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MODERN GREECE
A CHRONICLE AND A SURVEY
1800-1931



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MODERN GREECE
C. 1
A CHRONICLE AND A SURVEY
1800-1931

BY
JOHN MAVROGORDATO

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
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1931

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TO

N. J. M. AND M. J. M.

An nescitis, filii mei, quantilla orbis regatur prudentia?

PREFACE

IT is usual to mention in this place either "the general reader" or "the upper forms of public schools"; but I find it difficult to point to any particular class of reader for whom this book is intended. I have tried to write down as briefly as possible and I hope dispassionately the adventures of a young nation trying to find its place in the community of Europe. It is a record of what I have succeeded in learning myself from a good deal of desultory reading and enquiry. I should like everyone to read it who is interested in the Near East either as a politician or a traveller, a historian or a philanthropist.

The earlier chapters are based on the standard works of Finlay and Gordon, Alison Phillips and William Miller. I have dwelt on particular incidents which seemed significant; and sometimes I have marked a bare chronicle of years with a few names and dates. Dates can seldom be carried in the head, and I believe that any history book should contain as many as possible. The true significance of contemporary events must often remain hidden; but if the relevant dates are accurately recorded it will be easier to fit into place any information which comes to light.

The list of books at the end is not a scientific bibliography, which may be found elsewhere, but a register of

most of the works which I have used or referred to, together with a few which may be recommended for further reading.

My respect and affection for M. J. Gennadius, whose distinguished diplomatic career covered the period from the Congress of Berlin to the days of the Great War, make it a pleasure to acknowledge how much I have learned from his experience, his personality, and his library. Among many others from whom I have acquired information I must not fail to mention with gratitude Sir Edward Boyle, Sir Arthur Crosfield, Professor F. H. Marshall, Lady Muir, Mr. D. P. Petrocchino of Athens, who has answered innumerable letters with unflinching patience and humour, and the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. But none of these must be held responsible for the opinions expressed or for the manner in which I have presented my view of recent events and controversies.

I am extremely grateful to the Directors of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* for permitting me to make use of the articles which I wrote for that work in 1922 and 1926.

In the transliteration of Greek words and proper names I have used, not always consistently, a system in which ω is represented by δ , χ by h , and η by ε (and other letters by their obvious counterparts); but in the familiar termination of proper names in $-\eta\varsigma$ I have usually omitted the circumflex.

JOHN MAVROGORDATO.

August 31, 1931.

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I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONALISM AND THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: 1800-1832

I.

GREECE under the Turks was never entirely cut off from communication with Western Europe. The Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Greek Church, was an official of the Turkish Empire. Thus their own piety ensured the nominal allegiance of the Greeks to the Imperial system; but the privileges of ecclesiastical and communal autonomy they thereby enjoyed enabled them to continue their own system of education and their own racial traditions. (Some of them by entering the Turkish service had acquired wealth and a training of doubtful value in the arts of diplomacy and administration, and round the Patriarchate at Constantinople grew up the so-called Fanariot aristocracy. Others as traders and mariners had not only maintained their relations with Venice, direct contact with which had so recently been severed, but had pushed farther afield and established more or less permanent colonies in Russia, Austria and France. These relations they turned to educational profit, and by the end of the 18th century Greek students were attending in considerable numbers the French, German and Italian universities. After the fall of Venice (1797) the chief

Greece under
the Turks.

outpost of Hellenic enlightenment was at Vienna, where the first Greek newspaper was established as early as 1793; and Vienna, so soon to become the diplomatic centre of Europe, was in commercial communication through Hungary and Serbia with continental Greece and through Trieste with Asia Minor and the Aegean islands. The ideas of the French Revolution were thus disseminated throughout the Greek world and an educational renaissance produced a class of teachers who by study of the classics tried to liberalise the mediaeval instruction of the local Greek churches; by lectures and correspondence and by standardisation of the spoken Greek (Romaic) language tried to awaken a sentiment of national unity. The greatest of these men,¹ Koraës (or in the French form Coray), worked throughout the French Revolution in Paris, whence his letters and studies not only quickened the various centres of the Greek world but aroused the interest of European scholars and encouraged the beginnings of western philhellenism. Other Greeks less attracted by accident of temperament or domicile to western liberalism looked rather to Russia, the natural champion of Eastern Christianity, who in her advance to the south had already expelled the Turks from the northern coast of the Black Sea, and in 1770 had actually made an abortive attempt to raise an insurrection in the Morea which had only resulted in local disorders, Albanian raids, massacres and expatriations.

These tendencies were common talk among the continental Greeks who had been addressed by Byron in *Childe Harold* as early as 1810 as "fondly sighing" for

¹ Others were Boulgarès (1716-1806), Fotiadès (1750-1805), Doukas (1760-1845), Gennadios (1786-1854); and the revolutionary poet Régas Feraios (1754-1798).

the "foreign arms and aid" of "Gaul or Muscovite." It was at Odessa that the first definitely revolutionary society was founded in 1814, the *Filikê Etaireta*, which tried to coordinate the intellectual revival with the local patriotism of the various semi-autonomous Greek communities so as to form a Greek national consciousness, a consciousness of "Hellenism"—which is still the watchword of those who preach the union of the Greek race throughout the world and from antiquity.

2.

Adamantios Koraes had the quiet life of a scholar. Koraes 1748–Born in Smyrna in 1748¹ to a Chiot family he entered 1833. his father's house of business and from 1772 to 1778 was its representative in Amsterdam. He may have been rather bad at "business." Four years later he abandoned it in order to study medicine at Montpellier; and in 1788 he settled in Paris, on a pension from the brothers Zosimades of Leghorn, and there he died at the beginning of April 1833. During those forty-five years he distilled all his emotions, the wonder of the French Revolution, and above all his passion for the regeneration of the Greek language and the Greek state, into his correspondence with friends and with French, Dutch and English scholars, and into his prolegomena to a monumental series of editions of the Greek classics. He tells us very little about the French Revolution except the worries of getting passports and identity books—(it is a lesson in history to realise how serenely ordinary life can go on while tempests rage overhead). He was with other scholars commissioned by Napoleon to undertake

¹ Byron in his notes to *Childe Harold* insists that he was not born at Smyrna but at Chios.

a translation of Strabo; and he gives in his letters an amusing glimpse of his compulsory appearance at the imperial court (1805):¹ "The Hero is anxious to see the end of our task; and we had to make a personal presentation, and as far as I am concerned a comical presentation, of the second volume: comic because we had to be introduced in court dress and uniform. Think of me therefore dressed up in borrowed garments, with a hat as big as an umbrella, and with a great sword which kept getting between my legs and tripping me up. Imagine me if you can without laughing."

There is also an amusing example of the Socratic way in which he applies political principles to the details of ordinary life. He is commenting on a passage in the *Republic* in which Plato describes how under an unrestrained democracy even "the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty."² "I used to think," observes Koraes,³ "that this was just a joke. But I noticed that in the time of Robespierre and other 'evil cup-bearers' even the cab-drivers were, just as Plato says, drunken and ready to burst with liberty, so that they never bothered either to chasten the will to freedom in their horses, or to shout the usual 'by your leave' to anybody who came in their way." (So perhaps the manners of Parisian cab-drivers are a survival of the French Revolution.)

As a scholar Koraes anticipated the modern inter-

¹ *Apanthisma Epistolôn*, p. 134.

² *Republic* viii. 563 C; cf. Julian, *Misopogon*, 355 B.

³ *Paraineseis Politikai*, p. 256 note.

preters of classical literature, who have taught us not to regard the Greek classics as so many readers for use in the upper forms of public schools; but rather as expressions of a living body of thought which can always be related to contemporary life and interpreted afresh by every generation. Consequently he devoted as much care to the minor and later Greek authors as to the great classics, editing Heliodorus, Hippocrates, Athenaeus and Galen as well as Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides.¹ Secondly he believed and continually preached that the problems which faced the world and particularly his own countrymen at the beginning of the nineteenth century should be solved, not by blindly imitating the ancients, but by applying those principles of moral and political justice which they discovered and recorded: principles which the ancients themselves failed to apply, and therefore never attained the true end of political science which is to enable men to dwell together in unity.² Thus with the treatment of their barbarian neighbours by the ancient Greeks he favourably contrasts the practice of the Americans, who conquer the savages of their continent (he says) only in order to teach them to plough and to sow, the beginnings of all civilisation. (It is perhaps fortunate for his idealism that he did not live to see the later relations between the United States and the Indians.) In his criticism of the ancients he is particularly severe on their treatment of a conquered enemy; and his words have the pathetic majesty of neglected wisdom when we remember the fury of

¹ A testimonial to his fair-mindedness is the fact that his edition of one of St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy was afterwards reprinted by the Anglican mission at Malta. See S. S. Wilson, *Sixteen Years in Malta and Greece*, p. 277.

² *Paraineseis Politikai*, p. 150.

mutual extermination into which the Greek rebellion soon degenerated. "The victor," says Koraes, "who treats his enemy as a chattel not only sins against humanity, but changes a war which should be ended by victory, into another war of a much worse sort, into that hidden hatred which lurks in the hearts of slaves, until it finds a chance to attack the oppressor; and the violence of the attack is proportionate to the time during which the hatred has been concealed."

Because he was always opposed to the blind imitation of the Ancients it is a pity that in the language controversy the extreme purists have exalted him as a high priest of ancestor worship. Koraes originated, to some extent, the unfortunate habit of regarding the normal spoken language as something "corrupt," to be "purged" of foreign words and "degenerate formations." But in his case such an attitude was subservient to the two special objects he had in view: objects which at that time were of supreme importance for historical and political purposes. He wanted to establish the continuity of Romaic with Ancient Greek, and he wanted to fix a literary standard to express the political unity for which he was fighting.

In September 1821 Koraes wrote his prolegomena to Aristotle's *Politics*, and these took the form of a direct address of advice and exhortation to his countrymen, whose independence after six months of revolution seemed now assured. It gives in a concise form the opinions of Koraes as to the prospects and dangers of Greek independence.¹

¹ It was afterwards published separately in a popular form as a Political Admonition to the Hellenes: *Adamantios Koraë Paraineseis Politikai pros tous Ellēnas* . . . [with a German translation on opposite pages by Johann Kaspar Orelli]. Zurich, 1823.

Like all political philosophers he was haunted by the dream of escaping from the failure of existing states by starting entirely afresh. With almost Platonic enthusiasm he describes the New State, in which the Law Giver will be able to inscribe on a clean page only those statutes which are necessary for peace and happiness. But he knew very well that this delightful notion of starting entirely afresh was only a philosopher's dream,—unless a new and uncorrupted sort of man could be found to work the new institutions. He knew very well that men are more important than rules; and that is why instead of estimating the material resources of the New State he urged his countrymen to look into their own hearts.

Writing in September 1821, he was not at all anxious about the ultimate success of the Revolution, probably because he over-estimated the generosity of the Western Powers. He clearly was anxious about the capacity of his countrymen to maintain and preserve the freedom which they had earned. Again and again he reminds them that it is easier to win freedom than to keep it. The Turk whom they had driven out with the sword would creep back again in the forms of injustice and jealousy. By insidious jealousy and injustice they would enslave themselves as surely as they had been enslaved by the Turkish conqueror. He followed Plato in explaining every form of bad citizenship as a form of injustice; and every unjust citizen was at heart a Turk. If the victorious revolutionaries were jealous and quarrelsome and selfish and intolerant, they had the tyrant Turk in their souls, and were as miserably oppressed as if the armies of Turkey were still among them. The ancient Greeks had failed because, after beating back the imperialism of Asia, they had turned city against city and class against class,

wanting to enslave each other. He knew only too well, clearly and without bitterness, the dangers which awaited his countrymen;—his warnings read almost like a description of the state of Greece under the government of Kapodistrias ten years later. It was no consolation to him to know that these dangers were the very same political vices which had destroyed their illustrious ancestors. But he thought the new Greeks might succeed where the old had failed, because they had certain advantages which might school them in tolerance and in the capacity for cooperation. If they would only use these advantages; if they would only remember that the only weapon for the defeat of *tyrannia*, tyranny, was *homonoia*, concord, they might yet succeed. And that they might never forget this lesson he urged them to dedicate their principal church not to Holy Wisdom (*Agia Sofia*) but to Holy Justice, for the Justice of Plato's Republic is the same virtue as the Charity of Paul's letter to the Corinthians: and they are both "Righteousness which is the Lord's."

Of the new weapons which modern civilisation had put into the hands of the new Greeks, weapons capable of counteracting the weaknesses of human nature and of the Greek character, the chief was that of education. Intellectual Europe, awakened by the French Revolution, was then deeply stirred by the theories of the German educational revivalists Pestalozzi and Froebel; and Koraes shared the characteristic revolutionary beliefs inaugurated by Rousseau; like Godwin and Paine, like Danton and Robespierre, he had "an almost religious faith in human perfectibility."

The Greek educational revival had already played an essential part in preparing the way for the Greek revolution. Koraes believed that the effects of education were

certain, although he did not forget that they might be slow. It is very significant that he had himself neither expected nor desired the Greek revolution to break out before the middle of the century.¹ (It is possible to speculate that it might have been better for Greece if his expectation had been fulfilled, and if the Greeks had worked for another generation, under Turkish neglect instead of under Bavarian tutelage, to prepare themselves for complete self-sufficiency.) But now that the Revolution had come and though premature seemed already to have succeeded, Koraes believed that education might yet bless them with the political art of dwelling together in unity. He rightly knew that a Greek would never refuse education; and he believed that anything was possible if the new educational methods were applied in new schools and substituted in the large number of existing schools for mediaeval methods, which taught a great deal, but taught it in an atmosphere of ecclesiastical intolerance which made it worse than useless. The particular method in which Koraes believed was the *allēlodidaktikē méthodos*, the method of mutual instruction. This was the "monitorial system" invented by Dr. Andrew Bell (1753-1832) at an orphanage in Madras, where, finding it impossible to get enough teachers, he conceived the idea of getting the pupils to teach themselves or rather to teach each other. The method had been popularised by Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker (1778-1838). Dr. Bell made a fortune, and Lancastrian schools, as they were called, sprang up all over England, and spread to the Ionian Islands under the British Protect-

¹ P. Argyropoulos: *Adamantios Koraïs* . . . (Athens, 1877). Cf. *Apanthisma Epistolôn*, p. 164, which shows that in 1812 Koraes thought that "at least another 50 years of education" were required before the Revolution.

orate.¹ The method, but not unfortunately the practical and popular curriculum contemplated by Koraes; was to some extent adopted in Greece.

With the benefits of education Koraes always couples the uses of printing; he notes how Aristotle would have welcomed printing for the diffusion of knowledge; and imagines that Socrates would have been delighted to find in the newspaper press the greatest enemy of the *anexetastos bios*, the unexamined life. We can hardly blame Koraes for not knowing that the diffusion of falsehood and the defence of obscurantism are easier and more popular than the diffusion of truth. In his revolutionary optimism he was not alone in believing that when everybody could read, nobody would fail to recognise the truth, if only a sufficient number of copies were printed and circulated.

The second weapon which the Greeks would have in order to insure the preservation of their freedom was representative government. A wise selection of representatives from the middle class, without respect of birth or riches, would secure an equitable distribution of wealth and knowledge. He does not appear to have foreseen the fact that a rigid application in Greece of Western institutions might actually increase disorder by destroying the local systems of autonomy, communal and municipal, which the Turks had spared. It is curious that though he was singularly clear-sighted in detecting the weaknesses of human character, he thought it com-

¹ See also Ferriman, *Lord Guildford*, p. 84; article on Joseph Lancaster in *The Nation*, October 22 and 29, 1927; and for a vivid picture of mutual instruction at work at Levadia in 1838, William Mure, *Journal of a Tour in Greece*, i. 242 ff. Cf. Leake, *Travels in the Morea*, ii. 61, for the curriculum in 1805 at "the best school in the Morea."

paratively easy to secure political liberty by the machinery of government. He thought it better, he said, that the Greeks should have no King, for they would have all Christian Kings to be their defenders. Only if they had a King they must choose him for themselves. Their important and present duty was, he urged, to frame a constitution which should codify the liberties they had acquired. "If you want the encouragement of living witnesses," he writes to Mavrocordato on July 4, 1823, "only think that the sound part of Europe is watching you, and all the blessed nation of the Anglo-Americans. From those same English Americans you must persuade our countrymen to borrow their constitution." (He once in a letter half seriously suggested that Lafayette should be asked to come over and become president of a Greek Republic.) With representative government, goodwill, education, ecclesiastical reform, and tolerance, the Greeks might set an example to Europe. The only tyranny they had to fear was that of their own passions.

Perhaps the truth was that Koraes did not over-estimate the capacity of the Greeks; but he certainly under-estimated the stubbornness of their environment. He honestly thought that the Turk was the only "tyrant" left in Europe. Yet even in the matter of ecclesiastical reform, for instance, the Greeks, with the best will in the world, could not get their ecclesiastical independence recognised by the Patriarchate of Constantinople before 1850. (It may be noted that in the case of Bulgaria religious preceded political liberty.) It was not wholly, if at all, the fault of the Greeks that, when they asked for political freedom, they received in 1833 a Bavarian autocrat, and acquired, after ten years, a constitution which for another twenty years would not

work. Koraes thought that the constitutional monarchy of the Western powers was the last word in political liberty; and especially that constitutional monarchy as defined by the Constitutional Charter promulgated by Louis XVIII. on his restoration to the French throne in 1814 was an efficient guarantee of political liberty. "Today," he writes, "the Constitutional Charter of free nations is become one of the first lessons of a child's education; hundreds of thousands of copies of it are printed so that nearly all may read; and very soon"—that is to say when ignorance has been finally banished by the method of mutual instruction—"it will be impossible to find a single citizen who has not read it." So he wrote in 1821. But only a few years later the Constitutional Charter had been to such an extent perverted or ignored by Charles X. that, after the revolution of 1830, it had to be reaffirmed by Louis Philippe, "explicitly acknowledging the sovereignty of the people." It was then said to have become "the inalienable birth-right of the French nation": and so it was, perhaps, until it was alienated by Louis Napoleon after the revolution of 1848 and the *coup d'état* of 1851. The optimism of Koraes with regard to the French monarchy and the general "soundness" of western Europe was not unnatural. He had seen the Allies dividing Europe and dictating the invincible boundaries of peace, and he was naturally infected with their own illusions about the stability of their arrangements. Living in Paris as he did among that level-headed middle class which he had so urgently recommended to his countrymen, it was natural that he should think that the restored monarchy was a final resultant of the great clash of Revolution and Reaction which he had witnessed over the top of his books;

a permanent resultant to be prolonged for generations in a straight line of order and compromise. He could not have known that the reactionaries, so much more royalist than King Louis XVIII., were quickly making that compromise impossible. That form of optimism with regard to the stability and virtues of Western institutions was natural and indeed almost inevitable for anyone living in Paris in 1821. But there was another form of optimism peculiar to his countrymen which was shared to some extent by Koraes. This was a mysterious and ineradicable belief in the liberalism and democracy of the Western powers.¹ This belief has remained characteristic of Greek statesmen to this day. It is difficult to say that it has done more harm than good to the Greek nation for it is always possible to argue that empty hopes and sanguine expectations are as beneficial to the health of a nation as to the career of an individual. We must be content to record the fact that the belief existed although it is difficult to find in the history of diplomacy a single fact to justify that belief. In Koraes this belief can be explained by his environment. He naturally lived in a closed circle of Philhellenes and "Grecians," and was persuaded that all Frenchmen were more interested in the Greek cause than they actually were. In the case of his countrymen we may perhaps make an allowance for what has been called their "hellenocentric"² view

¹ See however *Lettres... à Chardon de la Rochette...* (1873), p. 17. Lord Strangford, in an unpublished despatch from which an extract is quoted by J. I. Manatt (*Aegean Days*, p. 328), denounces "the celebrated M. Koray, who employs his powerful abilities in encouraging his Countrymen to persist in their revolt by assuring them of the present sympathy and future support of the French Nation."

² The word is used by Lovinesco in describing the well-known pamphlet of Edmond About; but it does not appear to be used by About himself.

of the universe, which means that, rather more than other nations, they have always had a way of thinking their own affairs more important than anything else in the world. But it might be nearer the truth to suggest that their confidence in Western altruism was a false inference from the travelling nobleman, who is always more liberal abroad than he is at home, and is often himself a rebel who has shaken the dust of his own country from his feet. The Greeks saw Byron and forgot Castlereagh and Liverpool. They had never heard of Peterloo. They forgot that the Englishmen who worked for the rebirth of liberty in Europe, Byron and Shelley, were both exiles from England. A brutal foreign policy can be dictated by a charming minister: the Greeks saw only the attractive manners of the individual and forgot that States, unlike individuals, have manners indeed but no morals; for morality only begins when self-interest ceases to be the sole motive for action. They forgot that in 1817 when the people of Parga, after heroically maintaining their independence for four hundred years, had voluntarily put themselves under English protection, Castlereagh had handed them over to Ali Pasha. They would have had a saner view of the prospects of their new state if they had been able to observe more closely and more unemotionally the foreign policies of Europe, and the series of diplomatic accidents which led to the intervention of the Three Powers.

3.

When the Greek Revolution broke out the Holy Alliance, or rather the Big Three, were in session at Laibach whither they had adjourned from Troppau.

England abstained, and Castlereagh sketched the doctrine of non-intervention which was emphasised at the next Congress of Verona. They were discussing a circular proposal for the joint suppression of all revolutions:

Europe in
Congress
1821.

"States which have undergone a change of government due to Revolution, the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. . . . If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance."¹

It may be said without exaggeration that the desire of the Greeks for independence left all the Governments of Europe entirely unmoved. The Philhellenes were "cranks" as much in advance of their time as the modern intellectuals to whom international socialism seems the merest common sense. It was not only the official view, it was the normal and obvious view throughout Europe, to regard the Greeks simply as rebellious subjects of the Sultan. It was not any sympathy with Greek rebellion, but the Turkish massacres of Christians in April and May 1821, beginning with the hanging of the Patriarch Gregorios on April 22, that first attracted the notice of the Tsar, who as Protector of the Orthodox Church regarded these massacres as a personal insult to himself, while Lord Strangford (the British Ambassador at Constantinople) expressly dissociated England from his protest. Accordingly Russia's first intervention was specifically concerned with the inviolability of the Christian

¹ The "Troppau Protocol", November 19, 1820.

religion, and the demands presented by the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople in July 1821 only incidentally mentioned the Greek insurgents, in order to contemplate their submission within a given time. Russia was looking for an opportunity to confirm and extend her own rights of encroachment, spiritually in the Orthodox Church and geographically in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, while the other Powers, led by Castlereagh and Metternich, were worthily active in what is called "avoiding a European conflagration."

4.

The preparatory work of the *Etaireia* had not been very efficient. The leadership was refused in 1820 by Kapodistrias, a Greek from Corfu who had become Foreign Minister of the Tsar Alexander, probably because he knew that the time was not ripe and that Russia would not countenance revolution even against Turkey. But the opportunity seemed too good to be missed when the Turkish armies were occupied in an attack on Ali Pasha of Janina, the Sultan's Albanian Viceroy, who by subduing after many years of fighting the hillmen of Epirus had carved out for himself a semi-independent kingdom in north-western Greece. The *Etaireia* now appealed to Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, a Greek of a Fanariot family in the Russian army. Ypsilanti invaded Turkey, crossing the Pruth from Russia on March 6, 1821. He believed or professed to believe that the Tsar would support him and he probably believed that he would be welcomed by the peasants (who being Christians were not then distinguished from the Greeks by the Turkish authorities but are now known as

Rumanians). The Moldavian peasants however failed to rise because they were less conscious of their religion and of their Byzantine inheritance than of their class; they had had little reason to love their Fanariot princes, appointed by the Sultan; and it was the very same Fanariot families who now appeared as leaders of the Revolution. The local Greek officials turned against the Turks and Ypsilanti advanced to Bucarest; but when the serious fighting began he was compelled to retreat and finally, disowned by the Tsar, crossed the frontier into Austria where he was thrown into prison. The best part of his force, mountaineers from Greece and a "sacred battalion" of young Greek volunteers, were cut down trying to fight their way back to Russia, and very few escaped to return to the Morea. By the end of June the rising in the extreme north of the Greek sphere (which was then held to include the whole of Turkey in Europe) was over.

Meanwhile in the Morea the revolution less directly controlled by the *Etairia* had been completely successful. "The news of the Greeks continues to be more and more glorious," wrote Shelley from Pisa on December 11, 1821; "it may be said that the Peloponnesus is entirely free, and that Mavrocordato has been acting a distinguished part, and will probably fill a high rank in the magistracy of the infant republic." This was no rising of nominated leaders and Russian uniforms but a spontaneous explosion of the native elements some of which were already in unwilling alliance with Ali Pasha. Whether at the call of the rebellious satrap or of the *Etairia* the whole province flew to arms against the Turkish garrison. Already, Khurshid Pasha the Turkish commander having gone to blockade Ali Pasha in Janina,

there had been isolated attacks on tax-collectors and patrols when the Turkish officials took alarm and summoned the Christian authorities to assemble for the surrender of arms. But it was too late.

The mountains of Greece had always been the haunt of a semi-nomadic class of pastoral warriors, who took the name of "Klefts" from their occasional occupation of brigandage, and had never submitted to the Turkish authorities except in so far as they had themselves from time to time been invested with a sort of constabulary authority as "Armatoles"—poachers turned gamekeepers. These Klefts and Armatoles, whose exploits are recorded in the ballad poetry of Greece, had never lost the practice of arms; and when on April 6 (O.S. March 25), 1821, the Archbishop of Patras raised the standard of revolt at the monastery of Megaspélaion, their gathering in the Morea under their own captains immediately threw all the Turkish garrisons on the defensive. Of these natural leaders the most notable were Peter, head of the Mavromihalês family, hereditary chieftains of the wild Laconian clan of Manê, and Theodore Kolokotronês who added to a touch of military genius the experience he had gained as officer of a native regiment raised by Sir Richard Church in Zante. Under these leaders the fall of Kalamata, on April 4, the first great success of the rebellion in the extreme south of the Greek peninsula, balanced the failure of the cultured Ypsilanti in the extreme north. It was Kolokotrones whose knowledge of the passes enabled him to cut off the reinforcements sent by Khurshid Pasha from the north: and when Prince Demetrius Ypsilanti arrived to take up the supreme command the only Turkish troops in the Morea were closely blockaded in half a

dozen scattered fortresses (Tripolitza,¹ the Turkish capital, Navarino, Koron, Modon, Monemvasia, Korinth).

He was a stronger man than his ill-fated brother but the authority of the *Etairia* with which he was invested did not enable him to prevent the massacre of these garrisons as one by one they were forced to surrender. To these Greek and Albanian Klefts the only way to freedom seemed to be to kill all the Turks in Greece, and as the revolution proceeded they grew more and more impatient with the intellectual leaders who tried to introduce methods of "civilised" warfare, and diplomacy and constitution-mongering. By the end of the year three local senates which were seats of local faction, and fortunately did nothing to supersede the municipal administrations, were nominally dependent on a central government summoned by Ypsilanti at Argos. A constitution had been proclaimed at Epidaurus (January 1822) and Alexander Mavrocordato, a Fanariot, who had enjoyed the friendship of Shelley and Byron at Pisa, was elected president (January 1822). But his rather pedantic education and his English ideas (including honesty) made him suspect, and he enjoyed little authority except in Western Hellas (Akarnania) where he succeeded in holding Mesolonghi against the forces of Khurshid Pasha. The Turkish commander-in-chief (another of whose armies, released from Janina by the capture and execution of Ali Pasha, had been destroyed by Kolokotrones in an attempt to penetrate into the Morea in the previous

¹ C. W. Crawley quotes from the Church papers in the British Museum a letter in which the monks of Megaspelaion among their services to the Greek cause mention the sending of "two loads of valuable books to make cartridge papers at the siege of Tripolitza in 1821."

summer), finding his southward advance once more checked, poisoned himself in January 1823.

Massacre of
Chios.

More valuable to the Greeks than their constitution was their fleet, contributed by the islands of Hydra, Spetsai and Psara, small and wealthy trading communities whose merchantmen were well armed as a protection against Levantine pirates. A Greek fleet of some fifty sail under Admirals Tombazês, Miaoulês and Kanarês failed to hold command of the sea. The personal gallantry of the admirals atoned for the failings of their mercenary quarrelsome and mutinous crews, and the skilful use of fireships, with which Kanarês twice destroyed the Turkish flagships, compelled the Turkish fleet after two years of the rebellion to retreat into the shelter of the Dardanelles. They had failed however to prevent the Turkish descent in April 1822 on Chios, a rich island of mastic plantations and olive groves with a long tradition in the arts of peace, when to avenge the visit of a couple of incompetent agitators a Turkish army was landed and systematically slaughtered some 25,000 of the inhabitants and sold 45,000 into slavery. "The Turkish Expedition against Scio has been successful," wrote Lord Strangford. . . . "I have the honour to enclose a Translation of the Placard which accompanied the exhibition of Heads, Standards and other Trophies sent to the Porte by Vahid Pasha, Governor of Scio. . . . The fury of the Turkish Troops was not to be restrained, and the greater part of that delightful Island, and all its flourishing and interesting establishments have been converted into a scene of most unhappy desolation."¹ The Turks made a second attack after

¹ Lord Strangford's despatches of April 26 and May 10, 1822, quoted with other long extracts by J. I. Manatt.

the destruction of their flagship by Constantine Kanarés on June 18. "Scio is a desert," wrote the Ambassador on August 10; "and many years must elapse before it can hope to recover even a portion of its former prosperity."¹

The massacre of Chios was the second blow by which the infuriated Sultan Mahmud had seemed to defy the Christian powers. At the outbreak of the rebellion on April 22, 1821, he had hanged the Patriarch Gregorios, as the official responsible for the good behaviour of all Christian subjects of the empire. On that occasion a joint protest of the powers had been frustrated by the British Ambassador Lord Strangford, and though Russia had withdrawn her ambassador from Constantinople, Castlereagh and Metternich had succeeded in averting any breach either between Russia and Turkey or in the counsels of the Holy Alliance, which was in fact occupied in considering the suppression of revolutionary activity in Germany, Italy and Spain, subject always to the English doctrine of non-interference. The idea of

Reactions in
Europe.

¹ "La désolation la couvre encore: il semble que le massacre et la ruine soient d'hier," wrote Fustel de Coulanges in 1856. Yet in 1828 at the time of Fabvier's expedition C. G. Urquhart notes in his diary (unpublished: in the possession of Mr. F. F. Urquhart)—"Island beautifully cultivated like a garden—woodcocks amongst the mastic plantations—very wild." This seems to show that the mastic villages which had been spared in the first expedition, because they supplied the ladies of the Seraglio with chewing-gum, were not entirely destroyed even by the second devastation, as is usually assumed by writers following Finlay (vi. 260). On August 17, 1822, Lord Strangford was instructed to warn the Turks that "by a repetition of such deeds of blood, they will not only render all pacifick arrangements impossible, but they will leave to friendly and allied states no other alternative but to withdraw their Missions . . ."

nationalism being as foreign to political thought at the time as bolshevism was in the next century, it was quite natural to regard the Greeks as rebellious subjects whom the Sultan had a perfect right to suppress. "Our intervention, though friendly to the Greeks, was yet more friendly to the Turks, inasmuch as it was directed to a pacification calculated to limit sacrifices on their part . . ." wrote Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) in 1863, looking back on the events in which he had played an even larger part than his more famous cousin. But the massacre of Chios, with the brutal and public execution of Chiot hostages at Constantinople which followed it, shocked public opinion and made a new issue of the Greek question which had hitherto appealed to the poets rather than the governments of Europe. Even then, as the German Philhellene Wilhelm Müller had written, it seemed likely that the Tsar might "declare war only against the Porte, not a war *for* Christianity *for* humanity *for* Greece." But it was precisely this danger, that Russia using Greece as a pretext might take the disposition of Turkey into her own hands, which alarmed Metternich and Canning (who succeeded Castlereagh in August 1822). It was in order to avert a Russo-Turkish war that negotiations were initiated for the settlement of the Greek question: and Canning, who had as early as 1823 recognised the Greeks as belligerents, finally on the accession of the new Tsar Nicholas sent Wellington to Petersburg where he signed the Anglo-Russian Protocol (April 4, 1826) proposing to offer Greece a form of tributary autonomy. Metternich abstained from these proposals because he believed that only complete subjection or complete independence would guarantee Greece against Russian inter-

ference; but they were subsequently supported by France in order to prevent an Anglo-Russian control of the Levant and became the Treaty of London signed by the Three Powers on July 6, 1827. England, France and Russia pledged themselves to secure for Greece a form of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. Treaty of
London 1827.

On April 6, 1931, a statue of George Canning, presented to Greece by Mr. and Mrs. Boot, was unveiled in Athens by M. Venizelos. The real object of Canning's extremely tortuous negotiations seems to have been to consolidate his own position in England by cheating the Russians single handed of their excuse for a Turkish war. He only approached and to that extent recognised the Greek insurgents in "an attempt to discover on what terms they would submit";¹ and at the same time he tried to frighten the Turks into accepting his mediation by threatening to cooperate with the Russians. While Stratford Canning continued to negotiate with the Turks and to interview selected Greeks, the Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg to prevent any independent action by Russia, and there signed the Protocol of 1826 which was based on an alleged Greek request for English mediation which had not yet been made. After Canning's death in August and the Battle of Navarino in October 1827, Wellington became Prime Minister, and overcame all liberal opposition. Canning and
Wellington.

¹ The words belong to Mr. Crawley (*Greek Independence*, p. 29) who applies them however only to a single incident. Mr. Lytton Strachey in his *Portraits in Miniature* (1931; p. 125) adorns Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian Ambassador, with an old embroidery which does not deserve to survive—that "it was possibly owing to her influence . . . that Canning obtained the premiership, and it was certainly owing to her efforts that the Treaty of London was signed in 1827, by which the independence of Greece became an accomplished fact" [*sic*].

in his Cabinet (1828) only to find himself entangled in the terms of his own protocol and dragged at the heels of the Russians: unless he followed they would advance alone, and having advanced and made peace in Persia (February 1828) they would now make Greece into their own protectorate and so complete their encirclement of the Turkish Empire. /

6.

Greek
jealousies. While these currents of international policy were setting far above their heads the Greeks were doing anything rather than consolidate their early successes in the Morea. The personal jealousies of the leaders were intensified by and to some extent originated in local patriotisms, which were never forgotten in Greek politics except under the urgency of immediate danger. The balance of power was held for a time by an alliance in the central government of the Fanariot Greeks from Constantinople (Mavrocordato and Ypsilanti) with the Hydriot traders and shipowners (Kountouriotēs), but their authority was never unquestioned and was sometimes openly defied by the chiefs of the Morea, whether Kleftic leaders such as Kolokotronēs or territorial magnates such as Zaimēs; by leaders from the Greek mainland (Rumeliots) such as Kollettēs, who was well fitted to enter into the party game at the seat of government by the education he had acquired at the court of Ali Pasha; and by the wholly unprincipled Odysseus Androutsos who frankly played for his own hand in Eastern Hellas and made peace with the Turks whenever it suited him; (Odysseus was the noble savage without any nonsense about honour or patriotism in whom Tre-

lawny found a boon companion and a brother-in-law). Kolokotrones, a military chief frankly impatient of constitutional procedure, actually kidnapped the executive committee of the Government and ruled the Morea from his stronghold at Nauplia. When the rump of the National Assembly appointed a new Executive Committee he set up his own Government and was only defeated by an alliance in power of Islanders with Kollettes who introduced bands of Rumeliot mercenaries to seize the strongholds of Nauplia and Tripolitza.

Such was the situation when on January 5, 1824, Byron landed at Mesolonghi, still held for the central government by Mavrocordato. There he died of fever three months later. His counsel would have been of more value to the Greeks than his European prestige, more valuable perhaps than the first instalment of the loan he had brought from London for the Greek Government. The allocation of this money to the needs of the fleet excited the jealousy of the Moreots and Klefts but their rebellion was again suppressed by the alliance of Kollettes and Kountouriotos.

Byron at
Mesolonghi
1824.

For four years from the beginning of the rebellion the Greeks, in spite of their divisions, had successfully held the Morea and a great part of continental Greece against all the forces of the Turkish Empire. The Sultan now appealed to his vassal Mehemet Ali, Khedive of Egypt, offering him the island of Crete and promising to make his son, Ibrahim, Pasha of the Morea if he would crush the rebellion. Miaoules, whenever his crews consented to put to sea, fought many gallant actions but made very little impression on the Egyptian fleet; and in February 1825 Ibrahim with a well-equipped Egyptian army, after subduing Crete, landed in the

south of the Morea almost unopposed. Kolokotronis was recalled from imprisonment but Ibrahim soon drove the Greek forces into the hills and ravaged at his will all the open country of the Morea except the corner in the north-west where the Government showing its better qualities still held on.

7.

Coincident with the descent of Ibrahim on the Morea a new Turkish army of 20,000 men under Reshid Pasha Kiutayeh had been prepared to advance from the north, and at the end of April 1825 arrived before Mesolonghi which was held by a garrison of 4000 men under N. Botzarès. Although the town was defended only by a few low earthworks Reshid made no progress and the blockade only became effective two months later when the Egyptian fleet arrived from Patras with small gun-boats which invested the town from the lagoons while his own artillery kept up a bombardment from the north. At the end of July in heavy attacks which were kept up for a week the Turks failed to storm the defences of the town: twice they seized and twice they were ejected from one of the outer bastions. The Greek defenders had only two kegs of powder left when Miaoules arrived, dispersed the Egyptian fleet and landed food and ammunition. In September the garrison were bold enough to make successful sallies against the Turkish camp. In October Reshid, his army reduced to 3000 men, withdrew to the hills. But the Turkish fleet returning regained command of the harbour, and in November Ibrahim arranged with Reshid that the Egyptian army should join forces with the Turks. Meanwhile however

the Greek Government had raised enough money to refit the fleet and in January 1826 Miaoules again appeared off Mesolonghi, defeated the Turkish and Egyptian fleets and had landed provisions for another two months before his Hydriot sailors clamouring for pay compelled him to sail home and once more leave the command of harbour and lagoons to the Turks. In February and March Ibrahim and his Egyptian storm troops were repulsed again and again from the inland defences but with the help of the Turkish gunboats had captured some island forts from the lagoons. By April, Miaoules having returned but failed to break through the Turkish and Egyptian fleets, the garrison were starving, and a plan was concerted for a band of Klefts to distract the Turks with an attack from the mountains while the garrison with the non-combatants in their midst cut a way out through the Turkish lines and escaped into the hills. The plan was betrayed, and, when at midnight on April 22 the sortie began, those who broke through fell into an ambush of Ibrahim's cavalry from whom only a few hundred escaped, while those who were following were caught by a bombardment and driven back into the town where they were cut down in the darkness by the Turkish troops.

Fall of Mesolonghi 1826.

Ibrahim boasted a trophy in Mesolonghi of 3000 heads. But every stage in the defence had been followed by Philhellenes all over Europe (who seem to have introduced at this time the practice of marking positions on a map with little coloured flags)¹ and the Greek Government, now by another shift of parties presided

¹ See Stendhal, *Armance* (1827) Ch. 20. "Il prend une carte de la Grèce; en la dépliant, il fait tomber une de ces aiguilles garnies d'un petit drapeau rouge, avec lesquelles Armance marquait les positions des Turcs lors du siège de Missolonghi."

over by Zaimes, owed to the fall of Mésolonghi and the savagery of Ibrahim a stream of distinguished volunteers and abundant supplies of money, which so raised its reputation that it regained on the very heels of Reshid's victorious army the allegiance of many of the wavering Klefts of Continental Greece. The army was reorganised by General Gordon, Sir Richard Church and Colonel Fabvier; the navy by Lord Cochrane (not a volunteer but retained by the Greek Government at an exorbitant cost) and by Captain Hastings, a gunnery expert, generous, brilliant and unappreciated.

Church and Cochrane, with Greek forces under Karaiskakês, who was killed, failed disastrously to rescue the garrison of Athens now besieged by Reshid (June 1827). They had been more successful in their attempts to reconcile for a time the conflicting factions among the Greeks, who had now complicated their own territorial allegiances by a new cross-division of parties professing to reflect the rival influences of the Great Powers: thus Kolokotrones and the Moreots claimed Russian support, Kollettes and the Rumeliots French, Mavrocordato with Miaoules and the Islanders English. A new National Assembly met at Troezen and in April 1827 elected Count Kapodistrias President of Greece, a signal victory of the "Russian" party. The factions soon broke up into anarchy more chaotic than before. In July the twin citadels of Nauplia, occupied by rival Klefts, were bombarding each other over the heads of the futile senators, while Ibrahim issuing from winter quarters in the south was again ravaging the Morea opposed only by the valiant Kolokotrones (who fortunately conducted military operations not less energetically than he had forced the decisions of the

Assembly), and by the naval adventures of Captain Hastings in his steamship *Karteria*.

England, France and Russia were now trying to stop hostilities in accordance with the Treaty of London. On October 20, 1827, the Allied fleets under Admiral Codrington, instructed in accordance with the Treaty of London to impose an armistice without using force and to cut off the supply of Turkish munitions "*sans toutefois prendre part aux hostilités*," sailed into the harbour of Navarino, and having been openly defied by Ibrahim, were led into an action which ended in the total destruction of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets. Navarino
1827.

The Duke of Wellington however who became Prime Minister in January 1828 at once withdrew from any joint action which might appear hostile to Turkey: only after Russia had declared war on Turkey in the following April, did England and France between them—England by negotiation in Egypt (August 6, 1828) France by a military display under General Maison (July 19, 1828)—persuade Ibrahim to remove his troops from the Morea (October 1828); and only then—after Russia had not without considerable difficulty concluded the campaign and imposed on Turkey the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829)—they joined Russia in negotiations which led to the acceptance by Turkey of the London Protocol of March 22, 1829, by which a very small Greece (Arta to Volo,¹ without Crete or Samos) was to be an autonomous but tributary state under an hereditary prince. These terms had been

¹ The Turks had still been trying to hold northern Greece; but they had been strategically driven out of Akarnania by the winter campaign of Sir Richard Church; and a force of Albanians advancing on Athens were finally defeated (September 25, 1829) by Prince Demetrius Ypsilanti.

Greek Inde-
pendence
1830.

embodied in the Adrianople Treaty; but were modified by a later Protocol (February 3, 1830) to complete independence. To compensate for this added dignity the proposed frontiers were withdrawn so as again to exclude the provinces of Aetolia and Akarnania, the Duke of Wellington thinking that if Greece must be quite independent, so as not to be a vassal of Russia, she should be as small as possible so as not to be a danger to Turkey.¹ It was the exclusion of these north-western provinces and of Crete together with the scrupulously discouraging reports of Kapodistrias which seem to have caused Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg to refuse the throne which was offered to him at the same time.

8.

Kapodistrias
1828-1831.

Kapodistrias had landed in Greece to take up his new office, officially recognised by the Powers, in January 1828, and had immediately reorganised all the services of the Government, taking care however to concentrate in his own hands a power based on the support of the Russian Admiral Ricord and the armed forces of the "Russian" Kolokotrones. In August 1829 the leaders most devoted to honest and constitutional procedure, such as Mavrocordato and the Islanders, refused places in the new Senate which was packed with the nominees of the President. In the following year when the attention of the Great Powers was distracted by liberal movements in other parts of Europe, the opposition grew in strength; and after the Turks had at last evacuated northern Greece in January 1831, it included all parties

¹ On the first news of the fall of Adrianople however the Duke in a panic had snatched for a moment at Lord Aberdeen's notion of building up a great Greek empire as a substitute for the Turkish.

except the Moreot Klefts. So tactless was the austere autocracy of the President that in July 1831 the liberal opposition, not without French and English sympathy, seceded and set up a Provisional Government in the islands, and Miaoules seized the Greek fleet and blew it up rather than surrender it to the Russian Admiral Ricord. A little later Kapodistrias tried to subject to his bureaucracy even the incorrigible Maneots. He imprisoned and insulted the proud, the simple, the fiery Peter Mavromihales, who went to intercede for his rebellious tribesmen. On the morning of October 9, 1831, he was murdered on his way to church by George and Constantine Mavromihales, son and brother of Peter. Kapodistrias was a better man than many of his critics; "He seems to work for a world composed of beings as perfect as himself" Nesselrode had written of him in 1821. But he was maddened by the nemesis of overwork that attends those conscientious ministers who do everything themselves and are so intent on perfection in detail that they have no time for vision or judgement; and he had not the imagination to understand that Greeks would never submit to a tyranny, even if it were less corrupt than some of the political methods it superseded.

The successors of the official Government, presided over by Kapodistrias' incompetent brother Agostino, at Nauplia, and of the liberal opposition Government transferred from Hydra to Megara and now strengthened by the accession of Kollettes and his Rumeliots, were still defying each other when in March 1832 arrived news of the selection as King of Greece of Otho, second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. Kollettes immediately invaded the Morea, Agostino left the country; and at

King Otho
1832.

Nauplia the Residents of the Powers arranged a governing committee in which the nominal power and presidency were held by Kollettes—a government of Rumeliot mercenaries and French protection which was hated by all other political parties, not to mention the unfortunate inhabitants, and had no authority outside the walls of Nauplia which was occupied by French troops. On May 7, 1832, the three Powers signed a Treaty with Bavaria settling the conditions under which Otho accepted the throne of Greece—the frontiers of which had again been advanced by the efforts of Palmerston and Stratford Canning so as to include Aetolia and Akarnania (from Arta to Volo) but still excluded Thessaly and Crete. In July conditions were ratified by a National Assembly meeting outside Nauplia before it was broken up by the unpaid Rumeliots, who, after severe fighting which continued till the end of the year, were driven out of the Morea by the patriarchal rule of Kolokotrones. The rest of Greece, those of the inhabitants who were still alive, continued to govern themselves, and, hoping that a King would be less oppressive than they had found parties and constitutions, joined in the general welcome to the young Bavarian Otho when he landed at Nauplia on February 6, 1833 —“a fair young man, with a good figure, but a plain unmeaning countenance.”

II.

THE BAVARIAN PROTECTORATE: 1833-1843

I.

THE misery of the Greek people who ingenuously welcomed the dawn of independence in 1833 was an undeniable proof of their love of political liberty. Under the Turks they had suffered indeed from insecurity but they had remained a nation with a civilisation of their own; their own institutions, their own schools, their own elders (*démogerontes*) or aristocracy (*arhontes*) who were frequently admitted to be the advisers if not exactly the masters of the Turkish magistrate appointed by the Sultan. Their civilisation was an affair of heroic pride and elaborate custom combined with such dirt and discomfort as accorded with the mediaeval teaching of the Orthodox Church; carried on in villages that were grouped round stone built houses, ancient towers and Latin fortresses; and supported by a considerable volume of overland and overseas export. It is hardly too much to say that the whole material framework of this self-sufficient civilisation had been swept away by eleven years of rebellion and civil war. The strong places and churches had been destroyed by bombardment or explosion; the villages were burnt to the ground, the fields and vineyards uncultivated, the olive trees cut down,

The Greek people.

and the survivors starved among the ruins which they hardly dared to rebuild: for anything that had escaped from the accidents of warfare or Ibrahim's campaigns of deliberate destruction was a prey for the hordes of irregulars to whom robbing Greeks was as natural as killing Turks. Only amid this desolation some traditions of municipal autonomy persisted, and survived even the bureaucracy of Kapodistrias, which had ignored them, in order to preserve here and there a semblance of order in the anarchy that followed his death. Unfortunately these native institutions were again contemptuously ignored by the Bavarian régime which arrived with King Otho, just as the Greeks themselves were ignored by the officials of the Bavarian regency and their hangers on. In 1834 Athens, where a new palace was built for the King (and thanks chiefly to King Louis of Bavaria it was not built on the Akropolis), became the capital of a governing class who if they were not Bavarians were Philhellenes Scotch Swiss or French who had come to prove their love for Greece, most of them quite sincerely, by governing the Greeks. The Greeks would have been quite capable of working their own institutions which might have been gradually developed to meet the requirements of a modern state. But because they were admittedly not familiar with western methods of government and not at ease in western uniform or frock coats, they were completely ignored and became merely the subjects of a western system above their heads, which was in effect a Bavarian protectorate. Not only the Greeks themselves but their municipal institutions were ignored by the new administration, which imposed prefects, sub-prefects and demarchs (mayors) all nominated by the Ministry of the

Interior. It has been said that Greece never recovered from this western reform initiated by Kapodistrias, for its government has suffered ever since, and continues to suffer as the country expands, from excessive centralisation.

2.

This system of administration was the elaborate work of von Maurer, one of three regents who arrived with Otho and by the Treaty of the Three Powers with his father were to hold office till he came of age in 1835. They complicated by their jealousies and intrigues the small political society which was already twice divided, split up into conflicting parties not only according to territorial rivalries but also according to the influence of the Three Great Powers. Count von Armansperg, the most prominent of the three regents, who assumed most of the executive functions, was supported by the British Resident Dawkins, and after 1835 by his successor Sir Edmund Lyons. The French were still backing the resourceful Epirot Kollettes, who took the part of von Maurer, and thus the local co-operation of England and France which had supported the liberal movement against Kapodistrias was already broken up. The Russian party, still represented by Kolokotrones and his Klefts, including naturally the remains of the Kapodistrian party, and strong with the authority of the Orthodox Church, was working meanwhile for the recall of all three regents who were regarded as obstacles to the capture of the still plastic Otho. Kolokotrones, who could not aspire without action, soon found himself, with another Moreot

The
Bavarian
Government.

leader, Plapoutas, arrested, charged (by a Scotch Attorney General) with conspiracy, and sentenced to death (September 19, 1833). Fortunately the sentence was commuted and he was released three years later.

Meanwhile von Armansperg had been petitioning King Ludwig of Bavaria in whose power the appointment rested for the recall of his colleagues in the Regency; and von Maurer with the French party had sent a petition to Palmerston for the recall of the British Resident Dawkins! The result was inevitable. Palmerston advised King Ludwig to recall von Maurer; and Armansperg supported by Palmerston and Sir Edmund Lyons remained absolute ruler of Greece for three years (August 1834-1836); for when the Regency came to an end in 1835 Otho maintained him in office as "Arch-Chancellor" of a private cabinet of advisers. But at the end of 1836 Otho returned from a visit to his father with a wife, Amalia, daughter of the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, "a fresh pretty German girl," and another German official, von Rudhart, who was named Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in place of the Arch-Chancellor; but resigned a year later. The dismissal of von Armansperg, who enjoyed their complete confidence, appears to have angered Palmerston and his representative, for from that date the English party made common cause with the Russians in opposition to the protestant King.

Palmerston may have been perfectly justified in threatening King Otho with revolution and in reminding him that the Greek people had been promised a Constitution (although no Constitution or Assembly had been mentioned in the proclamation issued by the re-

gency after the landing at Nauplia).¹ But King Otho's absolute rule was not a bit less constitutional than the rule of von Armansperg who had been an autocrat, honest indeed, but without any particular policy or any particular competence, except in society. Indeed as the successors of von Rudhart in the office of Prime Minister were Greek political leaders, it might have seemed as if Otho had at last determined to temper his absolutism by accepting the advice of at least one representative of the nation.

3.

There were abundant causes of discontent to justify Discontents. the threatening advice of the British representative (who was said to combine "the manners of a well bred gentleman with the open frankness of the British seaman"). The Bavarians neglected road-making, afforestation or the rebuilding of the ruined villages; and the insecurity of the miserable peasantry was made worse by the swarms of brigands who could retire over the Turkish

¹ There is no mention of a constitution in any of the documents which secured the independence of Greece. The Convention of May 7, 1832, by which the throne was offered to Prince Otho, only notes that the Three Powers are "duly authorised for this purpose by the Greek Nation." This and similar expressions presume that the new state exists in order to secure the welfare of the Greek people; but it is not implied that they shall themselves be the best judges of their own welfare or allowed any say in the matter. It was not till the Treaty of July 13, 1863, which records, after the deposition of Otho, the "arrangements to be taken in order to give effect to the wish of the Greek nation," and confers the crown on Prince George of Denmark, that the original guarantee of national independence was supplemented by the insertion of the word "constitutional," perhaps in order to remind the new sovereign and his successors that Otho's expulsion was the result of his failure to observe the spirit of the written constitution imposed on him in 1843.

frontier if any serious attempt were made to round them up. The brigands of course were none other than the irregular troops whom the Bavarians had boldly and inevitably disbanded, although the majority of them had fought long and bravely against the Turks. But the regular troops, 5000 of whom were Bavarians, proved to be quite incapable of imposing order; and the faithful Gordon and Church seem to have been too much attached to the Klefts to display much efficiency in suppressing them. The larger bands of brigands as well as local rebellions which occurred in 1834, 1836, and 1838, had to be suppressed, on the plan of Kolletttes, by enrolling further bands of Rumeliot irregulars, who carried out the work admirably, under the command of a Swiss general; and naturally, as soon as their work was done, reverted to their ordinary recreation or livelihood of brigandage! The extraordinary levy added another transformation to the life-cycle of the Kleft, who could usually get himself enrolled in the local gendarmerie for the suppression of brigandage. Brigandage was indeed supposed to have been completely suppressed by General Gordon in 1835, but Gordon going for a shooting party was himself attacked by brigands from over the frontier; while General Church had such a fondness for the *pallêkars* that he was said to ensure the success of his campaigns by bestowing "commissions of colonel, major or captain of light infantry" on the brigand chiefs. In 1838 there were said to be about a hundred cases of highway robbery a year but in only about two of these were the victims Frank tourists. Communications were never interrupted, for the Greeks were so accustomed to brigandage that they had come to ignore the risks, which were after all, as

Mure remarks, no greater than those of fox-hunting. Yet the unhappy people grew to hate the brilliant Bavarians who seemed to be living on them instead of protecting them: and when conscription was enacted in 1838 it curiously failed to reduce the disorderly elements as it was obviously better to sleep on the mountains in a goatskin cloak like a Kleft than to wear the hated Bavarian uniform.

The suppression of the minor monasteries and the nationalisation of their land was not by any means an unpopular measure, but it was very useful as a means of political agitation to the Russian party who opposed Otho because he was not a member of the Orthodox Church; and they now joined with the English party in demanding a Constitution because they believed that Otho would never grant it. The Russian party wanted to get rid of Otho; England distrusted and disliked Otho's absolutism; the Fanariot politicians of the English party wanted a share of political power. The demand for a Constitution first raised by a few politicians interpreted the general discontent of the common people who cared little for Otho's beliefs and less for a constitution but hated the Bavarians. The Constitution 1843.

At midnight on September 14, 1843, Colonel Kallerges, a Cretan, the appointed leader of the Anglo-Russian coalition, raised in the Infantry barracks the cry of "Long live the Constitution!" The troops followed him to the Palace and refused to disperse when the King appeared. A civilian deputation explained to the King the causes of the disturbance and begged him to give his people a Constitution. At daybreak the re-

representatives of the Five Powers drove up to the Palace, but Kallerges had the tact to keep them waiting. Before the afternoon King Otho had signed a proclamation dismissing from his service all foreigners, except the old Philhellenes who had fought in the Revolution; and undertaking to summon within thirty days a National Assembly of 225 members to draw up a Constitution. He had also thanked Kallerges and his colleague Makrygiannes for their services, and the troops had made demonstrations of loyalty in front of the Palace in the great square still called after the Constitution. So on September 15, 1843, the Bavarian Protectorate came to an end and the Greeks were free to enjoy, if they could, the blessings of constitutional government.

III.

KING OTHO'S FAILURE: 1843-1863

I.

THE Anglo-Russian understanding at the court of King Otho did not last long, for as the young King tried to adapt himself to the mood of his subjects he offended England's determination that the Turkish question should not be reopened. When he dismissed his Bavarian advisers and listened to the Greeks he was supposed to have become an instrument of Russian ambitions for the disintegration of the Turkish Empire.

Constitutional Government
1843-1849.

On March 30, 1844, he took the oath to the new Constitution. His first Prime Minister, Mavrocordato, leader of the English party, was an honest believer in its value, though he probably regarded it as an ingenious English method by which additional power could be drawn from the extremities of the Kingdom and centralised in the hands of the Prime Minister. He had sincere ideals of good government and it was a testimonial to his honesty that he was soon (like Trikoupes in 1895) defeated in his own constituency of Mesolonghi; and so made way for his rival Kollettis, leader of the French party, who was the fine flower of Klefitic culture, and had been a physician at the court of Ali Pasha of Janina. On taking office he issued a programme,

very acceptable in France, all about Glory and the Reward of Heroes; and he surrounded himself with heroes for whom he was always ready to find suitable employment. In due course there was a serious revival of brigandage. Patras was sacked in 1847 by a band of Akarnanians who ought to have gone raiding into Turkey but apparently took the wrong direction. There were also the usual revolts in the Manê and conspiracies at Nauplia in the suppression of which by the use of chartered brigands Kollettes had long been an expert. When Palmerston and Sir Edmund Lyons, who were anxious about Turkey, protested against the continuance of brigandage, Kollettes in a long communication proved that no brigands existed in Greece; and this reply was regarded in Paris, as well as at Athens, as a French victory over Palmerston, for it was an open secret that it had been drafted by the French Minister. Finally the Turkish Minister left Athens, the occasion being a quarrel with King Otho at a court ball about the refusal to grant a passport to one of Kollettes' favourite frontiersmen, Karatassos, who had been given a position in the Palace. Diplomatic relations were only restored by the intervention of Russia. Kollettes died in the same year (September 6, 1847) and was succeeded by a long line of retired Klefts and Admirals who devoted themselves to managing deputies and elections and suppressing various revolts and acts of organised brigandage. When the leaders of the Akarnanian band who sacked Patras escaped in an English ship to Malta, carrying with them a large sum of Government money, the incident supported a general belief that England actually fomented these disorders. This was of course fantastic: but it is clear that Palmerston and Sir Edmund Lyons

could not miss an opportunity of showing that in their opinion there was little to choose between the Akarnanian filibusters and the Greek Government. Lyons was replaced in 1849 by Sir Thomas Wyse. But Palmerston remained to administer a severer warning in the following year.

2.

Kolletttes had introduced one admirable reform in financial administration, putting an end to the old system of farming the revenue and providing that all taxes should in future be collected by regular Government agents. For the rest he and his successors were too much occupied with the intrigues of the capital to give much attention to governing. Consequently the people were comparatively happy, making considerable progress in commerce and agriculture while their governors were exploring the possibilities of the constitutional machine. No Prime Minister after the first of them had been so surprisingly defeated in his own constituency ever doubted that the chief purpose of this highly centralised administrative system of prefects, sub-prefects, demarchs and gendarmerie, all controlled from the Ministry of the Interior, was to enable the Government to win the elections; while King Otho from the first nominated his own candidates at every election, and thus secured in practice the same control over the Chamber of Deputies as the Constitution gave him, intentionally, over the Senate: in fact as the Senators were appointed for life they were actually more independent than the Deputies who had to fear the withdrawal of royal and governmental support; and the proof that the Constitution only

existed for the convenience of the Government was that when it became inconvenient it was ignored.

The Great
Idea.

Meanwhile Otho, inspired to some extent by Kollettes and the Russian party, continued to dream of the break up of Turkey and to propagate the "Great Idea"—the doctrine that the Greek race was destined to revive the glories of the Greek empire of Byzantium; and that the small Greek state centred at Athens was only a fulcrum by the use of which the Turks were to be ejected from the Imperial throne at Constantinople. He claimed as King of Greece to enter the councils of the Great Powers and to be consulted as an equal in the solution of the Eastern Question. But the excitement of unrest on the Turkish frontier only stirred the suspicions of Turkey without pleasing Russia; while Palmerston, scenting a Russian plot, determined to humiliate the tiny state which aspired to disturb the balance of power in the Near East. As early as 1846 the French Minister Thouvenel had noted that one fine day England would realise that she had lost influence through the brutality and maladdress of Lyons; "*et c'est par un coup de violence qu'elle reprendra sa position.*"

1850 On January 17, 1850, Palmerston launched an ultimatum demanding the settlement within twenty-four hours of all the claims that could possibly be raised against Greece, seven in all, including a claim of George Finlay, the historian, for compensation for a piece of land enclosed in the gardens of the Palace, and a claim of Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew from Gibraltar, for damages sustained in riots at the Piraeus. The other

claims appeared to be merely vexatious and were subsequently dropped. The British fleet then blockaded the Piræus and seized not only a Greek warship but also several merchantmen which were of course private property. Russia and France both intervened, but it was only on February 12 that Palmerston consented to accept the good offices of France which were offered with rather malicious readiness. A special French envoy came to Athens; but his award was rejected by Sir Thomas Wyse and the blockade was renewed. On the following day, April 27, the Greek Government paid the full amount as dictated by Sir Thomas Wyse. Meanwhile on April 19 Palmerston had agreed with the French Ambassador in London on a much larger sum; and it afterwards appeared that Sir Thomas Wyse had actually been aware of this impending agreement as early as April 24. In spite of that he had renewed the blockade. The British Government appeared to prefer a smaller sum (180,000 drachmae) extorted by blockade to a larger sum (250,000 francs) arranged by French intervention. The French Government withdrew their Ambassador from London, and Palmerston's attitude was censured in the House of Lords, after which he agreed to accept after all the French arrangement signed in London on April 19. But in the House of Commons, in a famous speech, he successfully maintained (by 46 votes) the majesty of Don Pacifico as a British subject. The greater part of Don Pacifico's claim for the alleged destruction of certain documents was subsequently reduced by a mixed commission sitting at Lisbon from £26,618. 16. 8. to £150. Not unnaturally King Otho became more popular than he had ever been before, and the Russian party more influential.

Palmerston
and Don
Pacifico.

4.

The Crimean
War.

A greater than Palmerston, Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and British Ambassador at Constantinople, was preparing to compel Europe to acknowledge British supremacy in the Near East. He had seen a generation pass since the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 8, 1833) and he believed that Russia using Greece as an advanced base was preparing another great offensive against the independence of the Turkish Empire. When a quarrel arose about the custody of the Holy Places in Palestine between Orthodox monks and the Roman Catholic monks, whose ardent champion, Louis Napoleon, was still feeling rather small for his imperial robes, Russia took occasion to claim a protectorate over all the Orthodox Christians in Turkey; and the Turkish resistance, supported if not prompted by Lord Stratford, involved England in the Crimean War, which broke out on March 27, 1854.

The professed object of the War had been transferred by the British ultimatum from Palestine to the Danubian principalities, which had been invaded by Russian forces. Essentially it was a struggle to preserve the neutrality of Turkey by checking Russian pretensions which had been so patiently acquired and were based largely on prestige at Constantinople. At Athens however the religious problem was taken quite seriously. The Russian Orthodox party believed that all the Christians in Turkey were Greeks and that all Greeks would claim Russian protection for the sake of their religion; and that at the name of Russia or of Greece, all the Christians in Turkey would rise as themselves had risen in 1821. King

Otho saw his chance and flung himself into the arms of the Russian party.

During the winter of 1853 the King and Queen Amalia threw off all disguise of neutrality; there were demonstrations at the Opera, where the King, as always, wore Greek dress, and Crusaders bearing the Russian cross of St. Andrew were cheered and Saracens in the likeness of Turks were hissed off the stage. The Court openly patronised the formation of bands of irregulars which left for the frontier in order to undertake the annexation of Thessaly and Epirus. On January 27, 1854, Epirus was invaded and Turkish forces defeated at Peta and Five Wells. In February Hadji Petros crossed the Thessalian frontier at Lamia. In March Grivas entered Metzovo. Relations between the court and the legations were already so strained that those who wished to be well with the court would not visit the British Minister. King Otho's own court officials, who were for the most part notable Klefts, like Tsavellas and Karatassos, resigned their appointments and left to join the insurgents; and they were followed by all the students from the University and the Attorney General. On March 19 a Turkish ultimatum, supported by the Four Powers, demanded the recall of the insurgent bands; diplomatic relations were broken off, and as no satisfactory answer was received, Turkey began to expel all Greeks from Constantinople and Smyrna (April 16). At about the same time the raiders were driven back from Five Wells. Grivas was defeated at Metzovo and retired to Thessaly, the Thessalian forces were defeated at Domoko, and Karatassos, who had effected a landing near Salonica, had his ammunition sunk by a French cruiser. The more sober part of the Greek population, the middle class

which was now beginning to arise, "with its three hundred vessels in the Turkish trade," was not anxious to lose its relations with Turkey for so little accomplishment. They were supported by men like Admiral Kanares and General Kallerges, who had taken the place of Kollettas as the favourite of the French and had just returned from Paris where he had advised Louis Napoleon to depose Otho without more ado. Alternatively the Emperor had offered to send a regiment of French bayonets to strengthen the hands of Otho against the fanaticism of his orthodox subjects. Otho did indeed make some attempt to conciliate influential opinion. General Church was restored to all his military honours and together with Kallerges was the first time for many years invited to dinner at the Palace. But Otho was sustained against French notes and English threats to garnish his revenues by a more glorious vision than that of immediate success or of his subjects' approval. He saw Greece, himself that is to say in his Greek uniform all embroidered with silver, as the equal partner of Russia in the liquidation of the Turkish Empire.

The Allied Ministers at Athens might have saved themselves a lot of trouble if they had been able to publish for his benefit and that of the Orthodox party in Greece the record of a conversation between the Tsar and the British Ambassador at Petersburg in the spring of the previous year. "I never will permit," said the Tsar Nicolas, "an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful State: still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little Republican asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis and other revolutionists of Europe."

In May 1854 French and English troops occupied the Piræus in order to enforce Greek neutrality. A cabinet was formed under the old leader of the English party, Mavrocordato (who finally retired from public life in October 1855), with the anti-dynastic Kallerges as Minister for War, which resumed relations with Turkey, and failed to deal with the alarming outbreak of brigandage resulting as usual from the dispersal of the frontiersmen. The occupation was prolonged till February 27, 1857, and the presence of the French troops immensely increased King Otho's popularity.

On February 25, 1856, the belligerents at last met in Paris and a month later signed the Treaty which ended the Crimean War and guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in terms almost identical with the suggestion for an Anglo-Russian understanding which the Tsar Nicolas had given to Lord Aberdeen when he visited London in 1844. Greece was not forgotten. In the Protocol of the subsequent conferences the Three Powers concerned referred to the "anarchy" and "deplorable situation" of the "Kingdom which they had created," and they recorded the fact "that no one has contested the necessity of seriously deliberating as to the means for improving the situation of Greece and that the Three Protecting Courts have recognised the importance of coming to an understanding among themselves in this respect." The only result of this resolution was that a Financial Commission met at Athens in February 1857 which did not finish its deliberations till May 1859. Its report was not communicated to the Greek Government till November and not published till 1860. The Three Powers decided that Greece was to pay an

annual sum of £36,000 instead of interest on their loan.

In 1858 King Otho celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession and touched the summit of his popularity. Four years later, owing to a variety of causes, he was driven from his country and few regretted his departure; for his strange secretiveness made it difficult for anyone to love or even to defend him. First of all in 1859 came the revolutionary war in Italy, in which Otho took the wrong side; while the Greek people were fermenting in sympathy with the insurgent Italians, many of whom had found an asylum in Greece, Otho wanted to offer Austrian merchantmen the protection of the Greek flag. And when in the following year the exploits of Garibaldi in conquering the kingdom of Naples made his people less than ever inclined to tolerate the suppression of all civil liberty by the loyalist ministry of Athanasios Miaoules, they only suggested fresh schemes for the propagation of rebellion in Turkey (one of which was planned by the irrepressible Karataşos) to Otho and his Queen, who earned innumerable rebukes from the Great Powers concerned.

The Succession.

Secondly, there was the question of succession. No Bavarian prince having entered the Orthodox Church, the throne had been legally without an heir since 1844 when the Constitution had enacted that the successor "must profess the religion of the Orthodox Eastern Church." At the same time a decree of the National Assembly had conferred the regency on Queen Amalia in case of the successor's minority. Bavaria thought that Otho would be able to modify the relevant article of

the Constitution and that in any case the Three Powers should be obliged, under the Treaty of 1832 and the Convention of 1833, to guarantee the Bavarian succession. But Queen Amalia much preferred the letter of the Constitution, on which depended her rights of regency; especially as another article of the Constitution authorised Otho, in the absence of an heir, to name his own successor, with the consent of two-thirds of the Chamber and Senate. She hoped that Otho would exercise this right in favour of her own brother, and thus exclude Bavaria from the succession; and as her brother, Prince Peter of Oldenburg, was thought to be capable of a change of religion (for which the princes of the Bavarian house had definitely expressed their disinclination), she was supported by the phil-Orthodox, Great Idea Party, whose methods of agitation increased the general unrest. She thus alienated the Bavarian Court, while the Three Protecting Powers were more than ordinarily irritated by Otho's refusal to take any action in accordance with the Constitution. The whole question was discussed and agitated throughout the country, much to the detriment of the Bavarian dynasty.

Thirdly, the people had begun to realise that representative government gave them no real liberty, no power of expressing their own opinion, as long as it was worked from above by what they called "the System". The elections of 1859 were so scandalously manipulated by the "recommendation" of Government candidates, that when the Chamber met the Opposition succeeded in electing their own candidate Zaimes as President of the Chamber. Otho dissolved the Chamber, and in the new elections "Nomarchs, eparchs, gendarmerie, tax-collectors, custom officials, judges, magis-

Representa-
tive Govern-
ment.

trates, schoolmasters, demarchs, forest guards and rural policemen" were mobilised in order to secure the return of certain candidates and the exclusion of the sixty-two who had voted for Zaimes. Finally even demarchs, or mayors (who were of course Government officials), were elected in such numbers that "Dissolution of the Chamber of Mayors" became as common as "Abolition of the System" as a revolutionary demand.

When the "Chamber of Mayors" met, on February 27, 1861, a revolution began to kindle. In May there was a military plot. In September an attempt to assassinate Queen Amalia. In November a military plot to kidnap Otho on his return from Karlsbad. Miaoules tendered his resignation, but remained in office when the popular Kanares failed to form a ministry. On February 13, 1862, there was a revolt of the garrison of Nauplia, followed by minor outbreaks at Argos, Tripolitza, Kyparissia and Syra; it was suppressed by the Swiss philhellene General Hahn, and the surrendered ringleaders were deported, at their own request, in a British cruiser. On June 7, on English advice, a new ministry was formed: but as the new prime minister, G. Kolokotrones, the Marshal of the Court, belonged to the phil-Orthodox and anti-British party it was clear that Otho had no intention of turning from the Great Idea to thoughts of constitutional reform. In fact he had hopes of engaging Garibaldi himself for the organisation of the next rising in Turkey.

1862. On October 13, Otho and Amalia set out for a tour round the Peloponnese.¹ Three days later, at Kalamata,

¹ The commandant of the Royal Yacht, Leonidas Palaskas, left a most interesting and detailed journal of the tour—*Ta symvanta tou Oktōbriou 1862 epi tou Basilikou Atmodromēnos Amalias* which was printed in Athens in 1882.

they heard that an insurrection in Akarnania, of which they had been forewarned by the British Minister, had actually broken out. There was a rapid outbreak of Provisional Governments at Vonitza (under the veteran Kleft Theodore Grivas), at Mesolonghi, at Patras. On October 22, at night, the Athenian garrison revolted, and nobody troubled to order the arrest of the conspirators. A Provisional Government was formed, Boulgares, Kanares, and Roufos, which proclaimed the deposition of Otho, and reassured the Powers by declaring its intention of "maintaining the Monarchical Constitution." When the royal yacht returned from an enthusiastic welcome at Kalamata it was obviously impossible for the King and Queen to land at the Piraeus where the Royalist commandant had just been shot by his own soldiers. Otho was visited on board by the diplomatic corps. The next morning, October 24, not before the crew of the royal yacht had shown signs of fraternising with the insurgents, who were signalling with red flags from the beach, Otho went on board a British cruiser. From H.M.S. *Scylla*, in the roads of Salamis, he issued to the Greek people a short proclamation in which he announced his resolve, in order to avoid further bloodshed, to quit "for the present" a land which he had cordially loved, and for whose welfare he had laboured unceasingly for nearly thirty years. He died four years later in complete obscurity, in so far as complete obscurity could be attained by anyone who insisted on wearing Greek dress in the middle of Bavaria.

Departure of
Otho and
Amalia.

IV.

KING GEORGE: 1863-1886.

I.

THE British Government accepted the accomplished fact of Otho's departure with considerable equanimity. Lord Russell's first remark to Trikoupes on hearing of the Revolution (October 29, 1862) was that "he hoped there would be no incursions on Turkish territory"; and he informed Bavaria, which was making mild efforts to preserve the dynasty, that the Treaty of London of May 1832 "gave a guarantee to Greece under the sovereignty of Otho, but no guarantee to Otho personally"; and that Great Britain would never maintain Otho on the throne "against his own people and in spite of any faults that he might commit." In Greece the Provisional Government proceeded with the arrangements for a National Assembly and for the election by plebiscite of a national monarch; while the new popularity of England, as the champion of civil liberty, expressed itself in the nomination of Prince Alfred, second son of Queen Victoria. England was chiefly concerned to exclude the Russian candidate, a nephew of the Tsar, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, who was also supported by France, and the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg was kept busy collecting evidence to prove that the Duke of Leuchtenberg, in

Prince Alfred
and the Duke
of Leuchten-
berg.

spite of his Bavarian father and domicile, was still regarded as a Prince of the Russian Imperial family.

The Russian Vice-Chancellor Gorchakov, asked directly whether the Duke was "in the sense contemplated by the Treaty" a prince of the Imperial family, replied that the question was "susceptible of juridical discussion":—"it was moreover a question which might never arise at all." When further pressed he referred to the danger of discouraging in the Greeks any display of monarchical inclinations and "driving them into Republican notions"; finally he turned and accused England of failing in neutrality; he was deeply shocked to hear that the English admiral at the Piraeus had saluted the revolutionary flag and thus officially recognised the Provisional Government; he mentioned the rumour that at Zante and elsewhere there had been fraternisation between English officers and the revolutionaries. To which the English Ambassador Lord Napier could only reply that "the notion of an English officer fraternizing with the Greek populace was too 'bizarre' to deserve serious credit." A fortnight later the demonstrations in front of the British Legation at Athens having continued to grow in size and enthusiasm Gorchakov realised that nothing could prevent the election of Prince Alfred and accordingly hastened to declare (December 4) that Russia maintained "in all its force and value" the protocol of February 3, 1830, excluding from the Greek throne any member of the reigning houses of the Three Powers; and a joint declaration to this effect, pointing out that the election of either Prince Alfred or the Duke of Leuchtenberg would be considered null and void, was only handed to the Greek Government on December 15, 1862, the very day on which the result of the plebi-

scite was announced with Prince Alfred at the top of the poll by an enormous majority.¹ It was a diplomatic triumph for England which was worth the trouble of finding a substitute for Prince Alfred. Shortly afterwards England informed the Greek Government of her readiness to give Greece the Ionian Islands (which had been under English protection since 1815) on the understanding that the Greek people should maintain a constitutional monarchy and definitely "abandon an aggressive policy towards Turkey."

Ever since Gladstone's visit to Corfu and Athens in 1858 reports of the cession of the Ionian Islands had been in the air, and these reports had been journalistically associated with Prince Alfred when he visited Athens as a midshipman in 1859. The National Assembly proceeded unabashed on February 3, 1863, to ratify the election of Prince Alfred and then broke up into armed factions calling themselves "men of the mountain" and "men of the plain" while the clan of Mavromihales began to interest themselves in a Bavarian proposal to restore Otho. The triumvirs of the Provisional Government were divided in their allegiance, but order was restored by the officials of the National Assembly and a new Government was formed under Balbes. On March 30 it was announced that England (after vainly approaching Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg, widower of Queen Maria of Portugal, and all other available members of the house of Coburg, and after

¹ The exact figures are worth recording: Prince Alfred 230,016. Duke of Leuchtenberg 2400. An Orthodox King 1917. The Emperor of Russia 1841. A King 1763. Prince Napoleon 345. Prince Imperial of France 246. A Republic 93. Prince Amedeo of Italy 15. Count of Flanders 57. Prince William of Denmark 6. Prince Ypsilanti 6.

warning the Greek people that they must be sure to elect a Prince "of mature years and of some experience with the world"), had at last found them a King in the person of a sixteen year old naval cadet, Christian William George, a prince of the Danish Royal House, who was duly elected King of the Hellenes by the National Assembly.

2.

The new arrangement was formalised in a Treaty between the Three Powers and Denmark on July 13, 1863, which declared in the preamble that Greece "under the guarantee of the three courts forms a monarchical, independent and constitutional state." It seems clear that the emphasis in this and subsequent Treaties on the "constitutional" nature of the Greek state was intended to imply a King who would be a mere figure-head and would, it was supposed, be less likely to pursue a policy of expansion or become "the symbol and precursor of revolutionary disturbance." It further stipulated that his successors should be Orthodox, that the crowns of Greece and Denmark should never be united, and that the date of his majority could be hastened by the National Assembly. It provided handsomely for his Privy Purse; for each of the Three Powers relinquished in his favour £4,000 a year out of the sums which the Greek Government had agreed in 1860 to pay annually in lieu of interest; while England promised to advise the Ionian Government to reserve for him £10,000 a year out of the Island revenues.

King George
I. 1863.

Meanwhile fighting had again broken out in the streets of Athens: the opposition bombarded the Government fortified in the Palace, and order was only

restored and maintained by the National Assembly and the municipal authorities, who dismissed the army from the capital and governed the country for the next four months, until King George landed in Greece on October 30, 1863. In the following June he formally took over the government of the Ionian islands (of which Corfu and Paxos had meanwhile been declared neutral and their fortifications destroyed), after a journey through the Peloponnese in the course of which he was able to see for himself a good half of his realm "still lying waste from the ravages of Ibrahim Pasha thirty years before" where as yet "only mud huts had been raised on the ruins of towns and villages." On November 20, 1864, King George took the oath to the new Constitution, which provided among other amendments that in future municipal authorities were to be elected by ballot instead of being appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. This Constitution (with the exception of Article 83, creating a Council of State nominated by the Crown, which was abolished in the following year) could only be revised after ten years if three-quarters of the Chamber in two successive legislatures demanded the revision of specific articles. When a long overdue revision was undertaken in 1910 these conditions were not observed.

3.

Rebellion in
Crete 1866-
1869.

The hopes of a modest and contented little Greece were soon falsified however by the first of a series of events outside the Kingdom, which began to inflame the fever of nationalism; the first of a long series of disturbances which kept the centre of Greek political interest outside the frontiers of the Kingdom throughout

the long reign of King George. In 1866 an insurrection broke out in Crete, which chiefly by the influence of the Duke of Wellington had been excluded from the new Greek Kingdom in 1830. The islanders proclaimed their union with Greece, where the Governments of Boulgares and Koumoundouros maintained a precarious neutrality, and were only suppressed by Omar Pasha after two years of bitter warfare. All the Powers had supported a French proposal for the union of the island to Greece (March 30, 1867), but England would not hear of it, English opinion still firmly believing that the rising was the work of Russian agitators. King George, though he married in October 1867 the Russian Grand Duchess Olga, was himself eminently pacific; but he could not control the passions of his subjects, and there was the usual flow of klefts and irregulars from Greek harbours to Crete, even after the Cretans had themselves been amnestied and granted by the Sultan the "Organic Statute" of 1868, conferring certain equal rights of representative government on Turks and Greeks alike. Finally, on February 6, 1869, Greece had to accept the declaration of a conference of the signatory powers of the Treaty of Paris summoned by Bismarck, requesting Greece to prevent the equipment of frontiersmen or blockade runners; while the Cretan leaders amid the desolation and misery of their ruined villages waited for the next opportunity.

4.

The disbanding of the frontiersmen caused as usual a fresh outbreak of brigandage. On April 11, 1870, a band who had been raiding over the frontier in Turkish

Thessaly captured a party returning from an excursion to Marathon, including Lord and Lady Muncaster and the secretaries of the British and Italian Legations. In addition to the usual ransom the brigands demanded a free pardon which was unfortunately forbidden by the Constitution except for political offences. The British Foreign Minister Lord Clarendon wrote that he "could not admit the validity of the constitutional objection," and thus found himself in complete agreement with the brigand chief who suggested that at a pinch the Constitution could easily be amended, or that alternatively his crime could be regarded as "political" because his victims were all civilians. A week later the affair turned to tragedy: there was some misunderstanding and the brigands, fearing capture by Colonel Theagenes, the veteran friend and aide de camp of General Church, sent by the Government for a final parley at Oropos, took to flight and murdered the four prisoners who remained in their hands (including the British secretary Mr. Herbert, whose memorial may be seen in Burghclere Church). The outrage naturally created the greatest sensation in England, and intensified the disfavour with which Greece was regarded, as the supposed instrument of Russian tendencies to disturb the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Yet by a curious irony in the very same year Russia combined with Turkey to deliver the severest blow to Greek prospects. On March 11, 1870, the Sultan established a separate Church for the Bulgarian Christians of European Turkey. The foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate indicated the adoption by Turkey of a policy of dividing the Greeks from the other Christians within the Empire who should have been their allies; and the adoption by Russia of a policy

Bulgarian
Exarchate
1870.

of using Panslavism rather than Christianity as an instrument for the disruption of the Turkish Empire. The priest-ridden Greeks played the Turkish game to perfection and confirmed their own isolation by excommunicating the Bulgarian Exarch and his clergy.

5.

Russia justified British suspicions at the end of 1871 by repudiating the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (a repudiation formalised by the Treaty of London, March 13, 1872); and was thus in a very strong position when the time came for taking the first forward step in the Panslavist programme. In the summer of 1875 local peasant risings against conditions of taxation and land tenure took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the following year Russia combined with Austria and Germany, with French and Italian approval, to demand certain reforms already promised by the Sultan; and Serbia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey. England, with Disraeli now in power, sent the fleet to Besika Bay. But the unrest had now spread across the Danube to Mount Rhodope and caused a civil war between Christian and Moslem Bulgarians of that district; the suppression of these disturbances by Turkish troops in the usual summary manner were reported by an English journalist in Constantinople to the *Daily News* (June 23) and confirmed by the visit of a British commissioner two months later; and Gladstone's denunciation of these "Bulgarian atrocities" (September 1875) so stirred public opinion that it became exceedingly difficult for England to support the Turkish case against Russia with united sincerity.

Bulgarian
atrocities
1875.

"Even if Russia were to declare war against the Porte," complained the Foreign Minister, Lord Derby, "Her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere."¹

Peace between Serbia and Turkey was signed by Russian intervention on March 1, 1877, and in December Lord Salisbury attended a conference of the Powers at Constantinople to consider the pacification of Montenegro (whose armies had been completely successful), Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina. But Abdul Hamid, now Sultan, baffled them all by suddenly proclaiming a constitution; the "Parliament" thus created rejected England's advice and the suggestions of a further conference held at London in March; and on April 24, 1877, the Russians invaded Turkey.

In Greece there was repeated all the excitement that had accompanied the Crimean War. But a ministry which included four former Prime Ministers serving under the veteran Admiral Kanares (who died in office on September 15, 1877) was strong enough—in spite of Russian victories (which were not checked by Plevna till July 20); in spite of Rumania's declaration of war and independence on May 21; in spite of the re-entry into the war of Montenegro under Prince Nicolas and of Serbia under King Milan—to preserve a correct

¹ "Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner," wrote Mr. Gladstone, "namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakans and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned." In September 1821 Stratford Canning (quoted by C. W. Crawley, p. 48) had written: "As a matter of humanity, I wish with all my soul that the Greeks were put in possession of their whole patrimony, and that the Sultan were driven bag and baggage into the heart of Asia."

attitude; and Trikoupes who was Foreign Minister (admirably seconded by his chargé d'affaires in London M. Gennadius) obtained from England a specific promise that when the time came the claims of Greece would be considered and would not be prejudiced by her good behaviour. The strain became unendurable when, after the fall of Plevna, Russia was at last advancing on Adrianople, and Koumoundouros, who succeeded Kanares, was forced to allow a Greek army to cross the Turkish frontier; but it was recalled on the specific renewal of Lord Derby's pledge, and by May 1878 the British consuls had succeeded in pacifying with promises the risings which had already broken out in Thessaly and Crete.¹ By June the Russians were within ten miles of Constantinople, which they had promised not to occupy. Only the Sultan kept his head and took advantage of the confusion to dissolve the Turkish Parliament and Constitution, which were only revived thirty years later at Salonica. In England the alarm almost became a panic. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, only a year younger than Kanares, had issued from his retirement an echo of the old Crimean War cry, pointing out that Russians in the Caucasus were on the confines of Armenia, that Armenia bordered the valley of the Euphrates, and that the Euphrates led straight down to the Persian gulf: he added that it was England's duty to "observe their movements with vigilance and prepare to counteract any failure in their promises," which was the exact equivalent of the music hall song "we don't want to fight but by Jingo if we

¹ During the suppression of one of these outbreaks on Mount Pelion the Turkish troops on March 29 murdered a correspondent of *The Times*, C. C. Ogle; a memorial stele was erected to him by the community of Makrynitza in 1931.

San Stefano
1878.

do!" Yet nobody knew what to do beyond ordering the fleet to Besika Bay and reminding the Tsar of his promise not to occupy Constantinople. But when Russia imposed the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878) creating a "Big Bulgaria" (an autonomous principality including all Macedonia and old Serbia but not Thrace or Salonica), the simplicity of Russian procedure caused throughout Europe a genuine revival of the policy that all the Great Powers should have equal rights in the settlement of Turkish affairs, and enabled England, supported by Austria and Germany, to insist on a re-examination of the whole Treaty. Lord Salisbury succeeding Lord Derby as Foreign Minister prepared for the Congress by making a number of secret Treaties—the most important of which was the Convention with Turkey (June 4, 1878), whereby England was to occupy and administer Cyprus as long as Russia occupied Kars and Batum in consideration for defending the Asiatic dominions of Turkey. When the Congress opened at Berlin under Bismarck's presidency on June 13, 1878, the Greek delegates were admitted to state their views without voting, and claimed Thessaly and Epirus, Crete and part of Macedonia.

6.

Berlin Con-
gress 1878.

The Treaty of Berlin, concluded on July 13, 1878, created a small Bulgaria, independent but under Turkish suzerainty, and separate from the adjacent province of Eastern Rumelia which was to be autonomous under a Christian governor. Austria was to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina and garrison Novi Bazar. Independence and small rectifications of frontier

were granted to Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania (and the latter gave a promise to abolish Jewish disabilities). Greece was not quite forgotten. But whereas all the other articles of the Treaty were definite and absolute provisions, the adjudication on the Greek claims took the form of an "invitation" to Turkey to "come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of" the Thessalian frontier so as to include Janina and Larissa, while Turkey promised a strict application in Crete of the Organic Law of 1868 and "analogous reforms" for the provinces of European Turkey not specifically provided for in the Treaty—(Macedonia, Thrace, Albania and Epirus). It subsequently appeared that it was the English delegates who, out of consideration for Turkey, had prevented the Congress from declaring the definite annexation to Greece of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus.

The disappointment of the Cretans at being left under the shadow of Turkey was modified by the fact that they were able with the assistance of their General Assembly and the consuls to extort a definite settlement under the Treaty. In October 1878 they obtained a modification of the Organic Law of 1868, known as the Pact of Halepa, which under a Christian governor worked reasonably for seven years. Greece was left in suspense. It was not likely that the Turks would "come to an understanding" with Greece on a mere recommendation when they refused to carry out the definite stipulations of the Treaty. The whole of 1879 was tided over by the organisation of a collusive Albanian League and by a Turkish agitation throughout Europe in favour of the Albanians who prevented them, they said, from ceding Dulcigno to Montenegro; and it was not till November 1880 when England proposed to seize the custom house

Cretan Pact of
Halepa.

at Smyrna that Albanian opposition collapsed and Dulcigno was surrendered. Such rude methods could be used to enforce the stipulations of a Treaty; but they could not be used to compel Turkey to accept an "invitation" which, within her rights, she preferred not to accept. The Powers, France and England taking the lead, arranged the meeting of a Greco-Turkish frontier commission at Preveza in March and again in August at Constantinople but it came to no agreement. In June 1880 Gladstone, who with Lord Granville as Foreign Minister had succeeded Disraeli and Lord Salisbury, arranged a further conference in Berlin which agreed on a very favourable northern frontier including Janina, Metzovo and Olympos. Trikoupes now Prime Minister accepted, and when Turkey refused made the mistake of mobilising the Greek Army; thus alarming the Albanians who during this winter had a representative in Athens and might have been successfully approached without a show of arms. But a sudden change of government in France deprived the new British policy of French support and enabled Turkey to reopen the whole question, supported by the British opposition who argued, like the aged Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, that Turkey must never be coerced but "required rather to be strengthened by measures of relief." More negotiations followed, but it was not till May 24, 1881, that thanks to the efforts of Lord Granville and Mr. Goschen, a convention was signed giving Greece Thessaly and the Arta district of Epirus. The British delegate's impressions of this conference were that "the Ambassadors showed themselves quite indifferent to Greek interests so long as enough was secured to save the King from a revolution." It was indeed a good deal less than had been "re-

Thessaly
1881.

commended" at Berlin, but Koumoundouros accepted in the face of public opinion and was rewarded for his good sense by being allowed to remain in office till his death in 1883, when Trikoupes succeeded him for two quiet years of reform.

7.

On September 21, 1885, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria urged on by Stambulov seized Philippopolis, the capital of Eastern Rumelia. Lord Salisbury, inspired to some extent by the real or simulated annoyance of Russia, insisted on recognising the accomplished fact, which was of course a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and a conference at Constantinople secured the election of Prince Alexander as governor for life of Eastern Rumelia (April 5, 1886), thus uniting the two provinces which the Congress of Berlin, fearful of Russian expansion, had separated.¹ Thus in 1886 England, still governed by the fear of Russia, dropped easily and almost instinctively into the policy of backing as a barrier against Russia not Turkey only but a strong and united Bulgaria. The effect on Athenian politics was immediate. A wave of nationalist excitement, the natural result of seeing the Treaty of Berlin successfully defied by the youngest of the Balkan States with the assistance of England, swept the pacific Trikoupes from office. Délégiannes, always ready to make party capital out of the nationalist fever, borrowed money, reintroduced the forced paper currency intro-

Bulgaria and
Eastern
Rumelia 1886.

¹ Meanwhile Milan of Serbia had invaded Bulgaria (November 14, 1885) and been defeated by Alexander at Slivnitza, when Austria intervened on his behalf; the *status quo ante* was restored by the Peace of Bucarest, March 3, 1886. This was the little war which provided colour for Bernard Shaw's first play *Arms and the Man*.

duced in 1877 which Trikoupes had succeeded in abolishing, mobilised army and fleet. A collective note from the Six Powers ordered Greece to disarm; and when Gladstone came into office and Delegiannes continuing to mobilise appealed with more confidence for the frontier "recommended" at Berlin, so as to restore the balance in the Balkans, an ultimatum proposed by Lord Rosebery, supported by all the Powers except France (April 26, 1886), and enforced by a three weeks blockade of the Greek coasts, compelled him to submit. It was a happy accident that the blockading fleets were commanded by the Duke of Edinburgh, the Prince Alfred to whom the Greeks had offered their throne twenty-three years before.

V.

THE FAILURE OF NATIONALISM: 1887-1910

I.

TRIKOUPES now came into power, and was allowed for many urgent reforms four of the few years in the reign of King George which were undisturbed by nationalist agitations. He was a hard-headed man, the first realist in Greek politics, and admired England realistically as a naval and industrial power instead of sentimentally as a legendary figure of Liberalism and Democracy. Above all he brought from his English training a personal honesty which lent an air of distinction both to his diplomacy and to his electoral campaigns. He was not strong enough to reform the system of general corruption by which the Constitution and the party system were exploited; and his excessive confidence in the quick returns of industrial development led him to borrow money too recklessly; but he was able to institute numerous reforms and public works, in spite of the deficit which Delegiannes always bequeathed to his successors. The revenue had tripled since the Financial Commission had sat thirty years before, and it was in an atmosphere of comparative peace and prosperity that King George celebrated in October 1888 the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession. In foreign policy Trikoupes was on a dif-

Trikoupes
1887-1895.

ferent plane from any of his rivals. He visited Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania and actually made proposals (in 1891) for a Balkan Alliance—proposals which were immediately betrayed to Turkey by the great Bulgarian statesman Stambulov who was himself working for a Turco-Bulgarian understanding; yet he realised the uselessness of challenging Turkey and alienating Europe by a succession of premature and futile insurrections. Thus he was bold enough to discourage the Cretan agitation of 1889, and was accordingly defeated by Delegiannes at the next elections.

2.

Unrest in
Crete 1889-
1896.

The Cretan unrest originating in party differences but extending gradually to a religious feud was intensified by the intervention of the Sultan who revoked the Pact of Halepa. While political leaders at Athens struggled with financial insolvency and with a prolonged crisis in the currant trade, caused by over production, the island of Crete, deprived of its only security for something approaching self-government, smouldered in a slow fire of murder and anarchy until the insurrection broke out openly in the streets of Canea, on May 24, 1896, under the eyes of the admirals of the Five assembled Powers. The Powers proposed to blockade the island so as to isolate it from the supply of Turkish troops: but England refused. The Pact of Halepa was revived and another new governor, a Christian, hurriedly appointed. But it was too late: in the following February there was a sudden outbreak of the Moslems who burned and massacred in the Christian quarter at Canea; whereupon the Christian insurgents, among whose leaders the most prominent was a young barrister called Venizelos,

withdrew from the town, and established themselves in a strong position at Akrotêri. On February 10 the united admirals were dismayed by the arrival of Prince George of Greece, with a flotilla of torpedo boats, who announced his intention of cutting off the island from Turkish reinforcements; and five days later a force of 2000 Greek volunteers landed under Colonel Vassos. The admirals tried to suspend hostilities by occupying Canea and bombarding the insurgents at Akrotêri when they advanced against the Turkish troops. On March 2 the Five Powers demanded the withdrawal of the Greek troops, promising that they would allow no Turkish troops to land and would arrange some form of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. When Greece refused, the admirals blockaded the island and proclaimed its autonomy under the protection of Europe (March 20, 1897); after which they again bombarded the insurgent camp at Malaxa.

At Athens, Delegiannes' election cry of Cretan martyrdom had been maintained and organised by a society for the stimulation of extreme nationalism, the *Ethnikê Etairia*, founded in 1894, which was in continual communication with the Cretan leaders; and the excitement of public opinion (no longer balanced by the practical views of Trikoupes, who had been defeated in 1895 in his own constituency of Mesolonghi and died in the following year) had been maintained by the mere spectacle of the shiploads of Cretan refugees driven to the Piræus, together with Armenian refugees from Constantinople, to depend on Athenian charity. King George, carried away by the national fever, and hoping, under the influence of Delegiannes, to re-enact the part played by Prince Alexander of Bulgaria in 1885 and

Venizelos in-
surgent 1897.

Greco-
Turkish War
1897.

confront Europe with an accomplished fact, announced that he had decided to take the matter into his own hands and himself unite Crete to Greece. On March 27 the Crown Prince Constantine left Athens to take command of the Greek army at Larissa, with instructions from the Government, which expected that Europe would intervene before the Turkish army could cross the Thessalian frontier, to act strictly on the defensive. The *Ethnikē Etairia* which for months with the connivance of the government had been distributing rifles among the shepherds of Thessaly, sent its armed bands over the frontier on April 9. On April 17 Turkey declared war. The Turkish army invaded Thessaly, and the Greeks, who, supported though they were by many Philhellene volunteers and by the hopes of unofficial liberalism all over Europe, had neither discipline nor ammunition, retired in confusion. Edhem Pasha occupied Larissa without much difficulty and checked only at Meluna and at Velesino (by the Greek hero of the war Colonel Smolenski) advanced to Domoko where the final battle of the war was fought on May 17, the Greek army again retreating owing rather to shortage of ammunition and fear of being outflanked than to Turkish generalship. A campaign in Epirus followed on a smaller scale a very similar course; initial gallantry and success; incompetent generalship and disorganisation and rout; a sharp final battle when it was too late (at Gribovo on May 13); and then retreat again only saved from disaster by Turkish inertia. The Powers had secured the inactivity of the Greek fleet by exercising pressure at the Palace; and they now intervened in time to save King George from the indignation of the Athenian populace, which was first focussed and

then diverted from the Palace by the irrelevant eloquence of Demetrios Rallés who became the new premier. Peace was signed at Constantinople before the end of the year; Greece returned to Turkey some strategic positions near Larissa and promised an indemnity of £T.4,000,000 the payment of which required an international commission of the Six Powers to control Greek finance.

The troubles of Crete however were now over. On the Admirals' proclamation of autonomy the Cretans had immediately set up a Provisional Government under Sfakianakes and Venizelos, which though not officially recognised was still functioning a year later, when, on September 6, 1898, the Moslems within the cordon of the British occupation at Candia broke out again and murdered twenty British soldiers and the British Vice-consul. The Four Powers—Germany and Austria having withdrawn from the Cretan Concert in March—now insisted that all Turkish troops must leave the island, and by the end of November, at the suggestion of the Tsar, they asked Prince George of Greece to be their High Commissioner in Crete for a term of three years, still under the suzerainty of the Sultan, who was represented by a flagstaff on a rock in the harbour of Suda Bay. Cretan autonomy 1898.

On December 21, 1898, Prince George landed in Crete. A Constitution was drafted by Venizelos, and the island enjoyed complete self-government which pleased everybody except Prince George. He ignored the Constitution, which he professed to find the only obstacle to the island's union with Greece, and thought to hasten that union by his personal influence, visiting all the European courts, but destroying all rights of local Prince George and Venizelos.

or party government. In March 1904 the opposition under Venizelos took to the mountains, set up a provisional government at Therisso, and began by themselves proclaiming the Union which they were accused of delaying. The consuls as usual intervened, and in 1906 King George, as entrusted by the Four Powers, appointed Alexander Zaimês to succeed his son, who left the island unobtrusively, vowing hatred to the Cretan leader who had thwarted his ambition. Under Zaimes, who had succeeded Ralles in the premiership, and was qualified for his new appointment by his moderation and his lack of the national eloquence, such complete tranquillity was restored that on July 29, 1908, the Powers began to withdraw their troops, and within a year had withdrawn the last of the international detachments, leaving only four ships of war to protect the Moslem inhabitants and the Sultan's flagstaff. From this tranquillity and self-sufficiency was to come the man who was to introduce for a time the same spirit into the Greek state.

After the war of 1897 the Greeks relapsed into a slough of despair in which all work and all reconstruction were made impossible by the political game which alternated the corrupt indolence of a Theotokes with the magniloquent obstruction of Delegiannes. "A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones," said an Irish writer; "but if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher, until the demand of the Nationalist is granted. It will attend to no business, how-

ever vital, except the business of unification and liberation."¹ So the Greeks were haunted by all sorts of mystical theories of patriotism, and raved about an abstraction called Hellenism, a sort of dream complex of all their unsatisfied instincts; goaded by the younger generation, extreme Nationalists of whom the best known and most brilliant was John Dragoumes, declaring that the correct little state with its Belgian constitution and its imitation of English politics and French society was all a futile pretence; and that unless Greeks had the vitality to help themselves in their own way it was a pity they had ever emerged from the Turkish shadow. The despair of politics, itself a healthy reaction from the black-coated party game of demanding alternately more army and less taxes; the hatred of their neighbours, born of fear and jealousy, taught by their own perverted patriotism, and carefully fostered by Turkey, Austria and Russia, who were intriguing to maintain a hold on the Balkans,—all these influences combined in the ten years after the war of 1897 to throw the Greeks into a fight for Macedonia where a new enemy was now threatening their dreams.

4.

Macedonia was inhabited in the middle of the century Macedonia. by a mixture of Slavonic and Greek stocks, such as might have been found in southern Greece after the Slavonic invasions of the thirteenth century. The Slavonic element predominated in the north, the Greek in the south, the Albanian in the west, but on the whole the peasantry represented a homogeneous mixture which might if left alone have crystallised naturally into some definite

¹ G. B. Shaw, *John Bull's Other Island*, p. xxxiv.

nationality, or been assimilated to any one of the neighbouring nations. These Macedonians were largely bilingual and had, like the Klepts of Thessaly and Epirus, no patriotism other than local patriotism. Even after the Russians in 1870 had created the Bulgarian Exarchate which was branded by the Greeks as schismatic there was little consciousness of Bulgarian or Greek nationality and certainly no mutual hatred to divide this peasantry. But the Bulgarians had the patience to convert where the Greeks had only a traditional and ingenuous claim. In 1895 a Macedonian Committee was founded at Sofia with the professed object of making Macedonia Bulgarian. They slowly extended their organisation to every village in Macedonia, and began by distributing arms among the peasants so as to give agricultural discontent, under the extortions of Turkish and Albanian landowners, the colour of revolutionary intention. If the Turkish authorities, "searching for arms," could be provoked to massacre, so much the better. Meanwhile by threatening, as during the war of 1897, to come to an understanding with the Greeks, they extorted from the Sultan ecclesiastical and educational privileges in Macedonia. In January 1899 the Bulgarian Committee presented to the Powers a petition for an autonomous Macedonia. They followed this up by elaborating a system of terrorism intended not only to create anarchy and thus provoke the intervention of the Powers, but also to extort money from the very villages for whose conversion it was required. Any Macedonian peasant who refused to contribute to the funds of the Committee was murdered; any Macedonian, Bulgar or Greek, who applied to the Turkish authorities for protection was murdered as a spy; if necessary whole villages would be

massacred and burnt for refusing obedience to the demands of the Committee. In 1901 they captured an American missionary, Miss Stone, not only for the sake of publicity but also for the sake of the ransom of £16,000 which provided them with dynamite; so that after the arrival of Hilmi Pasha sent by the Sultan in 1902 to carry out certain reforms and pacify the province, the Turks were successfully frightened by a series of bomb outrages at Salonica into a certain number of "atrocities" which served their purpose of publicity.

In the following year, in February and again in October 1903, Austria and Russia promulgated the so-called Mürzsteg Programme of reforms, which left all the authority in Turkish hands while providing a gendarmerie under European officers. In the summer of the same year the Bulgarian Committee broke into their first open insurrection in the district of Monastir; and before the Turkish troops arrived the small and mobile forces of the Committee were able to withdraw into the unaffected districts, leaving the unfortunate villagers, who in this district at least had no sympathy at all with the insurrection, to bear the full violence of Turkish retribution. The miseries of the following winter were witnessed by gendarmerie officers, consuls, and distributors of relief sent from England; and English Liberal opinion in its admiration of Bulgarian nationalism fell into line with English official policy which was inspired as usual by the fear of Russia. By their "courage and devotion" in drawing attention to Turkish misrule by a system of terrorism "the worst developments of which were directed against the Greeks"¹ the Bulgarian Committee won the sympathy of English Liberals; while Lord Lans-

¹ Brailsford, *Macedonia*, pp. 129, 137, 148, 154.

downe, the Conservative Foreign Minister, opposed, in the Canning tradition, the exclusively Austro-Russian solution, and supported the programme of autonomy which tended to the creation of a Big Bulgaria as a permanent barrier to Russian aggression. After much negotiation he succeeded in obtaining the appointment of an International Financial Commission which the Sultan on November 26, 1905, was forced to accept by an international occupation of Mitylene.

Meanwhile the Bulgarian terrorism had continued unabated; and in 1904 the Greeks, finding their diplomatic representations ignored, were driven in self-defence to organise combatant bands in Macedonia. They did this quite openly, announced their defensive intentions, and hardly denied that many of these bands were led by Greek officers. This irregular warfare revived the traditions of the Klefts and its methods were hardly distinguishable from brigandage and murder. The Greek bands, armed by the *Ethnikē Etairia*, imitated only too well the brutalities of the Bulgarian Committee, and fell into a sort of desperate sabotage of Macedonia. The Sultan easily played off one party against another, and in 1905 added to the Macedonian confusion by recognising the Koutzo-Vlachs as a distinct nationality in Macedonia, thus stimulating, as a counterpoise to Greek and Bulgarian, the Rumanian propaganda which had hitherto failed to make much progress, practically all the Vlach communities having always been Greek in sentiment. Greek bands added Rumanian propagandists to their proscription. Rumania retaliated by confiscating Greek school and ecclesiastical property in Rumania; and diplomatic relations were broken off for several years. Bulgaria retaliated by destroying the Greek quarters of

Anhialos and Philippopolis. Yet the only living party at Athens were the young men who despised politics and wanted to live dangerously, and when one of them, Paul Melas, was killed in Macedonia his name became that of a national hero. Such was the state of Greece at the beginning of 1908, the year in which, thirty years after the Congress of Berlin, the next crisis occurred in Balkan affairs.

5.

On July 24, 1908, just as the troops of the Four Powers were beginning to leave Crete, the Turkish Nationalists, or "Young Turks," represented by the "Committee of Union and Progress," carried out its plans matured at Salonica, and effected a revolution at Constantinople which revived the Turkish Constitution and Parliament of 1877. The announcement that henceforth all Ottomans were to be equal before the law was greeted throughout Europe as the dawn of liberty, and was celebrated in Macedonia by a general reconciliation of the warring nationalities. It was not yet realised, perhaps not till the deposition of Abdul Hamid in April of the following year was celebrated by Armenian massacres at Adana, that, as in 1877, the fact that all subjects of the Turkish Empire were equal before the law meant only that they were all regarded as Turks, and implied the integrity of the Turkish Empire; it did not matter now whether the Macedonians were Greek or Bulgarian, because they had all jolly well got to be Turks. Meanwhile however attention was distracted by greater events. On October 5, 1908, by a previous understanding with Austria, Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria

The Young
Turks 1908.

and his own sovereignty; and two days later Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had administered with great success since 1878. On October 12 the Cretan Assembly at Canca, perhaps not unmindful of the equal and analogous advantages so often promised since 1878 to all Christian subjects of the Turk, once again proclaimed their union with Greece.

It has been pointed out that if Greece had immediately annexed Crete the fact would probably have had to be accepted together with the other encroachments on Turkish authority which the Turkish parliament was obliged to recognise in the following spring. But Theotokes, who had been in power since the assassination of Delegiannes in 1905, conscious of the unreadiness and corruption of the state, could do nothing except refer Turkish protests to the Powers; and the Powers were too much occupied in averting war between Austria and Russia¹ to do anything except express goodwill and a decision to maintain the *status quo*. Theotokes tried to resign but had to remain in office because his successor Ralli was afraid to dissolve the Chamber for fear of the Cretans, who had hoisted the Greek flag on the Sultan's flagstaff and intended to send their deputies to the Greek Chamber. It was not till July 17 that Ralli came into office and he was immediately summoned by the Young Turks, by this time in the full tide of militant nationalism, which carried them into a boycott of Greek goods, to disavow any intention of ever annexing Crete, Macedonia, Epirus or the Islands. Ralli returned the meek and correct answer,

¹ It was in February 1909 that Germany appeared at Austria's side "in shining armour."

and on the same day, August 18, the Four Powers landed a party of Marines in Crete and solemnly cut down the Greek flag.

6.

The country which had been left by the Turks a desert was indeed converted during the reign of King George into the semblance of a thriving modern community. The population had increased from 651,233 in 1834 to 2,631,952 in 1907, and as the territory had increased in the same period from 48,976 to 64,292 square kilometres, the average density of population to the square kilometre had increased from 13.2 to 40.9. The Piræus which in 1839 had been marked by "a piece of deal boarding projecting a few feet into the sea, to serve as a landing-stage for small boats" had become the fourth port in the Mediterranean. Exports had increased from 32,323,426 drachmae in 1862 to 140,900,000 drachmae. The mercantile marine grew from 28 steamers of 8,240 tons in 1875 to 347 steamers of 384,446 tons. The total volume of foreign trade was more than five times as great in 1911 as it had been in 1862. The production of currants, olives, figs and cereal crops was from two to four times as great as it had been at the beginning of the reign. 3700 miles of high road had been built (the Bavarians had built only one from Argos to Tripolitza), and though the first railway line from the Piræus to Athens, about 10 kilometres in length, had only been built in 1869, 1200 kilometres had been laid in 1905, when, but for Turkish obstruction which obliged the Thessalian line to end at the Greek frontier, Athens might already have been

placed within sixty hours of Paris.¹ History is not able to decide whether this would have been an advantage. But in spite of material progress there was a general feeling at Athens that the reign of King George had been a failure; a long fever of nationalism ending only in the vanity, laziness and jobbery of politics, which the affable King had done little to resist.

7.

The Military
League calls
Venizelos
from Crete
1910.

It was to the credit of a number of Greek officers, the so-called Military League, that at this point they intervened, presented an ultimatum, and seceded to the camp outside Athens with no very definite programme beyond a demand for the reorganisation of the army and the exclusion of court influence and old gang corruption. King George at first threatened to abdicate, but finding that the threat left them unmoved he himself asked his sons to resign their military commands which had hitherto been one of the chief obstacles to efficiency. Mavromihales had succeeded Ralli on August 29, and was willing to help: but at the end of the year the Military League, because they found it impossible to work with the old gang, who were all under court influence, and even if they were afraid to take office themselves were infinitely obstructive, and also perhaps because they did not quite know how to use the power they found in their hands, called Venizelos to Athens as their political adviser. Arriving from Crete where he was head of the Provisional Government, he immedi-

¹ The "Acropolis Express" first began running regularly in 1921 taking five days. E. About notes in his second edition (1855) "la rapidité des transports a fait de tels progrès depuis un an qu'on peut aller en sept jours du Louvre à l'Acropole."

ately decided on the need for a National Assembly to revise the Constitution, and although the King, the Court, and the diplomatists, with their warships at Faléron, uttered cries of alarm, he insisted on breaking the Constitution by summoning this Assembly without the necessary preliminaries. By the passage of the necessary bill the League of officers was induced to dissolve itself (March 28, 1910); but after the Assembly had been elected and had met on September 21, under the premiership of Stephen Dragoumes, disputes arose as to whether it was to be constituent or revisionary; Venizelos, insisting that it was to be only revisionary, was obliged to resign his position in Crete and became Prime Minister at Athens (October 18); and, when the old gang attempted to obstruct him by leaving him without a quorum, he dissolved the Assembly and returned from the elections of December 11, 1910, with a majority of 300 to 64.¹

¹ A "National Assembly" differs from your ordinary Chamber of Deputies only in having double the number of members.

VI.

TOWARDS A BALKAN FEDERATION:

1910-1914

I.

SOMETHING more than hard work, the best antidote to corruption, was required to redeem the Greek people from the stagnation to which they had fallen in the first ten years of the century. Greece had been humbled before Turkey, and none of the Great Powers regarded Greece as a factor of any importance in the solution of the Eastern problem. But the real depth of the tragedy was that not Greece alone but all the Balkan nations were so seamed by hatred and division, the result to some extent of the conflicting policies of the Russian, Austrian and British Empires, that Greece was quite cut off from any healthy intercourse with her neighbours. That is why the most significant result of the first year of Venizelos' work in Greece was that, at Easter 1911, three hundred Bulgarian students visited Greece and were welcomed in the capital. Where the Sultan Abdul Hamid had induced the conflicting races to persecute each other, the Young Turks persecuted impartially all the Christian inhabitants who were now equal before the Ottoman law; with the result that even the Greek and Bulgarian Churches, Patriarchate

and Exarchate, almost forgot their schism. As early as April 1911 Venizelos suggested to Bulgaria a defensive alliance against Turkey. Serbia and Bulgaria began negotiations under Russian auspices. There was an Albanian rising against the Turks which stirred Montenegro to approach Bulgaria for common action. Throughout 1911 therefore the Balkan nations were drawing together, while at Athens the second Revisionary National Assembly which had met on January 21 was inaugurating a period of energetic reform.

Revision and
Reform 1911.

The administration was freed from corruption, partly by the hard work of Venizelos, and partly by the fact that his electoral triumph had shattered the old party machinery in the provinces. By the beginning of June the Assembly had settled the following revisions of the Constitution: Foreign officers were made eligible for service of state, and accordingly foreign missions were at once summoned to Athens to reorganise the services: English officers for the Navy, Italians for the Gendarmerie and French for the Army, in which the Crown Prince was reinstated as Inspector General; elementary education was to be free and compulsory; the official language was declared to be that of the Constitution, without prejudice however to literature;¹ while, after a violent recrudescence of the agitation "to defend the purity of the language" under the leadership of a certain Professor Mistríotes, who finally had to be suppressed by the Gov-

¹ Most of which was and continues to an increasing extent to be written in the popular or demotic language artificially developed from the colloquial Romaic by such writers as Psichari, Pallis, Palamas and J. Dragoumes: although the best of modern Greek poets, K. P. Kaváfes, of Alexandria, uses an eclectic syntax and vocabulary, as did A. Papadiamantés whom some consider the finest of modern Greek storytellers. See below, pp. 206 ff.

ernment, the translation of the Scriptures was forbidden without the consent of the Church; expropriation was defined, thus enabling Venizelos to settle (April 2) on a basis of voluntary sale an agitation among the peasant cultivators of Thessaly against speculative landlords who had bought up the estates of Turkish feudal Beys after the annexation of 1881; no soldiers, mayors, or other public servants were to be eligible for the Chamber, the quorum of which was to be one-third of the total number of deputies; The Council of State (instituted in 1864 and abolished in the following year) was revived; and security of tenure was enjoined for judges and other public officials (in order to put an end to the American "spoils" system, which however is still prevalent). In March diplomatic relations, suspended since 1905, were resumed with Rumania; and the better relations of Christian communities in Macedonia, where their "disarmament" had been carried out with great severity since 1910 by Shepket Torgut Pasha, led to an Easter visit of Bulgarian students to Athens, and enabled Venizelos as already noted to put forward the first suggestions of a defensive alliance against Turkey—which in the autumn (September 29) became involved in the Tripolitan war with Italy.

On January 3, 1912, the National Assembly was dissolved, and at the Elections for an ordinary Chamber on March 25 Venizelos won 150 seats out of 181. To this Chamber 69 members were elected by a Cretan Revolutionary Assembly, which, assuming the government of the island on the outbreak of Turkey's war with Italy, had already tried to send a number of deputies to the National Assembly; these had been arrested by the International Forces (December 15, 1911) and detained at

Suda Bay till the dissolution. Of the 69 Cretans elected to the new Chamber 19 were arrested by H.M.S. *Minerva* and detained at Suda (April 28–June 6, 1912); others made their way to Athens and attempted to take their seats on June 1. Venizelos however, by troops and persuasion, succeeded in excluding them from the opening sitting and then adjourned the Chamber, thus avoiding an inopportune and premature provocation of Turkey.

For meanwhile more definite and official approaches had been made to Bulgarian friendship. The Crown Prince had visited Sofia on February 2 for the coming of age of Prince Boris. The Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance had been signed at Sofia on March 13. On May 29 a secret Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Bulgaria was signed at Sofia, by which the two powers bound themselves to act together "with all their armed forces" for the defence and preservation of equal rights and privileges for their nationals in the Turkish Empire. A special clause however declared that the stipulations of the Treaty should not be binding in case of an outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey in consequence of the admission of Cretan deputies to the Greek Chamber. The military convention annexed to this Treaty was not signed till October 5. During the summer the condition of the Macedonian races had become desperate. A revolt had broken out in Albania; the Turkish troops had mutinied at Monastir; and bombs thrown at Kotchane had succeeded in provoking them to massacre. On September 30, the Balkan States, beginning to mobilise, made a united *démarche* at Constantinople, in the nature of an ultimatum, demanding immediate reforms in Macedonia. On October 8, 1912, the Powers,

Treaties of
Serbia and
Greece with
Bulgaria
1912.

who with the exception of Russia had remained unaware of the new grouping in the Balkans, addressed to Sofia, Belgrade and Athens a severe warning, promising that they themselves, "relying on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, would take in hand the realisation of administrative reforms in European Turkey, in the interest of the populations concerned, on the understanding that such reforms should not infringe the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire." But on the same day King Nicolas of Montenegro declared war against Turkey. On October 14 the Greek Chamber met, and the Cretan deputies were admitted to take their seats, an act which denoted the formal annexation of the island, to which the ex-Premier S. Dragoumes was sent as Governor.

2.

First Balkan
War.

Turkey declared war on the following day against Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, but not against Greece, who was on the contrary offered the island of Crete, and the long refused permission for the construction of the railway between Salonica and the Thessalian frontier which should connect Athens with Europe, if she would remain neutral. The offer is said to have tempted King George. But Venizelos, who, before making the arrangement with Bulgaria, had done all that was possible to arrive at a friendly settlement with the Turks, actually offering to pay a small tribute and acknowledge Turkish sovereignty over Crete if the Porte would recognise the right of the Cretan deputies to sit in the Greek Chamber, realised that it was now of supreme importance that Greece should not be left out of the new grouping, and proved his country's

loyalty to the nascent Balkan Alliance by declaring war against Turkey (October 18, 1912).

The Greek forces immediately crossed the frontier, and on October 22 sharply defeated the Turkish army, which made a first serious attempt to resist the invasion at Sarandaporon. After occupying Southern Macedonia the Crown Prince, who was in command, intended to march towards Monastir, but was diverted by urgent instructions from the Government that for political reasons the primary objective of his army must be Salonica. He accordingly wheeled his forces towards the north-east and fought another two days' battle at Yenitsa. Three days later, on November 8, the feast of its patron saint Demetrius, the town of Salonica, after negotiations inaugurated by the foreign consuls, surrendered to him with the whole Turkish garrison of 30,000 men. Four days later the Greek army again turned westward in order to clear western Macedonia of the Turkish forces which had been threatening their left flank, and on November 20 at Florina joined hands with the Serbians who had now taken Monastir. The successes of the army gave the Greek people a new confidence and began to improve their narrow and extreme nationalism into a sense of worthy membership of the Balkan Alliance, the beginnings of a steady loyalty, more than ever necessary in the delicate situation which arose when, two days after the occupation of Salonica, a Bulgarian army, after a forced march over the mountains, entered the town, claimed a sort of condominium and displayed an increasing hostility towards the Greek authorities.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians had swept through Thrace and invested Adrianople but had been held up by the

lines of Chatalja. By the end of the month the Turks, holding nothing in Europe, outside those lines, but the fortified towns of Adrianople, Scutari and Janina, sigried an armistice (December 3) with Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, but not with the Greeks, who were thus enabled to maintain the blockade of the Dardanelles and to transfer their major activity to Epirus, where an army under General Sapountzakes had already driven the Turks into the fortress of Janina, but not being strong enough to effect a close investment had been losing very heavily in ineffective attacks and through the rigours of mountain warfare in winter.

1913. The Greeks took part however in the conference which met in London on December 16, when the Balkan Allies met the Turks and demanded the surrender of all that they held together with the fortresses invested. Under pressure of a note from the Powers the Grand Council at Constantinople (January 22, 1913) had finally decided to accept these terms, when the extreme Nationalists under Enver Bey expelled the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha and murdered Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief. Hostilities were resumed on February 3. The Greek army in Epirus, now heavily reinforced and under the immediate command of the Crown Prince, carried Janina by storm (March 6). Twelve days later the victorious Crown Prince acceded to the throne as King Constantine, his father, King George, whose affable inactivity had never been so successful as during the last few months of his reign, having been assassinated at Salonica by the usual mad-man with a grievance.

Bulgarians and Serbians stormed Adrianople at the end of the month, and on April 22 Scutari surrendered

to Montenegro. Negotiations between the belligerents were reopened in London on May 20, and by the Treaty of London (May 30) Turkey ceded collectively to the Balkan Allies all her European territory west of a line drawn from Enos on the Aegean to Media on the Black Sea, leaving the questions of Albania and the Aegean islands (except Crete, which was at last to be definitively annexed to Greece) to be settled by the Powers.

Unlike Bulgaria's treaty with Serbia, the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty contained no territorial provisions, Venizelos having believed that it was better to come into the Alliance at the last minute and without any security than to be left out of the Alliance in inglorious and querulous isolation. It is extremely probable however that a friendly and equitable division of the surrendered territory could have been arranged between the three Allies, had not Sir Edward Grey been induced, on the generous pretext of setting up an independent kingdom of Albania, to support the Austrian proposal to exclude Serbia from the Adriatic. Once again England's liberal idealism was in the same scale as the fear of Russia. This unexpected exclusion caused Serbia to reconsider the provisional partition of Macedonia arranged in the Treaty with Bulgaria; while Bulgaria, success having brought out the less attractive qualities of her character, adopted such a threatening and aggressive attitude to both her allies that on June 2 Greeks and Serbians signed a defensive alliance, intended primarily to prevent a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans, but clearly drafted so as to be binding in case of attack by any third power, a contingency which was actually foreseen during the negotiations. Bulgaria, hoping to rush

Second Bal-
kan War.

Salonica and anticipate the result of further negotiation or arbitration, attacked the Greek and Serbian lines on June 29, but was heavily defeated at Kilkish (July 4) and compelled to retire fighting towards the Bulgarian frontier. *Seeing the Bulgarians punished, Rumania* intervened to claim territorial concessions in the Dobrudja. On July 20 the Turks reoccupied Adrianople; and it is to be noted that neither the Powers nor the two surviving partners of the Balkan Alliance protested against this violation at Bulgaria's expense of the Treaty of London.

The Rumanian intervention brought the belligerents to terms, and peace was signed at Bucarest on August 10, 1913. The frontier of Greek Macedonia was carried eastwards as far as the river Mesta (Karasu), thus excluding Bulgaria from the coveted Aegean port of Kavalla, and northwards as far as Florina and Doiran. Venizelos had no hope of mitigating Bulgarian hatred and restoring the shattered Alliance by any further concessions, and was thus driven to base his policy on a balance of power, hoping to immobilise Bulgarian ambitions by the standing threat of the alliance with Serbia and the new friendship with Rumania.

3.

The Greek frontier in Epirus depended on the delimitation by the conference of the Powers in London of the new principality of Albania, and the decision of the International Commission appointed for this purpose was subject to Italy's refusal to allow Greece to hold any of the Adriatic littoral north of Corfu. When the decision of this Commission was promulgated (Florence,

March 1914), Greece obediently withdrew her troops to the south of the new frontier, but the inhabitants of the evacuated district, which included Heimarra, Argyrocastro, and Koritsa, were so thoroughly Greek in sentiment that they immediately proclaimed a Provisional Government, and finally obtained from the Albanian Government, subject to the International Commission of control, certain rights of autonomy with which they were provisionally satisfied. (Corfu, May 17, 1914.)

Epirus and
Albania
1914-1921.

In October 1914, after the departure from Albania of Prince William of Wied, Greece was authorised by the Entente, with the consent of Italy, to reoccupy this district of Northern Epirus with troops for administration and police, *on the express understanding that the question should be finally settled by the Peace Congress.* Greek forces were obliged to hand over these districts to Italian occupation in 1916, but were authorised to reoccupy them after the war (December 1919). The Italians accordingly evacuated Epirus and French troops the Koritsa district in April and May 1920. Subsequently Heimarra and other of the disputed districts were restored by the Greek authorities to Albania (June 1, 1921), who appealed to the League of Nations against the frontier claimed by Greece. The Council of the League of Nations however, relying on the declaration of the Powers in 1914, decided (June 23, 1921) that only the Supreme Council of the Allies (then represented by the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris) was competent to determine the Albanian frontiers.

The Ambassadors' Conference gave their decision on November 18, 1921, confirming, as regards the Southern frontier, the "Florence Line".

4.

The Aegean
Islands 1914-
1924.

Greece also awaited the decision of the Powers with regard to the islands of the Aegean; and in the solution of this question it happened again that Italy was the power responsible for checking Greek aspirations. Italy had occupied during her Tripolitan war with Turkey the twelve islands of the Southern Sporades, known as the Dodekanese, all of which, except Rhodes and Kos, were barren rocks inhabited by Greek sponge fishers, and by the Treaty of Lausanne (which ended her war with Turkey, October 18, 1912) had retained them only as security for the evacuation of Tripoli by the Turkish troops. During the Balkan war the Italian occupation had naturally protected these islands from attack by the Greek fleet which had successfully seized from Turkey all the other islands of the Aegean. Sir Edward Grey declared on August 12, 1913, that "Italy had never allowed England for one moment to doubt that it was her intention to complete that part of the Treaty of Lausanne with regard to these islands and retire from these islands when Turkey had completed her part: England had complete confidence in her good faith." On February 13, 1914, the Powers recognised Greek sovereignty over all the islands seized by the Greeks during the war, with the exception of Tenedos and Imbros, which were supposed to command the entrance to the Dardanelles; but still the Italians gave no sign that their occupation of the Dodekanese was either conditional or temporary.

It remained for Venizelos after the Great War to negotiate with Signor Tittoni an agreement (July 29, 1919) by which all the outstanding questions between Italy and Greece were compromised, and all the islands

were to revert to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, the cession of which was to be dependent on the results of a plebiscite to be held within five years of England's hypothetical cession of Cyprus. This agreement was recognised by the Supreme Council, the time limit within which the plebiscite was to be held being however extended to 15 years, on the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) in accordance with which the islands of Tenedos, Imbros and Lemnos, which had been occupied during the Great War by the British fleet, were handed over by General Finlayson to the Greek authorities on June 25, 1921. The Tittoni agreement needless to say was repudiated by Italy in 1922, after the fall of Venizelos and the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkey though she had closed the Balkan War with Greece by the signature of a sort of provisional peace (Treaty of Athens, November 14, 1913) had refused to accept the decision of the Powers of February 1914; consequently the *de jure* possession of the islands remained in suspense until the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) when Turkey renounced in favour of Italy all rights over the Dodekanese and the island of Kastellorizon and recognised Greek sovereignty over the remaining islands as conferred by the 1914 Conference of London, subject to certain provisions for their demilitarisation, and with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos, which were retroceded to Turkey on condition that they should enjoy full local autonomy (an undertaking that has not been fulfilled). Lord Curzon attempted to preserve Greek sovereignty in the Aegean by maintaining (October 15, 1922) that the desired cession of Jubaland (in East Africa: properly Trans-Juba, Oltre Giuba) to Italy must depend on an equitable solution of the

question of the Dodekanese. But this contention was abandoned by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald who ceded Jubaland unconditionally by the Anglo-Italian treaty of July 15, 1924.

Cyprus. Cyprus had been formally annexed by Great Britain on the outbreak of war with Turkey (November 5, 1914) the annexation being recognised by Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923); and has since enjoyed under the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs (August 12, 1926) a greater measure of good government than she had ever known before: on August 31, 1927, the British Government relieved the island of the Ottoman Debt Charge in return for an annual contribution to Imperial Defence of £10,000, a concession equivalent to an annual credit to the island of a sum of £32,000: but it is still doubtful whether the Greek islanders continually excited by a fanatical and ignorant clergy will be able to excrete the poison of nationalism and be glad to leave the task of administration to those who are more capable of it than themselves. A memorial signed by the Greek Elected Members of the Legislative Council was presented to His Majesty's Government by a Delegation which visited London in 1929; when the demand that Cyprus should immediately be ceded to Greece elicited from Lord Passfield the reply (November 28, 1929) that "His Majesty's Government are unable to accede to it. This subject in their view is definitely closed and cannot profitably be further discussed."

VII.

THE GREAT WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: 1914-1923

I.

THE decision of the Powers after the Peace of Bucarest, assigning to Greece sovereignty over the Aegean Islands, was not recognised by the Turks, who after signing the Treaty of Athens (November 14, 1913) commenced a boycott of Greek shipping and an organised persecution of Greeks in Asia Minor. Fortified by the opportunity of buying two battleships which would have secured for their fleet the supremacy of the Aegean, Turkey plainly threatened to reopen the war. In June 1914 the situation was indeed so 1914. alarming that Venizelos appealed for Serbian support. The Serbs in their reply did not hesitate to recognise the obligations of the Greco-Serbian Alliance; and after pointing out that their immediate participation in a third war was for obvious military and financial reasons extremely undesirable, if not impossible, they proceeded to address such a strongly worded protest to the Grand Vizier at Constantinople as to bluff him into thinking that they were quite prepared to declare war in defence of Greek interests. They also requested the other Powers to use all possible pressure to restrain Turkish provoca-

1914. tion. They showed such goodwill in the exercise of these diplomatic measures that on June 22, 1914, Mr. Streit, then Foreign Minister in the Government of Venizelos and subsequently King Constantine's private adviser, telegraphed to Belgrade "the lively gratitude of the Greek Government for the Serbian *démarche* at Constantinople on the subject of the persecution of the Greeks in Turkey, a *démarche* which has proved once again the solidarity of our alliance and the bonds of affection which unite the two peoples." Meanwhile Venizelos, having sounded the other Powers and learned that, owing to Germany's refusal to take part, there was no chance of a naval demonstration by the Great Powers in order to compel the Turks to respect the decision of the London Conference with reference to the Aegean Islands, succeeded (July 8, 1914) in buying for immediate delivery two American battleships, which deprived the Turks of any chance of challenging the superiority of the Greek fleet. Turkey at last consented to negotiate; and Venizelos was on his way to meet the Grand Vizier at a neutral capital, when at Munich he was arrested by news of the outbreak of the Great War. There also he received the question from the Serbian Premier as to the attitude Greece would adopt in view of the Austrian invasion. Venizelos declared at once (August 2) that "with regard to the war with Austria he must await fuller information and consultation with his colleagues in the government before he could determine the answer to be given; but that with regard to the possibility of a Bulgarian attack the place of Greece would be at the side of her Serbian ally in order to keep their common enemy at a respectful distance" and ensure the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucarest.

This declaration was officially renewed on his return 1914. to Athens.

2.

On August 4, Germany informed Greece both officially and by private telegram from the Kaiser to King Constantine that she had concluded alliances with Turkey and Bulgaria, and invited Greece to join the Germanic Powers in a united campaign against a Slav domination in the Balkans. This invitation was declined by King Constantine in terms of warm personal friendship. Venizelos, on behalf of the Greek Government (August 8), supplemented the King's rather regretful reference to the impossibility of Greek cooperation with Germany owing to the Mediterranean supremacy of the British and French fleets, by suggesting the renewal of a Balkan federation *to include Bulgaria* for the maintenance of neutrality. The hostile attitude of Turkey, however, now once more strengthened by the entry into the Dardanelles of the German battleships *Goeben* and *Breslau*, gave little hope of preventing the war from spreading in the Near East; and on August 23 Venizelos officially declared, with full authority, that "Greece, not merely in consciousness of her indebtedness to the great Guaranteeing Powers, but from a clear perception of her vital interests as a nation, understood that her place was at the side of the Powers of the Entente; and that whereas in the war that was being waged it was not possible for her to take a military part, since she could not, owing to the danger from Bulgaria, reinforce the Serbians, much less send an expeditionary force to France, nevertheless she thought it her duty to declare to the Powers of the Entente that, if Turkey went to

1914. war against them, she placed all her forces, naval and military, at their disposal for the war against Turkey, always presupposing that she was to be guaranteed against the Bulgarian danger."¹ The results of this voluntary declaration, made at a time when the Germans were advancing triumphantly towards Paris, were an assurance from the British Government that the Turkish fleet would not be allowed to leave the Dardanelles, the consent of the Three Powers and of Italy to the provisional reoccupation of Northern Epirus by the Greek army, and a cordial telegram from King George V. of England to King Constantine. Shortly afterwards Admiral Mark Kerr, instructed by the British Admiralty to concert plans with the Greek staff for a possible occupation of Gallipoli, was surprised² to be told by King Constantine that he had no intention in any circumstances of declaring war against Turkey unless Turkey first attacked Greece. Venizelos in a memorandum to the King (September 7) explained the reasons for forestalling an inevitable Turkish attack, Turkey in her persecutions of the Greek element in Asia Minor "having long been waging a war which had never been declared"; he protested against the King's excessive fear of offending Germany; and finally offered to resign. He was induced to remain in office, but insisted on the resignation from the Government (September 28) of M. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who

¹ The exact terms of this declaration have never been published; the present summary is taken from a speech of Venizelos in August 1917.

² According to the Admiral's subsequent declarations (e.g. *Times*, April 21, 1931) that he had "begged our Government to keep Greece and Rumania out of the War" the surprise must have been a pleasant one.

was understood to have advised the King without the 1914.
knowledge of his colleagues; Streit indeed continued
to be the private political counsellor at the Palace. A
month later Turkey entered the war.

In January 1915, England, on behalf of the Allies, 1915.
once more invited Greek assistance, not against Turkey
but for the relief of Serbia, by a well-meaning attempt
to reconstitute the nascent Balkan federation of 1912.
Serbia, in the hope of eventually reaching the Adriatic,
was to secure Bulgarian cooperation by certain conces-
sions in Macedonia; and if Greece would facilitate these
concessions the Three Powers would gladly acknow-
ledge "the right of Greece to very important compensa-
tions on the coast of Asia Minor" (January 24, 1915).
Venizelos, whose own deepest policy had always tended
whenever possible towards a Balkan federation, ex-
plained to King Constantine in a memorandum of the
same date the necessity of securing the cooperation not
only of Rumania but of Bulgaria as well, and declared
that in exchange for Bulgaria's active cooperation in a
war which must result in "the creation of a real Magna
Graecia" he would not hesitate to sacrifice Kavalla (the
port in Western Macedonia chiefly coveted by Bulgaria);
and in a Third Memorandum (January 17) he defined
the territory in Asia Minor,—“a province of 125,000
square kilometres, as large as and no less rich than the
whole Kingdom of Greece, and containing 800,000
Greek inhabitants”—which might be secured in ex-
change for the 2,000 square kilometres of the Kavalla
district, the population of which need not necessarily be
lost to Greece. These negotiations were frustrated prim-
arily by the attitude of Bulgaria.

On February 19 however, at the time of the prelim-

1915. inary attack by the British fleet on the Dardanelles, Venizelos, realising that a landing force would be required, took up again the question of Greek cooperation. By a Fourth Memorandum (unpublished) he believed that he had succeeded in gaining the King's assent to the mobilisation of one Army Corps to join in the Allied attack on Turkey, but he was checked by the immediate resignation of Colonel John Metaxas, Chief of the General Staff. He therefore called a Crown Council of former Premiers, under the presidency of the King (March 5), at which his proposal was favourably received by the leaders of all parties, including the ex-Premiers Ralli and Dragoumes. At the suggestion of the ex-Premier Theotokes a second Crown Council was held (March 6) in order to hear the reasons for the continued opposition of the General Staff. At this meeting Venizelos, influenced by information from Constantinople (February 29) that the Turks were already preparing to evacuate their still unfortified capital, attempted to meet the argument of the General Staff (against denuding the frontier of troops which might be required in view of the possibility of a Bulgarian attack), by proposing that not an Army Corps but only one division should be sent to the Dardanelles. This proposal was unanimously adopted by the Crown Council, and even the ex-Premier Theotokes, who never wavered in his personal preference for neutrality, advised the King that it was his duty to follow the advice of the Government of Venizelos without further hesitation. Nevertheless King Constantine refused, demanded the resignation of Venizelos (March 6), and dissolved the Chamber (April 10).

Venizelos re-
signs.

3.

A new Government was formed on March 10, 1915, 1915. by D. Gounares, who declared that the basis of Greek policy in loyalty to Serbia would remain unaffected by the change of government, and in the following month, when Bulgarian "irregulars" raided the Nish-Salonica railway, associated Greece with the Serbian protest at Sofia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zografos, "honestly adopted all that was possible of the Liberal Policy, the foundation of which was a very benevolent neutrality towards the Entente with a firm determination never to allow a Bulgarian attack on Serbia"; he continued for some weeks to negotiate with the Governments of the Entente, who on April 11 specifically offered the vilayet of Smyrna, but his sincere proposals were overtaken by the extravagant stipulations attached to them by the General Staff. In the following month further offers of Greek cooperation were made through less formal channels, such as the suggestion (May 2) that Greece would lend the assistance of her fleet if guaranteed against Bulgarian attack. But the French Government, to which at this period most of these offers were addressed, replied that all proposals of assistance must be unconditional. Other offers were left unanswered by the French and British Governments, which were convinced of the insincerity of these proposals; not only because the Government of Gounares had taken office on the specific programme of maintaining Greek neutrality, and was believed to be putting forward these suggestions (as ex-President Poincaré subsequently stated, on December 9, 1920) as a manoeuvre directed against the Liberal Party on the eve of the elections; but also because the real

1915. government of the country had been taken over by the King, who from this time forward assumed the right of negotiating directly with foreign Powers either through their Ministers in Athens or through his brothers, one of whom would be sent from time to time on a tour of the Western courts.

King Constantine. King Constantine was at the beginning of the war honestly neutral. He regarded the Protecting Powers with genuine benevolence, but his weak military type of mind was overwhelmingly impressed by German prestige, and influenced by his own education at Leipzig and at the Prussian Staff College and by the German training of some of the most capable officers of the General Staff.¹ His Queen Sofia whom he had married in 1889 was a sister of the German Emperor. He was convinced by sentiment and environment, in spite of the logic of Venizelos, that Germany was going to win; but not having the courage honestly to declare an intention of maintaining Greek neutrality at all costs and saving his country, as he thought, from disaster in spite of the Constitution, he was led from this time forward to play off one group of Powers against the other, and to pretend to the Allies, to those of his subjects who favoured them, and sometimes perhaps even to himself, that he was only waiting as a military expert for the right moment to join them. His attitude of opposition to Venizelos inevitably brought him into party politics. The German press propaganda,

¹ He had visited Berlin after the conclusion of the Balkan Wars and had been made an honorary field-marshal of the German Army. In returning thanks for this honour he had attributed the recent Greek victories to his own training in Germany. This speech gave great offence in France, as a French military mission under General Eydoux had been responsible for the training of the Greek army.

well organised under Baron Schenck, now became active, and as Germany had nothing to hope from Greece beyond Greek neutrality, directed all its efforts not only to strengthen the politicians opposed to Venizelos but also to popularise the person and policy of the King. At the elections which were finally held on June 13, the voters were definitely told that a vote cast against Venizelos, against the Liberal party, meant a vote for their King and a vote for peace. It is therefore somewhat remarkable that, although Venizelos himself took no part in the elections, his party, with a programme of intervention, maintained a majority of 58 seats in a house of 310. (In Old Greece alone they won 123 seats out of 184, but lost heavily in Macedonia.) In spite of this result Gounares remained in office, alleging that the serious illness of the King prevented him from considering any change of policy that might be necessitated by a change of Government; and the interval was used by the German propaganda which had now obtained a firm hold on a certain section of the press, in conjunction with the counsellors of German sentiment within the palace, to wean public opinion from the ideas of confidence in Venizelos and loyalty to Serbia. It is probable that M. Gounares himself was aware of this movement and was also privy to negotiations conducted by Germany at this period with Turkey and Bulgaria in which the attitude of Greece must have been a primary consideration. In July an agreement was signed between Turkey and Bulgaria, an agreement which the *Times* correspondent in the Balkans (August 10) magnificently declared to be "quite devoid of political importance"! The Greek press, less credulous, perceived the danger, and on August 2 Gounares officially declared that "a Bulgarian

1915. attack on Serbia could not leave us indifferent, and the Turco-Bulgarian agreement will only strengthen the bonds between Greece and Serbia." Yet it is significant that on July 30 the Greek Minister at Bucarest was informed by his English colleague that Germany had formally promised Bulgaria that Greek neutrality was definitely assured even in face of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia.

Venizelos. At last on August 23, 1915, Venizelos was recalled to office. He had to face a strong opposition, composed of jealous party leaders, great provincial families, party bosses, mayors and lawyers, the whole network of party jobbery whose power had been endangered by the reforms of 1910-1911; and this opposition of personal hostility to Venizelos was cleverly utilised by the German propaganda, which had only to identify the policy of loyalty to Serbia and to the Protecting Powers with the figure of Venizelos in order to make this mixed opposition into a compact body of opinion working in effect if not intention for Germany. The first act of Venizelos on taking office was to inform Serbia as well as Germany and the Protecting Powers that his policy was to preserve Serbia from Bulgarian attack, and his despatch to the German Government expressed the hope that Germany "would not fail to exercise all her influence in order to restrain Bulgaria from attacking Serbia, and would thus ensure the preservation of peace on the Greek frontiers." It is evident, however, that Germany and Bulgaria had received other information to the effect that Greece would in any event remain neutral.

Bulgaria mobilised on September 23, and three days later the Bulgarian Premier publicly reassured his fol-

lowers on the subject of Greek and Rumanian neutral- 1915.
 ity. Venizelos accordingly ordered a counter mobilisa-
 tion, and was reminded at the Palace that, as the King
 did not want to fight Germany, this must be regarded
 only as a "precautionary measure"; he agreed, and hav-
 ing received an assurance from Sofia that Bulgaria had
 no intention of attacking either Greece or Serbia, ex-
 plained in the Chamber (September 29) that in spite of
 Bulgaria's declared intention of maintaining an "armed
 neutrality" the situation was grave, and suggested that
 it might easily be improved by a simultaneous demobilisa-
 tion. At this time the opposition press began to develop
 for the first time the suggestion, which proceeded from
 the General Staff, that Serbia was not in a position to
 carry out her obligation, under the military convention
 annexed to the Greco-Serbian Treaty, to put 150,000
 men into the field for the operations against Bulgaria;
 and Venizelos, in the course of his discussions with the
 King, who at this time disputed neither the validity of
 the Greco-Serbian Treaty nor the authority of his
 Prime Minister as head of a constitutionally elected
 government, but could only repeat that he did not want
 to fight Germany, was authorised to meet the argu-
 ments of the General Staff by asking France and England
 if they would be in a position to supply, in place of
 Serbia, the 150,000 bayonets stipulated by the military
 convention. It was understood that at the same time
 the King was to sound Germany as to the guarantees
 she would be prepared to offer if Greece remained
 neutral. The King subsequently changed his mind, but
 the invitation to the French and English troops, if it
 could be regarded as such, had already been sent. On
 October 2, a note from the French Minister announced

1915. the arrival at Salonica of the first French troops "in order to assist Serbia" . . . , France and England assuming "that Greece . . . will not oppose measures taken in the interests of Serbia who is her ally." On this the King pointed out that the troops must not land until Bulgaria attacked Serbia; for the Treaty would not come into force until Bulgaria declared war, and until that moment the landing of foreign troops would be a violation of Greek neutrality; and Venizelos accordingly formally protested against the disembarkation, which would however, it was understood, be facilitated in every possible manner. On October 4, Venizelos explained in the Greek Chamber his intention of respecting the Greco-Serbian Treaty and using the Greek Army to protect the Serbian flank: "Greece has no immediate quarrel with Germany and Austria; but if in the course of events in the Balkan Peninsula she should find herself faced by other Powers, she will act as her honour demands. Such is the policy of the present Government. I would add that it has been approved by the Greek nation at the recent elections." In the debate that followed M. Gounares declared for the first time his view that the Treaty with Serbia was only applicable to a purely Balkan War. Venizelos received the confidence of the Chamber by a majority of 46. On the following morning he was dismissed from office by the King, who entrusted the formation of a Government to M. Zaimes.

Zaimes. M. Zaimes announced a policy of "armed neutrality," and replying on October 11 to a Serbian appeal for assistance (which England supported with the offer to cede Cyprus, an offer withdrawn on October 22) he developed the argument that the Treaty had a "purely Balkan character," and applied only to a "war between

one of the Allied States and a single other Power." He ^{1915.} added the remarkable sophism that "even in the course of the European War Greece was ready to face the Bulgarian danger. . . . But Greece anticipated a Bulgarian attack undertaken separately even though in conjunction with other hostilities directed against Serbia. The hypothesis of a combined attack with other Powers was outside the question." The Venizelist majority in the Chamber continued to support the new Government, on the understanding that Greek neutrality, as announced by M. Zaimes, was not less "benevolent" than before, until November 3 when an incident produced by General Giannakitsas, the Minister for War, provoked Venizelos to defeat the Government by 33 votes. On the following day General Giannakitsas was given an appointment at court. The King dismissed the Chamber (November 6), and a Government was formed by M. Skouloudes, a wealthy old man ^{Skouloudes} of good repute but weak character, who elaborated the now familiar declaration (November 9) of "*very benevolent neutrality*" towards the Entente.

The elections for the new Chamber were held on December 19. Venizelos and the Liberal Party regarded as an unconstitutional use of the King's authority this second dissolution of the Chamber, which appeared to have no reason other than the hope of whittling down the Liberal majority, the state of mobilisation having given the General Staff unparalleled opportunities, which they had not neglected, of influencing the voters. The Liberals as a protest decided to abstain from the polls and had the barren satisfaction of noting that only 230,000 votes were polled as against 720,000 recorded in the previous June. M. Skouloudes, now

1915. wholly under the influence of the Palace and the General Staff, soon found that the practice of "*very benevolent neutrality*" was less easy than the profession. He was driven in a mood of querulous pedantry to explain that there were only two sorts of neutrality,
1916. voluntary and involuntary. In April 1916 he refused permission for the use of Greek railways for the transport of the Serbian army from Corfu (where they had been collected and re-equipped after their retreat from Nish over the mountains of Albania) overland to Salonica; and the manner of his refusal gave further offence to France, in spite of the fact that the permission had only been requested at the instigation of a British Intelligence Officer (Captain Compton Mackenzie), acting in conjunction with the French authorities, as a ruse to distract the attention of German submarines while the Serbian troops were actually being transported by sea.

On May 23 Skouloudes received from the German Minister a notification that Fort Roupel, a key position of great importance in the passes entering Eastern Macedonia, would shortly be occupied as a "*purely defensive*" measure and without prejudice to Greek sovereignty. Two days later the fortress with its contents was duly surrendered by the Greek garrison to German and Bulgarian troops. Skouloudes possibly argued not without reason that if he was to remain neutral he could not refuse to Germany facilities which he had granted to the Allied forces at Salonica. Unfortunately he denied all knowledge of the incident when questioned in the Chamber on June 6, and his attitude was the beginning of a period of almost open hostility between the Greek Government and the Allies. "By adopting a passive attitude in face of an invasion which might weaken the position

of the Allies, Greece appeared to be abandoning her 1916. policy of benevolent neutrality," telegraphed the Greek Chargé d'Affaires from Paris. Exaggeration of the incident by organs of public opinion in the Allied capitals led to violent attacks on King Constantine; he was as violently defended by the German propaganda and by his own natural supporters in Athens. Embittered by these attacks and controversies he not only expected but began at this time, it is not improbable to suppose, eagerly to desire a German victory.

On June 3, 1916, General Sarraïl proclaimed martial law at Salonica. On June 21 the Allied Ministers presented a Note, drafted at the British Legation, in which they demanded, in the name of the three Guaranteeing Powers (*Puissances garantes*) the demobilisation of the army, a General Election, the formation of a non-political or "business" ministry to carry out these changes, and the replacement of certain police officials who were supposed to be in close relations with the German propaganda. M. Skouloudes resigned, and M. Zaimis again Zaimes. took office (June 23) in order to accept performance of the Note. Demobilisation was at last begun on June 29. The army had been kept mobilised at tremendous expense to the State for nine months and as the Government had had no intention of entering the war, the only reason for keeping it on a war footing had been in order to increase the political power of the General Staff. In order to continue this influence the demobilised men were now organised into "Leagues of Reservists" pledged to impose what was now definitely known as the King's policy in opposition to that of the Liberal Party and to form in practice centres of German propaganda and of active hostility to the Allies. This situation, already somewhat

1916. startling to conventional ideas of constitutional government, was complicated by the fact that King Constantine's policy of permanent neutrality was secretly supported by Italian and to some extent by Russian diplomatic forces which were jealous of the position which Greece might attain in the Levant under the leadership of Venizelos.

In July and August the Bulgarians advanced, and occupied almost the whole of Eastern Macedonia, including the port of Kavalla, the Greek garrison of which, amounting to 8,000 men, was instructed to surrender to the invaders (August 28) and was subsequently deported and interned at Goerlitz in Germany. The Bulgarian invasion of Macedonia greatly embittered the feelings of the Entente Powers and of Greek Liberals against King Constantine; and when the invasion extended to Western Macedonia it also led to the abandonment (very unfortunately) of the proposed election, the Liberals not caring to insist on carrying through an election without the Macedonian constituencies. As the invasion served no military end it seemed to have been planned for this very purpose of preventing an election; and such an aggressive military movement including the seizure of Kavalla can hardly have been undertaken without previous arrangement with the Greek authorities. The Chamber was not dissolved but adjourned (June 29), and was recalled on November 13.

The evident sincerity of M. Zaimes however produced a temporary improvement of the relations between the Allies and the Greek Government, and when Rumania entered the war King Constantine seemed to be wavering in his allegiance to a neutrality which owing to the fanatical character of its supporters could no

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longer be represented as benevolent. Venizelos promised 1916. to give his unconditional support to any Government that would follow a policy of intervention; and King Constantine, in order to calm popular excitement produced by Rumania's decision and by the Bulgarian invasion of Macedonia, let it be known that he had authorised M. Zaimes to reopen negotiations with the Entente. On the eve of Rumania's declaration of war (August 27, 1916) Venizelos at a mass meeting of his supporters made a final appeal to the Government and to the King to take this opportunity of associating Greece with the Allies before it was too late. King Constantine refused to receive a deputation elected by this meeting. On September 1 a revolutionary movement was started by some of Venizelos' most prominent supporters at Salonica (P. Argyropoulos and Colonel Zymbrakakes), who established a Committee of National Defence with the object of reinforcing the Allies with such troops as they could gather and helping them to drive the Bulgarians from Greek soil. On September 2 a further Entente Note, supported by the presence of the Allied fleet at the Piraeus, demanded control of the Posts and Telegraphs, and the expulsion of certain enemy agents who under the protection of the Palace were thought to be endangering the plans of the Allied forces at Salonica; and on September 11 Zaimes resigned, finding it impossible, owing to the control now exercised by the Palace, honestly to satisfy the Allies by enforcing the cessation of hostile activity in the capital. A new Government was not formed till September 16, when M. Kalogeropoulos took office; but he was not recognised by the Allied Ministers, whom he was unable to satisfy as to his capacity to restore a more tranquil atmosphere. Kalogero-
poulos.

1916. On September 25, 1916, Venizelos left Athens and, joined in Crete by Admiral Kountouriotis and General Dankles, proclaimed a revolutionary movement, intended not to displace the throne and the central government but to force their hands by concentrating and displaying the strength of the Liberal and interventionist parties. This triumvirate, after gathering support by a tour of the Aegean islands (Samos, Mitylene and Chios), landed ten days later at Salonica and, absorbing the Committee of National Defence, organised a Provisional Government which took on all the functions of a sovereign administration in alliance with the Allied forces, raised a Greek "Army of National Defence", and a month later declared war against Germany and Bulgaria. It was not however officially recognised by the Allied Powers. "Whenever we find part of the Greek community which is in fact under the Government of M. Venizelos," said Lord Robert Cecil after an Allied Conference at Boulogne (October 20), "where the majority of the population recognise him as their Government, we recognise it as *de facto* the ruler of that portion of Greece." This cautious attitude contributed to the prestige still enjoyed by King Constantine at Athens, and enabled his Leagues of Reservists to terrorise the ordinary population throughout the country, except in so far as their terrorism was mitigated in the capital by the Franco-British secret police, who exhibited some of the decision which the diplomatists lacked. Their zeal however in the pursuit of enemy agents (whom when found they deported with little pretence of neutrality) enabled the Reservists and the King's friends to spread the report that Venizelists were fomenting a revolution in Athens, and to regard anyone who favoured the Allies as a dan-

Provisional
Government
at Salonica.

Terrorism
at Athens.

gerous rebel. On October 10 a new Government had 1916.
 been formed by Professor S. Lambros, who was completely subservient to the Palace and the General Staff. So also the Allied Ministers were now to some extent superseded by the French Admiral Dartige du Fournet in command of the Allied fleets.

On November 19, 1916, the Admiral, at 48 hours' notice, expelled from Athens the Ministers of the enemy Powers, General Sarrail, who had just reoccupied Monastir, being now seriously alarmed about the safety of his left flank owing to the continual communications which were said to be passing between the Palace at Athens and the Headquarters of the Central Powers, and owing to the appearance of Greek irregular bands in the neutral zone which had been established in Macedonia between the spheres of the Athens and Salonica Governments. On November 24 the Admiral demanded the surrender of a considerable part of the Greek army's artillery;¹ this demand was the result of a private interview between the King and a French deputy, M. Benazet, who had visited Athens at the end of October and understood that the King in his anxiety to prove the sincerity and the benevolence of his neutrality would willingly comply with such a request. Two days later some detachments of French troops were landed, and on December 1, the day on which the time limit accorded by the Admiral expired, 2,500 French and British marines, the Admiral being confident, in spite of the protests of the Legations and the warnings of the British Intelligence, that no resistance would be offered but that the King required a show of force in

¹ 18 field batteries, 6 mountain batteries, 4,000 rifles, 140 machine guns, with ammunition, etc.

1916. order to be able to justify his surrender of the arms. The troops were approaching Athens when they were attacked with machine gun fire by Greek troops posted in prepared positions. Many were killed and wounded, and the remainder were escorted as prisoners back to their ships, while the Admiral himself was a prisoner in the Zappeion gardens which he had made his headquarters, until the Allied fleet dropped a few shells in the gardens of the Palace. The French and British Ministers retired to their warships, and for two days the capital was given over to the excesses of the troops and Reservists, who, excited by reports of a Venizelist plot to dethrone the King, hunted down as rebels and traitors all prominent citizens suspected of Venizelist tendencies, especially if their houses were worth looting.

On December 7 the Allied fleet began a close blockade of the Greek coasts, which inflicted great hardship on those least responsible for the Greek attitude. A week later a note from the Three Powers and Italy demanded reparation, and the withdrawal of all troops and arms to the Peloponnese; and on December 19 England officially recognised the "Provisional Government of National Defence," and sent Lord Granville to Salonica as British envoy. On December 31 a further note from the Protecting Powers demanded a reduction of armed forces, the transfer of all armament to the Peloponnese, the cessation of Reservists' meetings and of the arming of civilians, the re-establishing of the control officers (who had been expelled from the Telegraphs, etc., on December 1), the release of political prisoners, and
1917. apologies; and on January 8, after an Allied Conference at Rome, a further Note gave the Royal Government a week for the acceptance of these demands, but assured

it that the Provisional Government of Salonica should ^{1917.} not be permitted to extend its power or threaten the capital.

On January 16, 1917, the Government accepted these terms, and by way of apology the flags of the Allies were formally saluted by Greek troops at the Zappeion. The blockade was, however, maintained, as King Constantine and his Queen were holding out in expectation of a German offensive in Macedonia, and, while organising Greek irregulars in the Thessalian neutral zone, were sending frantic wireless enquiries to Berlin, one of which for example, addressed to the German Emperor, prayed "that God grant you very soon a glorious victory over all your infamous enemies." So hostile indeed was the attitude of the Palace that the British General Staff at this time was actually preparing plans for landing an expeditionary force to seize the capital. Once more however the tension died down; King Constantine probably realised that the prospects of a German offensive on a large scale in Macedonia were very remote; his confidence must have been shaken by America's entry into the war (April); and, although the Russian Revolution in March had deprived him of some diplomatic support, he had not lost the Italian favour already referred to and he still had many personal supporters among the Allies—military officials who found him personally attractive and politicians who feared that his removal would strengthen republican sentiment in Europe. These influences encouraged and enabled him to reopen relations of "friendly neutrality" when the French and British ministers returned to their legations in March. At the end of the month one or two of the Venizelist news-

1917. papers, whose presses had all been broken up in December by the Royalist mob, ventured to reappear. On the other hand, the replacement of the French Government of M. Briand by that of M. Ribot probably disposed France for a more drastic policy; and at the Allied Conference (April 19) at St. Jean de Maurienne, Italy is credibly reported to have withdrawn her opposition to Venizelos in return for the promise of Smyrna. The King's less truculent attitude therefore, reflected in the reappearance of M. Zaimis as Prime Minister (May 3), was now confronted by greater unity and decision in the Councils of the Allies, who had hitherto been balanced by opposing influences in a position of somewhat strict neutrality with regard to the conflicting claims of Salonica and Athens. They would shortly be obliged to take a definite step by the ripening of the Thessalian crops which were urgently required by the districts (especially the Aegean islands) subject to the Venizelist régime, and on the other hand if gathered by the Royalists would have enabled them to laugh at the Allied blockade.

4.

Expulsion
of King
Constantine.

At the end of May the Allies were at last agreed that the professed neutrality of King Constantine was not genuine enough to be respected. On June 6, 1917, M. Jonnart, a French Senator, arrived in Greece as Commissioner of the Three Powers, and after Conferences at Salonica returned to Salamis and on June 11 presented the Greek Government with a Note which demanded the abdication of King Constantine, "who would himself choose, in accord with the Protecting

Powers, a successor among his heirs."¹ The Greek Government, required to give an answer within twenty-four hours, was also informed that the Crown Prince would be excluded from the succession (on account of his German sentiments) and that the King, after his departure, and subject to his good behaviour, would be guaranteed a pension of £20,000. On the following morning (June 12) M. Zaimes informed the High Commissioner that the King, "anxious as always for the welfare of Greece, had decided to leave the country together with the Prince Royal, and had chosen as his successor Prince Alexander" (his second son, born August 1, 1893); and the same night King Constantine left Athens and made his way to Switzerland, with his family and suite, which included his chief political adviser, M. Streit. General Dousmanes and other officers of the General Staff, with M. Gounares, and other politicians notorious for their German sentiments, were deported to Corsica; and with them M. Ion Dragoumes, a brilliant and rising writer diplomatist and politician, who while not hostile to the Allies was regarded as dangerous owing to the extravagance of his hatred of Venizelos.

On June 26 Venizelos himself returned to Athens and with the members of his Government, after the resignation of M. Zaimes, took the oath of allegiance

¹ In the *Eleutheron Bêma* of April 21, 1931, M. Venizelos, writing to correct some points in the reminiscences of G. Ventêres, says that England, Russia and Italy were all opposed at this time to the establishment of a republic in Greece. The suggestion of an English prince for the Greek throne was strangely enough accepted by M. Briand, but refused by England. Fears about the Belgian succession excluded the second son of the King of the Belgians who was favourably considered. Thus as a King had to be found the choice fell on the Greek Prince Alexander.

1917. to King Alexander. French troops had been landed in Athens on M. Jonnart's arrival, and had also advanced into Thessaly to secure the harvest. Venizelos had repeatedly asked the Allies to suspend the neutral zone and allow the Salonica Government to advance into Thessaly, and also to march against the Athenian Government, which could have offered very little resistance; for at the time the Salonica Government had raised an army of 60,000 men, "well organised in three divisions, with a fourth division, that of the Cyclades and Ionian Islands, ready for immediate equipment." The Allies had refused the request, not wishing to permit any outbreak of civil war, however brief. They quite naturally preferred to effect the purgation of the Athenian State without bloodshed; but the presence of French troops in Athens during the month of June had the unfortunate result of exposing Venizelos to the charge of having been restored to power by "foreign bayonets."

5.

Greece joins
the Allies.

On June 29, 1917, the reunited Greek Government declared war against the Central Powers. The Chamber of June 13, 1915, which King Constantine had dissolved on November 6, 1915, was recalled, and in a great speech (August 26, 1917) Venizelos explained to the legally elected representatives of the Greek people the causes of his policy from the beginning of the war and of his conflicts with King Constantine. Of 198 deputies present 188 voted for the resolution of plenary confidence in the Government. Yet the passions aroused by these conflicts and by the respective propagandas were not easily stilled. A large number of officers who refused

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to disavow their allegiance to King Constantine were 1917. cashiered, and many civil servants who refused to acknowledge the authority of the new Government were also removed. Of the civil servants all but about 400 (out of a civil service amounting to some 30,000 persons) had been reinstated at their own request by May 1920, in spite of the difficulties created by the duplication of staff effected by the Salonica administration; and of these 400 many remained unemployed not for political reasons but on account of their official incompetence. But the reinstatement of officers was less easy owing to questions of seniority involved, and the Royalist officers remained as an element of irreconcilable discontent to be exploited by a sedulous propaganda conducted by the ex-King Constantine from his exile in Switzerland. Several mutinies occurred during the mobilisation of the army, which were quickly suppressed; but the shooting of the ringleaders, inevitable in a state of war, left a painful impression. In November 1917, Venizelos visited Paris and London, where he was entertained at the Mansion House, and secured supplies of food, all stocks having been exhausted during the Allied blockade, as well as munitions and equipment for the Greek army. By April, 1918, the 1918. mobilisation was complete. The Greek forces, which were successfully tested in a preliminary action at Skra di Legen (May 30), amounted in July to ten divisions, about 250,000 men, and gave the Allies for the first time a definite superiority on the Macedonian front. The Allies were thus enabled to plan in August the great offensive which was opened in the following month and culminated, after the Greek troops had distinguished themselves in conjunction with the British at the storm-

War ends on
the Mace-
donian Front.

1918. ing of the Doiran heights (September 22) in the capitulation of Bulgaria (September 30, 1918)—the first breach in the defences of the Central Powers.

6.

Peace
Conference
1919.

Venizelos arrived in Paris at the end of the year and soon became one of the leading figures at the Peace Conference, which opened in January 1919. The Greek delegation argued before the Supreme Council of the Allies the Greek claims for the annexation of Northern Epirus, Thrace, Smyrna, with a large part of the western littoral of Asia Minor, and the Dodekanese; and for the internationalisation of Constantinople. Meanwhile Greek troops had taken part in the unfortunate French expedition to South Russia, and the Greek army and fleet had been represented in the Allied occupation of Constantinople. But the number of statistical factors involved, the tendency of the Council of Ten, not less than that of the subsequent Supreme Council of Four, to postpone difficult problems, and the conflicting ambitions and policies of the Great Powers in the Near East, combined to keep the future of Greece in suspense for two years after the conclusion of hostilities. As affecting Bulgaria the Greek claims were settled by the Treaty of Neuilly, to which was annexed a Greco-Bulgarian convention for the protection of racial minorities, etc. (November 27, 1919), by which Bulgaria was cut off from the Aegean. But the Turkish problem in which all the Powers were interested remained to be dealt with in the following year.

The Armistice concluded with Turkey (October 30, 1918) had unfortunately made very incomplete pro-

vision for the disarmament of the Turkish forces, 1919. and it was partly in order to pacify Asia Minor and protect the Christian populations that Venizelos, after a first presentation of his Turkish argument, obtained an authorisation for Greek troops to occupy Smyrna (May 14, 1919). Unfortunately, owing to the defective arrangements of the Greek authorities, the landing was followed by a disturbance in which the Greek troops and local population got out of hand and about 20 Turks were shot down in the streets. The Greek Government immediately set up a Court Martial which passed severe sentences on 48 Greeks (3 of whom were executed), 13 Turks, 12 Armenians and 1 Jew involved in the riots. Subsequently an Inter-Allied Commission of British, French, American and Italian officers was sent out to investigate, but its Report was never published as by an oversight the decision of the Supreme Council, that a Greek officer should be present at the investigations, had been ignored. In September 1919 leading British residents of Smyrna testified to the admirable impartiality of the new Greek Commissioner, M. Sterghiades. But the suppression of this report, as well as similar incidents said to have occurred at the end of June at Aidin, where the Turks had burned the Greek quarter and murdered many of the inhabitants, gave rise in ensuing discussions of the Turkish solution to very severe criticisms of Greek capacity for ruling a mixed population. When the Supreme Council met in London in February 1920, the presentation of the Greek case was opposed by a strong Moslem propaganda. Many good Christians in England therefore looked on with some satisfaction while the Turkish irregular armed forces in Asia Minor, retreating beyond the limits set

Greek
occupation of
Smyrna.

1919. by the Supreme Council to the Greek army of occupation, were developed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha into a Turkish Nationalist movement definitely hostile to the Allies; and after the Supreme Council had announced (February 21) their decision to allow the Sultan to remain in Constantinople, where he would be more amenable to Allied persuasion, the Turkish authorities professed to be unable to control Kemal, who declared his independence of Constantinople and established an Anatolian Government at Angora.

At a further Conference at San Remo the Allies completed the draft of the Treaty and handed it to the Turkish delegates (May 11), and at the beginning of July at another Conference at Spa, Venizelos received from the Supreme Council a mandate for the Greek army to restore order in the whole North Western district of Asia Minor, beyond the frontiers of the Smyrna district, as well as in Thrace, where similar disorders had arisen. The Greek army occupied Thrace and entered Adrianople on July 25. "Venizelos expressed the opinion," said Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons (July 21), "that he would be able to clear up the whole neighbourhood between Smyrna and the Dardanelles in 15 days. . . . The Greek troops, well organised and admirably led, did so in 10 days."

7.

Treaty of
Sèvres. The business-like way in which the Greek army carried out this mandate was held to justify the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres finally signed on August 10, 1920, by which the whole of Turkish Thrace from Adrianople up to Chatalja and Derkos, within 20 miles

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of Constantinople, including Gallipoli and the northern 1920.
shore of the sea of Marmora (subject to an International Commission which was to control the Zone of the Straits), was definitely ceded to Greece, together with the islands of Tenedos and Imbros and all the Aegean islands already in Greek occupation; the Smyrna district with its hinterland was placed under Greek administration, with provision for the exhibition of a nominal symbol of Turkish sovereignty, and subject to the rule of a local parliament, elected by Proportional Representation, on the demand of which after five years the territory might be definitely incorporated in the Greek Kingdom; while Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodekanese were ceded to Italy, but transferred to Greece by a Greco-Italian Convention signed on the same day and incorporating the terms of the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement.¹

8.

The Anatolian policy of Venizelos was not "imperialistic". As early as the Balkan Wars he had realised that the million or two Asiatic or Anatolian Greeks extending in scattered villages as far as the Caucasus, survivors and direct descendants of the Eastern Roman Empire, were more valuable as Hellenic stock than the crowded trampled and tribulated Greeks of Thrace or Macedonia. It was moreover apparent that the policy of "Young Turks" or "Turkish Nationalists," whether embodied in Enver or in Kemal, aimed at the assimilation or extermination of these Greeks. There was only one way to save them. Venizelos decided to establish an

Greece in
Asia Minor.

¹ See above, p. 95.

1920. enclave round Smyrna which should be not only an island of refuge whenever these Asiatic Greeks cared to cross the frontier, and a nucleus to draw them down towards the coast, but also a stronghold, the presence of which should deter the Turks from taking violent measures to "assimilate" the Greeks in the interior. For if the Turks began to persecute, massacre or otherwise forcibly convert them, a large Greek population would immediately abandon their villages and fly over the frontier into the Smyrna enclave, and forming a compact population there would serve to strengthen the Greek hold on Smyrna, which under the Treaty of Sèvres was only provisional and subject to the League of Nations. The Greek case was supported by some extremely doubtful statistics which did not invalidate the equity of the Greek claim for a mandatory régime at Smyrna. In order to secure not oil or concessions but only the survival in a biological sense of a million of his countrymen Venizelos obtained the lease of a patch round Smyrna about as big as the counties of Devonshire and Cornwall; for this he was reviled in the British Liberal press as the founder of a "great Greek Empire," while the Conservative and Socialist press, seldom far behind in unreality, scolded Mr. Lloyd George for endangering British rule in India by "backing the Greeks."

9.

After thus concluding his diplomatic labours Venizelos was leaving Paris (August 12, 1920) when an attempt to assassinate him was made by two ex-officers of the Greek navy (Tserépes and Kyriákos). The crime

was reasonably suspected to have been instigated by 1920. King Constantine's propaganda: it was certainly extolled as a glorious tyrannicide by the Royalist press. When the news reached Athens the mob broke loose, and looted the houses of many anti-Venizelist politicians, with the connivance of the police, who, under the command of a Cretan condottiere named Gýpares, were also responsible for the brutal murder, after his precautionary arrest, of M. Ion Dragoumes; and although Venizelos telegraphed his horror at the crime he failed, after his return to Athens, publicly to censure the Government for their negligence.

During his absence from the country Venizelos had left as Vice-President of the Council his Minister of the Interior, M. Répoules, an honest and clever man of weak and emotional character. A few other members of his Government were either honest or competent; very few were both. With the growing pressure of public affairs he had been insulated by an increasing number of secretaries from any healthy contact with the community he was called upon to govern. Often too he was as unfortunate in his choice of administrative subordinates as he was impatient of their advice. Every leader of a revolution is obliged to accept the services of any adventurer who hopes to gather some of the perquisites of revolution; Venizelos had been no exception to this rule when he went to Salonica in 1916; and when he returned to Athens in 1917 he had been too grateful or too busy with the war to turn out any of the subordinates who had supported him in his forlorn hope at Salonica. Corruption and party spite, which he had expelled in 1910, crept back into the administration and were now made worse than before by the general relaxation of

Venizelos
returns to
Athens.

1920. public morality that was observed in all belligerent countries. When local officials and policemen were called upon to enforce the tyranny of war emergency legislation, the people were easily persuaded by the mendacious propaganda kept up by King Constantine's agents that they were being persecuted and oppressed; and the very activity of these agents who never ceased, even at the most critical period of the war, their attempts to stir up seditions and conspiracies made it impossible to relax any of the stringent measures of censorship and suppression. Venizelos had attempted in May to repeal some of the provisions of martial law, retaining only those measures strictly necessitated by the state of war in Asia Minor, but had quickly been obliged to revoke the concession. Meanwhile the country districts suffered even more severely than the towns under the burden of mobilisation, from which they had known little release since 1912.

These discontents were assiduously exploited by King Constantine's agents, not without the help of American and Italian money.¹ Not the Greek peasants only but many of the urban population lived mentally in the middle ages: no other mentality indeed could have enjoyed the grime and incense of the Greek Orthodox Church: and they bore a grudge against Venizelos for dragging them out of the sentimental disorder of a feudal monarchy into the sparsely furnished workshop of a modern state. These naturally took a pre-Copernican

¹ Italian because Italy was jealous of Greek influence in the Levant and was afraid that Greece under the guidance of Venizelos might be a formidable rival; throughout this period the anti-Venizelist parties could always count on Italian recognition and sympathy. American because King Constantine's brother Christopher had married the widow of an American millionaire.

view of European affairs and believed as firmly as any English journalist that Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to "sanction and secretly finance a Greek advance in Asia Minor," (as the *Star* said after the restoration of King Constantine). All the political bosses and the spoils-hunters and the incompetents hated Venizelos because he had tried (unfortunately with only partial success) to rob them of their occupation. And many honest Greeks were tired of hearing Venizelos praised by English and French journalists who wanted to use him for their own ends and took no interest in his country or his countrymen.

When Venizelos returned to Greece, and presented to the Chamber (September 7) the three Treaties with Turkey, Bulgaria and Italy, he was indeed unanimously thanked as the saviour of his country, and was able to announce that on the imminent dissolution of the Chamber all restrictions of civil liberty would be abolished, so that the elections in the autumn should be held under constitutional conditions. He only made the stipulation that the return of King Constantine should not become an issue. The opposition, whose strength Venizelos, with his usual optimism, seems to have ignored, consisted of a coalition of 16 prominent politicians or group leaders united only by their hatred of himself, and could appeal to the people only by denouncing Venizelos as the author of all their discontents. The situation was changed by the death of King Alexander, from the bite of a monkey, on October 25. At a special session (October 28) of the Chamber dissolved on September 23, the Government advised the election as Regent of Admiral Kountouriotis and the offer of the Crown to Prince Paul, Constantine's third son, whom they regarded as the only constitutional suc-

1920. cessor. Prince Paul replied that "the Throne does not belong to me; it belongs to my august father, King Constantine, and constitutionally my eldest brother is his successor. Neither of them has ever renounced his rights . . . I would only ascend the Throne if the Hellenic people were to decide that it did not want the return of my august father, and were to exclude the Crown Prince George from his right of succession"; and it then became clear that the restoration of Constantine must be the real issue at the General Election fixed for November 14. The opposition jumped at the heaven-sent election cry, while Venizelos was content to announce that if defeated he would retire from public life. The result came as a surprise to both parties.¹ Only 120 Liberals were elected as against 246 members of the opposition (and 4 independents); and although the result failed to represent the real strength of the Venizelists in the country (it was calculated that Proportional Representation would have returned 200 Venizelists) and they still remained the largest single party in the Chamber, it was impossible to minimise the catastrophic nature of their downfall. Venizelos immediately resigned, and with many of his ministers and officials left the country. A Government

¹ In the *Eleftheron Bêma* of April 21, 1931, M. Venizelos replying to criticism in articles by G. Ventêres maintains that he had given the Royalists a pledge to hold elections as soon as possible after the signing of the Treaty and could not long have postponed them. He admits however that he committed a grave error in not postponing them, after the death of King Alexander, long enough to get into touch with King Constantine. He actually wrote a letter to M. Take Ionescu asking for Rumania's intervention to persuade Constantine to agree to the accession of his eldest son George but yielding to the advice of his colleagues made the mistake of tearing it up. The attempt on his life had greatly disturbed him as evidence of the violent feeling in Greece. Finally he insists that he could not have remained in office without elections as he is not of the stuff which makes dictators.

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was formed by the aged Demetrius Ralli, which entrusted the Regency to the Dowager Queen Olga (who had come to Athens for the funeral of King Alexander).

10.

On December 5 a plebiscite was held on the question of the return of King Constantine, from which the Liberals decided to abstain, announcing that they were content loyally to abide by the result of the Election. The British, French and Italian Governments issued a proclamation (December 3, 1920) reminding the Greek people that the actions of King Constantine had been hostile to the Allies and "reserving to themselves complete liberty in dealing with the situation" if he were recalled. Nevertheless, 999,954 votes out of 1,013,724 were said to have been cast in favour of the King's return. King Constantine, with his Queen and retainers, returned triumphantly to Athens on December 19 and was received with an ovation from which very few Venizelists dared to abstain. The Allied Powers refused however to recognise him, and withdrew the financial assistance which Greece had been receiving. (Note of 1920, December 8, addressed to Premier, suppressed by censorship until March 19, 1922.)

Return of
King
Constantine.

The withdrawal of Allied support was serious. Mustafa Kemal's Anatolian movement was still gaining in strength;¹ he had set up a Nationalist "Parliament" at Angora which entirely repudiated the Treaty of Sèvres; he had also established communications with Russia, and thus vitalised was threatening the French occupa-

¹ According to A. J. Toynbee the Kemalist army grew from 19,000 men in May 1919 to 200,000 men in June 1920.

1920. tion in Cilicia and endangering the whole Allied arrangement in the Levant. The Turkish army indeed was now so formidable that it was obviously impossible for Greece to hold a long frontier in Asia Minor without Allied support; yet of the three Allies Italy had always been secretly supporting the Turks; France transferred her financial and diplomatic support to the Turks as soon as it became apparent that their army was the strongest in Asia Minor; while the English Government, whatever the inclinations of individual ministers, was forbidden by considerations of internal politics to spend "a penny, a man or a gun" on any eastern adventure, much less on the support of a Christian power against Islam. The Indian discontents it may now be needless to recall were quite unconnected with any display of Christian feeling in England; and the Turks themselves were soon to depose their Sultan and expel the Caliph. Yet the Aga Khan, a religious potentate well known at Monte Carlo and Newmarket, and Mr. Edwin Montagu, the Jewish Secretary of State for India, threatened that any expression of English hostility to Turkey, the home of the Caliph, would have disastrous results in the Indian Empire. Mr. Montagu was subsequently obliged to resign after attempting to force Lord Curzon's hand by publishing a telegram from the Indian Government (March 8, 1922).

A strong section of Allied opinion, especially in France, seeking a quick and economical settlement, thought that Kemal should be pacified by negotiation and by concessions in Asia Minor; and that the restoration of King Constantine was an excellent pretext for revising the whole Treaty (which, though signed, had not been ratified) in Turkey's favour and at the expense

of Greece. Accordingly a Conference of the Three Powers (England, France and Italy) met in London on February 21, 1921, and was attended by *two* 1921. Turkish delegations (from Constantinople and Angora), while Greece was represented by M. Kalogeropoulos, who had become Prime Minister on February 7, 1921, after a dissension between the former Premier Ralli and M. Gounares (who, though leader of the strongest single group in the coalition, was held to be unfitted by his notorious record of opposition to the Allies during the war to represent Greece at an Allied Conference). The two Turkish delegations coalesced with dignity, the Constantinople delegate retiring to bed and leaving the Turkish case in the hands of the Nationalist delegate from Angora. M. Kalogeropoulos on the other hand, who was a puppet in the hands of the extreme Royalists, violently rejected semi-official attempts to persuade him to cooperate in defending the Treaty with M. Venizelos, who had come to London in order to plead in his private capacity against the penalisation of the Greek people. The Supreme Council first proposed that an Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry should be sent out to investigate the racial and other problems involved in the questions of Thrace and Smyrna.¹ This proposal having been rejected by Greece, on the grounds that

¹ It was the intention of Mr. Lloyd George that the Greeks should accept this proposal, in the certainty that the Turks would reject it and thus put themselves with their French and Italian supporters in the wrong. A communication to this effect was actually carried from one of Mr. Lloyd George's private secretaries to M. Kalogeropoulos by a well-known journalist who himself dictated to the Greek representative a suitably vague and amenable reply. On the next day however M. Kalogeropoulos falsified Mr. Lloyd George's expectations by insisting on referring the proposal to Athens where it was unanimously rejected by the National Assembly.

1921. these problems had already been exhaustively discussed by the experts in Paris, the Conference (March 12) submitted to the delegates its own proposals for modifying the Treaty. These, while leaving the Greeks undisturbed in Thrace, strengthened the Turkish position in Constantinople and made certain financial concessions to the Turks; while for Smyrna they proposed a complicated régime of which the principal provisions were the following: The Vilayet of Smyrna was to remain under Turkish sovereignty; a Greek garrison would remain in Smyrna, but elsewhere order was to be maintained by a gendarmerie under Allied officers and recruited in proportion to the numbers and distribution of the population in each district as reported by an Inter-Allied Commission; the same proportional arrangement would apply to the administration; and a Christian Governor would be appointed by the League of Nations with an elective Assembly and Council. No definite replies to these proposed modifications of the Treaty were received from either party; but on March 24 the Greeks opened an offensive against the Turkish Nationalist positions, and before the end of the month had seized the important railway junctions of Afium Karahissar and Eski Shehr on the line to Angora. North-west of Eski Shehr, however, they were heavily defeated (April 2), and after losing 4,000 killed and wounded were compelled to retreat all along the line to their old positions. The reverse was not surprising, as the Government had just removed from their commands all the higher officers of Venizelist sentiments and replaced them by Royalists. On April 7 Gounares, who had visited London and Paris during the last days of the Conference, and had himself telegraphed from London the order to open the

offensive, became Prime Minister. At the same time ¹⁹²¹. the centenary of the proclamation of Greek Independence was rather gloomily celebrated (April 7, 1921) and marked by the canonisation of the Patriarch Gregory V.

The new Chamber, which had met on February 1 and declared itself a National Constituent Assembly, was a very representative collection of all the reactionary elements which had been swept out of Greek politics in 1910; indeed some of the most prominent figures in it had not been heard of since 1897. After voting a large increase in the King's Civil List, as well as all the arrears of the pension promised him in 1917, it spent most of its time in denouncing such traces as were left of the Venizelist "tyranny" including the introduction into the national schools of the popular or demotic language. M. Gounares, a fluent and clever lawyer, had on his programme ambitious proposals for the revision of the Constitution,—providing for women's votes; for an Industrial Council of not more than 200 representatives of legally organised trades to advise the legislature on social and economic questions and draw up bills for submission to the Government and Chamber; for a plebiscite to be held under certain conditions on the demand of King, Chamber or a fixed number of citizens; and for a "service" Government of permanent civil servants, to carry out elections after a dissolution. He was also said to be contemplating decentralisation in local government in the direction of departmental (nomarchical) autonomy. But at the end of May 1921 the National Assembly was still discussing generous proposals for the compensation of all those who had suffered for political reasons since 1917. The Government were content to

1921. allow members to waste their time in these discussions, knowing that they were held together only by their hatred of Venizelos and their consequent adulation of the King. The Treasury was empty; but the spirits of the populace, who had begun to get uneasy at the continual postponement of the new offensive, the depreciation of the exchange and the rise in the cost of living, were maintained by such stimulating doses as the fiction that England was secretly helping King Constantine in his war against Turkey with supplies of money, and munitions, and even with army and fleet. On May 20 the British, French and Italian High Commissioners in Constantinople proclaimed the strict neutrality during the Greco-Turkish "state of war" of all districts in their military occupation (*i.e.* the "Zone of the Straits"). Some colour was lent to these Athenian rumours at the beginning of June, when British relations with the Nationalists of Angora were severely strained; and on June 11 (anniversary of the fall of Constantinople and death of Constantine Palaeologus in 1453) King Constantine left for the Smyrna front amid a frenzy of hysterical flattery, hailed by the Government press as Emperor designate of Constantinople and as "Commander of the Anglo-Greek forces in the Near East."

II.

King
Constantine
and Gounares
his Minister.

Soon afterwards the Powers made another attempt to tranquillise Asia Minor before the Greek offensive should open. On June 21 the Ministers of the three Powers handed the Greek Government a note in which they offered their "friendly services to prevent the re-

opening of hostilities in the Near East and to secure an 1921.
honourable and lasting peace." Four days later the Greek Government, after consultations with the King at Smyrna, replied in an unparalleled mass of verbiage that Greece, while thanking "her great Allies" for their offer of mediation, could not postpone the offensive, as by imposing the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres she was only continuing the task undertaken in conjunction with "her great Allies" during the war, and that the Turkish question could only be solved by force of arms. Nothing can excuse the madness of the men who rejected this offer. On June 28 the Greek forces evacuated Nicomedia (Ismid), and the offensive finally opened on July 19. *After a few days the Greek army had again seized Eski Shehr and Afium Karahissar as well as Kutahia.* A month later they had reached Sivri Hissar, within 60 miles of Angora, but on August 26 they had again been checked on the river Sakaria. The check on the river Sakaria turned out to have been a disastrous defeat—costing more casualties than had been incurred in the previous three years of the war—and one of the charges against the Ministers afterwards executed is that the military authorities had always intended to advance only as far as the river, but that at a Council of War at Kutahia under the presidency of the King, the two civilians, Gounares and Theotokes, had insisted on a further advance across the river in the hope that the resounding glory of an occupation of Angora would lead to the recognition of the King.

September was occupied in the retreat. On September 29, 1921, Constantine returned to Athens. The truth was concealed from the public, the political situation was patched up, and on October 16, after receiving a

1921. vote of confidence in the Chamber (Stratos¹ and his 26 followers supported the Government with reservations, and only the 82 Liberals abstained), Gounares and Baltazzi left for Paris and London. At the end of October and during November these two desperate and incompetent men had repeated interviews with the Government and after trying to instruct Lord Curzon in Near Eastern history were at last persuaded to tell him the truth; and although they had rejected all the Allied proposals of intervention in March and June (as well as informal offers of mediation from Lord Granville on the basis of slight modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres), they now went to the other extreme and put the interests of Greece without any reserve whatever in the hands of Lord Curzon the Minister of a Foreign Power. Meanwhile the situation had been complicated by the French Franklin-Bouillon agreement with Kemal signed at Angora October 20, 1921. And although Lord Curzon could probably now have found it all the easier to make a single-handed intervention with Turkey, he preferred not to follow the French example but to do nothing except in common with his Allies. Consequently his ability to make peace in the Near East was limited not by any lack of energy or goodwill but by the difficulty of coming to any preliminary agreement with France. Gounares having thus aban-

¹ . . . "Stratos, the Minister [of Marine] in a former Venizelist Cabinet, who had been forced to resign for corrupt practices and who in consequence had become one of the bitterest of Venizelos's enemies. The tragedy of Stratos was that in his heart he believed in the policy of his old leader, but that out of personal hatred he had sold his soul to thwart it by every unscrupulous device he could contrive. He was a dark-bearded, bulky man, with a sour expression in his eyes" . . . says Mr. Compton Mackenzie (*First Athenian Memories*, p. 320); he might have added a crooked nose.

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done all Greek interests vested in the Treaty of Sèvres, 1921. now also gave up all claims to the balance of credits guaranteed to Greece by the Allies, receiving in return permission to raise a loan under the Trade Facilities Act or on the open market *if he could*. (Financial agreement signed by Sir Robert Horne, December 21, 1921.) At Athens this transaction was represented as a financial triumph, and thus arose considerable outcry in the English Parliament and press to the effect that England was "secretly financing the Greek army."

On December 7, 1921, the synod at Constantinople had elected as their Patriarch none other than Meletios Metaxakes formerly Venizelist Metropolitan in Athens, then an exile in America. On January 18, 1922, the 1922. Patriarch-elect Meletios on his way to Constantinople had a long interview with the Prime Minister at Downing Street in the course of which he was repeatedly told in picturesque language that with Constantine on the throne it was impossible for Greece to remain in Asia Minor. But if Gounares had at last told the truth to Lloyd George and Lord Curzon he still refused to tell it to the Greek people. This interview was not allowed to be published in Athens. Gounares denied all knowledge of it although it was found among his papers after his arrest. The editor of the chief Liberal paper which attempted to publish it was assassinated, and a number of Liberal journalists and deputies who (February 26) signed a republican manifesto intended for publication in the *Patris* were arrested without warrant and thrown into prison. On March 10 Gounares and Baltazzi, after following Mr. Lloyd George ineffectively to Cannes, returned at last to Athens, were defeated as anticipated in the Chamber, and resigned. But Stratos

1922. failed to form a Government: the leader of the Liberals 90 strong was of course not sent for: so Gounares re-formed his Government.

On March 22, 1922, the Near East Conference, (Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and Sig. Schanzer) met in Paris. (It must be repeated that the delay was not due to Lord Curzon who at least since November had been making desperate efforts to get the Allies together.)¹ On March 26 the now well-known Allied proposals for an armistice and the evacuation of Asia Minor were transmitted to Athens, Angora and Constantinople. Constantinople accepted (April 8) but subsequently put forward so many reservations that nobody knew whether she had accepted or not; Angora accepted, but proceeded to explain (April 22) that what she would accept was the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor.

Gounares after following Mr. Lloyd George to Genoa, returned to Athens and on May 12 resigned. Stratos formed a new Government but was immediately defeated (Gounares refusing to postpone reassembly of Chamber). A Coalition Government was therefore arranged; Gounares and Stratos both took office under the premiership of Protopapadakes being represented in the Government according to the strength of their respective parties. The new Premier Protopapadakes had

¹ The critics who accused him of delay and of ignoring the so-called "Gounares letter" (Gounares' desperate appeal for help and confession of imminent disaster addressed to Lord Curzon a few days before the Conference) would have been the first to protest if he had attempted to act without previous agreement with France and Italy. After the Revolution this letter and other similar documents were communicated to the English press by Gounares' former private secretary, and were used by Lords Birkenhead and Beaverbrook to attack Lord Curzon and by a section of the press in a general attack on Greek interests.

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previously been Minister of Finance and had acquired fame by cutting in half all the bank notes in circulation and thus raising a forced internal loan of dr. 1,500,000,000 (April 4). 1922.

The first act of the new Government was to dismiss the commander in chief Papoulas, apparently because he had been in communication with the Patriarch Meletios, and also with a London Committee, with a view to the possibility of strengthening his front by the enrolment of some of the Venizelist officers in Constantinople, or of Venizelist volunteers generally. They appointed General Hadjanestes, a notoriously eccentric courtier. Under his wild supervision the unfortunate Greek army already in a state of demoralisation was rapidly broken up. The Retreat from Asia.

In July the Government searched for some way of compromise. The Independence of Ionia was actually proclaimed by the Greek High Commissioner M. Sterghiades. On August 4 there was an outbreak of fantastic Greek propaganda about the approaching occupation of Constantinople: apparently inspired by a reference in a speech of Mr. Lloyd George and intended to cover the abandonment of Asia Minor. This culminated in an actual request to the Powers to be allowed to occupy Constantinople—a request which nobody in England took seriously except a certain section of the press. Mr. Lloyd George, defending his Government against charges of philhellenism, had just pointed out that England and France by their occupation of Constantinople were actually preventing the Greeks from bringing the war to a victorious conclusion by seizing the enemy's capital. There is a possibility that this speech was taken by the much too clever Greek leaders Gounares and Stratos as

1922. a serious hint that England really wanted Greece to seize Constantinople and so to force the hand of the Powers. Whether the request was seriously intended or whether it was only a way of excusing the now inevitable retreat from Asia it was accompanied by a considerable movement of troops from Smyrna to Thrace. It was alleged during the subsequent Court Martial, but not satisfactorily proved, that the Gounares Government deliberately ordered this movement in order to weaken the front before the imminent Turkish offensive, so that the inevitable withdrawal from Asia Minor might be excused by a military defeat. It was more probably an extremely incompetent attempt to effect a secret withdrawal before the Turkish advance.

The Turks attacked the weakened Greek Army on August 26: occupied Afium Karahissar two days later: and entered Smyrna on September 9, 1922. Five days later the whole city, with the exception of the Turkish quarter, was burned to the ground.

12.

Revolution
of Chios.

The Government resigned on September 8, after ordering the demobilisation of the troops who were leaving Smyrna. But the attempt to scatter the remnants of the army as they were evacuated from Asia Minor failed. Many units landed on the island of Chios; and there a revolution headed by Colonel Plastêras broke out on September 26. King Constantine left the country, leaving his eldest son on the throne as King George II., and died in the following January at Palermo. Eight of his principal ministers and advisers indicted by a special Commission of Enquiry (appointed by a Revolutionary Com-

mittee to enquire into the responsibility for the national 1922. disaster) were tried before an extraordinary Court Martial of eleven officers. The trial lasted 14 days and six of the accused (Gounares, Stratos, Baltazzi, Theotokes, Protopapadakes and Hadjanestes) were shot immediately after the verdict (November 28, 1922). Though the indictment had been clumsily drawn it was made abundantly clear at the trial that these men had been led by party passion to persist in a policy of criminal incompetence, sacrificing the interests of the country to Constantine's tenure of the throne and their own tenure of office. The executions shocked Europe. The British Minister, Mr. Lindley, who had refused to take the responsibility of guaranteeing that the accused, if reprieved, should never again take part in politics, left Athens. Mr. Venizelos who had consented to represent his country abroad and was engaged at Lausanne in the Allied negotiations with Turkey had refused in spite of the unconcealed discomfort of Lord Curzon to intervene while the trial was in progress. On Tuesday November 28, as soon as the verdict was known, he telegraphed to Athens to warn the Revolutionary Committee of the effect which might be produced if the sentences were carried out. The condemned men had already been shot. Lord Curzon was at first disposed to break off diplomatic relations with the Greek delegation at Lausanne but soon realised that such an attitude would have expressed shock rather than judgement.¹ The ruthless punishment of men in high

¹ These particulars are taken from an article by Mr. George Glasgow (*Contemporary Review*, January 1923) who was at Lausanne at the time. Mr. Glasgow adds: "It was interesting to observe how the diplomatists' instinct quickly reacted to pride in an unusual and dangerous situation. Many men have been shot since 1914, some of them in battle, some of them against a

1922. plates had a salutary effect on the Greek army. Thousands of deserters are said to have returned to the colours, and a small but efficient army, re-formed on the Thracian frontier under the command of General Pangalos, had a decisive effect in strengthening the hands not only of the Greek representative but of all the Allies at the Second Conference of Lausanne which met on April 23 and finally succeeded in signing peace with the Turks on July 24, 1923. (The First Conference had met at Lausanne on November 14, 1922, and after all the territorial demands of the Turks had been conceded, had broken up on the question of the status of foreigners in Turkey.)
- Treaty of
Lausanne
1923.

13.

Refugees and
Minorities.

Meanwhile the Revolutionary Government after proclaiming an amnesty for all political offences (January 22, 1923) was left to struggle with the problem of the million destitute Greek and Armenian refugees, mostly women, children and old men, who were expelled by the Turks from Asia Minor. For some months the settlement of the refugees on a productive basis was organised

wall at dawn. The only class of people who as a general rule have been exempt from paying the price have been the politicians and diplomatists who made the war. The diplomatists at Lausanne were proud enough on second thoughts to realise that for them to wince because politicians, as opposed to other people, had been shot was to invite an obvious comment. When further there came a clearer recognition of the nature of the evidence before the Revolutionary Tribunal it was conceded that if there was occasion for tears, they should be shed primarily for the half-starved, unpaid, ill-clothed, ill-equipped soldiers who were sacrificed. It is not the case that the Athens executions were a form of retaliation against the Royalists. The Revolutionary Tribunal consisted of nine Royalists to two Venizelists."

with the help of American charitable societies;¹ later the 1923. Greek authorities had to depend entirely on their own resources until a loan was raised (December 1924) the administration of which was guaranteed by the League of Nations.

In eighteen months the Refugee Settlement Commission of the League of Nations had settled more than half a million refugees in new villages (at an average expenditure of £51 for each agricultural family) and urban districts throughout Greece, and thus promised a remarkable development of new agriculture and new industries. This settlement has increased the homogeneity of population on the Greek frontiers where the problem of alien minorities had already been reduced by a system of exchanging populations embodied in the Greco-Bulgarian Convention (1919) for the voluntary emigration of minorities and the Greco-Turkish Convention (Jan. 30, 1923) for the compulsory exchange of Moslem and Greek-Orthodox minorities. These agreements, together with the Turco-Bulgarian Agreement of 1913, completed and regularised a series of migratory movements which had begun with the Balkan Wars and have transformed the populations of Thrace and Macedonia. Thrace east of the Maritsa is now completely Turkish, Western Thrace predominantly Greek; and in September 1925 the League of Nations Refugee Settlement Commission reported that Macedonia was then "crowded with an active and industrious population, of which more than 90 per cent were Greeks by race and sentiment." An agreement between that Commission and the Greek

¹ American charity it may be recalled had entered the Mediterranean a hundred years before this, coming to the help of the refugees from Chios during the War of Independence.

1923. Government for winding up the organisation at the end of the year was approved by the Financial Committee of the League in February 1930.¹

Reform of the Calendar. Not the least of the reforms carried through by the Revolutionary Government was the adoption of the Western Calendar. February 16, old style, 1923, was called March 1, and the question of certain feasts of the Church was settled subsequently by a Pan-Orthodox Council which met at Constantinople in May and accepted the change as from October 1/14, 1923; it was adopted by the Oecumenical Synod as from March 10, 1924.

14.

The Corfu Incident. On August 26, 1923, the Italian member of an international commission delimiting the Greco-Albanian frontier was brutally murdered with all his staff on Greek territory about a mile from the Albanian frontier. The Greek Government instituted an enquiry with every appearance of sincerity; but three days later Italy presented an ultimatum of fantastic severity, of which Greece demurred only to certain demands which no sovereign state (in the present stage of civilisation) could possibly have accepted. Yet on August 31 an Italian squadron bombarded the town of Corfu, killing 16 Armenian refugees housed in the old Venetian citadel—the defences of which had been dismantled in 1864 in accordance with the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the island—and Italian troops proceeded to occupy the whole island and other islands of the group, while it was explained that the operation was only a "peaceful and temporary measure" and not an act of war. Greece

¹ See below, p. 184.

immediately appealed to the League of Nations, the 1923. Council of which was sitting at Geneva, and although the Italian Premier Mussolini ostensibly refused the "intervention" of the League, the public opinion of Europe, and especially of the smaller nations, to which the League gave an opportunity of expression, was so overwhelming that Italy was forced to evacuate Corfu on September 27. Italian susceptibilities were saved by the Ambassadors' Conference, meeting under French auspices in Paris, which ordered the £500,000 paid into court by Greece to be handed over to Italy without waiting for the verdict of the International Court of Justice at The Hague; and the report of the League's Commission of Inquiry on the murder was never published. Nevertheless the incident was undoubtedly a moral victory for the League, and the correct and conciliatory bearing of the Greek Government and its delegate, M. Polites, brought greater credit to the country and the Revolution than any amount of military display.

VIII

RECONSTRUCTION AND REPUBLIC

I.

1923. At home the Revolutionary Government led by Colonels Gonatas and Plasteras with M. Alexandres as Foreign Minister, made genuine attempts to return to constitutional government. They failed however to persuade M. Zaimes to take part in the forthcoming elections as leader of a centre party uniting moderates of both Royalist and Venizelist groups (September); and a month later the extreme Royalists, under Gen. Metaxas, attempted to raise a counter revolution, which was easily suppressed. There was no decisive evidence that General Metaxas had been in communication with the Palace, where King George II., a not unattractive schoolboy married to a daughter of the King of Rumania, was known to be discontented with the part of a constitutional monarch. The Republicans nevertheless received a tremendous impetus; and though at the elections (December 16), from which the Royalists abstained, they were defeated, winning only 120 seats as opposed to 200 Venizelists and 6 Agrarians, they had secured the almost unanimous support of the Army and the Navy under the influence of General Pangalos and Captain Hadjikyriakos, whose pressure was so energetic

that the Government, to avoid disorder, requested the 1923. King to absent himself during the meeting of the National Assembly which was to decide the future of the throne. On December 18 King George and his Queen left for Rumania with a solatium of £10,000. Admiral Kountouriotis was appointed Regent and a delegation representing every element in the Assembly immediately left for Paris and invited Venizelos to return to Greece. He had refused a previous invitation, before the elections; and at the elections he had himself headed the poll in numerous constituencies in which his name had been put forward. In view of the apparent unanimity of the appeal he found it impossible longer to refuse. He returned (January 4, 1924) only, he 1924. announced, temporarily, "in order to put an end to civil war"; and he proposed to solve the constitutional problem by an immediate plebiscite. The Revolutionary Committee resigned and Colonel Plasteras retired into private life.

A week after his arrival Venizelos unwillingly accepted the premiership. He proposed (January 23) that a plebiscite should be held in two months' time, under the supervision of a committee representing every party, to decide whether a Republic was desirable, and if not, who should be King. The decision was to be followed by a general election held under a system of Proportional Representation. He found himself opposed however not by his old enemies but by the extreme republicans under M. Papanastasiou who insisted on the immediate expulsion of the dynasty and establishment of a Republic by a vote of the Assembly. Venizelos, impatient of the interminable debates in the Chamber, resigned the premiership (Feb. 4) to M. Kafantares who continued to

Establish-
ment of a
Republic.

1924. urge the same programme admitting the desirability of a Republic but only after a plebiscite. He succeeded (Feb. 27) in defeating the republican motions in the Chamber and was proceeding to negotiate for an agreed programme with the Royalists when the Officers' League was re-formed and demanded from Regent and premier that a republic should be set up without more ado. M. Kafantares resigned, Venizelos left Greece (March 10) and returned to the study of Shakespeare and the translation of Thucydides in Paris. A government was formed by M. Papanastasiou who proposed to settle the fate of the throne by a resolution of the Chamber to be ratified by a subsequent plebiscite; and a generous offer by which the King was to abdicate voluntarily having been refused, there was no difficulty in getting the necessary vote. The Republic was proclaimed on March 25, 1924. The plebiscite, the arrangements for which were accepted by the Royalists, was held on April 13, when 758,742 voted for the Republic and 325,322 for a monarchy. The Republic under the provisional presidency of Admiral Kountouriotis was recognised on April 23 by England who had resumed diplomatic relations on January 16, and had been represented for the celebration of the centenary of Lord Byron's death at Mesolonghi (April 19) by Sir Rennell Rodd, Lord Ernle, Mr. Pember Reeves and Mr. John Drinkwater.

The Government of M. Papanastasiou was strengthened by the inclusion of General Pangalos, Colonel Kondyles and Admiral Hadjikyriakos, but Colonel Kondyles left the Government on June 9, complaining that it had been insufficiently drastic in dealing with a series of strikes; the Admiral resigned a month later

after a strike of naval officers; and M. Papanastasiou 1924.
resigned and was succeeded by M. Sofoules on July 19
after a violent attack on the Minister for War (General
Pangalos) by M. Mihalakopoulos who himself formed
a Government on October 7.

The next period of Republican Government was
entirely occupied with difficult problems of foreign
relations.

2.

At the end of July 1924 some Bulgarian komitadjis
captured on Greek territory at Tarlis were shot down
by their escort, and a month later a commission of
enquiry appointed by the League of Nations censured
the local authorities though it exonerated the Greek
Government; a satisfactory feature was that the report
was signed by the Greek member of the Commission.

The
Unratified
Protocol.

On September 29, 1924, the Bulgarian and Greek
delegates Col. Kalfoff and M. Polites meeting at the
Assembly of the League at Geneva after negotiations
initiated by Professor Gilbert Murray signed a Protocol
providing that each power should appoint as its official
advisers for carrying out the Treaty protecting the
interests of minorities (as provided by the Treaty of
Neuilly and subsequently embodied in an annexe to the
Treaty of Sèvres from the non-ratification of which it
was salvaged by a subsequent protocol) the same two
members—Col. Corfe (British) and Major de Roover
(Belgian)—of the existing Mixed Commission for the
Exchange of Populations appointed under the Greco-
Bulgarian Convention of 1919 and already at work on
the frontier. Unfortunately this sincere and generous
movement, this gleam of sanity, was regarded at Bel-

1924. grade as an arbitrary recognition of the existence of "Bulgar" minorities in Greece which might lead Bulgaria to claim similar privileges for "Bulgar" minorities in Serbia. Serbian annoyance and Greek suspicion were quickened by exaggerated rejoicing in the Bulgarian press. On November 27 Serbia denounced the Alliance of 1913 with Greece and this undoubtedly determined
1925. Greek repudiation of M. Politis. On February 3, 1925, the Greek Chamber refused to ratify the Protocol and on March 14 it fell to Venizelos to announce and defend this refusal before the Council of the League.

3.

Negotiations
with Serbia.

On April 27, 1925, negotiations for renewal of the Greco-Serbian Alliance were opened at Belgrade and soon broke down over Serbia's preliminary demands. Serbia demanded the control and exploitation of the railway from Ghevgeli to Salonica (*i.e.* the section on Greek territory of the line from Nish to Salonica the greater part of which lies in Serbian territory and of which the war claims had been bought from a French company by the Serbian Government). Secondly they demanded an extension of the Serbian zone on the harbour of Salonica; and thirdly a recognition that the Slavs of Macedonia were not "Bulgars" but "Serbs." This last demand was referred by Greece to the League of Nations. With regard to the railway she offered to rebuild and reorganise the line or to appoint a permanent League of Nations official to arbitrate on all Serbian complaints but objected to any such cession of rights as would be not only a diminution of sovereignty but a continual source of friction. The negotiations were broken

off on June 1 and renewed in September when a proposal that the line should be worked by a French company was not more successful (October 9). 1925.

The negotiations were finally concluded in the short premiership of M. Eutaxias (May 1926) on the understanding that the disputed section of the line should be under Greek management and the Serbian free zone on the port of Salonica should be suitably extended.¹ The larger question of the Alliance remained in suspense but there remained a possibility that, both powers having disclaimed any territorial ambitions, negotiations might be reopened for the conclusion of a Balkan security pact analogous to that of Locarno.²

4.

At the conference of Lausanne the Turks had consented to the maintenance of the Oecumenical Patriarch at the Phanar provided he exercised no civil or administrative powers. But on January 30, 1925, they expelled from Constantinople the new Patriarch, Constantine VI., contending that he was not an "inhabitant of Constantinople," and that accordingly he was not exempt by the Treaty of Lausanne from the provisions of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations. It was clear that the Greeks had put themselves in the wrong by ignoring the usual formalities of election and failing to obtain Turkish consent to his candidature. The Council of the League of Nations referred the dispute to the Hague Court (March 16); but meanwhile the expelled

The
Patriarchate.

¹ This completed a previous convention of May 10, 1923. Both Greek and Serbian Free Zones co-exist and have been a success.

² See below, p. 171.

1925. Patriarch was persuaded to resign and Greece and Turkey arrived at a direct settlement.

5.

Distracted by these difficult problems the Government had rather neglected internal affairs. The National Assembly had not yet succeeded in voting the new Constitution, and there were numerous complaints of speculation and administrative inefficiency. On June 16, 1925, M. Mihalakopoulos re-formed his Government but ten days later, confronted with a threat of violence from General Pangalos and Admiral Hadjikyriakos, who had seized the Post Office and the National Bank, he resigned. General Pangalos formed a Government (June 26)—including, besides the Admiral, M. Kofinas, an economic expert with many years of Government service, and later (July 2) M. Rentes, an experienced diplomatist—and after receiving a vote of confidence dissolved the Assembly. The new Constitution, issued by proclamation on September 30, provided for a President to be elected for a term of five years; and a Senate of 150 members, 100 to be elected by the parliamentary franchise, 30 by various guilds and corporations, and 20 by Chamber and Senate. General Pangalos promised that it should be submitted for ratification after elections to be held in the new year. A proposal to court martial M. Papanastasiou for issuing a democratic manifesto was cancelled (October 5) but martial law was proclaimed, and General Plastaras, whose simple honesty and energy made him a likely instrument of discontent, was expelled from Athens (October 24).

Two officials were hanged for embezzlement but

two Greek members of the staff of the Refugee Settlement Commission arrested on the same accusation were released after the Commission had appealed to Geneva. 1925.

6.

On October 19 there was some shooting between Greek and Bulgarian frontier posts at Demir Kapu north of Salonica and two sentries and a Greek captain were killed. The Greek staff fearing a Bulgarian attack ordered a general advance and the Government followed this up with an ultimatum to Sofia demanding apologies, penalties and indemnity. The foreign minister, M. Rentes, resigned (October 22) doubtless unwilling to take responsibility for the incorrect attitude of his Government, though he subsequently (December 3) led the Greek delegation at Geneva. Bulgaria appealed to the League of Nations (October 23) and the Council of the League meeting in Paris the same day ordered both Governments to withdraw troops behind their respective frontiers. Athens received the news just in time to stop a mass offensive on Petrich which the Bulgarians had prepared to resist (October 24). By the end of the month all troops had been withdrawn and the Council had appointed a Commission under the presidency of Sir Horace Rumbold to investigate the facts and assess damages. The "Rumbold Report" issued in Geneva on December 3 found that although there was no premeditation on either side Greece had violated the Covenant by armed occupation of Bulgarian territory, and must pay damages under different heads amounting to £45,000, receiving in turn indemnity for the captain who was killed on October 19 when advancing under a flag of truce. The

Bulgarian
Frontier
Incident.

1925. Commission also made various recommendations for avoiding frontier incidents (including a system of frontier guards under neutral officers), and for completing without friction the Convention for the exchange of populations. This undoubted success of the League was obscured in Athens by an inevitable comparison with the Corfu Affair, in which the League seemed to have devoted all its attention to the original incident, whereas in the present case it appeared to have weighed only the deportment after the fact of the parties concerned. The decision of the Council in accordance with the Report was accepted by the Greek Government on December 13.

7.

Dictatorship
of General
Pangalos.

- Meanwhile General Pangalos was making strenuous efforts to suppress political rancour at home. On November 24, 1925, at a conference of party leaders he received assurances that the constitutional question would not be raised at the forthcoming elections in March, and on this understanding the election of a Senate was fixed for January 10, and two Royalists M. L. Roufos and M. Sehiotes entered the Government. On January 3, 1926, however and in a subsequent proclamation General Pangalos announced that the senatorial and parliamentary elections were to be indefinitely postponed and that his Government had decided to concentrate all executive and administrative powers in his own hands; with the declared aims of economy and internal order and the reconciliation if necessary by force of contending factions the ministries of National Economy and Public Assistance were abolished, the permanence of the civil service was suspended, some of the policing of the capital

was transferred from the British-trained civilian police 1926. to the gendarmerie, the press was forbidden to publish any articles written by the political leaders MM. Kafantares, Papanastasiou and Mihalakopoulos; at the Ministry of Finance M. Tantalides, replacing M. Kofinas who had gone on a debt-funding mission to Washington, issued a forced loan similar to that of 1922 from which foreigners were not to be exempted (Jan. 23); and girls were forbidden to wear skirts which hung more than fourteen inches from the ground. All these measures except the last were received by the people with the fatigue and listlessness which were becoming almost a substitute for stability. Admiral Hadjikyriakos and M. Sehiotes had resigned when the General made his first openly dictatorial proclamation in January: but while the agreeable M. Roufos remained at the Foreign Office to develop the improving relations with Serbia and Italy there was a prospect that the dictatorship of General Pangalos with the merits as well as the defects of unscrupulous common sense might yet give Greece a period of tranquillity.

The improving relations with Italy, which were advertised by a visit of Roufos to Rome in March were suspected of being connected with the termination, sudden to the point of discourtesy, of the British Naval and French Military missions, which was officially said to be exclusively due to reasons of economy. Admiral Townsend and his officers, who had arrived in April 1925, left Greece on June 15, 1926; the "termination" of the French mission was found to be impracticable owing to a protective clause in the French Government contract.

The professed object of General Pangalos, who was far from inarticulate, was to suspend or override party

1926. politics in order to get things done. He did not pretend to abolish an obsolete system of democracy, nor proclaim, like the Fascists, a transvaluation of political values. He did claim repeatedly to give effect to the true wishes of the people outside the capital, wishes which were delayed and distorted by the personal rancours of their elected representatives. He claimed to stabilise democracy at a true figure. He accused the press not without reason of fostering the very bickerings and spite which he was anxious to abolish. A slashing censorship was supplemented by frequent seizures and even courts martial. Yet the violence of his methods was tempered by a paternal manner; and there was a benevolence about his ferocity which made it hard to condemn him except, as the Liberals did, on principle. The newspapers had been forbidden to publish the manifestos of protest issued by MM. Mihalakopoulos, Kafantares and Papanastasiou; and on February 17, 1926, the two latter with General Kondyles were deported to the volcanic island of Santorin.

On March 19, 1926, Admiral Kountouriotis resigned the Presidency of the Republic. His discomfort at the General's proceedings had been manifest for some weeks and his resignation had been actually reported at the beginning of the month. On March 15 General Pangalos had already announced that the new Constitution to be ready at the end of April would have to be remodelled on American lines: accordingly a leading feature would be the concentration of far greater powers in the hands of the President. In order that no political rancours should be reawakened neither Venizelos himself nor any member of the royal family would be admitted as a candidate; nor in fact would anybody under the

age of 45 or over the age of 60. (This provision had 1926.
the effect of excluding the septuagenarian Alexander
Zaimes who, silently, commanded the respect of all
political parties.) He added as an afterthought that the
Government had not yet decided whether he would be
a candidate himself. These ingenuous manœuvres were
more effective in reconciling party strife than all his
previous severity: the opposition leaders after some brief
negotiations (March 22-24) succeeded in nominating as
their common candidate M. Konstantine Dêmértzes.
The General now offered to except M. Zaimes from
the operation of the age limit if he would consent after
all to become a candidate and so, it was understood, to
split the opposition vote. When M. Zaimes categori-
cally refused, the General decided that he would have
to stand himself, and issued an election address of the
greatest liveliness. On the eve of the poll however the
Government suddenly announced (April 3, 1926) that
"owing to the non-completion of electoral arrangements"
only ten out of 33 electoral divisions would vote on
the morrow—four in Crete, four in Macedonia, and
two in Old Greece, Attica and Argolis. Thereupon the
leaders of the opposition parties despairing of a fair
contest advised their supporters to abstain from voting
and withdrew the nomination of M. Dêmértzes.
Whether the General had deliberately manœuvred his
opponents into adopting this favourite tactic of Greek
politics was never known. But the number of votes
recorded in his favour when there was no other candi-
date in the field, and his repeated offers from the
Ministry of the Interior to allow a nominee of his
opponents to concert measures to guarantee the fairness
of the voting, enabled him to claim that his rule without

1926. parliamentary assistance had been given the fullest possible measure of popular approval. He signalled his election as President of the Greek Republic by commuting the death sentences on three officers sentenced for an abortive mutiny at Salonica, and permitting the return of the political exiles from Santorin. He took the oath on April 18, 1926, and made his first public appearance on April 23 at the inauguration of the magnificent library collected by M. John Gennadius, by him given in trust to the American School of Classical Studies, and worthily housed in a marble building provided by the Carnegie Institute.

Pangalos
President.

Then began a difficult search for a Prime Minister prepared to assume office and responsibility under an all powerful and irresponsible President. In May General Paraskevopoulos formerly commander in Asia Minor and then living in retirement in Paris was invited to Athens and refused the task (May 29). In June and July M. Zavitsianos was approached, and M. Venizelos, who had himself consented to assist MM. Caclamanos and Tsouderos in negotiations in London for the settlement of Anglo-Greek War Debts (May 27) sent his son Kyriakos to Athens to see if it were possible for the Liberal party to support such a Government. These negotiations having also failed (July 11) M. Zêlêmôn, President of the Areopagus, was next invited to form a Government and refused, although the President promised that elections for both Chamber and Senate would shortly be held at the same time "probably at the end of August or the beginning of September." These refusals were due not only to the invidious nature of the post under such a President but also to the courage and persistence of the opposition leaders who continued

to demand the restoration of civil liberty and to point out that any Cabinet of Affairs formed to carry out the elections must include no person connected with the dictatorial régime. On July 17 MM. Kafantares, Mihalakopoulos and Papandreou with M. Achilles Kyros editor of the *Estia* were arrested and deported to Naxos without M. Papanastasiou because he could not be found. They were allowed to return to Athens on July 27 but M. Kafantares who signalled his release by sending a defiant telegram to his party was stopped on the way and not allowed to resume his return till July 29. During the temporary silence of these leaders a Government had at last been formed by M. Eutaxias—who had been a Cabinet Minister in the nineties and again held office under Gounares in 1915 and under M. Triantafyllakos, King Constantine's penultimate Prime Minister, in September 1922. An attempt was made to conciliate the press by the inclusion as Minister of Education of M. George Pôp, who had long been editor of the independent and reactionary *Athênai*, and had long aspired to Cabinet rank. M. Roufos continued to be responsible for Foreign Affairs and on August 17 concluded the negotiations with Serbia; but the signing on that day of conventions including a defensive alliance and agreements for a Serbian Free Zone on the Port of Salonica and for the joint management of the Ghevgeli-Salonica Railway was stigmatised by the resignation of M. Tsamados, an important permanent official of the Foreign Office.

During the following week, the last of the General's dictatorship, there were reports of unrest at Halkis and in Crete, marked by the arrest as usual of M. Kafantares

1926. (August 16), followed by that of General Metaxas (August 20) and other political leaders.

Fall of Pangalos. The General himself was spending a summer holiday at Spetsai when on August 22 he heard that General Kondyles supported by the Athenian garrison had seized various public buildings and released the political leaders from prison. General Pangalos tried to escape on the destroyer *Pergamos* but was overtaken on the same night near Cape Matapan by the destroyer *Leon* and brought back to Athens. After two days' confinement in the Military Hospital he was transferred to Aegina and subsequently to the Cretan fortress of Izzeddin.

On August 22 on the invitation of General Kondyles Admiral Kountouriotis announced that on suppression of the dictatorship he resumed his duties as President "to which office he had been installed by the Fourth National Assembly of Hellenes."

The dictatorship however was not brought to an end without bloodshed. The force behind the dictator had been the Republican Guard under Colonels Zervas and Dertiles, who had consented to the overthrow of Pangalos only in the expectation of setting up another puppet. When Kondyles on September 9 ordered the dissolution of the Guard they challenged his authority and were only overpowered by the Government troops after severe fighting which in the afternoon and evening spread through the streets and was complicated by desultory rioting. It was said to have been of communist origin but appears to have been a genuine outburst of popular hatred directed rather erratically against military government: Pangalos had fallen so suddenly that the Athenian populace had had no chance of displaying their real feelings about him on the day of his overthrow; they

therefore took advantage of the street fighting a fortnight later for a quite inappropriate release of their long inhibited hatred of stratocracy: and next morning it was all over. Colonels Zervas and Dertiles were court-martialled (September 21) and sentenced to imprisonment for life (October 3); but their release was recommended by the Amnesty Commission on June 9, 1927.

General Kondyles now announced his decision (September 23) to retire from politics and to dissolve his own party known as the National Republicans; but he refused to give up his position before the holding of a general election originally announced for October 24 but subsequently postponed till November 7. The Royalist leaders Metaxas, Tsaldáres and Démértzes protested vigorously against the system of Proportional Representation as well as against his retention of the premiership; but when the day arrived no criticism was made of the fairness of the arrangements, and when the result was announced, giving Republicans a majority of 34 seats in a Chamber of 286 (9 of whom were communists), General Kondyles loyally handed over his office to an "oecumenical" government of leaders of all parties, in which the three Republican leaders Kafantares, Mihalakopoulos and Papanastasiou, and the two Royalists Tsaldáres and Metaxas, with General Mazarakes as Minister for War, took office under the premiership of M. Zaimes.

Before his withdrawal General Kondyles announced that the unpopular Serbian convention would not be promulgated by decree as Pangalos had intended but would be submitted to parliament for ratification in the usual way. And in one of his last public utterances on October 15, 1926, he declared to a group of Bulgarian

1926. journalists that the Balkan States instead of exhausting themselves by internecine friction should form a confederation.

On September 25 the British War Memorial was unveiled at Doiran, where British and Greek troops had fought side by side on September 22, 1918, in an action of the greatest possible gallantry which had marked the opening of the final stage of the Great War, as it led directly to the capitulation of Bulgaria. And on November 16 was opened the new university of Salonica with Professor Sôteriades as the first Rector.

8.

1927. The new Government was at first fully occupied in clearing up the confusion caused by the régime of General Pangalos with his methods of common sense and hearty ignorance. On December 30, 1926, arrangements were made and on January 20, 1927, the agreement was signed for a new British Naval Mission which under Captain C. E. Turle arrived in Athens at the end of March. And in December 1927 the Government renewed for the third time the contract for the British Police Mission under Sir F. Halliday first granted in September 1918.

For the disentanglement of the commercial transactions undertaken by General Pangalos a committee of financial experts was appointed to advise the Government and on the recommendation of this committee it was decided on February 26 that the commercial concessions granted by the Pangalist régime should be ratified by the departments concerned provided they were not legally irregular or contrary to existing statute.

Accordingly the contract for the supply of electric power entered into with the British Power and Traction Finance Company was confirmed in due course. On March 1 was signed a commercial convention with Bulgaria which came into force on April 4 and marked the opening of a period of more reasonable relations. On August 25 the Chamber unanimously decided to abrogate the conventions signed with Serbia on August 17, 1926, and to renew the attempts to arrive at an understanding on the questions involved.

More important still were the attempts of the Government to regularise the financial situation beginning with the settlement of the British War Debt. On April 9 was signed the agreement by which Greece was to pay a sum of £21,441,450, in 62 annual instalments beginning with a first annuity of £200,000 (which was paid on June 2) and rising to £400,000 from 1936 onwards. It was remarked at the time that although Mr. Winston Churchill had made no little parade of his Philhellenic sentiments these terms were far more onerous than those on which he had previously settled the Italian War Debt. In return however the British Government agreed to support the Greek proposal to raise a loan of 5½ millions for wiping out the budget deficit, stabilising currency, and continuing the settlement of refugees; Greece on the other hand resigning her claim to the balance of credits promised by the agreement of February 10, 1918. The raising of this loan was opposed by France at Geneva; but at the end of the year (December 5) notes exchanged with the Government of the United States provided for a settlement of the American War Debt payable like the British in sixty-two annuities and for a loan of £2,500,000 for Refugee Settlement. This

Financial
arrangements.

1927. enabled Greece to settle her French War Debt, MM. Briand and Kafantares at Geneva agreeing to submit to arbitration the question of payment for war stores, and France accordingly withdrew her opposition to the loans sponsored by the League of Nations.

On April 18 the President had threatened to resign his provisional tenure of the office if the Chamber did not accelerate their discussions, and on June 2 the Fourth Constitution, providing for President and Senate, was duly adopted by the Chamber. But on May 8 the delays of the Coalition Government had caused General Kondyles to reappear on the political stage and reconstitute his own Republican party in order to criticise the Government not only for their lukewarm republicanism but also for their hesitation in dealing with General Pangalos. On May 31 the danger of military intervention to prevent the reinstatement of Royalist officers on the active list of the army was narrowly averted by the firm and silent action of General Plastiras who with General Othonaios secretly visited Venizelos (who on April 20 had landed at Candia for a holiday in his paternal home), and persuaded him to write and warn the Government of the danger of precipitating further violence through an excessive fear of force.

There were further rumours of a threatened Pangalist outbreak in July, but this was soon crushed and on August 19 numerous arrests were made. It was a wholesome sign that it was not the treatment of Royalist officers but the question of the gold reserve at the National Bank that led to the resignation of the Government on August 11 and its reconstitution five days later without the Royalist leader M. Tsaldáres.

October 20 saw the celebration of the centenary of 1927. the Battle of Navarino. Lieutenant-General Sir A. Codrington, grandson of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington who had commanded the Allied fleets in 1830, was sent on board H.M.S. *Ramillies* to represent the British Government; while his son, Colonel G. R. Codrington, attended a centenary dinner in London, which was further distinguished by an indiscreet and noble speech from the Dean of St. Paul's.

At Athens on October 30 an unemployed waiter, who as usual was said without evidence to be a communist, shot at President Kountouriotis, and had to be sentenced (November 20) to fourteen years' imprisonment after failing to commit suicide by taking quinine. On November 16 M. Sofoules was elected President of the Chamber for the fourth time: M. Mihalakopoulos visited Rome where he arrived on December 22.

In England Christmas Eve was marked by the publication in the *Times* of Thomas Hardy's *Christmas in the Elgin Room* (he died on January 11, 1928):

"O it is sad now we are sold—
We Gods! for Borean people's gold,
And brought to the gloom
Of this gaunt room
Which sunlight shuns and sweet
Aurore but enters cold.

"For all these bells, would I were still
Radiant as on Athenai's Hill."

—"And I, and I!"

The others sigh,

"Before this Christ was known, and we
had men's good will."

9.

1928. The new year began with the successful flotation of the new loan now sanctioned by the League of Nations, after the withdrawal of French objections, amounting with the $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions found by America on the settlement of the American debt to £9,000,000, for wiping out the budget deficit, settling refugees and stabilising the drachma. For the latter purpose a new Bank of Issue was opened on May 14, and the drachma was stabilised at 375 to the pound sterling (77 to the dollar). The financial situation was put on a sound basis only just in time to enable the country to stand up to a series of grave natural disasters which descended in April. Floods in Macedonia were followed by an epidemic of dengue fever: and on April 23 Corinth was destroyed by an earthquake.

Meanwhile the Government had been labouring with internal disputes. On February 3 M. Papanastasiou resigned because he could not agree with his colleagues to accept the Shell Company's tender for a £6,000,000 contract for road-making, and after four days M. Zaimes reconstructed his Cabinet without him.¹

The dissensions in the Cabinet became more acute when M. Venizelos, who had returned to Paris (February 3) after his Cretan holiday, came back to Athens on March 24. His name had been mentioned in journalistic attacks on MM. Kafantares and Mihalakopoulos and he

¹ Three years later (May 1931) when legislation was contemplated for prohibiting the negotiation of Government contracts through intermediaries, the Prime Minister indicated the possibility that this contract (awarded to Messrs. P. G. Makres and Co., representing the Shell Trading Company, which was financed by Messrs. Hambro) might ultimately be rescinded.

had been obliged to defend them by letter. But now M. 1928.
Kafantares found the situation impossible. On May 19 he announced his resignation of the leadership of the Progressive Liberals and this involved in his opinion his membership of the Government, which accordingly resigned on May 22. M. Venizelos assumed the leadership of the party in order to prevent its dissolution—his first public act since his return to Greece—and recommended the formation of a Government under the premiership of M. Sofoules. The Government of M. Zaimes was however reconstituted on May 28 (after an arrangement between the Liberal party and the Popular Royalist party of General Metaxas), and continued a troubled survey of the constitutional jungle, in which all difficult questions were carefully avoided: thus on March 22 they had signed a pact of Non-Aggression and Arbitration with Rumania, but no approach had been made to Serbia or Bulgaria; General Pangalos was still in prison; there was still no Second Chamber.

On June 28, after a severe criticism of his financial policy from M. Venizelos, M. Kafantares again resigned. Not for the first time it was obvious that M. Venizelos could not reasonably remain in Greece without being Prime Minister. He took office on July 3 and on July 9 dissolved parliament. On July 10 President Kountouriotis after some hesitation consented to sign a decree abolishing Proportional Representation and restoring the system of single member constituencies; as the new Prime Minister was convinced that the more scientific system had the fatal defect that the small majorities it yielded were incapable of supporting the country's first necessity, a stable Government. On July 11 General Pangalos was released from prison as it seemed fair that

M. Venizelos
Prime
Minister.

1928. the new parliament should not be prejudiced in its consideration of the problem of what to do with him. (On April 8, 1930, he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for irregularities in connection with the grant of a concession for a casino at Eleusis.) On August 4 there was a further outbreak of brigandage in Epirus but the brigands were subsequently captured and sentenced to terms of imprisonment (June 3, 1929).

The General Election was held on August 19 and produced a Chamber in which the Government commanded two-thirds of the seats (an Opposition of 37 facing 203 Liberals and Republicans).

10.

M. Venizelos proceeded to turn his attention to foreign affairs. On September 23 he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration with Italy in which the question of the Dodekanese was left out of consideration for the simple reason as he calmly announced that it no longer existed.¹ After a brief visit to London negotiations were opened with Turkey. And on October 11 he signed at Belgrade, after beginning negotiations with Dr. Marinkovich in Paris, an agreement to negotiate a settlement of all outstanding questions with Serbia on the basis of the agreement of 1923.

Six protocols embodying this settlement were finally signed at Geneva on March 17, 1929. The Salonica Free Zone was to remain under Greek sovereignty and administration but was to be open to Serbian commerce in both directions; the limits of the Free Zone reserved

¹ On October 8, 1922, Italy had announced that owing to the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres the Tittoni agreement had lapsed. See above, pp. 95, 125.

for Yugoslav trade being those laid down in the agree- 1928.
 ment of May 10, 1923, not as expanded in the un-
 ratified Pangalos agreement of 1926. At the same time
 control of the railway to Ghevgeli acquired by Serbian
 capitalists from the original French company in 1925
 was now bought by the Greek Government for
 £160,000. On March 27, 1929, this settlement was Serbian
 followed by the signature at Belgrade of a Treaty of Settlement.
 Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement, by
 which all disputes were to be referred to special arbitra-
 tion or to the Permanent Court of the League of Na-
 tions. (The Serbian Foreign Minister paid an official
 visit to Athens on December 10, 1930, probably stimu-
 lated by private and not altogether happy attempts by
 the Greek Government to sound the gulf between
 Serbia and Bulgaria.)

In November a convention was signed with Albania
 and in the same month (November 16, 1928) M. Den-
 drames was sent with the rank of Minister to Sofia, only
 thought worthy since the War of a *Chargé d'Affaires*.
 On December 17 the convention for payment to Bulgaria
 of the balance owing on properties of exchanged popula-
 tions was ratified by the Chamber. It may be noted that
 when at the League of Nations Council meeting at
 Geneva in the following spring (March 9, 1929) the
 Greek Foreign Minister, M. Karapanos, ventured to
 suggest that these payments might await and be set off
 against the payment to Greece of her share of Bulgarian
 reparations, he was sharply rebuked by Sir Austen
 Chamberlain, who had been himself chiefly responsible
 for imposing this "Molloff-Kafantares Agreement" on
 the signatories in December 1927.

A bill creating a Senate, as provided for by the Con-

1928. stitution of 1927 was introduced on October 22 and after considerable amendment became law on December 12. The new Senate consisted of 120 members, 92 elected, 18 chosen by professional bodies, and 10 by Chamber, Senate and Council of State. The first Senatorial elections were held on April 21, 1929, and on May 22 M. Alexander Zaimes was deservedly elected President of the Senate.

A Public Works Loan concluded in December with a British banking group was remarkable as being the first Greek loan not under the management of the International Financial Commission: and on January 25 another loan for Roads and Drainage was arranged with an American group. On February 16 a Sheffield firm (Boot) obtained a £6,000,000 contract for land reclamation and irrigation (ratified by the Senate March 14, 1930): and on the same date the Congress of the United States ratified the War Debt Settlement by which Greece was to pay \$18,125,000 in 62 years and receive a loan of \$12,167,000. In the same month as a measure towards the industrial revival the *Office Autonome des Tapis* was established at Athens with a Government grant and a loan for five years from the League of Nations.

On June 7 the Cabinet was reconstructed, the Foreign Ministry being taken by M. P. Argyropoulos, who was succeeded on July 5 by M. Mihalakopoulos. The inclusion of General Gonatas, whose revolutionary record was not forgotten by his enemies though it had never been rewarded by his friends, gave considerable offence to M. Tsaldáres and the Popular Royalists and the breach was not healed till the end of the year.

Negotiations arising out of the exchange of populations and the confiscation of Ottoman Greek properties

at Constantinople broke down at Angora on July 21 but 1929.
 were reopened under the auspices of neutral members of
 the League of Nations Mixed Commission. In August
 MM. Dendrames and Buroff were still plodding on with
 their negotiations at Sofia, begun on January 22. On
 September 8 M. Venizelos addressing the Assembly of
 the League of Nations at Geneva spoke with enthusiasm
 and gratitude of the work of the League in Greece,
 and took the opportunity of assuring the widest possible
 audience in the most solemn way that Greece had no
 ideas of territorial expansion. It was not inconsistent
 with this declaration that on October 25 a deputation
 from Cyprus visited Lord Passfield who "held out no
 hope" of satisfying their aspirations for Union with
 Greece. (A White Paper giving Lord Passfield's very
 categorical reply to a memorial from Greek elected
 members of the Legislative Council of Cyprus was pub-
 lished on January 30, 1930.) Cyprus.

On December 9 Admiral Kountouriotis who although
 he had only been formally elected on June 3 had acted
 as President since the foundation of the Republic, and
 had lent dignity to that office without making an enemy,
 was compelled by advancing age to resign. On Decem-
 ber 12 the party leaders all agreed to accept the candidate
 nominated by M. Venizelos with the exception of M.
 Tsaldáres who had been sulking since June. Fortunately
 he withdrew his opposition when General Gonatas, now
 a Senator, resigned from the Cabinet and was made Gover-
 nor General of Macedonia: and M. Alexander Zaimis
 was nominated by the Government and on December 14
 elected President (receiving 257 votes, as against 22
 given for M. Kafantares). He was succeeded in the
 presidency of the Senate (March 19, 1930) by General

1929. Paraskevopoulos. It is remarkable that a country usually known for the violence of its political life should have been able to elect by general consent as its first two Presidents two men so willing in service, so blameless in reputation and so undemonstrative in judgement as Admiral Kountouriotis and Alexander Zaimis. M. Venizelos subsequently made further efforts to conciliate M. Tsaldáres and finally to eliminate the Royalist controversy from politics, going so far as to offer another plebiscite to be conducted with M. Tsaldáres himself at the Ministry of the Interior.

Even without the Royalist feud and without Proportional Representation the conduct of the Government was not easy. On December 30 MM. Argyropoulos and Pappas resigned from the Cabinet because General Kondyles, leader of the Party they represented, had criticised the Government in a private letter which owing to an indiscretion was published in the newspapers.

When M. Venizelos resumed control of the Government the condition of the country was such that he was careful to promise no relief of taxation: and it may be interesting to quote here the actual words of a speech he made at Salonica on the eve of the elections, as a year later he was obliged to recall them in a letter to *The Times* (December 31, 1930), in the columns of which he was accused of promising more than he had been able to perform.

Taxation. "The taxation is heavy, and, what is worse, empirically imposed and unfair in incidence. Its assessment is often effected in a way most irksome and onerous to the taxpayer, while the procedure of the hearing of objections raised does not inspire him with any confidence that his objections are treated with care and fairness.

Without excluding any eventual, although at present 1929. limited, reform in taxation, which without putting any further burdens upon the taxpayer will aim at a fairer incidence and thereby to a relative alleviation of the taxpayers, I do not promise any immediate reduction of taxation; only an increase of revenue and the Budget relief which is expected to result therefrom will allow such a reduction, which might be connected with a general reform of the system of taxation. I can only promise that the Government will immediately give the most earnest consideration to the problem of effecting a less irksome assessment of the existing taxation."

On January 27, 1930, returning from The Hague 1930. conference on Reparations he was able to show that on a balance between War Debt payments to England, France and America and reparations from Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria and Bohemia, Greece should receive £706,000 for 14 and £344,000 for another 22 years. In further pursuit of economy he proposed (February 11) a reduction in naval expenditure pointing out that as all fears of Turkish aggression were now quite unfounded it was no longer necessary to maintain naval supremacy in the Aegean. This was a clear hint to Turkey that he was ensuing peace and was not to be deterred by thoughts of tradition or ballot box. On March 2 the Greek Minister at Angora was instructed to sign an agreement in connection with the exchange of populations. On March 25 the celebration of the centenary of Greek Independence in Athens was attended by the Turkish Minister. Negotiations were continued throughout the Spring while in Greece the people was reminded that the army and navy were not the only weapons for the dispersal of Asiatic barbarism. In May was completed under M. Balanos the

1930. reconstruction and re-erection of the northern peristyle of the Parthenon. And in May thanks to the enthusiasm and enterprise of the poet Angelos Sikelianos and his American wife a "Delphic festival" was held at Delphi which included not only performances of the *Prometheus* and *Suppliants* of Aeschylus in a translation by the poet K. Grypares against a mountain background (which perhaps lent to the monuments of remote Greek puritanism an aesthetic charm which they were never intended to possess) but also athletic contests and a display of folk-dancing and Greek popular art which suggested a better basis than the classics from which the reconstruction of Greek art might be hopefully pursued.

On May 5 a Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration was signed with Hungary and on June 19 with Austria: (ratifications of which were exchanged January 3, 1931). A treaty of Friendship and Arbitration and a Commercial Convention between Greece and Persia were signed in London on January 9, 1931.

11.

Turkish
Settlement.

At last on June 10 at Angora Tewfik Rushdi Bey and M. Polychroniades signed an agreement covering all the differences arising out of the Anatolian War of 1922. (It was settled that Greece was to pay £425,000 as compensation in connection with the exchange of populations: Turkey accepted the Constantinople Greeks as unexchangeable: but Greeks who had left Turkey with Ottoman passports were not to return.)

The Treaty was ratified by the National Assembly at Angora on June 17, when it was noticed that Tewfik paid a warm tribute to the friendly advice of M. Musso-

lini. At Athens the Greek Chamber ratified the Treaty 1930. for this final settlement of mutual claims on June 26, by 191 votes to 19, after three days of stormy debate, in the course of which Venizelos challenged all parties to resist if they dared this signal advance towards Near Eastern harmony: Greece, he added, had now spent £80,000,000 on the Refugees, whose representatives were loudest in their opposition to the settlement, and would make no further sacrifices. On the following day (June 27) the Economic Agreement was ratified by the Senate. When on July 12 the Government's reply to M. Briand's Memorandum on a European Federal Union was handed to the French Minister, it was significant that the Greek reply while welcoming the proposal expressed the opinion that Turkey should be invited to participate. It still remains however for Greece to persuade Turkey to join the League of Nations; an accession which would solve many of the remaining Minority problems of the Near East.

The settlement with Turkey was not completed till the end of October and on July 25 M. Venizelos was able to leave Athens for a short holiday at a French watering-place while negotiation of the remaining details was continued at Angora. Final instructions were sent to the Greek delegation on October 7 and when the treaty was ready M. Venizelos left for Angora with his Minister for Foreign Affairs. On October 27 he was received in audience by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Republic—and there must undoubtedly have been on the meeting of these two an unusually frank discussion about the past, present and future of Greco-Turkish relations. Speeches of a more formal cordiality were exchanged at a banquet in the evening. On October 30 were signed Treaties of Friendship and

1930. Commerce,¹ providing for the neutrality of either state in the event of attack by a third party, together with a protocol providing for maintenance of the naval *status quo* and requiring each party to inform the other six months beforehand of any intention to construct new naval units. M. Venizelos, leaving the Ghazi to open the final session of the Grand National Assembly, then went on to Constantinople (November 1) where after calling on the Oecumenical Patriarch at the Phanar, he drove through the streets and was welcomed with an innocent enthusiasm which was never allowed to offend Turkish susceptibility.

M. Venizelos told *The Times* correspondent that the British and Russian Governments had communicated their approval of the new friendship. At Athens a few days later (November 7) the Government issued an announcement which was clearly intended to disperse uneasiness caused by Mustafa Kemal's earlier reference to the good offices of Mussolini, and to assert in the most definite possible manner that Greece intended to live at peace with Italy and Turkey without joining any Italian "revisionist bloc" which, incidentally, existed mostly in the imagination of French alarmists:

"Greece and Turkey in their new treaty recognise the Treaty of Lausanne as final; consequently there is no reason for these two countries to involve themselves in coalitions for the revision of the treaties of peace for the benefit of third parties. Should the desire for a revision of those treaties lead to a recourse to arms Greece and Turkey by their new treaty have agreed to remain neutral. The pacific spirit of the two Governments has

¹ Approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on February 12, 1931.

been completely proved at Angora. They have accepted 1930.
the territorial arrangements as defined by the post-War treaties and have no interest in each other's frontiers."

But if M. Venizelos had been able to say at Angora that his Government's policy of friendship with Turkey was approved by the leaders of every political party in Greece and corresponded with the sentiments of the whole Greek nation, there remained a section who did not disapprove of any policy but only of the Prime Minister, and thought they might find in the policy an opportunity to stir up the relics of pre-war chauvinism. Royalist intrigues.

The exiled King George had for some time been living in England, occasionally speaking in debates at Cambridge, visiting the offices of *The Times* in semi-state attended by only one equerry; honouring demi-smart dinner parties in London or appearing at Scottish house parties in knickerbockers. His advisers thought that discontent with the Turkish settlement might be swollen into a demand for his restoration. The case that King Constantine had been a misunderstood hero always longing to help England (or in French editions France) in the Great War against Germany and always foiled at the last minute by the machinations of the needy adventurer Venizelos had been written up again and again by embittered journalists like G. F. Abbott and Paxton Hibben on instructions from Royalist centres in London and Paris.¹ The brief, by this time somewhat foxy,

¹ King Constantine has also been championed with the most persistent loyalty by Admiral Mark Kerr whose case however is slightly different. He appears to argue that King Constantine wished to remain neutral; that it was in the best interest of the Allies that Greece should remain neutral; that therefore the King by remaining neutral was serving the Allies in their own

1930. was now taken up by Sir Basil Thomson, who had at one time held a high appointment in the London police and in March 1931 published a volume even more inaccurate than Mr. Abbott's. In June and July rumours were circulated which were to be echoed in the press of both countries; and attempts were made to involve prominent Englishmen in proposals for King George's return, by assuring them that Venizelos desired it and was only waiting to have his hand forced, so that their influential names might be used in the Greek press to create an illusion that the ex-King was armed in the smiles of the British aristocracy.

When the actual signing of the Turkish Treaty approached together with the news that M. Venizelos would visit Angora in person and shake hands with Mustafa Kemal a further effort was concerted to take advantage of what was felt to be a last opportunity. On October 11 King George, who paid all expenses, and a collection of members of the Greek colony in London and English friends of the royal family, were entertained at dinner on the eve of his departure for Rumania. Asked by a reporter if he intended to go to Athens in the near future, he replied, "How can I tell?" Meanwhile the Greek Government was to be overthrown by a military outbreak in Athens on the morning of October 30 in time to prevent the signing of the Treaty with Turkey and to give a new dictator the excuse of saving his country. Fortunately the officers concerned were arrested at a house in the suburbs on the eve of the outbreak and General Pangalos himself whose chief

despite. (If this position was universally recognised by Admiral Mark Kerr and other naval and military experts one wonders why Germany troubled to encourage Greek neutrality.)

followers were all intimately concerned was arrested a few days later at Eleusis; and on November 5 committed for trial. On May 8, 1931, Major Katzaros and two other followers of General Pangalos were arrested for planning another outbreak.

It will be relevant to note here that M. Venizelos had always been in theory strongly in favour of a constitutional monarchy; he thought that a King would give the country some security against the *pronunciamentos* and dictatorships of discontented colonels: and he had an admiration for all British institutions which was sometimes excessive (as when in February 1930 it led to a contract for new Greek silver and nickel coins being given to the English Royal Mint although England has the ugliest coinage in Europe) but was not misplaced when it was directed enviously towards the English monarchy, which enjoys enormous statutory powers and exercises them only to give balance and continuity. In addition to this strong general admiration of monarchy Venizelos had as recently as February 1, on a proposal in the Senate to turn the former Royal Palace into a Parliament house, taken occasion to express his personal sentiments of respect for their former majesties, George I., Constantine, and George II. But with regard to any possible restoration of monarchy in Greece his attitude was that all the members of the Glücksburg dynasty had proved themselves incapable of exercising power constitutionally—and when in October a London paper was stimulated by the Royalist rumours to ask him what he thought about it, he had replied that there was “nothing in the situation to warrant either an early or a late restoration of the ex-King George.”

12.

1930. Not less significant than the Turkish settlement of a new era of Balkan relationship was the meeting in Athens on October 5 of a Balkan Conference organised under the auspices of the International Peace Bureau, one of those vague bodies which are not taken seriously in Government offices. Although unofficial however it was welcomed in Athens by M. Venizelos, the members, 10 Albanians, 11 Bulgars, 30 Greeks, 30 Rumanians, 10 Turks and 7 Serbs, were escorted to the first meeting by their respective Ministers, and M. Papanastasiou, a former Prime Minister, who had taken a large part in promoting the conference, himself presided over the plenary sessions.

The Balkan
Conference.

They succeeded in establishing a central Balkanic Institute with branches in each of the six States concerned, charged with the task of drafting a joint programme for the export of agricultural and manufactured goods, the abolition of obstacles to normal commercial intercourse, the improvement of transport facilities; the unification of customs nomenclature, the establishment of a monetary and postal union, the exchange of students and teachers, and in general the fostering of any activity designed to promote friendly feelings between the countries concerned. The Institute was to have a Council and a permanent Secretariat and was to hold a general conference every October in one of the six capitals, to which representatives of the League of Nations and of the International Labour Office should always be invited. Resolutions were also passed urging the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan States to meet once a year for the purpose of exchanging views on current problems;

and calling for the appointment of a committee to study 1930.
the question of a regional pact extending the operation of the Kellogg-Briand treaty against war and giving solid guarantees for peace. (The first meeting of the Council was held at Salonica on January 31, 1931.) When the meeting ended at Delphi on October 12, they had effectively demonstrated the virtues of the new policy of substituting friendship for suspicion: they also gave M. Venizelos on October 11 the opportunity to address a party of Bulgarian journalists in terms which gave life to the negotiations still proceeding at Sofia.¹

He said that the difficulty about the Bulgar minority in Greek Macedonia must be settled by degrees. He was ready to grant the right to have their own schools if the Bulgars asked for them. He would allow Bulgaria to have her port on the coast of Western Thrace, through which Bulgarian traffic could find an outlet on the Aegean across Greek territory, and while waiting for Bulgaria to ask for that port he was ready to let her have a Free Zone at Salonica under the same conditions as those in force for the Jugoslav Free Zone there, and would permit the railway systems of the two countries to be linked up between Petrich in Bulgaria and Siderokastron (Demirhissar) in Greece. It was to be expected that the conciliatory attitude of the Bulgarian delegates at Athens should be sharply criticised by the elements in Bulgaria which are desperately intriguing to keep alive the cantankerous nationalism of the past; and attempts are being made to enlist the support of the Albanian delegation in order to demand the inclusion in the agenda

¹ A fuller account of the organisation and proceedings of the Conference may be found in Mr. Montague Bell's *Near East Year Book*.

1930. for the meeting at Constantinople in October 1931 of a Bulgarian resolution about minorities and Treaty revision which is unlikely to be acceptable by the Serbs.

On December 22 the Cabinet was reconstructed, the object of the changes being to give ministerial rank to the former Under Secretaries for Health, Aviation and Public Welfare and to the Governor Generals of Thrace and Crete: and on the following day the Senate adopted the Treaties of Friendship and Commerce with Turkey signed on October 30.

End of
Refugee
Settlement
Commission.

At the end of February the League of Nations Financial Committee had approved a Convention between the Refugee Settlement Commission and the Greek Government for winding up the organisation, whose functions were to be finally transferred at the end of the year to the Government which was to undertake the further administration of the Refugee Loan through the Agrarian Bank. In seven years under Mr. Henry Morgenthau and Sir John Campbell, under Mr. C. P. Howland who succeeded Mr. Morgenthau in 1924, and under Sir John Hope Simpson and Mr. C. B. Eddy, the Commission first assembled in November 1923 had settled nearly 170,000 families at a cost of about £13,400,000 and made the more than million Greeks expelled from Anatolia an organic part of a country grown apparently stronger by their accession.

It is curious that in the same period England was struggling with a similar problem, the problem of a million or two unemployed who differed from refugees only in being stronger and less destitute. Greece, with the help of the Settlement Commission, had succeeded while England had not yet had the courage to deal with her own problem at all. But the immediate success of

the Greek solution at the end of the year had changed the character of the land and threatened it with the terrors of an industrial future.

On April 17, 1931, M. Mihalakopoulos signed an agreement with the British Minister giving the Imperial Airways Company the right to cross Greece by various alternative routes and providing for eventual Greek services to Malta and Cyprus if desired, the chief condition being that the English Company should pay customs duties on the petrol and oil consumed by its machines while flying over Greek territory. 1931.

A new six per cent Public Works Loan amounting in all to £4,600,000 was issued on March 24. £2,000,000 was the English share of this loan which was intended to finance contracts for road construction and for public works in the Vardar and Struma valleys. A contract for the Athens water supply had been given to an American company (Ulen); this company's dam near Marathon and other works begun at the end of 1926 were now terminated and the supply was inaugurated on June 3.

M. Venizelos left Athens for England on July 10; the visit had been arranged long before in order that he might take part in ceremonies at Newstead Abbey. The gloomy home of Lord Byron having come into the market had been presented by an enlightened donor to the city of Nottingham; and on July 16 M. Venizelos, after visiting the poet's grave in Hucknall church, in the afternoon presented to the Lord Mayor the deeds of gift conveying the Abbey, the gardens and lakes to the City of Nottingham, "to be maintained in perpetuity for the enjoyment of the public,"—in faint hope that a few of them from time to time might remember the loves of poetry and freedom. Newstead Abbey.

1931. Arriving in London on July 13 M. Venizelos took advantage of his brief visit in order to confer with Mr. Henderson, as on his return through Paris on July 25 with the French Premier M. Laval, as to the effect on Greek finances of Greek acceptance of President Hoover's plan of an international moratorium for war debts. The application of the moratorium to Bulgarian reparations would involve Greece in a loss of the year's instalment of about £266,000, and Greece proposed to offset this loss against the instalments due from Greece to Bulgaria under the "Molloff-Kafantares" Agreement for the compensation of populations exchanged under the convention of November 27 1919 (Financial Agreement between Bulgaria and Greece on Procedure in regard to compensation payable to Exchanged Populations, signed at Geneva December 9, 1927, and in force since March 8, 1929). On the non-payment of the instalments due from Greece on July 31, 1931, the Bulgarian Government appealed to Geneva and on September 7 M. Venizelos and M. Malinoff stated their cases before the Council and began private conversations with the *rapporteur*. It may be noted that while the Greek Government had been striving for years to have all financial questions at issue with Bulgaria submitted for joint settlement to the League of Nations it had once before endured a severe rebuke from Sir Austen Chamberlain for suggesting that the payments under this Molloff-Kafantares Agreement could be withheld in order to satisfy a claim for reparations. In the official statement of the Committee of Experts appointed to give effect to President Hoover's proposal, issued in London on August 11, it was noted that "the Greek Government have difficulties as regards the suspension
- The Hoover Plan.

of payments by Bulgaria"; and that on principle the 1931. payments by Bulgaria under the Hague Agreement of January 20, 1930, should be suspended during the moratorium (July 1, 1931, to June 30, 1932) but that in this case (as in that of payments due by Hungary), "certain adjustments required to be made, as a complete suspension of these payments might result in a suspension of certain classes of payments to individuals which under President Hoover's proposal were not to be affected"; and that "negotiations are continuing in regard to the adjustments which are required in the case of Bulgaria." A few days later the Bulgarian Government informed the Committee that it was ready to continue its payments, used to meet the claims of Hungarian Optants against Rumania, provided that Bulgaria were granted a moratorium for reparation payments and that Greece should resume her payments under the Molloff-Kafantares Agreement.

13.

At the beginning of 1931 Greece had resumed Greece and rational relations with all her neighbours except Bulgaria. Bulgaria: and the differences with Bulgaria although complicated and of long standing were not quite so serious as they were thought to be by foreign observers, many of whom failed to realise that the fog of hatred generated by nineteenth century nationalism had already begun to disperse; and that the fostered rivalry of Greeks and Bulgarians had magnified quite ordinary disagreements into a spectral illusion of gigantic antagonisms. Conversely the exercises in the diplomacy of inertia often displayed by the Bulgarians (although they were not the only or even the most brilliant exponents of the art of

1931. doing nothing and suspecting everybody) were not a sign, as was sometimes suggested, of Bulgarian bad faith, but expressed an instinctive desire to keep alive the stubborn spirit of Bulgarian nationalism as long as any of the vague aspirations rejected by the Treaty of Neuilly remained unsatisfied. Fortunately a new generation was growing up in both countries old enough to have seen some of the follies of war and young enough to have escaped its passions; and under the eyes of youth no honest if unreasonable intransigence was likely to withstand the arbitrament of Geneva.

Minorities. The Bulgarian grievance concerning the Slavonic minority in Greek Macedonia had to a great extent disappeared automatically with the exchange of population referred to above; the Slavonic settlements on the frontier having been evacuated under the supervision of a League of Nations Commission and replaced by the refugees from Anatolia. But there still remained some 80,000 or 90,000 "Bulgarians" in Greece (who must be distinguished by inverted commas because strictly speaking they are not Bulgarians but Greek subjects, natives of Macedonia, probably bilingual but by preference speaking a Bulgarian dialect, and members of the Bulgarian Church). Most of them are concentrated in the Florina district of Macedonia, and it was to these M. Venizelos referred when he declared in October 1930 that he should make it his personal concern that minorities should have the rights to which they were entitled under the Treaties, and specifically that they should have schools where a request for schools should be put forward. On this it may be remarked that the "Bulgarians" in question seem to have taken no steps to establish schools at their own expense as they are entitled

under the Minorities Treaty; and that there is evidence 1931. that they are living in complete harmony with their new neighbours, mostly Greeks from Anatolia, as well as with the long-established Macedonian Greeks. It is to be expected that persecution should cease when there is nothing to fear from the intruding minority. Although a considerable section of Bulgarian opinion represents this minority as more numerous and as being seriously terrorised by the Greek authorities, I believe that this will to expect hostility is, as I have suggested above, a natural attempt to keep up the temperature of nationalism; and that the "Bulgarians" of Florina will soon be provided with all their proper schools and churches. Minorities are persecuted when they are feared; and the Slavonic minority remaining in Greece are concentrated in the Florina district just because they constitute no danger there, while they have been removed from Eastern Macedonia where they threatened a Slavonic percolation from the Bulgarian frontier to the Aegean Sea. (A serious outbreak of rioting directed against the large and prosperous Jewish community at Salonica by Greek nationalists, at the beginning of July 1931, was provoked only by reports that the Jews were agitating in favour of Macedonian independence.)

Former Greek attempts to satisfy these Slavonic communities with full minority rights had been frustrated by Yugoslavia, who had resolutely refused to acknowledge the existence of a "Bulgarian" minority in Serbian Macedonia and was naturally unwilling to countenance recognition of an ethnically identical minority on the Greek side of the frontier; and now that Greece had settled her outstanding differences with Serbia it was not by any means easier to conciliate Bulgaria without

1931. offending Serbian prejudices. With regard to Serbian treatment of her (unacknowledged) "Bulgarian" minorities, with which we are not directly concerned, it may be sufficient to note that so long as the Macedonian party in Bulgaria fail to prove any genuine intention to adopt constitutional methods, the Yugoslav Government have some excuse for refusing Treaty rights in Macedonia to a "Bulgarian" minority which is by its connections disloyal and revolutionary. But as the League of Nations only recognises the rights of loyal minorities it may some day occur to the Governments concerned that the simplest way to secure the integrity of their frontiers *and the duty of their minorities will be to invite the inspection of a League of Nations commissioner.*

The Aegean
Outlet.

The outlet on the Aegean, which under the Treaty of Neuilly the Allied and Associated Powers had undertaken to secure for Bulgaria, is another problem which could be solved without difficulty if the will were ripe on both sides. On November 24, 1922, a subcommission appointed by the conference of Lausanne had recommended the construction of a free port at Dedeagach under an international commission which should also administer the railway connecting the port with the Bulgarian frontier. Bulgaria rejected these proposals, as well as a private suggestion of a freehold port connected by a neutral corridor in exchange for slight frontier rectifications, and similar offers made by Greece at Geneva in 1926. In 1929 M. Venizelos took advantage of a meeting at The Hague to inform the Bulgarian representative that Greece was prepared to grant to Bulgaria in the port of Salonica the same facilities as are enjoyed by Serbia, and made it clear that this concession should not imply any claim upon Bulgaria to waive her

right derived from Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly 1931. to secure a commercial outlet on the Aegean at Dedeagach or Port Lagos. This offer which has been publicly repeated on several occasions has not been thought worthy of Bulgarian acceptance, the argument being that even if it were possible for Bulgaria to undertake the expenses of building a new harbour at Dedeagach the investment would be far too precarious unless it were attached by a territorial corridor. This appears to justify Greek suspicions that successive Bulgarian Governments are attracted by the hope of ultimately assimilating a Greek enclave isolated by a territorial corridor through Thrace rather than by the immediate prospect of any advantages which might accrue to the country as a whole by the enjoyment of commercial facilities. Bulgarians reply that in order to ensure the purity of their intentions they would be prepared to run the corridor to Dedeagach along the present Greco-Turkish frontier. Greeks declare with show of reason that no Greek Government however anxious to settle outstanding questions on a friendly basis can be expected to make concessions of territory without some very definite compensation to show the electorate: so what about ceding a frontier corridor along the Maritsa in exchange for an equal area in the Rhodope district which grows the finest Bulgarian tobaccos? A blessing on your generosity, says Sofia; in that case, however, though the Bulgarians might have their harbour, there would be very little left for them to export from it. But it is time to come down from these dialectical exercises to the realities of the situation which ought to be familiar to informed opinion in both countries.

The whole problem of the Aegean outlet as commonly discussed with unnecessary heat is thoroughly

1931. unreal; and responsible men in Bulgaria know that the Greek offer of Dedeagach with or without a harbour and with or without a corridor is of no practical interest. Article 48 offers Bulgaria a right which would in practice be useless, and serves only to inflame Bulgarian public opinion with a sense of grievance, and Greek public opinion with a passion of self-defence: because the natural and obvious outlet for Bulgarian trade is at Salonica.

Railway
Junction. Far more important therefore is the question of joining up the Greek and Bulgarian railway systems so as to connect Sofia with Salonica by way of the Struma valley.

The Bulgarian railway down the Struma valley to the Greek frontier at Kula, near Petrich, is at present of standard gauge only as far as Dupnitsa, whence a narrow gauge (Decauville) line runs to the frontier. Before the Great War this narrow gauge line linked up with the Salonica to Constantinople railway at the junction of Demirhissar, but in the course of the war this link was demolished by the Greek authorities; the embankment can still be seen but without rails. As the Bulgarian authorities are now pushing on with the conversion to standard gauge of the next section from Dupnitsa southwards (Dupnitsa—Gorno—Djumaya) it may be assumed that they have lost their former nervousness as to the military danger of building a standard gauge line so near the Serbian frontier, and that they intend, as funds allow and as the formidable engineering difficulties can be overcome, to complete the whole standard gauge line to the frontier; in that case, even if Greece does not think it worth while in the meantime to restore the short missing narrow gauge link between Demirhissar

(Sidérokastron) and the frontier, full railway connection 1931. between Sofia and Salonica should be in sight in the near future, since M. Venizelos has succeeded in overcoming the objections of the Greek General Staff to the junction of the two systems. This is obviously required not only in the interests of Bulgarian trade and of the port of Salonica, but also in connection with the future development of a route from north to south across the lower Danube which should put Rumania and even the Baltic states in direct communication with Constantinople and the Mediterranean. There is no fundamental conflict of interests involved in the dispute between the two countries to prevent a satisfactory solution of the problem of Bulgarian access to the Aegean if the factors are clearly stated at Geneva in the presence of the powers who signed the Treaty of Neuilly; and it may be accepted that one of the first results of any conciliation will be an agreement to complete and improve the Struma valley junction.

Just as communications in England are said to have The Danube
Bridge. been worse in the eighteenth century than in the first, so they are less competently planned in the Balkans to-day than they were under the domination of Rome and Byzantium. While the Western and Eastern Empires maintained several bridges on the lower reaches of the Danube, the Balkan nations have been individualistically disposed to develop communications only on lines of least resistance from East to West; and a line from north to south connecting Warsaw with Salonica and crossing the Danube somewhere on the frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania would mark a notable advance in their civilisation. The best elements in Greece and Bulgaria are both anxious for improved railway com-

1931. munications; and any genuine *rapprochement* between the two neighbours may be expected to have important consequences in carrying forward the scheme for bridging the Danube.

Financial
Claims.

Of the numerous financial claims at issue between the two governments it is perhaps an exaggeration to say that if they were submitted to arbitration they could be settled in a few months by the experts of the League of Nations, who are the only persons fully capable of understanding them. But to Geneva they must sooner or later be submitted for settlement, or to The Hague, for many of them are essentially juridical questions concerning the source from which desired compensation should be sought. The complex of claims and counter-claims which estranges the two countries has been woven not only by disputes about financial consequences of the exchange of populations but by all sorts of demands going back to the period before the war, such as the question of compensation for forests in Rhodope of which certain former Turkish subjects, who became Greek subjects by Treaty after the Balkan Wars, had been dispossessed by the Bulgarian authorities, a question which thanks to the Council of the League is already receiving its proper treatment at the hands of a Swedish arbitrator; or the claim recently revived for damage done to Greek property in the town of Anhiolos in Bulgaria in 1906, which at first sight would appear to have been an intentional *reductio ad absurdum* of the nationalist game of finding excuses for disagreement, but actually is an example of what each side has done in order to find makeweights, and must continue to do so long as they put off striking a balance.

Of all these financial claims and counter-claims and

indebtednesses and compensations the central knot is 1931. the Molloff-Kafantares Agreement which was extracted from the Greeks by Sir Austen Chamberlain in 1927 in order to facilitate the finance of the exchange of populations under the Convention of 1919; secondly arise the payments due by arrangement of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Emigration Commission; and beyond these a continually growing tangle of outstanding claims and counter-claims the nature of which has already been suggested. Of all the financial arrangements and demands in these three classes the Molloff-Kafantares Agreement alone produces a fixed annual payment, securing a definite credit for Bulgaria which M. Buroff is naturally unwilling to see whittled down by any arbitral settlement. Consequently on any calculation of the whole array and counter-array it is the Greeks who must remain the creditors on balance. This must not be forgotten in contemplating their reluctance to postpone the instalments of reparations or to allow any other concessions to Bulgaria, a reluctance which M. Venizelos partly owing to his preoccupation with other problems must find it difficult to overcome.

The Bulgarian and the Greek estimates of the balance of claims under these three headings are naturally widely divorced. But while the Bulgarian view is that a process of conciliation should first be applied in order to reduce as much as possible the gap between the two opposing estimates, and that arbitration should be sought only to arrive at a final compromise between the two figures submitted, M. Venizelos on the other hand believes that the political atmosphere would be cleared and the ground prepared for a commercial convention (which was suggested by M. Buroff at Geneva in

1931. September 1930), if all these differences were immediately referred in a bundle to the League of Nations.

Such was the position in November 1930, when the British Government realised that this was a case in which the intervention of a disinterested Great Power might not be resented. Accordingly Mr. Henderson took advantage of the presence at Geneva in January 1931 of M. Mihalakopoulos and MM. Buroff and Liapcheff to acquaint himself with the nature of their differences, and before the end of the month a scheme was drawn up dividing the various matters in dispute into separate categories and proposing the submission of them all to various forms of arbitration. This scheme with a personal letter from Mr. Henderson was presented to M. Buroff in Sofia on February 7. Mr. Henderson's proposal, which was also supported by the French and Italian Governments, was formally accepted in Athens on February 9; and a fortnight later the Bulgarians also accepted in principle but insisted on making some reservations "dictated by the interests of the country." It will be seen that the position is not by any means unhopeful, and if the financial and political stability of both countries can be maintained an agreed settlement should lead to the final extinction of obsolete suspicions between the two countries.

It is a very significant testimony to the improved conditions already introduced by the League of Nations that this penultimate stage of the negotiations was in no way complicated by another frontier incident which occurred on February 4, 1931, when a Greek soldier driving away some Bulgarian peasants from a frontier post crossed the boundary and was shot. The incident was investigated automatically by a Greco-Bulgarian

mixed commission which reported without excitement 1931. on February 10 that the Greek soldier was shot on Bulgarian soil and had used his own rifle before being killed.

14.

No one who has had any intimate knowledge of the Greek people as confined in the modern republic can be very confident about the future. They have faults of character which must make them rarely fitted to be left in charge of an administrative machine; and although much is hoped of the new Public School on English lines founded at Spetsai it must be at least two generations before a sufficient number of sound civil servants can be regularly drawn from the educated classes to ensure a reasonably smooth and honest administration. A normally incorruptible and dispassionate civil service is the necessary foundation of good constitutional government; and it is to be feared that in the Greek state many weeks of parliamentary discussion will continue to be wasted every year on personal recriminations and counter charges. The frequency of such episodes might suggest the remark that no Greek politician can resist a chance of sacrificing the interests of his country to a game of vexatious and hypocritical obstruction. But the temptation to regard all such exhibitions as signs of delayed adolescence or of an incurably frivolous mentality should be checked by the thought that they are not more saddening to the historian than the spectacle enjoyed in England of famous administrators writing to *The Times* about Russia or of great lawyers solemnly declaring that the National Strike of 1926 was illegal, as if any declaration of illegal-

Prospects of
the Greek
Republic.

ity could either prevent its recurrence or affect its value as a demonstration of solidarity and of stupidity.

The difficulties of parliamentary government under a fully democratic constitution are not confined to Greece. But it is impossible to look forward without anxiety to the internal affairs of a country which can find only a very small increase of trained officials who owe some valuable experience to the League of Nations Commission, blessed though it be with a new Constitution which includes adult suffrage with an extremely efficient second chamber and impressive guarantees for freedom of opinion¹ and liberty of the subject, and with a population which increased from 4,818,000 after the Balkan Wars to 6,204,000 at the census of 1928, while the territory was increased during the same period from 121,000 to 130,200 square kilometres (about 50,000 square miles with a density of about 123½ to the square mile). The exchange of populations has effected an agrarian revolution in Macedonia where big estates have been broken up into small holdings. It is too early to foretell the effects of such a change except in so far as it increases the density of the population: but it can hardly be doubted that M. Venizelos would never have proposed or signed the Treaty for the compulsory exchange of populations at Lausanne if there had been any other way out. (It must be remembered that at the time there were already 850,000 Anatolian refugees in Greece whom Turkey would never consent to take back; and the only way to settle them was by getting possession of the estates of the Turkish landowners in

¹ Except that if anyone should still want to translate the Scriptures he would be forbidden to do so without the authorisation of the Church.

Macedonia.) In addition to the new agricultural population there are the urban refugees, about three quarters of a million of them. These it is to be feared can only be provided for if the country accepts the methods of industrial development, and condemns itself, like the great Western nations to whom it has looked for guidance, to the lingering horrors of over-production and over-population, in the last stages of which great industries are so prosperous that they are continually obliged to "issue fresh capital," and citizens so numerous and so powerful that they accept the symptoms of material progress as proofs of civilisation. There is small sign in Greece of any conspiracy of faithful citizens who know that civilisation has nothing to do with an extended capacity to move about quickly and to live on preserved food.

This gloomy prospect can fortunately be illuminated by a consideration of external relations. At the beginning of February 1931 an extremely realistic and even cynical observer of foreign affairs in London, an enquiring soul much more profoundly instructed than the author of these remarks, after a survey based on the fullest possible information, was unwillingly obliged to conclude that the only remaining obstacle to complete peace and union in the Balkans was the Macedonian conflict of Serbia and Bulgaria, which incidentally, as mentioned above, delays a final minority settlement between Bulgaria and Greece. This observer was quite ready to discount the disruptive influence of Italy (who has taken the place held by Austria in the last century): for, although Italy is said to have hopes of including Greece in a "revisionist" group with Turkey, Hungary and Bulgaria, it is quite clear that Greece would never accept

the risks of Treaty revision—now that the wounds are beginning to heal—even if it were impossibly supposed that Italy offered to return the Dodekanese. Consequently he was obliged to base his expectation of continued trouble in the Balkans on a belief that the Macedonian difficulty was insoluble. Anyone however who takes a longer view should be less impressed by the one difficulty that remains than by the ranks of apparently impassable difficulties that have been overcome in the last twenty-five years. Even the Macedonian difficulty, “insoluble” as it is between neighbours who regard each other with suspicion and hatred, could be compromised in a few days by neighbours whose mood had changed to friendship. And those who think friendship is impossible among Balkan peoples are often those who (perhaps because they fix their gaze too closely on their own experiences in Macedonia at the beginning of the century) think only of the period of nationalism and free Christianity, and forget the four hundred years during which the Balkan nations lived under the Turkish yathaghan side by side without distinction of race. The nations of the Balkan peninsula in spite of last century’s outburst of nationalism which made the most of their differences of language are joint inheritors of one Byzantine tradition, and are fundamentally united not only in culture which is waiting to revive but in capacity.

Federation is not yet officially spoken of in Greece: but M. Papanastasiou, a former Prime Minister, one of the chief authors of the new Republic, and the chief moving spirit behind the Athenian Conference of October 1930, has proposed a “network of bi-lateral treaties”: and sooner or later the next phase in any peaceful evolution must be a political federation.

15.

The first hundred years of the new Hellas have not produced any works of art of great significance or startling beauty. Such manifestations could hardly have been expected: for while the flowers of field and mountain were thought unworthy of notice, the soil was still too shallow to produce the lovelier blooms of civilisation. A hundred years ago Greece still had a native art, a wild and popular delight in embroidery and wood-carving and metal work and even in painting in so far as the church permitted any development of the traditional composition of holy Eikons. It was an art just as lively and of course just as limited as the art of the folk songs; its beauties were intended for the adornment of life in the cottage or on the mountain, in fishing boat or pasture; both were genuine forms of Greek art, humble descendants of the Byzantine tradition which had acquired from Turkey a few Oriental turns of pattern or melody.

Modern
Greek
Culture

All this was severely discouraged by the founders of the new kingdom. The folk songs were left to be collected by foreign scholars like Fauriel and Passow; popular literature was almost extinct in Greece when a band of Greek scholars arose, as Lampros and Hatzidakis, and Xanthoudides, Polites and his pupils one of whom S. P. Kyriakides now carries on the folklore journal *Laografika* which he founded and inspired. All these and many more have been collecting the fruits of learning and beauty in the fields that lie between folklore and philology. (Popular art can never long survive self-consciousness; and it will not be possible much longer to find maidservants in Athens who dictate letters home in rhymed couplets.)

Scholarship. No attempt can be made to name all those not less eager and competent to establish foundations of scholarship and history. The most cursory note of these beginnings of Greek culture would not be tolerable without a mention of Professor A. M. Andreades who with a European reputation as an economic historian has also published studies of the modern theatre and of English politics. Byzantine sources have been and are being industriously explored by scholars like K. N. Sathas (1842-1914), A. N. Giannares (1852-1909), G. Sôtériades (first Rector of the new university at Salonica), N. A. Beês (editor of the *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*), and G. Sôtêriou, Director of the Byzantine Museum. Literary and philological history and criticism of some merit are being produced by S. Menardos, M. Triantafyllides, and D. Bouttierides. E. M. Antoniadi, author of a standard survey of the great church of *Agia Sofia*, who lives in Paris, is also well known to members of the Royal Astronomical Society for his observations of the planet Mars. Some of these scholars have grown out of the habit of thinking it necessary to prove that everything good or characteristic in Greece is entirely free from Italian or Oriental influences.

An Athenian Academy (of Positive Sciences, Literature and Fine Arts, and Moral and Political Sciences)—first suggested in 1824 and again by the Regent von Maurer ten years later, for which a building presented by Baron Sina (a Macedonian benefactor established in Vienna), with a foundation stone laid by King Otho in 1859, was completed in 1885—was finally established by decree on March 18, 1926—a proof of the dictatorial accomplishment of General Pangalos. Its sixty members

(besides 40 foreign associates and 300 corresponding members) include the Metropolitan of Athens, MM. F. Negres, G. Hatzidakis, S. Menardos, G. Sotêriou, A. Andreades, N. Polites, the international lawyer, Hr. Tsountas, the archaeologist, D. Aiginêtes, Director of the Observatory, and the writers Palamas, Drosines and Xenopoulos.

The founders of the Kingdom, the Philhellenes and Bavarians, naturally thought only of ancient art. It was Painting and Sculpture. fortunate indeed for Athens that the Bavarians at least were thorough in their knowledge of Attic art, as far as it went, and genuine in their love; so that the academic style of the buildings they erected does little violence to the mountain background or to the native marble. But no native art could be cultivated or could ever develop from such a foundation, so that it is not surprising that Greece produced no painters at all during the nineteenth century who can be mentioned with kindness. Attempts have been made to find merit in the paintings of Theodore Ralli and Nicolas Ghizes (many of whose works were unfortunately acquired by the State), but it is impossible to pretend that they are anything but the most mediocre imitations of the worst mediocrities of the Salons of Paris and Munich. Nor have any of the more recent landscape painters anything to recommend them; like the numerous poets of the last century they do not seem to suspect that a work of art is something more than a modest expression of laudable sentiments. Only in sculpture did the last century produce an artist, J. Halepás, born in Tenos in 1854, who was strong enough to express some sense of plastic beauty in academic conventions; and in a similar tradition, but refreshed by the genius of Maillol, a contemporary sculptor, Michael

Tompros (born in Athens in 1889) has produced a few works of great beauty and will soon be well known as the sculptor of a monument erected to the memory of Rupert Brooke in the island of Skyros (unveiled in the presence of M. Venizelos, M. Mihalakopoulos, Mr. Patrick Ramsay the British Minister, and Professor Lascelles Abercrombie on April 5, 1931). In painting the most distinguished artist at present is Demetrius Galánes born at Athens in 1882, and settled in Paris where he has produced the finest woodcuts of the day. Paintings of the greatest promise are also being produced in Paris by George Gounaropoulos, who was born at Sozoupolis one of the Greek villages in Eastern Rumelia in 1891 and came to Athens as a refugee from the Bulgarian disturbances in 1905. (It is doubtful whether the Italo-Parisian painter Giorgio di Chirico, born at Volo in 1888, is to be regarded as a Greek artist.) In Greece itself, while there has existed since the beginning of the century a movement for the study and preservation of all forms of popular art, it has been greatly extended and vitalised in the last few years chiefly owing to the enthusiasm of Mmes. Kalliroe Parren and Angelica Hatzémihalê; a growing school of artists may now be found in Athens who, with a new understanding of native art as presented to a modern and sophisticated intelligence, are producing works of the greatest interest and charm in painting, in book decoration and in architecture.

Music. In music Greece has produced a few successful singers who have displayed a tendency to sacrifice quality to volume. But little original music of any value had come out of Greece before the appearance of Petro J. Petrides, born in 1892 at Nigde in the Taurus and educated at Constantinople (1899) and in Paris (1911). His major works

include numerous *lieder*, a symphonic suite "*Panighiri*," a Chamber Symphony, a *Concerto Grosso*, a *Kleft Symphony* in four parts for a big orchestra, a *Suite grecque* in five parts (first performed in Paris on March 5, 1931), and a lyrical drama—and those which have been performed in France, Switzerland and Greece have proved him to possess a subtle and personal melodic sense and a masterly power of modern orchestration and polyphonic composition.

In literature the nineteenth century started with a great advantage, for there was already flowing a slight but genuine current of Greek poetry independent of the folk songs and using a language commonly spoken and written for all purposes all over the Greek world—a poetic art ready for all experiments, as exemplified in the highly self-conscious work of Vêlaràs (1771-1823), Kalvos (1792-1867), Hrêstopoulos (1772-1847) and Laskaratos (1821-1901).

Language
and
Literature.

Unfortunately, in spite of the influence of the over-rated Solômos (1793-1857) and the major poet Valaôrites (1824-1879), who consciously based his work on folk literature and had a rich and noble imagination and a fine sense of language and life, the academic fashions of the new reign and the linguistic reforms of Koraës crushed any tendencies to express literary sentiment in "vulgar" language or in any development of the colloquial idiom. Thus in spite of the lively efforts of Alexander Soutsos (1803-1863) and his brother Panagiôtēs (1806-1868), of George Zalogkostas (1805-1858) who had the distinction of writing a poem which has become almost a folk song, and of Achilles Paraschos (1838-1895) and his brother George, the springs of poetry written in a living language were completely sub-

merged, and the middle of the century was occupied by the learned D. N. Bernardakes (1835-1907) who wrote academic tragedies in almost ancient Greek and in accentual iambics, and by the dullness of alexandrian writers like A. Vlachos (1838-1920), D. Bikelas (1835-1907), a considerable scholar, memorable as the founder (1899) of the *Syllogos pros diadosin ôfelimôn biblîôn*, an educational series of admirable translations and handbooks, and author of the well-known historical story *Loukes Laras*, and E. D. Roides (1835-1904) whose acute critical intellect led him to pronounce in favour of authors then beginning again to write in the popular language although writing himself in the literary language which was till 1917 the sole vehicle of official education.

The battle for literature in the popular language however was really pitched and won by John Psyhares (Psichari) (1854-1928) with a long series of controversial and literary works beginning in 1888. He had a personality of great violence and charm but was unfortunately deficient in scholarship, controversial honesty and judgement. He attempted a rigid codification of the most exaggerated forms of colloquial Greek based on an assumed uniformity of phonetic law. He established once for all the tendency of the literary language and all Greek writers have to thank him for his services in that respect; but he is also responsible for their unfortunate preoccupation with rustic phraseology and with phonetic spelling. A language should be standardised by a literature and by a metropolis. But the pronunciation and to some extent the vocabulary of a standardised language must vary from place to place and even from individual to individual; so that a phonetic spelling instead of pre-

serving the standard only serves to obscure the norm and the history of which local and individual pronunciations are variations and developments. Alexander Pallis (b. 1851), who ably supported him in the battle, was in some ways a more extreme reformer but had better taste and far more genius as a writer. His translation of the *Iliad* into the verse and imagery of the Kleftic world is one of the few major achievements of modern Greek literature. Another extreme reformer who has attempted to codify the spelling and grammar of an exaggerated rusticity formally adapted to a highly cultured mind is Peter Vlasto (b. 1879). These three really exhausted the possible absurdities of trying to stereotype colloquial and variable forms of elision and crasis in a literary orthography. The result has been to effect a linguistic revolution far more violent than any desired by the purists. For whereas a modern Athenian cabman would easily understand the popular Greek written and printed in the sixteenth century, the demotic Greek written by a modern Athenian poet would be unintelligible to any Greek of any period earlier than the twentieth. From these extremes there has been some happy reaction but all subsequent writers (except the few critics and historians who still use the academic form) have used a language heavily burdened with phonetic disguises. The fame of the humorous journal conducted in verse by G. Soures (1852-1919) has rather obscured his real merits (shown in his translation of the *Clouds* of Aristophanes) as a writer who could bridge the gap between the learned and popular languages. Not the least admirable feature of the demotic movement was the committee (1910-1924) (*Ekpaideutikos Omiros*), organised with scholarly judgement by D. P. Petrocochino, M. Triantafyllides,

I. Dragoumes, M. Tsirimōkos and others, which published an annual Bulletin and a series of handbooks and readers. Their reforms were much assisted by the quantity of poetry and criticism poured out by Kōstēs Palamas (b. 1859) whose extremely "popular" diction was generally accepted on account of the correct and academic character of the ideas it disguised. He has claimed the honours of a major poet, and his frail and sensitive figure is the centre of an eager band of apostles and adulators, but his excessively fluent and exclamatory anapaests, curiously reminiscent at their best of Shelley at his worst, and at their worst of Tagore at his best, have little to express except a vague emotionalism and a literary love of nature; he will be remembered as a versatile man of letters with a lyrical gift, and for his short story *Thnatos Pallēkariou* ("Death of a Playboy") in which an account of the humiliating death of a young villager is made to symbolise the downfall of physical pride. Many others less gifted than Palamas have failed to realise that a poem is not any statement in verse about beggar girls, flowers, mothers' deathbeds, snow and despair; and few indeed have been the poets who have been able to express a powerful emotion, "recollected in tranquillity," in significant imagery and lovely diction.

The end of the century produced very many short story writers of whom K. Mihaelides (b. 1849), A. Papadiamantes (1851-1911), J. Vlahogiannes (b. 1868), G. Drosines (b. 1859), D. P. Tangopoulos (founder of the Psicharist periodical *Neumas*, afterwards carried on by his son Panos Tangopoulos whose early death in 1931 was much lamented by the friends who had admired his poems), and many others can be read with

enjoyment in small quantities. Of these only Papadiamantes, who came to Athenian journalism from the island of Skiathos and lived in great poverty between the church and the wine-shop, attempted to give colour and flexibility by an eclectic development of the learned language. Real distinction of style was seldom attained in the popular language till the beginning of the present century, when Ion Dragoumes (1878-1920) wrote his nationalistic manifestos, a few stories, and his book on *Samothrakē*, in a language as brilliant, as natural and as charming as if it had had a long tradition of accomplishment behind it. Other admirable prose writers who must be mentioned are K. Hrêstomanos (1868-1911), whose novel *The Wax Doll*, a tragedy of low life in Athens, though overloaded with flowery and hectic imagery is the work of a powerful and sustained imagination; which also gives charm to his reminiscences of the Empress Elizabeth of Austria and other works. J. Kondylakes (1861-1920) whose Cretan story *First Love* conveys a sincerity not often expressed in recollections of village life; and K. Hatzopoulos (1871-1920), who translated *Faust* and wrote brief and tragic tales of an extremely cultivated melancholy. Very high praise has been given to the plays of Spyros Melas (b. 1883) but they mostly depend on situations of melodramatic violence which suggest the ululations and grimaces of a famous actress.

Far better as a dramatist is Gregory Xenopoulos (b. 1876) whose satiric comedies of Athenian life (with which he followed a series of plays mostly dealing with social problems of life in Zante in the middle of the last century) are as much above all other contemporary Greek dramatists as his numerous novels and tales are

superior in solidity and absence of sentimentalism to those of any of his younger contemporaries. His plays may be read with pleasure for their admirable dialogue which incidentally illustrates the wide difference between the actual spoken language and the spoken language imagined, extended and stereotyped by Psychares and his followers. Only some sense of beauty or some refinement of personality is lacking to put Xenopoulos in the first class of European writers. Most of his followers seem to be embracing a view of life reflected from London and Paris in the Eighteen Nineties, from the symbolists and the Yellow Book. A few young writers of a stronger breed and a greater sincerity however have made their appearance since the foundation of the Republic, and among these it may be fair to name Demetrios Lampikes, Thrasos Kastanakes (who in spite of an excessive preoccupation with Parisian night life seems to deserve a better subject); Fôtes Kontoglou, from Aivalê in Asia Minor, who besides minor sketches and translations, woodcuts after Byzantine paintings and a literary periodical *Filikê Etairia* (1923) has written a volume of *Travels in Greece (Taxeidia)* to places recalling the Byzantine Turkish and Venetian periods illustrated with his own very excellent drawings; and Strates Myribêles, author of a powerful and original book of war stories, *Life in The Tomb*.¹ There are many other writers of talent and feeling; as in poetry D. P. Demetriades (1886), K. G. Karyôtakes (1896-1928), M. Tsirimôkos, and N. Lapathiotes (1893); in prose G. Theotokas, a writer of cultured and illuminating essays, F. Polites and Kôstas Ouranes, both born in

¹ An English translation of this book by F. H. Marshall and A. Pallis is now in preparation.

1890, writers of literary and dramatic criticism; B. Daskalakes, P. Pikros, a romantic communist, and N. Kazantzakes (1885), a restless and original artist who has wandered from Crete to Russia producing poems and plays and expositions of "post-communism"; but Greece is still very far from a general level of culture and accomplishment comparable for instance with due allowance to that which in England since the war has produced such a school of women novelists as Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Lynd, Margaret Kennedy, Gay Taylor, E. B. C. Jones, Sylvia Townsend Warner and Naomi Mitchison. An art of elegance and chamber loveliness may be produced while we are waiting for the flame of genius: but only where there is a secure background of general culture and civilisation.

The poets of the twentieth century like those of the nineteenth seem to have little original to say: little or nothing, with one remarkable exception. K. P. Kavafes, or C. P. Cavafy (born in Constantinople) lives in Alexandria where his poems are issued on loose fly sheets and are occasionally published in literary periodicals.¹ He has escaped not only from the jingling metres of Victorian verse but also from the tyranny of the Psicharist rusticity. In loose iambic rhythms usually without rhyme and in easy but completely eclectic language he crystallises his ironical meditations, his visions of Greek life extending from post-classical history to the underworld of a modern city; he expresses a remarkable personality and seems to be the only Greek poet whose mind inhabits the same modern world as such various but contemporary writers as Thomas Hardy or André

¹ There is a good essay on "The Poetry of C. P. Cavafy" in Mr. E. M. Forster's *Pharos and Pharillon* (Hogarth Press, 1923).

Gide or T. S. Eliot, W. J. Turner or Siegfried Sassoon, D. H. Lawrence or Valery Larbaud or Hermann Hesse or Aldous Huxley. Modern Greece has at last produced a modern poet.

IX.

A TRACT ON FEDERATION

I.

SOONER or later a Balkan Federation is bound to come; and future historians will have to recognise that the Turkish Empire in Europe was disrupted by Balkan nationalisms only to be reconstituted as a federation. But it is legitimate to ask whether a consciousness of that development might not at this stage shorten the process and lessen the bitterness of contending and suspicious neighbours. It is not enough that they should each have a strong and stable Government. They must work in confidence with other Balkan Governments. They must cut themselves off from European entanglements that lure them on with visions of invincible armament. They must forget the mystical patriotism that teaches hatred and jealousy, and learn to co-operate in civilising the community of nations in which they live. The whole movement of modern civilisation (*e pur si muove*) is towards a development of moral and organic relations between individual states, which as long as no right was acknowledged but that of conquest existed in a wolfish state of nature tempered only by the good manners of diplomacy.

Irish and African and Indian nationalistic fevers may

quite soon appear in retrospect to have been a necessary preliminary to the federation of the British Empire (within which the greatest dominions have already sought the advantages of federal government); and in the more distant future all the wars of the last few centuries, culminating in the Great War of 1914, may be presented by history as the final convulsions of an age of state particularism which necessarily intervened between the break up of the Roman Empire and the organisation of the United States of Europe. Within the state the same principle is at work in the development of socialism, always denounced and everywhere surreptitiously adopted, as the only satisfactory means of reducing the anarchy that has followed the industrial revolution. Socialism itself has always welcomed national autonomy just because it is the organic substance of the International. "L'existence même de l'Internationale," said Vandervelde in 1907, "implique l'existence préalable de nationalités autonomes. Notre fédération n'est pas une masse amorphe d'individus; c'est une libre fédération de nationalités vivantes, parmi lesquelles nous devons compter non seulement celles qui vivent sous des gouvernements distincts mais encore celles comme la Finlande et la Pologne, auxquelles l'Internationale a reconnu le droit de la vie." The only excuse for the wholesale manufacture of small national states by the Congress of Versailles is that nationalism is not an end of itself but only an expression of the need for local autonomy as a condition precedent to federation—just as a man must learn self-control and self-respect before he can be a good citizen governing and respecting his neighbour.

It is hardly necessary to add that the argument that the State is everywhere destined to be taken up into a

larger organism need not disconcert political philosophers who believe that it is a *vera persona*. For personal freedom precedes and implies obligations to other free persons; perhaps the State, or autonomous community, not less than man himself, is a "political animal."

Such is undoubtedly the movement of Europe and of the world; and if the world in only a few years has learned to accept with hardly a murmur the authority of the League of Nations, it is clear that even an idealist may venture to anticipate that movement and to take advantage of it.

2.

Federation is the only hope of a permanent settlement in the Balkans. It would be easy by gifts of territory or generous compensations to relieve any one of the nations concerned of her immediate grievances. Unfortunately if you relieve that deserving nation of her grievances by giving her everything that she cannot be happy without, you will in fact leave her neighbours with a new grievance apiece; and the sum of contentment and peaceableness will not have been augmented. The solution of this dilemma is to be found only in federation. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the particular grievances and diffused discontents of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Federation is in fact the only remedy for political unrest caused by inflamed nationalism, and irritant minorities, and overdoses of propaganda, wherever they occur. If Balkan statesmen will agree among themselves to settle their own affairs they may incidentally set an example to their elders in other parts of Europe. For though they may receive some unofficial advice from the League of Nations they must expect

little help in their political progress from any of the Great Powers. They will be lucky indeed if they escape active interference or the gentle dissuasions of a financial boycott when they propose to form a federation "both to prevent war among themselves and for the sake of more effectual protection against the aggression of powerful States."

3.

Two points of preliminary interest remain to be noted. The word Federation rightly used implies the supremacy of a common government in the union of the constituent states (*Bundes-staat*) while the union of independent states for certain common purposes or mutual aid without delegating any of their sovereignty is distinctively known as a Confederation (*Staaten-bund*). It must therefore be understood that it is for convenience or euphony that we sometimes speak of a Balkan Federation when nothing more is in fact immediately proposed than a Confederacy. Not the great powers themselves are prouder of their sovereignty or more easily alarmed than these small states which have only recently become conscious of it: and for the present at least nothing shall threaten the integrity of that jewel. Secondly there is the question of monarchy. A republican form of government has sometimes been regarded as a condition of successful federation. It may be doubted whether this condition is always necessary, except in so far as republican constitutions are usually more efficient and economical than monarchies. "A King," says J. S. Mill, "who holds his power by inheritance, not by delegation, and cannot be deprived of it nor made responsible to anyone for its use, is not likely to renounce having a separate army, or

to brook the exercise of sovereign authority over his own subjects not through him but directly by another power."

On the other hand the security of power which Mill remarks would hardly be characteristic of a modern monarch, who is more likely to be *unruhig auf seinem Sessel*; and M. Venizelos, whose opinion has been recorded above,¹ has found a new use for the sceptre as counterweight to the sword. We know too that jingoism and chauvinism may flourish just as vigorously in a republic; the exaggerated worship of state sovereignty no longer depends on the presence of a personal "sovereign" now that sovereignty is no longer in fact or even in theory vested in the Crown. At the same time there is no doubt that in the Balkans at least a system of homogeneous republics would be more easily federated than a collection of states with disparate governments, some of which might be more closely connected dynastically with central or western Europe than with their own peoples. The example of Greece, which has succeeded so opportunely in launching a republic, after it had been repeatedly explained, in the name of conservatism and inertia, that the Greeks were "not yet fit for it", must not be forgotten: yet the Bulgarian and Serbian and Albanian monarchies may have better qualities which fit them for their respective peoples, and there is no reason why their supporters should fear either the proposal or the consequences of federation.

4.

Having quoted John Stuart Mill I may now perhaps be reminded that of several conditions necessary to render a federation advisable "the first", in his opinion,

¹ See p. 181.

is "that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations." I had not forgotten it. I have in fact been harping for years on "the real Balkan problem—a problem of conflicting hatreds, most of which are entirely artificial." Fortunately the mutual hatred of the Balkan nations—if it can be still said to exist—is not a natural or primary condition. It has always had to be periodically stimulated by atrocities or by accounts of atrocities, by frontier incidents and threats of invasions, and there is good reason to believe that, if the atrocity mongers and the priests and the military alarmists and the war office contractors could be led to suspend their activities for a few years, the great majority of the Balkan population would settle down to cultivate their gardens on friendly terms with the very neighbours whom they have been taught wickedly to describe as their hereditary enemies. "No national culture need be accompanied by hatred or intolerance of any other." If hereditary enmity can ever be said to exist at all, which is very doubtful, it certainly is not to be found among the Christian races of the Balkan peninsula: even a natural incompatibility between these neighbouring races would be difficult to prove; it would not be paradoxical to suggest that Greeks and Bulgars, Albanians and Serbs are not more heterogeneous than English and Scotch, Welsh and Irish. I think indeed that a different course of events in the peninsula might have produced as in England a fine nation of mixed race instead of a number of small states segregated in accordance with their supposed nationality. As late as the eighteenth century all the massed populations of the Balkan peninsula, the proud but huddled fragments of the Byzantine empire, were recognised only

as Christian subjects of the Turk and were all regarded without distinction not as Greeks but as Romans, subjects that is of the fallen empire; and this common appellation did not ignore differences of language and race or pretend to disregard them; it took account of them and put them in a subordinate place.¹ At that time the Greeks were the rebellious element in the mass and were anxious to redeem all their fellow-subjects: but they did not either regard them all as Greeks, or resent the distinctions of language and race. It was only a century later that by the confusion of Western opinion all Balkan Christians were regarded as Greeks: and this confusion was gradually acquired by the Greeks themselves so that the appellation *Romaïos* came to mean a Greek: and finally the altruism of the seventeenth century Greek who was burning to deliver from Turkish captivity all his fellow-Christians, all fellow-subjects of the city of Constantine, became confused by Western ideas of nationality, and degenerated into the imperialism of the *Megalê idea*, which dreamed that all Balkan Christians should be made into Greeks. Western observers first wrongly regarded all Balkan Christians as one Greek nationality. Then flying to the other extreme insisted on regarding them through the prism of nineteenth century nationalism as four or five separate, distinct, isolated, windowless and self-sufficient nationalities. There may in truth be actually five or six nationalities but only one people, with a common popular culture, varying from one district to another, and a

¹ Cf. C. W. Crawley's remark (*Greek Independence*, p. 173) of Polignac's scheme for a partition of the Turkish Empire in July 1829: "It is hardly fair to criticise it from our later knowledge of nationalist movements: even travellers who knew the East hardly noticed the Bulgarians as having an identity of their own."

common heritage of Byzantine memories. This is the truth that must inspire political development, rather than chatter about hereditary enmity and patter about strategic frontiers.¹

5.

More serious difficulties may be expected from the internal politics of the countries concerned. If we may leave others to speak of Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, it must be admitted at once that Greece has more than a fair share of reactionary politicians who will put every obstacle in the way of federation and will probably find it easy to revive past storms of fear and hatred in a capital which has always been noted for its extravagances of party jealousy and heresy hunting. Such influences as

¹ All this was written before the publication of C. Evelpidi's elaborate work *Les États balkaniques: étude comparée politique, sociale, économique et financière*. I am delighted to note therefore how closely M. Evelpidi's conclusions, authorised by far more profound knowledge, agree with my own:

"L'antagonisme des nations balkaniques est postérieur à la formation de leurs États; il est plus grand entre les personnes cultivées qu'entre la masse des paysans, qui constitue la majorité de leur population . . ."

"... Mais en dehors de la communauté de races, ces peuples ont encore une culture commune, héritée de Byzance, qui fut le foyer commun de leur civilisation. Leur genre de vie, leur art, leur littérature, présentent des ressemblances considérables. De plus la domination turque a formé chez eux une mentalité identique et leurs luttes contre l'oppresseur commun créèrent des liens historiques que leur intellectuels nationalistes essayèrent en vain de rompre par les récits, fabriqués de toutes pièces, de soi-disant antagonisme ethnique pendant le moyen âge. . . ."

"... Les peuples balkaniques présentent enfin un autre point de ressemblance: c'est qu'ils se trouvent actuellement à peu près au même niveau de civilisation et d'évolution économique. Peuples agricoles, à peine entrés dans la période d'industrialisation, ils se trouvent, de ce chef, sur la même échelle de progrès technique." (Op. cit. pp. 382-384.)

these will be exploited to the full by external enemies of Balkan harmony; of whom Italy, for example, though others are not above suspicion, is not likely to permit without a struggle a new grouping in the Mediterranean which will not only put an end to her alleged hopes of "encircling" Yugoslavia but will also proclaim something like a Monroe doctrine round the Aegean basin.

These dangers might seem sufficient to postpone the achievement of even the loosest federation for another half century, were it not that there are certain favourable factors which if encouraged and recognised may grow strong enough to overcome all hostile influences. These are first of all the fact that several Balkan statesmen, although rather more vague in their language than M. Papanastasiou with his "network of bi-lateral treaties", have already uttered rhetorical aspirations towards what they have called a "Balkan Locarno." (It may be remembered that it was at Locarno that Sir Austen Chamberlain reaped the harvest sown by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in 1924.) Secondly, the League of Nations has earned more fame in the Balkans than in any other part of the world; and by the devoted labour of its officers as well as by its cooperative approach to political wisdom at Geneva, whether in the protection of minorities, in the settlement of refugees, in the exchange of populations or in the pacification of frontiers, has shown that there is a method of solving international disputes which if it fails to attain perfect justice is at any rate more efficient than the old diplomacy which was nothing but brute force tempered by good manners. Thirdly, there is the influence of the younger generation who, if it is ever permissible to generalise about the

young, have the greatest contempt for national policies based on the balance of power and shining armament. With all these factors in its favour an immediate pact would only facilitate the settlement of the few questions that remain at issue; and need not be indefinitely postponed until the problems of the Aegean ports and the Bulgarian minorities in Macedonia have been disposed of by other methods. What other methods in fact are there besides those of arbitration or compromise? And in a federation instead of requiring elaborate diplomatic groundwork and preparation these will be the normal methods of political intercourse.

6.

The membership of the Federation need not be limited; in any case it must not be exclusive or differentiated. No one will dispute the membership of Greece, Serbia and Albania—Albania which we may hope should have not a “protected” but a national government, possibly itself a federation of autonomous clans. As the membership is to be elastic, Rumania must not be expressly excluded. But Rumania is not wanted for the time being, by aspiration not less than by position belonging rather to the great tract of East-Central Europe, which will probably be in process of crystallisation for another hundred years.

But it is of the highest importance that Bulgaria should be an original member. To exclude Bulgaria would perpetuate and exacerbate those grievances which it is the primary purpose of the federation to remove. It will remove them by substituting corporate for individual ownership. If, to take an outstanding example, all Bul-

garians feel that the unity called Bulgaria can lead only a mutilated existence without possession of the whole of Macedonia, and if all Greeks and all Serbs have similar feelings that the unities called Greece and Jugoslavia will be for ever imperfect without the undivided possession of Macedonia, it is obviously impossible, assuming the good faith of all parties, to satisfy all three of them by the delineation of any frontier however scientific and meandering. It would hardly be easier or more useful to divide London into administrative areas of English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish, than it would be to divide into provinces ethnologically pure the whole of Macedonia, the rendezvous of Greek, Serb, Albanian, Bulgar, Turk and Vlach, where the situation has been further complicated by two generations of murder and religion—even after the recent Exchanges of Population have done a great deal to sort out three of the nationalities on the frontier. But if all parties know that the whole of Macedonia is an integral portion of a larger unity of which they are themselves members, each may be satisfied not only by the feeling of corporate ownership, but also by the knowledge that the rights of any other member are not larger than his own. If in order to give these feelings free play on all sides it should be necessary to make Macedonia an autonomous province, an independent and co-ordinate member of the Federation, I see no reason why anyone should shrink from that decision; and although there are just as good Greeks in Macedonia as in Thessaly or the Peloponnese it might do some of them good to be released for a change from the Athenian bureaucracy.

It is also important that Turkey should be an original member: not only in order to remove any fear that the

new Balkan group might be the origin of another crusade; but also in order to draw Mustafa Kemal's ingenuous republic into the Aegean orbit. The widest gap in the League of Nations' organisation for the protection of minorities would be filled if Turkey, by becoming a member of the League, were to submit to a measure of supervision; and membership of a Balkan Federation would make Kemal less suspicious of the West, which at present (in spite of the measure of protective coloration he thinks he has acquired by his adoption of the Bowler Hat), fills him with unreasoning terror.

The Federation will hope to induce in its citizens the knowledge that a frontier is only an imaginary line marking the limits of an administrative area, for the convenience and not for the frustration of the community. The frontier between Greece and Bulgaria is not more important than the frontier between Kensington and Paddington (the importance of which was established once for all by Mr. G. K. Chesterton in that *reductio ad absurdum* of nationalism *The Napoleon of Notting Hill*). National customs and national language and all that is connoted by national culture are of the first importance; but once the freedom of these is secured, as it will be secured in any decently democratic community that is not over-centralised, the extent of the administrative area is not an affair to be brooded over with bayonets and uniforms and machines of steel kindly imported by Western Powers who are also lending the money to pay for them.

7.

The immediate steps to be taken may begin with the preparation of public opinion not only in the countries

concerned but in circles in Western Europe which are interested in the future of the Balkans. I may be allowed to recall that when in 1923 I had the honour to be asked to address the Balkan Committee, some proposals of this sort that I put forward were received with the politest expressions of surprise as if they were unsuitable for the attention of experts. Yet an important part of what I then proposed—the immediate constitution of a permanent consultative commission with delegates from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania meeting first in one capital and then in another to consider the possibility of a customs union and safe subjects like Postage and Inland Waterways—this proposal which then seemed so extravagantly utopian has already been realised, with important additions to the membership and agenda, in the permanent Institute established (as described above) by the Balkan Conference which met at Athens in October 1930 and is meeting at Constantinople in October 1931. If these preliminary steps which seemed so difficult have already been taken it is not too soon to speak about the ultimate or ideal form towards which our political development should proceed or should be directed. It should be made quite clear that a mere alliance between Governments, even if strengthened by a Customs union, is not enough. There should ultimately be a federal Government, which must to some extent detract from the full sovereignty of the individual states. We may say that the new relation of the Balkan States must not be so loose as that of the Swiss Confederation before 1847; and not so close as that of the United States of America. But unless the Central Government is a real government and represents a general will arising from the co-operation of the members,

the new group will have no more significance than any other alliance of independent states arranged by some diplomatic bargain. No real political progress is possible without some diminution of state sovereignty and some proportionate delegation of sovereignty to the central authority. A genuine federation of states with undiminished sovereignty is no more possible than would a single state be possible in which the freedom of the individual subject should be entirely unlimited. This is the most difficult pill to swallow: a pill which is supposed to be so bitter that the League of Nations which has got to swallow it some day has not yet had the courage to talk about it.

If the Federal Government is to have some real but not strictly defined measure of sovereignty, a Supreme Court of Justice will almost certainly be required, as in America, to act as umpire between the federal and state governments. It is true that there is no Supreme Court in Switzerland. But it seems likely that a Supreme Court becomes necessary in a confederation in proportion to the strength of anti-federal opinion. It cannot be denied that in any federation of Balkan States there would be an unusually strong centrifugal force of state individualism to be overcome; and the example of America shows that it is not impossible for such a court, once established, to attain a deserved and lively reputation for impartiality; and that its members might be expected to live up to the dignity of their office. Although each member, originally and in his private capacity, might be a hot nationalist, it would not be surprising if, by the slow processes of justice and the support of public opinion, "consideration like an angel came and whipp'd the offending Adam out of

him." The power of the Court would grow with its reputation for impartiality; and its reputation would be largely based on the crystallisation of moderate opinion in each state. Thus the powers of the federal government will depend ultimately on the decisions of the Supreme Court; and the Court in interpreting the Constitution will seldom fail to express the general will.

It is unnecessary here to examine the other possible organs of a Federal Government, such as a Congress of members elected in proportion to the population of the several states, together with a Balkan Council in which each state, large or small, would be equally represented. There should of course be a federal capital different from each of the state capitals (of which perhaps Athens and only Athens would be geographically suitable). Constantinople, now that the Turks have abandoned it, is a city so obviously deserving and designed for such a revival of honour that it would be wise and modest not to be tempted to its selection as a centre of such political importance, which might excite unfair suspicions, and fears and open hostility. It is not fantastic to hope that Greece might have the honour of giving up to be extra-territorialised one of the islands in the Aegean. Why should not Delos itself be the first capital of the Balkan confederacy,

*sacra mari medio gratissima tellus
Nereidum matri et Neptuno Aegæo . . .?*

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