 'Social Time Pitirim A Sorokin and Robert K Merton, *Amer J Sociol* March, 1937, 615 629 indicates that the current concept of time is merely an attribute of our 'sensate culture' An interesting rejoinder and reply to the rejoinder reveal another point of view *Amer J Sociol* May, 1938, 667–670

* *American Sociological Review*, April, 1939, pp 190–98 Reprinted by permission of the author The material of this article also has been incorporated in the author's book, *The Railroader*, published by the Stanford University Press, 1940

to whether in the long run the present conception of time may be altered, for, in the moment that we are considering, the use of the Newtonian system of mechanics for the creation of our technology binds us to the use of a mechanical conception of time We may argue long and bitterly about the nature of time, but we know that if we want to catch a train, see a kick-off, or hear a radio program, our frame of reference forces us to consult an accurate clock

The vast subdivision of labor which characterizes our technology requires coordination in time and space — neither axis alone is adequate The backbone of industrialism is the railroad. Split-second timing of industrial operations reflects back along the line of transportation and imposes constantly new and closer limits upon those who operate trains

Time is an important factor in any social pattern Social interaction requires time coordination, and to the degree that occupation determines time distribution, time limits all forms of social participation As technology controls time for the railroader, it also determines the tempo and the interval of other social relationships and sets a pattern for the personality

After consulting Gulliver on the function of his watch, the Lilliputians came to the conclusion that it was his God Observing the money spent and the care lavished on his watch, a Martian might conclude the same thing of the railroader All those who have direct responsibility for the actual operations of trains must carry a fine timepiece which will gain or lose not more than forty seconds in two weeks and which must be cleaned and regulated twice a year by a railroad watch inspector A delay of thirty seconds in leaving a terminal calls for explanation, five minutes' delay means investigation, and a half hour gives apoplexy to every official from the superintendent to the lowest foreman. On single track roads where trains meet at passing tracks, thirty seconds' delay means that one of the trains will be almost a half mile from a passing track when the other reaches it, and that means delay of a second train, with possible misunderstanding and resultant disaster

Delays at crossovers may mean a reversal in the order in which trains use the intersection, possible increased delay while clearance is secured, and a whole series of new orders to care for trains that otherwise would be met as a matter of course by other trains over which they have the right of way The timetable is not only a convenience for the fidgeting tourist who uses it to chart his progress and occupy himself, it is a habit-system, or a "subconscious mind," for the railway "organism" Trainmen meet all scheduled trains in accordance with this table and plan to take sidings or make stops with a margin of time great enough to clear automatic signals for superior trains. The timetable makes all these coordinations as automatic as a conditioned reflex as far as the operating brain in the dispatcher's office is concerned Delays mean that a new situation must be faced, operative intelligence is required for too many things at once and operating efficiency falls The fatigued brain of the trick dispatcher is much more likely to err when it is called upon to take a load additional to that involved in planning only for extra trains The technique of railroading itself makes it necessary to operate thousands of tons, moving at extremely high speeds with an accuracy greater than that maintained on many a factory assembly line.

This operating technique, determined by the nature of *things,* if disaster is to be avoided, is intensified by the interest and insurance calculus of capitalist civilization To the African, time is like air, a free good, and therefore has no exchange value. To the American business man,

who uses it as frequently as any other unit in determining price and exchange value, time becomes a cost factor of no little significance Passenger trains were first to feel the impact of this factor The plainsman planning to rejoin his fur-trapping "pardner" was content to rejoin him "after snow melts" or "when the grass turns green," or more accurately "in April" or "six moons from now" Wagon trains made planning of trips calculable within a matter of weeks, stage coaches were due on a certain day, but no efficiency expert computed the value of a half-hour's delay for five hundred people, nor calculated the insurance rate on the whole outfit Nowadays, business executives accustomed to making decisions involving millions after an interview lasting a few hours or even minutes, demand accurate coordination so that these precious minutes may be calculated far in advance, and even salesmen of less importance schedule their day in minutes Interdependence with schedules of competing roads and other means of transportation led to increased emphasis on *time,* until the five- or ten-second error permitted on passenger trains became a commonplace

Then luxury goods began to require the same sort of accuracy Silk trains, valued in millions, speeding from Pacific Coast ports to silk centers the width of a continent away, were heavily insured The insurance was high and calculated not in days but hours, the road which could promise accurate delivery could save in insurance sums large enough to make special schedules for silk a paying proposition

Vitamin research and the necessity for stimulating the jaded palate of America with fresh fruits and vegetables next laid their toll on the railroader For instance, lettuce can be picked only during two or three hours of the day if it is to remain fresh and firm, and a delay of an hour or two in delivery to a commission house means that the morning auctions are over, buyers surfeited and huge losses must be sustained The radio and telegraphic reports on the market give sellers and buyers instantaneous information on which they may act, but the goods put in transit on that information must reach their destination within the range of a few hours if they are to meet the market for which they are intended Railroads bidding for the milk business must guarantee schedules as accurate as those of passenger trains if losses due to spoilage are not to eat up profits Even though beef can be refrigerated and kept indefinitely, its delivery to meet a certain day's market, or to keep the production line of a packing house going, means that cattle trains have to be put on penalty schedule if a competing road is not to get the business

All this is as nothing compared to the demand imposed by new mass production industry and the cost accountants of our new business firms Assemblage of an automobile on the Pacific Coast from parts manufactured at a half hundred or more widely scattered plants all over the United States makes the railroad *part of the assembly line* When branch plants were first set up, management expected to carry overhead in the form of inventory great enough to permit some flexibility in delivery by the railroads, but cost accountancy quickly revealed a saving for "up and coming" firms, and now many a plant manager boasts that he closes each day without a single item of inventory and opens the next morning with the expectancy that all items brought from all over the United States will be found waiting on his siding Perhaps the tremendous impetus given to this movement for increased speed can best be shown if we consider something of the history of train speed in America *The Railroad Gazette,* and its successor, *The Railway Age,* has published

an interesting series of tables showing fast and unusual runs all over the world.[2] Study of them is particularly enlightening In 1905, a Pennsylvania train reached the speed of 127 2 miles an hour, and until very recent times that remained the record for railroad performance in the United States. In fact, in 1928 the conclusion reached by the editor was, "The improvement which has been made in locomotive service since 1895 is shown not so much in higher speeds *per se* as in the heavier trains now hauled without diminution of speed and at sustained speeds for long distances" Another comparison might also show the nature of changes In 1906, there were only two trains, traveling a total of 114 miles scheduled at sixty miles an hour or more; in 1928 the same two trains, now covering 135 miles, were the only trains scheduled to do more than sixty miles an hour. The next highest train speed in 1928 was the 48 m p h average maintained between New York and Chicago by extra fare trains, and adding two other runs scheduled at more than forty-five miles per hour brought the total mileage schedule at that speed or better to a little less than 2500 miles all told That these limitations were not technical in character will be observed when we see what was done with the same equipment when the depression forced railroad management to make adjustments

In two significant articles, Steffee[3] shows the dramatic increase in scheduled train speeds In 1936, there were six hundred and forty-four different runs scheduled at sixty miles or more an hour including stops from start to finish of the run They cover a distance of 40,205 miles of which 29,301 are scheduled daily The fastest long run scheduled in that year was the Santa Fe's *Superchief* which covered 202 miles of its eastbound trip at a cool 84 miles per hour On one ten-mile stretch, it was *scheduled* to do 108 miles an hour It is interesting to note that of the 40,000 mile-a-minute miles, 14,000 are made by steam locomotives, in many cases the same engines in use in 1928 That the trend established between 1928 and 1936 is still accelerating can be seen when we look at the figures showing increases during 1937 During that year, the number of runs at a mile or more a minute jumped to 781, the total mileage of these runs jumped to 46,242 miles and the daily mileage increased by more than a third — from 28,301 to 38,523 miles of mile-a-minute trains This was accompanied by some readjustments in the extreme scheduled time between certain points There was a general increase in the speed of trains so that forty-five miles an hour becomes commonplace and Steffee[4] states that there is a "whole army" of trains operating at more than 55 miles an hour Another significant trend is seen in that an increasing proportion of the fast runs are made by steam trains For us, this means that the check on this rapid movement for speed which would naturally have resulted if new Diesel or electrics were required does not exist Standard equipment already in existence is being used in increasing amounts Of the 38,000 miles run daily, 20,000 miles of mile-a-minute runs are pulled by steam engines

While comparable figures are not available to show increased freight speeds, some summaries are available which show a like trend For example, the *Monthly Labor Review*, July, 1937, 45. 78–101, cites aver

[2] *Railroad Gazette*, June 11, 1897, 415, Jan 11, 1901, 24, Dec 15, 565–566, Nov 12, 1906, 394–395, *Railway Age*, July 7, 1928, 20–21, April 4, 1936, 583–586, see letter to editor, April 25, 1936, 700–701 See also letter in *The Railway Gazette* (British), Feb 4, 1938, 210–214

[3] Donald M. Steffee, "North America's Mile-A-Minute Runs," *Railroad Stories*, Oct 1936, 20–27; same author and title, *Railroad Magazine*, April 1938, 7–20

[4] *Op cit.*, April, 1938, 7

age freight train speed in 1926 at 11.9 miles per hour; 1933, 15 7; 1934, 15 9; and 1935, 16.1 The American Railway Association advertises an increase in speed of 43 percent in five years, 1932 to 1937, and many freight time cards show scheduled speeds of more than forty miles an hour

The complete interdependence of mass production industries is revealed by such events as the strikes of 1937 in which the absence of single items such as an induction coil or brakeshoe brought the whole automobile industry to a halt The result is, of course, that the penalties imposed for a few hours' delay in delivering any one of hundreds of items may be fantastic

Time penalties come to figure highly in the minds of business managers, therefore, railroads have made seemingly impossible promises of delivery because they must bid for regular accounts from shippers who, by Interstate Commerce regulation and antirebate laws, are denied the price cutting and special discounts by which other industries secure contracts These impossibilities are then turned into realities through pressure on the railroader The traffic department which has secured a "juicy bit" of business gets apoplectic when a delay threatens to lose it, therefore, down the line, from general manager to car inspector, goes out the edict, "Delay *this* train at peril of your job" Supervisors are bombarded with messages, "Meet this train", "No explanation for delay of this train will be accepted", 'From this date, train operates on such and such a schedule, no delay can be permitted" In the meantime, under the same pressure from "efficiency experts,' men are fired or laid off, trains increased in length, the number of service-stops cut, and less money is spent on repairs and maintenance The second hand of his watch becomes a sword of Damocles to the railroader

The twenty-four hour day and the three hundred and sixty-five day year are as necessary to the railroad as to the calendar. There are no holidays Christmas day in Chicago is two days before Christmas in Los Angeles, if you are moving east, and two days after Christmas if you move west No break in service at one point would correspond with delivery date at another except where short distances are involved So the pressure is incessant For the railroader, split second timing never ceases, he is always on call The plant is never shut down A wreck, a washout, a split switch, a sudden increased demand for power, an engine failure, frozen steam pipes, clogged toilet facilities, failure of air conditioning, a broken train line — any one of a thousand incidents may threaten to cause delay or to inconvenience patrons, so the railroader must be available even though his shift is over and he is supposedly a "free man" He is a slave to the clock, intense time-consciousness marks the railroader in all his social relationships

This time emphasis is, of course, an aspect of the lives of all moderns They catch the timed trains, eat by the clock, quit by the clock and are clocked in their amusement "The next feature will begin at 8 12", "Twenty-five cents for the first three minutes, five cents for each additional minute", "The kickoff will be at 2 30", and so on, *ad infinitum*

Coordination in time takes its toll from all of us but probably among few other classes is it so complete and coercive as among railroaders It becomes a marked irritant in his relationship with other less time-conscious groups "Dinner at eight" means *eight, not* eight-ten or eight-twenty; 'I'll meet you at seven," means *seven, not* seven-thirty or the debutante's eight-thirty The casualness with which people in other walks of life take delays irritates the railroader and in turn his irritation produces counterirritation among his fellows. A rail-

road worker expects to lay down his tools with the whistle, or a little before To the railroader, the callousness with which a building contractor, storekeeper, or other employer, exacts an additional five minutes' work is unforgiveable.

The "sixteen hour law" under which the Federal Government regulates the working hours of trainmen and enginemen is absolute If a hapless crew "lets the monkey get them" or, in other words, finds itself on the road at the expiration of sixteen hours from their terminal of departure, they must stop all active operations When they sense the approach of the limit, the crew takes to a siding, notifies the dispatcher of their situation and waits for a relief crew to be sent to bring them in Even delays occasioned by landslide, washout, the derailment of another train, or other accident, do not serve as excuse. If the crew has been on duty during the waiting time, they cannot move the train under penalty of heavy fine on the employing road If an accident holds the train on the main line while the sixteen hour limit elapses, its crew may not even move the train to clear traffic for others Protecting it from collision with track "torpedoes" and "fusees" (flares), they must wait until a crew with legal rest arrives to take charge of it

Eight hours' rest is required out of every twenty-four in which sixteen hours are worked A crew may not be called to take a train out before that rest has elapsed, but if another crew *is* called and takes their place and it is later shown that the legal rest of the first crew was up before the train departed, a "run around," or pay for the trip, is given the crew so deprived of their proper "turn" Time is certainly the essence of this contract

The obverse of this occupational dependence on the clock is the almost complete denial of the opportunity to "time-plan" other relationships Shopmen working on general repairs, or those on a three-shift basis, such as dispatchers, car and engine inspectors, can normally expect to work one shift and be through, but men on the extra-board, or trainmen and enginemen working on a "chain gang," in which crews take their turns on whatever business is handled, car repairers who may be called out to handle repairs or service extra trains, and many others, find that the demands of occupation make all other plans conditional Like other aspects of railroading, this is more typical of trainmen than it is of workers in the other crafts

"We can't plan to have Johnny in the Christmas play because his father may be 'in' right then and we want him to be home" "Mary can't promise to come at that time because her father may want his dinner and he likes to have the children at meals" "I can't join the bridge club because I want to be with John when he is home and I might have to miss too many times" "We did want to have Sunday dinner with the Browns but Will is going to be 'out' and we have to have our dinner Saturday night instead" "We'll go to the benefit if John is 'in and has his rest, but I can't buy a ticket because he may want to sleep" "We don't want to sign up for that series because you never know whether you can go or not" "The boys were *so* disappointed They planned to go fishing with their Dad on the Fourth but there was an excursion and he had to take it 'out'" "I had the nicest Easter outfit and then we couldn't go to church because Henry was 'called' at nine o'clock" These are typical of the irritations which beset the life of the railroader and his family when he is still on unscheduled freight or the extra-board, which usually occurs while his family, if he has one, is young, and when the demarcation which this sort of life serves to make between the railroader and others,

and between various railroaders, is most important Meals may be required at any hour, sometimes two or three series of meals in a day must be prepared depending upon school schedules and those of men on various shifts Car inspectors, for example, eat their lunch when they can get it The noon meal may come any time between eleven and three, depending on the arrival of nonscheduled extra trains, or the amount of "running repairs" that have to be done The rest of the community,—its schools, its churches, lodges, bridge clubs, official meetings of boards of trustees, town councilmen, benefits, socials, theaters (except movies),—also run on a time schedule, but it is not so rigid as that of the railroad, although it is much more definite and therefore will permit more time-planning than is possible for those railroaders who operate trains

Membership in any organization with regular meetings is difficult to maintain and the socializing effect of such contacts is lost Forms of recreation that depend upon no collaboration with others must be indulged in In cities, there are continuous shows, night clubs and restaurants, taxi-dancehalls, and other individualized amusements, in rural areas, fishing and hunting, pool parlors, or saloons are offered, in both, the ubiquitous crap game and other forms of gambling

Civic participation is rendered difficult No membership in governing boards is feasible, promised aid in community service may be impossible when the "layover" between runs comes at the other end of the line or a "bump" may put one on another run Indifference created by occupationally induced mobility is heightened by this time factor, and the other members of the community resent the refusal of this group, usually the most financially able, to take any responsibility in community affairs

Family life is greatly affected If the wife and mother attempts to make her family an integrated part of the community, she must conform to its timing Meals must be ready for the children so that they can attend school and Sunday School Promises as to their participation in athletics, school government, and extracurricular activities must be kept If this be done, it may mean that the husband and father will see the children only rarely He can expect that at least half the time his rest will come during the time they are sleeping, their whole day is normally taken at school, if his meals cannot be made to coincide with theirs (and frequently, if he is to get any sleep, they cannot), he may not see his children at all, unless they give up all plans of their own

The wife labors under a double difficulty In the absence of the father of her children, she has the whole problem of discipline She cannot even threaten "when your father comes home tonight" for that may be at three o'clock in the morning She must be prepared to have meals ready whenever he comes in, which means constant preparation for the unexpected, she seldom knows in which particular meal her husband will share She cannot plan with any degree of certainty her own recreation or community participation If she joins club, church, guild, or lodge, and takes office, she may incur the displeasure of a husband deprived of what he regards as his right to her time and attention when he is 'in' If she does not join, she is likely to be deprived of almost all recreation since she is denied the equivalent of the forms of recreation her husband may have, and if she chooses to go to public dances or any other public place where couples are expected, she is immediately suspected by all the "good" people of the community Small wonder that family life during this period is frequently so distasteful and disorganized as to rob later

years, when a satisfactory "run" has been earned, of most of its satisfactions. Yet the very situations that make family life difficult also serve to increase the significance of the family in the life of the railroader. In many cases, it is the only group in which he functions, and an idealized attitude toward children frequently results, making for a romantic indulgence of their whims.

Other classes of employees in continuous service, particularly telegraphers and "agents" in small stations, with no relief operator, are made even more dependent upon the clock Interrupted rest periods are a commonplace Though the station be officially closed, emergencies may make their presence at the "key" necessary, and many of these men have slept for years with a telegraph repeater in the room, paying no attention to its continuous clatter until the call letters of their own station shock them into instant wakefulness The newer dependence upon the "dispatcher's" telephone with a selector that rings only the operator for whom it is intended has somewhat reduced this tension, but no operator, whether on or off duty, ever gets out of hearing of his "call bell" without a sense of guilt To wives anxious to escape the confines of a lonely station, this marriage to a telegraph key is frequently an almost unbearable form of polygamy.

"Agents" in small stations work all trains, the clock around, meeting passengers, selling tickets, arranging for the loading and unloading of freight, securing a doctor to treat the train-sick old lady from Dubuque and a nurse to hold the hand of a homeward bound conventionite who has imbibed not wisely but too much; checking on the whoops of a child about to board the train to discover whether he will become liable for permitting a person with contagious disease to cross a state line; ordering a California-bound farmer's wife with preserves packed in straw to substitute paper in order to avoid another penalty, all under the continuous pressure of time, and with the knowledge that error in transmitting or receiving a "train order" may mean disaster and death.

The higher the railroader climbs on the supervisory ladder, the less he is able to plan his own life. The foreman is expected to supervise even those employees who work night shifts, to meet trains when necessary regardless of the hour, and to be in continuous presence during the day when the regular shifts of "dead workers," "rip track" men, section men, janitors, etc, are working If he reaches the rarefied atmosphere of the office of "train master," "roadmaster," or "master mechanic," he is expected to maintain an office in regular contact both with superiors and foremen and to be physically present at numerous points scattered over as much as a thousand miles Getting up in the middle of the night to catch trains, getting meals when he can, and in emergency, neither getting nor expecting sleep is the lot of the supervisor as well as his underlings. Is it any wonder that these "real railroaders" look with envious contempt at the comfortable "plush polishers" in the central offices, who live in a world of the eight-hour day, forty-hour week, and who take all legal holidays?

As "time marches on," its rhythm is set, not by organic impulse, but by the clacking of wheels on rail joints, the clatter of a telegraph key, and the distant whistle of a train departing "on time"

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Anderson, C A, "Sociological Elements in Economic Restrictionism," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1944, pp 345–58 Anderson examines the various forms of economic restrictionism under two main headings monopoly and the restriction of production The sociological source of restrictionism are found in the desire for security, stability, status, and power.

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3 Bunzel, Ruth, "The Economic Organization of Primitive Peoples," in *General Anthropology*, ed by Franz Boas, D C Heath and Company, New York, 1938, pp 327–408 This is a compact and sociologically sophisticated description of the economic organization of communal societies, some of them simple and some not so simple Particularly important is the author's emphasis on the multi functional character of economic activity in these groups

4 Lynch, David, *The Concentration of Economic Power*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1946, pp 91–238 *The Concentration of Economic Power* is an objective factual report of the findings of the congressional Temporary National Economic Committee The findings of this committee reveal clearly the administered character of our economy brought about by the growth of large economic units

5 Merton, R K, "The Machine, the Worker, and the Engineer," *Science*, January, 1947, pp 79–84 Many people have accounted for the changes in our economic structure by the rapid expansion of technology Merton's short article shows that the impact of technology is determined by the uses to which it is put by those who have the power to determine such uses, and by the lack of responsibility for examining and making provision for the total system of significant consequences rather than merely those which are intended

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10 Warner, W L, and Low, J O, *The Social System of the Modern Factory*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947 This book, part of the Yankee City Series, describes the character of industrial organization in a relatively small New England community It also deals at length with a severe strike occurring in the community and traces its roots to the frustrations engendered primarily by the break in the skill hierarchy

11 See also Spengler, "Population and Per Capita Income," p 397 Davis and Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," p 434, Mills, "The Middle Classes in Middle Sized Cities," p 443, Useem, Tangent, and Useem, "Stratification in a Prairie Town," p 454, Sibley, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification," p 642 Roethlisberger and Dickson, "An Industrial Organization as a Social System," p 687, Wilson, "Prestige and Competition," p 716, Chapman, "Industrial Conflict in Detroit," p 727, Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," p 771, Fuller and Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," p 780, Heberle, "A Sociological Interpretation of Social Change in the South," p 804, Abel, "The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement," p 827, Hook, "Law, Freedom and Human Action," p 831

17. Family Organization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The need of every society to replenish its membership has resulted in the universal association known as the family The need is not so much one of mere biological reproduction as of providing care for children during their period of helplessness and of inducting them into the culture of the society. For the performance of this function more is required than a set of institutions; a primary group, in which the child can develop his personality and his self, is also necessary. Thus the family as a *social group* is one of the basic forms of social life.

We are accustomed to think of the family as being identical with the conjugal unit of husband, wife, and children While this unit is found within the structure of most families, it should be noted that in almost all simple communal societies the family is a much larger social group, usually containing several conjugal units and several generations, bound together into a co-operative unity on the basis of kinship ties It is a relatively permanent group which endures for generations and, generally speaking, is the foundation stone of the simple communal society; indeed, in many cases the society is made up of extended kinship groups While the family universally performs the function of caring for children, in the simple communal society it is also the locus of practically all important institutional activities. Economic, religious, educational, and even political activity is carried out by the family, under the guidance of institutions which are community-wide, while marriage as an adjunct of the family is the institutional means of regulating sex relations and of providing relatively permanent conjugal pairs

Far different is the family of the associational society Although there are many types of families in the modern associational society, we can still speak of a typical associational family, the urban middle-class family unit. In the upper class we find a tendency for the family to deviate from this type in the direction of a larger kinship unit which performs the important function of controlling and administering sizeable aggregates of wealth and power. In the lower social classes, on the other hand, we find a few survivals of the older communal type of family life.

The most striking characteristic of the associational family is its limited size It has been reduced to the smallest possible family unit, namely, the conjugal group Occasionally relatives are still attached to the family, but only by vague and confused ties Even the connections between parents and their adult children are attenuated, because the adult son and daughter have established their own family units. Two basic factors restrict the associational family to the conjugal

unit. First, there is no longer a need for the large family, since many of its institutional functions have been removed. It is significant that the three basic functions which remain, i.e., care of children, satisfaction of emotional needs, and regulation of sex behavior, do not require a large social group. Second, in a society where rewards go to the individual and not to the group, where the individual must be able to move about geographically and climb the status ladder, the family unit must be small. In seeking social status the individual travels fastest if he travels alone, or at least with no more than his wife and children.

Thus the family has not only been reduced to the conjugal unit, but the size of that unit itself has been cut down. In the struggle for status and economic goals, children are an economic liability. Even though most married couples want children, they are forced to evaluate them in relation to other ends they wish to achieve and cannot have if their family becomes too large. As a result the urban middle-class family does not produce enough children to replace itself in the next generation. Lower-class families have for the same reasons become reduced in size. City populations grow, not because of natural increase, but because of immigration from rural areas and from nations which are still largely communal.

The associational family, like all groups in the associational society, has a different relationship to the ultimate value system of the larger society and to its pervasive institutions than does the family of the simple or complex communal societies. The ultimate value system of the associational society defines the family more as a source of personal satisfaction and personality growth than as the means by which society is to be perpetuated. The legal institutions of the state regulate the family to some extent, and various religious associations regulate the families of their members and occasionally try to control the families of nonmembers; but the family exists pretty largely as an independent association. There is, however, an extremely important exception to this generalization in the degree of control exercised over family life by social classes. This is particularly true of the middle- and upper-class families where life patterns are almost as rigidly controlled by the norms of class as the communal family is controlled by the total community. There are, of course, significant differences in the nature and functions of the controls.

The communal society controls the family in such a way as to secure its success in meeting the needs of the society. Economic, political, religious, educational, and child-care functions were all carried out by the communal family. Today most of these have been removed from the sphere of the family. Economic production is carried on outside the home, and political, religious, and educational activities are centered in other associations. As noted earlier, all that is left of the old functions are the socializing of the child, the filling of affectional and companionship needs of the adult, and the regulation of sex relations. The imposition of control by the social class, however, introduces new functions. It is the function of the middle-class family to live a kind of life which serves to distinguish the middle class from other social classes and to reaffirm the status-values of the class struc-

ture by striving for a higher position in the social order. The basic familial function of the husband is to establish the status of his family through success in the occupational realm, and of the wife to live so as to exemplify this status and to carry on the struggle for social advancement. Even child rearing now serves a dual function. First, the family still has the task of preparing the child for his future social roles, and second, the parents must so pattern their and the child's activities as to reflect the social status of the family.

Thus we find that the associational family possesses ambivalent characteristics On the one hand it is undoubtedly more democratic than the communal family, being less patriarchal and more equalitarian On the other, it is tightly articulated into the economic structure through the occupational role of the father and into the status structure through its struggle for an improved style of life.

Many sociologists have stressed the instability of the modern family and have pointed with alarm to the rising divorce rate — which they have tended to blame on the increasing individualism of modern man, and also his susceptibilty to the "romantic complex." Doubtless these factors have increased the individual's willingness to separate and to secure a divorce; the emotional exaggerations of the romantic complex have resulted in inevitable disillusionment and in broken marriages. But the sources of family strain and instability go deeper, for they are primarily the product of the individual's inability to secure the associational goals of companionship, mutual concern, and personality growth in the modern family In turn, the failure of the family to perform these functions is due in large measure to its domination by the market economy and the status structure organized around the market economy. The structure and functions of the modern family are fundamentally involved in the same crisis which has developed within the political and economic structure. The removal of the economy from control by the ultimate value system of the associational society and the consequent integration of economic activity with the status system have forced the family to substitute status and occupational success for companionship and personality growth as the goals of family life. The family's future ability to perform its personality and affectional functions will be dependent upon developments in the economic and political spheres. The essential values of family life, i.e., companionship and personality growth, expressed in the associational society's system of ultimate values and in perverted form by the romantic complex as it is peddled in our commercialized mass culture of movies and slick magazines, must be retained if society is to remain associational in character. The only question is whether the social structure can be modified so that they can be realized.

The first selection in this chapter, Talcott Parsons's "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," is important for its picture of the structure and functions of the middle-class family in American associational society. Parsons analyzes the various roles assigned to the individual on the basis of age and sex The roles of children in the early years tend to be the same for boys and girls, except that girls are able to participate in the work of the mother, while boys

are separated from the work of the father. This prevents, Parsons believes, the gradual emergence of the son into the role which he will play as an adult In adolescence the children move into the youth culture, which contrasts sharply with the culture of adult society Both the boy and the girl tend to play roles far different from those which they will play later on

Parsons's article is particularly important for its description and analysis of the adult roles of our society The adult male becomes increasingly absorbed into his occupational role, and his success as husband is measured largely in occupational and economic terms This role tends to separate husband and wife, for the wife is deprived of participation in most of his activities Her relations with her husband are limited to those within the home and those which are part of the social activities in which she and her husband participate The personality of the wife is subjected to further strain in the roles she herself plays. She vacillates among three possible patterns, none of which are clearly defined First, she can devote herself to being a housewife — a functionally important role but one popularly regarded in our society as dull and prosaic. Second, she can attempt to become a "glamorous" woman — a role likely to involve considerable strain in her relations with her husband. And finally, she can devote herself to community activities A separate role, that of a career woman, is open only to those who remain unmarried or who are willing considerably to modify their family life None of these roles are extremely rewarding, and none of them are intimately connected with the roles of the husband Hence there comes to exist, as we have already indicated, considerable strain in the personalities of the husband and wife and in the relations between them Parsons's article closes with a description of the alienation of the older members of our society Suddenly removed from occupational roles upon reaching the retirement age and cut off in large measure from continued social interaction with their children, old people in American society are relegated to roles likely to induce personality tensions, and even neuroses and psychoses

The article by Howard W Beers, "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," serves as a contrast to the family described by Parsons Here we find a family midway between the communal type and the associational type. The family has moved into the market, it is somewhat reduced in size, and it has become partially democratized Nevertheless, it still contains many patriarchal elements, is still a unit in which there is considerable common activity, and has not become geared into the status struggle to the extent of inducing strain in the relations among the members It is, however, moving in the direction of the urban middle-class family and may eventually become like it Yet this may not come to pass, since the stresses in the economic, political, and family structures of the associational society will probably result in some new social form before the farm family makes the complete transition It may well be that some of the traits that Beers describes will become part of the new associational family.

The article by Willard Waller, "The Rating and Dating Complex," describes the dating behavior of college students. To Waller such behavior is a status strug-

gle, rather than a means of seeking out a future wife or husband. Indeed he doubts that the dating complex contributes much to courtship as a preliminary to marriage; rather, it tends to create hostile and exploitative attitudes in all participants. While dating is ingrained in the youth culture and is defined as "fun," it also creates severe tensions in the personality of the adolescent. Although not mentioned by Waller, it is interesting to speculate on the functional relationship between the roles played in dating and the adult status struggle There can be little doubt that the rating and dating complex serves as the training ground for more serious battles in adult life There is a difference, however, in that the later struggle for status is a family struggle carried on by husband, wife, and children, while the rating and dating struggle, particularly for the middle- and lower-class adolescent, is individual in character.

It is clear that the strains in family life made apparent by the selections in this chapter are not subject to cure by a return to the strong multi-functional family of the simple communal society. Only through the totalitarian state can our society become communal once more, and it is extremely doubtful whether the characteristics of family life in such a society would please even the most ardent communalist. Although the associational family is in a state of crisis, this crisis reflects the more serious fissures in modern social life If a solution for the political and economic crisis can be found within the framework of the associational society there is little reason to believe that the associational family cannot be made to perform both its societal function of replenishing the society and its personal function of offering primary group satisfactions and new experience to the individual

AGE AND SEX IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES *

Talcott Parsons

In our society age grading does not to any great extent, except for the educational system, involve formal age categorization, but is interwoven with other structural elements In relation to these, however, it constitutes an important connecting link and organizing point of reference in many respects. The most important of these for present purposes are kinship structure, formal education, occupation and community participation In most cases the age lines are not rigidly specific, but approximate, this does not, however, necessarily lessen their structural significance [1]

[1] The problem of organization of this material for systematic presentation is, in view of this fact particularly difficult It would be possible to discuss the subject in terms of the above four principal structures with which age and sex are most

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In all societies the initial status of every normal individual is that of child in a given kinship unit In our society, however, this universal starting point is used in distinctive ways Although in early childhood the sexes are not usually sharply differentiated, in many kinship systems a relatively sharp segregation of children begins very early Our own society is conspicuous for the extent to which children of both sexes are in many fundamental respects treated alike This is particularly true of both privileges and responsibilities The primary distinctions within the group of dependent siblings are those of age Birth order as such is notably neglected as a basis of discrimination, a child of eight and a child of five have essentially the privileges and responsibilities appropriate to their respective age levels without regard to what older, intermediate, or younger siblings there may be The preferential treatment of an older child is not to any significant extent differentiated if and because he happens to be the first born

There are, of course, important sex differences in dress and in approved play interest and the like, but if anything, it may be surmised that in the urban upper middle classes these are tending to diminish Thus, for instance, play overalls are essentially similar for both sexes What is perhaps the most important sex discrimination is more than anything else a reflection of the differentiation of adult sex roles It seems to be a definite fact that girls are more apt to be relatively docile, to conform in general according to adult expectations, to be "good," whereas boys are more apt to be recalcitrant to discipline and defiant of adult authority and expectations There is really no feminine equivalent of the expression "bad boy" It may be suggested that this is at least partially explained by the fact that it is possible from an early age to initiate girls directly into many important aspects of the adult feminine role Their mothers are continually about the house and the meaning of many of the things they are doing is relatively tangible and easily understandable to a child It is also possible for the daughter to participate actively and usefully in many of these activities Especially in the urban middle classes, however, the father does not work in the home and his son is not able to observe his work or to participate in it from an early age Furthermore many of the masculine functions are of a relatively abstract and intangible character, such that their meaning must remain almost wholly inaccessible to a child This leaves the boy without a tangible meaningful model to emulate and without the possibility of a gradual initiation into the activities of the adult male role An important verification of this analysis could be provided through the study in our own society of the rural situation It is my impression that farm boys tend to be "good" in a sense in which that is not typical of their urban brothers

The equality of privileges and responsibilities, graded only by age but not by birth order, is extended to a certain degree throughout the whole range of the life cycle In full adult status, however, it is seriously modified by the asymmetrical relation of the sexes to the occupational structure One of the most conspicuous expressions and symbols of the underlying equality, however, is the lack of sex dif-

closely interwoven, but there are serious disadvantages involved in this procedure Age and sex categories constitute one of the main links of structural continuity in terms of which structures which are differentiated in other respects are articulated with each other and in isolating the treatment of these categories there is danger that this extremely important aspect of the problem will be lost sight of The least objectionable method at least within the limits of space of such a paper seems to be to follow the sequence of the life cycle

ferentiation in the process of formal education, so far, at least, as it is not explicitly vocational. Up through college differentiation seems to be primarily a matter on the one hand of individual ability, on the other hand of class status, and only to a secondary degree of sex differentiation One can certainly speak of a strongly established pattern that all children of the family have a "right" to a good education, rights which are graduated according to the class status of the family but also to individual ability. It is only in postgraduate professional education, with its direct connection with future occupational careers, that sex discrimination becomes conspicuous It is particularly important that this equality of treatment exists in the sphere of liberal education since throughout the social structure of our society there is a strong tendency to segregate the occupational sphere from one in which certain more generally human patterns and values are dominant, particularly in informal social life and the realm of what will here be called community participation.

Although this pattern of equality of treatment is present in certain fundamental respects at all age levels, at the transition from childhood to adolescence new features appear which disturb the symmetry of sex roles while still a second set of factors appears with marriage and the acquisition of full adult status and responsibilities

An indication of the change is the practice of chaperonage, through which girls are given a kind of protection and supervision by adults to which boys of the same age group are not subjected Boys, that is, are chaperoned only in their relations with girls of their own class This modification of equality of treatment has been extended to the control of the private lives of women students in boarding schools and colleges. Of undoubted significance is the fact that it has been rapidly declining not only in actual effectiveness but as an ideal pattern. Its prominence in our recent past, however, is an important manifestation of the importance of sex role differentiation Important light might be thrown upon its functions by systematic comparison with the related phenomena in Latin countries where this type of asymmetry has been far more sharply accentuated than in this country in the more modern period

It is at the point of emergence into adolescence that there first begins to develop a set of patterns and behavior phenomena which involve a highly complex combination of age grading and sex role elements These may be referred to together as the phenomena of the "youth culture" Certain of its elements are present in pre-adolescence and others in the adult culture But the peculiar combination in connection with this particular age level is unique and highly distinctive for American society

Perhaps the best single point of reference for characterizing the youth culture lies in its contrast with the dominant pattern of the adult male role By contrast with the emphasis on responsibility in this role, the orientation of the youth culture is more or less specifically irresponsible One of its dominant notes is "having a good time" in relation to which there is a particularly strong emphasis on social activities in company with the opposite sex A second predominant characteristic on the male side lies in the prominence of athletics, which is an avenue of achievement and competition which stands in sharp contrast to the primary standards of adult achievement in professional and executive capacities. Negatively, there is a strong tendency to repudiate interest in adult things and to feel at least a certain recalcitrance to the pressure of adult expectations and discipline. In addition to, but including, athletic prowess the typical pat

tern of the male youth culture seems to lay emphasis on the value of certain qualities of attractiveness, especially in relation to the opposite sex It is very definitely a rounded humanistic pattern rather than one of competence in the performance of specified functions. Such stereotypes as the "swell guy" are significant of this On the feminine side there is correspondingly a strong tendency to accentuate sexual attractiveness in terms of various versions of what may be called the "glamor girl" pattern [2] Although these patterns defining roles tend to polarize sexually — for instance, as between star athlete and socially popular girl — yet on a certain level they are complementary, both emphasizing certain features of a total personality in terms of the direct expression of certain values rather than of instrumental significance

[2] Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this tendency lies in the prominence of the patterns of "dating," for instance among college women As shown by an unpublished participant-observer study made it one of the Eastern women's colleges, perhaps the most important single basis of informal prestige rating among the residents of a dormitory lies in their relative dating success — though this is by no means the only basis One of the most striking features of the pattern is the [illegible] publicity given to the "achievements" of the individual in a sphere where traditionally in the culture a rather high level of privacy is sanctioned — it is interesting that once an engagement has occurred a far greater amount of privacy is granted The standards of rating cannot be said to be well integrated, though there is an underlying consistency in that being in demand by what the group regards as desirable men is perhaps the main standard

It is true that the "dating" complex need not be exclusively bound up with the "glamor girl stereotype of ideal feminine personality — the "good companion" type may also have a place Precisely, however, where the competitive aspect of dating is most prominent the glamor pattern seems heavily to predominate, as does, on the masculine side, a somewhat comparable glamorous type On each side at the same time there is room for considerable difference as to just where the emphasis is placed — for example as between "voluptuous" sexuality and more decorous "charm."

One further feature of this situation is the extent to which it is crystallized about the system of formal education [3] One might say that the principal centers of prestige dissemination are the colleges, but that many of the most distinctive phenomena are to be found in high schools throughout the country It is of course of great importance that liberal education is not primarily a matter of vocational training in the United States The individual status on the curricular side of formal education is, however, in fundamental ways linked up with adult expectations, and doing "good work" is one of the most important sources of parental approval. Because of secondary institutionalization this approval is extended into various spheres distinctive of the youth culture But it is notable that the youth culture has a strong tendency to develop in directions which are either on the borderline of parental approval or beyond the pale, in such matters as sex behavior, drinking and various forms of frivolous and irresponsible behavior The fact that adults have attitudes to these things which are often deeply ambivalent and that on such occasions as college reunions they may outdo the younger generation, as, for instance, in drinking, is of great significance, but probably structurally secondary to the youth-versus-adult differential aspect Thus the youth culture is not only, as is true of the curricular aspect of formal education, a matter of age status as such but also shows strong signs of being a product of tensions in the rela-

[3] A central aspect of this focus of crystallization lies in the element of tension, sometimes of direct conflict, between the youth culture patterns of college and school life, and the "serious" interests in and obligations toward curricular work It is of course the latter which defines some at least of the most important foci of adult expectations of doing "good" work and justifying the privileges granted It is not possible here to attempt to analyze the interesting, ambivalent attitudes of youth toward curricular work and achievement

tionship of younger people and adults

From the point of view of age grading perhaps the most notable fact about this situation is the existence of definite pattern distinctions from the periods coming both before and after. At the line between childhood and adolescence "growing up" consists precisely in ability to participate in youth culture patterns, which are not for either sex, the same as the adult patterns practiced by the parental generation In both sexes the transition to full adulthood means loss of a certain "glamorous" element From being the athletic hero or the lion of college dances, the young man becomes a prosaic business executive or lawyer The more successful adults participate in an important order of prestige symbols but these are of a very different order from those of the youth culture The contrast in the case of the feminine role is perhaps equally sharp, with at least a strong tendency to take on a "domestic" pattern with marriage and the arrival of young children

The symmetry in this respect must, however, not be exaggerated It is of fundamental significance to the sex role structure of the adult age levels that the normal man has a "job" which is fundamental to his social status in general It is perhaps not too much to say that only in very exceptional cases can an adult man be genuinely self-respecting and enjoy a respected status in the eyes of others if he does not "earn a living" in an approved occupational role Not only is this a matter of his own economic support but, generally speaking, his occupational status is the primary source of the income and class status of his wife and children

In the case of the feminine role the situation is radically different The majority of married women, of course, are not employed, but even of those that are a very large proportion do not have jobs which are in basic competition for status with those of their husbands.[4] The majority of "career" women whose occupational status is comparable with that of men in their own class, at least in the upper middle and upper classes, are unmarried, and in the small proportion of cases where they are married the result is a profound alteration in family structure

This pattern, which is central to the urban middle classes, should not be misunderstood In rural society, for instance, the operation of the farm and the attendant status in the community may be said to be a matter of the joint status of both parties to a marriage Whereas a farm is operated by a family, an urban job is held by an individual and does not involve other members of the family in a comparable sense One convenient expression of the difference lies in the question of what would happen in case of death. In the case of a farm it would at least be not at all unusual for the widow to continue operating the farm with the help of a son or even of hired men In the urban situation the widow would cease to have any connection with the organization which had employed her husband and he would be replaced by another man without reference to family affiliations

In this urban situation the primary status-carrying role is in a sense that of housewife The woman's fundamental sta-

[4] The above statement, even more than most in the present paper, needs to be qualified in relation to the problem of class It is above all to the upper middle class that it applies Here probably the great majority of "working wives" are engaged in some form of secretarial work which would, on an independent basis, generally be classed as a lower middle class occupation The situation at lower levels of the class structure is quite different since the prestige of the jobs of husband and wife is then much more likely to be nearly equivalent It is quite possible that this fact is closely related to the relative instability of marriage which Davis and Gardner (*Deep South*) find, at least for the community they studied, to be typical of lower class groups The relation is one which deserves careful study

tus is that of her husband's wife, the mother of his children, and traditionally the person responsible for a complex of activities in connection with the management of the household, care of children, etc

For the structuring of sex roles in the adult phase the most fundamental considerations seem to be those involved in the interrelations of the occupational system and the conjugal family In a certain sense the most fundamental basis of the family's status is the occupational status of the husband and father As has been pointed out, this is a status occupied by an individual by virtue of his individual qualities and achievements But both directly and indirectly, more than any other single factor, it determines the status of the family in the social structure, directly because of the symbolic significance of the office or occupation as a symbol of prestige indirectly because as the principal source of family income it determines the standard of living of the family From one point of view the emergence of occupational status into this primary position can be regarded as the principal source of strain in the sex role structure of our society since it deprives the wife of her role as a partner in a common enterprise The common enterprise is reduced to the life of the family itself and to the informal social activities in which husband and wife participate together This leaves the wife a set of utilitarian functions in the management of the household which may be considered a kind of "pseudo-" occupation Since the present interest is primarily in the middle classes, the relatively unstable character of the role of housewife as the principal content of the feminine role is strongly illustrated by the tendency to employ domestic servants wherever financially possible It is true that there is an American tendency to accept tasks of drudgery with relative willingness, but it is notable that in middle class families there tends to be a dissociation of the essential personality from the performance of these tasks Thus, advertising continually appeals to such desires as to have hands which one could never tell had washed dishes or scrubbed floors [5] Organization about the function of housewife, however, with the addition of strong affectional devotion to husband and children, is the primary focus of one of the principal patterns governing the adult feminine role — what may be called the "domestic" pattern It is, however, a conspicuous fact, that strict adherence to this pattern has become progressively less common and has a strong tendency to a residual status — that is, to be followed most closely by those who are unsuccessful in competition for prestige in other directions

It is, of course, possible for the adult woman to follow the masculine pattern and seek a career in fields of occupational achievement in direct competition with men of her own class It is, however, notable that in spite of the very great progress of the emancipation of women from the traditional domestic pattern only a very small fraction have gone very far in this direction It is also clear that its generalization would only be possible with profound alterations in the structure of the family

Hence it seems that concomitant with the alteration in the basic masculine role in the direction of occupation there have appeared two important tendencies in the

[5] This type of advertising appeal undoubtedly contains an element of "snob appeal" in the sense of an invitation to the individual by her appearance and ways to identify herself with a higher social class than that of her actual status But it is almost certainly not wholly explained by this element A glamorously feminine appearance which is specifically dissociated from physical work is undoubtedly a genuine part of an authentic personality ideal of the middle class, and not only evidence of a desire to belong to the upper class

feminine role which are alternative to that of simple domesticity on the one hand, and to a full-fledged career on the other. In the older situation there tended to be a very rigid distinction between respectable married women and those who were "no better than they should be" The rigidity of this line has progressively broken down through the infiltration into the respectable sphere of elements of what may be called again the glamor pattern, with the emphasis on a specifically feminine form of attractiveness which on occasion involves directly sexual patterns of appeal. One important expression of this trend lies in the fact that many of the symbols of feminine attractiveness have been taken over directly from the practices of social types previously beyond the pale of respectable society. This would seem to be substantially true of the practice of women smoking and of at least the modern version of the use of cosmetics. The same would seem to be true of many of the modern versions of women's dress "Emancipation" in this connection means primarily emancipation from traditional and conventional restrictions on the free expression of sexual attraction and impulses, but in a direction which tends to segregate the element of sexual interest and attraction from the total personality and in so doing tends to emphasize the segregation of sex roles It is particularly notable that there has been no corresponding tendency to emphasize masculine attraction in terms of dress and other such aids One might perhaps say that in a situation which strongly inhibits competition between the sexes on the same plane the feminine glamor pattern has appeared as an offset to masculine occupational status and to its attendant symbols of prestige It is perhaps significant that there is a common stereotype of the association of physically beautiful, expensively and elaborately dressed women with physically unattractive but rich and powerful men.

The other principal direction of emancipation from domesticity seems to lie in emphasis on what has been called the common humanistic element. This takes a wide variety of forms One of them lies in a relatively mature appreciation and systematic cultivation of cultural interests and educated tastes, extending all the way from the intellectual sphere to matters of art, music and house furnishings. A second consists in cultivation of serious interests and humanitarian obligations in community welfare situations and the like It is understandable that many of these orientations are most conspicuous in fields where through some kind of tradition there is an element of particular suitability for feminine participation Thus, a woman who takes obligations to social welfare particularly seriously will find opportunities in various forms of activity which traditionally tie up with women's relation to children, to sickness and so on. But this may be regarded as secondary to the underlying orientation which would seek an outlet in work useful to the community following the most favorable opportunities which happen to be available.

This pattern, which with reference to the character of relationship to men may be called that of the "good companion," is distinguished from the others in that it lays far less stress on the exploitation of sex role as such and more on that which is essentially common to both sexes There are reasons, however, why cultural interests, interest in social welfare and community activities are particularly prominent in the activities of women in our urban communities On the one side the masculine occupational role tends to absorb a very large proportion of the man's time and energy and to leave him relatively little for other interests Furthermore, unless his position is such as to

make him particularly prominent his primary orientation is to those elements of the social structure which divide the community into occupational groups rather than those which unite it in common interests and activities The utilitarian aspect of the role of housewife, on the other hand, has declined in importance to the point where it scarcely approaches a full-time occupation for a vigorous person Hence the resort to other interests to fill up the gap In addition, women, being more closely tied to the local residential community are more apt to be involved in matters of common concern to the members of that community This peculiar role of women becomes particularly conspicuous in middle age The younger married woman is apt to be relatively highly absorbed in the care of young children. With their growing up, however, her absorption in the household is greatly lessened, often just at the time when the husband is approaching the apex of his career and is most heavily involved in its obligations. Since to a high degree this humanistic aspect of the feminine role is only partially institutionalized it is not surprising that its patterns often bear the marks of strain and insecurity, as perhaps has been classically depicted by Helen Hokinson's cartoons of women's clubs.

The adult roles of both sexes involve important elements of strain which are involved in certain dynamic relationships, especially to the youth culture In the case of the feminine role marriage is the single event toward which a selective process, in which personal qualities and effort can play a decisive role, has pointed up. That determines a woman's fundamental status, and after that her role patterning is not so much status determining as a matter of living up to expectations and finding satisfying interests and activities. In a society where such strong emphasis is placed upon individual achievement it is not surprising that there should be a certain romantic nostalgia for the time when the fundamental choices were still open This element of strain is added to by the lack of clear-cut definition of the adult feminine role Once the possibility of a career has been eliminated there still tends to be a rather unstable oscillation between emphasis in the direction of domesticity or glamor or good companionship According to situational pressures and individual character the tendency will be to emphasize one or another of these more strongly But it is a situation likely to produce a rather high level of insecurity In this state the pattern of domesticity must be ranked lowest in terms of prestige but also, because of the strong emphasis in community sentiment on the virtues of fidelity and devotion to husband and children, it offers perhaps the highest level of a certain kind of security It is no wonder that such an important symbol as Whistler's mother concentrates primarily on this pattern

The glamor pattern has certain obvious attractions since to the woman who is excluded from the struggle for power and prestige in the occupational sphere it is the most direct path to a sense of superiority and importance It has, however, two obvious limitations. In the first place, many of its manifestations encounter the resistance of patterns of moral conduct and engender conflicts not only with community opinion but also with the individual's own moral standards In the second place, it is a pattern the highest manifestations of which are inevitably associated with a rather early age level — in fact, overwhelmingly with the courtship period Hence, if strongly entered upon serious strains result from the problem of adaptation to increasing age

The one pattern which would seem to offer the greatest possibilities for able, intelligent, and emotionally mature women

is the third — the good companion pattern. This, however, suffers from a lack of fully institutionalized status and from the multiplicity of choices of channels of expression It is only those with the strongest initiative and intelligence who achieve fully satisfactory adaptations in this direction It is quite clear that in the adult feminine role there is quite sufficient strain and insecurity so that wide-spread manifestations are to be expected in the form of neurotic behavior

The masculine role at the same time is itself by no means devoid of corresponding elements of strain It carries with it to be sure the primary prestige of achievement, responsibility and authority By comparison with the role of the youth culture, however, there are at least two important types of limitations In the first place, the modern occupational system has led to increasing specialization of role The job absorbs an extraordinarily large proportion of the individual's energy and emotional interests in a role the content of which is often relatively narrow. This in particular restricts the area within which he can share common interests and experiences with others not in the same occupational specialty It is perhaps of considerable significance that so many of the highest prestige statuses of our society are of this specialized character. There is in the definition of roles little to bind the individual to others in his community on a comparable status level By contrast with this situation, it is notable that in the youth culture common human elements are far more strongly emphasized Leadership and eminence are more in the role of total individuals and less of competent specialists This perhaps has something to do with the significant tendency in our society for all age levels to idealize youth and for the older age groups to attempt to imitate the patterns of youth behavior.

It is perhaps as one phase of this situation that the relation of the adult man to persons of the opposite sex should be treated The effect of the specialization of occupational role is to narrow the range in which the sharing of common human interests can play a large part In relation to his wife the tendency of this narrowness would seem to be to encourage on her part either the domestic or the glamorous role, or community participation somewhat unrelated to the marriage relationship. This relationship between sex roles presumably introduces a certain amount of strain into the marriage relationship itself since this is of such overwhelming importance to the family and hence to a woman's status and yet so relatively difficult to maintain on a level of human companionship Outside the marriage relationship, however, there seems to be a notable inhibition against easy social intercourse, particularly in mixed company [6] The man's close personal intimacy with other women is checked by the danger of the situation being defined as one of rivalry with the wife, and easy friendship without sexual-emotional involvement seems to be inhibited by the specialization of interests in the occupational sphere. It is notable that brilliance of conversation of the "salon" type seems to be associated with aristocratic society and is not prominent in ours.

Along with all this goes a certain tendency for middle-aged men, as symbolized by the "bald-headed row," to be interested in the physical aspect of sex — that is, in women precisely as dissociated from

[6] In the informal social life of academic circles with which the writer is familiar there seems to be a strong tendency in mixed gatherings — as after dinner — for the sexes to segregate In such groups the men are apt to talk either shop subjects or politics whereas the women are apt to talk about domestic affairs, schools, their children, etc., or personalities It is perhaps on personalities that mixed conversation is apt to flow most freely

those personal considerations which are important to relationships of companionship or friendship, to say nothing of marriage In so far as it does not take this physical form, however, there seems to be a strong tendency for middle-aged men to idealize youth patterns — that is, to think of the ideal inter-sex friendship as that of their pre-marital period [7]

In so far as the idealization of the youth culture by adults is an expresssion of elements of strain and insecurity in the adult roles it would be expected that the patterns thus idealized would contain an element of romantic unrealism The patterns of youthful behavior thus idealized are not those of actual youth so much as those which older people wish their own youth might have been This romantic element seems to coalesce with a similar element derived from certain strains in the situation of young people themselves

The period of youth in our society is one of considerable strain and insecurity. Above all, it means turning one's back on the security both of status and of emotional attachment which is engaged in the family of orientation It is structurally essential to transfer one's primary emotional attachment to a marriage partner who is entirely unrelated to the previous family situation In a system of free marriage choice this applies to women as well as men For the man there is in addition the necessity to face the hazards of occupational competition in the determination of a career. There is reason to believe that the youth culture has important positive functions in easing the transition from the security of childhood in the family of orientation to that of full adult in marriage and occupational status. But precisely because the transition is a period of strain it is to be expected that it involves elements of unrealistic romanticism Thus significant features in the status of youth patterns in our society would seem to derive from the coincidence of the emotional needs of adolescents with those derived from the strains of the situation of adults.

A tendency to the romantic idealization of youth patterns seems in different ways to be characteristic of modern western society as a whole.[8] It is not possible in the present context to enter into any extended comparative analysis, but it may be illuminating to call attention to a striking difference between the patterns associated with this phenomenon in Germany and in the United States The German "youth movement," starting before the first World War, has occasioned a great deal of comment and has in various respects been treated as the most notable instance of the revolt of youth It is generally believed that the youth movement has an important relation to the background of National Socialism, and this fact as much as any suggests the important difference While in Germany as everywhere there has been a generalized revolt against convention and restrictions on individual freedom as embodied in the traditional adult culture, in Germany particular emphasis has appeared on the community of male youth "Comradeship" in a sense which strongly suggests that of soldiers in the field has from the beginning been strongly emphasized as the ideal social relationship By contrast with this, in the American youth culture and its adult romantization a much stronger emphasis has been placed on the cross-sex relationship. It would seem that this fact, with the structural factors which underlie it, have much to do with the failure of the youth culture to develop any considerable

[7] This, to be sure, often contains an element of romantization It is more nearly what he wishes these relations had been than what they actually were

[8] Cf E Y Hartshorne, "German Youth and the Nazi Dream of Victory," *America in a World at War, Pamphlet,* No 12, New York, 1941

political significance in this country. Its predominant pattern has been that of the idealization of the isolated couple in romantic love. There have, to be sure, been certain tendencies among radical youth to a political orientation but in this case there has been a notable absence of emphasis on the solidarity of the members of one sex. The tendency has been rather to ignore the relevance of sex difference in the interest of common ideals.

The importance of youth patterns in contemporary American culture throws into particularly strong relief the status in our social structure of the most advanced age groups. By comparison with other societies the United States assumes an extreme position in the isolation of old age from participation in the most important social structures and interests Structurally speaking, there seem to be two primary bases of this situation In the first place, the most important single distinctive feature of our family structure is the isolation of the individual conjugal family It is impossible to say that with us it is "natural" for any other group than husband and wife and their dependent children to maintain a common household. Hence, when the children of a couple have become independent through marriage and occupational status the parental couple is left without attachment to any continuous kinship group. It is, of course, common for other relatives to share a household with the conjugal family but this scarcely ever occurs without some important elements of strain For independence is certainly the preferred pattern for an elderly couple, particularly from the point of view of the children.

The second basis of the situation lies in the occupational structure In such fields as farming and the maintenance of small independent enterprises there is frequently no such thing as abrupt "retirement," rather a gradual relinquishment of the main responsibilities and functions with advancing age. So far, however, as an individual's occupational status centers in a specific "job," he either holds the job or does not, and the tendency is to maintain the full level of functions up to a given point and then abruptly to retire. In view of the very great significance of occupational status and its psychological correlates, retirement leaves the older man in a peculiarly functionless situation, cut off from participation in the most important interests and activities of the society There is a further important aspect of this situation Not only status in the community but actual place of residence is to a very high degree a function of the specific job held. Retirement not only cuts the ties to the job itself but also greatly loosens those to the community of residence Perhaps in no other society is there observable a phenomenon corresponding to the accumulation of retired elderly people in such areas as Florida and Southern California in the winter It may be surmised that this structural isolation from kinship, occupational, and community ties is the fundamental basis of the recent political agitation for help to the old. It is suggested that it is far less the financial hardship [9] of the position of elderly people than their social isolation which makes old age a "problem" As in other connections we are here very prone to rationalize generalized insecurity in financial and economic terms. The problem is obviously of

[9] That the financial difficulties of older people are in a very large proportion of cases real is not to be doubted This, however, is at least to a very large extent a consequence rather than a determinant of the structural situation Except where it is fully taken care of by pension schemes, the income of older people is apt to be seriously reduced, but, even more important, the younger conjugal family usually does not feel an obligation to contribute to the support of aged parents Where as a matter of course both generations shared a common household, this problem did not exist

particularly great significance in view of the changing age distribution of the population with the prospect of a far greater proportion in the older age groups than in previous generations It may also be suggested, that through well-known psychosomatic mechanisms, the increased incidence of the disabilities of older people, such as heart disease, cancer, etc may be at least in part attributed to this structural situation.

A PORTRAIT OF THE FARM FAMILY IN CENTRAL NEW YORK STATE *

Howard W. Beers

Pictures of the grandparents or great-grandparents hang today beside needlework samplers and faded hair flowers in heavy frames on the walls of an occasional farmhouse parlor. Heirlooms now, they typify a cultural period that had also its characteristic patterns of social arrangement The early designs for living are heirlooms, too, but not yet as completely relegated to the walls of memory as are the paintings and the handwork in those parlor frames Sometimes, indeed, we have nostalgic urges to recall them entirely from the past to play again the old roles of certain status in the present period of greater social confusion But cultural systems change and if there were to be any permanence of role and status it would be too often a kind of social *rigor mortis* Specific patterns of family life are therefore neither universal nor permanent Our pictures of the farm family, as of every other social grouping, must be adjusted at intervals to cultural change in each locale and in each social stratum

A classic picture of the early farm family in New York State has been worded by James Mickel Williams [1] The figure in his portrait is an English puritan family reaching New York via New England, gradually reshaped by the conditions of pioneering, but with basic patterns enduring throughout the period of subsistence farming and continuing even into the recent periods of commercial agriculture and contemporary metropolitan dominance The pioneer American family was large, biologically vital, and of strong social texture It was "the beginning and the end of rural social organization." [2] Family groups were geographically isolated, economically self-sufficient and socially self-contained Parents were often "the school, the church, in extreme cases the state" [3] Fathers were austerely dominant. Wives were obedient, faithful, subordinate in person and in law Strict obedience was required of children Actually the subjection of wife and children to the father exemplified their common submission to natural processes, never completely understood, always uncertain The common and paramount interest of family

[1] James Williams, *Our Rural Heritage*, N Y, A A Knopf, 1925, pp 46–80

[2] P A Sorokin, C C Zimmerman, and C J Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, Univ of Minnesota Press, 1931, vol II, p 4

[3] J F Brown, *Psychology and the Social Order*, N Y, McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1936, p 224

* *American Sociological Review*, October, 1937, pp 591–600 Reprinted by permission of the author.

members in the outcome of the farm enterprise necessitated agreement on all matters. Farming and living were synonymous There was need for an executive in each family who could give direction to the process of living The natural executive was the father, hence our usual judgment that the farm family was patriarchal There followed from these conditions a strong family pride and exclusiveness, rigid adherence to custom Self-restraint, thrift and industry were predominant in attitude and in action There were strong standards of modesty and morality. There was respect for authority, whether parental, religious or legal

The matrix of rural custom in which these family-forms were set has been only stiffly flexible, yielding slowly to urban encroachment The very strength of its original position has not only retarded change but it has added to the discomforts of change. Social confusion is in proportion to the rate of change of the mores Life is well-ordered and relatively easy when standards and rules are fixed, commonly known and commonly unchallenged The psychological strains and tensions accompanying rapid social change are most acute where there has been greatest reliance on precept and formula The potentialities for intragroup conflict, therefore, have recently been great in the farm family. City folk were earlier inured to the presence in one family group of widely variant interests and activities than were farm people Perhaps this is why Burgess found evidence that adolescent-parent relationships are less well adjusted in the rural than in the city home [4] Alterations of farm family life may be occurring today in a maximum-discomfort stage of cultural change.

The family type described by Williams was at one time common in many parts of the northeastern hay and dairy sections. It was the biological and social ancestor of present day farm families in Central New York State. These families are living today on family-size farms which they own or rent and from which they derive their chief income In the sample studied,[5] all members are native born They are in the second and third stages [6] of family development, with husbands averaging 43 5 years in age, two years older than the wives The parents were married an average of 18 years ago An average of 3 6 children have been born per family An average of 2 7 of these children per family are living with their parents at the time of observation The families have been settled on their present farms an average of 10 8 years Three-fourths of the wives and four-fifths of the husbands were born on farms The families are similar, then, with respect to race, general culture, and occupation They differ among themselves with respect to age, stage of family development, economic status and other factors. There are many interfamily variations like the individual differences among persons The family patterns in this group are only once or twice removed from those of native white families in town, for they all stem from the early patriarchal type The country cousin, however, remains biologically more vital than its urban kin Even though farm birth rates have declined, perhaps more rapidly than city birth rates, the farm family still is

[4] White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, *The Adolescent in the Family* Report of the sub-committee on the Function of Home Activities in the Education of the Child, E W Burgess, chairman N. Y, D. Appleton-Century Co, 1934

[5] Howard W Beers, *Measurements of Family Relationships in Farm Families of Central New York* Ithaca, N Y, Cornell Univ Agr Exp Station Memoir 183, 1934, pp 38

[6] Charles P Loomis, *The Growth of the Farm Family in Relation to Its Activities,* North Carolina Agr Exp Station Bul 298, 1934, p 18

formed earlier and is larger.[7] The age of marriage in the United States has been increasing among classes of higher economic status, but it has been declining among farm people, as among other low income classes.[8]

This portrait of contemporary farm families in a particular area will emerge more distinctly if one model sits against the background of descriptive data for all the families studied. Excerpts from a case narrative will help to clarify the outlines of our discussion.[9]

"The X family lives eight miles from a village of 2500 people in a rugged south central dairy section of New York State. To reach their home, one drives out through the broad valley and up a winding black-top road through the Gully. Turning right into an uphill lane, one stops between the frame house (straw yellow with white trimmings) and the unpainted barns. A flashlight beam points the way through a dark, rainy night to the back entrance.

"This has been their home for 17 years. Mr. X is 43 years old, and his wife is 41. Both were born and reared on nearby farms. He finished common school. She attended the village high school for two years. Neither has had any occupational experience other than farming, and the farm is now their sole source of income.

"Four children have been born to the mother, but the first boy died of pneumonia in his second year. The second boy, now eighteen, is a sophomore at college. The next child is a boy of eleven, in seventh grade. The youngest, a daughter of six, is in school for the first time — four born, three living, and two at home.

"When married 20 years ago, Mr. and Mrs. X lived for three years with Mr. X's parents, working the homestead on shares. Then they bought their present farm of 96 acres, going in debt for the full cost. Their small cash reserve was invested in repairs to buildings.

"An average season's work on this farm involves handling 15 acres of hay, 12 of spring grain, five of ensilage corn, seven of buckwheat, three of potatoes, one acre of field beans, two acres of wheat, four of alfalfa, the care of nine milch cows, some young stock and 100 hens. Mr. X is now rated by local leaders as a careful and successful farmer."

The basic differences between early farm and city families were due both to rural isolation and to occupation. Today we find the kind of work that families do is becoming relatively more important than their place of residence. The social length of a physical mile varies from moment to moment. Farmers in central New York State undoubtedly knew of the Hindenburg Zeppelin disaster before the flames were extinguished. Certainly many of them while at breakfast took vicarious part in the coronation of a British King. Furthermore, as the influence of distance declines and the influence of occupation becomes more marked there comes increasingly into the picture a third differentiating factor, namely, that of economic status. Socio-economic differentiation within the rural community is becoming more pronounced. It is less and less possible to portray sharp contrasts between "the rural" and "the urban" family because of greater social heterogeneity within both rural and urban groups. Hitherto, rural people in America have belonged largely to the middle classes. Recently, increasing numbers have moved into social positions of lessened status. As this happens it is

[7] Dwight Sanderson, "The Rural Family," *Jour. Home Economics*, 29, April 1937, p. 223.

[8] Dwight Sanderson, *ibid.*, p. 223.

[9] The case excerpts included with the text of this article are all drawn from the narrative of one family, sufficiently representative to illustrate general statements.

important to note that "the climbing of the ladder of gentility" [successfully accomplished by Mr. X] "has suddenly become a much more difficult task than has heretofore been the case."[10]

Underlying or accompanying the vital and economic changes of the farm family, there are changes in psychosocial relationships, changes in status and role. One factor basic to the definition of status is the division of labor among family members Hence, any change in work pattern is significant.

"Mr. X is primarily responsible for the outdoor work and the chores In summer the oldest boy, home from college, helps regularly with work outdoors. He is chief teamster during the summer, operates the mowing machine, binder and other implements Practically no outside help is hired The younger boy does some of the mowing, 'drives on the horse-fork' during haying, he does some milking, helps with general chores, helps with gardening and is entirely responsible for feeding the poultry. He drove the team and hay-rake last summer All members but the little girl share responsibility for the home garden Mrs X washes the milk utensils She takes sole responsibility for work in the house. The little girl occasionally helps to wash dishes and to dust She likes the latter chore in particular The younger boy carries wood (they burn no coal) for the stoves. Mrs. X says that her husband was not 'handy with babies,' so she had no help in the care of the younger children The coming of children altered the division of labor in this home. Mrs X helped with the milking and with general farm chores until the children arrived."

In the farm family of today, specialization is more marked than it was during an earlier period. Formerly, it was not unusual for girls to help with the outdoor work and for boys to help in household routines Today, however, the processes of economic production have largely left the house for field and barn Sanderson has raised an interesting question with respect to this change. "It is undoubtedly true that there is less need for home production but if the wife and the family are to be relieved of all domestic activities . . do they secure the satisfaction and is there a possibility of developing the affection that would result from a sharing of common activities which make possible an interchange of personal service, of what the Binkleys call 'domestic interaction'? "[11]

Child labor is traditional on farms and it has been reduced in quantity more by compulsory school attendance than by any shifts in rural attitude This is well evidenced by nation-wide rural negation of the proposed constitutional amendment regulating the labor of children In an earlier time, custom allowed rural fathers the privilege of getting all the work they could from their sons while the latter were legal minors Social maturity was recognized at 21, but not before This father-son work relationship is still almost unique to the farm family It constitutes a type of vocational training inherent in family farming A father-son relationship that is markedly different in at least one phase from the pioneer pattern, however, is found in the X family

"When the older boy started college he had saved $120 in cash Most of this had accumulated as follows The boy once had wanted a calf The father gave him a calf on condition that he raise it carefully and be responsible for its care. When the calf be-

[10] Roy H. Holmes, *Rural Sociology*, N Y, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932, p 73

[11] Dwight Sanderson, "Trends in Family Life Today," *Jour Home Economics*, 24, April 1932, p 318.

came a cow the father was to get the milk for the expense of feeding The cow's first calf was vealed and the boy got the money on condition that he put it in the bank. So every calf to which this cow gave birth was vealed and the boy kept the money. In the end the cow was sold The same plan is being followed with the eleven year old who now has a calf that he is feeding "

Although there is greater division of labor in today's farm home, many activities are still shared, and propinquity still fosters family solidarity Farm families vary in these customs, but the X family is representative for central New York

"The family members are all home together an average of six evenings per week When asked what the family usually does in the evening to pass time pleasantly, Mrs X said, 'Well, when the boys are home they like to have Mr X play checkers with them or something like that I read a great deal Mr X reads as much as he can with his poor eyes Then we have music too Lots of times we get around the organ and sing' The family always gathers at meal time with the exception of luncheon on school days when the children are not at home But when the family is at home, each waits for the others to assemble before starting to eat. Reading aloud is customary, as it was in both of the parental homes The Bible is read aloud once each day As a rule, shopping in town is a family activity There is family observance of the usual holidays On Christmas the family goes to the home of Mrs X On Thanksgiving they go to the home of Mr X On New Year's Day they observe a holiday at home On Decoration Day they go to the cemetery to decorate the graves of their first-born and their dead kin Birthdays are always celebrated with at least a cake."

Religion and ritual are less intimately a part of the family pattern today than they were yesterday. In this respect, the X family is closer to pioneer customs than to modern city folkways.

"In the extra parlor, a well-thumbed Bible and an accumulation of Sunday School papers cover the surface of a small table On the wall above hangs the framed marriage certificate On the opposite wall hangs a placard with the message, 'His Mercy Endureth Forever.' At one end of the room is an old melodeon on which a well-worn hymn book is open at *Rock of Ages* There is no other music visible."

Daily Bible readings and strong social dependence upon church activity appear in the case of the X family Neither they nor their neighbors follow the old custom of "saying grace" at meals Yet every one of the marriages among these farm families was performed by a minister of religion rather than by a civil officer. Wives in particular declared that they "would not feel married unless a minister had performed the ceremony" The marriage mores of rural life are still intimate with institutional religion, but family activities are affected less directly by religion than they were in an earlier period

The shared activities, propinquity and group rituals in these families are not ordinarily accompanied by overt demonstrations of affection Here, as elsewhere, traditions of restraint and habits of emotional control are vestiges of the pioneer attitude It is likely, however, that practices with respect to shared activity, demonstration of affection or family ritual vary more from family to family now than they would have varied three generations ago in the same area

Along with propinquity and the patterns of work and leisure, division of executive authority in the home is equally basic to family structure As Sims has

written, "Although the rural family inclines to the patriarchal type, it often manifests noteworthy democratic traits."[12] It might now be argued that the farm family inclines more and more to the democratic type of organization The old conditions of risk and uncertainty in agriculture have not been entirely supplanted but there is now less mystery about the processes of production Uncertainties of biology and weather, although replaced by uncertainties of the market, are no longer so insistent that each family group have a patriarchal head.

The present importance of markets, and the consequent emphasis upon intense, specialized production is introducing certain new influences on role and status within the family, giving some impetus to the democratic trend.

"On a check list, which Mr and Mrs X completed independently, each gives the other credit for helping earn the family income Each of them reports it to be earned by 'father and mother together' Mrs X is responsible for buying food Purchasing children's clothing is a shared responsibility Borrowing money is a matter that rests largely with Mr X, although both parents discuss any problem of this sort before action is taken If a problem directly concerns the children, they are called into council Buying machinery is a matter for Mr X's decision He decides what crops to plant, when and where to plant them If there is any remodeling to be done in the house, a joint decision is made. Contributing to the church is a matter for consensus. Mr and Mrs X select together the papers to which they will subscribe Writing checks is done only by the husband. He buys the insurance, although whether or not it shall be taken is first agreed upon. Training the children is shared, seeing that children study lessons is also shared. Giving the children permission to leave the home or to go away is joint, punishing children is done by both Both parents give the children spending money Both of them help in planning the children's education, although Mrs X said, 'Now some of these things, like choosing the children's vocation, neither one of us ever thought that was our place'"

There is little evidence here of uncompromising paternal dominance The husbands in these families rarely take upon themselves the sole responsibility for making decisions, even when problems of business are up for solution A discussion involving at least the husband and wife precedes the reaching of a decision in seven homes out of eight In nearly half of the homes, children also are consulted However, the importance of family discussion varies according to the kind of problem awaiting solution Questions relating primarily to the farm business are more likely than others to be decided by the husband without consulting the wife Decisions about the purchase of machinery or what crops to plant are of this type On the other hand, if the question is whether or not to borrow money, to buy insurance, or to buy a car, there is likely to be a family discussion before any final action is taken These questions relate directly to family welfare rather than solely to the farm business If money is borrowed thrift is forced upon the members of the family If insurance is purchased, other things will have to be foregone A new car will be either liked or disliked by each family member, hence each one has an interest in the decision.

The tendency for husbands to be solely responsible for financial decisions is more marked in families on large than on small farm enterprises. There is a suggestion in

[12] N. L. Sims, *Elements of Rural Sociology*, Thomas Y Crowell Co, 1934, p 434

the evidence that as standards of competitive business efficiency enter farming, the splitting of executive responsibility into home and farm divisions may become more pronounced. The prophets of chemurgy as well as the discoveries of conservative research point to extreme and imminent changes in the practices and skills of agricultural production The rate and final extent to which country life may be deruralized, of course, cannot even be conjectured, but even now milk-dresses and bathtub-tomatoes are more than pure fantasy.

There are also some new problems of financial administration in the home In the days of family self-sufficiency, production and consumption were one dual process, begun and finished on one farm unit Cash was unimportant Now, however, the medium of exchange has a new significance to each family member How do families meet the problem of an equitable or satisfactory distribution of cash among the separate members? There is little evidence of any one answer sufficiently extant to be called a folkway, but it is likely that low income or disagreement over distribution of income is a new source of tension in the farm family

Some phases of the parent-child relationship have been mentioned above In the X family, we found each child attending school, the oldest boy in college This illustrates an attitude frequently voiced by mothers who want to educate their children into white-collar strata We found each child with a definite place in the work pattern, a place of responsibility increasing with age, and allocated to house or field and barn on the basis of sex We found parents and children playing as well as working together. We found children included occasionally in family councils, we found the boys with property and money of their own, we found ritualistic observance of the children's birthdays (The manner of giving money to children in the X family is not general in the area studied. Irregular amounts of spending money are more customary in other families) We found both parents sharing some responsibilities for guidance and control, yet allowing children relative freedom in such matters as choice of vocation. However, we still find that unfailing obedience is expected.

"'Mr X, how do you get the children to do what you ask them to do?'

"'Why, we just tell them' Mrs X added, 'we never believed in bribing them or paying them to do things' Mr X continued, 'we always cal'clate that if they are told to do anything they are s'posed to do it'

"'What methods of punishment do you use?'

"'Oh, the whip and the strap Often we deny them something they want But we always make it clear to them just why we are doing it'"

The changed status of wife and mother is at once cause and effect of changing family relationships It has been only recently that a writer of syndicated newspaper features could, with impunity, advise a farm wife to "calmly announce to your husband that unless you can have a maid on your farm next year you will refuse to do any canning, gardening or chicken raising. Plan to cut down your work at least 40 per cent"[18]

But women have been enfranchised. The law now recognizes their property rights Educational levels have been raised They participate freely in the organizational life of communities Their roles with respect to household and farm work have changed Some of these things have tended to give them a social status both within and out of the home that is more

[18] Garry C Meyers, *The Parent Problem.* (Syndicated newspaper column Dec 11, 1936)

than ever like that of their husbands. The relationship of the mother's position to patterns within the family has been recognized in the foregoing discussion It is related also to the role of the family in the community, a role that has changed since the days of pioneering. Mrs. X does not operate the family car but 43 percent of the farm wives in neighboring homes are licensed drivers

"The organized participation of the family centers largely in the church All members of the family attend church and Sunday School regularly. They have not joined the Grange. Mr X belongs to the Farm Bureau and Dairymen's League. Mrs X is a faithful attendant at meetings of the Missionary Society. They have not been to a moving picture since they were married. Mr X goes to the village or a nearby city about twice a week and Mrs. X not more than once a month. Entertainments take them out not more than once a month Mrs X visits with neighbors on the telephone from one to three times a day Mr X confesses, however, that he probably does just as much visiting if not more than his wife. He meets neighbors on the road and stops to chat with them or he exchanges work with his neighbors and gossips while he works Once a year they have friends from the city who come to spend a week or a few days with them. Mr. X has been on the church board; he has been a church steward and has been on the church building committee. Mrs. X teaches Sunday School and is vice-president of the Missionary Society. Mr X is now collector and school trustee of the school district"

The proportion of husbands who did not participate in any organization (15 percent) is greater than for wives (12 percent). Similarly husbands attended an average of only 2.6 organizations while the wives attended an average of 3.2 organizations. This is a reversal of pioneer customs. Commercial recreation is infrequent. The husbands and wives attend moving pictures only about once in two months. Town contacts were twice as frequent for husbands as for wives because of business trips.

The local leadership of their communities comes from these families. Three-fourths of the men and over half of the women had a record of some past or present office in an organization. This changed community role of the farm wife, however, has not yet removed her from the family group enough to threaten the integration of the home, for wives with leadership records were found in those homes in which there are many shared activities Furthermore, this activity in organizations often helps mothers to cope with current change "Parent-teacher associations, child study clubs, and similar organizations render an important service in establishing norms of child behavior and strengthening the morale of the associated members in their efforts to maintain them"[14]

Although the strength of the great family as a rural social control has weakened materially we find the kinship group still important One-fourth of the households studied included some relative whose only home was with the family group.

The X's "go visiting" about once a month and receive visits from others with the same frequency, usually entertaining these guests at dinner. Most of this visiting is with nearby members of the great family. Nearly half of the families typified by Mr. and Mrs X and their children attend an annual reunion of the paternal great family and the same proportion attend a similar gathering of the mother's great family. When we analyze their habits with respect to visiting we find that

[14] Dwight Sanderson, *op cit*, *Jour. Home Economics*, 24, April 1932, p. 317.

one-fourth of these families visit from one to four kin families of the husband and a similar number of kin families of the wife. Only one family in eight reports visiting no homes in which there are relatives of the husband, and one family in three reports visiting in no homes containing relatives of the wife.

In many respects, then, the portrait of today's farm family in Central New York could well hang on the same wall with needlework samplers and framed hair flowers In other respects, it would not be out of place in a modern mural It is a modification of old patterns, a partial acceptance of new patterns It is smaller than the pioneer family, yet it is still among our chief sources of population increase The rural social organization of the area is no longer familistic, but it is at least "semi-familistic"[15] The roles of parent and child are less fixed in the mores There is a definite heritage of paternal dominance, but the outlines of the heritage become progressively more dim Obedience and subjection of children stand forth still as parental goals but with less and less filial recognition. Specialization and education have affected the division of labor, but shared work and shared leisure are still formative of the family pattern Propinquity continues to foster solidarity, resisting the centrifugal effects of urbanization There has been definite democratization in the changes of role and status. That is evidenced particularly in the joint executive function of mother and father The rate at which this change occurs accelerates with the advance of business efficiency and industrialization in agriculture. Both rate and direction of future change in the farm family pattern are, therefore, quite as likely to depend upon larger economic and social influences affecting agriculture as upon the dictation of tradition.

It is significant that the family pattern of these farm folk is so widely valued today As an accepted design for living, it is a stated or implied goal of those current governmental efforts at agricultural adjustment which propose to make the family farm more general and more secure.

[15] Dwight Sanderson, *op cit*, *Jour Home Economics*, 29: April 1937, p 223.

THE RATING AND DATING COMPLEX* *Willard Waller*

Courtship may be defined as the set of processes of association among the unmarried from which, in time, permanent matings usually emerge This definition excludes those associations which cannot normally eventuate in marriage — as between Negro and white — but allows for a period of dalliance and experimentation. In the present paper we propose to discuss the customs of courtship which prevail among college students

Courtship practices vary from one culture group to another. In many cultures marriage eventuates from a period of sexual experimentation and trial unions; in others the innocence of the unmarried is carefully guarded until their wedding day. In some cultures the bride must be virgin-

* *American Sociological Review*, October, 1937, pp 727-37 Reprinted by permission of Mrs. T. H. Brady.

al at marriage; in others this is just what she must not be Sometimes the young are allowed no liberty of choice, and everything is determined for them by their elders Sometimes persons marry in their own age group, but in other societies older men pre-empt the young women for themselves Although there are endless variations in courtship customs, they are always functionally related to the total configuration of the culture and the biological needs of the human animal It is helpful to remember that in a simple, undifferentiated, and stable society a long and complex process of choosing a mate is apparently not so necessary or desirable as in our own complex, differentiated, and rapidly changing society.

The mores of courtship in our society are a strange composite of social heritages from diverse groups and of new usages called into existence by the needs of the time There is a formal code of courtship which is still nominally in force, although departures from it are very numerous; the younger generation seems to find the superficial usages connected with the code highly amusing, but it is likely that it takes the central ideas quite seriously The formal code appears to be derived chiefly from the usages of the English middle classes of a generation or so ago, although there are, of course, many other elements in it.

The usual or intended mode of operation of the formal mores of courtship — in a sense their "function" — is to induct young persons into marriage by a series of progressive commitments In the solidary peasant community, in the frontier community, among the English middle classes of a few decades back, and in many isolated small communities in present-day America, every step in the courtship process has a customary meaning and constitutes a powerful pressure toward taking the next step — is in fact a sort of implied commitment to take the next step The mores formerly operated to produce a high rate of marriage at the proper age and at the same time protected most individuals from many of the possible traumatic experiences of the courtship period

The decay of this moral structure has made possible the emergence of thrill-seeking and exploitative relationships A thrill is merely a physiological stimulation and release of tension, and it seems curious that most of us are inclined to regard thrill-seeking with disapproval The disapproving attitude toward thrill-seeking becomes intelligible when we recall the purpose of such emotional stirrings in the conventional mores of courtship Whether we approve or not, courtship practices today allow for a great deal of pure thrill-seeking Dancing, petting, necking, the automobile, the amusement park, and a whole range of institutions and practices permit or facilitate thrill-seeking behavior These practices, which are connected with a great range of the institutions of commercialized recreation, make of courtship an amusement and a release of organic tensions The value judgment which many lay persons and even some trained sociologists pass upon thrill-seeking arises from the organizational mores of the family — from the fact that energy is dissipated in thrills which is supposed to do the work of the world, i e , to get people safely married.

The emergence of thrill-seeking furthers the development of exploitative relationships As long as an association is founded on a frank and admitted barter in thrills, nothing that can be called exploitative arises But the old mores of progressive commitment exist, along with the new customs, and peculiar relationships arise from this confusion of moralities. According to the old morality a kiss means something, a declaration of love means something, a number of Sunday

evening dates in succession means something, and these meanings are enforced by the customary law, while under the new morality such things may mean nothing at all — that is, they may imply no commitment of the total personality whatsoever. So it comes about that one of the persons may exploit the other for thrills on the pretense of emotional involvement and its implied commitment When a woman exploits, it is usually for the sake of presents and expensive amusements — the common pattern of "gold-digging" The male exploiter usually seeks thrills from the body of the woman The fact that thrills cost money, usually the man's money, often operates to introduce strong elements of suspicion and antagonism into the relationship.

With this general background in mind, let us turn to the courtship practices of college students. A very important characteristic of the college student is his bourgeois pattern of life For most persons, the dominant motive of college attendance is the desire to rise to a higher social class, behind this we should see the ideology of American life and the projection of parents' ambitions upon children. The attainment of this life goal necessitates the postponement of marriage, since it is understood that a new household must be economically independent, additional complications sometimes arise from the practice of borrowing money for college expenses And yet persons in this group feel very strongly the cultural imperative to fall in love and marry and live happily in marriage

For the average college student, and especially for the man, a love affair which led to immediate marriage would be tragic because of the havoc it would create in his scheme of life Nevertheless, college students feel strongly the attractions of sex and the thrills of sex, and the sexes associate with one another in a peculiar relationship known as "dating." Dating is not true courtship, since it is supposed not to eventuate in marriage; it is a sort of dalliance relationship. In spite of the strength of the old morality among college students, dating is largely dominated by the quest of the thrill and is regarded as an amusement. The fact that college attendance usually removes the individual from normal courtship association in his home community should be mentioned as a further determinant of the psychological character of dating.

In many colleges, dating takes place under conditions determined by a culture complex which we may call the "rating and dating complex" The following description of this complex on one campus is probably typical of schools of the sort

"X College, a large state-supported school, is located in a small city at a considerable distance from larger urban areas The school is the only industry of the community There are few students who live at home, and therefore the interaction of the young is but little influenced by the presence of parents The students of this college are predominantly taken from the lower half of the middle classes, and constitute a remarkably homogeneous group; numerous censuses of the occupations of fathers and of living expenses seem to establish this fact definitely. Nevertheless, about half of the male students live in fraternities, where the monthly bill is usually forty-five or fifty dollars a month, rarely as high as fifty-five There is intense competition among the fraternities. The desire for mobility of class, as shown by dozens of inquiries, is almost universal in the group and is the principal verbalized motive for college attendance

"Dating at X College consists of going to college or fraternity dances, the movies, college entertainments, and to fraternity houses for victrola dances and 'necking',

coeds are permitted in the fraternity parlors, if more than one is present. The high points of the social season are two house parties and certain formal dances. An atypical feature of this campus is the unbalanced sex ratio, for there are about six boys to every girl, this makes necessary the large use of so-called 'imports' for the more important occasions, and brings it about that many boys do not date at all or confine their activities to prowling about in small industrial communities nearby; it also gives every coed a relatively high position in the scale of desirability; it would be difficult to say whether it discourages or encourages the formation of permanent attachments. Dating is almost exclusively the privilege of fraternity men, the use of the fraternity parlor and the prestige of fraternity membership being very important Freshman men are forbidden by student tradition to have dates with coeds.

"Within the universe which we have described, competition for dates among both men and women is extremely keen. Like every other process of competition, this one determines a distributive order There are certain men who are at the top of the social scramble; they may be placed in a hypothetical Class A There are also certain coeds who are near the top of the scale of dating desirability, and they also are in Class A. The tendency is for Class A men to date principally Class A women. Beneath this class of men and women are as many other classes as one wishes to create for the purposes of analysis. It should be remembered that students on this campus are extremely conscious of these social distinctions and of their own position in the social hierarchy. In speaking of another student, they say, 'He rates,' or 'He does not rate,' and they extend themselves enormously in order that they may rate or seem to rate.

"Young men are desirable dates according to their rating on the scale of campus values. In order to have Class A rating they must belong to one of the better fraternities, be prominent in activities, have a copious supply of spending money, be well-dressed, 'smooth' in manners and appearance, have a 'good line,' dance well, and have access to an automobile. Members of leading fraternities are especially desirable dates, those who belong to fraternities with less prestige are correspondingly less desirable I have been able to validate the qualities mentioned as determinants of campus prestige by reference to large numbers of student judges.

"The factors which appear to be important for girls are good clothes, a smooth line, ability to dance well, and popularity as a date The most important of these factors is the last, for the girl's prestige depends upon dating more than anything else; here as nowhere else nothing succeeds like success. Therefore the clever coed contrives to give the impression of being much sought after even if she is not. It has been reported by many observers that a girl who is called to the telephone in the dormitories will often allow herself to be called several times, in order to give all the other girls ample opportunity to hear her paged Coeds who wish campus prestige must never be available for last minute dates; they must avoid being seen too often with the same boy, in order that others may not be frightened away or discouraged; they must be seen when they go out, and therefore must go to the popular (and expensive) meeting places; they must have many partners at the dances. If they violate the conventions at all, they must do so with great secrecy and discretion; they do not drink in groups or frequent the beer-parlors Above all, the coed who wishes to retain Class A standing must consistently date Class A men.

"Cressey has pointed out that the taxi-dancer has a descending cycle of desirability. As a new girl in the dance hall, she is at first much sought after by the most eligible young men. Soon they tire of her and desert her for some newer recruit Similarly the coed has a descending cycle of popularity on the campus which we are describing, although her struggle is not invariably a losing one The new girl, the freshman coed, starts out with a great wave of popularity, during her freshman year she has many dates Slowly her prestige declines, but in this case only to the point at which she reaches the level which her qualities permanently assure her Her descent is expedited by such 'mistakes,' from the viewpoint of campus prestige, as 'going steady' with one boy (especially if he is a senior who will not return the following year), by indiscretions, and by too ready availability for dates Many of the girls insist that after two years of competitive dating they have tired of it and are interested in more permanent associations

"This thrill-dominated, competitive process involves a number of fundamental antagonisms between the men and the women, and the influence of the one sex group accentuates these Writes one student informant, a girl, 'Wary is the only word that I can apply to the attitude of men and women students toward each other The men, who have been warned so repeatedly against coeds, are always afraid the girls are going to "gold-dig" them The coeds wonder to what degree they are discussed and are constantly afraid of being placed on the black list of the fraternities Then too they wonder to what extent they can take any man seriously without being taken for a "ride"' Status in the one-sex group depends upon avoiding exploitation by the opposite sex Verbatim records of a number of fraternity 'bull sessions' were obtained a few years ago. In these sessions members are repeatedly warned that they are slipping, those who have fallen are teased without mercy, and others are warned not to be soft. And almost all of the participants pretend a ruthlessness toward the opposite sex which they do not feel.

"This competitive dating process often inflicts traumas upon individuals who stand low in the scale of courtship desirability 'While I was at X College,' said a thirty year old alumnus, 'I had just one date That was a blind date, arranged for me by a friend We went to the dorm, and after a while my girl came down and we were introduced She said, "Oh, I'm so sorry I forgot my coat I'll have to go get it" She never came down again Naturally I thought, "Well what a hit I made!"' We have already seen that non fraternity men are practically excluded from dating, it remains to note that many girls elect not to date rather than take the dates available to them One girl writes as follows 'A girl's choice of whom to fall in love with is limited by the censorship of the one-sex group Every boy that she dates is discussed and criticized by the other members of the group This rigid control often keeps a girl from dating at all If a girl is a member of a group in which the other girls are rated higher on the dating scale than she, she is often unable to get dates with boys who are considered desirable by her friends. In that event she has to decide whether to date the boys that she can and choose girl friends who would approve, or she must resign herself to not dating'

"Since the class system, or gradient of dating desirability on the campus, is clearly recognized and adjusted to by the students themselves, there are interesting accommodations and rationalizations which appear as a result of inferior status Although members of Class A may be clearly in the ascendant as regards prestige,

certain groups of Class B may contest the position with them and may insist upon a measuring stick which will give them a favorable position. Rationalizations which enable Class D men and women to accept one another are probably never completely effective

"The accommodations and rationalizations worked out by one group of girls who were toward the bottom of the scale of campus desirability are typical Four of these girls were organized in one tightly compact 'bunch' All four lived off campus, and worked for their room and board They had little money to spend for clothes, so there was extensive borrowing of dresses Members of the group cooperated in getting dates for one another. All of them accepted eleventh hour invitations, and probably realized that some stigma of inferiority was attached to such ready availability but they managed to save their faces by seeming very reluctant to accept such engagements, and at length doing so as a result of the persuasion of another member of the bunch The men apparently saw through these devices, and put these girls down as last minute dates, so that they rarely received any other invitations The bunch went through 'dating cycles' with several fraternities in the course of a year, starting when one of the girls got a date with one member of the fraternity, and ending, apparently when all the girls had lost their desirability in that fraternity

"Partly as result of the unbalanced sex ratio, the boys of the group which we are discussing have a widespread feeling of antagonism toward the coeds This antagonism is apparently based upon the fact that most of the male students are unable to date with coeds, at least not on terms acceptable to themselves As a result of this, boys take great pride in the 'imports' whom they bring in for house parties, and it is regarded as slightly disgraceful in some groups to date a coed for one of the major parties. Other men in the dateless group take on the role of misogynists — and read Schopenhauer

"During the winter term the preponderance of men assures to every coed a relatively high bargaining power Every summer witnesses a surprising reversal of this situation Hundreds of women school teachers flock to this school for the summer term, and men are very scarce, smooth, unmarried boys of college age are particularly scarce The school-teachers are older than the boys, they have usually lost some of their earlier attractiveness, they have been living for some months or years within the school-teacher role They are man-hungry, and they have a little money As a result, there is a great proliferation of highly commercialized relations The women lend their cars to their men friends, but continue to pay for repairs and gasoline, they take the boys out to dinner, treat them to drinks, and buy expensive presents for them And many who do not go so far are available for sex relations on terms which demand no more than a transitory sort of commitment from the man"

The rating and dating complex varies enormously from one school to another In one small, coeducational school, the older coeds instruct the younger that it is all right for them to shop around early in the year, but by November they should settle down and date someone steadily As a result, a boy who dates a girl once is said to "have a fence around her," and the competition which we have described is considerably hampered in its operation In other schools, where the sex ratio is about equal, and particularly in the smaller institutions, "going steady" is probably a great deal more common than on the campus described It should be pointed out that the frustrations and traumas im

posed upon unsuccessful candidates by the practice of "going steady" (monopolistic competition) are a great deal easier to bear than those which arise from pure competition. In one school the girls are uniformly of a higher class origin than the boys, so that there is relatively little association between them, the girls go with older men not in college, the boys with high school girls and other "townies." In the school which is not coeducational, the dating customs are vastly different, although, for the women at least, dating is still probably a determinant of prestige

True courtship sometimes emerges from the dating process, in spite of all the forces which are opposed to it The analysis of the interaction process involved seems to be quite revealing We may suppose that in our collegiate culture one begins to fall in love with a certain unwillingness, at least with an ambivalent sort of willingness Both persons become emotionally involved as a result of a summatory process in which each step powerfully influences the next step and the whole process displays a directional trend toward the culmination of marriage, the mores of dating break down and the behavior of the individuals is governed by the older mores of progressive commitment In the fairly typical case, we may suppose the interaction to be about as follows The affair begins with the lightest sort of involvement, each individual being interested in the other but assuming no obligations as to the continuation of the affair There are some tentatives of exploitation at the beginning; "the line" is a conventionalized attempt on the part of the young man to convince the young woman that he has already at this early stage fallen seriously in love with her — a sort of exaggeration, sometimes a burlesque, of coquetry — it may be that each person, by a pretence of great involvement, invites the other to rapid sentiment-formation — each encourages the other to fall in love by pretending that he has already done so If either rises to the bait, a special type of interaction ensues; it may be that the relation becomes exploitative in some degree and it is likely that the relationship becomes one in which control follows the principle of least interest, *i e*, that person controls who is less interested in the continuation of the affair. Or it may be that the complete involvement of the one person constellates the other in the same pattern, but this is less likely to happen in college than in the normal community processes of courtship

If both persons stand firm at this early juncture, there may ensue a series of periodic crises which successively redefine the relationship on deeper levels of involvement One form which the interaction process may assume is that of "lover's quarrels," with which the novelists have familiarized us A and B begin an affair on the level of light involvement A becomes somewhat involved, but believes that B has not experienced a corresponding growth of feeling, and hides his involvement from B, who is, however, in exactly the same situation The conventionalized "line" facilitates this sort of "pluralistic ignorance," because it renders meaningless the very words by means of which this state of mind could be disclosed Tension grows between A and B, and is resolved by a crisis, such as a quarrel, in which the true feelings of the two are revealed The affair, perhaps, proceeds through a number of such crises until it reaches the culmination of marriage. Naturally, there are other kinds of crises which usher in the new definition of the situation.

Such affairs, in contrast to "dating," have a marked directional trend, they may be arrested on any level, or they may be broken off at any point, but they may not

ordinarily be turned back to a lesser degree of involvement, in this sense they are irreversible As this interaction process goes on, the process of idealization is reenforced by the interaction of personalities. A idealizes B, and presents to her that side of his personality which is consistent with his idealized conception of her; B idealizes A, and governs her behavior toward him in accordance with her false notions of his nature; the process of idealization is mutually re-enforced in such a way that it must necessarily lead to an increasing divorce from reality. As serious sentimental involvement develops, the individual comes to be increasingly occupied, on the conscious level at least, with the positive aspects of the relationship, increasingly he loses his ability to think objectively about the other person, to safeguard himself or to deal with the relationship in a rational way; we may say, indeed, that one falls in love when he reaches the point where sentiment-formation overcomes objectivity.

The love relationship in its crescendo phase attracts an ever larger proportion of the conative trends of the personality; for a time it may seem to absorb all of the will of the individual and to dominate his imagination completely; the individual seems to become a machine specially designed for just one purpose; in consequence, the persons are almost wholly absorbed in themselves and their affair; they have an *egoisme à deux* which verges upon *folie à deux*. All of these processes within the pair-relationship are accentuated by the changes in the attitude of others, who tend to treat the pair as a social unity, so far as their association is recognized and approved.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1. Burgess, E W, and Locke, H J, *The Family*, American Book Company, New York, 1945, pp 61–206, 483–522 The first pages cited of this well-known family text describe four types of family systems rural, urban, Negro, and Russian. Some conception of the variability of family types can be had from these brief sketches The second group of pages describes some of the main aspects of the transition of the American family from the communal to the associational type

2 Folsom, J K, "Changing Values in Sex and Family Relations," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1937, pp 717–26 This article deals with the change in values in the American family as it moves from the communal type to the associational type It should be read in conjunction with the selection by Newcomb in this chapter since it deals with the same general problem

3 Frazier, E F, "The Impact of Urban Civilization Upon Negro Family Life," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1937, pp 609–18 Frazier distinguishes four traditional types of Negro families to be found in the Negro areas of large cities Each of these types has reacted differently to the urban environment Perhaps of most interest is the stable type of family which, when presented with the opportunity in the economic sphere, has come to resemble closely the white middle-class family

4. Gross, Llewellyn, "A Belief Pattern Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Romanticism," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1944, pp 463–72 The romantic complex has been the subject of a great deal of sociological speculation This article attempts first of all to define precisely the elements which go to make up the complex and then to develop a scale by means of which the degrees of romanticism of an individual may be measured

5 Kirkpatrick, Clifford, and Caplow, Theodore, "Courtship in a Group of Minnesota Students," *American Journal of Sociology*, September 1945, pp 114–25 This is a quantitative study of courtship which examines factors in the family background of students in their relation to courtship difficulties and adequacy It also reveals that there exists a considerable degree of confusion in modern courtship patterns

6 Kolb, W L, "Sociologically Established Family Norms and Democratic Values," *Social Forces*, May, 1948, pp 451–56 The author makes a plea for more consideration of the individualistic family values such as personality growth and new experience in setting up criteria for successful marriages He indicates that present criteria tend to measure as successful, families in which there

is considerable strain growing out of status struggle

7 Newcomb, Theodore, "Recent Changes in Attitudes Toward Sex and Marriage," *American Sociological Review,* October, 1937, pp 659–67 This article is valuable for the light it throws on changes in the associational family The author's data show that the trend from communal norms to associational norms is continuing Divorce is less frowned upon, and there is increasing tolerance of premarital sex-relations provided that promiscuity is not involved Extramarital sex experimentation is still strongly opposed

8 Riemer, Svend, "Marriage on the Campus," *American Sociological Review,* December, 1942, pp 802–15 Increasing numbers of marriages are occurring on American college campuses, but so far the sociologist has not studied them to any great extent This brief study reveals the ways in which such marriages are similar to and different from other forms of family life, and it also contrasts in some respects unmarried students with married students

9 Truxal, A G, and Merrill, F L, *The Family in American Culture,* Prentice Hall, Inc, New York, 1947, pp 77–97 The authors of this text relate individualism and family disorganization In many respects the arguments advanced are opposed to those in reference 6 where individualistic values are defended In other respects, however, the two analyses converge

10 See also Benedict, "The Diversity of Cultures," p 120, Thomas, "The Regulation of the Wishes," p 185, Mead, "Play, the Game and the Generalized Other," p 187, Benedict, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning," p 223, Green, "The Middle Class Male Child and Neurosis," p 236, Horney, "Culture and Neurosis," p 248, Cooley, "Primary Groups," p 287, Useem, Tangent, and Useem, "Stratification in a Prairie Town," p 454

18. Educational Organization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

Since all social behavior is learned behavior, the importance of education in any society is self-evident As Malinowski has pointed out (pages 170–71), group members have to be "renewed" even as material objects have to be replaced. In the widest sense, education is the development of the person as a full-fledged member of society; hence it is a universal activity carried on with reference to all kinds of group participation Learning as such, of course, is a lifelong process, but education more specifically means guided, systematic instruction and, in most cultures, this is confined largely to youth Education as a concept implies a number of elements: something to be taught and learned, teachers and learners, and the activities of teaching and learning The integration of these elements into a pattern is what is meant by educational organization

The subject matter of education is no less than man's entire cultural heritage, and educational processes are the primary means through which culture is passed on from generation to generation Thus knowledge (the whole body of recorded or remembered experience and its derived principles) becomes diffused, and educational organization has the functions of cultural conservation, dissemination, and renovation. It is interesting to note that in communal societies these functions are generalized rather than specialized: in nonliterate or the most primitive of societies there is no written language to record and transmit culture and no special class of individuals occupationally engaged in education as an organized activity Furthermore, the cultural heritage is likely to be so restricted that most of it can be acquired by the average member of such a society Even in these simpler societies, however, different sectors of the culture are taught to different age grades, to each of the sexes, and to the select few in training as chieftains or medicine men Yet the content of education is very much the same for everyone and it is assimilated mostly in an unconscious manner through daily living Except in rites of passage ("coming of age" ceremonies) and other special rituals, education in communal societies is carried on as an undifferentiated activity of the family and the community. There are systems of knowledge, to be sure, but formal educational associations as specialized groups do not exist.

In certain important respects in our society education is also an unspecialized activity, and many of its fundamental components (i.e, those pertaining to basic culture) are transmitted through unspecialized activities of the family and community. Initial learning typically takes place within the family, and much of the instruction we receive throughout life is experienced outside of the provinces of

systematically organized education Moreover, there are thousands of individuals in our society, even today, who have had no formal schooling; it has been estimated, as one of our selections shows, that more than half of the jobs being performed as sources of livelihood require no previous technical training Yet everyone knows the importance of educational organization and few would deny the handicaps a lack of formal schooling imposes upon a person's social participation

The increased complexity and range of accumulated culture is one potent reason for a highly developed educational organization in our society. A vast amount of knowledge must be preserved, organized, and made available It is obviously more efficient to centralize this responsibility than to let it become completely incidental to other kinds of organized endeavor In addition, educational organization is directed toward current and anticipated societal needs Individuals must be prepared for specialized as well as common roles in order to maintain society as a going concern. Without a high degree of educational organization to induct persons properly into membership, the whole complex social system would break down and dissolve into chaos or else revert to a much simpler type Still another function of educational organization in a complex, associational society such as ours is that of discovering, developing, and assessing the capacities of individuals. Although different degrees of access to secondary education and markedly different degrees of access to higher education exist among various social strata, our democratic system of free public education provides not only the opportunity but also the compulsion for all persons within certain age groupings to go through the sifting mechanism provided by both public and private schools

From all of this it is apparent that educational organization performs diverse functions with regard to culture, society, and the individual Many aspects of educational organization are of no direct interest to the sociologist, yet within its framework are to be found both broad and specific sociological concerns, such as social structures and functions, social relations and groups, principles of differentiation and stratification, and interaction processes Moreover, the rapid rate of cultural and social change and the conflicting ideas of various groups about what should be taught, how, and to whom, are facets of educational enterprise in our dynamic, associational society which give rise to problems requiring sociological analysis. The three selections we have chosen do not by any means cover all of the major aspects of sociological interest in educational organization, but they do afford considerable insight into some of the more significant problems

Our first selection was chosen for its emphasis on culture. One of the best analyses ever made of the American public school as a social system is Willard Waller's *The Sociology of Teaching,* from which "The Separate Culture of the School" is taken. Looking at the cultural ways of the American school very much as a social anthropologist would observe the ways of some primitive group Waller notes how the folkways and mores are instilled into the young, with the school serving as a center of diffusion for transmitting the vast body of culture from age to youth. Its major task is that of imposing pre-existing community standards on

children, but in so doing there is a conflict between the wider culture represented by the teachers and the local cultural peculiarities. Since the child perceives the world differently from the adult and can appropriate from cultural patterns only what is within his power of comprehension, there is also a conflict of generations. Waller's analysis stresses cleavages resulting from differences in ages and life situations, and shows that the role of the teacher lies in easing the transition by presenting to children finely graded and continuously more complicated patterns Waller also emphasizes the importance of tradition in determining what is taught, the manner of teaching, and who shall teach Since educational organization has achieved a certain degree of autonomy in our society, the schools to some extent have their own separate culture, with special traditions governing the behavior of teachers, special institutional forms for student life in schoolboy codes, extracurricular activities, and so on. Despite a great deal of spontaneous interaction, it is obvious that much of the behavior going on in the school is determined by the wider culture.

Our second selection is directed toward certain basic problems in the interrelations between educational organization and contemporary American democracy The central problem of *General Education in a Free Society*, a report of an inquiry conducted by twelve Harvard University professors, is as follows "How can general education be so adapted to different ages and, above all, differing abilities and outlooks, that it can appeal deeply to each, yet remain in goal and essential teaching the same for all?" Our excerpt from this study, "The Impact of Social Change on Education in the United States," has to do primarily with the new functions schools have had to take on as a result of the transition of our society from a relatively communal to a highly associational type.

This transition is traced from the older framework of education in a predominantly rural setting where family, household and farm chores, a countryside environment of plants and animals, a closely-knit community, and a strongly influential church all stood as bulwarks to the school in educating the young Standards were less in flux and the country school performed limited functions, in part because these other agencies assisted it greatly and in part because "book learning" was less important then than now With the impact of urbanization and industrialization, however, the family, the neighborhood, and the church have undergone a constriction of activities In an era of rapid cultural and social change there are fewer settled standards; economic and cultural schisms are more pronounced among heterogeneous city populations, and contrasts in wealth between city and country, as well as between different sections of the nation make for extreme differences in educational opportunity.

Educational organization has responded to this change and diversity with many different types of schools — big city public schools with their regimentation and impersonality, somewhat more personalized suburban high schools and grade schools, small town schools, one-teacher and consolidated rural schools, technical and trade schools, parochial and private schools — all catering to various categories

of children and all performing special as well as general functions. Even though specialized types of schools with restricted functions have developed, schools on the whole have undergone an enlargement that is both curricular and extracurricular. This has resulted from their having to assume many responsibilities formerly discharged by the family, the church, and the community as a whole. Concerning the scope and function of schools, two questions arise: How far can paternalism go without sapping the final responsibility of the individual? If the community does not meet basic individual and societal needs, does not the obligation fall upon educational organization?

The Harvard Report shows how these and other questions pose terrific difficulties for the teaching profession, and the report sets forth the conditions necessary for good teaching. But its main concern has to do with two ideals of democracy, the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian, in relation to educational organization. The former ideal is predicated upon equality of opportunity but conceives of education primarily as a sifting mechanism which would limit the best opportunities to those who demonstrate their ability to use them The Jacksonian ideal, on the other hand, points toward raising the general level of opportunity and performance The report concludes that our schools need more democracy in both of these senses Attention is called to the anomaly of overemphasis on college preparatory courses in an industrial democracy where most persons do not go to college. Attention is also directed to the need for a closer correlation between the educational system of our society and its occupational distribution of members, or the division of labor.

In spite of a general recognition of free public education as the foundation of democracy, the Harvard Report emphasizes that our schools have not been entirely successful in general education, or in the inculcation of common ideals. For example, poor students are dumped into vocational courses and are excluded from courses in history, literature, and other general subjects which should be part of the common training of every future citizen The report is not disturbed so much about the 10 per cent or so who go to college or professional schools and then into the managerial or professional positions, nor the 25 to 30 per cent who get adequate training in trade and technical schools and then go into technical pursuits requiring this background Its concern is over the majority, who go into jobs requiring no previous training. For them, education terminates in grammar or high school: the kind of general education these people receive is exceedingly important for the welfare of society. Acknowledging a conflict of forces in the schools, as in the community, concerning the determination of objectives, the report proposes closer co-operation between educators and the lay public in educational matters It recommends teaching, not by books and information alone, but through work, guidance, and a more democratic school environment

One of the incidental problems in the Harvard Report becomes the central point of analysis in our third illustrative case, "Some Demographic Clues to Stratification." The author takes the initial position that high mobility rather than

equality of status has maintained the open-class system of stratification in this country, and he further holds that our educational system has been the chief mechanism for facilitating social ascent (vertical mobility) and is explicitly conceived as such. The first part of his analysis singles out factors which in the past have been responsible for this vertical mobility, but the second part indicates that it is slowing down, so that today the average individual's chances of rising are no longer better than his chance of falling. As a consequence, arbitrary barriers to social circulation are being erected as many occupational associations take steps to prevent "overcrowding."

This situation gives rise to the question: Can the educational system produce more vertical circulation? It is true, of course, that schools continually eliminate pupils of inferior intelligence, but it is also true that they eliminate those whose parents' economic status is relatively low, and apologists for the *status quo* are prone to identify the latter with the former. Sibley refers to studies showing intelligence to be the main eliminative factor in the grades, yet beyond high school "the boys' chances . . . are much more highly correlated with their fathers' occupational ratings than with their own intelligence quotients." Furthermore, all along the line there is an imperfect apportionment between educational opportunity and ability. Since the more desirable positions are open to those who have had higher education, it is evident that educational organization in our society is far from being as effective as it might be in offsetting tendencies toward rigid social stratification. The conclusion is that to preserve faith in democracy and the merit principle of advancement, some institutional changes must be made in our system of education. This conclusion is arrived at not only on the basis of preserving one of our fundamental ideals but also as a preventive to acute class conflict.

Our cases pertaining to educational organization focus respectively upon cultural transmission, meeting societal needs, and providing individual opportunity, moreover, they all demonstrate the intricate interlocking of education with the whole institutional and associational structure of community and nation. Education, it may be concluded, is certainly no panacea for all of our social ills, and, like other human institutions and associations, it reflects our foibles and shortcomings as well as our ideals. Nevertheless, educational organization has been a potent social force in the past and probably will become even more powerful in the future

THE SEPARATE CULTURE OF THE SCHOOL *

Willard Waller

Teachers have always known that it was not necessary for the students of strange customs to cross the seas to find material. Folklore and myth, tradition, taboo, magic rites, ceremonials of all sorts, collective representations, *participation mystique*, all abound in the front yard of every school, and occasionally they creep upstairs and are incorporated into the more formal portions of school life.

There are, in the school, complex rituals of personal relationships, a set of folkways, mores, and irrational sanctions, a moral code based upon them There are games, which are sublimated wars, teams, and an elaborate set of ceremonies concerning them. There are traditions, and traditionalists waging their world-old battle against innovators There are laws, and there is the problem of enforcing them There is *Sittlichkeit* There are specialized societies with a rigid structure and a limited membership There are no reproductive groups, but there are customs regulating the relations of the sexes All these things make up a world that is different from the world of adults. It is this separate culture of the young, having its locus in the school, which we propose to study. To work out all the details of this culture would be a task long and difficult, and, for our purpose not altogether necessary We shall be content to mark out the main lines of the cultural background of school life

In part the discussion of the school in cultural terms has been anticipated in a preceding section We have advanced the notion that the school is a center of cultural diffusion we have shown that the school serves as a point from which the cultural standards of the larger group are mediated to the local community The organization of higher and lower schools for the purpose of cultural diffusion may be thought of as analogous to the organization of wholesale and retail merchandising for the distribution of material goods The goods, here certain cultural traits, are sent out from centers in job lots, to be distributed by retailers by their own methods at their own price There is a certain amount of central control of education, as there is central control of the merchandising of certain material objects We have noted also that the school is engaged in the transmission of a vast body of culture which is passed on from the old to the young The school must pass on skills and it must implant attitudes, most of these are not new in the community At any time and in any community the major portion of the work of the school is that of imposing these pre-existent community standards upon children

Certain cultural conflicts are at the center of the life of the school These conflicts are of two sorts The first and most obvious is that which arises from the peculiar function of the school in the process of cultural diffusion A conflict arises between teachers and students because teachers represent the culture of the wider group and students are impregnated with the culture of the local community. Where the differences concern matters of religion

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or of fundamental morality, the struggle which then ensues may become quite sharp and may seriously affect the relation of the school to the community. A second and more universal conflict between students and teachers arises from the fact that teachers are adult and students are not, so that teachers are the bearers of the culture of the society of adults, and try to impose that culture upon students, whereas students represent the indigenous culture of the group of children

The special culture of the young grows up in the play world of childhood It is worth while to note that it arises in the interstices of the adult social world. Thrasher's *The Gang* is a study of the conflict between the established social order and the interstitial group which has sprung up and grown strong in the sections of society where the adult order does not hold But this is by no means a complete explanation of the behavior norms of childhood groups. Another fact of importance is that the child does not experience the world in the same manner as does the adult. The child perceives the world differently from the adult in part because he sees it in smaller and simpler configurations The adult sees social situations as falling into certain highly complex configurations, the child, with a simpler mental organization, does not see these, but breaks up his sensory data into different wholes The sensory patterns of childhood, then, arise in part from imperfectly experienced adult situations. What the child appropriates from the cultural patterns around him must always be something which it is within his power to comprehend This is usually one of the simpler and more elementary forms of adult behavior, as the criminal behavior followed out by the gang, or it is a split-off part of a more complex whole common in the culture of adults.

The culture pattern followed out by children may be a survival, for when culture changes it often happens that what was formerly a serious activity for adults is continued in the play of children. Indian fighting, sword play, Hallowe'en festivities, fairy tales, and the use of the bow and arrow have lost their worth in the adult world, but they have retained a certain value in the mental world of childhood. Sometimes economic activities survive and are continued in play because they have great intrinsic interest and have disappeared from the adult world only because they were unable to hold their own in competition with more efficient and prosaic means of getting a living This has been true of hunting and fishing There is in the development process a gradual evolution in the complexity of social situations and of the adjustment which the person makes to them; the fact that these social situations sometimes reproduce the actual situations of an earlier state of society has led some common sense observers to believe in the theory of recapitulation

Between mental processes and the cultural milieu in which they take place there is at all times a nice adjustment. As one's mind approaches the adult form of organization, he is increasingly assimilated to the culture of adults Koffka, in *The Growth of the Mind,* has ably described the intellectual processes by which the child approaches mental maturity The very young child sees the red ball against the indifferent background, it sees its mother's face and hears her voice. It is conscious of only the most elementary discomforts. As the child grows older, it acquires more objects in its world, and those objects are more complicated; interrelations appear between those objects in the form of new configurations Mental life develops by a series of "Aha moments" As a result of these moments of insight, material objects may pass through a long

series of metamorphoses The little round glass backed with mercury is for the very young child something to pound with, a little later it is a mystery, and later yet a thing with which to play a prank upon the teacher, at one time it is a thing that it is slightly disgraceful to be caught looking into, for the adult it is just a pocket mirror. It is this difference in mentality which determines the different uses of cultural products among groups of different age levels

Age is not the only factor that separates people who nominally drink of the same cultural stream from actual community of culture Mental ability, education, subtle differences of interests and of personality may likewise sort people into cultural pigeonholes So completely is the individual immersed in the culture of his own age and social level that he often has difficulty in realizing that any other kind of culture exists. He is separated by invisible walls from those about him who follow different gods. Persons living in different segments of our culture, as determined by age and life situation, may find difficulty in communicating with each other or in understanding each other at all The old cannot understand the young, the prudent cannot understand the heedless, the married can have little sympathy for the unmarried, parents can never commune with non-parents, each person in the world is surrounded by many with whom he must communicate by smoke signals and by only a few with whom he can converse But the greatest chasm is that which separates young persons and old

The journey from the world of the boy to the world of the man is rarely smooth and continuous But it has fewer sharp corners to turn if the members of the adult world are able to project themselves back into the psychic world of childhood. The adult who can live in the childish world with sufficient intensity to understand children from within can help them intelligently to develop those complex and unstable syntheses upon which the adult adjustment depends Teachers have tried to make the transition easier by presenting to children a finely graded and continuously evolving culture, organized into ever more complex configurations (They have succeeded very well in grading and sorting academic subject matter) So have arisen those teacher-initiated and teacher-managed "activities," ceremonials, traditions, etc So were produced, in fact, most of the things which we shall treat in discussing the culture of the school The purpose of all these things is to soften the conflict of cultures between old and young

Though an enlightened pedagogy may ameliorate the conflict of adults and children, it can never remove it altogether In the most humane school some tension appears between teacher and students, resulting, apparently, from the role which the situation imposes upon the teacher in relation to his students There are two items of the teacher's duty which make it especially likely that he will have to bring some pressure to bear upon students he must see to it that there is no retrogression from the complexity of the social world worked out for students of a certain age level, and he must strive gradually to increase that complexity as the child grows in age and approximates adult understanding and experience Activities may reduce conflict, but not destroy it.

Children have something which can be regarded as a culture of their own Its most important loci are the unsupervised play group and the school The unsupervised group presents this culture in a much purer form than does the school, for the childish culture of the school is partly produced by adults, is sifted and selected by adults, and is always subject to a certain amount of control by teachers.

The culture of the school is a curious melange of the work of young artisans making culture for themselves and old artisans making culture for the young; it is also mingled with such bits of the greater culture as children have been able to appropriate. In turning to more concrete materials, we may note certain aspects of tradition in the school. It will illustrate well this mingling of cultures if we divide the tradition which clusters about the school into three classes tradition which comes entirely, or almost entirely, from the outside, tradition which is in part from outside the school and in part indigenous; and tradition which is almost entirely indigenous. It is roughly true that tradition of the first class exists in the community at large, that of the second class among teachers, and that of the third class among students.

Tradition of the first class, that which for the particular school comes altogether from the outside, is a manifestation of a culture complex diffused throughout the whole of West European culture. The historic school has of course had a part in the formation of this complex, but any particular school is largely the creation of it Tradition of this sort governs the very existence of schools, for, without such a culture complex, schools would not exist at all This traditional culture complex governs also the general nature of the life in the schools It determines that the old shall teach the young, and not that the young shall ever teach the old, which would be at least equally justifiable in a world that changes so rapidly that an education twenty years old is out of date. Tradition governs what is taught and it holds a firm control upon the manner in which it is taught Tradition determines who shall teach; we have already discussed some of the traditional requirements for teaching. It is this same sort of tradition also which largely determines how students and teachers shall think of each other.

The best example of a mingled tradition in part absorbed from the general culture of the group and in part produced in the particular institution is the tradition of teachers In so far as this tradition of teachers is derived from outside a particular school, it is drawn by teachers from the general culture, and from association with members of the teaching profession everywhere. In so far as it is a purely local product, it is produced by the teachers in the institution and is passed on from one teacher to another. We may mention some cardinal points of the teacher tradition as it is usually encountered, making due allowance for local variations There is a teacher morality, and this morality regulates minutely the teacher's relations with his students and with other teachers, it affects his relations with other teachers especially where the standing of those teachers with students might be affected There is a character ideal of the teacher, nearly every group which lives long in one stereotyped relation with other groups produces its character ideal, and this ideal for teachers is clearly observable When teachers say of a colleague, "He's a school teacher," they mean that he conforms to this local character ideal (It usually implies that the individual puts academic above other considerations, is conscientious in his duties, and exacting in the demands he makes upon himself and others) There is a taboo on seeking popularity among students, and this taboo operates with dreadful force if it is thought that popularity seeking is complicated by disloyalty to the teacher group There is a traditional attitude toward students; this attitude requires that a certain distance be kept between teachers and students The desire to be fair is very likely not the strongest motive that teachers have for keeping students at a distance, but it is

certainly one of the consequences of the policy, and it has in its own right the compelling value of an article of faith. None may violate the code of equality with impunity. Teachers have likewise a certain traditional attitude toward each other The most obvious manifestation of this traditional attitude is the ceremoniousness of teachers toward each other and toward the administration of the school It seems clear that this is the ceremoniousness of a fighting group which does not care to endanger its prestige with underlings by allowing any informality to arise within itself Another interesting observation that has often been made about particular groups of teachers is that they discriminate markedly between veterans and new men This distinction is in the folkways Occasionally there is a more or less definite ceremony of initiation, more rarely, actual hazing.

The indigenous tradition of the school is found in its purest form among students This tradition, when it has been originated on the spot, is passed on, largely by word of mouth, from one student to another Some of the indigenous tradition has been originated by the faculty, and then imposed upon the students, once it has been accepted by students, however, it may be passed on by student groups Some of the traditional observances which students follow are not home-grown, there is a great literature of school life, and students occasionally appear who are obviously playing the parts of story-book heroes Besides, there exists in the culture of any community a set of traditional attitudes toward school and school life, varying from one social class to another, and from family to family; these attitudes influence profoundly the attitudes which students have toward school life Nevertheless the tradition of students is very largely indigenous within the particular school. Although this sort of tradition varies much in detail from one school to another, we may mention certain characteristics of the fundamental patterns

Like teacher morality, student morality is the morality of a fighting group, but differences appear in that the student group is subordinate, and its morality is relevant to that situation Social distance between student and teacher seems as definitely a part of the student code as of the teacher code The student must not like the teacher too much, for that is naiveté. There is the well-known school-boy code, the rule that students must never give information to teachers which may lead to the punishment of another student Certain folkways grow up in every group of school children, as the folkway of riding to grade school on a bicycle or of not riding to high school on a bicycle, and these folkways have a great influence over the behavior of all members of the group These groups of children are arranged in stair-steps Membership in the older group implies repudiation of the folkways of the younger group No one more foolish than the high-school boy on a bicycle, or the college boy wearing a high-school letter! Interlocking groups look forward only, each group aping its elders and despising its juniors In modern schools, there is a whole complex of traditions pertaining to activities, it seems that all activities are meritorious, that they are in some way connected with the dignity and honor of the school, that some activities are more meritorious than others

Sometimes a whole social system is carried in the tradition of students, and such social systems are very resistant to change. The fagging system, or a system of any sort of hazing, may persist for decades against the best efforts of highly efficient teachers and administrators to change them. A collegiate institution comes to mind which has conducted such a struggle for upwards of a hundred years. We

are led to believe that hazing, at least, having its roots in the desire of those already in the group to dominate new members (and having its parallel on the faculty), would be destined to have some place in the culture which the young work out for themselves even if it had no sanction in tradition. In other words, the manner in which the young experience the universe recreates a hazing problem in every generation of students

An interesting sidelight upon the importance of tradition is afforded by the fact that certain universities have recently become aware of the beauty of old tradition and have tried to establish traditions overnight. Thus the student daily of one of the great western universities recently announced that it had become a tradition in that university for cowbells to be rung by loyal students in the stands when a touchdown was made by the home team; this tradition, one gathered, had been established on the preceding Saturday Regulations concerning the wearing of caps by freshmen, likewise, become traditions as soon as the regulations are promulgated. Tradition from time immemorial, that is from time beyond the memory of a particular generation of students, determines the relations of classes, sets the day for the class fight of the freshmen and sophomores, and reserves for seniors the right to sit upon a certain bench or to walk with their sweethearts along a particular path across the campus. In American universities, which have mostly not had a long history, such traditions are rarely aged in the wood.

Less dignified than tradition, and less old, but of a fascinating diversity, are those bits of folklore which circulate among students. A few years ago there walked upon this very spot a marvellous being, a student who defied the school authorities, laughed when the principal flogged him, finally ran away from home and has never been seen again. There was formerly a teacher in this school who was so near-sighted that the boys played leapfrog in the rear of the classroom Such and such a teacher has a glass eye. The principal has an artificial foot. A certain male teacher once killed a man in a boxing bout. Much of this folklore centers about teachers By its spread to adults, which occurs only occasionally, it gives rise to some of the fantastic gossip concerning teachers which circulates in the small town.

The cultural anthropologists have taught us to analyze the actions of human beings living in a certain culture into culture patterns Those partially formalized structures of behavior known as "activities" will serve as excellent examples of culture patterns existing in the school Among the "activities" to be found in most public schools may be mentioned athletics, work on the school paper, oratory and debating, glee club work, Hi-Y work, dramatics, participation in social clubs, departmental clubs, literary societies, fraternities, etc Each of these activities may be thought of as representing a more or less ritualized form of behavior carried out by the individual as a member of a group and, often, a representative of the larger group. There is a set form for these activities. There is merit in these activities, and that merit seems to rest ultimately upon the notion that group welfare and group prestige are involved in them; the honor of the high school is damaged if the team loses. ("Our team is our fame-protector, On boys, for we expect a touchdown from you —" is unpoetic, but explicit on this point.) But there is intrinsic, irrational merit in them, too, as in the trading of the Trobriand Islanders There is distinction in these activities for individuals. That distinction rests in part upon the prominence which participation in them gives the individual in the eyes of

the school at large, and in part upon the recognition which the adult group accords them The variety of activities is almost endless, for each of the activities mentioned above has many subdivisions. these subdivisions are sometimes arranged in something of a hierarchy as in athletics, where the greatest distinction attaches to football, a little less to basketball, less yet to baseball and track These activities are commonly justified on the grounds that they actually prepare for life, since they present actual life situations, their justification for the faculty is in their value as a means of control over restless students It is noteworthy that a competitive spirit prevails in nearly all activities Not all activities are really competitive, but the struggle for places may make them so, and the desirability of having some place in some school activity makes the competition for places keen One "makes" the school orchestra or glee club quite as truly as one makes the football team

These culture patterns of activities are partly artificial and faculty-determined, and partly spontaneous In so far as they have been evolved by the faculty, they have been intended as means of control, as outlets for adolescent energies or substitutes for tabooed activities They represent also the faculty's attempt to make school life interesting and to extend the influence of the school Any activity, however, which is to affect the life of students at all deeply, any activity, then, which aspires to a greater influence than is exerted by the Latin Club or the Cercle Français, must have a spontaneous basis, and must appeal to students by presenting to them behavior patterns of considerable intrinsic interest. Each activity usually has some sort of faculty connection, and the status of the faculty adviser is thought to rise or fall with the prosperity or unprosperity of the activity which he promotes. Activities, then, increase in importance and gain recognition from the faculty through the efforts of interested faculty members, as well as through their own intrinsic appeal to students. (A change is taking place in our teacher idiom. The young teacher now refers to himself not as the teacher of a certain subject, but as the coach of a certain activity)

Of all activities athletics is the chief and the most satisfactory. It is the most flourishing and the most revered culture pattern It has been elaborated in more detail than any other culture pattern Competitive athletics has many forms At the head of the list stands football, still regarded as the most diagnostic test of the athletic prowess of any school Then come basketball, baseball, track, lightweight football, lightweight basketball, girls' basketball, girls' track, etc Each of these activities has importance because the particular school and its rivals are immersed in a culture stream of which competitive athletics is an important part Each school has its traditional rivals, and a greater psychic weighting is attached to the games with traditional rivals than to those with other schools Schools are arranged in a hierarchy, and may therefore win moral victories while actually suffering defeats. Pennsylvania wins, but Swarthmore triumphs.

Games, the most interesting phase of competitive athletics, are complex and elaborate cultural patterns Other culture patterns reside in them Some form of game is to be found in most cultures. The history of games is one of the most fascinating chapters of anthropology of the historical sort Enthusiasts of the modern games played with balls claim for them a most ancient origin (Basketball is an exception) The game acquires a clearly defined pattern, and this is passed on with little variation. (Even minor changes in the rules usually meet with determined

opposition) Skill is relevant to the culture pattern of the game, if the form of the game is changed, skill vanishes It is interesting, too, that a "form" which is partly cultural comes to reside in every feature of competitive athletics The most flexible and skillful performance, with irrelevant motions most completely eliminated, represents "form" in a particular performance Lack of form usually limits the perfectibility of a performance sufficiently to keep the athlete out of competition. Thus there is "form" for batting a baseball, for a drop-kick, for putting the shot. It is possible that an athlete, by long practice, might develop this form through trial and error and the gradual removal of imperfections in his performance But it is more likely that the athlete gets this form through cultural diffusion Form itself may represent the accumulated improvements in technique of many generations of athletes Form, produced by the internal mechanisms making for the perfection of responses, has thus a cultural character as well.

Competition between schools in athletics comes to a focus in games The game is in fact disguised war There is a continual tendency for the game to revert to actual war. "Now go out and fight," says the coach "Fight," says the school orator "Fight," scream the spectators Everyone treats the game as a fight and thinks of it as a fight except perhaps the referee. It is small wonder that the political order worked out for this conflict situation, the political order consisting of the rules and the referee to back them, is maintained with such difficulty and only by penalties which impose the direst disabilities upon the offenders There is, it is true, a whole code of sportsmanship which arises from this conflict situation, a code which internalizes the rules and makes for the principle of fair play This code of sportsmanship is a central part of the athletic tradition, and as such is an important aspect of the cultural life of the school.

THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ON EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES *

Report of the Harvard Committee

From the turn of the century to 1940, the number of people living in communities of twenty-five hundred or more rose from about 40 to 56 per cent Fostered by quick means of transportation, great metropolitan districts came into being, each embracing one or more central cities with satellite towns and farming lands, and these, some one hundred and forty in number, contain nearly half the population. Meanwhile, the wealth invested in industries increased many times over and their output at an even faster rate Industrialization became increasingly a national phenomenon, with the South and Far West affected in only less degree than the

* Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Paul H Buck and others, *General Education in a Free Society*, Report of the Harvard Committee, Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1945.

older sections of the East and Middle West, and with the war tending to erase even these disparities To an amazing degree people's environment has come to consist of machines and man-made things, much as the environment of animals is made up of natural objects and growing things. Even the farmer and his wife have mechanized their work, go to town in a car, and hear the voice of the city from the radio.

The educational effect of this mighty change has been equally great, though different, on city and on country Of the two, the country has fared the less well, and because education is a state and local responsibility, those states which are largely rural, less industrialized, and less wealthy have been at a very great disadvantage in comparison with their richer and more urban neighbors Mississippi, for instance, is able to spend only a fifth as much per pupil as New York and to pay its teachers and principals an average annual salary of $559 against New York's $2604 Ten states annually spend less than $50 a pupil, whereas eight spend more than $100 The birth rate being higher in the country than in the city, the poorer states face the further disadvantage of having a relatively higher proportion of children to educate South Carolina, for instance, has twice the proportion of children to adults as Los Angeles county; yet Los Angeles has five times the wealth available for education Indeed, if South Carolina spent its entire state budget for education, it would still be spending less per pupil than do several states

Such disparities have roused the current movement to obtain federal support for education The question is troublesome On the one side is the evident fact that in no sphere is local and state concern more natural or rightly stronger than in education It is the sphere next removed from the family itself, touching parents and communities in their closest interests. Hence in no sphere is remote control less desirable On the other side is the equally evident fact that the nation at large has no less concern for the condition of its young people Americans move about more than any people on earth Country children go to the city, young people brought up in one section move to another The quality of education in one state therefore affects all other states It follows that the federal government has an inescapable duty toward education, the more so because the income tax is increasingly draining from the states the funds by which education can be supported

It has in fact recognized this duty, though spasmodically and for the most part in conjunction with other aims, as in the Civilian Conservation Corps, which was partly educational in function, in the National Youth Administration, which was more fully so, and even as early as the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 furthering vocational training The war has brought other steps of the same ambiguous kind, in the use of schools and colleges for training and in educational provisions for veterans Nothing is more to be wished than that the whole tangled subject be clarified and a solution found which shall do justice at once to the clear need for local and state control and yet to the equally clear obligation of the federal government toward those states which cannot now support anything like an adequate system of schooling There is a further question whether the best interests of the nation, in both peace and war, would not be served by federal subvention of very able students.

The difference of educational opportunity as between country and city thus appears in part as a difference between state and state But it appears also as a difference within any given state, and this whole question of the relative advantages of the

country and the city child leads in turn to a basic and intensely interesting question concerning the larger role of the modern school. In simpler times, still partly perpetuated in small towns and in the country, schooling, far from being the whole of education, was only one among several influences at least as strong, probably stronger. First and strongest was the family, usually large, living together in a household where each member had tasks and all watched and learned the other's tasks. Then, there was the world of crops, animals, and wild nature, the green or snowy margin ever at the door, a standing lure to learning and doing In addition were the relatively clear, settled standards of less changing times, those of the family first of all, but hardly less those of the community of small-town or country neighbors And finally there was the more or less tight bond of the church. By temperament most city-bred moderns probably tend either to idealize or to disparage these conditions Certainly it is hard to judge them accurately Moreover, they differed enormously from place to place. It is a far cry indeed from the secure small towns described by Sarah Orne Jewett to the more cheerless of the Mississippi settlements visited by Huckleberry Finn. We are not concerned here to judge these conditions but simply to point out that, for better or worse, the older school was — as the country school to some extent still is — strictly limited in function because other influences were so strong

To conclude with the country school, its disadvantage as compared with the city school is therefore less great than might appear at first sight For the latter's ever-widening scope — which now extends to health, athletics, extracurricular activities of all kinds, counseling, placement, and even in some cases to staying open all day and all year as a meeting ground and place of organized doings — is in part simply a compensation for the restrictions of city life. The country school, on the other hand, having to supply no such compensations, has less call to be so elaborate. Yet it is true that the country school has serious needs. As was noted, many country children eventually find their way to the city, where more complex conditions await them and they must compete for all kinds of jobs Moreover, farming itself has become increasingly technical, both as a science and in the use of machines When one reflects that the majority of American high schools are still small rural schools of five or six teachers and less than one hundred and thirty pupils, it is evident that enormous tasks are to be done These are mostly tasks of consolidation and redistricting and to some extent of specializing Consolidation of outlying schools in a central school makes possible a range of courses much more nearly equal to the actual differences among pupils than anything that a small school can offer Specializing means the setting up in one district of a school strong in certain subjects and, in another district, of one strong in others There are evident dangers and difficulties in such a scheme dangers of overspecialization, difficulties of transportation or living away from home But if the country child is to crown his many native advantages by a formal education in any way equal to that of his city cousin — which is to say, if his advantages are to be of the use to him and to the nation that they might be — then some such steps must be carried forward in all parts of the country as fully as they have been carried forward already in some That possibility in turn leads back to the question of federal support.

The wave of change which has lifted and shaken every phase of American life has thus not failed to touch the country high school, in part simply negatively by leaving it stranded in old, now outmoded

ways, in part positively by carrying it forward to new ways But the city, with all its familiar complexities and contradictions, its unity yet discord, its efficiency yet waste, its opportunity yet frustration, is after all the characteristic feature of the times, and it is the city high school which puts most neatly the current problems of education These spring in part from the weakening or loss of precisely those things which the country school can assume the previously noted influences of family, household, chores, animals, countryside, community, church, which had always been taken for granted as the framework of education until they began to disappear They reflect in part also the growth of entirely new influences, comparative freedom from work, readier access to books, ideas, and music, the indiscriminate presence of the movies, radio, and pulp magazines Not least important, they reflect the economic and cultural schisms within the seeming unity of the city, schisms which are all the greater if one reckons as part of the city the industrial and residential areas around it And with everything else they reflect the weight of sheer numbers

There is of course no such thing as the typical city high school But certain broad types can be distinguished First there is the very large school of two thousand students or more,[1] situated in the crowded part of the city and drawing mostly from working-class families The classes are big, averaging at least forty, and an air of regimentation and discipline prevails Students march from class to class, and it is no accident that men teachers are in the halls between periods and that a patrolman loiters by the entrance. Equipment and objects of art are under lock and key. Teachers, all specialists in their subject, have five classes daily in addition to keeping the "home room" Their material is largely planned for them by the state and local authorities In the press of faces they have difficulty in knowing or following any one student, a task left to a rarely adequate staff of professional counselors There are athletic teams, which, however, affect only comparatively few The building is closed at a certain hour in the afternoon, after which, unless a student has a job, he has little to do except to idle at the street corner or play the juke box or finger magazines in a drugstore Such a school offers many different kinds of vocational training, and the great majority are enrolled in one of these, having made their choice more or less at random at the age of fourteen or fifteen Only a few, perhaps a tenth, go on to college Like this school, though smaller, poorer, less ably taught, harsher in atmosphere, thinner in offering, and usually still more dominated by politics, are high schools in the very heart of industrial areas Many of these are made up almost wholly of first- or second-generation Americans Very few of their graduates go to college

In sharp contrast to either of the foregoing is the high school in some comfortable suburb Classes are smaller, teachers are better paid, the Parent-Teachers Association is eager and interested; there are many activities such as plays, athletics, and student publications, an atmosphere of concern for education pervades the school and the staff A cleavage, to be sure, runs between the college-preparatory group and those who are taking vocational and business courses, and this cleavage reflects a difference of means and background But lines are not sharply drawn, many able but less well-to-do pupils, responding to the favorable atmosphere and encouraged by interested teachers, take the college-preparatory course. The activities of the school are also a common bond About half the graduates of

[1] Over fifty high schools have five thousand or more students each

this school go on either to college or to further education of some sort.

Two other schools somewhat resemble it: the private school and the central high school in prosperous small towns, particularly in the Middle West These are the extremes, so to speak, of which the suburban high school is the mean. All three have in common a sense of solidarity and pride in the school, a more or less personal relationship between teachers and pupils, a fairly thoroughgoing internal democracy, however unrepresentative the private school may be of the whole community, and a vigorous set of activities surrounding the schoolwork as such The two extremes differ in that the private school draws from a much more restricted class and sends virtually all its graduates to college. The students are both more sheltered and more forced The good small-town high school, on the other hand, is a cross-section of the town itself, and its strength is that of a community where everyone goes by his first name In an academic sense it is perhaps less good than either the suburban high school or the private school, but it always sends a fair proportion of its graduates to college and contributes at least its full share, probably more than its share, of distinguished people.

These examples are doubtless neither typical nor complete. Most actual schools are probably a cross between two or more of the types just described, and we have omitted other types, for instance, parochial schools and various technical and trade schools But even these examples will suffice to reinforce the point already made: namely, that as the roundedness and self-sufficiency of an earlier, partly rural way of life have disappeared, the school has necessarily taken on new functions Or rather, the schools of well-to-do communities have taken on these functions The comparative lack of them among precisely those parts of the population which have borne the brunt of industrialization is the point most worth noticing.

What are these functions? They are first of all those which follow from the inherent nature of the city as a place where people congregate for the convenience of work That means that living quarters are small, there is little family life, fewer odd jobs (everything being manufactured), fewer chances for recreation (all the land being taken up) The school alone under these conditions is the place formally set aside for young people, and their life in consequence inevitably centers about it. Hence the rise of boarding schools and the multiplication of activities in all high schools where the means are sufficient No other course is possible Health, play, social life, avocations, help in the choice of a career all devolve increasingly on the school and have in fact thus devolved in the case of the comparatively well-to-do, who least need such help In the case of the others, the Y M C A, settlement houses, the Boy Scouts, churches, public libraries, and other independent agencies have done and continue to do important work Such privately supported organizations are characteristic of democratic and especially of American life Churches in particular do a kind of work which, by its nature, no publicly supported agency can attempt Yet it is probable that even these influences have not been able to keep pace with the times Over and above, then, the enlargement of the curriculum discussed earlier, the modern city high school faces — in part has already faced — a further and equally great extracurricular enlargement It is not too much to expect that by another few decades most city schools, like a few at present, will be staffed and equipped to stay open all day the year round as places where the young can achieve that fullness of opportunity which the city otherwise denies.

But, as with the enlargement of the curriculum, there are problems and dangers in this extracurricular enlargement These are in part simply another phase of the familiar modern problem of a planned society How far can such paternalism go without sapping the final responsibility of the individual? But this question inevitably raises another what responsibility can the individual be expected to assume unless he has known good influences? Whether you interpret democracy primarily as political democracy protecting the rights of the individual or as economic democracy protecting opportunity for the mass, there is a point where the two views meet namely, that opportunity means nothing unless it is opportunity for good, which in turn depends on some experience of the good Even Jefferson's competitive, selective ideal of democratic education rests on the assumption that at each stage the teacher and the school shall be the best possible, so that those who might otherwise be handicapped will have equal chance to get ahead Thus when the modern city deprives many young people of the most basic concomitants to education, is it not the school's place to supply these so far as it can, even over and above the curriculum? There seems no doubt of the answer, and this wider view of the school's function will underlie much that is said about general education in later chapters

This expansion raises other questions still, notably as to the nature and function of teaching We have said little hitherto about teaching, and what follows bears equally on what was said earlier about the growth of the curriculum It has been fashionable for some time among college people to criticize public-school teaching and, still more bitterly, the teachers' colleges, schools of education, and normal schools which prepare for it School people for their part have come to believe that colleges have no grasp of public education except as it concerns themselves and no interest in it except to criticize. This state of mutual acrimony is understandable, if not excusable, as another and particularly confusing result of the expansion of the public school It seems clear in retrospect that when, about 1900, the need for literally armies of teachers became evident, liberal colleges and universities faced a decisive choice. Either they might train these teachers as they had those of earlier generations, in which case, however, very serious changes would have to be made in the conventional college curriculum, or else they might keep their traditional dedication to higher studies, in which case they would surrender the training of teachers to new and, in terms of knowledge and tradition, far less well-equipped institutions and themselves increasingly lose touch with the schools The element of expense also entered in. The pay that most schoolteachers could expect and the means with which a great many started hardly justified four years even at a state university, much less at an endowed college Many also could not have met the usual collegiate requirements For these and other reasons, the second of the two choices just mentioned was in fact made by the colleges, no doubt in part unconsciously and out of inertia Any other choice would have been hard, and there is something to be said in our complex age for a specialization whereby colleges and teachers' colleges each perform their unique function But the consequences have been grave, not only the misunderstanding already noted but loss of any continuing interchange whereby each group might inform and influence the other This report is, in some sense, only an attempt to bridge, so far as is possible at this date and by such means, this dividing canyon

The reproach commonly expressed by

college people is that, as a result of their training, teachers are badly educated even in the subjects which they teach, much more so in other subjects. The reason given is that their training, brief in any case, is largely taken up with methods, psychology, and administration — with anything, in short, except the subject to be taught. And schools of education, it is said, sink deeper and deeper into these bad habits, making of teaching an elaborate and largely incomprehensible pseudo science instead of the essentially clear and straightforward task which it should be. Still worse, the criticism goes on, they have falsely persuaded the legislatures of most states to make these technical subjects a prerequisite to the teaching license — a clinching deterrent to entering upon teaching with a sound general background. The reply of experts on education and some teachers has, in effect, been already described. It is that the growth of our educational system has brought into the schools crowds of students so immensely varied in abilities and outlook that the chief problem today is less to know the subject which you teach than to know what to teach and how to teach it. Education, in this view, is essentially a matter of social planning. Hence the emphasis on methods. In addition, there is the commonly suppressed assumption that, in view of the numbers of teachers necessary, they could not all be of the highest talent and accordingly the best that could be done would be to make up by knowledge of method what might be lacking in native endowment and general cultivation.

As usual, both sides have much to be said for them. It is of course true that in the end only the spark of knowledge and devotion to knowledge will kindle an answering flame in students. Hence everything finally depends on the teacher's quality of mind and spirit. But it is also true that criticism, though well founded, means little when it comes from those who have neither seriously considered nor themselves experienced the killing weight of numbers, the low pay, the political interference, the struggle against bad backgrounds and influences, the impersonality implicit in any big system, the demands on nervous energy and sheer physical strength, that characterize the life of the public-school teacher.

We return, therefore, to the earlier question. What are the conditions necessary for good teaching within the wider curriculum and wider concept of the school? The answer seems to fall into three parts: higher pay for teaching, a more widespread dedication to it, and a clearer recognition that, like the kingdom of heaven, it is a house of many mansions, each different, each honorable. The first two points are inseparable from each other. The people who should will not go into teaching unless it is more respected and more highly paid merely as teaching, not as superintending or administering, the jobs better paid at present. At the same time, it will be neither more respected nor better paid until more dedicated people go into it. Like the ministry and the armed services, teaching will presumably never be so lucrative as other callings. At least it never has been, except in the writings of philosophers. But there seems hope that the peculiar violence of expansion in commerce and industry which took able people from it during the last half-century will be less strong in the next. If so, its quieter rewards and more inward satisfactions will come to be more justly valued for what they are. Assuming that the growth of higher education will hence forth also be less violent, there is further hope that colleges and universities will take up once more their ancient function of influencing students toward school teaching, a function which they have largely abrogated in past decades when

every influence has been toward college teaching

Meanwhile, an unceasing struggle must be fought to free education from a type of direct political control which seeks to impose appointments, restrain the legitimate freedom of teachers, and even dictate what they should teach. No doubt the ultimate control of education must be political But there is a serious question whether appointive school boards, membership on which is given after scrutiny and for a term of years to demonstrably qualified persons, are not more informed, more independent, and more responsible than most of the present elective boards With this struggle against direct political control must come a similar struggle against excessive technical requirements for the teaching license No doubt some such requirements are beneficial — say, six or eight hours in practice teaching and educational psychology, instead of the sixteen or eighteen hours in these and other subjects now commonly asked Surely the hope of a sound general education is in teachers who are themselves generally edu cated

But, as was said, these hopes will not be fulfilled automatically, and the conditions of teaching will not improve until more and better-qualified people embark on it in a spirit of devotion One of the tragedies of our time has been the change of teaching from a calling to something like an industry The fault, as has been argued, is at once with the colleges, which have turned their backs, with the schools of education, which have taught everything except the indispensable thing, the love of knowledge, and with American society itself, which has tolerated the conditions under which many students and their teachers still labor The remedy is a joint concern both of the public and of people who so believe in the importance of high-school teaching as the floor and foundation of democracy that they will go into it as a calling.

There is one further precondition to improvement a clearer realization of the variety yet interdependence of tasks in the new high school The variety of these tasks has been suggested already, it follows from the expansion of all extracurricular activities and of the curriculum itself Their interdependence is hard to grasp clearly, harder still to make real in practice Yet precisely in this interdependence lies the heart of education in a common tradition and for a common citizenship The big modern high school resembles the modern university in being minutely subdivided. Up to a point it must be Each subject requires its special training and fosters its particular outlook, the atmosphere of academic subjects differs from that of vocational subjects, the function of the teacher from the function of the counselor Yet, from what has been said of the degree to which the high school is and must increasingly become the center of young people's lives in cities and even in towns, it follows that all its phases, being thus educational in the broader sense, must be bound together by common purposes if they are to exert a rounded, unifying influence

The implications of this very important point for the curriculum have been already broached, and we shall revert to them in later chapters More will also be said on the place of extracurricular activities in fostering the aims of general education Here we would return to the basic postulates of democracy for this large yet ideally interdependent school Democracy was earlier taken to imply two in part contradictory commands first, that of discovering and giving opportunity to the gifted student and, second, that of raising the level of the average student One can call these two forces, in education no less than in politics, the Jeffersonian and the

Jacksonian.[2] Our point here is that there is need for a more complete democracy in both these senses not only between student and student but between subject and subject and teacher and teacher In saying this, we have in mind the powerful, widespread, and very unhappy distinction of atmosphere and general standing between academic and vocational courses The latter tend to be simply the dumping ground for those who do not succeed in the former There are obviously strong forces in American society making for this state of things The wish to get ahead, parents' desires that their children shall have what they have lacked, the vague optimistic belief of many young people that they may go to college and hence might need the preparatory subjects, teachers' better preparation in these subjects, and their naturally greater interest in brighter pupils all this and simple snobbishness tend to give luster to the academic course and a higher status to its teachers For the same reason, the academic course tends to be crowded with students who do not belong in it, and hence is often diluted But this is not our main point here, rather that it is a strange state of affairs in an industrial democracy when those very subjects are held in disrepute which are at the heart of the national economy and those students by implication condemned who will become its operators

The question, to which no adequate answer has as yet been found, is, then, how to endue all subjects in the modern high school, and the teachers of these, with a respect commensurate to their equally necessary part in American life. Here Jeffersonian and Jacksonian principles collide head on, and subjects making for success create an atmosphere harmful to those making for simple usefulness In this connection it is important to distinguish clearly between so called technical courses and those in manual training It is sometimes falsely assumed that students not gifted in mind are gifted in hand That is not the case Virtually as high an intelligence is demanded for success in a good technical high school as in a good college-preparatory course These two, the academic and the technical courses, are the aristocracy of the high school, and in them the Jeffersonian principle of selection operates However imperfect they may be, cause for major concern is not in them, but in the vocational and trade courses, regarded as inferior, made up of inferior students, and taught by inferior teachers And this concern must be the greater because this distinction bears a relationship to American life as a whole It has been estimated that about 10 per cent of the jobs in the United States are professional or managerial, that another 25 or 30 per cent demand some technical training (for instance, scientific farming, any one of the skilled trades, office work), but that for the great remaining mass of more than half the jobs no previous training is necessary It is of future holders of these that we are thinking now Colleges and professional schools on the whole prepare for the first kind of jobs, junior colleges, technical high schools, and trade schools prepare for the second kind, responsibility for the third kind is on the grammar schools and high schools alone Moreover, this is a responsibility for a strictly general, not a technical education since, as said, education of the latter kind is not necessary for these jobs This important point was touched on earlier when we said that the huge expansion of the curriculum was not chiefly intended to fit students for specific jobs but rather to reach all students in ways which they severally might respect and profit from For

[2] This terminology is certainly unfair to Jefferson's express interest in the citizen farmer and artisan But it does reflect the importance which in *Notes on the State of Virginia* he attached to selection of the ablest through education

these students their whole high-school education is in the truest sense general education.

Thus we return to the imperative need that all the courses, indeed all the wider activities of the high school be thought of as interdependent and equally honorable. For it is in all these courses and activities alike that the civilizing work of preparing for American life takes place There is always a strong tendency, which this report will not have escaped, to think of general education merely as a series of specific courses, highly literate in character and thereby perforce appealing to the bookish. Such courses have their important place, but, considering the population as a whole, they again illustrate the selective Jeffersonian principle They are for those students who can and will go ahead But had the high school consisted only of such students, there would have been no need in the first place greatly to expand the curriculum The unsolved problem, the Jacksonian task, of the high school is to reach students who do not read well yet are not skilled in hand, whose backgrounds are bad who in cities especially are a prey to a thousand mercenary interests — the kind of young people who, as said, in other times would have left school early and found self-respect in work but who now, if they leave school, are simply unemployed For them particularly, though for all to some extent the whole range of the school must be general education — sports, activities, provisions for health, opportunities for avocation and part-time work, quite as much as courses And a great untried realm of community and national work, foreshadowed in the C C C and in the instructional programs of this war, is yet to be formulated These are the young people for whom experience of this kind has meant higher standards, improved health, greater self-respect, and a wider experience of life. Other nations have met the same problem by regimenting the young even in peace. But such regimenting cannot safely be our solution. That solution is rather in a vision of the scope of the high school and of the equal dignity and importance of teaching in the Jacksonian and the Jeffersonian senses — that is to say, of teaching not by books and information alone, which are necessarily for the brighter, but by work, guidance, and atmosphere

Finally, there is outside the school, in the movies and radio, in adult education and the life of the community, a realm still more powerful for good or ill We shall return to this subject also, in the last chapter Here we merely add that the same conflicting forces that operate in the school system operate in this realm likewise The conflict is in part between the forces making for unity and those making for division Like the high-school curriculum, the movies and radio, not to speak of magazines and newspapers, have adapted themselves to the enormous range of taste and intelligence which exists in the general public, catering quite consciously, often quite cynically, to one or another level This variety is necessary and within limits good But, as in the case of the high school, it carries with it the possibility of division between class and class because tastes will have been so differently formed. It also carries the possibility of personal frustration, when people struggle against influences which they scarcely know how to escape. Doubtless wisdom has always been the fruit of the tree of good and evil But one need be no soft paternalist to believe that never in the history of the world have vulgarity and debilitation beat so insistently on the mind as they now do from screen, radio, and newsstand. Against these the book or movie which speaks with authentic largeness to the whole people has no easy victory.

Again, the conflict is in part between

the same Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism of which we have spoken Or perhaps these are not the right terms in this context We mean the conflict between the right of any person to create and do for his own profit and the right of the public to what will be to its profit It is said that the public is often ahead of legislators. Certainly it is often ahead of what is given it for entertainment It is no reply to say that entertainment is not education The greatest periods of the world's art and literature have been those of expanding horizons when ordinary men found in the arts the model and revelation of their humanity. Precisely because they wear the warmth and color of the senses, the arts are probably the strongest and deepest of all educative forces. The spread of music in our times carries untold good, but the movies have rarely equaled this side of the radio's accomplishment And however many opportunities museums and libraries offer, these, like the advanced course or special teacher in school, are on the whole Jeffersonian, appealing to the naturally elect Yet it seems clear that general education, as making for an enfranchisement of spirit among all Americans, will fail in the schools unless it extends to the community.

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CLUES TO STRATIFICATION *

Elbridge Sibley

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the war, we were considerably concerned about the gradual emergence of social classes in our traditionally if not actually classless society Lately, more immediate problems have been absorbing our attention, yet if the history of past wars teaches anything, it is that nations depart from peace conferences to face in exaggerated form many of the same internal social trends as before We can ill afford to wait until the present war ends to try to foresee what problems lie ahead.

The title of this paper is chosen advisedly *some clues* does not mean *all clues,* nor is it implied that demography could possibly throw light on all aspects of the formation of social classes Indeed the very term *social class* denotes a psychological or cultural phenomenon not measurable in the objective terms of demography The present subject of discussion is not full-fledged social classes but some processes which may favor their development

The argument which follows may be summarized thus Not universal equality nor near-equality of status but a high rate of vertical mobility has been the most important demographic basis of this nation's tradition of classlessness The long-existing favorable balance of vertical circulation of individuals in American society, i e , the excess of upward over downward moves, has diminished and seems likely to be further reduced Development of class consciousness will be likely to occur unless our social institutions are so readjusted as to produce a large amount of compensating up-and-down movement of individuals The educational system,

* *American Sociological Review,* June, 1942, pp 322–30 Reprinted by permission of the author

which is the chief American institution explicitly conceived as a mechanism for facilitating the ascent of talented individuals, must become more highly selective of individual merit if the loss of certain dwindling sources of upward mobility is to be offset It must be admitted that there is no criterion of what would be exactly enough vertical mobility to prevent the formation of conscious and hostile classes in our nation, yet in relative terms, it can be shown that there is danger of actual circulation falling short of the critical amount.

II THE TREND OF THE UPWARD TIDE

Technological progress, immigration, and differential fertility have heretofore contributed to a great excess of upward over downward circulation in American society

Technological progress during the last few decades has rapidly reduced the proportion of the population engaged in the physical labor of producing and handling material goods and correspondingly has increased the proportion in professional, business, and clerical occupations In 1870, the last three categories together embraced only a little more than one tenth of the nation's workers, two generations later in 1930, they included about three tenths The greatest decline was in the percentage engaged in farming, which fell from 48 to 21 percent, clerical occupations expanded most rapidly, from 3 to 16 percent Considering nonagricultural workers only, the ranks of white-collar workers swelled during the two generation interval from one fifth to three eighths of the entire number It might be argued that some of these changes, from farming to bookkeeping, for example, really involve degradation rather than advancement To those directly involved, the path doubtless seemed to lead upward Likewise, the period in question witnessed many cases of loss of individual economic independence, both of farmers who became tenants and of small businessmen who had to go to work for bigger ones. Nevertheless, the transition from blue-collar to white-collar work can be taken as a rough index of upward occupational movement

Considering only transfers between these two very broad categories and disregarding vertical mobility within each one, changes in the national economy between 1870 and 1930 produced a very marked upward shift of the center of occupational gravity (to coin a dubious term) Some 9,000,000 persons who were white collar workers in 1930 would have been engaged in manual labor if the occupational distribution of 1870 had persisted On the average, about 150,000 workers per year ascended from blue-collar to white-collar jobs

Side by side with the liberation of more and more workers from manual toil and the multiplication of white collar jobs, there has been in recent years a rapidly rising volume of technological unemployment On the assumption that any work at all confers higher social-economic status than no work, we should have to conclude that the upward mobility already discussed has been offset by the growth of what some economists not so long ago regarded as a permanent number of as many as ten million unemployed persons It may be recalled that the question has even been asked in print, "Are the Unemployed a Caste?" Debates on the inner nature of technological unemployment need not be summarized here; suffice it to admit that the great contraction of job opportunities from the late 1920's onward reduced to the vanishing point the statistical odds in favor of individual occupational advancement In these days of war, the very term unemployment may seem archaic to residents of many parts of the country; but

it is unfortunately still relevant to a discussion of long-term trends

We have so far accounted for the net upward shifting brought about by changes in the occupational distribution of the population. Vertical mobility has also been produced by higher rates of natural increase and of immigration in certain parts of the population than in others Together, immigration and differential fertility have contributed more than technological progress to the upward movement of individuals in America Poets and real estate speculators alike have grown ecstatic on contemplating the immigrant's unlimited opportunity for self-advancement in the United States but both of them seem to have overlooked the immigrant's contribution to the native American's chances of rising in the world During the first fifteen years of the Twentieth Century, the United States counted between thirteen and fourteen million immigrants, a disproportionate number of whom were impecunious and unskilled when they arrived. If these immigrants had been distributed *pro rata* among the several social economic segments of the population their arrival would evidently have had no direct effect on the rate or direction of vertical mobility within the country But of the 642,724 immigrant workers admitted during the year ending June 30, 1914, 603,378 stated that they were engaged in manual occupations[1] This means that the immigrants included about 105–000 more blue collar workers than would be found among an equal number of workers taken at random from the American population An equal number of persons must therefore have shifted from blue collar to white collar jobs during that one year in order to maintain the same broad occupational distribution in the population Most of those who ascended were in all probability native Americans.

Although the apparent net upward circulation resulting from immigration thus reached a volume comparable to that resulting from technological progress, the figures may represent an understatement of the actual situation because the occupations reported by arriving immigrants are those which they pursued in the Old World and it seems probable that many of them may have been forced into occupations of lower grades at the outset of their careers in the New World Since 1914 the picture has changed The flow of immigrants increased briefly after being checked by the first World War, only to be limited by statutes and further reduced by adverse circumstances Now, the thin stream of newcomers is mostly composed of persons from the higher social and economic levels, laborers in general can no longer afford to immigrate, even if they could escape from their national masters Thus instead of a strong upward current, immigration now produces a slight downward movement in our society One might naively conclude, to judge from recent verbal and legislative attacks on foreign born professional men that aliens are sweeping in an overwhelming flood over the prostrate bodies of their native competitors The reaction against them is only a sample of what may result from a general slackening of the upward tide of vertical circulation

Differential birth rates, while less spectacular than either technological changes or mass immigration have made about as great a contribution as either of the former to the upward tide in American society Relatively low fertility in the white collar workers has produced what Sorokin calls "a social vacuum within the upper strata" Recruits from the more prolific families of farmers and laborers have been constantly flowing into the vacuum In 1928, by rough calculation, approximately

[1] *Reports of the Department of Labor, 1914*, 187–194

80 percent of the babies born in the United States were children of manual workers,[2] but manual workers represented only about 70 percent of the total population Assuming that three out of five infants survive and become workers, it appears that when the 1928 cohort of babies reaches maturity, there will be an annual shift of about 160,000 persons from blue-collar to white-collar work [3] American vital statistics do not yet afford a sound basis for asserting that fertility differentials are generally diminishing, but if the experience of more "mature" European countries is any guide, such a trend may be expected

Most American demographers have described the negative correlation of fertility and social status as an unmixed evil, and many of them used to take a similar view of immigration -- especially of the "New Immigration" Little attention has been given to the role played by these processes in keeping the United States free from rigid social strata Will the net upward movement of from 300,000 to 400,000 or more American workers per year be more or less permanently reduced? The last three decades have seen one of the three sources of the movement, namely immigration, choked off, once for the duration of a war and later seemingly permanently. Another source, differential fertility, may conceivably be drying up The future of the third source, technological progress, depends upon the not-yet-demonstrated ability of the nation's leaders to readjust political-economic institutions so as to produce a genuine "economy of plenty"

Even if the favorable balance of vertical mobility should disappear, it would be theoretically possible to prevent the development of rigidity in the social structure by developing an increased volume of downward movement of the less "fit" and correspondingly increasing the opportunities for ascent If this does not occur (and it cannot be expected to happen automatically), general realization of the fact that an individual's chances of rising are no better than his chances of falling may lead to the erection of arbitrary barriers to social circulation If well-to-do citizens come to believe that their own (and their families') privileges are menaced by the ascent of numerous Horatio Algers, their reaction will likely take the form of efforts to restrict by law admission to the more lucrative vocations and the dissipation of established fortunes Moves in the former direction have already been made by organizations representing various "overcrowded" professions In such a situation, the less successful may also develop group consciousness in an attempt to exchange their traditional birthright of unlimited individual opportunity for a mess of the pottage of collective security The defensive attitudes of the *rentier* may tend to supplant the optimistic liberalism of the *speculateur*.

III CAN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PRODUCE MORE VERTICAL CIRCULATION?

If we must look forward to a slackening of the upward tide that has sustained our liberal democratic optimism, it is appropriate to examine the educational system by which, supposedly, the ablest members of each generation are selected for advancement to higher social-economic positions Heretofore, the mechanism has seemed to work sufficiently well if it has caught in its meshes enough promising youngsters to fill the actual vacancies in high places, henceforth it must perform the more strenuous function of pulling up a large number of the best-qualified boys and girls even at the expense of pushing

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality Statistics, 1928*, Table 10

[3] On the assumption, of course, that the occupational patterns that existed around 1928 continue to prevail.

down others who are initially more fortunate but inherently less able.

It is well known that from the lowest to the highest level of the educational system, pupils of inferior intelligence are continually being eliminated; it is also well known that school "mortality" is higher among those whose parents' social-economic status is relatively low But so far, these two selective factors have usually been studied separately and their respective relationships with school progress stated in the form of raw correlations It has remained the privilege of the apologist for the *status quo* to attribute the failure of poor children to their low intelligence, while the revolutionary has had at his disposal statistics which can be interpreted as showing that the children of the poor fail because their fathers are not rich

Strangely enough, data adaptable to an appraisal of the relative roles of intelligence and social-economic status as factors influencing children's school progress appear to have been collected on a large scale in only one American study Late in 1934, as an emergency work project, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Instruction collected records of some 23,000 boys and girls who were in the sixth grade in selected public schools of that State in 1926 or 1928 The items recorded include highest grade attained at the time of the survey, intelligence quotient, and father's occupational rating [4] In coding the data for tabulation, the fathers' occupations were translated into ratings according to the Barr Scale, a rating scale derived from the appraisal of one hundred "representative" occupations by thirty "judges," in terms of "the relative demands which they make upon intelligence." Scale values are in terms of standard deviations of the frequency distribution of the average ranks assigned by the judges.[5] Such a scale does not lend itself to the segregation of functionally distinct occupational groups, and its use in the analysis which follows probably results in an understatement of the influence of parental status upon children's educational attainment However, most of the white-collar occupations occupy the upper range of the scale, and those rated 10 or higher are almost exclusively professional, proprietary, managerial, sales and clerical workers

The records of 5677 boys who were in the sixth grade in 1926 are here analyzed The eight-year period of observation in their case is long enough to reveal reasonably completely which ones of them continued their formal schooling for at least one year beyond high school Both intelligence quotient (determined at the sixth-grade level or earlier) and father's occupational rating are recorded in 2158 cases

Table 1 shows the percentages of boys completing 9 or more, 12 or more, and 13 or more grades of schooling, in relation to indices of their intelligence and social status The lowest percentage of boys completing at least one year of high school, 53 percent, is found in the group least favored in both respects, chances of attaining this school level are seen to be slightly positively associated with both variables although almost all boys with I Q's of 100 or more reached this level no matter how low their fathers' status The percentages of boys completing at least four years of high school show somewhat more intense selection with respect to both variables, the extreme range is from 25 to over 80 percent Here, as at the lower

[4] A monograph by Harlan Updegraff, *Inventory of Youth in Pennsylvania* was issued in "preliminary draft" by the American Youth Commission, Washington, D C , in 1936 This report stopped short of exploring adequately the interrelationships of parental status, intelligence, and educational attainment.

[5] Lewis M Terman and others, *Genetic Studies of Genius*, I 66–72, Palo Alto, Calif , 1925

TABLE 1

Numbers of Boys, and Percentages Completing Specified Grades of School, by Intelligence Quotients by Father's Occupational Status Ratings [1]

Barr scale ratings of fathers' occupations [2]	*Boys' intelligence quotients*				
	Under 88	*88–99*	*100–111*	*112–123*	*124 & over*
	NUMBER OF BOYS				
Under 4	75	102	89	29	17
4–7	86	173	166	76	39
8–9	61	93	127	89	38
10–11	81	151	233	126	76
12 and over	14	39	82	66	30
	PERCENTAGE COMPLETING 9 OR MORE GRADES				
Under 4	53	76	90	93	82
4–7	64	85	92	95	100
8–9	64	82	93	96	97
10–11	75	90	95	99	100
12 and over	86	90	96	98	100
	PERCENTAGE COMPLETING 12 OR MORE GRADES				
Under 4	25	30	63	69	65
4–7	29	61	63	71	87
8–9	30	46	67	72	79
10–11	36	72	72	85	85
12 and over	64	67	74	88	87
	PERCENTAGE COMPLETING 13 OR MORE GRADES				
Under 4	1	2	2	3	0
4–7	0	5	2	14	10
8–9	0	5	4	15	5
10–11	7	12	14	21	18
12 and over	14	13	26	35	37

[1] Unpublished data from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Instruction, on 2158 boys who were in the sixth grade in 1926

[2] See text for description of the Barr Scale Representative occupations in the class intervals used above are 0–3, hoboes, day laborers, 4–7, miners, policemen, bakers 8–9, metal workers, carpenters, salesmen in stores, 10–11, highly skilled craftsmen, clerks, traveling salesmen 12 and over, executive and professional workers

level, intelligence is the more important selective factor The percentage completing at least one year's schooling beyond high school varies sharply from one corner of the table to the other, reaching a maximum of 37 percent in the most favored category But, in contrast with the data for the two lower levels, the boys' chances in this case are much more highly correlated with their fathers' occupational ratings than with their own intelligence quotients.

In order to compare the net influences of intelligence and social status on boys' educational attainments, indices have been computed of the relative chances of completing specified numbers of grades, with respect separately to each factor, after eliminating the influence of the other by an adaptation of the so-called Westergaard method of expected cases In Chart 1, the chances of boys from the least favored group are arbitrarily taken as 1.

With the influence of parental status eliminated, a boy with an intelligence quotient of 112 or over enjoys a 50 percent better chance of completing nine grades than one rated 87 or less, his chances of finishing high school are somewhat more than twice as great as those of the dull boy; and his chances of spending at least a year in college or other higher institution are about four times those of members of the dullest group Stated in general terms, this shows that the higher levels of the educational system are more selective of intelligence than the lower levels

But the net influence of the father's status on his son's chances is a different matter. At the ninth grade and at the twelfth grade level, father's status has less influence than intelligence on educational opportunity, but at the college level, the situation is sharply reversed While the most intelligent boys have only a 4 to 1 advantage over the least intelligent, the sons of men in the highest occupational category enjoy an advantage of more than 10 to 1 over those from the lowest occupational level A particularly striking feature of the third chart is the sudden rise of a boy's chances of going beyond high school which takes place near point 10 on the Barr Scale — the point which roughly divides white-collar from blue-collar workers


These statistics indicate that as a boy passes through the educational sifting process, his parents' status assumes increasing importance, both absolutely and in comparison with his own intelligence, as a factor influencing his chances of continuing his preparation for one of the more advantageous vocations Although there has been (in Pennsylvania) an approach to the "social-economic democratization" of high-school education, college education and higher vocational training remain to a large extent the special privilege of children of superior social-economic backgrounds Even on the lower levels, perfect apportionment of educational opportunity to ability as indicated by the I Q is not achieved

As recruitment for the higher-paid and otherwise more desirable occupations tends increasingly to be limited to those who have had higher education, it is evident that the American educational system is far from being as effective as it might be in counteracting tendencies toward social stratification Increased enrollment on any particular level of the system does not automatically mean progress toward the goal of assorting individuals into positions commensurate with their own abilities A system of higher education might admit only a small minority of applicants and yet stimulate rather than retard vertical circulation in society, provided that the minority were selected for admission solely on the basis of their abilities, and *vice versa*.

If we propose to preserve the American faith in freedom from social-class barriers to individual achievement, some institutional changes must be planned and effectuated in order to offset the previously discussed diminution of the favorable balance of vertical circulation. Educational institutions appear to offer the most promising field for such changes If the changes are made well enough and quickly enough, they may forestall the onset of an acute case of class conflict and indefinitely

CHART 1

Relative Influences of Boy's Intelligence and Father's Occupational Rating on Boy's Chances of Completing Specified Grades of School



postpone the death of a leading American ideal. If not, our social arteries are likely to become sclerotic.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 *A College Program in Action,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1946 (Note especially pp 3–47) Subtitled "A Review of Working Principles at Columbia College," this committee report is comparable in certain respects to the Harvard Report we have cited, and shows how a college organizes the content of culture for presentation to undergraduates

2 Cook, L A and Greenhoe, Florence, "Community Contacts of 9,112 Teachers," *Social Forces,* October, 1940, pp 63–72 The findings of a questionnaire are summarized in tabular form, together with comments on the physical mobility of teachers, teacher traits valued and deprecated by employers, teacher participation in community activities, conduct codes, and the reactions of teachers to such codes

3 Curti, Merle, "The School and the Triumph of Business Enterprise, 1860–1914," *The Social Ideas of American Educators,* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1935, pp 203–60 The struggle of conflicting ideologies to dominate our school system is historically traced, and it is shown that only among the vanguard of American educators was there much organized effort to put forward ideas not "thoroughly in keeping with the existing system of profit-making industrialism"

4 Dewey, John, "Education as a Social Function," *Democracy and Education,* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1923, pp 12–27 John Dewey probably has had more influence on the philosophy of American education than any other contemporary figure This selection will serve to illustrate some of his principal ideas concerning the relations of school and society

5 Dodson, D W, "College Quotas and American Democracy," *The American Scholar,* Summer, 1946, pp 267–76. A sociologist gives some facts and figures concerning policies of discrimination practiced against various minorities and points out their implications

6 *Higher Education for American Democracy,* A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, U S Government Printing Office, Washington, 1947 The more pertinent booklets in this much-discussed series of six volumes are Volumes 1–3, which carry the titles, "Establishing the Goals," "Equalizing and Expanding Individual Opportunity," and "Organizing Higher Education"

7 Hutchins, R M, "The Dilemmas of the Higher Learning, *The Higher Learning in America,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1936, pp 33–58 From a partisan point of view, the author attempts to resolve the conflict between the dual university aims of pursuing truth for its own sake and preparing men and women for their life work His views are cited for their contrast with those of John Dewey and other leading educators

8 Wirth, Louis, "Education for Survival the Jews, *American Journal of Sociology,* May, 1943 pp 682–91 Against a background of historical fact, Wirth indicates the high esteem in which Jews have held education as a social function and analyzes its causal importance in the persistence of their distinctive culture

9 Zeleny, L D, "A Sociological Curriculum in J S Roucek and associates, *Sociological Foundations of Education,* Thomas Y Crowell Company, New York 1942, pp 308–29 This selection indicates specifically how culture is parceled out for presentation from the first grade through high school, and mentions plans in effect in various school systems for more meaningful contacts with the community

10 Znaniecki, Florian, 'The Explorer as Creator of New Knowledge, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* Columbia University Press New York, 1940, pp 164 99 Since our quoted materials do not stress cultural innovation as a function of educational organization, this selection is cited for its sociological analysis of the manner in which new developments take place in the field of knowledge

11 See also Thomas "The Regulation of the Wishes," p 185, Mead, "Play, the Game and the Generalized Other," p 187, Piaget, "The Rules of the Game," p 194, Hartshorne, "Undergraduate Society and the College Culture," p 290

19. Religious Organization

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The origins of religion have been variously explained in terms of man's attempt to cope with the unknown and the unpredictable, his efforts to rationalize and render more acceptable the phenomenon of death, and as his more or less unconscious personification of tribal or societal unity. In addition, there are numerous other explanations — some of them quite acceptable for certain analytical purposes, but none of them (including those given above) entirely satisfactory from all points of view. Since the origins of religion are forever lost in the mists of time, there will doubtless never be any universally accepted explanation.

Moreover, similar difficulties are encountered when one examines the theoretical generalizations about *existing* religions. Most definitions are advanced from the point of view of a particular creed, and hence it is common for many scholars as well as laymen in our predominantly Christian society to think of the essence of religion as consisting of a belief in a supreme being and in such doctrines as sin and salvation. Even a superficial study of comparative religion, however, is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of widely held religions in which none of these features are present. The nature of religion includes a broad range of experiences, actions, and attitudes, even within the confines of our own society. Religious experience ranges from emotional ecstasy to highly rational speculation, from private contemplation to collective frenzy. Likewise, religious actions run the gamut from the spontaneous expression of private prayer to the complex ritual of a Zuñi Indian rain-making ceremony or a Roman Catholic Eucharistic Congress. Religious attitudes vary from those of propitiation, awe, and — if one's definition of religion includes magic — to those of manipulation and coercion.

Fortunately the problem of analyzing religious *behavior* is simpler than that of trying to establish a universally valid definition of the nature of religion. Furthermore, our interest in religious behavior is restricted to its significance in relation to social structure. Regardless of how religion originated or what it means in all of its variations, it tends to develop into a collective activity which reaffirms the ultimate values and solidarity of a unified society. This function implies pre-existing consensus. Where fissures in the social order appear, religious activity is more likely to reflect and reinforce the unity of each of the conflicting groups than it is to bring them together.

In the *simple* communal society religious activity expresses the undifferentiated unity of the entire society. All of its members have the same religion. It pervades their daily activities and special religious ceremonies are performed within the family or the community as a whole. There may be priests, but there are no reli-

gious associations with separate doctrines. Since the life of the society is a closely interwoven whole, it is difficult to differentiate religious and nonreligious action patterns. In the *complex* communal society (e.g., medieval Europe), on the other hand, the religious element is readily discernible, for it has already developed into a ramified association manifesting much differentiation and stratification. The rank-and-file member of the complex communal society does not usually differ very much in his behavior — religious, familial, or economic — from the member of the simple communal society, but there are elite groups found in the complex society which are not found in the simple society. These elites — religious, political, and economic — have arisen within the differentiated spheres of social life and assist one another in the development and maintenance of a system of social stratification which gives them greater access to the values of the society. Thus an additional function of religious organization in a complex communal society is to support the existing system of social stratification.

Our previous analyses of the associational society indicate that the broadening of its system of ultimate values results in the growth of numerous religious associations. The differences between religious organization in the complex communal society and the associational society can be readily seen by employing the typology of religious groups contained in our brief excerpt from Howard Becker's "The Abstract Collectivity: The Church." Becker distinguishes four main types of religious groups: the *ecclesia*, the *sect*, the *denomination*, and the *cult*. The ecclesia is a large all-embracing religious association which includes all or most of the members of a particular society, and in some cases may extend beyond national boundaries. The sect is a religious protest group which tends to isolate itself from the larger society and to establish a religious society encysted in the broader social order. As time passes and the sect makes peace with the outside world, it becomes a denomination, i.e., a religious group adapted to the social order and existing peaceably with other religious groups. Finally, the cult, a very loose form of religious organization, grows up where there is a lack of social order and a high degree of atomization of society.

From this brief description of the four types, it is possible to generalize about religious organization in both the complex communal and the associational society. Since the ecclesia is the basic religious association of the complex communal society, it supports the state in protecting the social order even though it may come into conflict with secular power over particular issues. The ecclesia is also a prop of the existing system of social stratification and includes in its affirmations the ideology which justifies the differentiation of society into fixed social classes. The sect, on the other hand, grows up within the communal society as it begins to develop into the associational type. The sect arises in opposition to the ecclesia, but is almost always based on economic and political discontent as well as religious dissatisfaction. In the early stages of change, when the state and the ecclesia form a powerful alliance, the sect can survive only by withdrawing from the world and isolating itself as much as possible.

As the bonds of the complex communal society loosen, and associations begin to spring up in all areas of life, the sects lose their distinguishing characteristics and become denominations. Although Becker states in his article that the denomination is nothing more than a sect which has made its peace with society, we must note that if the ecclesia survives the advent of associational society it too takes on the characteristics of the denomination, since it must adapt itself not only to society as a whole, but also to other religious groups. Since religious diversity is one of the characteristics of the associational society, there is little that the ecclesia can do to retain a monopoly of religious life.

Although the various denominations still affirm the basic value system of the society, each does it in its own way and attracts its own membership on a voluntary basis. Thus in the "pure" associational society one would expect to find denominationalism the predominant form of religious organization, with the addition of a few sects for the ardently religious and a few cults for the extremely individualistic. To some extent this is what we actually find, yet certain aspects of religious life in the modern associational society do not fit this pattern, the most important divergence being the large number of sects and cults. This number cannot possibly be explained as being simply the means by which certain members of our society express individual peculiarities.

The first source to which the continued existence of sects and sectarian denominations can be traced is, of course, the survival of communal elements in our associational society. In rural areas and among urban immigrant groups, religion is not just one of many interests but still a pervading life concern. As the trend toward associationalism continues, this source of sectarian religious organization can be expected gradually to disappear, as has been demonstrated again and again in the historical assimilation of ethnic groups which brought their communal religious organizations with them to this country, only to have them develop into denominations.

The selection by Liston Pope, "Patterns of Denominational Development: Churches and Sects," however, points to a different source of sectarianism which is of considerable importance. (Pope uses a set of religious types similar to those of Becker, except that he uses the term "denomination" more broadly, and employs the word "church" where Becker uses "denomination." In our synopsis of this article we shall continue to use Becker's terminology.) According to Pope, new sects are continually arising in the mill villages of the South. These sects go through the usual steps of becoming denominations, but in so doing they leave behind the mass of their membership and obtain new members. The significant aspect of this transition is that the members lost belong to the lower social classes and those gained belong to the upper and middle classes. Only a few of the old members—and they are the ones who have succeeded economically—remain as the sect becomes a denomination. It is not so much that the sect in its rise in status ejects the old members as that they reject it and form new sects to carry on the old religion. In other words, large segments of the population remain attached

to sectarian behavior because they are unable to move out of their social class. In turn, the class as a whole is alienated from the associational society and its differential valuation of rights and privileges

This analysis is amply borne out in Pope's descriptions of sect and denomination in Gaston County, North Carolina A historical perspective reveals that this refusal of the lower social classes to accept denominationalism is a communal survival itself, for it has been characteristic of all associational societies in the early stages of their development In the past this resistance to denominationalism has been partially broken down by the increasingly open character of the class system With increased upward social mobility, the emotional drive to reject the associational society is less powerful among members of the lower social classes In our day, however, there is scant likelihood of the resistance to denominationalism being broken down in this manner, since our class system is in the process of becoming closed. (See the chapters on social stratification and economic organization) Rather, as the still somewhat communal areas of our society become more associational in character, the role of the sect will be taken over by the labor union If the unions fail to meet the needs of the lower social classes, there is already on the horizon the totalitarian political party which can offer these people a type of status and function that so far they have been unable to find in the associational society

We cannot fully discuss the function of the cult in associational society, but it can be noted that, in contrast with the sect, the cult represents the religious response developed in those areas of the associational society which have tended to become atomized The relatively mild religious activity of the denomination does not adequately relieve the insecurities, frustrations, and loneliness of those persons who are unable to organize their lives around a set of associations Consequently we find these individuals participating in bizarre religious cults which represent the mass aspects of contemporary associational society, whereas denominations and sects are closely allied with the system of social stratification

Although the most important difference between the real and the theoretical pattern of religious organization in modern associational society is the large number of sects and cults relative to the number of denominations, a second deviation from the ideal type should be mentioned, namely, the marginal character of our religious participation Theoretically there are two conceivable ways in which religious activity might be defined by the broad value system of the associational society First, everyone might be expected to participate in *some* form of religious activity, but with latitude permitted in the *kind* of activity Second, where extra-religious means of affirming the ultimate value system existed, society might permit the individual to be either religious or nonreligious There would be denominations for those who chose to be religious and nothing would be said about the others Our society seems to fall about midway between these two forms of associational religious organization Legally very little can be done at present about the nonreligious person Yet there is considerable community pressure to adhere to religious beliefs and to engage in religious activities We find this situation reflected

in the personalities of many people in some respects they no longer feel a need for religion, and yet they have internalized attitudes which continually call them to religious activity

In consequence, the average person is what John F Cuber calls a "marginal church participant" Cuber's article by that title shows that no sharp line can be drawn between those people engaged in organized religious activity and those not so engaged If individuals are formally members of the church, they do not attend with complete regularity, nor do they carry over into other spheres of life the values extolled in religious ritual On the other hand, many nonmembers are likely to attend church more often than some members and are likely to feel "peculiar" if they do not attend. Cuber contends that many people occupy a halfway point between being religious and being nonreligious If the associational society endures it is probable that this state of affairs will change in the direction of people being clearly religious or nonreligious Thus, there will be those interested in religious activity and vitally concerned with the problem of what lies beyond this life, and there will be others not interested in religion for whom this world is enough Provided that they agree on the ultimate value system of the society and that this value system actually permeates the associational society, there is no reason why these people cannot live peaceably with one another To those, however, who see the hope for mankind contained in a return to a complex communal society dominated by a religious association, it must soon become apparent that such hopes cannot be realized in the foreseeable future Although many people are turning to religion in these days of insecurity, more are yielding to the calls of charismatic political leaders (leaders to whom extraordinary qualities are popularly attributed) It is the latter who will establish the communal society of the twentieth century, *if* one is established So long as this situation exists, the immediate future of religion, as of almost all forms of social activity, is bound up in the fate of the associational society

FOUR TYPES OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION *

Howard Becker

(1) The social structure known as the ecclesia is a predominantly conservative body, not in open conflict with the secular aspects of social life, and professedly universal in its aims The phrase "Come out from among them and be ye separate" has no place in the ideology of the genuine ecclesiastic; "Force them to come in" is likely to characterize his thinking The fully developed ecclesia attempts to amal-

* Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, *Systematic Sociology*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York, 1932, pp 624–28. Reprinted by permission of Howard Becker

gamate itself with the state and the dominant classes, and strives to exercise control over every person in the population. Members are *born into* the ecclesia, they do not have to *join* it. It is therefore a social structure somewhat, although remotely, akin to the nation or the state, and is in no sense elective. Membership in an ecclesia is a necessary consequence of birth into a family, folk, or similar structure, and no special requirements condition its privileges

The ecclesia naturally attaches a high importance to the means of grace which it administers, to the system of doctrine which it has formulated, and to the official administration of sacraments and teaching by official clergy It is in a very real sense an educational institution which, when functioning properly, trains its youthful members to conformity in thought and practice, and thus fits them for the exercise of the religious "rights" they have automatically inherited

The ecclesia as an inclusive social structure is closely allied with national and economic interests, as a plurality pattern its very nature commits it to adjustment of its ethics to the ethics of the secular world; it must represent the morality of the respectable majority

Two main varieties of the ecclesia may be distinguished international and national The Catholic Church is the most outstanding example of the first, whereas the Lutheran and Anglican varieties illustrate the second

It should not be supposed, however, that a sharp line can be drawn between the two. Catholicism, nominally international, as a matter of fact is pervaded by a great many minor nationalistic rivalries that sometimes flare out in controversy. French Catholicism, for example, sometimes maintains an attitude of marked aloofness toward the Vatican, just before the Reformation it was so thoroughly detached from the papacy that one could justifiably speak of two Catholicisms. French and "other." When all the necessary qualifications are made, however, there is no doubt that the Catholic ecclesia is much more international in character than is any other.

Lutheranism and Anglicanism, to mention but two varieties of the national ecclesia, are and have been extremely nationalistic, they are types which began to flourish when the isolated sacred structure of the Middle Ages began to give way to the new ethnic cultures born in the Renaissance, soon after the Commercial Revolution shattered the agrarian basis of medieval life

(2) The sect is in marked contrast to the ecclesia In the first place, it is a relatively small plurality pattern that has abandoned the attempt to win the whole world over to its doctrines, the phrase "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate" is followed literally It is readily seen that the sect is an elective body which one must join in order to become a member At bottom, the sect is exclusive in character, appeals to strictly personal trends, and emphasizes ethical demands, it frequently requires some definite type of religious experience as a prerequisite of acceptance. It therefore attaches primary importance to the religious experience of its members prior to their fellowship with the plurality pattern, to the so-called "priesthood of all believers" It frequently rejects an official clergy, preferring to trust for guidance to lay inspiration rather than to theological or liturgical expertness.

In many instances sects are persecuted, but this persecution only reinforces the separatist and semi-ascetic attitude toward the world inherent in the sect as a social structure At times it refuses participation in the government, at times rejects war and other resort to force, and at times

seeks to sever as much as possible the bonds which tie it to the common life of the larger plurality pattern within which it develops In general, the sect prefers isolation to compromise.

Sects exist in great variety at the present time, but they were to be found even before the period of the Reformation, as evidenced by the Cathari, the Waldensians, the Wyckliffites, and others Since the Reformation, of course many such bodies have come into being Anabaptists, Mennonites, Huguenots, Presbyterians, Baptists, and scores of others dot the pages of history.

(3) Denominations are simply sects in an advanced stage of development and adjustment to each other and the secular world The early fervor of the self conscious sect has disappeared, as a general thing, by the second or third generation, and the problem of training the children of the believers almost inevitably causes some compromise to be made in the rigid requirements for membership characteristic of the early phases of sectarian development Thus, for example, the Presbyterians inaugurated the Half Way Covenant in order that children whose "calling and election" was not yet sure could be held within the fold, with the consequence that in time the greater proportion of professing Presbyterians were those who had gone no further than the Half-Way Covenant Similarly, the Baptists have gradually lowered the age of "adult baptism" so that at the present time, in some branches of the denomination, it is possible for children only twelve years old to be baptized Similar instances can be gleaned from the history of almost any sect one cares to name; age inevitably brings compromise.

A further factor in mitigating the mutually exclusive tendency of the sect in Western Christendom is the common opposition of all genuinely Protestant bodies to Roman Catholicism. In the early phases of the Reformation members of rival Protestant sects detested each other just as thoroughly as they detested adherents of "Babylon the Mighty", the burning of Servetus by Calvin is a case in point With the passage of time, however, opposition to the common foe has gradually drawn the Protestant sects, especially of the evangelical variety, into a vague sort of mutual adjustment, it is tacitly agreed that Protestants should engage in polemics with Rome rather than with each other. It should not be forgotten, however, that any denomination is a sect in historical origin and doctrine, and only failure or unwillingness on the part of the clergy to emphasize the grounds of division can obscure this fundamental fact

(4) Tendencies toward religion of a strictly private, personal character — tendencies fairly well marked in the sect — come to full fruition in the cult as here defined The goal of the adherent of this very amorphous, loose-textured, uncondensed type of social structure is not the maintenance of the structure itself, as in the case of the church and sect, but is that of purely personal ecstatic experience, salvation, comfort, and mental or physical healing Instead of *joining* a cult, an act which implies the consent of others, one simply chooses to believe particular theories or follow certain practices, and the consent of other members of the cult is not necessary It therefore verges on the abstract crowd, although its well-marked ideology probably entitles it to a place among the abstract collectivities The religious mystic of the Catholic or Protestant varieties has marked leanings toward the cult, although his mystical practices may be incorporated in the general body of sanctioned behavior.

The sources of emotional satisfaction for the cult believer lie wholly within himself, the injustices or good fortune which

others may suffer affect him, to be sure, but the center of his cosmos is his "I"

Only a highly atomized and essentially secular social order gives rise to extensive cult belief. The frontier cities of Ionia, Athens in the famous fifth century, the cities of the Italian Renaissance, and the urban centers of the modern world have been and are the fertile soil from which new cults arise in rank profusion The cult is the most ephemeral of all types of religious structure — indeed, it is usually so loosely integrated and so transitory that the term "structure" is almost a misnomer.

Cults frequently are much like sects, and it is extremely difficult to draw a line between the two — just as it is difficult to draw a line between the sect and the denomination At the same time, the following cults are fairly well marked types Spiritualism, Theosophy, New Thought, Christian Science, Unity, Buchmanism, and the various pseudo-Hinduisms associated with Swamis and Yogis who consent, for a consideration, to carry their messages to the materialistic Western World.

PATTERNS OF DENOMINATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: CHURCHES AND SECTS *

Liston Pope

In his monumental work, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,* Ernst Troeltsch formulated a distinction, which has become classic, between the Church type and the sect type of religious institution He defined the Church as being, in essence, an objective institution into which an individual is born, and by which, under the direction of duly constituted ecclesiastical officials, he is trained and disciplined for life in the religious community Desiring to cover the whole life of humanity and to be coextensive with society, the Church accepts the secular order and becomes an integral part of existing social structures; it correspondingly becomes especially dependent on the upper classes and overwhelmingly conservative in outlook. It vests authority in religious matters in an established ecclesiastical hierarchy, in the precedents of tradition, and in the sacraments, while it seeks to dominate and to use political institutions for authority in secular matters The sect, on the other hand, was defined by Troeltsch as a small, voluntary community, aiming at the inward perfection and fellowship of its own members, who have joined it by conscious choice Rather than seeking to penetrate or dominate other social spheres, the sect is indifferent, tolerant, or antagonistic toward secular matters, and attempts to be a moral community separate and sufficient unto itself Rather than locating religious authority in the religious institution or its officers, it appeals directly to the Scriptures and to Christ, practicing within itself the priesthood of all believers and criticizing the Church for apostasy from the original

* Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1942, pp 117–40 Reprinted by permission of the publisher

charter of Christianity It is especially connected with the lower classes, working "upwards from below, and not downwards from above" [1]

In numerous respects beyond those already observed, wide variance is discernible between denominations in Gaston County, and a line of division somewhat akin to that of Troeltsch is possible if indices are formulated more precisely, and if it is recognized from the outset that classification of any particular denomination is relative in character In order to embrace the manifold character of religious culture, indices of comparison and classification must be of several types — economic, sociological, psychological, and doctrinal — without the assumption that any one type of index is purely secondary and completely determined by the others

Before proceeding to formulation of indices and to classification of denominations, it is desirable to define more clearly the character of relations between sect and Church, summarizing the general result reached from a comparative study of all the denominations represented in Gaston County Troeltsch appears to have dealt with relations between his two types in static terms, for the most part, he explicitly denied that a sect is an undeveloped expression of the Church, and assumed that it is an independent sociological type which may or may not stand in process of transition away from sectarianism [2] Changes in religious institutions in Gaston County since 1880, however, indicate that the relation between the Church type and the sect type is to be interpreted, broadly, in dynamic terms. Though many other factors underlie its emergence, the sect arises as a schism from a parent ecclesiastical body, either a Church or a previous sect It then becomes a distinct and independent type of religious organization but moves, if it survives, increasingly toward the Church type

A number of factors are associated with this transformation as dynamic agents On the face of it, the transition from sect to Church appears to lie parallel with a class movement The poorest mill workers have afforded the invariable starting point of sects in Gaston County, but as a new sect has passed toward churchly status the percentage of mill workers in its membership has correspondingly decreased, roughly, the degree to which any denomination is churchly at a given moment varies inversely with the percentage of its membership which is composed of mill workers Deeper analysis, however, leaves little evidence that the transition is a class movement in the sense that changes in a sect depend upon changes in the economic class, as a class, with which it is especially associated Rather, some process such as the following appears to take place A sect, as it gains adherents and the promise of success, begins to reach out toward greater influence in society, whatever the roots of its ambition may be — evangelistic fervor, denominational rivalry, ministerial desire for greater income and influence, the cultural vindication of its peculiar faith, or what not In the process it accommodates gradually to the culture it is attempting to conquer, and thereby loses influence over those relatively estranged from that culture It counts this loss a gain as its own standards shift and as it attracts an increasing number of persons who enjoy the cultural and economic privileges of the society Though at any

[1] Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (trans by Olive Wyon New York 1931), I, 331–336 Cf H Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York, 1929), pp 17–21, for summary of Troeltsch's distinction, with special reference, as the title suggests, to the problems of denominational differentiation

[2] Troeltsch, *op. cit.*, I, 338.

[3] Cf Niebuhr, *op cit*, pp 19–21

given moment of transition the rising sect is associated especially with one economic group, it does not necessarily carry that group as it moves on There is no indication that classes rise as classes but there is proof that denominations do. Perhaps emphasis by earlier sects on the Calvinistic virtues of industry, frugality, and the like resulted in making their practitioners wealthy, as is often averred concerning the Methodists of England Thus far, however, sectarian ascetism and moral discipline have not caused a majority of the members of any religious sect in Gaston County to ascend appreciably in the economic scale, to the contrary, the teachings of the sects have often been accessory to keeping members in their previous social and economic station. Emphasis on personal virtues produces more efficient workers, it does not necessarily produce owners and managers of the economic system

As the new sect reaches out for conquest of society, its original identification with those existing at the edges of society is soon modified The change does not follow an improvement of economic status in its membership as a whole, but is consequent on the growing economic opulence of a small minority of its membership. A few members of any sect are likely to prosper, partly because of personal qualities (not necessarily virtues), but more often because of loose play in the economic organization In the vernacular, a few members "get the breaks" Becoming more affluent and "responsible," they either desert their sect as their economic status improves or else help to remold it in keeping with their newer position They are the more easily able to influence the life of an institution after they have attained comparative economic wealth because a struggling sectarian group stands in need of many things money can buy

A denomination inclines to move and to settle down with its few leaders who become community leaders also, leaving behind the masses of its members and of society. Its position on the scale of transition from sect to Church follows closely after the economic fortunes of its more influential members, its religious character changes as the economic status of its leaders improves From reflecting the needs of a large group of people, it comes to sanction the position of its more respectable members simply because their position, sanctioned also by the whole weight of existing culture, enables them to control the particular religious institution. As time goes on, the emerging Church either raises up its membership from childhood, finds new members from cultural groups to which its fresh but moderate enthusiasm appeals, or else declines in membership and influence It cannot go back to sect form because the unique social naiveté and pristine enthusiasm are irrevocably lost Movement on the scale between sect and Church is, with minor exceptions, in one direction only [4] A sect may arise through schism from a Church but not through the decline or reconstitution of a Church, according to the evidence available here

To be sure, the sect is not always clearly aware that it is striving to gain larger control over its cultural environment and that in so doing it modifies its peculiar religious character More extensive contact with society is forced upon it, however, by the very necessities of institutional existence No institution, however embryonic in form (and the newer sects are closely integrated from the outset), can escape social responsibilities, as contrasted with sheer religious responsibilities Children are born to members of the sect, and their

[4] This does not mean that the movement consists in successive attainment of a series of fixed stages, without possibility for omission of steps or for retrogression at certain points No neat unilinear pattern is intended here, even by inference.

relation to the religious contract must be defined, Professor Niebuhr has pointed out that "by its very nature the sectarian type of organization is valid only for one generation"[5] It frequently is not preserved inviolate for even one generation[6] From the outset there are relatives — careless husbands, aged mothers — who are not signatories to the contract, but for whose religious welfare (especially if a funeral must be held) the new sect has a derived, but inescapable, responsibility The conventicle becomes a parish almost immediately, and wider social bonds intersect and relax the tautness of religious bonds

Further, the nature of the religious impulse renders it unable to sustain an institution on purely religious grounds, any more than the sex impulse alone could sustain the family institution The first fine fervor associated with the appearance of sects begins to fade, and to be replaced by reasoned faith and institutional structures The religious experience is not synonymous with life on the earth, and imperatives arising from mundane relations reshape perspectives and condition religious association as time goes on. All social pressure is against immoderate deviation from conventional religious patterns, and the members of a sect, who cannot spend all their time in association solely with each other, lose ardor under its restraining influence

The preservation of association despite diminution of enthusiasm demands horizontal organization. A social institution encysts the institution of Grace Nightly prayer meetings in a parlor — or anywhere, because place does not matter — lead, after a few months, to the renting of a hall or the erection of a cheap church. Then songbooks and a piano must be bought, and responsibility for the care and use of the building and program must be specified, an official hierarchy begins to develop In contrast with other churches, the building is nothing to be proud of and so a part-time preacher is appointed "to build up the church," and esoteric monopoly of religious joy is extended into an evangelistic program The new group begins to compare itself with other religious groups, and to regard others as rivals, especially those which compete with it in terms of its own peculiar religious doctrines Rivalry between sects ensues, and each seeks to outdistance the others — no longer simply in religious possessions but in terms that the entire society accepts and can understand, which are, by definition, qualities that characterize a Church rather than a sect

The process of transition from sect to Church can be described in evolutionary terms, if it is clearly affirmed that the use of such terms constitutes a parable rather than designation of religious institutions as organisms New variations occur in the religious realm Against necessities inherent in their social environment, they compete with each other As they adapt, they survive and grow strong and stable, if conditions change, they either adapt or decline All the while, unless the social environment is surfeited with religious institutions, new variations are occurring and old churches are declining, or else surviving in sheltered cultural pockets The rate of infant mortality is high among the new variations, but they continue to occur so long as the Church is not completely coextensive with culture in fact as well as theory.

Specific aspects of the movement from sect to Church are more tangible and illuminating than general description After close observation of religious institutions

[5] Niebuhr, *op cit*, p 19

[6] Of the 34 sect groups on observation of which this generalization is based, all are less than forty years old and 21 are less than ten years old All these latter show clear symptoms, already, of transition toward Church status

of all types, the following scale has been worked out to indicate the various facets of this transition

1. *From* membership composed chiefly of the propertyless *to* membership composed of property owners

2 *From* economic poverty *to* economic wealth, as disclosed especially in the value of church property and the salary paid to ministers

3 *From* the cultural periphery *toward* the cultural center of the community

4 *From* renunciation of prevailing culture and social organization or indifference to it, *to* affirmation of prevailing culture and social organization

5 *From* self centered (or personal) religion *to* culture centered religion, from "experience" to a social institution

6 *From* noncooperation, or positive ridicule, toward established religious institutions *to* cooperations with the established churches of the community

7 *From* suspicion of rival sects *to* disdain or pity for all sects

8 *From* a moral community excluding unworthy members *to* a social institution embracing all who are socially compatible within it

9 *From* an unspecialized, unprofessionalized, part time ministry *to* a specialized, professional, full time ministry

10 *From* a psychology of persecution *to* a psychology of success and dominance

11 *From* voluntary confessional bases of membership *to* ritual or social prerequisites only (such as a certificate of previous membership in another respected denomination, or training in an educational process established by the denomination itself)

12 *From* principal concern with adult membership *to* equal concern for children of members

13 *From* emphasis on evangelism and conversion *to* emphasis on religious education

14 *From* stress on a future in the next world *to* primary interest in a future in this world — a future for the institution, for its members, and for their children, *from* emphasis on death *to* emphasis on successful earthly life.

15 *From* adherence to strict Biblical standards, such as tithing or nonresistance *to* acceptance of general cultural standards as a practical definition of religious obligation

16 *From* a high degree of congregational participation in the services and administration of the religious group *to* delegation of responsibility to a comparatively small percentage of the membership

17 *From* fervor in worship services *to* restraint, *from* positive action *to* passive listening.

18 *From* a comparatively large number of special religious services *to* a program of regular services at stated intervals [7]

19 *From* reliance on spontaneous leadings of the Spirit' in religious services and administration *to* a fixed order of worship and of administrative procedure

20 *From* the use of hymns resembling contemporary folk music *to* the use of slower, more stately hymns coming out of more remote liturgical tradition

21 *From* emphasis on religion in the home *to* delegation of responsibility for religion to church officials and organizations

Classified in terms of the indices contained in this scale denominations represented in Gaston County fall as follows in a series ranging from sect type to Church type Free Will Baptist Holiness, Pentecostal Holiness, Church of God, Free Will

[7] That is, participation in religious activities becomes more and more compartmentalized and institutionalized as the denomination trends toward Church status and thereby takes a relative place in the prevailing culture rather than continues to assume hegemony over large spheres of time and interest

Baptist, independent tabernacles, Wesleyan Methodist, Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Protestant Episcopal, Roman Catholic A brief review of salient particularities of these denominations will illumine further the process of transition from sect to Church, and the relation of economic and religious factors thereto.

CHURCHES

The Protestant Episcopal and Roman Catholic churches have never gained any significant following in Gaston County, despite the fact that both have been active there for about seventy years Though present in the county since 1842, and though they have maintained a fairly large monastery and abbey there since 1884, the Roman Catholics have made little headway among natives, and their church membership in 1939, a total of 396 white and 173 colored members, was only 007 per cent of the total population They have reached almost no mill workers, chiefly because they have not adapted themselves to the mill village system Their unwillingness to compromise fully on the race question has also handicapped them, mill workers frequently say, with a scornful chuckle, "Catholics use the same church for white people and niggers" Both the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Episcopal churches have been impeded by the ethnic backgrounds of the early settlers (almost entirely Scotch and German), reaction in colonial years against ecclesiastical hierarchies, and the like Neither has come into contact with a sufficiently large segment of the population to permit generalizations concerning its adaptation to economic change, or its movement along the sect-Church scale Both are distinctly uptown in type, however, and their theory and type of organization place them at the other extreme from minority groups such as the Church of God.

Of the major denominations in the county, the Lutherans and Presbyterians most nearly represent the Church type Each is a Church in terms of every index listed above, though the process of transition in some instances is less complete than in others There is doubt, for example, concerning the proximity of the Lutheran churches to the cultural center of the community, in membership and practice, they are associated more closely with rural traditions than with the new industrialism Each denomination retains, moreover, particular traits that appear to be survivals of earlier sect practices, evidences of transition away from sectarianism are clearly discernible in the brief period since 1880 In 1880 and 1890 the Lutheran churches listed "Expulsions" as an item on which individual churches should report to the Synod (though none were reported in churches in Gaston County for those years), indicating that they still thought of themselves as exclusive moral communities Presbyterian churches have continued to emphasize tithing down to the present, and their women's auxiliaries stress daily reading of the Bible, membership in intercessory prayer groups, and family worship in the home [8]

Despite the survival of occasional sect traits, the Lutheran and Presbyterian denominations in the county have been largely of the Church type throughout the period covered in this study The impression one gets from reading the Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States from 1863 to 1938 is that of consistency throughout the period Put another way, it is that of conservatism. Committees are

[8] Of 1,818 members of the auxiliaries in 1938, 630 were reported as daily Bible readers, 477 were members of intercessory prayer groups, 206 reported family worship in the home, and 418 practiced tithing

largely the same, attitudes expressed in reports are almost unvarying, statistical tables still regard the same items as worth recording. The scope of the church has increased: it reaches more people and spends more money, but in essence is much the same. Instead of writing "3½ o'clock" the Minutes now write "3 30 o'clock"; other modernization is not greatly in evidence The same conservatism and sense of tradition prevail among Presbyterians in Gaston County; older persons among them "look down on" Methodists and Baptists much as the latter snub the Church of God. Similar conclusions may be drawn for the Lutheran churches. Lutheran ministers in the county wear pulpit gowns and use the Common Service, and seem to the suspicious mill workers to be pretty close to the Pope.

The Methodist and Baptist denominations are still in transition from sect to Church, with the former much nearer Church status than the latter. Of the twenty-one indices listed above, the Methodists in 1880 were nearer the sect type in ten of them (Nos 5, 7, 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21) Except in continuing emphasis on personal religion and considerable suspicion of rival sects, they are now nearer to the Church type in terms of each index In 1880 the Baptists were sectarian in every particular, in 1939 the denomination approached Church status in seven indices (Nos. 2, 3, 9, 12, 16, 19, 21), remained a sect in eight (Nos. 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 20), and was confused in its position on the remaining six Remnants of sectarian status appear in several significant respects In 1938, 33 of the 37 Baptist churches reported weekly prayer meetings, and only 3 of them failed to have at least one revival meeting during the year. Exclusions from membership in that year totaled 118, of a total of 12,712 members. Several Baptist churches continue to place considerable emphasis on tithing by their members. As the denomination has grown in wealth and membership, however, it has reached out after cultural conquest, and in doing so has accommodated its own traditions at many points to the general culture. It has changed to greater degree than any denomination in the county during the last six decades

SECTS

The rise of new religious sects in the last twenty years, and especially in the last ten, has been one of the most significant aspects in the development of religious institutions in Gaston County, as in the United States Successive invasions by esoteric cults have seriously modified the influence of Methodist and Baptist churches *over the mill workers Generically, the* newer sects are often lumped together as "Holy Rollers," but this designation has been specifically repudiated by several of them In their rise they illustrate the influence of economic conditions on the genesis and growth of religious institutions, and the methods by which religious groups often tend, in their formative stages, to transvalue economic realities A fairly broad consideration of them is necessary if one is to see economic and religious factors in perspective

The first notable invasion of the mill villages by newer sects occurred in the first decade of this century, when the Wesleyan Methodists established six churches in the county, all of them among the mill workers. The two cardinal doctrines of this sect, regeneration (conversion) and sanctification ("cleansing of the heart and empowering for service") are typical of the theological bases of most sect groups The movement was strongly sectarian in 1910 in terms of all the twenty-one indices listed above. More recently it has moved rapidly toward Church status, es-

pecially in respect to cooperation with older denominations, comparative growth of wealth, and increasing emphasis upon an educated ministry In six other respects its position at the moment is confused (Nos. 1, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15), but the denomination is clearly moving away from extreme sectarianism Whereas most of its membership came through "conversion" thirty years ago, about 80 per cent of it now comes into the church through training in the Sunday School, and the number of revival meetings held annually is decreasing In the 1920's one of its five churches in Gaston County definitely changed from a mill church to an uptown church, having come to include in its membership a cotton mill superintendent, a number of small merchants and mechanics, and other persons comprising a nucleus of uptown people, who increasingly "set the tone" for this particular church and changed its fundamental character

The denomination as a whole, however, still belongs definitely in the sect classification Of 300 members in Gaston County in 1938, a total of 22 were expelled, and 171 were reported as habitual tithers Major sins in the eyes of ministers and members consist of Sabbath desecration, drinking, and participation in such social amusements as swimming at pools, dancing, and movies. Religious services are more restrained than those of the Church of God, less so than Baptist services Testimony meetings—a regular mark of the emphasis of sects on "personal experience"—are still held, but have usually been relegated to the Wednesday evening service Sectarian expressions and ideas crop out in the testimonies offered. For example

"I am glad my sins are under the blood ."

"I love the Lord; pray for me ."

"I want to live like Jeremiah [*sic*] and the men on the wall, working as though it all depended on them, but praying as though it all depended on God ."

"Big preachers and big professors in the seminaries are trying to stop God's work How? By trying to take away the divinity of Jesus Christ But God ain't a-goin' to stand for it How's He goin' to stop it? By the Second Comin' of Christ, a-settin' on a cloud"[9]

A large number of isolated sectarian groups, affiliated with no denomination or constituting the sole representative of a denomination in the county, have appeared since 1920, and especially since 1930, with thirteen of them surviving in 1939 The diversity of their names indicates their variety the Van Dyke Auditorium, the Church of God Undenominational, the Gastonia Gospel Tabernacle, the Dallas House of God Tabernacle, the Church of the Nazarene, the Tomlinson Church of God Often these highly atomistic religious units arise from the promotional activities of an individual minister who, dissatisfied with his status in his denomination or expelled from it, has organized an independent group of his own The most significant and successful religious entrepreneur of this type has built a rude tabernacle in Gastonia and attracts a wide following among the mill villagers In ideas and methods he resembles the various sectarian movements, but is also close to the type of the evangelist often imported by Methodist and Baptist churches He represents, therefore, a transitional link between sectarian and churchly levels Many people in Gastonia, and especially the uptown ministers, are skeptical of his

[9] These particular testimonials were heard in a service in an uptown Wesleyan Methodist Church, along with a dignified and fairly scholarly sermon by the minister on the objectivity of Grace!

sincerity; they point out that his devotion to religion has brought him a beautiful home on one of the town's best residential streets, and more recently, a luxurious Packard limousine His tabernacle, nevertheless, is well filled with mill workers whenever he preaches Similar congregations thrive in nearly every town in the county, attesting to the fact that churches of the older denominations are not affording adequate satisfaction to large numbers of the people

The more significant sectarian movements in the county have come under denominational rather than individual leadership A large number of new denominations appeared shortly after 1900, often originating in the mountainous regions of North Carolina and Tennessee, and spread quickly through the rising mill towns A correspondent from one of the mill villages in Gaston County complained in the *Gastonia Gazette* in 1910 of "tongue exhorting" in his village by persons "claiming that they are possessed of gifts of the Holy Ghost," and thereby helping to "lead men's wives astray" Later in the same year he denounced the so-called "holy dance," attributing all such manifestations to "hypnotism" and, therefore, to "demonism"[10] Subsequently the Pentecostal Holiness Church, the Church of God (Cleveland branch),[11] the Free-Will Baptist Church, and the Free-Will Baptist Holiness Church have each established a number of churches in the county

[10] *Gastonia Gazette* correspondence from Arlington Mill, April 15, December 6, 1910

[11] At least a dozen small denominations in America appropriate to themselves, in various forms, this name Church of God, Church of God (Apostolic) Church of God is Organized by Christ, Church of God in North America, Church of the Living God, Churches of God Holiness, Churches of God in Christ, Church of God (undenominational), Tomlinson Church of God, Original Church of God (which was an offshoot of another Church of God), etc See Elmer T Clark, *The Small Sects in America* (Nashville, 1937)

During the last decade the growth of these groups has been especially rapid, and has provided the most noteworthy aspect of religious development Since 1920 the older denominations have organized only 20 new churches, while the newer sects have organized 26, of which 21 have been established since 1930 During the same period the older denominations have abandoned 12 churches, while the newer sects have abandoned none Without exception, the churches established by these sectarian groups in Gaston County have been exclusively mill churches Growth in membership, though exact figures are not available,[12] has been as rapid in the last two decades as growth in number of churches, from less than 500 members in 1920, the total had grown to nearly 4,000 in 1939 Membership per church unit varies from 8 to 275, with the median at about 100, in addition to the actual membership, however, there is always a large following of persons not technically attached

A composite and impressionistic picture of the kind of religious service held by extreme sectarian groups may help to lay bare the roots from which they spring

"One traverses a grassless, rutted yard, climbs precarious 2 x 6 steps into a long, bare room filled with crude pews, and takes a seat in the Church of God It is Sunday night, and the building is filled to overflowing, with about a thousand people present Many stand in the doors or in the front yard of the church, including a large group of young men watching the girls go in and out An ice cream vendor has placed his portable refrigerator near the church door, and is doing a thriving business About 65 per cent of those present are women between the ages of

[12] A minor mark of sectarian status seems to be indifference toward keeping ecclesiastical records One of the sects explicitly refuses to keep a membership roll

fourteen and fifty-five, many of whom have sleeping babies in their laps The atmosphere is expectant and informal, members of the congregation move about at will, and talk in any tone of voice that suits their fancy

"A crude pulpit, a piano, and a section of pews for the choir are placed at the far end of the oblong building Back of the pulpit to the left is a homemade board on which to register weekly attendance, beneath the board, in sprawling letters, the question

HOW WILL YOUR
REPORT IN HEAVEN BE

To the right of the pulpit is another sign

GOD IS ABLE

A band, including three stringed instruments and a saxophone, plays occasional music

'The service begins at eight o'clock or thereabouts Rather, the actions of the congregation become more intense and concerted in character, there is almost nothing by way of formal announcement The choir, in cooperation with the pastor, breaks into a rhythmic hymn, and the congregation follows suit The hymn has an interminable number of stanzas, and a refrain, reminiscent of mountain ballads both in music and in narrative form The hymn looks toward a narrative climax, and the excitement of the congregation increases as the singing proceeds The stanzas are punctuated with loud shouts of 'Hallelujah,' 'Thank you, Jesus,' 'Glory,' and the rhythmic clapping of hands and tapping of feet Almost immediately, various members of the congregation begin to 'get the Holy Ghost' (as a teen-age boy awesomely remarks) One young woman leaves the front row of the choir and jerks about the pulpit, with motions so disconnected as to seem involuntary, weird A man's head trembles violently from side to side Another man, tieless and red-faced, laughs boomingly at odd moments, in a laugh resembling that of intoxication

"Half a dozen songs follow in succession Then comes a prayer, with everybody kneeling on the floor and praying aloud at the same time, each in his own way Some mutter with occasional shouts, others chant, with frequent bendings backward and forward, the volume of sound rises and falls, without unified pattern or group concentration The pastor's voice booms out occasionally above all the others Then, as if by a prearranged but unobservable signal, the prayer abruptly ends, the onlooker is amazed to see emerging from the confusion a concerted return to a sitting position The cacophony of prayer is ended as suddenly as it began

'Then the pastor reads 'the Scripture,' after confessing that he 'ain't had no time to study today,' and after attempting to induce a layman in the congregation to 'say something'—without avail, because the layman confesses that he 'ain't had no time to study neither' and insists, 'you go right ahead, brother' Reluctantly the pastor begins to read, expluning each verse with amazing exegesis and equally amazing insight Each verse becomes the subject for a homily, and the reader works up to a climax in its exposition—a climax reflected in increase of rhythmic motions and hortatory shouts from members of the congregation Having finished the Scripture lesson, the preacher takes up a collection, counts it, announces that he has to have 'a little more,' and runs around in the congregation to garner proffered contributions, acknowledging each with a receipt 'God bless you, brother,' and finally emptying the collection plate into his pocket

"Then the service moves toward a climax, the taking of the collection has been an emotional interlude The preacher be-

gins a sermon; more precisely, he enunciates verbal symbols that arouse immediate response from the congregation Such motifs play through his shoutings as 'sanctification,' 'the Second Coming,' 'the world despises and misunderstands and lies about the Church of God,' 'Jesus can heal your body and soul,' 'Believe the Word,' 'follow the knee-route' The Church of God is depicted as a remnant of those who have escaped from the 'coldness' of the Methodist and Baptist churches Lay preaching is urged, and personal evangelistic work Attention is called to a number of prayer meetings to be held at various houses during the subsequent week, and to persons for whom prayer is desired — especially the family of a four-year-old girl who has just died, because 'they can't hardly get over it'

"Then there is a testimony meeting in which a large number of the more faithful testify to their personal experience and joy in religion, some mutteringly, some loudly, fervidly One woman defends her right to wear long sleeved, high-necked dresses in the summer time, because 'the Spirit told me to' Nearly all say that they are proud to speak for Christ, and not ashamed to speak out for their Master in church. The man who has been indulging the intoxicated laugh defends his right to laugh in church, saying that his religion makes him feel good all over and is not like the stiff coldness of the Methodist church Recurring phrases appear in the testimonies 'I'm glad I got over bein' too proud to be a Holiness and get all there was of the Holy Ghost', 'I'm a better wife and I've got a better husband because I joined the Church of God', 'the Baptists are all right, but I wanted more of the Lord than they had' Several testify to marvelous cures of physical illness during the past week, through prayer and the 'laying on of hands.'

"All the while waves of ecstatic rhythm have been sweeping over the congregation, with the actions of the preacher setting the pace There are patterns to the rhythmic actions running around the pulpit, holding trembling hands to the sky, very fast clogging of the feet, swinging the arms in sharp, staccato motions. One girl leaps from her seat as though struck by an electric shock, races four times around the aisles of the church, screaming 'O God . . . do Jesus O God . . glory, glory, glory give me more . . . more . . . glory, glory, glory'; falling over backward with hands outstretched, her whole body quivering and rhythmically jerking, she collapses at last in a dull heap on the floor, and stays there in comatose condition for several minutes Others rise and shout at the top of their lungs for five minutes, or bang on something in staccato rhythm The same persons respond again and again, with perhaps seventy-five individuals represented Each responds with an individual pattern of motions, but all motions revolve around a few general types The motions appear to have been culturally conditioned, whether immediately conditioned by the agent or not One wonders if some form of mass hypnotism is at work.

"About ten o'clock the pastor calls for sinners to come to the front and kneel around the altar (constructed of a bench quickly placed before the pulpit) About ten come, including one five-year-old boy A hundred members of the congregation gather about, and a tremendous tumult ensues as they attempt to 'pray and shout the sinners through,' interspersed with wild demonstrations of joy as one is 'saved'

"It is nearly 11 P M, but one stays and wonders They cry out, and cry, 'they are drunken, but not with wine, they stagger but not with strong drink . . .'"[18]

[18] Cf Isaiah 29 9

This description points to several factors explanatory of the emergence of the newer sects. A number of theories have been advanced to account for their appearance. One has made transiency the fundamental factor, holding that there is a positive correlation between instability of residence and membership in the newer sects.[14] This explanation, if true, would only push the investigation deeper, and call for an explanation of transiency. It does not appear to be valid in the first place, a close study of the entire membership of one sect group in Gastonia revealed that 98 per cent of its members had been living in the community for more than five years. Another theory points to ignorance as the fundamental basis, but this judgment is based on an external standard and contributes little to understanding. Still another accounts for the rise of sects in terms of the failure of older churches to meet the religious needs of all groups in the population, and this theory is of unquestionable merit. The Church of God and similar groups consist chiefly of the religiously disgruntled—of those who have fallen out or been dissatisfied in older churches. At least 80 per cent of the members of such groups had previously belonged to established churches in their communities,[15] Baptist churches for the most part.[16] A recurring note in sectarian services condemns the coldness of the older churches, and sect preachers draw much of their support from ridiculing the exclusive, proud, "stuck-up" character of older religious institutions.

A recent interpretation, combining several of the factors enumerated above, attributes most of the phenomena of the newer sects to the "culture shock" involved in transition from a rural to an urban setting.[17] The older urban churches symbolize to the new migrant to the city his exclusion from urban life, and he turns to the "new" churches, which seem to represent defense of his former standards and modes of behavior. This theory is plausible but inadequate for explanation of the growth of sects in small villages and rural areas in other sections of the South, and is in error in assuming that the newer sects uniquely preserve traits of rural religion.

It has been popular more recently to explain emergence of sects primarily in terms of underlying economic conditions. Ordinarily the poorest strata of the community are attracted into membership, and it is urged that an otherworldly emphasis in the newer sects affords compensation for poverty and transcendence of poor estate. The phenomenal rate of growth during the recent depression argues in favor of a theory of this sort, as economic conditions grew worse, newer sects flourished increasingly.[18]

Another credible diagnosis ascribes psychological deficiencies to most members of the newer sects. Frenetic religious services represent release from psychological repression, it is said, fulfilling a need for self-expression and for identification of one's self with a greater power. Life in a mill village is monotonous and dull, production processes in the mills are largely

[14] E. R. Hartz, "Social Problems in a North Carolina Parish" (A.M. thesis, Duke University, 1938), pp. 132, 136.

[15] Interviews with three ministers of the Church of God, Gastonia, July 27, 1939.

[16] Not only because of the numerical preponderance of the Baptists in the county but also because most of the newer sects practice baptism by immersion, and thus appeal especially to persons habituated to the Baptist faith.

[17] John B. Holt, "Holiness Religion: Cultural Shock and Social Reorganization," in *American Sociological Review*, V, 740-747 (October, 1940). Cf. Grace G. Lesbourne, "Urban Adjustments of Migrants from the Southern Appalachian Plateaus," in *Social Forces*, December, 1937.

[18] Cf. the simple but brilliant analysis contained in A. T. Boisen, "Religion and Hard Times," *Social Action*, March 15, 1939.

mechanical in character, and the worker has little opportunity for choice as to any of the basic factors that control his daily life. The new cults are notably lay movements, and the entire membership participates in most of the services and activities of a particular group The unusually high percentage of women who belong and who appear to be the most active participants in semihysterical religious practices is also significant, of the members of one Church of God in Gaston County, 57 per cent were women, almost all of whom were between the ages of seventeen and fifty-four A psychologist observing the religious ceremonies of the Church of God might conclude that the sex factor is crucial in explanation Certainly members of these groups are widely accused of being immoral, and a considerable degree of sexual laxity is undoubtedly a concomitant of their services An uptown boy explained, standing outside a Church of God while a service was in progress "It'll get hot in there pretty soon A lot of women come over here, which is why all the boys are hanging around I got started out late tonight and all the dates are taken, so I have to take what I can get Mill girls are the best looking girls nowadays anyhow" Rhythmic music, supported by stringed instruments and saxophones, tendencies toward exhibitionism, and injunctions to "let yourself go" for "possession by the Spirit" are surcharged with sex stimulation.

Ministers of the emerging denominations insist that the explanation of rapid growth in their adherents must be pitched completely on the religious plane They argue that their rigid teachings challenge people and force them to invest so much in money and in devotion that they necessarily remain interested and become propagandists "People are gettin' disgusted with professional religion," one of them said, "and demandin' to get results in their religion — so that's why they come to us" They hasten to add that the devotion of the ministers themselves, in contrast with the professional attitudes of ministers of the older denominations, is of great importance The type of preacher associated with the sect groups does help to explain their rapid growth, though it does not explain their appearance Many of the preachers are mill workers who preach as an avocation They have very little education — often no more than completion of the fourth grade in the public schools, plus a few weeks of training in a Bible school maintained by their denomination [19] They are, therefore, much closer to the mill workers than ministers of the older denominations They also work for smaller compensation, living at the level of the mill workers One sect urges its churches to pay their pastors at least $12 50 a week aside from rent, that "they may wield a better influence in their communities" — the desire to conquer culture is making itself felt Another sect limits the salary of its ministers to $200 a month "and expenses", it is doubtful that many receive this amount Most of the ministers tithe rigorously, along with their members, one denomination supervises ministerial fidelity in this respect by providing "that all members of the Conference pay at least 75 per cent of their Ministerial tithes into the Conference Treasury or else give a satisfactory reason for not doing so before their character shall be passed" [20]

[19] Preparation in the eyes of God, rather than the schools of men, is emphasized one sect carries this emphasis to the point of requiring that "the wife of the Applicant for Bishop license must have the Holy Ghost" *Minutes of the Thirty Second Annual Assembly of the Church of God 1937*, p 148

[20] *Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Western North Carolina Annual Conference of the Pentecostal Holiness Church, 1939*, p 19 Each minister's character must be reviewed and approved annually before he is approved for reappointment to a pastoral charge

All these interpretations of the rise and growth of the sects have in them valid elements, and an adequate explanation cannot afford to ignore any of them They all are gathered up in the general statement that such groups thrive wherever a considerable portion of the population exists on the periphery of culture as organized, whether the index used be that of education, economic status, possibilities for psychological satisfaction, or religious organization Members of the newer religions do not belong anywhere — and so they belong, and wholeheartedly, to the one type of institution which deigns to notice them A considerable percentage of mill workers stand on the outer fringes of their communities, and they provide the invariable starting point of sect movements [21] The rapidity of growth of the sects is a rough indication of the degree to which mill workers recognize their cultural alienation

The sects substitute religious status for social status, a fact which may help to account for their emphasis on varying degrees of Grace This emphasis, indeed, forms their most distinctive theological tenet As over against the lack of religious differentiation within older denominations, the newer sects divide their members, and people in general, into several religious classifications saved, sanctified, baptized with the Holy Ghost, baptized with water, recipient of the first, second, or third blessing and the like What matters it, then, if a Methodist has more money but has never been baptized with the Holy Ghost? As over against segregation from the community, the newer sects affirm separation from the world, in the face of exclusion on educational, economic, and religious grounds, they affirm exclusion from their own fellowship of those who engage in mixed bathing, dancing, card playing, bobbing the hair, gambling, baseball, county fairs, drinking, and using tobacco [22] Because they have no jewelry to wear, they make refusal to wear jewelry, including wedding rings, a religious requirement They transmute poverty into a symptom of Grace Having no money, they redeem their economic status by rigid tithing of the small income they do possess, and thus far surpass members of churches of any other type or denomination in per capita contributions, despite the fact that they stand at the bottom of the economic scale Many of them cannot take baths at will, because of lack of facilities, but they can practice the washing of the feet of the saints, and rejoice thereby at their superiority to older denominations which have come to regard such practices as uncouth and unesthetic Excluded from secular society they set up a religious society of their own, in which standards of

[21] In other regions, sharecroppers are especially susceptible to this variety of religious program because they occupy in a plantation economy much the same status as mill workers hold in an industrial economy Similar religious movements, bearing such names as "The Fire-Baptized Holiness Church," flourish among Negroes, a wave of "Holiness religion" was sweeping over the colored population of Gastonia in the summer of 1939

[22] The Church of God stipulates "All members who appear in public exposing their upper limbs above the elbow or any part of the lower limbs being nude are dressing unmodest and not according to Scripture, and that where violation of this recommendation exists offending parties be called in question and dealt with except in factories where certain uniform dress is required by their employers However, this order does not apply to children We further recommend that it shall be left to the pastor and his councillors to decide when in their judgment the offending person is a child" (*Minutes of the Thirty-Second Annual Assembly of the Church of God, 1937*, p 135 Cf *Minutes of the Twenty-Second Session of the Western North Carolina Annual Conference of the Pentecostal Holiness Church, 1937*, p 18) This sect accepts female ministers but stipulates that a woman who has bobbed her hair shall be advised to cease her activities as a minister until her hair has had time to grow out again (*loc cit*, p 149)

membership are more rigid than those of the general culture that has ignored them.[28] The inspired Scriptures, rather than general cultural standards, provide the charter of their new community, without exception, the new churches accept the Bible as their sole and adequate authority (in theory), and interpret it with direct literalness

Not all mill workers, of course, belong to sectarian groups, there are class distinctions among the mill workers themselves — distinctions clearly reflected in religious affiliation Presbyterian workers feel superior to those belonging to the Methodist and Baptist churches, while members of the latter two denominations regard themselves as definitely higher in the social scale than Wesleyan Methodists All, in turn, despise the Church of God and deprecate the social status of its members The attitude of a typical Presbyterian or Lutheran toward the Church of God is different, however, from that of a Methodist or Baptist. The former regard the sect movements with disdain and are often rather happy to see the "upstart" Methodists and Baptists suffering discomfiture at the hands of new rivals only slightly below them in the religious hierarchy As a Presbyterian minister put it, "the Methodists and Baptists used to care for the ignorant, the Holy Rollers do now, and the Methodists and Baptists are left floundering, wondering what to do" A Lutheran minister expressed pity for the newer symptoms of religious errancy:

"The Church of God, Holy Rollers, etc., do not give our people what they ought to have Ignorance and itch will eat up anything Those preachers are so ignorant they cannot even pronounce correctly the names in the Holy Word I heard one of them call Mesopotamia 'Mes-o-pot-i-ma.' Of course, his congregation did not know the difference."

Rather than regard their new and dangerous rivals as a thoroughbred might survey a dirty mongrel pup, the Methodists and Baptists look on them with mingled fear and contempt, with ridicule rather than pity "They practice," said one Methodist minister, "the religion of Hurrah and Take-On, of Knock Down and Drag-Out"

The sects thrive on persecution and exult in the harassment they afford to older denominations One Church of God preacher announced proudly "The Baptists look down on us, but we are getting their members, why don't they get ours, if they are better than us?" It is only toward each other that the newer denominations feel real rivalry, as contrasted with their sense of religious superiority to older denominations Most of them are essentially alike in their fundamental teachings and practices, and therefore are competitors in the religious field. They denounce each other as impostors, thieves, plagiarists, and fanatics Remarks by a Holiness preacher typify vilification by one sect of another·

"Those so-called Holiness Churches are completely different from my kind of Holiness; they are fanatics and bring discredit on the name 'Holiness' by their handling of snakes, their offers to sacrifice their own mothers, and the like. All the preachers who handle snakes, etc, belong to the 'unknown tongues' group, as does the Church of God A New Testament scholar went to them to preach, began speaking

[28] The rate of expulsion from such bodies is very high In 1938 one Free-Will Baptist Holiness Church in Gastonia received 33 new members and expelled 24 persons, of a total membership of 88 A Church of God with 143 members has expelled 30 in the last two years, another with 95 members has expelled 40, a third with 101 members has expelled 20 in the last four years Most of the expulsions were based on participation in one or another of the "worldly amusements" listed above

in Greek, and seventeen people were saved. These folks regard any kind of outward manifestation as a sign of possession by the Holy Spirit — but to live the way they do makes you wonder if they have the Spirit. Those folks have backslid from the true way"

In their desire to surpass rival sects the newer denominations begin to lose their extreme sectarianism Increasingly they are building more expensive churches, insisting on greater educational background for their preachers, and cooperating more fully with older denominations and with community leaders, in an effort to achieve prestige and power One Church of God preacher boasted "We have the biggest building program in North Carolina, and are growin' so fast we can't hardly get enough preachers to keep up with it" Ministers of the Church of God in the county are very proud that one of their number was selected to deliver the commencement sermon at one of the local high schools recently, "with several mill owners and preachers of big uptown churches setin' right there.' One of the clearest impressions that comes from conversation with sect preachers is of their desire to extend the influence of their sect as a denomination, rather than simply as a faith.

Little by little, the newer sects are seeking and winning support from mill managements and are coming to occupy a recognized place in the life of mill communities Previously, most employers have discouraged them, on the ground that they upset the routine of the life of workers, and perhaps also lest organization along religious lines among less integrated segments of the labor force might pave the way for organization along economic lines, as it has in some instances More recently, however, subsidies similar to those granted to older churches are being offered a few sectarian groups One Church of God minister, when asked if he knew an executive of the mill in whose village he was stationed, replied exultingly "Know him! Why, he's my financier! I've got about $1,400 from him in the last two or three years You see, I know something about the income tax, and have had great success with mill officials!" A preacher of the Pentecostal Holiness Church is planning to erect a new building soon, he has inquired, for the first time, concerning possible assistance from the mills, and reports happily that "the mills will be tolerable to us when we get ready to build" In many respects the newer sects are tending to make their peace with the world, seeking to conquer it rather than to transcend it.

The sect, in summary, represents a reaction, cloaked at first in purely religious guise, against both religious and economic institutions Overtly, it is a protest against the failure of religious institutions to come to grips with the needs of marginal groups, existing unnoticed on the fringes of cultural and social organization But as the sect begins to force its way into the cultural pattern and to become entrenched as an institution within the cultural fabric, it passes from sect type to Church type Then new sects arise, in protest against the failure of old sects and of society to distribute their benefits more impartially

MARGINAL CHURCH PARTICIPANTS *

John F. Cuber

There seems to be widespread tacit acceptance of the idea that participation in organized religious institutions is a matter of "either or," that is, that one either is or is not a "churchman" Studies of various objective manifestations of participation, however, supply abundant data which indicate that contemporary participation in the church may better be conceived in terms of degrees of marginality than by a dichotomous classification of church people and nonchurch people To the extent that a given person is observably controlled in his behavior by the institution, in however slight a degree, he cannot be said to be wholly outside its "culture" He is a marginal participant, perhaps even with nonchurch culture ascendant over church culture, but marginal to the church culture, neverthless

There are numerous objective manifestations of church culture marginality First, there are great variations in the frequency with which members of churches attend the functions of their churches One study of Protestant churches in a metropolitan area indicated that approximately 10 5 per cent of a sample of one thousand church members attended church forty or more times a year, 29 0 per cent between twenty and forty times, 28 5 per cent between one and twenty times, and 32.0 per cent less than once [1] Participation, as measured by attendance, seems highly variant and leads to the superficial view that sometimes membership may be largely nominal There are, however, numerous facts which tend to show that the church has a larger constituency than mere membership and attendance data would indicate A check of attendance at four churches in a metropolitan city for each of eighteen regular worship services, exclusive of religious holidays, revealed that from 18 to 37 per cent of persons in attendance, on the average, were nonmembers [2] In a more recent study of religious loyalties of university students, [3] it was found that nonmembers of churches manifest many traditional doctrinal and moral views of the churches and have a decidedly favorable attitude toward churches as institutions — more so in some instances than church members Almost every clergyman interviewed [4] stated that numerous requests are made by nonchurch members for religious ceremonies at weddings and funerals These data seem to point to the facts (1) that there is no line that can be drawn between "church people" and "nonchurch people," (2) that the social control of the church regarding beliefs and sanctions for behavior extends materially beyond the limits of formal membership or attendance, and (3) that even approximate measures of real participation in the church culture cannot be secured, because both within and without formal membership groups there are great varia-

[1] John F Cuber "Effects of the Depression upon Selected Protestant Churches in Greater Detroit," unpublished doctor's dissertation, University of Michigan Library

[2] *Ibid*

[3] Paul Horton, "Religious Loyalties of University Students," (ms Kent State University Library)

[4] Cuber, *ibid*

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tions in the degree of actual participation in the church culture complex

Since Park [5] coined and defined the term "marginal man," numerous sociologists have used the concept in studies of persons living "between" two (or more) cultures, influenced by both and accepting, or wholly acceptable in, neither The quasi acculturation by one culture excludes the person from full-fledged participation in the other Cultural marginals are often 'unwittingly initiated into two or more historic traditions, languages, political loyalties, moral codes, or religions" [6] This, he goes on to show, may result from education, marriage, migration, or some "other influence" The concept of marginality may, however, also possess utility in other areas of conflicting cultural influence than those to which it has already been applied It might, for example, be employed to designate persons who occupy a peripheral role between any two differentiated, but largely exclusive, institutions, culture complexes, or other cultural segments In other words, possibly the concept of cultural marginality may be useful when employed not only in reference to personal disorganization and conflict resultant from two or more cultures but also with reference to two or more antagonistic cultural patterns *within a given culture* [7] Thus, in this sense of the term, the ruralite recently migrant into a metropolitan area or vice versa, a "newlyrich" or "newlypoor" may be a "marginal man" And, as Waller hints, it may be useful to apply the term to the quasi-emancipated person who "cannot live outside it" [8] Stonequist himself suggests the problem of the marginal man in respect to religion [9] He writes that "conflicts of religious identification have torn souls asunder," and that "Religious conflict in the deeper sense is a conflict of the inner moral or spiritual life, with God and the self, the ideal and the actual Such conflicts also have their social reference" [10]

Case studies of some of the marginal men differentially acculturated by the sacred and the secular phases of contemporary American culture seem to indicate that the persons themselves are conscious of their marginality, because it has some obvious manifestations to them Such persons seem often to have encountered their differential acculturation as a more or less direct result of spatial or social mobility Mobility seems to be emancipating with respect to the mores generally, and the sacred mores in particular The following excerpt was taken from a life history study of an informant who showed no apparent symptoms of personal disorganization other than those related to religion

"While I lived in ——— I was perfectly happy and essentially religious I had been taught that it was well to be moral — in the way the preacher defined morality — because then I could be sure that God would always be on my side, so to speak Church attendance and church work were taken for granted About the only people who didn't participate in church were the social outcasts, or least they were so de-

[5] R E Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1928

[6] Everett V Stonequist, quoting R E Park in *The Marginal Man* (New York Scribners, 1937), p 15

[7] It is not intended here to argue for a *reductio ad absurdum* of the concept of 'marginal man" so that it would cover personal disorganization due to all conflict between cultural segments And yet it might be useful to note that behavior manifestation of a schizophrenic may be as much a result of culture conflict as those of the racial hybrid of the Jew See, for example Read Bain, "Our Schizoid Culture" *Sociology and Social Research*, 19 266-76 and especially his "Cultural Integration and Social Conflict" *American Journal of Sociology* 44 449 ff

[8] W Waller, *The Family* (New York The Cordon Company, 1938), p 450

[9] Stonequist *op cit*, p 8

[10] Stonequist, *ibid* p 217

fined by the rest of us. What could be more convincing evidence of the preacher's rationalizations? . . .

"But then I moved to ——— [a metropolitan city]. Many of my companions are seemingly as innocent of the church as if they were cave men [*sic!!*] Their daily sins of commission and omission at first shocked me, then puzzled me, and now almost intrigue me I observe that no dire consequences befall them . As time went on I thought less and less of the church This was made possible partly because when I came to ——— I did not know where to go to church and nobody asked me to go I waited and no one has asked me yet My recreation now consists of things and thoughts which I regarded six or seven years ago to be 'sinful' I think now that they are not, but I still do not feel right about it, but I don't know why

"When I go home I always feel my worst about this My folks (parents, fiancee, friends) don't know what I do think or that I do not go to church when I am away I feel like a hypocrite when I am home I see that the church and the preacher are very narrow, provincial, superstitious, and not really religious in many matters. I am unmoved by discussions about 'sin,' 'repentance,' 'backsliding,' and by most of the doctrinal lingo about 'eternal salvation,' baptism, and other eternal principles I am sure they are not, but I do not know why. I have an awful sense of guilt when ——— (my fiancee) brings up religious matters She is so innocent and yet so sure, that she gets on my nerves Someday I am going to blow up, but that will bring me nothing good But it's going to happen sure . . .

"I have tried going to church alone, but I feel even worse then. I am truly wasting my time, and I feel even more like a hypocrite. . . .

"Deep down I am sure that it is me who is wrong. Everybody else can't be wrong . . I may pay for my irreligion . . . How do I know but that the preacher is right? But he can't *prove* to me that he is Or do you have to *feel* it only or have what they call 'faith'? . Sometimes I worry a great deal and then again I forget the whole thing for a day or so.

But when I go home and when I think of marriage I get a cold sweat I can't always go on making believe to others There's going to be a showdown

"I still read my Bible quite often I am sure that it is the Word of God And I pray too — but not every night. . . ."

Here is one "marginal man" of the church culture "poised in psychological uncertainty" for six years He can rationalize neither his total acceptance nor his total rejection of the church culture In his habitual primary group situation he feels the ideological conflict most acutely The expedient mode of behavior, he has learned, is the "double personality" — one set of overt behavior when away and another when at home He does not know quite how he became partly "emancipated" from his traditional church culture, and he is quite aware that his emancipation is not complete He "feels" emotionally that he has "done wrong" in discarding the older behavior and attitudes as far as he has, but he cannot rationalize his way back to the traditional

Cases such as this one could easily be multiplied They differ from one another in detail, but the general theme is the same, a dual acculturation (either simultaneous or successive), conflict leading often, but not necessarily, to a crisis, a sense of impending ostracism or frustration, guilt complexes difficult to rationalize, and inconsistent behavior from time to time about which the person is "sensitive." It appears probable that the rapid emergence

of the metropolitan culture and the concomitant rural-urban migration have augmented the problem Yet in many instances the apparent sources of the dual acculturation are not traceable to either migration or social mobility. In fact, they occur among persons who are relatively immobile Contact with the conflict culture seems to be often difficult to isolate Sometimes the sources seem to be such cultural segments as popular "science," 'materialism,' or some other competitive element of the church culture And, also, usually the conflict culture seems to remain marginal, like the church culture, neither clearly ascendant

It does not follow, of course, that the marginal church "participant" is necessarily always or even often a "marginal man" in the psychosociological sense Marginal participation for many well adjusted persons may be merely an expedient and rational mode of behavior Also, it may be that persons with a high frequency of attendance may be very casual participants or may have serious mental conflicts relative to religion It appears, however, from limited case data at hand, that with a significant frequency the marginal participant in the church culture is subjectively a marginal self

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Bushee, F A, 'The Church in a Small City' *American Journal of Sociology* November, 1945, pp 223–32 This article is a study of the general characteristics of religious organizations in a small city Bushee finds that the small city churches are quite vital with the small churches holding the loyalty of their members more than the large churches, and the conservative churches more successful than the liberal congregations

2 Goldschmidt, W R, 'Class Denominationalism in Rural California Churches' *American Journal of Sociology* January, 1944, pp 348–55 Goldschmidt's study parallels our selection from Liston Pope's book, *Millhands and Preachers*, except that the background is the industrialization of agriculture rather than actual factory communities Here we find the same social stratification, and the division between upper class denominations and lower class sects

3 Gruton, J H Religious Origins and Sociological Theory, *American Sociological Review*, December, 1945, pp 726–39 The author develops an interesting and plausible theory of the origin of religion based on the social psychological theories of George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley and John Dewey The supernatural is conceived as an Other which the social mind of man creates for the sake of responding to it

4 Kollmorgen, W M, The Agricultural Stability of the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites of Lancaster County Pennsylvania, *American Journal of Sociology* November, 1943, pp 233–41 Sectarian religious organization is analyzed in this article from the point of view of its stabilizing and order producing effect on social structure All aspects of life are ruled by religion and the economic order is part of the general religious system Some of the difficulties which a sect has in surviving in an associational society are discussed

5 Weber, Max *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* trans by Talcott Parsons, George Allen and Unwin London 1930 This study of Weber's, which is part of a much broader analysis of capitalism and of religion attempts the derivation of the attitudes characteristic of the capitalist mentality from the ethic of Calvinistic Protestantism If this thesis is properly understood as explaining *one* of the significant factors in the rise of capitalism it has a high degree of validity

6 Yinger, J M, *Religion in the Struggle for Power* Duke University Press Durham, 1946 esp pp 137–75 Religious organization is analyzed in this study against the background of the total social structure The pages cited are concerned with the orientation of various religious groups toward the contemporary economic system The attitudes and actions typical of the Catholic ecclesia denominations and of prophetic sects are described and analyzed

7 See also Weber, "Science as a Vocation" p 5 Murdock The Cross Cultural Survey, p 64 Aginsky, An Indian's Soliloquy p 129 Kluckhohn The Navaho View of Life, p 130 MacIver, 'The Multi Group Society,' p 366 McWilliams Does Social Discrimination Really Matter?, p 300 D Greene 'Freedom and Social Structure' p 521 Lee Techniques of Social Reform An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive" p 812

PART SIX *SOCIAL INTERACTION*

SOCIAL INTERACTION

INTRODUCTION

Although sociological analysis may be variou
ality, social relations, social structure, and othe
common concern of sociology is social interaction Be
products of *social interaction,* which in itself is the fun
the countless ways of people of all times and places are reducible Social interaction may be defined operationally as what happens when two or more persons come into contact (not necessarily physical contact) and a modification of behavior takes place This, of course, presupposes communication All sociologists are agreed that social interaction is the generic or elemental social phenomenon from which all the specific varieties of social phenomena are compounded.

Social interaction is the dynamic rather than the static aspect of sociocultural phenomena, and its varied forms are called social processes Our main objective in this section is to set forth and analyze some of the more basic social processes, but before this can be done some attention must be given to the problem of classification Unfortunately, in this regard one encounters no neat array of categories, but a multiplicity of viewpoints Some treatises list only two or three processes, others list two or three hundred This confused state of knowledge has several causes. In the first place, a favorite armchair exercise of sociologists of the past era was the enumeration and illustration of social processes without much empirical inquiry. In the second place, the concrete manifestations of the processes are actually infinite, and hence classification is in part an arbitrary matter

From some points of view the "nature" of the phenomena themselves will be the criterion, from others the purposes of the actors (agents), or the goals and effects Some classifications embody only two categories, the *associative* and *dissociative processes,* without any specification of subforms Others go into minute specification of subforms, and would include, for example, contravention under dissociation, and under contravention would further include rebuffing, repulsing, restraining, disparaging, depreciating, circumventing, harassing, and numerous other varieties One can readily see that however interesting this taxonomic line of thought may be, it results primarily in a kind of sociological thesaurus rather than any working guide for sociological analysis

Contemporary sociological theory makes use of only a few basic interaction categories and ordinarily subsumes these under two main types, variously known as solidary and antagonistic, or associative and dissociative Since association is implied in all interaction, we shall avoid the possibility of misleading connotations by

ctive and *disjunctive* Under the conjunctive processes we
oint which principally exemplify co-operation, accommoda-
ion, and under disjunctive social processes we shall deal in the
petition and conflict
e of examples is largely arbitrary; other situational illustrations of the
would do equally well It is futile, of course, to try to show even the more
mental instances of political, economic, religious, and other concrete manifes-
ions of the processes, since they function in *all* compartments of society The
basic principles of co-operation, for example, are fundamentally the same whether
they are exemplified in a labor union, the Junior League, a gang of thieves, a
schoolroom, a football game, or the United Nations Although processes are not a
part of original nature, they are based upon human impulses and needs and are
situationally inherent whenever persons come into contact Rarely are they found
in pure or unmixed form Likewise, one never observes them as such but as aspects
which must be abstracted out of *Gestalts* or larger wholes

In a sense the social processes are to society what metabolism or the vital proc-
esses are to the human body They are vital, dynamic, "on-going" occurrences
which are continually repeated in time and space They are the social actions
which the transformations of human energy constitute, and at the same time they
stimulate effort and supply the means to social organization There is a tendency
to regard some of the processes as constructive or "good," and others as destruc-
tive or "bad" Thus, co-operation is on the whole highly approved, competition re-
garded diversely, and conflict generally disapproved Although one can deduce the
functional bases for such value judgments, it should be noted that co-operation can
lead to dire consequences and conflict may satisfactorily resolve troublesome
issues. Likewise, it may be noted that even though some of the cruder forms of the
disjunctive processes have been largely eliminated with the rise of civilization,
history does not show conclusively any progressive refinement or linear evolution
of the processes into higher forms It is true that spheres of co-operative activity
have been widened, but so have the spheres of conflict Cultural and societal com-
parisons indicate, none the less, that human beings can and do maximize and min-
imize the incidence of the various processes in different social systems

Space limitations prevent systematic inquiry into many of the broader implica-
tions of the social processes, and we must likewise forego concern with certain of
those aspects of interaction that have to do with its causes, intensity, extensity
duration, and effects on personality, social structure, and so forth The cases we
shall cite, however, are sufficient in number and variety to demonstrate the more
basic processes, and the attendant empirical analyses should give the student a
good understanding of what is meant by the processes and how they may be
studied

20. Conjunctive Social Processes

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

We Americans live in a society commonly regarded as individualistic and competitive The impressions we get of what is going on in the world are derived primarily from newspapers and other media which focus much of their attention on competition and conflict Perhaps there is more intrinsic interest in contests, litigations, disputes, strikes, political strife, and other manifestations of the dissociative or disjunctive processes than in relatively harmonious relations, and certainly it cannot be gainsaid that they lend savor as well as sorrow to human existence Our interest in the more dramatic aspects of the social forces that pit human beings against one another in competitive and antagonistic relations, however, may lead us to overlook the importance of the associative or conjunctive processes in human affairs The latter forms of interaction also lend drama to life as they draw men together to build and maintain the dynamic and manifold phases of social organization Without the conjunctive social processes, the family and all other groups, as well as the community and the larger society itself would be impossible

As was stated earlier, in reality one seldom finds a situation of any degree of complexity embodying just one of the social processes In fact, it might be said that by definition a complex situation is one in which there is a mixed process, or there are intermixed processes For example, we speak of the competitive sports to differentiate them from hunting, fishing, and other diversions which may involve no social interaction, but from some points of view it would be just as logical to refer to them as co-operative sports, and especially would this be true of team games The point is that actual situations usually comprise a number of processes, just as commonplace objects ordinarily consist of a number of chemical elements

How, then, does one get at the social processes and analyze them? The answer is that they cannot be defined or explained "intrinsically" but only in terms of the circumstances of their occurrence Even this cannot be done with complete satisfaction because theoretical knowledge in the field has not yet reached a high level of abstraction and integration. By deliberately ignoring certain methodological moot points to avoid confusing issues, however, we can formulate reasonably sound working definitions Let us begin with the process of co-operation

One of the monographs stemming from a very comprehensive inquiry into competition and co-operation sponsored by the Social Science Research Council a number of years ago sets forth four postulates which the investigators hope "are sufficient to describe and to understand all forms of competitive and cooperative

behavior in any situation and in any culture." (See May and Doob's work, pp. 17–18, cited under Annotated References.) May and Doob's postulates concerning co-operation are as follows:

"On a social level, individuals cooperate with one another when: (1) they are striving to achieve the same or complementary goals that can be shared; (2) they are required by the rules of the situation to achieve this goal in nearly equal amounts; (3) they perform better when the goal can be achieved in equal amounts; and (4) they have relatively many psychological affiliative contacts with one another.

"On a psychological level, an individual cooperates with others when: (1) there is a discrepancy between his level of achievement and his level of aspiration; (2) his knowledge of the goal that he seeks indicates that it can be reached by striving with others; (3) his attitudes produce within him a state in which his attitude toward cooperating overbalances possible conflicting attitudes toward potential cooperators, toward the rules of the situation, toward competing rather than cooperating, etc; and (4) his skill is of such a nature that under the rules of the situation he has a reasonable chance of success by cooperating."

These postulates may be examined in the light of our selection illustrating *co-operation,* "An Industrial Organization as a Social System." This comprises most of a chapter from Roethlisberger and Dickson's book, *Management and the Worker,* which is an empirical study of working conditions and employee efficiency, employee relations, the sources of employee dissatisfactions, and the social organization of employees in a large industrial plant. In the plant situation one finds a number of individuals—executives, technical specialists, supervisors, factory workers, and office workers—all in daily interaction. These interactions lead to certain patterns of relations, some of which are determined by the formal organization with its systems, rules, policies, and regulations intended to secure co-operation toward the common end of producing a product. Still another objective of the industrial organization, and one which is frequently neglected in industry, is that of creating and distributing satisfactions other than money among the members of the organization. This is closely tied to the informal organization of the plant. Within the informal organization, patterns of interaction are influenced by the intimacy of individual relationships, and sentiments in turn vitally affect activity. It becomes evident, for instance, that individuals are not motivated merely by economic or strictly rational considerations. The problem of management is to strike the most effective balance between technical organization and the "human" organization, between the needs of the machine process and the needs of group members, since they are interdependent aspects of the whole system. In some cases the relations between the two kinds of organization and between both kinds of need are compatible, yet in other instances they are opposed. Since informal organization and the needs of group members cannot be ignored as factors in industrial production, *all* of the major factors necessarily must be effectively integrated if the ends of the whole enterprise are to be achieved.

Such an integration of the component elements in the total situation or balance among the parts of a functioning system is what the authors mean by *equilibrium*. This equilibrium or balance is never complete but is always relative. It is demonstrated that changes in patterns of interaction in one part of the plant affect those in another, and hence constant managerial effort is required to maintain the industrial organization in a state of relative equilibrium as a "going concern." The conclusion of Roethlisberger and Dickson is that human collaboration is determined far more by the informal than by the formal organization of the plant. The research of these authors is relevant not only for its immediate bearing upon the process of co-operation, but also for its wider implications. It represents a pioneering work in the field of "industrial sociology"—a field in which keener as well as broader insights are rapidly being developed for understanding the extremely important and formerly neglected human side of industrial organization.

A second basic type of conjunctive social process is *accommodation*. It is somewhat analogous in meaning to social adaptation and adjustment. Accommodation presupposes the existence of opposing influences or social forces to be reconciled, e.g., a conflict situation to be resolved. Furthermore, it may be observed that most conflicts do not simply resolve themselves through the exhaustion or extinction of the adversaries, but rather that through the process of accommodation some reciprocal adjustments ("compromises") are worked out. These are the general circumstances in which accommodation appears, and it may be added that it is accompanied by a redefinition of participant attitudes and a new equilibrium of opposing forces. Arbitration, compromise, coercion, rationalization, and other specific varieties of accommodation may be effected to establish either a co-ordinate relationship or one which is superordinate-subordinate. Since the opposing forces are seldom equal, the stronger party typically makes fewer adjustments.

The material we have included from Myrdal's book, *An American Dilemma*, very aptly shows how mechanisms of accommodation have been worked out in American society between the superordinate white majority and the subordinate Negro minority. Here one encounters a situation in which there are mixed processes: many white and Negro interests simultaneously duplicate and oppose one another. The caste system enforces segregation or mutual isolation of the two races, and this from the white perspective is allegedly for the purpose of minimizing conflict; yet the two ethnic groupings must *necessarily* associate to some extent as long as they exist within the same social system. It is interesting to note how in response to this mutual need accommodating leadership develops on both sides. Just as with two foreign nations, most intergroup dealings are carried on through the medium of plenipotentiaries. The main burdens of accommodation, as is typical, fall upon the less powerful party, but special techniques are required of both white and Negro intermediaries. Myrdal's commentary demonstrates how the accommodation process varies under different circumstances (e.g., in the South and in the North). The data are from a field of study where the vast majority of sociological analyses of accommodation have been made. Notwithstanding this

focus, it should be noted that accommodation as a process is by no means confined to the area of ethnic group relations but is also prevalent in family and other situations, where people must associate regardless of the intimacy or lack of intimacy of the disputants.

Our third case in point illustrates *assimilation,* a conjunctive process very much in evidence in this country over many decades and one which has been studied in great detail by American sociologists. Assimilation is the process through which the immigrant or alien loses the modes of behavior previously acquired in another society and gradually takes on the ways of the new society. When such an individual no longer thinks of himself as distinctly different and in turn is not treated in a special category apart from the natives or ordinary members of the society, then he is fully assimilated A number of distinctions are to be noted in defining assimilation. The term is sometimes confused with *amalgamation,* which denotes biological intermixture or fusion, and with *acculturation,* which ordinarily is used by social scientists to indicate the social process through which peoples of diverse cultures in close contact with one another fuse their cultures into new forms comprising elements from both but differing from either (see Gillin's "Parallel Cultures," p 95) Likewise, it will be remembered that *socialization* is a term used to designate the social development of personality from infancy to adulthood within a particular society and culture (cf Chapter 6).

Sociologists have established a number of valid generalizations about the circumstances which facilitate and hinder the process of assimilation. It is well known, for instance, that ethnic and cultural similarities speed up the process, whereas dissimilarities slow it down Likewise, the age of the immigrant, his intelligence his own desire to be assimilated, and other features have some bearing. The system of stratification and native attitudes of ethnocentrism are also important considerations Since most of our readers are likely to have some familiarity with assimilation in our own country through personal experience or a study of American history, it will be interesting to examine data from an area which is even more of a "melting pot" than the United States

"The Relations Between Position and Status in the Assimilation of Chinese in Hawaii" indicates that the first Chinese settlers in the Hawaiian Islands came to seek jobs and that most of them expected to return to China. Gradually, however, they underwent a transition from sojourners to settlers, and oriented themselves to new ways of living. Glick's investigation is relevant not only because of its empirical observations but also for its analysis of the following: (1) objective measures of assimilation; (2) the specific factors which may initially impede assimilation, (3) hostility among the whites and the consequent solidarity of the Chinese as a new "out-group"; (4) the development of immigrant accommodative devices; (5) the dispersion of the Chinese and their gradual shift in values toward American standards; (6) the high degree of assimilation shown by many of the second generation and the corresponding tendency of the whites to regard the Chinese as good examples of "Americanization."

Although the materials we have chosen are based upon particular instances of the processes of co-operation, accommodation, and assimilation, these processes, as we have observed, are fundamentally the same wherever one encounters them, and hence our analyses have a generalized significance

AN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM *

R. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson

THE TWO MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF AN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

An industrial organization may be regarded as performing two major functions, that of producing a product and that of creating and distributing satisfactions among the individual members of the organization The first function is ordinarily called economic. From this point of view the functioning of the concern is assessed in such terms as cost, profit, and technical efficiency The second function, while it is readily understood, is not ordinarily designated by any generally accepted word It is variously described as maintaining employee relations, employee good will, co-operation, etc From this standpoint the functioning of the concern is frequently assessed in such terms as labor turnover, tenure of employment, sickness and accident rate, wages, employee attitudes, etc. The industrial concern is continually confronted, therefore, with two sets of major problems (1) problems of external balance, and (2) problems of internal equilibrium. The problems of external balance are generally assumed to be economic; that is, problems of competition, adjusting the organization to meet changing price levels, etc The problems of internal equilibrium are chiefly concerned with the maintenance of a kind of social organization in which individuals and groups through working together can satisfy their own desires

Ordinarily an industrial concern is thought of primarily in terms of its success in meeting problems of external balance, or if the problems of internal equilibrium are explicitly recognized they are frequently assumed to be separate from and unrelated to the economic purpose of the enterprise Producing an article at a profit and maintaining good employee relations are frequently regarded as antithetical propositions The results of the studies which have been reported indicated, however, that these two sets of problems are interrelated and interdependent The kind of social organization which obtains within a concern is intimately related to the effectiveness of the total organization Likewise, the success with which the concern maintains external balance is directly related to its internal organization

A great deal of attention has been given to the economic function of industrial or-

* Reprinted by permission of the publishers from F J Roethlisberger and William J Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1939

ganization. Scientific controls have been introduced to further the economic purposes of the concern and of the individuals within it. Much of this advance has gone on in the name of efficiency or rationalization Nothing comparable to this advance has gone on in the development of skills and techniques for securing cooperation, that is, for getting individuals and groups of individuals working together effectively and with satisfaction to themselves The slight advances which have been made in this area have been overshadowed by the new and powerful technological developments of modern industry

THE TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

In looking at an industrial organization as a social system it will first be necessary to examine the physical environment, for this is an inseparable part of any organization The physical environment includes not only climate and weather, but also that part of the environment which is owned and used by the organization itself, namely, the physical plant, tools, machines, raw products, and so on This latter part of the factory's physical environment is ordered and organized in a certain specified way to accomplish the task of technical production For our purposes, therefore, it will be convenient to distinguish from the human organization this aspect of the physical environment of an industrial plant and to label it the "technical organization of the plant" This term will refer only to the logical and technical organization of material, tools, machines, and finished product, including all those physical items related to the task of technical production

The two aspects into which an industrial plant can be roughly divided — the technical organization and the human organization — are interrelated and interdependent The human organization is constantly molding and re-creating the technical organization either to achieve more effectively the common economic purpose or to secure more satisfaction for its members Likewise, changes in the technical organization require an adaptation on the part of the human organization

THE HUMAN ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

In the human organization we find a number of individuals working together toward a common end the collective purpose of the total organization Each of these individuals, however, is bringing to the work situation a different background of personal and social experiences No two individuals are making exactly the same demands of their job The demands a particular employee makes depend not only upon his physical needs but upon his social needs as well These social needs and the sentiments associated with them vary with his early personal history and social conditioning as well as with the needs and sentiments of people closely associated with him both inside and outside of work

THE INDIVIDUAL

It may be well to look more closely at the sentiments the individual is bringing to his work situation Starting with a certain native organic endowment the child is precipitated into group life by the act of birth. The group into which the child is born is not the group in general The child is born into a specific family. Moreover, this specific family is not a family in isolation It is related in certain ways to other families in the community It has a certain cultural background — a way of life, codes and routines of behavior, associated with certain beliefs and expectations. In the beginning the child brings only his organic needs to this social milieu

into which he is born. Very rapidly he begins to accumulate experience. This process of accumulating experience is the process of assigning meanings to the socioreality about him; it is the process of becoming socialized. Much of the early learning period is devoted to preparing the child to become capable of social life in its particular group. In preparing the child for social participation the immediate family group plays an important role. By the particular type of family into which the child is born he is "conditioned" to certain routines of behavior and ways of living. The early meanings he assigns to his experience are largely in terms of these codes of behavior and associated beliefs. As the child grows up and participates in groups other than the immediate family his meanings lose, although never quite entirely, their specific family form. This process of social interaction and social conditioning is never-ending and continues from birth to death. The adult's evaluation of his surroundings is determined in a good part by the system of human interrelations in which he has participated.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

However, the human organization of an industrial plant is more than a plurality of individuals, each motivated by sentiments arising from his own personal and private history and background. It is also a social organization, for the members of an industrial plant — executives, technical specialists, supervisors, factory workers, and office workers — are interacting daily with one another and from their associations certain patterns of relations are formed among them. These patterns of relations, together with the objects which symbolize them, constitute the social organization of the industrial enterprise. Most of the individuals who live among these patterns come to accept them as obvious and necessary truths and to react as they dictate. Both the kind of behavior that is expected of a person and the kind of behavior he can expect from others are prescribed by these patterns.

If one looks at a factory situation, for example, one finds individuals and groups of individuals who are associated at work acting in certain accepted and prescribed ways toward one another. There is not complete homogeneity of behavior between individuals or between one group of individuals and another, but rather there are differences of behavior expressing differences in social relationship. Some relationships fall into routine patterns, such as the relationship between superior and subordinate or between office worker and shop worker. Individuals conscious of their membership in certain groups are reacting in certain accepted ways to other individuals representing other groups. Behavior varies according to the stereotyped conceptions of relationship. The worker, for example, behaves toward his foreman in one way, toward his first-line supervisor in another way, and toward his fellow worker in still another. People holding the rank of inspector expect a certain kind of behavior from the operators — the operators from the inspectors. Now these relationships, as is well known from everyday experiences, are finely shaded and sometimes become complicated. When a person is in the presence of his supervisor alone he usually acts differently from the way he acts when his supervisor's supervisor is also present. Likewise, his supervisor acts toward him alone quite differently from the way he behaves when his own supervisor is also there. These subtle nuances of relationship are so much a part of everyday life that they are commonplace. They are taken for granted. The vast amount of social conditioning that has taken place by means of which a person maneuvers him-

self gracefully through the intricacies of these finely shaded social distinctions is seldom explicitly realized Attention is paid only when a new social situation arises where the past social training of the person prevents him from making the necessary delicate interpretations of a given social signal and hence brings forth the "socially wrong" response

In the factory, as in any social milieu, a process of social evaluation is constantly at work From this process distinctions of "good" and "bad," "inferior" and "superior," arise. This process of evaluation is carried on with simple and ready generalization by means of which values become attached to individuals and to groups performing certain tasks and operations It assigns to a group of individuals performing such and such a task a particular rank in the established prestige scale Each work group becomes a carrier of social values In industry with its extreme diversity of occupations there are a number of such groupings Any noticeable similarity or difference, not only in occupation but also in age, sex and nationality, can serve as a basis of social classification, as, for example, "married women," the "old timer," the "white collared" or clerical worker, the "foreign element" Each of these groups, too, has its own value system

All the patterns of interaction that arise between individuals or between different groups can be graded according to the degree of intimacy involved in the relationship Grades of intimacy or understanding can be arranged on a scale and expressed in terms of "social distance" Social distance measures differences of sentiment and interest which separate individuals or groups from one another Between the president of a company and the elevator operator there is considerable social difference, more for example than between the foreman and the benchworker Social distance is to social organization what physical distance is to physical space However, physical and social distance do not necessarily coincide Two people may be physically near but socially distant

Just as each employee has a particular physical location, so he has a particular social place in the total social organization But this place is not so rigidly fixed as in a caste system In any factory there is considerable mobility or movement Movement can occur in two ways, the individual may pass from one occupation to another occupation higher up in the prestige scale, or the prestige scale itself may change

It is obvious that these scales of value are never completely accepted by all the groups in the social environment The shop worker does not quite see why the office worker, for example, should have shorter hours of work than he has Or the newcomer, whose efficiency on a particular job is about the same, but whose hourly rate is less than that of some old timer, wonders why service should count so much The management group, in turn, from the security of its social elevation, does not often understand what "all the fuss is about"

As was indicated by many of the studies,[1] any person who has achieved a certain rank in the prestige scale regards anything real or imaginary which tends to alter his status adversely as something unfair or unjust It is apparent that any move on the part of the management may alter the existing social equilibrium to which the employee has grown accustomed and by means of which his status is defined Immediately this disruption will be expressed in sentiments of resistance to the real or imagined alterations in the social equilibrium

[1] See Chapter XVI [*Management and the Worker*]

From this point of view it can be seen how every item and event in the industrial environment becomes an object of a system of sentiments According to this way of looking at things, material goods, physical events, wages, hours of work, etc, cannot be treated as things in themselves Instead they have to be interpreted as carriers of social value The meanings which any person in an industrial organization assigns to the events and objects in his environment are often determined by the social situation in which the events and objects occur The significance to an employee of a double-pedestal desk, of a particular kind of pencil, or of a handset telephone is determined by the social setting in which these objects appear If people with double-pedestal desks supervise people with single-pedestal desks, then double-pedestal desks become symbols of status or prestige in the organization As patterns of behavior become crystallized, every object in the environment tends to take on a particular social significance It becomes easy to tell a person's social place in the organization by the objects which he wears and carries and which surround him In these terms it can be seen how the introduction of a technical change may also involve for an individual or a group of individuals the loss of certain prestige symbols, and, as a result, have a demoralizing effect

From this point of view the behavior of no one person in an industrial organization, from the very top to the very bottom, can be regarded as motivated by strictly economic or logical considerations Routine patterns of interaction involve strong sentiments Each group in the organization manifests its own powerful sentiments It is likely that sometimes the behavior of many staff specialists which goes under the name of "efficiency" is as much a manifestation of a very strong sentiment — the sentiment or desire to originate new combinations — as it is of anything strictly logical

This point of view is far from the one which is frequently expressed, namely, that man is essentially an economic being carrying around with him a few noneconomic appendages Rather, the point of view which has been expressed here is that noneconomic motives, interests, and processes, as well as economic, are fundamental in behavior in business, from the board of directors to the very last man in the organization Man is not merely — in fact is very seldom — motivated by factors pertaining strictly to facts or logic Sentiments are not merely things which man carries around with him as appendages He cannot cast them off like a suit of clothes He carries them with him wherever he goes In business or elsewhere, he can hardly behave without expressing them Moreover sentiments do not exist in a social vacuum They are the product of social behavior, of social interaction, of the fact that man lives his life as a member of different groups Not only does man bring sentiments to the business situation because of his past experiences and conditioning outside of business, but also as a member of a specific local business organization with a particular social place in it he has certain sentiments expressing his particular relations to it

According to this point of view, every social act in adulthood is an integrated response to both inner and outer stimuli To each new concrete situation the adult brings his past "social conditioning" To the extent that this past social conditioning has prepared him to assimilate the new experience in the culturally accepted manner, he is said to be "adjusted To the extent that his private or personal view of the situation is at variance with the cultural situation, the person is called "maladjusted."

THE FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

The social organization of the industrial plant is in part formally organized. It is composed of a number of strata or levels which differentiate the benchworker from the skilled mechanic, the group chief from the department chief, and so on. These levels are well defined and all the formal orders, instructions, and compensations are addressed to them. All such factors taken together make up the formal organization of the plant. It includes the systems, policies, rules, and regulations of the plant which express what the relations of one person to another are supposed to be in order to achieve effectively the task of technical production. It prescribes the relations that are supposed to obtain within the human organization and between the human organization and the technical organization. In short, the patterns of human interrelations, as defined by the systems, rules, policies, and regulations of the company, constitute the formal organization.

The formal organization of an industrial plant has two purposes: it addresses itself to the economic purposes of the total enterprise, it concerns itself also with the securing of co-operative effort. The formal organization includes all the explicitly stated systems of control introduced by the company in order to achieve the economic purposes of the total enterprise and the effective contribution of the members of the organization to those economic ends.

THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

All the experimental studies pointed to the fact that there is something more to the social organization than what has been formally recognized. Many of the actually existing patterns of human interaction have no representation in the formal organization at all, and others are inadequately represented by the formal organization. This fact is frequently forgotten when talking or thinking about industrial situations in general. Too often it is assumed that the organization of a company corresponds to a blueprint plan or organization chart. Actually, it never does. In the formal organization of most companies little explicit recognition is given to many social distinctions residing in the social organization. The blueprint plans of a company show the functional relations between working units, but they do not express the distinctions of social distance, movement, or equilibrium previously described. The hierarchy of prestige values which tends to make the work of men more important than the work of women, the work of clerks more important than the work at the bench, has little representation in the formal organization, nor does a blueprint plan ordinarily show the primary groups, that is, those groups enjoying daily face-to-face relations. Logical lines of horizontal and vertical co-ordination of functions replace the actually existing patterns of interaction between people in different social places. The formal organization cannot take account of the sentiments and values residing in the social organization by means of which individuals or groups of individuals are informally differentiated, ordered, and integrated. Individuals in their associations with one another in a factory build up personal relationships. They form into informal groups, in terms of which each person achieves a certain position or status. The nature of these informal groups is very important, as has been shown in the Relay Assembly Test Room and in the Bank Wiring Observation Room.

It is well to recognize that informal organizations are not "bad," as they are sometimes assumed to be. Informal social organization exists in every plant, and can be said to be a necessary prerequisite for

effective collaboration Much collaboration exists at an informal level, and it sometimes facilitates the functioning of the formal organization On the other hand, sometimes the informal organization develops in opposition to the formal organization The important consideration is, therefore, the relation that exists between formal and informal organizations

To illustrate, let us consider the Relay Assembly Test Room and the Bank Wiring Observation Room These two studies offered an interesting contrast between two informal working groups, one situation could be characterized in almost completely opposite terms from the other In the Relay Assembly Test Room, on the one hand, the five operators changed continuously in their rate of output up and down over the duration of the test, and yet in a curious fashion their variations in output were insensitive to many significant changes introduced during the experiment On the other hand, in the Bank Wiring Observation Room output was being held relatively constant and there existed a hypersensitivity to change on the part of the worker — in fact, what could almost be described as an organized opposition to it

It is interesting to note that management could draw from these studies two opposite conclusions From the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment they could argue that the company can do almost anything it wants in the nature of technical changes without any perceptible effect on the output of the workers From the Bank Wiring Observation Room they could argue equally convincingly that the company can introduce hardly any changes without meeting a pronounced opposition to them from the workers To make this dilemma even more striking, it is only necessary to recall that the sensitivity to change in the one case occurred in the room where no experimental changes had been introduced whereas the insensitivity to change in the other case occurred in the room where the operators had been submitted to considerable experimentation To settle this question by saying that in one case the situation was typical and in the other case atypical of ordinary shop conditions would be to beg the question, for the essential difference between the two situations would again be missed It would ignore the social setting in which the changes occurred and the meaning which the workers themselves assigned to the changes

Although in both cases there were certain informal arrangements not identical with the formal setup, the informal organization in one room was quite different from that in the other room, especially in its relation to the formal organization In the case of the Relay Assembly Test Room there was a group, or informal organization, which could be characterized as a network of personal relations which had been developed in and through a particular way of working together, it was an organization which not only satisfied the wishes of its members but also worked in harmony with the aims of management In the case of the Bank Wiring Observation Room there was an informal organization which could be characterized better as a set of practices and beliefs which its members had in common — practices and beliefs which at many points worked against the economic purposes of the company In one case the relation between the formal and informal organization was one of compatibility, in the other case it was one of opposition Or to put it in another way, collaboration in the Relay Assembly Test Room was at a much higher level than in the Bank Wiring Observation Room

The difference between these two groups can be understood only by comparing the functions which their informal

organization performed for their members. The chief function of the informal group in the Bank Wiring Observation Room was to resist changes in their established routines of work or personal interrelations This resistance to change, however, was not the chief function of the informal group in the Relay Assembly Test Room. It is true that at first the introduction of the planned changes in the test room, whether or not these changes were logically in the direction of improvement, was met with apprehension and feelings of uneasiness on the part of the operators The girls in the beginning were never quite sure that they might not be victims of the changes

In setting up the Relay Assembly Test Room with the object of studying the factors determining the efficiency of the worker, many of the methods and rules by means of which management tends to promote and maintain efficiency — the "bogey," not talking too much at work, etc — were, in effect, abrogated With the removal of this source of constraint and in a setting of heightened social significance (because many of the changes had differentiated the test room girls from the regular departments and as a result had elevated the social status within the plant of each of the five girls) a new type of spontaneous social organization developed. Social conditions had been established which allowed the operators to develop their own values and objectives The experimental conditions allowed the operators to develop openly social codes at work and these codes, unhampered by interference, gave a sustained meaning to their work It was as if the experimenters had acted as a buffer for the operators and held their work situation steady while they developed a new type of social organization. With this change in the type of social organization there also developed a new attitude toward changes in their working environment. Toward many changes which constitute an unspecified threat in the regular work situation the operators became immune What the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment showed was that when innovations are introduced carefully and with regard to the actual sentiments of the workers, the workers are likely to develop a spontaneous type of informal organization which will not only express more adequately their own values and significances but also is more likely to be in harmony with the aims of management

Although all the studies of informal organization at the Hawthorne Plant were made at the employee level, it would be incorrect to assume that this phenomenon occurs only at that level Informal organization appears at all levels, from the very bottom to the very top of the organization.[2] Informal organization at the executive level, just as at the work level, may either facilitate or impede purposive cooperation and communication In either case, at all levels of the organization informal organizations exist as a necessary condition for collaboration Without them formal organization could not survive for long Formal and informal organizations are interdependent aspects of social interaction.

THE IDEOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PLANT

There is one aspect of social organization in an industrial plant which cuts across both the formal and informal organization the systems of ideas and beliefs by means of which the values residing in the total organization are expressed and the symbols around which these values are organized Both the formal and informal organizations of a plant have systems of ideas and beliefs Some are

[2] Barnard, C. I., *The Functions of the Executive*, Harvard University Press, 1938, pp 223–224.

more capable of logical and systematic expression than others. Those of the formal organization in general are more logically explicit and articulate than those of the informal organization, but they are not for that reason more powerful in their effects than those of the informal organization. The sentiments underlying the beliefs and ideas of informal organizations are often very powerful determinants of overt behavior.

Some of these systems of ideas and beliefs represent what the organization should be, that is, what the relations of people to one another should be or how people should behave. Some express the values of one part of the total organization, for each specialist tends to see the total organization from the point of view of the logic of his own specialty. Still others express the values residing in the interhuman relations of the different social groups involved.

Some of these ideas and beliefs represent more closely the actual situation than others. In all cases, however, they are abstractions from the concrete situation. In this respect they are to the concrete situation as maps are to the territories they represent.[3] And like maps these abstractions may be either misleading or useful. They may be misleading because sometimes the person using them fails to realize they are representing only one part of the total organization. Sometimes in the minds of certain individuals these abstractions tend to become divorced from the social reality and, in effect, lead an independent existence.

A CONDITION OF EQUILIBRIUM

The parts of the industrial plant as a social system are interrelated and interdependent. Any changes in one part of the social system are accompanied by changes in other parts of the system. The parts of the system can be conceived of as being in a state of equilibrium, such that "if a small (not too great) modification different from that which will otherwise occur is impressed on the system, a reaction will at once appear tending toward the conditions that would have existed if the modification had not been impressed."[4]

Some parts of the system can change more rapidly than others. The technical organization can change more rapidly than the social organization, the formal organization can change more rapidly than the informal, the systems of beliefs and ideas can change more rapidly than the patterns of interaction and associated sentiments, of which these beliefs and ideas are an expression. In the disparity in the rates of change possible there exists a precondition for unbalance which may manifest itself in many forms.

In their studies the investigators identified two such possibilities of unbalance. One was the disparity in the rates of change possible in the technical organization, on the one hand, and the social organization, on the other. This condition was manifested in the workers' behavior by distrust and resistance to change. This resistance was expressed whenever changes were introduced too rapidly or without sufficient consideration of their social implications; in other words, whenever the workers were being asked to adjust themselves to new methods or systems which seemed to them to deprive their work of its customary social significance. In such situations it was evident that the social codes, customs, and routines of the worker

[3] This distinction has been borrowed from Korzybski, A., *Science and Sanity*, The Science Press Printing Co., New York, 1933.

[4] For a discussion of equilibrium, see Pareto, V., *The Mind and Society*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1935, pp. 1435–1442. The quotation used above is Dr. L. J. Henderson's adaptation of Pareto's definition of equilibrium.

could not be accommodated to the technical innovations introduced as quickly as the innovations themselves, in the form of new machines and processes, could be made. The codes, customs, and traditions of the worker are not the product of logic but are based on deeply rooted sentiments. Not only is any alteration of the existing social organization to which the worker has grown accustomed likely to produce sentiments of resistance to the change, but too rapid interference is likely to lead to feelings of frustration and an irrational exasperation with technical change in any form

Another possibility of unbalance lies in the relation of the ideological organization to the actual work situation The logics of the ideological organization express only some of the values of the social organization They frequently fail to take into account not only the feelings and sentiments of people within the plant but also the spontaneous informal social groups which form at all levels of the organization. Thus they tend to become divorced from the concrete situation and to lead an independent existence. As a result of failing to distinguish the human situation as it is from the way it is formally and logically represented to be, many human problems are stated either in terms of the perversities of human nature or in terms of logical defects in the formal organization. The facts of social organization are ignored, and consequently the result in terms of diagnosis or remedy is bound to be inadequate

It became clear to the investigators that the limits of human collaboration are determined far more by the informal than by the formal organization of the plant Collaboration is not wholly a matter of logical organization It presupposes social codes, conventions, traditions, and routine or customary ways of responding to situations Without such basic codes or conventions, effective work relations are not possible.

ACCOMMODATING LEADERSHIP * — *Gunnar Myrdal*

THE INTEREST OF SOUTHERN WHITES AND NEGROES WITH RESPECT TO NEGRO LEADERSHIP

The white caste has an obvious interest in trying to have accommodating Negro leaders to help them control the Negro group. Under no circumstances, in any community where the Negro forms a substantial portion of the total population, are the attitudes and behavior of the Negroes a matter of no concern to the whites Negroes may be robbed of suffrage and subdued by partiality in justice, by strict segregation rules, by economic dependence, and by other caste sanctions; but it makes a great deal of difference to the whites how the Negroes — within the narrow margin of their freedom — feel, think and act

The whites have a material interest in keeping the Negroes in a mood of want-

* Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1944, Vol II, pp. 720–33 (*passim*). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

ing to be faithful and fairly efficient workers. They have an interest in seeing to it that the Negroes preserve as decent standards of home-making, education, health, and law observance as possible, so that at least contagious diseases and crime will not react back upon the whites too much. In this particular respect, whites formerly under-estimated the community of interest which follows from being neighbors, but they are increasingly becoming aware of it.

Further, as we have seen, the whites in the South have a strong interest that Negroes be willing, and not only forced, to observe the complicated system of racial etiquette. Southern whites also see a danger in that Negroes are becoming influenced by certain social ideas prevalent in the wider society. They want to keep them *away from "red agitators" and* "outside meddlers." In most Southern communities the ruling classes of whites want to keep Negroes from joining labor unions. Some are quite frank in wanting to keep Negroes from reading the Constitution or studying social subjects. Besides these and other interests of a clearly selfish type, many whites feel an altruistic interest in influencing Negroes to gain improved standards of knowledge, morals and conduct.

As the contacts between the two groups are becoming increasingly restricted and formalized, whites are more and more compelled to attempt to influence the Negro masses indirectly. For this they need liaison agents in the persons of Negro "leaders." This need was considerably smaller in earlier times when numerous personal and, in a sense, friendly master-servant relations were in existence. These personal relations of old times are now almost gone. This means that the whites have seen their possibilities of controlling the Negro masses directly — that is, by acting themselves as "Negro leaders" — much diminished. The whites have increasingly to resort to leaders in the Negro group. They have, therefore, an interest in helping those leaders obtain as much prestige and influence in the Negro community as possible — as long as they cooperate with the whites faithfully.

On the other side of the caste gulf, the Negroes need persons to establish contact with the influential people in the white group. They need Negro leaders who can talk to, and get things from, the whites. The Negroes in the South are dependent upon the whites not only for a share in the public services, but individually for small favors and personal protection in a social order determined nearly exclusively by the whites, usually in an arbitrary fashion. The importance of Negro leaders to the masses of Negroes — as to the whites — *is also increasing* as it is becoming more rare for Negroes to have individual white friends to appeal to when they are in danger or in need of assistance.[1]

Under these circumstances it is understandable that the individual Negro who becomes known to have contact with substantial white people gains prestige and influence among Negroes for this very reason. Correspondingly, an accommodating Negro who is known to be influential in the Negro community becomes, because of this, the more useful to the whites. The Negro leader in this setting serves a "function" to both castes and his influence in both groups is cumulative — prestige in the Negro community being an effect as well as a cause of prestige among the whites. Out of this peculiar power system, a situation develops where Negro

[1] Factors which are decreasing the importance of accommodating Negro leaders to the Negro masses in the South are, on the other hand, the raised standards of legal culture in the region, the increasing professionalism and independence in state and local government administration, and particularly the growth of federal assistance and control.

leaders play an even more important role than is usual, according to the common American pattern

IN THE NORTH AND ON THE NATIONAL SCENE

In the North fewer white people are in a position where they have to care much about how the Negroes fare, or what they think and do The Negroes, on their side, have the protection of fairly impartial justice and of the anonymity of large cities They also have the vote and can press their needs in the regular fashion of American minority politics They are, therefore, decidedly less dependent on accommodating leaders to court the whites For neither of the two castes does the Negro leader fill such important functions as in the South.

But the pattern of pleading to the whites through their own leaders, who are trusted by the whites, is firmly rooted in the traditions of Southern-born Negroes who make up the great majority of adult Negroes in the North Northern Negroes, also, are a poor group and are frequently in need of public assistance and private charity They are discriminated against in various ways, particularly with respect to employment opportunities They live in segregated districts and have few contacts with white people in most spheres of life Though they have the vote, they are everywhere in a small minority For all these reasons many of the Southern attitudes and policies in regard to Negro leadership can be observed to continue in the North

Isolation breeds suspicion among Negroes against the majority group And suspicion is, in fact, justified For isolation bars the growth of feelings of mutual identification and of solidarity of interests and ideals in both groups. A white man's purposes when stepping down to lead Negroes must be scrutinized carefully before he can be trusted This is a pragmatic truth obvious even to the most unsophisticated Negroes, and it has a basis in the Negro people's history through centuries Northern Negroes will thus be reluctant to listen to white people with a thorough trustfulness and an entirely open mind Indeed, they are able to give freer play to their suspicion than Southern Negroes as they are less controlled and dependent Too, the growing race pride exerts its influence in this direction Northern Negroes, therefore, also seek the intermediation of leaders from their own group

On the white side, those politicians, public officials, philanthropists, educators, union leaders, and all other white persons in the North who have to maintain contact with and exert influence upon the Negro group must sense this suspicion They usually also find the Negroes strange in many ways Negroes seldom constitute the main interest in their various pursuits They welcome the Negro leader as a great convenience, therefore, as a means of dealing with the Negroes indirectly [2]

The Northern situation, however, is different from the Southern situation in two closely coordinated respects (1) that the white majority is not motivated by an interest solidarity against Negroes, reaching practically every white individual, and (2) that the Negro minority is not cramped by anything like the formidable, all pervasive, Southern system of political, judicial and social caste controls One effect of this difference is that the Northern situation gives greater opportunity for the protest motive to come out in the open and not only, as in the South, to contribute its queer subdued undertones to the

[2] An interesting parallel, which cannot be followed up here, would be with similar problems and tendencies in the relation between the wider society and other distinct minority groups such as the other color castes — Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos, Mexicans — and immigrant groups — Jewish, Czech, Polish, Italian

pretended harmony of accommodation.

THE "GLASS PLATE"

In the sphere of power and influence — in politics proper and outside of it, locally and nationally, in the South and in the North — the population thus becomes split into a white majority and a Negro minority, and the power relations running between these two blocs are concentrated and canalized in special liaison agents in the minority bloc. Whites who want to deal with the Negro masses do not have to go among them directly as they have to go among, say, Episcopalians. But it is, of course, just as difficult, and, in fact, more difficult, for Negroes to have direct contacts with the white population. Corresponding to the Negro leaders, there are white leaders.

The isolation implied in caste means thus, in the realm of power and influence, that *intercaste relations become indirect from both sides. Direct contacts are established only between the two groups of leaders, acting on behalf of the two blocs.* Except for those individuals, the invisible glass plate, of which Du Bois spoke,[3] is in operation. Common whites and blacks see each other, though usually only as strange stereotypes. But they cannot hear each other, except dimly. And they do not understand what they dimly hear from the other side of the glass plate. They do not trust and believe what they perhaps understand. Like two foreign nations, *Negroes and whites in America deal with each other through the medium of plenipotentiaries.*[4]

In a sense the white leaders have, from the Negroes' point of view, a similar "function" of acting as liaison agents to the Negro bloc. But there is this difference between the two groups of leaders: the white leaders are not "accommodating." They are not acting as "protest" leaders, either. The entire axis between the two extreme poles of accommodation and protest, which sets the orbit of Negro attitudes and behavior, exists only on the Negro side. The white leaders' "function" to serve as liaison agents with Negroes is only incidental to their power in white society. Unlike the Negro leaders they have, in addition, to run the whole society. This is a consequence of all the power being held on the white side. The Negroes do not, therefore, pick their white agents in the same manner as the whites choose their Negro ones. The Negroes cannot confer much power upon whites of their choice. In the South they do not partake in the selection of even political leaders. The Negroes — through their leaders — have to accept the white leadership as it exists, determined exclusively by the whites. They have to try to "get in" with the ones who are already on top in white society.[5]

To this a few qualifications must be made. First, in some Southern communities white persons, distinguished by birth, education, or wealth, who have prestige but do not care to exert active leadership generally, may occasionally be induced to step in and use their potential power in favor of the Negroes or one individual Negro. When Negroes turn to such a person they might be said to pick

[3] *Dusk of Dawn* (1940), pp. 130–131.

[4] There are, of course, the exceptions of master-servant relations, but they are decreasing and they have always been treated as exceptions. There are also the exceptions in the academic and artistic worlds, but they are few.

[5] It is true that, according to Southern aristocratic traditions, to have Negro dependents — who, in servant fashion display gratitude and attachment — gives status in white society. Negroes are, therefore, in the position to deliver something to the white leader which has social significance. But in the Southern caste situation, the Negroes will have to be prepared to pay this price to practically any possessor of white power and influence who asks for it.

him as a white leader for their purposes. The assumption is, however, that he already has latent power The Negroes do not award him influence by selecting him, as whites do when they pick a Negro leader. He has, rather, to be careful not to assist the Negroes too often and too much, as this might wear out his prestige He might even become known as a "nigger lover," which would be the end of his usefulness to the Negroes

Second, some white persons actually specialize in becoming the fixers and pleaders for Negroes while they are not active as white leaders generally They are the white interracialists of the South In order to have protracted influence they require moral and financial backing from Northern philanthropists or, lately, from the federal government They should, in addition, preferably have upper class status because of birth, education or occupation Even when they have both Northern backing and Southern status their influence in matters affecting Negroes is likely to be uncertain and narrow in scope Acclaim from the Negroes is usually more a result of their activity than a basis for the assumption of it

In the North, the fact of Negro suffrage means that in the sphere of politics proper Negroes participate in selecting the white officeholders (and occasionally add some Negro representatives) Support from Negroes, therefore, means something in the North Their opposition might occasionally turn an election against a candidate The actual and the still greater potential significance of the Negroes' sharing in the political power in the North has been discussed in earlier chapters Negroes are, however, only a tiny minority everywhere in the North. Even if the difference from the South is enormous, Negroes are, most of the time and in most respects, dependent on white leaders who do not feel dependent on Negro opinion

This is, generally speaking, still more true in other power spheres than in politics proper, for example, in philanthropy, in educational institutions, in professional associations Poverty and cultural backwardness generally prevent Negroes from having practically any primary power over the selection of white leaders in these fields An exception is the labor movement In so far as unions are kept open to Negroes, and where unions are democratic, Negroes have their due portion of power much according to the rules in politics National power relations are much like those in Northern communities

The following discussion will deal only with Negro leaders It must never be forgotten, however, that Negro leaders ordinarily do not deal with the white people but only with white leaders Negro leaders are, in fact, even more isolated from the whites in general than are the white leaders from the Negroes We shall find, however, that some of the protest leaders actually do try to reach white public opinion Walter White, and the whole set-up of the N A A C P, is steadily hammering at the glass plate, as did James Weldon Johnson and W. E. B Du Bois before him and Frederick Douglass still earlier Such an effort is effective practically only on the national scene The carefully worded "letters to the editor" by Negroes to liberal Southern newspapers, which are sometimes printed — reminding the whites of their Constitution, their democratic faith and their Christian religion, and respectfully drawing their attention to some form of discrimination — represent local attempts in the same direction

The direct approach by Negroes to the white world stems almost entirely from the protest motive The accommodating Negro leaders generally do not even attempt to reach white public opinion directly On the national scene, Booker T Washington and, after him, Robert R.

Moton were exceptions But Moton's errand, when disclosing to the general public "what the Negro thinks," was to give vent to a protest, modified by acceptable and soothing words, and, in a degree, the same can be said of Washington Washington's *main motive*, however, was accommodation *for a price* This was his message in the Atlanta speech of 1895 and in countless other addresses to white audiences in the North and in the South, where he promised Negro patience, boosted Negro efforts, begged for money for his school and indulgence generally for his poor people He had become a personality with prestige whose voice could pierce the caste wall And he was freely allowed audience since he toned down the Negro protest On the local scene the accommodation motive by itself does not usually encourage Negro leaders to such adventures of trying to reach behind the white leaders to the white people, and there is generally no white public which wants to listen to them

ACCOMMODATING LEADERSHIP AND CLASS

Negro leadership — as determined by caste in the way we have sketched — stands in an even closer relation to class than does white leadership In a previous part of this book, we saw that Negro classes generally were mainly a function of caste One ramification of this thesis was touched upon only lightly and spared for the present discussion of Negro leadership namely, that an individual Negro's relation to white society is of utmost importance for his class status in the Negro community.

It always gives a Negro scientist, physician, or lawyer prestige if he is esteemed by his white colleagues Prestige will bring him not only deference but also clients and increased earnings The Negro press eagerly records and plays up the slightest recognition shown a Negro by whites A professional position outside the segregated Negro world, even if unpretentious, also carries high prestige Being consulted by whites concerning Negro welfare, taking part in mixed conferences or having any personal relation to individual whites confers status This common view in the Negro community is, of course, realistic. White standards are, on the average, higher, and an indication that whites recognize a Negro as having approached or reached those standards means most of the time that he is exceptionally good in his line More important still, the whites have the power, and friendly consideration from whites confers power upon the individual Negro participating in such a relation The belief that whites have power has been exaggerated in the Negro community, so that friendly relations with certain individual whites confer status upon a Negro even when these whites actually have no power

The import of this is that *leadership conferred upon a Negro by whites raises his class status in the Negro community* Correspondingly, it can be stated that an upper class position in the Negro community nearly automatically, with certain exceptions that we shall note later, gives a Negro the role of Negro leader He is expected to act according to this role by both whites and Negroes Because most upper class Negroes are leaders, there is an extraordinarily close correlation between leadership and class position in the Negro community On the other hand, there are more lower class leaders among Negroes than among whites — partly because a much greater proportion of Negroes are lower class and partly because of the tradition of a strong lower class preacher and lodge leader among Negroes Still, we believe that practically all upper class Negroes are leaders, something that is not true among whites In order to under-

stand this, several other things must be considered

For one thing, the Negro upper class is — because of caste — such a small proportion of the total Negro population that the scarcity value of upper class status becomes relatively high In smaller communities only a handful of persons have upper class status, in all communities they are few enough to be in close contact with each other

The upper class Negro is, furthermore, culturally most like the group of whites who have social power Under a long-range view, the social classes represent various degrees of acculturation to dominant American culture patterns or gradations of lag in the assimilation process During this process standards of living have been raised, illiteracy and mortality rates have declined, the patriarchal type of family organization has made its influence felt, and, generally, white American middle class norms and standards have been filtering downward in the Negro people The upper class represents the most assimilated group of Negroes In part, they have status in the Negro community for the very reason that they are culturally most like upper class whites It is natural also that upper and middle class whites feel most closely akin to this group of Negroes.

The attitude of whites in the Old South was, on the contrary, that the lowly "darky" was the favored and trusted Negro, while the educated, socially rising "Negro gentleman" was to be suspected and disliked When a social stratification in the Negro people first appeared during slavery, the whole complex of legislation to suppress the free Negroes, to hinder the education of slaves, and to check the meetings of Negroes was expressly intended to prevent Negro individuals of a higher status from leading the Negro masses, and, indeed, to prevent the formation of a Negro upper class The inclination of white people remained much the same after the Civil War The Jim Crow legislation followed a similar tendency The white masses even today are usually most bitter and distrustful toward upper class Negroes This is still often the expressed opinion also of the upper class whites who are in control of the political and social power in Southern communities

But even in the South it has become more and more unfeasible to trust the Negro leadership to the lower class "Uncle Toms" of the old type One reason has already been mentioned paternalistic personal relations in which they developed have decreased in frequency There are fewer "good old darkies" available Also, as wealth and education have become somewhat more attainable to Negroes, those who were favored with these things — the slowly growing upper class, who thus came to symbolize Negro advancement and race pride — supplanted the 'darkies" in prestige in the Negro community Even white backing could not entirely shield the "darkies" from ridicule and contempt on the part of the Negroes of superior wealth and education

In this situation, the upholding of the old-time "darkies" as white-appointed Negro leaders would have implied an unyielding refusal to recognize the entire rising Negro class structure and the Negro's respect for education It soon became apparent that such a policy would be ineffective and unrealistic The development of a Negro upper class could not be checked as we have pointed out, this class grew partly because of segregation itself A protracted resistance to recognizing the growth of class stratification in the Negro community would also have run contrary to the dominant class pattern within American white society By analogy a Negro class structure seemed

the more natural as personal ties to white society became broken, and as the Negro group was more definitely set apart.

Finally, a large portion of the Negro upper class is actually appointed by the whites or is dependent for status upon the influential local whites. The whites soon learned that they could find as many "Uncle Toms" among Negroes of upper class status as among the old-time "darkies," and that educated persons often were much more capable of carrying out their tasks as white-appointed Negro leaders . . .

ACCOMMODATING LEADERS IN THE NORTH

In the North, there has never been much love for the lowly "darkies" on the part of the whites. They have never felt much of an interest or inclination to lift poor, uneducated servants as leaders over the Negro community. There has been more acclaim of social climbing generally than in the South. Almost from the beginning the Negro upper class was accepted by the whites, without resistance, as the source of Negro leaders.

On the other hand, probably a somewhat greater proportion of upper class Negroes in the North do not care for the responsibilities and rewards of being active Negro leaders. On the whole, the Negro masses are less passive. The preachers have, perhaps, rather less prominence as leaders and are, on the average, somewhat better educated and have a higher social status.

Negro suffrage in the North, however, creates space for a political leadership which, in order to be able to deliver the Negro vote to the party machines, must be chosen from people who really meet the common lower class Negroes. A good many of the petty politicians in Northern cities are lower class Negroes. Negroes who enjoy a sort of "upper class" status outside the respectable society — big-time gamblers, criminals, and so on — are often the machine lieutenants, precinct captains and bosses, or the "insiders" in the political game.

The odor of corruption and the connection with crime and vice which often surrounds American city politics, particularly in the slums, deter, of course, many upper class Negroes, as well as many upper class whites, from taking any active part in political leadership. This does not mean, however, that there is not a good deal of honest and devoted political leadership among Northern Negroes. It comes often from upper class Negroes. But proportionately the upper classes monopolize less of the actual leadership in local politics than in other fields. And the labor unions, which are stronger in the North, are training a new type of lower or middle class Negro leader of particular importance in politics. They can there often compete successfully with the upper class leaders. They are just as often as honest and as devoted to the Negro cause as are the upper class leaders.

On the national scene, upper class status and, particularly, considerable education and personal ability are necessary for Negro leaders.

THE RELATION BETWEEN POSITION AND STATUS IN THE ASSIMILATION OF CHINESE IN HAWAII *

Clarence Glick

The analysis of the process of assimilation may be aided by tracing the relationship between the changing position of an immigrant group within the competitive system of a society and the status changes among members of the group within that society. In the highly traditionalized village communities from which Chinese immigrants came to Hawaii, a person's status, his social standing, and his conception of himself tended to correspond with his location in the community and his position in the village economy [1] In fact, a person's position and his status in such a situation were so closely interrelated that only by a process of abstraction could any distinction between the two be drawn Change in location by migration to a new country disrupted this correspondence between position and status and provided circumstances which enable us to observe more clearly the difference between the two and to describe the reestablishment of an interlocking between them within a very different social and moral order

When the Chinese became a migrant his economic position inevitably changed from one in the village to one in the ecological order of the frontier community to which he had migrated He was not prepared upon arrival, however, to become a part of any common culture order there Nor was he at first interested in the status-values given to various occupations in the new community While he had given up his occupational position at home to seek his "fortune" abroad, his intention was ultimately to secure a new position in his native village economy and a more enviable status among his fellow-villagers At one and the same time, therefore, he was competing, temporarily he thought, for an advantageous position in a frontier community and striving to improve permanently his status in the old world But as the migrant changed from a sojourner to a settler, he gradually reoriented his status-seeking activities and his conception of himself From this point of view, the extent to which the area in which the migrant seeks status becomes identical with the area in which he competes for position may serve as an index of the degree of his assimilation

Two types of data indicate the changing position of the Chinese in Hawaii (1) their dispersion into different occupational classes and (2) their residential dispersion after being originally segregated.

CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONAL POSITION

The first influx of Chinese into Hawaii in considerable numbers began in 1852 with their importation as contract laborers by white owners of sugar plantations Their legal status was defined by a "mas-

[1] I am indebted to Robert E Park for the distinctions between location, position, and status used here For a partial treatment of his point of view, see R E Park, "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XX (Chicago, 1926), 1–14.

* *The American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1942, pp 667–79 Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press

ter and servant act" which carried penal sanctions, and during this early period the Chinese were bound into temporary servitude for five years at three dollars a month and "keep" The position of these migrants, of course, was at the bottom of the plantation division of labor By the dominant whites Chinese were welcomed as utilities, as cheap and industrious instruments to perform unskilled, menial plantation labor. They were there for work, not for participation in Island society

Newly arrived Chinese migrants did not regard this as exploitation Instead, they thought of themselves as favored by their god of wealth Translated into village terms, the plantation wage was fabulous But Chinese discovered that they could make their "fortunes" faster in other ways than as indentured laborers, and as soon as possible most of them left the plantations for other occupations Thousands went into independent agricultural ventures such as rice-farming and banana-raising, and others became the ubiquitous rural peddlers and village storekeepers Eventually, prospects of a more lucrative future in the port city of Honolulu resulted in a process of urbanization, by 1930, 71 1 per cent of the entire Chinese population was concentrated in Honolulu alone

The point at which a Chinese penetrated the urban occupational structure depended upon such factors as the length of time the migrant had spent in rural Hawaii before coming into the city, the amount of money he had accumulated, the skills he had acquired at home or in Hawaii, and the position which had been achieved by relatives upon whom he could depend for assistance The first job in Honolulu for many was unskilled labor Others became domestic servants, cooks, and waiters As the years passed an observable movement into skilled and proprietary positions took place In the eighties and nineties Chinese secured virtual monopoly of laundries, tailor shops, restaurants, and small trade This dominance has subsequently been broken by the occupational climbing of other migrants, particularly Japanese, but census reports have nevertheless shown a steady improvement in the position of Chinese in Hawaii's occupational structure By 1930, 50 1 per cent of the employed Chinese males were engaged in professional, proprietary, clerical, and skilled forms of employment Of the 136,505 males of all races gainfully employed in the Territory only 30 6 per cent were in these occupational classes The relative positions of Chinese males in the Island occupational structure in 1910, 1920, and 1930 are indicated by the indices in Table 1

The occupational indices show an increasing concentration of Chinese in professional, proprietary, and clerical classes, classes which in Western urban society tend to confer highest social status Accompanying this trend has been a decline in the proportional representation of Chinese in the lower occupational brackets, with the exception of the domestic class [2]

A significant feature of data which show the favorable position of Chinese in preferred classes of occupations is the fact that an increasing number of Hawaiian-born Chinese have been able to establish themselves in positions of an interracial or nonracial character Among professional men, some, such as a few physicians and dentists, have an interracial clientele, and some academic men have secured their positions on the basis

[2] The excessive proportion of Chinese males in the domestic class is largely accounted for by the fact that these data include only males and few males of other racial groups have entered domestic service Also, the Census classifies all types of cooks as "servants," which means that numerous Chinese cooks in restaurants and hotels are included here in the domestic class

of achievement, irrespective of their racial origin. Chinese have obtained a wide variety of positions in the interracially organized and operated government services. Some Chinese are employed by white-controlled business firms to work particularly among Chinese customers, others have joined with American citizens of other racial origins to organize corporations and carry on business on a nonracial basis.

TABLE 1

Occupational Indices of Gainfully Employed Chinese Males, by Occupational Classes, Hawaiian Islands, 1910–30 *

Occupational class	*1910*	*1920*	*1930*
Professional	36	46	100
Proprietary	275	308	393
Clerical	140	214	347
Skilled	83	64	47
Semiskilled	70	72	91
Farm	139	84	92
Domestic	257	279	414
Unskilled	80	80	54

* These indices are obtained by dividing the percentage of all employed Chinese males engaged in a given class of occupations by the percentage of the total employed males who are engaged in the same occupational class and multiplying the quotient by 100. An occupational index of 100, then, would mean that Chinese males had a "normal proportion" of the positions within the occupational class. An index above or below 100 represents a deviation from the "normal proportion," either in the direction of excessive concentration or of a lack of expected representation in the particular class of occupations. Cf. Andrew W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 251.

The total numbers of employed Chinese males for the three dates, as reported by the Census, are as follows: 1910, 13,742; 1920, 11,110; and 1930, 8,571.

Chinese migrants to Hawaii entered an ecological organization which might be called a "plantation frontier" rather than a "frontier of settlement." As McKenzie and others have pointed out,[3] one of the significant differences between these two types of frontiers is that in the former the group which is financially and politically dominant is not numerically dominant. In the Hawaiian Islands the relatively small group of whites, or *haoles*,[4] has held the financial and political control. They successfully established the large, corporate plantation system. The subsequent expansion of the economy has resulted in the opening of many new jobs, the development of secondary industries, the extension of trade and the means of transportation and communication, the growth of towns and of a small metropolitan port city, and the increase in the demand for skilled and professional services.[5] Since the number of individuals in the dominant group has been inadequate to fill the positions which have opened in the preferred classes of occupations,[6] it has been possible for the partially acculturated Chinese, the first laboring group imported, to rise rapidly in the occupational scale. Their Hawaiian-born and more westernized descendants have continued the trend upward. Thus the occupational

[3] R. D. McKenzie, "The Concept of Dominance and World-Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (July, 1927), 37.

[4] The term *haole* is applied in Hawaii to white persons of American and North European origin. Up until 1872, almost a century after white discovery of the Islands, the total number of *haole* males did not exceed 2,000 at any one time. As late as 1920, of a total population of 255,912, and of a total male population twenty-one years old and over of 90,522, the total number of *haole* males twenty-one years old and over was only about 8,500. Nearly 4,000 of these were Americans in military service quartered in Hawaii.

[5] The best account of these changes in Hawaii is found in A. W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii*.

[6] The number of *haole* men gainfully employed in 1930, apart from those in military service, was only about 9,000, while the total number of positions in the first four classes of Table 1 was 19,440.

situation has been more favorable for Chinese in Hawaii than for those in the mainland United States, where the frontier was one of settlement, drawing whites until they had become the most numerous population element as well as politically and financially dominant

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND DISPERSION

Associated with changes in the economic and occupational position of Chinese in Hawaii have been changes in their residential distribution The pattern of residential distribution which the imported migrants found upon arrival was one of segregation Not only were they sent to the isolated plantation hinterland while the majority of whites remained in port towns, but on the plantation a rigid pattern of segregation was enforced by the management The small white group lived by itself, the native Hawaiians were housed in one set of quarters, and the Chinese, men without families, were housed elsewhere in rudely constructed barracks These Chinese neither resisted nor resented segregation In fact, they preferred it Segregated from other racial groups, the migrant was among those who shared his customs and old-world attitudes, as well as his indifference toward participating in the society of the new world

Since most of the Chinese — over twenty thousand — now reside in Honolulu, the trends in residential distribution there are the most significant for the present analysis Although more Chinese live in Honolulu than in San Francisco, which has the largest Chinatown in continental United States,[7] no part of Honolulu is similar to San Francisco's Chinatown Nevertheless, for a period of about fifty years Honolulu had its "Chinese quarter" [8] When Chinese began to move into Honolulu from the rural districts, they sought voluntarily the segregation which had been provided for them on plantations These Chinese retained to a large extent attitudes they had possessed on the plantations — the desire to exploit the economic resources as rapidly as possible, a general indifference toward participation in the interracial society, and a preference for maintaining contacts with the old world society through association with other Chinese All of these attitudes favored the growth and maintenance of a Chinatown in Honolulu Guilds could be and were organized there to secure economic advantage in a given occupation by attempting to control and regulate the conditions of competition among Chinese themselves while at the same time underbidding non-Chinese competitors who maintained a higher standard of living Other institutions could serve migrants temporarily residing in Hawaii, away from their accustomed family and clan pattern of existence

Between 1860 and 1900 almost all of the Chinese business establishments were located in the Chinese quarter Cooking and lodging quarters were an indispensible part of every store or shop The first Chinese families established in Honolulu lived on the business premises After the Chinatown fire of 1886, however, families began to move into buildings on the periphery of the Chinatown business district When a bubonic plague was followed by a second disastrous Chinatown fire early in 1900, there was an exodus

[7] The 1930 Census reported that 19,334 of the 137,582 individuals in the city of Honolulu — 14.1 per cent — were Chinese Since 1890 the number of Chinese in Honolulu has steadily increased, although the proportion which Chinese have comprised of the total Honolulu population has steadily decreased In 1884 and again in 1896 Chinese made up slightly more than 25 per cent of the city's population

[8] Clarence Glick "Residential Dispersion of Urban Chinese," *Social Process in Hawaii*, II (Honolulu, 1936), 28–34

from the Chinese quarter which began an ever widening dispersion of Chinese into every part of the city. By 1920 they comprised only about half of the population of the old Chinatown, with Japanese, Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, Filipinos, Portuguese, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and *haoles* — all of the other major groups in the Islands — composing the other half. The decline in the number and proportion of Chinese in the district has continued to the present time.[9]

While the dispersion of Chinese in Honolulu has not followed closely the pattern of formation of areas of second and third settlement, parts of Honolulu do correspond roughly with these generalized areas. Less than a mile from the old Chinese quarter, in what might be called Honolulu's area of workingmen's homes, lies one small area in which 1,514 Chinese were reported as residents in 1930. The Chinese were the largest population group in this enumeration district, but they composed only 31 per cent of its total population. Almost two miles from the old Chinatown, in an area of single dwellings, is another district sometimes referred to as "Chinese Hollywood." Here, in small modern homes, live Hawaiian-born Chinese. They are of the well-educated middle class — business and professional men. Their families, as contrasted with the families of their immigrant parents, are of the small one-to-three-child size. A survey directed by A. W. Lind of the University of Hawaii in 1937 revealed, however, that less than 50 per cent of the families in this area were Chinese, that the proportion of Chinese families was smaller than in 1930, and that the next-door neighbors of Chinese families living in the area were as likely to be of some other race as Chinese.

When census data for Honolulu were regrouped into twenty-four districts, approximating natural areas as closely as possible, twenty-one contained at least two hundred Chinese residents in 1930, there were three hundred or more Chinese in two-thirds of the areas and at least five hundred in half of them. The dispersion of the Chinese had increased considerably between 1920 and 1930 and the distribution of building permits issued to Chinese for the construction of new homes since 1930 indicates that the substitution of a dispersion pattern for a segregation pattern has proceeded steadily.

REORIENTATION OF STATUS-SEEKING ACTIVITIES

Changes in status among Chinese within the Island social order have accompanied these occupational and residential changes and may be seen as interacting with them. When Chinese plantation laborers sought to advance toward their "fortune-seeking" goal by pushing into other occupations, they were regarded as failing to fill the economic role as plantation utilities for which they had been imported. Expressions of welcome changed to expressions of disappointment and hostility. In the eighties and nineties anti-Chinese antipathy became intense, and restrictions were applied both upon further immigration and upon efforts of those Chinese already in the Islands to invade the preferred occupations.

Emotional outbursts against Chinese and special legislation against them as a class evoked a new sense of solidarity among the Chinese themselves. Institutions for counterattack arose, particularly the United Chinese Society. Through

[9] In this connection it would be interesting to analyze the factors involved in the quite different outcome of the San Francisco Chinatown following the earthquake and fire of 1906. There the area was rebuilt on a more elaborate scale than ever before, and Chinese informants state that some 15,000 Chinese — almost all of the city's Chinese population — are crowded into about eighteen blocks near the center of the city.

them the migrant became concerned about his status in a world larger than the family, clan, and village world from which he had come

It must be emphasized that the Chinese migrant who came to Hawaii was not "nationality-conscious" His conceptions of himself and his status were functions of his clan membership and of the territorially limited world in which that clan had status He became aware of such a thing as "nationality" through the categorical treatment which he received He found himself classed with other migrants from China who at home would have been regarded as outsiders distrusted by his clan Subsequently, the migrant found himself participating with these individuals in associations which aimed to ameliorate or counteract the anti-Chinese agitation and restrictions Through such participation he later became interested in Chinese nationalistic organizations which began to appear in Hawaii about 1895 and have continued to function with periods of activity corresponding to crises facing the Chinese in Hawaii and crises in the political situation in China [10]

Participation in these groups was the result of the migrant's changing conception of his status and at the same time further modified it. His developing concern about his national status led him also to take an interest in his status in the Hawaiian interracial society At first this took the indirect form of striving for status in the various Chinese associations An amazing network of almost one hundred immigrant organizations appeared in Chinatown Most of them provided some form of social control over the migrants themselves; through their complicated interrelationships they imposed a political order upon migrants who were not yet acculturated into Island society and over whom the white-dominated government had only superficial control. Induction into these organizations, however, did more than provide a basis for control in the new world; the groups had status-giving value for the migrant The status-giving process operated in at least three ways The activities of the migrant brought him formal, highly valued recognition from China, they brought him the more personal esteem of other members of the Chinatown community, and, finally, as these Chinese activities secured recognition from the dominant Island groups, the migrant who achieved "face" in Chinatown was raised in the esteem of the interracial society [11]

This form of social organization, while indicating that the participating migrants were undergoing the process of identifying themselves with a new society, was still an accommodative one In a sense, assimilation of the migrant into a Chinatown society meant at the same time accommodation to a larger interracial society of which Chinatown was an integral but distinct part To the extent that the migrant willingly participated in the emerging interracial society he did so in the role of a recognized member of a distinct racial and cultural group

It is at this stage of social organization that Chinese groups and Chinatowns in continental United States seem to have crystallized In Hawaii, however, the process has continued much further There

[10] Clarence Glick, "Transition from Familism to Nationalism among the Chinese in Hawaii," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIII (March, 1938), 734–43

[11] In the process of acquiring status in the Hawaiian Chinese community the migrant was becoming more detached from his village world This was particularly true of the economically successful migrant It is paradoxical that the more strenuously he worked to secure economic advantage and the closer he came to his original goal, the more subject he became to appeals to improve his prestige in the social world around him Hence, the very pursuance of his first goal led him into a changed direction of status-seeking

the point has been reached at which Chinese immigrants or their immediate descendants are having an opportunity to establish themselves as "persons" in the interracial society rather than being forced to continue their roles as representatives of a distinct group in the population This process has been accelerated since Hawaii's annexation to the United States and particularly since World War I, annexation and the application of American exclusion acts have meant that there have been few Chinese immigrants entering the Islands during the last forty years Those of the first generation who remain have now consciously or unwittingly become greatly acculturated to life in the Islands Even more important, due to the greater proportional influx of Chinese women into Hawaii than into continental United States, well over four-fifths of the Chinese are now Hawaiian-born and Hawaiian-reared individuals[12] Chinese have been replaced by later immigrant groups as objects of such antipathies as have existed Meanwhile, their prestige has improved locally Many *haoles* express the opinion that the Chinese in the Islands represent one of the best examples of the "Americanization" process

With the decline of Chinatown as a physical fact went the dissolution of Chinatown as a way of life Most of the old Chinatown organizations which remain are on the way out or have become so changed as to be hardly recognizable as the same institutions of years ago Few of the younger generation of Chinese are interested in securing recognition as leaders in associations founded by the immigrants or even in participating in them as members.

New institutions and interests have risen, patterned after American forms and ideals and quite definitely an integral part of the interracial society emerging in Hawaii Even organizations composed entirely or predominantly of persons of pure Chinese ancestry parallel and are co-ordinate with organizations whose memberships are interracial or "nonracial" in composition One prominent organization among Chinese, for example, is the Kau-Tom Post of the American Legion Members of this group and of its women's auxiliaries work co-operatively on projects with other American Legion groups, and in 1940 a member of the Kau-Tom Post a Chinese physician, was commander of the whole Hawaiian Department of the Legion As a matter of fact, Chinese frequently are members simultaneously in both "Chinese" and "interracial" institutions, depending upon the nature and objectives of the organizations

Kinship ties, the usual chance personal contacts, and the like operate in such a fashion that personally satisfying relationships for the majority of young Chinese are still maintained in primary groups with other persons of Chinese ancestry But the interests and values of these groups are dominated by the interests and values of the interracial community, not by those of the old world or of a Chinatown Thus, while the individual's status seeking activities may be primarily directed toward securing satisfying responses from other Chinese individuals in Hawaii, this orientation is basically controlled by new-world values which he and other Chinese share with persons of other racial ancestries.

At the same time, the social situation in Hawaii has made it fairly easy for Chinese to establish primary relations with persons of other races, and there has been a considerable amount of interracial marriage. A third of the marriages of Chinese individuals between 1920 and 1930 in-

[12] The percentage of foreign-born Chinese dropped from 84 4 in 1900 to 27 5 in 1930, and 1940 data should show a continuation of this rapid decline.

volved non-Chinese or part-Chinese marital partners, and in the period 1930–34 more than a fourth of the Chinese men and more than a fifth of the women were marrying persons who were not "pure Chinese." Under such circumstances an increasing number of persons of full or part Chinese ancestry define their own conceptions of themselves and of their future in terms of an identification with Hawaii and American life. Although the assimilative process has not been completed, the stage is rapidly being reached where the area in which the Chinese seek status is the same as the area in which they compete for position.

The basic outlines of the changing relationship between position and status among Chinese in Hawaii appear as follows. In the early phase migrants were segregated on the plantations, relatively isolated from persons of other races and with few contacts even with other Chinese except on the same plantations, they were concentrated at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, they were evaluated by outsiders largely as economic utilities, while they themselves were less interested in their status in the migrant area than in the local social world from which they had migrated. In the second phase urbanization resulted in the growth of a Chinatown, largely a voluntary form of segregation, which facilitated the intensification of intragroup contacts and relations, this change was accompanied occupationally by an expansion into a variety of new employments, migrants responded to hostility by becoming concerned about their "national" status and their status in the Chinatown colony. The third phase, not yet completed, has involved the gradual dispersion of the migrants and their descendants residentially into various parts of the interracial community, with an intensification of personal contacts with individuals of other races, occupationally, there has been a continuation of the infiltration into different occupational classes, an improvement in the general economic position of the group, and an increase in the proportion of individuals engaged in interracial and nonracial positions, status-seeking has become more clearly identified with the community in which the individual seeks a livelihood, including more concern over the status implications of one's occupation and more attention to maintaining a personally satisfying status in the emergent interracial society.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Deutschberger, Paul, "Interaction Patterns in Changing Neighborhoods: New York and Pittsburgh," *Sociometry*, November, 1946, pp. 303–15. Through the use of sociometric techniques this study describes the range and intensity of certain leisure time associative processes in relation to ecological factors of neighborhood and community.

2 Infeld, Heinrich, "Social Control in a Cooperative Society," *Sociometry*, August, 1942, pp. 258–71. Since our own economic system is characterized by individualistic competition, it is interesting to contrast it with the collectivistic economy of this Zionist agricultural settlement in Palestine, where there is no private ownership of land and the whole community is managed by an elected committee.

3 Kennedy, R. J. R., "Single or Triple Melting-Pot? Intermarriage Trends in New Haven, 1870–1940," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1944, pp. 331–39. Using intermarriage as a single but important index of assimilation, this statistical type of analysis shows that religious differences function as the chief impediment to a fully materialized "melting-pot" in this country.

4 King, A. R., "Status Personality Change in Northern Negroes in Southern United States," *Social Forces*, December, 1947, pp. 153–66. As a study in accommodation this article is of special interest for its intensive analysis of three cases of minority group individuals who underwent shifts in "status personality" orientation. The findings complement what was set forth by Myrdal.

5 Loomis, C. P., "Informal Groupings in a Spanish-American Village," *Sociometry*, February, 1941, pp. 36–51. This study notes how pat

terns of co-operative activity develop among families and friends in a small village

6 May, M A and Doob, L W, *Competition and Cooperation,* Social Science Research Council, New York, 1937 Note especially Chapters II–IV, "A Theory of Competition and Cooperation," "Experimental Approaches to Problems of Competition and Cooperation," "Sociological Approaches to the Study of Competition and Cooperation," pp 7–85

7 Mead, Margaret, *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples,* McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1937 Although the concrete materials of this monograph are valuable for cultural comparisons, the section especially referred to for our purposes is the editor's "Introduction," pp 1–20, which supplies a conceptual guide for the analysis of co-operation and competition

8 See also Malinowski, "The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis," p 168, Linton, "Status and Role," p 211, Waller, "The Separate Culture of the School," p 625, Abel "The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement, p 827.

21. Disjunctive Social Processes

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

One does not have to be a philosopher to perceive that human existence is characterized by struggle. Men not only struggle against the constant threat of adverse natural circumstances, but also against one another. The latter struggle is implied in the disjunctive social processes. Although it was once believed by many social theorists that societal evolution would eventually displace all conflict with co-operation, this view is now generally recognized as being utopian. Deliberate controls may maximize or minimize conflicts, yet it must be acknowledged that competition and conflict as well as accommodation and co-operation are inherent in human association.

Designating precisely what is meant by the two basic disjunctive processes, *competition* and *conflict*, is not an easy matter. Some theorists stress the importance of subjective factors, such as attitudes, and maintain that both competition and conflict stem from mutually opposed desires which lead to mutually hindering actions. Thus, when some persons think that other persons hinder, block, or otherwise impede the realization of their desires, a mental and emotional state called *tension* is said to result. According to this interpretation, competition is simply a moderate and conflict a high degree of tension. Other theorists point out, however, that periodic open conflict may ultimately reduce or minimize social instability by keeping sources of mutual irritation from cumulating. Likewise, it should be noted that a valid distinction between competition and conflict may be made in terms of whether the means employed are nonviolent (e.g., persuading, underbidding) or violent (e.g., forcing, injuring, annihilating), and that competition more characteristically is impersonal.

Instead of trying to consider both of these processes together, let us try to simplify matters by looking at them separately. The preceding points of view are of some value, but the most clear-cut and useful definition of competition appears to be an operational one paralleling that set forth for co-operation in the preceding chapter (see pp. 17–18 of the May and Doob citation under Annotated References).

"On a social level, individuals compete with one another when (1) they are striving to achieve the same goal that is scarce; (2) they are prevented by the rules of the situation from achieving this goal in equal amounts, (3) they perform better when the goal can be achieved in unequal amounts, and (4) they have relatively few psychologically affiliative contacts with one another.

"On a psychological level, an individual competes with others when: (1) there

is a discrepancy between his level of achievement and his goal of aspiration; (2) his knowledge of the goal that he seeks indicates that it is limited and cannot be shared at least equally by other persons in that situation; (3) his attitudes produce within him a state in which his attitude toward competing overbalances possible conflicting attitudes toward potential competitors, toward the rules of the situation, toward cooperating rather than competing, etc ; and (4) his skill is of such a nature that under the rules of the situation he has a reasonable chance of success by competing."

In our selection bearing the title "Prestige and Competition" one can observe how competition as a social process has been singled out for emphasis in the highly complicated interaction going on in the university world Within any given university and between universities there is necessarily much co-operation, but the striving for objectives which cannot be equally shared also results in extensive competition Interuniversity competition is transmuted into intrauniversity competition, and rivalry is generated on both levels Although intellectual competition is ordinarily more subtle and muted than intercollegiate athletic competition, educational institutions vie with one another in many phases of endeavor In terms of prestige symbols denoting successful accomplishment, universities receive their ratings or rankings, and the whole competitive process develops pressures upon all of those who are engaged in it The individual participant gets his goals, therefore, in a setting where there is a premium on practical success, spectacular achievement, and even quantitative productiveness

This line of analysis shows how individual wishes for security and recognition are tied in with a competitive social system in which status becomes important Thus, the individual gains prestige through competition with other individuals, and the stimulus of competitive activity and success symbols are both used to motivate endeavor. Yet different types of persons respond in varying ways, and the heavy stress on goals sometimes leads to a disregard for academic standards of ethics in achieving them, with such unanticipated consequences as opportunism, loss of interest, and even disgust among some of the participants The latter, of course, are deviant modes of behavior, and on the whole it may be said that in the college and university world, as well as elsewhere, competition as a social process is essential to the achievement of organizational objectives

Turning our attention from competition to conflict we find a disjunctive process in which the interests of the individuals or groups involved clash and the parties become adversaries in some form of "combat" Although not invariably so, conflict is often marked by violence or the threat of violence In competition energy or activity is directed toward a goal, whereas in conflict energy or activity is largely deflected toward weakening or even eliminating the opposition Since conflict always takes place between persons and groups mutually regarded as obstructing one another's objectives, it is necessarily a personalized process which alters the status of one or both of the participants when it is resolved

Minor and intermittent conflicts stem from all sorts of differences which set in-

dividuals apart from one another, but the more persistent patterns of conflict cluster around the familiar lines of societal cleavage which were discussed in the section on social differentiation and stratification. In addition to these sources of conflict within a society there is also the traditional pattern of conflict known as war, which is the ultimate form of strife between societies. Furthermore, whether between small groups or whole nations, conflict tends on the one hand to increase the social distance between the antagonists and on the other to promote in-group solidarity.

It has been pointed out by Dawson and Gettys in their *An Introduction to Sociology* that conflict also may be regarded as a "process through which accumulated tensions may be resolved or liquidated." The time sequence may be brief or prolonged. Its familiar forms range from minor quarrels and petty tiffs through feuds, litigations, strikes, lynchings, riots, wars, and a wide variety of other disjunctions. As many of the large-scale conflicts within our own society arise from the clash of economic interest groups, we have chosen the field of industrial conflict as our first case in point.

Chapman's empirical study has as its locale Detroit, a city characterized by heavy industry, a heterogeneous population, and, during the 1930's, turbulent strife between management and labor. Initially most of the advantages were on the side of management, but during the depression the advent of the NRA promoted collective bargaining, and public opinion compelled industry to renounce much of its overt opposition to unionization.

"Industrial Conflict in Detroit" analyzes step by step the development of the whole sequence from the initial sources of irritation, apprehension, tension, and chronic discontent which had long plagued industrial relations in that city. One can see how the upsurge of conflict made labor more solidary as an in-group and how the labor organization which won over most of the automotive workers to its ranks was the one best prepared with a closely-knit, militant program to do battle with management. The authors trace the sequence of the active campaign, with its culmination in the sit-down strike after one of the parties had refused to accept mediation by conference as a possible solution. Then came instances of violence and the use of organized force by each side. Public meetings and rallies, newspaper reports, and other media of communication aroused public opinion over the immediate situation and its implications. After certain concessions (alterations in objectives), a solution was finally arrived at through a process of compromise, so that the tensions were resolved even though not entirely liquidated. As so often occurs, conflict eventuated in (temporary) accommodation.

A slight pro-labor bias may be detected in the exposition, but on the whole this account portrays objectively and in basic outline what has happened time and again in the sphere of industrial relations and what we may expect to recur in similar conflict situations.

Our final item on conflict is not a specific case but a comprehensive set of generalizations based on many specific analyses. Williams's "Propositions on Inter-

group Hostility and Conflict" is a highly useful summary for disjunctive processes as a whole and it also complements at many points the materials presented in Chapters 13, 14, 22, and 23 on social classes, ethnic aspects of social stratification, social disorganization, and social change. Propositions concerning the origins and prevalence of hostility, the varied types of hostility and conflict, the causes and consequences of hostility and conflict, and modes for controlling them necessarily have such far-reaching implications that they cut across many areas of sociological analysis

This selection is relevant for our purposes as an example of what might be called synthetic analysis, i e , the author obviously covered a considerable body of studies of intergroup relations within certain categories and deduced from them some principles, working hypotheses, and assumptions. Some of them, as he acknowledges, had already been set forth by the original investigators, but others had to be inferred Some of the propositions are admittedly of questionable validity and reliability, whereas others have been verified time and again by empirical inquiry Since most of the propositions cannot be condensed any further, and since each of 101 statements has a distinctive bearing on some aspect of the disjunctive processes, a commentary which tried to show the many points of specific interest to us would be at least as long as the quoted material

Williams's extended set of generalizations indicates a foundation of knowledge which has already been established through sociological analysis and suggests directions to be taken by further research in testing and building upon it; but more important for the general reader is the "reasonably solid base of reference" afforded for intelligent understanding and social action.

PRESTIGE AND COMPETITION * *Logan Wilson*

It is clear by now that the academician participates in a highly competitive social system. There is necessarily much co-operation, but competition, or individual striving for ends that cannot be equally shared, creates the problems in which we are interested. Those in training for membership, it has been observed, compete for grades, prizes, honors, and fellowships. Selection and promotion are based upon criteria that assume competition Universities and departments within them are in active and sometimes acrid competition for students, money, and other symbols of achievement Wherever accomplishment is measured comparatively, there is inevitable competitiveness

Co-operation is a much lauded process in higher education, and effective organization would be impossible without it yet no considerable acumen is required to see divergences between professed empha

* From Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man* Copyright 1942 by Oxford University Press, New York

ses and actual workings of the system Major universities compete for their share of the national income Institutions supported by the same domain compete with one another Private and public universities are placed in rival positions, and growth in one place may imply decline elsewhere As the limits of expansion in higher education are approached, the struggle for a place in the sun is even more intensified The quick tempo of social change prevents stabilization of the position of any university, so that the weakest institutions struggle to keep alive, the average ones to maintain themselves or to improve their status, and the best to stay at the forefront Levels of institutional aspiration are always relative, and the status of any university is relative to that of comparable universities

FACTORS IN UNIVERSITY PRESTIGE

Inter-university competition is transmuted into personal competition, for to secure a desirable place in the prestige hierarchy, an institution must be able to bring forward specific claims To obtain endowments, appropriations, and the other material means of sustaining or advancing its position, the university needs to show evidences of accomplishment Such evidences are popularly seen in the size of its student body, the magnificence of its physical plant, and the prowess of its athletic teams Expert judgments, however, are based upon other criteria of prestige

Qualified judges are interested above all in the general competence, training, and experience of the faculty An inquiry into fifty-seven co-operating institutions in the North Central Association[1] has ascertained that institutional excellence is dependent largely upon a competent, well-organized faculty, which is provided with a satisfactory working environment Individual members must be adequately trained, sufficiently experienced in their specialties, and must evidence their scholarship through publication and by participation in learned societies Effective faculty organization means a well-balanced ratio between student numbers and instructional staff, an adequate representation in the various fields of instruction, and ample opportunity for staff participation in policy making Good working conditions means that satisfactory provision must be made for the following "salary status, tenure, instructional load, recruiting, selection, and appointment, aids to faculty growth; and provisions for leaves of absence, retirement, insurance, housing, and recreation and community life" (Ibid)

With reference to faculty competence, a statistical estimate of the relative importance of major items has yielded the following table

TABLE 1

Regression Weighting of Items of Importance in Staff Competence[2]

Doctor's degrees	10
Master's degrees	30
Graduate study	30
Experience	30
Books and monographs	35
Articles	50
Membership in learned societies	06
Attending society meetings	25
Office in learned societies	20
Part in society programs	20

[2] Ibid, p 78 The average rank of faculty competence by these criteria, according to types of institutions, is as follows (1) universities, (2) liberal arts colleges, (3) Catholic colleges, (4) teachers colleges, (5) junior colleges (see p. 89)

In addition to having a competent faculty, as judged by these and other factors, an institution is measured in terms of its

[1] Melvin F Haggerty, *The Evaluation of Higher Institutions* (Vol 2, *The Faculty*), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1937

laboratory, library, and other facilities, the quality of its undergraduates and graduates,[3] and its administrative leadership To insure institutional stability, there must be adequate and continued financial support, and a dependable enrollment Equally important are those intangible items expressed as morale, and an emphasis on the higher reaches of scholarship

Some of the terms of inter university competition are set in a rather mechanical way by such accrediting agencies as the Association of American Universities, the National Association of State Universities, and a number of others of national as well as regional scope,[4] which maintain explicit standards. Aside from expelling or refusing to admit institutions falling below their standards, these agencies attempt to give no rank order to affiliated and non-affiliated colleges and universities

INSTITUTIONAL RANKINGS

The general standings of universities become known to the educated classes of laymen largely through informal channels Specialized excellence, while known to scholars and scientists within a field, is not widely disseminated as information, even among undergraduates who contemplate entering the field Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and other leading centers stand as symbols of scholarly prestige with many persons having only vague notions of how such standings are deduced Even academicians themselves are prone to be swayed by the magic of traditional renown, regardless of how meaningless it may be when applied to the merit of a particular department within a major university

To provide interested individuals with a more rational basis for their impressions numerous attempts have been made to rank colleges and universities in various orders of merit In 1911, for instance, the Bureau of Education prepared a rating of 344 institutions at the request of the Association of American Universities This list was first distributed semi confidentially and aroused such a storm of protest that it was officially withdrawn Despite objections from various sources to invidious comparisons, later rankings have been made The best known of these is one undertaken by the American Council on Education in 1934[5] This study relied upon the ratings of a presumably representative group of prominent specialists in thirty odd fields (averaging about sixty five judges to a field) The derived rank order of universities according to the number of distinguished departments is as follows (as of the year 1934) (1) Harvard (2) Chicago, (3) Columbia, (4) California, (5) Yale, (6) Michigan, (7) Cornell, (8) Princeton, (9) Johns Hopkins (10) Wisconsin, (11) Minnesota

In a commentary on these findings Edwin R Embree has pointed out that

[3] The rank order of the first thirteen institutions in the production of graduates of distinction since 1915 has been computed as follows (1) Harvard, (2) Yale, (3) California, (4) Columbia, (5) Princeton, (6) Chicago, (7) Wisconsin, (8) Michigan, (9) Pennsylvania, (10) Cornell, (11) Dartmouth, (12) Illinois, (13) Indiana See B W Kunkel and D B Prentice, "The Production of Graduates of Distinction by Undergraduate Liberal Arts Colleges and Technical Schools," *Ass'n of American Colleges Bulletin*, XXVI, No 3, 1940, p 136

[4] See George F Zook, *The Evaluation of Higher Institutions* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936.

[5] *Report on the Committee on Graduate Instruction* Washington, American Council on Education, 1934 Whereas this *Report* is the most comprehensive study yet attempted, the sampling procedure was somewhat faulty, and the representativeness of the returns was not checked Likewise, certain institutional rankings based upon the cumulative totals of distinguished departments have rather indiscriminately given the same weighting to relatively minor fields in which few persons are engaged as to those in which thousands of individuals are trained and employed

[6] "In Order of Their Eminence"

there is nothing particularly difficult about rating individual departments, since it is constantly done in all university thinking and planning. Although this is perhaps a *non sequitur,* one might assuredly state that contemporary eminence is nothing more than what competent judges think it is. In the case of the eleven institutions just mentioned, it is evident that from the point of view of their total number of distinguished (as well as adequate) departments, Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, and California are pre-eminent. Cumulative ratings become more difficult as one passes below this group. Some of the larger state universities, for example, have adequate graduate departments in many fields without being adjudged distinguished in any of them. There are other institutions, notably Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the California Institute of Technology, which are unsurpassed in their specialties, but without attempting to compete in all fields. Then again, a few well known universities which try to spread themselves over the entire field of scholarship and science are not considered by disinterested specialists to be adequate in a single graduate department.

A further means of arriving at the distinction of universities is through the distribution of American Men of Science. Embree shows the close correspondence between institutional eminence and the location of outstanding scientists as follows: Harvard, 78, Chicago, 57, Columbia, 54, Yale 50, California, 46, Johns Hopkins, 39, Cornell, 35, Princeton, 31, Wisconsin, 30, Michigan, 29; Minnesota, 26, Pennsylvania, 26, Stanford, 25 (Ibid.).

Another investigator has used a composite index based on these criteria: institutions at which there are Fellows of the Social Science Research Council, the National Research Council, and so on; the institutional affiliations of officers and members of committees of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and other learned societies; starred men in *American Men of Science,* institutions from which these men took their degrees, and so on to get a total of twenty-eight items for statistical comparison.[7] The relative standing of the sixteen leading American graduate centers was found to be (figures indicate sum of ranks): Harvard, 63, Chicago, 121, Columbia, 126, Yale, 157, California, 180, Johns Hopkins, 199, Cornell, 234, Princeton 242, Michigan, 245, Wisconsin, 250, Pennsylvania, 257, Minnesota, 279, M. I. T., 317, Illinois 329, Stanford, 339, Ohio State, 393.

It is in these and other leading universities within the main stream of higher education that intellectual competition is most intense. Every major university vies for recognition in nearly all the branches of learning. Intellectual competition, to be sure, is more subtle and muted than is athletic competition on the collegiate level, but it is equally evident in disguised or open forms. Most of the central universities already have tremendous resources, hence they are in a position to press their advantages through demands upon their staffs to a much greater extent than would be possible in provincial colleges.

Existing disparities between leading and lesser universities are further intensified by recruitment of the ablest scholars and scientists to such centers, so that this draining off of talent — especially marked in the South — leaves lesser institutions still further weakened. Graduate centers enjoy the marginal advantage of being able to use their prestige to secure more prestige. They can and do bid for outstanding individuals, and their superior resources

[7] Walter C. Jells, Another Ranking of American Graduate Schools, *School and Society,* Vol. 46, 1937, pp. 282-84. For another treatment of the subject, see Laurence Foster, *The Functions of a Graduate School in a Democratic Society,* N. Y., Huxley House, 1936.

make them the logical recipients for added resources from foundations and other benefactors.[8] Affiliated institutes for research and advanced study provide an environment where undivided attention is given to cultural discovery and invention.

Since the Ph.D. has been conceived as a research degree, research centers also tend to become centers for training toward the doctorate. In general, there is a close correspondence between the resources of a university and its power to attract graduate students. Offsetting factors exist, however, which cause individual institutions to strain or under-utilize their resources in the production of doctorates. A rough approximation of the utilization being made by various universities of their physical resources may be ascertained from Table 2. Here we get a comparison of leading graduate centers with reference to certain material factors that are necessary though not sufficient conditions for the attainment of prestige in the academic world.

Any comparison of universities in terms of physical resources is inevitably misleading in certain particulars. For example, state and denominational institutions may rank low in endowment, yet have a more stable and adequate financial support than many private institutions with considerably higher endowments. Expenditures for teaching and research cannot be compared fairly until figures are reduced to a per capita basis according to the size of staff and student body. Among the most important material criteria of adequacy with regard to physical resources is the size of a university library, but it should be borne in mind that institutes of technology do not require the extensive libraries needed in universities offering advanced training in practically all subject-matter fields. On the whole, however, it may be inferred that a university is straining its resources and emphasizing quantity at the expense of quality when it ranks high in the production of doctorates, while ranking low in value of property, income, expenditures for teaching and research, and size of library. This inference may be verified by comparing the data of Table 2 with those of Appendix 1 [in *The Academic Man*].

[8] It should be noted that the initial advantage of leading endowed universities is being undermined as lower interest rates and the heavier state absorption of private incomes place the tax-supported institutions in a relatively more favorable competitive position.

THE LOCAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INVIDIOUS COMPARISONS

A significant aspect of invidious comparisons between universities is the interpretation made of them within a university. In larger institutions where there are few if any personal contacts between the deans or presidents and average staff members, the principal check upon departmental activities is the annual report made to the central administration. A case in point is afforded by a University of Chicago survey[9] which ranks the four divisions with respect to higher degrees held, extensity of published works, and recognitions accorded in such published lists as *American Men of Science* and *Who's Who in America*. In addition to this comparison, the survey also gives tables showing the average number of published contributions according to subject-matter departments, and academic rank. The authors comment that bibliographical entries obtained from reports to the president are not necessarily complete, but add — perhaps facetiously — that "faculty members in general feel an interest in having their publications recorded, and few fail to send in the data called for."

The rapid rise of the University of Chi-

[9] *The University Faculty, passim*

TABLE 2

A Comparison of the Physical Resources of the Thirty Leading Graduate Centers

Rank order of the thirty leading graduate centers in terms of doctorates conferred between 1929–30 and 1938–9 *	RANK ORDER WITH REFERENCE TO †				
	Value of property	Endowment	Expenditures for teaching and non-budgeted research	Expenditures for research separately budgeted	Size of library (Number of bound volumes)
1 Columbia	3	4	4	3	3
2 Chicago	2	3	13	1	5
3 Wisconsin	16	23	10	6	6
4 Harvard	—	1	1	7	1
5 Cornell	8	11	5	11	8
6 Yale	1	2	7	9	2
7 California	4	12	3	2	4
8 Michigan	7	17	2	14	9
9 Illinois	10	26	9	4	7
10 N Y U	18	18	6	27	17
11 Ohio State	17	25	12	13	18
12 Iowa	19	27	15	20	16
13 Johns Hopkins	14	10	19	27	15
14 Minnesota	13	15	8	5	11
15 Pennsylvania	9	13	11	10	10
16 Princeton	—	9	21	15	12
17 Stanford	12	7	16	23	13
18 M I T	11	6	18	19	24
19 Pittsburgh	20	21	23	16	28
20 Iowa St College	24	28	20	8	26
21 Catholic	28	20	29	27	22
22 Northwestern	15	14	14	17	14
23 Cal Tech	23	19	–	12	30
24 Texas	5	5	22	18	19
25 Fordham	27	30	27	25	29
26 North Carolina	25	22	28	21	23
27 Washington (Seattle)	22	29	24	26	21
28 Virginia	21	16	25	22	25
29 Duke	6	8	17	27	20
30 Southern California	26	24	26	24	27

* Rank order is based upon figures obtained from Clarence S. Marsh, *American Colleges and Universities*, Washington, American Council on Education, 1940. Table XIII. The number of doctorates by institutions and by departments is given in Appendix I of the present study.

† Institutional rank orders with reference to indicated physical resources are from Henry G. Badger and others, *Abridged Statistics of Higher Education, 1935-6*, Washington, U. S. Dept. of the Interior, 1938 (Bulletin 1937, No. 2) *passim*. Blank spaces indicate no data reported. (One should bear in mind that the endowment rankings have no particular significance for tax supported institutions.)

cago to the forefront as a graduate center is attributable in no small measure to its emphasis upon the prestige which accrues from intellectual competition. Specific evidence of this attitude is seen in a brochure distributed to the alumni. A few representative passages follow.

"As not too modest alumni of the University of Chicago, we wish to share with

others our pride in the recent announcement that twelve more University faculty members have been voted 'star' ranking by the country's leading scientists.

. . .

"Including the twelve scientists newly honored in the 1938 poll, the University of Chicago now has a total of forty-six men on its faculty who have won stars since 1921.

. . .

"We blush a bit that Harvard should outrank Chicago, but console ourselves with the reminder that the Crimson has been in the business longer and has a tremendous edge in capital assets

"We thought it would be a good idea to kill two birds with the same chart So along with Professor Visher's total on starred men we have included several endowment estimates taken from *Fortune* magazine's recent article on the University of Chicago

"When it printed the endowment totals of the four leading privately supported universities, *Fortune* said ' *When you come to equate the endowment and income figures with scholarship, a reasonable case could be made out that Chicago gets more B T U's of teaching and research energy per dollar than any other U S university, even including Harvard*'

. . .

"So, returning to Professor Visher's statistics, we find that among 1,000 men starred since 1921, a *total of 123* received their Ph D 's from Chicago.

"Only one other university, Harvard, exceeds the University of Chicago in this respect Harvard has 126, just three more than Chicago

. . .

"Perhaps we sound like alumni extolling their Alma Mater But the implications of these reports are broader than any local 'pointing with pride'

"We have amassed a good deal of evidence demonstrating that Chicago is a great research institution — one of the greatest With that accomplished, our final purpose is to point out the place of a great research institution in the pattern of modern life

"A university must not be confused with a college A college *teaches*. A university *learns* A college transmits knowledge A university discovers new knowledge (or recaptures lost knowledge) which colleges presently will interpret and teach . But the real test of a great University lies in its *Additions* to human knowledge" [10]

Explicitly or implicitly invidious comparisons with their competitors place tremendous pressures upon major institutions to uphold their reputations Both administration and staff security depend upon the ability to get maximum results In marginal instances these may be mere surface results, as there is engendered a misplaced premium upon practical success, spectacular achievements of value for publicity purposes, and even upon mere quantitative productiveness ("dean's research," as it is colloquially known) The logic of the situation tends to counterbalance keen qualitative discrimination, so that there is a palm for almost any sort of investigative effort, and administrators become prone to judge academicians by the yardage of their publications As a consequence, there is much hothouse forcing of second-rate material and an intense spirit of rivalry and *reclamé*.

It is within this institutional setting that the academic man seeks his goals Institutional prestige is translated into personal prestige, and vice versa The social

[10] "New Stars in the Scientific Firmament," Chicago, Alumni Committee on Information and Development 1938

system of the university abstractly phrases competition in terms of objective technical competence, irrespective of personal rivalries, yet on the concrete level status is made important and there is no way of measuring success except by comparisons To satisfy individual wishes for security and recognition, scholarly disinterestedness must rest paradoxically upon some form of interestedness

THE PRESTIGE MECHANISM

Prestige attained within the academic profession usually elevates its possessor in his whole social milieu To be a champion horseshoe thrower carries no great general prestige, but to be eminent in any of the major professions is to be eminent in every sense of the word The extension of prestige beyond the immediate group understanding its components is afforded by the lay reputations of such men as Einstein It should be noted, nonetheless, that the in-group does not always succeed in having its evaluations of importance accepted by outsiders The leading authority on the *musca domestica* may command the utmost admiration in entomological circles, yet his less learned confreres may consider him a very ordinary mortal

Since prestige symbols vary from one complex social situation to another prestige itself is in no sense a metaphysical entity or social force remaining constant Prestige, whether academic or otherwise, is bound up with a "complex sign or symbol situation" embodied in whatever is known as success It accrues to the individual as a result of his possessing qualities or achieving ends envied by the group As Frank H Knight has remarked,

"Economic activity is at the same time a means of want satisfaction, an agency for want- and character-formation, a field of creative self-expression, and a competitive sport While men are 'playing the game' of business, they are also moulding their own and other personalities, and creating a civilization whose worthiness to endure cannot be a matter of indifference"[11]

Yet prestige referents are not essentially the same in the academic world as they are in other social universes, likewise, legitimate means of achieving them are differently defined The academic ethic is not to be reconciled with bandying about knowledge "as an object of sport, no matter how fascinating it may be to leaders" Knight considers action motivated by rivalry as being of dubious worth He feels that the satisfaction of discovery carries with it — if one insists upon hedonism — an elation, kin to true invention, which is sufficient reward

It is generally recognized, however, that actual behavior always falls short of the standards of recommended behavior Although scholars and scientists collectively are less given to ulterior motives than are most occupational groups, deviations appear on the individual level The quest for prestige normally is indirect, in that self aggrandizement supposedly is only a by-product of merit, but this is not always the case It is easy to exaggerate academic competition as a selfish struggle of egoists, and concomitantly to minimize the vast amount of co-operation in higher learning Notwithstanding the latter, the outward placidity of academic life belies the intensity of inner processes These processes are not naked, neither are they always sensed by the outside observer, for as Veblen has noted

"This advancement of learning is in no degree a business proposition, and yet it must, for the present at least, remain the sole ostensible purpose of the business-like university In the main, therefore, all the

[11] *The Ethics of Competition*, N Y, Harper & Bros, 1935, p 47

competitive endeavors and manoeuvres of the captains of erudition in charge must be made under cover of an ostensible endeavor to further this non-competitive advancement of learning, at all costs." [12]

Group interests are complicated by the development of active but unavowed purposes in many members. That relatively few devote themselves to learning altogether for its own sake is borne out by the following statement from Einstein:

"Many kinds of men devote themselves to Science, and not all for the sake of Science herself. There are some who come into her temple because it offers them the opportunity to display their particular talents. To this class of men science is a kind of sport in the practice of which they exult, just as an athlete exults in the exercise of his muscular prowess. There is another class of men who come into the temple to make an offering of their brain pulp in the hope of securing a profitable return. These men are scientists only by chance of circumstance which offered itself when making a choice of career. If the attending circumstances had been different they might have become politicians or captains of business. Should an angel of God descend and drive from the temple of Science all those who belonged to the categories I have mentioned, I fear the temple would be nearly emptied. But a few worshipers would still remain — some from former times and some from ours." [13]

Although he might prefer a situation in which materialistic considerations did not have to be taken into account, the savant cannot ignore them entirely, so that in academic pursuits, as in all others forming the basis of livelihood, there must be a working adjustment.

SYMBOLS OF SUCCESS

There are many substantive symbols of status within the higher learning, but income is regarded as only incidental. As in all occupations, there are also in the academic profession persons who are actually being paid more than they could get in any other type of work; this may be due to general incapacity or merely to a trained incapacity for other kinds of pursuits. In all probability there are more instances of highly capable persons on university faculties — chemists, engineers, teachers in medical schools, and others — who could obtain far more remuneration on the outside. At any rate, the individuals who are attracted to teaching or research primarily because it affords a comfortable, leisurely, and respectable life seldom achieve much prestige in the profession.

Prestige within the academic world depends upon statuses that are both ascribed and achieved, but the latter are far more numerous and important. Many mediocre men fill important professorships largely by virtue of seniority, but with increasingly keener competition this is becoming less true. Likewise, the professor's prestige is connected with his institutional affiliation, and a faculty member at one of the leading universities has some prestige attached to him regardless of his personal standing among the elite of his field. A fortunate institutional connection is a double asset to the teacher or research man: first, it gives prestige to him by signifying (if status is permanent) that he has already "arrived", and second, it places him in an advantageous position further to enhance his reputation. He is aided in this second respect in devious ways; de-

[12] *The Higher Learning*, p. 174.

[13] "Prologue," to Max Planck's *Where Is Science Going?* N. Y., W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., p. 7. For other treatments of the motives of scholars and scientists see Alexander Herzberg, *The Psychology of Philosophers*, N. Y., Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1929, and Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy's Ulterior Motives," *The Atlantic*, 159, pp. 149–55.

spite the fact that material submitted for publication from, let us say, Yale or Princeton, may not be better than that submitted by an unknown from a second-rate college, it usually *looks* better to the editor or reader because of the institutional prestige and authority behind it.[14] The leading universities, in short, afford more favorable environments for the development of distinction.

Notwithstanding this, there is a large mixture of folklore in the ascription of prestige, especially to men in central universities, where their status carries a halo effect. There is a ritual element in the historic nature of office, which causes the occupier to be judged by popular conceptions of what the office should be.[15] Although the professorial office is by no means completely ritualized, objective judgments concerning holders are partially held in abeyance. It is for this reason that a mediocre Columbia, Chicago, or Harvard professor is more likely to be included in *Who's Who*, called to Washington for consultation, or otherwise signalized, than is a professor of equal achievement in a provincial institution.

The vast majority of the nation's leading scholars and scientists, it is true, are found in the major universities,[16] and the more promising ones in outlying places are constantly being recruited to them. Moreover, the prestige of research centers is so potent that other institutions, established for quite different purposes, indiscriminately try to simulate the pattern, so that teachers almost everywhere must strain to become intellectual innovators and leaders, with demonstrated ability to impress, express, and persuade followers.

Regardless of whether the academic man is in a major or a minor university, his need for security as well as his institutionally induced ego demands provide the push from within and the pull from without toward socially valued norms. Lip service is given to the impersonal and unselfish advancement of learning, but at the same time keen personal competition is fostered. Unmitigated strains develop in a defective social structure relying upon an increasingly meaningless credo to secure co-operativeness and objectivity. Individually, all of this appears in the necessity for zealously upholding one's status within the local situation and in the national professional group. In brief, the scholar-scientist is competing against all others in his immediate field for status in the wider arena, and also for status among his local colleagues to gain their acclaim and to secure administrative recognition.

Still, this does not mean that prestige is a function and activity is its variable. The teacher and researcher who is genuinely interested in what he is doing may have little thought of the prestige that may come to him as a by-product. Also, there are many who may be under pressures without being aware of them, or who may

[14] For example, the author of an outstanding recent book in history had difficulty initially in getting his manuscript considered merely because he happened to be connected with an obscure southern college. His monograph finally received the attention of a leading publishing firm, had its merit recognized, and the book is now widely used as an authoritative reference in its field.

[15] See Everett C. Hughes, "Institutional Office and the Person," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 43, 1937, pp. 404–13.

[16] Verification of this generalization in one important field is afforded by an inquiry I recently made in another context. A questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 200 members of the American Economic Association, asking them to name the ten living economists who had made the most valuable contributions to the field of economics. The 98 replies received mentioned a total of 162 different names, many of which appeared on only one individual list. It is interesting to note, however, that with the exception of two economists with a private foundation, the twenty-one men receiving as many as ten or more mentions were all concentrated in seven universities—Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Wisconsin, Chicago, Princeton, and Pennsylvania.

enjoy the stimulus of the competitive process, or may find so much pleasure in their activity that they are wholly unconscious of the existence of pressures There are still others in the academic fold who turn their backs on scholarly fame or recognition, they may have the capacity for significant research work but prefer to remain in colleges where the emphasis is wholly or primarily upon teaching

It cannot be denied, however, that perversions of the process of competition and overemphases of prestige values tend to make successful teaching and research commodities that are manufactured for the direct purpose of trading them for personal prestige The university organization within which the academic man functions defines the goals, purposes, and interests for his "aspirational frame of reference," and it also sets up a regulative structure A disproportionate stress on goals at the expense of the legitimacy and adequacy of means serves to promote opportunism and to weaken the efficacy of the regulative structure [17] The observations of this study should make it quite clear that a disproportionate accent on goals has intensified competition to the extent that satisfactions often cease to be derived from mere participation In the academic world the symbols of success and the tokens of acclaim are much the same for all participants, and are theoretically attainable by all—in spite of their scarcity With a limited possibility in sharing the symbols of prestige, warped results and distorted organization personalities are bound to develop, and especially so in light of the wide discrepancies in performers' abilities

Stress upon goals and lack of attention to regulation generate anti-social behavior in the university organization as well as in the wider social organization. Although the "rules of the game" are not unknown to the competitors, regardless of the principles of legitimacy or the norm of disinterestedness, a significant number of individuals tend to use those means of obtaining prestige that are most easily adapted to institutionally derived ends The present system creates needs that are neither cared for nor formally acknowledged, and gives rise to problems that are often officially ignored If the organization of higher education is to persist in its present form as an open social system, then it is very likely that within the near future there will have to be a redefinition of ends or else greater attention to the legitimacy of means

The preceding analysis of prestige and competition was set forth to show the dynamic processes at work in the social organization of the university Men must be supplied with motivations in order to get necessary tasks accomplished These motivations result in both intended and unintended consequences, and within the complex social system of higher learning there is much confusion over means-ends relations Some of the more important sources of confusion will be traced in the next two chapters, in which it is demonstrated how the processes of prestige and competition affect teaching, research, and other specific functions of the academic man

[17] Cf Robert K Merton "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review*, III, 1938, pp 672–82

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN DETROIT* *Dwight W. Chapman*

EARLY EFFORTS AT ORGANIZATION

The period of efforts at unionization in the auto industry prior to the campaign of the CIO was marked by desultory and impermanent success Because the industry employed mainly unskilled labor, it was slow in becoming an attractive field for the A F of L, whose interests lay almost exclusively in the realm of craft unions Subordinate to the A F of L, however, was the Carriage, Wagon, and Automobile Workers' Union, an organization actually industrial in character, and to this union in 1911, the A F of L, almost reluctantly, entrusted the task of organizing the automobile factories But in 1916, because of the opposition of craft locals already entrenched among the skilled workers, the C W A W U was ordered to desist Upon its refusal to do so, it was expelled from the A F of L As an independent union, it proceeded with its campaign and reached a membership of over 45,000 in 1920 But its militancy incurred the wrath of Samuel Gompers, and his report in 1919, pointing to the union as a source of "deadly doctrines of Bolshevism" in Detroit, spurred employers to such vigorous opposition that the union lost its strength within a period of two years

At the 1926 convention of the A F of L, there was introduced a resolution pointing out that only a few hundred members were to be found in the automobile industry and calling on the Federation for a vigorous campaign of organization Immediately there arose from the employers of Detroit another lively protest The resolution was condemned by business and employers' organizations as "un American", and a citizens' committee (in this case, a collection of business men's associations) announced their intention of maintaining "the American plan of employment in Detroit" "Detroit is Detroit because of the open shop" became the defiant slogan

Faced with this opposition, the A F of L did nothing which would ordinarily be thought appropriate to the challenge There followed no energetic organizational activities, no drive for membership, no local mass meetings or national publicity Instead, a meeting of craft unions already interested in automobiles and evidently primarily concerned with potential threats to their own jurisdictions, found that the proposed campaign offered almost insuperable difficulties, and ended by recommending to William Green that he see whether he could persuade Detroit employers to relax their opposition to unionism This odd mission he dutifully carried out No one, we may presume, was surprised when he reported that the employers, thus approached, showed no intention of co operating Nevertheless, the A F. of L. persuaded the crafts to set aside their jurisdictional rivalry and to work jointly, for the time being, to attract the greatest possible number of workers Two years of this program followed, at the end of which period the results were assessed as distinctly disappointing, and

* From *Industrial Conflict*, ed by G W Hartmann and Theodore Newcomb, The Cordon Company, New York, 1939, pp 51–71 Reprinted by permission of Theodore M Newcomb

activity of any notable energy ceased.

It is clear from the account of these two unsuccessful attempts at unionization that an effective labor program in Detroit required, first, vigorous tactics in the face of the powerful opposition of employers, and second, the support and guidance of a national labor organization, with its experience, trained organizers, funds, and stability. The Carriage Workers' Union had been vigorous, but it failed when the A. F. of L. deserted it. The A. F. of L, on the other hand, failed through timidity and indecision. Ultimately the C.I O was to furnish both these desiderata, but in the interval, the Federal government lent unforeseen assistance to labor.

The National Recovery Act made specific provisions to encourage and safeguard the right of collective bargaining in those industries which it affected The codes by which it operated were voluntary; but as in other industries, the automobile manufacturers (with the exception of Ford) followed the pressure of strong public opinion and subscribed to the Act The consequence was that employers in the industry were abruptly compelled to renounce overt opposition to unionization. The stimulus to organization acted rapidly. A series of local strikes engendered three new independent unions, and in response to this challenge, the A F of L entered the field with actual determination, and by 1934 had recruited a membership of some 100,000

Even with the assistance of the N R A and with the quick response of workers to this opportunity for organization, the contest was bitter Although the employers had, after decades of intense opposition, capitulated openly to the principle of unhampered unionization, they availed themselves of whatever weapons were left The complaints of bona-fide unions of this period point to two devices as preeminent. In the first place, the automobile industry in accepting the code of the N.R.A. had done so only after writing into it a clause which reserved to them the right to hire and dismiss workers on the basis of "merit." Whatever doubt may exist as to the purpose of this clause, its practical use seems often to have been that of providing a way to eliminate workers of importance in the unions which the companies feared. Secondly, it was possible within the framework of the N.R.A. for companies to organize their own unions in competition with independent organizations. The existence of such company unions — which the N R A. did not directly forbid — was a constant source of irritation to the A F of L. Because of the prevalence of this abuse, the independent unions threatened a general strike aiming at securing a closed shop for the whole industry. There followed days of apprehensive tension in Detroit until the intervention of President Roosevelt, who set up a nonpartisan Automobile Labor Board which should review and settle all such contentions between unions and industry But although the Board forestalled the threatened general strike, its operation and decisions were seldom acceptable to the A F. of L ; and it served merely to make chronic the discontent which had nearly come to a head.

The A. F. of L. had never before been so nearly in command in Detroit. With an impressive membership, outspoken opposition to the concrete abuses of N R.A unionism, and a widespread penetration of the automobile factories and their satellite industries, it might have brought permanent unionization to the city. But again the Federation's historic craft-proclivities led it to blunder. In 1934, the various Detroit locals which had been clamoring for united action were co-ordinated into one body which in 1935 was chartered as the United Automobile Workers. But not only did the A. F. of L. impose

upon this body a set of nonelective and unsatisfactory officers, it also forbade the new union to recruit skilled workers over which craft unions claimed prior rights. At the following convention, this injunction was protested by the U A W. But craft sympathies within the parent body prevailed, and the protest was refused. This frustration of the program of the U A W led to a serious drop in its membership, less than a year later it could claim but 10,000 in the industry

It is plain in retrospect that whatever the advantages of craft unions in certain occupations, this form of organization, or any form diluted by it, was ill-adapted to organization in the automobile area In an industry in which so great a proportion of workers are unskilled and are identified with no more particular form of work than is given them by the accidents of employment, appeals to group loyalty must come in terms of membership in the type of industry, not the type of job But under the A. F of L. in the auto industry, there inevitably arose conflicts between industry-wide organization and the entrenched spheres of influence of craft unions — those of tool- and die-makers, skilled machinists, and others regarded as elite The precarious morale of the average laborer, unaccomplished and insecure, was not bolstered by repeated emphasis upon this class distinction within what should have been a unified body

It is clear too that the A F of L failed in other important respects We may take it as self-evident that no worker can find permanent satisfaction in a union which does not provide these four features:

(1) A vigorous and successful drive for membership, to maintain strong feelings of universality in the individual member

(2) A concrete and attractive program based on keenly-felt wants, in order that the individual may sense a practical importance in continued co-operation.

(3) Some record of concrete achievement toward carrying out this program (won demands, an impressive strike, etc.), to demonstrate the practicability of what is intended.

(4) A militant group of leaders able to work congenially with the rank-and-file, but also educated far better than the average in the philosophy and tactics of the labor movement.

It does not appear that the A F. of L met these demands better than sporadically Its few concentrated drives for membership were of brief duration and infected with craft limitations Its program was seldom clear or impressive and was often so poor as the mere vague hope that employers would in future show themselves conciliatory to unionization Its actual accomplishments through strike or negotiation were scattered and often subject to later nullification Rather than admit the obvious fact that a labor leader militant enough for his job will inevitably be painted as a radical by the opposition, the Federation was generally careful to select, where it could, officers distinguished either by their loyalty to craft boundaries or their employer-pleasing conservatism.

UNIONIZATION UNDER THE C I.O.

In 1936 the Committee for Industrial Organization was formed within the A F of L. in protest against the craft-union policy of the Federation A number of industrial-type unions affiliated with the Committee and supported its program for the industrial unionization of appropriate industries. By September, 1936, the anger of the A. F. of L. at the intransigency of the C I O. was so great that the Committee was expelled from the Federation Among those to leave with the C I O was the United Automobile Workers union, which, resentful of the leadership which had been imposed upon it, had elected its

own officers and announced its affiliation with the C.I.O. As president it had chosen Homer Martin, a former minister who had lost his pulpit through labor activities and who evidenced an outspoken and vigorous determination to join battle with the automobile employers.

Opportunity to initiate a new campaign came rapidly. Toward the last days of the year, William Knudsen of General Motors stated before the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce that he favored collective bargaining in his plants, and that he would not oppose "legal and constructive" unionization. Martin rejoined next day, asking for a conference in General Motors on collective bargaining, and citing a series of current abuses (speed-up, variable employment, violation of seniority rights, piece-work wages) which required amelioration. To this Knudsen replied that these complaints must be taken up locally in the plants where they were alleged to exist; a general conference would not be granted.

The U A W acted quickly and with a *device new to America, the sit-down* strike. On December 28 the organized workers in the Cleveland Fisher Body Plant quit work but remained in the building, and the next day the Fisher Body Plants of Flint were similarly struck. The occupation of factories making these key parts thus brought the whole General Motors system to a virtual standstill. The strike, meanwhile, spread to General Motors plants in other communities· Cleveland, Anderson (Ind), Kansas City

General Motors officials were at first obdurate; but within a few days, with about 90,000 employees participating in the strike, the company offered to enter into negotiations, but with the provisos that the plants must be evacuated and that the U A.W must in any event not expect to receive full bargaining rights For its part, the union informed Governor Murphy that these terms were acceptable, provided the company would agree not to operate its plant during the conference. But the company refused this stipulation, and negotiations were therefore abandoned

General Motors had, immediately following the sit-down, applied for and received an injunction against the workers occupying its Flint factories The sheriff responsible for serving the injunction, however, found entrance to the plant impossible The firm organization of those holding the buildings made futile any attempt formally to serve notice, and the injunction perforce remained a legal gesture When, in addition, it was shown that the issuing judge owned approximately $250,000 worth of General Motors stock, even the Detroit papers, which vociferously deplored the sit-down strike as a gross trespass, carried this news and abandoned their defense of the injunction.

Frustrated in the direction of legal redress, the company bided its time. Within a day or two there appeared in Flint an association known as the Flint Alliance about which sporadic back-to-work movements began to crystallize. The Alliance claimed a membership of 20,000 and the endorsement of 200 businessmen It condemned the strike, deplored the sit-down tactic, demanded the opportunity for its members and others to return to work, and favored forcible evacuation of the struck plants. It is now clear, both from the facts of the LaFollette Committee's investigation and from the obvious similarity of the Alliance to the citizens' committees which the well-known Mohawk Valley Formula advocated as a useful strikebreaking tool, that the Flint Alliance had more than accidental connection with the company's general campaign to end the strike How large the true membership of the Alliance was, is difficult to determine. A New York *Times* reporter

who spent considerable time in Flint attending meetings of all sorts, union and anti-union, recorded his conviction that the Alliance could never speak for more than a minority of workers in the community. Had its membership been actually 20,000 among the 30,000 on strike in Flint, it could quickly have ended the strike by action inside the union locals.

Nevertheless, this organization presented a grave menace to the union, both in Flint and Detroit Its demands and claims received prominent publicity in the Detroit press; and it was used constantly to strengthen the editorial argument that the strike was an irresponsible act on the part of a minority, who could by clever tactics hold the plants idle while the great majority of workers were forced to remain unemployed and without wages.

The intention of "back-to-work" propaganda envisages a public opinion aroused to the point where it will tolerate the often outrageous use of force by police or vigilantes to break a strike Whether this crusade might have been finally successful in Detroit and Flint remains debatable There seems little question — and this was admitted in the propaganda itself — that the position of the strikers in the plants was sufficiently impregnable to have required military forces to evict them. In a skirmish between company and Flint police on the one hand and the strikers on the other, as a result of an attempt on the part of General Motors to turn off light and heat in the struck plants, the police were easily defeated. Under a barrage of missiles and quickly returned tear-gas bombs, they were kept from setting foot in the plant. The attack was not repeated. But military assistance for the company was not forthcoming. Appeals to Governor Murphy to use state troops to clear the plants were unsuccessful. The governor, instead, acted with a restraint rare in the history of such conflicts. Without denying that the occupation of the plants was technically illegal, he called attention in his public statements to the fact that the strike had been nearly bloodless, and that there was continued hope that it might be settled without violence. To clear the plants of men determined not to relinquish their position would, he reminded the public, involve bloodshed and loss of life. His position, with the press crying for vengeance, was a difficult one, but the appeal to humane sentiments was powerful. Furthermore, General Motors had acted sufficiently truculently at his conciliation efforts to justify an official rebuke.

Meanwhile the union was making steady headway For the first time in the history of Detroit, automobile labor could look upon a militant program in the process of vigorous execution Within the struck plants, the activity of occupation was determined and disciplined. Each building housed several hundred laborers, and each had its commanding committee. The men stood guard in shifts Ready at hand to repel attack were piles of hinges or automobile door-handles to serve as missiles Fire-doors communicating with parts of the plant still held by company police were welded shut and re-enforced by conveyor trucks backed up against them Fire hoses under pressure to the nozzle were stretched from hydrants toward every entrance Each man wore around his neck a scarf which, when dipped in a near-by bucket of water, could serve as an emergency gas mask. Appointed individuals served as police charged with maintaining a strict set of rules: there must be no damage to company property, no smoking except in restricted quarters, no liquor or firearms introduced into the building by union visitors or occupants returning from overnight leave. Life within the building was

organized to avoid monotony and to maintain morale. There were regular meetings, organized games and concerts, and protective drill. The cafeteria prepared and served generous meals at regular hours, the food having been brought in under union guard. Each man had the privilege of an occasional twelve hours away from the plant, a device which not only helped maintain spirit within the building but also permitted the growing number of union members outside to hear at first hand of the solid and military determination that prevailed within.

The union, undoubtedly for obvious tactical reasons, published no figures on membership during the General Motors sit-down; with how large a membership the decision to occupy the plant had been made is not known. But during the three weeks of occupancy, there was a steady influx of members — so rapid in some locals that officers, already busy, were hard put to supervise registration and the collection of dues The task of maintaining control of the plants was supplemented by vigorous union activity outside Frequent rallies heard speakers from the "front" describe the life within the plants Local newspapers, frequently mimeographed, appeared regularly summarizing the progress of the strike, protesting employers' tactics, violations of civil liberties by police or anti-union groups, or counteracting the stories and opinions of the *Free Press* or the *News*.

On January 15, Governor Murphy's continued efforts to bring about a conference between union and company succeeded. The plants were to be evacuated, state troops were to be used to preserve the truce, and negotiations would begin. The strikers marched out of the Detroit plant, but at the last moment it was learned in Flint that the Flint Alliance had asked a separate conference with General Motors and that the company had accepted the request. Suspicious of double dealing, the Flint strikers remained in the buildings, and the company seized this opportunity to announce that the negotiations were thereby made impossible. On behalf of the C I.O , John L. Lewis denounced this act of General Motors and called upon President Roosevelt to act, reminding him of the support which labor had given him in the 1936 election. Secretary Perkins summoned both Alfred P. Sloan and Knudsen of General Motors to confer in Washington, but both refused, and drew upon themselves a rebuke from the President.

Meanwhile new mass meetings of a "back-to-work" character were augmenting the pressure upon the union; it was decided, therefore, to deliver a crippling blow to the industry, which was still running on non-union labor at a greatly reduced rate in the free plants Knowing of the presence of company spies in the union, the U A W , in a meeting called to decide tactics, voted to occupy Chevrolet Plant No 9. True to expectations, the company rushed guards to this building; but instead of following this publicized plan, the union (as had been secretly decided) marched into Plant No 4 In this factory are made all Chevrolet motors; its loss by the company meant the paralysis of the Chevrolet division.

Again the company demanded and received an injunction The granting judge this time imposed a fine of $15,000,000 on the U A W. if the building were not evacuated within twenty-four hours. But on this occasion the U.A.W called for general assistance from its parent organization, the C.I.O. In response, brigades of workers from sister industries — rubber works in Ohio, coal mines and steel mills in Pennsylvania — were rushed by automobile to the Detroit area to serve as reenforcements for the besieged Chevrolet

plant. Faced with this situation, the sheriff refused to attempt to serve the injunction, and once again the union controlled the situation. Governor Murphy was now able to persuade Knudsen to confer, in his presence, with Lewis; the long-awaited negotiations began in earnest.

After several days of public suspense, the governor announced that a solution mutually agreeable had been reached. The U.A.W. had been successful in its demands for recognition as a bargaining agency (but not as bargaining agency for non-members), it had won shop committees, seniority in employment for workers of six month's standing, time-and-a-half pay for overtime, and a promise that the allegations of speed-ups on the conveyor line would be studied On the other hand, the company had defeated the demand for a thirty-hour week and had refused a uniform minimum-wage scale

Within limits, the specified victories of the U A W in this agreement were irrelevant compared with its major accomplishment The General Motors strike marked the temporal boundary between the long period in which industrial Detroit had successfully combated the labor movement and the present era in which unionization is the established rule rather that the exception. The U A W. had shown itself capable of carrying to conclusion a decisive strike, and this in the face of genuine middle- and upper-class alarm and opposition, counter-propaganda from every employers' association, a thoroughly adverse public press, and even the efforts of local public officials and courts. In return it had won the loyalty of a tremendously increasing membership, who could now see the practical fruits of their devotion and who were for the first time assured that labor was permanently on the march.

The Chrysler plant was the next to capitulate to the movement toward unionization. A "spontaneous" wage increase failed to quiet the ambitions of the union, and by March the buildings were occupied Again the courts were powerless to do more than issue an injunction which was never implemented. The plant was evacuated only on the understanding of a conference, and from this conference, once more, the U A W. emerged with technical advantages, a still greater membership, and a permanent status in the second of the three greatest automobile companies. By September, 1937, the number of dues-paying auto workers was estimated at 375,000 in the industry at large

The great Ford plant at River Rouge was logically next in line But here the union found progress more difficult Unlike General Motors, which has been shown by the LaFollette Committee to have relied mainly on the hire of outside agencies for espionage against the unions, the Ford Company maintains [1939] a large force of "service men" who perform the duties of company police The surveillance by this service department is thorough and relentless Ford employees tell of the reluctance they consequently feel toward any talk or associations on the job which might mark them out as interested in the union The U A W members at the plant have always guarded their identity most carefully, nor has the union ever published figures on its membership in the factory

Whatever the extent of U.A W. affiliation in Ford Motors, it was evidently too small to make use of a sit-down as the initial attack. Instead, the union began with an effort to distribute pamphlets outside the gates of the factory to workmen leaving the day shift The organizers who undertook this task approached the gates, but were quickly set upon and beaten brutally by Ford service men Union bystanders who had come to lend support were also kicked and mauled. Newspaper

photographers were driven from the scene or arrested, as were also union members; none of the assailants were restrained by the Dearborn police.

This event, which immediately gained great publicity both locally and in the national press, furnished the U.A.W. with an example epitomizing the abuses which existed in the factory. The statement of the Ford officials that the union organizers had been attacked by "loyal Ford workers" eager to protect their individuality against the threat of unionism met the hearty ridicule of even that section of the press unbiased in favor of labor. *Time* in its next issue called attention to the pair of handcuffs dangling from the belt of a "loyal worker" photographed in combat with an organizer. The whole incident was soon made the subject of a National Labor Board hearing which found that the company had been grossly culpable. That the incident was significant for the Ford plant, too, is shown by the fact that a second distribution of union literature outside the factory a few weeks later went unmolested.

But before the campaign thus begun in River Rouge had progressed very far, it was interrupted by factional disputes within the U.A.W.; and the unionization of the Ford Motor Company still remains an unfulfilled and ultimately necessary step in the consolidation of labor in Detroit. [As of the publication date of this article, 1939.]

Because the automobile industry is the giant of Detroit, and because the important events centered about the three great automobile companies, this account has dwelt on that field. But it should also be said that the year 1937 saw widespread labor conflict in other areas of the community. Both the accomplishments of the auto workers and the fact of a militant C.I.O., eager to organize workers wherever possible, encouraged labor and white-collar organizations in many occupations to form, or where existent, to seek adjustment of their grievances. In this relatively short period there occurred labor conflicts of large or small magnitude in which figured dairy workers, department and ten-cent store employees, newsboys, office and professional workers, transportation employees, taxi drivers, hotel employees, waiters in restaurants, and others. These conflicts involved tactics of every sort, from relatively amicable and immediate agreements to prolonged sit-down strikes in which stores were occupied stubbornly for periods of days. Not all were successful; and it must be said that the police, frustrated or restrained in dealing with the U.A.W., acted summarily and often brutally against relatively defenseless small groups of strikers in little establishments. In part they reflected business and middle-class emotion of the time, which was something approaching fair panic. It was possible on almost any day of that spring to overhear excited rumors, many quite unfounded, of a strike in this store or that industry. Thus, for a period of at least a week, the daily story was that Hudson's great department store was to be struck, and the store planted groups of plain-clothes men at every door. The anticipated strike never took place.

But the gains made by workers in various occupations not connected with automobiles were substantial. The period was one of general labor conflict and advance in Detroit—a reaction catalyzed and sustained by the major successes of the U.A.W.

FORCES AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION

If we list those devices of propaganda which during this year of conflict sought to bend public opinion toward or away from labor, there appears a striking imbalance.

First among the opponents of the

U.A.W and of strikers generally was the general public press. The editorial attitude of the Detroit *Free Press,* the Detroit *News,* and the *Times*—the city's three daily papers—was consistently in conflict with the union. The policy of the *Times,* a member of the Hearst chain, was of course predictable from the familiar sentiments of that organization The *Free Press,* on the other hand, represented interests indigenous to the community Its news columns featured heavily events tending to discredit the U A W , its editorials were denunciatory and bitter, and the boundary between news and opinion was frequently unclear The letters which appeared in its readers' column were strongly proportioned on the side of anti-union sentiment, and its daily columnist, who is an enthusiastic supporter of Henry Ford, maintained a steady flow of praise for resistance to the union The *News,* Detroit's more nearly cosmopolitan daily, fought the U A W. editorially and in much of its reporting But it drew a somewhat sharper line between news and opinion; and there was often a marked discrepancy between its articles and its editorials. Thus, for example, it sent into the captured plants in Flint a reporter who found the spirit and discipline of the men within the buildings admirable. Editorially, however, the paper continued to regard the occupation merely in the light of a trespass In both the *Free Press* and the *News,* full-page statements of labor policy and back-to-work appeals were carried as advertising matter and were favorably discussed within the papers' free columns, notices of union mass meetings and rallies were difficult to find

If we consider the fact that Detroit and its surrounding community are notable centers for a great laboring population, the unrepresentativeness of the press is apparent. The census of 1930 shows that of 100 persons in Detroit who were gainfully employed, 21 would be found as skilled or unskilled laborers in industry. But to these, at least, as well as to others sympathetic with labor, the daily newspapers accorded little or no favorable attention Similar is the situation regarding political sympathy the community had shown a Democratic majority in the 1936 presidential election, but all three papers remained militantly anti-New Deal Both the true and the imagined connections between labor's campaign and the aims of the Democratic administration served only to intensify the Republicanism of the press

Besides the large daily papers, various other local publications fought the labor movement Of these, some, like the trade journals of the automobile manufacturers and the publications of the Chamber of Commerce, reached mainly a small and already biased public. Others had a wider circulation, as did Father Coughlin's *Social Justice.* Perhaps the utmost in emotional journalism was achieved by the Detroit *Saturday Night,* a weekly paper devoted to local news and advertisement and having a fairly broad and middle-class public The tactic of depicting the union as Bolshevist, as well as its sympathizers outside, was exploited to the fullest in its columns. Besides cartoons and editorials unbridled in the imagery and expression of their invective, a regular feature of each issue was a biographical "exposé" of some Detroit "communist"—usually a union organizer or a member of some liberal or left-wing group. Just what finances abetted the *Saturday Night* in this unrelenting propaganda is not a matter of public record, it may perhaps not be accidental that in 1938, with labor well established, the journal went bankrupt after some thirty years of publication

The bases of appeal used by this solid

front of the local press were various. Preeminent was the attack upon the sit-down technique as a violation of property rights; from this powerful stimulus to middle-class sentiments was carefully omitted reference to the historical fact that labor has in general created by its own acts its rights under the law, and that each of its weapons — organization, strike, boycott — was originally, but temporarily, held illegal. Nor was consideration given to current opinion of some jurists (e g, Leon Green of the Wisconsin Law School) that company property rights are not the principal consideration in the complex of relations entering into such strikes A second much-used argument against the union pointed to the fact that its fight was sustained and directed by the C I O, and that this outside agency was therefore meddling in affairs which concerned only Detroit, or more specifically, only the automobile industry The workers, it was said (and with some ironic truth), had not organized until "outside organizers" stirred them up The inescapable fact that the U.A W continued its rapid growth in membership was explained by the assertion that laborers, though really unsympathetic to the union, felt they must join it to protect their jobs in case a closed shop were achieved A third form of persuasion dwelt upon the presumptive aims of labor organizations; they were, according to this, either headed by racketeers interested in assuring themselves comfortable incomes from dues, or they were vehicles for the revolutionary aims of radicals and fanatics intoxicated by the prospect of power, in either case the individual worker was being duped. A fourth argument touched the interests of the pocketbook and was popular in middle-class conversation: the year 1937 had been one of considerable recovery from the economic depression, but this recovery had been interrupted in Detroit by the strikes; labor was therefore acting in its own worst interests as well as everyone else's. Last in this not exhaustive list may be recorded the technique of identifying labor difficulties with the Democratic administrations of Governor Murphy and President Roosevelt. Much of upper middle-class Detroit is historically Republican.

Publicity favorable to the union appeared almost exclusively in its own publications, or in those of the few organizations active in its support Throughout the campaign, the U A W. published its *United Auto Worker,* as well as shop journals in the various plants and larger locals The Wayne County Federation of Labor also published its journal, at that time favorable to the strikers The Michigan Conference for the Protection of Civil Rights — a civil-liberties group representing unions, churches, and other organizations in support of civil rights — gave publicity by circulars and press releases concerning abuses against strikers, restrictions of labor's freedom, and mass meetings of protest But while labor's propaganda was efficient and vigorous within its own ranks, it cannot be said to have compared with the breadth of the established press.

Beyond written persuasion, the unions were able to employ the effective device of public meetings and rallies, which could not escape the attention of the public During the progress of the strikes, the Mayor was petitioned for permission to hold a general mass meeting of all organized labor in Cadillac Square At first he refused, but the determined statement of labor leaders that the meeting would be held, permit or not, led him at the last to acquiesce. City officials immediately covered their retreat by announcing through the papers that hundreds of police would guard the square and keep the demonstration strictly under control. Contrary to the expectation of violence im-

plied in this assurance, the public witnessed an orderly and self-governed mass meeting of unprecedented size. It formed, attended to its program of prominent labor speakers, and disbanded with perfect self-restraint. The police, whom the immense crowd of workingmen could easily have overwhelmed, stood idly by, unmolested and even ignored. Even the reactionary press, though it conscientiously underestimated the size of the crowd next morning, found nothing to say in criticism of the proceedings.

This disproportion between the avenues of publicity open to labor and anti-labor groups was marked indeed, but it was not really critical in the particular situation. In the long run, it was important that the union was able by publications, word of mouth, or mass meetings, to lay its case before laborers. Its accomplishments in this sphere were vigorous and effective. But it was not essential, however one might wish it in fair play, that the union be able to influence non-laborers to its point of view. Given the technique of the sit-down, which on the one hand paralyzed industry and on the other hand afforded a concrete rallying point for labor, the settlement of issues between employers and employees was bound to proceed in relative independence of the opinions of newspaper readers. The press might rave in indignation, but concessions to the union were inevitable so long as it held the whip-handle of occupation. To have broken the march of labor would have required nothing short of either military intervention (which a liberal and humane Governor refused) or the formation of a city-wide army of vigilantes, bent upon violent retribution. The semi-vigilante Alliance in Flint blundered from self-exposition to final impotence; in Detroit, no such movement of any importance arose —perhaps because the notorious Black Legion was at the time under prosecution and would have lent an evil odor to any similar organization.

LABOR SUBSEQUENT TO THE GREAT STRIKES

The advances and consolidations of labor in the first half of 1937 transformed the industrial population of Detroit from a generally unorganized to a generally unionized body. In all the automotive plants with the exception of Ford, and in satellite plants manufacturing parts as well, the U A W had secured status and a series of contracts guaranteeing bargaining rights and furnishing the mechanism for ameliorating working conditions. The impetus of the movement in the automobile industry had likewise carried other C I O unions forward together with independent unions and affiliates of the A F of L. The opening of this era of a well-entrenched labor movement was marked by the subsidence of major conflicts and a resumption of general production, as labor and management began to function under the new agreements. The automobile companies, however, complained of the continuance of numerous "wildcat" strikes, usually local to a department or building and mostly of very brief duration, and which represented breakdowns in the mode of labor relations set by contract with the union. It seems reasonable that these minor conflicts may have resulted in large part from the inexperience of groups of labor with their newly discovered power. The U A W has also made the accusation that some wildcat strikes were company-provoked in order to create the impression that the union is irresponsible. Whatever their cause, the union has an obvious strong interest in preventing them, and they appear already to have markedly decreased in frequency.

There can be little doubt that Detroit has now permanently joined the ranks of organized labor; but to the sympathetic observer of labor events, the course of the

past year and a half holds three disappointments: internal dissension within the U A W., the protracted failure to organize the Ford Motor Company, and labor's failure to gain political representation in the city and state. [*Ed. note* This was in 1939!]

It seems plain from the events of the contemporary labor movement that the attainment of effective size by an organization carries the risk of internal fractionation. To what extent this tendency is a function of sheer size, whether and how it is affected by competitive relations between the group and others, whether it implies an upper limit to the magnitude of a group with which individuals can solidly identify themselves — these questions raise important problems for social psychology In the case of the U A W, conflict within the group began at least as early as the spring of 1937 In April, there appeared publicly a rift between Homer Martin and Travis, the popular and militant organizer in Flint, and when the election of officers in the Flint local went in favor of Travis, Martin annulled the election. Between that time and the national convention of the U A W in August, opposition between Martin and the group sympathetic to Travis, Mortimer, and Hall (these last being vice-presidents), rapidly sharpened After a stormy convention, marked by a bitter quarrel over the credentials of a group of delegates in the Mortimer-Hall group, Martin was re-elected president with an executive board sympathetic to him in the ratio of 15 to 9.

There followed months of antagonism. From the time of the convention onward, the chief battle-cry of the Martin group became the accusation that their opponents were communists, and the often summary dismissals of local leaders who remained sympathetic to Hall and Mortimer were officially defended as acts necessary to discipline or remove radicals from the union. On the other hand, the opposition denied the charges of sectarianism and pointed to evidence that Martin was considerably influenced by the Lovestoneite communist program. This war of countercharges in various shades of red has tended to obscure the fundamental phenomenon of a struggle for power in the union, and has made it difficult to discern the real interests at play, which must probably await the analysis of later historians For the union itself, its effects have been deplorable It has brought about the dismissal (followed recently by a grudging "compromise" reinstatement) of officers and organizers who headed the earlier successes of the union The conduct of the quarrel in terms of reference to extra-union radical ideologies has placed the conflict on a level which the mass of rank-and-file union members can neither comprehend nor join The use, by the Martin group especially, of the language of "red-baiting" — the favorite device of the anti-union propagandist — has given ready opportunity to all who have an interest in unfavorable publicity Stolberg's account of the U A W in his *Story of the C I O.* simplifies a complex and often personal contest into the neat form of a battle against Moscow

It was said that the campaign in the Ford plant was the next logical step in the union's program But when the factional split arose, the conduct of organization in River Rouge was halted while changes were made in its leadership Since then there has been no good evidence of striking accomplishments Under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, the company has been cited for its efforts to prevent organization, and the union has obtained some legal redress in this field But the internally disunited U A W is apparently by no means ready to obtain recognition, either by a strike or

through the mechanism of a vote under the N L R B

Finally, the labor movement in Detroit has failed to extend its new power to the political field Its first opportunity came in the Fall of 1937, when the city held its regular election of mayor and councilmen, the C I O endorsed a list of nominees headed by O'Brien, a former judge notable for his interest in labor In the primaries he gained the position of opponent to Reading, a member of the incumbent administration But the forces of labor were split along the line of separation between the A F of L. and the C I O, the Federation's support went to Reading, behind whom also the anti-union sentiment was already to be found The campaign was harsh The press, naturally in support of Reading, revived all the instruments of persuasion which it had used against the strikes, with the addition, this time, of the warning that not only had Detroit fallen bodily into the hands of the C I O, but was about to lose its political soul to the enemy This time labor's inability (on the side of the C I O) to control any part of the accepted public press counted heavily against it, in contrast with the situation at the beginning of the year, for the necessity now existed of making an appeal sufficient to attract middle-class votes

As regards its own campaign, the C I O made certain patent mistakes In general it failed to produce a ticket or a platform with wide attractiveness The candidates whom it endorsed were either members of the auto union or intimately connected with it, save for O'Brien In consequence, the opposition could argue with some truth that what the C I O proposed was a city government by auto workers, a prospect unattractive to most voters outside the U A W. Reading's supporters were therefore able to characterize their opponents as representing special interests rather than labor in general; and this opportunity was of especial advantage in Detroit, where elections are by statute nonpartisan in the ordinary sense The platform of the C I O put, also, undue emphasis upon such objectives as those of removing from power city officials who had demonstrated their hostility to labor —a logical objective, but narrow when measured by the rules of successful propaganda

The campaign thus progressed in marked contrast to, say, the successful simultaneous efforts of the American Labor Party in New York, where labor found its practical role to lie in political co-operation with a wide liberal front of organizations and a list of candidates of the most various affiliations Late in October the Gallup poll predicted a 65 per cent majority for Reading On November 2, he was elected by a vote of 261,000 to O'Brien's 154,000 Of the nine councilmen elected, none was a C I O candidate Even though the A F of L had backed the winners, the election was in no sense a victory for any part of labor All of six nominated incumbents returned to the council, the new mayor was of the old guard

Again in the Fall of 1938, labor suffered a severe political defeat when Governor Murphy failed of re-election His role in the course of unionization had been well understood by every group hostile to labor, and it was quite literally for his great forbearance and courageous indifference to an hysterical public and press at the time of the sit-down strikes that he was turned out of elective office Here again the embittered A F of L co-operated in destroying him as a Detroit symbol of the New Deal.

It is obvious that although organized labor has now vigorously entered the Detroit scene, it faces a period in which its chief task is to find its generally effective

position in the community. The changes it has thus far brought about are largely those within industry, where the basis for an ordered industrial relationship, implemented to guard the working conditions of the unskilled laborer, has been laid. But even though the movement is temporarily impeded by inappropriate dissension, it will before long have to assert itself in the affairs of the community at large Problems of government, public opinion, social legislation, the general standard of living, remain unsolved in this city that became a giant overnight. By what means the great group that was once most insecure but is now finding its power will act in these fields will provide the material for most interesting observation.

PROPOSITIONS ON INTERGROUP HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT *

Robin M. Williams, Jr.

PRINCIPLES, WORKING HYPOTHESES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

Most of the propositions about relations among racial, ethnic, and religious groups which are listed hereinafter are current in the literature,[1] although the present wording is usually synthetic rather than drawn from any one source In some instances in which the hypothesis was not found in explicit form in published material, the present statement represents an inference necessary to "make sense" of actions or statements which have been observed The total listing may be regarded as a series of notes on problems needing further research The present formulations can only be tentative and it is certain that they fall far short of exhausting the questions which could be raised, even on the basis of present knowledge The sole aim of the compilation is to bring together in compact and convenient form a sampling of what is known and surmised in this field To whatever degree further thinking may be stimulated or research possibilities suggested, the compilation will have served its purpose

Many, if not most, of the propositions outlined are at present little more than "educated guesses" Certain generalizations, on the other hand, are supported by such a large and consistent body of cumulative observations that their validity under specified conditions is highly probable Many other generalizations, however, are supported by almost no data

[1] Representative sources and quotations are given to illustrate a number of propositions (Numbers in parentheses refer to items cited in the Selected Bibliography [on p 760]) However, many of the propositions listed have been put forward in essentially congruent form by many different students of this field It has not seemed expedient, therefore, to attempt any elaborate or systematic documentation Incidentally, one of the striking impressions gained from a review of available literature is the existing consensus on a considerable number of basic hypotheses — along with the usually recognized divergences of viewpoint

* From *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions,* Social Science Research Council, New York, 1947, pp 49–77. Reprinted by permission of the publisher

other than "expert opinion", in some instances authorities of equally wide practical experience and scientific knowledge have reached what appear to be diametrically opposite conclusions There are grounds for suspecting that the seeming disagreement may frequently be traceable to ambiguities in definition and failure to specify the precise conditions within which a given generalization holds true In other cases it is to be expected that further research will show prevalent hypotheses to be false, or at least in need of reformulation and qualification In spite of the slight and uncertain factual basis of many of the propositions, it has seemed desirable to outline them as completely and sharply as possible Nothing is to be gained in the current stage of scientific knowledge in this field from a refusal to formulate hypotheses In fact, one of the greatest needs appears to be that of making working assumptions explicit and clear, in order to expose significant gaps in knowledge and clarify the specific problems needing research, and also to develop perspective in choosing major emphases and orientations in research

Although the hypotheses outlined are not all presented as "probably true," they were not selected at random They were formulated with three criteria in mind (1) their potential importance for social understanding, policy, and action, (2) their possibilities for fruitful empirical research in the near future, (3) their probable validity In many instances the criteria were in conflict, as when a proposition of great importance involves such methodological difficulties as to cast doubt on its immediate feasibility as a research hypothesis Propositions of somewhat dubious validity were included whenever they seemed to hold promise on the basis of one or both of the other criteria Similarly, some hypotheses of relatively minor social importance were included if they seemed plausible and feasible for research. The propositions are roughly classified under these main headings·

I Origins and prevalence of hostility
II. Types of hostility and conflict
III. Factors in the incidence of hostility and conflict
IV Reactions of minority groups
V Approaches for the reduction or control of hostility or conflict

Since this monograph is specifically oriented to problems of techniques for reducing tension, the inclusion of certain broad propositions which do not directly concern specific techniques deserves comment It seemed essential to include some of the basic "high order" generalizations to provide a frame of reference for the particularistic propositions Without some such guiding context the specific assertions might well seem to constitute merely an agglomeration of discrete and unorganized items On the other hand, any attempt to integrate the materials into a more systematic theoretical scheme seemed premature at this time, although there is a definite possibility that such systematization will be made in the near future

I ORIGINS AND PREVALENCE OF HOSTILITY

1 It is a fact of observation that all individuals brought up in human society manifest some hostility toward other individuals or social groups

"It would seem a safe estimate that at least four-fifths of the American population lead mental lives in which feelings of group hostility play an appreciable role" (Allport and Kramer, 3, p 9)

"In every known human society there appears to exist a varying amount of 'free floating aggression' This is thought to be mainly the product of the painful restraints put upon all immature human organisms during the socialization process

and of the deprivations and frustrations which are incident to adult social life in all societies" (Kluckhohn, 17, p 224)

". . . almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which lasts for some time . . leaves a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which have first to be eliminated by repression" (Freud, 12, p 34)

2 The amount of hostility at any given time varies greatly among individuals, among specific groups, and among social systems ("Amount" is defined by observable "manifestations"—ranging from group conflict in a physical sense to the analysis of dreams in personality study)

3 The amount of hostility varies greatly for given individuals, groups, or social systems at different points in time

General principle Hostility is universal, but has a wide range of variation in intensity and incidence

4 In all known social systems individuals conceive of themselves as belonging to certain groups to which they owe loyalty and within which there is an obligation to repress hostility Invariably, repressed or suppressed hostilities generated in such we-groups are to some degree directed outside to other groups

" whatever is different in social custom always arouses attention and tends to set up antagonisms" (K. Young, 39, p. 489)

"The identification of the individual with the group gives the emotional satisfaction of the ego urge, without the pang of conscience which accompanies it apart from the group." (Miller, 26, p 134)

"The greater and more intense the group feeling, that is, the stronger the identification between members of a group, the greater is the strength of the prejudice against the alien group and against those who are not members of one's own group" (MacCrone, 24, p. 249)

5 Infants and preschool children typically do not exhibit prejudice toward ethnic or racial groups Prejudice is learned. (Horowitz, 16, and many others)

6 Prejudice may be relatively independent of the direct personal experience of the individual definite prejudices often exist in the absence of any direct contact with members of the pre-judged group. (*Idem*)

" racial attitudes are not necessarily a function of 'contact experience'" (Nettler, 29, p 182)

II TYPES OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT

7 Hostility directed outward from the self may operate at three (or more) levels of specificity (a) generalized, "free-floating" aggression, (b) fixation on specific individuals, (c) fixation on social categories of persons (group hostility)

8 An important factor in racial or ethnic conflict is the pattern of *deflected aggression* Some of the conditions defining this pattern are

(a) Frustrations or deprivations are imposed by sources which are either
  (1) difficult to define or locate, or
  (2) persons or organizations in a position of power or authority over the individual, or
  (3) persons to whom the individual is closely tied by affectional bonds
(b) Aroused hostilities are blocked from direct expression against the sources of frustration
(c) Substitute objects of aggression are available and are,
  (1) highly *visible,* and
  (2) *vulnerable,* i e , not in a position to retaliate.

"It appears that in the case of direct aggression there is always some displaced aggression accompanying it and adding additional force to the rational attack." (Dollard, 8, p 19)

This is a widespread, recurrent, and important pattern of emotional structuring in human society and is widely recognized on the level of common-sense observation Ordinary examples are legion the child punished by his parents destroys a toy or maltreats his pet, the employee humiliated by his superior "takes it out" on his family, the defeated small businessman joins an anti-minority movement

III FACTORS IN THE INCIDENCE OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT

Question What factors are associated with high or low intensity or incidence of hostility?

9 Hostility is a function of *frustration*, under certain conditions, the more frustration of important drives or socially induced needs, the more hostility (Dollard and others, 9)

10 "Frustration" differs in its effects depending upon whether it is a mere "need-deprivation" or a sensed "personality-threat" (Maslow, 25) Maximum hostility may be expected to result from frustrations which combine these characteristics (a) they violate normal expectations which are felt to be morally justifiable, (b) they are felt to be unnecessary and avoidable; (c) they are perceived as a threat to the security system of the whole personality (This usually means, a threat to the individual's sense of status It is thus quite different from a simple deprivation of a segmental need)

11 Hostility is a function of "insecurity", the greater the insecurity, within limits, the more hostility

"If there be one established generalization from clinical psychology and psychiatry, it is that those who are insecure themselves manifest hostilities toward others." (Kluckhohn, 18, p 51)

" anxiety is generated by a repressed hostility and . it in turn again generates hostility" (Horney, 15, p 89)

12 Whatever its sources, hostility does not automatically lead to interpersonal or intergroup conflict Instead, it may be structured in a variety of ways which, however, are not indeterminate but are the outcomes of specific types of social situations

13 Once generated, hostility is structured intrapersonally through such familiar psychological mechanisms as repression, projection, and displacement.

"Aggression, whether overt or masked, is not, to be sure, the only possible adjustive response Withdrawal, passivity, sublimation, conciliation, flight and other responses are sometimes effective in reducing the motivation of those who have been deprived or threatened" (Kluckhohn, 18, p 51)

14 The amount or frequency of interpersonal or intergroup overt aggression varies inversely with the strength of the anticipatory responses regarding punishment

Assumption There is usually greater anticipation of punishment for overt than for non-overt aggression or substitute responses (Doob and Sears, 10)

15 The overtness of aggression varies positively with the strength of instigation to a frustrated goal-response

Assumption Overt aggression is more satisfying to the individual than non-overt aggression (*Ibid.*)

16 The frequency of substitute responses varies positively with the strength of anticipatory responses to punishment-for-being-aggressive. (*Ibid*)

17 The frequency of substitute re-

sponses varies inversely with the strength of instigation to a frustrated goal-response

Assumption Direct aggression is more satisfying to the individual than indirect or displaced overt aggression (*Ibid*)

18. Whether hostility becomes focused upon *groups* is *in part* determined by

(a) *Visibility* of groups
  (1) Physical appearance color, physiognomy, dress, etc.
  (2) Social definition (including "propaganda" emphasizing differences)
(b) *Contact* of groups
(c) *Competition* of groups
(d) Differences in *values* and behavior patterns considered as expressing values (language, sex mores, manners, personal aggressiveness, etc)

19 Minimum conditions for conflict include (a) contact, (b) visibility, and (c) competition (Reductions in the values of these variables will, in certain combinations, reduce the probability of conflict Under some circumstances conflict seems to be facilitated by minimal "impersonal" contact, inhibited by close "personal" contact)

20 Where a basis for social categorization exists, that is, in group relations, some degree of prejudice-hostility always appears when there is the combination of *visibility* and *competition* (It does not necessarily follow that the degree of hostility bears a linear relation to the other variables For example, it has been suggested that hostility is especially likely when a competing group is just noticeably different.)

"Economic factors, if they are to have any effect upon group prejudice, must presuppose the existence of the psychologically prior division into an in-and-out group. It is not because of their economic competition that Jews and Japanese excite hostility, but it is because they are Jew or Japanese that their competition is [regarded as] unfair, or underhand, or an offense to those who are neither Jews nor Japanese" (MacCrone, 24, p 254)

"Group antagonisms seem to be inevitable when two peoples in contact with each other may be distinguished by differentiating characteristics, either inborn or cultural, and are actual or potential competitors Only by eliminating the outward evidences of distinction, such as color dress, or language, or by removing the competitive factor, may racial antagonisms be destroyed" (D Young, 37, p 586)

The tension level of any social grouping is in part a function of the relative emphasis in that group's culture upon *participation in common values* as over against individual or group *acquisition of scarce "goods"*

In every social system people act in orientation to certain values which can be shared by everyone, and which are not scarce in the sense that one individual's sharing will reduce others' enjoyment of the value The most ready and conspicuous examples are religious salvation, and group (e g, national) prestige All adherents to a religious faith can participate in its values — all, for example, can have salvation — without any member's "success" detracting from that of any other member Similarly, in this respect all Americans are presumed to share in any increase or decrease in the prestige of the nation considered as a collectivity National prestige as such is "participated in" rather than "divided up" On the other hand, in every social system people also act in orientation to scarce, divisible and divisive values This is, of course true even of those who share a common culture in such other respects as language religion, family mores, political ideology and so on The main classes of scarce, di

visible values are: wealth, power, and prestige within a given group or culture. In any given state of the economy, the more economic goods held or consumed by one individual, the less there are for others.[2] Power consists of control over others; hence it is inherently scarce and distributive. Prestige status is meaningful only in terms of relative ranking within a system: for one individual or group to be "high" requires that others be ranked "lower."

Thus every society has to work out some equilibrium of relative emphasis upon these two broad classes of action orientation. It seems to be generally agreed among serious students of American society that our culture places a rather extraordinary stress upon competition for distributive values. The "competitive" motif is not merely a matter of such competition being permitted, rather, the striving for "success" is positively enjoined to such an extent that in many areas and classes it approaches the status of a culturally obligatory pattern. At the same time, American society — at least in comparison with many older, more stable, more homogeneous societies — appears historically to have a relatively low development of the shared, nondivisible values.[3] These two aspects seem clearly interrelated. Thus in so far as emphasis upon religious, otherworldly values has declined, this must in itself reinforce tendencies for "worldly" competition, other things being at all equal.

The competition which is significant for the analysis of group hostility is not just any kind of competition but that which revolves around basic security in subsistence and status. In this connection the importance of status mobility in the United States is difficult to overstress. Rising and falling on the status prestige scale is nominally free, and in actuality has been very widespread, i.e., the dominant institutional pattern has been that of achieved rather than ascribed status. In fact, "intensive competition" and "emphasis upon achieved status" are merely two formulations of the same situation. As Charles Horton Cooley pointed out, there are only two polar systems for ranking individuals in the social order: either inherited status or some form of competition.[4]

Note: In the following propositions the condition "all other things being equal" should be understood in each case. Since "other conditions" are rarely "equal," this is a rigorous limitation on concrete generalizations.

21. The greater the differentiation of groups and of individual social roles in a society, the greater the probabilities of group conflict.

"We are living in a more complex and developed culture than any before, and the possibilities of confusion and conflict are correspondingly the greatest" (Pettee, 32, p. xii).

"In complex civilization, therefore, group antagonism necessarily increases because every differentiation (division of labor, heterogeneity) brings about particularistic interests" (Alexander, 1, p. 28).

[2] That is, abstracting from the complex interlocking of economic interests in a dynamic process through time. The fact that the long run economic interests of immediately competing individuals or groups may be harmonious is, in this context, irrelevant to the fact that at a given time there is only a limited quantity of utilities available for distribution. The division of utilities which by definition are scarce relative to the desires for them, is that of the allocation of goods in the short run, regardless of ultimate congruities or clashes of interest.

[3] This situation is certainly complex, and there are some evidences that nationalistic feeling and the values of the "American Creed" are of more importance in national integration than is commonly supposed.

[4] "Personal Competition," Chapter IV in his *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930). Cf. especially pp. 163–175.

22. Intergroup conflict is the more likely the more rapid and far-reaching the social changes to which individuals have to adjust.

"Theorem 1: A people forced to make readjustments are likely to display increased energies of hostilities in some direction, even when their 'objective' situation is more favorable than in the status quo ante period This prediction is particularly indicated when the people have been deprived of habitual outlets for aggression" (Kluckhohn, 17, p 226)

23 Open conflict is the more likely the more *direct* the intergroup competition for the distributive rewards of wealth, power, prestige, or other scarce values, and the more *successful* the competition of vulnerable groups

"When there is an actual threat to the dominance of the in-group, socially legitimated hostilities may appear" (Dollard, 8, pp 19–20)

24. Intergroup hostility and conflict are the more likely the greater the general level of tension in the society as a result of economic depression, prior cultural conflict, or various types of social disorganization.

". . . the most important source of virulent anti-Semitism is probably the projection on the Jew, as a symbol, of free-floating aggression, springing from insecurities and social disorganization" (Parsons, 31, p. 121)

"Throughout the history of the United States there seems to have been a direct correlation between the peaks of nativist spirit and the valleys of exceptional economic difficulty" (D Young, 37, p. 133)

25. Disruption of stable expectations of interpersonal conduct tends to be productive of intergroup conflict Insofar as institutional patterning of behavior break down in important life-areas, predictability is lowered, with a consequent increase in anxiety and in various types of frustration. Free-floating aggression thus produced easily becomes focused on ethnic racial, or religious groups. (The special conditions conducive to this focus are outlined in other propositions cf 8, 18, 19 20)

26 The intensity of intergroup hostility varies inversely with the number and adequacy of "harmless" outlets for aggression within a society (What are "harmless outlets" is a matter of valuation from other points of view One possible definition is those avenues for discharge of aggressive impulses which do not violate major norms necessary for the structural continuity of the social system. These in our society might include competitive sports, swearing, some forms of aggressive interpersonal joking, certain uses of alcohol, drama and pageantry, etc)

27 Migration of a visibly different group into a given area increases the likelihood of conflict, the probability of conflict is the greater (a) the larger the ratio of the incoming minority to the resident population, and (b) the more rapid the influx

28 Conflict is especially likely in periods of rapid change in levels of living The probability of conflict is increased insofar as the changes have a differential impact on various groups

29 Hostilities and conflicts among ethnic or racial groups are to an appreciable extent interchangeable with "class" conflicts. (This hypothesis states that ethnic conflicts may prevent focalization of class conflicts, e g, labor vs employers, and that interclass struggle may direct a given "charge" of hostility away from ethnic targets)

30 Given a social group which is "a going concern," a sensed outside threat

to the group as a whole will result in heightened internal cohesion and an increased centralization of control within the group

This appears to be one of the most important general principles of group dynamics It is applicable to a large number of concrete events, ranging from nations at war to the behavior of neighborhood factions, and it is supported by a wealth of observation. However, it holds true only under very specific conditions (a) The group must be a "going concern," i e, there must be a minimal consensus among the constituent individuals that the aggregate is a group, and that its preservation as an entity is worth while The case of France in 1940 may be taken, in part, as illustrative of the consequence of inadequate collective consensus (b) There must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group as a whole, not just some parts of it An objective threat is not causal, in this respect, unless recognized. On the other hand, external groups may be defined as threatening in the absence of objective danger

31 The probability of internal group conflict is lowered by the presence of an outside threat which endangers all groups

"Hatred of a common enemy is the most powerful known agency for producing group unity" (Edwards, 11, p 55)

"Groups which arise out of conflict tend to disintegrate when opposition ceases" (Hiller, 14, p 30)

"The best safeguard against internal disruptive antagonisms seems to be the presence of an external enemy which gives the hostile impulses an external target" (Alexander, 1, p 28)

To find a common dislike is apparently one of the most frequent and gratifying experiences in creating a bond between individuals It is as though uncomfortable latent hostilities between the two parties are removed by deflection to a third, outside object

32 Focalization of hostility upon a given group is probably inhibited by a multiplicity of vulnerable minorities in the society, a society riven by many minor cleavages is in less danger of open mass conflict than a society with only one or a few cleavages (However, there is a possibility that a socially incapacitating chaos of group antagonisms may generate a demand for unification which will involve focusing hostility upon a selected minority)

In the most extreme case of mass violence

"An essential step in the development of revolution is the gradual concentration of public dissatisfaction upon some one institution and the persons representing it . . In the earlier stages the dissatisfaction is diffused and dissipated." (Edwards, 11, p 46)

33 Among the members of any dominant group the greatest incidence of open conflict behavior toward a given minority will be found among those classes which are most vulnerable to competition from the minority It is a legitimate guess from the scattered evidence at hand that group conflict is not so much a correlate of *differences* in status as it is of *changes* in status and in the highly visible symbols thereof

"Aggressive responses are apparently powerfully excited by fear" (Dollard, 8, p 18)

34 Group conflict arises in part because it satisfies certain individual or group needs Unless these needs can be eliminated or greatly diminished or satisfied through other means, there will remain a possibility of conflict, no matter how skill-

fully formal techniques of diversion and control are applied.

"What seems to be required first is an analysis of the prejudiced individual to find out not where he acquired the prejudice but *why he needs it.*" (Watson, 35, p 181)

35 Maintenance of the "American Creed" in intergroup matters is usually strongest among small groups of professional and upper class persons, and emphasis upon its universal values circulates downward in the social stratification pyramid. In general, only persons in "upper" groups have sufficient security to work actively for innovations in the direction of greater privileges for minorities Although behavior in nondiscriminatory labor unions and certain related organizations may appear to contradict this hypothesis, it may be argued that even in such cases the impetus toward nondiscrimination tends in the main to come from the top organizational levels (Suggested by Charles Dollard)

36 Historically viewed, American lower class groups have always had successive groups of recent immigrants which provided both a basis for compensatory feelings of superiority and a target for release of structurally determined frustrations. Each level in the class structure could thus control and subdue those still lower by displacing its aggression on lower groups as a means of maintaining its own sense of status.

The cessation of large-scale immigration has thus removed an important element of flexibility in the balancing system for controlling intergroup hostilities.

37. In American society psychological insecurity concerning position on the scale of social stratification is most intense in the lower middle class. This class may, therefore, be expected to exhibit a maximum of free-floating hostility.

38 An important element of the American value-system is the belief that individuals have an obligation to accept the results of fair competition, i.e., to be a "good loser." Hence competition tends to turn into conflict whenever doubts are raised concerning the fairness of the competition or the validity of the rules of the game.

Experience seems to show that American groups do not easily accept the results of competition or other processes which appear to them to be responsible for catastrophe declines in their social position.

39. Conflict between persons of different identifiable groups is the more likely when there is no clear definition of the situation, especially with regard to detailed patterns of "appropriate" personal behavior.

". . . the intensity of intergroup antagonism varies with the frequency of contacts between minority and majority individuals not in accord with customary practice under an accepted social definition of status relationship" (D Young, 38, pp 65–66)

40. Mass violence (e g, race riots) is most likely under the following conditions (a) prolonged frustration, leading to a high tension level, (b) presence of population elements with a propensity to violence (especially lower class, adolescent males in socially disorganized areas), (c) a highly visible and rapid change in intergroup relations, (d) a precipitating incident of intergroup conflict.

IV. REACTIONS OF MINORITY GROUPS

41. Marked self-consciousness and sensitivity is characteristic of those minority group members occupying ambiguous social positions in modern America

42 Militancy, except for sporadic and short-lived uprisings, is not characteristic

of the most deprived and oppressed groups, but rather of those who have gained considerable rights so that they are able realistically to hope for more.

"The consciousness of repression leads to discontent only when it is felt unnecessary This is the reason why a rising class, which is actually becoming constantly better off objectively, generally rebels most readily, and why the most severe repression has so often failed to cause a revolution." (Pettee, 32, p. 32)

43. A militant reaction from a minority group is most likely when (a) the group's position is rapidly improving, or (b) when it is rapidly deteriorating, especially if this follows a period of improvement

"The whole argument about distress and expansive ambition as causes of revolution [conflict] may be resolved if one remembers that a shoe may pinch, either because the foot has grown, or because the shoe has shrunken" (*Ibid.*, p 15)

44. Prejudice against Negroes and certain other minorities is likely to be especially vigorous and vocal among ethnic groups which have been only recently "Americanized" and which are attempting to move up in the class hierarchy (This tendency is intensified by any discrepancy between the ideology of upward social mobility and actual rigidities in the social structure)

45 Mutual hostilities sometimes arise between minority groups which are themselves the object of aggression by the dominant majority, e g, anti-Semitism among Negroes In other instances minorities combine in mutual support againt prejudice and discrimination on the part of the majority groups. The conditions determining these opposite types of behavior are not well understood

V. APPROACHES FOR THE REDUCTION OR CONTROL OF HOSTILITY AND CONFLICT

(*A*) *General Orientation*

46 The two extreme "solutions" for eliminating a given group conflict are (a) complete insulation, e g, geographic exclusion, and (b) complete assimilation

47 The main theoretical possibilities for minimizing a given group conflict are

(a) actual reduction in hostility
(b) no change in hostility level, but a rechannelization to substitute targets (in the extreme case, diffusion to a variety of objects)
(c) no change in hostility level and retention of major object-fixation, but repression of overt conflict

48 The reduction of intergroup conflict depends upon

(a) reduction of hostility, which depends upon minimization of frustrations and insecurities and their attendant anxieties
(b) proper canalization of existing hostilities, through sanctions, diversions, redefinition of situations, etc

"Thus the anxiety and frustration which our social order continually generates can be reduced to manageable proportions only if at least two conditions are fulfilled First, if our physical and economic situations are reasonably comfortable and secure, and, secondly if we derive adequate security and gratification from satisfactory interpersonal relationships If people are anxious and frustrated by society and if, moreover, they live in social isolation . . many of them will try to discharge their aggressions explosively through acts of violence." (Bettelheim, 4, p 36)

"In attacking many specific phenomena of social pathology one is attacking 'symptoms'—not 'causes' The result, if

successful at all, will be merely to shift the currents of hostility — not to eliminate them. An attack upon 'causes' must consist: (a) in ameliorating basic situations which are productive of 'realistic' worries and hostilities, (b) in devising improved techniques of child socialization and of subsequent inter-personal relations so that the total amount of 'free-floating aggression' is decreased." (Kluckhohn, 17, p 238)

49 An individual does not act only in *more* or *less* prejudiced ways: he acts in *different* ways depending upon the function of the basic value structure in his personality in action

"The findings are clear proof that prejudiced responses are not dissociated from the total pattern of personal life Those who have a jungle philosophy of life (viewing the world as basically evil and dangerous) are generally prejudiced" (Allport and Kramer, 3, pp 34, 38)

50 Any given pattern of intergroup hostility and conflict varies in its intensity and in its implications depending upon whether it is (a) traditional and sanctioned as a "legitimate" channel for aggression-release, or (b) in opposition to nominally dominant value-patterns

The most intense conflicts, such as those which merge into mass political actions, are to be expected when (1) situation *a* co-exists with an increased threat to the dominant group, or (2) situation *b* has moved close to widespread repudiation of the dominant values

51 Simultaneous direct attack on every form of intergroup discrimination is likely to intensify the reaction it attempts to stop. Programs aimed against discrimination will be least likely to set off unmanageable "nativistic" reactions by proceeding one point at a time, and by starting with items of lowest negative symbolic potential

"Generally speaking, any policy which tends to make Jews as Jews more conspicuous, and particularly those Jews who are at the same time vulnerable symbols in other respects, would tend to be an invitation to anti-Semitic reaction Thus, indiscriminate attack on every form of existent discrimination, regardless of anything but the immediate effectiveness of the means, is not likely to achieve the actual elimination of anti-Semitism, but on the contrary to intensify the reactions it attempts to stop" (Parsons, 31, p 121)

52. A general principle of approach is that, except in acute crisis situations, problems of group conflict are usually most readily resolved by indirection rather than by frontal assault In propaganda, for example, direct arguments tend to present a sharp issue which arouses maximum resistance, a more effective procedure is to emphasize common aims and suggest group integration as a means for their attainment

Insofar as possible, if it is desired to avoid defensive hostility, guided changes in intergroup relations must be made in such a way as to avoid or minimize the interpretation that they threaten security with regard to those things in which the groups have important emotional commitments (It should be clear, however, that various gradualistic ameliorative proposals for reducing hostility or conflict do not directly reach the problem of "interested," calculated discrimination or the conscious use of group visibility as a means for perpetuating a privileged social and economic position)

53 Where strong prejudice is present in a group which is highly self-conscious, and strongly bound together, outside criticism of its prejudice is likely to be taken as an attack on the group, and *one* immediate effect is to strengthen the prejudice, which by virtue of the attack becomes a

symbol of in-group membership and solidarity. (Two historical cases are especially good illustrations· Northern criticism of race relations in the Southern states, outside criticism of the Afrikaans-speaking whites in the Union of South Africa)

(B) Information and Education

54 The likelihood of conflict is reduced by education and propaganda emphases upon characteristics and values *common* to various groups rather than upon inter group *differences.* (But there is danger that attitudes thus created may lead to ex pectation of greater similarity than later experience demonstrates, and this can lead to disillusionment and secondary reinforcement of hostility A second qualifica tion is that some persons holding to a doctrine of cultural pluralism advocate awareness of differences on the assump tion that acceptance of differences comes only after a transitional period, which may involve temporary intensification of hostility)

55. Favorable attitudes and the extent of information about given groups are positively, but slightly, correlated, effects are not clearly proven in detail but the general evidence is positive

"Altogether, our rather meager evidence suggests that those who know most about other races and peoples tend to have favorable attitudes about them, particularly in the case of those more frequently met, such as Negroes in this country" Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, 27, p 1001)

56. The effects of imparting a given type of information about minority groups – under given circumstances — differ, depending upon the extent and degree to which the recipients already have favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward the group or groups in question

". . . the influence of information upon attitude may vary with the nature of that attitude" (Nettler, 29, p 182)

Related sub-hypotheses

(a) "Information is more effective as an attitude determinant where the attitudinal norm [in a given group] is unfavorable" (*Ibid*, p 185)

(b) Imparting of information will have greater positive effects upon individuals who stand in an intermediate attitudinal position than upon those at either extreme

(c) Imparting information to the more militant of those prejudiced against the group will rarely produce an immediate change in attitudes and may intensify hostile reactions a nonlogical prejudice may be transformed into consciously irrational hostility

57 The mere giving of objective general information in print or by lecture about a group which is the object of hostility has only a slight effect, or no effect, in reducing hostility — at least in the short run (This is the negative statement of the hypothesis that the communication of scientific information or other factual data tends to undermine the strength of prejudice Any research on this point must be careful to specify the content and the conditions of communication, to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects, and to watch for differences between effects on isolated individuals or small groups and effect on communities as wholes)

". . . straight lectures on the interests, rights, and virtues of minority groups accomplish very little" (Allport, 2, p 6)

58 Even with a uniform body of instructional materials about a given group or groups, the effects of instruction upon recipients will vary appreciably with the

basic attitudes and "personality" of the instructor.

59 Insofar as education or propaganda reduces hostility toward any specific group or toward out-groups in general, it does so largely by rechannelizing aggressive impulses rather than removing them.

60. Attempts to reduce intergroup hostility by education will be the more effective, (a) the more the learners are convinced in the beginning that they themselves are not under attack for their opinions, and (b) the more the learners are allowed initially to express freely their verbal hostilities to instructors who maintain an atmosphere of calm objectivity.

"It is an axiom that people cannot be taught who feel that they are at the same time being attacked. It is also an axiom that they learn very little unless they want to learn." (Allport, 2, p. 5)

". . . re-trainers who encounter more resistance than they expect may need to provide more abundantly than they do for the free expression of hostility" (*Ibid.*, p. 9)

61. Educational programs will have maximum effects, all other things being equal, when information is presented as part of the ordinary action of a group in carrying out its usual social function (e g, as part of general teacher training, job training for public officials, conferences of industrialists, labor leaders, merchants, real estate dealers, etc).

62. Prejudices are most likely to be changed by the imparting of information about the object of prejudice when the learners themselves actively participate in gathering the relevant information

". . . complete acceptance of previously rejected facts can be achieved best through the discovery of these facts by the group members themselves." (Lewin and Grabbe, 21, p. 63)

63. Changing the attitudes of *groups* rather than isolated individuals is the more effective approach for breaking up intergroup stereotypes and prejudices.

". . many stereotypes and dislikes are anchored not so much in the individual's personality as in the face-to-face groups to which the individual belongs and which determine his standards and ideals." (Lewin, 20, p. 186)

"The group is more resistant to environmental change than is the individual

The impact of cultural differences or of social disapproval is weakened by the presence of others who share it." (Strother, 34, p 51)

"Permanent belongingness in an organized locally rooted, solidary social system is the only concrete matrix capable of grasping and involving the whole motivation of man . . . Consequently, this sort of matrix is ultimately the most effective setting for the re-educational process" (Bales, 6, p 21)

64. Hostility is decreased by any activity which leads members of conflicting groups to identify their own values and life-activities in individuals of the other group. To be most effective this requires devices for inducing *personal* identification before the introduction of group labels.

Dictum Personalize, personalize, personalize.

(*C*) *Direct Reorientation of Values*

65 In intergroup relations, as in many others, word-of-mouth propaganda, especially that which appears spontaneous and informal, is more effective than visual or formal propaganda in influencing attitudes and behavior.

So far as specific media are concerned, the scanty evidence suggests this general order of effectiveness: (1) direct personal

communication (speeches, lectures, etc.); (2) radio; (3) printed materials However, the research results also suggest that the order of effectiveness varies with the subject matter, the type of appeal, and the type of audience.

66. In intergroup relations, as in many others, propaganda which makes an "emotional" (value-oriented) appeal is likely to be more effective than that which is restricted to factual appeal.

But this plausible assertion may be countered with the view that such appeals arouse relatively uncontrolled emotions which are not likely to lead to tolerant or humane behavior It certainly appears that there are sufficient dangers in strongly emotional propaganda to warrant careful testing with different types of audiences

67 In intergroup relations, as in many others, the "propaganda of the deed" is especially likely to have effects upon attitudes and behavior

68 Propaganda which appeals for minority rights on the basis of the group's achievements tends beyond a certain point to arouse insecurity-hostility in the dominant group by stressing group differences and competitive success.

This hypothesis implies that appeals which suggest a status-threat to prejudiced groups are to be avoided

69 It is dangerous technique to employ *mass* propaganda emphasizing "rising tides of prejudice" as a means intended to mobilize defenders of minority rights and good intergroup relations Such propaganda is likely to have a boomerang effect upon slightly prejudiced or wavering elements· it creates the presumption of group support for hostile actions.

70. Appeals to conscience or ethics must be carefully handled, if they are to diminish rather than intensify hostility In general, such appeals are probably most effective in reinforcing the sentiments of persons who are already convinced; they are probably not effective (immediately, at least) with militant anti-ethnics, and may even result in increased hostility as a reaction to guilt-feelings That is, where individuals are utilizing prejudice to satisfy strong emotional urges, activation of the conscience-functions may tend to heighten psychological conflict and thus to result in increasingly devious or irrational hostilities.

71 Appeals to local pride are sometimes useful in motivating leaders to prevent open conflict. Mass violence is widely regarded in America as bringing discredit upon the community in which it occurs

72 Conflict is discouraged by providing, through sources of high general prestige, for specific public commendation of individuals of the dominant group who work for toleration, minority rights, mutual understanding, and the like

73 An effective propaganda approach in intergroup relations is that which emphasizes national symbols and common American achievements, sacrifices, destinies, etc, while unobtrusively indicating the common participation of minority group members

74 Other things being equal, the blocking of hostile impulses and their deflection into harmless channels is facilitated by any devices which strongly remind individuals of commonly acknowledged cultural prescriptions against hostility to other groups Examples of such devices are (a) pronouncements by representatives of moral and political authority, (b) dramatic ceremonial affirmation of the relevant patterns and values, (c) public reward and (sometimes) punishment

75 Conflict and hostility are rendered less probable by any activity which leads individuals to *take for granted* the other group (e g, moving pictures which show Negroes as members of various kinds of groups, where the emphasis of presentation is upon what the group is doing).

76. Individuals who have been exposed to strongly religious training, or who participate in organized religious activities, do not necessarily manifest less hostility or greater tolerance than individuals not having these characteristics. Only certain types of religious training are effective in lessening intergroup hostility.

"Religious training in itself does *not* lessen prejudice But religious training which successfully stresses tolerance and brotherhood *does* tend to lessen prejudice" (Allport and Kramer, 3, p 38)

Note Certain studies have shown a correlation "cluster" consisting of attitudes of nationalism, out-group prejudices, conventional and rigid moral codes, and religiosity (study of Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford; an unpublished study by Louis Guttman indicates a correlation between prejudice and conventional religiosity)

77. The effects of public refutation of hostile rumors vary with the nature of the refutation and with the type of rumor and attendant situation, e g.·

(a) *In chronic but relatively stable and mild intergroup tensions,* rumors are probably best ignored, or refuted only by indirection and propaganda of the deed

(b) *Rumors of unusual character, intensity, or prevalence* (e g., role of minorities in the armed forces in war) probably should be met by "official" propaganda However, publicizing the rumors themselves should be avoided, the refutation should be as indirect (nonmanifest) as is consistent with the necessity of gaining attention.

(c) *In crisis situations* (pre-riot, etc) refutation of rumors of hostile intentions or of hostile actions of opposing groups, weakness of control forces, and the like tends to check conflict

Note Contrary assumptions are also advanced by experienced authorities Almost nothing is definitely established on these propositions.

(D) Intergroup Contact and Collaboration

78 Lessened hostility will result from arranging intergroup collaboration, on the basis of personal association of individuals as functional equals, on a common task jointly accepted as worth while

"To achieve any kind of mutual understanding and regard, people must share experiences which permit the interplay of character and personality. They must share a common objective." (Lett, 19, p. 35)

" . where peoples of various cultures and races freely and genuinely associate, there tensions and difficulties, prejudices and confusions, dissolve; where they do not associate, where they are isolated from one another, there prejudice and conflict grow like a disease." (Brameld, 7, p 245)

79. (a) Personal contacts between members of different groups are generally most effective in producing friendly relations when the individuals are of the same, or nearly the same, economic and social status and share similar interests and tastes

"The interracial agencies have the theory that prejudice is broken down more easily and understanding built up more rapidly through the personal contact of the races than by any other method . An effort is made to bring together people of the same age and cultural level, following the belief that groups which have many things in common will achieve a better understanding" (Baker, 5, p 178)

"Conversely, contact between members of groups holding very different economic and social status (or between members of groups equally deprived of status, e g, the poor whites and poor blacks) intensifies rivalry and the desire to establish status at the expense of one another" (Allport and Kramer, 3, p 23)

(b) But these statements can be matched with different opinions

"The contact of the races in America when it is on the basis of equality often breeds suspicion, fear, resentment, disturbance, and at times open conflict As long as the contact is on 'the superior and inferior' relation, the two groups can mingle on a social and intimate basis without friction" (Baker, 5, p 120)

'Yet racial attitudes and stereotypes do change They change, however, not because of exceptional and intimate understanding friendships between individuals of antagonistic groups, but when the basic conditions which have produced group hatreds are removed" (D Young, 37, p 14)

"Closeness of contact, or familiarity as such, between groups will not necessarily lead to a reduction in social distance between the individual members, unless it is accompanied by the discovery that there are elements shared in common Otherwise such familiarity, by enhancing the differences that divide the two groups, will only lead to an increase in social distance" (MacCrone, 24, p 178)

(c) Evidently research testing of sharply defined hypotheses is especially appropriate with regard to intergroup contacts The great importance attached to the subject by action agencies is coexistent with a wide variety of opinions among persons with long experience and study in the field. The differing results of intergroup contacts at various times and places, and the divergent assumptions and hypotheses drawn from these experiences, strongly suggest a need for further definition, isolation, and control of potentially important variables in contact experiences A few tentative suggestions as to such variables are given below

(d) In personal contacts between members of different racial ethnic, or religious groups the effects upon the prejudice hostility level will be contingent in part upon some or all of the following variables

(1) The general status of the minority group in relation to the majority groups Eg, the fact that Jewish persons tend to occupy higher occupational positions than Negroes will influence the results of specific types of contacts
(2) The class positions of the various individuals within their own group and the comparative status of individuals in the one group relative to the other
(3) The initial prejudice hostility level of the individuals involved
(4) The character and extent of prejudice in the total social milieu within which the contacts occur Eg, the effects of Negro white contacts in Mississippi may be expected to differ from those occurring in Maine
(5) The actual and anticipated duration of contact
(6) The "intimacy" of contact (actual and anticipated)
(7) The extent to which contact is explicitly defined in terms of intergroup relations, or only with reference to other activities of common interest
(8) The strength of competitive and noncompetitive factors in relations between members of the two groups

(9) Number of persons involved
(10) The degree to which the situation of contact is defined as "real," that is, the extent to which the participants expect it to affect their personal relations within their accustomed group associations. This would be important, for example, in differential reactions to a mixed tour in a foreign country as against associations of equal intimacy in the individuals' own local community.

(e) Illustrative qualifying hypotheses

(1) In the case of Negroes and probably Spanish Americans and other "depressed" groups, majority members may be most favorably affected by contacts with persons of equal or higher status.
(2) In the case of Jews, Gentiles may be most favorably affected by contacts with those of the same or lower status
(3) In both (1) and (2) the effects will vary with the class position of the majority group member in his own group
(4) In all cases the effects will vary with the anticipated duration of the contacts and with their anticipated effects upon the individual's social relations within his own group

80. Personal association of members of different groups is most effective in reducing hostility and increasing understanding when the focus of interaction is upon a common interest, goal, or task rather than upon intergroup association as such (The converse hypothesis, that such association should explicitly stress the purpose of promoting group understanding, is often acted upon.)

81. Increased concrete knowledge of the life of a minority group, especially of particular persons whose behavior does not fit stereotyped conceptions, tends to break up rigid stereotypes and under some conditions to diffuse or decrease hostility.

82 Prejudice is reduced by arranging for personal, intimate contacts of members of different groups who share important tastes and interests in common. (Prejudice is usually only increased by casual, public contacts, especially in urban situations) Contact must be intensive enough to result in personal likes *and* dislikes which help to break up stereotypes It is not wise policy for a minority to insist upon wholesale liking of its members to the point of claiming "discrimination" unless universal acceptability is granted the group

". . . a person may have prejudices which stand in direct opposition to his personal experience . favorable experiences with members of another group, even if they are frequent, do not necessarily diminish prejudices toward that group . only when the individuals can be perceived as 'typical representatives' of that group, is the experience with individuals likely to affect the stereotype" (Lewin and Grabbe, 21, p 58)

"A factor of great importance in bringing about a change in sentiment is the degree to which the individual becomes actively involved in the problem" (*Ibid*, p 59)

83 Diminution of hostility may be expected when it is possible to arrange for ritualized conflict or competition between groups which cut across ethnic or racial lines (e g, a local athletic team which includes an "ethnic" playing against a rival team which is also multi-ethnic).

84. Hostility is reduced by arranging for reverse role-taking in public drama or ceremony (e g, an anti-Negro person plays a realistic Negro role). Re-training in intergroup relations among highly prej-

udiced persons is facilitated by arranging "rehearsal" situations in which initial contacts with out-group members may be made without the feeling of "playing for keeps." To change permanently and to stabilize behavior patterns, however, the "players" must be led through increasingly realistic participations

85 Participation in public rituals and ceremonies re-affirming solidarity and pledging cooperation works toward inhibition of tendencies for intergroup conflict.

The same hypothesis holds true for joint participation in common rituals, festivals, and ceremonies (e g, joint Christmas-Chanukah observances, patriotic observances)

86 Formation of committees of mixed membership to deal with local problems tends to reduce the likelihood of conflict for the time being But.

"minority groups wonder, publicly, whether some of these committees may not be doing more to inhibit than to stimulate action." (Liveright, 23, p 106)

". many committees on minority problems do not see their way clear for action and that frustration may lead to dangerous disillusionment." (Lewin, 20, p 188)

87 In any integration of minority members into a work situation *on the initiative of higher control-groups in an organization,* acceptance is facilitated by arranging for representation of the minority in the upper as well as the lower levels of the organization This arrangement is necessary to forestall accusations that workers are forced to accept that which the control-group itself will not tolerate.

"The smart personnel man will always start his nondiscrimination program with employment of a Negro or Negress in his own department or on the top management level." (Haas and Fleming, 13, p. 55)

88. *Problem* The introduction of minority group members into new areas or activities may be accomplished by (a) gradual introduction of selected individuals, with a minimum of prior discussion or announcement, (b) statement that the minority will be introduced, accompanied by a considerable volume of information, exhortation, and discussion prior to the change itself, (c) polling, or otherwise determining wishes of the majority group, in advance of the change — the results being understood to constitute a binding decision (This may be done either with or without an information and discussion program)

Examples

(1) ". discrepancy between the imagined problems and the actual problems is so great as to lead some administrators to question whether advance discussion may not discourage steps which could have been taken if the matter had not become controversial before it had been tried" (Watson, 35, p 178)

(2) Haas and Fleming (13, pp 52–53) recommend this procedure In essentials it was used by the National Smelting Company (reported by Rubin and Segal, 33).

(3) A department store polled white employees and found them opposed to the entrance of Negro employees, thus blocking further immediate action (reported by Watson, 35, p 178)

Hypotheses

(1) Procedure *a* will be most effective, in securing acceptance with a minimum of conflict, in cases in which there are

relatively tolerant initial attitudes in the majority population
(2) Procedure *b* will be the more effective method in the case of populations having relatively strong initial prejudice
(3) Procedure *c* will almost always be the least effective of the three methods named

(*E*) *Legislation and Law Enforcement*

89 The existence of laws protecting the rights of minorities and court decisions upholding these laws tend, in the long run, to decrease conflict over the rights involved. This result appears because of at least the following factors (a) the set toward generalized conformity resulting from the typical training of individuals in any social system, (b) insofar as effective sanctions are actually invoked, some deterrent effect is possible and, more important, those who apply or acquiesce in the application of sanctions thereby reinforce their own sentiments toward conformity, (c) the presumption of legitimacy discourages conflict over rights claimed by minorities, by mobilizing intrapersonality "conscience" functions of majority group members

90 Whenever there is sufficient flexibility in public attitudes, the abolition of legal discriminations and disabilities in the long run will reduce hostility and conflict

"In opposition to a common belief, school segregation tends to increase rather than prevent race conflicts" (D Young, 37, p 495)

91 A general expectation of authoritative intervention and the possibility of punishment for acts of violence, whether in group conflict or in individual incidents, will decrease the probability of open conflict.

(a) Tendencies toward open conflict are inhibited by the publicized presence of effective, well disciplined, and impartial law-enforcement agencies
(b) Mixed police forces, with careful indoctrination in handling conflict situations, can deal most effectively with open conflict, and the presence of such forces may decrease the likelihood of conflict.

92 In the event of open conflict the resolution of the crisis with a minimum of violence, damage, and residue of hostility is facilitated by

(a) prompt and full publicity to allay fears and to stress the control agencies' capacities to control
(b) assurances of strict and impartial justice
(c) special distribution of police to danger spots
(d) provision for prompt summoning of military or other outside order maintaining forces
(e) enlisting cooperation of neighborhood leaders
(f) personal public appeal by high officials
(g) the presence of high officials in danger areas — with full dramatization of their presence
(h) minimum use of force

(*F*) *Social Organization*

93. Possibilities of conflict are lessened by the establishment of clear, detailed and widely recognized patterns for interpersonal relationships in situations of casual contact (e g , in public conveyances).

Example In Detroit increasing numbers of instances of intergroup friction were noted:

" in certain areas around five in the evening due to the effort of workers leaving several large factories to crowd

onto overloaded streetcars and busses curing up greatly reduced the amount of pushing and fighting on the loading platforms" (Watson, 35, p 178)

94 In America a minority ethnic or racial group struggling for improved status, or for the alleviation of intergroup hostility, will be most successful if it relies upon a variety of organizations rather rather than one over-all organization.

"In race relations, as in other problem areas, the 'omnibus' type of organization has little chance to achieve real success

It is entirely conceivable that a given community might well support several interracial committees, each functioning in a specific field of interest, each attracting to its membership individuals who find in the committee objective outlets for their primary interest" (Lett, 19, p 38)

'Our conclusion will be that a suppressed minority group like the Negro people is best served by *several organizations* dividing the field and maximizing the support that can be gained from different groups of whites." (Myrdal, 28, p 835)

95 Mediation between groups in conflict is possible only when effective appeal can be made to a superior value-consensus which transcends group differences, e g, the preservation of a larger community, common larger "interests," basic religious values, shared mores, etc (Suggested by L S. Cottrell, Jr)

96 Open conflict is rendered less likely by providing regularized leisure-time activities for those population elements most susceptible to riot-forming influences (e g., adolescent males of lower class groups)

97. The device of *official* committees concerned with intergroup relations (e g, Mayors' committees) will not ordinarily originate pressure for change but may be useful in transmitting pressure from more militant groups to official political leaders (Watson, unpublished study of intergroup action programs)

98 Outside agencies coming into a local community to stimulate, initiate, or otherwise effect programs directed toward intergroup relations will meet minimum resistance when they (a) work through local persons and established local groups, (b) avoid extensive publicity for themselves, (c) adapt techniques and organization to local circumstances rather than propose a rigid scheme prepared in advance

99 Aggressive needs, arising out of internal group structure, are lessened by arrangements providing for the necessary authority and coordination through group consensus rather than through rigid hierarchal organization.

"Another safeguard of disruptive social phenomena is a social structure in which the group members' cooperation is based on more or less free agreement with each other, and is not based on a coercion through a tyrannical father figure" (Alexander, 1, p. 28)

"Comparison of groups of children playing under 'democratic' and mildly 'autocratic' leadership has shown evidence of greater hostility-tension in the autocratic groups A repressive structure can generate either apathy or aggression within the group Only in autocratic groups were individuals used as scapegoats for focused aggression" (From Lewin, Lippitt and White, 22)

"[In a rigid dictatorship] . . . aggressive impulses are turned against the dissenting citizenry . . . the disobedient brothers and sisters " (Zilboorg, 40, p 641)

"The more highly disciplined an army, the greater is its aggressive spirit against an enemy. Hence, the greater the disci-

pline of group life, its repressions, privations, and exactions, either in the form of moral, religious, or economic sanctions, the greater may we expect its aggressiveness to become at the expense of some other group or groups." (MacCrone, 24, p 251)

100. Dispersion of minorities as individuals or small groups (*not* as communities) throughout a wide area and in various positions in the social structure tends to diffuse hostility and in the long run to reduce it

"Experience has shown that, when an individual or a few individual Negro families have entered high and medium income areas [residential], resistance to them has gradually declined" (Weaver, 36, p 105)

"If Jews could be evenly distributed through the social structure, anti-Semitism would probably be greatly reduced" (Parsons, 30, p 197)

101 A vulnerable minority can itself help to reduce hostility and conflict insofar as there is group control over individual members, by

(a) educating its members to an understanding of the dominant group's reaction to the minority's values and behavior
(b) careful study of the behaviors of its own members which are regarded as objectionable by other groups
(c) minimizing conspicuous display of traits of marked negative-symbol value
(d) participation *as individuals* in wider community activities which are widely regarded as necessary in the common welfare.

102. All other things being equal, the probability of intergroup conflict is reduced by any measures which facilitate the internal differentiation of minorities, insofar as this serves to remove the objective basis for rigid social categorization

It is believed that these propositions constitute a reasonably solid base of reference from which future research may depart It is believed also that they constitute a challenge of the first order to social science and social action in these times We have a fair sampling of the problems now before us and shall next consider possible approaches to the study of these questions — approaches which must always be guided by the ultimate imperatives of developing understanding and control

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PART SEVEN SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

In a world fraught with social disorganization and made hectic by the rapid tempo of social change, many persons seek comfort in nostalgic recollections of a past to which we cannot return or in fanciful dreams of a future which may never be. Whether our forebears were on the whole better satisfied with their lot, or whether succeeding generations will be with theirs, we have no way of knowing. The simpler communal societies undoubtedly have been more coherent and stable than our own loosely integrated and highly dynamic society, but we have no universal yardstick for gauging and comparing the total amount of happiness and misery of various times and places. Needs and aspirations, as we have repeatedly observed, are in large part socially engendered, and the crucial individual and societal problems of one era are not necessarily those of another. Moreover, "order and stability" as described from one perspective may be considered "stultification and stagnation" from another (cf. characterizations of European society during the Middle Ages)

Social equilibrium or balance is always relative, never absolute, in human society. Even the simplest communal societies have some social disorganization (i.e., recognized and unsolved societal problems) and undergo social change (i.e., alterations in structure and function). Complete harmony and stability are never achieved anywhere, and are sheer impossibilities under the conditions of modern life. Thus it appears that in our era, a flexible, not too tightly integrated society may have the best survival capacity. Contemporary conditions place a greater premium on resilience than on rigidity, both of individuals and societies, and an increased amount of disorganization is perhaps one price we pay for social change.

This is not to imply that all social disorganization is to be dismissed as either inevitable or of no real consequence, but merely that under certain conditions it is "normal" and to be expected. One of our primary objectives in Part Seven is to get a reasonably adequate understanding of the meaning and significance of social disorganization. We shall inquire into its causes, point out the bearing it has on some of the more critical social problems of our society, and observe how sociological research gets at the underlying factors and interprets them systematically. It should be self-evident that intelligent social action directed toward minimizing the causes and ameliorating the effects of social disorganization presupposes objective inquiry of this sort. Yet the time-worn and common procedure in society at large has been, and to a disturbing extent still is, quite different. Popular thought and action in this area reveal a long history of ignorance, error, and prejudice, and

even objective approaches have often led down false trails With scientific analysis at last yielding valid clues to the solution of many hitherto baffling and misunderstood social problems, much of the requisite knowledge for a more enlightened public policy is now at hand if we will merely use it.

Our other major consideration in this section has to do with the sociological aspects of contemporary change. Many of the aspects of social change which have been incidental in other parts of this volume will be subjected to more careful and detailed analysis The perspectives of conventional history and sociology will be contrasted and attention given to the significance of the time dimension as it appears in the duration, tempo, and direction of social phenomena Basic changes in societal forms and functions, such as those manifested in secularization (increasingly critical attitudes toward tradition), atomization (the breakdown of group relations), and urbanization, will be observed empirically in the setting of our own society. There will be a sociological analysis of circumstances leading to innovation, the common forms of innovation, the forces which oppose or facilitate social change, and the respects in which change may be controlled and directed It will be noted that social change is not a distinct process but is brought about through a complex set of interrelations; some of the processes operate slowly and imperceptibly and others are noticeably abrupt Gradual changes in the age composition of a society, for example, may produce slow modifications in institutions, political revolutions may accomplish drastic changes very quickly — and, vice versa, societal alterations effect demographic changes and foment political violence

As we shall observe, social history does repeat itself in the form of patterns discernible through sociological analysis Social movements, such as reforms and revolutions, occur in response to specific conditions and pursue a characteristic course of development Even the so-called blind forces operate in response to social laws, and every event has definite causes The cumulative pressure of all of these causes is not always subject to human control, to be sure, but there are varying degrees of necessity and many eventualities may be predicted and controlled No longer need mankind be a hapless spectator of social change As Max Weber pointed out in the first selection in this book, science and technology have disenchanted our world and set in motion stupendous powers which have changed the course of civilization, but this same science, when more fully developed and widely applied than at present to the problems of culture and society, will bring about a world more in accordance with human needs and aspirations.

22. The Disorganization of Society

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The only perfectly organized human societies are Utopias This being so, if one wishes to observe actual societies in which there is normally no disorganization whatever, one must go to subhuman societies, such as those of the social insects Ant hills or bee hives occasionally become disrupted or disorganized by outside forces, but if they are not exterminated, the old modes of behavior are resumed as the society returns to its former balance or equilibrium Human societies, on the other hand, are dynamic rather than static They are never in a state of perfect balance or complete equilibrium and some disorganization is always present. Even when not subjected to wars, widespread drouths, floods, epidemics, or other disturbing influences, they continually change Social disorganization is not necessarily a corollary of social organization, but it does appear to be an inevitable accompaniment of social change

Moreover, social disorganization in one form or another permeates the entire structure of our society Its processes and products have been implicit if not explicit in many parts of this volume In the chapter on personality disorganization, for instance, social disorganization was found to be the source of individual frustrations resulting from discrepancies between means and ends, of incompatible or conflicting social roles, and of many other human dilemmas eventuating in personality disorders. Although there is a close relation between personal and social disorganization, the former is not invariably a reflection of the latter, and social disorganization is not simply personality disorganization multiplied many times.

Our first basic question is What is social disorganization? Several important specifications are to be noted (1) It is a comprehensive concept developed by sociologists for both cultural and societal phenomena On the one hand it indicates contradiction or conflict between cultural norms, and on the other it denotes the weakening of behavior rules or norms, the loss of predictability in social action, and the breakdown of groups Either focus implies maladjustment or a loss of necessary co-ordination. If the maladjustment is sufficiently serious it may threaten group and individual survival (2) The general processes of social disorganization should not be confused with symptoms or manifestations Thus, crime is a manifestation of social disorganization, and a rising rate of juvenile delinquency is a symptom or index, but the same disorganizing processes leading to delinquency may also cause poverty, broken homes, and ill health (3) Use of the concept involves specifying the norms or standards to be employed in ascertaining what is organized or disorganized, normal or abnormal, conformist or deviant, and to

what extent. In general, it may be said that consensus (the main pillar of social organization) determines what is meant by normal behavior, even though expert judgment may be required to establish precise shades of variation. Not every manifestation of social disorganization is considered equally deplorable or reprehensible by all segments of society, to be sure, but deviation in socially disapproved directions is commonly deemed immoral, pathological, or otherwise undesirable Since all of the preceding considerations are elaborated upon in several of our selections, it will not be necessary to go into further detail here.

Our second basic question is: Since social disorganization affects individuals, groups, associations, and whole societies, and has many different manifestations, what are its fundamental causes? It is interesting to note that prior to the development of the concept of disorganization there was no valid and reliable theory to explain "social problems." It was customary to deal with criminality, alcoholism, prostitution, broken homes, unemployment, and so forth, as isolated social problems variously attributed to original sin, individual misfortune, innate human perversity, machinations of evil forces, and any number of other factors Every pseudo scientist and reformer had his own special explanation and pat solution for whatever problem happened to interest him The lore of criminology, for example, is replete with fallacious theories of the causes of criminality, ranging from protruding ears to sun spots. Although sociology has not succeeded in reducing the explanation of all kinds of social disorganization to a simple and precise formula, it has displaced erroneous notions with objective knowledge and is developing a systematic body of theory which embraces wide varieties of deviant behavior It is now recognized that individual instances of maladjustment and abnormality are often reflections of disorganization in the larger society. Valid and reliable indexes have been worked out, and symptoms or concrete manifestations are less frequently confused with underlying causes In explaining the social causes of disorganization, sociologists give varying emphasis to such factors as cultural contradictions and confusions, the loss of universally accepted definitions of situations, cultural lag, and the breakdown of communication and of groups, but all of these may be included in social disorganization as an analytical concept Our three selections in this chapter are quite dissimilar, yet each of them demonstrates the utility of the disorganization concept in causal analysis.

A third fundamental question is. What bearing does the concept of social disorganization have upon our understanding of "practical social problems"? Murder, theft, sexual immorality, political corruption, and other deviant forms of behavior are not merely theoretical problems for scientific analysis but also matters of very great concern in societal welfare The point here is that even though specialized knowledge is not required for the recognition of such problems, it is necessary for an understanding of their significance. Without some knowledge of the processes of disorganization behind such familiar phenomena as divorce, illegitimacy, and chronic alcoholism, for example, we are likely to misunderstand their real meaning. Furthermore, our entire conception of what constitutes a social

problem is likely to be modified through more penetrative analysis. The Merton, Fuller and Myers, and Sutherland articles show conclusively why we need to revamp our conventional mode of thinking about social problems.

In addition to knowing what social disorganization signifies, what causes it, and how it is related to practical problems of human welfare, we need to know something about the techniques for describing and analyzing its manifestations. A fourth basic concern of this chapter, therefore, is to ascertain how one gets at the significant facts of social disorganization and interprets them systematically. Our first two selections suggest general guides for research in many areas, and the third designates needed reformulations and refinements of research in a particular area

Against this general background, let us now turn to our first case in point, Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie" Merton begins by calling attention to the persistent tendency to attribute maladjustment and malfunctioning to biological drives which are not adequately restrained by social control According to this popular view, the social order becomes a device for impulse management, and nonconformity is assumed to be the "natural" (unrestrained) mode of response This leaves unanswered the question of how nonbiological conditions may induce deviations, however, and the author's thesis is that certain phases of social structure generate circumstances in which the infringement of codes is a "normal" response Our principal interest in Merton's analysis is its systematic treatment of the sociocultural sources of deviation and its precise formulation of the various ways by which pressure toward deviation is built up

Merton shows how culture defines goals and interests and sets forth acceptable modes of achieving these goals, notwithstanding this, regulatory norms do not necessarily coincide with norms of expediency In other words, deviant behavior is a symptom of dissociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means With widespread cleavage, the integration of society becomes tenuous and *anomie* (a French term whose nearest English equivalent is *disorganization*) ensues In his analysis Merton delineates the logically possible modes of adjustment — conformity, innovation, retreatism, and rebellion — but his main concern is with illegitimate modes, and particularly those having to do with economic activity.

In addition to touching upon fraud, corruption, vice, crime, and other illegitimate modes of adjustment, the analysis mentions various types of individuals who are in society but not of it (psychotics, pariahs, vagabonds, drunkards, and so forth) and shows how these too may be accounted for by the "means-end" analysis Increase in the lack of integration in our culture and our particular class structure combine to favor more and more antisocial conduct, and this explains why common definitions of success coupled with markedly unequal opportunities lead to criminality, and why crime and poverty are more closely associated in our society than in certain other societies The author concludes that such a social order produces a "strain toward dissolution," and that the Hobbesian observation (see the selection by Hobbes, p 160) is partly borne out by the facts Since the most gen-

eral function of social organization is to provide a basis for calculability and regularity in social behavior, social breakdown is increasingly evident as deviation becomes more widespread. Finally, predictability may virtually disappear and cultural chaos or *anomie* follow.

Fuller and Myers, in "The Natural History of a Social Problem," also present a significant contribution to the clarification of sociological theory in the field of social disorganization. Their article is useful for showing how social problems come to be defined, and for describing the natural history approach to their various stages of development. The authors' propositions indicate that in defining a social problem there must exist a condition widely felt to represent a deviation from a cherished social norm; yet this condition itself, while necessary, is not a sufficient social cause, since "social problems are what people think they are." Conflicting social values not only play an important role in causing objective conditions but also in obstructing the solutions of problems rising out of these conditions. Moreover, many social problems remain unsolved "because people do not share the same common values and objectives." (It will be noted that this last assertion introduces a source of disjunction not stressed in the Merton analysis.) The authors conclude that sociologists must study both the objective situation involved in a social problem and the varying definitions of the situation which lead to different proposals for a solution.

This is the analytical framework in which may be traced the natural history of every social problem through stages of initial awareness of the conditions, policy determination, or consideration of means and ends, and the final stage of action or reform. All of this is illustrated by reference to a concrete social problem posed by the mushroom growth of the trailer camp, and hence there is an application of the concepts and an empirical demonstration of how procedures may be employed.

Less comprehensive in scope than the two preceding analyses, Sutherland's "White-Collar Criminality" is concerned with a particular area of social disorganization which probably has been the subject of more different modes of inquiry than any other area of deviant behavior. Sutherland's thesis is not only that most of the data about criminality, as popularly conceived and officially measured, are misleading and incorrect, but also that crime is in fact not closely correlated with "causes" conventionally used to "explain" it. It is interesting to note that both Merton and Sutherland trace the sources of criminality to our widespread obsession with wealth as a goal and our equally widespread public apathy toward the normative rules governing its pursuit. Sutherland maintains that present data about crime are derived mainly from biased samples of lower-class deviants and grossly underrepresent the amount and kinds of criminality in the total population. Although his evidence is necessarily incomplete, it is sufficient to suggest the flagrancy and seriousness of criminality among the white-collar classes. In lieu of accurate statistics, enough scattered examples are given of fraud, swindling, duplicity, misrepresentation, bribery, embezzlement, misapplication of funds, short weighting, mis-grading, and tax evasion to suggest that white-collar crime is more

diffused in its social effects and more costly to society than any other kind of crime.

Sutherland analyzes the consequences of a varying definition of criminality, of a varying implementation of law due principally to the social position of offenders, and of the fact that the upper class molds the law in its own interests. Furthermore, he concludes that conventional theories do not even explain lower-class criminality, and advances the hypothesis that systematic criminality, like conformist behavior, is learned. His final propositions summarize the theoretical implications of his observations and contentions, and point out the need for a more adequate theory of criminal behavior. To this we may add that Sutherland's own analysis is certainly a contribution toward the formulation of such a theory.

All three of our cases suggest how completely erroneous are many of our casual notions concerning the nature and causes of social disorganization. These analyses should make us skeptical about facile explanations and easy panaceas, but at the same time they should increase our understanding of everyday social problems. Although such an understanding is necessarily incomplete, and often merely reveals that much more is to be known than we now know, it is certainly a first step toward a more rational control of the forces which constantly threaten the general welfare.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ANOMIE *

Robert K. Merton

There persists a notable tendency in sociological theory to attribute the malfunctioning of social structure primarily to those of man's imperious biological drives which are not adequately restrained by social control. In this view, the social order is solely a device for "impulse management" and the "social processing" of tensions. These impulses which break through social control, be it noted, are held to be biologically derived. Nonconformity is assumed to be rooted in original nature.[1] Conformity is by implication the result of an utilitarian calculus or unreasoned conditioning. This point of view, whatever its other deficiencies, clearly begs one question. It provides no basis for determining the nonbiological conditions which induce deviations from prescribed patterns of conduct. In this paper, it will be suggested that certain phases of social structure generate the circumstances in which infringement of social codes constitutes a "normal" response.[2]

[1] E.g., Ernest Jones, *Social Aspects of Psychoanalysis*, 28, London, 1924. If the Freudian notion is a variety of the "original sin" dogma, then the interpretation advanced in this paper may be called the doctrine of "socially derived sin."

[2] "Normal" in the sense of a culturally oriented, if not approved, response. This statement does not deny the relevance of biological and personality differences which may be significantly involved in the *incidence* of deviate conduct. Our focus of interest is the social and cultural matrix, hence we abstract from other factors. It is in this

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The conceptual scheme to be outlined is designed to provide a coherent, systematic approach to the study of socio-cultural sources of deviate behavior. Our primary aim lies in discovering how some social structures *exert a definite pressure* upon certain persons in the society to engage in nonconformist rather than conformist conduct. The many ramifications of the scheme cannot all be discussed; the problems mentioned outnumber those explicitly treated.

Among the elements of social and cultural structure, two are important for our purposes These are analytically separable although they merge imperceptibly in concrete situations. The first consists of culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests It comprises a frame of aspirational reference. These goals are more or less integrated and involve varying degrees of prestige and sentiment They constitute a basic, but not the exclusive, component of what Linton aptly has called "designs for group living" Some of these cultural aspirations are related to the original drives of man, but they are not determined by them The second phase of the social structure defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of achieving these goals Every social group invariably couples its scale of desired ends with moral or institutional regulation of permissible and required procedures for attaining these ends These regulatory norms and moral imperatives do not necessarily coincide with technical or efficiency norms Many procedures which from the standpoint of *particular individuals* would be most efficient in securing desired values, e g., illicit oil-stock schemes, theft, fraud, are ruled out of the institutional area of permitted conduct. The choice of expedients is limited by the institutional norms.

To say that these two elements, culture goals and institutional norms, operate jointly is not to say that the ranges of alternative behaviors and aims bear some constant relation to one another. The emphasis upon certain goals may vary independently of the degree of emphasis upon institutional means. There may develop a disproportionate, at times, a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of specific goals, involving relatively slight concern with the institutionally appropriate modes of attaining these goals The limiting case in this direction is reached when the range of alternative procedures is limited only by technical rather than institutional considerations Any and all devices which promise attainment of the all important goal would be permitted in this hypothetical polar case [3] This constitutes one type of cultural malintegration A second polar type is found in groups where activities originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted into ends in themselves The original pur-

sense, I take it, that James S. Plant speaks of the "normal reaction of normal people to abnormal conditions." See his *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, 248, New York, 1937

[3] Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in this direction See André Siegfried, *America Comes of Age*, 26–37, New York, 1927 The alleged extreme(?) emphasis on the goals of monetary success and material prosperity leads to dominant concern with technological and social instruments designed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institutional controls become of secondary importance In such a situation, innovation flourishes as the *range of means* employed is broadened In a sense, then, there occurs the paradoxical emergence of "materialists from an "idealistic" orientation Cf Durkheim's analysis of the cultural conditions which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms Durkheim was one of the first to see that "contrairement aux idées courantes le criminel n'apparaît plus comme un être radicalement insociable, comme une sorte d'élément parasitaire, de corps étranger et inassimilable, introduit au sein de la société, c'est un agent régulier de la vie sociale" See *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique*, 86–89, Paris, 1927

poses are forgotten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescribed conduct becomes virtually obsessive.[4] Stability is largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of alternative behaviors is severely limited. There develops a tradition-bound, sacred society characterized by neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat may be cited as a case in point. Finally, there are the intermediate types of groups where a balance between culture goals and institutional means is maintained. These are the significantly integrated and relatively stable, though changing, groups.

An effective equilibrium between the two phases of the social structure is maintained as long as satisfactions accrue to individuals who conform to both constraints, viz., satisfactions from the achievement of the goals and satisfactions emerging directly from the institutionally canalized modes of striving to attain these ends. Success, in such equilibrated cases, is twofold. Success is reckoned in terms of the product and in terms of the process, in terms of the outcome and in terms of activities. Continuing satisfactions must derive from sheer *participation* in a competitive order as well as from eclipsing one's competitors if the order itself is to be sustained. The occasional sacrifices involved in institutionalized conduct must be compensated by socialized rewards. The distribution of statuses and roles through competition must be so organized that positive incentives for conformity to roles and adherence to status obligations are provided *for every position* within the distributive order. Aberrant conduct, therefore, may be viewed as a symptom of dissociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means.

Of the types of groups which result from the independent variation of the two phases of the social structure, we shall be primarily concerned with the first, namely, that involving a disproportionate accent on goals. This statement must be recast in a proper perspective. In no group is there an absence of regulatory codes governing conduct, yet groups do vary in the degree to which these folkways, mores, and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the more diffuse goals which are part of the culture matrix. Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support from the culturally defined implementation of these ends. As we shall see, certain aspects of the social structure may generate countermores and antisocial behavior precisely because of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the extreme case, the latter may be so situated by the goal-emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by considerations of technical expediency. The sole significant question then becomes, which available means is most efficient in netting the socially approved value?[5] The technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process continues,

[4] Such ritualism may be associated with a mythology which rationalizes these actions so that they appear to retain their status as means but the dominant pressure is in the direction of strict ritualistic conformity, irrespective of such rationalizations. In this sense, ritual has proceeded farthest when such rationalizations are not even called forth.

[5] In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton Mayo's paraphrase of the title of Tawney's well known book. "Actually the problem *is not that of the sickness of an acquisitive society, it is that of the acquisitiveness of a sick society*." *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, 153, New York, 1933. Mayo deals with the process through which wealth comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering the unintegrated monetary-success goal as an element in producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both phases of this system of interdependent variables.

the integration of the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues.

Thus, in competitive athletics, when the aim of victory is shorn of its institutional trappings and success in contests becomes construed as "winning the game" rather than "winning through circumscribed modes of activity," a premium is implicitly set upon the use of illegitimate but technically efficient means. The star of the opposing football team is surreptitiously slugged; the wrestler furtively incapacitates his opponent through ingenious but illicit techniques, university alumni covertly subsidize "students" whose talents are largely confined to the athletic field. The emphasis on the goal has so attenuated the satisfactions deriving from sheer participation in the competitive activity that these satisfactions are virtually confined to a successful outcome. Through the same process, tension generated by the desire to win in a poker game is relieved by successfully dealing oneself four aces, or, when the cult of success has become completely dominant, by sagaciously shuffling the cards in a game of solitaire. The faint twinge of uneasiness in the last instance and the surreptitious nature of public delicts indicate clearly that the institutional rules of the game *are known* to those who evade them, but that the emotional supports of these rules are largely vitiated by cultural exaggeration of the success-goal.[6] They are microcosmic images of the social macrocosm.

Of course, this process is not restricted to the realm of sport. The process where by exaltation of the end generates a *literal demoralization*, i.e., a deinstitutionalization, of the means is one which characterizes many[7] groups in which the two phases of the social structure are not highly integrated. The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success[8] in our own society militates against the completely effective control of institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune.[9] Fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the emphasis on the *culturally induced* success-goal becomes divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis. This observation is of crucial theoretical importance in examining the doctrine that antisocial behavior most frequently derives from biological drives breaking through the restraints imposed by society. The difference is one between a strictly utilitarian interpretation which conceives man's ends as random and an

[6] It is unlikely that internalized norms are completely eliminated. Whatever residuum persists will induce personality tensions and conflict. The process involves a certain degree of ambivalence. A manifest rejection of the institutional norms is coupled with some latent retention of their emotional correlates. "Guilt feelings," "sense of sin," "pangs of conscience" are obvious manifestations of this unrelieved tension; symbolic adherence to the nominally repudiated values or rationalizations constitute a more subtle variety of tensional release.

[7] "Many," and not all, unintegrated groups for the reason already mentioned. In groups where the primary emphasis shifts to institutional means, i.e., when the range of alternatives is very limited, the outcome is a type of ritualism rather than anomie.

[8] Money has several peculiarities which render it particularly apt to become a symbol of prestige divorced from institutional controls. As Simmel emphasized, money is highly abstract and impersonal. However acquired, through fraud or institutionally, it can be used to purchase the same goods and services. The anonymity of metropolitan culture, in conjunction with this peculiarity of money, permits wealth, the sources of which may be unknown to the community in which the plutocrat lives, to serve as a symbol of status.

[9] The emphasis upon wealth as a success-symbol is possibly reflected in the use of the term "fortune" to refer to a stock of accumulated wealth. This meaning becomes common in the late sixteenth century (Spenser and Shakespeare). A similar usage of the Latin *fortuna* comes into prominence during the first century B.C. Both these periods were marked by the rise to prestige and power of the "bourgeoisie."

analysis which finds these ends deriving from the basic values of the culture [10]

Our analysis can scarcely stop at this juncture We must turn to other aspects of the social structure if we are to deal with the social genesis of the varying rates and types of deviate behavior characteristic of different societies Thus far, we have sketched three ideal types of social orders constituted by distinctive patterns of relations between culture ends and means Turning from these types of *culture patterning*, we find five logically possible, alternative modes of adjustment or adaptation *by individuals* within the culture-bearing society or group [11] These are schematically presented in the following table, where (+) signifies "acceptance," (−) signifies "elimination" and (±) signifies "rejection and substitution of new goals and standards"

		Culture goals	*Institutionalized means*
I	Conformity	+	+
II	Innovation	+	−
III	Ritualism	−	+
IV	Retreatism	−	−
V	Rebellion [12]	±	±

[12] This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that of the others It represents a *transitional* response which seeks to *institutionalize* new procedures oriented toward revamped cultural goals shared by the members of the society It thus involves efforts to *change* the existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions *within* this structure, and introduces additional problems with which we are not at the moment concerned

[10] See Kingsley Davis, "Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure," *Psychiatry*, 1938, I, esp 62–63, Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* 59–60, New York, 1937

[11] This is a level intermediate between the two planes distinguished by Edward Sapir, namely, culture patterns and personal habit systems See his "Contribution of Psychiatry to an Understanding of Behavior in Society," *Amer J Sociol*, 1937, 42 862–70

Our discussion of the relation between these alternative responses and other phases of the social structure must be prefaced by the observation that persons may shift from one alternative to another as they engage in different social activities These categories refer to role adjustments in specific situations, not to personality *in toto* To treat the development of this process in various spheres of conduct would introduce a complexity unmanageable within the confines of this paper For this reason, we shall be concerned primarily with economic activity in the broad sense, "the production, exchange, distribution and consumption of goods and services" *in our competitive society*, wherein wealth has taken on a highly symbolic cast Our task is to search out some of the factors which exert pressure upon individuals to engage in certain of these logically possible alternative responses This choice, as we shall see, is far from random.

In every society, Adaptation I (conformity to both culture goals and means) is the most common and widely diffused. Were this not so, the stability and continuity of the society could not be maintained The mesh of expectancies which constitutes every social order is sustained by the modal behavior of its members falling within the first category Conventional role behavior oriented toward the basic values of the group is the rule rather than the exception It is this fact alone which permits us to speak of a human aggregate as comprising a group or society.

Conversely, Adaptation IV (rejection of goals and means) is the least common Persons who "adjust" (or maladjust) in this fashion are, strictly speaking, *in* the society but not *of* it Sociologically, these constitute the true "aliens" Not sharing the common frame of orientation, they can be included within the societal population merely in a fictional sense. In this

category are *some* of the activities of psychotics, psychoneurotics, chronic autists, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards and drug addicts.[18] These have relinquished, in certain spheres of activity, the culturally defined goals, involving complete aim-inhibition in the polar case, and their adjustments are not in accord with institutional norms. This is not to say that in some cases the source of their behavioral adjustments is not in part the very social structure which they have in effect repudiated nor that their very existence within a social area does not constitute a problem for the socialized population

This mode of "adjustment" occurs, as far as structural sources are concerned, when both the culture goals and institutionalized procedures have been assimilated thoroughly by the individual and imbued with affect and high positive value, but where those institutionalized procedures which promise a measure of successful attainment of the goals are not available to the individual. In such instances, there results a twofold mental conflict insofar as the moral obligation for adopting institutional means conflicts with the pressure to resort to illegitimate means (which may attain the goal) and inasmuch as the individual is shut off from means which are both legitimate *and* effective. The competitive order is maintained, but the frustrated and handicapped individual who cannot cope with this order drops out Defeatism, quietism and resignation are manifested in escape mechanisms which ultimately lead the individual to "escape" from the requirements of the society. It is an expedient which arises from continued failure to attain the goal by legitimate measures and from an inability to adopt the illegitimate route because of internalized prohibitions and institutionalized compulsives, *during which process the supreme value of the success-goal has as yet not been renounced* The conflict is resolved by eliminating *both* precipitating elements, the goals and means The escape is complete, the conflict is eliminated and the individual is asocialized

Be it noted that where frustration derives from the inaccessibility of effective institutional means for attaining economic or any other type of highly valued "success," that Adaptations II, III and V (innovation, ritualism and rebellion) are also possible The result will be determined by the particular personality, and thus, the *particular* cultural background, involved Inadequate socialization will result in the innovation response whereby the conflict and frustration are eliminated by relinquishing the institutional means and retaining the success-aspiration, an extreme assimilation of institutional demands will lead to ritualism wherein the goal is dropped as beyond one's reach but conformity to the mores persists, and rebellion occurs when emancipation from the reigning standards, due to frustration or to marginalist perspectives, leads to the attempt to introduce a "new social order"

Our major concern is with the illegitimacy adjustment This involves the use of conventionally proscribed but frequently effective means of attaining at least the simulacrum of culturally defined success, —wealth, power, and the like. As we have seen, this adjustment occurs when the individual has assimilated the cultural emphasis on success without equally in-

[18] Obviously, this is an elliptical statement These individuals may maintain some orientation to the values of their particular differentiated groupings within the larger society or, in part, of the conventional society itself Insofar as they do so, their conduct cannot be classified in the "passive rejection" category (IV) Nels Anderson's description of the behavior and attitudes of the bum, for example, can readily be recast in terms of our analytical scheme See *The Hobo*, 93–98, *et passim*, Chicago, 1923

ternalizing the morally prescribed norms governing means for its attainment The question arises, Which phases of our social structure predispose toward this mode of adjustment? We may examine a concrete instance, effectively analyzed by Lohman,[14] which provides a clue to the answer Lohman has shown that specialized areas of vice in the near north side of Chicago constitute a "normal" response to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed, but where there is little access to conventional and legitimate means for attaining such success The conventional occupational opportunities of persons in this area are almost completely limited to manual labor Given our cultural stigmatization of manual labor, and its correlate, the prestige of white collar work, it is clear that the result is a strain toward innovational practices The limitation of opportunity to unskilled labor and the resultant low income can not compete *in terms of conventional standards of achievement* with the high income from organized vice

For our purposes, this situation involves two important features First, such antisocial behavior is in a sense "called forth" by certain conventional values of the culture *and* by the class structure involving differential access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, prestige-bearing pursuit of the culture goals The lack of high integration between the means-and-end elements of the cultural pattern and the particular class structure combine to favor a heightened frequency of antisocial conduct in such groups The second consideration is of equal significance Recourse to the first of the alternative responses, legitimate effort, is limited by the fact that actual advance toward desired success-symbols through conventional channels is, despite our persisting open-class ideology,[15] relatively rare and difficult for those handicapped by little formal education and few economic resources. The dominant pressure of group standards of success is, therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, expedients of vice and crime The cultural demands made on persons in this situation are incompatible On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally The consequences of such structural inconsistency are psychopathological personality, and or antisocial conduct, and or revolutionary activities The equilibrium between culturally designated means and ends becomes highly unstable with the progressive emphasis on attaining the prestige-laden ends by any means whatsoever Within this context, Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence over morally prescribed "failure," when the channels of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed[16] *in a society which*

[14] Joseph D Lohman, "The Participant Observer in Community Studies," *Amer Sociol Rev.*, 1937, 2 890–98.

[15] The shifting historical role of this ideology is a profitable subject for exploration The 'office-boy-to president' stereotype was once in approximate accord with the facts Such vertical mobility was probably more common then than now, when the class structure is *more* rigid (See the following note) The ideology hugely persists, however, possibly because it still performs a useful function for maintaining the *status quo* For insofar as it is accepted by the "masses," it constitutes a useful sop for those who might rebel against the unjust structure, were this consoling hope removed This ideology now serves to lessen the probability of Adaptation V In short, the role of this notion has changed from that of an approximately valid empirical theorem to that of an ideology, in Mannheim's sense

[16] There is a growing body of evidence, though none of it is clearly conclusive, to the effect that our class structure is becoming rigidified

places a high premium on economic affluence and social ascent for all *its members.*[17]

This last qualification is of primary importance. It suggests that other phases of the social structure besides the extreme emphasis on pecuniary success, must be considered if we are to understand the social sources of antisocial behavior A high frequency of deviate behavior is not generated simply by "lack of opportunity" or by this exaggerated pecuniary emphasis A comparatively rigidified class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may limit such opportunities far beyond the point which obtains in our society today. It is only when a system of cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain *common* symbols of success *for the population at large* while its social structure rigorously restricts or completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquiring these symbols *for a considerable part of the same population,* that antisocial behavior ensues on a considerable scale In other words, our egalitarian ideology denies by implication the existence of noncompeting groups and individuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success The same body of success symbols is held to be desirable for all These goals are held to *transcend class lines,* not to be bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is such that there exist class differentials in the accessibility of these *common* success symbols Frustration and thwarted aspiration lead to the search for avenues of escape from a culturally induced intolerable situation, or unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit attempts to acquire the dominant values[18] The American stress on pecuniary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses and antisocial behavior

This theoretical analysis may go far toward explaining the varying correlations between crime and poverty[19] Poverty is

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and that vertical mobility is declining Taussig and Joslyn found that American business leaders are being *increasingly* recruited from the upper ranks of our society The Lynds have also found a diminished chance to get ahead for the working classes in Middletown Manifestly, these objective changes are not alone significant the individual's subjective evaluation of the situation is a major determinant of the response The extent to which this change in opportunity for social mobility has been recognized by the least advantaged classes is still conjectural although the Lynds present some suggestive materials The writer suggests that a case in point is the increasing frequency of cartoons which observe in a tragi comic vein that my old man says everybody can't be President He says if ya can get three days a week steady on W P A work ya ain't doin so bad either See F W Taussig and C S Joslyn, *American Business Leaders,* New York, 1932, R S and H M Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* 67 ff, chap 12, New York, 1937

[17] The role of the Negro in this respect is of considerable theoretical interest Certain elements of the Negro population have assimilated the dominant caste's values of pecuniary success and social advancement, but they also recognize that social ascent is at present restricted to their own caste almost exclusively The pressures upon the Negro which would otherwise derive from the structural inconsistencies we have noticed are hence not identical with those upon lower class whites See Kingsley Davis, *op cit*, 63, John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town,* 66 ff, New Haven, 1936, Donald Young, *American Minority Peoples,* 581, New York, 1932

[18] The psychical coordinates of these processes have been partly established by the experimental evidence concerning *Anspruchsniveaus* and levels of performance See Kurt Lewin *Vorsatz Wille und Bedürfnis* Berlin 1926 N I Hoppe Erfolg und Misserfolg *Psychol Forschung,* 1930 14 1–63 Jerome D Frank "Individual Differences in Certain Aspects of the Level of Aspiration," *Amer J Psychol* 1935, 47 119–28

[19] Standard criminology texts summarize the data in this field Our scheme of analysis may serve to resolve some of the theoretical contradictions which P A Sorokin indicates For example, "not everywhere nor always do the poor show a greater proportion of crime many poorer countries have had less crime than the richer countries The [economic] improvement in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, has not been followed by a decrease of crime See his *Con*

not an isolated variable It is one in a complex of interdependent social and cultural variables When viewed in such a context, it represents quite different states of affairs Poverty as such, and consequent limitation of opportunity, are not sufficient to induce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behavior Even the often mentioned "poverty in the midst of plenty" will not necessarily lead to this result Only insofar as poverty and associated disadvantages in competition for the culture values approved for *all* members of the society is linked with the assimilation of a cultural emphasis on monetary accumulation as a symbol of success is antisocial conduct a "normal" outcome Thus, poverty is less highly correlated with crime in southeastern Europe than in the United States The possibilities of vertical mobility in these European areas would seem to be fewer than in this country, so that neither poverty *per se* nor its association with limited opportunity is sufficient to account for the varying correlations It is only when the full configuration is considered, poverty, limited opportunity and a commonly shared system of success symbols, that we can explain the higher association between poverty and crime in our society than in others where rigidified class structure is coupled with *differential class symbols of achievement*

In societies such as our own, then, the pressure of prestige bearing success tends to eliminate the effective social constraint over means employed to this end "The end justifies the means" doctrine becomes a guiding tenet for action when the cultural structure unduly exalts the end and the social organization unduly limits possible recourse to approved means. Otherwise put, this notion and associated behavior reflect a lack of cultural coordination In international relations, the effects of this lack of integration are notoriously apparent. An emphasis upon national power is not readily coordinated with an inept organization of legitimate, i e, internationally defined and accepted, means for attaining this goal The result is a tendency toward the abrogation of international law, treaties become scraps of paper, "undeclared warfare" serves as a technical evasion, the bombing of civilian populations is rationalized,[20] just as the same societal situation induces the same sway of illegitimacy among individuals

The social order we have described necessarily produces this "strain toward dissolution" The pressure of such an order is upon outdoing one's competitors The choice of means within the ambit of institutional control will persist as long as the sentiments supporting a competitive system, i e, deriving from the possibility of outranking competitors and hence enjoying the favorable response of others, are distributed throughout the entire system of activities and are not confined merely to the final result A stable social structure demands a balanced distribution of affect among its various segments. When there occurs a shift of emphasis from the satisfactions deriving from competition itself to almost exclusive concern with successful competition, the resultant stress leads to the breakdown of the regulatory structure.[21] With the resulting attenuation of the institutional imperatives,

temporary Sociological Theories, 560–61, New York, 1928 The crucial point is, however, that poverty has varying social significance in different social structures as we shall see Hence one would not expect a linear correlation between crime and poverty

[20] See M W Royse, *Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of War* New York, 1928

[21] Since our primary concern is with the sociocultural aspects of this problem, the psychological correlates have been only implicitly considered See Karen Horney *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, New York, 1937, for a psychological discussion of this process

there occurs an approximation of the situation erroneously held by utilitarians to be typical of society generally wherein calculations of advantage and fear of punishment are the sole regulating agencies In such situations, as Hobbes observed, force and fraud come to constitute the sole virtues in view of their relative efficiency in attaining goals, — which were for him, of course, not culturally derived.

It should be apparent that the foregoing discussion is not pitched on a moralistic plane Whatever the sentiments of the writer or reader concerning the ethical desirability of coordinating the means-and-goals phases of the social structure, one must agree that lack of such coordination leads to anomie Insofar as one of the most general functions of social organization is to provide a basis for calculability and regularity of behavior, it is increasingly limited in effectiveness as these elements of the structure become dissociated At the extreme, predictability virtually disappears and what may be properly termed cultural chaos or anomie intervenes

This statement, being brief, is also incomplete It has not included an exhaustive treatment of the various structural elements which predispose toward one rather than another of the alternative responses open to individuals; it has neglected, but not denied the relevance of, the factors determining the specific incidence of these responses, it has not enumerated the various concrete responses which are constituted by combinations of specific values of the analytical variables, it has omitted, or included only by implication, any consideration of the social functions performed by illicit responses it has not tested the full explanatory power of the analytical scheme by examining a large number of group variations in the frequency of deviate and conformist behavior, it has not adequately dealt with rebellious conduct which seeks to refashion the social framework radically, it has not examined the relevance of cultural conflict for an analysis of culture-goal and institutional-means malintegration It is suggested that these and related problems may be profitably analyzed by this scheme

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM *

Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers

It is our thesis that every social problem has a natural history and that the natural history approach is a promising conceptual framework within which to study specific social problems

Let us first clarify our usage of the terms "social problem" and "natural history." The concept "social problem" as used in this paper can be stated in a series of propositions.

1 A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of persons as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish Every social problem thus consists of an objective condition and a subjective definition The objective condition is a verifiable situation which can be checked as to existence and magnitude (proportions) by impartial and trained observers, e g , the state of our

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national defense, trends in the birth rate, unemployment, etc. The subjective definition is the awareness of certain individuals that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values.

2 The objective condition is necessary but not in itself sufficient to constitute a social problem Although the objective condition may be the same in two different localities, it may be a social problem in only one of these areas, e g , discrimination against Negroes in the South as contrasted with discrimination in the North, divorce in Reno as contrasted with divorce in a Catholic community *Social problems are what people think they are* and if conditions are not defined as social problems by the people involved in them, they are not problems to those people, although they may be problems to outsiders or to scientists, e g , the condition of poor southern sharecroppers is a social problem to the braintrusters of the New Deal but not to many southern landowners.

3 Cultural values play an important causal role in the objective condition which is defined as a problem, e g , the objective conditions of unemployment, race prejudice, illegitimacy, crime, divorce, and war come into being, in part at least, because people cherish certain beliefs and maintain certain social institutions which give rise to these conditions

4 Cultural values obstruct solutions to conditions defined as social problems because people are unwilling to endorse programs of amelioration which prejudice or require abandonment of their cherished beliefs and institutions, e g , one possible "solution" to illegitimacy would be social acceptance of contraception and abortion, practices which in themselves are now defined as violations of the mores

5 Social problems thus involve a dual conflict of values first, with regard to some conditions, people disagree as to whether the condition is a threat to fundamental values, e g , race prejudice, divorce, child labor, war, unorganized labor, second, with regard to other conditions, although there is a basic agreement that the condition is a threat to fundamental values, because of a disparity of other values relative to means or policy, people disagree over programs of reform, e g , crime, mental and physical disease, motor car accidents

6 In the last analysis, social problems arise and are sustained because people do not share the same common values and objectives

7 Sociologists must, therefore, study not only the objective condition phase of a social problem but also the value-judgments of the people involved in it which cause them to define the same condition and means to its solution in different ways [1]

The specific analytical frame which we have called the "natural history" is de-

[1] The basic idea that the social problem is a conflict of values is not a new one See Lawrence K Frank, "Social Problems," *Amer J Sociol*, 1925 30 463-473, page 468 for Frank's definition Harold A Phelps, *Contemporary Social Problems*, rev ed , 737 New York, 1938, Willard Waller, "Social Problems and the Mores," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1936, 1 922-933, Kingsley Davis "The Sociology of Prostitution" *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1937, 2 749 755, and "Illegitimacy and the Social Structure," *Amer J Sociol*, 1939, 45 215 233, Richard C Fuller, "The Problem of Teaching Social Problems," *Amer J Sociol*, 1938, 44 415-425, and [with Richard R Myers], "Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems" *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1941, 6 24-32, Stuart A Queen and Jeannette R Gruener, *Social Pathology*, 38-42, New York, 1940, Louis Wirth, "Ideological Aspects of Social Disorganization," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1940, 5 472-482 Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action, passim*, New York, 1937, and "The Role of Ideas in Social Action," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1938, 3 652-664, and Robert K Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *Amer Sociol Rev*, 1938, 3 672-682, have also analyzed the concepts of social problem and social disorganization from a general sociological point of view.

rived from the above conception of what constitutes a social problem. In our concept "social problem," we have attributed to all social problems certain common characteristics. These common characteristics imply a common order of development through which all social problems pass, consisting of certain temporal sequences in their emergence and maturation. The "natural history" as we use the term is therefore simply a conceptual tool for the examination of the data which constitute social problems.

Social problems do not arise full-blown, commanding community attention and evoking adequate policies and machinery for their solution On the contrary, we believe that social problems exhibit a temporal course of development in which different phases or stages may be distinguished Each stage anticipates its successor in time and each succeeding stage contains new elements which mark it off from its predecessor. A social problem thus conceived as always being in a dynamic state of "becoming" passes through the natural history stages of awareness, policy determination, and reform. As we proceed to discuss the qualitative differences between these stages, we will refer by way of illustration to data gathered by graduate students on the residence-trailer problem in Detroit

AWARENESS

The genesis of every social problem lies in the awakening of people in a given locality to a realization that certain cherished values are threatened by conditions which have become acute. Definitions of alarm emerge only as these group values are thought to be involved. Without awareness or "problem consciousness" in certain groups of people, be they scientists, administrators, or likeminded neighbors, no identifiable problem can be said to exist. Before a social problem can be identified, there must be awareness on the part of people who express their concern in some communicable or observable form.[2] The outstanding characteristic of this initial phase of awareness inheres in the constantly recurrent statements of people involved in a challenging situation that "something ought to be done" As yet, these people have not crystallized their definition sufficiently to suggest or debate exact measures for amelioration or eradication of the undesirable condition Instead, there is unsynchronized random behavior, with protest expressed in general terms

The objective condition aspect of the residence-trailer problem is the residence-trailer camp or community The earliest record of such a community in Detroit goes back to the spring of 1920 This was a small camp of eight or ten families located on the periphery of the city, the residents were industrial workers living in homemade trailers At this time, no discernible residence-trailer problem existed in Detroit The three Detroit newspapers contain no reference to the situation and the records of the police, health department, and social work agencies are equally silent Although neighbors remember the camp, they insist it was "no trouble at all" However, the objective condition grew rapidly in proportions. By 1930, there were four well-established camps within the city limits and by 1935 the number had increased to nine In five of these nine communities, the inhabitants made no pretense of temporary camping, but removed the wheels from their trailers, mounted them on saw horses and two-by-fours, and settled down to a semipermanent existence As the visibility of trailers and trailerites increased, there came the dawn of a social problem awareness as

[2] As yet, we have not perfected research techniques which can penetrate covert mental states very satisfactorily

measured by newspaper items, gossip of neighbors, formal complaints of neighbors to the press and to civic authorities, and the official utterances of these civic authorities.

A sampling of the three Detroit newspapers reveals no comment on the situation either in the form of news or editorials until January, 1925, when we have an item in one paper noting a "brawl" which occurred in one of the camps During the next decade, 1925–35, there was a steadily increasing number of items and in the two-year period 1936–37, the items reached their greatest frequency If a qualitative interpretation of these items is permissible, we can say that up to 1930 their tone was one of curiosity and amusement rather than alarm Before 1930, the editorial columns and "letters to the editor" section gave very little attention to the situation After 1930, the editorial departments of all three papers made frequent comment and "letters to the editor" became quite common. In both straight news reporting and in editorial page comment, the tone of the items rapidly took on a note of concern and alarm In 1936–37, over one half of the items were editorials or letters to the editor; the remainder were news items concerned with crime, disease, fires, accidents, and humorous incidents in the camps. The letters to the editor were principally from people living in the neighborhoods close to the trailer communities, from school authorities, from real estate dealers, and from social workers

Complaints of neighbors were articulated on the grounds of the unsightliness of the camps, noises, odors, immorality, crime, and property depreciation in the surrounding districts. The response of neighborhood groups to the condition was measured not only by formal complaints to police, health officials, and newspapers, but also by the participant observations of students living in local areas near trailer camps One student reported,

"At first, none of us paid much attention when a number of families moved into the big open lot on the next corner below us. They were poor factory workers and the depression was pretty tough in 1932 They did not have to pay much rent Most of us thought they would only stay a month or two and then be on their way But after a year there were more trailers there than ever and neighbors began to say, 'Well, it looks as if they were here to stay' But no one seemed to think that the camps were hurting any of us. Then we all began to miss certain small articles around the house Newspapers, milk bottles, and tools began to disappear We laid it to the trailer kids and blamed their parents for letting them run wild Then someone said, 'Why aren't these kids in school? That will keep them out of trouble' A neighbor wrote a letter to the truant officer about it but nothing came of it at first

[Another typical comment] "Dad said Mother thought the trailer children were a bunch of sex perverted brats, but Dad said he did not worry half so much about that as how he would ever sell his house unless they got the campers out of the district And Dad was always saying that he had nothing against the trailerites themselves They could not help being poor, he said, but it was a 'hell of a note why that should mean we all must be poor'" [This statement referred to the situation in 1932]

Awareness was registered in the official statements of organized civic authorities, such as health agencies, the police, and school functionaries, almost as soon as protests were being registered by local neighborhood groups The health authorities were the first governmental unit to show concern in public statements and

their information was given them first by social workers called into the camps to administer relief. The chief complaints of health inspectors to the Common Council were: families averaged two to each trailer and accommodations were scarcely large enough for one; several of the camps had no toilet accommodations and there was little or no privacy in such matters; water supply was low and residents were often dependent on sources outside the camp, in winter, the heating accommodations were deficient, small gas stoves serving most trailers and others had no heating whatsoever, garbage disposal was indiscriminate and dumping on nearby vacant lots was the usual expedient

The police, as another organized official group, came to view trailer camps as potential danger spots, presenting a new challenge to the preservation of law and order. This awareness definition reflected in official police reports emerged as the police were increasingly called in to quell brawls, apprehend delinquents, and investigate reports of indignant neighbors

School authorities became aware of the residence-trailer problem because the stability and routine of the school were affected. Some schools did not have the accommodations for the incoming trailer children, day to day attendance of the newcomers was extremely irregular, and, because of the impermanence of the trailer community, many children would depart before the school year was completed

Thus, the stage of progressive awareness for Detroit's residence trailer problem covered the approximate period of 1925–35, and is measurable by newspaper indexes as well as by the definitions of citizens and government officials who felt that group values of health, education, private property, and morals were threatened by the existence of the objective condition.

POLICY DETERMINATION

Very soon after the emergence of awareness comes debate over policies involved in alternative solutions Ends and means are discussed and the conflict of social interests becomes intense. People who propose solutions soon find that these solutions are not acceptable to others. Even when they can get others to agree on solutions, they find agreement as to means a further difficulty The stage of policy determination differs significantly from the stage of awareness in that interest groups are now concerned primarily with "what ought to be done" and people are proposing that "this and that should be done."[3] Specific programs occupy the focus of attention The multi-sided protests have become organized and channelized.

Policy determination on the residence trailer problem in Detroit indicated discussion on at least three interrelated levels first, discussion by neighbors and other interested but unorganized groups, second, discussion by organized interest or pressure groups such as taxpayers, trailer manufacturers, real estate organizations, parent-teacher associations, women's clubs, and men's clubs, third, discussion among specialists and administrators in government or quasi governmental units — the police, health officials, Common Council, social workers, and school boards The interinfluence and cross-fertilization of debate among and between these three levels of participating discussants represent the dynamics of policy determination

Policy determination was preoccupied both with broad questions as to ends and with narrow, more specialized questions as to means As to ends, should the trailer camps be prohibited entirely and expelled

[3] Newspaper comment on the residence-trailer problem subsequent to 1935 reveals this transition in emphasis from simple alarm to concrete proposals

from the community, should they only be licensed, taxed, or otherwise restricted in growth, or should they be let alone in the hope that the situation would right itself? As to narrower questions of means, the more established, organized, and official the group, the more likely it was to agree on ends but to disagree on means For instance, health officials debated periodic inspection, which would be costly but more efficient, as against sporadic inspection on complaints received, which would be less costly but involve more risk to the health of the community at large Similarly, school officials debated the pros and cons of expansion, the pros and cons of vigorous truant officer activity, the pros and cons of a special class for trailer children Police had to decide whether or not special details and augmented forces were necessary for trailer camp areas and whether a tough or lenient policy of arrest should be applied to trailer inhabitants

Conflicts over policy determination can best be observed by charting the alignments of different interest groups who have various stakes in the solution of the difficulty These groups represent certain institutional values, many of which appear incompatible with each other, all of which must be reconciled or compromised before the community can go ahead on a collective policy of reform The official groups (police, health, school, social workers) can be said to be perpetuating basic organizational mores pertaining to the protection of private property, public health, education, and relief of the distressed Then there are the special interest groups such as the real estate operators, hotel owners, and neighborhood taxpayers who want elimination or restriction of the homes on wheels because their pecuniary values of survival and status are threatened

Lined up on the other side is the Coach Trailer Manufacturers' Association, a pressure group seeking the protection of the interests of trailerites, also motivated by self-interest and the profit mores Then there are the interests of those who live in trailers. Though these trailer communities consist of low-income groups of migrant and transient workers, the casually employed, the chronic unemployable, factory wage earners, and the like, some of them are identified with an interest group of their own — The Mobile Home Owners' Association of America This organization contends that trailer homes are the solution to the housing problems of the low-income family With property and rental values held beyond their means, what is left for these people but the trailer house? There are citizens who are in sympathy with the position of trailer-residents, and although they favor some public control, they oppose abolition of these communities Labor unions, civil rights groups, and other liberal organizations also are on record as championing the survival of trailer communities

It seems, then, that the dynamics of policy determination on the residence-trailer problem, which became intensified during the approximate period of 1935–37, can be represented as an alignment of certain humanitarian interests with certain organizational interests to combat other humanitarian interests aligned with other organizational interests.

REFORM

The final stage in the natural history of a social problem is that of *reform* Here we find administrative units engaged in putting formulated policy into action General policies have been debated and defined by the general public, by special interest groups, and by experts It is now the task of administrative experts specially trained in their jobs to administer reform. This is the stage of action, both public and

private. The emphasis is no longer on the idea that "something ought to be done" or that "this or that should be done" but on the fact that "this and that are being done." Public action is represented in the machinery of government bodies, legislative, executive, and judicial; and in the delegated authority of administrative tribunals, special supervisory officers and boards. This is the institutionalized phase of the social problem in the sense that we have established policies carried out by publicly authorized policy-enforcing agencies. Reform may also be private in character, as witnessed by the activities of private clubs and organizations, private charities and other benevolent associations, and church groups

Decisions of policy remain necessary at the reform stage, but such decisions usually involve quite technical matters pertaining to means and fall within the special bailiwick of the experts concerned with such questions Of course, such policy questions may be taken out of the hands of the administrators whenever the general public exercises its powers of censorship, veto, or referendum The already established public agencies may prove sufficient for the administration of reform in connection with a new community problem or it may be necessary to establish new agencies of administration

The residence-trailer problem in Detroit is just beginning to enter the reform stage in its natural history Although police and sanitation officials had sporadic contacts with the camps prior to 1937, their activities were not concerned with carrying out any special policies established for trailer communities They were merely acting on community policies already established pertaining to crime and public health, wherever and whenever conditions called for bringing such old policies into action. Beginning about 1937, however, the Common Council enacted legislation which placed the trailer camps within the city under certain prohibitions and restrictions. These camps were absolutely prohibited from certain areas and allowed to survive only in specially designated areas. Also, special requirements as to licensing, inspection, and supervision of the camps were enforced on owners and/or lessees of the real estate where the camps were located. The health officials and sanitation inspectors were ordered to establish special rules of public health for the trailer communities Reform has only begun, and many knotty legal problems remain to be ironed out before collective action can proceed further There is no indication that the school authorities have taken any official action The problem seems to be on the border of transition from policy determination to reform.

It should be fairly obvious from the statement of the residence-trailer problem that the stages in the natural history are not mutually exclusive and that they tend to overlap For conceptual purposes, however, the three general phases may be set off from each other, in practical reality, the state of development of a problem at any one time usually contains elements of all three stages.

Is the natural history technique equally adaptable to all types of social problems? The residence-trailer problem is a situation which can be observed on a local and emergent basis in specific neighborhoods and communities The factors of localism and emergence offer the investigator a delimited area and a timeliness of observation which permit a current, intimate focus on the items of awareness, policy determination, and reform. The data are fresh and immediate and the participant observer technique is available. Such problems are often transitory — that is, awareness, discussion, and conflict cease permanently with some arrangement for compromise or removal of the difficulty,

or the abatement of conflict may be only momentary and the issue flares up again and again.

What of the traditional, older, more pervasive problems which have occupied the attention of teacher and student in social problems texts for the past fifty years or more? What of crime, poverty, insanity, war, family disorganization, prostitution, illegitimacy, and race prejudice? Obviously, we cannot go back into antiquity to record the first awareness of social groups defining such conditions as problems We cannot trace the earliest conflicts over policy and the first attempts at solution. Anthropological, historical, and contemporary data may be used to demonstrate to the student the universal aspects of these problems in space and in time Such materials, however, are inadequate in that they do not bring the student face to face with the dynamics of the problem. If the student is to understand why these old established problems persist and defy solution, he must examine the values of our social organization which bring the undesirable conditions into existence and which obstruct efforts to remove them His laboratory for the study of these realities is the local community where the cross-sectional conflicts at the core of the problem can be observed most intimately

The important fact which the textbooks overlook is that the old traditional problems are given relative emphases in the local community At the awareness stage, a problem such as crime may be receiving very little attention in community *A*, whereas in the neighboring community *B* it is the all-absorbing focus of interest. Similarly, there may be no discussion of policies relative to race discrimination in *B*, whereas the people of *A* are intensely occupied with such discussion The administration of relief for unemployment may be in an advanced stage in *B*, whereas little if anything is being done in *A* Thus, even these problems which are persistently national in scope do not blanket the country with the same stage of development Such conditions are only latent, dormant, or potential problems in the local area, and before they rise to local consciousness, debate, and control, a local issue is essential to set the natural history going Although the conflicts of social values which make up the problem, once it has evolved, are much the same in all communities, the natural history technique provides a specific focus on these conflicts as they function in the concrete reality of a local situation

CONCLUSION

We have presented the "natural history" interpretation of social problems as a broad conceptual frame for the examination of the dynamics of specific social problems. Obviously, before the natural history technique can be made a precise tool of research, the many implications of our statement must be refined and explored by further analysis.

Within our experience as teachers, the natural history approach has proved most valuable in bringing students to grips with the realities of social problems These realities, as we see them, are the cross purposes at which people find themselves because they cherish incompatible and inconsistent objectives The very norms of organization which give the community a working routine tend to produce conflicts of cultural values which create and sustain conditions defined as social problems

In the search for temporal sequences in the "becoming" of a social problem, the student does not take problem conditions for granted, as objective "evils" caused by "evils" He seeks to explain social problems as emergents of the cultural organization of the community, as complements of the approved values of the so-

ciety, not as pathological and abnormal departures from what is assumed to be proper and normal As such, the natural history technique is a sociological orientation rather than a social welfare orientation If social problems theory is to come of age, it must cease being a poor relation of sociological theory and become sociological theory in its own right.

WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALITY *

Edwin H. Sutherland

This paper is concerned with crime in relation to business The economists are well acquainted with business methods but not accustomed to consider them from the point of view of crime, many sociologists are well acquainted with crime but not accustomed to consider it as expressed in business This paper is an attempt to integrate these two bodies of knowledge. More accurately stated, it is a comparison of crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of respectable or at least respected business and professional men, and crime in the lower class, composed of persons of low socioeconomic status. This comparison is made for the purpose of developing the theories of criminal behavior, not for the purpose of muckraking or of reforming anything except criminology

The criminal statistics show unequivocally that crime, *as popularly conceived and officially measured,* has a high incidence in the lower class and a low incidence in the upper class; less than two percent of the persons committed to prisons in a year belong to the upper class. These statistics refer to criminals handled by the police, the criminal and juvenile courts, and the prisons, and to such crimes as murder, assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, sex offenses, and drunkenness, but exclude traffic violations

The criminologists have used the case histories and criminal statistics derived from these agencies of criminal justice as their principal data From them, they have derived general theories of criminal behavior These theories are that, since crime is concentrated in the lower class, it is caused by poverty or by personal and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty, including feeblemindedness, psychopathic deviations, slum neighborhoods, and "deteriorated" families This statement, of course, does not do justice to the qualifications and variations in the conventional theories of criminal behavior, but it presents correctly their central tendency

The thesis of this paper is that the conception and explanations of crime which have just been described are misleading and incorrect, that crime is in fact not closely correlated with poverty or with the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions associated with poverty, and that an adequate explanation of criminal behavior must proceed along quite different lines The conventional explanations are invalid principally because they are derived from

* *American Sociological Review,* February, 1940, pp 1–12 Reprinted by permission of the author (Some of the materials of this article will be incorporated in the author's book on white-collar crime to be published by the Dryden Press)

biased samples. The samples are biased in that they have not included vast areas of criminal behavior of persons not in the lower class One of these neglected areas is the criminal behavior of business and professional men, which will be analyzed in this paper.

The "robber barons" of the last half of the nineteenth century were white-collar criminals, as practically everyone now agrees Their attitudes are illustrated by these statements· Colonel Vanderbilt asked, "You don't suppose you can run a railroad in accordance with the statutes, do you?" A B Stickney, a railroad president, said to sixteen other railroad presidents in the home of J P Morgan in 1890, 'I have the utmost respect for you gentlemen, individually, but as railroad presidents I wouldn't trust you with my watch out of my sight" Charles Francis Adams said, "The difficulty in railroad management . . . lies in the covetousness, want of good faith, and low moral tone of railway managers, in the complete absence of any high standard of commercial honesty"

The present day white collar criminals, who are more suave and deceptive than the "robber barons," are represented by Krueger, Stavisky, Whitney, Mitchell, Foshay, Insull, the Van Sweringens, Musica-Coster, Fall, Sinclair, and many other merchant princes and captains of finance and industry, and by a host of lesser followers Their criminality has been demonstrated again and again in the investigations of land offices, railways, insurance, munitions, banking, public utilities, stock exchanges, the oil industry, real estate, reorganization committees, receiverships, bankruptcies, and politics. Individual cases of such criminality are reported frequently, and in many periods more important crime news may be found on the financial pages of newspapers than on the front pages White-collar criminality is found in every occupation, as can be discovered readily in casual conversation with a representative of an occupation by asking him, "What crooked practices are found in your occupation?"

White collar criminality in business is expressed most frequently in the form of misrepresentation in financial statements of corporations, manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favorable contracts and legislation, misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of funds, short weights and measures and misgrading of commodities, tax frauds, misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies These are what Al Capone called "the legitimate rackets." These and many others are found in abundance in the business world

In the medical profession, which is here used as an example because it is probably less criminalistic than some other professions, are found illegal sale of alcohol and narcotics, abortion, illegal services to underworld criminals, fraudulent reports and testimony in accident cases, extreme cases of unnecessary treatment, fake specialists, restriction of competition, and fee splitting. Fee splitting is a violation of a specific law in many states and a violation of the conditions of admission to the practice of medicine in all The physician who participates in fee splitting tends to send his patients to the surgeon who will give him the largest fee rather than to the surgeon who will do the best work. It has been reported that two thirds of the surgeons in New York City split fees, and that more than one half of the physicians in a central western city who answered a questionnaire on this point favored fee-splitting.

These varied types of white collar crimes in business and the professions consist principally of violation of delegated or implied trust, and many of them can be

reduced to two categories· misrepresentation of asset values and duplicity in the manipulation of power. The first is approximately the same as fraud or swindling; the second is similar to the double-cross. The latter is illustrated by the corporation director who, acting on inside information, purchases land which the corporation will need and sells it at a fantastic profit to his corporation The principle of this duplicity is that the offender holds two antagonistic positions, one of which is a position of trust, which is violated, generally by misapplication of funds, in the interest of the other position. A football coach, permitted to referee a game in which his own team was playing, would illustrate this antagonism of positions Such situations cannot be completely avoided in a complicated business structure, but many concerns make a practice of assuming such antagonistic functions and regularly violating the trust thus delegated to them When compelled by law to make a separation of their functions, they make a nominal separation and continue by subterfuge to maintain the two positions.

An accurate statistical comparison of the crimes of the two classes is not available The most extensive evidence regarding the nature and prevalence of white-collar criminality is found in the reports of the larger investigations to which reference was made Because of its scattered character, that evidence is assumed rather than summarized here. A few statements will be presented, as illustrations rather than as proof of the prevalence of this criminality

The Federal Trade Commission in 1920 reported that commercial bribery was a prevalent and common practice in many industries. In certain chain stores, the net shortage in weights was sufficient to pay 3.4 percent on the investment in those commodities. Of the cans of ether sold to the Army in 1923–1925, 70 percent were rejected because of impurities. In Indiana, during the summer of 1934, 40 percent of the ice cream samples tested in a routine manner by the Division of Public Health were in violation of law. The Comptroller of the Currency in 1908 reported that violations of law were found in 75 percent of the banks examined in a three months' period Lie detector tests of all employees in several Chicago banks, supported in almost all cases by confessions, showed that 20 percent of them had stolen bank property. A public accountant estimated, in the period prior to the Securities and Exchange Commission, that 80 percent of the financial statements of corporations were misleading. James M Beck said, "Diogenes would have been hard put to it to find an honest man in the Wall Street which I knew as a corporation lawyer" (in 1916)

White-collar criminality in politics, which is generally recognized as fairly prevalent, has been used by some as a rough gauge by which to measure white collar criminality in business. James A Farley said, "The standards of conduct are as high among officeholders and politicians as they are in commercial life," and Cermak, while mayor of Chicago, said. "There is less graft in politics than in business" John Flynn wrote, "The average politician is the merest amateur in the gentle art of graft, compared with his brother in the field of business" And Walter Lippmann wrote, "Poor as they are, the standards of public life are so much more social than those of business that financiers who enter politics regard themselves as philanthropists"

These statements obviously do not give a precise measurement of the relative criminality of the white-collar class, but they are adequate evidence that crime is not so highly concentrated in the lower class as the usual statistics indicate. Also, these statements obviously do not mean that

every business and professional man is a criminal, just as the usual theories do not mean that every man in the lower class is a criminal. On the other hand, the preceding statements refer in many cases to the leading corporations in America and are not restricted to the disreputable business and professional men who are called quacks, ambulance chasers, bucket-shop operators, dead-beats, and fly-by-night swindlers.[1]

The financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the "crime problem" An officer of a chain grocery store in one year embezzled $600,000, which was six times as much as the annual losses from five hundred burglaries and robberies of the stores in that chain. Public enemies numbered one to six secured $130,000 by burglary and robbery in 1938, while the sum stolen by Krueger is estimated at $250,000,000, or nearly two thousand times as much *The New York Times* in 1931 reported four cases of embezzlement in the United States with a loss of more than a million dollars each and a combined loss of nine million dollars. Although a million-dollar burglar or robber is practically unheard of, these million-dollar embezzlers are small fry among white-collar criminals The estimated loss to investors in one investment trust from 1929 to 1935 was $580,000,000, due primarily to the fact that 75 percent of the values in the portfolio were in securities of affiliated companies, although it advertised the importance of diversification in investments and its expert services in selecting safe securities In Chicago, the claim was made six years ago that householders had lost $54,000,000 in two years during the administration of a city sealer who granted immunity from inspection to stores which provided Christmas baskets for his constituents.

The financial loss from white-collar crime, great as it is, is less important than the damage to social relations White-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust, which lowers social morale and produces social disorganization on a large scale Other crimes produce relatively little effect on social institutions or social organization.

White-collar crime is real crime. It is not ordinarily called crime, and calling it by this name does not make it worse, just as refraining from calling it crime does not make it better than it otherwise would be It is called crime here in order to bring it within the scope of criminology, which is justified because it is in violation of the criminal law. The crucial question in this analysis is the criterion of violation of the criminal law. Conviction in the criminal court, which is sometimes suggested as the criterion, is not adequate because a large proportion of those who commit crimes are not convicted in criminal courts This criterion, therefore, needs to be supplemented When it is supplemented, the criterion of the crimes of one class must be kept consistent in general terms with the criterion of the crimes of the other class The definition should not be the spirit of the law for white-collar crimes and the letter of the law for other crimes, or in other respects be more liberal for one class than for the other Since

[1] Perhaps it should be repeated that "white-collar" (upper) and "lower" classes merely designate persons of high and low socioeconomic status Income and amount of money involved in the crime are not the sole criteria Many persons of "low" socioeconomic status are "white-collar" criminals in the sense that they are well-dressed, well-educated, and have high incomes, but "white-collar" as used in this paper means "respected," "socially accepted and approved," "looked up to" Some people in this class may not be well-dressed or well-educated, nor have high incomes, although the "upper" usually exceed the "lower" classes in these respects as well as in social status.

this discussion is concerned with the conventional theories of the criminologists, the criterion of white-collar crime must be justified in terms of the procedures of those criminologists in dealing with other crimes. The criterion of white-collar crimes, as here proposed, supplements convictions in the criminal courts in four respects, in each of which the extension is justified because the criminologists who present the conventional theories of criminal behavior make the same extension in principle.

First, other agencies than the criminal court must be included, for the criminal court is not the only agency which makes official decisions regarding violations of the criminal law. The juvenile court, dealing largely with offenses of the children of the poor, in many states is not under the criminal jurisdiction The criminologists have made much use of case histories and statistics of juvenile delinquents in constructing their theories of criminal behavior This justifies the inclusion of agencies other than the criminal court which deal with white-collar offenses The most important of these agencies are the administrative boards, bureaus, or commissions, and much of their work, although certainly not all, consists of cases which are in violation of the criminal law. The Federal Trade Commission recently ordered several automobile companies to stop advertising their interest rate on installment purchases as 6 percent, since it was actually 11½ percent. Also it filed complaint against *Good Housekeeping*, one of the Hearst publications, charging that its seals led the public to believe that all products bearing those seals had been tested in their laboratories, which was contrary to fact Each of these involves a charge of dishonesty, which might have been tried in a criminal court as fraud A large proportion of the cases before these boards should be included in the data of the criminologists. Failure to do so is a principal reason for the bias in their samples and the errors in their generalizations.

Second, for both classes, behavior which would have a reasonable expectancy of conviction if tried in a criminal court or substitute agency should be defined as criminal In this respect, convictability rather than actual conviction should be the criterion of criminality. The criminologists would not hesitate to accept as data a verified case history of a person who was a criminal but had never been convicted Similarly, it is justifiable to include white-collar criminals who have not been convicted, provided reliable evidence is available. Evidence regarding such cases appears in many civil suits, such as stockholders' suits and patent-infringement suits These cases might have been referred to the criminal court but they were referred to the civil court because the injured party was more interested in securing damages than in seeing punishment inflicted This also happens in embezzlement cases, regarding which surety companies have much evidence. In a short consecutive series of embezzlements known to a surety company, 90 percent were not prosecuted because prosecution would interfere with restitution or salvage The evidence in cases of embezzlement is generally conclusive, and would probably have been sufficient to justify conviction in all of the cases in this series.

Third, behavior should be defined as criminal if conviction is avoided merely because of pressure which is brought to bear on the court or substitute agency Gangsters and racketeers have been relatively immune in many cities because of their pressure on prospective witnesses and public officials, and professional thieves, such as pickpockets and confidence men who do not use strong-arm methods, are even more frequently im-

mune. The conventional criminologists do not hesitate to include the life histories of such criminals as data, because they understand the generic relation of the pressures to the failure to convict Similarly, white-collar criminals are relatively immune because of the class bias of the courts and the power of their class to influence the implementation and administration of the law This class bias affects not merely present-day courts but to a much greater degree affected the earlier courts which established the precedents and rules of procedure of the present-day courts Consequently, it is justifiable to interpret the actual or potential failures of conviction in the light of known facts regarding the pressures brought to bear on the agencies which deal with offenders

Fourth, persons who are accessory to a crime should be included among white-collar criminals as they are among other criminals When the Federal Bureau of Investigation deals with a case of kidnapping, it is not content with catching the offenders who carried away the victim, they may catch and the court may convict twenty-five other persons who assisted by secreting the victim, negotiating the ransom, or putting the ransom money into circulation. On the other hand, the prosecution of white-collar criminals frequently stops with one offender Political graft almost always involves collusion between politicians and business men but prosecutions are generally limited to the politicians Judge Manton was found guilty of accepting $664,000 in bribes, but the six or eight important commercial concerns that paid the bribes have not been prosecuted Pendergast, the late boss of Kansas City, was convicted for failure to report as a part of his income $315,000 received in bribes from insurance companies but the insurance companies which paid the bribes have not been prosecuted In an investigation of an embezzlement by the president of a bank, at least a dozen other violations of law which were related to this embezzlement and involved most of the other officers of the bank and the officers of the clearing house, were discovered but none of the others was prosecuted

This analysis of the criterion of white-collar criminality results in the conclusion that a description of white-collar criminality in general terms will be also a description of the criminality of the lower class The respects in which the crimes of the two classes differ are the incidentals rather than the essentials of criminality. They differ principally in the implementation of the criminal laws which apply to them. The crimes of the lower class are handled by policemen, prosecutors, and judges, with penal sanctions in the form of fines, imprisonment, and death The crimes of the upper class either result in no official action at all, or result in suits for damages in civil courts, or are handled by inspectors, and by administrative boards or commissions, with penal sanctions in the form of warnings, orders to cease and desist, occasionally the loss of a license, and only in extreme cases by fines or prison sentences Thus, the white-collar criminals are segregated administratively from other criminals, and largely as a consequence of this are not regarded as real criminals by themselves, the general public, or the criminologists.

This difference in the implementation of the criminal law is due principally to the difference in the social position of the two types of offenders Judge Woodward, when imposing sentence upon the officials of the H O Stone and Company, bankrupt real estate firm in Chicago, who had been convicted in 1933 of the use of the mails to defraud, said to them, "You are men of affairs, of experience, of refinement and culture, of excellent reputation and standing in the business and social world" That statement might be used as

a general characterization of white-collar criminals for they are oriented basically to legitimate and respectable careers. Because of their social status they have a loud voice in determining what goes into the statutes and how the criminal law as it affects themselves is implemented and administered. This may be illustrated from the Pure Food and Drug Law. Between 1879 and 1906, 104 pure food and drug bills were presented in Congress and all failed because of the importance of the persons who would be affected. It took a highly dramatic performance by Dr Wiley in 1906 to induce Congress to enact the law. That law, however, did not create a new crime, just as the federal Lindbergh kidnapping law did not create a new crime; it merely provided a more efficient implementation of a principle which had been formulated previously in state laws When an amendment to this law, which would bring within the scope of its agents fraudulent statements made over the radio or in the press, was presented to Congress, the publishers and advertisers organized support and sent a lobby to Washington which successfully fought the amendment principally under the slogans of "freedom of the press" and "dangers of bureaucracy" This proposed amendment, also, would not have created a new crime, for the state laws already prohibited fraudulent statements over the radio or in the press; it would have implemented the law so it could have been enforced Finally, the Administration has not been able to enforce the law as it has desired because of the pressures by the offenders against the law, sometimes brought to bear through the head of the Department of Agriculture, sometimes through congressmen who threaten cuts in the appropriation, and sometimes by others. The statement of Daniel Drew, a pious old fraud, describes the criminal law with some accuracy, "Law is like a cobweb; it's made for flies and the smaller kinds of insects, so to speak, but lets the big bumblebees break through. When technicalities of the law stood in my way, I have always been able to brush them aside easy as anything."

The preceding analysis should be regarded neither as an assertion that all efforts to influence legislation and its administration are reprehensible nor as a particularistic interpretation of the criminal law It means only that the upper class has greater influence in moulding the criminal law and its administration to its own interests than does the lower class The privileged position of white-collar criminals before the law results to a slight extent from bribery and political pressures, principally from the respect in which they are held and without special effort on their part The most powerful group in medieval society secured relative immunity by "benefit of clergy," and now our most powerful groups secure relative immunity by "benefit of business or profession"

In contrast with the power of the white-collar criminals is the weakness of their victims Consumers, investors, and stockholders are unorganized, lack technical knowledge, and cannot protect themselves Daniel Drew, after taking a large sum of money by sharp practice from Vanderbilt in the Erie deal, concluded that it was a mistake to take money from a powerful man on the same level as himself and declared that in the future he would confine his efforts to outsiders, scattered all over the country, who wouldn't be able to organize and fight back White-collar criminality flourishes at points where powerful business and professional men come in contact with persons who are weak. In this respect, it is similar to stealing candy from a baby. Many of the crimes of the lower class, on the other hand, are committed against persons of wealth and pow

in the form of burglary and robbery. cause of this difference in the compara- e power of the victims, the white-col- criminals enjoy relative immunity.

Embezzlement is an interesting excep- on to white-collar criminality in this re- ect Embezzlement is usually theft from employer by an employee, and the em- oyee is less capable of manipulating so- al and legal forces in his own interest an is the employer As might have been xpected, the laws regarding embezzle- ent were formulated long before laws or the protection of investors and con- umers.

The theory that criminal behavior in general is due either to poverty or to the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions associated with poverty can now be shown to be invalid for three reasons. First, the generalization is based on a biased sample which omits almost entirely the behavior of white-collar criminals The criminologists have restricted their data, for reasons of convenience and ignorance rather than of principle, largely to cases dealt with in criminal courts and juvenile courts, and these agencies are used principally for criminals from the lower economic strata Consequently, their data are grossly biased from the point of view of the economic status of criminals and their generalization that criminality is closely associated with poverty is not justified.

Second, the generalization that criminality is closely associated with poverty obviously does not apply to white-collar criminals With a small number of exceptions, they are not in poverty, were not reared in slums or badly deteriorated families, and are not feebleminded or psychopathic. They were seldom problem children in their earlier years and did not appear in juvenile courts or child guidance clinics. The proposition, derived from the data used by the conventional criminologists, that "the criminal of today was the problem child of yesterday" is seldom true of white-collar criminals. The idea that the causes of criminality are to be found almost exclusively in childhood similarly is fallacious Even if poverty is extended to include the economic stresses which afflict business in a period of depression, it is not closely correlated with white-collar criminality. Probably at no time within fifty years have white-collar crimes in the field of investments and of corporate management been so extensive as during the boom period of the twenties

Third, the conventional theories do not even explain lower class criminality The sociopathic and psychopathic factors which have been emphasized doubtless have something to do with crime causation, but these factors have not been related to a general process which is found both in white-collar criminality and lower class criminality and therefore they do not explain the criminality of either class They may explain the manner or method of crime — why lower class criminals commit burglary or robbery rather than false pretenses.

In view of these defects in the conventional theories, an hypothesis that will explain both white-collar criminality and lower class criminality is needed For reasons of economy, simplicity, and logic, the hypothesis should apply to both classes, for this will make possible the analysis of causal factors freed from the encumbrances of the administrative devices which have led criminologists astray Shaw and McKay and others, working exclusively in the field of lower class crime, have found the conventional theories inadequate to account for variations within the data of lower class crime and from that point of view have been working toward an explanation of crime in terms of a more general social process Such efforts will be greatly aided by the procedure which has been described.

The hypothesis which is here suggested as a substitute for the conventional theories is that white-collar criminality, just as other systematic criminality, is learned, that it is learned in direct or indirect association with those who already practice the behavior; and that those who learn this criminal behavior are segregated from frequent and intimate contacts with law-abiding behavior Whether a person becomes a criminal or not is determined largely by the comparative frequency and intimacy of his contacts with the two types of behavior. This may be called the process of differential association It is a genetic explanation both of white-collar criminality and lower class criminality. Those who become white-collar criminals generally start their careers in good neighborhoods and good homes, graduate from colleges with some idealism, and with little selection on their part, get into particular business situations in which criminality is practically a folkway and are inducted into that system of behavior just as into any other folkway The lower class criminals generally start their careers in deteriorated neighborhoods and families, find delinquents at hand from whom they acquire the attitudes toward, and techniques of, crime through association with delinquents and in partial segregation from law-abiding people The essentials of the process are the same for the two classes of criminals. This is not entirely a process of assimilation, for inventions are frequently made, perhaps more frequently in white-collar crime than in lower class crime The inventive geniuses for the lower class criminals are generally professional criminals, while the inventive geniuses for many kinds of white-collar crime are generally lawyers.

A second general process is social disorganization in the community Differential association culminates in crime because the community is not organized solidly against that behavior. The law is pressing in one direction, and other forces are pressing in the opposite direction In business, the "rules of the game" conflict with the legal rules. A business man who wants to obey the law is driven by his competitors to adopt their methods. This is well illustrated by the persistence of commercial bribery in spite of the strenuous efforts of business organizations to eliminate it Groups and individuals are individuated, they are more concerned with their specialized group or individual interests than with the larger welfare Consequently, it is not possible for the community to present a solid front in opposition to crime The Better Business Bureaus and Crime Commissions, composed of business and professional men, attack burglary, robbery, and cheap swindles, but overlook the crimes of their own members The forces which impinge on the lower class are similarly in conflict Social disorganization affects the two classes in similar ways

I have presented a brief and general description of white-collar criminality on a framework of argument regarding theories of criminal behavior That argument, stripped of the description, may be stated in the following propositions:

1. White-collar criminality is real criminality, being in all cases in violation of the criminal law

2. White-collar criminality differs from lower class criminality principally in an implementation of the criminal law which segregates white-collar criminals administratively from other criminals

3. The theories of the criminologists that crime is due to poverty or to psychopathic and sociopathic conditions statistically associated with poverty are invalid because, first, they are derived from samples which are grossly biased with respect to socioeconomic status, second, they do not apply to the white-collar criminals,

and third, they do not even explain the criminality of the lower class, since the factors are not related to a general process characteristic of all criminality

4 A theory of criminal behavior which will explain both white-collar criminality and lower class criminality is needed.

5 An hypothesis of this nature is suggested in terms of differential association and social disorganization.

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Kramer, Ralph, "The Conceptual Status of Social Disorganization," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1943, pp 466-74 After analyzing theories of social disorganization which respectively emphasize economic factors, cultural lag, the breakdown of communication, early childhood influences, and the breakdown of groups, the author concludes that group breakdown is the most crucial factor He suggests its significance as a symptom and as a frame of reference

2 Landis, P H, "Emerging Problems of the Aged," *Social Forces*, May, 1942 pp 460-67 Summarizing the major respects in which the aged constitute a social problem in American society, the author contends that as an organized pressure group they will become more demanding in attempts to better their lot

3 Mannheim, Karl, Social Causes of the Contemporary Crisis in Culture, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc, New York, 1940, pp 79-114 Although this entire volume is a cogent sociological analysis of problems of social disorganization and social change in contemporary society, the section mentioned here is cited for its description and analysis of the disintegrative influence on culture of a faulty liberalism

4 McClenahan, B A, "Social Causes of Decline of Neighborhoods," *Social Forces*, May, 1942, pp 471-76 This article shows how middle-class as well as slum neighborhoods become disorganized and indicates that a deterioration in "social desirability" is just as much an index of disorganization as some of the symptoms in more common use

5 Mowrer, Ernest, "The Trend and Ecology of Family Disorganization in Chicago," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1939, pp 344-53 Utilizing quantitative data, the author applies statistical techniques to their classification and interpretation Information is reduced to simple percentages, ratios, and statistical means or averages to yield comparable indexes of family disorganization One may perceive how the correlation device is used to objectify background factors associated with divorce and nonsupport The ecological frame of reference used throughout the study shows some of the interrelations between social disorganization and the various spatial environments of the community

6 Reckless, W C, "Twenty Years of Vice Suppression," *Vice in Chicago*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1933, pp 1-31 Tracing the effects of a public policy of suppressing prostitution over a period of two decades, the author gives statistics to show that police drives were successful in changing some of the manifestations of this form of vice but were not successful in eliminating it

7 Riezler, Kurt, "The Social Psychology of Fear," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1944, pp 489-98 The author maintains that a vague and widespread feeling of collective insecurity is the nightmare of modern associational society He analyzes the various causes of contemporary uncertainty and despair in democratic societies, and concludes that the rise of totalitarianism is inevitable unless public measures are taken to minimize such attitudes

8 Strong, S M, "Negro-White Relations as Reflected in Social Types," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1946, pp 23-30 The subordination of Negroes produces strains and conflicts reflected in attitudes and definitions of social types (e g, the "white man's nigger," the "bad nigger," the "smart nigger") variously disapproved by the whites, by the colored, or by both This article describes a number of these social types and relates them to the processes of social disorganization

9 Thomas, W I, and Znaniecki, Florian, "Social Disorganization," *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1927, Vol II, pp 1127-1306 First published in 1918, this systematic analysis of social disorganization has had a tremendous influence on later sociological analysis It stresses the importance of attitudes and values, and traces family and community disorganization

10 Wilson, Logan, "Public Opinion and the Individualized Treatment of Criminals," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, January-February, 1938, pp 674-83 Pursuant to basic propositions set forth in both "The Natural History of a Social Problem" and "White-Collar Criminality," this paper is relevant for a specification of

how public opinion incorrectly interprets the causes of crime and often obstructs a more rational program for the treatment of criminals

11. Wirth, Louis, "Housing as a Field of Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1947, pp 137–43 "That housing is an important practical problem needs no argument" Starting from this point, the article indicates the respects in which the sociologist — as distinguished from the architect, engineer, businessman, and others — is interested in housing as a social problem Housing is discussed as a social value, in relation to community, and in terms of social policy

12 See also Glueck, "Predictability and Criminal Justice," p 30, Faris and Dunham, "The Concentration of Alcoholic Psychoses and Drug Addicts in the Zone of Transition," p 252, Davis, "Caste, Economy and Violence,' p 479, Polanyi, "Our Obsolete Market Mentality," p 557, Chapman, "Industrial Conflict in Detroit," p 727

23. Sociological Aspects of Contemporary Change

BASIC CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS

The concrete realities of social change are so complex and infinite that it is futile to try to record and interpret everything that happens Historians are therefore concerned only with those *unique* occurrences (e.g., the French Revolution, the National Socialist regime in Germany) which seem to be significant for history as an *individualizing* science Although there is no sharp division of labor between the historian and the sociologist, the latter works primarily in an analytical rather than a historical frame of reference Yet the sociologist does this with a full awareness of the temporal nature of social processes and patterns, and therefore his analyses of society always take *social dynamics* into consideration.

As a *generalizing* social science, sociology is not concerned with unique social events, but only with those which are repeated in time and space (e g., revolutions, dictatorships; see Sorokin's "Sociology Among the Sciences," p. 16). The ultimate objective of this kind of sociological inquiry is to derive scientific laws to be utilized for purposes of prediction and control. Even though sociology originally grew out of efforts to make a science of the philosophy of history, the aims of contemporary sociologists are on the whole less grandiose and more closely confined to carefully controlled observations of social change Attempts to derive scientific theories of progress, to discern the ultimate objective of the course of history, or to reduce explanations of the sweep of history to simple formulas have been largely abandoned Social change is no longer regarded as a separate and distinct social process but is studied as a complex manifestation of many interrelated elements

In much of the material covered in this volume the time dimension and the historical point of view have been both explicit and implicit. It has been noted that some fluctuations or variations are of brief duration, whereas others are extended over longer periods Some social relations originate, mature, and expire in a fleeting manner. Some groups and associations, such as friendship circles, committees, conferences, and reform movements, are short-lived Others, such as church and state, are long-lived. Some groups and associations change rapidly; others remain relatively unchanged. Many of the changes we have noted in societal structure and function have taken place within our own era; others have been going on for centuries and even as yet seem to be far from their full development. Certain processes of change are continual, others are intermittent; some have a rapid and others a slow tempo or rate Many kinds of changes appear to be cyclical or oscillating in character, and other kinds seem to follow a linear movement.

All this presupposes that the phenomena of social change may be reduced to observable and comparable categories, however large or small It has been noted that objective indexes such as the divorce rate, the number of patents issued for inventions, the incidence of suicide, the literacy ratio, and many other statistical summations of social behavior may be traced over periods of time to deduce cycles or other trends, to note correlations with various causal factors, and to establish rates of change. Broadly composite and changing characteristics of social behavior are denoted in secularization, urbanization, atomization, and other such terms as we have used to describe changes in societal forms and functions.

Sociologists are interested in many aspects of social change, ranging from those involving small numbers of individuals and lasting briefly to those embracing whole societies and enduring throughout long historical epochs Their researches not only describe and analyze many particular types of social change, but also seek out its causes and consequences Many investigations have centered around efforts to delineate the circumstances which lead to innovation, the basic forms innovation may take, the forces which resist or assist social change, and the extent to which change may be consciously directed

Space limitations prevent our going into many interesting and pertinent problems of social change It would not be amiss to explore the ramified concerns to be noted where sociology touches upon the philosophy of history and to evaluate the highly controversial hypotheses of Comte, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, and others Likewise, there is a rich mine of materials showing the effects of population growth, cultural accumulation, science and technology, and other causal factors on social change. There are many valuable monographic studies of fashions and fads, panics, mass migrations, acute crises, rushes, stampedes, booms, crazes, reforms, and other forms of collective behavior indicative of underlying social trends and tendencies Sociologists have given a great deal of attention both to the "blind" forces of social change and to the relatively spontaneous as well as carefully planned efforts to direct social change. They have become aware of the intricate interrelatedness of the processes of change and interpret change itself as the dynamic result of these interrelations.

Since we obviously cannot consider all of these matters here, our cases will necessarily have to focus upon certain central problems. Our first selection illustrates vividly and within a familiar setting the processes of social change attending the transition from a communal to an associational society and shows how social relations, social structure, the major associations, and social interaction are affected by secularization, urbanization, and industrialization. It also indicates how a sociological perspective of contemporary social change differs from a conventional historical presentation Our second selection is a description and analysis of social reform, a pattern of social change which has been particularly conspicuous in American history. That it happens to pertain to the prohibition drive is purely incidental. The third selection exemplifies the pattern of revolution, a much more sweeping type of social change, and gives considerable insight into the rise of dic-

tatorships in our time. The final essay represents a broadly abstract but incisive analysis of the deep-seated problems social change poses for us as citizens, and also brings together many of the problems of individual freedom and social order dealt with throughout this book Let us now turn to the cases themselves.

Heberle's "A Sociological Interpretation of Social Change in the South" describes within brief compass a region still undergoing the transition from a communal to an associational type of society ("community to society" in his terminology). Heberle shows how in its brief span of three centuries from wilderness to metropolis the South has telescoped social changes that required a much longer epoch in Europe Unlike some sociologists, he makes a clear-cut distinction between cultural and social change and concentrates his attention on the latter Furthermore, he assumes a general familiarity with the technological changes which have occurred and limits himself to sociological processes The article points out and analyzes how labor relations have shifted from patriarchal to associational types and shows how this trend has made for a gain in freedom and a loss in security (cf the Introduction to Chapter 11 on forces creating a desire for "escape from freedom") With the shift from a status to a contract system of economic relations, the caste system has been undermined, race relations have changed, and with urbanization the colored minority has become more vocal, self-assertive, and minority-conscious.

Changing social relations, increased heterogeneity and mobility of population, urbanization of small communities and "citification" of large communities, changing composition of classes and the more pronounced class system — these and other significant aspects of social change are all neatly illustrated in Heberle's article It is also important to note his conclusion — that spontaneous understanding and concord on the basis of common values and universally accepted customs can no longer be expected, but that formal contracts, statutes, regulations, and enforcement procedures will be increasingly needed The inevitability of more state control, regardless of how some individuals may feel about it, indicates the South's "coming of age" and points to the need for more rational measures of social control and a more highly trained political leadership.

Social changes often come about as a result of a combination of circumstances intended by nobody and anticipated by few if any individuals or groups (see item 7 in Annotated References) Many changes are effected, however, as a result of social movements, which have been described as collective enterprises attempting to establish some sort of new order of life In a generalized analysis of social movements, Herbert Blumer (listed under Annotated References) points out that such movements derive their motivation from dissatisfactions with the *status quo* (or some aspect of it) and from wishes and hopes for a new scheme of living A reform movement accepts the basic tenets of the existing order and merely seeks to enlist public opinion in favor of some new mode of behavior or in favor of returning to a former mode of behavior A revolutionary movement, on the other hand, rejects certain basic mores and aims at overthrowing the existing order. Its aims

are more drastic and its means more violent. Both types of movements begin amorphously but through agitation develop an *esprit de corps,* morale among the cohorts, a common ideology, and tactics. Yet their methods differ in important respects. Reform is typically an attempt to help a distressed or exploited category of individuals, and it often works *for* rather than *with* them. It appeals largely to the vicarious sympathy of others who are more strategically placed to do something about alleviating the situation (cf. antislavery, child labor, prohibition, and other reform movements). Revolutionary movements make their appeals directly to the "have-nots" and vigorously attack whatever is considered to be the opposition. Because of these differences, revolutionaries are always subject to violent counterattack, whereas reformers—although sometimes falsely charged with revolutionary aims—are open primarily to caricature or ridicule with charges that they are visionary and impractical. Religious movements, fashion movements, and other instances of what Blumer calls "expressive movements" have their own special characteristics, but all social movements are mechanisms of social change.

Here we shall consider only two examples a reform and a revolution Lee's article, "Techniques of Social Reform: An Analysis of the New Prohibition Drive," is somewhat restricted in its analytical perspective but it does give a wealth of descriptive detail for a well-known reform movement in this country. It is also useful for demonstrating how readily available documentary materials may be analyzed to get at some of the basic sociological features of a social movement and to show their bearing on problems of social change and social control The author describes the successful drive for the prohibition amendment, the later success of the counterdrive for repeal of the amendment, and then analyzes these factors against the background of the social structure The historical settings, characteristics of the groups, and the kinds of propaganda used are all admittedly given little attention in Lee's treatment, but he does outline in bold relief some of the crucial elements making for the success or failure of a reform movement.

In contrast to Lee's elaboration of factual detail around several main points, Abel's "The Pattern of a Successful Political Movement" presents a much more generalized treatment. Abel is not concerned with describing empirically Hitler's rise to power as a unique leader; instead, he uses the Hitler-led movement as a case in point to generalize about how something similar would occur under kindred conditions anywhere. His basic propositions, however, do not stem from speculation but from an examination of six hundred life histories of members of the National Socialist party.

Abel's analysis is useful for a number of reasons First, it indicates why we need an adequate theory of social movements in order to make valid statements about particular historical situations Second, it shows how we delimit a subject of inquiry in the field of social change and construct abstract categories for singling out the various elements in a complex situation and relating them to one another. Third, it stresses the need for comparative data as a basis for formulating universally valid generalizations (laws) about revolutions as social movements. In spite

of the limitations imposed upon the investigator by the second and third considerations, Abel does formulate generalizations about how a public develops around an issue and materializes into a sweeping political movement His analysis stresses the importance of the issue, the ideology, the charismatic leader, and other human protagonists as elements in promoting the movement. Acknowledging that tactics will vary from situation to situation, the author concludes from his analysis that *any* successful political movement must perform certain essential tasks, such as getting community attention, justifying claims for leadership, winning confidence of the masses by gaining ascendancy, and having an organization adequate in both the struggle for power and for taking over power. These propositions, Abel states, require further testing and elucidation, but they suggest directions for research The next step is to develop specific indicators to test the presence or absence of significant factors in particular situations, so that sociologists can predict and (if called upon) guide social movements better than at present

Our last case in point, Sidney Hook's "Law, Freedom, and Human Action," is a provocative statement of the main issues before us in furthering both freedom and order in human affairs Starting from a sociologically acceptable definition of historical law, he demonstrates the *logical* absurdity of two extreme attitudes toward social change At one extreme is fatalism; at the other is a blind faith in the possibility of complete control regardless of limiting conditions Considering social and historical laws as relatively autonomous, the author examines the extent to which they are conditions of human action and the extent to which they are modifiable by human action This is done by analyzing five situations — in part hypothetical and in part actual — where varying degrees and kinds of necessity, as well as freedom, are present

Hook's general conclusion is that some form of collectivism is inevitable; we can neither stop nor turn back the clock of history Our intelligent choice therefore is not to contest an irreversible trend but to determine *who* the state will represent, *how* it will intervene, and the *extent* to which we shall have collectivism in our economic system Fascism and communism are seen as false alternatives, but to avoid totalitarianism better safeguards for freedom must be devised and strenuously maintained Although too many past and present influences stand in the way of our striking out on a new course, we can profit from past mistakes and should not underestimate man's power to control the future. Because unpleasant contingencies cannot be entirely eliminated it does not follow that intelligent planning will not minimize them (Note Annotated References for articles on planning) Even though some may construe the author's contentions as a brief for collectivism, one cannot deny the incisiveness of his basic analysis Moreover, regardless of what form of democracy one may prefer as an alternative to totalitarianism, the functional necessity of intelligent planning is obvious if the freedom of an associational society is to survive.

A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH *

Rudolf Heberle

INTRODUCTION

The only justification I can think of for a newcomer to the South to attempt a sociological interpretation of social change in the region is the assumption that a native son might not see the woods for the trees There can be little doubt that after years of most fruitful fact-finding studies and analyses of particularly pressing problems, we should try to answer the old question of the great sociological thinkers of the past what does it all mean? Where do we stand? And whither are we going? There is also the professional motivation of giving direction to specialized research and establishing standards for judging the significance of new knowledge [1]

The difficulty of the task lies, paradoxically, in the limitations of the region and of the time span with which we are dealing The South is, after all, only a relatively small region within the vast domain of Western civilization, and the trends of social change in the South can scarcely be isolated from the trends in that larger area. Furthermore the South is a young region. Its history is, as far as we are concerned with it, merely that of the last ten generations or so of Western man, it falls almost entirely into the period of High Capitalism,[2] although, in a sense, an economic and technological development from wilderness to metropolis, which took centuries in the old world, has been telescoped into the brief span of three hundred years of southern history Out of this short span we have to select, in view of the purpose of this discussion, only the most recent decades This raises the problem of determining which of the changes that have occurred recently are really indicative of long run trends We will therefore have to relate the observed phenomena to a general *theory* of social change

The discussion will be limited to what Alfred Weber [3] calls the *social* process The progress in technology and other aspects of the *civilization* process — in Weber's systematic — will be assumed as known and treated as data Almost nothing can be said in this paper about new phenomena in the order of *culture* The creations of the arts and of philosophy are trendless, they seem to come in spurts, and they are subject to evaluations which are quite different from those that lead us to the construction of trends of change in the other two spheres [4]

[1] Even regional research must necessarily be oriented towards general social theory and receive its direction from such theory if it is to arouse more than regional interest by contributing to the advancement of our understanding of social life in general.

[2] Werner Sombart, "Capitalism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*

[3] Alfred Weber, "Fundamentals of Culture — Sociology Social Process Civilizational Process and Culture-Movement," in *Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft u Sozialpolitik*, Vol 47 (1920–21) translated by C H Weltner and C F Hirshman under the auspices of the WPA and the Department of Social Science, Columbia University, New York, 1939 (mimeographed)

[4] By way of illustration, we may refer to the history of religious movements in the South To construct any trend of change would be quite hopeless and not even meaningful in this field Along with a tendency towards secularization of

* Reprinted by permission from *Social Forces*, October, 1946, pp 9–15.

Among the *social* changes, we shall select for discussion: first, those phenomena which are characteristic in the development of a rural region, largely dominated by planters, towards a more industrialized state; and second, some of those that are indicative of the much more general and slower movement from Community to Society, in the sense of Tonnies. The South, because of its agrarian economy and relative cultural homogeneity, has retained more traits of "Community" than any other region of the country, but it is assimilating itself to the rest of the country at quite a rapid pace.

PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION

Before going into the interpretation of social changes, a brief consideration, in very general terms, of the civilizational progress with which they are interrelated is necessary We are here concerned with man's increasing control over and the advancement of intellectual understanding of his natural and social environment

It may be said that the first third of this century has been, for the South, a period of decisive improvement in the utilization of its natural resources and in the control of certain diseases characteristic of the region, all of which have helped to save the South from economic collapse and to improve the health and stamina of the people. Now we may be entering upon a period of further great improvements, which for the first time will enable white men to live comfortably and efficiently even in the region's subtropical zone The experiences gained during the war in the technique of living in the tropics, the new methods of insect control, of food preservation and air conditioning, may bring about a veritable revolution in southern life.

Furthermore, new techniques in manufacturing are already leading to the industrialization of hitherto economically undeveloped sections. Technological progress is also likely to create new uses for certain agricultural and other raw materials of the region

Wartime labor shortages have resulted in more efficient methods of production in agriculture as well as in manufacturing [5] The mobilization of the last manpower reserves had the effect of diffusing industrial skills into populations hitherto quite untouched by modern mechanical technology.[6]

Finally, the more direct experiences of the war and the knowledge of foreign lands acquired through war work or service in the armed forces, have widened the intellectual horizon of many a son and daughter of the South and have aroused intellectual appetities which cannot remain without consequences for the social relations and institutions in the region For the first time, large masses of mostly young Southerners are in a position to compare conditions at home with those in areas of the world more advanced in *civilization*. The result may be a great deal of social unrest and perhaps organized movements for economic and other reforms in the South.

In any event, the southern mind, which so far has been less tinged with the social standards of a capitalistic society than the American mind in general, is likely to become more like the mind of the more advanced regions The values and codes of conduct characteristic of pre-industrial and even pre-capitalistic societies which

thought we see a very persistent fundamentalism and, at the same time, constantly new forms of emotional religiosity, thus one cannot say that religion in the South is changing in any definite direction

[5] Including shifts towards farm products which require less labor than the traditional staple crops, thus leading to greater diversification

[6] See Rudolf Heberle, "War-Time Changes in the Labor Force in Louisiana," *Social Forces*, 24 (March 1946), pp 290–99

have been so long maintained in the South will be abandoned when and if the South participates more intensively in the technological and intellectual progress.

SOCIAL CHANGE

If we now inquire into the nature of changes in the social sphere,[7] we may very well begin by raising the question whether the South is and will remain a definite social entity, united by common values, common goals, and group consciousness Extreme scepticism in this respect is warranted in view, among other things, of the disagreement among social scientists, about the proper definition of the South.

If we adopt, for the purpose of this discussion, Howard W. Odum's concept of the southern region we realize that those interests which welded the South together are going to decrease in binding power and that, as new issues arise, new interest groups are being formed within the region which are not characteristic of the South alone and which tend to overshadow the once predominant southern interests.

In particular, the political myth[8] which has kept the South solidaric as a region — that is, the memory[9] of the Confederacy — is bound to lose vitality with the passing away of those generations which still had immediate reminiscences of the fighting, the defeat, and the ensuing suffering and humiliation. The generations which are destined to determine the South's fate during the coming century will be dominated by the memory of the second world war and the overwhelming experience of national unity. Furthermore, the differentiations between the various economic zones and subregions within the South are likely to gain importance and so will the differentiations between social classes It is therefore quite doubtful whether the South will remain much longer the "solid South," in socio-political consciousness.

We shall now discuss the changes in labor relations, in social stratification and in the social structure of local communities, thereafter we shall, very briefly, consider changes in values and norms. These are to be seen, not as mutually exclusive classes of subject matter, but rather as various aspects of the same social phenomena.

Labor relations. The South has, as a region within the United States, certain socio-economic traits and functions, which would justify our comparing it with Europe east of the Elbe. (1) a vast agricultural region with wide areas in which large scale farming in highly capitalistic form predominates, conducted by a politically powerful class of landlords constantly in need of credit and desirous of subsidies in some form or other, and depending upon a rather thin urban middle class of dealers, bankers and money lenders, (2) a numerous rural proletariat, partly of ethnic stocks other than the landlords, in certain mountainous areas and on soils of low fertility, family farmers[10] who in their culture and level of living represent an older phase of social development; (3) few and not very important cities, many but sparsely scattered small towns; (4) a prevalence of extractive industries — mining and lumber — except for certain districts of iron and textile industries, (5) high fertility and heavy out-

[7] In the stricter sense, as indicated above

[8] The term "myth" is being used here in the technical sense which does not involve any judgment about the truth or other value aspects of the ideas concerned.

[9] On "memory" as a psychological foundation of Community, see Ferdinand Tonnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* 8 ed , p. 97 ff

[10] It should perhaps be pointed out here, that such "peasant" areas exist throughout the entire East of Europe, including the eastern provinces of Prussia.

migration, low wages and poor living conditions especially among the highly mobile rural proletariat — these are some of the most striking similarities Both regions are remote from the great centers of consumption and are therefore handicapped in the diversification of agriculture and of manufacturing industries.

Many of the social changes which we observe in the South today, have been effective in Eastern Europe since the middle of the last century.

In the South, as in other world regions of large scale agricultural enterprise, we find technological and managerial progress accompanied by a change in the nature of labor relations from Community to Society, or from patriarchal to associational types

Just as in the European East the patriarchal relations between landlords and workers, which had persisted after the abolition of serfdom, were gradually destroyed by the mechanization and rationalization of the estates and gave way to contractual relations,[11] while at the same time resident labor was largely replaced by seasonal migratory labor, so we observe in the South, since the abolition of slavery, a gradual decline of patriarchal [12] labor relations and the replacement of resident plantation workers by transients and seasonal migrants from near-by towns and villages

The sociological implications of this change are well-known while the worker gains in freedom he loses the landlord's protection and care, and his economic insecurity increases as he is exposed to the vicissitudes of the labor market A relationship of Community based on a shared interest in the output, on reciprocal service and protection, and on steady, often intimate, contacts gives way to loose, intermittent, contractual relations based solely on the cash nexus

Pressure on the workers' wages increases as the region's chief staple crops are coming into fierce and ever fiercer competition with those of more recently developed overseas regions and with new substitute products The consequences are heavy out-migration of rural workers and frequent change of ownership of plantations, many of which fall into the hands of urban commercial entrepreneurs This again tends to destroy the last survivals of communal patriarchal relations of landlords to the actual tillers of the soil

Consequently, the antagonism of economic interests between landlords and agricultural workers tends towards a condition of unmitigated sharpness What will be the effect on the workers' economic condition is hard to predict Certain it is that in the past the development of the cotton plantation into a capitalistic enterprise has resulted in a deterioration at least of the croppers' diet The future development of wages and other conditions of agricultural labor depends largely on the opening of non-agricultural employment opportunities Perhaps a smaller, but better paid plantation labor force will emerge from a broad mass of underemployed, casual agricultural workers [13] In any event, it may be assumed that labor relations will soon be such as to require regulation by collective agreements and

[11] The classical work is G Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung* See also Max Weber's articles on the conditions of agricultural workers in Eastern Germany Gesammelte *Aufsatze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik* (Tubingen, 1924)

[12] Whether this term is really appropriate in view of peonage and other abuses of the landlord's power may be questioned, however, paternalism has been and still is "cherished as the ideal relation between whites and Negroes" (Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, I, 459, also William Percy, *Lanterns on the Levee*)

[13] See Arthur Raper, "The Role of Agricultural Technology in Southern Social Change," in this issue of *Social Forces*, pp 21–30

supervision by some kind of government agency. This applies also to tenants' contracts.

"As to the family farmers (who are their own employers) in a declining cotton economy, it is likely that subsistence farming will give greater economic security than commercial farming but there is the danger that, in a competition for land between subsistence farmers, those with the most modest stomachs will win out, in other words, that the general level of living among these farmers may tend to decline unless effective counter measures are taken, foremost among which would have to be public control over new ground settlements (land prices and contracts)"[14]

Similar tendencies are observable in non-agricultural production and in trade and services, including domestic service

The secondary industries in the South have until recently been largely limited to the extractive stages, to the first steps of processing of raw materials, and to the production of low-grade consumer goods Now we are witnessing a new era, an era of expansion in new industries where high wages prevail while labor is only a minor factor of total production costs. In these industries, the older pattern of relations between employers and employees, which was fashioned after the model of the plantation, is disappearing and giving way to more strictly contractual forms The state of "*anomie*"[15] which in the 'twenties resulted in so much violence is being succeeded by a state of autonomous order based on collective agreements, long since adopted in industrially more advanced regions. The growth of labor unions since the 1920's and the impact of federal labor legislation are important factors in this development.

Furthermore, absentee ownership in manufacturing industries tends to weaken personal relations between employers and employees and brings to the fore a group of intermediate functionaries managerial officials whose relationship with the workers is bound to be of a more depersonalized and rational, businesslike kind than that of the old type owner-operator The result is that even the most tradition bound workers will feel the need for institutionalization of labor relations and for social security measures.

The same factors which produce these changes in labor relations can scarcely remain without effect on *race relations* Just as the genuine caste system in India is slowly crumbling under the impact of industrialization, so may the southern pseudo caste system soon prove incompatible with the principles of rational plant organization These require placement of workers according to ability and technological needs, without consideration of color The adjustment in caste relations[16] will be a slow process and not without friction

Thus we may foresee that on the one hand the old relations of quasi-patriarchal domination and neighborly symbiosis which still are to be found in many rural communities, are going to disappear, at least from plantation areas, and that on the other hand discrimination against the once enslaved group may become less common in nonagricultural employment However, one should also realize that urbanization of increasing numbers of Negroes and the trend towards more pronounced ecological segregation in urban communities will inevitably lead to further estrangement of the two groups Even today, the urban white youth has much less experience of personal, play-group association with Negroes than their fathers

[14] Max Weber, *op cit passim*

[15] Durkheim, *La Division de Travail*

[16] The castes as such are not likely to be abolished, as Myrdal points out in *An American Dilemma*

and grandfathers used to have

The Negroes certainly have become a more self-asserting, more vocal, and more minority-conscious group. Viewed against a background of interracial differentials of world-population growth, which must lead to a shift in the proportions of white and colored peoples — not in the United States but in the world as a whole — the development of geographically concentrated Negro masses into a group-conscious minority has its serious perspectives In any case, these tendencies increase the need for institutionalization of interracial contacts and relationships (interracial committees, etc) The old devices of personal patronage and reliance on a generally known (and accepted) "etiquette of race relations" will have to be replaced by new codes of conduct, based upon more formal group agreements and upon legislation

The local communities. In rural areas, the neighborhood is still the basic local unit in which much of the social life of southern people is comprised Even in plantation areas it still means a great deal in the social organization of the Negroes Taking this and the great importance of the larger kinship group into account, it is safe to say that the social structure of rural areas in the region is still more Community-like than, e g in the Midwest [17] Gradual changes are brought about by the increasing availability and use of quick transportation, especially in the more prosperous farming areas Here, the larger village-open-country community is gaining superiority, and with it the "special interest groups." Again, we notice the decline of primary relations and primary group controls and the ensuing need for institutionalized controls

Turning now to the phenomenon of urbanization, we should distinguish the two aspects of demographic change and of changes in the quality of the social structure of urban communities Demographically, urbanization in the South means not only an increase in the proportion of urban population, but more specifically an increase of rural-nonfarm population around towns and cities and also an increase of farm population in areas adjacent to such communities [18] The war had caused a dramatic but temporary concentration of people in a few larger urban centers For the coming years we predict a piling up of rural surplus population in villages, towns, and small cities [19]

"Connected with urban growth we find in some communities interesting ecological changes Towns which were originally oriented towards rivers and railroads are undergoing reorientation towards overland highways and are thus undergoing quite radical dislocations and readjustments in their ecology"

In the sociological interpretation of urbanization we should make a conceptual distinction between small town and big city The former is more of a "Community," the latter shows all the characteristics of the great "Society." [20]

Southern urban communities, with few exceptions, corresponded until recently more to the former than to the latter type Much of the charm of southern life was due to this fact We are speaking not only of those towns in plantation areas where a declining oligarchy of old families strives to retain status by social exclusiveness, but of the great majority of southern towns

[17] R Heberle, "Discussion" of B Ryan, "The Neighborhood as a Unit of Action in Rural Programs," *Rural Sociology* (March 1944).

[18] See for example, T Lynn Smith and Homer L Hitt, "Population Redistribution in Louisiana," *Social Forces,* 20 (May 1942), pp 437–44

[19] R Heberle, *The Impact of the War on Population Redistribution in the South* (Nashville, Tennessee Vanderbilt University Press, 1945)

[20] We adopt here Tonnies' distinction between "Stadt" and "Grosstadt"

where the people on Main Street still know each other personally from school, church, or lodge, and where the proverbial cousins are still plentiful.

Today we observe how the social structure of such towns is changing partly because of sheer influx of population, much of which comes from more distant parts of the country than in the past. We notice how special interest groups and such new contact-providing groups as country clubs, dancing clubs, newcomers clubs, and industrial USO's take the place of older informal groupings Furthermore, the rather well-paid managerial and professional personnel which comes to such cities with the establishment of industrial plants by large absentee corporations, tends to dislodge the old families of local merchants and manufacturers from their dominant status.[21] Similar changes occur where the old wealth acquired in the cotton trade and in the lumber industry is giving way to the new wealth of the old men.

From below, the position of the old and new ruling strata is threatened by the ascent to political power of the "small" people· the family farmers, the tenants here and there, and the industrial workers. The former are still largely an amorphous mass, easily rallied around quasi-charismatic leaders or demagogues, as their antagonists call them, the latter have their unions which give them clearer direction and presumably a more rational and responsible leadership

The quintessence of these changes in social stratification seems to be the evolution of a more clear-cut class society and the disappearance of the last traces of that status-group[22] stratification which, although never fully developed, had been characteristic of the ante-bellum South. The two extremes of status-giving conditions — descent from the old planter oligarchy and descent from the slaves with their corresponding differences in honor and all other attributes of "status" — are slowly losing their former significance. It may be suggested in parenthesis that the social type of the poor white may also be on the way to extinction But it should be noted that the Negro caste is not dissolving, while the upper and lower white status groups are losing their status character.

At the same time we observe in the cities a widening of the distances between classes Not the categorical distances, which may be very great even in rural society, but the personal social distances are growing The mitigating effects of frequent contacts and more intimate acquaintance, of neighborly and friendly associations between individuals belonging to different social strata, so typical of the small town, are restrained and reduced by the mere growth of the urban community and by the ecological segregation which usually goes with such growth

The structure of southern society is in many respects less mature than that of the more industrialized regions. Consequently, the "social awareness" of southern people in all classes tends to be couched in ideas and stereotypes which appear

[21] The same fact has recently been observed in other parts of the country by C Wright Mills "Small business and civic welfare," Report of Smaller Warplants Corporation to Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business Senate (Prepared by C Wright Mills and Melville J. Ulmer) Washington, D. C, S. doc. 135, 1946

[22] The term "Status Group" is used in the sense of the German "Stand" or the English "estate" See Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* I, Ch III, and also Hans Gerth and C Wright Mills, from Max Weber, 1946 The American language, developed in a society where status groups did not exist and even the existence of social classes tends to be denied, does not provide adequate popular terms to denote the two actually distinct phenomena of "Stand" and "Klasse", in such situations a new term has to be invented or a specific meaning assigned to an existing word

somewhat out-dated in comparison to those current in the more advanced regions. Employers tend to be more conservative, workers less class conscious, middle-class women more late Victorian than in other regions Or, the values of the Southerner are not yet those of a highly developed capitalistic society This may be said without romanticizing the love of leisure and related traits often praised by southern intellectuals Changes in the economic and social structure, if they should come suddenly, are likely to involve conflicts. Whether these will be violent, depends on what may be called the state of "social preparedness"

The South has long been known as a region where certain types of social conflicts and violations of social codes were settled by direct action or extra-legal action rather than in court The duel, the lynching, the violence in labor conflicts resorted to by both parties, the settling of disputes between croppers by authority of the planter, are some of the more spectacular instances But there is on the other side also the reliance on oral agreements, on custom, on personal confidence in landlord-tenant relations, also in other labor relations, and in many minor business transactions

Changing social relationships, increasing heterogeneity and mobility of population, citification of urban communities, and the changing composition of certain social classes make reliance on such practices more and more impractical Where spontaneous understanding and concord on the basis of common values and universally accepted custom cannot any longer be expected, formal contracts, statutes and regulations, and institutionalized procedures of enforcement will be needed At the same time practices of extra-legal self-help, having become superfluous and unjustified, will eventually be suppressed by State and Federal authorities This would be only a belated instance of the monopolization, by the modern state, of social control functions formerly resting with local communities, kinship groups and other primary groups.

These developments, it may be finally suggested, create a demand for more competent political leadership, for more and better trained administrative experts Like other rural societies, the South has been relying in these fields largely on locally prominent people, who were not necessarily trained for their tasks, but had common sense and a certain amount of experience in related activities

As conditions become more complex and more dynamic, more adequate personnel will be required on all levels, from the State government down to the rural deputy sheriff While this trend raises serious problems for the future of democracy there seems to be no other choice, and the problem is not peculiar to the South, it is merely indicative of the South's "coming-of age." [23]

[23] For the benefit of such critics as might object to the use of this metaphoric term because it has a connotation of progress, I would like to point out that some people do not like the idea of "growing up" at all

TECHNIQUES OF SOCIAL REFORM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROHIBITION DRIVE *

Alfred McClung Lee

The waves of Prohibitionist and anti Prohibitionist agitation that have swept the United States during the past century and more furnish significant case materials on aspects of cultural change, cultural lag, and social control These materials are illuminating, in my estimation, in connection with such general subjects as these (1) the nature of reformist movements, in their societal, social psychological, and psychological aspects, (2) the relationships between moralistic emotional and scientific opinions in Dry and Wet propagandas and strategies, and (3) the probable consequences of educational and legalistic efforts at social change, such as the Drys and the Wets have promoted, in terms of anticipated and unanticipated goals and consequences

Within the necessary limits of a paper, it is hoped to touch upon some conclusions reached along such lines during a detailed survey of Dry and Wet agitational work, with especial reference to the new prohibition drive [1] Naturally only samples and brief summaries of data may be given here, but it is hoped that the quotations and summaries capture and transmit pertinent characteristics of the originals Care is taken in footnotes to refer the reader to both objective and partisan documents and summaries

For the sake of brevity, this paper sketches and seeks to analyze these factors bearing upon the new prohibition drive (1) major strategies, (2) the drives for the Eighteenth and the Twenty First Amendments compared with the present prohibition drive, (3) the groups involved in the present struggle, an anatomy of agitation, (4) their philosophies, and (5) their tactics Adequate treatments of the historical perspectives into which the present drive should be fitted, of the characteristics of the specific pressure groups involved in the struggle, of the propaganda theories and techniques used by these groups and of other pertinent matters cannot be treated within the limits of an article, but it is thought that the discussion of the aspects chosen permits certain generalizations concerning techniques of so

[1] The materials upon which this study is based include extensive newspaper and magazine clipping files, volumes of the back numbers of Dry and Wet publications, and pamphlet and book collections as well as first hand observation by the author of the work of Dry and Wet organizations, especially in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Kansas Particularly useful objective studies of the general field are John Allen Krout *The Origin of Prohibition* (New York Alfred A Knopf 1925) Peter H Odegard *Pressure Politics The Story of the Anti Saloon League* (New York Columbia University Press 1928) Clark Wishburton Prohibition *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* XII (1934) pp 499–510 Dayton I Heckman *Prohibition Passes The Story of the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment* (MS Ph D Dissertation Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939) and Frederick W Adrian, *The Political Significance of the Prohibition Party* (MS Ph D Dissertation Columbus, Ohio State University, 1942) A mine of Dry material is the partisan *Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem* (Westerville, Ohio American Issue Publishing Co 1925–30) 6 vols

* *American Sociological Review*, February, 1944 pp 65–77 Reprinted by permission of the author

cial agitation that might be suggestive in the study of other pressure programs

1 *Major Strategies.* Dr Purley A Baker, General Superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League of America at the time, outlined the whole sequence of steps in Dry major strategy at the League's Victory Convention in Washington in 1919 as follows

"When we had township option we could do little with wet townships about us
When we had municipal local option we could do little with wet cities about us
When we had county option we could do but little with wet counties around us
When we had state option we could do little with wet states around us
And now, what does it mean to have wet countries around us with the system of transportation now in the world?
For a hundred miles down in Texas and Louisiana and all those border states rum would rule in pandemonium as it comes across the border
Mexico must be cared for South America must be cared for The nations of the earth must be helped."

This outline of the steps in Dry strategy naturally oversimplifies the whole program It leaves out of consideration the rôle of the manufacture of bootleg liquor and many of the consequences of the greater ease with which "high-powered rot-gut" can be transported secretly than the more bulky wines and beers But it gives the steps taken in the thinking and action of the Drys as they drove on for the Eighteenth Amendment in the years before 1919 and also since repeal as they have begun to seek the restoration of nationwide prohibition

The major strategy of the anti-prohibitionist forces is not so programatic It consisted before 1919 and it still consists chiefly of fighting the efforts of the Drys to extend the prohibition areas and the scope of restrictive legislation, of precipitating efforts to repeal local-option prohibition laws and ordinances, and of generally discrediting prohibition as a technique for the promotion of temperance or abstinence

In the light of such high strategies by the protagonists in the struggles, let us attempt to sum up the influence of ten major factors in bringing success first to the Drys, then to the Wets, and to examine the operation of these ten factors today in the new prohibition drive

2 *The Drives for the Eighteenth (Prohibition) and Twenty-First (Repeal) Amendments Compared with the Present Prohibition Drive.* Here are ten factors that apparently contributed powerfully to the success of Dry strategy in the drive culminating in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, January 16, 1919 [3]

a *Drink and religion are competitors* As William James[4] has pointed out, the "sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour . The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness, and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that larger whole" In other words, religious mysticism and alcoholic mysticism can only be understood psychologically as phases of mystical experiences

[3] For more detail, see especially John Allen Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1925), and Peter H Odegard, *Pressure Politics The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928) For a partisan (Dry) treatment, see Ernest H Cherrington, *The Evolution of Prohibition in the United States A Chronology* (Westerville, Ohio, American Issue Press, 1920)

[4] *The Varieties of Religious Experience A Study in Human Nature* (New York, Longman Green and Co, 1902), p 387

generally. Thus, as Clark Washburton[5] points out, "liquor dealers, religious organizations and the moving picture exhibitors are natural competitors for patronage." And it has taken a long time for all three to come to some recognition of this competitive situation and for some workable adjustments between them to appear The first adjustment attempted by the ministers was to eliminate what they regarded as an unnecessary and vile competitor to their search for souls to convert to Christianity, with the Saloon representing most directly the Devil.

b. *The farmers and villagers wanted to maintain the influence of their ideals over the country.* The first prohibition drive was also a part of an attempt by rural and village people to regain something of their waning influence in the United States and to impose their way of life upon urban dwellers. What seems to objective observers to have been a quixotic waste of Protestant reforming energy upon the subduing of a windmill, looked to the country folk as a way of preventing American cities — to which their children were being drawn — from going the course of Sodom and Gomorrah and taking the whole country with them.

c. *Evangelical Protestants raised the cry of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion"* With the Roman Catholics not showing in general any enthusiasm for prohibition and with many Irish and other Roman Catholics identified with the Saloon, the evangelical Protestants turned to the old nativist appeal with the cry of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" and its equivalents, especially in the extremely rural and Protestant districts. The fact that the Protestant Episcopalians also did not show any enthusiasm for prohibition was discounted on the grounds that they are "tissue-paper Catholics" and tend to identify themselves with the Anglican Catholics of the Church of England The anti-Roman-Catholic enthusiasm of the old Protestant nativist movements that went into the Ku Klux Klan during the period immediately following World War I was thus canalized into the prohibition movement before and during that war.[6]

d. *Prohibition gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers* Every sizable community contained at least one "bad saloon" that came to typify in the minds of the citizenry the evils of the Saloon System and the Whiskey Trust As William Allen White wrote in the Chicago *Tribune* of March 10, 1908, "It is not a prohibition wave but an anti-saloon wave, a protest against the product of the liquor business as it has developed in this country" And Peter H. Odegard[7] points out, "Moderate drinkers and total abstainers, who balked at the idea of absolute prohibition, were willing to admit that the American saloon had become a noisome thing." In other words, there is general agreement that a large share of the vote against Liquor in the first prohibition drive was a vote against the excesses and political power of specific "poor men's clubs," certain especially obnoxious saloons.

e *Business interests looked upon drinking as bad for their employees* Drinking employees, they thought, were both inefficient and dangerous They looked upon them as improper workers in a machine civilization and also as probable agitators and strikers Representatives of management believed before 1919 that saloons in working-class districts were hotbeds of

[5] "Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (1934), pp 499–510, p 504, quoted

[6] Noel P Gist, *Secret Societies A Cultural Study of Fraternalism in the United States* (Columbia, University of Missouri, 1940), esp chap 4, J. M Mecklin, *The Ku Klux Klan* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1924)

[7] *Pressure Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928), p 38

agitation for shorter hours, improved conditions, and higher wages They therefore believed that prohibition would help to "civilize" their employees Representatives of other business interests, such as the vendors of non-alcoholic beverages, also looked upon prohibition as a means of diverting funds from Liquor to "more useful" outlets. And so did some who were interested in savings, home-construction, food, automobiles, etc

f *Prohibition appealed to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro "in his place."* This was especially true in the urban districts where Negroes had a tendency to "get ideas" and to "get out of hand" As Clark Washburton [8] notes, "In the first prohibition wave, when the Negroes were under the complete domination of plantation owners, and in the second, when they still resided chiefly in the rural areas and the domination of white landlords was almost as complete as under slavery, the south was virtually untouched by the movement But with the migration of the Negroes to urban areas, drunkenness and crime associated therewith became serious Negro problems The third wave of state wide prohibition began in the south and by 1917 the entire section was legally dry Throughout the south state laws and national prohibition have been enforced more stringently among the Negroes than among the white population" Suppressed and frustrated Negroes, members of a submerged caste, with some release given to them through drink, sometimes threatened to forget to "stay in their place," and the whites handled the situation in the same fashion as they had handled the problem of Negro voting with laws that applied to Negroes, not to whites.

g *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogs found in the Dry drive an attractive and profitable outlet for their talents,* especially under the auspices of the W C T U and the Anti-Saloon League They therefore flocked to it and gave it power and direction.

h. *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns found that the Drys offered a more attractive issue than did those who stressed issues more fundamental to the control of our economic and political institutions* The "era of the muckrakers" of about 1901 to 1912, so labeled by Theodore Roosevelt, struck many business leaders in particular as having an unsettling tendency The Prohibitionists merely attacked Booze, the Saloon, the Whiskey Trust, and the Brewers, but Lincoln Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker, Upton Sinclair, and others went after the political bosses, the public utilities, patent medicines, advertising, and even capitalism itself Let the reformers have Booze and the Saloon! Let that keep them busy!"

i *The identification of beer with German immigrants to this country and of those immigrants with pro-Germanism in World War I reacted to the discredit of Booze and the Saloon* Many breweries were owned by Americans of German birth or ancestry, and the group was represented in part by the National German-American Alliance, which carried on propaganda against prohibition As a result, Congressional investigations [10] (then as now a prime way to provide a sounding board for propaganda) firmly identified in the minds of many the breweries with the enemy, by derivation all Liquor

[8] "Prohibition," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* XII (1934), pp 499–510, p 504 quoted

[9] C C Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1932)

[10] See, for example, U S Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German and Bolshevist Propaganda* (65th Congress, 2nd Session, pursuant to Senate Resolutions 307 and 439, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919), 3 vols

with pro-Teutonic influences.

j. *Liquor became a wartime sacrifice* In World War I, as in World War II, Americans deprived themselves of many things to defeat "the Kaiser" in a great upsurge of courageous and puritanical self-sacrifice, and Liquor was one of these sacrifices As Harry Elmer Barnes[11] has it, "Prohibition was sneaked over under the cover of the prevalent hysterical tendency of the people of the United States to save and sacrifice to defeat the Kaiser Prohibition was part and parcel of war idealism, as much as the freeing of repressed peoples, the sanctity of treaties, the battle for democracy, and the like"

And so wartime Prohibition came, and then as Prohibitionist Irving Fisher[12] of Yale University admitted in 1926, Constitutional "National Prohibition came prematurely, before a proper try-out of War time Prohibition had sufficiently prepared the population of the large cities for Constitutional Prohibition" A more objective student of the subject, John Allen Krout,[13] observes that Federal Prohibition through the Eighteenth Amendment came to many Americans in 1920 "with something of a shock Though they were aware of the political power possessed by the enemies of the liquor traffic, they had not realized that the reformers were so near the goal" Naturally the super pressure tactics of the Anti Saloon League, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, *et al* had much to do with the surprise factor in this victory, the immediate growth of anti prohibition agitation

Let us review now the operation of these same ten factors in the counter drive for the Twenty-first Amendment. Here is a summary[14]

a *Drink and religion are competitors* They continued to be competitors, but ministers and especially laymen were learning that the age old problems of Liquor cannot be solved by outright and immediate suppression In a democracy, laws resemble rather closely the mores or they do not "work," and the mores are patterns of behavior and not of idealization

b *The farmers and villagers wanted to maintain the influence of their ideals over the country* During World War I, the world of our villagers and farmers had expanded, and the automobile and radio made it expand even more during the 1920's and early 1930's What had been thought of as the "urban type of mind" became less bound by geography, more a psychological factor that might and did appear throughout the country

c *"Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion"* The Ku Klux Klan reached a peak possibly in 1924 with what may have been as many as 6,000,000 members[15] It had a resurgence in the 1928 campaign to "Keep the Pope Out of the White House," the contest between Alfred E Smith and Herbert Hoover (in which Hoover won) But such organizations as the National Conference of Christians and Jews, formed in 1928, were pointing the way toward more sensible relations between our religious and cultural minorities, emphasizing among other things that we all belong to minorities. Organized

[11] *Prohibition Versus Civilization Analyzing the Dry Psychosis* (New York Viking Press, 1932), pp. 122–23

[12] *Prohibition at Its Worst* (New York Macmillan Company, 1926), p 83

[13] *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), p no not given (Foreword)

[14] See especially D E Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS Ph D Dissertation Columbus, Ohio State University 1939), and Clark Washburton Prohibition' *Encyclopedia of the Social Science* XII (1934), pp 499–510

[15] M S Handman, 'Ku Klux Klan," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* VII (1932), pp 607–09, especially p 608 See also Frank Bohn "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted' *American Journal of Sociology,* XXX (1925), pp 385–407

Protestantism as a whole had set its course strongly against intolerant movements that capitalized upon such differences, and the wave of new ecstatic Protestant groups that began to blossom in World War II had not gained much prominence as yet.

d. *Prohibition had gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers.* But the Liquor Gangster, the Beer Baron, and the Speakeasy Mobster now loomed as more horrible persons to dread than the dimming vision of the old-time Saloon Keeper and the Whiskey Trust On the sound propaganda theory that people would vote against a specific menace under their noses but not necessarily against a vague "system," the Wets did exactly what the Drys had done in the previous drive they dramatized the excesses and political power of specific speakeasy operators.

e *Business interests had looked upon drinking as bad for their employees* Now business representatives had come to at least four conclusions, or their actions and statements suggested that they suspected these conclusions

(1) that their workers could organize effective unions and strikes without a saloon to help them,

(2) that so-called "private prohibition" enforced upon the employees of a given industry for reasons of efficiency and safety worked as well or better than National Prohibition and the need for such prohibition was not eliminated by National Prohibition,

(3) that the allegation that Prohibition would make workers a better market for consumers' goods did not appear to be as substantial an argument in Depression as were the more direct contributions Repeal promised to make to the offsetting of technological unemployment and to aiding with the mounting tax burden, and

(4) that bootlegging subsidized a power outside of the business community with which it was quite difficult to deal on satisfactory terms

f. *Prohibition appealed to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro "in his place."* And it still worked that way, especially in the cities. But the southerners preferred to have a Democrat for President, even with Repeal as the cost, and they knew that they would find "ways and means" to keep "the niggers in their place," as they put it

g *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogs* found themselves up against new competition for adherents and subsidies The decay of fundamentalist religious beliefs, the rise of the motion picture as a substitute for the sawdust trail, the development of national personalities through the radio as personal leaders for greater masses of people, all these things undermined the followings of the old-time gospel performers who did so much to stir up popular support for the Eighteenth Amendment drive The modern counterparts of the old-time religious demagogs, too, such as Father Charles E Coughlin of Royal Oak, Michigan, built up some followings, but they failed as yet to "deliver the vote"

h *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns* continued to believe that the Drys offered an attractive issue with which to distract attention from issues more fundamental to the control of our economic and political institutions, but to keep prohibition alive as such an issue, repeal also had to be an issue and a live one Prohibition as an accepted and accomplished goal, if such could have been possible, would have eliminated a valuable issue entirely

i *The identification of brewers with pro-Germanism* disappeared as a matter of any significance in the general postwar revulsion against what had become

known, with sarcasm, as the "Crusade to Make the World Safe for Democracy." With *Fortune Magazine* and Congressional committees [16] branding wars as the products of the munitions makers, with the American Legion and other patriotic bodies attempting to take the "profits out of war," [17] pro-Germanism temporarily ceased to serve as a term of rebuke

j. Liquor as a wartime sacrifice naturally was also a thing of the past World War I was long ago. Few dreamt in those days of the possibility of World War II.

In the early years of the depression, economists were making estimates that repeal would yield revenues of $2,500,000,000 to $3,000,000,000 a year, by analogy with the British tax rate and excise system and barring a return of the saloon. These figures looked inviting to many As Barnes [18] put it in 1932, "The one possible source of pressure which may achieve repeal or revision of Prohibition lies in the current depression This, together with the deficit in the federal budget, may suffice to offset the Dry Lobby and give legislators courage to vote as they think and drink." Fletcher Dobyns had a slightly different emphasis, and he explained it seven years after repeal in his book, *The Amazing Story of Repeal* (1940). This lawyer attributed repeal to the machinations of a small group of wealthy men who believed that liquor taxes would relieve them of part of their tax loads In their enthusiasm over Dobyns's analysis, the Drys chose to forget that it was a Dry, James A. White of Ohio, who invented the slogan, "No money is tainted if the Anti-Saloon League can get its hands on it," a principle that had been very useful in financing Prohibitionists in their drive for the Eighteenth Amendment.

That both National Prohibition and Repeal should have come because people with personal axes to grind interested themselves in these projects is no surprise to a social scientist. A careful student of the subject [19] estimates that "the Eighteenth Amendment, which Wayne B Wheeler once estimated cost sixty-five million dollars to secure, was repealed at a cost of but twenty million dollars" If such pressure tactics had *not* taken place, the social scientist would have cause for surprise Motive power for such dynamic promotion must come from somewhere.

So much for a summary of the operation of the ten factors during the drives for the Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments Let us examine their status in the present drive for the extension of prohibition. [20]

a *Drink and religion are competitors* But organized religion is giving more and more evidence, particularly through pronouncements of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and and of certain denominational spokesmen, that approaches to the liquor problem other than immediate prohibition grow in favor. Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, is a co-operative movement of alcoholics who seek to aid themselves with the help of "a Power greater than ourselves." It has gained wide institutional support (Roman Catholic, Protestant,

[16] As reported for example in U S Senate, *Hearings Before the Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry* (73rd Congress, 3rd Session, Pursuant to Senate Resolution No 206, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1934)

[17] For a retrospect on this agitation, see D C Blaisdell and Jane Greverus, *Economic Power and Political Pressures* (T N E C. Monograph No 26, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), pp 170–3.

[18] H E Barnes, *Prohibition Versus Civilization* (New York Viking Press, 1932), p 121

[19] D E Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS Ph D. Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939), p. 381

[20] Some of these factors are surveyed by Dwight Anderson, "Alcohol and Public Opinion," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (December 1942), pp 376–92

Jewish, and other). It points to one of several different religious approaches to alcoholism and the alcohol problem.[21] The members of Alcoholics Anonymous, incidentally, even though they are seeking to be total abstainers, are as a whole bitterly resentful of the Prohibitionists. As Jack Alexander states in *The Saturday Evening Post* of March 1, 1941, "I met and talked with scores of A A's, as they call themselves, and found them to be unusually calm, tolerant people."

b. *The farmers and villagers* still numbered many who wanted to restore the influence of their ideals over the country. Through the demands of Army, Navy, and factory employment in World War II, however, they continued to become more the members of an urbanized country and less the exponents of a narrow morality that they wished to enforce upon their fellow countrymen.

c. *"Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion"* or perhaps some tie-up between Prohibitionism and Jew-baiting or Negro-beating may become a factor again in the promotion of prohibition. Such comments as the following from *Progress Publication of the International Reform Federation*[22] in 1943 are not unusual.

"The wets are waking up to the power of protest and are sending in petitions against the Bryson Bill evidently obtained in the saloons from the character of the foreign names attached as well as the sender."

The "character of the foreign names" is a native-American catch-phrase. But such excesses, such divisive tendencies, have had a "lid clamped on them" during World War II. They represent, however, a real danger for the postwar period not only to those fearful of prohibition and its consequences but also to those who dread authoritarianism born of such hysterical scapegoat-beatings. Such events as the Detroit race riots of the week of June 20, 1943,[23] and other racial clashes and frictions may issue forth in a new nativist movement after World War II, similar to the Ku Klux Klan after World War I. Demagogs are now available — Father Charles E. Coughlin, Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith, and Rev. J. Frank Norris, all of the Detroit area, for examples. But then demagogs always arise when the opportunities for their work are present. They can smell societal decay afar, and they swarm to it.

d. *Prohibition had gained greatly from votes against the excesses and political power of specific saloon keepers.* Repeal had also gained greatly from votes against the excesses and power of similar speakeasy operators. Until the distillers and brewers so far forget this point as to think that America has come to like the saloon whether or no, so long as the distillers and brewers put up a reasonably accurate and convincing facsimile of self-regulation, they will keep this irritant within manageable limits.[24]

e. *Business interests* on the whole, as the preceding list (e) indicates, have

[21] *Alcoholics Anonymous* (New York, Works Publishing, Inc., 1937). Jack Alexander, "Alcoholics Anonymous Freed Slaves of Drink, Now They Free Others," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 1, 1941. *A A* (New York, Alcoholic Foundation, August 1943, pamphlet). For other religious approaches, see Otis R. Rice, 'Religion and the Church in Relation to Alcohol Addiction I, Religious Resources in the Treatment of Alcohol Addiction," and Seward Hiltner, "Religion and the Church in Relation to Alcohol Addiction II. Aspects Other Than Therapeutic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (December 1942), pp. 393–408.

[22] XLIII 9 (October 1943), p. 9.

[23] A. M. Lee and N. D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York, Dryden Press, 1943).

[24] C. W. Badenhausen, "The Brewing Industry's Program of Action," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, IV (1940), pp. 657–63. Brewing Industry Foundation, *Self-Regulation in Wartime 1942*.

learned their lesson so far as prohibition is concerned in connection with their employees.

f. *Prohibition still appeals to southerners as a way of keeping the Negro — especially in the cities — "in his place."* With race riots and other evidences of friction flaring in northern cities the rôle that anti-Negro feeling may play in future Dry agitation — as point (c) above brings out — is uncertain and menacing.

g. *Professional evangelists, reformers, and other demagogs* are likely to find "softer pickings" in movements more strictly economic and political in character than were the old time Dry revival meetings, the tremendous money raising orgies of the Anti Saloon League and its affiliates and competitors, and the W C T U.

h *Large contributors to political movements and campaigns* may once more find prohibition an enticing political issue, but to be workable such an issue would probably have to come riding back in as a part of the ideology for an authoritarian drive, the kind of abstinence Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party advocated for the "Master Race"

i. *The identification of brewers with pro-Germanism* did not materialize again during World War II. On the contrary, the inept leadership of the Drys permitted the Prohibitionist lobby to get itself identified with an obviously labeled pro fascist, "Capt" Edward Page Gaston, United States Director of the World Prohibition Foundation and organizer of the New Vigilantes of America in 1932 and of its successor, the Patriotic Guard of America.[25] Pro-Germans also seized upon such foolish and unpatriotic Dry canards as the Pearl-Harbor-drunkenness story[26] and used them for subversive purposes. This embarrassed many a sincerely convinced Prohibitionist who was also a patriotic American.

j *Liquor as a wartime sacrifice* is one of the factors that most nearly approximates its World War I characteristics If it were not for the bitter experiences of National Prohibition[27] and if it were not for the sizable and vocal anti Prohibitionist sympathies of the Army and Navy, more progress might have been made towards wartime prohibition As the war goes on, however, indications increase that liquor, wine, and possibly also beer will dry up more and more, and then what? Wartime expedients have a way of staying on and on

These comparative analyses of the Eighteenth, Twenty First, and present drives in the light of ten major factors emphasize the rôles of life conditions and events in the success of agitations for changes in law and custom This material also furnishes background for the other three points to be discussed, beginning with what was referred to above as "an anatomy of agitation"

3 *The Groups Involved in the Present Prohibition Struggle* The most obvious differentiation between the Dry and Wet movements in the present Prohibition struggle is that the Drys, like so many reformist groups, are led by people who are motivated by a kind of fanaticism; the Wets, like so many conservative groups, are led by professionals who are motivated less by burning zeal and more by finite considerations Since both movements have some social types in common, it will be

[25] New York *Post* January 13, 1942

[26] Apparently first given wide circulation by "Capt" Edward Page Gaston, beginning with a sermon he delivered early in January 1942 in Washington's New York Avenue Presbyterian Church. Later given greater impetus by George Burton Cutten, President of Colgate University *after* the canard had been officially disproved by a Presidential Committee headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J Roberts

[27] See for examples Frederick L Collins, "Prohibition — Will It Happen Again?" *Liberty*, June 27, 1942, "Creeping Prohibition, *Time* November 15, 1943

useful to characterize first the types to be found in the more complex one, the Dry movement, and then to identify those also found among the Wets.

In such an attempt to sum up observations on the "sorts of people" active in the Dry movement, it is helpful at the outset to discuss what is meant by fanaticism, defined briefly as a "frenzied partisanship or blind zeal in any cause, whether religious, social or political"[28] Fanaticism has been further described in "its authentic occurrence" as "the effect of three passional components," as follows: (1) "extreme narrowness and rigidity of temper," (2) "unyielding determination to make the fixed idea triumph over men," and (3) "callousness to pain uncommonly insensitive to human suffering, often to the point of cruelty"[29] In short, as Isaac Taylor puts it in his old book on *Fanaticism* (1834), it is "Enthusiasm inflamed by Hatred"

It is not contended that all Drys are out and out fanatics, specimens of the "authentic occurrence" of fanaticism The contention is that fanaticism is a variable part of the make up of Drys, as it is of the mentalities of those dedicated to other Causes of the sort anti tobacco, anti swearing, Sunday observance, anti card playing Rather extreme fanaticism can be illustrated with Frances E Willard, long-time leader of the National W C T U, who tells in her *Glimpses of Fifty Years* how she decided to side up with the Prohibition Party, as follows:

"It was a solemn and exalted hour in which my brain teemed with the sweet reasonableness of such a course, and my conscience rejoiced in its triumph over considerations of expediency. Nothing has ever disturbed the tranquil assurance that I was then helped to make a logical and wise decision inspired from Heaven."

Without dealing further in specific personalities, one can summarize observations on the kinds of personalities drawn into their movement by the Drys by saying that they attract (1) agitators, (2) professional promoters, (3) bureaucrats, (4) "heelers," (5) "just members," (6) "fronts," and (7) "fellow travelers" These are not mutually exclusive categories They are rough types Some agitators are somewhat professional in their grasp of promotional techniques Some professional promoters exhibit a degree of fanaticism beyond that expected and sometimes beyond that desirable in such a technician Bureaucrats constitute a special class of "heelers," one might say, and the lines between "heelers" and "just members" and between "just members" and "fellow travelers" have no distinctness As the term suggests, "fronts" are "fellow travelers" who are sufficiently prominent and unlabeled to give a function broader respectability In addition, the basis of motivation of a given person may change as time goes on, the agitator may work out a new basis of adjustment for his personality problems and thus develop into a professional promoter and then, as more time passes, he may ripen or disintegrate (as you view it) into a bureaucrat Others are bureaucrats from the outset, and still others may go through transitional stages from agitator to "fellow traveler"

The agitators, the real fanatics, both paid and volunteer, furnish the emotional drive, the unflinching zeal, the really dogmatic and uncompromising fanaticism that serves as the spearhead of drives and programs Professional promoters differ from agitators chiefly in being motivated primarily by "professional" (monetary,

[28] M C Otto "Fanaticism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VI (1931), pp 90–2, p 90 quoted

[29] *Ibid*

service, artistic, security-giving, status) considerations rather than by The Cause (a fanatical drive to attain a "necessary" goal). Professional promoters have the talents of public speakers, publicity agents, writers, lobbyists, as do agitators, but the professional promoters also include among them experts in the broader field of public relations, a perspective on society that requires somewhat more objectivity and technical competence than an agitator is likely to accumulate As a matter of fact, truly professional promoters contribute most importantly an objectivity unmixed with emotionalism that helps to stabilize and direct a movement [80]

Trailing behind the agitators and professional promoters in any movement come those of small talents and narrow aspirations, the bureaucrats, those who see opportunities for jobs as such and little more, the people who know the arts of memo-passing, protective-coloration, and self-preservation and who care for little else than the comparative security thus provided.

The "heelers" and "just members" of any movement are the great rank-and-file, those who for many reasons need the kinds of psychological and social satisfactions a pressure group or Cause organization can offer them "Heelers" are the more or less faithful foot soldiers of the army; "just members" are the casual contributors, the members of the audiences, the people who "think it's a good thing" and "want to be identified with it" Prohibition and the Anti-Saloon League or W C.T U. give the heelers focal points to which they orient themselves and through which they can get a greater feeling of security in an unsatisfactory, vaguely shifting world For that matter, both agitators and heelers get something of the same satisfactions out of the Prohibition movement that others get out of other forms of religious mysticism or out of alcoholic beverages.

Through visits from traveling leaders and experts on The Cause and through the publications of city, state, and national Dry organizations, their principal media of communication, the propaganda "line" is not only kept constantly before the rank-and-file of the movement, but the "line" is kept fresh in its applications, through constantly relating Dry philosophy to new situations and personalities as they arise The circulation of *The National Prohibitionist,* the National W C T U *Union Signal,* and the like is not impressive, but the various types of Dry organization members absorb their contents and pass the propaganda along to the much larger body of "fellow travelers" The way in which Dry propaganda filters, for example, into the elementary and secondary school textbooks of the country has been surveyed by Anne Roe, and this penetration has been tremendous [81]

The Wets number in their movement chiefly (1) professional promoters, (2) bureaucrats, (3) "just members," (4) "fronts," and (5) "fellow travelers" During the prohibition period, the Wets numbered some agitators and heelers, but the maintenance of the *status quo* in any field has little attraction for the fanatic and for those entranced by the romance of a Cause The Wets do not promise human salvation through the achievement of a clearly defined goal; their goals, as they see them, involve merely the promotion of a tolerant society, the provision of a pleasant diversion, the continuance of an ancient industry that pays excessive

[80] See A. M Lee, "Public Relations Counseling as Institutional Psychiatry," *Psychiatry,* VI (August 1943), pp 271–6

[81] "A Survey of Alcohol Education in Elementary and High Schools in the United States" (New Haven, *Quarterly Journal of Studies in Alcohol,* 1943)

taxes and provides many jobs

How do such social types, drawn into the two opposing camps, compete with each other for the support of the vast and indifferent majority? How do they hold their adherents, get new ones, and extend their grasp over the minds and actions of fellow travelers? Their philosophies, stressing the appeal of such philosophies to adherents, will help to develop this picture.

4 *Their Philosophies.* The play, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room,*[82] a propaganda piece that ranks with *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* may be said to epitomize the philosophy of Prohibitionists and the substance of their popular propaganda efforts even today In it, Liquor and The Saloon lead Frank Slade irrevocably from the ways of Decency to those of Murder and Damnation *There is no compromise, no effort* to see the good in the evil person's mind, the evil in the mind of the saint, the brotherhood under the skin of "all God's chillun"; all is Good or Evil The first sip of beer, even the first cigarette, can thus lead only to the criminal's dock, the gallows, and a forgotten grave

Dry philosophy succeeds — when it does — because of the hold that one or more powerful appeals in it can secure over the minds of old and new adherents. The following list outlines briefly seven of the chief of such appeals inherent in Dry philosophy

a It provides a religiously-sanctioned *Scapegoat* into which frustrations may be projected and upon which pent up aggressions may be vented

b It furnishes religiously-sanctioned *Child-Substitutes* into which Drys can project their idealizations, as compensations for their own inadequacies, which sometimes include the lack of children or of the "right kind" of children. In short, having exaggerated or frustrated needs for such satisfactions, the Drys can thus find a channel through which they can express those needs in the attempted management of others

c It caters to exaggerated needs for *Perfection,* the sort of thing the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes summed up in an essay on "Natural Law," published in his *Collected Legal Papers,* when he said, "It is not enough for the knight of romance that you agree that his lady is a very nice girl — if you do not admit that she is the best that God ever made or will make, you must fight" He calls this *demand for the superlative the factor that* drives some men to drink and points out "that this demand is at the bottom of the philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the jurist's search for criteria of universal validity which he collects under the head of natural law"

d It offers a formula for *Simplification,* a simple and all-explaining ideology, that orients Drys to the world's complexities

e It gives a pattern for *Regression.* Individuals frustrated by their daily contacts with unpleasant reality frequently feel a compulsion to go back in their imaginations and behavior to periods at which they fancy they were more content and especially more secure, usually at some period in their childhood Dry philosophy permits some to take that way of experiencing again some of the joys associated with a sternly disciplined home

f It supplies, more generally speaking, a way to flee from reality into its *Mysticism,* a flight from the woes of this wicked work-a-day world to a "finer plane of understanding" This mysticism is part of the sort of thing adherents en-

[82] First performed in New York City's National Theater August 23, 1858 W W Pratt, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room, a Drama, in Five Acts* (New York, Samuel French), founded on T S Arthur, *Ten Nights in a Bar-Room and What I Saw There* (New York A L Burt Co)

joy in secret societies.[33] It derives in the case of Dry philosophy from certain religious conceptions, theological theorizings, and psychological needs, and it has as one of its symptoms and characteristics a special language, somewhat different in meaning and detail from that defined in the ordinary dictionary.

g. It encourages, through common goals, mystical conceptions, and special language, the *Identification* of adherents with the movement and with one another in a manner that assures at least some of them of a higher degree of psychological security than they might otherwise find.[34]

As the brief descriptions of these seven psychological appeals indicate, they are not sharply separable conceptions but rather aspects of the whole appeal made by Dry ideology to old and new adherents. The mind cannot be categorized, and these seven appeals are labeled and described merely to indicate seven aspects of certain people's interrelated personalities which — to a greater or less degree — find in Dry philosophy the fulfillment of needs and other satisfactions.

From the foregoing analysis, those acquainted with the psychology of alcoholics[35] can appreciate the statement that the mystical appeals of alcohol and of Dry philosophy have much in common.[36] The devotees of alcohol also find in it elements that cater to their exaggerated needs for perfection, simplification, and identification.

The appeals of the philosophies of the Wet propagandists are more difficult to analyze because there is no one Wet philosophy, no finely wrought Wet ideology. The anti-prohibition position appeals for reasons ranging from a well-developed thirst for alcoholic beverages to a dread of the societal consequences of prohibition legislation and enforcement, from the psychotic or neurotic or merely emotional to the "normal" and logical. This lack of a well-worked-out set of rationalizations, aside from the intellectual ones provided by tolerant liberalism and the commercial one supplied by industrial apologists, reflects the conservative character of the Wet position and the rear-guard type of fight the Wets tend to carry on, a kind of combat common among conservative groups when not too hard pressed.

5. *Their Tactics.* The (1) major strategies, (2) events and climates of opinion, (3) groups involved, and (4) philosophies converge upon programs of implementation. And both the Wets and the Drys forward their efforts through the common tactics of (a) publicity, (b) political pressuring, and (c) "boring from within," to borrow another term from those used to describe left-wing political tactics. These means of promotion naturally overlap somewhat, but they provide rough headings under which to sum up very briefly this dynamic aspect of the subject.

a. *Publicity.* Lacking currently as sympathetic treatment in the general-circulation press as they would like to have, the Drys depend chiefly for publicity upon such media as their own periodicals, country and small-town weeklies, their own organizations, public speakers, special holidays, handbills, posters, etc. The Wets, chiefly represented by the manufacturers and distributors of liquors, wines, and beers and their trade associations, distrib-

[33] Noel P. Gist, *Secret Societies* (Columbia, University of Missouri, 1940), especially chaps. 7 and 8.

[34] In this digest of a much longer work, it is naturally not possible to illustrate these points here adequately for reasons of space.

[35] H. W. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Explored* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1942), especially chaps. 4, 5, and 7. *Alcoholics Anonymous* (New York, Works Publishing, Inc., 1937).

[36] J. P. Shalloo, "Some Cultural Factors in the Etiology of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, II (1941), pp. 464–78.

ute their messages through newspaper and magazine advertizing, radio, posters, and special devices placed in bars and liquor stores.

Despite the volume and persistence of the efforts of both Wets and Drys, however, the effectiveness of all such publicity projects depends upon the extent to which they can and do make plausible explanations of facts, experiences, needs, events, desires felt by their audiences When the "climate of sentiment" is unfavorable, the Drys or the Wets beat the winds, when a particularly irritating saloon or other sore-spot helps to change that "climate," the Drys make strides in a given area, when a Dry orator or organization is discredited, the Wets benefit

b *Political Pressuring* is the term commonly given to all the ways Americans have devised for forcing politicians to translate their glittering double-talk into behavior representative of special interests, the interests of the pressuring group[97] The partly accurate popular conception is that Booze and Bribery account for the bulk of such pressuring, but the Anti Saloon League demonstrated from its earliest days the virtues of bludgeoning representatives with petitions, letters, telegrams, and delegations External pressures brought to bear upon governmental functionaries from Washington to the smallest governmental unit, cleverly organized, plus "horse-trading" and the "right kind ' of contacts and friendships have tremendous power in "aiding legislators to decide what the people want and need."

c *Boring From Within* can include practically everything not grouped under the preceding No "simon pure" pressure group can obtain a very large audience in terms of its own membership As a purist sect, its demands upon its membership attract the fanatical minority and repel the tolerant or indifferent majority Similarly no commercial pressure group can hope to obtain a very large audience in one industry in terms of those directly connected with the business in question Both seek, therefore, to spread the "message" as widely as possible through "fellow travelers" and "neutral" publicity media, to achieve segments of their programs piecemeal through compromises and deals, and to establish as many "common fronts" as possible with other organizations, and these are the chief "boring from within" tactics And the public, parochial, and private school systems of the United States are always the first goals for any extensive boring efforts of the sort[98] As Frances F Willard liked to say, "We must go among the children with our temperance work Mighty weapons will be hurled against them when they emerge from the sheltering fortress of home — they ought not to go forth unarmed"

Anne Roe, in her *Survey of Alcohol Education in Elementary and High Schools in the United States* (1943), tells how the Drys effected the change, repeal, and reenactment of state laws dealing with alcohol education until now all the states have mandatory legislation in this area In the materials used recently, the "horror-

[97] In this connection, especially illuminating is D C Blaisdell and Jane Stevens, *Economic Power and Political Pressures* (T N E C Monograph No 26 Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), answered by John Scoville in *Fact and Fancy in the T N E C Monographs* (New York, National Association of Manufacturers, 1942) On the broader implications of this type of activity, see R A Brady, *Business as a System of Power* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943) The outstanding treatments of this subject in the Wet-Dry struggles are P H Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1928), and D E Heckman, *Prohibition Passes* (MS Ph D Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University, 1939)

[98] "Propaganda in the Schools" and "Propaganda Over the Schools," *Propaganda Analysis*, I 8 (May 1, 1939) and IV 4 (February 25, 1941) respectively

provoking illustrations of diseased livers, and many sweeping statements, have been discarded along with the purely moralistic orientation." In other words, Dr. Roe says that the public-school program is now alleged to be "'scientific, unemotional, pedagogical,' and great emphasis is laid on these descriptive terms But in spite of the recognition of the desirability of a scientific approach, the motivation remains essentially moralistic, as is apparent from a scanning of the newer publications." The Roman Catholic parochial schools, Dr. Roe concludes, identify "temperance" with "moderation," not "teetotalism," and she says it appears that their "general position [is] that alcohol is one of God's creations and is therefore not inherently evil, but can be abused" Dr Roe credits Miss Bertha Rachel Palmer's *Syllabus in Alcohol Education* (published by the National W C.T U., sixth edition 1941) with having great influence upon the courses of study throughout the country despite its distortions of scientific fact and other inaccuracies.

While the Wets do not have ecclesiastical machinery for sanctioning their "boring" tactics and can only offer non-emotional scientific and commercial arguments, they try to offset the activities of the Drys in "neutral" territories and to do what boring they can on their own behalf

Within the limits of this brief paper, the foregoing attempts to set forth a sketch of some of the things that may be learned from studying such a reform movement as that currently agitated by the Prohibitionists. Naturally this is only one case, even though comparative materials are brought to bear upon it from other cases, directly and by inference, and from more general studies Also space ha prevented adequate treatments of the historical perspectives into which the present drive should be fitted, of the characteristics of the specific pressure groups involved in the struggle, of the propaganda theories and techniques used by these groups, and of other pertinent matters.

Among other things, this type of social-psychological and historical synthesis and analysis has the merit of bringing the sociologist closer to what might be called clinical societal materials than more individualistic and more generalized (including many statistical) approaches Such a clinical approach, bringing one into contact with vibrant societal struggles and other processes, can perhaps eventually furnish significant data for useful societal guidance in such areas.

As to the relation of such positions as those of the Drys and Wets to coping with the roles of alcohol in modern society, one is immediately impressed by the fact that more energy is expended upon the promotion of pat propaganda theories than upon attempts to work out sensible and workable programs An outstanding student of social dynamics and of alcohol[39] has pointed out that "the public must understand its kinship with the problem drinker before it will be possible for many to accept his difficulties as their own" He believes that this adjustment could be effected through the reiteration of "these 4 kinetic ideas.

1. That the problem drinker is a sick man, exceptionally reactive to alcohol
2. That he can be helped.
3. That he is worth helping.
4. That the problem is therefore a responsibility of the healing professions, as well as of the established health authorities and the public generally"

The next step that might be taken in this thinking would be to the societal malad

[39] Dwight Anderson, "Alcohol and Public Opinion," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, III (1942), pp 376–92, pp 391–2 quoted

justments of which alcoholics and many other types of neurotics and psychotics are by-products and to an attempt to cope with these maladjustments In pursuing such lines of thought, however, one quickly leaves the Prohibitionist and the business-as-usual Wet far behind.

THE PATTERN OF A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL MOVEMENT *

Theodore Abel

"Is fascism possible in America?," "Does Communism have a chance?," "How can the movement for Birth-control Legislation be made more effective?"

In current discussions of national affairs we frequently encounter questions like these They demand predictions about social movements and ask for guidance in the execution of plans of change "Social Movements," being modes of collective or pluralistic behavior, fall in the province of sociology, and the sociologist ought to be equipped to furnish a reply to questions about them

However, prediction and guidance with regard to social movements, presuppose a generalized knowledge of the subject We have to know the common and distinct features of social movements, and the factors or conditions significant in determining their development We must be able to view a given situation, with its unique constellation of factors as the instance of a type, we must appraise it in terms of a general pattern, if we want to express any valid judgment about it For the type or pattern, when constructed on the basis of intensive studies of individual cases by the method of analytical induction [1] gives us the clues to what is relevant and significant It tells us what we have to look for in studying a particular situation, and in weighing it in relation to certain questions we may be asked about it.

In short, in order to make valid statements about a particular movement, an adequate *theory* of social movements is necessary

As yet we have no such theory In fact, only few attempts have been made at a typological analysis of social movements [2] They constitute a neglected field of sociological inquiry, and in most text books of sociology, or social psychology we look in vain for any reference to them

It is the aim of this paper to present a few preliminary considerations of a general nature about social movements Our remarks on the pattern of social movements shall be limited to a discussion of the significant factors that account for the

[1] For a discussion of the method of analytical induction, cf Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology* New York, 1934, chap vi

[2] Jerome Davis, *Contemporary Social Movements*, New York, 1930

* *American Sociological Review*, April, 1937, pp 347-52 The materials of this article have been incorporated in *Why Hitler Came into Power* by Theodore Abel, copyright 1938 by Prentice-Hall, Inc, and published by Prentice-Hall, Inc, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N Y.

persistence, growth, and successful termination of a political movement. The propositions set forth here are derived from an intensive study of the Hitler Movement in Germany, made by the author on the basis of six hundred life stories of members of the National Socialist Party.

What is a social movement? As a mode of pluralistic behavior, it belongs to the general class of social phenomena which includes mob actions, booms, crazes, panics, revolutions, and so forth As a subclass, a social movement is circumscribed by pluralistic behavior functioning as an organized mass-effort directed toward a change of established folkways or institutions A social movement may be said to exist wherever a group of individuals, operating within a community, aims to win the support of that community for establishment of some innovation in the ways and means of promoting a common interest The innovation or change may be a new or untried mode of procedure, or the restoration of a mode applied in the past In either case the intention that underlies the attempted change arises from the experience of the inadequacy of a given procedure, and the belief in the adequacy of the proposed change

A collective effort may be properly called a social movement only if it operates within the medium of a community. An attempt, for example, to change the by-laws of some association is not a social movement, since such action, as a rule, does not bear upon a community interest The most significant social movements are those which take place on a national scale, and affect political, religious and moral folkways and institutions

From the definition of a social movement just given, it follows that a movement is, on the one hand, directed *against* something which it endeavors to combat and eliminate, and on the other hand, favors something, i e., it is directed *toward* some goal which it is striving to realize. These two opposite but complementary intentions we call respectively the *Issue* and the *Ideology* of a movement.

What is the basis of an issue or an ideology? About behavior in general we know that the intention to act against or for something results from a problem-experience induced by some event impinging upon some value or values that the individual holds An impinging event is always some action that brings about the modification of existing arrangements through the activities of human beings The reaction of an individual to an event depends on how he feels or thinks it will affect his social position, possessions, intentions, relations with others — anything that is an integral part of his life organization, and thus is a value which he is set to protect, defend and promote The event obtains its meaning, is named or defined by the individual according to the way in which he experiences it in terms of his values

In view of this we may say that underlying the issue of movement is the experience of a *threat* to certain values, while at the basis of an ideology lies the experience of an opportunity to *promote* certain values

We may now ask what are the significant aspects of an ideology or issue that determine the success of a social movement Concerning the issue, the following special conditions, favorable to concerted action, must be present, in order that a movement may materialize and maintain itself.

1 The experience of events as a threat to values must be common to many individuals This presupposes that events will be operative over a wide area, and the values affected will be prevalent in that area

2 A strong emotional reaction of dis

satisfaction and opposition is required to sustain a movement. Assuming a rank-order of values, the strength of the reaction may be said to be directly proportional to the place which the affected values occupy in the individual's hierarchy of values.

3 No movement can occur unless *personal* values are involved, such as social status, income, and so forth. This was the case in the Hitler movement, insofar as it grew out of the dissatisfaction and opposition induced by such events as the revolution of 1918, the inflation, the economic insecurity of the white-collar class, unemployment, — all of which affected directly the personal welfare of many individuals But for a movement to materialize, a threat or impairment of personal values must be linked to the experience of a threat or impairment of *social* values. These are values *shared* by members of the same group or community, such as traditions, group prestige, group symbols, and possessions In terms of such values events in Germany, as for example the establishment of a republican regime, the Versailles treaty, the occupation of the Ruhr were experienced as threats The linking of social with personal values is important not only because it enables the individual to rationalize his negative reaction, justifying a selfish reason by a group purpose, but also because it facilitates concerted action, and makes possible the fanaticism which in most cases is necessary to keep a movement alive

4 When different events are experienced as affecting personal and social values the dissatisfaction and opposition resulting therefrom must be capable of being focussed upon some object that can be regarded as the *common source* of the disturbing events. For example, in the case of the Hitler movement, such object was the Republican regime (more specifically the groups and individuals that enacted and supported it), the "System," as it was called, which was made responsible for all the troubles that confronted the individuals and the nation

An adequate issue is the groundwork upon which enterprising individuals may organize some collective action But if such action is to become a genuine social movement, there must be not only concerted opposition, but also collective striving for the realization of some plan, or scheme of betterment. Without an ideology, as we called such plans, pluralistic behavior will at best be a revolt.

An adequate ideology is one which, first of all appeals to some ideal In the case of the Hitler Movement in Germany this ideal was the realization of a *Gemeinschaft,* i e , a primary group relationship, uniting all Germans and in which everyone puts the common interest before self [3]

Secondly, an adequate ideology expresses the ideal in terms of current glow words, i.e., ideas that carry a strong and prevalent emotional tone In the Hitler Movement such words were nationalism, socialism, racial superiority,[4] and so forth, all capable of being reinterpreted in terms of *Gemeinschaft* as the unifying concept

Thirdly, an ideology, in order to function as the basis of a successful movement, must link up the goal with the issue This can best be accomplished by setting forth

[3] F Tonnies' classical treatise on "*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,*" Berlin, 1887, and subsequent editions, has contributed to the receptivity of this idea

[4] Anti-Semitism was an important propaganda device of the Hitler Movement, which appealed to sentiments and beliefs that were inculcated during 1870–1890, when the first wave of organized anti-Semitism since the emancipation of the Jews swept Germany under the leadership of Stoeker, Ahlward, and others In the ideology, however, anti-Semitism is incident to the idea of "community of blood," as the basis of the *Gemeinschaft* that was to be realized, and in consequence of which the exclusion of all "non-Germans" was advocated

a plan in which the items are the opposite of that which is regarded as the cause of the problem-experiences For example, in Germany it was dictatorship vs parliamentarianism, *Gleichschaltung* vs. liberalism, a policy of the strong hand in dealing with the Allies vs. a policy of concession and compromise, etc.

Fourthly, an ideology must be propounded by a *charismatic* leader — to use Max Weber's terminology [5] — one who can induce in his followers an identification with the ideology as a cause worth fighting and dying for

In dealing with the issue and ideology of a movement, we are considering only one group of significant factors which have to be present in order to make a movement successful. However, issue and ideology are, in a sense, only *structural* elements of a movement. The *dynamic* elements are the activities of individuals who on the basis of an issue and an ideology engage in propaganda and organization for the purpose of winning the support of the community, and in the quest for power These individuals are banded together into what we may call the *promotion group* of the movement The National-Socialist-German-Workmen's Party was such a promotion group From the point of view of the causal analysis of a movement, the issue and ideology may be regarded as the basic conditions, or the potential factors which might induce individuals to action in a certain direction. For the initiation, growth and successful termination of the action, however, the activities of a promotion group and its leaders are primarily responsible. Applied to the Hitler Movement, for example, this means that it is wrong to account for its success in terms of unemployment, the Versailles treaty, and similar causes On the basis of these factors many other promotion groups attempted to organize a movement and obtain control of the government, such as the *Stahlhelm,* the Communists, and others. Primarily responsible for the success of the Hitler Movement was the way in which the promotion group presented the issue, made the ideology attractive, and manipulated the technique of propaganda and organization

It is necessary, therefore, to consider a second group of factors, those relating to the activities of the promotion group of a movement, if we want to complete a pattern of the significant and relevant elements of a social movement.

It is more difficult to generalize on the promotion aspect of a movement than on its issue and ideology The difficulty is due in part to the scarcity of comparable data. To a large extent, it is due, however, to the fact that the activities of a promotion group involve matters of strategy and tactics, which are to a considerable degree dependent upon the *particular* situation in which the group operates This question awaits further investigation.

For the time being, we can generalize with a certain degree of confidence on the *tasks* which confront a promotion group, and which it must solve if a strong and successful movement is to materialize

A promotion group must first of all hold the *attention* of the community In the case of the Hitler Movement this task was accomplished by maintaining a persistent barrage of propaganda through meetings, the press, pamphlets and posters, displays of symbols, ostentatious demonstrations, like parades and party congresses and participation in affairs affecting the community, as in the case of the Young Plan

Secondly, it must *justify* its claim for leadership This task the Hitler group achieved by keeping the issue alive, continuously stirring up prevalent dissatisfac-

[5] M Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gemeinschaft,* 1922, p 124.

tion and opposition, and skilfully linking dissatisfactions with its ideology. Acceptance of the ideology was sought for by appeal to traditions and to prevailing sentiments, for example, to sentiments for "discipline and order," for unity, and for the abolition of classes

Thirdly, a promotion group must win the *confidence* of the masses, by maneuvering itself into a position of ascendancy over competing groups, and by successfully combating its opponents Thus, in the case of the Hitler Movement, the National Socialist Party succeeded in absorbing the members of most other groups with a nationalistic ideology, by pursuing a policy of "no compromise and no alliance." These members, as well as the large number of voters who supported the movement eventually, were won over in many cases by the shows of strength and successful defiance of the radical leftist groups, particularly the communists This the promotion group accomplished by direct invasion of the "strongholds of the enemy," and readiness to "fight it out" if necessary

A fourth task is the development of an adequate organization not merely for the carrying out of the propaganda, and for the struggle with competing and opposing groups, but also in preparation for the taking over of power

These tasks require adequate leadership What determines adequate leadership is a question we cannot answer here. We can emphasize only this point. the success of a promotional group depends to a considerable extent on its having a charismatic leader, who functions as a glorified symbol of the movement and can command the unquestioned obedience and devotion of his followers For allegiance to a leader, the inspiration of his charisma is primarily responsible for the winning and holding of active participants, who not only carry on the propaganda and struggle, which frequently requires neglect of personal interests, but who possess the peculiar fanaticism that enables an individual to be steadfast in the face of abuse and persecution The fact that the Hitler Movement had a charismatic leader was, therefore, an important factor in its success.

The propositions advanced in this paper require further testing and elucidation They indicate the direction in which a theory of social movements should be developed As we advance our knowledge by further studies, and particularly, as we succeed in developing indices that will test the presence or absence of *significant* factors in *particular* situations, we shall be able as sociologists to perform the important function of predicting and guiding social movements, in a better fashion than we can at present

LAW, FREEDOM, AND HUMAN ACTION * *Sidney Hook*

The understanding of history, like other forms of human evaluation, has its fashions They range all the way from the view that men are creatures of environment and circumstance to the view that everything is possible to them. Neither of these views can be sustained by evidence. In fact, they are usually so formulated

* Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History*, The John Day Company, Inc, New York, 1943, pp. 246–67. Reprinted by permission of the publisher

that it is hard to know what would constitute evidence for them. Nonetheless, they have important bearings on the way in which specific problems are approached.

The attitude that man's future is already determined, that the shape of things to come is now settled and cannot be escaped, makes for a slighting of the concrete problems of choice that face us at every turn. On the other hand, the attitude that man can storm the heavens at any historic occasion, that all he needs is a good will or a strong one, leads to a disregard of the limiting conditions of intelligent action. Today the first of these general attitudes is very much in evidence among the opinion makers of the western world. The wave of the future is described as a kind of predetermined fatality that not only will transform our economy but will destroy the last refuge of democratic culture.[1] The drift toward totalitarian political controls is accepted or bemoaned as a natural consequence of the development of our economy and as an inescapable consequence of total war. Those who scoffed at economic determinism during the heyday of capitalism are now become converts to its chief dogma, namely, that the character of a given economic system can determine one, and only one, political and cultural pattern. Although they were able to conceive of capitalism in many political variants, socialism to them seems simply to be what Hitler and Stalin have made of it.

Widespread attitudes and beliefs of this kind have their causes in the objective conditions of the times. But we wish to discuss not the causes of these ideas about history but their validity. What assumptions are involved, and are they true?

To begin with, let us note that those who believe that the future of human society is determined by laws *already known* set great store on our knowledge of these laws. It makes a difference, they insist, whether we know them or ignore them. Why? Because the knowledge of these laws gives us power to direct the future. But this admission means that a considerable area of social history, the area affected by man's knowledge or ignorance, is not determined by the original set of laws but by other laws that come into operation as a consequence of what we know, value, and do. As long as we grant, then, that knowledge makes a difference, we cannot really believe that the future is fixed to a degree where there are no alternatives.

What, after all, shall we understand by historical laws whose iron sway is supposed to determine our future? Roughly speaking, a law in history is a determinate relation between classes of events which we discover can be relied on in solving a problem, overcoming an obstacle, or predicting the future. This covers, however, physical and biological laws, too. Distinctive of historical laws is that the classes of events which they relate, designate the behavior patterns of human beings as members of organized social groups. As members of social groups, the behavior of individuals is marked by ideals, habits, traditions, and other ways of acting associated with the anthropological term "culture."

The subject matter, then, of historical laws always involves reference to the associated, interacting behavior of human beings as members of a society or culture. This remains true even when we seek to explain historical activity by reference to conditions and to events that are them-

[1] "Like a log on the brink of Niagara Falls, we are impelled by unforeseen and irresistible socio-cultural currents, helplessly drifting from one crisis and catastrophe to another." Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, p. 130, New York, 1941. See also *Cultural and Social Dynamics*, vol. 4, p. 768. A similar mystical view of social fatality is presented in the more influential works of Spengler and Toynbee.

selves controlled by physical laws, like the presence or absence of precious metals or oil in the soil, or the occurrence of drought, floods, and earthquakes These physical conditions and events have great significance in history and social affairs, but not as physical elements. It is only in relation to some activity or interest of men that they assume significance That is why the presence of coal and iron and oil in America explains nothing about the history and social life of the American Indians, and so much about the history and social life of the American settlers "Gold in the ground is a cipher for a study of society so long as we are doing nothing and not tending to do anything in connection with it Gold that does not exist is an important factor when we are in a turmoil of chasing for it" [2]

The subject matter of historical laws, since it concerns the relations of groups of socially organized human beings to each other, involves reference to human behavior that can be often described by psychological laws But these psychological laws alone can never explain historical or social events For historical and social events are determined by the way human beings interact with the physical elements of their environment Before we can have knowledge of history and society we must have some prior knowledge of nature Before we can say that it was Brutus who slew Caesar, we must understand something about the biology of death and the physics of the instruments of death The variable historical and social behavior of men, who are subject to the same psychological laws, indicates that the latter cannot explain the former Such laws are relevant in history only when they are taken together with physical and cultural conditions "Let desires, skills, purposes, beliefs be what they will, what happens is the product of the interacting intervention of physical conditions like soil, sea, mountains, climate, tools, and machines, in all their vast variety, with the human factor" [3]

Having won the right to consider social and historical laws as relatively autonomous, it remains to ask to what extent they are conditions of human action and to what extent they are modifiable by human action Let us consider a few typical situations We present them as purely illustrative of the position to be developed

1 Suppose a political organization has before it a proposal to nominate a man of Catholic or Jewish faith for the office of President of the United States. It is objected that, although there are no constitutional bars to his election, the history of the country reveals a law of American political behavior that "dooms" him to defeat, despite the fact that in every other aspect he is an ideal candidate This law states that "no Catholic or Jew can be successful in a race for the highest political office in the United States" It is presented as an induction from experience and fortified by social and psychological generalizations about other aspects of the behavior of American citizens, for instance, their religious traditions and social prejudices

What is the character of such a "law"? Note that it does not rule out the election of a Catholic or Jew as something literally impossible It asserts not the impossibility but the unlikelihood of such an election Second, the law does not assert that every Protestant will vote against the candidate or that every non-Protestant will vote for him, or that any particular person will vote in this way rather than in that It states that a sufficient number of Protestants will vote against the candidate solely on the grounds of his religious faith to

[2] Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government*, p 193, Chicago, 1908

[3] John Dewey, *Logic Theory of Inquiry*, p. 492, New York, 939

ensure his defeat. Third, it tells us something about patterns of distribution in a series of human choices or decisions. And we know that human choices or decisions are "influenceable" in certain ways, that they may be changed and modified by changing the conditions under which they have developed. Fourth, its validity is restricted to a certain historical domain It would be false to apply it to the selection of presidents or prime ministers in countries like England, where the majority of the population is also of the Protestant faith.

Here we have a "law" which every realistic practitioner of politics must take into account. Nonetheless it would be foolish for those responsible for the nomination to accept the law as binding, or even as a decisive guide to action in all cases The candidate may be a national military hero. His nomination may be pressed on the ground of another "law" that the American people are always grateful to successful military heroes and that they show their gratitude by electing them to office. Under the circumstances, we may believe that the second law will be fulfilled rather than the first. Whichever "law" is invoked, if our decision were based on it alone, we would be assuming that the future of the election is determined by fixed patterns of behavior that have operated in the past We would be assuming that our decision and the actions following from it made no appreciable difference to the outcome, that the future is determined by the past and not by the past together with the intervening present. In the situation considered, of course, the assumptions would be obviously mistaken. The law that "Catholics and Jews cannot be elected to the highest national office" may cease to be true as a result of changes introduced by our efforts to elect one The more we know about the conditions under which the attitudes of people have been set, the more intelligently we can go about the task of changing them. If it happens that the country is involved in a war for the survival of its democratic faith, we may go to the country with the demand for an expression of its sincerity in respect to its professed principles. We rely on other laws when we do so, but it is *we* who give them an opportunity to come into operation by the changes in the physical, psychological, and social scene produced by our activities.

We might discover, if our efforts are well organized and if our political campaign is tied into a genuine educational crusade for democracy, that the law "no Catholic or Jew can be President of the United States" holds no more than the "law" which previously had been regarded as just as valid, *viz.*, "no President can be elected to more than two terms of office" We have not abolished the law, but as a result of our action in changing the conditions we have rendered it nugatory. The extent to which our intervention in the present will affect the future outcome, when this is projected as a simple induction from the past, is a matter of degree. In some affairs the future may be accurately predicted with little concern over what we can do about it In other affairs what we do or leave undone may have more determining significance than any other known factor

2. Consider another rather different situation. Suppose we were trying to foretell who the next Pope of the Catholic Church will be. We would have to take note of at least the following "laws" (a) "No Protestant or Jew could be Pope." (b) "No Catholic woman could be Pope" (c) "Whoever the Pope was, he would be an Italian Cardinal." None of these laws is certain, but the first is more binding on our prediction than the second, the second more than the third.

By this we mean that the chances of electing a non-Italian Catholic man as Pope would be much better than the chances of electing a Catholic woman, and as small as the chances of doing the latter, they would be better than the chances of electing a Protestant or Jew The reasons are obvious. For the first law to be violated or to cease operating would practically require the entire transformation of the nature of the Church organization and the abandonment of basic theological doctrines This would be tantamount to virtual dissolution of the Church At the present time this organization is growing in power The pressures against which it had to contend in the past are diminishing in intensity, while its own influence on public affairs is growing Further, without hostile pressure or opposition those who control a successful organization that serves their interests effectively never liquidate it, or even profoundly modify the doctrines that have been useful to it

The second law is less binding than the first because if it ceased holding it would not require basic organizational changes but primarily changes in theological doctrine. No longer could the doctrine be accepted that women are a negative element to Holy Orders And theological changes, as church history eloquently shows, are always easier to make than organizational revolutions But so far as the calculable future goes, both of these laws are binding upon our prediction It is extremely improbable that anything that could now be done would lead to their abrogation

The third law, however, has a different status insofar as the possibility of modifying it is concerned In the past there have been non-Italian Popes In the last few centuries we know that Popes have been Italian primarily because of the pressure of the Italian hierarchy It is easy to see the complications that might ensue if an alien, a citizen of a foreign country with personal and social ties abroad, were to occupy the Holy See and exercise the very real power that a Pope can employ in the internal affairs of Italy. Nonetheless, if Catholic sentiment were organized against existing Italian Fascism, and if the defeat of Italian Fascism were followed by a progressive and democratic regime, the next Pope might well be non-Italian Out of intelligent self-interest the Catholic hierarchies in countries other than Italy, encouraged by their own governments, might bring influences to bear on the College of Cardinals Together with the moral pressure of anti-Fascist Italian Catholics on the Italian Cardinals, this might result in the election of a non-Italian Pope Even if the outcome of activity in this direction were doubtful, the chances of success would not be overwhelmingly unfavorable.

Our next situation is more complicated

3 In a world where the engines of human destruction are becoming more and more deadly, the problem of preventing war must be met before modern civilization goes down into shambles Few people profess to enjoy war, everyone deplores its costs, and although the different sides lose unequally in a war, it is questionable whether any long war is economically profitable to anybody. Why then should not the universal acceptance of an absolute pacifism like Tolstoy's be the solution to the problem? Let us grant that if everyone, or almost everyone, actually adopted the Tolstoyian or Gandhian position, war would be impossible We shall consider the proposal only from the point of view of its efficacy in bringing about the desired results.

It is logically not inconceivable that enough human beings may be converted to pacifist doctrine to prevent wars in the future But there are so many "laws"

of social behavior that would have to be suspended for the doctrine to spread, that the prospect of its adoption must be dismissed as Utopian Some men will risk their lives because of the intrinsic nobility of an ideal or the truth of a doctrine But the vast majority of individuals, past and present, have fought for ideals in order to further interests of a more concrete kind, like security, a longer life, or a materially better one It is not absolutely excluded that in time the vast majority of men might be won to the position of Tolstoy that to be holy is better than to be, and that to forgive one's enemies is better than to insist on justice from them But long before enough have been converted, the situation will enable some unpacific men to further their existing interests by profiting from the nonresisting behavior of those who practice absolute pacifism The latter will not fight for their own lives and possessions or for the lives and possessions of friends, children, and countrymen In that case, others, perhaps from countries and regions in which the ideals of pacifism are held in scorn, will discover that it is truly to their interest to be aggressively militant and to cut down and enslave the pacifists. The pacifist argument that it pays everyone not to have wars runs up against the fact that it would pay some people, in a world where others were pacifist, to make war on the pacifists. Consequently, *for the pacifist position to be truly effective the vast majority of mankind would have to adopt it at once in order to achieve its universal benefits.* For until it is adopted by everyone, it pays those who are not pacifists to reject it. The only kind of war that is always profitable is a war against pacifists.

What is the chance that everyone, or almost everyone, would adopt the pacifist position at once? So small that it would be the height of foolishness to rely upon it in order to prevent war The more want, the more boredom, the more fear there is in the world, the smaller the chance We must therefore declare that, as a practical means of preventing war, absolute pacifism is bound to fail, barring a miraculous change in the natures of men in present-day society It is significant that every absolute pacifist, although he hopes that the propagation of his philosophy will prevent war, will never surrender his philosophy even if he is compelled by the evidence to admit that it cannot be successful In other words, the ground on which he holds it, ultimately, has nothing to do with its instrumental efficacy in preventing war

Does this mean that we must accept a law to the effect that there will always be wars betwen nations and classes in world society? Yes, *if* we accept the major institutions, economic, educational, ethnic, political, that have so far existed in history as permanent features of the social scene No, *if* we believe that we can use our knowledge of other laws of human behavior to modify these institutions, to experiment and devise new ones, and to correct them in the light of their consequences. *The frequency and intensity of wars can be diminished in a world society in which through peaceful social processes men can actually get at a lesser cost the things they believe — often mistakenly — that war can win for them* It is not a matter of fate that men must war on one another Nor are men altogether free not to fight when conflicts of basic interests cannot be resolved to their mutual satisfaction through means other than war

4 The philosophy and practices of modern democracy to a large extent developed with the growth of a capitalist society As the capitalist economy matured through the phase of industrial capitalism to finance and monopoly capitalism, a great many of the freedoms associated with the democratic philosophy became

progressively restricted The economic and social restrictions flowed from the consequences of large-scale industrial organization under capitalism Political restrictions resulted when the state actively intervened in industry, sometimes to cooperate with, and sometimes to curb, monopolistic practices. Equality of opportunity, central to the philosophy and practice of democracy, was much more in evidence in the agrarian economy of Jefferson's day than in the twentieth-century era of gigantic corporations, trusts, cartels, and monopolies

Many who are loyal to Jefferson's democratic philosophy believe that it is dying in the present-day capitalist world and that it will certainly be dead in the collectivist world of tomorrow Unable to convince themselves that his philosophy can be modified so as to vivify and redirect the world of modern industrialism, they urge a return to the earlier agrarian economy, to the simpler capitalist ways of yesterday, as the only material basis upon which the democratic philosophy of life can be restored and defended

The reply to such proposals is that they are economically *impossible*. The economically *impossible* implies a counter concept of economic *necessity*. What do we understand by economic necessity here, and why is the reply to the agrarian democrats a valid one? What we say will apply *a fortiori* to all proposals which suggest, as a program of action, a return to earlier systems of economy, whose ideals and values we would keep as integral elements of our own democratic philosophy

Why not, then, go back to an earlier economy? After all, an economic system is a set of social relationships that regulate the behavior of men It is a scheme of human arrangements, not a God given or nature-given fact, but something that has resulted historically from the activities of men True. As a logical possibility we can conceive of any economic system prevailing at any time But precisely because an economic system is both a *human* economy and a *historical* economy, its basic relations cannot be made over at will

We could not return to an agrarian economy without destroying our large cities, decentralizing mass-production industries, transforming our banking and transportation systems, producing catastrophic unemployment, making huge plants and many skills obsolescent, and depriving the existing farm population of its market — to mention only a few things Almost every group in the population would have a vested interest immediately imperiled by the change, and with only the promise of an agrarian Utopia to console them. Even if the promise had a hypnotic effect, the disaster attendant upon any effort to carry out such a program would awaken the populace from their trance It would require the profoundest modification in present human motives, modes of appreciation, standards of living and taste — all once historically acquired but now set and hardened into habit or second nature All of men's habits can be altered, but not so many of them at the same time So long as human beings did not lose their memories, it is even doubtful whether the devastation produced by an earthquake or war would incline them to return to the economics of the past They would begin to rebuild where they had left off because it would be easier and more "natural" for them to do so They would choose sites which they believed less subject to earthquakes, or they would turn their cities into impregnable bomb shelters

The compounding of improbabilities is so great in this projected return to an earlier economy that we call it an *economic impossibility*

But even suppose the economically "impossible" happened How could this agrarian economy be stabilized? The free mar-

ket would still exist Small commercial enterprises would exist. The human inventive spirit would not remain dormant. New needs would spring up as effects of existing manufacture and as causes of expanding manufacture. There would be wage labor. It would be legally free The demand for it would make itself felt in the offer of more money than could be made on the farm. An expanding market for the products of industry would be set up. An industrial revolution would begin again. The small cities would become large cities In short, the agrarian economy would be booming on its way toward industrial capitalism once more

Left to itself, the social relationships between human beings would acquire, if not the same, then a similar character to that they had when the call for a return to the past was sounded That is an illustration of what is meant by a *historico-economic necessity.*

But the system would not have to be left to itself! Have we not admitted that a historico-economic necessity is not absolute? True, but in that case, all sorts of controls and restrictions on the glorious freedoms of the agrarian economy would have to be enforced Those who were so fearful of the encroachment of the state on the freedoms of advanced capitalism would have to encroach just as much on the freedom of the agrarian society in order to prevent it from developing in the way it historically did develop. The philosophy and practice of democracy would be sacrificed for a standard of living which would be lower than the existing standards, and far lower than the potential living standard of an industrialized culture that has not yet lost its democracy.

5. We turn now to the present situation in which the problem is to preserve the democratic way of life, as described in the previous chapter, in an industrial economy moving toward collectivism. This illustration is more topical. If the cultural and political horrors of collectivism as practiced in totalitarian countries of the world were the inescapable concomitants of collectivism, even the futile attempt to return to the agrarian past would be preferable For the end of such an effort would be death, not the degradation of death-in-life.

The important thing is to determine what is meant by collectivism. Collectivism or socialism can be so defined that the presence of a set of totalitarian techniques of cultural and political rule follows logically from the definition But we don't have to define it that way The problem becomes the empirical one of whether these totalitarian techniques in fact would be required for the functioning of such a socialist system.

It would be unfair both to the question and the author to attempt to settle this problem in a few pages, but since we are using it as purely illustrative of our views on law, freedom and human action it is hoped that allowance will be made for the apparent dogmatism of our remarks

By a collectivist system we mean one in which the basic instruments of production — the great industries, mines, railroads, utilities, etc — are owned by the community and operated for public use instead of private profit This involves a form of planned and continuously planning society in order to provide full employment, equal opportunities of education, and a rising standard of living The fact that the state or community is the employer gives it a great power over the lives of ordinary citizens since it can deny them access to the use of these instruments But the state is not an abstraction but a group of men — clerks, bureaucrats, politicians, statesmen, philosophers — call them what you will What is to prevent them from becoming the dictators of the community, if all political and economic

and educational power is concentrated in their hands? Nothing, *if* such concentration takes place. For any group of men who had such power would, in fact, be dictators, no matter how benevolent they were!

There are those who say that once collectivism in this sense is introduced we have no longer a genuine *if* but a foregone conclusion To avoid the conclusion, we have to foreswear collectivism As opposed to this position it seems to us that the collective control of industry is a "foregone" conclusion, that is, "very probable" independent of our efforts to reverse the trend, whereas the *if*—the total monopoly of power in the hands of the economic planners—depends almost completely upon our faith in democracy and willingness to fight and suffer for it, not only in war but in peace

The trend toward collectivism in the capitalist economies of all nations in the world is the result of the ever-renewed quest for profit which is at the basis of these systems The consequence of the quest for profit is the accumulation of huge masses of capital that increase the productive powers of society At the same time, because of the gross inequalities of income between the different classes engaged in the process of production, the effective purchasing power of the masses for consumers' goods is reduced The disproportion becomes progressively acute, resulting on the one hand in the narrowing of the field for profitable investment and in large-scale unemployment More and more the state steps in as a partner in industry and sometimes as independent producer in an attempt to keep production going, to induce new capital investments, and to relieve the growing burden and political dangers of unemployment Left to the rationale of its own processes, capitalist economy cannot guarantee profits, generate full employment, and provide a standard of living commensurate with the technological potentialities of modern industry It periodically convulses itself in crises that can only be partially resolved at ever-growing social costs

The trend toward collectivism and the intervention of the state into economy are "unavoidable" To hark back to the era of free enterprise is just another futile call, of the same kind but not of the same desperate degree as the call to return to an agrarian economy We can make the attempt, but the overwhelming probability is that we shall disastrously fail Where our intelligent choice lies is not in trying to contest what seems an irreversible trend but in determining *who* the state shall be, *how* it shall intervene, and the *extent* to which collectivism in production shall go Therein lies our freedom Whether in the collectivist economy there will exist certain sectors of private enterprise will be decided by the state If those who control the state are not interested in preserving the traditional freedoms of democracy, citizens who work in the free sectors will have no greater safeguard from persecution than those who work in the collectivized sector, just as under a Fascist regime professors in private universities have no more freedom of inquiry than professors in public universities. On the other hand, a democratic collectivist society can evolve adequate safeguards against the economic outlawing of heretics by writing into its Bill of Rights the provisions that every citizen has a vested interest in a job, that trade unions, co-operatives, courts, press, churches, and certain institutions of higher education be organized in permanent independence of the state[4] But whether what is written into a constitution will be enforced in fact again depends upon us No safeguard can be automatic That is

[4] I have briefly discussed some of the safeguards that might be devised in a democratic socialist society *Op cit*, p 125 ff

why freedom is never safe, and intelligence should never slumber. . . .

The illustrations considered indicate how we regard the interplay of law and human freedom in social and historical affairs. At any period there are no realistic alternatives to certain paths of development because of the number and cumulative weight of "the laws" that stand in the way of our striking out in a new direction. We may explore theoretically the ideal alternatives *to* this path and lament that we cannot follow them without risking destruction. But in a world where we choose to continue to live, it is wiser to explore the alternatives *on* this path, since it is before these alternatives that we have not only the power to wish but the power to act No matter what alternative we take, in time we will come to other alternatives, perhaps less ambitious in scope than those we left behind but not necessarily less poignant or meaningful History and politics, not to speak of personal life, present a daily confrontation of alternatives in which we forge part of our own destiny and for which we therefore assume some responsibility Every man knows he will die yet in how many different ways can a man live!

There is no complete catalogue of the mistakes men commit when they make history But in the light of the past we can list the most common among them They are the failure to see alternatives when they are present, the limitation of alternatives to an oversimplified either-or where more than two are present; false estimates of their relative likelihoods; and, as a special case of this last, a disregard of the effects of our own activity in striving for one rather than another What these mistakes amount to is a systematic underestimation of man's power to control his future.

The development of societies as well as of individuals along certain lines is sometimes the result of cosmic or earthly accidents. A drought or a tidal wave may undo the planned labor of generations, madness may cloud over the well-cultivated mind before it can reap its golden harvest Social control and intelligence can mitigate the effects of such contingencies and prevent many of them, but they cannot be eliminated For a man is limited, and the world he can control is much smaller than the world beyond his control. From this no counsel of resignation follows, precisely because these events are accidents Wise resignation can be made only before what is certain, and, by definition, these events are not.

All genuine opportunities of choice are specific Every resolution of a choice involves to some degree a reconstruction of the self, society, and the world Every intelligent reconstruction is an experiment, guided by laws already known, to achieve mastery over concrete problems To the extent that we are committed to a democratic philosophy, we cannot entrust the present political and social choices before us to an event-making man, or to an uncontrolled elite As democrats, whatever planning we do must be planning for a free society in which every citizen can participate in the determination of collective policy Intelligent policies of planning, directed toward the liberation of diversity of talents, can also safeguard the preservation of areas of personal life in which each personality is free to make his own decisions

ANNOTATED REFERENCES

1 Bain, Read, "Sociopathy and World Organization," *American Sociological Review,* April, 1944, pp 127–38 This highly generalized treatment of social organization and disorganization on a world-wide scale argues the thesis that the international nature of physical science and technology, the growth of the social sciences, the trend

toward secular religion, global communication, universal disgust with war, and the growth of international law are all leading toward world integration

2 Blumer, Herbert, "Social Movements," in *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, ed by A M Lee, Barnes & Noble, New York 1946, pp 199–220 In a brief chapter, Blumer sets forth some of the basic generalizations concerning social movements He traces their development from the initial stages of unrest to the highly institutionalized end-products

3 Gerth, Hans, "The Nazi Party Its Leadership and Composition," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1940, pp 517–41 Gerth analyzes the Nazi Party, utilizing the concepts *charismatic leadership* and *bureaucracy* Different elements of the population are attracted to the party by its leadership principle in comparison with those attracted by its bureaucratic structure

4 Hart, Hornell and Hertz, Hilda, "Expectation of Life as an Index of Social Progress," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1944, pp 609–21 Demonstrating a quantitative approach to the study of social change, this statistical analysis focuses upon a particular set of facts considered by the authors to be a valid and reliable measure of one kind of social progress

5 Hertzler, J O, "Crises and Dictatorships," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1940, pp 157 70 In contrast to Abel's focus upon one revolution and dictatorship, this analysis attempts to derive generalizations from a study of thirty five instances of dictatorship from Ancient Greece down to the current period The critical comment by Kirkpatrick at the end of the article should also be read

6 Lasswell, H D "The Garrison State" *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1941, pp 455–68 This is an interesting example of extrapolation, or the projection of a contemporary trend into the future Considerable evidence is massed to suggest that our times will witness an increased trend away from the dominance of the businessman toward the supremacy of the soldier, and a corresponding change in the structure of our society

7 Merton, R K, "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1936, pp 894–904 Many aspects of social change are the unintended results of actions which people carry out in order to realize their purposes Merton analyzes the various factors which play a role in producing such consequences

8 "Recent Social Changes Issue," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1942 This entire issue of the *Journal* is given over to recent social changes in basic aspects of American life Note especially the following P M Hauser, "Population", Louis Wirth "Urban Communities" C C Taylor Rural Life M F Nimkoff "The Family" Hornell Hart Religion Thorsten Sellin Crime and Margaret Mead, "Customs and Mores"

9 Riemer, Svend, "Social Planning and Social Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1947, pp 508–16 Riemer develops the thesis that social planning is a new principle of social organization which will increasingly penetrate our society with "unorthodox" procedures counter to older laissez faire political and economic traditions

10 Taylor, C C, "The Sociologists' Part in Planning the Columbia Basin *American Sociological Review* June, 1946, pp 321–30 As the author states this paper "is a report on an experiment in planning, not a theoretical discussion It demonstrates how the services of sociologists have been put to very practicable use in the development of a large scale engineering project

11 Vance, R B, "The Place of Planning in Social Dynamics" *Social Forces* March, 1945 pp 331–34 In a "planning" rather than a planned society Vance points out how values must be taken into account, new goals clearly indicated, and policies and procedures readjusted The role of the social scientist in all of this is delineated

12 See also Lowie, "Theory of Culture," p 87, MacIver, "The Multi-Group Society" p 366, DeGre, "Freedom and Social Structure," p 521 Polanyi "Our Obsolete Market Mentality" p 557 Drucker "The Industrial Reality of the Twentieth Century" p 567 Beers, "A Portrait of the Farm Family in Central New York State," p. 603

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS

For many readers of this book the sociology course in which it was used will not be followed by specialized courses. For others a more intensive exploration of a number of the fields touched upon here will follow. For both groups, however, the introductory course is likely to be the only course where there is an attempt to treat the whole of sociology as a systematic discipline. Moreover, even professional sociologists sometimes need to be reminded that they are concerned with a common subject matter which can be intellectually grasped as a unified field of research.

In this book a wide variety of specific facts pertaining to social life has been detailed, and meaningful generalizations or theories about the interrelations of these facts have been set forth. Throughout the volume the reader has had the opportunity to follow the painstaking scientific procedures used to get at facts and to derive generalizations. But our objective has not been merely that of setting forth illustrative facts or demonstrating typical research techniques. A prime endeavor has been to show how the various facets of sociology may be held together within a unified frame of reference. It is not suggested here that other perspectives are not equally adequate—indeed, it seems apparent that some of the conceptual schemes in current use are fundamentally similar—but it is maintained that the conceptual scheme used in this book is a fruitful one for systematizing the field of sociology. In summarizing the materials covered it will be useful to review briefly the parts and chapters in relation to this frame of reference and also to show how they point to fields of specialized analysis the student will encounter in advanced courses.

Although every chapter in this volume is an integral part of the whole, the reader will note retrospectively that many of the key definitions are theoretically formulated in Chapter 9. Here the concepts of social relation, social system, social group, association, and society are introduced. These are basic "unit" concepts essential in sociological analysis. We begin with the social relationship as the simplest form of social phenomenon existing in isolation. When a social relation, or set of relations, is organized according to mutual rights and duties, then it is a social system. A social system in turn constitutes a social group when its participants are united by emotional solidarity, common purpose, or both, and share a role-defining culture as well as possess means whereby members are differentiated from nonmembers. Proceeding from this definition of the social group we have distinguished a society from an association by treating the former as a grouping whose members share the conditions of a common life.

All other concepts introduced in *Sociological Analysis* designate variations of

the unit concepts, aspects of the various units, or processes occurring within and among the units. Thus variant types of associations are viewed as primary and secondary. Social statuses, roles, and institutions are aspects or elements of social systems. Socialization, competition, conflict, and so forth are processes taking place within and among social systems The employment of such secondary and derivative concepts has made possible the structural and functional analysis of the interrelated social systems exemplified by our materials.

Turning from general considerations to an examination of the various parts of *Sociological Analysis,* let us reconsider the initial section, "Cultural Backgrounds of Social Life" The title itself suggests that culture *per se* is only indirectly relevant to sociology. The materials included were largely anthropological in character, and it should now be apparent to the reader that the sociologist's interest in culture is different from the anthropologist's. While recognizing that culture is an important normative element in determining social behavior, the sociologist is interested primarily in social rather than cultural systems. Thus folkways, mores, value systems, laws, statuses, institutions, and so forth are all cultural systems *viewed* by the sociologist as functional elements within social systems.

The student will find the concept of culture to be either explicit or implicit throughout sociology, but he will encounter very few sociology courses devoted to culture as such Whoever wishes to pursue the analysis of culture in and of itself should take courses dealt with primarily under the rubric, Social Anthropology,[1] or Cultural Anthropology Yet there are two fields of sociological research focused particularly on the cultural elements of social systems Personality, Society, and Culture, and the field known as The Sociology of Knowledge. In the study of personality, stress is laid on the internalization of cultural norms through socialization, and in the sociology of knowledge the inquiry centers on the social roots of particular cultural systems, especially those called ideologies.

While in this text the explicit frame of reference for treating culture is largely anthropological (but with a sociological point of view always implicit), that used for describing and analyzing personality is explicitly sociological The sociologist views the person as playing various social roles within different social systems, and recognizes that different motivational patterns can be used to support the same role behavior Yet the basic personalities people have are not accidental but are products of the socialization process carried out by families within a particular society The relationship between basic personality (a subject studied mostly by social psychologists) and social roles (a subject usually considered by sociologists in connection with group organization) constitutes an analytical problem touched upon only in passing. This problem and others of a like nature are encompassed by courses in Culture and Personality, Social Structure and Personality, and so on Such courses and the topics they include have not been very fully developed by sociologists but they can be conceived within a sociological frame of reference.

[1] Throughout the following commentary, common designations for college and university courses will be capitalized in order that the reader may note them more readily.

Although the analysis in the section on personality and social structure is clearly sociological in character, the only sociological concepts explicitly formulated were those having to do with status, role, and socialization. Others, such as social system, social group, a society, and so forth are used implicitly. As has been shown, however, the frame of reference is delineated in Chapter 9, with the possible exception of the concept "institution." From that point on the materials dealt with are referred directly to the basic conceptual scheme, and in particular to the concept of an organized society. Thus in Chapter 10 collective behavior is treated as occurring within an organized society, and in Chapter 12 demographic and ecological theories are related to social structure

The materials in Chapter 10 are an elementary introduction to matters of concern in such courses as Social Psychology, Collective Behavior, and Public Opinion. Such courses deal with social phenomena which, while possessing a degree of order and regularity, are not organized into highly structured social systems Nevertheless, it is helpful to treat them as existing within the structure of an organized society, for when thought of in isolation it is difficult to account for the degree of order and regularity they do manifest as well as the conditions under which they recur.

To study social phenomena as events occurring within an organized society one must have a more concrete conception than is embodied in the definition of "a society." It is the function of Chapter 11 with its description of the simple communal, complex communal, and associational societies to bring to life the abstraction called society. While no special courses in sociology are devoted to the elaboration of these societal types in their totality, the student will find them to be either explicit or implicit in almost any sociology courses he may take Wherever there are comparisons between rural and urban societies, for example (as in Rural Sociology, Urban Sociology, Contemporary Society, and so forth), he is likely to find materials having to do with the contrast between communal and associational societal types. Practically all discussions of American and other modern social institutions presuppose the background of the associational society concept

The fruitfulness of our conceptual scheme is very clearly demonstrated in Chapter 12, dealing with demographic and ecological phenomena Too often one encounters "sociology" courses in Population Problems taught in isolation from the main body of sociological theory It must be acknowledged that the purely biological aspects of population composition, growth, and decline can be so treated, but such treatment is not really an integral part of sociology Fortunately, more and more of the population treatises written by sociologists depict the causes, nature, and results of population phenomena as an aspect of organized society. Ecological data, on the other hand, have generally been encompassed within a theoretical framework greatly affected by social Darwinism and its emphasis on the struggle for survival. If, however, economic life is recognized as being basically social in character, and if the dependence of the spatial distribution of people upon economic factors is seen as not necessarily universal, then the student will perceive

that the spatial distribution of people and the division of labor can be accounted for within the theory of social systems and organized society. As he takes courses in urban sociology, where human ecology is generally elaborated, he will be able to explain the spatial configurations of social systems as an element in the functioning of the total society.

By the time the student has reached Part Four on social differentiation and stratification the utility of our sociological frame of reference should be entirely clear. Differentiation and stratification, the institutional and organizational structure of society, social interaction, social disorganization, and social change are all fundamental features of the structure and function of societies. Differentiation and, to a somewhat lesser extent, stratification are universally manifested in human groupings, and are reflections of the cultural and social evaluations attached to both innate and acquired distinctions among individuals. The phenomena of class and caste present some of the most acute social problems of our era, and such problems cannot possibly be understood without reference to the normative pattern of the community and nation as it is reflected in the system of differentiation and stratification. Specialized treatment of these subjects is occasionally given in courses in Social Stratification but is more likely to be found scattered among courses in Social Problems, Minority Groups, Race Relations, and so on.

Structural-functional analysis of political, family, economic, religious, and educational organization (not to mention recreational organization and other forms we have omitted because of space limitations, as well as the paucity of suitable analytical materials) can be carried out only if these modes of association and action are conceived as functional parts of a total society or societies These lines of analysis may lead variously to different courses in political science or economics and to sociology courses in The Social Structure of Industry (Industrial Sociology), The Family, Educational Sociology, and The Sociology of Religion. Yet wherever the course is taught on an analytical level, the particular form of social organization will be treated as part of a total social structure Sociologists are concerned with the interrelations of the main forms of social organization, their changing character in different kinds of societies, and with the development of a general theory of social institutions As a matter of fact, many sociology departments offer a course in Social Institutions which has no other function than to describe and analyze such structural interrelations and their consequences.

All sociologists recognize that the structure of social systems and their functioning is achieved through social interaction Hence it is imperative that considerable attention be given to social processes. In Part Six the social processes are dealt with in terms of their functional or dysfunctional roles in maintaining or destroying social systems. Treated apart from social structure the processes are so abstract that little can be said about them or little use made of them in research. Seen as functional elements within social systems they take on significance as the dynamic components which make society a going concern Thus it is that such processes as co-operation, accommodation, competition, and conflict not only bring various

forms of social organization into existence and maintain them in a dynamic state, but also are responsible for their mutability. It should be evident therefore that one may dissect the anatomy of social forms without regard to the processes, but if one wishes to analyze the functioning of social forms the processes cannot be ignored.

Finally, it is necessary to conceive society as a going concern which changes in its structure. Change can mean shifts in social organization, or it can mean social disorganization It usually means both, since there is ordinarily some disintegration in the controlling power of social norms in a dynamic society, even though new norms may develop to replace them In either case, and whether one is dealing with the various aspects of change and disorganization as is usually done in social problems courses (including Juvenile Delinquency, Criminology, and so forth), or with the basic structural modifications considered in courses in social disorganization or social change (e g , Social and Cultural Change, Social Movements, Social Planning, and so forth), the concept of the organized, functioning society must be used as a starting point lest such courses degenerate into polemics concerning particular social movements or problems

In concluding this attempt to demonstrate the effectiveness of our over-all frame of reference and in offering the student a means for organizing materials to be encountered later, two basic aspects of this book should once more be emphasized The first is that the authors have endeavored to frame their analysis strictly in terms of the structure and functions of social systems Second, and perhaps equally clear to the reader by now, has been the emphasis laid on the associational society. This stress has been given for several reasons The authors feel that the sociological generalizations most applicable to the contemporary world are those pertaining to the associational society The simple communal society is apparently gone forever. Moreover, the complex communal society (e g , the modern totalitarian nation) stands in direct antithesis to the basic value-system of Euro-American society Since there are many who doubt the continuing vitality or viability of the associational society, another reason for our detailed attention to its structure and functions has been the desire to inquire into the validity of such doubts In contrast to many sociologists, and others, we have attempted to explore the possibility of an enduring associational society instead of assuming, as is frequently the case, that such a society is inevitably decadent

Our materials show rather conclusively that the stresses and strains of our own associational society can be resolved in a *communal* manner only through political totalitarianism If the associational society is a manifestation of a decaying civilization, such totalitarianism may be the only solution We have suggested, however, that associational solutions are possible In spite of the contradictions seriously threatening the democratic way of life, it may be possible to reconcile order and diversity while maintaining the values of freedom and social individualism. It is our belief that this possibility should be more fully explored before there is any blind submission to the alleged necessity of a unicentered communal system,

whether it be economic, political, or religious. This admittedly is a value judgment, and as such it may serve to dispel some of the confusion generated by the semantic distortion of associational terms in the service of communal ends For this orientation there need be no apology, since ours is an associational society Lest many slowly evolved and painfully achieved human rights disappear to be replaced by new forms of human bondage, our problems must be solved by the free intelligence of free men.

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