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Vol. II

ADHYĀYAS IV–VIII

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Translated into English by

GANGANATHA JHA

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ADHYĀYAS IV–VIII

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ALLAHABAD,
4th May, 1934.

GANGANATHA JHA.

SHABARA-BHĀṢYA.

Vol. II.

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ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The definition of 'what subserves the purposes of Man' and of 'what subserves the purposes of an Action'.*

SŪTRA (2).

['WHAT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF MAN' IS] THAT UPON WHICH FOLLOWS THE HAPPINESS OF MAN; BECAUSE ITS UNDERTAKING IS DUE TO THE MAN'S DESIRE TO OBTAIN HAPPINESS, AND [THE 'MAN'S PURPOSE'] IS NOT DIFFERENT [FROM HAPPINESS].

Bhāṣya

The question now arises—What is that which subserves the purposes of Action'? and what is that 'which subserves the purposes of Man'?—It is necessary to supply the definition of these, as by means of definition, comprehension becomes easier; if the teaching were carried on by pointing to each individual act [as 'this act subserves the purposes of man', 'this act subserves the purposes of action', and so on with each individual act], it would be a very tedious affair. Hence the *Sūtra* has supplied the definition—*That upon which follows the happiness of Man*,—i.e. on the accomplishment of which Man's happiness comes about,—that act is one 'which subserves the purposes of Man'.—Why so?"—*Because its undertaking is due to the Man's desire to obtain happiness*,—and not to (mere) scriptural injunction; while the undertaking of what 'subserves the purposes of Action' is due entirely to the scriptural injunction, not to any other thing.—Further the man's purpose is not anything different from *Happiness*. Thus it comes to this that, whatever brings happiness to Man is what 'subserves the purposes of Man'.

'What subserves the purposes of Man having been thus defined, it follows that what subserves the purposes of Action' is that which is a kind other than the one just described [i.e. the undertaking whereof is due to scriptural injunction not to the man's desire to obtain happiness].—

['*Puruṣārtha* is that which a man ordinarily undertakes entirely for the purpose of obtaining a reward in the shape of Happiness; '*Kratvartha*' is that which helps in the accomplishment of the *Puruṣārtha act*, and does not bring any reward by itself. There are some acts which are neither *Puruṣārtha* nor *Kratvartha*' such as Fire-laying and Vedic Study says *Tantravārtika* (p. 10). But certainly both these are needed for and therefore helpful in the performance of acts bringing about results desired by man. Without Fire-laying and Vedic Study there could be no performance of sacrifices.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2A): *Things like the 'Milking Vessel' are not to be taken as 'subserving the purposes of Action'.*

Sūtra (2).—[*as above*].

Bhāṣya.

The *Sūtra* (2) may also be explained in the following manner (embodying a separate *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with special instances of '*Kratvartha*' and '*Puruṣārtha*' details).—

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we meet with the following texts—(*a*) '*Anatidṛshyāṁ stṛṇāti, anatidṛshyamēvainam prajayā pashubhiḥ karoti*' ['He spreads the grass upon the altar so that it is not seen; then the altar so surrounds the sacrificer with offspring and cattle that he is not seen'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 5. 2);—(*b*) '*Āhāryapurīṣām pashukāmasya vēdim kuryāt*' ['For one desiring cattle, he should construct the altar in such a manner that dust may be taken out of it'].—(*c*) '*Vatsajānum pashukāmasya vēdam kuryāt*' ['For one desiring cattle, he should make the sweeping brush in the shape of the calf's knee']; (*d*) *Godohanēna pashukāmasya pranayēt*' ['For one desiring cattle, he should fetch water in a milking vessel'].

In regard to these, there arises the question Details like those laid down in those texts—do they subserve the purposes of Action or of Man?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows. "Details like these subserve the purposes of the Action.—How? The help that they render to the sacrificial performance is quite perceptible;—for instance, the taking up of the dust and the spreading of grass over the altar, which tend to *embellish* the *altar*, and as such come within the definition of '*shēṣa*' (auxiliary, *subsidiary*) as that which embellishes the substances, is a *shēṣa* according to Bādari' (*Sūtra* 3. 1. 3). From this it follows that the details in question are to be taken as 'subserving the purposes of the action (sacrifice)'."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*That upon which follows the happiness of man* is what is to be regarded as 'subserving the purposes of Man', happiness follows from the details in question;—hence it follows that they should be regarded as 'subserving the purposes of Man'.—"It has already been pointed out that we actually see that they render visible help to the sacrifice (action)."—Our answer to that is that it is true we actually see it; but that help does not follow the details *as laid down for the purpose of rendering that help*; that is, these details are found to have been enjoined for the purpose of bringing about certain results desired by man [and not for the purpose of rendering any help to the sacrifice: they render any such help, it is only incidentally that they do so]. And one thing is an auxiliary or subsidiary to another, not because it *helps* it, but because it is enjoined as being for the purpose of that other thing:—as what has been explained under the *Sūtra*—'One thing is an auxiliary to another, because it serves its purpose' (Sū. 3. 1. 2).

ADHIKARAṆA (2B): *The 'Acquiring of Property' should be regarded as 'subserving the purposes of Man'.*

Sūtra (2).—[*as before*].

Bhāṣya.

The *Acquiring of Property* is the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*. Several modes of acquiring wealth are found to have been enjoined.—For the *Brāhmaṇa*, by means of Receiving Gifts [officiating at Sacrifices and Teaching]; for the *Kṣattriya*, by means of *Conquest* and the like; and for the *Vaishya*, by means of Agriculture and the rest.

In regard to this *Acquiring of Wealth*, there arises the question—Is this Acquiring of Property to be taken as 'subserving the purposes of Action'? or as 'subserving the purposes of Man'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"It should be regarded as 'subserving the purposes of Action', because of the restriction (as to the modes of acquiring it). If it were meant to 'subserve the purposes of Man' any such restrictions would be meaningless; because it is a perceptible fact that Property brings happiness to man, whether it is acquired according to rule or not according to rule. Hence we conclude that it must be taken as subserving the purposes of Action';—and here we find these rules to be 'syntactically connected (i.e taken along) with those Vedic texts which speak of desirable results following from the actions (sacrifices); while, in the other case (in the event of the rules being taken as subserving the purposes of Man) it would be necessary to construe the rule with some assumed sentence speaking of results (following from the observance of the rules) —We have texts also (which are indicative of the fact of the Acquiring of Wealth subserving the purposes of Action)—e.g. (*a*) '*Agnayē kṣāmavatē purodashamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, Yasyāhitāgnēḥ sato'gnirgṛhān dahēt*' ['To *Agni-Kṣamavat* he should offer the cake baked on eight pans, if the *Agni* happen to burn the house of the man who laid the Fire'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 2. 2. 4-5); (*b*) '*Yasya hiraṇyam nashyēt āgnēyādīni nirvapēt*' [If man lose gold and other things, he should make the *Āgnēya* and other offerings'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 3. 2. 5); and so forth;—all these are laid down as to be done when there is loss of wealth; and all this could be regarded as subserving the Action (of sacrifice) only if the acquiring of wealth were for subserving the purposes of Action and thus there were some relationship between the Wealth and the Action. On the other hand [if the acquiring of wealth were for subserving the purposes of Man], as there would be no relationship between the Wealth and the Action, the fact that the acts laid down in the indicative texts just quoted are helpful to the sacrifices concerned could be only inferred; and it would also be necessary to assume some result as following from these acts. Thus then it follows that the *acquiring of wealth* which is supported by the injunction of 'sacrificing',—and without which the performance of the sacrifice could not be

accomplished,—must be taken up by (regarded as connected with) the injunction of the sacrifice. From all this we conclude that the *acquiring of wealth* 'subserves the purposes of the Sacrifice'."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The acquiring of wealth should be taken as 'subserving the interests of Man'. As a matter of fact, the act of acquiring wealth is such that when it is done it brings happiness to the Man; hence *the undertaking of the act is due to the man's desire for happiness*.— i.e. for the maintenance of his body; when a man's body is maintained, it already shows that he has wealth or property; —the sacrifice also is enjoined for one who has his body;—and it is in this sense that the performance of sacrifices as laid down for one who has wealth or property; it is not necessary that the acquiring of wealth should be included in the Vēdic Injunction (of the Sacrifice), as even without the word expressive of *acquiring wealth* being there in the Injunction, the sacrifice comes to be performed all the same (if the performer happens to possess the requisite wealth).— From all this it follows that the acquiring of wealth subserves the purposes of Man.

Further, if the acquiring of wealth were held to be declared by the scriptures as 'subserving the interests of sacrifices', then the wealth so acquired could not be used for any other purpose; and this would put an end to all sacrificial acts [on account of the man's death which would come about by reason of his not using his wealth for the maintenance of his body says *Tuptīkā*].

Again [if the acquiring of wealth subserved the purpose of actions] every act would have to be begun with the acquiring of wealth (required for the purpose of that act); and in that case, there could be no possibility of the contingency spoken of in the following text—'*Api vā svargāt lokāt chhidyatē yō darshapūrnamāsayōḥ san amāvāsyām vā pūrṇamāsīm na utpātayēt*' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4) ['If a performer of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* omits to perform in time the *Amāvāsyā* or the *Paurnamāsa* sacrifice, he becomes cut off from the heavenly regions'. [Because the only circumstance in which a man can omit a sacrifice is when he has not the requisite wealth; thus contingency could never be possible when every sacrifice would have to be begun with the acquiring of wealth.— Such being the case (in order to avoid this absurdity), it will be necessary for the Opponent to hold that the acquiring of wealth (for the performing of a sacrifice) would be done at a time other than that of the said performance itself, and in that case, being something extraneous to the performance, it could not be helpful to the performance.—Nor could the acquiring of wealth (for all sacrifices) be taken as to be done once for all at a particular time (apart from the performance of any sacrifice), just as the *Laying of Fire* is done once for all [and in this Fire all sacrifices are offered]. The cases are not analogous; because in the first place, in regard to the Fire-laying, we have the distinct Injunction that 'Fire should be laid *in the spring*' [while there is no injunction of time regarding the acquiring of wealth]:- and secondly, *Fire-laying* is not an auxiliary (to any sacrifice at all).

As regards the argument that— "if the acquiring of wealth were taken

as subserving the purposes of Man, then the texts laying down the rules regarding the modes of acquiring wealth would be meaningless",—our answer is as follows:—what you urge cannot set aside the fact that the acquiring of wealth subserves the purposes of man; as this fact is directly perceptible, while what you urge is an indirect reasoning; and indirect reasoning cannot set aside direct perception. Hence, by reason of the rules laid down we might well assume an unseen (transcendental) result to follow from the adopting of those rules and restrictions; but we cannot set aside what is actually seen.—From all this it follows that the acquiring of wealth is for the purpose of bringing about that happiness which is the purpose of Man. Such being the case, when one has to perform a sacrifice with *Vrīhi corn*, he may do it with the corn that he has acquired for his happiness or with that which he has acquired for the purpose of performing the sacrifice, it makes no difference; as the corn acquired for one's happiness is also *Corn*; and that acquired for the purpose of performing the sacrifice is also *Corn*. Hence it is not necessary for the *acquiring of wealth* to be included in the injunction of the performance of the sacrifice.

As for the argument that—"in the *Siddhānta* the rule regarding the methods of acquiring wealth would have to be taken along with assumed sentences having no bearing upon the context, while in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the rules are taken along with the directly perceptible injunction of the sacrificial performance",—this does not affect our position at all; in our view also the rule is connected with the perceptible act of *enjoying* the wealth, not with any assumed mention of results.—"But how then do you know that the following of the rule brings about an unseen transcendental result?"—It is known exactly as in your case.—"In our view, the rule is taken along with a statement of results and hence it is understood that it helps an act leading to desirable results."—Our answer to this is that in our view also the rule would be taken along with an act leading to desirable results; the only difference being that for you the result is learnt from verbal texts, while for us it is *seen* (in the form of the enjoying of wealth and maintenance of the body, etc. etc.).

As regards the indicative texts (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—showing that certain rites are laid down as to be performed when one's house is burnt and so forth,—our answer to that is, that, even when the acquiring of wealth does not subserve the purposes of actions, it is quite possible that there should be an injunction of the *Kāmanasti* and such other rites, either on the burning of one's house, or for the obtaining of certain results, or by way of an auxiliary to a sacrifice.

From all this it follows that the acquiring of wealth should be taken as 'subserving the purposes of Man', because *it is not different from happiness.*

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Prajāpati-vratas' subserve the purposes of Man.*

SŪTRA (3).

EVEN THOUGH THEY INVOLVE THE RENUNCIATION [OF HAPPINESS] YET THE ACTIONS (IN QUESTION) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS 'SUBSERVING *THE PURPOSES OF MAN*': *BECAUSE THE AUTHORITY OF* THE SCRIPTURES IS NOT TO BE DOUBTED. NOR IS ANY SUBSTANCE MEANT TO BE MADE (OR EMBELLISHED, BY THE ACTIONS). CONSEQUENTLY, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE PURPOSE OF MAN, IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT IT IS THE MAN THAT IS SPOKEN OF IN THE TEXT AS CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS IN QUESTION.

Bhāṣya.

The *Prajāpati-vratas* form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—such as 'One should not look at the rising sun, nor at the setting sun' and so forth.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these '*Prajāpati-vratas*' to be taken as 'serving the purposes of Action'? Or as 'serving the purposes of Man'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *observances* in question should be taken as subserving the purpose of Actions'.—*Why?*—Because in so doing, it would not be necessary to assume a desirable result following from them (which must be done if they are to 'subserve the purposes of Man').—'But a desirable result is already mentioned—*he does not become contaminated by sin*'.—The answer to this is that this statement is not meant to be an assertion of the desirable result following from the observances; it is only the statement of a settled fact.—From all this it follows that the texts laying down the particular observance is a *prohibition* of looking at the rising and the setting sun at sacrifices where such *looking at the sun* would otherwise be done;—or [if it has to be taken as an *affirmation* of something to be done] the observance in question may be taken as forming part of a sacrificial performance."

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta—Though they involve the renunciation*—the giving up—*of happiness, the actions like those in question should be taken as 'subserving the purposes of Man'*; that is, they have been enjoined for the benefit of the *Agent*, not for that of an *action*: what is meant to be enjoined by the text in question is that connection with the Agent whose presence is already implied (by the fact that there

can be no *action* without an *Agent*),—and not any connection with the action, which does not exist. [Such being the sense of the text] *the authority of the scriptures is not to be doubted*,—being, as it is, more authoritative than even the words of one's parents; because from the scriptures one derives his knowledge directly by himself,—they being as direct sources of knowledge as the sense-organs themselves.—Further, such actions as those in question are not found to render any visible help to any *substance* (connected with a sacrifice).—From all this, it follows that, *on account of the connection with the purpose of Man, it is the Man that is spoken of as connected with the actions like those in question* [i.e. they subserve the purposes of Man].

Further [if the actions were meant to 'subserve the purposes of an Action', then] the *effort (activity) of Man* [which is expressed by the injunctive affix in '*ikṣeta*', 'should look at'] would have to be taken as used for the sole purpose of indicating the injunction of the details of the action only,—and that *effort* itself would not be regarded as meant to be stressed at all.

It has been argued above (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"the text contains the prohibition of that looking at the rising and the setting sun which would otherwise be done". It is true that it would be logical to take the text as containing a prohibition,—as that interpretation would be in keeping with the directly expressed meaning of the (negative) words,—and otherwise it would have to be taken as indicating a positive observance, which could be done (by the negative sentence) only indirectly;—all this is quite true; but the fact of the matter is that it is the *positive observance* that is actually expressed directly; as the texts in question are found to be introduced with the phrase—'Now follow the *observances*'; so that it is a positive observance that *the rising sun should not be looked at*.

Then again, we have the assertion that 'he does not become contaminated by sin', where what is spoken of is an evil effect in connection with the *Man*, not any in connection with an *action*.

From all this it follows that the *Prajāpati-vratas* should be taken as 'subserving the purposes of Man'.

The same is the case also with the *Golakṣaṇa vratas*, laid down in such texts as '*Kartarikarmyaḥ kartavyāḥ*'. (?)

SŪTRA (4).

[OBJECTION]—"AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE FORM OF THE SCRIPTURAL INJUNCTIONS, ALL THE ACTS SIMILARLY SPOKEN OF SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS BRINGING ABOUT RESULTS THAT MAY BE FOUND TO BE MENTIONED IN OTHER VEDIC PASSAGES [AND AS SUCH 'SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF MAN']."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If it is as you say, then the acts laid down in such texts as the following should also have to be regarded as 'subserving the purposes of Man'—(a) '*Samidho yajati, Tanūnapātam yajati*' ('offers the

Samidh sacrifice and offers the *Tanūnapāt* sacrifice') (Taitti. Sanh. 2. 6. 1. 1); —(*b*) '*Nānṛtam vadet*' ['One should not tell a lie'] (Taitti. Sanh. 2. 5. 5. 6); —as in these also *Man's effort* is spoken of, and here also no substance is meant to be made or prepared (by the acts laid down)."

SŪTRA (5).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, A DETAIL IS REGARDED AS 'SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF MAN' WHERE NO AUTHORITATIVE MEANS IS FOUND (TO INDICATE THAT IT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF AN ACTION),—BECAUSE IN SUCH CASES WHAT IS LAID DOWN HAS NO CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION AT ALL.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is not right that the *Samidh* and other sacrifices would have to be regarded as 'subserving the interests of Man'. In fact, it is because we find no authoritative means for regarding the *Prajāpati-vratas* as 'subserving the purposes of an action', that we regard them as 'subserving the purposes of Man'. That is to say, in the case of these *observances*, we do not find any Direct Assertion (or Indicative Power or Syntactical Connection or Context or Order or Name) indicating the fact of the observances forming part of any actions; that is why we regard them as 'subserving the purposes of Man'; specially as these *Prajāpati-vratas have no connection with any action at all*.—In the case of the *Samidh* and other sacrifices, on the other hand, we find a 'means of knowledge' in the shape of *Context* which indicates that these sacrifices form part of a certain act (i.e. the *Darsha-Pūrṇa-māsa sacrifices*). Thus the two cases are not analogous.—As regards the 'Man's effort' spoken of in the texts laying down the *Samidh* and other sacrifices, that may be taken as a mere *reference* (to what is already otherwise known).

SŪTRA (6).

SO IT IS IN ORDINARY LIFE.

Bhāṣya.

In ordinary life also, when, in connection with accomplished acts fulfilling useful purposes, some other act is mentioned without any result of its own, this latter is taken to be a part of the former acts; and under this impression, when they advise people to keep a fast or to repeat a *mantra*, they are satisfied by merely giving the advice, and they do not proceed to say that 'these acts are part of, or auxiliary to, such and such an act leading to a result';—and people do not regard this as a bad form of advice.—Thus it is established that, while the *Samidh* and other sacrifices are auxiliaries to certain sacrifices, the *Prajāpati-vratas* are not so.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Sacrificial Implements are spoken of only by way of 'reference'.*

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ARTICLES SHOULD BE OFFERED, AS OTHERWISE THEIR MENTION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS, AND BECAUSE NOTHING IS SPECIFIED [THEY SHOULD BE OFFERED AT THE PRINCIPAL SACRIFICE]"

Bhāṣya

There are the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which, we read—*Sphyashcha, kapālāni cha, agnihotrahavanī cha shūrpañcha, kṛṣnājinañcha, shamyā cha, ulūkhalañcha, musalañcha, drsachcha, upalā cha,—etāni vai dasha yajñāyudhāni*' [where the ten 'Sacrificial Implements', *Sphya* and the rest are enumerated] [Taitt. Sam. 1. 6 8. 2]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these articles mentioned here as to be offered? Or only as to be used for the purpose for which each of them is suited? For the purpose of ascertaining this what we have to consider is—Is the text quoted an *injunction* or a mere *reference* (recapitulation)? If it is an *injunction*, then the articles have to be offered; if it is a *reference* then each of them has to be for the purpose which has been enjoined as to be accomplished by its means

On this point, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"The text quoted is an injunction; as it is then alone that it can give rise to a particular form of activity, otherwise (if it were not an injunction), it would be a mere assertion, serving no useful purpose.—Further, if they were offered, then that would be in keeping with their title '*Yajñāyudha*' ('*sacrificial* implements'), in the sense that they would be 'implements', means of accomplishing 'a sacrifice' (by being offered at it); otherwise, they would be the 'implements' of striking and other such acts (as are done with each of these implements), on the basis of the direct injunction of such acts,—and they would be 'implements of the sacrifice' only *indirectly*. Then again, the number ('ten') which is specially mentioned would be explicable only if these articles were *offered*; as in that case all of them—*ten* in number—would be offered at a sacrifice; while, in the other case, as the articles would be used for several purposes (as several of them are to be used for more than one purpose), their number would not be *ten* only.—From all this it follows that the articles should be offered.—And as the offering is laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice, it should be taken as to be done at the Principal Sacrifice"

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ARTICLES HAVE TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH EACH OF THEM IS SUITED—BECAUSE EACH HAS A DISTINCT USE OF ITS OWN; HENCE THEY SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VEDIC TEXTS (LAYING DOWN THEIR USES).

Bhāṣya.

The text in question cannot be taken as an injunction to the effect that 'the articles are to be offered'; in fact, it has to be taken as a mere *reference* (or recapitulation), because what it speaks of (i.e. the fact of the Implements being used at the sacrifice) is what is already known from other sources (i.e. the injunctions laying down the use to which each of the implements is to be put); e.g.—'Strikes the altar with the *Sphya*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 6. 4. 1); 'Cooks in the pans' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 3. 6. 2); 'Pours the offerings in the *Agnihotrahavani*'; 'Winnows with the winnowing basket'; 'Spreads the deer-skin under the mortar'; 'Keeps the pounding stone in the *Shamyā*'; 'Thumps corn in the pestle and mortar which has been previously washed'; 'Pounds it with the pounding stone and the stone-slab which have been previously washed';—each of these sentences lays down the use—*striking* and the rest—to which each of the articles is to be put. The assertion of what is already known from other sources can only be treated as a *reference* or *reiteration*.—As for the 'Context' (by virtue of which the *Pūrvapakṣin* has sought to establish the conclusion that the implements in question are to be offered at the Principal sacrifice),—that must be taken as set aside by the 'syntactical connection' (of the sentences just quoted).—As for the term '*Yajñāyudha*' ('sacrificial implement'), its use is justifiable only if the text is taken as a *reference*, not when it is taken as an *injunction*. Because as a matter of fact, the term 'sacrificial implement' ('*Yajñāyudha*') can be applicable to the *Sphya* and the rest only in a figurative sense.—As regards the number 'ten', that can be taken as referring to the enumeration contained in the text.—As a matter of fact, it is quite clear that the *Sphya* and the rest are brought in and used for the purposes of *striking* and the rest; to this end there is certainly an Injunction,—in the form 'Strikes the altar with the *Sphya*', and so forth; while there is no such injunction as that 'the *Sphya* and the rest should be made *Yajñāyudha*'.—From all this it follows that the text in question is only a *reiteration* of the fact, already known from other sources, that the articles in question are to be used *for* the purpose of *striking the Vedi*, and so forth.

SŪTRA (9).

FURTHER, THE CAKE AND OTHER THINGS HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN TO BE OFFERED AT THE FRUITFUL SACRIFICES. [OR, THE ARTICLES HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN AS TO BE USED AT ANOTHER USEFUL ACT.]

Bhāṣya.

The Cake and such other things have been laid down as to be offered at sacrifices leading to desirable results; now if the sacrificial implements also were meant to be offered, then the Cake and other things will have to be taken as optional alternatives to these implements; so that in one case they would have to be rejected, as both the alternatives could not be combined; because the Cake, etc., as well as the *sphya*, etc., would be connected with the act of *sacrificing*, independently by themselves.

Or, the *Sūtra* may be taken to mean that the articles in question have been laid down as to be used for another useful purpose, in the text—'The body of the *Agnihotrin* is burnt with his fires and the sacrificial implements'. If these implements were to be offered in the sacrifice, they could not be there to be used in the burning of the dead body. From this it follows that the articles are not to be offered.

SUTRA (10).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

The same conclusion is indicated also by the text—'There are fourteen libations poured at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice and thirteen at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice'. [If the ten implements were to be offered, then there would be *ten* additional libations, which would make the numbers *twenty-four* and *twenty-three*, and this would militate against the numbers *fourteen* and *thirteen* spoken of in the text just quoted.]—From this also it follows that the passage in question is a mere *reiteration*, not an injunction.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Due significance attaches to the singular number in the word 'pashum'.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THE 'ONE-NESS' HAS NO BEARING UPON THE SACRIFICE; AS IT IS AUXILIARY TO THE OBJECT (ANIMAL)."

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) At the *Jyótistoma*, there is the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, spoken of in the text— *'Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē'* (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 11. 6) ['On being initiated, he sacrifices the *animal* dedicated to *Agni-Soma*']; and (*b*) the text *'Anaḍvāhau yunakti'* ['Yokes the *two* bulls']; —similarly (c) in connection with the *Ashramēdha* we have the text, *Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē'* ['To the Spring, one sacrifices the *Kapiñjala* birds']. [Sha. Brā. 1. 5 1. 13.]

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the numbers,—(*a*) *one*, (*b*) *two*, and (*c*) *three*, meant to be significant? Or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:- The *one-ness* [as also 'two' and 'many'] *has no bearing upon the sacrifice*,- is significance is not meant to attach to them,—*because it is auxiliary to the object*. As a matter of fact, the number (*one*, *two* or more) is not an auxiliary, either to the *killing* (*a*, *b*), or to the *yoking* (*b*); it is auxiliary to (*a*) the *animal*, (*b*) the two *calves*, (*c*) the *Kapiñjala*-bird. What the case-ending *directly expresses* is the number of the object expressed by the basic noun (to which the said case-ending is attached), -while the fact of the number pertaining to the sacrifice could be indicated only indirectly by Syntactical Connection; —and *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. Hence it follows that the number (one, or two, or more) cannot be meant to have any bearing on the sacrifice.

"The Opponent may say —'The number may not be an auxiliary to the sacrifice; it may be an appurtenance of the *Animal* (the object denoted by the basic noun), and even so, it would have to be regarded as significant'. —Our answer to this is that it does not matter whether an appurtenance of the *Animal* or any other object (denoted by the noun) is signified or not signified; what does matter is that an appurtenance of the *sacrifice* should remain unimpaired; as for the animal and such objects, even if these are impaired (or damaged), the sacrifice itself remains unimpaired; and it is from the *sacrifice* that the desired result follows, not from the Animal and such things. It is for this reason that it does not matter whether an appurtenance or qualification of the Animal and such things is known or not known; and hence no such qualification could be intended to be expressed; because it is only what serves a useful purpose that is regarded as meant to be expressed."

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THE TEXT ADDS THE TERM 'ONE'."

Bhāṣya.

"There is a text from which we deduce the fact that no significance is meant to be attached to the *number* (of a noun); this text is—'*Yadi somamapaharēyuḥ ekām gām dakṣiṇām dadyāt*' (Shatapatha Brā. 4. 5. 10. 6) ['If they take away the *Soma*, he should give *one* cow as the sacrificial fee']. If significance had attached to the singular number (in '*gām*', 'cow'), then the text would not have added the word '*ēkām*' ('one'), as this *one-ness* would have been already signified by the singular number in '*gām*'.—Similarly, there is the text—'*Avī dvē, dhenū dvē*' (Taitti. Sam. 5. 6. 21. 1) ['*Two* sheep, *two* milch cows']; here also the presence of the word '*dvē*' ('two') indicates the fact that *no* significance *is* meant to be attached to the dual number in the word '*avī*' ('sheep').—Similarly there is the text '*Trīn lalāmān*' (Kaṭha. Sam. 13. 7) ['*Three* spotted animals'], wherein the term '*trīn*' ('three') is indicative of the fact that no significance attaches to the plural number in the word '*lalāmān*' ('spotted animals')."

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"'BUT THE NUMBER IS ACTUALLY COGNISED', — IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"You may urge the following argument—'It is not that no significance attaches to the *number*; because we actually cognise the number as an appurtenance to the verb; for instance, when it is said *Pashum ānaya* [Bring the animal], only *one* animal is brought [and this because the number signified by the singular number in '*pashum*', is *one*]; similarly when it is said *Pashū ānaya* [Bring the *animals* (dual number)], *two* animals are brought; and when it is said *Pashūn ānaya* [Bring the *animals* (plural number)], several animals are brought;—and what is cognised from a word forms its *connotation* (what is signified by the word); hence we understand from the word itself that the number is an appurtenance to the Sacrifice;—and what is understood from the word cannot, without sufficient reason, be taken as not meant to be signified'.—[Our answer to this argument is as follows]—"

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"IT IS NOT AS YOU SAY; WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS NOT SIGNIFIED BY THE WORD; AS IT IS REALLY SIGNIFIED BY THAT (SENTENCE IN WHICH THE WORD OCCURS);—JUST AS, IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'PŪRVA' ('FOREMOST')."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not as you say. It is true that the number is understood; but it is not signified by the *word*, as in reality the idea is due to a misconception.—'How so?'—That the number is an appurtenance to the sacrifice can be understood only from the sentence (Syntactical Connection),—and Syntactical Connection is set aside by Direct Assertion (Direct connotation of the *word*). Hence it follows that the notion of the number 'one' and the rest appertaining to the sacrifice cannot be accepted as signified by the word.—Then again, what is not actually signified by a word is also sometimes understood; for instance, when it is said '*purvo dhāvati*' ('the foremost man runs'), that man alone can be called 'foremost' who has a corresponding 'hindmost man'; hence when the term 'foremost' is used, the 'hindmost' also becomes understood (as implied),—and yet the words used ('the foremost man runs') do not signify the idea that 'the *hindmost* man runs'.—Similarly in the case in question, when the word '*pashum*' is used, the number 'one' is understood (as implied), but not as appertaining to the sacrifice. Just as in the case of the word 'foremost' the *hindmost* is only understood, and not predicated (enjoined) in regard to anything,—in the same manner in the case in question, the number is only understood, not predicated (enjoined), as something to be done at the sacrifice,—nor in regard to the animal.—'But why should it not be taken as predicated (enjoined) in regard to the animal?'—For the simple reason that there is no injunctive (or predicative).—'The verb shall be the injunctive.'—That also is not possible; as a matter of fact, what the verb '*ālabhatē*' (in the sentence '*pashum ālabhatē*') enjoins is the connection between the *Deity* and the *substance*, and hence it cannot enjoin the connection between the *number* and the *object numbered*; as if it did, then there would a syntactical split.—From all this we conclude that no significance attaches to the *number* (in the word '*pashum*' as used in the sentence '*Pashum ālabhatē*')."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE NUMBER IS REALLY FOUND TO BE SIGNIFIED BY WORDS; AS THE IDEA OF THE NUMBER COMES WHEN THE WORD COMES; SO THAT THE COGNITION OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE WORD IN THIS CASE IS EXACTLY AS IN THE CASE OF OTHERS (OTHER WORDS).

Bhāṣya.

'The particle '*tu*' ('really') is meant to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. It is not true that the word does not directly denote the Number as having

ADHYĀYA IV.

PĀDA I.

ĀDHIKARAṆA (1): *Introduction.*

SŪTRA (1).

NEXT THEN AN ENQUIRY INTO 'WHAT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF MAN' AND 'WHAT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF AN ACTION'

[After the 'Principal' and 'Subsidiary' character of actions has been discussed, we proceed to consider the question of '*Prayukti*', *Motive*, the question dealt with being—What is it that affords the occasion of a certain action? What is it for whose accomplishment an action is to be p— —, or a thing brought into use?—This question follows upon the preceding *Adhyāya*, because as a rule, it is the Principal Action that incites, and provides an occasion for, the Subsidiary. There are some actions however for which the sole *motive*, or inciting cause, is afforded by the desirable result expected to follow from it; while there are others, not directly accomplishing anything desired by the Agent, which are yet performed for the purpose of helping in the fulfilment of some other action which latter accomplishes something desired by the Agent. Hence the question of the 'Motive' of an action necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the Action by itself fulfils something desired by the Agent, or something in connection with another action: in the former case it would be '*Puruṣārtha*', subserving the purposes of Man', and in the latter '*Kratvartha*', 'subserving the purposes of an Action'. For this reason, before proceeding with the main question of 'Motive' (which is the real subject-matter of *Adhyāya* IV, as clearly stated by *Bhāṣya* under 5. 1. 1), it becomes necessary to enquire what is '*Puruṣārtha*' and what is '*Kratvartha*'. This latter matter is connected with, and may be regarded as a supplementary to, *Adhyāya* III, and yet as an Introduction to *Adhyāya* IV. The treatment of this subject goes on up to *Sūtra* 4. 1. 20, after which the *Bhāṣya* (on 4. 1. 21) says—'*Atikrāntaḥ tṛtīyaviṣayaḥ*', 'The subject-matter of the *Third Adhyāya* is finished'. *Prābhākaramimāmsā*, pp. 196-197.]

Bhāṣya.

[Under *Adhyāya* III it has been explained in what manner the *Subsidiary* is to be performed, on the basis of *Direct Assertion*, *Indicative Power*, *Syntactical Connection*, *Context*, *Order* (or Position), and *Name*.] We now proceed to consider 'what subserves the purposes of Man' and 'what subserves the purposes of an Action';—i.e. what is that which is to be regarded as *subserving the purposes of Man*? and what is that which is to be regarded as *subserving the purposes of an Action*?—Even discussions (that we are going to have) regarding such subjects as the 'instigator' and 'non-instigator', 'the injunction of results' and 'Declamatory statements', 'Subsidiary' and 'Principal', resolve themselves into an enquiry

regarding 'what subserves the purposes of Man' and 'what subserves the purposes of an Action'.—"How so?"—Well, as a matter of fact, a *Subsidiary* (helping in the fulfilment of the Principal) *subserves the purposes of an Action* —while the 'Principal' (helping directly to bring about the result desired by the performer) *subserves the purposes of Man*; similarly an 'Injunction of Results' (serving to incite the man to activity) *subserves the purposes of Man*, while the 'Declamatory statement' (serving to attract the Agent to the performance of the Action) *subserves the purposes of an Action*;—as regards 'instigators', some of them *subserve the purposes of Man*, while of the 'non-instigators', *some*—[this has to be added here also, says *Tantra ratna*, because certain non-instigators also, like the *milking vessel*, subserve the purposes of Man]—*subserve the purposes of Action*.—It is for all these reasons that we have the statement in the *Sūtra* that, there is now going to be an enquiry into 'what subserves the purposes of an Action' and 'what subserves the purposes of Man'.

Of this *Sūtra*, the first two terms, '*atha*' ('next') and '*ataḥ*' ('then') have been already explained under the First *Sūtra* of the First *Adhyāya*; in the present context, the term 'next' is in reference to the *Adhyāya* that has dealt with the use of 'Subsidiaries' (i.e. *Adhyāya* III); and the term 'then' introduces the particular enquiry relating to 'what subserves the purposes of Man' and 'what subserves the purposes of Action'. That which is done for the purpose of the action is said to 'subserve the purposes of actions', and that which is done for the purpose of Man is said to 'subserve the purposes of Man'. The term '*jijñāsā*' ('Enquiry') also has been explained under *Sūtra* I of *Adhyāya* I, as standing for the 'desire to know'.

Thus then the present *Sūtra* serves the purpose of stating the subject of enquiry.

a bearing upon the sacrifice; in fact the Number is found to subsist in the connotation of the verb. For instance, in common parlance, when one says '*Paśum ānaya*' ('Bring the *animal*'), the noun '*paśum*' ('animal') being in the singular number, what is understood from the words is *the act of bringing up as qualified by* '*unity*' *and the* '*animal*';—when one says '*Pashū ānaya*' ('Bring the two animals') ['he noun '*pashū*' being in the Dual Number], what is understood is the same thing qualified by 'duality'; so that *unity* has disappeared (with the disappearance of the word with the singular ending) and *duality* has appeared (with the coming in of the word with the Dual ending); and when a thing appears on the coming in of a word, that thing is known as the *connotation* of that word.—Thus, it is found that *the cognition of the signification of the word in this case is exactly as in the case of other words*; for instance, when one says 'Bring the *horse*', *the bringing of the horse* is understood to be expressed by the words,—when it is said 'Bring the *cow*', the *bringing of the cow* is understood to be expressed by the words,—and the notion of the *horse* disappears and that of the *cow* comes in [on the disappearance of the word '*horse*' and the appearance of the word '*cow*'];—from this it is understood that the *horse* forms the connotation of the word '*horse*', and the *cow*, that of the word '*cow*'.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 11) that—"Direct Assertion sets aside the indication of Syntactical Connection".—The answer to this is as follows:—Direct Assertion does not say that 'what is indicated by Syntactical Connection is not true', all that it does is to express the Number as pertaining to the object denoted by the Noun; and (what we say is that) it is *this Number as pertaining to the object* that is indicated by 'Syntactical Connection' as bearing upon the Sacrifice. [So that there is no conflict between the Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection, and hence no setting aside of the latter by the former.] In fact, what happens is that what is denoted by the Noun, as also what is denoted by the case-ending, becomes connected (through Syntactical Connection) with what is denoted by the Verb. Hence in the case of the sentence '*Pashumālabhēta*', what is understood (from the words) is the *sacrificing* (denoted by the verb '*ālabhēta*') as qualified by the two qualifying adjuncts (the *animal* denoted by the noun '*pashu*' and the number 'one' as denoted by the singular case-ending in '*pashum*']; and as the whole of this forms one connected idea, it is regarded as 'one sentence'.—If the number 'one' were taken as predicated of the *animal*, the verb, alone by itself, could not predicate what is expressed by the verb, as well as the connection between the *number* and the *numbered*.—From all this it follows that the *Number* is meant to be signified as bearing upon the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (16).

TO THE SAME EFFECT, WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

What are these 'indicatives'?

(*a*) There is the following text—'*Karṇā yāmyāḥ, avaliptā raudrāḥ, nabhorūpāḥ pārjanyāḥ, teṣām aindrāgno dashamaḥ*' ['The animals with

moonlike ears are dedicated to Yama, the haughty ones are dedicated to *Rudra*, those in the form of the sky are dedicated to *Parjanya*; that dedicated to *Indra-Agni* forms the tenth of those '] (Vājasaneya Saṁh. 24. 3). Now here 'that dedicated to *Indra-Agni*' could be the 'tenth', only if the plural number in each of the three nouns did actually signify the number *three* [so that there would be three 'dedicated to *Yama*', three 'dedicated to *Rudra*', and three 'dedicated to *Parjanya*', thus making *nine* in all, and then, in addition to these would come 'that dedicated to *Indra-Agni*', as the *tenth*.]

(*b*) Similarly, there is the following text—*'Kṛṣṇā bhaumāḥ, dhūmrā āntarikṣāḥ, bṛhanto divyāḥ, shabalā vaidyutāḥ, sidhmāstārakāḥ'* (Vājasanēya-Saṁh. 24. 3); and in reference to this passage, we have the following—*'Ardhamāsānām vā ētat rūpam yat pañchadashinaḥ'* (Shatapatha Brā. 13. 2. 5. 1) ['The dark ones are dedicated to the Earth, the dusky ones to the Sky, the large ones to Heaven, those of variegated colour to Lightning, and those suffering from *Sidhma* to the Stars;.....these fifteen constitute the form of half-months'] [Here also we can have the number *fifteen* only if the plural number in each of the five nouns '*Kṛṣṇāḥ*' and the rest actually signify the number *three*].—

From all this we conclude that significance must attach to the *Number*.

It has been argued that "such expressions as '*ēkām gām*' ('one cow') show that the Number *one* is not signified by the singular number (in '*gām*')".—The answer to this is that the word '*ēkām*' ('one') is used in such expressions for the purpose of predicating the connection between the *cow* and the *number* (one); otherwise (if only the word '*gām*' were used), the sentence would be understood to predicate the connection between the *cow* and the *sacrificial fee*; for this reason it is necessary to read the word '*ēkām*' even when the singular number in '*gām*' actually signifies the number *one*.—Such expressions as 'two sheep', 'two cows', 'three houses' (which have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) are mere reiterations (and hence do not prove what the Opponent seeks to prove).

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Significance attaches to the Gender*—Supplement to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

SŪTRA (17).

SO ALSO IS THE GENDER (MEANT TO BE SIGNIFICANT).

Bhāṣya.

Having decided as above [that significance must attach to the Number], it follows as a necessary corollary that significance should attach to the *Gender* also, as it is expressed by the same word as the Number. It is only then that we can explain such texts as the following—'*Vasantē prātaḥ āgnēyīm kṛṣṇagrīvāmālabhatē grīsmē mādhyandinē simhīmaindrīm, sharadi aparāhnē shvētām bārhaspatyām*' ['In spring, he sacrifices, in the morning, the black-necked animal dedicated to *Agni*; in summer, he sacrifices, at midday, the lioness dedicated to Indra; in autumn, he sacrifices, in the afternoon, the white animal dedicated to Brhaspati'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 2. 5);—then follow the words '*garbhiṇyo bhavanti*' ['*These animals are pregnant*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2 1. 2. 6); as 'pregnancy' can be a qualification of the female only, it follows that the animals spoken of must be females [which shows that due significance should attach to the nouns used in the text in the Feminine Gender, i.e. the nouns '*kṛṣṇagrīvām*', '*simhīm*' and '*shvētām*'].—Similarly there is the text, '*ashva ṛṣabho vṛṣnirvastaḥ puruṣaḥ—iti tē prājāpatyāḥ*' ['A horse, a bull, a ram, a goat, and a man—these are to be dedicated to *Prajāpati*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 6. 12. 1);—in reference to this text, we have the following passage—'*Muṣkarā bhavanti sendriyatvāya*' ['These should be entire (not castrated) in order to be able to have the generative potency'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 2. 2),—'being entire' (not castrated) is a qualification that can belong to males only; hence the text shows that the animals meant must be *males* [which proves that significance is meant to attach to the masculine gender of the nouns '*ashvaḥ*' and the rest].

This *Adhikaraṇa* may be presented in a somewhat different manner, as follows:—What the *Sūtra*—'*So also is the gender*'—does is to apply the details of the (foregoing) *Adhikaraṇa*, which has dealt with *Number*, to the *Adhikaraṇa* (present one) dealing with *Gender*.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view in this case (like that in the last *Adhikaraṇa*) would be as follows:—"No significance attaches to the Gender; because Direct Assertion sets aside the indications of Syntactical Connection; nor do we find any assertion to the effect that the Gender is meant to be significant. Then again, we have a text also indicative of the same conclusion—'*Strīgauḥ sa Aikrayaṇi*' ['The price paid for the *Soma* is the *female cow*']; now here the addition of the epithet '*Strī*' ('female') shows that no significance attaches to the Feminine Gender of the noun '*Somakrayaṇī*'

[for if it did, then there would be no point in adding the epithet 'female'].—'How then is it that when one says *mṛgīm ānaya* (bring the *doe*), the *buck* is not brought [as it should be, if no significance attaches to the Feminine Gender in the noun '*mṛgīm*']?—There is no force in this; as the idea produced by the expression '*mṛgīm ānaya*' (which prevents the *male deer* being brought in) is not derived from the words directly; it is only implied (indirectly), as in the case of the expression 'the foremost man runs' (where the notion of the *hindmost* man is only *implied*, not directly expressed by the word)."

The *Siddhānta* in answer to this is as follows:—Significance does attach to the Gender; in fact, the indication of *Syntactical Connection* is not negatived by Direct Assertion. As indicative of the same conclusion we have the texts (quoted above)—'These should be pregnant', 'They should be entire (not castrated)'.—As regards the argument based upon the phrase '*strī gauḥ somakrayaṇī*', in fact no significance attaches to the epithet '*strī*'; so also no significance attaches to the term '*puruṣa*' ('male') found in the sentence 'He sacrifices male elephants for offering to Prajāpati'. In support of the view that due significance should attach to Gender,—we have already stated a clear reasoning.—From all this it follows that significance does attach to *Gender*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Complementary Details' serve the purpose of bringing about an unseen Transcendental Effect.*

SŪTRA (18).

[*Prima Facie* SIDDHĀNTA]—IN THE CASE OF ALL 'COMPLEMENTARY DETAILS', WITHOUT DISTINCTION, THE APŪRVA (TRANSCENDENTAL EFFECT) MUST BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

Bhāṣya.

Complementary Details [i.e. such details as come into a sacrifice only as tending to embellish the substance or the deity, or both—says the *Tantraratna*] are to be taken as the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*; i.e. such sacrifices as the *Uttama-Prayāja*, the *Pashupurodāsha*, and the *Sviṣṭakṛt* form the subject matter of enquiry.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is every one of these sacrifices preparatory (embellishment) of the Deity concerned? Or does the sacrifice produce a transcendental effect in the Deity?

On this question, the *Prima Facie Siddhānta* is as follows:—*In the case of all Complementary Details without distinction a Transcendental Effect must be understood to be brought about*;—that is to say, in the case of all complementary details, like the sacrifices named above, the bringing about of a transcendental effect must be admitted; because there is no distinction between the sacrifices in question and those other acts which are spoken of by means of such other verbs as 'sacrifices', 'offers', 'pours libations'.—And the general principle has already been laid down (in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 2. 1. 4) that 'an *accomplished* entity is enjoined with a view to the bringing about of *what is still to be accomplished*'

SUTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA, *traversing the Prima Facie Statement of the Siddhānta*]—"IN THE CASE OF THE INJUNCTION (OF THE COMPLEMENTARY DETAILS) IN QUESTION, THERE CAN BE NO BRINGING ABOUT (OF A TRANSCENDENTAL EFFECT), AS THERE IS A DISTINCTION AMONG VERBS, AND THERE IS NO WORD ENJOINING THE TRANSCENDENTAL EFFECT (TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DETAILS IN QUESTION)."

Bhāṣya.

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*] "In connection with the Injunction in question, there can be no bringing about of a transcendental effect; because *there is*

a distinction among verbs; that is, there is that verb which expresses an act serving a purely visible purpose (the cleaning of vessels for instance),—from such an act no transcendental effect can follow; there is however another verb which expresses an act which does not produce any visible effect (e.g. the reciting of a certain *Mantra*);—from such an act there must follow a transcendental effect.—Now as regards the particular sacrifice in question—i.e. the *Paśupuroḍāśa*, for instance,—it serves a visible purpose, inasmuch as when this sacrifice is performed, the Deity concerned is recalled to the mind; and in the *Sviṣṭakṛt* sacrifice also there is the visible purpose served that the offering-material (remnant) is disposed of. [Thus then there being visible results, there is no room for an unseen transcendental effect.] Nor is there any other word (apart from the said verb) which could lay down a transcendental effect.—From all this it follows that every one of the sacrifices in question is a preparatory embellishment (of the Deity concerned)."

SŪTRA (20)

[FINAL SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, A TRANSCENDENTAL EFFECT MUST FOLLOW FROM THE SACRIFICES IN QUESTION; EVEN THOUGH THERE IS THE DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT (THE EMBELLISHMENT OF) THE DEITY, WHERE THERE IS A PURPOSE SERVED BY IT, THE SACRIFICE OCCUPIES A SUBORDINATE POSITION; WHERE THE ACT ITSELF RESTS IN THE DEITY, IT IS SUBORDINATE TO THAT DEITY [HENCE THE TRANSCENDENTAL EFFECT PRODUCED RESTS IN THE DEITY]

Bhāṣya

In reality a transcendental effect must result from the sacrifice in question; *even though there is the desire to bring about the embellishment of the Deity*,—where there is a purpose served by the sacrifice—this purpose being either the embellishment of the Deity or the disposal of the remnant-material,—*the sacrifice occupies a subordinate position*. What happens is that by the reciting of the *Mantra*, the Deity is recalled to the mind (thus being the embellishment of the Deity—a visible purpose); and while this visible purpose (of recalling the Deity to the mind) is being done by the *Mantra*, there is the other action of *making the offering* which is found to be laid down for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental effect; and there is no visible result brought about by this latter act;—and inasmuch as this act of *making the offering* rests upon the Deity, having been made to him,—it follows that the transcendental effect that is produced by it must also rest in that same Deity.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *Introduction to the main subject-matter of the Adhyāya.*

SŪTRA (21).

IN REGARD TO THE PURPOSE SERVED BY SUBSTANCES AND ACTIONS, THERE IS (SOMETIMES) EQUALITY AND (SOMETIMES) INEQUALITY —[THIS IS WHAT IS NOW GOING TO BE DEALT WITH].

Bhāṣya.

The treatment of the subject-matter of *Adhyāya* III is finished. After this we are going to explain the 'equality' and 'inequality' among substances and actions, in regard to the purpose served by them. In some cases, there is 'equality', in other cases there is 'inequality'. For instance, there is 'inequality' between *Āmikṣā* (Curdled Milk) and *Vājina* (Whey) [see Sū. 4. 1. 22 *et seq.*]; there is 'inequality' between *Kraya* (Purchase) and *Pāmsu* (Dust)* [see Sū. 4. 1. 25 *et seq.*]; while there is 'equality' between the holding of the stick by the Maitrāvaruna and the holding of it by the Sacrificer [see Sū. 4. 2. 16 *et seq.*]. —Similarly may 'Equality' and 'Inequality' be traced in particular cases.

[Up to this point we have considered the subject of the Principal act and its Subsidiary (which is the subject-matter of *Adhyāya* III); - as leading up to the subject of *Motive*, which is the subject matter of *Adhyāya* IV. Henceforward we shall devote all our attention directly to the main subject of *Adhyāya* IV, by itself. In some cases however -as in the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with *Curdled Milk* and *Whey*, we shall discuss the question of 'Principal and Subsidiary also' as bearing upon the question of Motive. What is meant by 'equality' between two things is that both of them constitute the 'motive' behind a certain act, and what is meant by 'inequality' is that while one of them is the real 'motive' behind an act, the other is only a *by product*, coming only incidentally.—And it is cases of this 'equality' and 'inequality' that will be considered now.—*Tantraratna.*]

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* At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in the process of purchasing *Soma*, a heifer is led out of the Sacrificial House, and on the spot where she puts her right foot at the seventh step, they halt and certain libations are offered; the dust of the spot is collected and kept safely by the Sacrificer's wife. Now here the Purchasing of the *Soma* is the motive behind all the details, while the collecting of the dust is only incidental. Hence there is 'inequality' between the two.—See *Prābhākara Mīmāmsā*, pp. 279-280.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The securing of 'Curdled Bits' is the motive behind the act of putting curds into hot milk.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN SEVERAL THINGS ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SAME ACT, THEY SHOULD ALL EQUALLY BE REGARDED AS THE 'MOTIVE' OF THAT ACT."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vaishvadēva* sacrifice performed in course of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, we read—'*Taptē payasi dadhyānayati, sā vaishvadēvī āmikṣā, vājibhyo vājinam*' ['He puts curd into hot milk, whereupon the curdled milk that is produced is offered to the *Vishvādēvas* and the liquid whey is offered to the *Vājins*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is the *motive* behind the act of *putting curd into hot milk*?—Is it the securing of the *Curdled Milk* (*Āmikṣā*), and not that of the *Whey* (*Vājina*)? Or is it both?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—'Both (Curdled Milk and Whey) form the *motive* behind the act.—Why? When a useful thing is brought about by the performance of an action, that thing is regarded as the 'motive' behind that act; in the case in question, when the act of *putting curd in hot milk* is done, both the things are brought about, the Curdled Milk and also out of the same, the Whey. Now the act might have been regarded as done for the purpose of securing only one of these, if there were some ground for making a distinction between the two;—but there is no ground for making a distinction between the two; hence it follows that *the putting of curd into hot milk* is for the purpose of securing both; and thus the one act (*of putting curd into hot milk*) should be taken as incited by (done for the sake of) both the substances."

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE CURDLED MILK SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVE, BECAUSE IT IS IN THAT THAT THE MIXED TASTE IS PERCEIVED.

Bhāṣya.

It is *not* true that *both* the *substances* are the 'motive' behind the act in question; because in reality the *Curdled Milk* is the motive.—Why?—Because in the case in question, what forms the *offering material* is not what is produced out of Milk and Curds; if *that* were the offering-material, then the fact of both *Curdled Milk* and *Whey* being produced out of Milk and Curds would be a ground for making a distinction in favour of the view

that both form the 'motive'.—"What, then, is the offering-material?"—The offering-material consists of *Milk mixed with Curds*.—"How do you get at this idea?"—We deduce this from the fact that the text speaks of '*sā*' (i.e. the milk *itself* mixed *with* curds),—and *not* what *is* produced out of it—as what should be offered to the *Vishvēdēvas*.

Says the Opponent—"From the use of the Feminine Pronoun ('*sā*') it is clear that it is the *Curdled Milk* ('*Āmikṣā*', which also is in the Feminine Gender) that forms the offering-material, and it is produced out of milk and curds; similarly, the *Whey* also is an offering-material, and this too is produced out of milk and curds; [so that both stand on the same footing regarding their being the motive behind the act of putting curds in hot milk]."

Answer—It is not so; it is the hot milk itself which, on being mixed with curds, becomes the *Curdled Milk*, so that the presence of the Feminine Gender does not affect our position at all.

Says the Opponent—"If it is the *Milk mixed with Curds* that forms the offering-material, then why is it said that it is the *Curdled Milk* (*Āmikṣā*) that is the motive behind the act of *putting curds into hot milk*?".

Answer—That is because it is in the *Curdled Milk* that both milk and curds are present,—not in *Whey*.

"How do you know that?"

We know it from the fact that the mixed taste of Curds and Milk is found in the *Curdled Milk*; i.e. it is in the Curdled Milk that we perceive the taste of Milk and Curds mixed together; and from this fact it is deduced that both Milk and Curds are there. Of the *Whey*, on the other hand, the taste is bitter and pungent [which does not indicate the presence of Milk and Curds].

Says the Opponent—"When the curds are put in hot milk, two things happen—the milk becomes mixed up with the curds, and it also becomes separated from the whey; why then should it be assumed that what is desired to be secured by the act is the *mixture* (of the milk with curds) and not the *separation* (of the milk from whey)?"

Answer—In the first place, the mixing of the Milk with Curds is expressed directly by the words of the text, while the separation of the Milk from Whey is not expressed by the words of the text.—Secondly, the Pronoun ('*sā*') also becomes construed with the word that precedes it. In accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, on the other hand, the *putting of curds into hot milk* would have to be taken as being done for the purpose of separating the Milk from the Whey;—which *separating*, not expressed directly by any words, will have to be taken as indirectly indicated; and when there is a doubt as to which of the two—Direct Expression or Indirect Indication—should be accepted, it is the Direct Expression that would have to be accepted as the more authoritative of the two.

From all this it follows that the *putting of curds into hot milk* is for the purpose of securing the *Curdled Milk*; and the use of the word '*āmikṣā*' in the text is only by way of reiteration, because when curds are put into milk, this mixture is exactly 'curdled milk' ('*āmikṣā*') itself [so that no useful purpose is served by the addition of the word '*āmikṣā*', except

that of reiteration].—Thus we conclude that it is *Curdled Milk* which forms the motive, and *Whey* is not the motive.

SŪTRA (24).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS THE PRINCIPAL THING THAT IS EULOGISED [AND IT IS THE CURDLED MILK THAT HAS BEEN EULOGISED].

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be right to regard both the things as the 'motive'; nor is there any declaration to the effect that 'this thing is the motive, not that thing'; in fact a motive is assumed simply because without a motive the act would be useless. Under the circumstances when the injunction of an act has been rendered useful by the assumption of one motive, there can be no reason for regarding any other thing as the motive. Nor is it true that no ground for differentiation is to be found.—"How do you know that there is a ground for differentiation?"—We deduce it from the fact that *it is the principal thing that is eulogised*; i.e. in all cases, the most reasonable course is to eulogise the principal thing; and as the principal thing (Curdled Milk) is mentioned first, it is recognised as the 'Motive', and when thus one motive has been found for the act, and thereby its uselessness has been set aside, there is no reason why a second motive should be assumed. In the case in question the first to be mentioned is the *Curdled Milk* and the Whey comes second. Hence it follows that it is the Curdled Milk that is the motive.

Further, we find that the Curdled Milk has been eulogised by the words of the Veda itself, in the following text—*Mithunam vai dadhi cha dhanañcha atha yat samsṛtam mandamiva mathitam, para iva ārdrahē garbhō'iva saḥ*' ['Curds and boiled milk form a couple, when the two are mixed up, something like a solid mass appears; this appears like the foetus']; here we find the Curdled Milk eulogised as 'foetus', and it is *as* foetus, not the liquid in the womb, which is the motive behind the *coupling*. From this eulogy also we infer that the Curdled Milk is the motive.

"What is the purpose served by this *Ishṭikaraṇa*?"

The purpose that is served is as follows: If both (Curdled Milk and Whey) formed the motive, then, in the event of the Whey being lost (or spoilt), it would be necessary to put curds again into hot milk (in order to secure another supply of Whey); on the other hand, if the Whey did not form the motive, then in the event of the Whey being lost (or spoilt), there would be no need for putting curds into hot milk again.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The operation of the steps of the cow is not the motive behind the act of bringing in the cow.*

SŪTRA (25).

THE 'OPERATION OF THE STEPS' CANNOT BE THE MOTIVE OF THE 'BRINGING UP' OF THE COW; AS THIS LATTER IS FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we read—'*Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā somam krīṇāti*' ['With reddish tawny-eyed one-year-old cow, he purchases the *Soma*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 6. 7); in connection with this same, there is another text—'*Satpadāni anunikrāmati*' ['He follows the cow for six steps'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 8. 1), and then, '*Saptamam padam adhvaryuranjalinā gṛhṇāti*' ['The Adhvaryu takes up with his two hands the dust from under the seventh step'];—then there is another text—'*Yarhi haviṛdhānā prāchī pravartayeyuh tarhi tenākṣamañjyāt*' ['If they drive the cart towards the east, then he should anoint the axle with the dust taken up'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 1. 3. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Bringing up of the cow*, which is to be paid as the price of the *Soma*, for the purpose of securing the dust from under the foot at the seventh step? Or for the purpose of securing the *purchase* of the *Soma*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"inasmuch as both—the *Purchase* as well as the *securing of the dust* from under the foot—are accomplished by means of the Bringing up of the cow,—both should be regarded as its 'motive'. We do not perceive any ground for distinction (whereby one, and not the other, would be regarded as the motive),—this has already been explained under *Sūtra* 4. 1. 22, where it has been said that 'when several things are brought about by the same act, they should all equally be regarded as the motive of that act'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The '*operation of the step*' *is not the motive*—why?—because the *Bringing up of the cow* is for the purpose of securing the purchase (of the *Soma*); as a matter of fact, without the *Bringing up* of the cow, no purchase of the *Soma* would be possible at a particular spot;—hence it follows that the *securing of the purchase* is the motive for the *Bringing up of the cow*; and hence the purchase is its motive, and hence it cannot, at the same time, have the 'operation of the steps' also as its motive.

Then again, there is no such injunctive sentence as that 'the dust of the step of the cow should be taken up'.—"But the *one-year-old cow would be connected with the sentence* speaking of the taking up of the dust of the feet".—That cannot be, we reply. The particular *sentence* '*Ekahāyanyā*

krīṇāti ' ['Purchases *Soma* with the one-year-old cow'] has declared the *one-year-old cow* as to be used for the purchasing of the Soma,—while with the sentence speaking of the taking up of the dust, the one-year-old could be connected only by reason of its occurring in the same *Context*;—and certainly *Sentence* (Syntactical Connection) is more authoritative than the *Context*. Hence what happens is that the *one-year-old cow*, which has been declared to be for the purpose of the Purchase of Soma, comes incidentally to be connected with the sentence speaking of *the dust of the feet*; the sense of this latter connection being —'Of this cow which really serves a totally different purpose, the dust under her seventh step should be taken up and collected'.—From all this it follows that the Purchase forms the motive for the Bringing upof the Cow, and the 'Step' is not the motive of anything.

"*What is the purpose served by this Adhikaraṇa?*"

If both —purchase and operation of the steps, —were the motive for the *bringing up of the cow*,—*then in a case where the seventh step of the cow* falls upon stone (from where no dust can be collected), the cow will have to be brought up again for the securing of the dust from under her left foot: —on the other hand, if this 'step-operation' is *not* the motive, then in the case cited, it would not be necessary to make the cow go again for six steps

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Winnowing of the Husks' is not the motive of the Potsherds.*

SŪTRA (26).

THE NAMING (OF THE POTSHERD) AFTER ITS PURPOSE IS BASED UPON WHAT IS TO COME: AS THE CONNECTION IS DUE TO THAT: SPECIALLY AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE THAT THE ARTICLE IS ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Kapālēṣu purodāsham shrapayati*' ['Bakes the cake upon potsherds'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 3. 6. 2): and further on, '*Purodāshakapālēna tusān uparapati*' ['Winnows the husks with the Cake-potsherd']. [This refers to the winnowing of the husks of the corn which is done at the time that it is threshed, prior to being made into dough out of which the Cake is to be made.—*Ṭupṭīkā*.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is the motive behind the securing of the Potsherds? Is it both *Baking of the Cake* and *Winnowing of the husks*? Or the *Baking* alone, not the *Winnowing*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—'There being no ground for discrimination, both should be regarded as the motive.'

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The naming of the Potsherd after its purpose*, i.e. the name 'Cake-potsherd'—signifies *that which is for the purpose of the Cake* [and not 'that in which the Cake has been baked', so that the meaning of the second sentence cannot be that the winnowing should be done with that potsherd on which *the Cake has been baked*'; and it is only if the sentence meant thus that the *winnowing* could be taken to be the motive in question].—'How do you know that such is the signification of the name?'—As a matter of fact, the Cake is not there at the time (of the *winnowing*) [as it is made only after the winnowing and threshing of the corns and preparation of the dough]; and it is only if the Cake were there at the time that the naming could be based upon a connection (between the *Cake* and the *Potsherd*) existing at the time. For this same reason (of the Cake not yet having come into existence), the naming could not be based upon any *past* connection (between the *Cake* and the *Potsherd*). Consequently the connection between the *Cake* and the *Potsherd* (on which the naming is based) must be taken to be with *what is to come* [i.e. the Cake that is *going to be baked*, so that what the name 'Cake-potsherd' signifies is 'that Potsherd on which the *Cake is going to be baked*']; and this connection with 'the Cake going to be baked' *must be due to that* which is to come; hence the meaning of the second text must be that 'the husks should be winnowed with that Potsherd of which the Cake is the 'motive' [that is, which has been secured for the purpose of *baking the Cake*, which is to be done later on].

Such being the meaning of the second text,—in a case where the material to be offered *is Cooked Rice*, and there is *no Cake*, *if* a potsherd were to be brought in for the *winnowing* of the husks, such a potsherd would not be a 'Cake-potsherd' [as in this case there being no Cake at all, the potsherd could not have any sort of connection, past, present or future, with the 'Cake']; and in that case the husks should not be winnowed with such a potsherd [as the injunction is that the *winnowing* should be done with the *Cake-potsherd*; and this name 'Cake-potsherd' has been found to mean 'that potsherd on which the Cake *is going to* be baked'].

From all this it follows that the *winnowing of husks* is not the motive behind the Potsherds; it is the *Baking* that is the motive.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Dung' and the 'Blood' are not the 'motive' for the bringing in of the Animal.*

SŪTRA (27).

THE BLOOD AND THE DUNG ARE NOT THE 'MOTIVE' FOR (THE BRINGING IN OF) THE ANIMAL; AS THE ANIMAL IS NOT KILLED FOR THE PURPOSE [OF SECURING THOSE THINGS].

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice there is the animal 'dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'; in connection with this animal we read—'*Hṛdayasyāgre avadyati, atha jihvāyāḥ*' ['First of all, he slices out a portion out of the Heart, then out of the Tongue']—and so forth (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 3. 10. 4):—and then there is the text—'*Lohitam nirasyati, shakṛt samprabidhyati, sthavimato varhiraṅktvā apāsyāti*' ['He sets aside the blood; cuts out the dung; having anointed the grass with it, he sets it aside'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 3. 9. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is the motive behind the bringing in of the Animal? Is it the offering of the slices of the Heart and other limbs? Or is it that offering, as also the *cutting out of the Dung* and the *setting aside of the Blood*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"In accordance with the principle enunciated above (under Sū. 4. 1. 22)—'when several things are brought about by the same act, they should all equally be regarded as the motive of that act',—both must be regarded as the 'motive'."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta—The Dung and the Blood are not the motive for the bringing in of the animal; because the animal is not killed for that purpose.* Then again, all that the second text says is that 'he throws away the dung, he sets aside the blood'; it says nothing as to this *blood* and the *dung* being that of the animal (killed for the sacrifice), or of some other (animal);—that the animal is killed for the purpose of being offered to *Agni-Soma* is indicated by the *Syntactical Connection* (of the sentence)—'On being initiated he kills the animal to be offered to *Agni-Soma*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6); while the fact of the *Blood* and the *Dung* being those of that animal could only be indicated by *Context* [i.e. by the fact of the second text, which speaks of the Blood and the Dung, occurring in the same *Context* as the text speaking of the killing of the animal]; and *Context* is always set aside by *Syntactical Connection*.—Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, what is laid down in the second text is the *Disposal* of the Blood and the Dung; from which it follows as a certainty that they are meant to be those of the animal killed for the sacrificial offering, and not of any other [as it is only of substances used at sacrifices that 'Disposal' is laid down in the scriptures]".—If that is so, then it follows (all the more) that the Blood and the Dung do not form the 'motive' (of the bringing in

of the animal) [as no action can be prescribed merely for the purpose of being *disposed of*, and not for the purpose of being *used*].

"What is the use of this discussion?"

The use of the discussion lies in this that if both (*offering* and *throwing away of Blood and Dung*) were equally the 'motive' for the bringing in of the animal, then,—in the event of there being no *blood* and *dung* of the animal killed for being *offered*,—another animal would have to be brought in; whereas if the *Blood and the Dung* were not a motive, then in the case cited, the action would be dropped [i.e. there would simply be no 'throwing away' of the Blood and Dung at all].

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Sviṣṭakṛt' offering is not the motive for the making of the Cake.*

SŪTRA (28).

THAT ACTION (SVIṢṬAKRT-OFFERING) WHICH HAS FOR ITS SUBSTANCE THE PART OF AN OBJECT [CANNOT BE THE MOTIVE FOR THE MAKING OF THE CAKE]: BECAUSE, IN ITS VERY ORIGIN, IT IS SPOKEN OF AS RELATED TO SOMETHING THAT ALREADY EXISTS.

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Uttarārdhāt-sviṣṭakṛtē avadyati*' ['Out of the outer half of the Cake he slices out a piece for offering to Sviṣṭakṛt'] (Taitt. Sam. 2-6. 6. 5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is the motive for the making of the Cake? Is it the *offering to Agni*, and not the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*? Or is it both?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"When several things are brought about by the same act, they should all equally be regarded as the motive of that act" (Śā. 4. 1. 22).

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—An action like the one in question, *which has for its substance, the part of an object*, cannot be the motive (of anything, like the Cake).—Why so?—Because *it is related to what already exists*. That is to say, any act which needs only a part of a thing cannot be the motive for bringing in the whole of that thing; and what is needed in the case of such acts is that the part required should be obtained from the thing which, in its entire form, is already there,—and not that the whole of that thing should be obtained.—Just as in the case of such directions as 'give him a piece of sugar-cane', 'give him a piece of sweetmeat',—the meaning understood is, not that an entire stick of sugar-cane is to be obtained, but that 'a piece should be obtained, for giving, out of a stick of sugar-cane already there', and that 'a slice should be obtained out of the sweet meat already there',—similarly in the case in question, what is to be done is that a piece should be sliced off for offering, out of the upper half of the thing (Cake) which has been already obtained for another purpose (i.e. for the offering to *Agni*).—From this it follows that the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering is not to be taken as the motive (for the bringing in of the Cake).

SŪTRA (29).

[OBJECTION]—"INASMUCH AS THE SAID CAKE HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED (TO AGNI), IT FOLLOWS THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE NEED FOR IT ANOTHER (CAKE) SHOULD BE OBTAINED FOR THE SVIṢṬAKṚT-OFFERING [SO THAT THIS OFFERING WOULD BE THE MOTIVE FOR THE OBTAINING OF THE SECOND CAKE]",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA]

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If your view is that the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering is not the motive for the obtaining of any Cake at all,—then this is not right, because in view of the fact that the Cake in question has been specifically assigned to *Agni*, another Cake has to be prepared, out of the 'upper half' of which, the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* would be made. Because, as regards the Cake already there,—since it has been already previously assigned to *Agni*, the Sacrificer has no right to dispose of it, how then could he make an offering out of it to any other deity (than Agni)?— How do you know that it has been assigned to *Agni*? It is learnt from the following text—*Aṅgiraso vā ita uttamāḥ svargaṃ lokamāyan, te yajñavāṭaṃ abhyāyan; te puroḍāśaṃ kūrmamabhūtvā saṃpantamapaśyan, tamabruvan indrāya dhṛiyasva bṛhaspataye dhṛiyasva ādityāya dhṛiyasveti, sa nā dhṛiyata, tamabruvan agnayē dhṛiyasvēti, so dhṛiyata; yadāgnēyo'aṣṭākapālo nirvāpyatē paurṇamāsyaṃchāchyuto bhavati* (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 2) [The excellent Angirasas went from here to the Heavenly Region; they approached the Sacrificial House, they saw the Cake becoming a tortoise and running away; they said to it—*Hold for the sake of Indra, hold for the sake of Bṛhaspati, hold for the sake of Āditya*, the Cake did not hold (stop); then they said—*Hold for the sake of Agni*, then it stopped,—this is why the Cake baked on eight pans and dedicated to *Agni* is never omitted at the *Darśa* and *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifices']. —In view of this text, this Cake can have no connection with the *Sviṣṭakṛt*. Such being the case, in view of the requirements of the case, another Cake has got to be prepared; because until the thing has been got ready, there can be no 'upper half' of it."

SŪTRA (30).

[ANSWER]—IT IS NOT SO; AS THE REMNANT (OF THE FORMER CAKE) IS STILL THERE AT HAND.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged above is not right; as the remnant of the former Cake is still at hand. The requirements of a case can justify the obtaining of a thing only when the requirements cannot be met without the obtaining

of that thing. In the case in question the remnant of the former Cake being already there, it is quite possible to cut a slice out of the 'outer half' of it; hence there is no *need* for the fulfilment of which another Cake should be brought in; as that same substance (Cake) which had been obtained *for* another purpose is near at hand, and out of the 'upper half' of this same Cake, a piece should be cut out (for being offered to *Sviṣṭakṛt*). As all that is laid down in connection with the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is that it should be cut out of 'the upper half',—nothing is said as to whether this 'upper half' is to be of this or that thing; but it is not possible to do anything with a mere 'upper half' (unless it is the 'upper half' of something);—every such 'half' therefore must be the 'upper half' of *something*;—as to what this *something* should be, the text speaking of the 'upper half' needs something which may be in proximity to itself;—what is in proximity in the case in question is the Cake that has been obtained for the other purpose (of being offered to *Agni*);—hence it follows that the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering should be made out of the Cake obtained for that other purpose; and hence by itself, that offering cannot be the 'motive' for the bringing in of any other Cake.

As regards the argument (urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"[since the first Cake will have been assigned to *Agni*] the Sacrificer would no longer have any right to dispose of it and hence could not offer it (to *Sviṣṭakṛt*)",—the answer to this is that the offer in question is of the nature of 'dedication' to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, and is merely *verbal*, intended to dispose of the remnant (of the Cake), and as such, it can be done by the sacrificer (after the main offering has been made out of it); it is only the *actual* 'offering' or 'giving away', which consists in *dedication* followed by the creating of the proprietary right of another person, and hence cannot be done by one who has no right to dispose of the thing concerned.

SŪTRA (31).

BECAUSE WHAT IS OFFERED TO SVIṢṬAKṚT IS A CONSIDERATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED.

Bhāṣya

We learn from the Veda that what is offered to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is a consideration for services rendered.—"How so?"—There is the following text—'*Dēvā vai sviṣṭakṛtam abruvan haviṣo no vahn it, so'bravīt varaṁ vṛṇai bhāgo mē astu iti, vṛṇīṣva iti abruvan; so'bravīt uttarārdhādēva mahyam sakṛt sakṛt avadyāt*' [The deities said to Sviṣṭakṛt—*Carry the sacrificial offerings to us*; he said—*May I ask for the boon that I may have a share of the offerings?*—They said—*Ask for it*;—he said—*May the sacrificer cut out for me an offering out of the upper half once each time*'].—This shows that the share to which *Sviṣṭakṛt* is entitled is by virtue of rendering a service to the Deities. The phrase 'out of the upper half' (in the text) is meant to be a praise of the offering; under the circumstances, if it is held that the offering is to be cut out of the 'upper half' *of the Cake dedicated to Agni*, then there is this similarity (*of the Cake dedicated to Agni*) to the said 'share for services

rendered ' that *Sviṣṭakṛt* gets the share because he carries *the offering that has been made to Agni* [and the said share also is out of the *Cake dedicated to Agni*]; and when there is this similarity, then the Praise (contained in the expression ' out of the upper half ') becomes intelligible. On the other hand, if the *offering to Sviṣṭakṛt* were made the motive for bringing in another Cake, then, as there would be no similarity [between this latter and the ' upper half of the Cake dedicated to Agni '], the said Praise would have no sense at all.—From all this it follows that the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* cannot be the motive (for bringing in another Cake)

SŪTRA (32).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There is also a text indicative of the same conclusion—' *Tat yat sarvēbhyo haviṛbhyaḥ samavadyati tasmāt idamudarē vishvarūpamannam samavadhiyatē* ' [' Because he cuts out the offering out of all offering-materials, therefore this, in the form of universal food, becomes stored up in the stomach '].—It is only if the offering (to *Sviṣṭakṛt*) is made out of the Cake already near at hand, that it can be said to be cut out of ' all offering-materials ', on account of all the offerings being equally at hand. If, on the other hand, the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering were made the motive for bringing in another Cake, then the offering would be made out of only one ' offering-material '.—For this reason also, the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* cannot be the motive for the bringing in of another Cake.

The following is another text indicative of the same conclusion—' *Shēṣāt idām avadyati, shēṣāt sviṣṭakṛtam avadyati* ' [' He cuts out the *Iḍā* out of the Remnant; he cuts out the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering out of the Remnant ']; [where it is clear that the offering in question is to be made out of the *remnant* left of a substance out of which an offering has already been made, and not out of a substance specially brought in for that purpose].—" But this text may be an (independent) Injunction (having nothing to do with the offering we are considering)." That cannot be, we reply; as there is no injunctive here, what is asserted is the bare statement of a *present* fact.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *In connection with 'Abhighārana', there need be no 'Keeping of the Remnant' or 'Bringing in of another vessel'.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 'DROPPING OF CLARIFIED BUTTER' ('BESPRINKLING'), THERE SHOULD BE A DIFFERENT VESSEL, BECAUSE OF THE REMOTENESS JUST AS THERE IS IN THE CASE OF THE ANUYĀJAS."

Bhāṣya

There is the *Vājapēya* sacrifice laid down in the text— *Vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['One desiring self sovereignty should offer the *Vājapēya* sacrifice']:—in connection with that same sacrifice, we read— '*Saptadasha prājāpatyān pashūnālabhatē, saptadasho vai prajāpatiḥ prajāpatēraptyai*' [He kills seventeen animals dedicated to Prajāpati for the purpose of reaching Prajāpati, Prajāpati is seventeenfold'] (Taitti. Brā 1 3 4. 3-4) —That (at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice) there is a combination of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati' with the 'sacrificial animals' (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which is the Archetype of the *Vājapēya*) is going to be explained under the *Sūtra* —'There is a combination of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati because of the direct declaration' (Sū. 10. 4. 6).

In connection with the original (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) sacrifice, which is the Archetype of the *Vājapēya*, there is the injunction of 'Besprinkling' in the text '*Prayājashēṣēna havīmsi abhighārayati*' ['With the Remnant of the *Prayāja* offerings, he besprinkles the offering materials'] (Taitti. Brā 1 3 4 4)

In connection with this, there arises the question—[According to the general law that the details of the Archetype are to be adopted at the Ectype] as the *Besprinkling* of the Fat of the Animals dedicated to Prajāpati has to be done at the *Vājapēya* and it has to be done with 'the remnant of the *Prayāja* offerings' (as at the Archetype),—should another vessel be brought in for the keeping of the remnant of the *Prayāja*-offerings' [the *Juhū*-vessel used at the original sacrifice being otherwise used at the *Vājapēya*], and with the remnant thus kept, the Fat of 'the Animals dedicated to Prajāpati' is to be besprinkled? Or, is no remnant to be kept and hence the Fat of the Animals dedicated to Prajāpati is not to be besprinkled?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows — *For the purpose of Besprinkling*, a fresh vessel should be brought in for the keeping of the Remnant of the *Prayāja* offerings —because the Remnant of the *Prayāja* offerings becomes available at the Morning Extraction, while the killing of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati is laid down as to be done at the remoter time of the Midday Extraction, when the *Brahma sāman* is chanted, in the text—'*Tān paryagnikṛtān utsṛjanti brahmasāmni ālabhatē*'

(Taitti. Brā. 1. 3. 4. 4) ['When Fire has been taken round them, they let them go; kills them at the chanting of the *Brahma-sāman*']; —now, at this Midday Extraction, the *Juhū*-vessel, in which the Remnant of the *Prayāja*-offering was kept at the Morning Extraction, is otherwise engaged;—hence it is necessary to bring in another vessel.—Just as at the *Anuyāja* offering, a fresh vessel is brought in for the keeping of the *Pṛṣadājya*, in accordance with the text—'He offers the *Anuyāja* offerings with *Pṛṣadājya*' (Tai. Sam. 6. 3. 11. 6),—so should it be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (34

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD NOT BE (ANY 'BESPRINKLING OF THE FAT OF THE ANIMALS DEDICATED TO PRAJĀPATI), AS THERE IS NO VESSEL, AND THIS ABSENCE OF VESSEL IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE REMNANT IS ONLY A PART (OF WHAT HAD BEEN GOT AT THE PRAYĀJA).

Bhāṣya.

The Fat of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati is not to be 'besprinkled'.—"Why?"—Because (at this time) there is no Remnant at all.—"Why is there no Remnant?"—*Because there is no vessel.*—"Why is there no vessel?"—Because *it is only a part*; i.e. the Remnant is only a portion of the Clarified Butter that had been got for the *Prayāja*-offerings.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then, any operation that may be laid down in connection with a part could not be taken as enjoining the *bringing* in of the whole; [so that for the purpose of the 'besprinkling' to be done with a portion of the Remnant, it is not incumbent on the performer to bring in the whole of that Remnant]. Says the Opponent—"It may be that it does not enjoin the *bringing about* of the whole; but the *keeping* of what had been already brought in (in connection with the *Prayāja*-offerings in the morning) would be implied by the requirements of the case".—Our answer to this is as follows:—What we say is that, inasmuch as the Remnant is only a part (of what has been used), the 'besprinkling' cannot be taken as supplying the motive for bringing in the substance (for besprinkling with). The Remnant is only a part of the Clarified Butter that has been used at the *Prayāja*, and when it is used for besprinkling the offering-materials, it is by way of 'disposal'; and the 'Besprinkling' is not a fruitful act (i.e. an act leading to an unseen transcendental result); [and hence it is an act that need not be done if there is no Remnant to 'dispose of'].—"But we find the Accusative ending in the word '*havīṁṣi*' (in the text '*Havīṁṣi abhighārayati*'), which shows that the *offering-materials* (*Haviṣ*) constitute the principal factor [and hence so long as the offering-materials are there, the act of *besprinkling* them has to be done]."—Not so, we reply. As in that case, it would be necessary to assume an unseen effect produced upon the offering-materials by the *Besprinkling*. On the other hand, if the Clarified Butter be taken as the principal factor [so that there should be

besprinkling only if the Butter is there], the purpose served by the *Besprinkling* is the visible one of emptying the *Juhū*-vessel ;—there is need that this Remnant of the Clarified Butter should not get mixed with the Butter for the *Ājyabhāga* offering,—this is the purpose of emptying the *Juhū*,—not that the offering-material should be besprinkled. Thus then, there is no need at all for the besprinkling of the Fat of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati; why then should the Remnant be kept? [and if no Remnant is to be kept, why should a fresh vessel be brought in?].

SŪTRA (35)

ALSO BECAUSE THE 'JOINT KILLING' IS SPOKEN OF AS A REASON FOR THE 'BESPRINKLING' [THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PURELY COMMENDATORY].

Bhāṣya.

Because the 'Joint killing' is spoken of as a *reason* for the 'besprinkling', the statement that 'he kills the animals together' should be taken as purely commendatory (according to Sū. 1. 2. 26 30).—Then again, we have the following text—'*Tīrtham vai prātahsavanam, yat prātahsavanē pashava ālabhyantē tīrthē ēvaitānālabhatē sayonitvāya, atho vapānām abhigrtatvāya*' ['The Morning Extraction is a sacred place; hence when animals are killed at the Morning Extraction, they are killed at a sacred place; for the purpose of having a common source and also for the besprinkling of the Fat']. In this passage the *besprinkling of the Fat* is spoken of as done (at the Morning Extraction) for a totally different person; and this indicates that in the case under consideration [i.e. the Midday Extraction] there is to be no *besprinkling*

SŪTRA (36).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE ENTIRE NEGATION (OF BESPRINKLING).

Bhāṣya

The following text clearly indicates that there is no *Besprinkling*:—'*Savyā vā ētarhi vapā yarhi anabhighārtā, brahma vai brahmasāma, yad brahmasāmni ālabhatē tēna asavyāḥ tēna abhighrtā iti*' ['The Fat which is not besprinkled is tough; the *Brahma-sāman* is *Brahman*; that which is killed at the time of the chanting of the *Brahma-sāman* ceases to be tough, being besprinkled thereby'];—here the term '*savya*' denotes *toughness*; so that the phrase '*savyā vapā*' indicates that the Fat has not been *besprinkled* [and the latter part of the text '*Brahma vai, etc.*' shows that the *softening of the Fat* which, in other cases, is done by the *besprinkling*, is done, in the case of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati, by their being killed at the time of the chanting of the *Brahma-sāman*; which means that there is no need for *Besprinkling* in this case].

SŪTRA (37).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"WHEN THE 'BESPRINKLING' IS ACTUALLY THERE, THE DECLARATION OF 'TOUGHNESS' THAT IS FOUND [MUST BE A MISTAKE]"—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT SŪTRA].—[THE PHRASE 'ITI CHET', 'IF THIS IS URGED', OF THE NEXT SŪTRA HAS TO BE CONSTRUED WITH THIS SŪTRA—SAYS THE SUBODHINI.]

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"What has been said in the preceding *Sūtra* is not right: because *the declaration of 'toughness' has been made even though the Besprinkling is there [and hence the declaration must be wrong]*. In fact, for the Fat, there is another 'besprinkling' also, spoken of in the following text—'*Upastrnāti ājyam hiranyashakalam, vapā hiranyashakalam, tato'bhighārayati*' (Aita. Brā. 2. 14) ['Spreads clarified butter over the gold-piece; the Fat is the gold-piece, hence he *besprinkles* it with clarified butter']; and when there is this 'besprinkling', how could the Fat be 'tough'? And yet the declaration is there. For this reason no such idea can be entertained as that the Fat is actually found to be 'tough'. Consequently we conclude that there must be 'besprinkling' with the remnant of the *Prayāja*-offerings; and when this 'besprinkling' is actually found there, the idea that the 'Fat is tough' must be treated as an illusion"

SŪTRA (38).

[ANSWER]—THE DECLARATION OF 'TOUGHNESS' CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN AS INDICATIVE OF THE ABSENCE OF 'BESPRINKLING'.

Bhāṣya.

If what has been urged above means that—'inasmuch as the *Besprinkling* is actually there, the declaration of '*toughness*' cannot be taken as rightly indicative (of the absence of 'Besprinkling')',—then our answer is that it cannot but be taken as indicative (of the absence of *besprinkling*),—specially that 'besprinkling' which actually does the softening of the Fat.—"Which is that Besprinkling which does this?"—It is the first one (i.e. the one that is done when the Fat is extracted); it is the first one that does the softening; not the second [i.e. that besprinkling which is done when the Fat is being cooked]; the second would do the softening of what *is* already softened; and yet no softening is done of that which is already softened.—Just as in ordinary life, people are found to say 'On coming out of the forest, when we took the oily food in Devadatta's house,—that made us cease to be rough'—even though there may have been other oily foods taken; in the same manner, on account of the absence of the 'besprinkling' which would have removed the 'toughness', it is only right

that the Fat should be spoken of as 'tough'. It would however not be right, if the *besprinkling* were done.—From this also it follows that there is no *besprinkling* of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati with the remnant of the *Prayāja*-offering.

SŪTRA (39)

THE DECLARATION [OF 'TOUGHNESS'] WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLE, BECAUSE IT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The *Sūtra* is an answer in anticipation of the following argument of the Opponent—'If on account of the absence of the *first* Besprinkling (i.e. the one which is done when the Fat is extracted), the statement that 'the Fat is tough' cannot be right, then since another 'first' would be there [the statement may be justified] Which is that other *first*'?—It is that 'besprinkling' which is done to the *Fat* when it is being cooked and the other 'besprinkling' is that which is done to it when it has been extracted"

The answer to this is that *the declaration of 'toughness' would be justifiable because it is the predominant factor*, that is to say, the declaration can be justified only if there is absence of that *Besprinkling* which is done with the remnant of the *Prayāja*-offering,—even though there may be a *besprinkling* of it when it is being cooked, and also when it has been extracted, because that *besprinkling* which is done while the Fat is being cooked would be burnt by the heat of the Fire, and that which is done to it when it is extracted is destroyed by the particles of Fire and particles of Heat; so that the Fat remains as 'tough and dry' as ever The *besprinkling* with the remnant of the *Prayāja* offering, however, is done to the Fat when it is quite cool, hence it softens it, when it has thus been softened, if another *Besprinkling* is done to it at the time of offering it, this second *besprinkling* does not soften it; and as this second *besprinkling* does not soften it the declaration that it is 'tough' is quite right. This is what we have explained above.

From all this it follows that the remnant of the *Prayāja* offering need not be kept (for the besprinkling of the animals dedicated to Prajāpati)

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Bringing in' is the 'motive' for securing the Clarified Butter with its qualifications.*

SŪTRA (40).

THE 'BRINGING IN' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE PRINCIPAL (MOTIVE), BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE OF THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Atihāyēḍo barhiḥ prati samānayati juhvāmaupabhṛtam*' ['Having passed over the third *Prayāja* called *It*, he should bring into the *Juhū* the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt Sruva*, for the purpose of performing the fourth *Prayāja*, called *Barhiṣ*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question- Is the 'Bringing in' here spoken of the *motive* of getting the Clarified Butter along with its qualifications (of being held in the ladle *four* times) [i.e. is the Butter to be got in along with its qualifications, so that it may be brought in into the *Juhu*]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that –"The *Bringing in* is not the motive of the Clarified Butter. –Why?—Because the Clarified Butter that is *brought in* is only a part of that which is used at the *Prayāja* and *Anuyāja*, and hence, in accordance with the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Bringing in* cannot be the motive for it."

The *Siddhānta* is as follows: –*The 'Bringing in' should be regarded as the principal motive, because we find an indicative to that effect.* –"What is that indicative?"—In connection with the *Ātithyā Iṣṭi* we read –'*Chaturgṛhītāni ājyāni bharanti, nahyatra anuyājān yakṣyan bharati*' ['The Clarified Butter is taken (into the *Juhū*) only four times, because he is not going to perform the *Anuyāja* sacrifices'] [The Clarified Butter taken out with the *Sruva* four times, is called the '*Chaturgṛhīta-ājya*']. Now if the Bringing in of the *Ājya* were for the *Prayājas*, then one *Chaturgṛhīta-ājya* would be for those, one would go into the *Anuyājas*, and the third to the *Ātithya-Idā*; [in this manner, the plural number in '*ājyāni*' would be justified]; but when there are no *Anuyājas* to be performed [as the text says—'one is not going to perform the *Anuyāja* sacrifices'], one *Chaturgṛhīta-ājya* would have to be got into the *Uprabhṛt* for being 'brought in' (for the *Barhi*-sacrifice), –not for the *Anuyājas* (which are not going to be performed); –as it is only thus that the plural number in '*ājyāni*' would become justified; as otherwise, as there are no *Anuyājas* going to be performed, if no *Chaturgṛhīta-ājya* were got into the *Upabhṛt*, there would be no justification for the plural number in the phrase '*Chaturgṛhītāni ājyāni*'.—From all this it follows that the *Bringing in* does form the motive (of the getting in of the Clarified Butter).

Says the Opponent—"What you have shown us is a mere indicative; what is the authority [for regarding the *Bringing in* as the motive]?"

Answer—We have seen that the purpose served by the Clarified Butter is that the two *Prayājas* are to be performed; so that what would be needed would be that the Clarified Butter should be brought into the *Juhū*, not that the *Upabhṛt* should be emptied (of the Clarified Butter by this latter being brought into the *Juhū*). Because the emptying of the *Upabhṛt*, if done, could be regarded only as serving an unseen (transcendental) purpose, whereas the bringing in of the Clarified Butter into the *Juhū* serves the visible purpose (of using the Butter in the offerings). Hence what prompts the getting in of Clarified Butter into the *Upabhṛt* is the *Bringing in* of that Butter (from the *Upabhṛt*) into the *Juhū* for the purpose of being offered at the (Fourth) *Prayāja* (called '*Varhiṣ*'), and it is going to be shown (in the next *Adhikaraṇa*) later on that the said *bringing in* of the Butter from the *Upabhṛt* into the *Juhū* serves the purpose of the *Prayāja* as well as the *Anuyāja*.

SŪTRA (41).

IF THE TEXT 'CHATURGRHĪTĀNI ĀJYĀNI' WERE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION, THEN THE STATEMENT OF THE REASON ['BECAUSE HE IS NOT GOING TO PERFORM THE ANUYĀJAS'] WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the sentence '*Chaturgrhītāni ājyāni*' be taken as an Injunction?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—If the sentence were an Injunction, then *the statement of the reason*—contained in the sentence 'Because he is not going to perform the *Anuyājas*'—would become meaningless. As a matter of fact, the sentence could be taken as an Injunction only when it is understood that the 'Bringing in' is not for the purpose of the *Prayājas*, —and when the sentence is an Injunction, then the *non-performance of the Anuyājas* could not be taken as a *reason* (as an Injunction does not require the statement of a reason); —and if there can be no reason, then there is no sense in the statement 'Because he is not going to perform the *Anuyājas*', which is clearly a *rationalistic declaration*. —From all this it follows that the 'Bringing in' of *the Clarified Butter contained in the Upabhṛta* into the *Juhū*, for the purpose of the *Prayāja* offerings, prompts (and is the motive for) the getting of Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt*.

"What is the purpose served by this discussion?"

Answer—If the 'Bringing in' is for the purpose of the *Prayāja* offerings, all that Butter should be brought (in to the *Juhū*) which would be needed for the *Prayāja* offerings—i.e. half of what is contained in the *Upabhṛt*; on the other hand, if the said *Bringing in* were not the motive of getting the Butter into the *Upabhṛt*, then it would not be necessary to bring in either exactly *half* of what is contained in the *Upabhṛt*, or as much as would be required for the *Prayājas*.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The Clarified Butter contained in the Upabhṛt is used at the Prayājas as well as at the Anuyājas,—while that contained in the Juhū is used at the Prayājas only.*

SŪTRA (42).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—'THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION (NOT REFERRING TO ANY PARTICULAR ACTION),—THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENTIATION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* we read—'*Chaturgṛhītaṁ gṛhṇāti, aṣṭau upabhṛti gṛhṇāti*' ['He pours it into the *Juhū* four times, he pours it into the *Upabhṛt* eight times'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 5. 4-5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the Clarified Butter poured into the *Juhū* and the Clarified Butter poured into the *Upabhṛt*, both used at both,—i.e. at the *Prayājas* as well as at the *Anuyājas*? Or that poured into the *Juhū* is to be used at the *Prayājas* and that poured into the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at the *Anuyājas*? Or that the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at both—the *Prayājas* as well as the *Anuyājas*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Both are used at both.—Why?—Because whatever can be done with Clarified Butter should be done at every sacrifice, as there can be no differentiation."

SŪTRA (43)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—OF THE TWO, THAT CONTAINED IN THE JUHŪ IS CLEARLY PRECLUDED FROM THE ANUYĀJAS

Bhāṣya.

It is not correct to say that 'both are to be used at both"; because the Clarified Butter contained in the *Juhū* is to be used at the *Prayājas*, and that contained in the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at both.—"Why so?"—Because there is the text—'*Yat juhvāṁ gṛhṇāti tubhyaṣṭat gṛhṇāti. ṛtavo vai prayājāḥ*' ['What he pours into the *Juhū*, he pours for the Seasons; verily the *Prayājas* are the Seasons']; and here we find that the text, speaking as it does of the Clarified Butter contained in the *Juhū*, mentions the *Prayājas* only with a view to preclude the *Anuyājas* (from the said Butter).

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, we do not find in the text anything to indicate the preclusion of the *Anuyājas*; all that the sentence—'What he pours into the *Juhū*, he pours for the *Prayājas*' (Sha. Brā. 1. 3. 2. 8)—lays down is that the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* is to be used at the *Prayājas*, and it has not the power to preclude the *Anuyājas*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—We do not say that the sentence is preclusive (prohibitive); what we mean is that, while the originative injunction of the Clarified Butter says nothing regarding its connection with any purpose or use,—the text quoted under this *Sūtra* ['*Yat juhvām gṛhṇāti*, etc.'] clearly shows that the said Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* is for the purpose of the *Prayājas*; and the conclusion that it is not to be used at the *Anuyājas* is deduced from the absence of any text mentioning its connection with these *Anuyājas*; this is what we mean when we say that the sentence quoted serves the purpose of precluding the *Anuyājas*.

SŪTRA (44).

[OBJECTION]—"THE CASE WITH THE CLARIFIED BUTTER CONTAINED IN THE UPABHṚT ALSO SHOULD BE SIMILAR".—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN [THE ANSWER SHALL BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING] SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya

Says the Opponent—'If your view is that the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* is precluded from being used at the *Anuyājas*, while that contained in the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at both (the *Prayājas* as well as the *Anuyājas*),—then what we say is that it may be concluded that the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* is to be used at the *Prayājas* only,—but it cannot be concluded that the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt* may be used at both (*Prayājas* as well as *Anuyājas*); in fact this latter also *should be similar*; i.e. it should be like the Clarified Butter contained in the *Juhū*, [i.e. it should be used at the *Anuyājas* only]—How so? Because in the following text, the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt* is clearly spoken of as to be used at the *Anuyājas* only—*Yat upabhṛti gṛhṇāti anuyājēbhyastāt gṛhṇāti, chhandāṁsi hy anuyājāḥ*' [What he pours into the *Upabhṛt* he pours for the *Anuyājas*, because the *Anuyājas* are the Metres'] (Shatapatha Brā. 1. 3. 2. 9); here it is clearly stated that the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at the *Anuyājas* only."

SŪTRA (45)

[ANSWER]—INASMUCH AS [THE CLARIFIED BUTTER IN] THE JUHŪ HAS BEEN PRECLUDED (FROM THE ANUYĀJAS), THE TEXT QUOTED (IN THE LAST SŪTRA) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A BARE STATEMENT OF FACT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not as has been explained by the Opponent. As a matter of fact the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at both (*Anuyājas* as well as *Prayājas*); because we have the following text—'*Yadaṣṭāvupabhṛti gṛhṇāti prayājānuyājēbhyastat gṛhṇāti*' ['The Clarified Butter that he

pours into the *Upabhṛt* eight times is poured for the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas*'] (Śba. Brā. 1. 3. 2. 9).—"But we have already explained that the text 'he pours it for the *Anuyājas*' distinctly shows that the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt* is to be used at the *Anuyājas* only."—Our answer to this is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the Clarified Butter in the Juhū has been precluded from the Anuyājas, the text quoted (by the Opponent) should be taken as a bare statement of fact.* That is to say, on account of the possibility of both—the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* and the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt*—being used at both (the *Prayājas* as well as the *Anuyājas*), that contained in the *Juhū* has been precluded from the *Anuyājas* (by the text quoted under Sū. 43);—not so the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt*; so that while the fact of the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt* being used at both *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* is duly recognised, the assertion (in the text quoted by the Opponent under Sū. 44) to the effect that the said Butter is to be used at the *Anuyājas* may be taken as a bare statement of a recognised fact; and it cannot be taken as precluding the Butter in the *Upabhṛt* from being used at the *Prayājas*, as its use at the *Prayājas* is laid down in a Vedic text (viz.—'Clarified Butter that one pours into *Upabhṛt* eight times, is poured *for the Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas*').—From all this, it follows that the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt* should be used at both the *Prayājas* as well as the *Anuyājas*.

Further, it has been laid down (in the text dealt with under *Sūtras* 40, *et seq.*) that the Clarified Butter is to be brought from the *Upabhṛt* into the *Juhū* [and what is contained in the *Juhū* is used at the *Prayājas*]; hence for this reason also, the fact of the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt* being used at the *Prayājas* cannot be denied.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *What is meant by the Clarified Butter being poured into the Upabhṛt 'eight times' is that it should be poured 'four times' twice over, and not 'eight times' all at once.*

SŪTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"IT SHOULD BE EIGHT IN NUMBER; AS SUCH IS THE DIRECT ASSERTION."

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'*Aṣṭāvupabhṛti gṛhṇāti*' ['He pours Clarified Butter into the *Upabhṛt* eight times'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 5. 5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is it meant that the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt* is embellished by the eight pourings, all at once? Or is the number 'four' a qualification for the two pourings [i.e. the *Pouring* is done twice, and four times each time]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The number qualifying the Pouring is 'eight',—and not the number 'Four' twice over."—Why so?—*Because such is the Direct Assertion*; that is, what is directly asserted in the text is the number 'eight', and the number 'Four' is only indicated by the number *eight*; and when there is conflict between *Direct Assertion* and *Indication*, it is the Direct Assertion that is to be accepted.—From this it follows that the Pouring into the *Upabhṛt* is to be *eight* in number.

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON THE CLARIFIED BUTTER CONTAINED IN THE JUHŪ."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the following text which speaks of benefits conferred—'*Chaturgṛhītam vā ētadabhūt tasya āghāramāghārya triratah prāchīnam prayājān yajati samānayatē chaturgṛhītatvāya*' ['It became poured four times; pouring libations of that, he offers out of it three *Prayājas* towards the east; then the two are brought together, for the purpose of making it *Chaturgṛhīta* (poured four times)'].—Now the question arises—In what manner would it be helped to become *poured four times* (*Chaturgṛhītam*)?—Does it become *Chatūrgṛhīta* by being brought together? We say, No. In fact, from the very first, the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* has been *Chaturgṛhīta*; even what remains after the pouring of the libations, is one the number of whose *pouring in* had been *four*.—'What then is the meaning of *for the purpose of making it Chaturgṛhīta*?' It means that what is done

is for conferring some benefit on what is already *Chaturgṛhīta*; the sense is that the *Chaturgṛhīta* (what has been poured four times) is small in quantity, and hence not sufficient for the offering of oblations, and it is necessary to make it sufficient for that purpose [this is the 'benefit to be conferred upon it'].—Thus then the term '*Chaturgṛhīta*' indicates *small quantity*; and a quantity is 'small' or 'large' only in comparison with something. If the Clarified Butter contained in the *Upabhṛt* consists of *eight* pourings, then *Chaturgṛhīta* (poured in four times) is certainly 'small' in quantity; and hence the term '*Chaturgṛhīta*' can be taken as indicating *smallness of quantity*.—For this reason also, we conclude that in the case of the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt*, the qualification consists of the number 'eight' [as then alone can the '*Chaturgṛhīta*' in the *Juhū* be taken as standing for *small quantity* and hence standing in need of augmentation]."

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE ARE TWO 'FOUR-POURINGS' ('CHATURGṚHĪTA'); IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE STATEMENT OF REASON HAS JUSTIFICATION AS FOR THE DIRECT ASSERTION (OF 'EIGHT'), THAT REFERS TO THE 'BRINGING TOGETHER' OF THE TWO

Bhāṣya

The particle '*tu*', 'in reality', sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*

In reality, there are *two* 'four-pourings'; it is only thus that the statement of reason in connection with the *Āthvya Iṣṭi* becomes justified, this statement occurring in the text—*Chaturgṛhītāni ājyāni bhavanti, nahyatra anuyājān yakṣyan bhavati*' ('The Clarified Butter is to be got in four-pourings, *because one is not going to offer the Anuyājas*') (Taitt. Sam. 5. 1. 1. 1).—If the number 'eight' were the qualification of the 'Clarified Butter' in the *Upabhṛt*, then there would have to be 'eight pourings' in connection with the Clarified Butter in the *Upabhṛt*, even when there would be no *Anuyājas* to be offered [while the text quoted lays down that there are to be only *four* pourings in a case where the *Anuyājas* are not going to be performed]; so that, there could not be two 'four-pourings'; with the result that the plural number in the phrase '*Chaturgṛhītāni ājyāni*' would cease to be justified.—From this it follows that there should be two 'four-pourings'.

Says the Opponent—"You have put forward an indirectly indicative text; please put forward some direct evidence."

This direct evidence we set forth as follows:—There is an isolated text—'*Chaturgṛhītam juhoti*' ['Offers an oblation of what has been poured four times'],—which is applicable to all *Homa*-offerings [since the text is not found in the 'Context' of any particular *Homa*]; and hence even at the *Prayāja* and *Anuyāja* offerings, the 'four-poured' Butter could not be set aside by the 'eight-poured' one; as their spheres of application would be different,—the 'eight-poured' Butter being applicable to the

Pouring and the 'four-poured' Butter to the Homa-offering; so that it is quite possible that while the 'eight-poured Butter' is used in the Pouring, the 'four-poured Butter' is used in the Homa-offering; [and as there would be no incompatibility between the two, the 'eight-poured' one need not set aside the 'four-poured' one]. Under these circumstances, as the number 'eight' would be applicable to the *Pouring*, how could the 'eight-poured' Butter supply the two 'four-poured' ones that are required for the Homa-offering? From all this it follows that there should be *two* 'four-poured' ones which are poured when the 'eight-poured' one is being poured; because no one can bring up two 'four-poured' ones unless he actually pours an 'eight-poured' one.—Hence the conclusion is that there are two 'four-poured' ones.

As regards the argument that —"The *eight-poured* one is *directly asserted* and what is *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than indirect Indication",—our answer to this is as follows:—We have also explained the use of the number 'eight',—the use being that, until there are *eight* pourings, (*a*) how could there be two 'four-poured' ones?—(*b*) how too would it be possible to combine the two 'four-poured' ones into the *Upabhṛt*, according to the text 'In the *Upabhṛt* one pours eight times'?—Otherwise, if the term 'eight' were not there (to express the number *eight*), it would be possible to hold the two 'four-poured' ones in different vessels. For these reasons (even according to our view), there is no incongruity involved in the presence of the word 'eight'; in fact it is only right, as there are two 'four-poured' ones in the *Upabhṛt* (and thus the number 'eight' is made up by the two being contained in the same vessel).

The purpose served by all this discussion is as follows:—When there are two 'four-poured' ones,—if one has to bring in (a four-poured Butter), it will be possible for him to bring in just half of what is contained in the *Upabhṛt*; while if there were only one 'eight-poured' Butter, in taking out of it, there could be no certainty that only just half has been taken out;—also in a case where there is no pouring for the purpose of the *Anuyāja*-offerings, the Butter in the *Upabhṛt* would have to be an 'eight-poured' one, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*,—while according to the *Siddhānta*, there would have to be only a 'four-poured' Butter in the *Upabhṛt*, at the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices [where there are no *Anuyāja*-offerings].

End of Pāda 1 of Adhyāya IV.

ADHYĀYA IV.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The 'Svaru' (piece of wood) is not the 'motive' for the 'Chopping' of the wood.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THE 'SVARU' CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A PRODUCT OF THE SAME OPERATION (AS THE POST); BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED BY ITS OWN INJUNCTION"

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is an animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, spoken of in the text—'On being initiated, he kills the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6); in connection with the killing of this animal, it is laid down—'He tethers the animal to the Post made of *Khadira* wood; he tethers it to the Post made of *Palāsha* wood; he tethers it to the Post made of *Rohita* wood';—and in close proximity to this last text, we read—'With the *Svaru*, he anoints the animal',—'makes the *Svaru* of the Post'.

In regard to this, there arises the following question:—Should the *Svaru* be made apart from the Post? Or should that piece of wood be taken as *Svaru* which comes out of the block of wood when the Post is being hewn out?—In connection with this question, what we have got to determine is—Is, or is not, the *Svaru* the 'motive' for the doing of such acts as the 'Chopping' (of the wood)? If it is the 'motive' of those acts, then it should be made apart from the Post; if it is not the motive of those acts, then that piece of wood will have to be taken as *Svaru* which comes out of the block of wood while the Post is being hewn out—"How could we determine whether or not the *Svaru* is the 'motive'?"—If the texts bearing on the subject were construed to mean that 'the article named *Svaru* is brought into existence,—how?—by a process consisting of such acts as 'selecting (the tree to be cut)' and the rest,—and if the *article* thus brought into existence were used as '*Svaru*' at the time of anointing the animal in accordance with the injunction 'one should anoint the animal with the *Svaru*',—then, in that case, the *Svaru* would have to be regarded as the 'motive' of all the acts of 'chopping' the wood and the rest. On the other hand, if it is not known what is the article spoken of as '*Svaru*' in the text 'anoints the animal with the *Svaru*',—all that is known about it is that the *anointing is to be done with it*,—hence, in accordance with the text 'makes the *Svaru* out of the Post', the Performer uses a chip of the Post itself in the *anointing*,—then, in that case, the *Svaru* is *not* the 'motive' of the acts of 'chopping' and the rest.

On this point, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*The Svaru cannot be regarded as the product of the same operation as the Post, because it has been enjoined by its own injunction.* That is to say, the *Svaru* cannot be regarded as a bye-product of the same operation which brings into existence the Post,—the *Svaru* has to be brought into existence, quite independently of the Post, by the process of 'selecting (the tree to be cut)' and the rest; why so?—*because it has been enjoined by its own injunction*; that is, the sentence that enjoins it—'He makes the *Svaru*'—is an independent injunction by itself. —Such being the case, what the text—'*Yūpasya svarum karoti*', 'makes the *Svaru* of the Post' [which appears to mean that the *Svaru* is a chip of the Post itself]—means is that 'the *Svaru* is made out of the same log of wood out of which the Post has been made',—the term 'Post' being taken as indirectly indicating *the block of Khadira or other tree* (out of which the wood for the Post has been obtained).—Why should it be taken thus?—Because it is the *Direct Assertion* of the Veda, '*svarum karoti*', 'makes the *Svaru*'—which lays down the *bringing into existence* of the *Svaru*, and it means that 'one produces (or makes) the *Svaru*';—while the idea that 'it is a chip of the Post itself that is to be used as the *Svaru*' is obtained only through the *Syntactical Connection* [of the word '*yūpasya*' in the sentence '*yūpasya svarum karoti*', 'makes the *Svaru of the Post*']:—and *Direct Assertion is* more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*.—Under the circumstances, it is not necessary that the *Svaru* must be made of a chip of the piece of wood out of which the Post has been hewn out; it may be made, independently by itself, even out of a different tree altogether."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THE VEDA ITSELF SUGGESTS THE LIKELIHOOD OF ITS BEING MADE OUT OF WOOD OF A DIFFERENT SPECIES."

Bhāṣya.

"From the following reason also, it follows that the *Svaru* should be made independently of the Post—How?—There is *likelihood* (suggested) *of the Svaru being made of wood of a different species*,—i.e. out of a different tree altogether.—How so?—There is the following text—'*Na anyasya svarum kuryāt. yadi anyasya vṛkṣasya svarum kuryāt anyē'sya lokamanvārohēyuḥ, yūpasya svarum karoti*' ['One should not make the *Svaru* of another wood; *if one makes the Svaru out of another tree*, other people would ascend to his regions; he should make the *Svaru* out of the same wood as the Post']. —If the *Svaru* were *always* to be that chip which comes out of the log of wood out of which the Post is being hewn out,—then there could be no likelihood of its being made out of another tree; as in every case, a chip of the Post would be used as the *Svaru*. Thus from the text quoted it is clear that the *Svaru* should be made entirely apart from the Post."

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE 'SVARU' IS A PART OF THE POST ITSELF; AS THE VERY CHARACTER OF THE 'SVARU' IS BASED ON ITS BEING THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*', 'in fact', sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

For purposes of the *Svaru* that chip should be taken up which comes out of the log of wood when the Post is being hewn out of it.—Why so?—Because there is the following text—'*Yadi anyasya vṛkṣasya svarum kuryāt anyē'sya lokamanvārohēyuḥ, yupasya svarum karoti*' ['If one makes the *Svaru* out of another tree, other people would ascend to his region; he makes the *Svaru* out of the Post'].—In this sentence, it is not enjoined that 'one produces the *Svaru*', all that is laid down is that 'what one takes up to use as a *Svaru* should be taken out of the Post'.—"How so?"—Because *the very character of 'Svaru' is based upon its being that* (i.e. part of the Post);—the *character of the Svaru* has been asserted, in reference to the *Svaru*, in the text '*yūpasya svarum karoti*' ('makes the *Svaru* of the Post']; which supplies the answer to the question 'whose own should the *Svaru* be?',—and the answer is that it is to be 'of the Post', and one thing is said to be the 'own' of a composite thing only when it is a part of it, it is for this reason that the Genitive ending in '*yūpasya*' ('of the *Post*') is taken in the sense of the Ablative,—the Post being an inanimate thing; just as the expression '*shākasya dēhi*' is construed as '*shākād dēhi*', in some cases the Genitive is taken in the sense of the Instrumental, when, for instance, the expression '*ghṛtasya yajati*' is construed as '*ghṛtēna yajati*', also in the sense of the Ablative, '*ghṛtasya yajati*' being construed as '*ghṛtād yajati*';—also in the sense of the Objective,—'*somasya pibati*' being taken as '*somam pibati*', or even as '*somāt pibati*' (in the Ablative). [Under *Bhāṣya* on 4. 4. 25, Shabara explains '*yūpasya svarum karoti*' as '*yūpam svarumantam kuryāt*', 'one should make the Post equipped with *Svaru*'.]

Says the Opponent—"We have already explained that the fact of the *Svaru* being a chip of the Post is indicated by *Syntactical Connection*, while it is *directly asserted* that the *Svaru has to be made*; and *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*'

Answer—True; but in that case, the word '*yūpasya*' will have to be taken as *not meant to be significant* (i.e. as having no significance at all); so that the *Pūrvapakṣa* view would involve the rejection of the *direct connotation* of a word, as also that of *Syntactical Connection*. In our view on the other hand, there is nothing that is to be regarded as having no significance. In fact the phrase '*svarum karoti*' ('makes the *Svaru*') would be a reiteration for its own sake, of the injunction of securing the 'chip of the Post'; and *as for* the word '*Svaru*', the *fact* of its serving the purpose of *anointing* (the Animal) points to its indicating *the chip of the Post*; the etymology of the term '*Svaru*' also points to the same fact; for instance, there is a Brāhmaṇa-text—'*Atha kasmāt svarurnāma; ētasmāt*

vaipo 'vachchhidyatē, tasyaitat svamiva arurbhavati; tasmāt svarurnāma ' ['Why is this named *Svaru*? Because it is cut out of the Post, and as such becomes, as if it were, *its own*, 'svaru', *vital part*, 'aruḥ'; that is why it is named *Svaru*'] (Shatapatha Brā. 3. 7. 1. 24).

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS DIRECTLY SPOKEN OF AS A 'CHIP'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also that chip has to be used as *Svaru* which drops down when the Post is being hewn out.—"What reason?"—*Because it is directly spoken of as a 'chip'*; as a matter of fact, in the following text, the *Svaru* is directly spoken of as a 'chip'—'*Yaḥ prathamaḥ shakalaḥ parāpatēt sa svaruḥ kāryaḥ*' ['The first chip that falls down should be made the *Svaru*']. The 'chip' is only a part of a whole; and what is only a *part* cannot be the 'motive' of any act; because it is denoted by a relative term, and is used as such, being always meant to be in relation to the *whole* (of which it is a part); on the authority of *Context*, the *chip* is taken as connected with the *Khadira* and other wood which have been brought in for another purpose (i.e. for the making of the Post), which has been equipped with the effects of such operations as 'selecting' and the rest, thus serving a useful purpose in connection with the sacrifice; the entire text thus reading as—'*Yupāya khadirādi jōsayatē, chhinattī, taksatē cha, tatra yaḥ shakalaḥ prathamaḥ parapatītastam cha svarumañjanārtham karōtē*' ['For the purpose of making the Post, he selects the *Khadira* or other wood, chops it, and pares it, the first chip that happens to fall, of that he makes the *Svaru* for the purpose of anointing']; the term '*svarum*' being used here only reiteratively. From all this it follows that it is not right that the *Svaru* should be taken as made separately by itself, simply on the ground that a likelihood has been indicated of its being made out of a different tree (wood) altogether. Hence the passage that speaks of the likelihood of the *Svaru* being made of a different wood should be taken as stating a bare fact, for the purpose of eulogising the *chip of the Post*.

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND A 'SVARU' IN CONNECTION WITH EACH POST.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Svaru* is not to be made separately from the Post.—"What reason?"—Because in connection with the *Ēkādashinī* sacrifice *we find a Svaru in connection with each Post*. For instance, we find a plurality of *Svarus* spoken of in the following text—'*Anupūrvam svarubhiḥ pashūn samajya madhyamē rashanāguṇē svē svē svam svam yūpashakalam upagūhati*' ['Having anointed the animals, one after the

other, with *Svaru*, he hides each chip of the Post within the knot of the rope tied round the Post of which that chip has been a part']. If the *Svaru* were something made independently of the Post, then a single *Svaru* would serve in common the purposes (of anointing all the eleven animals) at the *Ēkādashini* sacrifice [and there would be no need for having several *Svarus*). On the other hand if the *Svaru* used is that which comes into existence during the hewing out of the Post, then the *anointing* of the animal shall be done with the *Svaru* which is the chip of the Post to which that animal is tethered; and this having been done at the Primary Sacrifice, by the general law (by which the details of the Primary Archetype are borrowed by the Ectype) the *Svaru* used at the *Ēkādashini* sacrifice also would be the chip of that same Post to which the animal to be anointed by that *Svaru* is tethered; and thus (there being eleven animals) there would be a plurality of Posts and hence of *Svarus* also. That each *Svaru* will be in the form of the chip of the Post we deduce from what has been done at the Primary Sacrifice, the idea being that at the Ectype the *Svaru* should be of the same kind as the one that has been used at the Primary Archetype.—From all this it follows that the *Svaru* is not the 'motive' for any operations for its own production.

SŪTRA (6).

THE WORD 'KAROTI' ('MAKES') IS USED IN THE SENSE OF 'TAKING UP'.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument that "the *producing* (making) of the *Svaru* is directly asserted by the text '*Svarum karoti*' ('makes the *Svaru*'), and it is only in this sense of *producing* that the use of the word '*karoti*' can be justified",—our answer is as follows:—In the sentence quoted, the word '*karoti*' should be taken as standing for 'takes up', the expression '*Svarum karoti*' meaning 'he *takes up* the *Svaru*'; just as in the expressions '*Kāṣṭhāni karoti*' and '*Gomayāni karoti*', the word '*karoti*' stands for '*takes up*',—so would it do in the case in question.

[Next there follows in the *Bhāṣya* a shorter commentary, on the same lines as before, on each of the *Sūtras* 1–6 of this *Adhikaraṇa*. The *Tantra-ratna* remarks—'The author of the *Bhāṣya* has added this second explanation of the *Adhikaraṇa* only as a briefer *résumé* of the detailed explanation that has gone before'.]

SŪTRA (1).

(Translation as before.)

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*; in connection with which we read—'*Svaruṇa pashumanakti*' ['Anoints the

animal with the *Svaru*'].—In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the *Svaru* prompt all the operations tending to bring it into existence? Or is it to be used in the form of what is obtained in the wake of the making of the Post?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The *Svaru* is not the product of that same operation which produces the Post,—i.e. it prompts distinct operations tending to bring it into existence;—why?—because it has a distinct injunction of its own, in the form of the text '*Svarum karoti*' ['He makes the *Svaru*'], which means that 'he brings the *Svaru* into existence'. Such being the case, the *coming into existence* of the *Svaru* is what is enjoined by the Vedic text; hence one and the same operation cannot be regarded as bringing into existence the Post as well as the *Svaru*."

SŪTRA (2).

(Translation as above.)

Bhāṣya.

"If that piece of wood were used as *Svaru* which comes in as a bye-product of the operations bringing about the Post, then there would be no justification for suggesting the likelihood of its being made of a different tree; and yet we find such a suggestion in the text—'*Yadi anyasya*, etc.' ('If he makes the *Svaru* out of a different tree, etc. etc.'). From this also we deduce that the *Svaru* does prompt the operations tending to bring it into existence."

SŪTRA (3).

SIDDHĀNTA—(as above).

Bhāṣya

The *Svaru* used must be that which is a bye-product of the operations bringing about the Post; because the *Svaru* is a part of the Post as is indicated by the Genitive ending in the sentence '*Yūpasya svarum karoti*'. If the cutting of the tree were meant for both (*Post* and *Svaru*), then there would be no relationship between them; in which case there would be no justification for the use of the Genitive ending;—and yet we actually find the Genitive ending; from this it follows that the *Svaru* is only a *chip of the Post*,—i.e. a part of the Post,—and the meaning of the injunction '*Svarum karoti*' is that 'one should take up a part of the Post, which is called *Svaru*', just as we have the term 'slice of the Cake'.

SŪTRA (4).

(As above.)

Bhāṣya.

We also find the *Svaru* spoken of as a 'chip' in the text—'The first chip that falls should be made the *Svaru*'. And what are mere parts do not

prompt any operations; for instance, when we find only a part spoken of, we find no such injunction as that 'the whole should be brought about'; it is the part of an already existing *whole* that is taken up. For all this reason also the *Svaru* cannot be the 'motive' for any operations.

SŪTRA (5).

(As above.)

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, we find *Svarus* mentioned with each individual Post; for instance, in connection with the *Ēkādashinī* we read '*Anupūrvām*, etc.' (see above). If the sentence '*Svarum karoti*' means that each of the Posts is to have a *Svaru* of its own, —then alone can it be possible to have the plurality of *Svarus* spoken of in the text quoted. On the other hand, if the *Svaru* were the prompter of the operations tending to bring it into existence, then a single *Svaru* would be made for the purpose of anointing all the animals (and there could be no plurality of *Svarus*). For this reason also the *Svaru* cannot be the 'motive' for any operations

SŪTRA (6).

(As above.)

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that "the words '*Svarum karoti*' speak of the *producing* (making) of the *Svaru*; and in this sense alone can the use of the word have any justification".—Our answer to this is that the term '*karoti*' should be taken in the sense of *taking up*; the sentence '*Svarum karoti*' meaning that 'he *takes up* the *Svaru*'; just as in the expressions '*Kāṣṭhāni karoti*' and '*Gomayāni karoti*', the term '*karoti*' is used in the sense of *taking up*, so should it be in the case in question also.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *It is the Tree-branch that is to be fetched.*

SŪTRA (7)

THE 'FETCHING' IS OF THE TREE-BRANCH; AS THAT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Prāchīmāharati, udīchīmāharati, prāgudīchīmāharati*' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 2. 1. 3) ['He fetches the *Eastern*, fetches the *Northern*, fetches the *North-eastern*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is it the *Quarter* that is spoken of here (as to be *fetched*)? Or the *Tree-branch*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"It is the *Quarter* (Direction) that is spoken of; as that is the direct meaning of the terms ('Eastern', etc.); if they were taken as speaking of the *Tree-branch*, they could do this only by indirect indication; hence we conclude that the texts speak of the *Quarters* (as to be *fetched*)."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—It is the *Tree-branch* that is spoken of; why?—because, if the meaning were that 'the Eastern *Quarter* should be fetched', then it would be speaking of something quite impossible to do. In order to avoid this incongruity, if the sentence were taken to mean that 'it should be fetched *towards the Eastern Quarter*', then the question arises as to what is it that is to be fetched; and as the word 'tree-branch' is nowhere found in the sentence, this latter construction also is not admissible.—If lastly it be held, on the basis of *Context*, that it is the *Tree-branch* (spoken of in the same Context) that is meant to be 'fetched towards the East', -then it is far more reasonable to take the term 'Eastern' itself as standing for the 'Eastern Tree-branch' [rather than take the term 'eastern' as standing for the quarter and then presume, on the basis of Context, that it is the *Tree-branch* that should be *fetched towards the East*). -"Why should this be more reasonable?"- -Because the Syntactical Connection of the word '*prāchī*' ('Eastern') with the verb '*āharati*' ('fetches') is directly perceptible, whereas the connection with the term 'branch' would be based upon 'Context' and as such only indirect. —But in both cases, the word 'Eastern' should indicate either the *Tree-branch* spoken of in the Context, or the *sacrificial ground* as accompanied or occupied by something *most desired*; because in no way could the *Quarter* be the *most desired* factor (and hence it could not be expressed by a word with the Accusative ending).[1]

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[1] This passage is thus explained by Kumārila (in Ṭuptīkā) –*The phrase 'dishā'-nīpsitatvāt*' (the Quarter not being the *most desired* factor) contains the statement of a reason; the meaning being– "Inasmuch as the Quarter cannot be the most desired factor, the term 'Eastern' may be taken as indicating either the *Branch*

Then again, '*prāchī*', 'Eastern', is a relative term; and all relative terms are dependent (upon a correlative), and they do not express any complete idea, except in the company of another term; a mere vague connection with something in general cannot serve as the basis of any definite usage; because every place is to the 'East' of something or the other.—Similarly, '*shākhā*', 'branch' also is a relative term, and stands in need of the term 'of the tree'; and when it appears in connection with this latter term, it can enter into such relationships as—'the branch of the tree, Eastern, Northern, and North-eastern'; and on such relationships, definite usage also becomes possible.

As for the argument that—"if the text be taken as referring to the *branch of trees*, then it involves an indirect indication",—our answer to this is that words often do express their meanings on the basis of indirect indication. [There is nothing incongruous in that.]

From all this it follows that it is the *Tree-branch* that is spoken of (as 'Eastern', 'Northern', and 'North-eastern') in the texts under consideration.

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or the *sacrificial ground.*"—The *Tantraratna* adds that the second '*vā*' is to be taken after '*mhāradēsham*',—and that it is simpler and easier to take the word 'Eastern' as indicating the *Branch* rather than the *ground*.— The *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* says—The meaning is that—'one should cut and fetch the branch growing on the eastern side of the tree'; but it might be more useful to interpret the sentence to mean that the *branch* (which is got from the Context) is to be brought '*prāchīm prati*', i.e. *to the eastern part of the sacrificial ground.* –It also points out that according to the *Yājñikas*, Ritualists, what is spoken of in the text as to be 'fetched' is the *Quarter* itself.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The securing of the 'Branch' is the 'motive' behind the act of 'cutting' the Bough.*

SŪTRA (8)

THE BRANCH IS THE 'MOTIVE', AS THAT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR; IT BECOMES CUT OFF FROM THE 'UPAVEṢA', AND THERE IS DISPARITY (BETWEEN THE TWO)

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa*, we read—'*Mūlatah shākhām parivāsya upavēsam karoti*' [Cutting the Branch at the bottom, he makes the *Upavēṣa*'] [A bough having been got from the tree, it is cut into two parts at a point about six inches from the bottom; the top-portion is used as 'Branch' proper, the *stick* for keeping the calf away from the cow, and the bottom portion, six inches long, is made into the *Upavēsa* which is used for placing the pans upon Fire, removing the Fire-embers and so forth.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this 'cutting of the Bough' prompted by (for the purpose of securing) both the 'Branch' and the *Upavēsa*?—Or the 'Branch' alone is what 'prompts' it, and the *Upavēsa* is only a bye-product?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows—"Both the articles are brought into existence by the act of *cutting*—viz the Branch (the main top portion, the stick) and the bottom portion, both are of use: the top-portion is used for the driving away of the calf, and the bottom-portion is used as the *Upavēṣa* (in placing the Pan upon the Fire and so forth); hence as there are no grounds for differentiating between the two, both should be regarded as the 'motive' behind the act of cutting"

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—We say that it is the 'Branch' that prompts the *cutting*; because *that is the predominant factor*,—i.e. the 'Branch' is the principal thing to be secured,—and *it becomes cut off from the 'Upavēṣa'*, which *Upavēsa* therefore would be taken in only as a bye-product of the operation (of *cutting*) which brings about the 'Branch'.—"Why should the *Branch* be regarded as the principal thing?"—Because we find the Accusative ending in the word '*shākhām*' ('Branch') in the sentence '*Shākhām parivāsya*' ('Cutting the Branch') [and the Accusative ending denotes *the thing most desired*].—"But there is the Accusative ending in the word '*Upavēsam*' also, in the sentence '*Upavēsam karoti*' ('makes the *Upavēṣa*') [so that the *Upavēṣa* also is *the thing most desired*]."—The answer to this is that the *Upavēsa* is not the *objective* of the act of *cutting*,—it is the objective of the act of *making*.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the sentence be construed as—'Having cut the branch, he makes an *Upavēṣa* of its bottom-portion',—

the term 'branch' being as applicable to the bottom-portion as to the top-portion; so that what the sentence means is that 'by cutting, he should disjoin the top and the bottom',—for what purpose?—with the view that 'having disjoined the bottom from the top-portion, I shall make an *Upavēṣa* of the former' [so that the main thing to be secured by the *cutting* is the *Upavēṣa*, not the *Branch*]."

Answer—It is not so; such a construction would be too remote; by the straight construction it is clear that the *cutting* is for the purpose of securing the *Branch*, and it is only *after* the Branch has been secured that there comes the making of the *Upavēṣa*.

"Inasmuch as the sentence occurs in the 'Context' of the *Upavēṣa*, the 'bottom' is to be construed with the term '*Upavēsa*'."

The answer to this is that if the term 'bottom' were construed with both (the *Branch* and the *Upavēsa*), there would be an incongruity; and in the event of such an incongruity (due to conflict between 'Context', which connects the 'bottom' with the *Upavēsa*, and 'Syntactical Connection', which connects it with the *Branch*), 'Syntactical Connection' has to be regarded as more authoritative than 'Context'.

If it be held that "the *Upavēsa* may be connected with the *cutting* by reason of its being mentioned in close proximity to it (in the sentence under consideration)",—the answer is that even so, such connection would be possible with the *cutting*, only as prompted by (done for the purpose of securing) the *Branch*; and thus the *cutting* having been already done (for the purpose of the *Branch*, and the *Upavēṣa* also having been obtained as a bye-product), the *Upavēsa* cannot prompt (be the motive for) the act of *cutting*.

Thus it is that *there is a disparity* [between the *Branch* and the *Upavēṣa*] [i.e. the two do not stand on the same footing].

SŪTRA (9).

ALSO BECAUSE (THE PŪRVAPAKṢA VIEW WOULD INVOLVE) THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE VERY WORD ('BRANCH').

Bhāṣya

There are several uses laid down for the 'Branch'.—e.g. (*a*) He removes the calves with the Branch' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 2. 1. 1),—(*b*) 'Brings up the cows with the Branch, and milks them with the Branch' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 2. 1. 2);—for all these purposes, the *Upavēṣa* would be of no use; and if the *cutting* were not done for the securing of the *Branch* (and the *Branch* were not there, only the *Upavēṣa* consisting of the bottom-portion were there),—then the word 'Branch' would have to disappear (would be meaningless) in all the texts quoted; because the bottom-portion alone of the Branch is never called 'Branch'.—"What *if it is so*?"—Well, the *cutting* should be for getting that to which the name 'Branch' applies,—such being the force of the Accusative ending (in '*shākhām*'). If the name 'Branch' were applicable to the *bottom-portion*,—even so, the bottom-portion

could not be used for the purposes for which the 'Branch' has been prescribed; because the 'Branch' is that which has been cut off from the bottom-portion and hence rendered bottom-less. Then again, the *cutting* must be taken as to be done for that purpose which is accomplished with the Branch as thus embellished (by having the bottom cut off);—as for the placing of the pans on the fire, this is not done by the Branch of which the bottom has been cut off (in fact, it is done by the *Upavēṣa*, which is the bottom-portion itself);—hence the *cutting* cannot be taken as to be done for the purpose of placing the pans on fire.

"What is the purpose served by this discussion?"

According to the *Pūrvapakṣa* [i.e. if the *cutting* is for securing both the *Branch* and the *Upavēṣa*], the *Branch* should have to be secured at the *Paurṇamāsi* sacrifice also [where however there is nothing to be done with the Branch]: while according to the *Siddhānta* thus will not have to be done.

[At the *Paurṇamāsi* sacrifice, there being nothing to be done with the *Branch*, there would be no *cutting*, and hence no *Upavēṣa*; so that the putting up of the Pans on Fire would be done with any piece of wood.—this is according to the *Siddhānta*. According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, as the *cutting* should be done for securing the *Branch* as well as the *Upavēṣa*, it would have to be done also when there is nothing to be done with the *Branch*; so that in this case the *Upavēsa* would have to be secured and the placing of pans done with it—*Bhattadīpikā*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Throwing in of the Branch' is only by way of 'Disposal'; it is not a fruitful action prompting the Homa.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THERE IS 'THROWING IN' IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS 'OFFERING INTO FIRE'; BECAUSE BOTH ARE EQUALLY CONNECTED AND SUBSTANCES ARE ALWAYS SUBSERVIENT TO A PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read, '*Suha shākhayā prastaram praharati*' ('He throws in the *Kusha-bundle* along with the Branch').

In regard to this, there arises the question—"Is this 'Throwing in' of the Branch a mere *Disposal* or a Fruitful Action?"

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this point is as follows:—"*When there is 'Throwing in' it should be taken as 'offering into Fire'*", i.e. it should be regarded as a Fruitful Act;—why?—*because both are equally connected*; i.e. in the sentence 'He throws in the Kusha-bundle along with the Branch', the connection of the *Branch* (with the act of 'Throwing in') is equal to that of the *Kusha-bundle*. Wherever the Instrumental ending is used in connection with the term '*suha*' ('along with'), the thing expressed by the word with that ending is the subordinate factor, while that expressed by the word with the Accusative ending is the predominant factor. As regards the *Kusha-bundle*, it is clear that it is as an 'offering' that it is 'thrown in'; and in this same act of 'offering', the *Branch* also comes in as a concomitant of the *Kusha-bundle*, because its connection with that act is similar to that of the *Kusha-bundle*.—The following argument might be put forward—'In every such case, the *Branch* is the subordinate factor; hence the most reasonable view to take is that when it is *thrown in*, it is only an act of *disposal*; otherwise (if it were taken as an act of *offering*) it would involve the incongruity of the thing (*Branch*) subserving several and diverse purposes [the Branch has been used in the removing of the calf, etc., and now it is to be used as an offering-material]'.—The answer to this is that, as a matter of fact, *substances are always subservient to a purpose*; that is, whenever substances are enjoined, they are enjoined as subservient to something desired to be done, on the principle that 'whenever an accomplished entity is enjoined, it is always for the sake of something to be accomplished'; so that for substances (like the *Branch*, for instance), it is only right that they should subserve several and diverse purposes."

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A 'DISPOSAL'; BECAUSE THE TEXT INDICATES ITS PREDOMINANT CHARACTER.

Bhāṣya.

In reality the 'throwing in' of the Branch *should be regarded as a 'Disposal', because the text indicates its predominant character*; as a matter of fact, the text speaks of the Branch as the predominant factor.—"How so?"—Because of the presence of the Accusative ending.—"But the Accusative ending is found in another word '*prastaram*' (Kusha-bundle)—not in the term '*shākhā*' (which appears with the Instrumental ending)."—The answer to this is that what is connoted by the Accusative ending, which is present in the *Kusha-bundle*, is present in the *Branch* also—"How?"—Because of its being equally connected with the *Branch*; that is, the *Kusha-bundle* becomes 'thrown in' only if the *Branch* also is 'thrown in'; hence the term '*saha*' (together) signifies the equality of the connection of both things (with the act of 'throwing in'); so that if the *Kusha-bundle* is the principal factor in the act of 'throwing in', the *Branch* also is a concomitant of the *Kusha bundle*, thus it is that there is 'equality of connection'; hence if what is connoted by the Accusative ending is present in the *Kusha-bundle*, it is present in the *Branch* also. Thus it is that the *Branch* is a principal factor.

Then again, if the *Branch* were a subordinate factor in one case, then, if it were laid down as to be used in another case, it would involve the incongruity of its subserving several and diverse purposes.—What would be the incongruity in that?" The incongruity would be that the visible purpose served by it would have to be abandoned (ignored) and an invisible (transcendental one) assumed. After the *Branch* has been used (for the purpose of removing the calf, etc.), if it is removed from the Altar, more space becomes available and the subsequent details are more conveniently performed,—this is the *visible* purpose served by the removal (of the Branch); there is not the slightest visible purpose served by the 'throwing in' (of the Branch, as an offering in sacrifice); hence the only right view is to regard the 'throwing in' as an act of 'disposal'.

Says the Opponent—'Inasmuch as we find the Instrumental ending (in the word '*shākhayā*'), it should be more reasonable to take the *Branch* (*shākhā*) as mentioned for the purpose of (and subservient to) another thing (in this case, the *Kusha-bundle*)."

Answer—This would be reasonable if the *Branch* were something whose time (for being *thrown in*) were known; as in that case, its mention in the text could be taken as being for the purpose of indicating the time of the *Kusha-bundle* (being thrown in). In the case in question, the fact is quite the reverse; it is the *Kusha-bundle* whose time is known, and it is the *Branch* whose time is not known. Consequently, even though there is the Instrumental ending (in the word '*shākhayā*'), it is the *Kusha-bundle* which will indicate the time of the *Branch*. Thus then what is connoted

by the Accusative ending should be taken as appertaining to the *Branch*, and what is connoted by the Instrumental ending should be taken as appertaining to the *Kusha-bundle*; after all, it is the force (sense) of words (to express a certain meaning) which is more authoritative than anything else.

SŪTRA (12).

"BUT THAT WHICH IS SUBORDINATE (TO SOMETHING ELSE) MAY ALSO (BE SPOKEN OF BY A WORD WITH THE ACCUSATIVE ENDING)", —IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS BELOW].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, we find the Accusative ending also in connection with a term expressive of what is subservient to something else; we have this in the case—(*a*) of '*Saktu*' [in the text '*Saktūn juhoti*', where there is the Accusative ending in '*Saktūn*', and yet the *Saktu* is only a subordinate factor in the act of 'offering'], —(*b*) of '*Mārutā*' [in the text '*Mārutam saptakapālam*' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 4. 10. 2), where we have the Accusative ending in '*Mārutam saptakapālam*' and yet the 'Cake baked upon seven pans and dedicated to the Maruts' is only a subordinate factor], -and (*c*) of '*ekakapālam*' [in the text '*Sauryam ēkakapālam*' (Taitti. Sam. 2 1. 10. 2), where we have the Accusative ending in '*Sauryam ēkakapālam*' and the 'Cake baked on one pan and dedicated to *Sūrya*' is only a subordinate factor]."

SŪTRA (13)

THE CASES ARE NOT ANALOGOUS; IN THE OTHER CASE, THE THING IN QUESTION IS ONE THAT COULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE; WHEREAS IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE THING IN QUESTION HAS BEEN ACTUALLY USED FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The case we are considering now (that of the *Branch*) is not analogous to the case of the *Saktu* and other things (cited by the Opponent); because *the thing in the other case*—i.e. of the *Saktu* and other things, -*is one that could not be used for any other purpose*; whereas in the case we are considering, the thing in question—the Branch—has served a useful purpose, in the shape of the *removal of the calf* and the rest.

Says the Opponent—"What we find in the *Sūtras* [12 and 13] referring to the case of the *Saktu* and then answering it, is a mere repetition (of what has been done in several places)."

Answer—Repeating things cannot be very objectionable; what is useful should be learnt over and over again; if people avoid repetition, it is only through fear of making their work prolix; but when there is a fear that

people may not have understood the meaning, if one repeats a thing over and over again, they consider that very valuable.

"What is the purpose served by this discussion?"

If the 'throwing in of the Branch' is a fruitful act, the Branch should have to be secured at the *Paurṇamāsi* sacrifice [when there is nothing to be done with it, yet it has to be secured simply for being 'thrown in']; whereas if it is only by way of 'disposal' of what has been used, then there would be no need for securing it at the *Paurṇamāsi* sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): '*Pouring out*' *is an act of* '*Disposal*'.

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS IN ITS ORIGIN, THE WATER BROUGHT IN HAS NO CONNECTION (WITH ANY PURPOSE), THERE SHOULD BE A DIVISION OF IT,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read— *Apaḥ praṇayati, āpo vai shraddhā shrāddhamēvālabhya yajatē*' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 2. 4. 1) ['He brings in Water; Water indeed is faith, and it is only when imbued with faith that one offers a sacrifice'];—there are two uses laid down for the Water thus brought in—(*a*) 'With the Water brought in he kneads the offering-materials' and (*b*) 'Inside the altar, he pours out the Water that had been brought in'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are both these—*kneading* and *pouring out*—the 'motive' for the Bringing in of Water? Or is it only for the *kneading* that the Water is brought in, and the *pouring out* is only a 'disposal' of what remains of it after the kneading has been done?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"In its origin the Water is not connected with any purpose [i.e. it is not brought in for any purpose at all]; it is only after it has been brought in that it becomes connected with both the purposes (*kneading* and *pouring out*); hence we do not perceive any grounds for discriminating between these two; and when no grounds for differentiating are perceived, the Water must be regarded as meant for both purposes; and *there should be a division of it*—that is, some part of it should be used for *kneading* the offering-material and some of it should be *poured out; just as in the case of the Clarified Butter*, in regard to which it is declared that 'When the Clarified Butter is brought into the *Dhruvā-vessel*, it is for all the sacrifices' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 3. 5. 5) [and what is done is that it is divided among the various sacrifices performed]."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THE WATER IS BROUGHT IN FOR THE PURPOSE OF KNEADING; AS REGARDS THE REST OF THE WATER, ITS 'POURING OUT' MUST BE REGARDED AS A DISPOSAL, BECAUSE IN REGARD TO THAT ACT (OF 'POURING OUT') THE WATER IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

The Water that is *brought in* is for the purpose of *kneading*.—Why? Because it is spoken of by a word with the Instrumental ending (in the

text '*Praṇītābhiḥ haviṁṣi saṁyanti*'), therefore it follows that in this connection the Water *is a subordinate factor*. In connection with the act of 'pouring over', on the other hand, the Water is spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending (in the text '*Antarvēdi praṇītāḥ ninayati*'); and hence it follows that in this connection, the Water is the predominant factor.

The purpose served by this discussion is that, in cases where there is no Cake (and hence no kneading of the dough), Water need not be brought in at all; e.g. in the case where the material offered is *curd*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'making over of the stick' is a 'fruitful act'.*

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"LIKE THE 'THROWING AWAY' (OF THE HORN) THE 'MAKING OVER OF THE STICK' TO THE MAITRĀVARUṆA PRIEST [SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF 'DISPOSAL'], BECAUSE IT HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Vāgvai dēvēbhyo'pakrāmat yajñāyātiṣṭhamānā sā vanaspatīn prāvishat, saiṣā vāg vanaspatiṣu vadati yā dundubhau yā cha tūṇavē yā cha vīṇāyām, yat dīkṣitāya daṇḍam prayachchhati vāchamēvāvarundhē; krītē somē maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍam prayachchhati*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 4. 1-2) ['Verily, speech ran away from the deities, not waiting for the sacrifice; she entered the trees; it is this speech which speaks in the trees,—when, for instance, it speaks in the drum and in the bamboo and in the lute; when one presents the stick to the initiated sacrificer, he preserves his speech; He makes over the stick to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest'].—It is this last sentence—'He makes over the stick to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest'—which forms the subject of the present discussion.

In regard to this, there arises the question—The stick having been already used by being held by the Initiated Sacrificer, when it comes to be held by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest, is this latter *holding of the stick* an act of 'disposal'—or a 'fruitful act'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The 'making over of the stick to the *Maitrāvaruṇa*' is an act of 'disposal';—why?—*because it has already served its purpose*, by having been held by the Initiated Sacrificer.—The *stick* has been laid down as to be used in the initiating of the Sacrificer—in the text '*Daṇḍēna dīkṣayanti*', 'They initiate him with the stick' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 3. 8);—so that after it has been used for that purpose, if it is used for some other purpose, it is only reasonable that this latter should be regarded as an act of 'disposal'; just as when the Black Horn that has been used by the Sacrificer in rubbing the itching parts of his body is thrown into the pit,—in accordance with the text '*Chātvālē kṛṣṇaviṣāṇām prāsyati*', 'He throws the Black Horn into the pit',—this 'throwing' is regarded as an act of 'disposal'; the same should be understood to be the case in the instance under consideration.—Further, the *stick* is spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending, which shows that it is the predominant factor."

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS A 'FRUITFUL ACT', BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO AN AGENT,—JUST LIKE THE GARLAND.

Bhāṣya.

The act in question should, in reality, be regarded as a 'fruitful act';—why?—*because it is related to an agent*; in the text 'Makes over the stick to the *Maitrāvaruṇa*' the act of 'making over' is spoken of in relation to the Agent (*Maitrāvaruna*); so that the *stick* must be a subordinate factor, the Agent being the predominant factor; because it is the Agent whom the stick enables to walk about: with its help he moves about in the dark or in water, also drives away cows and serpents, and supports himself by it. Thus the Agent being the predominant factor, the action of 'making over' cannot be an act of 'disposal'.—In fact, the case is to be treated as *analogous to that of the garland: we have the text 'Srajamudgātrē dadāti'*, 'He makes over the garland to the *Udgātr* Priest' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 8. 18. 1); in this case, even though the garland does not serve any useful purpose for the man concerned, yet as the Man (*Udgātr*) is still wanted for several purposes, while there is no further use for the garland,—predominance is attached to the Man. The same should be done in the case in question also.

It has been argued that—"Because of the presence of the Accusative ending, the *stick* should be regarded as the predominant factor".—The answer to this is that, the Accusative ending is used here in the sense explained in Pāṇini's *Sūtra* 1. 4. 50, by which 'if a thing is connected with another thing which is what is *most desired* to be obtained by means of the action denoted by the verb, then the former thing also comes to be regarded as the *objective*, even though it is not what is the *most desired thing*'. [So that the mere presence of the Accusative ending does not make the thing *the most desired* and hence the predominant factor.]—"But why should it be taken in that sense?"—Because we find the term '*Maitrāvaruṇa*' with the Dative ending; as a rule, the Dative ending is added to a term which denotes *the recipient of a gift*; and the recipient of the gift is the one who is desired to be benefited by the act (of *giving*); it follows therefore that in the case in question, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest is more *desired* (and hence more important) than the *stick*.

SŪTRA (18).

ALSO BECAUSE THE STICK IS MENTIONED AS BEING IN (THE HANDS OF THE) PRIEST STILL ENGAGED IN THE PERFORMANCE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Daṇḍi praiṣānanvāha*' ('*Holding the stick*, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* repeats the directions')—which describes a certain act done by the priest; and it shows that after the stick has been made over to him, the priest moves about holding the stick in his hand; this would be possible

only if the 'making over of the stick' to him were a 'fruitful act'; if it were a mere 'disposal', then on its having been made over to the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, the function of the stick would have ended there, as all that had to be done with it would have been done; so that there would be no further need for it; and hence it could not be kept in the hand. Under the circumstances, what we find in the description just quoted would not be possible.

Similarly there is the text '*Ahastvām dashati iti maitrāvaruṇam brūyāt, ahirēva hyēṣa*' ['He should say to the *Maitrāvaruṇa—The Serpent is biting you, this verily is a serpent*'] [where it is the stick held by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* that is spoken of as the *serpent*].

Again, there is the text—'*Mushalī anvāha*' ['The man with the *Mushala* recites'], where the *Maitrāvaruṇa* is spoken of as holding the *Mushala*, and the word '*mushala*' is known to signify the *stick*,—as we find in such expressions as 'Where should the Boys with *mushalas* (sticks) descend into the Gangā?'.

From all this also it follows that the *making over of the stick* to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* (and his holding it) is a 'fruitful act'.

SŪTRA (19).

IF AN ACT, IN ITS VERY ORIGIN, IS CONNECTED WITH A DEFINITE PURPOSE, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SERVING THAT PURPOSE;—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT ASSERTION OF THE VEDA: AND WHEN SUCH AN ACT GOES OVER TO ANOTHER, THEN IT MUST BE REGARDED AS A DISPOSAL; AS IN THIS CASE IT IS NOT A SUBSIDIARY FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above that—"just as the throwing away of the Black Antelope's Horn [is an act of 'disposal', so should the 'making over of the stick to the *Maitrāvaruṇa*' also be]".—The answer to this is as follows—It is only right that, when an act, *in its origin*—i.e. while coming into existence,—comes as connected with a definite purpose,—it is only reasonable that that act should be taken as done for that purpose. And when it goes over elsewhere (i.e. apart from the said purpose), then it should be regarded as an act of 'disposal'. And this is right only in cases where no visible purpose is served (as in the case of the throwing of the *Horn*); but in the case in question there is a visible purpose served by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* holding the stick,—hence the two cases are not analogous.

[By this explanation, Sū. 19 is a part of *Adhikaraṇa* (6); but by a second interpretation given in the *Bhāṣya*, this *Sūtra* forms an independent *Adhikaraṇa* by itself—as below.]

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The throwing of the Black Antelope's Horn is an act of 'Disposal'.*

SŪTRA (19)—[as above].

Bhāṣya

The *Sūtra* may be taken as setting forth a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* by itself: [It is laid down that a *Black Horn* is to be used by the Sacrificer in scratching his body and then to be thrown into the Pit;—the question that arises is—Are both these acts—the *scratching* and the *throwing*—'motive' behind the securing of the Black Antelope's Horn? Or is it the *scratching* only?—and this resolves itself into the question—Is the *throwing* of the Horn a 'fruitful act', or an act of 'disposal'?]—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—'The Horn is secured for the purpose of both the acts, because 'when several things are brought about by the same act, they should all equally be regarded as the *motive* of that act' (Sū. 4. 1. 22)".—The *Siddhānta* is that in connection with the act of *rubbing*, the Horn is spoken of by means of a word with the Instrumental ending ('*viṣāṇayā*'), which shows that it must be the subordinate factor, whereas in connection with the act of *throwing*, inasmuch as it is spoken of by means of a word with the Accusative ending ('*viṣānam*'), and as it has been already used elsewhere, it must be regarded as the principal factor [from which it follows that the act of *throwing of the Black Antelope's Horn* is one of 'disposal'].

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The carrying of the things smeared with Soma-juice to the Sacrificial Bath is an act of 'disposal'.*

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AT THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, ALSO [THE CARRYING OF THE THINGS SMEARED WITH SOMA-JUICE TO THE SACRIFICIAL BATH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF 'DISPOSAL'], BECAUSE THEY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice*, there is the Sacrificial Bath, laid down in the text—'With the cake baked upon one pan, dedicated to Varuṇa, they proceed to the Sacrificial Bath' (Mai. S. 4. 8. 5). In connection with this Sacrificial Bath, we read—'*Varuṇagṛhītam vaitad yajñasya yadṛjīṣam yadgrāvāṇaḥ yadaudumbarī yadabhiṣavaṇaphalake. tasmāt yatkiñchit somaliptam dravyam tena avabhṛtham yanti*' ['All the sacrificial things are taken hold of by Varuṇa—the Soma-stalks out of which all the juice has been extracted, the stones, the Post of *Udambara* wood, and the two slabs used in the extracting of Soma-juice; hence they proceed to the Sacrificial Bath along with everything that is smeared with Soma-juice'] (Mai. S. 4. 8. 5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this carrying of the things smeared with Soma-juice to the Sacrificial Bath an act of 'disposal' or a 'fruitful act'?

The correct view is that the act in question is one of 'disposal';—why?—*because they have served their purpose*; that is, as a matter of fact, everyone of the things spoken of has served its purpose in connection with several acts; hence it is only right that the carrying of these to the Sacrificial Bath should be regarded as an act of 'disposal'.

SŪTRA (21).

[*Objection, embodying the Pūrvapakṣa*]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A 'FRUITFUL ACT', BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH A NAME."

Bhāṣya.

"The act in question should be regarded as a 'fruitful act'; *because it is connected with a name*, in the sentence '*tena avabhṛtham yanti*', which means that 'with that they accomplish the act named *avabhṛtha*',—where we have the Instrumental ending in the word '*tēna*', and the Accusative in '*avabhṛtha*'; whence it follows that *the thing smeared with Soma-juice*

is the subordinate, and the *Avabhṛtha* (Sacrificial Bath) the predominant factor [and hence the act denoted by the verb '*yanti*' is a fruitful act]."

SŪTRA (22).

[*Reply*]—IN REALITY, IT MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF 'DISPOSAL'; FOR THE REASON ALREADY STATED. AS FOR THE MENTION OF 'AVABHṚTHA' (SACRIFICIAL BATH), IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING THE PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the act in question should be regarded as one of 'disposal'.—Why?—*For the reason already stated*; i.e. as a rule, what has served its purpose in one place is 'disposed of' in another.—In the case in question, if *the thing smeared with Soma-juice* were laid down as a *means* of accomplishing the Sacrificial Bath, then the *carrying* of those things would be a 'fruitful act'; if, on the other hand, what is enjoined is only that the priests should *go* to the Bath with the *things smeared with Soma-juice*, then it would be an act of 'disposal'. As a matter of fact, *the things smeared with Soma juice* are not enjoined as a means to the Sacrificial Bath: for if they were so meant, then this relationship between the *Bath* and the *things smeared with Soma-juice* would have been enjoined by the verb '*abhyavayanti*',—and such an injunction would be by *Syntactical Connection*, not by *Direct Assertion* [as the said relationship is *not directly expressed* by the verb]. On the other hand, if the proceeding were taken as enjoined by the said verb, the injunction would be by *Direct Assertion* [as the *proceeding* is what is *directly expressed* by the verb '*yanti*']. Thus it is that this latter interpretation comes to be accepted: *Direct Assertion* being more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. Hence it follows that the act in question is one of 'disposal'.

It has been argued that—"the act in question should be regarded as a 'fruitful act', because it is connected with the name" (Sū. 20).—Our answer to this is as follows:—Under the circumstances, *the mention of 'Avabhṛtha'* (*Sacrificial Bath*) should be taken as *serving the purpose of indicating the place*; that is, in the phrase 'they proceed to the Sacrificial Bath', the *avabhṛtha* indicates the place; the meaning being that 'they proceed *to the place where the Sacrificial Bath* takes place'.

From all this it follows that the act in question is one of 'disposal'.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The injunctions of (a) Performer, (b) Place, (c) Time, and (d) Substance are meant to be restrictive.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE IS NO INJUNCTION OF (*a*) PERFORMER, (*b*) PLACE, AND (*c*) TIME,—AS THESE ARE NECESSARY FACTORS IN EVERY PERFORMANCE."

Bhāṣya

We have the following texts—(*a*) '*Pashubandhasya yajñakratoḥ saḍ ṛtvijaḥ*' ['There are six priests at the performance of the *Pashubandha* sacrifice'] (Taitti. Brā. 2. 3. 6. 3);—(*b*) '*Darshapūrṇamāsayoḥ yajñakratoshchatvāra ṛtvijaḥ*' ['At the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices, there are four priests'] (Taitti. Brā. 2 3. 6. 2);—(*c*) '*Chāturmāsyānām kratūnām pañcha ṛtvijaḥ*' ['At the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, there are five priests'] (Taitti. Brā. 2. 3. 6. 2);—(*d*) '*Agnihotrasya yajñakratoḥ eka ṛtvik*' ['At the performance of the *Agnihotra* sacrifice, there is one priest'] (Taitti. Brā. 2. 3. 6. 1);—(*e*) '*Saumyasyādhvarasya yajñakratoḥ saptadasha ṛtvijaḥ*' ['At the performance of the *Soma-sacrifice*, there are seventeen priests'] (Taitti. Brā. 2. 3. 6. 4).—[In all these the number of *performers* is mentioned).—Then again—(*f*) '*Samē darsha-pūrṇamāsabhyām yajēta, prāchīnapravaṇē vaishvadēvēna yajēta*' ['The *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* should be performed on level ground; the *Vaishvadēva* sacrifice should be performed on ground sloping towards the East'].—[In this, the *place* is mentioned]; —(*g*) '*Paurṇamāsyām paurṇamāsyā yajēta amāvāsyāyām amāvāsyayā*' ['One should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice on the Full-moon Day, and the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice on the Moonless Day'].—(In this, the *time* is mentioned.)

In regard to all this, there arises the question—In these texts are (*a*) the performers, (*b*) the place, and (*c*) the time *enjoined*? Or only spoken of by way of *reference*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*There is no injunction of the performer, the place, and the time*; it is all mere reference; —why?—*because they are necessary factors in every performance*; every one of these is a necessary factor in every performance; without a performer, a place, and a time, there can be no performance of any act; hence all these are already enjoined along with the injunction of the performance itself; hence, being already known, they are mentioned in the texts quoted, only by way of *reference*,—'the text may be taken as meant to prohibit the *uneven* ground and such other details'.—That cannot be, we reply. Because texts like those in question are *injunctive*, not *prohibitive*. Hence it should all be taken as a mere *reference* (to what is already known from the injunctions of the acts concerned)."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE TEXT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTION.

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—The text in question cannot be a mere *reference* or *reiteration*; a mere reiteration is useless; whereas if it is an Injunction, then it will lay down something new; hence it must be taken as an Injunction.—"But what it lays down is already known as part of the performance."—The answer to this is that the text will serve *the purposes of restriction*.—"What do you mean by *restriction*?"—When what is indefinite is made definite, it is *restriction*. For instance, in the case in question, what comes in as a necessary factor in every performance is only *place* in general (indefinitely);—but all places collectively cannot be used for any performance; when we use a level ground, we do not use an uneven ground; when we use uneven ground, we do not use level ground; so that in regard to any particular action [if our sole guide were the fact that some sort of place is necessary for every performance] the *level* ground may, as well as may not, come to our mind as to be adopted;—in a case where the level ground does not come up to our mind,—such a case affords the occasion for the Injunction (that 'the sacrifice should be performed on *level* ground'); so that even though the performer may be desirous of performing it on *uneven* ground, the text lays down the Injunction that it should be done on *level* ground; and the result is that, when this Injunction is there, the *uneven* ground does not come to the mind at all.—Similarly in the case of the other texts also.—From all this it follows that every one of the texts quoted contains an *Injunction*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The Injunction of the properties of substances is restrictive in its application.*

SŪTRA (25).

SIMILARLY, THE MENTION OF THE PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCES SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A RESTRICTIVE INJUNCTION; BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED TO THE VERY ORIGIN [OF THE SACRIFICE, VIZ. THE SUBSTANCES].

Bhāṣya.

This is a part of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

We have the following texts—(*a*) '*Vāyavyam shvētamālabhēta bhūtikāmaḥ*' ['Desiring prosperity one should sacrifice a *white* goat dedicated to *Vāyu*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 1. 1);—(*b*) '*Somāraudram ghṛtē charum nirvapēt shuklānām vrīhīṇām brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' ['Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer a cooked offering of *white* corns in Clarified Butter, dedicated to *Soma-Rudra*'] (Mai. Saṁ. 2. 1. 5);—(*c*) '*Naiṛṛtam charum nirvapēt kṛṣṇānām vrihīṇām*' ['One should offer a cooked offering of *black* corns, dedicated to the *Niṛṛti*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 8. 9. 1).

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the colours, *white* (and *black*) mentioned in these texts, actually *enjoined*? Or only *reiterated*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"It is only *reiterated*; because it is already included in the Injunction of the substances themselves".

The *Siddhānta* is that it is an *Injunction*,—for the purpose of *restricting* the colours which, in certain cases, may not come up to the mind.

The purpose served by both these *Adhikaraṇas* is the same that has been shown in the *Siddhānta* [that what was indefinite becomes well defined].

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The Injunctions of embellishments like 'Threshing' are restrictive in their application.*

SŪTRA (26).

SO ALSO, IN THE CASE OF EMBELLISHMENT; BECAUSE THAT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

This also is part of *Adhikaraṇa* (9).

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Vrīhīn avahanti, taṇḍulān pinaṣṭi*' ['He threshes the corn, and pounds the rice'].

Question—Are these two Injunctions? Or Reiterations?

Purvapakṣa—"What *is mentioned is already known to be the means* of securing what is wanted (in the making of the Cake, etc.); hence the statement is a mere reiteration."

Siddhānta—They are injunctions, as they serve the purpose of *restricting* the method (of securing what is wanted) to one out of several possible ones.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *What is 'Yāga', 'Sacrifice'?*

SŪTRA (27).

WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE ROOT 'YAJ', 'TO SACRIFICE', SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THAT ACT WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A 'SUBSTANCE' AND A 'DEITY', AS THIS SENSE IS APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE LOT (OF PRIMARY ACTIONS)

Bhāṣya

Hitherto we have explained how the performance of the *subsidiary* is prompted (by the *Primary* Act) —Now the question arises— What is that *Primary* Act of which the acts dealt with are *subsidiaries*?—The answer to this is that the *Primary Act* is in the form of *Yāga, sacrificing, Dāna, giving,* and *Homa, pouring into a receptacle.*—Next arises the question— What is the distinctive feature of each of these acts —of *sacrificing, giving,* and *pouring into a receptacle*?—In answer to this we have the definition of 'Sacrifice' provided in the *Sūtra*; [that of *pouring* into *a receptacle* follows under Sū. 28, and that of *giving*, under the *Bhāṣya* on Sū 28]—*What is denoted by the root 'yaj, to sacrifice'* - i.e the act of *Yāga, Sacrifice— is that act which brings about the connection between a substance and a deity*, the compound '*dravya-dēvatā-kriyam*' being explained as that '*kriyā*', act, whereby a connection is established between the '*dravya*', substance, and the '*dēvatā*', deity.—In this sense the term 'sacrifice' becomes applicable to the whole lot of (primary) acts [i.e *Yāga Dāna*, and *Homa*, every one of which, with slight variations, is an act that establishes a connection between a substance and a deity],—for instance, we find people making use of such expressions as *Iṣṭo'nēna pashupatiḥ*' [which is used in the case of all the three kinds of offering—*Yāga, Dāna*, and *Homa*].—From this we conclude that the term 'sacrifice' signifies that act which brings about the connection between a substance and a deity.

As for the purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa*, there is no need for seeking for the purpose served by a *definition*; as the sole purpose served by it is that it provides the idea of the thing defined.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *What is 'Homa'?*

SŪTRA (28).

INASMUCH AS THE NAME IS FOUND TO BE USED IN THE SAME SENSE (AS 'YĀGA'), THE 'HOMA' WOULD BE THE SAME (AS 'YĀGA') WITH THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENT OF 'POURING'.

Bhāṣya.

Question—What is the characteristic of '*Homa*', 'Offering into Fire'?

Answer—As a matter of fact we find that the name '*Homa*' is used in the sense of '*Yāga*', 'sacrifice', with the additional element of 'pouring'; hence *Homa* is 'sacrifice accompanied by pouring'. It is in this sense that in common parlance, people are found to be using such expressions as '*anēna hutam*' ('*Homa* has been performed by this person'). In the *Veda* also the act that has been enjoined as a 'sacrifice', '*Yāga*', is found referred to as '*Homa*',—e.g. in the following text—'*Saṅgrāminam chaturhotrā yājayēt; Chaturgṛhītamājyam kṛtvā chaturhotāram vyachakṣīta, pūrvēṇa grahēṇārdham juhuyādduttarēṇārdham*' [where the sentence opens with the injunction of '*Yāga*', sacrifice, by the word '*yājayēt*', and at the end of the sentence the same act is referred to as '*Homa*', by the word '*juhuyāt*'].

Question—What is the characteristic of the act of 'giving', '*Dāna*'?

Answer—In the act of 'giving', there is setting aside of one's own ownership (over the thing given away) and bringing about of the ownership of another person (the recipient of the gift).

In all the three acts of *sacrificing, giving*, and *Homa* (offering into Fire), the act of 'offering' is the common element; in the case of *sacrificing*, there is simple offering to (in reference to) the deity;—*Homa* is the same, but with the further element of 'pouring'; —and in *giving* there is *offering* followed by the bringing about of the ownership of the recipient.—Such is the distinction among these.

[The *Tuptīkā* remarks that the *Bhāṣya* mentions 'pouring' because this is the element present in most *Homas*, where the material generally used is Clarified Butter or some such liquid substance. As a matter of fact however, there are several *Homas* at which the material used consists of grains—sesamum in many cases. Hence what differentiates the *Homa* from the *Yāga* is this, that in the former the material is *thrown into* some suitable receptacle as remarked by *Tantraratna* and the *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā*, p. 105. It is not necessary for the offering to be thrown *into Fire* to make it *Homa* (as has been asserted in the *Bhāṭṭabhāskara*); because in many cases the throwing of substances *into water* is also called '*Homa*'; e.g. at the *Avabhṛtha-Iṣṭi*, performed on the completion of the *Agnistoma*.—The difference among *Yāga, Dāna*, and *Homa* is as follows:—The relinquishment of one's own ownership is the factor common to all the three; but in *Yāga* there is merely verbal surrendering of one's ownership, the thing offered not being actually taken away by the recipient-deity;—in *Dāna*, the thing is actually taken away by the recipient;—in *Homa*, the thing offered has got to be thrown into some suitable receptacle, water or fire.—See *Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsā*, pp. 248-249.]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Varhiṣ', 'grass', is common to the three sacrifices, 'Ātithyā', 'Upasad', and 'Agnīṣomīya' —i.e. the performance of all the three is the 'motive' for securing the 'grass'.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE INJUNCTION BECOMES FULFILLED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FIRST SACRIFICE, IF THE SAME THING (GRASS) IS USED AT 'ANOTHER SACRIFICE, THIS WOULD BE A TRANSFERENCE (OF THE THING FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND OR THIRD SACRIFICE)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Yadātithyāyām varhiḥ tadupasadām tadagnīṣomīyasya*' ['That grass which is at the *Ātithyā Iṣṭi* is also at the *Upasads* and also at the *Agnīṣomīya*'].—

[Having purchased the *Soma* and placed it in the cart, they bring it to the *Prāchīnavaṁśa*, at that time they perform an *Iṣṭi* which is called the '*Ātithyā Iṣṭi*'.—After that, for three days they offer a sacrifice which is called '*Upasad*', of which thus there are three, one on each day.—On the *Anuvasathya* day, they perform another sacrifice which is called the '*Agnīṣomīya*'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—(1) Does the injunction mean that the substance belonging to one sacrifice (*Ātithyā*) is to be used at another (the *Upasad*, etc.)?—or (2) that the remnant of the substance used at the first sacrifice is to be used at the second and third?—or (3) that the characteristic details of the substance used at the first sacrifice are to be transferred to the substance used at the second and third sacrifices?—or (4) the same substance has been enjoined in common, for all the three sacrifices?

(1) The first *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"The substance belonging to one sacrifice is enjoined as to be used at the others.—Why?—Because the words of the text—'That which is used at the *Ātithyā* is the same as that used at the *Upasads*'—are such as are used in cases where a thing belonging to one is laid down for another; e.g. when it is said that 'the ox that belongs to Devadatta should be made to belong to Viṣṇumitra', what is done is that the ox is wrested from Devadatta and given to Viṣṇumitra. Similarly in the case in question we have the injunction that 'what belongs to one sacrifice is to be used at another'."

This view however is open to the objection that the previous injunction of that substance as to be used at the *Ātithyā* would become absolutely useless [as the substance would be taken away from the *Ātithyā* and used at the *Upasads*].

(2) In view of this difficulty, the following view is put forth as the second *Pūrvapakṣa*—"What is enjoined as to be used at the *Upasads* is the

remnant of what has been used at the *Ātithyā*; in this case the meaning of the phrase 'that which is at the *Ātithyā*' is 'that which has been enjoined in connection with, or which has been got for, the *Ātithyā*'. In this way, the previous mention of the connection of the substance with the *Ātithyā* comes to have some use."

This view also is open to the objection that the *Upasads*, in this case, would be performed with the *remnant* of another sacrifice; which is not the practice of cultured people; and in this case, all the characteristics of the Original Primary Substance would not come into the second sacrifice.

(3) In view of this difficulty, we put forward the following view as the *third* (and final) *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*Inasmuch as the Injunction becomes fulfilled by the performance of the first sacrifice, if the same thing is used at another sacrifice, this would be a case of transference of the details of the thing from the first to the second sacrifice.* That is, when the *Ātithyā* is completed, the grass enjoined for it has fulfilled its purpose;—previously that grass belonged to the *Ātithyā*; but at the time of the performance of the *Upasads*, there is no connection between that grass and the *Ātithyā* (as the *Ātithyā* being long over, it is not there); under the circumstances, that grass could be only indirectly indicated by the name of the *Ātithyā* sacrifice; and recourse to Indirect Indication is not right. For all these reasons the most reasonable view to take would be that, there being no possibility of the '*grass of the Ātithyā*' being there at the time of the performance of the *Upasads* and the *Agnīṣomīya*, what is meant is that the characteristics of the grass used at these two sacrifices should be the same as the characteristics of the grass that was used at the *Ātithyā*."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE CONNECTION OF THE GRASS (WITH ALL THE THREE SACRIFICES) BEING EQUALLY BASED UPON ITS ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION, THAT USEFUL CONNECTION OF ONE AND THE SAME GRASS MUST BE WITH ALL THOSE SACRIFICES WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION; WHICH WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR THE SAME USE BEING MADE OF THE GRASS AT ALL THE SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', sets aside the view expressed above. As a matter of fact, *the connection of the 'grass' (with all the three sacrifices) is based upon its originative injunction*; if the grass brought in at the *Ātithyā* were one possessed of special characteristics, then it would be possible for those characteristics to be transferred to the grass used at the *Upasads* and the *Agnīṣomīya*; as a matter of fact, however, there is no text which lays down any such special characteristics for the grass used at the *Ātithyā*. In fact, the only special features of that grass will be laid down later on in such texts as—(*a*) '*Ashvabālaḥ prastaraḥ*' ('The bedding is of *Ashvabāla* grass or

horse-hair');—(*b*) '*Vidhritī chēkṣavyau*' ('The *Vidhṛtis* are to be of sugar-cane sticks').—Thus then it is clear—(1) that the text does *not* speak of the grass of one sacrifice to be used at another,—(2) that it is *not* the remnant of the grass used at one sacrifice that is to be used at the other,—(3) that it is *not* that the *characteristics* of the grass of one sacrifice are transferred to that of another.—"What then is the correct view?"—The correct view is that the grass is laid down in common for all the three sacrifices; that is to say, the grass that is enjoined for the *Ātithyā* is also enjoined for the *Upasads*, and also for the *Agniṣomīya*; so that the connection of the same grass with all the sacrifices without any distinction; that is to say, when the gra is cut in the beginning (before the performance of the sacrifices), that cuttin of the grass serves the purpose of all the sacrifices, and the use of the gra is common to all the sacrifices also.—In this way the direct meaning of th word 'grass' becomes accepted; in the other case there would be an indirec indication of the *characteristics* of the grass; and there is no doubt that when there is a doubt as to which of the two—Direct Expression and Indirect Indication—is to be accepted, the reasonable course is to accept the Direct Expression, not the Indirect Indication.—From all this it follows that the grass belongs in common to all the three sacrifices.

The purpose served by the *Adhikarana* is as has been pointed out in the exposition of the *Siddhānta*.

End of Pāda II of Adhyāya IV.

ADHYĀYA IV.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): (*a*) *Substances*, (*b*) *Embellishments, and* (*c*) *Minor Acts subserve the purposes of the sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1).

THE MENTION OF RESULTS IN CONNECTION WITH 'SUBSTANCES', 'EMBELLISHMENTS', AND 'ACTS' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS COMMENDATORY; BECAUSE THEY SUBSERVE THE PURPOSES OF ANOTHER (ACTION).

Bhāṣya.

(A) [There are some passages which speak of certain desirable results following from the use of certain *substances* at a sacrifice; e.g.]—(*a*) '*Yasya khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati sa chhandasāmēva rasēna ava dyati sarasā asya āhutayo bhavanti yasya parṇamayī juhūrbhavati na sa pāpaṁ shlokaṁ shṛnoti*' [' If a man uses the *Sruva* made of *Khadira*-wood, he offers the very essence of the Vedas, and his offerings become juicy; if one uses the *Juhū* made of *Palāsha*-wood, he never hears any evil of himself']; —(*b*) '*Yasyāshvatthī upabhṛt bhavati brahmaṇaivāsyānnamavarundhē, yasya vaikaṅkatī dhruvā bhavati pratyēvāsya āhutayastiṣṭhanti, atho prajaiva jāyatē, yasmivanurūpīḥ sruvī bhavanti sarvēṇāyēvānnaṁ rūpāṇi paśhūnāmupatiṣṭhantē nāsya apsurūpam ātmanjāyatē*' [' If one uses the *Upabhṛt* made of *Ashvattha*-wood, he obtains food through the Mantra; if one uses the *Dhruvā* made of *Vikaṅkata*-wood, his offerings become stable and obtain progeny; he who makes use of such *Sruvas*, all kinds of cattle accrue to him and no ugly progeny is born to him'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 3. 5. 7. 3). (B) Similarly we have the following declarations of certain results following from certain 'embellishments' in connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice—(*a*) '*Yadā anktē chakṣurēva bhrātṛvasya vṛṅktē*' ['When one applies collyrium to his own eyes, he destroys the eyes of his enemy'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 2); —(*b*) '*Kēśhaśmaśhrū vapatē, dato dhāvatē, nakhāni nikṛntati, snāti, mṛtā va ēṣā tvagamēdhyam vā'syaitadātmanī śhamalaṁ tadēvopahutē, mēdhya eva mēdhamupaiti*' ('He shaves his head and beard, cleanses his teeth, pares his nails, bathes; perished skin is unclean; when he removes it he becomes clean and fit for performing sacrifices'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 2).—(*c*) In the following texts we have declarations of results following from certain (minor) acts—(*a*) '*Abhīṣū vā ētau yajñasya yadāghārau*', (*b*) '*chakṣuṣī vā ētau yajñasya yadājyabhāgam*' ('The two *Āghāra* offerings are the two reins of the sacrifice'; 'the two *Ājyabhāga* offerings are the two eyes of the Sacrifice') (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 2. 1);—(*c*) '*Yat prayājānuyājā ijyantē varma vā ētat yajñasya kriyatē, varma yajamānasya bhrātṛivyasya abhibhūtyai*' [' When the *Prayāja* and *Anuyāja* offerings are made, it becomes

an armour for the Sacrificer, an armour for the Sacrificer conducive to the suppression of his enemy '] (Taitti. Saṁh. 2. 6. 1. 5).

In regard to these declarations of Results, there arises the question—Are these injunctions of actual results? Or are they only commendatory declarations?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"they should be regarded as *injunctions of actual results*; because an injunction of results prompts the activity (expected to bring about those results); e.g. it has been declared that 'if a person desires virility, his sacrificial post should be made of *Khadira*-wood; if he desires Brahmic glory, it should be made of *Palāśa*-wood; if he desires food, it should be made of *Bilva*-wood' [Aita. Brā. 2. 1]; and just as these have been regarded as injunctions of actual results (as admitted by all parties), so should the declarations in question also be regarded".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—These declarations of results should be regarded as purely commendatory.—Why? *Because they* [*i.e. the things from which the results are said to follow*] *subserve the purposes of another*—i.e. of the main sacrifice. For instance, the *Juhū* (a kind of ladle) is subservient to the act of *offering*, the *Upabhṛt* (a kind of dish) is subservient to the act of *Holding*; the *Dhruvā* (a kind of vessel) is subservient to the act of containing the Clarified Butter, the applying of collyrium and shaving, etc., are subservient to the Sacrificer, and the *Āghāra* and *Ājyabhāga*, as well as the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas* are subservient to the *Āgneya* and other sacrifices—Such being the case, if these were subservient to the Result also, then it would mean that things enjoined in one place (in the injunctions of those things to which they are subservient) are laid down in another place as subservient to yet other things:—and thus would be most incongruous.—Because 'subservience' consists in subserving the purposes of another, and the fact of the things in question subserving the purposes of the sacrifice has been made clear by Vedic texts themselves;—e.g. there is the text '*Juhvā juhoti*', which means that 'one performs the offering with the *Juhū*' [where the *Juhū* is spoken of as subserving the purpose of the offering of a material at the sacrifice]; similarly in the other cases.—From all this it follows that the things in question do not subserve the purposes of Man

SŪTRA (2).

ALSO BECAUSE THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION DOES NOT POINT TO THE MAN AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—The fact of the thing being subservient to Man also is pointed out by the texts quoted—e.g. 'One who uses the *Juhū* made of leaves, hears no evil of himself'."

This is not right;—why?—*because the originative injunction does not point to the Man as the principal factor.* As a matter of fact, in the text quoted there is no word which expresses the idea that the *Palāśa Juhū* brings about *non-hearing of evil*; all that is said is that 'one who has the

Palāsha Juhū does not hear evil'; all the idea that follows from the word is that 'the man who has such a *Juhū*, for him there is *non-hearing of evil*'; thus the words of the text say nothing either as to the *Juhū* bringing about the said *non-hearing*, or as to the *Juhū* subserving the purposes of Man.

Opponent—"We deduce it from Inference, the reasoning being 'surely the *Palāsha Juhū* brings about the *non-hearing of evil*, since whenever the *Palāsha Juhū* is there, there is *non-hearing of evil*'."

Answer—There can be no such inference of cause and effect; there is the relation of cause and effect between two things when they are so related that one (effect) is there when the other (cause) is there, and it is *not* there when the other is *not* there;—it is only in such a case that there is the relation of cause and effect. In the case in question, what we gather from the text is that 'when there is *Palāsha Juhū* there is *non-hearing of evil*', but not that 'when the *Palāsha Juhū* is not there, the *non-hearing of evil* is not there'; that is, there are no words to the effect that 'if a man does not have the *Palāsha Juhū*, there is no *non-hearing of evil*'. Hence it does not necessarily follow (from what is actually said in the text) that the *non-hearing of evil* is brought about by the *Palāsha Juhū*; in fact, what is said is only indicative of the man (who does not hear evil). Hence there can be no Inference (like the one put forward by the Opponent).

Further, as a matter of fact it is found that even where a man has a *Palāsha Juhū*, he does *hear evil of himself*.—"How do you know this?"—From direct perception [i.e. we often find that this is what actually happens].

[The Opponent now strikes a fresh line of reasoning]—"If such be the case with the texts under consideration [and no results are actually brought about by the *Palāsha Juhū*], then the *Agnihotra* also should be taken as not accomplishing any result; because in that case also, we do not perceive any result following immediately after the libation has been poured."

This does not affect our position. In the case of the *Agnihotra*, the text does not say that the result follows immediately upon the pouring of the libations; while in the case in question, what is denied is the *hearing of evil* at the very time that the *Palāsha Juhū* is present; and hence in this latter case, there can be no such Inference as that 'this is the cause and that the effect'. In the case of *Agnihotra* and other similar acts, the relation of cause and effect is actually declared by the words of the text itself; hence, even though the result is not seen to appear at the time, there is the conviction that it *will* come in due course of time. Such is not the case with those things that we are considering (the *Palāsha Juhū* and the rest); hence the conclusion is that no result follows from these things.

Opponent—"When the text says that 'a man who has a *Palāsha Juhū* does not hear evil of himself', it follows from this that this (*non-hearing of evil*) is the result that follows from that same *Palāsha Juhū*; so that in this case also this result might come about in due course of time [even though at the time the man might actually be hearing evil of himself]."

Answer—It is true that the said idea may be there; but what is the authority for it?—that is what we are considering. *Sense-perception* does not countenance the idea; nor Analogy or other such means of cogni-

tion as pertain to visible things; not even *Word*; as has been already explained above (under Sū. 1. 1. 25) where it has been shown that the meaning of the sentence as a whole must be one that is made up of the meanings of the words composing that sentence.—Thus then, there being no authority for the idea put forward by the Opponent, it should be regarded as a wrong idea. In the case of sentences used in common parlance, it is found that, as they pertain to things (of the world) that are already known, they are used and understood even in such a way that words are supplied from without and other methods of indirect interpretation are also resorted to, —such as altering the forms of words, connecting words far removed from each other and so on. [Hence there is chance of such sentences giving rise to many wrong ideas.]—Similarly, even in the case of things not amenable to (spoken of by means of) words there are wrong cognitions bearing all the semblance of right cognition; for instance, in the case of the *Mirage* and such illusions.

Then again, what is spoken of in the texts is something existing at the present time; while as a matter of fact, the result mentioned is not found to be existing at the present time. From this it follows that the results mentioned would not come when the *Sruva* ***made of*** *Khadira-wood* and other things are there. Thus then, it comes to this that, when the *Sruva made of Khadira-wood* (*Palāsha Juhū*) and other things are there, the result spoken of comes about, and also it does not come about,—and that when those things are not there, the result may or may not come about;—so that it cannot be ascertained what that is from which a particular result follows.—From all this it follows that when sentences like those under consideration are uttered, they do not lead to any activity, nor to any cessation from activity; and thus not serving any purpose regarding the activity of man, they are useless

On the other hand, if they are taken as commendatory declarations, then there *is* a useful purpose served by the *Khadira*-wood and other things, in the shape of the *Sruva* and other articles which become useful in the performance of sacrifices. If these articles did not serve any useful purpose in connection with sacrifices, then there might have been some occasion for considering whether or not, through some method of verbal interpretation, we could deduce the idea that they actually bring about the results mentioned. As it is however, why should we assume any such thing?

From all this it follows that texts like those we are considering are commendatory declarations; and in the case of a commendatory declaration, the mention of a thing which does not exist as *existing* would be explained as being said in praise.

SŪTRA (3).

THE RESULT CAN BE TAKEN AS ACTUALLY FOLLOWING ONLY IN A CASE WHERE THE MAN IS SPOKEN OF AS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"just as in the case of such texts as 'for one desiring virility, one should make the sacrificial post of *Khadira*-wood;

and for one desiring food, one should make it of *Bilva*-wood, and for one desiring Brahmic glory, one should make it of *Palāsha*-wood' [the result is taken as actually following from the things mentioned] [so should it be in the case of the texts in question also]".—But in the case of those other texts it is right that it should be so taken; as in them there is the Injunction ending in '*Kuryāt*' ('should make'), which actually lays down the connection between *Virility* and the *Khadira-wood*,—and it does not speak of anything *existing* at the present time. Hence there is no incongruity (in our accepting the Result as following in one case and not accepting it in the other).—In fact, persons conversant with the principles of interpretation of words and sentences read the following couplet in this connection—

'In all Vedas, the following five words are the true signs of an Injunction (1) *Kuryāt* (should make), (2) *Kriyēta* (should be made), (3) *Kartavyam* (ought to be made), (4) *bhavēt* (should be), and (5) *Syāt* (may be).'

People who make this pronouncement think that the Injunctive ending is the only indicative of a text being an Injunction.—In the two texts cited by the Opponent, we have the Injunctive ending.—Hence the citing of these (in the present discussion) is entirely futile [there being no injunctive ending in the texts under consideration].

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *What is 'naimittika' (contingent, non-essential) does not appertain to what is 'nitya' (compulsory, essential).*

SŪTRA (4).

IN A CASE WHERE A CONTINGENT DETAIL HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED THE DETAIL FOR THE (COMPULSORY) SACRIFICE SHOULD BE OTHER THAN THAT; BECAUSE THE FORMER IS CONTINGENT UPON SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, a contingent detail has been laid down in the following text—'*Bārhadgiram brāhmaṇasya brahmasāma kuryāt, pārthurasyam rājanyasya, rāyobājīyam vaishyasya*' ['*If the sacrificer is a Brāhmaṇa*, one should sing for him the Brahmasāman called *Bārhadgira*; *if he is a Kṣattriya*, that called *Pārthurashmya*; *if he is a Vaishya*, that called *Rāyobājīya*'].—(B) Similarly, in connection with *Agnichayana*, a contingent detail has been laid down in the following text—'*Sāhasram prathamam chinvānaḥ chinvīta, dvisāhasram dvitīyam, trisāhasram tṛtīyam*' ['When the *Agnichayana* is being performed for the first time, one should set up an altar consisting of one thousand bricks; when for the second time, of 2,000 bricks; when for the third time, of 3,000 bricks' (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 6. 8. 2). —(C) Similarly in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* certain contingent details are laid down thus—'*Godohanēna pashukāmasya praṇayēt, kāmasyēna brahmavarchasa-kāmasya, mārtikena pratiṣṭhākāmasya*' ['If the sacrificer desires cattle, one should fetch water in a milking vessel; if he desires Brahmic glory, then in a vessel of bell metal; if he desires honour, in an earthen vessel'].

In regard to these contingent details, there arises the question—Are these same contingent details to be adopted in the compulsory acts also? Or are other details to be adopted at the various compulsory acts?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"These same details are to be adopted at the compulsory acts also.—Why?—The details in question,—(A) the singing of the Brahmasāman [(B) the making of the altar and (C) the fetching of water] have to be done at the compulsory acts; as they have been enjoined; and being enjoined, they need the means of accomplishment to be mentioned in close proximity to themselves; as a matter of fact, no such means are laid down (in reference to the compulsory acts) at all;—and the contingent details happen to be in close proximity to them;—and under the circumstances, it is only reasonable that the compulsory acts should have their requirements met by these contingent details.—Why so?—Because the contingent detail is near at hand, and hence its connection is

indicated by *Syntactical Connection*: while none other is found to be directly asserted by any text. The incongruity too that is involved in taking what is contingent on special circumstances to be universal is the same as that involved in assuming what has not been asserted (in the Veda).—The Opponent might say—'Those details have been spoken of as contingent on certain conditions'.—The answer to this is as follows—When a thing is mentioned in a context, even though it may have been mentioned as connected with one act, it may become connected with another act also; for instance, though a canal is dug for irrigating paddy, yet people drink water out of it and also bathe in it; so would it be in the case in question also [i.e. though the details are mentioned in connection with certain special conditions, yet they may be connected with those acts also where those conditions are not present].—Or [at least in the case of the sentence '*godohanēna pashukāmasya pranayet*', 'for one desiring cattle, water should be fetched in the milking vessel', the sentence contains within itself the simple sentence '*godohanēna praṇayēt*' ['one should fetch in a milking vessel'] where the *fetching in the milking vessel* is laid down without reference to any particular desire. And what is thus directly asserted cannot be ignored. Then as regards the term '*pashukāmasya*' ('for one desiring cattle'), it can serve the purpose of connecting that *desire for cattle* with the *fetching of water*, but it cannot set aside what has been expressed by the shorter sentence; further, when a sentence has once expressed a meaning, such meaning cannot, without sufficient reason, be held to be one to which no significance is meant to be attached. There are many sentences that are expressive of two judgments, e.g.—'*Shvēto dhāvati alambusānām yātā*' ['The white horse is running, which goes to the *Alambusā* country'] [where there are two ideas expressed—(1) 'the white horse is running' and (2) 'the horse is going to the *Alambusā* country'].—From all this it follows that the contingent details should find room in the compulsory acts also."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta—In a case where a contingent detail has been prescribed*, the detail for the compulsory sacrifice *should be other than that*;—why?—*because the former is mentioned as being contingent upon special circumstances*; as a matter of fact, the detail that is laid down is made contingent upon special circumstances: hence that detail can find no place in a case where those special circumstances are not present.

It has been argued that the details are such as must be performed.—They will certainly be performed where it is necessary to perform them.

As for the argument that—"in connection with the compulsory sacrifice, no other means for accomplishing the *Brahmasāman* and the rest has been laid down, save the contingent details in question"—what is laid down in a general way (without reference to any sacrifice) may be adopted; hence there will be no difficulty.—"What is that (which is laid down in this general way)?"—(*a*) '*Abhivarta*' is such a *Brahmasāman*, (*b*) the *Agni* is that mentioned in the eighteenth *mantra* (?), and (*c*) the *Vāraṇa* is the vessel for fetching water.

It has been argued that—"the *Brahmasāman* and other factors would naturally become connected with the contingent details in question which are mentioned in the same context and in close proximity to them".—We say, no: the 'context' is not one of the contingent details, *Bārhadgira* and the rest.—It might be said that "the *Brahmasāman* and the rest would become connected with such *stotra-hymns* and other details as may be found mentioned in the same context".—This also is not possible. Though the *stotra-hymns*, etc., mentioned in the *context* are compulsory (essential), yet it is the *Bārhadgira* and the rest that are found to be indicated by *Syntactical Connection* as being contingent upon certain conditions, and *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*.

Then again, it has been argued that—"the fact that the contingent details are applicable to the compulsory sacrifice is deduced from the sentence, by reason of proximity".—But such deduced meanings of sentences cannot set aside general principles, and as a matter of fact, the *Bārhadgira* and other contingent details have their use only when those contingencies are present.—From all this it follows that at the various compulsory sacrifices the details should be other than the contingent details in question.

Another argument that has been urged is that—'the larger sentence 'for one desiring cattle, he should fetch water with the milking vessel' contains the shorter sentence 'he should fetch water in the milking vessel', and what is signified by this shorter sentence (that at all sacrifices water should be fetched in the milking vessel) cannot be rejected, i.e. without sufficient reason it cannot be held that this idea is not meant to be expressed, because in reality the larger sentence expresses two ideas [(1) that *water should be fetched in the milking vessel* and (2) that *it should be so fetched for one who desires cattle*]".

The answer to this is as follows.—There is sufficient reason why the said idea cannot be taken as meant to be expressed.—'What is that reason?"—The reason is that it is not possible that both should be done at the same time;—i.e. at one and the same time, the sentence cannot express the idea signified by the whole sentence, and also express the idea signified by a part of it.—"Why?"—The verb '*pranayati*' ('should fetch') is formed with the prefix '*pra*', the root '*nī*' and the injunctive affix and it denotes its meaning by 'Direct Assertion',—the 'milking vessel', etc., also as connected with the 'fetching' are denoted by 'Direct Assertion', as well as 'Syntactical Connection',—but as for the connection between the result ('acquiring of cattle') and 'the milking vessel, etc.' it is indicated by 'Syntactical Connection' only, not by 'Direct Assertion' at all.—If (in answer to this) it be argued that—"the connection of the 'fetching' with the 'milking vessel, etc', and also the connection of the 'milking vessel' with the Result, are both expressed (by 'Direct Assertion')",—then, the answer is that, that cannot be; as in that case, the sentence would be expressing two distinct ideas, and this would involve a syntactical split;—for which there is no justification.

The example of a sentence expressing two ideas has been cited;—'*Shvēto dhāvati alambusānām yātā*' ['The white horse is running, going to the

Alambuṣā country']. In the case of such a sentence it may be possible for both ideas to be expressed, in the absence of any special circumstance indicating that only one idea is meant to be expressed.—In the case in question however, there *is* such a special circumstance, in the shape of the term '*Kāma*' (in '*pashukāmasya*'). The connection of the 'milking vessel, etc.', with the action (of fetching water) [without any reference to the 'desire' for cattle] [which has been held by the Opponent to be one of the two ideas directly expressed by the sentence] could be taken to be the 'directly expressed' meaning of the sentence only if that were all that was meant to be declared; and in that case the presence of the term '*Kāma*' ('desire') would have to be regarded as a mistake;—as a matter of fact however, it is not a mistake; and yet, if what is expressed by the shorter sentence were accepted as meant to be 'directly expressed', then any connection with the term '*Kāma*' ('desire') would be impossible.—From all this it follows that the sentence does not express two ideas, and the only idea expressed by the sentence is the connection between the 'milking vessel' and the '*Desire*' (*Kāma*); and hence what is said here cannot find place in the compulsory sacrifice.

[Similarly in the case of all the other texts.]

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Things like 'curds' appertain to the compulsory as well as the optional or contingent sacrifices: 'Saṁyogapṛthattvanyāya', the Law of Connection and Disconnection.*

SŪTRA (5).

IN A CASE WHERE ONE AND THE SAME THING IS BOTH (COMPULSORY, ESSENTIAL, AS WELL AS CONTINGENT, NON-ESSENTIAL) THERE IS CONNECTION AND DISCONNECTION

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnihotra*, we read '*Dadhnā juhoti* ('One should offer curds'),—and then again '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' ['For one desiring efficient sense-organs, one should offer curds']—Similarly in connection with the *Agniṣomīya*, we have the text '*Khādirē badhnāti*' ('Should tie the animal to the post made of *Khadira*-wood'),—and then again *Khādiram vīryakāmasya yūpam kuryāt*' ['For one desiring virility one should make the post of *Khadira*-wood']—[In both these cases, the same thing, *curds*, has been laid down as to be used at the compulsory *Homa*, as also at the *Homa* performed with a special desire,—and the *Khadira*-wood has been laid down as to be used at the compulsory sacrifice as also at the sacrifice performed with a special desire].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is here also the thing to be used at the compulsory act to be other than that used at the optional (contingent) act? Or the same that is used at the contingent act?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"it should be different according to the principle arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*,—*In a case where one and the same thing is both*—i.e compulsory as well as contingent (optional),—*there is connection and disconnection*, which is a reason (for the same thing being used at both); that is, in this case there is 'connection and disconnection' (of the same thing): in one case there is 'connection' (of the thing, *curds*, with all *Homa*) expressed by the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*', and in another, there is 'disconnection' (of the thing from all *Homa* except the one performed for a man desiring *efficient sense-organs*), expressed by the sentence '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*'.—Similarly in the other case, there is 'connection' (of the *Khadira-wood*, with all posts), expressed by the sentence '*Khādirē badhnāti*', and also 'disconnection' (of the same from all posts, except the one for the man desiring *virility*), expressed by the sentence '*Khādiram vīryakāmasya*, etc.'.—From all this, it follows that the *curds* and the *Khadira*-wood and other things similarly circumstanced appertain to the *Compulsory* as well as the *Contingent* act.

SŪTRA (6).

"THE SECOND MAY BE SUBSIDIARY TO THE FIRST",—IF THIS IS URGED,—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent may ask—"Why cannot the second be subsidiary to the first? That is, the result in the shape of 'efficiency of sense-organs' which is spoken of in the second sentence as following from the use of *curds* in *Homa*, may be taken as following from the use of the same curds that have been spoken of in the first sentence, '*dadhnā juhoti*';—similarly, the result in the shape of 'virility' which is spoken of in the second sentence as following from the use of the *Khadira*-wood, may be taken as following from the same *Khadira-wood* which has been spoken of in the first sentence '*Khādirē badhnāti*'. So that in both cases, the two sentences are to be construed together forming a single sentence".—If this is your opinion, then our answer is as follows:—

SŪTRA (7).

THAT CANNOT BE AS THE TWO THINGS ARE ENTIRELY DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been said in the foregoing *Sūtra* is not possible; as *the two things are entirely distinct*; i.e. *the connection between the curds and the Homa* (expressed by the first sentence) is something entirely distinct from *the connection between curds and efficient sense-organs* (expressed by the second sentence); similarly *the connection between the Post of Khadira-wood* is something entirely distinct from *the connection between the Post of Khadira-wood and virility*. They are two distinct things; and both are meant to be enjoined (by the two sentences);—we have seen that it is 'one sentence' when it speaks of one thing only; in the case in question, as there are two things there would be a syntactical split (if the two sentences were treated as 'one sentence').—"How?"—The injunctive ending appearing with the root '*hū*' (in the word '*juhoti*') can enjoin the accessory (curds) only if the directly expressed injunction of *Homa* is not possible; and it can enjoin the connection between that accessory (curds) and the Result (efficient sense-organs) only if the injunction of the accessory is not possible. In the latter case therefore, the *Direct Assertion* would be abandoned for the sake of *Syntactical Connection*; as nothing could be possible as well as impossible at one and the same time.—From all this it follows that *contingent* is the same as that which is used at the compulsory act.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Living on Milk' and such other penances subserve the purposes of the sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (8).

THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THINGS SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF ACTIONS MUST BE REGARDED AS SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* we read—'*Payovratam brāhmaṇasya, yavāgū rājanyasya, āmikṣā vaiśhyasya*' ['Living on milk is the penance for the *Brāhmaṇa*, Rice-gruel for the *Kṣattriya* and Curdled Milk for the *Vaishya*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2 5. 2-3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this Penance a detail pertaining to the Man, or to the Sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Syntactical Connection, setting aside the Context, indicates the penance as pertaining to the Man".

In answer to this, we have the following Siddhānta—'Penance' is an embellishment for the maintaining of the body and for imparting strength to it, and as such, it must pertain to the Men who subserve the purposes of the sacrifice,—and hence this embellishment must be taken as subserving the purposes of the sacrifice, specially as in so doing the indication of the 'Context' becomes honoured.—'But by *Syntactical Connection*, the Penance is indicated as appertaining to the Man."—Not so, we reply; because, if it did so then, it would be necessary to assume a result (desired by the Man): whereas in regard to the sacrifice, the effect produced by the embellishment is already definitely known, being, as it is, included in the declaration of the entire procedure of the *sacrifice* which is the principal factor.—For these reasons the Penance should be taken as pertaining to the Sacrifice.

SŪTRA (9).

EACH BEING DISTINCT, THE MENTION OF THE MAN SERVES THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING THE PENANCES (WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES).

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Why then should the Man be mentioned at all?"

Answer—It serves the purpose of restricting the Penances within their respective spheres,—the meaning being that 'the penance of Living upon Milk is performed in connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* only when that sacrifice is performed by a Brāhmaṇa, not when it is performed by any other *man.—Similarly in the other cases.*

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Sacrifices like the Vishvajit are fruitful, bringing about definite results: 'Vishvajitn-nyāya (A)'.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE RESULT IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE INJUNCTION, THE ACTION ONLY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED, SPECIALLY BECAUSE WHAT IS NOT ACTUALLY SPOKEN OF IN THE TEXT SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNISED (AS AUTHORISED BY IT)."

Bhāṣya

There are the following texts—'*Tasmāt pūrvēdyuḥ pūrvēdyuḥ karoti*' ['Therefore on the previous day they perform it in honour of the *Pitṛs*'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 2. 5. 3. 6)—then again, '*Sarvēbhyo vā ēṣa dēvēbhyaḥ, sarvēbhyashchhandobhyaḥ, sarvēbhyaḥ pṛṣṭhēbhyaḥ ātmānamāgurutē yaḥ sattrāyāgurutē, sa viśvajitā atirātrēṇa sarvapṛṣṭhēna sarvastomēna sarvavēdasudakṣiṇēna yajēta*' ['He who takes a vow for the *Sattra* takes a vow for all deities, all metres and all chants; he should offer the *Atirātra Vishvajit*, at which all the *pṛṣṭha* and *stoma* are used and at which one's entire property is given away as the sacrificial Fee'] (Taitt. Brā. 1. 4. 7. 7).

In regard to the *Vishvajit* sacrifice here laid down and also others similarly spoken of, there arises the question—What is it that enjoined here? the mere action—or the action as bringing about results?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'The sacrifice in question should be taken as not bringing about any results;—why?—*because no result is mentioned in the injunction*, and in matters upon which trustworthy word is the sole means of knowledge, *what is not spoken of in the text should not be recognised (as authorised)*.—'But it has been declared that acts prescribed in the Veda are fruitful (bring desirable results)'.—The answer to this is that what has been declared is that acts are to be recognised as fruitful because they are found to be spoken of as associated with results, not simply because they have been prescribed in the Veda.—'In that case from the fact of the acts being recognised as *what should be done*, we shall deduce that they are conducive to results; because the act that brings about happy results is what should be done'—The answer to this is that the idea that such an act should be done is inconsistent with perceptible facts; we directly perceive that the performance of the act has unpleasant consequences (the performance of an elaborate sacrifice is always a source of trouble and discomfort); under the circumstances, even if there were a text declaring such an act to be conducive to happy results, it could not be accepted as true,—being, as it is, inconsistent with a perceptible fact; in fact such a text would be as trustworthy as such absurd

assertions as—'Dry gourds sink in water', 'Stones float on water', 'Fire is cool'.—Then again, the fact of the act leading to agreeable results would be deduced from Inference—the inferential reasoning being—Because the act is one that should be done, it must be conducive to happy results;—and certainly Perception is more reliable than Inference.—From all this we conclude that acts like those in question are not conducive to any results.

"'But we might assume the result on the basis of the reasoning that the injunction of the act would be useful only if the act led to a desirable result.'—The answer to this is that it would be quite reasonable to assert that the injunctive sentence is useless; as there are many declarations that are useless—such declarations, for instance, as 'Ten pomegranates'. 'Six cakes' and so forth.—'But the performance of the Vishvajit is conducive to happiness.'—*Answer*—What is conducive to happiness is the *Apūrva* (the Transcendental Force), not the *performance*; and the sentence in question does not say anything as to the *Apūrva* being such as should be *done* (or brought about); in fact the presence of the *Apūrva* is assumed only in cases where the result is spoken of as to be brought about; and what speaks of the result as to be brought about is a *sentence*, not a *word*; and in the case in question the sentence does not mention any result;—from all this we conclude that the text in question is not injunctive of the *Apūrva*; all that it enjoins is the mere *action*; and this action brings no result at the time that it is done (this we see actually); nor can it bring about any result in the future, because it is evanescent (and does not exist after the performance is over); so that if a result were assumed to follow from the action, it could be assumed to bring it about only through an *Apūrva*, which, in its turn, would have to be assumed on the basis of the assumed result;—thus there would be an interdependence; and mutually interdependent things are not fit for being assumed.—From all this it follows that actions like those in question are not conducive to any results.

"Says the Opponent—'We shall presume the sentence declaring the result to be *understood*'.—The answer to this is that in a case where the sentence is complete in itself, it is not open to us to presume anything as being *understood*;—the sentence in question is actually complete in itself, in the form 'the *Vishvajit* sacrifice should be performed': and here there is no word that stands in need of a word which could be supplied, on the basis of that need, and with which the Result could be connected. For example, even in reference to an unsafe road, there may be such a deceptive advice as—'The road is quite safe, you may go by it'; and this sentence, being quite complete in itself, does not require to have any words supplied by the Deceiver; so in the same manner, the sentence in question does not need to have any words supplied as understood.—Then again, if the sentence were to be connected with words presumed to be understood, it could be only in this form—'The *Vishvajit* sacrifice should be performed,—such and such a result will follow'; and there would be two ideas expressed here, while the sentence in its original form has been found to be expressive of a single idea.—From this also it follows that actions like those in question are not conducive to any result."

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE DECLARATION (OF THE RESULT) WOULD BE GOT AT BY IMPLICATION,—SUCH BEING THE FORCE OF THE DECLARATION ITSELF; WORDS ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER, ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS IS MEANT TO SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE; AND WHEN NO USEFUL PURPOSE IS SERVED BY WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS, THE WORDS ARE NOT TAKEN TO BE CONNECTED WITH ONE ANOTHER, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE CLOSE TOGETHER; FOR THESE REASONS, THE WORD (EXPRESSING THE RESULT) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS FORMING PART OF THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. It is not true that the action in question is not conducive to any result; as in reality, *the declaration of the Result would be got at by implication.*—"By what implication?"—By the implication of the assertion that something is to be accomplished.—Says the Opponent—"If action itself were taken as *to be accomplished* by the *Vishvajit*, then this would be inconsistent with a perceptible fact [the sacrifice is not found to bring about an action]."—We do not mean that it is *action* that is meant to be accomplished.—"Then what?"—What we mean is that something else is to be accomplished by means of the action.—[This 'something' is a purpose of the Man; the meaning being that 'by means of the sacrifice one should accomplish the Man's purpose—says the *Tantraratna*].—Thus it is in regard to this *something to be accomplished*, for the expressing of which the sentence needs a word; that is where the supplying of an understood word comes in. In many cases such supplying of understood words is very common. For instance, when one says 'the door, the door', it is necessary to supply the word 'close' or 'open'.—"But how do you know that in the case in question some word has to be supplied as understood?"—*Because such is the force of the declaration itself*; that is, it is only if we supply some word (expressive of *something to be accomplished*) that the declaration can serve a useful purpose and also express the intended meaning.—From all this we conclude that the sacrifice in question is not one that does not bring about any result.

Says the Opponent—"The word that may be supplied as understood, will be of human origin, hence what would be learnt from it would not be authoritative".

Answer—We shall not supply any new word; all that we shall do is to construe this same text in question along with another Vedic text.

Opponent—"That cannot be done; it is only a word in close proximity to another that can form a sentence with it and thereby make it possible for the idea to be expressed by that sentence;—this cannot be done with a word remotely situated".

Answer—Even when a word is remotely separated from another, it may set aside the intervening factors, and thereby appear in the mind of the man as if in close proximity to the other word, and being connected with it, express a particular idea (as expressed by the two words forming a sentence); e.g. in the following couplet—

'Itaḥ pashyasi dhāvantam dūrāj jātam vanaspatim
Tvām bravīmi vishālākṣi yā pinākṣi jaradgavam'

['I tell you, O large-eyed one, who art concealing from view the distant tree! Do you see the old bull running away from here?']

We find that the expression that comes to the mind first is '*Itaḥ pashyasi*' and this becomes connected with the word '*jaradgavam*', which is separated from it by the intervening words '*dūrāj jātam vanaspatim*, etc.', after having set aside all these latter.—As a matter of fact, *words are understood to be connected with one another, on the basis of the fact that what is expressed by words is meant to serve a useful purpose*; and on this basis even words that are separate from one another come to be construed together. If the words concerned are such as do not serve any useful purpose (by being construed together), then they are not fit to be construed together, even though they may be in close juxtaposition; for instance, in the couplet quoted above, the words '*yā pinākṣi jaradgavam*' are not construed together (even though they are in juxtaposition).—From all this it will be seen that the words supplied as understood would not make the sentence one of human origin.

"But the need that is felt for supplying the words is in the man."

The need is not in regard to the Vedic sentence; in fact it is a means of understanding the meaning of the Vedic sentence. what happens is that when the requirements of a certain word are not met by the word nearest to it, then, on the strength of the useful purpose to be served by the sentence, we have recourse to having the said requirements met by another word.

From all this it follows that *the word expressing the result* (which may be thus construed) *is a part of the Vedic text itself*; that is to say, the word denoting the 'desire for result', even though found at a distance (from the text laying down the *Vishvajit* sacrifice) should be taken as a part of this text.

SŪTRA (12).

THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE (AS PROPOSED) WOULD BE GOT AT AS IN THE CASE OF THE ACCESSORY DETAIL AND THE MEANING OF (ANOTHER) SENTENCE.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text '*Indrāya rājñē shūkaraḥ*' ['The boar to King Indra'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 5. 11. 1); now this is taken as enjoining the particular

accessory detail (the *Boar* as the animal to be sacrificed) by construing it along with the injunctive word in another sentence; in the same manner, we would get at the declaration of the Result of the *Vishvajit* sacrifice by construing the sentence enjoining that sacrifice with words expressive of the Result found in another sentence. Similarly, in the case of the sentence '*Varuṇo vā ētamagrē pratyagṛhṇāt*', the meaning of the sentence has been got at by having recourse to '*vyavadhāraṇakalpanā*' (i.e. by connecting sentences and words far removed from one another); similarly it should be in the present case also.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Sacrifices like the Vishvajit have a single Result: 'Vishvajin-nyāya (B)'.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BRINGING ABOUT ALL RESULTS; AS NO PARTICULAR RESULT HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED".

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood that the actions laid down in such texts as—'On the previous day one makes the offering to the Pitṛs' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 3. 6), and 'One should perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice' are conducive to Results.—Now there arises the question—Does the action bring about all results? Or only one?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*It should be taken as bringing about all results,*—why?—*because no particular result has been specifically mentioned*; i.e. it has not been specified that 'this is the result' brought about by this action; if there were any such result mentioned, it would certainly have been known.—From this it follows that, there being no specification, the action should be taken as bringing about all results."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY ONLY ONE RESULT FOLLOWS FROM IT; AS THE INJUNCTION IS ONE ONLY

Bhāṣya.

Only one result should be taken as following from the action;—in reality, it cannot bring about all results.—Why?—*Because the Injunction is one only.* It has been explained that the Injunction of the action in question stands in need of, and becomes connected with, a word denoting 'desire for a result'; even if a sentence were capable of being connected with several such words, it should be connected with only one such; because its needs would be met by that one word alone, so that there would be no justification for its being connected with any other.—From this it follows that the most reasonable view is to have only one injunction of the procedure of the action; and hence it can be conducive to only one result.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Sacrifices like the Vishvajit lead to the attainment of Heaven: 'Vishvajin-nyāya (C)'.*

SŪTRA (15)

THAT ONE RESULT WOULD BE 'HEAVEN', AS THAT IS EQUALLY DESIRABLE FOR ALL

Bhāṣya

In regard to the actions that we have been considering, it has been understood that only one result is brought about by the action.—Now there arises the question—Is this one Result anything (that one may desire) —Or is it Heaven only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that— it may be anything; as no particular result has been specifically mentioned".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows —*That one Result would be Heaven, as that is equally desirable for all*, that is, all men desire Heaven.— "But why so?"—Because 'Heaven' is *happiness*, and everyone seeks for happiness—'What if it is so?"—If it is so, then a word which has a general denotation (*Happiness in General*) cannot be restricted to anything particular, as we find in the case of such general terms as 'should sacrifice', 'should do' and the like.—From this it follows that actions like those we are considering are conducive to the one result—*Heaven*

SŪTRA (16)

ALSO BECAUSE SUCH IS THE COMMON NOTION (OF PEOPLE).

Bhāṣya

The common notion among people is that 'Heaven is the result of an action whose result is not specified', as we find people making such assertions as—'Devadatta has laid out a public park, he is sure to attain Heaven', 'Devadatta has dug a tank, he is sure to attain Heaven'.— "What if it is so?"—In this way we find that people have this notion regarding Heaven; that is why in the case of actions conducive to Heaven, they do not mention the result at all; it is left to be understood.—From this also we conclude that actions like those we are considering bring about the single result, Heaven.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Result of the Rātrisatra is that which is spoken of in the Commendatory Passage: 'Rātrisatranyāya'.*

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN REGARD TO THE SACRIFICE, THE SENTENCE IS COMMENDATORY, LIKE THE SENTENCE SPEAKING OF THE ACCESSORY DETAIL,—SO SAYS KĀRṢṆĀJINI"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rātri-sacrifices*, we read—'*Pratiṣṭhanti ha vā ēte ya ētā upayanti; brahmavarchasinno 'nnādā bhavanti ya ētā upayanti*' ['Those who have recourse to these sacrifices become famous: those who have recourse to these become endowed with Brahmic glory and also eaters of food'].

In regard to these, there arises the question—'Are these sentences merely commendatory declarations of results? Or are they injunctions of results actually following from the sacrifices?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"These are mere commendatory declarations of results,—says Kārṣṇājini.—'Why?'—Because the words of the sentence are similar to those of commendatory declarations of results.—'What is this similarity?'—The absence of the Injunctive ending;—as in the case of *the sentence speaking of the accessory detail*;—i.e. sentences like—'One who uses the *Sruva* of *Khadira*-wood, offers with the very essence of the Vedas' (Taitt. Sam. 3. 5. 7. 1)."

SŪTRA (18)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ĀTRĒYA SAYS THAT WHAT IS SPOKEN OF SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE ACTUAL RESULT; BECAUSE IT IS SO MENTIONED: IF NO RESULT WERE MENTIONED, ONE WOULD HAVE TO BE INFERRED.

Bhāṣya.

The teacher Ātrēya however has held that results actually follow from acts like the *Rātri-sacrifices*, and hence the sentence in question is not a mere commendatory declaration.—"Why?"—Even if no results were mentioned in connection with them, it would be necessary to assume a supplementary sentence laying down such results, and rather than assume a sentence far removed from the injunction of the act itself, it would be better to assume one in close proximity to it;—as a matter of fact, one such sentence in close proximity to the injunction is already there (in the shape of the sentence

under consideration) (and it has not got to be assumed); in fact, we actually perceive the sacrifices mentioned (in the sentences under consideration) along with 'fame' and 'brahmic glory'; so that it is only the injunctive ending that has to be sought for elsewhere.

Says the Opponent—"How can you say that it is only the Injunctive ending that will have to be got from elsewhere—when it should be necessary to have a verbal root also with which the said ending should be associated?"

When we say that the Injunctive ending will have to be sought for, we of course mean that ending along with the verbal root, and not merely the ending; hence what has been urged does not affect our position.—Or, we may take it that the *fame* and other Results are enjoined by that same injunctive ending which enjoins the *Rātri-sacrifices* themselves, by means of the whole sentence laying down the entire procedure.—Or, even the commendation itself may be taken as enjoining the sacrifices themselves along with *fame* and other results.

SŪTRA (19)

IN CONNECTION WITH ACCESSORY DETAILS THE SENTENCE IS TAKEN AS PURELY COMMENDATORY, AS THOSE DETAILS ONLY SUBSERVE THE PURPOSE OF OTHERS

Bhāṣya

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—just as in such sentences as 'one who uses the *Sruca* of *Khadira* wood offers the very essence of the Veda' (Taitt. Saṁh. 3. 5. 7. 1), the mention of the Result is taken as merely commendatory, so should it be in the case in question also".—But in those cases it is only right that the sentences should be taken as purely commendatory, because it is not possible for them to be taken as injunctions of results, and because they are capable of being taken as commendatory declarations of results. This has been fully explained under Sū. 4. 3. 1, where it has been declared that—'In connection with substances, embellishments and minor Acts, the mention of Results should be taken as a purely commendatory declaration'.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Prospective Acts' should be taken as leading to those results that are actually spoken of as brought about by them.*

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"IN THE CASE OF PROSPECTIVE ACTS, HEAVEN SHOULD ALWAYS BE TAKEN AS THE RESULT, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF SUCH SUBSIDIARIES OF SACRIFICES AS SUBSERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE".

Bhāṣya.

The 'Prospective acts' form the subject-matter of the present discussion;—such as '*Sauryam charum nirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*—['Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer the cooked rice dedicated to Sūrya'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 3). [That is, such actions as are laid down as fulfilling special desirable ends.]

In regard to these there arises the question—Does the result consist of *Heaven*, as also the desirable thing mentioned? Or only the desirable thing?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In the case of Prospective acts, Heaven should always be regarded as the result*;—why?—because when this is done, then the generic word ('heaven') which is expressive of the end desired by all men does not have to be restricted to any particular end; specially as it is possible to connect the action in question with the term 'desiring heaven', even though this latter term may be far removed from it.—The Opponent might argue thus—'In the case of the particular text cited, we find the term *desiring Brahmic glory*, which restricts the desired end to one particular purpose'.—This term does not serve to restrict the desired end; in fact, it is something that comes in only incidentally. Just as when a man has started for collecting fuel, he is told to 'bring vegetables' also,—where the 'bringing of vegetables' is made an incidental purpose.—'What do you mean by this being made an *incidental purpose*?'—What is meant is that side by side with the business of *collecting fuel*, another business is set up,—the meaning being that 'after having collected fuel, this is something else that you should do'.—In the same manner, in the case in question, the main end is Heaven, to which another end is tacked on; and the meaning of the text thus comes to be that 'Desiring Brahmic glory one should accomplish Heaven by means of the sacrifice'; the mention of 'Brahmic glory' as the result does not preclude Heaven as a result; *just as in the case of such sacrificial accessories as subserve the purposes of a sacrifice*; for instance, the sentence 'For one desiring cattle, one should fetch water in a milking vessel' means that 'if a man desires to acquire cattle, he should accomplish the fetching of water by means of the milking vessel'."

SŪTRA (21).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE EVEN ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MOTIVE, THE COMPLETING OF THE SACRIFICE HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS NECESSARY".

Bhāṣya.

"*Even on the disappearance of the motive*,—i.e. on the cessation of the desire for the particular result, or on the attainment of the particular result,—the completing of the sacrifice is found to be laid down as necessary; e.g. in connection with the sacrifice laid down as to be performed for the purpose of obtaining rain, it is said—'If it should rain, he should complete the offerings then; if it does not rain, then he should make the offering on the next day' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 4. 10. 1).—If Heaven were not the additional result to follow from the sacrifice, for what should it be necessary to complete the sacrifice?—From this it follows that Heaven is always the result of sacrifices."

SŪTRA (22).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE DESIRED RESULT (IS WHAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS FOLLOWING FROM THE PROSPECTIVE ACT): BECAUSE IT IS IN CONNECTION WITH THAT THAT THE SACRIFICE IS ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

The result following from the Prospective Act should be the particular one that is desired, not Heaven; because *it is in connection with that result* that the Injunction of that act appears,—and not in connection with desire for Heaven. Under the circumstances, the syntactical connection of the injunction with the 'desire for Heaven' could only be inferred; while that with the word expressive of the 'desired result' is directly perceived; and what is directly perceived is certainly more authoritative than what is inferred.—From this it follows that the result of Prospective acts must be that particular desired thing (which is spoken of in the injunction of the act.

SŪTRA (23).

IN THE CASE OF THE SUBSIDIARY, IT IS SO, BECAUSE IT IS AN ACCESSORY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 20) that "Just as it is in the case of the subsidiary of a sacrifice, so would it be in the case in question also".—The answer is that it is quite right *in the case of the subsidiary, because it is an accessory*; that is, its connection with the *sacrifice* as also with the desired result is clearly perceptible, the meaning of the sentence being that 'one

who happens to desire cattle should do the fetching of water with the milking vessel'. In the case in question however there is no perceptible word to the effect that 'one who happens to desire Brahmic glory should accomplish Heaven by means of the sacrifice'.—"What then is the construction of the sentence?"—The construction is that 'one who desires Brahmic glory should obtain it (accomplish it) by means of the sacrifice'.—From this it will be seen that the case in question is not analogous to that of the *subsidiary* sacrifices.

SŪTRA (24).

IF IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE TO FINISH THE ACTION EVEN ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MOTIVE,—IT IS ONLY FOR THAT SAME PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"Even on the cessation of the desire for the particular result, or on the attainment of that result, we find that necessity of finishing the action has been enjoined [and from this we conclude that Heaven is the only result]".—Our answer to this is that *if it is necessary to have to finish an action, even on the disappearance of the motive, it is only for that same purpose*; i.e. if texts lay it down as necessary that the sacrifice should be completed, it must be for that same purpose.—"For what purpose?"—For the purpose of avoiding the reproach of cultured people. If, after having begun a sacrifice, one were to leave it unfinished, cultured people would reproach him immediately after the stopping of the sacrifice, saying, 'this stupid man is ever ready to begin (but never to finish)'. If people, after having dedicated the offering to the deities, omit to complete the sacrifice, all cultured men reproach them; hence it becomes necessary to complete the sacrifice (even on the cessation of the desire for the result, or on the fulfilment of the result); and it is therefore only right that there should be the injunction to the effect that—'if it should rain, one should finish with that same offering' (Taitt. Saṁ. 2. 4. 10. 1.)

From all this it follows that in the case of Prospective Acts, the result is the one that is desired.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Sacrifices like the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa are conducive to all desired results: 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa-nyāya' (A).*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN A SACRIFICE IS SPOKEN OF AS BRINGING ABOUT ALL DESIRABLE RESULTS, WHAT ARE MEANT ARE THE RESULTS LAID DOWN AS FOLLOWING FROM THE MAIN SACRIFICE AND FROM ITS SUBSIDIARIES,—SUCH BEING THE INDICATION OF THE CONTEXT."

Bhāṣya

There are the following texts—(A) '*Ēkasmai vā anyā sarvāṇi kāmāya āhriyantē sarvēbhyo darsha pūrṇamāsau*' ['Other sacrifices are performed for the sake of only one result each the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are performed for the sake of all results']; —(B) '*Ēkasmai vā anyā kratavaḥ kāmāya āhriyantē, sarvēbhyo jyotiṣṭomaḥ*' ['Other sacrifices are performed for the sake of one result each, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed for the sake of all results'].

In regard to these there arises the question—Does the sentence contain a mere reiteration of the result of the Principal Sacrifice along with those of its subsidiaries and of the subsidiaries of those subsidiaries? Or does it contain an independent injunction of results (to the effect that all desirable results do actually follow from the principal sacrifice mentioned)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"It is only a reiteration; that is when the text speaks of a sacrifice as bringing about all desirable results, it is only a reiteration of the result of that sacrifice along with the results following from its subsidiaries, as also those following from the subsidiaries of those subsidiaries. As a matter of fact, there are results spoken as following from subsidiaries and from the subsidiaries of subsidiaries; e.g. 'For one who desires cattle, the altar should be one from which all dung has been swept away; for one who desires social position, it should be one from which all dung has been dug out', and so on;—again 'If he desires that the Rain-god should rain, he should measure out the Assembly on a lower level'. All these results have been already enjoined in the passages, and they are again spoken of in the sentence in question: we therefore think it right to regard this sentence as a mere *reiteration* (of results that have been already laid down in the texts enjoining the Main Sacrifice and its subsidiaries)"

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INDEPENDENT INJUNCTION OF RESULTS; BECAUSE THE RESULT IS MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NAME OF THE PRINCIPAL SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the sentence in question should be taken as an independent injunction of results,—why?—*because the result is mentioned in connection with the Principal Sacrifice*—'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are performed for the sake of all results',—'The *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed for the sake of all results';—in both these sentences the naming of the Principal Sacrifice clearly lays down that the Principal Sacrifices are really conducive to all desirable results. From this it follows that the texts should not be regarded as mere *reiterative*.—If the words 'all results' were taken as standing for only those results that have been laid down elsewhere as following from the sacrifice and its subsidiaries and subsidiaries to subsidiaries,—this would mean that the term indicates these only indirectly, (as the term '*all* results' cannot directly signify only those *few* results); and certainly Direct Expression (whereby really *all results* are meant) is more authoritative than Indirect Indication (which restricts the term 'all results' to only a *very few* results).

From all these we conclude that the texts should be taken as injunctions, on the basis of the texts laying down the entire performance of the sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): '*Yogasiddhi-nyāya*': *Sacrifices like the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa should be performed separately for the sake of each separate result desired*: '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa-nyāya*' (*B*).

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE JUST DISCUSSED, ALL THE RESULTS [SHOULD FOLLOW FROM A SINGLE PERFORMANCE], AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

In the cases discussed in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it has been explained that all desired results have been enjoined as following from the Principal Sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* or *Jyotiṣṭoma*).—Now there arises the question—Are all the results brought about by a single performance of the sacrifice? Or are they brought about one by one by separate performances?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"*All the results should follow from a single performance*,—why?—because the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,—as also the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice—are the means for the bringing about of all the results; and if they are such means of *all*, what result is there that would not be brought about (by the single performance)?—Hence we conclude that all the results follow simultaneously (from a single performance of the sacrifice)".

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, THE RESULTS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY TURNS; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR (SEVERAL) THINGS TO SPRING UP (AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME).

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that all the results appear simultaneously; in fact there is regular succession—*they are brought about by turns*; the results should be taken as appearing in succession, one after the other.—Why?—*Because it is not possible for several things to spring up at one and the same time*; all the desired results are so many *things*, and all things cannot spring up simultaneously; in fact, there is an inherent impossibility in all the results springing up simultaneously, as there is an incongruity involved (in such simultaneous appearance of all).

Or, we may take the word '*Utpattyasaṁyogitvāt*' (in the *Sūtra*), *not* as referring to the *springing up of the results*, but as referring to the results

when produced as indicating (the performance of the sacrifice); that is, what has been declared by the texts is that all the results are those for whose sake the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are performed, as also the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and this does not mean that all the results actually follow from the sacrifice; all that is meant is that the sacrifice is laid down as to be performed for the sake of all the results, and from this it does not follow that the Results are simultaneous.

Or, we make these two *Sūtras* (27 and 28) as embodying a different topic—as follows :—

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Prospective sacrifices' bring about results in this life as well as in the other life.*

SUTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ALL THE RESULTS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPEARING THERE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE."

Bhāṣya.

The various 'Prospective sacrifices' laid down in the following texts, form the subject-matter of this discussion—(*a*) '*Saurya śricharuṁ nirvapet brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' ['One desiring Brahmic glory should offer the cooked rice dedicated to *Sūrya*'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 3 2. 3); —(*b*) *Aindrāgnamēkādashakapālaṁ nirvapēt prajākāmaḥ*' ['One desiring offspring should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans, and dedicated to *Indra-Agni*'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 2. 1. 1);—(*c*) '*Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*' ['One desiring cattle should perform the *Chitrā* sacrifice'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 4. 6. 1) —(*d*) '*Vāshnavīṁ sāṅgrahaṇīm nirvapēt gram kāmaḥ*' ['One desiring to acquire a village should offer the *Sāṅgrahaṇ* dedicated to the *Vishnudēvas*'] (Taitt. Sam 2. 3. 9. 2).

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these results appear in this life? Or in the other life?

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows.—"The results should be taken as appearing *there*.—i.e. in the other world; *because there is no difference*, that is, all the results in question are just like 'heaven'. As a matter of fact the result, in the shape of 'cattle' and the rest, is never found to appear immediately after the sacrifice (which has been enjoined as bringing about that result),—it is only when an effect appears immediately after a cause that it is recognised as following from that cause; for instance, the pleasure resulting from massage appears at the same time as the massage itself;—when the result (cattle, for instance) appears at another time, for that also an entirely different cause (in the shape of *Purchase*, for instance) is perceptible; when a man is equipped with his physical body, there can be no cause for this phenomenon except the "Unseen Force";—thus then,

when we are told that a certain sacrifice brings cattle to the performer, it should be understood to mean that as a result of the performance of that sacrifice, the performer obtains (in his next life) such a special kind of Body and Sense-organs and the rest as enables him to acquire cattle. -That this is so is clearly indicated in the following passage—"Kaikaya, being desirous of performing a sacrifice, said to Dālbhya—'Please help me to perform this sacrifice which is calculated to bring me a kingdom';—Dālbhya replied—'Do not, my boy, think that the sacrifice brings kingdom in this life. in fact, sacrifices are performed for results to come in one's next life'.—Here it is clearly shown that the results of sacrifices appear in another life.—Hence we conclude that all 'Prospective Sacrifices' are such as have their results appearing in another life."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE OBTAINING OF RESULTS MUST TAKE PLACE DURING THIS LIFE AS OTHERWISE THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION OF THE SACRIFICE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE

Bhāṣya

It is during this life that *the accomplishment of the obtaining of results takes place*; otherwise the sacrifice could not have any connection with its originative injunction; i.e. when the injunction says—'He who desires cattle, should bring it about by means of this sacrifice'.—it is not understood to mean that the said result does not come about during this life.

As for the argument that 'the result is not found to appear immediately after the performance of the sacrifice',—it is true that it is not so found by Perception or by Inference; but it is duly known by means of the *word* (of the Veda).

As for the second argument that—'when the result (cattle for instance) is acquired at another time, there is another perceptible cause (in the shape of Purchase and the like)',—that does not affect our position; there may be another cause as well as the sacrifice.

Lastly, as for the argument that—'the Vedic passage declares that sacrifices are performed with a view to results to appear during another life',—our answer to this is that what the sage says is—'I am not going to help you to perform a sacrifice leading to results during this life. I am going to help you to perform a sacrifice leading to results during the next life'. This answers the *Pūrvapakṣin*'s argument.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Sautrāmaṇī' is part of the 'Chayana' (Erection of the Altar) and the 'Bṛhaspati-Sava' is part of the 'Vājapēya'.*

SŪTRA (29)

THE TWO ACTS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ENJOINED IN THE RELATION OF WHOLE AND PART, AS IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE MENTION OF THE TWO AS CONNECTED SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE

Bhāṣya

We have the two texts—(*a*) *Agniṁchitvā sautrāmaṇyā yajēta*' ['Having erected the Fire-altar, one should perform the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice'] (Taitt. Saṁh. 5 6 3. 4);—(*b*) '*Vājapēyēna stvā bṛhaspatisavēna yajēta*' [Having performed the *Vājapēya* sacrifice one should perform the *Bṛhaspati-sava* sacrifice'] (Ibid).

In regard to these there arises the question—are the two acts mentioned together for the purpose of showing that one is part of the other? Or are they mentioned together only for the purpose of indicating the time of their performance? [i.e. Is the *Sautrāmaṇī* a part of the *Chayana* and the *Bṛhaspati-sava* of the *Vājapēya*? Or simply the *Sautrāmaṇī* is to be performed *after* the *Chayana*, and the *Bṛhaspati sava after* the *Vājapēya*?]

The *Siddhānta*, we assert, is that the two are mentioned together for the purpose of showing that one is part of the other: it is only when we take it thus that the direct meaning of the text becomes accepted, otherwise (*if the other view were accepted*) *the Time would have to be taken* as indirectly indicated by the words of the text, and when there is a conflict between Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication, the right course is to accept the Direct Assertion, not Indirect Indication—Hence we conclude that the *Sautrāmaṇī* is part of the *Chayana*, and the *Bṛhaspati-sava* is part of the *Vājapēya*.

SŪTRA (30)

"THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN THE TIME, AS IT IS TIME THAT IS DIRECTLY DENOTED",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE NEXT SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If you think that the two acts are mentioned together for the purpose of showing that one is part of the other,—why cannot you take the text as laying down the *time*? In fact, the word '*Chitvā*' ('having erected'),—which means *on the completion of the Chayana*—has the form an injunction of Time".

SŪTRA (31)

THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as stated in the preceding *Sūtra*, as *in that case there would be no connection between what is expressed by the words*; that is to say, what is expressed by the word '*Chitrā*' is the *Chayana*, and there would be no sort of connection between this *Chayana* and the *Sautrāmaṇī*,—or between the *Vājapēya* and the *Bṛhaspati-sava* [if all that was meant was that one is to be performed on the completion of the other], and in this way the indications of the *Context* would become rejected because when *Sautrāmaṇī* is found to be laid down in the same *Context* as the *Chayana*, it is understood that the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice is part of the *Erection of the Fire altar*; similarly, when this *Bṛhaspati sava* is found to be laid down in the same *Context* as the *Vājapēya*, it is understood that the *Bṛhaspati sava* sacrifice is part of the *Vājapēya*. If there were no such connection (between the two sets of acts), the *Time* denoted would be understood as pertaining to some other entirely different act.—From all this it follows that the two are mentioned together for the purpose of showing that one is part of the other.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Vaimṛdha' is part of the Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT IS A PART OF BOTH",—IF THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Saṁsthāpya paurṇamāsīm vaimṛdhamanunirvapati*' ['Having completed the *Paurnamāsī* sacrifice, he offers the *Vaimṛdha*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Vaimṛdha* a part of both the *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, and the *Paurṇamāsī* is named only for the purpose of indicating the *time*? Or is it named for the purpose of indicating that the *Vaimṛdha* is part of the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Under the circumstances, the *Vaimṛdha* should be taken as a part of both the sacrifices;—why?—because of the force of the fact that it has been laid down in the 'Context' of both; also because the word '*Saṁsthāpya*' ('having completed') has the form of the Injunction of time [which shows that the '*Paurṇamāsī*' (Full-Moon Day) has been mentioned only for the purpose of indicating the *time* for the '*Vaimṛdha* which is part of both *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*]".

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS ONLY ONE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

There is only one sentence containing only one verb, '*Anunirvapati*' ('offers'), which cannot express two connections—(1) that of the *Vaimṛdha* with the two sacrifices, *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*, and (2) that of the *Vaimṛdha* with the time *Paurṇamāsī* (Full-Moon Day): we have seen that a single sentence expresses a single idea.

SŪTRA (34).

"BUT THERE IS THE INDICATION OF THE CONTEXT",—IF THIS IS URGED,—

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the *Context* (points to the connection of the *Vaimṛdha* with both the sacrifices); and this has got to be refuted (which is done in the following *Sūtra*)—

SÛTRA (35).

THAT CANNOT BE; THE CONNECTION OF THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION (POINTS TO THE CONTRARY VIEW).

Bhâṣya.

It cannot be as the *Pûrvapakṣin* has argued. The sentence in question is the only originative injunction of the *Vaimrdha*; this sentence may, on account of the *Context*, be construed with the *Darśa* and the *Pûrṇamâsa* sacrifices, or it may be taken with the *Pûrṇamâsa* sacrifice alone, with which it is directly (and perceptibly) connected. Certainly the connection that is directly perceptible is more authoritative than that based upon *Context*. Further, its connection with the *Pûrṇamasa* sacrifice is directly perceptible, while that with the *Time* is indirect.—From all this it follows that the *Vaimrdha* is part of the *Pûrṇamâsa* sacrifice

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *Exceptions to the last two Adhikaraṇas—The Anuyājas are to be performed at the time following the offering to Agni-Marut.*

SŪTRA (36).

THE SENTENCE NOT BEING THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN THE TIME, AS CONNECTION (BETWEEN TWO ACTIONS) IS ALWAYS BASED UPON SOME PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read -(*a*) '*Agnimārutād ūrdhvam anuyājaishcharanti*' ['After the offering to *Agni-Marut*, they perform the *Anuyājas*']:—(*b*) '*Prahṛtya paridhīn juhoti hāriyojanam*' ['After having offered the *Paridhis*, one makes the *Hāriyojana*-offering'].

In regard to these there arises the question—Do these sentences lay down one offering as part of the other? Or do they lay down the Time?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the fact of one being a part of the other is asserted directly, while the injunction of time could be got at only through indirect indication; hence they must be taken as laying down one offering as part of the other".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The sentence not being the originative injunction, it should be taken as laying down the time.* As a matter of fact, the offering to *Agni-Marut* is a part of the *Soma-sacrifice* [and as such has its originative injunction in that Context], similarly the *Anuyājas* are part of the *Pashu-sacrifice* [and as such has its originative injunction in that Context]: hence there is no connection between these two. —Similarly the *Paridhi-offering* is part of the *Pashu-sacrifice* [and has its originative Injunction in that Context], and the *Hāriyojana-offering* is a distinct Primary' by itself.—Thus then, we find that the *Anuyāja* and the *offering to Agni-Marut* are already known (as enjoined by texts other than the one under consideration); all that is not known (from any other source) is their immediate sequence; hence it is this latter alone that can be taken as enjoined by the text under discussion.—Similarly with the *Paridhi-offering* and the *Hāriyojana*. Such being the case, the *Paridhi-offering* can render no help to the *Hāriyojana*, nor the *Hāriyojana* to the *Paridhi-offering*—"But the *Paridhi-offering* coming first, would render help to the *Hāriyojana*".—Our answer to this is that it is not for the purpose of 'coming first' (before the *Hāriyojana*) that the *Paridhi-offering* is made; in fact, its performance is already there, as part of the *Pashu-sacrifice*; and it being there, its 'coming first' is also already there.—From all this it follows that the two actions are mentioned together only for the purpose of indicating the time (for the performance of the second act).

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The 'Soma-sacrifice' is to come after the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa'.*

SŪTRA (37)

IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS A DOUBT AS TO A CERTAIN TEXT BEING AN INJUNCTION OF 'PART' OR OF 'TIME'.—IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN 'TIME', AS THAT IS THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR IN THE SENTENCE

Bhāṣya

There is the text '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsau iṣṭvā somena yajēta*' ['After having performed the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, one should perform the *Soma-sacrifice*'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 5. 6. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this enjoin one sacrifice as being part of the other? Or does it lay down the *time*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"it should be taken as enjoining one as part of the other,—such being the direct meaning of the sentence".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—In this case, there being a doubt as to the sentence being an injunction of 'part' or an injunction of 'time', *it should be taken as laying down 'time', as that is the principal factor in the sentence*; as a matter of fact, it is the injunction of 'Time' that forms the principal factor in the sentence—not the injunction of the 'sacrifice'; that the sentence is not meant to be an injunction of the *sacrifice* is clear from the fact that the sentence does not mention the form of the sacrifice.—"Why do you say that it does not mention the *form* of the sacrifice?" We say so because there is no Deity.—"Why is there no Deity?"—Because no deity is mentioned in the sentence; it is only when a deity is mentioned in connection with a sacrifice that it is regarded as the 'deity' of that sacrifice, as a matter of fact, it is only through Direct Assertion (by a text) that the Deity of a Sacrifice becomes recognised as such,—not through any other means of cognition, like Sense-perception and the rest.—From this it follows that the sentence under consideration does not contain the injunction of any sacrifice not already known. On the other hand, if the sentence is taken as referring to a well-known sacrifice for laying down its 'time', then there is none of the above incongruities; because in this case the sacrifice, having its deity already enjoined elsewhere, is only referred to in this sentence. Hence we conclude that the connection between the two sacrifices serves the purpose of laying down the time (for the performance of the second sacrifice, *Soma*).—That this is so is also indicated in the following passage—'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are the *chariot of divinities*; if one performs the *Soma*-sacrifice after performing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, he proceeds on a well-known road clearly marked by the chariot':—the meaning of this is that 'just as passing in a chariot along a road well-beaten

by chariots is comfortable, so is the performance of the *Soma*-sacrifice comfortable, if done after the performance of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices' ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and other sacrifices that form part of the *Soma-sacrifice* and which are only modifications of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa*, have become well-known to the performer. Thus we find that the commendatory statement made in this passage is intelligible [only if the sentence under consideration is taken as laying down the *time* for the performance of the *Soma-sacrifice*, as to be *after the performance of the Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa*].

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *The Result of the 'Vaishvānara sacrifice' accrues to the Son: 'Jātēṣṭi-nyāya' (A).*

SŪTRA (38).

THE RESULT CANNOT BE TAKEN AS ACCRUING TO THE FATHER WHO IS NOT DIRECTLY ASSERTED (TO BE THE RECIPIENT OF THE RESULT), SPECIALLY AS THE SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS ALSO DO NOT SPEAK OF THE FATHER.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam nirvapēt putrē jātē*' ['On the birth of a son, one should offer the cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Vaishvānara*'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this offering made by the Father for his own welfare? Or for the son's welfare?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"He makes the offering for his own welfare; actions like these do not bring their result to persons other than the performer.—Why so?—Because the very initial act of fire-laying is laid down by means of a verb with the *Ātmanēpada* ending ('*ādadhīta*; which shows that the results of the act accrue to the Agent performing the act).—Then again, there is the following text—'If one pan breaks, one month of the year goes out and the Sacrificer dies; one should offer a cake baked upon one pan, dedicated to *Dyāvā-prthivī*;—if two pans break, two months of the year go out and the Sacrificer dies; one should offer a cake baked upon two pans, dedicated to the *Ashvins*;—he should count them and keep them carefully, for safety of the sacrificer' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 6).—Here we find that on the breaking of a pan, an action is laid down whose result is the welfare (safety) of the sacrificer himself. The same should be the case in the case we are considering. From this it follows that the result of the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice should accrue to the Performer (Father)".

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The result should not accrue to the Father, because the supplementary passage speaking of the Result speaks of it as accruing to the Son, not to the Father.—How so?—The passage reads as follows:—'On the birth of a son, one should offer the cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Vaishvānara*; when the cake is baked on eight pans, it endows him with brahmic glory through the *Gāyatrī*; when it is baked upon nine pans, it endows him with glory through *Trivṛt*; when it is baked on ten pans, it endows him with food, through *Virāṭ*; when it is baked upon eleven pans, it endows him with efficient sense-organs through *Triṣṭubh*; when it is baked upon twelve pans, it endows him with cattle through *Jagatī*; *that child at whose birth one offers this sacrifice, becomes purified, glorious, eater of food, possessed of efficient senses-organs and excellent cattle*'.—Here the result is spoken of as accruing to the child that is born. [As for the argument that the result of an action should always

accrue to the performer] no burden can be too heavy for a Vedic text [i.e. whenever a Vedic text speaks of a thing, however incongruous it may appear to us, it has to be accepted as true].—From all this it follows that the result of the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice should accrue to the Son.

As for the argument that—"actions like the one under consideration are never found to bring results to any other person (than the one who has performed it)".—our answer to this is that even when a result accrues to one's son, it brings pleasure to the Father himself; and hence the use of the *Ātmanēpada* ending cannot be entirely incompatible with the *Siddhānta*. In fact, it is in view of this fact of the Father being pleased that we have such assertions as –(*a*) 'The Son is one's own very self', -(*b*) 'Thou art born out of each of my limbs, produced out of my heart; thou art my very self-named *Son*: mayest thou live for a hundred years'.

SŪTRA (39)

THE MENTION OF THE DAMAGE TO THE ACCESSORIES IS TO BE TAKEN ONLY AS INDICATING THE OCCASION (FOR A CERTAIN OFFERING)

Bhāṣya

It has been argued above that the passage 'If one pan breaks, etc.' indicates that the result accrues to the performer.—The answer to this is that *the mention of the damage to the accessories (pans) is to be taken only as indicating the occasion* for a certain offering: in this sense it becomes quite explicable,—not in any other sense; for instance, when only a pan breaks, it cannot be right to seek for it by means of an elaborate sacrifice; certainly when a mere *Cowrie* is lost, one does not seek for it by spending a piece.

———

Or, this *Sūtra* (39) may be taken as representing another *Adhikaraṇa*, as follows:—

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The 'Vaishvānara sacrifice' is to be performed after the performance of the 'Birth-rite'.*

SŪTRA (39)

THE CONNECTION OF THE ACCESSORY (SACRIFICES) WITH THE EVENT IS MEANT TO BE A MERE INDICATION OF THE OCCASION

Bhāṣya

There is the text—'*Vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam nirvapēt putrē jātē*' ['On the birth of a son, one should offer the cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Vaishvānara*'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4).

In regard to this, there arises the question– Is this sacrifice to be performed immediately after birth? or after the performance of the '*Birth-rite*'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that– "it should be performed immediately after birth: because as soon as an event has occurred, what is contingent on that event should follow at once".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* –It should be performed after the *Birth-rite* has been performed. Why? Because of the force of circumstances: It has been enjoined that the child is to be fed after the *Birth rite* has been performed: if then, the sacrifice were to be performed *before* the *Birth-rite*, the time of feeding the child would be put off, and in that case, the child could not live.

It has been argued that 'as soon as an event has occurred, what is contingent on that event should follow at once"—The answer to that is as follows– *The connection of the accessory (sacrifices) with the event is meant to be a mere indication of the occasion*; the '*event*' is the *birth of the son*, which, when it has come about, becomes the occasion; but the precise time of that event does not form part of the sacrifice in question; as for the occasion (the *birth of the son*) it does not cease (it continues) even after the performance of the *Birth rite*. On the other hand, if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were accepted, and the time for the sacrifice were taken to be laid down as *immediately after birth*– then, if the *Birth-rite* were performed and the child were fed before the sacrifice, the prescribed time (of the sacrifice) would have lapsed, so that in this case it would be necessary to have recourse to Indirect Indication [i.e. the time *immediately after the Birth* would have to be taken as standing for *sometime after Birth*].

From all this it follows that the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice is to be performed after the performance of the *Birth rite*.

[*Supplementary Question*– Treated as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* by itself by Maṇḍana Miśra and Mādhava, and also by Pārthasārathi in *Tantraratna*.]

Now there arises the question– Is the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice to be performed any day within the ten days of the Birth?–Or at its own proper time (time otherwise most suitable for it)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that– it may be performed on any day, and there is no restriction at all".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:–It should be performed either on the Full-Moon Day or on the Moonless Day.—'Why?"—Because of the Vedic Text: we have the following text– 'If one, after having performed the *Paśu* or the *Soma* sacrifice, should offer another sacrifice, he should do it either on the Full-Moon Day or on the Moonless Day'. There is no burden that can be too heavy for a Vedic Text [i.e. when the Vedic Text definitely lays down a certain thing, no other consideration can come in the way]. Under the circumstances, if the other view were accepted,

then the proper time thus laid down would lapse; and in this case it would be necessary to have recourse also to Indirect Indication [the terms 'Full-Moon Day or Moonless Day' having to be taken as indirectly indicating any day within the first ten days].—Then again, if the sacrifice were performed on any other date (except the 15th and the 30th of the month, the Moonless Day and the Full-Moon Day), or within the first ten days, the man would find it impossible to get together all the accessories of the Sacrifice, and he would also be unable to secure the proper time or the requisite *purity* [the first ten days from a birth being regarded as a period of 'impurity'].—From all this, it follows that the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice should be performed after the lapse of ten days, either on the Full-Moon Day or on the Moonless Day.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *Subsidiary Sacrifices like the 'Sautrāmaṇī' should be performed at their own proper time.*

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY ARE CONNECTED WITH THEIR 'PRIMARIES', THE 'SUBSIDIARIES' SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THE TIME OF THE 'PRIMARIES'"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the two texts—(*a*) 'Having erected the Fire-altar, one should perform the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice' (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 6. 3 4); and (*b*) 'Having performed the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, one should perform the *Brhaspatisava* sacrifice',—it has been decided (under *Adhikarana* 13) that in each case the two sacrifices are mentioned together for the purpose of showing that one is part of the other. The question that arises now is—Should the *Sautrāmaṇī* be performed immediately on the erection of the Fire-altar, as an extension of the same (erection)? Or should it be performed at its own proper time?—Similarly, should the *Brhaspatisava* be performed immediately after, and as an extension of, the *Vājapēya*? Or at its own time?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'*The two sacrifices should be performed at the time of their Primaries*'—Why?—Because the time for the 'subsidiaries' is the same as that of their Primaries; as a matter of fact, there is only one time for the Primaries and their Subsidiaries; as is going to be explained under Sū. 11. 2. 7;—so that, after having erected the Fire-altar, the man should not rest there, he should proceed with the performance of another sacrifice, named '*Sautrāmaṇī*';—similarly, after having completed the *Vājapēya*, he should not rest content with that, he should perform the sacrifice named '*Brhaspatisava*'."

SŪTRA (41)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SACRIFICE IN QUESTION IS ENJOINED AS TO BE PERFORMED ON THE COMPLETION (OF THE OTHER SACRIFICE), HENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE GENERAL INJUNCTION, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT ITS OWN PROPER TIME.

Bhāṣya

The other sacrifice (*Brhaspatisava* or *Sautrāmaṇī*) has been enjoined as to be performed on the 'completion' of the Primary Sacrifice (*Vājapēya* or *Erection of the Fire-altar*);—there is 'completion' of a sacrifice only when all its main subsidiaries have been performed; not, as you think, when the details of the main sacrifice itself have been performed.—Why so?—Because

the term expressing the Primary Sacrifice appears with the Instrumental Ending—'*Vājapēyēna iṣṭvā*'—which means 'after having by means of the *Vājapēya*, carried on the operation leading up to the Result';—and this 'operation' is understood to consist in the Primary Sacrifice along with its subsidiaries, not independently of its subsidiaries. The *Bṛhaspatisava* could have been performed as an extension of the *Vājapēya*, if we had the text in the form '*Vājapēyam abhinirvartya*', where (by the presence of the Accusative Ending) the *Vājapēya* would appear as the *desired end*. Such however is not the form of the text. Hence the text must mean 'after having performed all the subsidiaries of the *Vājapēya* [one should perform the *Bṛhaspatisava*]'.—Such being the case the sacrifice in question (*Bṛhaspatisava*) should be taken as to be performed after the performance of the *Vājapēya* has been finished, and the time of the *Vājapēya* has passed away [That is, even though it is 'part' of the *Vājapēya*, its performance is to come *after* the *Vājapēyā* with all its component subsidiaries has been performed]. Under the circumstances, the *Bṛhaspatisava* falls under the same Injunction as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* which (being the Archetype of all Soma sacrifices) lends the details of its procedure to the *Bṛhaspatisava*; whereby this latter must be performed at its own proper time (in accordance with the details borrowed from the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).—And similarly the *Sautrāmaṇī* would fall under the general injunction of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* (which is the Archetype of all *Iṣṭis*) and as such be performed at the time of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*.

Says the Opponent—'In the case of the *Vajapēya*, it may be that, on account of the Instrumental ending in the phrase '*Vājapēyēna iṣṭvā*', the meaning is 'having completed the sacrifice', but this is not possible in the case of the Fire-altar, where the word being *Chitvā*, the meaning would be 'having completed the *Chayana* (Erection)' [and the *Chayana* would not come in as an instrument, like the *Vājapēya*, and hence its *completion* need not mean the performance of all its subsidiaries]'

Answer—That is not so; the words of the text are '*agnim chitvā*' which means 'having embellished (consecrated) the Fire by means of the *Chayana-rite*'; now the term '*Agni*' stands for the *Fire*, and merely placing it upon the ground does not confer any benefit (sanctity) upon the Fire;—if a sacrifice is performed in the Fire which has been placed upon the ground, then such a *chayana* (consisting of *placing upon the ground* and *performing of the sacrifice*) could be regarded as conferring a sanctity upon the Fire; and hence the phrase 'having completed the *Agni*' must mean 'after having performed the sacrifice in the Fire placed upon the ground';—as, so long as no sacrifice has been performed, the *Agni* is not benefited by the *Chayana* at all. That benefit (sanctity) conferred on the *Agni* whereby the *Agni* helps the Sacrificer does not consist in merely *placing it on the ground*. Hence in this case also the 'completing of the *Agni*' must mean 'after having performed the sacrifice'.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya IV.

ADHYĀYA IV.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *'Gambling' and the like are 'subsidiary' to the 'Sacrifices' included under 'Rājasūya'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ALL THE ACTS ENJOINED ARE NOT-SUBSIDIARY (PRIMARY), BECAUSE THE NAME OF THE CONTEXT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL".

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) *Anumati* and the rest are a few sacrificial acts laid down—[(1) 'Offers a cake baked on eight pans to *Anumati*', (2) 'Offers a cake baked upon one pan, to *Nirṛti*'; (3) 'Offers the cooked rice to *Āditya*', (4) 'a cake baked upon eleven pans to *Agni Viṣṇu*] (Taitt. Saṁh. I 8 1 1), (*b*) certain animals are spoken of, *Malhā*, etc. [(1) 'Sacrifices the pregnant *Malhā*,—i.e. she-goat with teats hanging by its neck—to *Āditya*', (2) 'the little she-goat—to *Maruts*'; 'the *Praṣṭhauhī* i.e. the cow capable of carrying a load,—to the *Ashvins*'] (Taitt. Saṁ. I. 8. 19 1): —(*c*) again, certain Homa-offerings called '*Dārvika homas*', are prescribed in the texts '*Valmīkavapāyām homaḥ*' ('the Homa offered on the omentum of white-ants'), —(*d*) and certain other acts as —(1) 'Gambles with the cow capable of carrying a load'; (2) 'Wins over the *Rājanya*', (3) 'Recites the story of *Shunaḥshēpha*'; (4) 'Takes a bath'.—In close proximity to all these we have the text '*Rājasūyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['One desiring self-sovereignty should perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice'.]—Here then we find mentioned a sacrifice of the name of '*Rājasūya*', of which the actual form is not mentioned; and it is mentioned in close proximity to a number of * acts whose actual forms are mentioned: -from this it is gathered that the former, '*Rājasūya*', is a collective name for all the said acts taken together.

In regard to all this, there arises the question —Does the word '*rājasūya*' denote the whole group of acts spoken of *Anumati* and the rest [and hence all these acts are equally 'primary'] ? Or does it denote some and not others [and hence the former are 'primary' and the latter 'subsidiary'] ?

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* The word '*yāgānām*' in the printed text should not be there; it is not found in MS. B. What are meant are all those acts that are mentioned in the texts quoted; some of these are not '*yāga*', if they were, the whole point of the *Adhikaraṇa* would be lost. The *Siddhānta* is that of all the *acts*, those that are of the form of 'sacrifice' are 'primary', the others are 'subsidiary'; if all the acts were 'sacrifices', no such distinction would be possible.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The word '*rājasūya*' denotes all the acts spoken of.—Why?—*Because the name of the Context is equally applicable to all*; i.e. the name of the 'context' belongs equally to the *Rājasūya* and all the acts in question. It is called '*rājasūya*', because the '*rājā*' (*Soma*) '*sūyatē*' (has its juice extracted); or because it is the '*sūya*' (sacrifice) offered by the '*rājā*' (King).—Thus then, the 'Context' being equally applicable to all the acts, and there being no grounds for making any distinction among them, the word '*rājasūya*' should denote all these acts; and the result spoken of ('self-sovereignty') would follow from that act (or group of acts) which is named '*Rājasūya*'.—From this it follows that all the acts in question are 'primary acts'."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THOSE THAT ARE NOT OF THE NATURE OF 'SACRIFICE' SHOULD BE SUBSIDIARY, BECAUSE THEY CAN BE DIFFERENTIATED.

Bhāṣya

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

Of the acts in question, those that are not of the nature of 'sacrifice' should be regarded as subsidiary;—e.g. the acts of *Gambling* and the rest.—When it is said that 'One should bring about self-sovereignty by means of the sacrifice named *Rājasūya*', it is meant that *self-sovereignty* is brought about by the act of *Sacrifice*,—not by what is *not* an act of sacrifice; and *Gambling* and the rest are acts that are *not sacrifices*;—consequently these acts that are mentioned should be regarded as subsidiary to those that are of the nature of 'sacrifice', which latter are what bring about the desired result.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): '*Gambling*' *is subsidiary to the entire Rājasūya sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (3)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THAT WHICH IS MENTIONED IN THE MIDDLE APPERTAINS TO THAT ACT WHICH IS IN PROXIMITY TO IT".

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, in the course of the *Abhiṣēchanīya sacrifice*, we find *Gambling* and certain other acts laid down in the texts—'He gambles with the cow capable of carrying a load' and so forth [see texts quoted in connection with the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*].

In regard to these acts, there arises the question—Are they subsidiary to the *Abhiṣēchanīya* (which is a part of the *Rājasūya*) only? Or to the entire *Rājasūya*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "inasmuch as they have been mentioned in the middle, they should be subsidiary to that *act which is in close proximity to it*,—thus would be in keeping with the fact that the acts have been spoken of in the immediate proximity of the *Abhiṣēchanīya*".

SŪTRA (4)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SUBSIDIARY TO ALL THE SACRIFICES (MAKING UP THE 'RĀJASŪYA').—BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL ENJOINED AS EQUALLY (IMPORTANT); THE 'CONTEXT' ALSO DOES NOT BELONG TO THE ONE ACT (OF ABHIṢĒCHANĪYA). THEY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE MIDDLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING THEIR CONNECTION (WITH ALL)

Bhāṣya

The *Gambling* and other acts should be regarded as subsidiary to the *Anumati* and all the sacrifices enjoined in the texts.—Why?—*Because they are all enjoined as equally important*; i.e. the *Anumati* and the other sacrifices are all equally enjoined, and they are all fruitful and hence 'primary'.—The 'Context' also belongs to all these, not to the *Abhiṣēchanīya* only. As a matter of fact, on the strength of 'Order', the acts in question should be subsidiary to the *Abhiṣēchanīya* only, while on the strength of 'Context', they should be subsidiary to all the sacrifices; and 'Context' is more authoritative than 'Order'. Hence it follows that they cannot be regarded as subsidiary to the *Abhiṣēchanīya* only.—They have been mentioned *in the middle of* (i.e. in close proximity to) the *Abhiṣēchanīya*, because being performed there (i.e. in proximity, and along with) the *Abhiṣēchanīya*, they would benefit all the sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Saumya' and the rest are to be performed at the time of the Upasads.*

SŪTRA (5)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT, BOTH WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE"

Bhāṣya

In course of the *Rājasūya*, the *Upasads* are performed; in connection with these *Upasads* we read—'*Purastādupasadām saumyēna charanti, antarā tvāṣṭrēṇa, uparistād vaiṣṇavēna*' [Before the *Upasads*, they make the offering to *Soma*; in between the *Upasads* they make the offering to *Tvaṣṭr*, and after the *Upasads*, they make the offering to *Viṣṇu*'] (Taitt. Brā. 1. 8. 1. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the *Saumya* and other offerings part of the *Upasads*? Or are they only to be performed at the *time* of the *Upasads*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—they are part of the *Upasads*—why? because their connection with the *Upasads* is *directly asserted* by the texts quoted;—while if the texts were taken as laying down the time for the offerings, they would express this only by *Indirect Indication*. Hence we conclude that the offerings in question are part of the *Upasads*.—*Objection*—'The offerings *qualified by* (made at) *the time* might be taken as part of the *Upasads*, so that we could have both—the connection of the offerings with the *Upasads*, as well as the injunction of *time* by means of the term *purastāt* (*before*); that is, the presence of the word "*Upasad*" would denote the fact of the offerings being part of the *Upasads*, while the force of the term *purastāt* (*before*) would denote the fact that the offerings are to be made *before* (the *Upasads*)'.—The answer to this is that *both would be incompatible*, i.e. in one and the same sentence, it is not possible for one word *upasadām*'—to qualify the *Saumya* and other offerings (as part of the *Upasads*) and also to denote the point of time 'before the *Upasads*', as, if this were done, there would be a syntactical split.—From this we conclude that the text cannot be taken as declaring the offerings *as qualified by the time* to be part of the *Upasads*."

SŪTRA (6)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN TIME ONLY; BECAUSE WE SEE NO DIFFERENCE

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the *Pūrva-pakṣa* view.

Time only should be taken as laid down by the text,—and it should not be taken as serving the purpose of laying down that the *offerings* are part of the *Upasads*.—Why?—*Because we perceive no difference*; i.e. we do not perceive any difference between the text in question and other texts which are admitted to be injunctions of time,—such texts, for instance, as 'they offer the *Anuyājas* after the offering to *Agni marut*'. In the present case also the *Saumya* and other offerings are such as have been already enjoined (elsewhere), and so also the *Upasads*; it is only their sequence that has not been enjoined elsewhere, hence it is this *sequence* alone that can form the object of the injunction in question.—From this it follows that *time alone* is laid down by the text in question

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Āmana-homas' are subsidiary to the 'Sāṅgrahāyaṇī' and the rest.*

SŪTRA (7).

FOR REASONS ALREADY EXPLAINED, THE 'FRUITFUL' SHOULD BE THE 'PRIMARY' OF THE OTHER (WHICH IS NOT FRUITFUL).

Bhāṣya.

The text—'*Vaishvadēvīṁ sāṅgrahāyaṇīm nirvapēt grāmakāmaḥ*' ['Desiring to acquire a village, one should offer the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇi* sacrifice to the *Vishvēdēvas*'] (Taittu. Saṁ. 2. 3. 9. 3); —in connection with this sacrifice, we read of the *Āmana-homa offerings* in the text '*Āmanamasyāmanasya dēvā iti tisra āhutīrjuhoti*' ['Repeating the *mantra Āmanamasyāmanasya dēvāḥ*, he pours three libations into the Fire.]

In connection with this, there arises the question—Are the *Āmana-homas* equal, in primary character to the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇī*? Or are they subsidiary to it?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'They are equally 'primary' with the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇi* sacrifice;—why?—because the grounds for being regarded as 'primary',—which consist in the presence of the element of 'Sacrifice',—are equally present in both [i.e. both are of the nature of 'Sacrifice'].—'But the *Āmana-homas* are not fruitful [they are not spoken of as bringing about any results, and as such, they should be subsidiaries].'—The answer to this is that the term '*grāmakāmaḥ*' ('desiring to acquire a village', occurring in the other sentence) may be construed with the *Homas* [so that they would be *fruitful*].—From all this it follows that the *Homas* in question are equally 'primary' with the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇī* sacrifice."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta—For reasons already explained, the fruitful should be the primary of the other.* It is not true that the *Homas* in question are equally 'primary' with the Sacrifice. Because, as a matter of fact, the *fruitful* (which brings about a result) is always the 'primary' of what is *not fruitful*; and in the case in question, the sacrifice is spoken of as bringing about a result (*the acquisition of a village*), while the *Homas* are not spoken of as bringing about any results.—"We have already said that the term 'desiring to acquire a village' would be construed with the sentence laying down the *Homas* [so that these also would be *fruitful*]."—The answer to this is that no such construction—the Elliptical Extension of the term from one sentence to the other—is possible in the case in question, because there is intervention; and it has been shown under Sū. 2. 1. 49 that 'There should be no Elliptical Extension where there is intervention of unconnected words'.—"What is it that intervenes here between the two texts (one laying down the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇī* and the other laying down the *Āmana-homas*)?".—The intervention is caused by the

Paridhi-mantras—'*Ugrosyugrastvam dēvēṣvadhyugroham sajātēṣu bhūyāsam priyaḥ sajātānām ugrashchettā vasubhiḥ*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 2. 1) ('Thou art mighty among the divinities; may I become very mighty among my Kinsmen, loved by my Kinsmen, and mighty in the possession of riches'). It is after these *mantras* that we have the text 'With the mantra *ūmanamasya*, etc. he pours three libations into the Fire' [wherein the *Āmana-homas* are prescribed].—From all this it follows that the *Āmana-homas* are subsidiary to the *Sāṅgrahāyaṇi* sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The offering of the 'Curd-cup' is compulsory (essential).*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—A]—"THE OFFERING OF THE 'CURD-CUP' IS A CONTINGENT ACT, BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT".

Bhāṣya

[What is 'primary' is '*puruṣārtha*', subserving the purposes of man, and what is 'subsidiary' is '*kratvartha*,' subserving the purposes of a sacrifice. Similarly what is 'compulsory', 'essential' is '*kratvartha*' and what is 'contingent' is '*puruṣārtha*'. That is why the subject of 'compulsory' and 'contingent' acts has been introduced here.]

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we read—*Yām vai kāñchit adhvaryushcha yajamānashcha dēvatām antaritah tasyā abrahchēta, yat prājāpatyam dadhigraham grhnāti shamayatyēvainām*' ['If the *Adhvaryu* and the Sacrificer omit a deity, that Deity becomes angry; if he offers the *Curd cup* to *Prajāpati*, he pacifies that Deity'] (Taitt. Sam. 3. 5. 9. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this offering of the 'Curd-cup' compulsory (essential)? Or contingent (non-essential)?

On this question, the first *Pūrvapakṣa* (*A*) is as follows.—'*The offering of the 'Curd-cup' is a contingent act, because of the direct assertion to that effect*; i.e. the offering is directly asserted as to be performed only when the contingency, in the shape of the 'omission of the Deity', is present; and certainly this *omission* cannot be compulsory or essential; hence it follows that the offering is *contingent*."

SŪTRA (9)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—B]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS COMPULSORY ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TERM 'JYĒṢṬHA'."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been said that the offering is a *contingent* act; we accept that; but it is *compulsory also*.—Why?—*Because of the presence of the term 'jyēṣṭha'*. In the following text we find the term '*jyēṣṭha*' (applied to the *offering* in question)—'*Jyēṣṭho va ēṣa grahāṇām, yasyaiṣa grhyatē jyaiṣṭhyamēva gachchhati*' ['This Curd-cup is the foremost of the cups, he for whom this is offered becomes foremost'] (Taitt. Sam. 3. 5. 9. 1); the term '*Jyēṣṭha*' stands for the *most important* or the *foremost*; in the present instance, it stands for the *foremost*, not the *most important*. It is only when the offering is *compulsory* that it can be so eulogised (as 'the foremost'); for people do not eulogise what is fleeting.—From this it follows that the offering

is *compulsory* as well as *contingent*; so that it may be offered even when the contingency (omission of the Deity) is not there, and also when the contingency is there."

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS HAVING THE FORM OF ALL (DEITIES)".

Bhāṣya.

In the following text we find the *offering* spoken of as having the form of all deities—'*Sarvēṣām vā ētaddēvānām rūpam yadēṣa grahaḥ, yasyaisa gṛhyatē sarvāṇyēvainam paśūnām rūpāṇyupatiṣṭhantē*' ['This Cup represents the forms of all deities, he for whom this Cup is offered obtains all forms of Cattle'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 5. 9. 1). No other 'form of deities' can be perceptible to us, except '*nityatva*' (*eternality*, which in the case of Action, consists in its being *compulsory*) From this also it follows that the offering is *compulsory* as well as *contingent*".

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS COMPULSORY; [THE TEXT SPEAKING OF THE OMISSION OF THE DEITY] SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION; BECAUSE THE TWO PERSONS SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT, ARE NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE 'OMISSION', AND ALSO BECAUSE THE 'OMISSION' IS AN INCONSTANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It has been declared that the *offering* is *compulsory* as well as *contingent*;—but in reality, it should be regarded as *compulsory* only, because of the presence of the term 'foremost' and because of the offering being spoken as 'having the form of all deities'.

As for the argument that—"it is found laid down as to be done only when the particular contingency, in the shape of the 'omission of the deity', is present",—the answer is that the 'omission of a deity' is nowhere spoken of as the condition of the *offering*; because the *two persons*—the *Adhvaryu* Priest and the *Sacrificer*—*spoken of in connection with the act, are not connected with the* 'omission'; that is to say, we do not find it asserted that 'The *Adhvaryu* or the *Sacrificer* should omit a deity'; in fact, the 'omission' is something *inconstant*. Nor again, have we any such words as 'The Curd-cup should be offered only when there is omission'; in fact, the 'offering of the Curd-cup' is to be done irrespectively of all conditions. As for the redressing of the wrong done by the omission of the deity, which is spoken of in the text quoted, that could only be a purpose that is served by the said offering; in which case the *offering* being compulsory and the purpose served

by it *inconstant*, it could not be right that a *compulsory* offering is made for the redressing of an 'omission' which is *inconstant* (uncertain); and hence if the purpose served were inconstant, that would militate against the direct assertion of the *compulsory* (constant) character of the offering.—If, therefore, the text speaking of 'the omission of the deity' be taken as a commendatory declaration, there is no militating against the Direct Assertion; because in that case, the Cup is not offered for the redressing of the wrong done by the 'omission'; there is an entirely different purpose served by it, and the mention of the omission is only for the purpose of eulogising it; the purpose served by the offering of the *Curd-cup* is that it is a subsidiary to the *Soma-sacrifice*.

This same conclusion is indicated by the fact that the 'omission' is something *inconstant*; so that it is the *inconstant* 'omission' which is mentioned with a view to eulogise the *constant* (compulsory offering).

From all this it follows that the objection does not affect our position that the offering of the Curd-cup is a compulsory act.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Vaishvānara' sacrifice is a contingent act.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'VAISHVĀNARA' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'COMPULSORY', BECAUSE ITS NUMBER IS THE SAME AS THAT OF (OTHER) COMPULSORY THINGS".

Bhāṣya.

There is the Setting up of the Fire-altar, laid down in the text—'*Ya evaṁvidvān agnim chinutē*' ['If one knowing this sets up the Fire-altar, etc.'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 5. 2. 1). In connection with this, we read—'*Yo vai saṁvatsaramukhyamabhṛtvā agnim chinutē, yathā sāmigarbho vipadyatē tādṛgēva tadārtimārchhēt, vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam purastānnirvapēt, saṁvatsaro vāgnirvaishvānaro yathā saṁvatsaramāptvā kālē āgatē vijāyatē ēvamēva saṁvatsaramāptvā kālē āgatē agniñchinutē nārtimṛchchhēt iti; ēṣā agnēḥ priyā tanūryat vaishvānaraḥ, priyāmēvāsya tanūmavarundhē*' ['If one erects the Fire-altar without having kept the Fire in the hearth, he perishes just like a half-developed embryo; a cake baked on twelve pans should first of all be offered to *Vaishvānara*; the year itself is the *Vaishvānara*-Fire; just as the embryo grows in a year and is born when the time arrives, so if one keeps the Fire in the hearth for one year and then erects the Fire-altar, when the proper time arrives, then, he does not perish; this *Vaishvānara* is the Fire's beloved body, the sacrificer obtains a beloved body'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 5. 1. 7).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Vaishvānara* sacrifice *compulsory*? Or *contingent*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Here also the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice is *compulsory*; and the statement that 'the sin involved in not keeping the Fire in the hearth for a year is destroyed by the *Vaishvānara*' is purely commendatory.—Further, *its number is the same as that of other compulsory things*,—as in the text '*Triṇyētāni havīṁṣi bhavanti, traya imē lokāḥ ēṣām lokānāmārohāya*' ['Three are these offering-materials, three are these regions; to climb up to these regions'];—there is no similarity between the 'offering-materials' and the 'regions'; what the sentence means is that 'just as there are three eternal regions so are there the three offering-materials',—in this way the offering-materials being eulogised by being likened to the regions.—From all this it follows that the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice is *compulsory*."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS CONTINGENT; BECAUSE THE EVIL IS SPOKEN OF AS APPEARING ONLY AFTER THE CONTINGENCY HAS COME ABOUT.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when the *contingency*, in the shape of *not keeping the fire in the hearth*, has come about that the evil (of perishing) appears; until it has itself come about, it cannot be the cause of the evil. Hence in this case there is no such incompatibility as we found in the case of the 'Curd-cup'; and consequently the passage cannot be taken as a commendatory declaration; the act must be taken as *contingent*.

It has been argued that "the sameness of number with the regions is possible only if the sacrifice in question is a *contingent* act, not otherwise".—Our answer to this is that, by reason of there being *three* regions and the offering-materials resembling them in that respect, the passage will have to be taken as a commendatory declaration.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The sixth Altar is contingent.*

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THE SIXTH ALTAR SHOULD BE REGARDED AS COMPULSORY AND ESSENTIAL BECAUSE IT IS PRECEDED BY OTHERS [WHICH ARE ALL COMPULSORY AND ESSENTIAL]".

Bhāṣya.

There is the Setting up of the Fire-altar, laid down in the text—'One who knowing thus sets up the Fire-altar' (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 5. 2. 1); in connection with this we read—'*Saṁvatsaro vainam pratiṣṭhāyai nudati. yo'gniṁchitvā na pratitiṣṭhati pañcha pūrvāgnichitayo bhavanti, atha ṣaṣṭhīṁchitiṁchinutē*' ['The year urges him to obtain social standing if one, having set up the Fire-altar, does not obtain social standing, after the five altars have been set up, he should set up the sixth altar'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 4. 2. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is it the Compulsory Fire that is spoken of here as *six-altared* (so that all the six altars are compulsory and essential)? Or, is the Fire set up in the one (sixth) Altar a Contingent one?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The sixth altar is laid down in regard to the compulsory Fire; and it is in regard to this sixth altar, which also is compulsory, that we have the commendation to the effect that 'this Altar is so effective that through it, even one who does not deserve social standing attains that standing'.—'But why is the sentence explained in this manner?'—Because we find the term 'sixth' present in the text: that which completes the number *six* is the 'sixth': hence the term 'sixth' could not rightly be applied to the *one* altar only. Hence what is compulsory is *the Fire set up on the six altars*".

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ENUMERATED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THOSE (FIVE ALTARS)".

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, we find that the sixth Altar has been enumerated in the same manner as the five preceding Altars, in the following text—'*Iyam vāva prathamā chitiḥ, oṣadhayaḥ puriṣam; Antarikṣam vāva dvitīya chitiḥ, vayāṁsi puriṣam; Asau vāva tṛtīyā chitiḥ. nakṣatrāṇi puriṣam: Yajño vāva chaturthī chitiḥ dakṣiṇā puriṣam; Yajamāno vava panchamī chitiḥ, prajāḥ puriṣam · Saṁvatsaro vāva ṣaṣṭhī chitiḥ, ṛtavaḥ puriṣam*' (Taitt. Saṁ. 5. 6. 10. 3) ['This earth is the first Altar; the herbs are the dung; the sky verily is the second Altar, the birds are the dung; this same is the third *Altar*,

the stars are the dung; the sacrifice is the fourth Altar, the sacrificial fee is the dung; the sacrificer is the fifth Altar, his offsprings are the dung; the year is the sixth Altar, the seasons are the dung'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 6. 10. 3); as a rule, things that are similar are always enumerated as similar, as in the sentence—'The *Devas, Ṛṣis, and Gandharvas* were in one place, and the *Asuras, Rakṣas,* and *Pishāchas* were in another place' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 4. 1. 1);—in the case in question also we find the five altars enumerated as similar to the sixth Altar; hence it follows that this sixth Altar should be similar to those five: and it can be so similar to those only if it were set up at that same sacrifice at which those five have been set up.—From this also it follows that the same Fire is set up on the six altars and hence the sixth also is compulsory."

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE COMMENDATORY DECLARATION BECOMES APPLICABLE".

Bhāṣya.

"There is a commendatory declaration also,—'*Ṣaṭ chitayo bhavanti, ṣaṭ puriṣāṇi, tāni dvādasha sampadyantē, dvādasha māsāḥ saṁvatsaraḥ, saṁvatsara ēva pratitiṣṭhati*' ['There are six altars and six dungs: these together become *twelve*; twelve months make the year; the year itself becomes stable'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 6. 10. 3);—this declaration could never be applicable if the Fire were set up on a single altar—From this also it follows *that what is compulsory is the Fire set up on six altars.*"

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE FIRE SET UP ON ONE ALTAR SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'CONTINGENT': BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS TO BE DONE AFTER THE COMPLETION (OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE), ON A CERTAIN CONTINGENCY ARISING.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the Fire set up on one Altar should be regarded as 'contingent'.—Why?—*Because it has been laid down as to be done after the completion of the main sacrifice, on the contingency*—of social standing not being attained—*arising.* So that this (sixth) altar is laid down for one *who has not attained social standing,* and as such, is *contingent*; hence it can never be regarded as *compulsory.*

Then again, it has been laid down as to be done *after the completion* of the sacrifice, and hence it cannot be done while the sacrifice is still going on.—"The term used in the text is '*chitvā*', 'having set up the altar', which shows that *the sixth Altar is to be set up after the other five altars have been set up,* and not *after the sacrifice has been completed*".—The answer to this is

that the term '*chitvā*' does not stand for what is connoted by this term itself; in fact it stands for what is expressed by the sentence; so that what the phrase '*agnim chitvā*', 'having set up the Fire on the altar', means is 'having accomplished the purpose by the setting up of the Fire on the altar'; and as a matter of fact, the 'purpose' of the setting up of the Fire-altar becomes accomplished only when the sacrifice is completed, not otherwise.—Then again, the word 'sixth', occurring after the mention of the five altars, can be taken only in relation to these five. That also is the reason why we say that it is to be done *after the completion of the Sacrifice*.—Thus it is found that on the strength of the Vedic text, the Fire spoken of as 'sixth' is one that has been set up on one altar only (and this is 'contingent').

SŪTRA (18).

AS REGARDS THE SAMENESS OF THE MANNER OF ENUMERATION WITH THOSE (FIVE ALTARS),—THAT IS DUE TO INCOMPATIBILITY.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* supplies the answer to *Sūtras* (15) and (16).

(*a*) 'The sameness of the enumeration with those (five altars)' (which has been urged in Sū. 15), as also (*b*) 'the commendatory declaration' (which has been urged in Sū. 16), is quite explicable (under the *Siddhānta* view): (*a*) The meaning is that 'There are five altars set up first, and when the man does not attain social standing by means of these, then he sets up the sixth, with a view to attaining social standing'.—(*b*) The praising of the altars as 'twelve' can be explained as being in relation to the five altars along with the dungs.—That the two passages have to be so taken is due to the 'incompatibility', between the 'one' (altar) and the numbers 'six' and 'twelve'.—As for the 'enumeration', we find dissimilar things also enumerated together; e.g. in the text 'Divinities, Men, and Pitṛs—these were elsewhere' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 4. 1. 1)—[where the three kinds of beings are entirely dissimilar].

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Piṇḍapitṛyajña' is not 'subsidiary' to any Act.*

SŪTRA (19).

THE PITṚYAJÑA SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS A 'SUBSIDIARY ACT', BECAUSE IT HAS ITS OWN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

Among sacrifices to be performed on the Amāvāsyā (Moonless) Day, we find the *Pitṛyajña* laid down in the text—'*Amāvāsyāyām aparāhṇē piṇḍapitṛyajñēna charanti*' ['On the Amāvāsyā in the afternoon, they perform the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña*'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 3. 10. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* subsidiary to the *Amāvāsyā sacrifice*? Or is it not a *subsidiary* act at all?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be regarded as a subsidiary, because it is prescribed in close proximity to a fruitful action (and has no result mentioned in connection with itself), and also because of the commendatory passage speaking of '*niṣkraya*' [i.e. the passage (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3. 10. 2), '*Pitṛbhya ēva yad yajñam niṣkrīya yajamāno dēvēbhyah pratanutē*', 'Having first, by way of exchange, offered the sacrifice to the *Pitṛs*, the sacrificer proceeds to offer it to the deities'; where it is clear that the *sacrifice to the Pitrs* is subsidiary to the *sacrifice to the deities*].—The other party might argue thus—'It is only when an *unfruitful* action is spoken of in proximity to a *fruitful* one that the former is regarded as subsidiary to the latter; in the case in question however, the *Pitṛyajña* may be regarded as *fruitful*, as leading to *Heaven*' (which is a result that may be assumed in connection with every act) [as explained under Sū. 4 3. 13].'—The answer to this is that what has been urged is true, but in the case in question, as the word speaking of the *Pitṛyajña* is syntactically connected with (in apposition to the word) speaking of the *Amāvāsyā*, there can be no justification for assuming any such result as Heaven.—Says the other party—'The word speaking of *Amāvāsyā* speaks of a *day*, a point of time, it could not be syntactically connected with (as being in apposition to) the word speaking of an act (the *Pitṛyajña*)'.—The answer to this is that the apposition to the term expressing the act could be secured by having recourse to Indirect Indication [i.e. by taking the term '*āmāvāsyā*', 'Moonless Day', as indirectly indicating the *Sacrifice* of that name, i.e. the *Darsha* sacrifice]; on the other hand, in support of the assuming of Heaven (as a result of the *Pitṛyajña*), there is neither Indirect Indication, nor Direct Assertion. Then again, there is the text—'*Yat pitṛbhyaḥ purōḍāśaḥ karoti, pitṛbhya ētat niṣkrīya yajamāno dēvēbhyaḥ pratanutē*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3. 10. 2; see above); where the *Pitṛyajña* is spoken of as a '*niṣkraya*', an 'exchange', in regard to the *Amāvāsyā* Sacrifice.—From all this, it follows that it is 'subsidiary' to the *Amāvāsyā* (*Darsha*) Sacrifice."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The Pitryajña should not be regarded as a subsidiary act, because it has its own time*; that is the *Piṇḍapitryajñā* should not be regarded as a subsidiary;—why?—*because it has its own time*; i.e. it is connected with the *time* directly expressed by the word ('*amāvāsyā*'), and not with an act of sacrifice indirectly indicated by that word. For instance, in the case of the text '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsābhyām iṣṭvī somēna yajēta*' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 6. 1) [dealt with under Sū. 4. 3. 37], -and in that of the text '*Purastādupasadām saumyēna charanti*' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 1. 2) [dealt with under Sū. 4. 4. 5-6],—the word concerned has been taken in the sense of *time*, which is what is directly expressed, and not in the sense of an *act*, which could be only indirectly indicated; exactly so should it be in the present case; because Direct Expression is always more authoritative than Indirect Indication.—It has been argued that, "through Indirect Indication the term '*amāvāsyā*' may be taken as in apposition to the *act* (of *Pitryajña*)";—but this is not possible; why?—because recourse to Indirect Indication can be accepted only in the case of words that contain a mere *reference* to what is already known and not in that of words that contain an *injunction* of something not otherwise known;—the sentence that we are dealing with is an *Injunction*;—hence it cannot be taken as expressing any connection between the *Pitryajña* and the *act* of *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice; in fact what it speaks of is two acts that are performed at the same time (day) and which are entirely unconnected with one another.

SUTRA (20)

ALSO BECAUSE, IT IS ENUMERATED AS BEING OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE.

Bhāṣya

As a matter of fact, the *Pitryajña* is found to be enumerated as being of equal importance with other 'primary' sacrifices; e.g. in the text—'*Chatvāro vai mahāyajñāḥ—agnihotram, darsha-pūrnamāsau, jyotiṣtomaḥ, piṇḍa-pitryajñah*' ['There are four Major Sacrifices—*Agnihotra, Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, Jyotiṣtoma*, and *Pindapitryajña*']; —in this sentence the *Pitryajña* has been spoken of as being of equal importance with the Major Sacrifices; and in what sense could it be a 'major sacrifice' except in the sense that it brings about its own results?—From this it follows that it cannot be regarded as a 'subsidiary'.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND IT SPOKEN OF AS TO BE PERFORMED AT A TIME WHEN THE OTHER IS PROHIBITED.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Pitryajña* is not a subsidiary.—There is a text which indicates the performance of the *Pitryajña* at a time when the

Amāvāsyā is prohibited—'*Paurṇamāsīmēva yajēta bhrātṛvyavān, nāmāvāsyām, hatvā bhrātṛvyam amāvāsyayā yajēta, piṇḍapitṛyajñēnaiva amāvāsyāyām prīṇāti*' ['One who has enemies should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, not the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice,—the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice is to be performed only after the enemy has been killed,—on the *Amāvāsyā* day, one satisfies the deities by the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* only'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 4. 3).—This passage clearly shows that the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* can be performed even when the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice is not performed; and this is possible only if it is not subsidiary to the latter sacrifice.—From this also it follows that the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* is not a subsidiary [and hence it is an act that subserves the purpose of *Man*, not of sacrifice].

Question—What is the use of all this discussion?

Answer—If the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is correct, then—if the Fire-laying has been done on the Full-Moon Day, the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* should not be done on the next Moonless Day;—on the other hand, it should be done, if the *Siddhānta* view is correct.—Another purpose served by the *Adhikaraṇa* is as follows:—In connection with the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, it has been declared that 'for a month one should offer the *Agnihotra*; for a month one should perform the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa sacrifices*', now if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is correct, it would be necessary to offer the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* also for a month;—but not so, if the *Siddhānta* view is correct.—They quote the following couplet also in this connection—'If the Fire-laying is done on the Full-Moon Day, the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* should be performed on the completion of the *Darsha*-sacrifice; but if the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* is not a subsidiary, then it should not be performed on that occasion alone'.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The Rope is an accessory of the Sacrificial Post.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ROPE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE ANIMAL; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS TO BE USED ON THE ADVENT OF THE ANIMAL".

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we read—'*Āshvinam graham gṛhītvā triṛtā yūpam parivīyāgnēyam savanīyam pashumupākaroti*' ['Having taken up the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*, and after having engirded the sacrificial post with the threefold rope, he sacrifices the *Savanīya* animal dedicated to Agni'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Rope an accessory of the Animal? Or of the Sacrificial Post?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The Rope should be regarded as an accessory of the Animal*;—why?—*because it has been laid down as to be used on the advent of the animal*; i.e. it has been laid down as to be used when the animal has been brought up; the connection of the Rope with the animal is found asserted in the originative injunction, the sense of which is that 'he sacrifices the animal after having done the *girding*, not otherwise'. This is the sense provided by the Direct Signification of the text; if it were taken as indicating the time, then that would involve recourse to Indirect Indication,—the *girding* indicating the time (of the Sacrifice)."

SŪTRA (23).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE SACRIFICIAL POST; BECAUSE IT IS AN EMBELLISHMENT OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣtoma*, the embellishment of the Sacrificial Post is directly perceived; inasmuch as the Rope with which the Post is engirded, adds to the stability of the Post,—and the Post needs stability; consequently the use of the Rope would serve the purpose of adding this stability to the Post.—Then again, the Accusative ending (in '*yūpam*') could be justified only if the Post were the predominant factor; the Rope is spoken of by a word with the Instrumental ending, which shows that it is a subordinate factor;—hence it must be an accessory of the Post.

As regards the argument that—"the Rope is laid down as to be used on the advent of the animal",—it has got to be refuted; and in answer to this we say that the fact that 'it is laid down as to be used on the advent

of the animal' is deduced from *Syntactical Connection*, while the Accusative Ending is a *Direct Assertion* and is perceptible; and these two circumstances —Direct Assertion and Perception—should set aside the *indication* of Syntactical Connection.—As for having recourse to *Indirect Indication*, it is reasonable that recourse be had to Indirect Indication only when there is no *Direct Assertion*

SŪTRA (24).

IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE COMMENDATORY DECLARATION BECOMES APPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when we take the Rope as an accessory of the Post that the following commendatory *Mantra* becomes applicable—'*Yuvī suvāsāḥ parivīta āgāt, sa u shrēyān bhavati jāyamānaḥ, tam dhīrāsaḥ kavaya unnayanti, svādhyo manasā dēvayantaḥ*' ['The young person finely clothed and engirded, came up; when he is born, he becomes excellent; the sedate and brave poets, with minds fixed on the Deities, raise him up'] (Rgveda Sam. 3. 8. 4). For this reason also, the Rope is an accessory of the Sacrificial Post

Question—What is the use of this Discussion?

Answer—In connection with the Agni sacrifices, we read that 'to one Post, eleven animals have to be tethered'; and it would be necessary to have a different Rope with each of the animals if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were right [and the Rope were an accessory of the Animal] while according to the *Siddhānta*, there should be only two Ropes.—In this connection they cite the following couplet—

'If the Rope were an accessory of the Animal,—and several animals were to be tethered to the same,'—then it should be necessary to have a rope with each of the animals; while if the Rope were an accessory of the Post, there should be only two ropes.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Svaru' is an accessory of the Animal.*

SŪTRA (25)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THE 'SVARU' ALSO [SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE POST; BECAUSE IT IS A PART (OF THE POST)]."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice there is the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, which is an accessory of the *Soma*, as laid down in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē*' ['The Initiated person who sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'] (Taitt. Sam. 6. 1. 11. 6)—In connection with that, we read '*Svaruṇā svadhitinā cha pashumanakti*' [Anoints the animal with the *Svaru* and with the *Svadhiti*]—[The chip of wood that drops first when the Sacrificial Post is being hewn out, is used for certain purposes and is called '*Svaru*'. '*Svadhiti*' is the *axe*].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Svaru* an accessory of the Sacrificial Post? Or of the Animal?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'We say that the *Svaru* should be regarded as an accessory of the Post. Why? *Because it is a part of the Post*, that is the *Svaru* is a part of the *Post*, as we learn from the text—'*Yūpasya svarum karoti*', which means—'one should make the Post equipped with the *Svaru*'; it is thus that it becomes a regular *Sacrificial Post*; the position of the *Svaru* in relation to the Post is just like that of the *Chasāla* [the ring which is fixed to the top of the post, like a bracelet]."

SUTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"THE TEXT SPEAKING OF IT AS 'RANSOM' ALSO SHOWS THAT IT IS AN ACCESSORY (OF THE POST)."

Bhāṣya

"The description of 'ransom' shows that the *Svaru* is an accessory of the Post: this description being as follows:—*Apashyan ha sma purā ṛṣayo yē yūpam prāpayanti, sambhajya sruvantē manyantē yajñavaishasāya vā idam karma, ta tē prastaraṁ sruvamuṣkrayamapashyan, yūpasya svarum ayajñavaishasāya*' ['In ancient times those sages who prepare the Post, when they broke the *Sruva*, thought that that act would bring harm to the sacrifice; hence they found the *Bundle of grass* as the ransom (substitute) for the *Sruva*, and the *Svaru* as the ransom for the Post; so that no harm would be done to the sacrifice']; from this mention of the *Svaru* being a 'ransom' for the Post, it follows that it is an accessory of the Post. For this reason also the *Svaru* should be regarded as an accessory of the Post."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SVARU SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE ANIMAL: BECAUSE IT SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Svaru* should be regarded as an accessory of the Animal; because it is the Animal that requires the *Svaru* for its anointment; as the text says—'With the *Svaru* he should anoint the Animal', and it is this *anointing of the Animal* which is the motive behind the bringing in of the *Svaru* [i.e. it is for the purpose of anointing the animal that the *Svaru* is made]. Under the circumstances, if the *Svaru* is taken as an accessory (subserving the purposes) of the *Animal*, then the purpose served by it (i.e. the *anointing of the Animal*) becomes one that is directly perceptible; if, on the other hand, it be taken as an accessory of the *Post* then it would be necessary to assume an unseen purpose served by it. From this it follows that the *Svaru* is an accessory of the *Animal*.

SŪTRA (28).

AS FOR THE MENTION OF 'RANSOM' THAT COULD BE TAKEN IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE.

Bhāṣya

"What would be the basis for the figurative sense?"

It has been declared that the Post has to be thrown into the Fire; if the *Svaru* is thrown in it is the Post itself that is thrown in, so that it becomes a sort of *Ransom*. By reason of the figurative description the passage becomes commendatory of the *Svaru*.

Question—What is the useful purpose served by this discussion?

Answer—When eleven animals are tethered to a single Post, then the *anointing* is to be done to only one animal, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; while according to the *Siddhānta* the *anointing* is to be done to all the animals. To this effect there is the following couplet also—

'If the *Svaru* is an accessory of the Post, then *anointing* should be done to only one animal, if there are several animals tethered to a single Post [according to the *Pūrvapakṣin*]; on the other hand, all the animals have to be anointed (according to the *Siddhānta*), if the *Svaru* is an accessory of the Animals.'

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *Acts like 'Āghārā', Pouring, are subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ALL THE SACRIFICES PERFORMED IN COURSE OF THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PRIMARY ACTS: AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which we read of the sacrifices (A)—*Āgnēya*, *Agnīsomīya*, *Upāmshuyāja*, *Aindrāgna*, and *Sānnāyya*; and (B) again, of *Āghāra* and *Ājyabhāga*, *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas*, *Patnīsaṁyājas*, *Samistayājas* and *Svistakrt*.

In regard to these there arises the question 'Are all these sacrifices 'primary' acts? Or are some of them 'subsidiary'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*All those sacrifices that are performed in course of the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa should be regarded as primary acts*; because from the text 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices', we learn that the result (Heaven) follows from sacrifices (in general), without distinction; that which brings about a result is a 'primary act':—and all the acts in question are *sacrifices*; hence it follows that they are all primary'."

SUTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, SOME OF THEM SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SUBSIDIARIES,—THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN EULOGISED AS SUBSIDIARIES. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A COMMON EULOGY [IF THEY WERE ALL EQUALLY PRIMARY].

Bhāṣya.

In reality, some of them should be regarded as subsidiaries—which are these? *those that have been eulogised as subsidiaries*; as in the following text—'*Abhīshū vā ētau yajñasya yat āghārau, chakshushī vā ētad yajñasya yadājyabhāgau*' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 2. 1)—'*Yat prayājānuyājāshcha ijyantē varma vā ētadyajñasya kriyatē, varma vā yajamānasya bhrātrvyasyābhibhūtyai*' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 1. 5) ['The *Āghāras* are the two reins of the sacrifice; the *Ājyabhāgas* are the two eyes of the sacrifice'; —'When the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* are offered, they become the armour of the sacrifice,—verily an armour for the sacrificer, leading to the suppression of his enemy'].—Now the 'reins' are subsidiary to (accessories of) the chariot; the 'eyes' are subsidiary to one having eyes; the 'armour' is subsidiary to one wearing the armour. *A common eulogy* would have been the right thing; if those that have been eulogised were regarded as *subsidiaries*, then alone would the eulogy have some sense. Hence we conclude that the sacrifices that have been eulogised as *subsidiaries* are actually *subsidiaries*.

SŪTRA (31).

WE ALSO FIND OTHER TEXTS POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

It is only the *Siddhānta* view which can be reconciled with such other texts as—(*a*) '*Prayājē prayājē kṛṣṇalam juhoti*' (Taitt. Sam. 2 3. 2. 3); and (*b*) '*Na cha prayājān yajati na chānuyājān yajati*'—[In (*a*) the *offering of the kṛṣnala* is laid down as to be done at each of the several *Prayājas*; such transference of details is possible in the case of *subsidiary* sacrifices, the Primary sacrifices not borrowing any details from another sacrifice—Text (*b*) denies the *sacrificial character* of the *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas*, this would be meaningless if these were *Primary* sacrifices]

SŪTRA (32)

[OBJECTION (A)]—'THE GROUND THAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (IN SŪ 30) IS APPLICABLE EQUALLY TO ALL; AS THE CHARACTER IS PRESENT IN THE PRIMARY SACRIFICES (ALSO)

Bhāṣya

Objection— The 'eulogy' [that has been put forward (in Sū 30) as a ground for regarding a few of the sacrifices as subsidiary] is applicable equally to others also, for instance, the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices (which the *Siddhāntin* regards as Primary) have also been similarly eulogised '*Shiro vātadyajñasya yadāgnēyah, hṛdayamupāṃshuyajñah, pādāvaindrāgnau saumīyah* [The *Āgneya* is the head of the sacrifice, the *Upāṃshuyāga* is the heart, the *Aindrāgnasaumīya* is the feet]—well here also the *Head* is 'subsidiary' to one to whom the head belongs, the Heart is 'subsidiary' to one to whom the heart belongs, and the feet are 'subsidiary' to one to whom the feet belong.—Thus we find that all the sacrifices under consideration have been eulogised as *subsidiaries*, so that all should be regarded as *subsidiaries*, and there would be no *Primary* at all. And when there is no 'Primary' to what would any sacrifice be 'subsidiary'?—For this reason, the few sacrifices that have been regarded (by the *Siddhāntin*) as 'subsidiary' are not to be so regarded."

SUTRA (33)

[OBJECTION (B)]—'UNLESS ANYTHING IS DEFINITELY ASSERTED, THE 'OTHER TEXTS' CAN HAVE NO BEARING UPON THE CASE IN QUESTION SPECIALLY AS THEY SERVE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE"

Bhāṣya

"It has been urged (under Sū 31) that 'there are other texts', but, inasmuch as these texts *serve an entirely different purpose*, they do not support the *Siddhānta* view; the text that has been quoted serves a purpose entirely different from the laying down of the *Prayāja* and other sacrifices

which are already known (and as such do not require to be enjoined again). —Hence it behoves the *Siddhāntin* to seek for other proofs in support of his view,—either in the form of another text or a reason. So long as such proof is not forthcoming, the view put forward must be regarded to be as illusory as the mirage.—As for the *eulogy*, that also cannot prove anything, in the absence of (corroborative) reasons."

SŪTRA (34)

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, THE TWO NAMES ['DARSHA' AND 'PŪRṆAMĀSA'] ARE APPLIED SEPARATELY [TO TWO SEPARATE GROUPS OF SACRIFICES], BECAUSE OF OUR HEARING THEM SO USED AND OF THE DESIGNATION. THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE 'PRIMARY' IS THAT IT SHOULD BRING ABOUT A DEFINITE RESULT IF A SACRIFICE, NOT BRINGING ABOUT A RESULT, HAPPEN TO BE MENTIONED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO SUCH A 'PRIMARY', THAT SACRIFICE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'SUBSIDIARY' TO THAT 'PRIMARY', BECAUSE THE SACRIFICE (PRAYĀJA FOR INSTANCE) WHICH MIGHT BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE (OF RESULTS) HAS NO RESULT SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH ITSELF, NOR HAS IT BEEN DECLARED TO BE CONNECTED WITH ANY OTHER RESULTS

Bhāṣya

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

It has been asserted that all the sacrifices in question are equally 'Primary'.—But that is not so; only those sacrifices are 'Primary' which are denoted by the term '*Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*'.—Why so?—Because of their connection with results, that is to say, results are found spoken of as following from those sacrifices which fall under the name *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*',—in such texts as 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices' (Taitt. Sam. 3. 5. 1. 4).—'Which are the sacrifices that fall under the name *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*?' 'They are those that are spoken of either by means of the term '*Paurṇamāsī*' or by the term '*Amāvāsyā*',—and such are the *Āgnēya* (the *Agnīṣomīya*, the *Upāṁshuyāja*, the *Aindrāgna-yāga* and the *Sāmnāyya yāga*).

Objection—"But we do not find any results spoken of as following from the sacrifices included under the name *Amāvāsyā*"

Answer—The two names—'*Paurṇamāsī*' and '*Amāvāsyā*' (or '*Darsha*') *are applicable separately to two separate groups* of sacrifices, the name '*Paurṇamāsī*' is applied to the group consisting of the three sacrifices,—*Āgnēya*, *Agnīṣomīya*, and *Upāṁshuyāja*,—and the name '*Amāvāsyā*' to the

other group consisting of the other sacrifices (i.e the *Āgnēya*, *Aindrāgna* and *Sāmnayya*)

Question—"Why should this be so?"

Answer—Because we actually hear the two names '*Paurnamāsī*' and *Amāvāsyā*' so used;—and also because there is a designation of the two as standing for two distinct sacrifices.—Where is this *designation*?"—It is there in the use of the Dual number in the term '*Darsha pūrnamāsā bhyām*', where the term '*darsha*' is synonymous with the term '*amāvāsyā*'—'How so?'—That this is so is made clear in the following text—'*Darsho vā ētayoḥ pūrvaḥ, Pūrnamāsa uttarah, tayoratha yat pūrnamāsam pūrvamāna-bhatē tat ayathāpūrvam prakriyatē, darshapūrnamāsamārabhamānah sarasvatyai charum nirvapēt sarasvatē dvādashakapālam amāvāsyā vai sarasvatī, pūrnamāsah sarasvān ubhāvētau yathāpūrvam kalpayitvā arabhatē rddhyai rdhnotyēvāsmai mithunatvāya*' ['Between these two, the *Darsha* comes first, and the *Pūrnamāsa* after it, hence if one begins with the *Pūrnamāsa*, he starts in the wrong order; when beginning the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, one should offer cooked rice to *Sarasvatī* and *the cake baked on twelve pans* to *Sarasvān*, *Amāvāsyā* is *Sarasvatī*, and *Pūrnamāsa* is *Sarasvīn*; if one performs these in the right order for the sake of obtaining prosperity, he prospers and acquires harmony with his wife'] (Taitt. Sam. 3 5 1 4). Here we find the same sacrifice spoken of in the beginning as '*Darsha*' [Read '*prakrtya*' as in manuscript 'V'] and later on as *Amāvāsyā*', which shows that the two are names of the same sacrifice. Inasmuch as the Moon is *not seen* on the *Amāvāsyā*, the day can be spoken of as '*Darsha*', figuratively (by contrary signification, '*darsha*' meaning the *seen*), just as a man who has *no eyes* is spoken of as having excellent eyes (*no eyes*) being indicated figuratively by 'eyes'

Thus from this designation', and from 'our hearing them' so used among people, we conclude that the two names (*Darsha* and *Amāvāsyā*) stand for the same sacrifice

Then again, *the characteristic of the 'Primary' sacrifice* is that it should bring about a definite result; and any other sacrifice, that may be found mentioned in proximity to it, but without the mention of any results following from it is subsidiary to the former sacrifice.—Why?" Because when two sacrifices are found mentioned together,—if one of them (otherwise complete, with results and all the rest) stands in need of the mention of certain details of its procedure and the other (mentioned without a result) is just capable of supplying that need of the details of procedure—the latter may be regarded as 'subsidiary' to the former, if it were not taken as supplementary to the other, then it would be necessary to assume a result (as following from this latter sacrifice).

Says the Opponent—"The result of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices may be construed with these (*Āgnēya*, etc.)"

Answer—It might be so construed; but in that case, (1) the injunction of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* itself would remain incomplete (the factor of Result having been construed with the injunction of the *Prayāja*, etc.); (2) a different procedure would have to be assumed for the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa*

[as the procedure would no longer be supplied by the *Prayāja*, etc.];—(3) it would also be necessary to assume a complete procedure for the *Prayājas* and the other sacrifices [which, *ex-hypothesis* being all independent 'primary' sacrifices, could not borrow the details from the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* as their Primary], -and (4) lastly, the procedure that we understand as pointed out by the texts (according to the *Siddhānta*) would have to be abandoned.

From all this it follows that the *Prayāja* and the rest are subsidiaries.

Then again, the sacrifices which might be regarded as the cause (of an independent result, and hence *primary*) are '*bhāgī*',—i.e. we do not find mentioned any connection between these sacrifices and any results (other than those spoken of as following from the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*).

From all this we conclude that the *Āghāra* and other sacrifices are not equally 'primary', they are *subsidiary* acts.

SŪTRA (35).

ACCESSORY DETAILS ARE ALWAYS ENJOINED IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN NAMES. THESE COULD NOT BE APPLICABLE IF ALL EQUALLY WERE SUBSIDIARIES

Bhāṣya.

Particular accessory details are enjoined in connection with particular names; e.g. in the text—'He should touch the cake at the *Paurṇamāsī* with the *Chaturhotṛ mantra*, and at the *Amāvāsyā*, with the *Pañchahotṛ-mantra*' [where the two *mantras* are laid down in connection with the two names '*Paurnamāsī*' and '*Amāvāsyā*'] If all the sacrifices in question were 'primaries', then there could be no such division among the sacrifices as that 'In this group of sacrifices (constituting the *Paurnamāsī sacrifice*), the *mantra* to be used should be the *Chaturhotṛ*, and in that other group (constituting the *Amāvāsyā sacrifice*) it should be the *Pañchahotṛ*' [as each sacrifice would be distinct and independent and there would be no *groups* at all]; and in the absence of such a division, the said Injunction would be meaningless.—And yet we have such an injunction Hence it follows that our view is the right one Further it is only under our view that the eulogy of *Āghāra*, etc. as 'subsidiaries' becomes intelligible

SŪTRA (36).

[OBJECTION]—"THE VEDIC ASSERTION THAT HAS BEEN CITED AS THE REASON [FOR REGARDING THE ĀGHĀRA, ETC. AS SUBSIDIARIES] IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE [TO THE ĀGNĒYA AND OTHER PRIMARIES]: THE RELATIONSHIP THEREFORE OF 'WHOLE AND PART' ('PRIMARY AND SUBSIDIARY') SHOULD BE TAKEN AS IN REFERENCE TO TOTALLY DIFFERENT SACRIFICES [APART FROM ALL THOSE UNDER CONSIDERATION]

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Purvapakṣin* that -"the *Āgnēya* and the rest (which the *Siddhāntin* regards as 'primary') also have been eulogised

as 'limbs', which shows that these also are subsidiaries".—[This is the argument that has been reiterated in this *Sūtra*, and] this has now got to be refuted. [This is done in the following *Sūtra*.]

SŪTRA (37).

[ANSWER]—THE ASSERTION CITED REFERS TO THE 'BIRTH' OF THE SACRIFICE, IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE LIKENING TO 'LIMBS' HAS TO BE UNDERSTOOD

Bhāṣya

What has been urged does not affect our position. Even though the sacrifices in question are 'primaries', yet they may be eulogised as 'head' and the rest, in reference to their 'birth' (appearance) —When a man is being born, it is the *head* that comes first, the middle portion of the body comes out in the middle and the feet come last;—in the same name, when the *Purnamāsa* sacrifice is being performed, the *Āgnēya* comes first, the *Upāṁshuyāja* in the middle, and the *Āgnīsomīya* comes last —This is all that is meant by the figurative eulogy cited

SŪTRA (38)

WE FIND OTHER TEXTS ALSO POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION

Bhāṣya

There is the text—'*Chaturdasha pūrṇamasyāmāhutayo hū antē. trayodasha amāvāsyāyām*' ['Fourteen libations are offered at the *Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice and thirteen at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice']—[This clearly shows that the two sacrifices *Paurnamāsa* and *Darsha* are distinct, as] otherwise it would not be true that there are only *fourteen* libations offered at the *Pūrnamāsa*, or that only *thirteen* libations are offered at the *Darsha* (*Amāvāsyā*) -[If the act were *one*, there would be 27 in all]

From all this it follows that the *Āgnēya* [*Agnīsomīya, Upāmshuyāja, Aindrāgna, and Sānnāyya*] are 'primaries' and the *Āghara* [*Ājyabhāga, Prayāja, Anuyāja, Patnisamyāja, Sānnāyyayāja*, and *Svistakrt*] are subsidiaries.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The Dīkṣaṇīyā (Initiatory) Sacrifice and the rest are subsidiary to the Jyotiṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (39)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE JYOTIṢṬOMA, ALL ARE EQUAL, AS THE GROUND (OF BEING REGARDED AS 'PRIMARY') IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL."

Bhāṣya

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice']. In course of this sacrifice, *Dīkṣaṇīya* and some other sacrifices are performed,—as also the *Soma-sacrifice* on the Extraction day.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is every one of these sacrifices a 'primary'?—or only the *Soma-sacrifice*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—*In the Jyotiṣṭoma all the sacrifices should be regarded as equal*,—why?—*because the ground is equally applicable to all.* That is to say, the Result is mentioned as following from the *sacrifice*,—all the acts in question are *sacrifices* (and hence leading to results);—and what leads to results is a 'primary'—Hence in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* all the sacrifices are 'primary'.

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE DECLARATION OF THE GROUND (OF 'PRIMARY' CHARACTER) IS DEPENDENT UPON THE CONNECTION OF ACCESSORY DETAILS WITH THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION, THE SOMA SACRIFICE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE 'PRIMARY'

Bhāṣya

As a matter of fact, the connection of accessory details is determined by the originative Injunction—"Of which accessory details?"—Such accessory details as the *musical modes* (*stomas*) called 'Luminaries' ('*Jyotis*')—Which is the originative Injunction which determines the connection of these accessories?"—By the injunctive sentence '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice*'] (Taitti. Brā. 1 5 11 2),—here what is spoken of is Heaven as following *from the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice*, not from any and every sacrifice; and the only sacrifice where the *musical modes* (*stomas*) are *luminaries* ('*Jyotis*', in the sense that they *illumine* the entire sacrifice) is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—"And which sacrifice (from among those comprising the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) has *musical modes that are 'luminaries'*?"—It is the *Soma-yāga*, we reply.

On this point there is the following declaration—'*Katamāni vā ētāni jyōtiṁṣi yē ētē tasya stomāḥ—trivṛt, pañchadashasaptadashaikaviṁshāḥ, ētāni vā jyōtiṁṣi, tānyētasya stomāḥ*'—['Which are the *Luminaries* that are its *musical modes*?—They are *treble, fifteenfold, seventeenfold* and *twenty-onefold*; these are the *Luminaries, these its musical modes*'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 5. 11. 3).—From this it is clear that the *musical modes* are the accessories of the *Soma-yāga*, because they have been mentioned together in the following text—'*Graham vā gṛhītvā chamasam vā unnīya stotramupākaroti*' ['Taking up the cup, or holding up the ladle, *he sings the hymn*']; it is this *singing of the hymn* where the 'Treble' and other *Musical Modes* come in.—"How so?"—Because of such assertions as '*Trivṛt vahiṣpavamānam*' ['The *Vahiṣpavamāna* Hymn is Treble']. '*Pañchadasha ājyāni*' ['The *Ājya* hymns are fifteenfold']; [where the names 'Treble' and 'Fifteenfold' are applied to the hymns that are sung].

Thus then, it follows that the sacrifice having the 'Treble' and other *musical modes* is the *Soma-sacrifice*, and this is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—that sacrifice which is *Jyotiṣtoma*,—from *that* follows the result;—and that sacrifice from which follows the result is the 'Primary'.

"How are the *Treble* and other *Musical Modes* 'Luminaries'?"

They may be *Luminaries*, or not; all that is meant is that they are spoken of as 'Luminaries' (*Jyotiṁṣi*); and merely by being spoken of by means of a word, a thing becomes that which is denoted by that word; specially in cases of indirect (figurative) expressions.—Then again, they derive the term '*jyotis*' from the root '*dyut*', or from the root '*dip*', or from the root '*jyut*'—all meaning 'to shine'; and hence the term is applied to the *Hymn* in the sense either that this is *illumined* by the word, or that they *illumine*.

From all this it follows that it is the *Soma-sacrifice*, which is *Jyotiṣtoma*, and is the 'primary', and the *Dikṣaṇīyā* and other sacrifices are 'subsidiaries'.

SŪTRA (41).

THERE IS A TEXT ALSO POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

We also find such texts as '*Shiro vā ētad yajñasya yad dīkṣaṇīyā*' ['The Dīkṣaṇīyā is the head of the sacrifice'],—which are indicative of the same conclusion:—and the following shows that the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the rest are accessories in the modification of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—'*Chaturviṁshatimānam hiranyam dīkṣaṇīyāyām dadyat, prāyaṇīyāyām dvē chaturviṁshatimānē*' ['At the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* one should give a piece of gold *twenty-four* in weight; and at the *Prāyaṇīyā*, a piece *twice-twenty-four* in weight'],—all which goes to show that the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the other sacrifices are not regarded as of equal standing.—From this also it follows that the *Soma-sacrifice* is the 'primary'.

ADHYĀYA V.

ORDER OF SEQUENCE.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1) (A): *Direct Assertion is the strongest authority in the determining of the Order of Sequence.*

SŪTRA (1).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT ASSERTION; AS THIS IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY (FOR VEDIC SUBJECTS).

Bhāṣya.

[The Discourses II–IV having dealt with *what is to be done*, the present Discourse is going to deal with the *Order* in which it is to be done.]

Under Discourse IV has been finished the treatment of the subject of what is the 'motive', and not the motive, behind certain actions; all this should be borne in mind (not forgotten) We now proceed to deal with the subject of 'Order of Sequence'; and as is going to be explained, this 'Order' is determined by (1) '*Direct Assertion*', (2) '*Efficiency*' (utility), (3) '*Verbal Text*', (4) '*Commencement*' or '*Tendency*', (5) '*Place*' (in Text), and (6) the '*Principal*'; and among these means of determination—Direct Assertion and the rest—there is comparative strength and weakness.

First of all we are going to consider the order as determined by 'Direct Assertion':—The question that arises is—should the things laid down be done in the order in which they have been *directly asserted*? Or in any order, without restriction?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"as the performer is one, and the things to be done are several, there must be some sort of order in which they are to be done, and for the sake of convenience and expeditious performance, there should be no restriction (regarding any particular order)".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The Order of Sequence should be determined on the basis of Direct Assertion, as this is the sole authority.* '*Shruti*' ('Direct Assertion') consists in the reading of the words of the Text; and that Order of Sequence which is determined by such 'reading' is the right one; because in all Vedic matters, *Shruti* is the sole authority; in such matters there is no other authority (means of knowledge)—as has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 2.

"What is the example of *Order* determined by *Direct Assertion*?"

We have an example of this in the order in which the Initiations are performed at the *Satra* [Sacrificial Session]. Having declared that 'those same persons who are the Priests are also the Sacrificers', the *Shruti* goes to lay down the order in which these sacrificers are to be initiated, in

the following text—"The *Adhvaryu*, having initiated the Master of the House, initiates the *Brahman* Priest, then the *Udgātr* Priest, then the *Hotr* Priest; then the *Pratiprasthātr* initiates the *Adhvaryu*, and then the '*Halfer-Priests*', —viz.: the *Brahmanāchchhamsin* Priest, who is the assistant of the *Brahman* Priest,—then the *Prastotr* who is the assistant of the *Udgātr*,—then the *Maitrāvaruna* who is the assistant of the *Hotr*:—then the *Nēṣtr*, having initiated the *Pratiprasthātr*, initiates the '*Thirder-Priests*'—viz.: the *Agnīdhra* the assistant of the *Brahman*, the *Pratihartr* the assistant of the *Udgātr*, the *Achchhāvāka* the assistant of the *Hotr*,—then the *Unnētr*, having initiated the *Nēstr*, initiates the 'Quarterer-Priests',—viz.: the *Potr* the assistant of the *Brahman*, the *Subrahmanya* the assistant of the *Udgātr*, the *Grāvastut* the assistant of the *Hotr*;—then some other *Brāhmana*, or Religious Student sent by his Teacher, initiates the *Unnētr*"

According to the *Pūrvapaksa*, there should be no restriction at all regarding the order in which these Initiations are to be performed while according to the *Siddhānta*, they must be performed exactly in the order laid down in the Vedic text just quoted.

Says the *Opponent*—"It is not right to put forward *Direct Assertion* in the present connection".

Answer—Is *Direct Assertion* not correct?

Opponent—"We do not say it is not correct".

Answer—Then it must be right

Opponent—"We do not say that the order pointed out by *Direct Assertion* is not right, what we mean is that it is not right to repeat what has already been explained before".

Answer—If it is *correct*, then its mention, however frequent, must be right; but of the *incorrect*, even a single mention is wrong.

Opponent—'When something has been already explained once, there is no useful purpose served by its being asserted again".

Answer—It has been already explained that if the frequent repetition reduces the chance of the matter being forgotten it serves a useful purpose. —It might be argued that—'this reducing the chance of a matter being forgotten might well be done by the author of the commentary (*Vrtti*) on the *Sūtra*" —Our answer is that there is no difference between the author of the *Sūtra* and the author of the *Vrtti* on this point.

ADHIKARAṆA (1) (B): *The Vedic Injunction is the sole authority in such matters.*

(B) Or the subject-matter of the *Adhikarana* embodied in the *Sūtra* may be totally different from what has been explained under (A):—(*a*) the Question, (*b*) the Discussion, and (*c*) the Conclusion, all being different—That is, (*a*) the *question* is—Is Order to be determined by the *Veda*? or by some other means?—(*b*) the *Discussion* is as follows—Sense-perception

and the other means of knowledge are the means of what is *to be known* (not of what is *to be done*), hence *Order* cannot be determined by means of these; and inasmuch as it is beyond the reach of the sense-organs, it has to be determined with the help of the Vedic Injunction.—(c) The *Conclusion* is that it can be determined only by the Vedic Injunction.—The validity of the cognition derived from Veda having been already established (under Discourse I), what is sought to be determined now is the correctness of the Order of Sequence in actual practice.

ADHIKARAṆA (1) (C): *The Order of Sequence is actually enjoined by the Veda.*

(C) Or, the *Adhikaraṇa* may be represented as containing an investigation into what is done by the *Shruti* (Veda)—The *question* is—Does the Veda enjoin the acts to be done? Or does it enjoin the Order of Sequence?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"As it cannot be right for any sentence to enjoin several things, the injunction should be taken as laying down acts; and as regards the *Order*, it should be taken as a mere reiteration (or reference); just as in the case of the sentences laying down the offering of cake-slices; and the reason for this is that while acts are enjoined by *Direct Assertion*, the *Order* is only indicated by *Syntactical Connection*; for this reason the *Order* cannot be taken as what is enjoined".

Objection to the *Pūrvapakṣa*—'As a matter of fact, in the case of the sentences speaking of the offering of cake-slices, the *Order* is actually enjoined'.

"True, it is enjoined, but only by 'the order of the Verbal Texts', not by 'Direct Assertion'."

But in the case of the sentence 'Those same persons that are the priests are also the sacrificers', the *Initiation* having been already laid down elsewhere, the sentence can only enjoin, by Direct Assertion, the *Order* in which that Initiation is to take place.—This is the *Siddhānta* view; and in this view, as thus explained, there is no needless repetition at all.

the following text—"The *Adhvaryu*, having initiated the Master of the House, initiates the *Brahman* Priest, then the *Udgātṛ* Priest, then the *Hotṛ* Priest; then the *Pratiprasthātṛ* initiates the *Adhvaryu*, and then the '*Halfer-Priests*', —viz.: the *Brahmaṇāchchhaṃsin* Priest, who is the assistant of the *Brahman* Priest.—then the *Prastotṛ* who is the assistant of the *Udgātṛ*,—then the *Maitrāvaruṇa* who is the assistant of the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Neṣṭṛ*, having initiated the *Pratiprasthātṛ*, initiates the '*Thirder-Priests*'—viz.: the *Agnīdhra* the assistant of the *Brahman*, the *Prativartṛ* the assistant of the *Udgātṛ*, the *Achchhāvāka* the assistant of the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Unnētṛ*, having initiated the *Nēṣṭṛ*, initiates the 'Quarterer-Priests'.—viz.: the *Potṛ* the assistant of the *Brahman*, the *Subrahmaṇya* the assistant of the *Udgātṛ*, the *Grāvastut* the assistant of the *Hotṛ*;—then some other *Brāhmaṇa*, or Religious Student sent by his Teacher, initiates the *Unnētṛ*."

According to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, there should be no restriction at all regarding the order in which these Initiations are to be performed; while according to the *Siddhānta* they must be performed exactly in the order laid down in the Vedic text just quoted.

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(B) Or the subject-matter of the *Adhikaraṇa* embodied in the *Sūtra* may be totally different from what has been explained under (A);—(*a*) the Question, (*b*) the Discussion, and (*c*) the Conclusion, all being different.—That is, (*a*) the *question* is—Is Order to be determined by the *Veda*? or by some other means?—(*b*) the *Discussion* is as follows—Sense-perception

and the other means of knowledge are the means of what is *to be known* (not of what is *to be done*), hence *Order* cannot be determined by means of these; and inasmuch as it is beyond the reach of the sense-organs, it has to be determined with the help of the Vedic Injunction.—(c) The *Conclusion* is that it can be determined only by the Vedic Injunction.—The validity of the cognition derived from Veda having been already established (under Discourse I), what is sought to be determined now is the correctness of the Order of Sequence in actual practice.

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Objection to the *Pūrvapakṣa*—'As a matter of fact, in the case of the sentences speaking of the offering of cake-slices, the *Order* is actually enjoined'.

'True, it is enjoined, but only by the order of the Verbal Texts', not by Direct Assertion.'

But in the case of the sentence 'Those same persons that are the priests are also the sacrificers', the *Initiation* having been already laid down elsewhere, the sentence can only enjoin, by Direct Assertion, the *Order* in which that Initiation is to take place.—This is the *Siddhānta* view; and in this view as thus explained, there is no needless repetition at all

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *In some cases the Order of Sequence is determined by 'efficiency' ('utility').*

SŪTRA (2).

ORDER OF SEQUENCE IS ALSO DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF 'EFFICIENCY' (USE).

Bhāṣya.

Question—Is it the universal rule—that in every case, the Order of Sequence is determined on the basis of *Direct Assertion* ?

In answer to this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "it is so; it having been already declared (under Sū. 1. 1. 2) that 'Dharma is that which is *indicated by the Veda* as conducive to the highest good'."

On this point, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—The Order of Sequence is enjoined (determined) also by '*artha*',—i.e. *utility, efficiency*. As a matter of fact, the Order of Sequence is only an auxiliary—(a subordinate factor) of things; and when one thing helps in the accomplishment of another, the former is regarded as an 'auxiliary' of the latter; but when, between any two things, it so happens that on the adoption (introduction) of one, the other fails to be accomplished, then the former is not an 'auxiliary' of the latter; so that in this latter case, even in the absence of the one, there is no deficiency in the other.—Such being the case wherever the Order of Sequence is distinctly perceived to be an auxiliary, it should be taken to be determined by the 'efficiency' or 'use' (of the things concerned). For instance, (A) there is the text—(*a*) '*Jātē varam dadāti*,—(*b*) *jātamañjalinā gṛhṇāti*,—(*c*) *Jātam abhiprāṇiti*' [(*a*) 'At birth, he should give a good gift;—(*b*) when the son is born, he should take him up with both hands, (*c*) when the son is born, he should breathe life into him'].—Now here the 'utility' (of the three acts laid down) indicates that the 'breathing in of life' should come first, then the 'taking up in both hands', and then the 'giving of a good gift'.—(B) The *abandoning* (of the Praṇītā) is spoken of first, and then its *using*; whereas in actual practice, the order is to be reversed.—(C) The *Yājyā* and the *Anuvākyā* hymns have been laid down in the reverse order; in actual practice that order is to be reversed; the order of the 'Verbal Text' is not accepted here, because the *Anuvākyā mantras* serve the purpose of indicating the *Deity*, and the *Yājyā* are used in the actual offerings [and as such this latter, though laid down first, is to be used after the *Anuvākyā*; as until the Deity is known, no offering can be made].—(D) The injunction 'one should offer the *Agnihotra*' comes first, and then comes the injunction 'he should cook the rice'; and on account of the impossibility of this order being adopted in practice (as until the Rice has been cooked, no offerings can be made), the cooking of Rice has to be done first.—(E) The *Directing* and the *acting according to the Direction* have been spoken of in the reverse order; in actual practice this order has to be reversed.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *In some cases there is no restriction as to the Order of Sequence.*

SŪTRA (3).

IN OTHER CASES, THERE IS NO RESTRICTION.

Bhāṣya.

In other cases, there is no restriction regarding the Order of Sequence. For instance, in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there are several acts to be done by the Sacrificer, such as *Prayājanumantrana* and the like, which are laid down in diverse recensional texts, —such as 'Vasantam *ṛtūnām prīṇāmi*, etc.' (Taitt. Sam. 1 6. 2. 3), 'Ēko *mama*, etc.' (Shatapatha. Brā. 1. 5. 4. 11).—[And these may be performed in any order one likes].

ADHIKARAṆA (4): '*Order of Sequence*' *determined by* '*Verbal Text*': '*Pāṭhakramanyāya*'.

SŪTRA (4).

AT ANY ONE SACRIFICE, THE ACTS SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN A DEFINITE ORDER OF SEQUENCE; SUCH BEING THE NATURE OF ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* we read—'*Samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, barhiryajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*' ['He should offer the *Samid*,—he should offer the *Tanūnapāt*,—he should offer the *Iḍ*,—he should offer the *Barhis*,—he should offer with the syllable *svāhā*'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 1. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these offerings to be made at random, without any definite Order of Sequence? Or is that Order of Sequence to be adopted in which the verbal texts laying down the acts appear?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—'As there are no rules restricting the Order of Sequence, no definite order need be adopted".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta—At any one sacrifice, the acts should be performed in a definite Order of Sequence*;—why?—because *such is the very nature of actions*; things are generally found to have the character of being done in a definite order; for instance, in the case of the sentence—'one should bathe, rub sandal-paste, breakfast', it is understood that the acts are to be performed in this definite Order of Sequence.—In regard to the laying down of acts done with a super-physical purpose, if someone were to speak of them in the following words—'Incense is to be burnt,—flowers are to be showered,—sandal-paste is to be rubbed,—presents are to be offered; this done, the deity become satisfied',—the other man (to whom the words have been addressed) would say in reply—'It is not so, the burning of incense is not the first thing to be done, the first thing to be done is the showering of the flowers'.—Here this answer shows that this second man understood the words of the first man to say that the 'Burning of Incense' should be the first in Order of Sequence.—From all this it follows that in all such cases, the Order of Sequence is the one that is indicated by the order of the *verbal texts* concerned.

SŪTRA (5).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD BE SOMETHING NOT EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS OF THE VEDA,—IT COULD BE REGARDED AS SO EXPRESSED ONLY IF THE SENTENCE WERE THE 'EXPRESSIVE WORD'",—[then the answer is as given in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya

The Opponent may argue as follows—'If the *order* were to be understood in the way explained above, then *it would be something not expressed by the words of the Veda*—why? because the meaning of a sentence is understood after the meanings of the component words have been understood.—and words express only things denoted by themselves, not any *Order of Sequence*.—In fact the *order* might be regarded as 'expressed by words' only if the hearing of the *composite whole* (in the form of the sentence) consisting of the words were the denoter of the meaning (of the sentence as a whole); as a matter of fact, however, no such *composite whole* is the denoter of things, as has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 25. Thus then [the sentence as a whole not being expressive of anything beyond what is expressed by the words, and] there being no *word* expressive of the *Order of Sequence* it follows that the notion of such order (derived from the words of the text) must be regarded as illusory.—[There would be a further advantage in the ignoring of this Order of Sequence.] It would be possible to perform the same act (the *offering of Samid*, for instance) several times, and thus help the accumulation of the Unseen Force resulting from that act; otherwise (if the acts were to be performed in the order mentioned, the whole set of acts would intervene between the first and the second performance of the first act and thereby) the Unseen Force resulting from the two performances would be separated [and there would be no accumulation of the Force].—Then again, the fact that no Order of Sequence can be indicated by the order of the verbal texts is shown by the following text—'*Hṛdayasāgre'vadyati, atha jihvāyāḥ, atha vakṣasaḥ*' ['*First of all*, he cuts the slice out of the heart, —*then* out of the tongue,—*then* out of the chest'];—now if the order of the verbal texts could determine the order of the acts spoken of, then it would not be necessary to expressly prescribe the order as it is done in this text (*first* one thing, *then* another, *then* the third); as the required order would already be indicated by the order in which the words expressing the acts occur in the text."

SŪTRA (6).

[ANSWER]—IN REGARD TO ANY ONE SACRIFICE, THERE WOULD BE AN INFERENCE (OF THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE) BASED UPON THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION; AS THE VEDA IS MEANT TO SERVE OTHER PURPOSES (THAN THE EXPRESSING OF THE MERE MEANING OF ITS WORDS), IT IS RELATED TO EVERYONE OF THE PURPOSES THAT IS SERVED BY IT; HENCE THE 'ORDER OF SEQUENCE' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INDICATED BY THE WORDS OF THE VEDA ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

In any one sacrifice, as the *doer* of the act is one, and the things to be done several, some order of sequence would have to be adopted in the performance: so that this particular order of sequence would be adopted through Inference (based upon the said needs of the situation).—"Why so?" *Because the Veda is meant to serve other purposes*; i.e. the Veda serves many other purposes; so that whatever the man is able to do, and for whatever purposes, all that is what is declared in the Veda [and not only what is expressed by its mere words]; hence it is quite up to the Veda to enjoin a certain thing, and also to be understood at the time of the actual performance. It is for this reason that the Veda has to be learnt for the purpose of getting at the injunction of things, and also for comprehending it at the time of the performance; and no such discrimination is possible as that the Vedic text serves to enjoin things, but not to be understood at the time of the performance; and when no such discrimination is possible, it follows that it is got up for both these purposes.—If then it is to be understood, it can be understood only in the definite order of sequence (in which the texts occur), not in any other order. It is for this reason that if there is any deviation in the Order of Sequence of the texts, it is said that it has been 'destroyed' (ruined, damaged, spoilt). Otherwise (even if the order was not observed), inasmuch as the purpose intended to be served by each of the texts will have been duly accomplished, why should there be any idea of its being 'ruined'? In fact, it would be necessary to postulate an unseen result; which would be improper so long as the visible result would be there.—From all this it follows that *the Order of Sequence is expressed by the words of the Veda itself*; i.e. the same word that is expressive of the things is also expressive of the Order of Sequence.

SŪTRA (7).

WE FIND OTHER TEXTS ALSO POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The same conclusion is also pointed to by the following texts—'*Vyatyastam ṛtavyā upadadhāti*' ['He should place *in the reverse order*, the bricks

dedicated to the seasons'] (Taitti. Saṁh. 5. 3. 1. 1); '*Vyatyastam poḍashinam shaṁsati*' ['He should recite the *Shoḍashī in the reverse order*'] (Taitti. Saṁh. 7. 1. 5. 4);—'*Āshvino dashamo gṛhyate, tam tṛtīyam juhoti*' ['He should take up the cup dedicated to Ashvins, as the *tenth*, and should offer it as the *third*'].—If the *placing of the bricks* or the *reciting* might be done in any order, then the assertion of its being done 'in the reverse order' would have no sense; as (there being no fixed order) there would be no order which would *not* be the 'reverse order'.—Similarly the offering of the *Āshvina cup* could not be referred to as the 'third', if there were no order of sequence based upon the order of the verbal texts.—Similarly again, we have the text—'*Abhicharatā pratiloman hotavyan, prāṇānēvāsya pratīchah pratyaṇti*' ['When performing a rite for the encompassing of some one's death, one should offer the libations in the reverse order; by so doing he reverses the life of the enemy'] (Taitti. Saṁ 3 4 8. 5), here we find it laid down that in a certain case the libations are to be offered 'in the reverse order', which indicates the presence of a 'natural order'; and this is possible only if the performance were in that order of sequence which is indicated by the order of the verbal texts; if it were not so, then all orders would be the *natural order*, and there would be no sense, in that case in speaking of the 'reverse order'.—Lastly, we have the text—'*Chaturthottamayoh prati samānayati*' ['He should bring together the *fourth* and the *last* offerings'], and this is followed by the text—'*Atihāyēḍobarhih pratisamānayati*' [Leaving aside the *Iḍā* offerings, he takes up the *Barhis*'], and this shows that the *Barhis* takes the *fourth* place, and this assigning of a definite place in sequence would be possible only if the order of sequence were taken to be determined by the order of the *Verbal texts*.

ADHIKARANA (5): *Order of Sequence determined by 'Commencement': 'Prāvartika-kramanyāya'.*

SŪTRA (8)

IN A CASE WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SEVERAL DETAILS TO BE PERFORMED AT ONE TIME, THEIR ORDER OF SEQUENCE IS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE ORDER OF 'COMMENCEMENT', BECAUSE THE PERFORMANCE BEGAN IN THAT ORDER

Bhāṣya

In connection with the Vājapēya sacrifice, we read—'Saptadasha prājāpatyān pashūnālabhatē' ['He should sacrifice seventeen animals dedicated to Prajāpati'].—Over all these animals certain 'embellishments', like 'sprinkling water' and the rest, are to be performed,—these being borrowed from the Primary Original Sacrifice, under the General Law [that the *Ectype* is to be performed like the Archetype or Original sacrifice]. Now from among these embellishments, the first may be started with any one animal one may choose [there is no restriction as to that), but in regard to the second and succeeding embellishments, there arises the question—should the second embellishment also be done to that same animal to which the first was done? Or is there no restriction regarding the second and other succeeding embellishments?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—as there is no rule laying down any restrictions regarding the order of sequence to be adopted, there should be no such restriction in the case in question.

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The second and succeeding embellishments also should commence with the same animal with which the first had started.—"Why so?" *Because the performance began in that order.* As a rule the details of an action should not be very far removed in time from the Primary Act (to which they belong), because it is the Primary Act that is meant to be performed; and it is only when that is done that it affords the occasion for the other details. We have also a declaration speaking of their being done together—'The Primary Act should be performed *along with* all the details'. But in a case where many details have been prescribed some sort of *remoteness (from the Primary)* is inevitable, but the intervention between the two should be only by such details as just saves that from immediate sequence, anything more than that should not be allowed to intervene. Thus then, if the second embellishment began with an animal other than the one with which the first embellishment had been started, then there would be an intervention of more than what is unavoidable; and this would militate against the injunction of the entire procedure.—"Well, in that case, there might be intervention by some smaller details"—The answer to this is that by abandoning such

intervening factors as are sanctioned, no additional excellence comes into the performance; [on the contrary, it renders the performance defective,—says *Tuptikā*].—From all this it follows that the subsequent details should be started with that same animal with which the first detail had started.

SŪTRA (9).

"IN THAT CASE THE WHOLE LOT WOULD HAVE TO BE PERFORMED OVER AGAIN"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If you think that the entire injunction of the performance becomes honoured, if the details are not far removed from the Primary, then the entire block of Accessories should have to be performed and completed in connection with a single sacrifice; as is done in the case of the '*Saurya*' and other offerings [mentioned in the text—'*Yasyāshvinē shasyamānē suryo nāvirbhavati' sauryam bahurūpamālabhatē.* ['If at the time of the cup dedicated to Ashvins being eulogised, the sun does not appear, then one should sacrifice an animal of variegated colour dedicated to Sūrya'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 1. 10. 3)"

SŪTRA (10).

ANSWER]—NOT SO; AS THEY WOULD NOT BE PERFORMED AT ALL.

Bhāṣya

What has been urged in the preceding Sūtra is not possible; for it is only if the details were performed all together, that the act would not be performed at all.

SŪTRA (11).

[OBJECTION]—"IT MAY BE AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER SACRIFICES",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer will be as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 9) that "it would be as in the case of the *Saurya* and other sacrifices".—This has to be refuted [and the refutation is as follows].

SŪTRA (12).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO COHERENCE.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the *Saurya* and other sacrifices, there is no Order of Sequence indicated by 'Utility', which could be restricted; because a restriction always pertains to accessories and subsidiaries; as regards the

sequence relating to what are not accessories or subsidiaries, the accessory or subsidiary character itself would have to be assumed.

[Those things that are not known to be *accessories*,—if the order of sequence is based upon them,—the accessory character of their 'Order' would have to be assumed; and for the assumption of this, it would be necessary to assume the accessory character of the things concerned, which *ex hypothesi*, are not accessories. —*Tantraratna*. Thus an objectionable 'interdependence' would be involved.]

[In the case of the acts under consideration, there is a *coherence*, of the *seventeen animals*, and hence the performance of the whole lot is not possible—The two cases therefore are not analogous.—*Subodhinī*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6) : *Order of Sequence determined by 'Place'.*

(A)

SŪTRA (13).

ON THE BASIS OF 'PLACE' ALSO [THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE CAN BE DETERMINED]; AS IT IS CONNECTED WITH THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'*Ēkaviṁshēna atirātrēṇa prajākāmaṁ yājayēt, triṇavēna ojaskāmam, trayastriṁshēna pratiṣṭhākāmam*' ['For one desiring offspring, he should sacrifice with the *Atirātra-stoma* containing *twenty-one* verses; for one desiring glory, he should sacrifice with the *Atirātra* containing *twenty-seven* verses; and for one desiring social standing, he should sacrifice with the *Atirātra* containing *thirty-three* verses' [see Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 4. 7].—It is going to be explained later on (under Sū. 10. 5. 26—'*Bahiṣpavamānē cha rgāyamah sāmaikatvāt*') that these varying numbers have to be made up by the bringing in of additional verses.

In regard to this, there arises the question—when this *bringing in of additional* verses is being done, are these additional verses to be brought in without regard to any order of sequence? Or are they to be brought in in the order in which they occur in the respective sections of the Vedic text?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"they should be brought in without regard to any order; —why?—because they come into the *Atirātra* by virtue of the words 'twenty-seven' (and 'thirty-three'; which are expressive of the various numbers); and when they come in thus, there is no order of sequence among them".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—As a matter of fact, the order of the verses coming into the *Atirātra* is determined by the 'Place' that each verse occupies in the Vedic text; so that those that appear first (in the Vedic text) should be used first. In fact, the perceptible purpose served by a regular succession of verses (as we find in the Vedas) is that the preceding one at once brings to the mind the one that follows it; and this indication of what follows is always desirable.

The present case does not come under the case of Order of Sequence determined by the 'Verbal Text' (Adhikaraṇa 4), because in the present case the numerical words 'twenty-seven' (and 'thirty-three') give rise to the idea that all the verses are to be used simultaneously; and that is why this has been brought under a separate *Adhikaraṇa*. Such is the opinion (of those who adhere to the foregoing presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa*).

In reality, however, the order of sequence in this case is actually determined by the Order of the '*Verbal texts*' as occurring in the Veda; and hence (if confined to the example chosen) the *Adhikaraṇa* would appear to

be a mere repetition (of what has gone under *Adhikarana* 4); hence we are putting forward a different presentation of the *Adhikarana*.—[i.e. with a different *text* as the basis of discussion—says *Tantraratna*]—as follows:—

In connection with the *Sādyaskra* sacrifice (a particular form of the Soma-sacrifice) we read—'*Saha pashūnālabhatē*'—['He should sacrifice the animals together']; and this has been taken to mean that all the three animals are to be sacrificed at the time of the *Savanīya*.

[*Jyotiṣṭoma* is the archetype of the *Sādyaskra*; at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the three animals are sacrificed in the following order:- (1) the *Agnīṣomīya* animal is sacrificed on the 'Previous Day', the *Aupavasathya*,—(2) the *Savanīya* animal is sacrificed on the 'Extraction Day', at the Morning Extraction, after the offering of the Cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*,- (3) the *Anubandhya* animal is sacrificed after the Final Sacrificial Bath.—In accordance with the general law regarding Archetypes and Ectypes, the order at the *Sādyaskra* would have been the same, had it not been for the special injunction that at the *Sādyaskra*, all the three animals should be sacrificed together. It has been decided also that this sacrificing of the three animals is to be done on the Extraction-Day, which, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, is the day for the sacrificing of the *Savanīya* animal.]

In regard to this, there arises the question 'Should the *Agnīṣomīya* animal be sacrificed first, on the strength of the order of the "verbal texts" speaking of these animals? Or should the *Savanīya* animal be sacrificed first, on the strength of its "place" as being the first to come on that particular day?'

On this question *the Pūrvapakṣa* view is that 'the animal to be sacrificed first is the *Agnīṣomīya*;- why? because of the *order of the verbal texts*'.

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* (stated in Sū 13). The *Savanīya* is the animal to be sacrificed first, *on the basis of Place* (Sūtra), if the *Agnīṣomīya* animal were killed first, then that would go against the 'Place', which (on that day) belongs to the *Savanīya*,—as distinctly laid down in the text, '*Āshvinam grhītvā trivṛtā yūpam parivya, etc.*' [Taking up the cup dedicated to the Aśvins, and engirdling the sacrificial post with the three-fold rope, one should sacrifice the *Savanīya*].

Says the Opponent—'But in the other case also [i.e. if the *Savanīya* is sacrificed first] the *Order of the verbal texts* would be violated'.

That might well be violated, in fact, it is for the rejection of that order that we have in the text the word 'together' ('the three animals should be sacrificed *together*'); as for the 'Place' prescribed—i.e. *after the taking up of the cup dedicated to the Ashvins*,—*that* has not been set aside (by any text); hence this latter should not be ignored

ADHIKARAṆA (7) : *The 'Order of Sequence' at the Subsidiary 'should follow the Order of the Principal.*

SŪTRA (14).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AT THE SUBSIDIARY SHOULD FOLLOW THE ORDER OF THE PRINCIPAL, BECAUSE THE ACCESSORIES ARE MEANT TO SUBSERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE PRINCIPAL

Bhāṣya

We have the text –'*Sārasvatau bhavatah, ētad vai daivyam mithunam*' [These are the two *Sārasvata* offerings, at which there is a pair of deities, *Sarasvatī* and *Sarasvān*"] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 4 6. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question--There being two sacrifices here (one offered to the female deity, *Sarasvati*, and the other to the male deity, *Sarasvān*), the details of *which* are to be performed first—those of the sacrifice to the *female* deity ? Or those of the sacrifice to the male deity ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that –'as there is no rule laying down any definite Order of Sequence in this case, there can be no restriction, one may do as one likes".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The Order of Sequence should be determined by the order at the Primary sacrifice –In the *Yājyā-Anuvākyā* the sacrifice to the female deity is mentioned first –in the words '*Prāno dēvi sarasvati etc*'. (Taitt Sam. 1. 8. 22. 1); from which it follows that the offering to the female deity should come first ; which means that the details of that offering to the female deity should be performed first. It is only if this is done that the subsidiaries would be done at the same time as the Primaries, otherwise there would be many more intervening factors than those that are permissible by the very nature of things

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *Exception to the above: At the Subsidiaries, the Order of Sequence indicated by the 'Verbal Texts' is more authoritative than that of the Principal.*

SŪTRA (15).

AT THE ARCHETYPAL SACRIFICE, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE (AMONG) ACCESSORIES) ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT INDICATED BY THE 'VERBAL TEXTS', BECAUSE THIS ORDER IS ONE THAT IS INDICATED BY THEIR OWN INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the details laid down first are those relating to the *vegetable substances* (required for the making of the *Cake*), and then come those relating to the *Clarified Butter*. [Under the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, we have the sacrifices, *Agnisomīya* and the *Upāmshuyāja*; the substance used at the *Agnīṣomīya* is the *Cake*, and that at the *Upāmshuyāja*, is the Clarified Butter.—As regards the details, those of the Cake are laid down first, and then follow those of the Clarified Butter; but as between the *Upāmshuyāja* and the *Agnisomīya*, which are the 'Principals', the former is laid down first, then the latter]

Now, in regard to the performance of the details, at the *Agnisomīya* sacrifice, there arises the question—Are the details related to the Clarified Butter to be performed first, on the strength of the order of the Principals (between which the first to be laid down is the *Upāmshuyāja*, which has Clarified Butter for its material)? Or should the details be performed in accordance with order of the Verbal Texts mentioning them (whereby the details related to the *Cake* should come first)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"on the strength of the 'order of the Principals', the details to be performed first should be those relating to the Clarified Butter".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the archetypal sacrifice the Order of Sequence (among accessories) adopted should be that indicated by the verbal texts*; because the Order of Sequence indicated by the verbal texts is one that *is indicated by their own injunctions*; hence, if they were performed in any other order, the said order would be violated. Further, as for the text laying down the entire performance, which text implies concomitance, does not become violated if a certain detail is brought nearer by virtue of its own natural order. Further, in support of the 'Order of the Verbal Texts', we have the specific injunction 'the Veda should be studied' [which lays down the study of the Vedic texts in the Order in which they appear in the Veda]; whereas in support of the 'order of the Principals' would be the extremely subtle syntactical connection of the

entire passage laying down the performance of the sacrifice [i.e. an order, not directly laid down, but only assumed,—says the *Tuptīkā*].

[This is an exception to the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*. The 'Order of Verbal Texts' is one that is learnt from the 'Study of the Veda', wherein the texts are studied in a definite order; this order therefore is *directly perceptible*. In the other case there is first of all the practical principle of expediency that the details should be performed together;—thus concomitance of the details is indicated by the injunction of the performance of the sacrifice,—and as a necessary corollary to this concomitance, the order of sequence also becomes inferred.—Now this *inferred order* is necessarily rejected in favour of the former *directly perceived order*.—*Tuptīkā*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The order of the 'Mantra-text' is more authoritative than the order of the 'Brāhmaṇa-text'.*

SŪTRA (16).

WHEN THERE IS CONFLICT, THE ORDER OF THE MANTRA-TEXT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED; BECAUSE THE CAPACITY TO BE USED AS IT STANDS IS INHERENT IN THE MANTRA; HENCE IT IS THAT THE BRĀHMAṆA-TEXT IS TAKEN AS THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION OF ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Darsha-Pūrṇamasa*, it is found that the *mantra-texts* bearing upon the *Āgnēya* sacrifice (which forms part of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*) come *before*,—and the Brāhmaṇa texts bearing upon it come *after*—(those bearing on the *Agnīsomīya* sacrifice). [That is, the *Agnīsomīya* is laid down by *Brahmaṇa-texts* occurring in the *fifth Prapāthaka* of the *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa*, and the *Āgnēya* is laid down by *Brāhmaṇa-texts* occurring in the *sixth Prapāthaka*; but in the *Mantra-kāṇḍa*, the *Mantras* connected with the *Āgnēya* are found before those connected with the *Agnīṣomīya*].

In regard to this, there arises the question—which of the two 'texts' (*Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa*) are to be regarded as more authoritative (in the matter of determining the order of sequence between the *Āgnēya* and the *Agnīṣomīya*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"there can be no restriction in this matter, as there is no rule laying down any such restriction".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Mantra-text* is to be regarded as more authoritative;—why?—*because the capacity to be used as it stands is inherent in the Mantra*; i.e. the *Mantra* has the capacity to be used as it stands, in its own form; it is by virtue of this capacity to be used as it stands that the *Mantra* is actually used at sacrifices; hence the order in which the *Mantra* appears serves a perceptibly useful purpose [of being used in that order].—But the same purpose is served by the *Brāhmaṇa-text* also"—The answer to this is that *the Brāhmaṇa-text is taken as the originative injunction of acts*; i.e. it also serves the other purpose of enjoining the performance of acts [and in most cases, it is not meant to be used in its verbal form, as it stands].

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The Order of Sequence indicated by the 'General Law' is more authoritative than that indicated by the description of the ceremonial procedure.*

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AT AN ECTYPAL SACRIFICE, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 'PRINCIPAL', BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION OF THE DETAILS CONCERNED."

Bhāṣya.

There is a sacrifice named '*Adhvara-Kalpa*', laid down in the text—'*Aṇāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt,—sarasvatyājyabhāgā syāt,—bārhaspatyashcharuḥ*'—['One should offer the cake baked upon twelve-pans to *Agni-Viṣṇu*;—Clarified Butter should be offered to *Sarasvatī*;—Cooked Rice should be offered to *Bṛhaspati*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 9. 1).

[This text describes the ceremonial Procedure and here the *Sarasvatī-sacrifice* comes before the *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice*.—But the *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice* has for its Archetype, the *Āgnēya* Sacrifice, at which Cooked Rice is offered; while the *Sarasvatī-sacrifice* has for its Archetype, the *Upāṁshuyāja*, at which Clarified Butter is offered.—Under Sū. 15, it has been settled that details relating to vegetable substances (Rice, etc.) should precede those relating to Clarified Butter; and according to the General Law that 'the Ectype should be performed like the Archetype', the substance offered at the *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice* should be *Rice*, and that at the *Sarasvatī-sacrifice*, Clarified Butter.—So that according to Sū. 15, the details of the *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice* should precede those of *Sarasvatī-sacrifice*.]

In regard to this, the question arises—Between the 'Sacrifice to *Bṛhaspati*', which is an *ectype* (modification) of the *Āgnēya* sacrifice, and the 'Sacrifice to *Sarasvatī*', which is an *ectype* of the *Upāṁshuyāja*,—the details of *which* should be performed first? Are the details of the *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice* to be performed first, on the ground that the 'General Law' ['The *Ectype* should be performed like the *Archetype*'] is more authoritative than the 'description of the ceremonial procedure'? Or are the details of the *Sarasvatī-sacrifice* to be performed first, on the ground that 'the description of the ceremonial procedure' is more authoritative than the 'General Law'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*At the Ectype*, that we are considering, *the order shall be in accordance with the 'Principal'*, *because of the direct declaration of the details concerned*. That is, in regard to the two *Ectypes*, there is a distinct declaration of the Order of Sequence; and 'the description of the ceremonial procedure', which takes in all the sacrifices spoken of in proximity to it, is what is directly perceptible; on the other hand, the order regarding the details is one that can only be deduced by Inference on the basis of the 'General Law'. And hence we conclude that the 'description of the Ceremonial Procedure', being directly perceptible, *is more authoritative than*, and sets aside, the 'General Law' whose application is a matter of inferential deduction."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT, IT SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARCHETYPE; BECAUSE THE DETAILS OF THE ARCHETYPE ARE APPLICABLE (TO THE ECTYPE)

Bhāṣya.

When there is a conflict—between the order of sequence in the Principal' and that in the 'subsidiary',—then the order at the Ectype should be as at the Archetype;—why?—*because the details of the Archetype are applicable to the Ectype*: that is, the details adopted at the Ectype should be like those adopted at the Archetype. Under the circumstances (in the case in question), if the details were performed in the order of their respective principals', then they would not be performed as they are at the Archetype. As a matter of fact, the 'General Law' (that the Ectype should be performed like the Archetype') is more authoritative than the 'description of ceremonial procedure'; because the former *originates* (enjoins) as well as *applies* the details: while the latter only recapitulates what has already been made applicable (by other injunctive texts). Under the circumstances, this latter (i.e. the description of the ceremonial procedure), itself coming into existence after the details have been already enjoined, and serving only to lay down the subsequent application of those details, cannot, even though it be directly perceptible, set aside the 'General Law', which has already been there. In fact, being outside the pale (of injunctive passages), it can only serve to recapitulate things that have been already enjoined.

From all this it follows that the details relating to the (Rice offered at the) *Bṛhaspati-sacrifice* should be performed, and after that the details relating to the Clarified Butter (offered at the *Sarasvati-sacrifice*).

ADHIKARANA (11): *The 'Sākamēdhīya-Nyāya': In some cases the Details of the Archetype are not transferred to the Ectype.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE ECTYPE TAKES IN THE DETAILS OF THE ARCHETYPE, IT SHOULD TAKE THE SAME TIME AS THIS LATTER,—JUST AS HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya

In course of the *Châturmāsya* sacrifice, the third part consists of the *Sākamēdha*-sacrifice: of this there are three component parts:—(1) *Agnayē anīkavatē prātaranvākapālaḥ*: (2) *Marudbhyaḥ sāntapanēbhyo madhyandinē charuḥ* (3) *Marudbhyo gṛhamēdhibhyaḥ sarvāsām dughē sāyāmavanam*' ['(1) In the morning, the cake baked on eight pans is offered to *Agni-anīkavat*; (2) at midday cooked rice is offered to the *Maruts-sāntapanas*: and (3) in the evening rice cooked in milk of all the cows, to the *Maruts-gṛhamēdhins*'] (Taitti. Sam. 1 8. 4. 1)

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the performance of these three sacrifices to extend over two days (like their Archetype)? Or should it be finished then and there?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"*The Ectype should take the same time as the Archetype,—just as has been enjoined*; i.e. the Ectype should be performed in the same manner as the Archetype has been enjoined as to be performed; because it takes in the details of the Archetype; consequently any sacrifice that is the Ectype (of the *Sākamēdha*) must extend over two days (like its Archetype)"

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THAT WHICH IS LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH SUCCESSIVE POINTS OF TIME (PARTS OF THE DAY) SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THAT SAME TIME; AND INASMUCH AS THE APPLICATION OF THE 'GENERAL LAW' WOULD BE BASED ON INFERENCE, THE DETAILS OF THE ARCHETYPE WOULD NOT COME IN.

Bhāṣya.

Those things that are spoken of in connection with the various points of time during the day—morning, noon and evening.—are always understood to be done on the same day at the successive points of time; e.g. when it is said—'Devadatta eats cakes in the morning, several kinds of food at noon and sweets in the afternoon',—it is understood that all this is done on one and the same day.—Hence we conclude that Ectypal acts like those in

question are to be performed on the same day at the time stated. That they should extend over two days could only be *inferred* through the 'General Law' (that 'the Ectype should be performed like the Archetype'); and hence it would be set aside by the fact of their being performed on one and the same day at the time stated, which is got at from Direct Assertion.*

SŪTRA (21).

[OBJECTION]—"THERE MAY BE EXTENSION OF TIME"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent may argue thus—"The text says that the sacrifice along with all its accessories is to be performed 'in the morning',—similarly 'at noon' and 'in the evening';—and there may be an extension of time; so that even so the sacrifice with its accessories might be performed at the same points of time; and yet there would be no transgression of the rule by which it should extend over two days. That is to say, the offering of the Cake to *Anīkavat* may be commenced 'in the morning' on the first day and may be completed 'in the morning' on the next day; similarly the offering to *Sāntapana* may be commenced 'at midday' on the first day and be finished 'at midday' on the next day; so also the offering to *Gṛhamēdhin* may be commenced 'in the evening' on the first day and be completed 'in the evening' on the next day.—It might be argued that from the sentence of the text itself it appears that the offering is to be made on one day only.—But as a matter of fact, the meaning of the sentence depends upon the force of what is expressed by the word; and in the text in question there is no word the force of whose meaning indicates that the sacrifice is to be performed in a single day."

SŪTRA (22).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE THERE IS ACTUAL CONNECTION WITH ONE POINT OF TIME.

Bhāṣya

What has been urged by the Opponent is not possible.—"Why?"—*Because there is actual connection with one point of time.* Because the Principals (the sacrifices in question) along with their accessories are all found to be directly asserted as connected with one point of time.—"How so?"—What is actually enjoined as to be performed 'in the morning' is the Principal along with its accessories;—similarly 'at midday' and 'in the evening'; and it is not asserted that the accessories (alone) may be performed 'in the morning' (or 'in the evening' or 'at midday'); in fact, if the Principal were performed at one time (on one day) and the accessories at the other time (on the next day, even though at the same time of the day), then, in that case, the Principal with its accessories could

not be regarded as performed 'at one and the same time'.—From all this it follows that the Ectypal sacrifices in question are to be performed on one and the same day.

Further, it has been declared that 'the *Sâkamêdha* sacrifices are to be performed on two days'; and this would be possible only if the component sacrifices (the Ectypes in question) were completed at the prescribed time on the same day. [For if the Ectypes were to extend over both days, then it would be a single performance of the *Sâkamêdha* sacrifices extending over two days; and not the performance of these *on two days*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *'Tadādi-tadantanyāya':—(a) There is 'postponement' (or 'deferring') of all accessories beginning with the Anuyāja, and (b) there is 'anticipation' (or 'performance before time') of all accessories ending with the Prayāja.*

SŪTRA (23)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE SUBSIDIARIES SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THE SAME TIME AS THEIR 'PRINCIPAL', THERE SHOULD BE 'POSTPONEMENT' ONLY OF THAT WHICH IS ACTUALLY LAID DOWN AS TO BE 'POSTPONED' [AND THERE SHOULD BE 'ANTICIPATION' OF THAT ONLY WHICH HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS TO BE 'ANTICIPATED']."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotistoma* we read in regard to the *Savanīya* animal—'*Āgnimārutādūrdhvam anuyājānshcharanti*' ['They perform the *Anuyāja* sacrifices after the offering to *Agni-Marut*']; here we have the 'postponement' or 'deferring' of the *Anuyājas* [because this text puts off the *Anuyājas* to a time later than the one at which it should have been performed in accordance with the 'General Law', at the time of their Archetype].—Similarly in regard to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal, we read '*Tiṣṭhantam pashum prayājanti*' ['They offer the *Prayājas* while the animal is still alive']:—here we have the 'anticipating' (of the *Prayājas*). [Because at the Archetype, the *Prayājas* are performed *after* the *offering material* has been got ready; in accordance with this, at the *Agnīṣomīya* sacrifice also, the *Prayājas* should have to be performed *after* the quartering of the animal; the text quoted however lays down that the *Prayājas* are to be performed while the animal is still alive; and thus the *Prayajas* are to be performed *before* the time at which they would have been performed according to their Archetype; thus there is an 'anticipation', or performance before time, of the *Prayājas*].

In regard to this, there arises the question—When there is 'postponement', is it the *Anuyāja alone* that is to be postponed, or *all the subsidiaries* beginning with the *Anuyāja*? Similarly when there is 'anticipation', is it the *Prayāja* only that is to be 'anticipated'—or all the subsidiaries ending with the *Prayāja*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The *postponement* or the *anticipation* should be only of that which has been laid down as to be *postponed* or *anticipated*;—why?—because *the subsidiaries should be performed at the same time as the Principal*; i.e. in this way, the other subsidiaries (except the one directly laid down as to be *postponed* or *anticipated*),

would be performed at the time of the Principal; and this would also be in keeping with the description of the ceremonial procedure which lays down the concomitance of the subsidiaries with their Principals".

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE 'POSTPONEMENT' OF ALL SUBSIDIARIES BEGINNING WITH THE 'ANUYĀJA', AND 'ANTICIPATION' OF ALL ENDING WITH THE PRAYĀJA,—BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL CONNECTED.

Bhāṣya.

There should be 'postponement' of all beginning with the *Anuyāja*, and 'anticipation' of all ending with the *Prayāja*;—why?—because they are all connected. That is to say, whatever subsidiary is laid down as to be done after the *Anuyājas* is always done after the *Anuyājas*, on the strength of the 'verbal texts' bearing on them,—thereby ignoring the time indicated for it by the description of the ceremonial procedure, which is immediately after the Principal. Similarly what is laid down as to be done after the said subsidiary is naturally performed after it. Thus, when one is 'postponed', it drags with it the entire set of subsidiaries (all which become postponed).—Similarly when one is 'anticipated', it drags along with it all the rest.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *On the basis of the 'Order of Commencement', the 'Prokṣaṇa' and other details relating to the Cake should be performed before the details relating to the Soma.*

SŪTRA (25)

AMONG THINGS WHOSE TIME IS DEFINITELY FIXED, THE ORDER OF SEQCENCE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE 'ORDER OF COMMENCEMENT'

Bhāṣya

* In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we read that *at the time of the Morning Hymn* (*Anuvāka*), the Adhvaryu gives the direction—'O *Pratiprasthātr, offer the Savanīya-cakes*', where the time for offering the *Savanīya-cakes* is distinctly indicated,—again, we find that *after the Bahiṣpavamāna hymn has been recited*, the Adhvaryu gives the direction O Agnīdh, please attend upon the fires, spread the grass and *decorate the cakes*'

[The *Order of Verbal Texts* is as follows—(1) *The Morning Hymn*,—(2) the *Pracharani homa* and other rites relating to the *Soma*,—(3) the offering of the *Savanīya cakes*, (4) *Bahiṣpavamana* Hymn—But immediately after directing the *Hotr* to recite the Morning Hymn, the *Adhvaryu* directs the *Pratiprasthātr* to make the *Savaniya* offerings Thus though under the 'Order of the Verbal Texts', the offering of the *Savanīya cakes* should have come after the *Pra haranī homa* etc, yet by virtue of the said Direction by the *Adhvaryu*, the offering of the *Savanīya cakes* is anticipated' and made at the time of the Morning Hymn—Then again, we have the following direction regarding the decorating of the *Savaniya cakes* 'After the *Bahiṣpavamāna* hymn has been recited, he says—*Decorate the Cakes*'. Here again, though by the 'Order of the Verbal Texts' the offering of the *Savanīya-cakes* should have come before the *Bahiṣpavamāna* Hymn, yet, by virtue of this second Direction, it has to be postponed and done *after* the *Bahiṣpavamāna* Hymn]

In regard to all this, there arises the question—What is it that should come after the Offering of the *Savanīya-cakes* at the time of the Morning Hymn?—the *Pracharanī-homa* and other rites relating to the *Soma*? Or the details relating to the Cake, preceding its 'decoration' [all these details being indicated by, and included under, this *Decoration*—adds *Kumārila*]?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there being no rules laying down any definite Order of Sequence, there need be no restriction (and one may do what one likes)".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*.—*Among things whose time is definitely fixed, the Order of Sequence should be determined by the Order of Commencement*; that is, when a number of things have their time definitely known, their Order of Sequence should be determined by the Order of Commencement. It is only when the previously mentioned thing is being done

that it determines the order of the subsequently mentioned thing*; it being only natural that what is mentioned after it should also be done after it. As for the *Pracharaṇī-homa*, which is a detail relating to the *Soma*, we find that its Order of Sequence (indicated by the verbal texts) is set aside by the Direct Assertion (of the Direction given by the *Adhvaryu*);—as for the 'decoration' of the cake, it is mentioned after the *Bahiṣpavamāna*;—hence it follows that all the details preceding that *decoration* should be the end (i.e last factor) among the acts beginning with the 'offering' (of the *Savanīya* cakes);—and it is after this offering that the details relating to the *Soma* should be performed.

SŪTRA (26)

ALSO BECAUSE THE OTHER VIEW INVOLVES INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE WORDS OF THE TEXT

Bhāṣya.

The words of the text become incompatible (under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view), for instance, when the man is told to decorate the cakes' (*Purodāshān alaṅkuru*') he would (under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view) comprehend by it all the details, *washing* and the rest (relating to the Cake),—while according to our view when told to 'decorate', he would comprehend only 'decoration' and in this case, when the time of the *Decoration* will have arrived, the use of the Imperative Ending (in *alaṅkuru*') which denotes the advent of the time for the performance of the act spoken of (viz decoration) would become quite justified.—For all these reasons, the Order of Sequence in this case is determined by the Order of 'Commencement'

[After the Morning Hymn, the *Pratiprasthātr* having done the offering of the *Savanīya-cakes*,—if before having done the details relating to the Cake beginning with *washing* and ending with *decorating*, he were to perform the *Pracharaṇī-homa* and other details relating to the *Soma*, ending with the *Bahiṣpavamāna*,—and then there were to come the direction to 'decorate the cakes', then the man thus directed would naturally wait for the washing and other details preliminary to the *Decoration*. This would not be right. Because the Imperative ending in *alaṅkuru* connotes the *advent of time for decorating* but inasmuch as the details preliminary to the Direction will not have been performed, *the time for decorating* will not have arrived, hence the Imperative Ending would be '*incompatible*'.—On the other hand if the details relating to the Cake, beginning with *washing* and ending with *decorating*, were done before those relating to the *Soma* were taken up,—then the use of the Imperative in the sense of *advent of time* would be quite compatible.—*Subodhinī*.]

[Kumārila's presentation of this *Adhikaraṇa* is somewhat different: (1) The *Adhvaryu* has directed the *Hotṛ* to proceed with the Morning Hymn;

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* Read—'*Prayujyamāna eva hi pūrvapadārtha uttarapadārthamabhinīyachchhati*'—as in MS A.

—(2) then he directs the *Pratiprasthātṛ* to 'offer the *Savanīya* cakes';—(3) again, after the *Bahiṣpavamāna* Hymn has been recited, the *Adhvaryu* gives the direction to the *Agnīdh* to 'attend to the Fires....and decorate the Cakes'.—The *Hotṛ* to whom the direction has been addressed is engaged with the Morning-Hymn;—the *Adhvaryu* himself is engaged in Meditation and remains so till the Morning Hymn is finished;—hence neither of these two can do the 'washing' and the rest (in connection with the Cakes). Hence it being inevitable that someone else should do these latter, the question that arises is—who is to do them? Is it meant that the *Pratiprasthātṛ* should do all this *washing, etc.*, which is included under the 'offering' (that he has been directed to do)?—This 'offering' however ordinarily should be the function of the *Adhvaryu*, and hence all that is included under the 'offering' could be done by another person only during the time that the *Adhvaryu* is otherwise engaged; it could not therefore include what is done after the *Decoration*; as by that time the *Adhvaryu* would be disengaged. Hence the question that has got to be decided is—Are the 'offering' and the subsequent details, all to be done by the *Pratiprasthātṛ*? Or the details preceding the *Decoration* and succeeding the *Offering* (which are all included under 'decorating') are to be done by the *Agnīdh*? The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there need be no restriction—any one might do it—either the *Pratiprasthātṛ* or the *Agnīdh*; as in both cases there is an indirect extension of the connotation of the terms ('offering' or 'decorating')."
The *Siddhānta* view is that—the two functions are to be performed at the same time, and they have to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*;—but he cannot do both; hence he is to remain engaged in *Meditation*, and the other work is to be done by the other man, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* . . . .So that the *Adhvaryu* is the direct nominative agent of the act of *Directing* only, and of the work directed to be done, he is only the indirect (directive) agent.—*Ṭuptīkā.*]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): '*Yūpakarma-nyāya*': *Exception to Adhikaraṇa* (12)—*At the Ectype, what is 'anticipated' is only the 'cutting of the wood for the Sacrificial Post'.*

SŪTRA (27).

WHAT RELATES TO THE ECTYPE—THAT ALONE SHOULD BE 'ANTICIPATED', [NOT THE OTHER DETAILS], BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION [WITH THESE DETAILS].

Bhāṣya.

One of the 'Ectypes' of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is the *Agnīṣomīya* sacrifice, at which there is the 'cutting of the wood for the Sacrificial Post', which is peculiar to this Ectype (and not found in the Archetype); and this is 'anticipated' [done on the previous day instead of the day on which it would be performed according to the 'Order of the Verbal Texts'], by reason of the direct injunction to the effect that 'one should cut the wood for the Sacrificial Post on the Initiation Day'.

[After the *Vaśanjana Homa*, the Fire is brought in, and the Soma is brought in; after the mention of these two 'bringings in', is mentioned the 'cutting of the wood for the Sacrificial Post'. In accordance with this 'Order of the Verbal Texts', this cutting of the wood would be done on the second, the *Upavasathya*, day; but there is the direct injunction that 'one should cut the wood for the Sacrificial Post on the Initiation Day'; and according to this the *cutting* is 'anticipated', that is, performed on the day previous to the *Aupavasathya*.]

In regard to this, there arises this question—When this 'cutting of the wood' is 'anticipated', does it—or does it not—carry with it all the other details preceding itself, such as the 'Bringing in of the Fire and Soma'? [That is, are those other details also performed on the previous day along with the 'cutting of the wood'? Or is it the 'cutting of the wood' alone that is so done?].

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"all those details also are 'anticipated', because they are connected (with the *cutting of the wood*) [in accordance with Adhikaraṇa (12), Sūtras 23-24]".

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—That detail of the Ectype which is over and above those of the Archetype, when 'anticipated', does not carry along with it those details that precede it, such as the 'Bringing in' of the *Fire* and the *Soma*.—Why so?—*Because there is no connection*; that is to say the making of the Sacrificial Post pertains to the *Animal*, while all that precedes it pertains to the *Soma*; hence there is no connection between them; that is, the details pertaining to the *Soma* do not in any way help either the details relating to the animal, or the Animal itself;—if they had helped them, then their Order of Sequence also would come in as an accessory;—but they do not help the animal or

the animal's details;—hence there can be no adjustment of any Order of Sequence among them.—From this it follows that what is 'anticipated' is only the *Sacrificial Post* (i.e. the cutting of the wood for the Sacrificial Post).—Further, when the text has its purpose served by the 'anticipation' of the Sacrificial Post only, there will be nothing to reject the natural order of sequence of the details relating to the *Soma* (which therefore need not be 'anticipated').

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The Homa-offerings into the Dakṣināgni are not 'postponed'.*

SŪTRA (28).

WHAT IS INCIDENTAL SHOULD NOT BE 'POSTPONED', AS THERE IS NO CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Savanīya-offering*, which is an Ectype of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read —'*Agnimārutādūrdhvam anuyājaishcharanti*' ['The *Anuyājas* should be performed after the offering to *Agni-Marut*'] [Then there are two *Homas* laid down as to be offered into the *Dakṣināgni* Fire—(1) the '*Piṣṭalēpa-homa*', in which all the offering-substances that are found smeared in the stone-slabs, pans and other things are collected and poured as a libation, and (2) the *Phalīkaraṇa-homa* in which broken rice-grains are offered —*At the Jyotiṣṭoma these two Homas are offered after the Anuyājas*; —in the first passage quoted above, it is laid down that 'at the *Savanīya*, the *Anuyājas* are to be performed after the offering to *Agni-Marut*'.]

In regard to this there arises the question:—When, at the *Savanīya*, the *Anuyājas* are 'postponed' till after the offering to *Agni-Marut*, do they carry with them also the two *Homas into Dakṣināgni* (i.e. the *Piṣṭalēpa-homa* and the *Phalīkaraṇa homa*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that 'those two *Homas* also become 'postponed', because they are related (to the *Anuyājas*)".

Against this we have the following *Siddhānta*.—The two *Homas* in question should not be 'postponed'. Because the *Anuyājas* that appertain to the *two Homas*, are only related to them; they are not impelled by the two *Homas* [i.e. the *Homas* do not form the 'motive' behind the *Anuyājas*; i.e. it is not the presence of the two *Homas* that affords the occasion for the performance of the *Anuyājas*]; in fact, the purpose of the *Anuyājas* is served by details belonging to acts other than the two *Homas*. [Hence the 'postponement' of the *Anuyājas* with its necessary details need not entail the 'postponement' of the two *Homas*.]

Further, the 'Order of Sequence' holds among things (acts), not among the 'motives' (or purposes) of those things; because as a rule several things render their help at one and the same time,—as we are going to show later on. [That is, when there is a desire to know —How, in what manner, a certain *Bhāvanā* is to be accomplished, all the help rendered by all the details of procedure come to the mind simultaneously; so that the connection of every one of these details is also simultaneous; hence there can be no order of sequence among them—at the time that we are simply enquiring after the Procedure. —*Tuptīkā*.]

Then again, where the Order of Sequence holds is the *coming into existence* of the things (or details); and the reason for this is that the *coming into*

existence (i.e. performance) of each of these is laid down by separate words (texts); while the 'Motive' (or purpose) of these things is not (always) spoken of by separate words; because the purpose of all is expressed simultaneously by the single 'declaration of the ceremonial procedure', which takes in all the details with itself.

For these reasons, the *coming into existence* (performance) of the *Anuyājas* cannot carry along with it anything else; hence there should be no 'postponement' of the two *Homas* in *Dakṣiṇāgni Fire* (when the *Anuyājas* are 'postponed').

Lastly, the text laying down the 'postponement' of the *Anuyājas* having served its purpose by 'postponing' the *Anuyājas* only, there can be nothing to justify the disturbance of the natural course of the two *Homas* in the *Dakṣināgni* Fire.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *At the Darsha-sacrifice, there is no 'anticipation' of the details ending with the 'abhivāsana' of the Cakes.*

[Cakes placed upon the heated pans are covered up with ashes from the *Gārhapatya* Fire: –this is called '*Abhivāsana*'.]

SŪTRA (29).

SIMILARLY ALSO THAT WHICH HAS NO ANTECEDENT [SHOULD NOT BE 'ANTICIPATED'].

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa*, there is to be an Altar, the erecting of which has been laid down as to be done at both sacrifices after the '*Abhivāsana*' of the Cakes, but in regard to the *Darsha* sacrifice, there is a text which lays down the 'anticipation' of the erection of the Altar—'*Pūrvedyuramāvāsyāyām vedim karoti*' [At the *Amāvāsyā* or *Darsha* sacrifice, the Altar is erected *on the previous day*'].

In regard to this, there arises this question –When the *erecting of the Altar* is 'anticipated', does it, –or does it not –carry along with it all the details preceding it (down to the *Abhivāsana* of the Cake)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that – it does carry all these along with it, as they are all connected with it'.

The *Siddhānta* is as follows *Similarly also that which has no antecedent.* That is, the *erecting of the Altar* has been laid down as to be done *on the previous day*, in connection with the *Amāvāsyā* (*Darsha*) sacrifice, which has no Archetype preceding it; the *Abhivāsana*' of the Cake is laid down for both sacrifices (the *Darsha* as well as the *Pūrnamāsa*) as to be done *on the morrow*. But there is neither *Direct Assertion* nor any other [of the proofs of 'Sequence' *Utility, Verbal Text, Commencement, Place, Principal*] indicating that 'at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice the Altar should be erected *after* having done the *Abhivāsana*'. For these reasons the details ending with the *Abhivāsana* should not be 'anticipated' (done on the previous day). In fact, if the *Abhivāsana* (covering up with hot ashes on heated pans) were done on the previous day, the Cakes would be reduced to ashes (by the time of their offering on the next day).

ADHIKARAṆA (17) : *The 'Postponement' of the 'Sāntapanīya Sacrifice' should not lead to the 'postponement' of the 'Agnihotra'.*

SŪTRA (30)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THE 'SANTAPANĪYA' SHOULD 'POSTPONE' THE AGNIHOTRA, AS OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE DEFECTIVE JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SAVANAS'"

Bhāṣya

Among the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, there is the *Sākamēdha* sacrifice, of which there is a part called the '*Sāntapanīya Iṣṭi*', laid down in the text—'*Marudbhyaḥ sāntapanēbhyo madhyandinē charum nirvapati*' [At midday one should offer cooked rice to *Maruts-Sāntapanas*'] (Taitt. Sam. 1. 8. 4. 1). [And naturally it is after this *Iṣṭi* has been performed at midday that the Evening offerings of the *Agnihotra* are made]

In regard to this, there arises the question—If on account of some obstacle, due to god or man, the *Sāntapana* be 'postponed' [i.e. somehow continued till the evening], does it—or does it not—lead to the 'postponement' of the *Agnihotra* also?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—*The Sāntapanīyā should postpone the Agnihotra, as otherwise it would be defective, just as in the case of the Savanas*—If the *Agnihotra* were not postponed [and it were done in course of the *Santāpanīya*, before this was finished], then it would have to be offered in the Fire which had been kindled for the *Sāntapanīya* which (naturally) will have been kindled at a time other than that prescribed for the *Agnihotra* [and also without the *mantras* laid down in connection with the *Agnihotra*], and to this extent the *Agnihotra* offered would be defective. In order to avoid this defect, the *Agnihotra* should be postponed [till after the completion of the *Sāntapanīya*, when, the *Sāntapanīya* fire being removed, a fresh fire would be kindled with the proper *Agnihotra-mantras*]—*Just as in the case of the Savanas*;—in the case of the *Savanas*, if, by some reason due to god or man, the *Morning Savana* becomes protracted and goes on till after midday, the *Midday Savana* becomes postponed (till the completion of the *Morning Savana*); the same should be done in the case in question also."

SUTRA (31)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—'ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO INTERVENTION"

Bhāṣya.

"By postponing the *Agnihotra* there would also be this advantage that *there would be no intervention* between the *Sāntapanīya* and the *Agnihotra*; so that the order of sequence (between the *Sāntapanīya* and the *Agnihotra*)

would be maintained. Evil effects have been declared as following from the disturbance of the order of sequence—'The whole sacrifice becomes destroyed, if, in course of the procedure of one sacrifice, the procedure of another is introduced'."

SŪTRA (32).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE SHOULD BE NO POSTPONEMENT (OF THE AGNIHOTRA), AS THERE IS NO CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

The *Sāntapanīya* is not a part (or subsidiary) of the *Agnihotra*; nor is *Agnihotra* a part of the *Sāntapanīya*. Hence the *Sāntapanīya* may be performed after the *Agnihotra*; and the *Agnihotra* should not be postponed.

SŪTRA (33)

ALSO BECAUSE THE OCCASION FOR THE AGNIHOTRA WILL HAVE ARRIVED

Bhāṣya.

The occasion for the performance of the Agnihotra will have arrived,—such occasion being laid down in the text – *Sāyam juhoti, prātarjuhoti, uditē juhoti, anuditē juhoti, prathamōdyantamitē juhoti, sandhau juhoti, nakṣatrāṇi dṛṣṭvā juhoti* | He should offer the oblations in the evening,—in the morning, at sunrise,—before sunrise,—immediately at sunset—at the junction-time of Day and Night,—on seeing the stars | (Taitt. Brā. 2. 1. 2. 7).—This occasion should never be passed over. For this reason also there should be no postponement of the *Agnihotra*.—What has been urged (under Sū. 30) regarding the *Agnihotra* offering becoming 'defective',—on postponement also, the performance would be defective, inasmuch as it would be done at a time other than the right one—"For the sake of the fulfilment of other conditions, the comparatively less important injunction of time might well be ignored". Not so; because the Time is an essential factor; and if that were ignored, the entire performance would be done in an unauthorised manner.—That the time is an essential factor follows from the fact that it has not been laid down as something *to be secured*, in fact, the Locative Ending (in '*uditē*', '*sandhau*' etc.) cannot have the sense of *location*; it has therefore to be taken as connoting an essential condition.

It has been argued (under Sū. 30) that 'the present case should be treated like *the case of the Savanas*".—Our answer to this is as follows—

SŪTRA (34).

IN THE CASE OF THE SAVANAS, THERE IS POSTPONEMENT BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

One *Savana* is connected with another *Savana*,—because both are connected with the same sacrifice. Hence it is only right that in that case the postponement of one should mean the postponement of the other.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The 'Ṣoḍashin' should be postponed in pursuance of the 'Ukthya'.*

SŪTRA (35).

BY REASON OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 'UKTHYA', THE 'ṢOḌASHI' [SHOULD BE POSTPONED].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Jyotiṣtoma* we read with reference to the *Soḍashin* '*Tam parāñchamukhthyēbhyo ruphnāti*' ['One should take up the *Soḍashin* after the *Ukthyas*'] (Taitt. Sam. 6. 6. 11. 6).

The question that arises is If, for some reason, emanating from God or man, the *Ukthyas* become postponed (or prolonged), should, or should not, the *Soḍashin* also be postponed?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *Soḍashin* should *not* be postponed;—why? because it is only when there is no postponement of the *Ṣoḍashin* that its hymn becomes recited at the prescribed time thus time having been prescribed in the text 'One recites the hymn of the *Soḍashin* at the time when neither the Sun nor the Stars are visible —For this reason there should be no postponement

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Soḍashin* should be postponed:—why? *—because of its connection with the Ukthya* The *Soḍashin* has been declared to be connected with the *Ukthyas* in the text—'One should take up the *Ṣoḍashin after the Ukthyas* —Hence the *Soḍashin* should be postponed It has been argued that—by not postponing it, we secure the observance of the prescribed time of the hymn of the *Soḍashin*'.—Our answer to this is as follows:—In this case it so happens that if we stick to the order of sequence of the *Hymn* we go against the order of sequence of the 'Principal'; hence we should not stick to the order of sequence of the Hymn. In fact, both cannot be observed: because we find it declared that 'one should recite the Hymn *either* after taking up the Cup, or after holding up the Ladle'. From all this it follows that the *Ṣoḍashin* should be postponed.

End of Pāda 2 of Adhyāya V.

ADHYĀYA V.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): '*Padārthānusamaya-nyāya*'—*i.e. The 'Principal of each to each at a Time': In connection with the 'Vājapēya animals', all the rites should be performed in such a way that each rite is performed in connection with every one of the animals, before another rite is taken up.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THERE ARE SEVERAL PRINCIPALS CONGREGATED TOGETHER, THE ENTIRE PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE RITES SHOULD BE COMPLETE WITH EACH OF THEM."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, we read—'*Saptadasha prājāpatyān pashūnālabhēta*' ['One should sacrifice seventeen animals dedicated to Prajāpati'] (Taitt. Brā. 1. 3. 4. 3). -In connection with the *Agnīsomīya* Animal (which is the Archetype of all animals)—certain consecrating rites have been laid down, all which become transferred to the said seventeen animals, by the General Law ('The Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype).

In regard to this there arises the question—Are the rites to be all done to the first animal, then all to the second, and so forth? Or the first rite is to done to all the animals, then the second to all the animals, and so forth?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows: "All the rites should be completed with each of them:—why? because in this manner alone would the proximity of the Principal (to the rites) be maintained; if any other method were adopted, this proximity would be removed.- Just as in the case of one receiving many horses in gift, when it comes to the offering of the several cakes (as expiation of the sin of the gift), all the offerings in connection with one horse are completed before those in connection with the second horse are made;—and it is not that one kind of offering is done in regard to all, then the second kind and so on; similarly should it be in the case in question also".

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN CONNECTION WITH ALL ANIMALS, ONE KIND OF RITE SHOULD BE PERFORMED FIRST, BECAUSE EVEN SO THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IS MAINTAINED.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the rite of one kind should be performed first.—"What would be the gain in this?"—Concomitance would be preserved; the concomitance (association) of all the animals has been directly asserted in the text '*Vaishvadevīm kṛtvā pashubhishchaharanti*' ['After performing the sacrifice to *Vishvēdēvas*, they should proceed to deal with the animals'] (where it is indicated that all the animals are to be dealt with together *at one and the same time*).

"In that case between the first rite to the first animal and the second rite to the same animal there would be an intervention due to the first rite being done to all the animals before the second is done to the first animal".

This does not affect our position. Because even so an order of sequence is preserved; for the first rite done to the second animal is the same first rite that had been done to the first animal,—and not a different rite; and intervention is caused when something different comes in between two things.

SŪTRA (3).

[IN THE INSTANCE CITED] THERE IS PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE RITES OVER ONE (THEN OF ALL TO THE SECOND AND SO ON), BECAUSE THERE IS A SPECIAL REASON.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "in the case of the offering of several Cakes, the system of doing one rite for all, (then the second rite for all) and so forth is not adopted".—This has to be refuted; and this refutation is as follows:—'*There is performance of all the rites over one, because there is a* special reason; this special reason is that if the system of one rite being done to all (then the second to all) were adopted, then by the time that the *adhishrayaṇa* (Heating on Fire) would be done to all the thousand cakes, the first cake would have dried up and its kneading would be impossible.

This Sūtra (3) may be taken as by itself embodying a distinct Adhikaraṇa as follows :—

ADHIKARAṆA (2) : '*Kāṇḍānusamayanyāya*' *or the Principle of* '*all in a body to each at a time*' :—*In the case of the Expiatory offering in connection with the acceptance of a gift of Thousand Horses, all the rites should be done for one Cake, then all to the second, and so forth.*

SŪTRA (3)—[as above].

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "in the case of the acceptance of the gift of several thousands of horses, the rites are to be performed one by one to each of the Cakes".

The *Siddhānta* is that all the rites are to be performed in a body over one Cake, then all in a body over the second, and so forth

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *'Samudāyānusamaya-nyāya'—The Principle of the Composite Whole: In the case of 'Muṣṭi' (Handful), 'Kapāla' (Pan) and the like, the act is one composite whole.*

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF 'MUṢṬI' (HANDFUL), 'KAPĀLA' (PAN), 'AVADĀNA' (SLICING), 'AÑJANA' (COLLYRIUM), 'ABHYAÑJANA' (ANOINTING), 'VAPANA' (SHAVING OF THE HEAD) AND 'PĀVANA' (PURIFYING),—EACH INDIVIDUAL ACT IS COMPLETE IN ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

[There are the following texts—(*a*) '*Chaturo muṣṭīn nirvapati*' ('Throws four *handfuls* into the basket),—(*b*) '*Aṣṭau kapālāni upadadhāti*' ('He sets up eight *pans*'),—(*c*) '*Dvirhaviṣo*' *vadyati madhyādavadyati purorārdhad avadyati*' ('Slices twice out of the offering-material, slices out of the centre, slices out of the front half'),—(*d*) '*Triranktē*' ('Applies collyrium to the eyes thrice'),—(*e*) '*Dīkṣitambhyāñktē*' ('Anoints the initiated sacrificer'), —(*f*) '*Pratidisham tristrirvapati*' (In each direction he shaves the head three times'),—(*g*) '*Chitpatistvā punātu iti saptabhirmukham*' (Pronouncing the words '*Chitpatistvā punatu*' he touches the mouth seven times').]

In regard to these 'Handfuls' and the rest, there arises the question—Is a single 'Handful' to be treated as a complete act?—Or the *four handfuls* (as a composite whole) are to be treated as a complete act?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"A single 'handful' constitutes an *Act*.—Why so?—Because what constitutes *one act* is the *throwing into the basket* of a single Handful, and not the *throwing into the basket* of all the *four handfuls*.—Why so?—On the 'throwing in' of the single 'handful', the man's effort (aim) would be completely accomplished [and if a second or subsequent 'throwing in' would be done, these would be the effect of other *efforts*, and this difference in the *effort* would make the resultant acts also different—says *Ṭuptīkā*]; and it cannot be said that 'nothing has been thrown in', nor could it be said that the 'throwing in' had not been done, when the *handful* has been actually *thrown in*. Nor again can it be said that there is no useful purpose served by the *throwing in* of a single *handful*. Further, unless *one* Handful (the first) is thrown in, it is not possible for the number 'four' to be accomplished; because after all the term 'four' is meant to qualify the 'handful'.—From all this, it follows that every single 'handful' (thrown in) should be regarded as a complete act [and should be performed as such, each singly, by itself].—Similarly in the case of the texts (*b*) 'Sets up the pans', (*c*) 'Slices from the centre, slices from the frontal half', (*d*) 'Applies collyrium', (*e*) 'Anoints', (*f*) 'Shaves' and (*g*) 'Purifies'."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ALL [SHOULD BE TREATED AS COMPOSITE WHOLES]; AS THEY FORM A SINGLE 'ACT'; (AS FOR THE (NUMBERS), THEY ARE ONLY QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, *all should be completed and treated as composite wholes.* In the present context, the 'throwing in' of a single 'Handful' does not constitute an 'act' at all; as the act of 'throwing in' is one that is qualified by the number 'four'.—"How do you know that it is the 'throwing in' (and not the *Handful*) that is qualified by the number *four*?"—From the fact that in the text the term 'four' is connected (construed) with the act of 'throwing in'. In this case therefore the correct course is to take the text as enjoining more than one adjunct along with the act [i.e. the 'handful' and the number 'four', along with the act of 'throwing in']; otherwise if the number 'four' were construed with the 'handful', then there would be a syntactical split; and what would be so enjoined would not be an adjunct of the act of 'throwing in'.

Similarly in the case of the acts of 'setting up' (of the pans); in connection with which also the text is (*b*) '*Aṣṭākapālam nirvapati*', '*Ēkādashakapālam nirvapati*' ['Sets it up on eight pans', 'sets it up on eleven pans']. Similarly with the texts—(*c*) '*Dviravadyati*' ['slices out twice'] (Shatapatha Brā. 4. 4. 3. 9), —(*d*) '*Trirabhyañktē*' ['anoints thrice'],—(*g*) '*Ēkaviṁshatyā pāvayati*' ['Purifies twenty-one times'] (Taitt. Sam. 6. 1 1. 8).—In all these cases the number and other factors are adjuncts of the *act*.—From all this it follows that the act is to be treated as one *composite whole*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The act of 'Avadāna' extends up to and includes the actual 'offering'.*

SŪTRA (6).

THE ACTION (OF 'OFFERING') BEING A CONJUNCT ONE, THE 'SLICING' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PART OF THE ACT OF 'OFFERING'; BECAUSE IT IS THE FIRST STEP IN THAT ACT; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE 'SLICING' IS DONE ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'OFFERING'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* we read—'*Dvirhaviṣo' vadyati*' ['He slices twice out of the offering-material'] (Shatapatha. Brā. 4. 4. 3. 9).

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the act complete with the mere 'slicing'? Or does it commence with the 'slicing' and end with the 'offering'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the action is complete with the mere 'slicing';—why so?—because it is a distinct act by itself; as a matter of fact, the 'slicing' is an independent act by itself, because the effort of the agent ends with it, and because it is spoken of by an independent verb '*avadyati*', 'slices'".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The action of 'offering' being a conjunct one, the 'slicing' should be regarded as part of the act of 'offering'; because it is the first step towards that act. specially because the 'slicing' is done only for the purpose of 'offering'*; that is, the 'slicing' is not a distinct act by itself; in fact, it is only the first step in the act of 'offering'. If that were not so, then the 'slicing' would have to be taken as serving only a transcendental purpose.—[Though it is already implied in the act of 'offering', yet] it is laid down over again (by means of the verb '*avadya.i*') for the purpose of laying down the particular number ('two'). Hence we conclude that the 'slicing' is only a part of an act; and the declaration of the ceremonial procedure of an act is not meant to lay down the concomitance of any part of the action.—Hence the conclusion is that the action is completed with the act of 'offering'.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The act of 'anointing' of the Sacrificial Post is to be taken as extending to and including the 'Engirdling' of it.*

SŪTRA (7).

THE SET OF ACTS BEGINNING WITH 'ANOINTING' AND ENDING WITH 'ENGIRDLING' [SHOULD BE TREATED AS ONE COMPLETE ACT BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION.]

Bhāṣya.

At the Jyotiṣṭoma, in connection with the *Agnīṣomīya* animal, there is a Sacrificial Post; in connection with which certain acts (rites) have been laid down in the shape of 'anointing' ['raising', 'making of the hole in the ground', 'the enlarging of the lower end' and 'engirdling with a rope in the middle']. In regard to all these rites when going to be performed at the *Yupaikādashini* (where there are *eleven* Sacrificial Posts), there arises the question - *Is each of these rites to be treated as complete in itself, and hence as to be performed each by itself (in connection with each of the eleven posts, after which the second rite is performed in connection with each of them, and so on)?* Or is the whole set of rites beginning with 'anointing' and ending with 'engirdling' to be treated as one complete act and hence as to be performed all together in connection with each of the Posts?

On this question, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—The whole set of acts, beginning with 'anointing' and ending with 'engirdling', should be treated as one complete act.—Why?—*Because of the direct assertion* to the effect that 'from the *anointing* till the end of the *engirdling*, the Sacrificer shall not leave the Sacrificial Post' (Taitt. Brā. 3. 8. 19. 1); it is not possible to do the 'anointing' and other rites *one by one* to each of the Posts, and yet not leave an individual Post. Hence it follows that the whole set of rites ending with 'engirdling' is to be performed together to each Post.

SŪTRA (8).

[OBJECTION]—"THE 'NON-LEAVING' (OF THE POST) IS DUE TO A SPECIAL REASON: JUST LIKE THE ADDITION OF A VESSEL."

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"Each rite should be dealt with as independent; as it is only thus that the *concomitance* indicated in the declaration of the ceremonial procedure would be observed.—As regards the direction that the Sacrificer shall *not leave* the Sacrificial Post from the time of the *Anointing* down to the *Engirdling*,—this is observed at the Archetype for a *special reason*; this reason or purpose consisting in the fact that thereby the Sacrificer

renders help to the *Adhvaryu* Priest (in the 'raising' of the Post);—it is only when taken thus that the 'non-leaving' (of the Post, by the Sacrificer) serves a visible purpose; otherwise it would have to be taken as serving an invisible (transcendental) purpose. The General Law (that the Ectype is to be done like the Archetype) does not transfer to the Ectype such details of the Archetype as are done at this latter for special reasons. Consequently the Sacrificer could certainly leave off the first Post (after its *anointing*, and before the other rites), when the occasion arose for the 'raising' of the second Post. Just as, when it is laid down that 'the *Anuyājas* are to be performed with *Pṛṣadājya* (Clarified Butter and Curd)', an additional vessel has to be brought in for the holding of this *Mixed* Butter."

SŪTRA (9).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THE 'NOT LEAVING' IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH A VEDIC TEXT; WHILE THE OTHER IS A MERE ARGUMENT; AS REGARDS THE ADDITION OF A VESSEL, THAT IS DUE TO A SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be right to deal with each rite as an independent unit, the right course is to deal with all the rites ending with 'Engirdling' as one collective unit.—As for the 'not-leaving' of the Post at the Archetype, it is in accordance with a Vedic text (not due to a special reason, as alleged); because as for the help rendered to the *Adhvaryu*, this latter could very well *raise* the Post even without the help of the Sacrificer.—"It would be more convenient [for the *Adhvaryu* to raise the Post with the Sacrificer's help]."—[If this convenience were the sole purpose of the Sacrificer's *not-leaving* the Post] this would militate against the Injunctive word, as the sole purpose of the said *not-leaving* would be restricted to the visible purpose (of convenience); just like the rule relating to facing the east at the time of eating.—Thus on account of the impossibility of the alternative suggested by the Opponent, the whole set of the rites in question is to be dealt with as one unit.—As for the declaration of the ceremonial Procedure (whose authority has been invoked by the Opponent), that is a *mere argument*; and the General Law (that the Ectype is to be done like the Archetype) is certainly more authoritative than that.—As regards the addition of a vessel, that has to be done only for a special purpose (of holding a new material in the shape of the *Butter and Curd, Pṛṣadājya*).

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In the case of (a) 'slicing for the deities', (b) 'slicing for the Sviṣṭakṛt' and (c) 'slicing for eating', each 'slicing' is to be dealt with as a separate unit.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF A NUMBER OF ANIMALS, ALL THE 'SLICING' SHOULD BE FINISHED WITH EACH OF THE ANIMALS (BEFORE THEY ARE DONE TO THE OTHER ANIMAL). BECAUSE EACH ANIMAL IS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY"

Bhāṣya.

At the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, there are (seventeen) animals dedicated to *Prajāpati*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—In connection with each individual animal, are all the *slicings for the deities* to be done, then (*b*) the *slicings* for the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering, and (c) *slicings for eating* [and then the same slicings are to be done to the second animal, and so on]? Or are all the *slicings for deities* of all the animals to be treated as a unit,—similarly all the slicings for the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering,—and all the *slicings for eating*,—to all the animals?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"All the three kinds of slicing are to be done out of one animal and the offering made into the Fire [then the same out of the second animal] and so on;—because such has been declared to be the course at the Archetype [as explained under *Adhikaraṇa* (1) above]; and when this is what is done in connection with the animals at the Archetype, then the same should be done in connection also with the animals dedicated to Prajāpati, in accordance with the General Law (of the Ectype being done in the same manner as the Archetype)".

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE 'SLICINGS FOR THE DEITIES' ARE TO BE DONE (WITH ALL THE ANIMALS) [AND THEN ALL 'SLICINGS FOR THE SVIṢṬAKṚT', WITH ALL. AND THEN THE 'SLICINGS FOR EATING' WITH ALL]: BECAUSE THE SLICINGS FOR ONE PURPOSE CONSTITUTE 'ONE ACT'.

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is not correct. In fact, the 'slicings for deities' (out of one animal) are to be done along with the 'slicings for deities' (out of the other animals),—the 'slicings for *Sviṣṭakṛt*' (out of one animal) are to be done along with the 'slicings for *Sviṣṭakṛt*' (out of other animals),—

and the 'slicings for eating' (out of one animal) are to be done along with the 'slicings for eating' (out of the other animals).—"Why so?"—*Because all the slicings of one kind form one act*; thus it is that all these slicings of one kind come to be done together.—As regards what is laid down in connection with the Archetype, in regard to the various kinds of slicings, in the following text—'Having done the *slicings for deities*, one should not make the offering with that alone,—the *slicings for Sviṣṭakṛit* should be done; after having done the *slicings for Sviṣṭakṛt*, one should not make the offering with that alone,—the *slicings for eating* should be done',—this direction is not militated against if one does the *slicings for deities* along with other *slicings for deities*; because even though doing the *slicings for deities* (out of all the animals), one does not make the *offering*, he goes on to do *the slicings for Sviṣṭakṛt* (again out of all the animals); and yet even though doing *those slicings for Sviṣṭakṛt*, he does not make the *offering*;—he goes on to do the *slicings for eating* [and it is only the *offering* that is prohibited in the text just quoted].—From all this it follows that each kind of slicing is to be done out of all the animals before another kind is done.

SŪTRA (12).

ALSO BECAUSE THE MANTRA SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

If the *Siddhānta* view is accepted, then the *Manutā-Mantra* (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 6. 10. 1) may be recited once only [in connection with one kind of *slicing*], done out of all the animals. On the other hand [according to the Pūrvapakṣa view, by which, even one kind of *slicing* will be done out of the several animals at different times] the Mantra would have to be recited in turn in connection with each of the animals.—From this also it follows that the *slicings for deities* should be done along with *slicings for deities*, the *slicings for Sviṣṭakṛt* along with *slicings for Sviṣṭakṛt* and the *slicings for eating* along with *slicings for eating*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *One whole 'Ulūkhala'—Wooden Mortar —is to be used at the 'Bahubīja-sacrifice', a sacrifice at which several kinds of seeds are offered.*

SŪTRA (13).

AT THE 'NĀNĀBIJA' SACRIFICE, THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE WOODEN MORTAR, AS THAT IS FIT (FOR USE)

Bhāsya

In connection with the *Rājasūya*, the 'Nānābīja' sacrifice has been enjoined—'*Agnayē grhapatayē purodāshamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, Sōmāya vanaspatayē shyāmākam charum*, and so forth' ['To *Agni Grhapati*, one should offer the Cake baked on eight pans, to *Soma Vanaspati*, the cooked *Shyāmāka*-corn, etc etc'] (Taitt. 1 8 10 1) —There is the *Threshing* which is done at the Archetypal sacrifice (to the corns that are used as offering-material).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is one and the same Wooden Mortar to be used for the *threshing* of all the corns, one after the other? Or should there be several *Wooden Mortars* used simultaneously?

'Why should any such question arise?"

The basis of the doubt lies in the fact that, if *the spreading of the antelope-skin* (under the Mortar) and other details are to be treated as separate and independent acts, then there should be as many mortars as there are varieties of the corn to be used, whereas, if the whole set of acts, beginning with *the spreading of the antelope skin* and ending with *the securing of the threshed grains*, be treated as one composite unit,—then the same Mortar should do for all.

The *Siddhānta* view is that *there should be only one Wooden Mortar*;—why?—*because that is fit for being used* in turn (for all the corns); and so long as the desired purpose is served by the use of *one* Mortar, the bringing in of another would be useless.—Hence we conclude that one and the same Mortar is to be used in common (for the threshing of all the corns in question).

SŪTRA (14).

[OBJECTION]—'THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICATION (OF MORTARS), BECAUSE THE REGULAR ORDER POINTS TO THAT CONCLUSION"

Bhāsya.

"*There should be multiplication*—of mortars, (*a*) because the fixed *regular order* as indicated by the verbal texts could be maintained only if the *threshing* of all the corns were done together;—(*b*) also because each of the

threshings has been taken as an independent act;—(c) because such details as the *spreading of the antelope-skin* and the rest are all to be regarded as distinct acts,—the effort involved in each being complete in itself, and each of them being spoken of by means of a distinct term, like 'spreading' and the rest.—From all this it follows that there should be *multiplication* [multiplicity of mortars]."

SŪTRA (15).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY THERE SHOULD BE ONLY ONE (MORTAR); AS WHAT IS REQUIRED IS THE SECURING OF THE FINISHED RICE; THE 'THRESHING' BEING FOR THAT PURPOSE

Bhāṣya.

In reality there should be only one-mortar —used by turns;—beginning from *the spreading of the antelope skin* and ending with the *securing of the finished rice*, it is all *one act* (spoken of by the comprehensive term 'Threshing'); the *spreading of the antelope-skin* being the commencement of the act of 'Threshing', and all that follows, up to the obtaining of the finished grain, is part of the same. Because the act of 'Threshing' is done for the purpose of securing the finished grain. In this way, we avoid the necessity of assuming unseen (transcendental) results as following from the *spreading of the antelope-skin* and other details, as also from *Threshing* [which, as shown above, is regarded as leading to the *seen* result, in the shape of the *Rice*].—Thus we conclude that one and the same *Mortar* is to be used in common (for all the corns).

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the Agniṣomīya-animal-sacrifice, the vessels for the 'Prayāja' and the 'Anuyāja' should be distinct.*

SŪTRA (16).

AT THE ECTYPE, THERE SHOULD BE A DIFFERENT VESSEL FOR THE ANUYĀJAS; BECAUSE ITS PURPOSE IS DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Agnīṣomīya*-animal-sacrifice; in connection with that we read—'*Prsadājyēna anuyājān yajati*' ['One should offer the *Anuyājas* with Curd-Butter'] (Taitti. Sam. 6. 3. 11. 6).

In regard to this, there arises the question.—Is one and the same vessel to be used at the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas*, for holding the Clarified Butter (used at the *Prayājas*) and the Curd-Butter (used at the *Anuyājas*)? Or, are there to be different vessels?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there should be only one vessel;—why?—because at the Archetype (i.e. the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) there is only one vessel; hence here too there should be only one".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*There should be a different vessel*;—why?—*because its purpose is different.* Pure Clarified Butter is used at the *Prayājas*, and the mixed (Curd-Butter) is used at the *Anuyājas*; so that if the *mixed* (Curd-Butter) were contained in the vessel, then there would be a discrepancy in the performance of the *Prayājas* (at which the offerings should consist of *pure* Clarified Butter);—on the other hand, if the vessel contain *pure* Clarified Butter, then there would be a discrepancy in the performance of the *Anuyājas* (where the offerings should consist of *mixed* Curd-Butter); nor is it possible to keep the two substances separate (in one and the same vessel). If it were possible to put in some sort of a barrier between the two substances in the vessel, at the time of offering, the two would be sure to become mixed up.—Further, if both the substances were kept in the same *Upabhṛt*-vessel, it would have to be larger and hence of a shape and size other than that prescribed for the *Upabhṛt*, so that it would cease to be an '*Upabhṛt*'; the size prescribed for the *Upabhṛt* is that its '*puṣkara*', container, should be of the size of the *Hand* and that it should have only one container.

It might be argued that—"*Prsadājya* (mixed Curd and Clarified Butter) is also *ājya* (Clarified Butter); so that if they are mixed up, there is no harm".

It is not so; at the Archetypal Sacrifice, 'sprinkling out' and 'Examining' are done to the Clarified Butter with the sole view that there may be no other substance mixed with it. Such being the case, it would be very wrong if the *Prayājas* were offered with *mixed* Curd-Butter.

Further, if the two substances were kept in a single vessel, there would certainly be some shortage in the quantity of the offering-material (at the later sacrifice, *Anuyāja*).—Nor would it be possible to add more of the material (and make up the shortage) after the completion of the *Prayāja*; because at the original Archetype, the supply of all the materials has to be got in at one and the same time; so that at the Ectype also it will have to be done at one and the same time.

From all this it follows that there should be two distinct vessels.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The Nāriṣṭa-homa should be performed before the Upahomas.*

SŪTRA (17).

WHAT COMES FROM THE ORIGINAL ARCHETYPE SHOULD BE PERFORMED FIRST; WHAT IS NEW COMING AT THE END: BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO SUBSIDIARY LAID DOWN FOR WHAT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Fire-laying Rite* there is the *Nakṣatrēṣṭi*, in connection with which we read "*Agnayē kṛttikābhyaḥ purodāshamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, sōtra juhōti agnayē svāhā kṛttikābhyaḥ svāhā*".

['To *Agni* and the *Kṛttikās* one should offer the cake baked on eight pans; he should offer the oblations saying—*Agnayē svāhā, Kṛttikābhyaḥ svāhā*'] (Taitt. Brā. 3. 1. 4. 1); where these and other *subsidiary homas* (*Upahomas*) are laid down; at the original archetype of these there are certain *homas* called '*Nāriṣṭahoma*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Which of these should be performed first?—the *Nāriṣṭa-homa* or the *Upahomas*?

On this question we have the following *Siddhānta*:—What comes from the original archetype should be performed first, what belongs to the ectype coming at the end;—why?—because it is only when an action has been enjoined in its complete form that a subsidiary to it is prescribed; for instance, it is only when the son has been born that a toy is provided for him.

SŪTRA (18).

[OBJECTION]—"ACCORDING TO ĀTREYA WHAT BELONGS TO THE ECTYPE SHOULD BE PERFORMED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRINCIPAL SACRIFICE: AS IT IS EQUAL TO IT IN BEING PRESCRIBED BY A VEDIC TEXT: AS FOR THOSE THAT COME FROM THE ORIGINAL ARCHETYPE, THEY MAY BE REMOVED FURTHER".

Bhāṣya.

Objection:—"Ātreya has held that *what belongs to the Ectype should come immediately after the Principal Sacrifice*; what comes from the original Archetype is done afterwards. As a matter of fact, in the Vedic text, the ectypal act is actually found to be mentioned immediately after the Principal Sacrifice; hence it follows that the *Upahomas* (which are ectypal) should come first, and then the *Nāriṣṭa-homas*; those that come from the Archetype may be further removed, because they are not directly

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mentioned in the Vedic text [they are only *inferred* on the basis of the Genera be
Law that the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype]."

SŪTRA (19).

[ANSWER]—ACCORDING TO BĀDARĀYAṆA, THE ECTYPAL DETAILS SHOULD COME AT THE END; BECAUSE THOSE THAT COME FROM THE ARCHETYPE ARE SUCH AS ARE INCLUDED IN WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS LAYING DOWN THE PRINCIPAL SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The teacher Bādarāyaṇa has held the opinion that *the ectypal details should* be performed at the end.—Why?—*Because those that come from the Archetype are such as are included in what is expressed by the words laying down the Principal Sacrifice*; i.e. those details that belong to the Archetype are included in what is expressed by the words laying down the Principal Sacrifice; and the following words (which lay down the *Upahomas*) 'He offers the oblation saying *Agnayē svāhā, Kṛttikābhyaḥ svāhā*, etc. etc.'—come after the words laying down the Principal Sacrifice.

From all this it follows that in accordance with the Order of Sequence indicated directly by the Vedas, the *Upahomas* should come after the *Nāriṣṭahomas*.

SŪTRA (20).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND OTHER TEXTS POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is another text also which points to the same conclusion—'*Adhvarasya pūrvamathāgnērupapraṇītat karma yadgnikarma*' ['The Fire comes before the Sacrifice; because the rites relating to the Fire come first']; this shows that what is laid down later should be performed later.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Exception to the preceding Adhikaraṇa: The 'Gambling' and other acts should be done before the 'Abhiṣēka', 'Consecration by Water'.*

SŪTRA (21).

THE PLACE OF THE 'ABHIṢĒKA' BEING FIXED, THE PLACE OF THE ACTS PRECEDING IT MUST BE THAT SAME; BECAUSE THESE LATTER ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THAT PLACE: THE OTHER BEING A MERE REASONING.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Rājasūya* we read—'*Akṣairdīvyati—Shunahshēpamakhyāpayati—Abhiṣichyatē*' [He gambles with dice,—recites the legend of *Shunahshēpa*—is *consecrated by water*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the *Gambling* and the rest to be done at the end? Or before the Consecration by Water?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that according to the principle laid down in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*—to the effect that 'according to Bādarāyaṇa, the ectypal details come at the end'—the acts of Gambling and the rest should be done at the end.

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—They should be performed before the 'Consecration by Water', whose place is fixed: the 'Consecration by Water' has its place fixed by the text. 'He is consecrated with water at the time of the *Māhendra* hymn'; and in observance of this direct assertion, the acts in question should be performed before the 'Consecration by Water'.—The other—i.e. what has been stated as the opinion of *Bādarāyaṇa*—is a mere argument [and hence has no authority as against the said Direct Assertion].

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Sāvitra-homa' and the other acts are to be performed before the 'Dīkṣaṇīyā'.*

SŪTRA (22).

THAT (ECTYPAL DETAIL) ALSO WHICH IS MENTIONED BEFORE THE ARCHETYPAL DETAIL [SHOULD BE PERFORMED BEFORE THIS LATTER].

Bhāṣya.

The Fire-laying Rite is enjoined in the text—'*Ya ēvamvidvānagniñ-chinutē*' ['One who knowing this sets up the Fire'] (Taitt. Sam. 5. 5 2. 1); in connection with this Rite, the *Sāvitra homas* [oblation to *Savitṛ*], the *Ukhāsambharana* [Preparing the Fire-place], the *Iṣṭakā* (Bricklaying) and *Pashu* (Animal sacrifice) have been mentioned before the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*.

In regard to this there arises the question—Are all these acts (*Sāvitra-homa* and the rest) to be performed first? Or the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the ectypal details should be performed at the end, in accordance with the principle that according to *Bādarāyaṇa* the ectypal details are to be performed at the end'."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Sāvitra-homa*, the *Iṣṭakās*, the Animal sacrifice, and the *Ukhāsambharana* should be performed first,—why?—because of the reading of the direct Vedic text, that is, the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* has been laid down, but before that have been laid down the *Sāvitra-homa*, the *Iṣṭakā*, the Animal sacrifice, and the *Ukhā sambharana*; and hence it follows that these latter should be performed first (before the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*).

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The Embellishments of the Sacrificer are to be performed before the Wearing of the gold-ornament.*

SŪTRA (23).

WHEN THERE IS COLLOCATION (OF ECTYPAL AND ARCHETYPAL DETAILS), THE 'WEARING OF GOLD', AS POINTED OUT, SHOULD COME AT THE END.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with Fire laying, the 'wearing of gold' and such acts have been mentioned after the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*;—and there are certain embellishments of the Sacrificer which come in from the Archetype by virtue of the General Law (relating to the Archetype and Ectype), whose time of performance is about the same as the said 'wearing of gold'.

In connection with this, there arises the question—Is there no restriction as to the order in which these acts are to be performed? Or should the 'wearing of gold' and the like be done first? Or the embellishments of the Sacrificer?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that there is no restriction; or just as, on the strength of the perceptible order of the 'Verbal texts', the *Ukhāsambharaṇa* and other acts are done before the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* (as explained under the preceding Sū. 22), so (on the same ground) the 'wearing of gold' and the like also should be done before the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The Embellishments of the Initiated Sacrificer should be performed first;—why?—because on the strength of the order of sequence of Verbal Texts in relation to the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*,—and also on the strength of the General Law (relating to Archetypes and Ectypes),—both the acts in question (Embellishment of the Sacrificer and the wearing of gold) should be done after the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*. As regards the order of sequence of these two acts in relation to themselves,—there is no perceptible order of verbal texts which would establish the precedence of the one or the other, as there was in the case of the *Ukhāsambharaṇa*. But in connection with the Archetypal Sacrifice, the embellishments are mentioned first;—and in connection with the Ectype, the wearing of gold is mentioned next;—hence the order of sequence between them should be as pointed out by these two facts; that is, the Ectypal should come at the end.

Question—"[When the order of sequence is so clearly pointed out] why should there be any suspicion of their collocation?"

Answer—As a matter of fact, it is their collocation that is manifest.—Or, we may take it as a doubtful statement in regard to something on which there is no doubt; as we find in such assertions as—'Brāhmaṇas learned in the Veda and performing many sacrifices should attain the highest state,

—*if the scriptures are true*' [There is no doubt that the scriptures are true; and yet it is spoken of conditionally, as if open to doubt].—Hence the objection brought forward does not affect our position.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya V.

ADHYĀYA V.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The numbers, 'Eleven' and the rest, are to be made up by all the performances collectively.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICATION OF THE ACTS, BECAUSE EACH ACT IS DIFFERENT; THE NUMBER THEREFORE MUST BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO EACH INDIVIDUAL ACT,—LIKE THE 'MIXED CURD-BUTTER'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnīṣomīya* Animal, we read—'*Ēkādasha prayājān yajati*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 3. 7. 5)—'*Ēkādashānuyājānyajati*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 3. 11. 6) ['He offers eleven *Prayāja* Sacrifices', 'He offers eleven *Anuyāja* Sacrifices'];—again in connection with the *Chaturmāsya* Sacrifice,—'*Nava prayājān yajati, navānuyājān yajati*' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 6. 3. 3) ['He offers nine *Prayājas*; he offers nine *Anuyājas*'];—again, in connection with the Fire-laying—'*Ṣaḍupasadah*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 3. 11. 6) ['There are six *Upasad* offerings']. [At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which is the archetype of the *Agnīṣomīya*, there are '*five Prayājas*' and '*five Anuyājas*' and '*three Upasads*'.]

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the number 'eleven'—or, at the *Chaturmāsya*, the number 'nine',—or at the Fire-laying, in regard to the *Upasads*, the number 'six'—to be made up in connection with each of the five *Prayājas*—and each of the five *Anuyājas*—and each of the three *Upasads*? Or is the number to be made up by all the performances (of the *Prayāja*, or the *Anuyāja*, or the *Upasads*) collectively?

[At the Archetype, Jyotiṣṭoma, there are *five* Prayājas (*five* Anuyājas and *three upasads*), at the Ectype, *Agnīṣomīya*, there are to be *eleven* Prayājas. The question is - How is the number *eleven* to be made up? Does it mean that each of the *five* Prayājas is to be repeated *eleven* times, there being *fifty-five* in all? Or, does it mean that the whole lot of *five* is to be repeated collectively, twice—thus making up the number *ten*, and as the *eleventh*, the last one of the *Prayājas* is to be done once again?]

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The number should vary with (and apply to) each principal act; –why?—because the actions are different and they are principal acts (not subservient to any other act); —and the number is laid down in reference to them;—whenever a detail or qualification is laid down in close proximity to a number of principal acts, it must vary with each of those acts; as for instance, when it is laid down that 'the *Anuyājas* should be offered with *mixed-Curd-Butter*', the

qualification that the Butter used should be *mixed* with Curds is taken to vary with, and apply to, each of the *Anuyājas*".

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE NUMBER PERTAINS TO ALL COLLECTIVELY, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE MADE UP BY REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

The number should be taken as to be made up by all collectively.—Why?—Because Number is a property that resides separately in the substances concerned, and where there are no separate or diverse substances, it is conceived of as due to repetitions of the same substance; but this repetition would be permissible only to that extent up to which no diversity would be possible; so that, to the extent that there is diversity, the number should rest in that diversity itself.—For this reason, the number in question should be made up by all the acts collectively. [As a rule, the number 'eleven' subsists in 'eleven' separate things; but when the eleven distinct things are not there,—as in the present case, there is only one *Prayāja*,—then the number has to be made up by repeating the same thing eleven times; i.e. there would be eleven *Prayājas*. But we would be justified in bringing *eleven* distinct units, only if we could not find any ground for differentiating below that figure. In the case in question, however, we find that we can have a unit of *five Prayājas*, on the basis of the fact that there are this number at the Archetypes. We can therefore admit of a repetition of only this unit of *five Prayājas*, and not a repetition of a *single Prayāja*, eleven times.]

As for the case of the 'mixed Curd-Butter' that has been cited,—the quality of *being a mixture* is not one that cannot subsist in a single substance,—it is not one that must subsist in diversity; nor is it one which, being brought about in connection with one act, helps other acts also; consequently, in this case, it is necessary to take it as varying with each act. Number, on the other hand, is a quality that can help several things in common; because it requires several things for its existence.—It is only when the number 'eleven' is taken as made up by all the acts collectively that the declaration of ceremonial procedure, which indicates the concomitance of the acts, becomes duly observed.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Of the 'three Upasads', each has to be repeated at its own place and time—in order to make the 'six Upasads' prescribed for the Agnīṣomīya.*

SŪTRA (3).

THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICATION OF THE UPASADS AT THEIR OWN PLACE AND TIME, BECAUSE THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG THEMSELVES HAS BEEN FIXED

Bhāṣya.

[At the Fire laying Rite there are to be 'six *Upasads*' (Taitt. Sam. 6. 3. 11. 6), at its archetype there are only three *Upasads*; the number 'six' has, according to the preceding *Adhikarana*, to be made up by repeating all the three *Upasads*.] Now in regard to this repetition of the *Upasads*, there arises the question—In this repetition like the 'repeated fall of the measuring rod' [which is let fall on the ground only by its two ends, so that the second fall is of the two ends together, and that also only after the first fall of the two ends,—similarly in the case in question, the repetition of the three *Upasads* would be in this way that the second performance of the three *Upasads* would come after all the three *Upasads* had been performed once]? —Or is each of the *Upasads* repeated at its own place and time?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"It is in the very nature of things to be repeated that they are repeated 'like the repeated fall of the measuring rod'; for instance, when it is said—'The *Anuvāka* should be recited thrice', what is done is that it is recited from beginning to end, and then it is again begun at the beginning. Hence in the case of the *Upasads*, the repetition should be 'like the repeated fall of the measuring rod'."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*There should be multiplication of the Upasads at their own place and time*; —why?—*because the order of sequence among themselves has been fixed*, the order of sequence among the three *Upasads* has been fixed by the following text—'The first *Upasad* should be done first; after that is done, the middle one should be done; and after the middle one, the last one is to be done'.—Now if the repetition were in the manner of 'the repeated fall of the measuring rod', then the second performance of the first *Upasad* would come after that of the last (third) one, thus multiplication (repetition) would not be at its own place and time (as prescribed by the text just quoted).—This discrepancy does not occur if there is repetition of the first *Upasad* at its own place and time.—Hence we conclude that the multiplication of the *Upasad* should be at its own place and time.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *In the case of the 'Sāmidhēnī Verses', the additional verses come in at the end.*

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'DHĀYYĀ' VERSES SHOULD COME BETWEEN THE 'SĀMIDHYAMĀNAVATĪ' VERSE AND THE 'SAMIDDHAVATĪ' VERSE; BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN EULOGISED AS LYING BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH."

Bhāṣya.

The '*Sāmidhēnī verses*' have been spoken of in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in the text—'*Sāmidhēnīranvāha*' ['He recites the *Sāmidhēnī* verses'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 8. 2). In regard to the number of these verses, there are several alternatives laid down with a view to definite desirable results, such as 'For one who desires social standing, one should recite twenty-one' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 10. 2), and so forth.—These numbers are to be made up by introducing additional verses, as is going to be explained later on (under Sū. 10. 5. 26).

[Of '*Sāmidhēnī verses*' proper, the number is only *eleven*; these have been translated by Eggeling in his translation of the *Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, in a foot-note, on p. 102. But in regard to actual practice, varying numbers have been laid down: The *Shatapatha* speaks of *fifteen* under 1. 3. 5. 7;—of *seventeen*, under 1. 3. 5. 10 and 3. 1. 3. 6;—of *twenty-one*, under 3. 3. 5. 11. There are several ways of making up these numbers: For making up 'fifteen', the device laid down is to secure the *four* additional verses by reciting the *first* and the *eleventh* verses thrice instead of once; while 'twenty one' is made up by bringing in additional verses from the Tenth *Mandala* of the *Rgveda*.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the additional verses to come at the end (after the original verses)? Or do they come between the '*Samiddhyamānavatī Verse*' ['*Samidhyamāno'dhvaraḥ etc.*'—Rgveda, 3. 27. 4],—and the '*Samiddhavatī verse*' ['*Samiddho agna āhūta etc.*'—Rgveda, 5. 28. 5]?

On this question, the natural conclusion—supported also by the principle enunciated under Sū. 5. 2. 19—is that they should come in at the end.

As against this we have the following view [which is regarded as the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the *Adhikaraṇa*]—"*The additional verses should come in between the* '*Samidhyamānavatī verse*' *and the* '*Samiddhavatī verse*'.—Why?—*because they have been eulogised*—praised—*as lying between Heaven and Earth*, in the text—'This (Earth) is *Samiddhyamānavatī* and that (Heaven) is *Samiddhavatī*, what comes between is the *Dhāyyā*'; - here the *Dhāyyā* (which is the name of the additional verses) is described as the *sky* (between Heaven and Earth), which shows that these verses are to be recited between the two verses named; so that they should not come in at the end".

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS ONLY THOSE VERSES THAT ARE CALLED 'DHĀYYĀ' [THAT MAY COME IN THE MIDDLE;—THE OTHERS MUST COME AT THE END].

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is only those that are called by the name '*Dhāyyā*' that may come in the middle (between the two verses named in the preceding *Sūtra*); because it is under that name that they have been spoken of in the eulogistic text quoted; and it is on the basis of this eulogy and name that we have such assertions as—'The two verses containing the term *pṛthupāja* [i.e. Rgveda 3.*27. 5-6] are the two *Dhāyyās*', and 'the two verses in the *Uṇik* and *Kakup* metres are the two *Dhāyyās*'.

Question—"What are these *mantras* that are called '*Dhāyyā*'? We do not find this term used anywhere".

Answer—The *Sāmidhēnī* verses themselves are '*Dhāyyā*'.

"How so?".

The words of the revered Pāṇini (3 1. 29) are as follows—'The terms (1) *Pāyya*, (2) *Sānnāyya*, (3) *Nikāyya*, and (4) *Dhāyyā* are used in the sense of (1) a measure, (2) an offering-material, (3) a residence, and (4) the *Sāmidhēnī* verses';—on the strength of this Smṛti-text, we infer the Vedic text (to the same effect).

'To which of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses is the name *Dhāyyā* applied?"

Answer—It appears that the name is applied to all the *Sāmidhēnī* verses. But in the present context, from what has been said under Sū. 4, to the effect that 'the *Dhāyyā* should come in between the *Samidhyamānavatī* verse and the *Samiddhavatī* verse',—it would seem that from among all the *Sāmidhēnī verses*, it is only a few specified ones to which the name '*Dhāyyā*' is meant to be applied.

"But from the words of *Pāṇini*, all the *Sāmidhēnīs* should come equally under the name '*Dhāyyā*'."

Not so; because even so, the application of the name to a few selected ones only would be quite compatible (with the words of Pāṇini).

"If only a few selected ones are to be included under the name, which ones are they?"

Answer—They are just those verses that contain the term '*dhāyyā*'; these alone are the *Dhāyyā verses*; and it is only if these alone are meant, that the said declaration (that the *Dhāyyā* verses are to come between the two verses, *Samidhyamānavatī* and *Samiddhavatī*) can have any sense;—and when the declaration serves a useful purpose under this restricted sense, no other verses could be regarded as '*dhāyyā*'; as there would be no authority for their being so regarded.

SŪTRA (6).

THE VERSES IN THE 'UṢṆIK' AND 'KAKUP' METRES ARE FOUND AT THE END.

Bhāṣya.

The two verses in the '*Uṣṇik*' and '*Kakup*' metres are actually found recited at the end; as is clear from this text -' *Yajyagatyā paridadhyāt antam yajñam gachchhāt, atha yat triṣṭubhā paridadhāti nāntam gachchhati*' ['If he places the *Paridhi* sticks with the *Jagatī* metre, then the Sacrifice will reach completion; if he places the *Paridhi*-sticks with the *Triṣṭup* metre, the sacrifice will not reach completion'].

"But here we find the *Triṣṭup* metre spoken of as coming at the end, not the *Uṣnik* and the *Kakup*."

Answer—It is the *Uṣṇik* and the *Kakup* that are spoken of here as '*Triṣṭup*'.

"How so?"

Because we find the eulogy at the end to the effect that 'The *Triṣṭup* is virility itself; the *Uṣnik* and the *Kakup* constitute the virility of the *Triṣṭup*', where the *effect* has been spoken of (figuratively) as the *cause*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4) : *The verses added to the 'Bahiṣpavamāna' should come in after the 'Paryāsa', at the end.*

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"WHEN VERSES ARE ADDED TO THE 'BAHIṢPAVAMĀNA' HYMN, THE ADDITIONAL VERSES SHOULD COME IN BEFORE THE 'PARYĀSA', AS IT IS SO SEEN AT THE 'DVĀDASHĀHA' SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya

There are certain sacrifices at which additional verses are to be used; for instance—'*Ēkaviṁshēnātirātrēṇa prajākāmam yājayēyuḥ, trinavēnaujaskāmam, trayastriṁshēna pratiṣṭhākāmam*' |'By the *Atirātra* with twenty-one verses, they should sacrifice for one desiring offspring, by one with twenty-seven verses, for one desiring glory; and by one with thirty-six verses, for one desiring social standing'| (Taitt. Brā. 2. 2. 4. 7). Here the various numbers are to be made up by adding other verses, as is going to be explained later on (under Sū. 10. 5. 26).

Now in regard to the additional verses brought into the Ectypal modifications of the *Bahiṣpavamāna*, there arises the question—Are these additional verses brought in at the Ectypes, to come in at the end? Or before the *Paryāsa*?

[At the *Bahiṣpavamāna*, which is the Archetypal Hymn, there are only three triads of verses, i.e. 9 verses in all, the three triads being named (1) '*Stotrīya*', (2) '*Anurūpa*', and (3) *Paryāsa*: in order to make up the number *twenty one*, four *verse-triads*, i.e. twelve verses, have to be added, for making up the number *twenty seven*, six *verse-triads*, i.e. eighteen verses, have to be added; and for making the number *thirty six*, eight *verse-triads*, i.e. 24 verses, have to be added.]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows. "*The additional verses should come in before the 'Paryāsa', as has been seen at the 'Dvādashāha' sacrifice*. That is, in connection with the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice it is said—'There are two Verse-triads, the *Stotrīya* and the *Anurūpa*; there are Verse-triads called *Vṛsanvat*; and the last verse-triad is the *Paryāsa*' [where the *Vṛsanvat* verse-triads appear before the *Paryāsa*], on the same analogy in the case in question also, the additional verse-triads should come in before the *Paryāsa*, the last verse-triad".

SŪTRA (8)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"THE NAME 'PARYĀSA' ALSO STANDS FOR THE END"

Bhāṣya.

"In common parlance, the term '*paryāsa*' is found to be used in the sense of *end*; as in such expressions as '*kṣetra-paryāsaḥ*' ('end of the field'),

'*nadīparyāsaḥ*' ('end of the river'). Thus from the very name '*Paryāsa*' it follows that the verse-triad of that name should come at the end [and it follows as a necessary corollary that the additional verses must come in before it]."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD COME IN AT THE END, AS ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

Such additional ectypal details as those under question should come in at the end, as has already been explained under Sū. 5. 2. 19, above.

SŪTRA (10)

AS REGARDS THE 'DVĀDASHĀHA' SACRIFICE, WHAT IS DONE THERE IS BY VIRTUE OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 7) that 'it has been so found to be the case at the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice';—this has got to be refuted.—The answer to this is that *what is done at the Dvādashāha sacrifice is by virtue of the direct declaration* to the effect that 'There are two verse triads, *Stotrīya* and *Anurūpa*; there are the verse triads called *Vīrāvat*; and the last verse-triad is the *Paryāsa*',—and no burden is too heavy for a Vedic declaration. [Hence what is so declared has to be accepted; but there is no such declaration in connection with the case in question]

SŪTRA (11)

ALSO BECAUSE THE BAHIṢPAVAMĀNA IS NOT A MODIFICATION OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA.

Bhāṣya

The *Bahiṣpavamāna* (which we are considering) is not a modification (Ectype) of the *Dvādashāha*; hence it is not necessary that it should take in the details of this latter.

SŪTRA (12)

IN FACT, EVEN IN WHAT IS A MODIFICATION OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA, [THE ADDITIONAL VERSES COME AT THE END] BECAUSE THEY ARE NEW [AND THEIR PLACE HAS NOT BEEN OTHERWISE FIXED]

Bhāṣya

Even at those sacrifices (such as the *Ahīna Satras*) which are Ectypes of the *Dvādashāha*, the additional verses are placed at the end.—How so?—

Because they are new; that is, as for the '*Vṛṣaṇvat verse-triads*', it is only the *Vṛṣaṇvat* verses proper that are placed before the *Paryâsa* [those however whose place is not so fixed are always placed at the end]. Because the text speaks of the *Vṛṣaṇvat verse-treads* only, and what is directly stated, that alone is to be accepted; it cannot be made applicable to other similar cases.

ADHIKARAṆA (5) : *At the aforesaid 'Sacrifices with additional verses', the additional Sāma-music comes in in the middle.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE TWO LATER PAVAMĀNA HYMNS, THE SĀMA-MUSIC SHOULD COME IN AT THE END."

Bhāṣya.

Here also the sacrifices to be considered are those same where additional verses are brought in. At these, in the two later *Pavamāna* hymns, the additional number is made up by means of additional Sāma-music as is going to be explained later on (under Adhyāya X).

In regard to these additional *Sāma-music*, there arises the question Are these to come in at the end? Or along with the three metres, *Gāyatrī*, *Bṛhatī*, and *Anuṣṭup* (i.e. in the body of the *Mantras* composing the Hymn)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "in the two later *Bahiṣpavamānas*, the *Sāma-music* is to be introduced at the end. The argument in support of this has been already set forth above, under Sū. 3. 2. 19. Hence the *Sāma-music* in question should come in at the end".

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD COME [IN THE BODY OF THE MANTRAS THEMSELVES] ALONG WITH THE METRES, GĀYATRĪ, BṚHATĪ, AND ANUṢṬUP:—BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

The *Sāma-music* in question *should come in along with the metres—Gāyatrī, Bṛhatī, and Anuṣtup.*—Why so?—*Because of the direct declaration*, which says—'Verily there are three wombs of the Sacrifice—*Gāyatrī, Bṛhatī*, and *Anuṣtup*, it is only in connection with these that they add or subtract the *Sāma-music*'.—Here we find it distinctly laid down that the addition of the *Sāma-music* is to be made in connection with these metres. Hence the *Sāma-music* cannot come in at the end—[Because the *verses-triad* in the *Gāyatrī* metre is the first one of the *Midday-Pavamāna*, beginning with the *Mantra* '*Uchchāte jātumandhasah etc*'., and also the first one of the *Ārbhava-Pavamāna*, beginning with the *Mantra* '*Svādiṣṭhayā madiṣṭhayā, etc.*'; while the Mantras coming *at the end* are in the *Triṣtup* and *Jagatī metres*, neither of which is mentioned in the text quoted as admitting the *Sāma-music*].

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Holding' is auxiliary to the Sacrifice, and the 'Bricks' are auxiliary to the Fire.*

SŪTRA (15)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'HOLDING' AND THE 'BRICKS' SPOKEN OF IN THE 'AUPĀNUVĀKYA' SECTION SHOULD BE AUXILIARY TO 'JUICE-EXTRACTION' AND 'HEARTH' RESPECTIVELY."

Bhāṣya.

In the *Aupānuvākya-Section* [i.e., in an isolated Section not dealing with any particular sacrifice—says the *Subodhinī*], certain (*a*) 'Holdings' and (*b*) 'Bricks' have been laid down:—(*a*) '*Ēṣa vai haviṣō havyajatē yo 'dābhyam grhītvā sōmāya yajatē*' ['One who sacrifices to *Soma* after *holding* the Ādābhya offers a sacrifice with the very essence of offering-materials'] (Taitt. Sam. 3. 3. 4. 3) [Here the '*Holding*' of the *Ādābhya* (a polished vessel made of *Udumbara* wood) is laid down];—'*Parā vā ētasyāyuh prāṇa eti yō'mishun grhnātē*' ['If one holds the *Amshu*, his life reaches the fullest span']. [Here the '*Holding*' of the *Amshu*-vessel is laid down];—(*b*) '*Istakābhishchitrinīrupadadhātē, rajatnīrupadadhātē*' ['He puts in bricks bearing the mark of figures, he puts in bricks bearing the mark of the thunderbolt'] (Taitt. Sam. 5. 7. 3 1). [Here the putting in of '*Bricks*' is laid down]. —'*Bhūtēṣṭakā upadadhātē*' ['He puts in well-burnt bricks'] (Taitt. Sam. 5. 6. 3. 1). [Here also the putting in of '*Bricks*' has been laid down].

In regard to this there arise the following questions—(*a*) Is the 'Holding' spoken of in the *Aupānuvākya-Section* auxiliary to the 'Juice-Extraction'—or to the 'Sacrifice'? (*b*) Are the 'Bricks' auxiliary to the 'Hearth'—or to the 'Fire'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows.—"The 'Holding' is auxiliary to the *Juice-Extraction* and the 'Bricks' to the *Hearth*; —why?—because it is the 'Juice-Extraction' that commences with the 'Holdings', and it is the 'Hearths' that commence with the 'Bricks'; and as a rule, when one thing commences with another, the latter is 'auxiliary' to the former".

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE 'HOLDING' AND THE 'BRICKS' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY TO THE 'SACRIFICE' AND THE 'FIRE' RESPECTIVELY; BECAUSE THESE ARE WHAT HAVE BEEN ENJOINED; WHILE THERE IS NO INJUNCTION OF WHAT HAS BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE (IN SŪ. 15).

Bhāṣya.

The 'Holding' should be regarded as auxiliary to the *Sacrifice*, and the 'Bricks' to the *Fire*;—why?—*because these are what have been enjoined*;

that is, it is the *Fire* that is enjoined as to be set up, in the text 'If one who knowing this sets up the Fire' [Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 5. 2. 1]; here it is not the *Hearth* that is spoken of as *to be set up*; what is laid down is the setting up of the *Fire* by means of *Bricks*; that this is so is indicated by the accusative ending in the word '*Agnim*'.—Similarly the text 'If one holding the *Aḍābhya sacrifices* to Soma' lays down the connection of the *Aḍābhya* with the *Sacrifice*; so also it is the connection of the *Aṁshu* with the *Sacrifice* that is laid down [in the text 'If one holds the *Aṁshu*, his life reaches the fullest span']; such being the case, this text will have served its purpose when it has expressed the said connection (of the *Holding*) with the *Sacrifice*, and has brought about the declared connection.—Similarly the other text will have served its purpose by having once established the connection (of the Bricks) with the Fire.

Then again, *there is no injunction*—of the *Hearth* and the *Juice-extraction*; these two are nowhere laid down as to be brought about (for their own sake): in fact, they have been laid down only as subserving the purpose of other things.

"What is the use of this discussion?"

If the 'Holding' were auxiliary to the *Juice-extraction*, then it would have to be done at each such *extraction*; similarly if the 'Bricks' were auxiliary to the Hearth, they would have to be put in at every Hearth;—whereas, if the 'Holding' is auxiliary to the *Sacrifice*, it need be done only once (in course of the entire *Sacrifice*); and if the 'Bricks' are auxiliary to the Fire, they need be put in only once.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Chitriṇī' ('Figure-marked') and other Bricks are to be put in at the Central Hearth.*

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"THEY SHOULD BE PUT IN AT THE LAST (HEARTH); BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THERE WOULD BE NON-INTERFERENCE."

Bhāṣya.

Under the *Aupānuvākya* section we read—'*Chitṛṇirupadadhāti, vajriṇīrupadadhāti*' ['He puts in the figured-marked bricks; he puts in the thunderbolt-marked bricks'] (Taitti. Saṁh. 5. 7. 3. 1).—[There are *five* Hearths].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these Bricks to be put in at the *fifth* (last) Hearth? Or at the *Central* one?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "they should be put in at the *fifth* Hearth; as it is only thus these Bricks do not interfere with—i.e. come between—the other bricks whose order is definitely fixed".

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE SEE TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

The text meant is—'*Āvapanam vā uttamā chitiḥ, anyā iṣṭakā upadadhāti*' ['The last Hearth is the refuge of the shelterless, hence all other bricks are put into this'].

SŪTRA (19).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE PUT IN AT THE CENTRAL HEARTH, BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION,—THESE BRICKS BEING CALLED 'BRĀHMAṆAVATĪ'.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the Bricks in question should be put in at the last Hearth.—Then at which Hearth?—*At the Central Hearth*,—why so?—because *these* bricks are called '*Brāhmaṇavatī*', and for *Brāhmaṇavatī* bricks, the Central Hearth has been ordained, in the following text—'Any brick which one may recognize as *Brāhmaṇavatī*, he should put in at the *Central Hearth*'.

"All bricks may be *Brāhmaṇavatī*."

That cannot be; as from indicative texts, and also from the distinctive name (which would be meaningless if all were '*brāhmaṇavatī*'), it is clear that only a few are so called.—And from this it follows that these Bricks should not be put in at the *last Hearth*.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Figure-marked' and other Bricks should be put in before the 'Lokampṛṇā' Brick.*

SŪTRA (20)

[THE SAID BRICKS SHOULD BE PUT IN] BEFORE THE 'LOKAMPṚṆĀ' BRICK; BECAUSE THIS LATTER IS MEANT TO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF MAKING UP DEFICIENCIES

Bhāṣya.

Under the *Aupānuvākya* section, certain Bricks have been spoken of—(*a*) 'He puts in the thunder bolt marked bricks, he puts in the figure-marked bricks' (Taitt. Sam. 5. 7. 3. 1);—He puts in the well burnt bricks' (Taitt. Sam. 5. 6. 3. 1),—we have learnt from the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* that these bricks should be put in at the Central Hearth.

Now there arises the question—Are these to be put in before the '*Lokampṛnā*' Brick? or after it? [The brick that is put in with the *mantra Lokampṛna chhidram pṛna*' (Taitt. Sam. 4. 2. 4. 4) is called the '*Lokampṛnā Brick*'].

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that they should be put in after it, according to the principle laid down under Sū. 3. 2. 19.

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*They should be put in before the Lokampṛnā Brick, because this latter is meant to serve the purpose of making up deficiencies* (filling up gaps), that it is meant to serve this purpose is clearly declared in the text. Whatever may be wanting, whatever gaps there may be all that they make up by this brick, saying—*Lokapṛna chhidram pṛna* [fill up the region, fill up the gaps]'. What is said in this text is something new (not already known), hence we conclude that this passage, though apparently commendatory, should be taken as mandatory.—From all this it follows that the bricks in question should be put in *before* the '*Lokampṛnā*' bricks.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Agnihotra' and other Rites should be performed in Fire consecrated by the performance of the Iṣṭi.*

SŪTRA (21).

RITES SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN THE CONSECRATED FIRE, AS CONSECRATIONS ARE MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Fire-laying Rite, the *Pavamāna* sacrifices have been laid down;—there are certain compulsory Rites to be performed, such as the *Agnihotra*; and others that are not compulsory, such as the offerings to *Indra-Agni*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Should these Rites be performed after the performance of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices? Or should they be performed in the Fires just after they have been duly installed (and the *Pavamāna sacrifices* have not yet been performed)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows—"They should be performed in the Fires just after they have been installed.—Why?—Because the man becomes fit to perform the Rites as soon as the Fires have been installed; as is clear from such texts as—(*a*) 'The man who has installed the Fires should not put in wet fuel', (*b*) 'When Fire has been produced, they follow it with the *Agnihotra*', where it is shown that the *Agnihotra* should be performed as soon as the Fires have been installed.—From all this it follows that it is not necessary to wait for the performance of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—Rites should be performed in such Fires as have been consecrated by means of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices.—Why?—Because *Consecrations are meant for that purpose*; as a matter of fact, such names as the '*Āhavanīya*' and the rest (which are applied to the Fires in which sacrifices are made) connote *consecration*, so that until there has been some *consecration*, no fire could be recognised as '*āhavanīya*'.—From this it follows that Rites are to be performed in consecrated Fires

SŪTRA (22).

WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD IS AN 'OBSERVANCE' FOLLOWING UPON THE INSTALLATION OF FIRES, AND THIS LATTER HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED

Bhāṣya.

As for the text that has been quoted—'The man who has installed the Fires should not put in wet fuel',—it is only right that such acts should be done as soon as the Fires have been installed; because it is an *observance* laid down for *the man who has installed the Fires*; and as soon as the Fires

have been installed, the man becomes *one who has installed the Fires*; so that it is only natural that the observance should follow immediately, *as 'the installation of the Fires' has been already accomplished.*

SŪTRA (23).

"BUT THE AGNIHOTRA AND THE REST SHOULD BE PERFORMED BEFORE THE PAVAMĀNA—AS INDICATED BY THE TEXT (ALREADY QUOTED)."

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "there is the text ['When the Fire has been produced, they follow it with the *Agnihotra*'] indicating that the *Agnihotra* should be performed as soon as the Fires have been installed, even before the *Pavamāna* sacrifices".—This argument has been reiterated in the present *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (24).

IN REALITY, THE TEXT QUOTED IS A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION, BECAUSE THE THING IS ALREADY THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence quoted is purely commendatory.—Why?—*Because the thing is already there*; that is, there already exists another *Agnihotra*-offering. The teachers of the Veda have considered the question as to why there should be no *Agnihotra-offering* (before *Pavamāna*), when the *Agnihotra* has to be offered (on the installation of the Fires); and the explanation is provided by the following text—'If one offers the oblation with a *Yajuṣ-mantra*, he offers two oblations which have not been previously offered; if he does not offer the oblation, Agni would come down upon him; therefore he should offer the oblation in silence'.—It is this *silent offering* [and not the regular *Agnihotra*] that has been eulogised in the commendatory passage in question.

SŪTRA (25).

ALSO BECAUSE IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ALREADY DETERMINED.

Bhāṣya.

If the *Agnihotra* and other rites were performed immediately after the Installation of the Fires (before the performance of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices), then that would militate against the principle already determined above, under Sū. 3. 6. 12 [where it is shown that the *Pavamāna sacrifices* help in the installing of the Fires, which shows that the installation of the Fires is not complete without the performance of the *Pavamāna*].

From all this it follows that the said Rites should be performed only in the duly-consecrated Fire.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The observances to be kept by the 'Agnichit', 'Fire-installer', during the rains, should come after the performance of the Sacrifice of 'Agnichayana'.*

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS SOON AS THE FIRE HAS BEEN INSTALLED (SET UP ON THE ALTAR) THE MAN HAS BECOME AN 'AGNICHIT' ('FIRE-INSTALLER'); HENCE IT IS PROPER THAT HE SHOULD KEEP THE OBSERVANCES FORTHWITH: AS THE CONDITION (ON WHICH THE KEEPING OF OBSERVANCES IS CONTINGENT) HAS BEEN FULFILLED."

Bhāṣya.

We read of certain observances in the following text 'When it rains, the fire installer should not run, he should not approach his wife,—the fire-installer should not eat birds' and so forth.

In regard to these observances, there arises the question—Should these observances be kept as soon as the fire has been simply *set up on the altar*?—Or after the performance of the whole sacrifice of *Agnichayana* (Fire installation)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows: They should be kept as soon as the fire has been set up on the altar. Because the man who has installed, or set up on the altar the Fire has become an *Agnichit* (Fire installer); consequently all the observances that have been prescribed for the '*Agnichit*' become incumbent upon him immediately after the setting up of the Fire, because as soon as the contingency upon which an act was contingent has been fulfilled, the act should be done. Hence the observances should be kept immediately after the setting up of the Fire on the Altar."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE KEPT AT THE END OF THE 'AGNICHAYANA' SACRIFICE; BECAUSE THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE 'DECLARATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PROCEDURE'.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the 'declaration of the ceremonial procedure' of a sacrifice brings up only those acts that subserve the purposes of that sacrifice;—the observances in question do not subserve the purposes of the sacrifice; in fact, they subserve the purposes of the Agent.—How so?—Because it is the Agent alone that is mentioned in the prohibition—'When it rains he should not run, he should not approach his wife' and so forth; none of these

acts (prohibited) are possible as subserving the purposes of the sacrifice, whereby alone could their prohibition subserve any purposes of the sacrifice.

"Even though the observances are acts subserving the purposes of the Agent,—they come in as to be kept by the man who has set up the Fire, immediately after thus *setting up*"

Not so, we reply.

SŪTRA (28)

BECAUSE IT IS THE 'FIRE' THAT IS INDICATED AS THE 'OBJECTIVE'.

Bhāṣya.

The 'installation' is for the purpose of the Fire, because when a thing helps the fire in the carrying on of its functions, it is regarded as being for the purpose of the Fire.—"What is the *purpose* of the Fire?"—Its purpose is the accomplishment of the *Sacrifice*; hence it is only when the sacrifice has been accomplished that the 'installation' can be regarded as having rendered its help.—Consequently it is only after the Sacrifice has been accomplished that the man can be called 'Agnidhr' ('Fire-installer'); and hence it is only at the end of the sacrifice that the observances come in.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Initiation' is complete only after the performance of the Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT IS ONLY AFTER HE HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE SO (BY THE ADHVARYU PRIEST), THAT HE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'INITIATED' BY ALL THE METHODS DESCRIBED; BECAUSE ALL ARE SPOKEN OF AS CONNECTED WITH THE ACT OF INITIATION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Agnāvaiṣṇavamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt dīkṣiṣyamāṇaḥ*' ['When one is going to be initiated he should offer the cake baked upon eleven pans to *Agni-Viṣṇu*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 5. 1. 4) [where the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi* is laid down].—Then again, we meet with such texts as—'He initiates him with the stick' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 3. 5);—'He initiates him with the girdle-zone';—'He initiates him with the black-antelope-skin' (Taitti Saṁ. 6. 1. 3. 2),—and so forth.

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the man become initiated' by all the methods that are laid down? Or, simply on the completion of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi*?

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows:—"It is by all the methods that he becomes *initiated*.—Why so?—*Because all are spoken of as connected with the act of Initiation*; the connection with *Initiation* is present in all the methods described—'He initiates with the stick', which means that 'he brings about his initiation'; if the man were to be an 'initiate' on the completion of the sacrifice only, then how could the priest bring about his initiation 'with the stick'? From this it is clear that the man does not become an 'initiate' by means of the sacrifice only.—Nor do we find the name 'initiate' applied to him at the end of the sacrifice;—the name is applied to him only when he is addressed as such. Hence it follows that he could not be regarded as an 'initiate' after the sacrifice only.—Then again, so long as combination (of all the methods of Initiation) is possible, it cannot be right to treat them as optional alternatives, because in the latter case every one of the methods would in one case have to be rejected, and this would go against the declaration of the ceremonial procedure (which takes in all the methods).—Thus the conclusion is that, though the sentences speaking of the various methods of Initiation are different, yet, they are all construed together, on the strength of the declaration of the ceremonial procedure; so that the man should be regarded as an 'Initiate' only after he is declared to be so (by the *Adhvaryu* Priest, who makes the declaration 'this Brāhmaṇa has become duly initiated')."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, HE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN 'INITIATE' AT THE END OF THE SACRIFICE: AS THE SACRIFICE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INITIATION. AS FOR THE OTHER TEXTS, THEY SIMPLY CONNECT THE INITIATION WITH PARTICULAR OBJECTS (NOT WITH ANY ACTS).

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the man should be regarded as an 'initiate' at the end of the sacrifice; because it is for the purpose of bringing about the Initiation that the sacrifice is performed: i.e. the sacrifice (*Dīkṣaṇīyā*) is performed for one who is *going to be initiated*, and who is not already initiated; and it could be taken as performed for one *who is going to be initiated* only if he actually became 'initiated' on the completion of the sacrifice. Hence from the sentence it follows that the man does become 'initiated' at the time of the completion of the sacrifice; when the thing which has been declared to be the means of Initiation has been accomplished, why should the man not be regarded as 'initiated'? Specially when the sentence, independently by itself, points out that he does become 'initiated' on the performance of the sacrifice.

It has been argued that—"the other methods also are spoken of as connected with Initiation, in such sentences as 'He initiates him with a *stick*';—*how could these be the means of initiation if the man were already* an 'initiate' (at the completion of the *sacrifice* only)?"—Our answer to this is that all that the sentence means is that 'by means of the stick such a thing is accomplished'—[but no action is mentioned, through which the Initiation could be brought about by the stick: the stick and other things could be the means of Initiation only if they accomplished some *act* or operation; because 'Initiation' is an 'embellishment', and an embellishment can be brought only by means of an action or operation, not merely by an *object*, which is not of the nature of an *act*—*Tuptīkā*].

Secondly, it has been argued that—"the name 'Initiate' is not applied to the man immediately after the completion of the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* sacrifice".—Our answer to this is that the mere fact of a word not being used cannot be regarded as proof of the non-existence of the thing expressed by that word; in fact, even when a thing exists, the word expressing it is not used, if there is no occasion for using it.

The other sentence however—'when going to be initiated, one should offer the cake baked on eleven pans to *Agni-Viṣṇu*'—clearly shows that the man does become an 'initiate' on the completion of the said offering (sacrifice).

Lastly, as regards the argument that "the name 'Initiate' is applied to the man only at the time that it is notified",—this notification would not be incompatible with the view that the man becomes an 'initiate' on the completion of the sacrifice.

Nor does this view militate against the declaration of the ceremonial procedure; because while one (the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* sacrifice) accomplishes the

Initiation, the others (*stick* and the rest) bring about the Initiated Man [*so* that there is no incompatibility.]

SŪTRA (31).

THE NAME ('DIKṢANIYĀ') ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the sacrifice is performed for the purpose of the Initiation, and that the name 'Initiate' applies to the man on the completion of the sacrifice.—'What reason?'—It is that *the name also points to the same conclusion*; that is, the conclusion that has been deduced from reasonings is the same that is indicated by the name of the sacrifice.—"How so?"—The name '*Dikṣaniyā*' ('Initiatory') means that it brings about the *dikṣā*, Initiation; just as the name '*bhojanīya*' means *that which brings about eating*; and '*snānīya*' is that *which brings about bathing*.—From this also we conclude that the *Dīkṣanīya* sacrifice is performed for the purpose of the Initiation; and that the term 'Initiate' becomes applicable to the man on the completion of that sacrifice (*Dīkṣaṇīyā*).

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *There is no restriction in the order of the performance of the 'Prospective Sacrifices'.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE MUST BE AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF SACRIFICES; JUST AS THERE IS IN THAT OF THE SUBSIDIARY SACRIFICES."

Bhāṣya.

The 'Prospective Sacrifices' [i.e. those that are laid down as to be performed for the purpose of bringing about particular desirable results] form the topic of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—such, for instance, as (1) 'One should offer the cake baked on eleven pans to *Indra-Agni*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 1. 1); and others such as (2) the 'Cow-sacrifices', (3) the 'Soma-sacrifices', (4) the '*Saumya*-sacrifices', and (5) the 'Animal-sacrifices'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these 'prospective sacrifices' to be performed in the same order in which they are found in the verbal texts? Or is there to be no restriction regarding their order of sequence?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—Among sacrifices there should be the same order of sequence in their performance as there is in the texts speaking of them; in this way the order of the verbal texts would be honoured; otherwise the order of the verbal texts would be set at naught. hence in order to avoid this, the sacrifices in question should be performed in a definite order of sequence".

SŪTRA (33)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS NOT SO, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION (AMONG THE SACRIFICES IN QUESTION)

Bhāṣya.

In reality, there can be no restriction regarding the order of sequence (among 'prospective acts').—Why?—*Because there is no connection among the sacrifices in question.* In regard to each one of the 'prospective acts', there is a distinct declaration of ceremonial procedure; and each of these declarations includes only those acts that are expressed by the words of that declaration. If one act does not help another, then it is not connected with it either in any order of sequence or without any order of sequence; and when one act does help another, then alone the order of sequence is of use in its rendering of that help.—The sacrifices in question however are such that they do not help each other in any way. Hence an order of sequence would be of no use to them; and there is no connection among them.

SŪTRA (34).

ALSO BECAUSE THESE ACTS ARE PERFORMED WITH A VIEW TO PARTICULAR RESULTS.

Bhāṣya.

The acts in question are 'prospective',—i.e. they are performed with a view to obtaining particular results; and the desires for the various results do not appear in man in any order of sequence; so that there being no order of sequence among the contingent causes, there can be none in the effects of those causes.

SŪTRA (35).

"THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT: AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED (BY THE ORDER OF THE VERBAL TEXTS)"—IF THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued in the *Pūrvapakṣa* that—"it is only if there is an order of sequence in the performance of the 'Prospective' acts that the order of the verbal texts (speaking of the acts) can serve a useful purpose"; —and this is reiterated in the present *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (36).

THE ORDER OF THE VERBAL TEXTS WOULD HAVE ITS USE IN THE LEARNING OF THE TEXTS; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF ACTS COMING AFTER THE 'SARVASVĀRA' SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The order of the verbal texts would still have its use,—even when there is no order in the performance of the sacrifices spoken of in those texts,—as it would be of use *in the learning of the texts*;—i.e. in the study of the texts for the purpose of learning our duty, if a definite order of sequence is adopted, there is an unseen (transcendental) result following in relation to that learning itself;—just as, even according to you, there is *in the case of acts coming after the Sarvasvāra sacrifice*; that is, even for one who holds the view that the order of sequence is part and parcel of the acts in question, if an order of sequence is adopted among the acts coming after the *Sarvasvāra* sacrifice, it will have to be assumed that the adoption of that order brings about only an unseen (transcendental) result.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The performance of all sacrifices is to be preceded by the performance of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (37).

IN THE SENTENCE 'YA ĒTĒNA', THE PRONOUN 'ĒTĒNA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE 'AGNIṢṬOMA'; BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* we read—'*Ēṣa vāva prathamo yajñānām yajjyotiṣṭomaḥ, ya ētēnāniṣṭvā athānyēna yajēta gartapatyamēva tajjāyatē pra vā mīyatē*' |'Verily the *Jyotiṣtoma* is the first of sacrifices; he who, without performing this sacrifice, performs any other sacrifice, it turns out to be as if fallen into a pit,'and he perishes'|.

In regard to this there arises the question—To what does the sentence beginning with the words '*ya ētēna*' refer?—The discussion starts with this question.—And the answer to this is that the sentence '*ya ētēna* etc.' refers to the *Agniṣtoma* (the first part of the *Jyotiṣtoma*)—How so?—*Because of the Context*; that is the sentence in question occurs in the context of the *Agniṣtoma*; and as a rule, pronouns stand for things dealt with in the Context.

SŪTRA (38)

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is also a text indicative of the same conclusion; thus as how the text reads—'*Yasya navatishatam stotrīyāḥ*'|'At which there are a hundred and ninety *stotrīya*-hymns'|(Aitarēya-Brā. 3. 41). It is the *Agniṣṭoma* at which there are a hundred and ninety hymns.—'How?'—There is the threefold *Bahiṣpavamāna* (9), the fifteen *Ājyas*, each of these is *four*;—so these make 9+60=69;—then there are 15 midday *Pavamānas*; thus the number becomes 84;—then there are the 17 *Prṣthas*, each of these being 4, their number becomes 68;—these, with the former 84, make up 152;—then there are the seventeen *Ārbhava Pavamānas*; this makes the number 169;—lastly, there are the 21 *Yājñyajñiya* hymns; thus making up the total of 190 hymns at the *Agniṣṭoma*. For this reason also the sacrifice referred to in the sentence in question must be the *Agniṣṭoma*.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The modifications (Ectypes) of the 'Jyotiṣṭoma' must be preceded by the 'Agniṣṭoma'.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE SAME SENTENCE, THE PHRASE 'ATHĀNYĒNA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS REFERRING TO THE OTHER 'FORMS' (OF THE JYOTIṢṬOMA ITSELF) BECAUSE THESE ARE THE NEAREST (NOUNS)"

Bhāṣya.

[In the same sentence that we have dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*] there is the phrase '*athānyēna*'. In regard to this, there arises the question—For what does the word '*anyēna*' ('another' sacrifice) stand? Does it refer to the 'Forms' of the Jyotiṣṭoma itself [i.e. to the *six* terminuses that follow the *Agniṣṭoma*, which is the first form or Terminus, and which is also, on that account, called *Jyotiṣṭoma*']? Or does it refer to the Ectypes (modifications) of the Jyotiṣṭoma *viz.*: the *Ēkāha* and the rest?

[The principal Soma sacrifice, the Archetype of all Soma-offerings, is called '*Jyotiṣṭoma*', this name is also sometimes loosely applied to the first of the seven '*Saṃsthās*' or 'Forms' i.e. 'Terminuses' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifices, to which first Terminus, the name '*Agniṣṭoma*' is given. In literature, the two terms are more or less convertible. In fact, it is on this confusion that the present *Adhikaraṇa* is based. It is declared that 'if one performs *any other sacrifice* without having performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, he falls into trouble'. And the question that is raised is—what is the meaning of 'any other sacrifice'? Does it mean any one of the six *Terminuses* that follow the *Agniṣṭoma* (the first Terminus)? [This doubt would be possible only if the name of the first *Terminus* were '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' as well as '*Agniṣṭoma*'].] Or does it mean any one of the various ectypes of the Principal Soma-sacrifice, *Jyotiṣṭoma*? The seven 'Terminuses' of the Soma sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) are—(1) *Agniṣṭoma* (also called *Jyotiṣṭoma*), (2) *Atyagniṣṭoma*, (3) *Ukthya*, (4) *Ṣoḍaśin*, (5) *Vājapēya*, (6) *Atirātra*, and (7) *Āptoryāmā*.]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"It refers to the *Terminuses*. —Why? *Because these are the nearest*; that is, in the particular Context, it is the *Terminuses* that are nearest to the pronoun in question; hence it must be taken as referring to them, in view of the 'Context'."

SŪTRA (40).

IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS REFERRING TO THOSE SACRIFICES OF WHICH THE JYOTIṢṬOMA IS THE ARCHETYPE; BECAUSE 'ĀPATTI' (BESTOWAL OF INDEPENDENCE) AND 'VIHĀRA' (TRANSFERENCE OF DETAILS) ARE NOT POSSIBLE AMONG EQUALS.

Bhāṣya.

The reference must be taken to be to those sacrifices—the Cow-sacrifice and the like—of which the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the Archetype; because '*āpatti*' (the Bestowal of Independence) and '*vihāra*' (Transference of Details) are possible only between the Archetype and its Ectypes, and not among those that are 'equal', i.e. equally included under the name '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' [and it is the Terminuses that are so included]. As a matter of fact, the phrase '*athānyēna*' is not construed to mean 'by another sacrifice included under the name *Jyotiṣṭoma*'; what the '*anya*', 'other', is meant to stand for is a sacrifice *other than the Archetype*; this 'other' is not qualified by *Jyotiṣṭoma*; [i.e. it cannot be said that this 'other' must be something connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*]; because the connotation of a word cannot be restricted to any part of itself by any other thing which has already served its purpose (of expressing its own meaning); and this for the simple reason that Direct Assertion (i.e. the direct Denotation of a word) cannot be set aside by Syntactical Connection (exigencies of syntax)—If the phrase be construed as a sacrifice 'other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*', then the chance of its referring to the *Terminuses* becomes remoter still.

"In what manner is there '*āpatti*' (Bestowal of Independence) and '*Vihāra*' (Transference of Details)?"

We have the following texts—(A) 'Verily *Agniṣṭoma* is *Prajāpati*; he created the later *Ēkāha* sacrifices; on being created, they said to him—we cannot control ourselves; thereupon he *bestowed upon them independence*; then they obtained control over themselves' [Here *Agniṣṭoma* is represented as 'bestowing independence' upon the 'other' sacrifices;—and this could not refer to the *Terminuses*, which have no 'independent' existence apart from the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].—(B)—'Out of the Fire thus born, other Fires become transferred'; —or again, 'out of this sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) other sacrifices get the details transferred; when the *Tṛcā* reaches the other sacrifices, it illumines it; that which reaches the fifteenth, illumines that; that which reaches the seventeenth illumines that; that which reaches the twenty-first illumines that; thus it is that they say—there is only one sacrifice;—verily all these are *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself'; here what are described are the Ectypes (modifications) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. —From this text it follows that the reference in the text under consideration is to these *Ectypes*.—"How does this follow?"—What this text shows is that the details of the Archetype are 'transferred' to those sacrifices which are referred to by the term 'other' ('*anyēna*', in the text under consideration);—and from that we conclude that the sacrifice referred to is one which is 'other' than that from which details are transferred to it.

SŪTRA (41).

[OBJECTION]—"THIS TEXT MUST BE TREATED AS MERELY COMMENDATORY, BECAUSE, IN REALITY THERE IS NO 'TRANSFERENCE'."

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"*If thus is so, then the reference cannot be to the Ectypes*; because in regard to them there can be neither 'bestowal of independence' nor 'transference of details'. Because from 'Context' and other sources of indication, it is clear that the details belong to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; if then, the details were transferred to the Cow-sacrifice and the other ectypes (of *Jyotiṣṭoma*),—this would militate against 'Context' and the other sources of indication.—Under the circumstances, the 'bestowal of independence' also would be something contrary to perception.—Thus then, neither 'bestowal of independence' nor 'transference of details' being possible, the texts speaking of these must be treated as purely commendatory."

SŪTRA (42).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, THERE WOULD BE TRANSFERENCE, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE GENERAL INJUNCTION; THERE CAN BE NO COMMENDATION AT RANDOM

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the above objection is as follows:—Even though 'bestowal of independence' and 'transference of details' are not actually enjoined, yet they come to be regarded as enjoined on the strength of the General Injunction (that 'the ectype should be performed like the Archetype'); so that all that is to be done at the Archetype comes to be understood, on the strength of the said General Injunction, as to be done at the Ectype also.—Thus it follows that the term 'other' is taken as referring to that in which there is 'bestowal of independence' and 'transference of details'.—*There can be no commendation at random* without some basis. If the text has to be taken as a commendation, it could be so taken only for the purpose of making the commendation applicable to what is referred to by the term 'other' [which is absurd].

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The performance of all sacrifices—'one-hymned' as well as 'many-hymned'—is to be preceded by the performance of the Agniṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHAT HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE PRECEDING ADHIKARAṆA APPLIES TO ONLY THOSE SACRIFICES AT WHICH ONLY ONE HYMN IS CHANTED, BECAUSE THEY ARE DESCRIBED AS 'SACRIFICES'."

Bhāṣya.

We have the text "He who, without having offered this (*Agniṣṭoma*), offers another sacrifice, etc."—in regard to this it has been understood that the reference here is to the *Ectypes* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

Now the question that arises is—Is this reference to the sacrifice with one hymn? Or to that with several hymns?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The reference should be taken to be to the sacrifice with a single hymn; why?—*because they are described as sacrifices*; that is to say, it is *sacrifices with one hymn*, that are described as 'Sacrifices' in the following text—'If a *Trivṛt* approaches a sacrifice, it illumines that; if it approaches the fifteenth, it illumines that; if it approaches the seventeenth, it illumines that; if it approaches the twenty first, it illumines that'; all these *Trivṛt* and the rest, are sacrifices with a single hymn; hence the reference should be taken as to these."

SŪTRA (44)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE INJUNCTION; THE DESCRIPTION QUOTED IS MERELY A COMMENDATION OF THE HYMNS.

Bhāṣya

In reality, the reference should be taken as applying to all [sacrifices] alike—to sacrifices with one hymn, as also to those with several hymns. Why so? Because they are equally spoken of by means of the word '*anga*', other—"But it is sacrifices with a single hymn that have been described as *sacrifices*"—True, they have been so described; but they have been so described for the purpose of being eulogised, and not for being in any way distinguished (for any purpose)—"What is the meaning of the eulogy?" The sentence is—'If the *Trivṛt* approaches a sacrifice, it illumines it', which means that when the details that have been practised at the Archetype, come into the Ectype by virtue of the General Injunction, they are easily dealt with.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya V.

ADHYĀYA V.

PADA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1) : *The Order of Sequence indicated by 'Direct Declaration' and by 'Utility' is more authoritative than that indicated by the Order of the Verbal Texts.*

SŪTRA (1).

THERE IS REJECTION OF THE ORDER (OF VERBAL TEXTS) BY (A) 'DIRECT DECLARATION' AND (B) 'UTILITY', (A) BECAUSE OF THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF DIRECT DECLARATION, AND (B) BECAUSE EVERY ACT IS MEANT TO SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE

Bhāṣya

Here we are going to discuss the question of the setting aside of the Order of Verbal Texts' by the order indicated by 'Direct Assertion' and the order indicated by 'Utility'. The question is—Is the 'Order of Verbal Texts' equal to these two? Or is it set aside by them?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—'Both are of equal authority, 'Verbal Texts' are as good indicators of *Order* as 'Direct Declaration' and 'Utility'; nor is there any difference in the authoritative character of these three; hence the conclusion is that there is no hard and fast rule as to which is the most authoritative'.

Against this we have the following *Siddhānta*. The 'Order of Verbal Texts' is rejected by 'Direct Declaration' as well as by 'Utility'. How so?" *Because of the peculiar character of Direct Declaration and because every act is meant to serve a useful purpose.*

What is the peculiar character of Direct Declaration?"

It is this, that the Order indicated by Direct Declaration is directly perceptible, while the Order based upon Verbal Texts is purely inferential. What 'the Order of Verbal Texts' does is to *remind* us that 'the action *should be done* in such and such a manner', and the method so recalled to the mind is adopted in practice on the sole strength of the *reason* that the *reminding* must be for the purpose of indicating the mode of activity:—in the case of Direct Declaration, on the other hand, the action itself is directly perceived as *being* so and so.

Similarly 'the Order of Verbal Texts' is set aside by 'Utility' also.

'Why"?

Because every act is meant to serve a useful purpose; that is to say, every act is for some purpose, i.e. for the purpose of the Principal Action;

i.e. every act tends to the fulfilment of the Principal Action, and is done for that purpose.

It is for these reasons that the Order of Verbal Texts is set aside by 'Direct Declaration' and by 'Utility'.

What is the example and what the purpose served by this discussion?

Example—(*a*) As example of Direct Declaration, we have the text 'The Cup dedicated to the Ashvins is the *tenth* to be held, and they offer it as the *third*';—here, if the Order of the Verbal Texts were more authoritative, then it would be the *third* to be held and offered; while by the *Siddhānta* (that Direct Declaration is more authoritative) it would be the *tenth*.—As example of 'Utility'—the Agnihotra-offering is laid down first, and then the *boiling* (cooking); this would be the order of sequence adopted if the indication of Verbal Texts were more authoritative; whereas according to the *Siddhānta* (whereby the order indicated by 'Utility' is more authoritative), the *Boiling* (*Cooking*) would be done first, and then the *offering*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *According to the 'Order of the Principal', the 'Carving' (Slicing) and other details should be performed first of all over the 'Āgnēya' offering.*

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AMONG THE DETAILS—'CARVING', 'BESPRINKLING' AND 'PLACING IN POSITION'—THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 'COMMENCEMENT'."

Bhāṣya

There are the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; in connection with which there are several offering-materials used,—such as *Curds*, *Cake*, and the like; and there are certain details to be performed with every one of these—[such details as 'carving' (slicing), 'besprinkling' and 'placing in position']; in the Veda, the injunction of these details as connected with *Curds* comes first, and after that comes the injunction of those as connected with the *Āgnēya* (cake),—but as regards the actual 'offering', that of the *Āgnēya* (Cake) is done first [and after that, that of the *Curds*].

The question that arises is—Should the 'carving', 'besprinkling' and 'placing in position' be done first of all to the *Curds*,—in accordance with the order of 'commencement'? Or should they be done first to the *Āgnēya* (Cake),—according to the order of the 'Principal'?

On this question, the view that suggests itself first is that in the case in question, there should be no restriction in regard to the Order of Sequence—Against this view, we have the second view [which is the *Pūrvapakṣa*] that—By the Order of Commencement, the 'carving' and the rest should be done first to the *Curds*—[the process regarding *Curds* 'commences' on the preceding day, with the milking of the cow; which is not the case with the *Cake*]—why? because if this were done, then [between the performance of these details and the actual offering of the Curds] there would be no more intervening factors than those that are actually sanctioned. Then again, there is a text indicative of the same conclusion—'The carving should be done first to the curds' [*Dadhnah pūrvamavadīyam*']."

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DETAILS SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACTUAL 'OFFERING'; BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'OFFERING' THAT THE DETAILS ARE PERFORMED.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the details in question should be performed in accordance with the '*offering*'; i.e. that which is *offered* first should have the 'carving'

and other details done to it first; hence it follows that the details in question should be done to the *Āgnēya* (Cake) first.—"Why so?"—Because the 'carving' and the other details are all included under the Injunction of the 'offering'; all these are only preparatory, or introductory, to the act of 'offering' and are not independent acts by themselves; as has been explained already.—As a matter of fact, the 'besprinkling' as well as the 'carving' of a substance is done only with a view to *offering* it; 'Placing in position' also, which consists in bringing up the substance within reach, is only with a view to *offering* it.—In this way all these details serve a visible purpose.—From all this it follows that the performance of the details should be in the 'Order of the Principal' [which in this case is the *act of offering*].

It has been argued that "it is the process in connection with *Curds* that *commences* first";—true, that is so, but that earlier 'commencement' is due to the needs of the situation (the nature of things), not to the Verbal Texts.

Then again, 'the Order of the Principal' is more authoritative than 'the Order of Commencement'. If 'the Order of the Principal' is adopted, it is only one act, the first one, that becomes removed in point of time; while, if 'the Order of Commencement' is adopted, all the acts become removed. It is for this reason that 'the Order of the Principal' is more authoritative.

As for the indicative text that has been cited.—'*Dadhnaḥ pūrvamavadēyam*' ['The carving should be done first to the Curds'],—our answer to that is that what is said in that text must be in reference to the *Cooked Curds*; hence it does not affect our position.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE (OF THE SIDDHĀNTA).

Bhāṣya.

In support of the *Siddhānta*, we also have the following indicative text—'Verily he besprinkles the *Dhruvā*-vessel before him, because it is out of that vessel that he is going to offer the first *Ājyabhāga* offerings' [where the fact of a thing being *offered* first is made the ground for its being *besprinkled* first].—From this also it follows that the Order of the details is determined by the 'Order of the Principal'.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *There is no restriction regarding the Order of Sequence between the 'Iṣṭi' and the 'Soma-sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE IṢṬI SHOULD BE PERFORMED FIRST; BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION."

Bhāṣya.

['*Iṣṭi*' is the common name applied to all those sacrifices in which the offerings consist of Milk, Butter, Rice, Barley or other grains; and the 'Soma' is the common name given to all those in which the offerings consist of Soma-juice. The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is the Archetype or Model of *Iṣṭis* and the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the Archetype of the Soma-sacrifices.]

It has been ordained that the *Iṣṭi* should precede the other sacrifices. There arises the question—Is it optional with the performer to perform the *Iṣṭi* first or the *Soma* first? Or must it always be the *Iṣṭi* to be performed first?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"In all cases, the *Iṣṭi* should be performed first;—why?—*because of the Direct Assertion*; there is a direct assertion to that effect in the following text—'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are the chariots of the deities; *if a man performs the Soma-sacrifice after performing the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa-sacrifice*, he reaches the highest position of the Divinity as if carried on a chariot' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 5. 6. 1).—And when the Direct Assertion lays down this order, no burden can be too heavy for it.—Hence the Soma-sacrifice must always be preceded by the *Iṣṭi*."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—FOR SOME PEOPLE THE SOMA-SACRIFICE [SHOULD COME BEFORE THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA]: BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRE-LAYING IT IS ASSERTED THAT THE RESTRICTIONS RELATING TO THE SEASON AND THE ASTERISM NEED NOT BE OBSERVED IN CASE THE SOMA-SACRIFICE WERE TO COME AT THE END (OF, I.E. AFTER, THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA), THEN THE SAID ASSERTION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

We accept the view that the Soma is to be preceded by the *Iṣṭi*; but *for some people the Soma sacrifice* should come after the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—

"How so?"—*Because in connection with the Fire laying it has been asserted that the restrictions relating to the season* [that it should be done during the 'spring'] *and the asterism* [that it should be done under the asterism of *Rohiṇī* and so forth] *need not be observed*; this assertion is contained in the following text—'If a man is going to perform the *Soma sacrifice*, he should install the Fire and not wait for the season or asterism'; this means that if one wishes to install the Fire for performing the Soma-sacrifice, he should not wait for the prescribed season or asterism he should install the Fire forthwith This text clearly indicates the immediate sequence of the Soma-sacrifice to the Fire-installation If it did not mean that the Soma sacrifice should be performed immediately after the Fire installation then the assertion that 'the season and the asterism should not be awaited' would have no meaning at all —That is, if immediate sequence were not meant, then the assertion would mean that the 'season and the asterism' should be ignored by that same man for whom the observance of these has been enjoined —From all this it follows that there should be immediate sequence between the Soma sacrifice and the Fire installation Then again, the affix in the participle *Somāya yakṣyamāṇaḥ*, 'going to perform the Soma sacrifice', clearly shows that the sacrifice is to be performed on the same day as the Fire installation This could not be the intended meaning if the view were held that the *Soma sacrifice* must always be preceded by the *Iṣṭi* and in that case no significance could attach to the participial affix which denotes the act as to be done on the same day. So that the word (participial) would be wholly incompatible From this it follows that *immediate sequence* is really intended to be expressed

SŪTRA (7)

FURTHER, THE FIRE INSTALLATION IS ASSERTED TO BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE 'AND IT COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS BEING FOR THAT PURPOSE UNLESS THERE WERE SOMETHING PECULIAR (MEANT IN REGARD TO THE SOMA).

Bhāṣya

For the following reason also there should be immediate sequence between the Soma-sacrifice and the Fire installation "For what reason?"—*Because the Fire installation is asserted to be for the purpose of the Soma sacrifice*, in the text—'One who would perform the Soma-sacrifice should install the Fire',—this is an additional reason As a matter of fact every one who is going to perform any sacrifice—either the *Soma sacrifice* or the *Agnihotra and the rest*—installs the Fire; so that it could not be said to be 'for the sake of the Soma-*sacrifice* (alone)', unless there were some peculiarity in the case of the *Soma*-sacrifice, and the only peculiarity possible is that the *Soma-sacrifice* follows *immediately* after the Fire-installation.

SŪTRA (8)

THEN AGAIN, FOR ONE WHO IS NOT GOING TO PERFORM THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, A SPECIAL TIME IS PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUBSTANCES TO BE USED AT THE PAVAMĀNA SACRIFICE. THEREFORE, IF THERE BE IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY AT ALL

Bhāṣya

For one who is not going to perform the *Soma* sacrifice a special time is prescribed in connection with the substances to be used at the *Pavamāna sacrifice*, in the text If one who is not going to perform the Soma sacrifice were to install the Fire, he should prepare the sacrificial substances before a year There is no one who can be said to be 'one *not going to perform the sacrifice*' because the sacrifice (Soma) has been prescribed for all, hence it follows that the term 'not going to perform the Soma sacrifice' must mean *not going to perform it immediately* (after the Fire-installation)

SUTRA (9)

FOR ONE WHO IS NOT GOING TO PERFORM THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, THE IṢṬI SHOULD COME FIRST. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE FIRE-INSTALLATION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, THEN THE SOMA-SACRIFICE SHOULD COME FIRST

Bhāṣya

This *Sūtra* explains the purpose of this *Adhikaraṇa*. The question being—'This *Adhikaraṇa* appears to be a weak one, what is the use of carrying it on?'—the answer is given by the *Sūtra*—(*a*) For one who is not going to perform the *Soma-sacrifice*,—and who installs the Fire without reference to the *Soma-sacrifice*,—the *Iṣṭi* should come first; (*b*) but if the Fire-installing is for the purpose of the *Soma-sacrifice*, then the *Soma-sacrifice* should come first, i.e. if the Fire is installed for the purpose of the *Soma-sacrifice*, then the performance of the Soma sacrifice should come first.—[Thus there is an option in the matter and there can be no restriction regarding the order of sequence between the *Iṣṭi* and the *Soma-sacrifice*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *For the Brāhmaṇa also, there is no restriction as to the order of sequence between Iṣṭi and Soma.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA, THE SOMA-SACRIFICE SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO BE PERFORMED, ON ACCOUNT OF POSTPONEMENT"

Bhāṣya.

There is the Installation of Fire; in connection with it we have understood that either the *Iṣṭi* or the *Soma-sacrifice* should be the first to be performed.

Now there arises the following question—Is it for all the three higher castes, that either the *Soma-sacrifice* or *Iṣṭi* may be performed first? Or is it that for the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Soma-sacrifice* should always be performed first? Or in the case of the *Brāhmaṇa* the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice alone (out of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa Iṣṭi*) is to be performed after the *Soma sacrifice*, and for the rest, both the options are open to him? Or what is laid down to be performed after the *Soma-sacrifice* is a totally different sacrifice? Or only one substance is put off till after the Soma, and for the rest of it, both the options are open to him?

The natural answer to this appears to be that the two options—of performing the *Iṣṭi* before the *Soma*, and the *Soma* before the *Iṣṭi*—are open to all the three castes—"Why"—Because there is no distinction, we do not find any ground for differentiation

Against this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* view:—

"For the *Brāhmaṇa* the *Soma-sacrifice* should be the first to be performed always;—why?—because of *postponement*; the following text speaks of the postponement (or putting off) of the *Iṣṭi* (*Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*) (till after the *Soma-sacrifice*)—'As regards deities, the *Brāhmaṇa* is *Āgnēya* (related to *Agni*); having performed the Soma sacrifice, he becomes *Agnīṣomīya* (related to Agni Soma); that offering which is made at the *Pūrṇamāsa* should be offered afterwards; thus he becomes related to two deities'; [here it is said that the *Pūrṇamāsa*, which stands for the *Iṣṭi Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, is to be performed after the *Soma-sacrifice*]—What can a direct Vedic text not do? [So that when something has been declared in the Veda, it has to be accepted, however unreasonable it may seem.]—From all this it follows that for the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Soma-sacrifice* should be performed first, always"

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT IS ONLY THE 'PAURṆAMĀSA' THAT IS TO BE PUT OFF; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF DIRECT ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted that "for the *Brāhmaṇa* the Soma-sacrifice should come first always"; but in reality that is not so; because for the *Brāhmaṇa* also, both the options are equally open.—"Why?"—Because there is no distinction; as between the two options, there is no differentiation made, even for the *Brāhmaṇa*. "But it has just been shown in a text quoted that there is *postponement* (of the *Iṣṭi*), in the case of the Brāhmaṇa."—Not so, we reply. The 'postponement' spoken of in the text quoted is of the *Paurṇamāsa* only (not of the entire *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Iṣṭi*); as it is only the *Paurnamāsa* that is actually mentioned by means of the clause 'that offering is to be made *at the Pūrṇamāsa*'; and in cases of verbal authority, only that much has to be accepted as is actually expressed by the words; and there is no approach of any such reasoning as—'between two equally placed things (*Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*), the *postponement* of one (*Pūrṇamāsa*) must mean the postponement of the other (*Darsha*) also'.

SŪTRA (12).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT IN FACT, THE WHOLE SETS OF ACTS MAKE UP A SINGLE SACRIFICE [CALLED 'DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA']."

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"It has just been said that it is the *Pūrnamāsa* alone that is put off.—But that is not so; it is the 'postponement' of the entire sacrifice, '*Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*' that is laid down in the text; as it is only when the entire sacrifice is performed (as put off), that its result can follow; otherwise (if only the *Pūrṇamāsa* section were put off) there would be no result at all. That this is so is due to the fact that the *Pūrṇamāsa* is only a part (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*); and hence if this were put off, and the rest of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* were performed earlier (before the *Soma-sacrifice*), then no result would follow from this latter performance; as it would be only a partial performance; so that, as it would be fruitless, the unpostponed part, even though laid down, would not be performed. On the other hand, if the entire set of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* were put off and performed later, due results would follow from it.—The postponement of the entire set becomes implied, on the ground that only thus would the injunction of the set be fruitful.—Thus there should be postponement of the entire *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; which means that for the *Brāhmaṇa* the *Soma-sacrifice* should be performed first, always."

[The objection is answered by the Siddhāntin under Sū. 17, below.]

SŪTRA (13).

[ANSWER—FROM A THIRD PARTY]—"THE TEXT QUOTED SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INJUNCTIVE [OF A SACRIFICE DIFFERENT FROM THE ORDINARY 'DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA'] AS A SUBSIDIARY [OF THE JYOTIṢTOMA]."

Bhāṣya.

"It cannot be as asserted under the last *Sūtra*. If, in the absence of a direct assertion to that effect, the entire *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* were put off, then this sacrifice, performed after the *Soma-sacrifice*, should be taken to be a totally different sacrifice of the name of *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*' (other than the ordinary sacrifice of that name) -The advantage under this view would be that it would not be necessary to assume a result from a part of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* (the *Pūrṇamāsa* section only, according to the *Siddhānta*); as for the name, there may be the same name for two distinct sacrifices; just as the names (*a*) '*akṣa*', (*b*) *pāda*' and (*c*) '*māsa*' are applied to various things [(*a*) *akṣa*' stands for *dice, sense-organs, axle* and other things;—(*b*) '*pāda*' stands for *feet* and *rays*.—(*c*) '*māsa*' stands for *beans, a particular weight measure a tool*'—Or, the text may be taken as an injunction of a sacrifice, a totally different act, with the same details as the *Pūrṇamāsa*. This would be of the nature of 'Direct Assertion' and as such would set aside all indications of 'Syntactical Connection'. From all this it follows that the action spoken of in the text is a sacrifice totally different (from the ordinary *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*)"

SŪTRA (14)

[THE SIDDHĀNTA VIEW REGARDING THE TEXT QUOTED BY THE PŪRVA-PAKṢIN]—FROM THE 'CONTEXT' IT SHOULD BE 'TIME' [THAT IS LAID DOWN BY THE TEXT QUOTED].

Bhāṣya

There is no authority for taking the text as laying down a distinct sacrifice;—it is a perceptible fact that the text speaks of the sacrifice to which the Context belongs; and that for which there is such authority is what should be accepted; specially as it is not reasonable to attribute several meanings to a single term (as has been done to the term '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'). Then again, if the term were taken as denoting the details (of the *Pūrṇamāsa*), that would mean the attributing to the word an indirect indicative sense, while it is possible to take it in its directly expressed sense.—Further, nothing is known regarding the form of the new sacrifice (suggested); and as the form of the sacrifice has not been mentioned, it cannot be taken as a distinct sacrifice.—For these reasons, the text should be taken as mentioning the same sacrifice that has been dealt with in the 'Context', for the purpose of laying down the *time* (i.e. the time *after the Soma-sacrifice*). As it is

only the entire sacrifice that can bring about the result, if there is a postponement, there should be postponement of the entire sacrifice —The same is to be done in the case of the Brāhmaṇa performer also.

As for the argument that 'Direct Assertion' is more authoritative than 'Syntactical Connection',—our answer to this is as follows In a case where no result is spoken of, the indication of 'Syntactical Connection' also is admitted,—in the case in question there is no mention of any result.—If it be argued that the result could be assumed,—there can be no such assumption without a corroborative assertion, so that a direct assertion of the result also would have to be assumed; and the syntactical connection of that assumed text with the text in question would also have to be assumed. On the other hand, if the text in question is taken as laying down the *Time*, the syntactical connection would be with a *perceptible* (not an *assumed*) text —From all this it follows that the text quoted does not lay down a distinct sacrifice

Thus so far the whole *Adhikaraṇa* (dealing with the precise order of sequence between the *Iṣṭi* and the *Soma-sacrifice*) remains indefinite and incomplete [The thread of this *Adhikaraṇa* is going to be taken up again, under *Sūtras* 17 and 18, below.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The text, 'One need not wait for the season or the asterism', sets aside the time of the 'Soma-sacrifice'.*

SUTRA (15)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA] — THE SOMA WOULD BE PERFORMED IN ITS OWN TIME AS THERE IS NO PROHIBITION OF THAT

Bhāṣya

There is the text – *Yaḥ somena yakṣyamāṇaḥ agnīnādadhīta nartuṃ sa pratikṣīta na nakṣatram* [One who, going to perform the Soma sacrifice, is to install the Fires should not wait for the season or the asterism].

In regard to this there arises the question –Does this text lay down the rejection of a particular time for the Fire-installation? Or that for the performance of the Soma sacrifice?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:— This text lays down the rejection of the time for Fire-installation as for the *Soma-sacrifice*, it *would be performed in its own time*,—why? *–because there is no prohibition of that.* In fact, Fire-installation is an auxiliary act; hence if there is to be a rejection of the time, it should be of the time of the auxiliary rather than that of the Primary Sacrifice; as is going to be explained under Sū. 12 2. 25, where it is going to be shown that 'where there is a conflict between a primary and an auxiliary, it is the latter that is to be rejected'."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS THE DISSOCIATION OF THE FIRE-INSTALLATION [FROM THE TIME OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, THAT IS LAID DOWN BY THE TEXT IN QUESTION]; BECAUSE [AS FOR THE FIRE-INSTALLATION ITSELF] IT CAN BE PERFORMED AT ALL TIMES.

Bhāṣya.

The text in question should be taken as laying down the *dissociation of the Fire-installation from the time of the Soma sacrifice.*—Why so?—*Because, as for the Fire-installation itself, it can be performed at all times.* That is, there is no restriction of time regarding Fire-installation; it having been declared that 'one may install the Fire on the very day on which he feels inclined to do so' (Śatapatha Brā. 2. 1. 3. 9).—Under the circumstances, if the text were to prohibit any time in reference to the Fire-installation, it would be prohibiting something that is not relevant at all.—From this it follows that the text should be taken as laying down the rejection of the time of the performance of the *Soma-sacrifice.*

[*Adhikaraṇa* 5 practically ends here. The next two *Sūtras* take up the thread of the discussion under *Adhikaraṇa* 4.]

SŪTRA (17).

[THE SIDDHĀNTIN'S ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION URGED UNDER SŪ. 12, ABOVE]—FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA THE PŪRṆAMĀSA ALONE WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTPONED TILL AFTER THE SOMA-SACRIFICE: BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* supplies the answer to the objection (urged under Sū. 12) which has remained unanswered [from the point of view of the *Siddhāntin*].—It is not right to hold that the entire set of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices is meant (by the text) to be postponed (till after the *Soma-sacrifice*); in fact, it is only the *Pūrṇamāsa* that is meant to be postponed *till after the Soma-sacrifice.*—How so?—*Because of the Direct Assertion* to that effect,—this assertion being contained in the following text—'That offering which is made at the *Paurṇamāsī* should be made afterwards'; and no burden is too heavy for the Vedic text. Hence it is the *Pūrṇamāsa* alone that is meant to be postponed.—As for the argument that "there can be no result (from such a partial performance)",—the result will of course follow from

the whole of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* [even when the *Pūrṇamāsa* section of it is performed after the *Soma-sacrifice*];—this has to be accepted in view of the text quoted actually asserting it. Thus the objection that has been urged (under Sū. 12) does not affect our position.

SŪTRA (18).

[THE FINAL ANSWER OF THE SIDDHĀNTIN TO THE SAME OBJECTION] —IN FACT, IT IS ONLY ONE (OFFERING, OUT OF THE PŪRṆAMĀSA OFFERINGS, THAT IS MEANT TO BE POSTPONED), BECAUSE SUCH IS THE SENSE OF THE WORDS USED, AND ALSO BECAUSE THE ENTIRE PŪRṆAMĀSA HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS TO BE PERFORMED BEFORE (THE SOMA-SACRIFICE).

Bhāṣya.

In fact, only *one offering* should be postponed, —not the entire *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice. —"Why so?"—*Because such is the sense of the words used*; the words of the text are 'That *offering* which is made at the *Paurnamāsa*', and thus clearly expresses the postponement of only *one offering*; and in the case of verbal authority, we have to admit just what is directly expressed by the words; and what the words directly express is the postponement of just the *one* offering, nothing else —Then again, *the entire Pūrnamāsa has been laid down as to be performed before the Soma sacrifice*. Thus then, that which is laid down in the text as to be postponed shall be done *after* the *Soma-sacrifice*, that which is not laid down as to be postponed shall be done *before* the *Soma-sacrifice* —From all this it follows that only one offering shall be postponed; and that for the Brāhmana also both the options are available [i.e. he also may perform either the *Ista* or the *Soma-sacrifice* first].

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The offering of 'Clarified Butter' shall not be postponed till after the 'Soma'.*

SŪTRA (19).

THE CAKE ONLY (WHICH IS DEDICATED TO AGNI-SOMA) IS TO BE POSTPONED (TILL AFTER THE SOMA-SACRIFICE) AS THERE IS NO INDICATION (OF THE OTHER) SPECIALLY AS IT IS 'AGNI AS ASSOCIATED WITH SOMA' THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE 'DEITY'

Bhāṣya

[The question dealt with in this *Adhikaraṇa* is—which *one* is the *offering*—Cake or Clarified Butter—that is to be postponed, according to *Sūtra* 18.]

There is the following text—'*Āgnēyo vai brāhmaṇo dēvatayā, sa sōmēna ētrā agnīṣōmīyo bhavati, yadērvīdah paurṇamāsam havih tat tarhi anunirvapēt, tarhyubhayadēvatyo bhavati*' ['As regards deities, the Brāhmaṇa verily is related to *Agni*, after performing the *Soma sacrifice*, he becomes related to *Agni Soma*; that offering which is made at the *Pūrṇamāsa* should be made afterwards, then he becomes related to both deities']. This means that—inasmuch as he becomes 'related to *Agni Soma*' only at the time stated (i.e. after offering the *Soma sacrifice*)—and not before it,—therefore the said offering is to be made 'afterwards', and here, after enjoining the offering to *Agni Soma* the fact of its being offered to two deities is cited as a reason for its offering, so that the offering to *Agni Soma* would be the one that is justified by reason,—not any offering to a single deity; at the time stated the man can make the offering to *Agni Soma*, before that time that (*Agni-Soma*) is not the deity for that man. thus it is by making the offering that the sacrificing person becomes related to the deity and it becomes established that it is only the *Cake*, not any other substance, that is *Agnīṣōmīya*' (related to *Agni Soma*)

SŪTRA (20)

"THE CLARIFIED BUTTER ALSO (MAY BE PUT OFF)".—IF THIS IS URGED—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE NEXT SŪTRA]

Bhāṣya.

Objection— If you think that the *Cake* is to be postponed because it is *related to Agni Soma*, then, inasmuch as the Clarified Butter also is *related to Agni-Soma*, that also should be postponed."

SŪTRA (21).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO A NUMBER OF DEITIES, LIKE THE OFFERING TO INDRA-AGNI.

Bhāṣya.

The Clarified Butter *is related to a number of deities*—being related to Agni-Soma, Prajāpati and Viṣṇu; the Cake, on the other hand, is related to the single (joint) deity *Agni-Soma*; what the text speaks of is not an offering related to several deities; because an offering to several deities might be made even before the time stated; because, even though at that (previous time) the Sacrificer has not become 'related to *Agni-Soma*' as his deity (because he has not yet made the offering that would make him so), yet he could certainly make an offering of the Clarified Butter,—by offering it to *Prajāpati* or to *Viṣṇu*. For this reason, in the case of Clarified Butter, the fact of its being 'related to *Agni-Soma*' cannot be a reason for its coming after the *Soma sacrifice*.—Just as the 'quartering' (which has been laid down as to be done to the Cake *related to Agni*) does not apply to the Cake *related to Indra and Agni*, because it is related to several deities, —that also because what is *related to Indra and Agni* cannot be spoken of as *related to Agni*; and this on the ground that the nominal affix ('*dhak*') cannot be added to a noun ('*Agni*') which stands in need of another noun ('*Indra*') [Hence the affix could not come in if *Agni* stood for *Agni and Indra*]; —exactly in the same manner, in the case in question, the Clarified Butter cannot be spoken of as '*related to Agni-Soma*', even though it is related to Agni-Soma [because it is related also to deities other than *Agni-Soma*]. For this reason it could be offered by the sacrificer even before (the Soma-sacrifice); consequently the fact of the sacrifice being 'related to *Agni-Soma*' cannot be a reason for its being postponed; because, being related to several deities, its case is similar to that of the offering to *Indra and Agni*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The Ectypes are to be completed on the same day, not to be continued for two days, like the Archetype.*

SŪTRA (22).

INASMUCH AS THE ECTYPE IS TO BE PERFORMED AT THE TIME, THE SUBSEQUENT ECTYPE SHOULD BE PERFORMED THEN AND THERE (AT THE PRESCRIBED TIME), THE TWO POINTS OF TIME HAVING BEEN DIRECTLY PRESCRIBED

Bhāṣya.

All *Ectypal* sacrifices form the subject matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—such as '*Aindrāgnamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt* [One should offer the Cake baked on eleven pans to *Indra and Agni*'], and the like

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these ectypes to be performed then and there at the prescribed time? Or are they to be continued for two days (like their Archetype)? [The Archetype of *Iṣṭi* sacrifices, the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, extends over two days—it being distinctly laid down that 'on the previous day he should set up the Fire and on the following day make the offerings to the deities', and the question is—Are the ectypes also to extend over two days? Or are they to be completed in a single day?]

The natural answer to this question that presents itself is as follows—As a matter of fact, the Ectype takes in the details belonging to its Archetype, on the strength of the General Injunction (that the Ectype is to be performed like its Archetype), and hence so far as the Ectype is concerned, all these details are assumed through Inference The Full-Moon Day is a time other than that at which the Ectype has begun to be performed [i.e. the Moonless Day]; —now this other time (the Full-Moon Day) might be taken up, either by the (continuation of the) Archetype itself, or by the Ectype; it could not be taken up by both, hence it would have to be abandoned in reference to one or the other of the two. Under the circumstances, it is far more reasonable that it should be abandoned in reference to the Ectype, with which the connection of the said time is only assumed through Inference,—and not in reference to the Archetype, with which its connection is directly laid down. From this it follows that the Ectypes should be performed then and there, at the prescribed time.

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"IF THEY WERE PERFORMED DURING THE TWO DAYS, IT WOULD BE MORE LOGICAL."

Bhāṣya.

[*Says the Opponent*]—"If the Ectypes were performed during two days, it would be done more logically; hence they should be performed during the two days, by this the General Injunction would become honoured. Because in connection with the Archetype, we read – On the previous day one should set up the Fire and on the following day he should offer the sacrifice to the deity'. Hence the order of performance should be like this –Having completed one Ectype extending over two days, one should begin the other on the same day and finish it on the following day."

SŪTRA (24).

[ANSWER]—THEY SHOULD BE PERFORMED THEN AND THERE, AT THE PRESCRIBED TIME, BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT

Bhāṣya.

It is not correct to say that the Ectypes should extend over two days; because *they should be performed then and there, at the prescribed time.*—"Why so?"—Because there is the following text to that effect –'When one is going to perform the *Iṣṭi*, or the Animal-sacrifice, or the Soma-sacrifice, or the *Āgrayaṇa*, he should perform it on either the Full-Moon Day or the Moonless Day'. This assertion is in reference to the Primary sacrifice along with its auxiliaries, and from this it follows that the whole sacrifice along with its auxiliaries should be performed either on the Full-Moon Day or on the Moonless Day: so that the Ectypes have to be performed then and there, at the prescribed time.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Ectypes of the 'Sānnāyya offering', and those of the 'Agnīṣomīya offering', are to be put off till after the Soma-sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (25).

THE ECTYPES OF THE 'SĀNNĀYYA OFFERING' AND THOSE OF THE 'AGNĪṢOMĪYA OFFERING' SHOULD BE PUT OFF TILL AFTER THE SOMA-SACRIFICE.—LIKE THEIR ARCHETYPES.

Bhāṣya.

The Ectypes of the '*Sānnāyya offering*' and those of the '*Agnīṣomīya offering*' are the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*.—The Ectype of the *Sānnāyya* is the *Āmikṣā* (curdled pieces) offering [Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 8. 2 1], and the Ectype of the *Agnīṣomīya* has been laid down in the text—'The Brāhmaṇa desiring Brahmaṇ glory should offer the Cake of *Shyāmāka* corn baked upon eleven pans to Agni-Soma, during the spring'—(Taitti. Saṁ 2. 5. 5. 1), and so forth.

In regard to these, there arises the question Are these Ectypes to be performed *before* as well as *after* the Soma-sacrifice? or only after it?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "they may be performed before as well as after the *Soma-sacrifice*: as there is no ground for distinction"

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—They should be performed *after* the *Soma sacrifice*. The Archetypes of these sacrifices are performed after the Soma sacrifice; therefore, on the basis of the General Injunction these sacrifices also should be performed *after* the Soma sacrifice—That the *Sānnāyya* should be offered after the *Soma sacrifice* has been declared in the text—'One who has not performed the *Soma-sacrifice* should not offer the *Sānnāyya*'. Of the *Agnīṣomīya* also the performance after the *Soma-sacrifice* has been laid down in the following text—'As regards deities, the Brāhmaṇa is related to *Agni*, he becomes that *after having performed the Soma-sacrifice*; hence that which is offered at the Paurṇamāsī should be offered afterwards, and then he becomes related to both deities'.—Thus then, inasmuch as both these *Archetypes* are spoken of as to be performed after the *Soma-sacrifice*, their ectypes also should be performed after the *Soma sacrifice*.

ADHIKARAṆA (9) : *The Ectypes of the Soma-sacrifice should be performed after the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*

SUTRA (26).

SIMILARLY, THE ECTYPES OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE SHOULD BE PERFORMED AFTER THE DARSHA-PŪRNAMĀSA

Bhāṣya.

The Cow-sacrifice and other *Ekāha* sacrifices are the Ectypes of the *Soma-sacrifice.*

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these Ectypes to be performed *before* as well as *after* the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ? or only after these ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that ' there should be no restriction, as there is no ground for making any distinction ".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*Similarly the Ectypes of the Soma-sacrifice should be performed after the Darsha-Pūrnamāsa.* The *Jyotiṣtoma* (which is the Archetype of the Soma-sacrifices) is performed after the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, as is clearly laid down in the text—'After having performed the *Darshā-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, one should offer the Soma-sacrifice ' (Taitt. Sam. 2. 5. 6. 1). By virtue of the General Injunction, this property (of being performed after the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) becomes transferred to the Cow-sacrifice and other *Ekāha* sacrifices (which are Ectypes of the *Jyotiṣtoma*) ; hence it follows that these also should be performed after the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa.*

End of Pāda IV of Adhyāya I.

End of Adhyāya I

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA I.

[Sacrificial acts and their order have been dealt with; we now proceed to consider the nature of the *Performer*—Who is the person qualified for the performance of sacrifices? As a rule, the person going to perform a sacrifice is one who wishes to obtain the results that the sacrifice is expected to bring about; hence the First *Adhikaraṇa* is devoted to establishing the fact that the sacrificial acts being considered are really fruitful, they really bring about definite results.]

ADHIKARAṆA (1): '*Adhikāranyāya*': *Sacrifices and other acts are conducive to Heaven and other desirable results.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHENEVER SUBSTANCES ARE CONNECTED WITH ACTIONS, IT IS ONLY AS SUBORDINATE AUXILIARIES THAT THEY ARE RELATED TO THEM".

Bhāṣya.

We have such texts as 'One desiring Heaven, should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices',—'One desiring Heaven, should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'.

(A) In regard to these, there arises the question—Is 'Heaven' the *subordinate*, and the 'sacrificial act' the *principal*, factor—or the 'sacrificial act' the *subordinate*, and 'Heaven' the *predominant*, factor?

Question—"Why should this question arise?"

Answer—Here both the things are mentioned—'Desiring Heaven' as well as 'should sacrifice'; so that some sort of relationship between 'desire for heaven' and 'sacrifice' is understood to be meant;—now in this relationship, does the '*sacrifice*' come in as the *means* or as the *end* to be accomplished?—there is reason for the consideration of this question.—Now (A), if what is enjoined by the sentence is the *sacrifice* as to be accomplished by the person 'desiring heaven',—the meaning being that 'the sacrifice should be performed by the person desiring heaven',—then it follows that the 'sacrifice' can be duly accomplished only by one who is imbued with the 'desire for heaven'; so that in relation to the 'sacrifice', the 'desire for heaven' would appear to be enjoined (as a *means*) for the man; so that the sacrifice can be accomplished only by one who has that desire, and not by any other person; as it is only one 'desiring heaven' that can be able to accomplish the sacrifice. [In this case, the 'sacrifice' would be the *end*, and the 'desire for heaven', the *means*.]—(B) On the other hand, if what is enjoined for the 'man desiring heaven' is the bringing

about of the desired thing,—then this bringing about of the *desired thing* would have to be taken to be qualified by the 'Sacrifice'; and in that case the 'Sacrifice' would be recognised as the *means* [and the 'desired thing' as the *End*].—As a matter of fact, the text in question is capable of affording both these meanings (A and B):—viz., (A) the *Sacrifice* should be accomplished (by means of the *Desire for Heaven*), and (B) the *desired thing, Heaven*, is to be brought about (by means of the *sacrifice*).—And yet both of these could not be possible simultaneously; for if the 'Sacrifice' is the end, the 'desired thing' cannot be so,—and if the 'desired thing' is the end, the 'Sacrifice' cannot be so; because the constructions of the text will have to be different in the two cases [i.e. if the 'Sacrifice' is the *End*, the construction would be '*kāmēna yāgam bhāvayēt*', 'one should bring about the sacrifice by means of the desire'; whereas if the 'desired thing' were the end, the construction would be '*yāgēna kāmam bhāvayēt*', 'one should bring about the desired thing by means of the sacrifice].—Thus we find that the question is quite reasonable.

(B) Similarly there is another question arising out of the said question—What is 'Heaven'?—Is it 'happiness'—or a 'substance'?—This question arises here because if 'Heaven' is a 'substance', then the *act* (sacrifice) is the *principal*, and the *substance* (Heaven) the subordinate, factor;—on the other hand, if 'Heaven' is 'happiness', then the *sacrifice* is the subordinate, and *Heaven* the *principal*, factor.

"But why should this question arise?"

It arises because the text does not speak of the 'desired thing' as the subordinate or as the principal factor; all that it expresses is the relationship between that thing and the 'Sacrifice'; while by the very nature of things, a *substance* is what subserves the purposes of an *act*, while human effort (activity) subserves the purposes of 'Happiness'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on the question (A) is as follows:—"Heaven (the *desired thing*) is the *subordinate*, and the *act* (sacrifice), the principal, factor. And in this connection they declare (in answer to question B) that 'Heaven' is a *substance*.—How is this deduced?—For the ascertaining of the meanings of all words, we have to depend upon common usage; and in common usage, the word 'heaven' has been found to be expressive of *substance*,—i.e. it stands for substances in all such assertions as—'Fine silken clothes are *Heaven*', 'Sandal-paste is *Heaven*', 'Sixteen-year-old girls are *Heaven*', and the like; in fact anything that is *pleasant* is spoken of as 'Heaven'; and from this equation we get at the proposition that 'Heaven is a pleasure-giving *substance*'.—It might be urged that 'the use of the word *Heaven* referred may be based upon Analogy'.—But as a matter of fact, there is no use of the word ('Heaven') independently of this analogy, upon which the said analogy could be based. Hence the use of the word in question cannot be regarded as 'analogical'.—Therefore we conclude that 'Heaven' is a *substance*.

"The Opponent says—This is not so; 'Heaven' is *happiness*; it cannot be a *substance*, because the two are not concomitant; i.e. there are cases where the word 'heaven' does not denote the same *substance*: on the other hand, there is no case where the word does *not* denote *happiness*. Hence from negative and positive concomitance, we conclude that the word 'heaven' denotes *happiness*.

"But it is not true that the word 'heaven' is expressive of *happiness*.—Why so?—Because it is a qualifying factor, and what enters into the connotation of a word as a qualifying factor cannot itself form that connotation. For instance, in the case of the word '*daṇḍin*', 'stick-holder', the word denotes the *man* through the *stick* (which is a qualifying factor): so that the *stick* is only a basis for the connotation, and does not form the connotation of the word. In the same manner, the word 'heaven' is not connotative of 'happiness', it is connotative only of a *thing bringing happiness*.

"Says the Opponent—Among common people, the word 'heaven' is found to be used in the sense of a particular *region*—'Where there is neither heat nor cold, neither hunger nor thirst, no unpleasantness, no sorrow,—a region to which go after death only men who have led virtuous lives'—The answer to this is that, if some people had gone there without dying, and had returned,—without going through the process of being born again,—then alone could any such region be believed to exist, on the basis of the direct perception of these men; and it cannot be believed in solely on the basis of Inference.—Opponent—'There have been persons with occult powers who have actually seen such a region, and have described it'.—There is no evidence in support of the assertion that there have been such men with occult powers and that they have described the Heavenly Region as above.—Hence we conclude that there is no such Region.—'But from (*a*) common usage, (*b*) from stories, and (*c*) from the Veda, we learn that there is such a region as *Heaven*'.—That cannot be; (*a*) because no men having ever come across such a region, any *ordinary description* of it cannot be regarded as trustworthy;—(*b*) *stories* also being the work of human authors, cannot be trustworthy;—(*a*) then, as for the description of Heaven met with in the Vedas,—there is no such passage which is mandatory in its character; wherever it is found, it is only as part of some other injunctive sentence, and as such to be taken only as commendatory (of what is enjoined in this latter sentence).—Even though some proof of the existence of such a region may be found in the fact that, if such a region did not exist, then there would be no justification for those Vedic declarations that speak of 'pure unalloyed happiness',—yet, the existence of such a region would not be inconsistent with our view that the word 'Heaven' denotes 'the means of happiness'.—Thus then, there being no human activity in relation to any such region, the word 'heaven' cannot be regarded as expressive of it.

"It being thus settled that Heaven is only *a thing bringing happiness*, we assert the following view (in answer to the main question of the *Adhikaraṇa*)—*Whenever substances are connected with actions, it is only as subordinate auxiliaries that they are related to them* (Sūtra). That is, in the text in question it is the 'Sacrifice' that is declared as *to be accomplished*

by the man 'desiring heaven';—hence there must be some 'connection' between the 'Sacrifice' and 'Heaven';—now of these two, that what is a substance is already an accomplished entity, and it is only the *act* (sacrifice), that is *yet to be accomplished*;—and between these two, it is only right that what is already an accomplished entity should subserve the purposes of what is *yet to be accomplished*; because in this case the help rendered by the latter would be something tangible;—what is *yet to be accomplished* cannot be regarded as subserving the purposes of what is already an *accomplished entity*; as in this case all idea of any tangible benefit would have to be renounced (as impossible).

"*Opponent*—'How do you know that the text in question enjoins the *sacrifice* as *to be accomplished*,—when it is clear that the same text also speaks of the *desired* result as *to be brought about*?'

"*Answer*—That the *desired result is to be brought about* is indicated by 'Syntactical Connection', while *that the sacrifice is to be accomplished* is declared by 'Direct Assertion'; and 'Direct Assertion' is more authoritative than 'Syntactical Connection'. Hence the meaning of the sentence is that 'one desiring Heaven should accomplish the sacrifice'; i.e. for 'one desiring heaven, it is necessary that the sacrifice should be accomplished'.—Then again, it is well known that 'what should be accomplished or done (i.e. Right)' brings happiness and 'what should not be done (i.e. Wrong)' brings unhappiness;—and the 'Sacrifice' is spoken of by the text as 'to be accomplished';—hence it follows that the 'Sacrifice' will bring happiness;—and this happiness can come only to one who desires (seeks for) it, not to anyone else.—Thus it is that 'desire for heaven' becomes subordinate to the 'Sacrifice'; in fact, in the case of all actions, a desire for things comes in as a subordinate factor; as it is through this desire that the man (who is going to do the act) tries to secure the things (required for the act) by tangible means. In the case in question, it is the desire for the particular substance, *Heaven*, that has been specified;—and exactly as it has been found to be subordinate (to the act of *Sacrifice*), so in the same form should it be taken as specified by the text;—that is to say, as subserving the purposes of the sacrifice, only through tangible, not through intangible, means.—From all this, it follows that when a man is impelled by the 'desire for heaven'—which is subordinate to the sacrifice,—he will try to accomplish the 'sacrifice', with a view to securing the substance, 'Heaven'.—Even if this were done through intangible means, it would not affect our position."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT [THE ACT ITSELF] WOULD NOT BE PERFORMED: BECAUSE IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*', 'but', serves to preclude the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

As a matter of fact, people always describe 'Heaven' as 'happiness'.—"But why so?"—Well, you have asserted that "the term 'heaven' denotes

a substance qualified by happiness".—If that is so, then it is necessary that it should first denote *happiness*; because it is only the idea of *happiness* with which the word is invariably concomitant; though it is not so concomitant with the idea of *substance*; for instance, that same *substance which is conducive to happiness*,—which substance is held to be denoted by the term 'heaven'—sometimes fails to bring happiness, and in that case that substance cannot be denoted by the term 'heaven', [which shows that the idea of *substance* is not inseparable from the term 'heaven']; and from this it follows that the term 'heaven' denotes *happiness*.

It has been argued that the case of the term 'heaven' denoting *the substance qualified by happiness* is analogous to the case of the term 'stick-holder' denoting *the man qualified by the stick*.—But there also the term brings about the notion of the *man holding the stick* only after the *stick* itself has been cognised as denoted by the word; because the term 'stick' forms part of the term 'stick-holder', and that is what denotes the *stick*. In the case in question however, there is only the one word 'heaven', and this must denote *happiness* [so the two cases are not analogous].

It being settled then that the term 'heaven' denotes *happiness*, the 'sacrifice' must be the *subordinate*, and 'happiness' the *principal*, factor. —Why so?—Because the Agent's effort (activity) *is for that purpose*; whenever a man puts forth an effort, it is always for the purpose of obtaining *happiness*; and from this we conclude that *happiness* [being the *end* of all activity] cannot be the *means* to the act of 'Sacrifice'; specially because it is a *substance* that is the means to a 'Sacrifice'; as in the absence of a *substance*, no 'sacrifice' is possible; since the very term 'sacrifice' denotes *an act bearing upon a substance and a deity*. Then again, there are 'sacrifices' even when there is no 'happiness'. Further, if the *sacrifice* were not performed for the purpose of obtaining 'happiness', then *it would not be performed at all*; i.e. it could not have anyone to perform it; it is only the act that serves the purpose of bringing about *happiness* that is performed,—none other is performed.

Says the Opponent—"But in the text itself, it is the *sacrifice* that is laid down as *to be done, brought about*".

Answer—It is true that the *sacrifice* is laid down as *to be done*; but the *desired thing* also is understood to be what should be *brought about*.

Opponent—"It is through *Direct Assertion* that the sacrifice is declared to be what should be brought about; while it is by *Syntactical Connection* that the *desired thing* is indicated to be what should be brought about; and both of them cannot be regarded as to be brought about; as that would involve a syntactical split. [And as *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*, it is the *Sacrifice* that should be taken as what is to be brought about.]"

Answer—Even though *sacrifice* is found to be directly asserted as to be brought about, yet it could not (by itself) be brought about or done; because what is done by man is an act that brings *happiness* (not what brings pain), and the performance of a sacrifice is always painful; thus being directly perceived as painful, it would be directly perceived as something *not to be done*.

"But from the fact of its being laid down as *to be done* it would be inferred to be conducive to happiness."

Answer—Inference, contrary to Perception, can have no validity.

From all this it follows that, if the Sacrifice does not serve the purpose of bringing about *happiness*, then it cannot be performed at all.

Opponent—"The sacrifice [enjoined by the text in question] could be connected (taken along) with some other text speaking of a desirable result."

Answer—Even if it were so *connected*, if it were not actually *enjoined*, it could not be understood to be conducive to any result, simply on the ground of its being mentioned in proximity to such a result.—It is for this reason that, in order to save the *sacrifice* from being regarded as fruitless, 'Heaven' comes to be understood as something to be brought about; and as the man's activity in the case is qualified by the act of 'Sacrifice', it is this act of 'Sacrifice' that should be the means of bringing about the said *Heaven*.

Thus we find that it has been well said that the 'Sacrifice' is the *subordinate*, and 'Heaven' the *principal*, factor.

SŪTRA (3).

FURTHER, INASMUCH AS THE ACT (OF SACRIFICE) MUST BE RELATED (TO SOMETHING), IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS RELATED TO THE DESIRED THING (HEAVEN); HENCE THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINING THE ACT (OF SACRIFICE, AS A MEANS TO THE ATTAINMENT OF HEAVEN).

Bhāṣya.

It is not only in order to avoid its fruitlessness that we regard the *sacrifice* as the subordinate factor; as a matter of fact (we do so) because the *sacrifice* is actually enjoined as a means to the attainment of the *desired thing* called 'heaven'.—"But it is the sacrifice itself which is enjoined directly by the text as what should be done or brought about [from which it follows that the *sacrifice* is the *principal* factor]".—True; but in that case, the *sacrifice* becomes entirely fruitless. If the *sacrifice* is not taken as enjoined in reference to Heaven, then,—and the sacrifice thereby being something fruitless,—the 'desire for heaven', even though laid down in the text, would be entirely useless; and in that case the whole Injunction would be pointless. If the two things (*Heaven* and *Sacrifice*) not related to one another, were taken as enjoined (by the text), then, that would involve a syntactical split.—From this we conclude that the term 'desiring heaven' does not *enjoin*,—it only *refers to*—what is expressed by it [i.e. it forms part of the *Subject*, not the *Predicate*, of the sentence]. Thus it is that the 'desired thing', which is indicated by 'Syntactical Connection', comes to be recognised as *to be done or accomplished*, and the 'Sacrifice' comes to be recognised as the *means* to that accomplishment. In this way there would be no direct inconsistency in not regarding the 'Sacrifice' as something to be done or brought about—[Read—'*evamayāgakārtavyatāyām*' as in *MS.C.* If we retain the printed text it can be taken as—'In this way there would be no direct

inconsistency *in the sacrifice being performed*', because the *means* also has to operate towards the fulfilment of the desired end]—From all this it follows that *the text should be taken as enjoining the act*, —i.e. it is the *act of sacrifice* that is enjoined as the means to the attainment of Heaven,—and not the *Heaven* as a means to the *act of sacrifice*

Objection—"What advantage is there if the Heaven is *not* enjoined?"

Answer—The advantage is this As a matter of fact, what is not enjoined and what is not implied cannot be treated as a subordinate factor, hence (if Heaven is not enjoined) it follows that Heaven must be the *principal*, and the *act of sacrifice*, the subordinate, factor

Then again, any such idea as—'one for whom Heaven is the desired object should accomplish the sacrifice'—would be a most incongruous one—the man *desiring* one thing and *accomplishing* something else— But from the connection between the two, it is understood that the sacrifice, when accomplished, would lead to the attainment of Heaven'—That cannot be; as for people for whom the Verbal Text is the sole authority (in regard to the matter under consideration), it is not right to derive any idea except through the Text If the Opponent were to say— It is from the text itself that we deduce the said connection between the *Sacrifice* and *Heaven* just as we do in the case of the sentence 'Desiring to collect wood, one should go to the forest','—then, the *Siddhāntin* should reply that in the case of the sentence cited, the fact that *going to the forest* is conducive to the *collecting of wood* is already known from other sources [which cannot be said in regard to the text speaking of *Sacrifice and Heaven*]—The Opponent might say—'In order to save the injunction from being futile, we could have the presumption (of the said connection between *Sacrifice* and *Heaven*)'—The answer to that is that the futility of an injunction has no such capacity as to provide the notion that 'Happiness is the fruit of sacrifice' in the absence of a direct assertion of such a fruit It might well become futile, but it cannot have the said capacity For instance, if a man is desirous of burning a thing and fetches water for that purpose, this *fetching of water* would be futile, as it would not bring about the desired *burning*,—but this 'futility' cannot produce, in the water, the capacity to burn

In reality however, if the other view is accepted—that the text enjoins the sacrifice for the man desiring Heaven—this injunction is found to serve a distinctly useful purpose—'According to this other view also, all that is done is that the Sacrifice is enjoined for the man desiring Heaven,—not that Heaven follows from the Sacrifice"—That is not right; because according to our view what the text does is to refer to the activity of the man desiring Heaven, and enjoins the *Sacrifice* as a means thereto So that it is not open to the objection that has been urged against it—"But there is no text to the effect that that activity is with a view to Heaven"—As a rule an activity is undertaken with a view to some desired object, for 'the man desiring Heaven' *Heaven* is the desired object;—in fact, the mention of 'Desire for heaven' is there only for the purpose of indicating that particular activity which would bring about that object,—hence this view is entirely flawless

From all this it follows that the text contains an injunction of the act of *Sacrifice* for the man desiring Heaven; and hence it also follows that 'Heaven' is the *principal*, and 'Sacrifice', the subordinate, factor. Thus then, the injunction 'should sacrifice' should be taken as referring to the person 'desiring Heaven'; and it thus becomes established that the text in question lays down the characteristics of the *performer*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Only human beings are entitled to perform such acts as the 'Sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS AN ACT IS PERFORMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING RESULTS, ALL BEINGS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO PERFORM THE ACTS PRESCRIBED IN THE SCRIPTURES".

Bhāṣya.

We have the texts—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices', 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'.

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these acts enjoined for all kinds of beings? Or only for such beings as may have the capacity to perform the acts enjoined?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The injunctions must be meant for all beings, because there is no distinction.—'But there are certain beings who do not *desire* anything; how could they be entitled to perform the acts enjoined'.—The answer to this is that the injunctions may not be applicable to inanimate objects; but the injunctive word 'should sacrifice' could certainly be addressed to all animals.—'But animals also do not desire anything'.—That is not so, we reply. Animals do desire happiness; for instance, it is found that when suffering from the effects of heat, they betake themselves to the shade, and when suffering from cold, they move into the sun.—Says the opponent—'Animals are conscious of immediately impending results, they never desire any results that are to come in the future: and the acts prescribed in the Veda (which we are considering now) are all such as have their results appearing in the remote future'.—The answer to this is that animals are found to evince a desire for some such results as are to appear in the remote future; for instance, we find dogs fasting on the fourteenth, and kites on the eighth, day of the month. There can be no chance of these animals suffering from disease (on account of which they may be going without food on certain days); because the fasting is found to recur on fixed days (and certainly there could be no such regularity of intervals in the animal's being ill): also because all the time we find several articles of food lying before the said animals (so that the fasting cannot be held to be due to want of food); while at other times they are not found going without food even though only simple articles of food are there before them.—Then again, there are Vedic texts also indicative of the fact that, like deities and sages, trees also perform sacrifices,—such texts, for instance, as—'*Devā vai sattramāsata.....vanaspatayaḥ sattramāsata*' ['*The deities took part in the sacrificial session .....the trees took part in the sacrificial session*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 11. 3).

—'As a matter of fact, however, animals and trees cannot be capable of carrying out the entire details of the enjoined act; and as such they cannot be entitled to perform them'.—The answer to this is that some of them may be able to perform the sacrifice; and therefore such injunctive words as 'should sacrifice' will apply to those that may be so able; though there may be some such details as the *Viṣṇukrama* and the like which they may not be able to perform, and the injunction of these will not apply to those.—So that the being to whom the injunctions of the *Viṣṇukrama* and such details will not be applicable will perform the *sacrifice* pure and simple; where would be the harm in that? As for the possession of property (necessary for the performance of sacrifices), such names of villages as '*Devagrāma*' ('village of deities'), '*Hastigrāma*' ('village of elephants') '*Ṛsabhasya grāmah*' ('village of the Bull'), indicate that beings other than *Men* also possess properties in an indirect (figurative) sense.—From all this it follows that beings other than man are also entitled to perform sacrifices, so long as they are able to do so".

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE INJUNCTION OF AN ACT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO APPLY TO ONLY SUCH AN AGENT AS MAY BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT THE ENTIRE DETAILS OF THE ACT; BECAUSE SUCH IS THE SENSE OF THE VEDIC TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*nā*' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

It is not correct to hold that animals also are entitled to perform sacrifices.—"Who then is entitled?"—Only one who is able to carry out the whole act. As a matter of fact, animals and others are not able to carry out the details of the sacrifice in their entirety;—hence for these beings the sacrifice cannot be a means of securing happiness; how can an act that one cannot do be a means of happiness to him?—The *deities* also are not entitled to perform sacrifices, because apart from themselves there are no other deities (to whom they could offer the sacrifice), and there can be no offering to one's own self; in fact, such an act would not be an *offering* at all.—Nor are *sages* entitled to perform sacrifices, because they have no '*gotra*'; *Bhṛgu* and other sages for instance cannot belong to the 'gotra' of those same *Bhṛgu* and others.—Nor is the capacity (of Deities and Sages) to perform sacrifices at all perceptible.

Then again, as a matter of fact, animals are never found to desire results expected to appear in the remote future; they desire only what is immediately present before them.—"But we have already pointed out that animals are actually found to desire results in the future, when, for instance, dogs fast on the fourteenth, and kites on the eighth, day of the month".—The answer to this is that these animals do not fast with a view to any results to accrue to them in their next life.—"How do you know that?"—We deduce it from the fact that they have not studied the Veda, and it is

only one who has studied the Veda can have any such idea as that 'Having done this act, I shall obtain such and such a result in other regions'; the animals do not study the Veda; nor the Smṛti-scriptures; nor can they learn it from teachers. Hence it follows that they are not cognisant of what *Dharma*, 'Duty', is. Being ignorant of *Dharma*, how could they perform any *Dharma*? Hence it follows that when they fast they do not do so for the sake of '*Dharma*'.—"Then why do they fast?"—They have an aversion to food due to illness.—"How is it that they have this illness at fixed intervals of time?"—*Answer*—There are certain illnesses which appear at fixed intervals; e.g. the Tertian and the Quartian ague and such others.—

Thus we conclude that only human beings are entitled to perform sacrifices.

Nor again is it possible for animals to own property; they are never found making use of any property according to their wish; hence it follows that they do not own any property. As for the names 'village of elephants', 'village of deities',—those are merely figurative expressions. —For this reason also animals cannot be regarded as entitled to perform sacrifices.

As for the indicative texts—'The deities sat at the sacrificial session .....the trees sat at the sacrificial session', and so forth,—they are merely declamatory statements, commendatory of certain injunctions; relating to every one of these statements, there is another injunction; and one injunction cannot be taken as connected with another injunction; as that would alter the form of the sentences. The statement in question therefore has to be taken as commendatory, the sense of the commendation being—'So important are the sacrificial sessions that even deities, who have all their desires fulfilled, sit at them, as also semi-intelligent animals and insentient trees sit at them,—what to say of learned men!'

"Those that are unable to perform the '*Viṣṇukrama*' and other details, may perform the *sacrifice* pure and simple".

That cannot be; because the details are prescribed in relation to the *sacrifice*, not in relation to the *performer*; so that if the mere *sacrifice* were offered (without the details), the performance would be defective; and the proper result would not follow.—"How do you know that the details are prescribed *in relation to the sacrifice* (and not in relation to the *performer*)?" —As a matter of fact, when the injunction of the *sacrifice* is in want of certain details those details that happen to be mentioned in close proximity to that injunction are alone capable of supplying that want;—otherwise, if the texts speaking of the details referred only to the capacity of the *performer*, the main injunction would be left without its wants supplied, and as such it would fail in its purpose; and under the circumstances, the statement of the result would come in as an 'elliptical extension'; and this would stand in the way of the syntactical connection of the Injunctive text which, on account of its incompleteness, would thus be hampered.—'But the same text would enjoin the sacrifice with all its details, for those who are capable of performing it in its complete form,—but only the *bare sacrifice* without the details, for those unable to perform it in its complete form."—That cannot be possible; if a single statement has two distinct

significations, there is a syntactical split, by reason of the two significations being incompatible with one another; specially as the sentence would still be incomplete in regard to the details of its procedure Consequently the injunction has to be taken as one of the sacrifice with all its details,—and it cannot be an injunction of the sacrifice without its details.

From all this it follows that only human beings are entitled to perform sacrifices.

The purpose served by this Adhikaraṇa is as follows:—There is a certain sacrifice laid down as to be performed 'for a thousand years';—now if, as held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, deities also were meant to be performers of sacrifices, then the said sacrifice could be performed by them, as their span of life does extend over 'a thousand years'; so that there would be no justification for taking the term 'years' as standing for *days*;- while according to the *Siddhānta*, as only human beings are entitled to perform sacrifices,—and they cannot live for 'a thousand years', the term 'years' *has, in this case, to be taken as standing for days. This we are going to* explain later on (under Sū. 6. 7. 31-40).

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Men and Women are both entitled to the performance of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ON ACCOUNT OF THE USE OF THE PARTICULAR GENDER (MASCULINE), ONLY MEN ARE ENTITLED,—SAYS AITISHĀYANA".

Bhāṣya.

We have such texts as—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'

In regard to these there arises the question—Has the word 'should sacrifice' been used in relation to *men* (males)? or to *men* and *women*, without restriction?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The word has been used in relation to *males* only—so thought Aitishāyana.—Why so?—*Because of the use of the particular gender*: i.e. in the sentence '*svargakāmo yāgēta*' ('Desiring Heaven, one should perform the sacrifice'), we find the Masculine gender used (in the word '*svargakāmaḥ*'); whence it follows that the person who is spoken of as to 'perform the sacrifice' must be taken to be *male*, not *female*."

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THE GENDER IS MEANT TO BE SIGNIFICANT; AS IS CLEAR FROM THE FACT THAT IT [IS THE KILLING OF THE FOETUS] BEFORE ITS SEX IS KNOWN THAT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE SINFUL".

Bhāṣya.

"It is the killing of the foetus *before its sex is known* that has been referred to as the sin of 'foetus-murder', in the text—'One becomes a *foetus-murderer* by killing a foetus before its sex is known';—a 'foetus-murderer' is the worst of sinners; because one who kills a foetus kills what is beneficial in both worlds; the *foetus-murderer* is also a *murderer of the sacrifice*, in the sense that he has killed the person who would have performed a sacrifice:—it is for this reason too that they call a sacrifice '*bhruṇa*' (foetus), in the sense that it *supports* ('*bibharti*') all things, or because it brings prosperity ('*bhūti*'):—thus one who destroys a sacrifice is a 'foetus-murderer' ('*bhrūṇa-han*')".—Now this reference to the 'foetus-killer' (as one who destroys the sacrifice) would have some sense only if the performer of sacrifices were always a *male*;—because if a foetus is killed before its sex is known, it is just possible that a male-child might be killed,—and this would mean that a prospective performer of sacrifices has been killed; and

thus alone could the 'foetus-murder' would be 'sacrifice-murder'.—Otherwise, if both males and females were entitled to the performance of sacrifices, then in all cases,—whether the sex of the foetus be known or not known—the 'foetus-murder' would be 'sacrifice-murder'; and in that case there would be no sense in the epithet 'not known' (regarding the foetus).—From this it follows that the masculine affix (in the term '*svarga-kāmah*', 'desiring heaven') must be regarded as significant.

"Similarly we have the declaration that 'the man who kills an *ātrēyī* is a foetus-murderer',—'*ātrēyi*' is the name given to a pregnant woman, in the sense that 'in her womb ('*atra*') there is a child'. From this also (for reasons explained in the preceding paragraph) it follows that *man* alone is entitled to the performance of sacrifices.

"Just as in the case of the injunction 'one should sacrifice the animal' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 5. 9. 7) it is only a *male* animal that is killed, *because of the use of the particular (Masculine) Gender* (in '*pashum*') [see Sū. 4. 1. 17.]—so should it be in the case in question also [because here also we have *the use of the particular (Masculine) Gender.*"

Against the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta* —

SŪTRA (8).

IN REALITY, IT IS THE WHOLE GENUS [THAT IS ENTITLED],—SAYS BĀDARĀYAṆA,—BECAUSE THERE IS NO GROUND FOR DISTINCTION; HENCE THE WOMAN ALSO SHOULD BE REGARDED (AS ENTITLED TO PERFORM SACRIFICES), AS THE GENUS IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL (HUMAN BEINGS).

Bhāṣya.

The phrase 'in reality' serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

It is not true that *Man* alone is entitled to perform sacrifices; in fact Bādarāyaṇa has held that 'the whole genus' is entitled.

Question—"Is it the term '*svargakāmah*' ('desiring heaven') that has been regarded as denoting a *genus*?".

Answer—No.

"Then what is it?"

The term '*Svargakāmah*' is to be taken in its literal (etymological) sense—signifying *presence of desire for heaven.*

"By which term then is the *genus* denoted, which *genus* is regarded to be entitled?"

We do not say that in the present instance there is a *word denoting a genus* which establishes the fact of all human beings being entitled; what we mean is that the term '*svargakāmah*' ('desiring heaven') serves to indicate the fact of both *men* and *women* being entitled, and that no significance attaches to the Masculine Gender.

"Why so?"

Because there is no ground for distinction; that is, the masculine affix cannot distinguish or qualify 'the person desiring heaven' by the Masculine Gender.

"Why?"

Because the term is meant to be only an *indicative*; it only serves to *indicate* the person *who desires heaven*; and the person so indicated becomes entitled to the act enjoined by the word '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'),—and this indication applies equally to *man* and *woman*. Thus then, from the words of the text it is clear that *man* and *woman* are both entitled to perform sacrifices; what is there then which would preclude the title of *women*?—It might be urged that "it is the Masculine affix (in *svargakāmaḥ*') that precludes women".—But that cannot be.—"Why?"—Because the affix being expressive of the *male*, has no power to exclude the *female*. "But the mention of the *male* over again by the affix would be superfluous [hence the only purpose served by the affix is to *preclude the woman*]".—That also is not possible: because even though the affix becomes superfluous, there can be no *preclusion of women*; because every case of *preclusion* involves (*a*) the abandoning, by the word, of its own signification, (*b*) the assumption of another signification, and (*c*) the rejection of what has come in.—In reality, however, there is no superfluity (in the affix denoting the *male*, though not precluding the *female*); because it serves the purpose of *indicating* [which could not be done except by means of an affix].—From all this it follows that the *woman also should be regarded as entitled to perform sacrifices*, because *the genus is equally present in all*.

SŪTRA (9).

IN A CASE WHERE IT IS DISTINCTLY ENJOINED, IT HAS, ON THAT ACCOUNT, TO BE TAKEN AS ASSERTED

Bhāṣya

The following argument has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"In the case of the injunction '*Pashumālabhēta*' ['One should sacrifice the animal'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 5. 9. 7), it is only the *male* animal that is sacrificed, on the strength of the Masculine affix (in '*pashum*'); similarly in the case in question also, the text laying down the sacrifice should be taken as indicating that the *man* alone is entitled, on the strength of the masculine affix (in '*svargakāmaḥ*')".

This has got to be refuted; and in refutation, we argue as follows:—In the case of the *animal*, the *genus* is not found to be asserted as an indicator of the substance (animal); if it had been found to be so asserted, then the sacrificing of the female animal also would be declared, and there would be nothing to preclude this. But what we find asserted in this case is that the 'animal' is a qualification of the 'sacrifice'; so that the relationship that is expressed by the sentence is that between the 'animal' and the 'sacrifice',—not between a *substance* in general and the 'sacrifice'; and just as the 'animal' is related to the 'sacrifice', so also are the '*masculinity*

and *one-ness* [all these three—*animal*, *masculinity* and *one-ness* being expressed by the same word '*pashum*']. Thus then, what is laid down here is *the sacrifice qualified by several qualifications*; and this should be performed exactly *as asserted*, because, in this case, the whole set of qualifications has been *enjoined*.

As regards the argument (of the *Pūrvapakṣa*) regarding the declaration of the *sinfulness* (*a*) of killing the foetus before its sex is known, and (*b*) of killing the pregnant woman,—both of which are spoken of in a way which *indicates their connection with the male*,—*we are going to refute it now*. Our refutation is as follows.—The reference to the foetus as 'of unknown sex' is meant to be purely commendatory; and what is meant by the exhortation not to kill the pregnant woman is that one should not kill a child in the womb, as it is a great sin to kill a child in the womb, even though its exact character may not be known.—As for the Masculine ending, even though it is found in the sentence it cannot mean that the *woman* is excluded from its purview, it is all the less reasonable that the mention of 'the foetus of unknown sex' should be taken as excluding the *woman*. Then again, the prohibition of killing the '*Ātreyī*' is meant to be in praise of the *Gotra* (*Atri* being the name of one of the *Gotra-Ṛṣis*), and 'ātreyī' here does not stand for the *pregnant woman* in fact, it is the name of one of the *Gotras* [it is derived from *atri*, the name of a *Gotra-Ṛṣi*], it is not derived from the indeclinable '*atra*' (as explained by the opponent), as a nominal affix is added only to '*sumvrtha*' words—*i.e.* nouns,—and '*atra*' is not a *noun* and as such has no 'capacity' for taking a nominal affix.

SUTRA (10)

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"[THE TITLE TO PERFORM SACRIFICES] SHOULD BELONG TO MEN ONLY AS THEY ALONE POSSESS PROPERTY, AND SACRIFICES REQUIRE PROPERTY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF SALE AND PURCHASE, WOMEN CAN POSSESS NO PROPERTY, IN FACT, THEY ARE IN THE SAME POSITION AS PROPERTY."

Bhāṣya

Says the *Pūrvapakṣa*—'*To men only* should the title to perform sacrifices belong;—*as they alone possess property*,—as a matter of fact, men alone, not women, possess wealth,—and wealth is necessary for the performance of sacrifices as they have to be performed with such grains as '*vrihi*', '*yava*' and the like.—'Why should the women not possess property?'—As a matter of fact, *women can possess no property*,—*on account of sale and purchase*, i.e. women are bought and sold, they are 'sold' by their father and 'bought' by their husband; and because they have been sold by their father, they have no right over the father's property; and because they have been bought by their husband, they have no right over the husband's property.—The 'selling' of women is found to be asserted in such texts as—'A hundred cart-bullocks should be given to the girl's father', 'in

the *Ārṣa* form of marriage a cow and a bull should be given to the girls' father'. What is said in these texts having the clear meaning [that these are *prices* paid for the girl] and thus serving the visible purpose of securing possession over the girl, it cannot be taken to mean merely *the obtaining of the consent* (of the Father), and thus serving only a transcendental purpose. Thus *women are in the same position as property itself*".

SŪTRA (11)

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN *continues*]—"TO THE SAME EFFECT, WE FIND ANOTHER TEXT ALSO."

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* continues—"There is the text—'If, on being bought by the *husband, she has dealings with others, etc.*',—which shows that women are actually bought (and sold)".

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN *continues*]—"AS THEY THEMSELVES BELONG TO THEIR HUSBAND, THEIR WORK ALSO BELONGS TO HIM"

Bhāṣya.

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* continues]—'It might be urged that—'the woman may perform sacrifices with wealth acquired by her by means of cooking or spinning'.—Our answer to this is as follows.—What the woman may earn is also not her own; when she herself belongs to another, whatever belongs to her also belongs to him. Then again, it is her duty to work for her husband; it does not behove her to neglect that and do any work on her own account. In fact, whatever she might earn by such additional work would be the property of her husband. Such is the opinion of the *Smṛti*,—where we read—'The wife, the slave and the son—all these are devoid of property; whatever they earn is the property of him to whom they themselves belong'—(*Manu*)".

SŪTRA (13).

[ANSWER]—BUT THE DESIRE FOR RESULTS (PROCEEDING FROM SACRIFICES) IS EQUALLY PRESENT (IN THE WOMAN ALSO).

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') sets aside the above view. It is not true that the woman has no property; because in reality, woman does possess property. Then again, *the desire for result is equally present in her*.—so that, even though desirous of obtaining the results proceeding from the performance of sacrifices, she has to be regarded as 'without property', (and hence unable to perform sacrifices) *if the Smṛti (just quoted) is to be regarded as authoritative*; on the other hand, *on the authority of the Vedic text* (laying down

sacrifices to be performed by one who desires results), if she is desirous of results, she must perform the sacrifice. Such being the case, if, in obedience to the *Smṛti*, she should be dependent upon others and devoid of any property of her own, she would not perform a sacrifice,—even in the face of the injunction '*yajēta*', 'should sacrifice',—then it would mean the rejection of the *Vedic*, by a *Smṛti*, text; and this would be most improper.—From this we conclude that if the woman desires the results that are spoken of as following from a sacrifice, she should reject the authority of the *Smṛti*, acquire property and also perform the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (14).

ALSO BECAUSE SHE IS SPOKEN OF AS CONNECTED WITH PROPERTY.

Bhāṣya

In fact, the woman is *actually connected with property*; as is clear from the following words addressed in course of a dialogue at the time of the marriage—'*Dharmē cha arthē cha kāmē cha na aticharitavyā*', 'in matters relating to religious performances, to property and to pleasure, she should not be ignored'.—As for the argument that "the wife and the rest have been declared (in the *Smṛti*) to be devoid of property,"—even though this absence of property has been declared in the *Smṛti*, yet it is wrong; because it is contrary to the Veda. All that the *Smṛti* therefore can be taken to mean is that the wife should not be independent of her husband's control; and this entirely for the sake of peace and concord in the family.

SŪTRA (15).

AS FOR THE 'SALE', IT IS A PURELY RELIGIOUS FUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

As for the 'sale' that is spoken of in regard to the wife,—that is *a purely religious function*, and not really a *sale* (in the ordinary sense of the term); a thing is said to be 'sold' when its price is a fluctuating factor—sometimes more sometimes less; in the case of marriage, however, the so-called 'price' is a fixed item, 'a hundred cart bullocks', for the girl, be she handsome or ugly.—Then again, people do not accept the Smṛti text speaking of the purchase and sale of a wife, when it is found to be contrary to a Vedic text.—Consequently the case of the wife is not one of 'sale' (or 'purchase').

SŪTRA (16).

THERE IS A TEXT WHICH CLEARLY INDICATES THAT WOMEN DO HAVE PROPERTY.

Bhāṣya.

Says the text—'*Pātni na pārināyyasya iṣṭē patyaivamanumatam kriyatē*' ['The wife is mistress over the household property, and she acts according to

the wishes of her husband'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 1. 1.);— again there is another text—'*Bhasadā patnīḥ saṁyājayanti, bhasadvīryā hī patnyaḥ, bhasadā evā ītāḥ paragṛhāṇām aishvaryamavarundhatē*' ['They offer the sacrifice for the wives, with *Bhasad*; the glory of wives lies in the *Bhasad*: *it is by the Bhasad that they become mistresses of other houses*'].—[These texts clearly indicate that women do possess property].

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *To the performance of sacrifices, the husband and wife are entitled jointly.*

SŪTRA (17).

THOUGH BOTH POSSESS PROPERTY, THEIR ACTION SHOULD BE ONE (JOINT), BECAUSE OF THE DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been settled that both husband and wife possess property.—The question that arises now is—should the sacrificer and his wife perform the sacrifice separately—each by himself? Or should they perform it jointly?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Each of them should perform it separately. Why? Because significance is meant to be attached to the singular number (in the noun '*svargakāmaḥ*' and in '*yajēta*') in the verb '*yajēta*', the Nominative Agent is mentioned as an important factor; consequently significance must attach to the singular number. In fact, just as two *men* cannot jointly perform a sacrifice, so also in the case in question [there can be no joint performance by the two persons, husband and wife"]

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Though both possess property, their action should be joint, because of the declaration to that effect*; on account of the declaration to that effect, their action should be joint. There are for instance, the following declarations in *Smṛtis*—'In matters relating to Duty, Property and Pleasure, she should not be ignored'; and again 'Religious acts should be performed jointly, and children should be begotten jointly'.

Says the Opponent—"It is not right to reject a Vedic declaration in favour of a declaration in the *Smṛti*".

There is no force in this, we reply. There are some sacrifices which must be performed by the man and the woman together; such, for instance, as the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* and the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—at both which oblations are laid down as to be offered out of the Clarified Butter that has been 'examined' (looked into) by the sacrificer as also by his wife; and the performance of such a sacrifice would be defective if done in the absence of either of the two.

"In a case where the sacrificer is a man, the Clarified Butter would be 'examined' by the man himself, while in a case where the sacrificer is a woman, it would be 'examined' by the woman."

That cannot be; because the 'Examining' is not an embellishment of the *examining person*. If it were an embellishment of the *examining person*, it could be as suggested. As a matter of fact, however, it is an embellishment of the Clarified Butter, and the two examining persons are only subordinate factors; hence the absence of either of the two would certainly cause a deficiency; because the declaration of the ceremonial

procedure includes all accessory details (the absence of any one of which therefore renders the performance defective)

"This could be remedied in the following manner :—When the sacrificer is a woman, she will engage the services of a *man* to do the 'examining of the Clarified Butter', and when the sacrificer is a man, he will engage the services of a woman to do the 'examining of the Clarified Butter'."

That also cannot be right because it is the mistress of the house,—not a servant engaged for the purpose—that is spoken of as '*patnī*', 'wife' (who is laid down as to do the 'examining of the Clarified Butter'); in fact, '*patnī*' ('wife') is a relative term. Similarly the 'sacrificer' (who is laid down as to do the 'examining of the Clarified Butter') is the master of the house not a servant engaged for the purpose

From all this it follows that actions like those in question should be performed by the husband and wife jointly

Now the idea might arise that 'on the strength of the Vedic text (laying down the performance as to be done jointly by *man and woman*), any man might join any woman and perform a sacrifice jointly'.

The answer to this is that what the *Smṛti text* means is 'whatever religious act you have to do jointly with a woman, you shall do with this, your wife', and we do not perceive any inconsistency between this *Smṛti* text and the Vedic text (laying down joint performance by man and woman)

It has been argued that— The man is entitled to the performance, alone, by himself,—and the woman also is entitled alone by herself, as is clear from the fact that the singular number in the verb '*yajeta*' ('should sacrifice') is significant'—This has got to be refuted. Now, the person who argues thus should be asked the following question—If the singular number in the verb '*yajēta*' is significant then how is the sacrifice performed by the sacrificer associated with the sixteen priests?

"The answer to this may be as follows—There is a distinct action pertaining to each Agent So that the Sacrificer is regarded as performing the sacrifice' by virtue of doing just those acts that are to be done by the Sacrificer himself,—such, for instance, as the *engaging of the Priests* and such others, and the *Adhvaryu* priest is regarded as 'performing the sacrifice' by virtue of doing just those acts that are to be done by the *Adhvaryu-Priest* Just as the *cooking dish* is spoken of as '*doing the cooking*', though all that it does is the *containing of the food cooked* Thus then, when a certain function pertains to a particular Agent, then alone is that function to be performed by that agent alone,—if the singular number in the word enjoining that function appear to be significant."

If such be the case, all the functions that pertain to the 'sacrificer' need not *all* be done by one and the same 'sacrificer',—one might be done by one 'sacrificer' and another by another 'sacrificer';—or when 'a hundred and twelve' is to be given away (as the sacrificial fee), *fifty-six* might be given by one and another fifty-six by another—In the case in question, the function of the 'wife' is different from that of the 'sacrificer', and by doing that, she does not interfere with the 'singleness' of the sacrificer; just as the Adhvaryu Priest, performing his own functions, does not interfere with the 'singleness' of the sacrificer—It is absolutely essential too that

the sacrifice should be performed by the husband and wife together; because the wealth (that is to be used in the performance) belongs in common to the husband and wife; under the circumstances, the sacrifice must be performed by one as associated with his wife; otherwise, if either of them were unwilling, the sacrifice could not be accomplished. Consequently the ignoring of the wife would not be possible, unless there were a second wife; because for one who has a second wife, either one of them might perform the functions of the 'wife'.

There is no difficulty, however, in the case of such acts as are of the nature of 'embellishments' of the man doing the act, these might be done anywhere by each man for himself [and hence in the case of such acts, as for instance, shaving of the head and the like, no association with the 'wife' would be necessary].

SUTRA (18).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

We also find a text pointing to the same conclusion— *Yoktrēṇa patnīm sannahyati mēkhalayā yajamānam mithunatvāya* ['He girds the wife's loin with the *yoktra-rope*, and that of the Sacrificer with the *girdle-zone*, in order *to make a couple of them*'] (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 3. 5):—it is only when the man and woman are together that there could be some sense in mentioning the '*yoktra-rope*' and the 'girdle-zone' separately,—as also in the eulogising of the 'couple'. All this is possible only if the sacrifice is performed jointly by the man and woman, not otherwise.

SUTRA (19).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"BUT AS THE WIFE IS A PURCHASED COMMODITY, HER 'OWNERSHIP OVER PROPERTY' CAN BE ONLY FIGURATIVE."

Bhāṣya.

This is in answer to what has been said above by the *Siddhāntin*—in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*—The particle '*Tu*' ('but') is meant to preclude the *Siddhānta* view.—"It is not true that the wife owns property;—because she is herself *a purchased commodity*, as her 'purchase' is the visible purpose served by the giving of 'cart-bullocks' (to her father). From this it follows that whenever her 'ownership of property' is spoken of, it can be only figurative. That is to say, when the wife is spoken of as 'the mistress of the household property', it is just like a man speaking of '*Pūrṇaka*' (his chief servant) as being 'the master of his bullocks'".

SŪTRA (20).

[ANSWER]—IT IS BY VIRTUE OF HER DESIRING THE FRUITS (OF SACRIFICE), THAT THE WIFE IS REGARDED AS ENDOWED WITH OWNERSHIP.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to hold that "when the wife is spoken of as 'bought' it is literally true, but when she is spoken of as 'owning property', that is only figurative". Because, as a matter of fact, the wife is a person desiring the fruits of the sacrifice In fact, we need not accept the authority of the *Smṛti* (which speaks of the 'purchase'),—and it is only on the strength of this *Smṛti* that the wife could be held to be 'devoid of property'; whereas, on the strength of the Vedic text, she should be regarded as 'possessing property'.

SŪTRA (21).

THERE IS ALSO A TEXT SHOWING THAT THE RESULT ACCRUES TO BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

The following text clearly shows that the result of a sacrifice accrues to both husband and wife.—'May the wife become one with her husband, through virtuous deeds! May they together bear the burden of the sacrifice! May they jointly destroy their enemies! May they attain imperishable effulgence in Heaven!' (Taitti. Brā 3. 7 5 11)

From all this it follows that both husband and wife are (jointly) entitled to the performance of a sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (5) : *Only one man is entitled to the 'Installation of Fire'.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'INSTALLATION' SHOULD BE BY TWO MEN, JUST AS THE 'SACRIFICE' IS PERFORMED BY TWO MEN."

Bhāṣya.

There is the installation of fire laid down in the text —'He who knowing thus installs the Fire'; in connection with this installation, there is another text —['*Kṣaumē vasānau agnimādadhīyātām*', 'They install the Fire wearing silken clothes'].

In regard to the question is —Should *two men* install the Fire? Or only one man?

Question :—"Why should this question arise at all?"

Answer The words that we find here are '*vasānau ādadhīyātām*' (where both terms have the Masculine *Dual* Ending). Now the *dual number*, which is already implied (by the previous *Adhikaraṇa* where it has been settled that all religious acts should be done by the husband and wife jointly), is again reiterated by means of the Dual Ending, and hence it becomes doubtful whether this reiteration is for the purpose of emphasising the masculine gender (the meaning being that the installation should be done by *two men*), —or it is only meant to emphasise the wearing of silk? As both these alternatives are possible, there is a doubt as to which of the two is correct; if the text is meant to emphasise the masculine gender, then *two men* should install the fire, and if it is meant to emphasise the wearing of silk, then only one man should do it.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The installation should be done by two men, just as the sacrifice is performed by two men.*—In the case of the text —'*Ētēna dvau rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajēyātām*' ['With this the two persons, King and Priest, desirous of absorption into the deity, should offer the sacrifice'], —the sacrifice comes to be performed by *two men*; and in the same manner, the installation of Fire also [laid down in the text '*Kṣaumē vasānau etc.*'] should be performed by *two men*; as this latter text does not differ from the former. The term '*vasānau*' ('wearing') directly denotes *two males*; this (Masculine Dual) cannot be construed with the *silk* which is spoken of by a totally different word; because what is denoted by the word is learnt directly from the word, while what is connected with another word is learnt (indirectly) only from 'Syntactical Connection'; and 'Direct Assertion' is more authoritative than 'Syntactical Connection'. Then again, what is connected with the act of 'Installing' is what is denoted by the term '*vasānau*' ('wearing'), not what is expressed by the term '*kṣaumē*' ('silk').

SŪTRA (20).

[ANSWER]—IT IS BY VIRTUE OF HER DESIRING THE FRUITS (OF SACRIFICE), THAT THE WIFE IS REGARDED AS ENDOWED WITH OWNERSHIP.

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"The opponent may say—'The term *vasānau* ('wearing') need not necessarily denote *two men*; it may denote *a man and a woman* also; just as the term '*Kukkutau*' expounded as '*Kukkutashcha kukkuṭī cha*' stands for *the cock and the hen*; similarly the term '*shūkarau*' is expounded as '*shūkarashaha shūkarī cha*', stands for *the boar and the sow*; in the same way the word '*vasānau*'—may be expounded as '*vasānascha vasānā cha*', and thus stand for both *the man and the woman*."

"Our answer to this would be as follows:—In cases where neither the meaning nor the context has any distinctive indication, and the term is predicative, not merely reiterative,—it is two *male persons* that are understood; for instance, when a man is directed to 'bring two persons' with the words '*dvau ānaya*' (where neither the meaning nor the context indicates anything as to the persons being *male* or *female*), the man thus directed brings up two *males*; and when the direction is '*dvē ānaya*', he brings two *females*; from this it follows that the noun with the dual affix ending in '*ē*' denotes *two females*, while that with the dual affix ending in '*au*' denotes *two males*."

"'But',—says the opponent—in the case in question we find a noun ending in '*au*' and denoting both *male and female*; should it be taken as denoting *one male along with another male*, for his second—or *a female along with a male for her second*?'"

"Our answer to this is that a term ending with '*au*' has been found to stand for *a male along with another male* in the case of such expressions as '*Brāhmanau ānaya*'; consequently in the case in question also, the term should be taken as standing for *a male along with another male*; hence we conclude that the term denotes *two males*.

'Says the opponent—'Usage, which is the only visible proof in the case, is found to point to *both males*, why then should the term be taken as denoting *one* (*as along with the second*)'?"

In answer, we may say that what the usage points to is a substance (man) and *duality* (a quality)—not *two substances* (men); and the reason for this lies in the fact that, while the term is never found apart from *a substance and a quality*, it is often found apart from *two substances*

"Further, just as in the case of the word (*a*) '*khadirau*' and (*b*) '*dhavau*' we take them to mean (*a*) '*two khadiras*' and (*b*) '*two dhavas*' [taking them as two *Ēkashēsa* compounds equivalent to (*a*) '*khadirashcha khadirashcha*', both Masculine, and (*b*) '*dhavashcha dhavashcha*', both Masculine],—so should it be in the case in question also ['*vasānau*' being taken as '*vasānashcha vasānashcha*', both Masculine]; the term '*vasānau*' is thus understood to denote the *male* and *duality*, not the *duality made up of a female*, and the reasons for this are as follows:—(*a*) the rule relating to the Copulative Compound lays it down that such compounding takes place where several things are simultaneously expressed by the component terms [e.g. in the case of the Copulative Compound '*dhavakhadirau*', both *khadira* and *dhava* are meant to be denoted simultaneously]; —(*b*) it is only when the several things are so expressed simultaneously that the use of the Dual and the Plural number with Copulative Compounds can be justified [i.e.

it is only when two things are spoken of at one and the same time that the Dual number can be used; so also with the Plural number]; —(c) because we find such expressions in the Veda as '*pra mitrayoh-varunayoh*' [where, in reality, there are not *two* deities of the name of '*Mitra*', nor two deities of the name of '*Varuna*', and yet the expression stands for the compounded name '*Mitrāvaruna*', where both *Mitra* and *Varuna* must be taken as separately denoted; as otherwise, the Dual number would not be justified]; —(d) because the Copulative Compound has been ordained only in the sense of mutual cohesion [thus also the simultaneous denotation of the things spoken of is essential]; —(e) and lastly, because the *Ēkashēsa* Compound is an exceptional sort of Copulative Compound. That is, in both, the element of *mutual cohesion* of a number of things is present, but with this difference that in the case of the ordinary Copulative Compound, the things and the terms denoting them are both perceptibly distinct, as in '*dhavakhadirau*', the two trees are different, and the two words '*dhavah*' and '*khadirah*' are also present; —while in the case of the *Ēkashēsa* Compound, while the two things are different, the term is one only; e.g. in the compound '*khadirau*', the same word '*khadirah*' stands for the two distinct *Khadira trees*.—[Thus then, the word '*vasānau*' being an *Ēkashēsa* Compound, the persons spoken of by both members of the compound should be masculine.—*Ṭuptīkā*].

"The Opponent says—In the case in question itself we find the compound denoting a *male and female*'.

'The answer to this is that it has been explained already that it is not right to attribute several meanings to a word; it is most unreasonable that the same word should signify *a male along with another male* and also *a male and a female*.—What other means is available there for the predication of *the male along with another male*?'—Inasmuch as the *female* cannot be denoted by the word ('*vasānah*'), and yet a *second* being essential (in view of the *dual* number) this *second* must necessarily be a *male*. In this way, each being the 'second' to the other, both the *males* become predicated. [It is for this reason that we assert that in the case in question two males are entitled to the performance of the Installation of Fire].

"Says the Opponent—According to the *Smṛti*-rules, the word with the Dual number ending in *au* denotes the *male and the female* [the term *vasānau* being treated as an *Ēkashēsa* compound expounded as *vasānashchā vāsānā cha*]'. There is no such *Smṛti rule*, we reply. 'We shall infer the *Smṛti-rule* on the basis of *Pāṇini*'s words *Pumān striyā* (Pā. Sū. 1. 2. 67) [whereby a masculine noun is compounded with a feminine noun into an *Ēkashēsa* compound]'.—The answer to this is that there are no words of *Pāṇini* to the effect that the word '*kukkutau*' is denotative of *a male and a female*; what Pāṇini's *Sūtra* means is that where a male and a female are spoken of together (in a compound), we may have the word ending either in *au*—the denotation in this case consisting of *the male along with another male*,—or in *ē*, in which case the denotation consists of *the female along with another female*;—and in such a case the masculine form (ending with *au*) would be correct (not the feminine form ending with *ē*); such is the sense of Pāṇini's words. The words of Pāṇini are that 'it is the masculine that remains', from which it follows that the word ending with

au denotes *two males*.—From this also it is clear that it is *two males* that are entitled to the Installation of Fire.

"Says the Opponent—'The sentence in question may be taken as laying down the *silk clothes*; as it is only thus that the connection of the *silk cloth* can serve a useful purpose; otherwise, the mention of the *silk cloth* would be wholly purposeless'.

"Our answer to this is as follows:—The connection is between the participle 'wearing' ('*vasānau*') and 'should install' ('*ādadhīyātām*'),—not between 'silk clothes' ('*kṣaumē*') and 'should install' ('*ādadhīyātām*'); hence, even though the *silk cloth* is mentioned in proximity to the *installing*, it is not connected with it.—'But the term *silk clothes* would have some sense only when connected with the term *wearing*'.—Even though the *silk clothes* are mentioned in close proximity to the term 'wearing', yet they cannot be regarded as *enjoined*, for the simple reason that there is no word injunctive of them; the term 'wearing' is not injunctive, nor is the term 'silk clothes' injunctive; nor is the combination of these two terms injunctive.—'What then is there in the sentence which would do the *enjoining*?'—It is the Injunctive affix in the word '*ādadhīyātām*' ('should install').—Says the Opponent—'Well then, that same Injunctive affix will enjoin the *silk clothes*'.—Our answer to this is that what the said Injunctive affix can enjoin is only the act of *installing*, which is denoted by the same word in which the affix itself occurs. Thus then, as the *installing* will have been enjoined by the Direct Denotation of the '*word*' ('*ādadhīyātām*'),—if the same were again enjoined, it would be superfluous; hence what is enjoined by the Sentence' (Syntactical Connection) is the *wearing* ('*vasānau*'). Because there is some connection between the *persons wearing* and the *act of installing*; hence in such an injunction, the word would not entirely renounce its own connotation. If, on the other hand the connection between 'silk clothes' and 'wearing' were regarded as enjoined, the injunctive word '*ādadhīyātām*' ('should install') would, in enjoining the said connection, entirely renounce the *act of installing*, which constitutes its own connotation, and would thereby entirely lose touch with 'Direct Assertion'.—If again the Gender, mentioned in proximity to the act of *installing*, were taken as enjoined, then too, the 'Direct Assertion' could not enjoin the connection between the 'silk clothes' and 'wearing', on account of the remoteness of the objective.—Further, if 'Direct Assertion' were abandoned, and the connection between the 'silk clothes' and 'wearing' were enjoined, the *silk clothes* would become a subordinate accessory to the *wearing*, not to the *installing*; and in that case, there would be no deficiency in the *installing*, even if it were done without the *silk clothes*; so that the act of *installing* could be done even without the *silk clothes*.—'In the event of the *silk clothes* being a subordinate accessory to the *wearing*, what would be the meaning intended to be conveyed by the sentence?'—None whatsoever, we reply; in fact, it is for this reason that we have rejected this interpretation—The Opponent asks—'Why then should there be any mention of the *silk clothes* and the *wearing*?'—What we mean is that it is not possible for the sentence to enjoin both, the *silk clothes* as well as the *Gender*; as that would involve a syntactical split; and therefore we take the term '*Kṣauma*'

('silk clothes') as referring to clothes which are not really *silken* [but which have the silken appearance on account of being soiled], and the term '*vasānau*' as enjoining *two males*;—the *wearing of clothes* being something already got at by the ordinary necessity of a man having some clothes on himself [it is only the masculine dual ending that can have the injunctive force, as laying down something not already got at by any other means]. When a man is engaged in some work, his clothes become *soiled*, thereby acquiring a silken appearance [and hence figuratively called '*Kṣauma*' '*silken*', figuratively]; or the name '*Kṣauma*' may be taken as applying to the *clothes* on the ground of the fact that when a man is working, his clothes produce a *rustling sound* ['*Kṣauma*' being derived from the root '*Kṣu*', *to make a sound*—says the *Tantraratna*]. [In either of these two senses, the term '*kṣauma*' has to be taken as a mere *reference* to something already known, and not as an *injunction* of what is not already known]"

From all this it follows that *two males* are entitled.

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS WHAT IS ENJOINED (IN THE TEXT 'KṢAUMĒ ETC.') IS A SUBORDINATE ACCESSORY,—THE TERM 'SECOND' WOULD APPLY TO THE WIFE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') signifies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

What has been declared above—to the effect that '*two males* should do the installing of fire'—is not right; only one man is to do the *installing*, in accordance with the text '*Vasantē brāhmano'gnīnādadhīta*' ['During the spring should the *Brāhmana* install the Fire']—(Taitt. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6);—where we have the singular number (in '*brāhmanah*') which is meant to be significant; hence it follows that only *one* man is to do the *installing*.—"But we have the declaration to the effect that *two males* should install the Fire [in the text '*Kṣaumē vasānau etc.*']".—Not so; we reply; what that text lays down *is only a subordinate accessory*; the right view to take is that this text only lays down the *silken clothes*; as it is only then that the text lays down something not already known; inasmuch as it is understood to provide a special rule (that *one must wear silk*); otherwise, the mention of the 'silk' would be a mere reiterative reference, and it has been already explained that a mere *reference* serves no useful purpose. If it is taken as containing in one part (i.e. in the word 'silk') a mere reiterative reference,—then it has to be pointed out that the words do not lend themselves to such piecemeal construction.—If the term 'silk' is taken in a figurative sense, through similarity (of the well-worn cloth with silk), then our reply is that such similarity would be a common thing (and could not therefore be taken as a determining factor). Thus then (if construed in accordance with the *Pūrvapakṣa*) the text would have to be taken, without adequate reasons, as being a wrong reading.

Says the Opponent—"What are enjoined are *two males*; and when these form the objects of injunction, the text cannot be taken as an injunction of *silk clothes* also, as that would involve a syntactical split as there would be two objects of injunction—(1) the *two males* who are spoken of by 'Direct Assertion', and (2) the *silk-clothes*, which are indicated by 'Syntactical Connection'."

Our answer to this is as follows:—*Two males* cannot be the objects of injunction; because the man is already known (as the performer, without whom there can be no act), and it is thus known man who is referred to, as accompanied by a second—'How so?'—It is only a *single* man that is directly spoken of here, and as for his 'second', *that would apply to his wife.* Such being the case, what is already known even before the text in question, cannot be regarded as forming an object of injunction by that text; consequently the text can only be taken as an injunction of the *silk clothes*; and there would be no syntactical split [as nothing else is enjoined by it]

It has been argued by the Opponent that "there is no word injunctive of *silk clothes*".—Our answer to this is that the verb *ādadhīyātām* ('should install') is the word that would enjoin the *silk clothes*.—But by 'Direct Assertion', this word is capable of enjoining the act of *installing* only nothing else".—The answer to that is that the act of *installing* having been already enjoined (by another text), the word in question cannot be taken as enjoining that act, nor can it be taken as enjoining the *male*, as that also, along with his 'second' has been already enjoined by another word, consequently, a fresh injunction of these being impossible, the only thing that the injunctive affix (in '*ādadhīyātām*') can enjoin, on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection' is the *Kṣauma*', *silken clothes*

It has been argued that "under such an interpretation, the word ('*ādadhīyātām*') would entirely renounce its own connotation".—But, in reality it will not renounce it, as what it would mean would be that 'at the time of the installing the man shall have *silk* for his clothes' [so that the factor of the *installing*, which forms the connotation of the word, would be there all right]

Now, under this view it is understood that the word in the masculine gender ('*vasānau*') denotes the *male and the female* and the basis for this lies in the fact that what it really denotes is *the male with a second* [and this 'second' is his wife] It is with a view to such cases that *Pāṇini* has laid down the rule in regarding to the compounding of a masculine with a feminine noun—'*Pumān striyā*' (Pāṇini 1. 2 67),—the meaning of which is that when a masculine noun is compounded with a feminine noun into an *Ēkashēsa* copulative compound, the correct form of such a compound is that in the Masculine, not the Feminine. [Hence there is nothing wrong in the compound '*vasānau*' in the Masculine form standing for '*vasānah*' (*Masculine*) *and* '*vasānā*' (*Feminine*).]

From all this it follows that the *installing* is to be done by *one Man* only—not by *two men.*

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The wife is to do only what is actually laid down as to be done by her.*

SŪTRA (24).

TO THE WIFE PERTAIN ONLY SUCH FUNCTIONS AS ARE DISTINCTLY LAID DOWN FOR HER,—AS ALSO THE 'INVOKING OF BLESSINGS' AND 'CELIBACY'; BECAUSE SHE IS NOT EQUAL (TO THE HUSBAND)

Bhāṣya.

In connection with such injunctions as—'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices', and 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotistoma* sacrifice',—it has been settled that the man and his wife are jointly entitled to the performance of such sacrifices.—The question that arises now is—Are all the functions laid down as to be performed by the 'Sacrificer' to be performed by the wife (also)? Or, is she to perform only what is actually laid down as to be done by her—such functions, for instance, as 'the invoking of blessings' and 'celibacy'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that—'all that is laid down as to be done by the 'Sacrificer' should be done by the wife also: because she is as much a 'Sacrificer' as the husband hence all should be done by her".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*.—*To the wife pertain only such functions as are distinctly laid down for her*,—because such direct declaration is our sole guide in such matters, and she is to do also the 'invoking of blessings' (or, *Embellishments*) and 'celibacy'. 'Why so?"—*Because she is not equal to the Husband*, the Husband is a male and is learned in the Veda, while the wife is a female and is not learned—[The term '*āshīḥ*' literally stands for those *Mantras* in which blessings are invoked,—such as *Āyurdā agnē āyurmē dēhi etc.*', but in view of the fact that the wife is not learned in the Veda and hence would not be able to recite the *Mantras*, with the proper accent etc., Kumārila, in the *Tuptikā*, has taken this term as standing for the 'embellishments' prescribed for the 'Sacrificer',—such as *bathing, anointing, applying collyrium* and so forth The term 'celibacy' also has been taken as standing for *freedom from passions of all kinds*.]

Question—"What if there is an inequality?"

Answer—What happens is this.—(*a*) There are certain details subserving the purposes of the sacrifice which are directly declared as to be performed by the 'Sacrificer';—and as in all these texts, the Sacrificer would be the 'Subject', the (Masculine) Gender of the term speaking of him would have to be regarded as significant,—and hence the wife would not perform these details;—(*b*) then, there are certain details subserving the purposes of the sacrifice which have to be performed with *Mantras*;—and these also could not be performed by the wife, because she does not possess the requisite knowledge.—It might be argued that—'these texts

themselves might be taken as indicating the necessity of women learning the Veda".—But that is not possible; because even without the text indicating the necessity of such learning by the wife, it would be possible for the details in question to be adequately performed; because there is a performer already, in the person of the Husband: and what subserves the purposes of the sacrifice may be done by either one of the two. Consequently there can be no authority for making any exception to the general prohibition of Vedic study for the woman.—It follows therefore that such details as require the reciting of *Mantras* cannot be performed by the wife.

As regards the 'Invoking of Blessings' [or, the *Embellishments*] and the 'celibacy',—these subserve the purposes of the *performer*; so that these could not be regarded as complete if done by only one of the couple; because if only one did them, the embellishment of the other would remain defective. Nor in the case of these does the 'Sacrificer' appear as the 'subject'; and hence the masculine gender in this case could not be taken as significant.—For these reasons, the 'Invoking of Blessings (or, *Embellishments*) and 'Celibacy' would have to be done by both—husband and wife.

What is distinctly laid down as to be done by the wife—as for instance, 'the wife should examine the Clarified Butter'—has to be done by her alone.

From all this it follows that on account of inequality, the wife does not stand on the same footing as the husband (in the matter of the performance of details).

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The Shūdra is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ALL THE FOUR CASTES [ARE ENTITLED TO THE PERFORMANCE OF SACRIFICES,—THERE BEING NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

The *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices are the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these sacrifices to be performed by all the four castes? or only by the three castes, leaving aside the *Shūdra*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The Veda uses such injunctive words as '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'), '*juhuyāt*' ('should offer libations') and the like, in reference to all the four castes—'How so?'—Because there *is no distinction*; no distinction is made in the Veda; hence the *Shūdra* cannot be excluded".

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACTS IN QUESTION CAN BE PERFORMED BY THE THREE (HIGHER) CASTES ONLY; AS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'INSTALLATION OF FIRE' THESE THREE ONLY HAVE BEEN MENTIONED: [THE SHŪDRA] THEREFORE CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH SACRIFICES; THE VEDA BEING APPLICABLE TO THE BRĀHMAṆA (AND THE OTHER TWO CASTES) ONLY;—SUCH IS THE OPINION OF ĀTRĒYA.

Bhāṣya.

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

Only three castes should be entitled to perform sacrifices;—how so?—*because in connection with the 'Installation of Fire' only these three have been mentioned*—*Vasantē brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta, grīṣmē rājanyaḥ, sharadi vaishyaḥ*'—['The *Brāhmaṇa* should install the fires during spring, the *Kṣattriya* during summer, and the *Vaishya* during autumn'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6-7);—here we find no mention of the *Shūdra* in connection with the Installation of Fire;—thus then, being without the duly installed fire, the *Shūdra* would not be able to perform the *Agnihotra* and such other acts. Hence it is that in connection with such injunctions as 'Desiring Heaven one should offer the *Agnihotra*', there is no Vedic text which makes them

applicable to the *Shūdra*; in fact, they are operative only in regard to the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*; as these alone have the capacity to perform the acts—being equipped as they are with the duly installed Fire. The '*Āhavanīya*' and other consecrated fires are not possible for the *Shūdra*; because they have not been enjoined for him, and because the names '*Āhavanīya*' and the like (which are applied to those fires in which alone the sacrificial offerings can be made) are all based upon certain consecratory rites (such as 'installation' and the like, which cannot be performed by the *Shūdra*).—From all this it follows that the *Shūdra* is not entitled to the performance of *Agnihotra* and such acts.—Such is the opinion that has been held by *Ātreya*.

SŪTRA (27).

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"THE TEXT QUOTED IS ONLY A CONTINGENT ONE; HENCE ALL THE CASTES SHOULD BE ENTITLED,—SO SAYS BĀDARI."

Bhaṣya

"It has been declared that the *Shūdra* cannot be entitled to the performance of sacrifices—This is not right: because as a matter of fact, the injunction 'should sacrifice' is addressed to everyone who seeks for the results expected to follow from the sacrifice, and so long as there is no text clearly precluding the *Shūdra*, it cannot but apply to the *Shūdra* also.—As regards the argument that the Shūdra would be unable to perform sacrifices because he would not have the consecrated fires,—he would certainly have such Fires as would be needed for his purpose,—the presence of such Fire being implied by the text which speaks of the desire for certain results as prompting the performance of a particular sacrifice [so that as the *Shūdra* would have such desires, it follows that he should have the Fire necessary for the performance of those sacrifices].

"The *Siddhāntin* says—'But the injunction of the Installation of Fire speaks of the *Brāhmaṇa* and other castes, but not of the *Shūdra*.'

"Our reply to this is that all such texts are only *contingent*; they are not meant to limit the scope of the injunction—How so?—These texts are of the nature of contingent declarations; the meaning is—'*If the Brāhmaṇa is to install the Fire*, he should do it during the spring; *if the Kṣattriya is to do it*, he should do it during the summer; *and if the Vaishya is to do it*, he should do it during the autumn'; so that what it is understood as declaring is the connection between the seasons and the *Brāhmaṇa—Kṣattriya—Vaishya*; hence it follows that the *Brāhmaṇa* and the other castes have been mentioned for the purpose of indicating their connection with the spring and other seasons: consequently this text does not exclude the Installation of Fire from the *Shūdra*.—For this reason, Bādari has held that the injunction (of sacrifices) is meant for all the castes."

SŪTRA (28).

[REPLY]—THE TEXT MUST, HOWEVER, BE UNDERSTOOD IN ITS LITERAL SENSE; BECAUSE WE FIND OTHER TEXTS POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('however') implies the rejection of the view put forward in the last *Sūtra*.

The text in question (relating to the *Brāhmaṇa* Installing the Fire during spring, etc. etc.) *should be understood in its literal sense*. That is, the text clearly asserts that the *Installing* is done by the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*; hence it must follow that the Installing is to be done *only* by the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya*, and the *Vaishya*; and because the *spring* and other seasons have been mentioned, it follows that the Installing should be done during that time.

In other instances also we find only the three castes mentioned,—the *Shūdra* being omitted:—For instance, (*a*) in connection with the *Brahma-sāma* we read—'For the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Brahma-sāma* sung should be the *Bārhadgira*; for the *Kṣattriya*, it should be the *Pārthurashya*; for the *Vaishya*, it should be the *Rāyovājīya*'; here even the name of the *Shūdra* is not mentioned;—(*b*) again, in connection with penances, we read—'The *Brāhmaṇa* should live on milk, the *Kṣattriya* on gruel, the *Vaishya* on curdled milk';—(*c*) again, in connection with the Installation of Fire, we read—'The Brāhmaṇa is to install the Fire at eight *prakramas*, the *Kṣattriya* at eleven *prakramas*, the *Vaishya* at twelve *prakramas*'.—Thus it is found that for the *Shūdra*, there is no *Brahma-sāma*, no *Penance*, and no *Prakramas*, under the circumstances, even if the *Shūdra* were to perform a sacrifice, it would be futile.

From all this it follows that the *Shūdra* is not to perform sacrifices or pour libations.

SUTRA (29).

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL ASSERTION, EVEN THESE TEXTS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ONLY CONTINGENT."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that—'the Shūdra having no Fire should not be entitled to perform the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices'.—Because Installation of Fire is possible for the *Shūdra* also by virtue of the general assertion—'one who knowing this installs the Fire'—which includes *all men*. In view of this general sanction, the particular texts (quoted under Sū. 28) should also be treated *as contingent* [meaning that '*if the act is done by the Brāhmaṇa*, the *Brahma-sāma* sung should be the *Bārhadgira*' and so on].—Thus we conclude that the injunctions relating to the performance of sacrifices should apply to all the castes."

SŪTRA (30).

[THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN CONTINUES]—"IF IT BE URGED THAT THIS CANNOT BE SO,—AS THE PERFORMANCE BY THE ŚŪDRA WOULD BE DEFECTIVE,—[then the answer is as follows in the next Sūtra]."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued by the Siddhāntin (under Sū. 28) that any performance of sacrifices by the Shūdra, being without *Brahma-sāma*, without Penance and without *Prakramas*, would be defective and hence would not bring about the desired results.—This has to be refuted; [and this refutation we set forth in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (31).

"WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT; AS THERE IS A 'BRAHMA-SĀMA' THAT COULD BE REQUISITIONED (BY THE ŚŪDRA)."

Bhāṣya.

"What has been urged by the *Siddhāntin* is not right: because there is a *Brahma-sāma*.—by name '*abhivarta*'—*which could be requisitioned by the Shūdra*, because this *Brahma-sāma* is spoken of in an isolated passage (in Taitti. Saṁ. 7. 5. 1. 6) not in relation to any particular act, and is apparently laid down without any distinction.—As regards the *Prakramas* one of those unspecified ones has been specified for the *Shūdra* in the text '*Chakṣurvimita ādadhyāt*' (?) (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 4. 1).—Finally as regards the *Penances*, there is the text declaring that 'the *Mastu* belongs to the *Shūdra*', and from this connection between the *Mastu* and the *Shūdra*, it follows that the *Shūdra* is to live on *Mastu*.—Thus from all this it follows that all the four castes are entitled to the performance of sacrifices."

SŪTRA (32).

[THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN CONTINUES]—"FURTHER, IN THE MATTER OF EMBELLISHMENTS, THE MAN IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

"In regard to *Penances*, we find this peculiarity that *Man is the predominant factor*; that is, in the matter of Penances, the Man (Agent) is the predominant factor.—'If the Man is the predominant factor, what then?'

—This is what it means—The embellishment, in which Man is the predominant factor, cannot have its application to any person withdrawn, until it is positively curtailed (by a direct declaration).—'Why so?'—When the injunction 'one should perform a sacrifice' has been addressed to 'one desiring heaven',—how do you get at the idea that this has not been addressed to the *Shūdra* who 'desires heaven'? What is there to be done by Man in connection with the sacrifice which the *Shūdra* cannot do?—If it is said that 'he cannot keep the penance',—that is not right; because the Penance is meant only to produce strength in the man; and when it is laid down for any person, the implication is that that person has no strength to do the act, unless he keeps the penance; because the penance is an auxiliary to the sacrifice only in the sense that it makes the Man strong enough to perform the sacrifice. So that if a man does not need this addition to his strength, he will perform the sacrifice, independently of the penance. [Thus, the fact of there being no penance laid down for the *Shūdra* as there are for the other castes, would show that the *Shūdra* is fitter than these latter to perform sacrifices.]—From this also it follows that the *Shūdra* is not excluded."

SŪTRA (33)

[THE SIDDHĀNTIN REPLIES]—IN REALITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE VEDIC DECLARATION, THE TITLE TO PERFORMANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BELONGING TO CASTES OTHER THAN THE SHŪDRA.

Bhāṣya

It has been urged that there are no texts laying down [the title of the various castes, to the performance of sacrifices]. But as a matter of fact, it can be asserted that there are texts laying down such title. The author of the *Sūtra*, however, has not made this counter-assertion to the effect that, even if the texts speaking of the seasons be merely contingent, we can assert the exclusion of the *Shūdra*. The author of the *Sūtra* has paid no heed to this counter-assertion; an entirely different argument has been put forward.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') serves to reject the view set forth in the foregoing *Sūtras*.—Even though the texts discussed above were taken as contingent upon the contingency of the performer being a *Brāhmaṇa* or a *Kṣattriya* or a *Vaishya*, yet the castes entitled to the performance of sacrifice must be those *other than the Shūdra*.—"How so?"—*On account of the Vedic declaration*; that is, in the Veda only three castes have been declared (as capable of performing sacrifices),—in the text, 'the *Brāhmaṇa* should be initiated during the spring, the *Kṣattriya* during the summer, and the *Vaishya* during the autumn'. Since the *Shūdra* is not mentioned here, he should be regarded as *unfit* for performing sacrifices (as not having been initiated into Vedic study); hence he cannot be entitled to perform sacrifices.

SŪTRA (34).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THE TEXT CANNOT BE TAKEN [AS DENOTING THE INCAPACITY OF THE ŚHŪDRA], BECAUSE WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN THE TEXT IS ONLY WHAT SERVES AS AN 'EMBELLISHMENT'"—[then the reply will be as in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent says—"What is laid down in the text just quoted is only the study that serves as an 'embellishment'; and this the *Shūdra* could acquire,—even though not 'initiated' by himself approaching the Teacher and carrying on the study [and thus secure the embellishment necessary for acquiring the capacity for performing sacrifices]."

SŪTRA (35).

THE MENTION OF MEN (BRĀHMAṆA AND THE REST, IN THE TEXT UNDER CONSIDERATION) MUST BE TAKEN AS IN REFERENCE TO 'LEARNING', BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

Our answer to what the *Pūrvapakṣin* has urged in the foregoing *Sūtra* is as follows:—*The mention of men* in the text under consideration *must be taken as in reference to learning, because the embellishment*—of Initiation (*Upanayana*)—*is for that purpose*; that is, when the boy is *brought up to* the Teacher, it is only for the purpose of being taught, not for any transcendental purpose, nor for any such ordinary purpose as the erecting of a wall. It is in reference to this *being taught* or *learning*, that we have the mention of the men (*Brāhmaṇa* and the rest in regard to the *Upanayana* or Initiation).—"How do you know this?"—We deduce it from the fact that what is laid down in the text referring to *Upanayana*, is the acquiring of the title of 'Teacher' ('*Āchārya*', by the Initiator).—"How does that follow?"—It follows from the presence of the *Ātmanēpada* ending (in the word '*Upanayīta*') that the root '*ni*' here denotes the acquiring of the title of '*Āchārya*'; and from this it follows that what prompts the action of *initiating* the Boy is the desire to acquire the title of '*Ācharya*'; as it is only by the teaching of *Veda* that one becomes an *Āchārya*.—Thus then, it is only the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* that are mentioned in connection with the learning of the Veda; and this learning of the Veda has nowhere been mentioned in connection with the *Shūdra*;—consequently, being without the knowledge of the Veda, the *Shūdra* has not the requisite capacity and hence is not entitled to perform sacrifices.

SŪTRA (36).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"THIS REASONING IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING THE KNOWLEDGE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer will be as in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

"If it is your view that being devoid of learning, and hence wanting in capacity, the *Shūdra* cannot be entitled to perform sacrifices,—then our answer is that this does not affect our position; *because of the possibility of acquiring the knowledge*; that is, the *Shūdra* can always acquire the requisite knowledge; even though such knowledge is not mentioned in the text quoted, yet he can study the Veda and acquire the requisite knowledge; it is certainly possible for one to study what has not been spoken of in a Vedic text.—Thus the correct view remains that all the four castes are entitled to perform sacrifices."

SŪTRA (37).

[*Answer*]—IT BEING IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SHŪDRA TO ACQUIRE THE KNOWLEDGE, HE CAN HAVE NO TITLE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya

It is not possible that the *Shūdra* would acquire the requisite knowledge. Because such learning has been actually forbidden for the Shūdra—'The *Shūdra* shall not read the *Veda*'. Under the circumstances, if he were to read it, such reading would be absolutely useless; in fact he would incur sin.—Thus then, it is *impossible for the Shūdra to acquire the knowledge*, and hence it becomes established that *he can have no title to the performance of sacrifices.*

Even though it were somehow possible for the *Shūdra* to acquire knowledge, yet he could have no title to the performance of sacrifices, as he would be without the Fire.—"But why should he be *without Fire*?"—Because the texts speak of the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya*, and the *Vaishya* only as entitled to install the fire—"But the real injunction of the installation of Fire is only the general one 'If one knowing this should install the Fire', and the other texts that mention the *Brāhmaṇa* and other castes,—such as 'The *Brāhmaṇa* should install the Fire during spring' and so forth,—are understood to be only contingent in their character [i.e. what they mean is that '*under the special contingency of the performer being a Brāhmaṇa*, the installation should be done during spring']."—The answer to this is as follows—As a matter of fact, the *direct* injunction of the installation of Fire is recognised to be in the form 'The Brāhmaṇa should install the Fire'; while the injunction that would be deduced from the commendatory text—'If one who, knowing this, installs the Fire, etc. etc.'—can only be *inferred* and hence *indirect*; and as such this would be less authoritative than the former *directly*

asserted one.—Thus it follows that the texts speaking of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes really specify these as alone entitled to the performance of the acts; so that the *Shūdra* cannot be regarded as so entitled.

SŪTRA (38).

FURTHER, WE FIND OTHER TEXTS ALSO, POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

We also find other texts pointing to the same conclusion,—that there is no learning (of the *Veda*) for the Shūdra —"What is that indicative text?" —It is this—'*Yadyu vā ētat smasānam yachchhūdrah, tasmāt shūdrasamīpē nādhyēyam*' ['The *Shūdra* is like the cremation ground; therefore one should not read the *Veda* near a *Shūdra*']: this clearly shows that the Shūdra cannot read the Veda.

From all this it follows that only castes *other than the Shūdra* are entitled to perform sacrifices.

Opponent—"Even without the consecrated (*Āhavanīya*) Fire, the performance of sacrifice can be regarded as laid down for the *Shūdra*, on the basis of general declarations [such as, '*Desiring Heaven* one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma*' and so forth]."

The answer to this is that such texts do not lay down the performance of the sacrifice for *anyone desiring heaven*, all that they do is to point out that the particular sacrifice brings about the attainment of Heaven as its result.

Thus we conclude that it is absolutely impossible for the *Shūdra* to perform the *Agnihotra* and such acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The man without wealth is also entitled to perform sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AMONG THE THREE CASTES, ONLY A PERSON POSSESSING WEALTH [IS ENTITLED TO PERFORM SACRIFICES]; BECAUSE THE PERFORMANCE OF SACRIFICES CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY MEANS OF WEALTH."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Agnihotra* and other acts, there arises the question—Is the man without wealth entitled to perform them or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Among *the three castes, only a person possessing wealth* is entitled to perform the acts—not one devoid of wealth.—Why so?—Because one who is devoid of wealth cannot be able to perform an act which requires many things. Hence it follows that one who is devoid of wealth is not entitled to perform sacrifices."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE IT IS A VARIABLE FACTOR; AND THE POSSESSION OF WEALTH CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT AS NEED ARISES.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted above—that "the man without wealth is not entitled to perform sacrifices",—cannot be right.—Why?—Because *it is a variable factor*; that is, the possession of wealth is a variable factor.—and *no man is* 'devoid of wealth' by his *birth*; there are always ways and means whereby one can become 'wealthy'.—In fact, the term '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') applies to anyone who is able to perform the sacrifice; and the term does not apply to one who is not in any way able to perform the sacrifice:—at the same time, it does not entirely exclude the person who (though not able at first, yet), somehow or other, becomes able to perform it; and the reason for this lies in the fact that *the possession of wealth can be brought about as need arises*; it is impossible that a man should live without any possession at all; so that as need arises, the necessary wealth can be acquired.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *A man suffering from a bodily defect is entitled to perform sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (41).

THE CASE OF THE MAN SUFFERING FROM A BODILY DEFECT IS LIKE THAT OF THE MAN DEALT WITH (IN THE PRECEDING ADHIKARAṆA).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices, there arises the following question, in relation to the man suffering from a bodily defect—Is such a man entitled to perform sacrifices or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" he is incapable (and hence not entitled to perform sacrifices) ".

The *Siddhānta* is that, as he has the capacity [he *is* entitled to perform sacrifices].—This is what is said in the Sūtra—*The case of the man suffering from a bodily defect is like that of the man dealt with in the preceding Adhikaraṇa.* —" Like what ? "—Like the man devoid of wealth. [That is, just as the man *devoid of wealth* is entitled to perform sacrifices so also is the man *suffering from a bodily defect*; and on the same ground of it being possible to remedy the defect].

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The man suffering from an incurable bodily defect is not entitled to perform sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (42).

INASMUCH AS WHAT IS THERE SINCE BIRTH REMAINS FOR EVER [THE PERSON SUFFERING FROM SUCH A BODILY DEFECT CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO PERFORM SACRIFICES].

Bhāṣya.

We now proceed to consider the case of the man suffering from an incurable bodily defect—Is such a person entitled to perform sacrifices, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"according to the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the man should be entitled to perform sacrifices".

The *Siddhānta* however is as follows:—The man cannot be entitled;—why?—because he has not the requisite capacity; he can never in any way, be able to perform a sacrifice; from which it follows that he is not entitled to perform them.

Says the Opponent—"The man should be regarded as qualified to do whatever he is able to do; for instance, if he is blind, he can do everything in connection with the sacrifice except the 'examining of the Clarified Butter';—if he is lame, he can do everything except the '*viṣṇukrama*';—if he is deaf, he can do everything except the hearing of the words of direction: so that it is only these particular acts for which the man, who is blind or lame or deaf, cannot be qualified".

This is not right, we reply. Such acts as the 'examining of the Clarified Butter' and the like are not enjoined in reference to the Man; if they had been enjoined for him, then even the maimed person might be qualified for it;—they have however been enjoined in reference to (for the sake of) the sacrifice, because they occur in the context of the sacrifice, and also because it is not the Man (Agent) that is spoken of by the verb; this has been already explained above under Sū. 3. 4. 13.—The said actions therefore are such that, if they were not done, the sacrifice, though performed, would be defective, and as such could not bring about its result.—Hence we concluded that the person in question is not qualified for the performance of sacrifices

[According to the *Neo-Mīmāṃsakas*, this disqualification applies only to the 'prospective acts', not to those that are *compulsory*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *A man without 'Three Gotra-Ṛṣis' is not entitled to perform the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (43).

ONE WHO CANNOT NAME 'THREE ṚṢIS' SHOULD BE EXCLUDED [FROM THE PERFORMANCE].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Ārsēyam vṛṇītē—Ēkam vṛṇītē—Dvau vṛṇītē—Trīn vṛṇītē—Na chaturo vṛṇītē—Na pañchātivṛṇītē*' ['He should name the *Gotra-rsis*;—he should name one *Ṛsi*;—he should name two *Ṛsis*;—he should name three *Ṛsis*;—he should not name four *Ṛsis*:—he should not name more than five *Ṛsis*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the man who is unable to name 'three *gotra-ṛsis*' entitled to perform the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice, or not?

The *Pūrvapaksa* view on this question is as follows:—"That man also who is unable to name 'Three *gotra-ṛsis*' is entitled to perform the sacrifice.—Why?—Because the injunction is in the general form 'he should name the *gotra-ṛsis*' [without any special number]; hence it is open to the man to name one or two also; that this is so is made clear by the sentences—'He should name *one*,' 'he should name *two*'; and this same fact is indicated also by the prohibitions of naming 'four' or 'more than five': if there were no possibility of the 'four' or 'more than five' being named, there should have been no prohibition of it [as there can be no prohibition of what is absolutely impossible].—From all this it follows that that man also is entitled to perform the sacrifice who is unable to name 'three *Gotra-ṛsis*'."

Against the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The man who is unable to name 'Three *Gotra-ṛsis*' is not entitled to perform the sacrifice. Why?—Because of the specific declaration 'He should name *three Ṛsis*',—which is to be taken as an injunction, as what it lays down is not already known.—"But there are other specific declarations—'he should name *one*' and so forth."—These cannot be taken as injunctions; as there is no injunctive affix in them.—"The enjoining would be done by means of the commendation contained in the sentences; as in the case of the sentence 'he should name *three Ṛsis*'."—The answer to this is that the commendation is of *three Ṛsis*; hence it can enjoin the naming of *three* only. As for the sentences 'he should name *one*' and 'he should name *two*', these also speak of the same *three Ṛsis*, but in parts (first of *one*, then of *two*); so that these two sentences also commend the *three*, with a view to enjoin them. In this way the enjoining would be done by a single sentence.—As for the other two sentences—'he should not name four', 'he should

not name more than five',—these may be taken as stating a settled fact.—From all this it follows that the person who is unable to name '*three Ṛṣis*' is not entitled to perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

[This Adhikaraṇa does *not* mean that the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* can be performed by only those Brāhmaṇas who have *three and only three Pravara-Ṛṣis*.—All that is meant is that those who are unable to name *three Ṛṣis* among their *Gotra Ṛṣis* are not entitled. So that persons with *five Pravara Ṛṣis* become entitled. The prohibition that 'more than *five* shall not be named' makes this clear.—*Ṭupṭīkā*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (12) '*Rathakāra-nyāya*' : *The* '*Rathakāra*', *who is not included among the* '*Three castes*', *is entitled to perform Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (44).

THE TEXT IN QUESTION SPEAKS OF THE INSTALLATION TO BE DONE BY THE 'RATHAKĀRA'—BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT DECLARATION, WHICH MUST REFER TO ONE NOT ALREADY MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with Fire-installation, we read—'*Varsāsu rathakāra ādadhīta*' ['The *Rathakāra* should install the Fire during the rains'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this '*Rathakāra*' included in any one of the three higher castes (*Brāhmaṇa*, *Kṣattriya*, and *Vaishya*)? or is he distinct from these?

The natural answer to this question [which is also the *Siddhānta* A] is that the 'Installation' spoken of in the text is that to be done by the *Rathakāra*, who is not included in any of the three castes.—"How so?"—*Because such is the direct declaration*; and there is nothing that cannot be done by a direct declaration. This same declaration also makes it clear that the person spoken of here as doing the Installation is not among the three castes, and is in fact one that is not already mentioned in other texts; that is to say, the Installation of Fire by the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* has been already laid down in another text (as to be done during *spring*, *summer*, and *autumn*); hence, by elimination, the 'Rathakāra' spoken of in the text in question (as to do the Installing during the *rains*) must be other than these three.

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE MAN REFERRED TO MUST BE ONE BELONGING TO A REGULAR CASTE, AS THE SPECIAL NAME ONLY MENTIONS A PROFESSION; AND THE SHŪDRA HAS BEEN ALREADY EXCLUDED."

Bhāṣya.

"The '*rathakāra*' *must be one belonging to a regular caste*,—i.e. to one of the three castes;—he is only specified here as '*rathakāra*' ('*chariot-maker*') in view of his profession;—and the *Shūdra* has already been excluded;—hence the *Rathakāra* must belong to one of the three castes."

SŪTRA (46).

[ANSWER TO PŪRVAPAKṢA]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THE PROFESSION MENTIONED IS NOT ONE THAT IS SANCTIONED (FOR THE THREE CASTES).

Bhāṣya.

The '*Rathakāra*' cannot belong to any of the three castes; because any such profession as *Chariot-making* has been forbidden for the three castes; he can, however, be one who does not belong to any of the three castes; and such a person, though not belonging to any of the three castes, would be entitled to perform the Installation on the strength of the direct declaration.

SŪTRA (47).

THERE WOULD BE SUPERFLUITY [IF THE TEXT UNDER CONSIDERATION REFERRED TO A PERSON AMONG THE THREE CASTES]; BECAUSE THESE HAVE BEEN ALREADY SPOKEN OF (IN ANOTHER TEXT)

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Brāhmana*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*, the three seasons *spring* (summer and autumn) have been already specified (for the Installation of Fire); if then the 'rains' also were laid down in connection with any of those same castes, it would be entirely superfluous.—From this it follows that the '*Rathakāra*' is not a person belonging to any of the three castes

SŪTRA (48)

"THE TEXT MAY BE TAKEN AS A CONTINGENT DECLARATION",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"If your view is that the *Rathakāra* cannot belong to any of the three castes, because it has been forbidden for persons belonging to the three castes to make a living by any such craft (as Chariot-making),—then our reply is that the declaration may be taken as a contingent one; it is just possible that someone belonging to the three castes may—though wrongly—take up the profession of *Chariot-making*; and what the text means is that *if there be such a one*, the installation of Fire by him should be done *during the rains*".

SŪTRA (49).

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THESE DECLARATIONS ARE NOT CONTINGENT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been already explained by us that the texts that are being considered are not those that make any contingent declarations.—"What if

they are not contingent declarations?"—What follows is that they are purely injunctive; so that the Installing of the Fire by the three castes having been already enjoined in another text,—if there were another injunction of the same,—it would be entirely superfluous; and as a necessary consequence, the text in question should be taken as laying down the installation by one for whom it has not been enjoined already.—It might be urged that "this one declaration may be taken as contingent".—But that cannot be; because how can the Installation which has been spoken of in connection with the *spring*, the *summer* and the *autumn*,—be connected with the *rains*?—Then again, if the text in question is taken as injunctive, the Installing would be enjoined by 'Direct Assertion', whereas if it were taken as contingent, then the injunction of the *rains* could be only indicated by 'Syntactical Connection';—and 'Direct Assertion' is more authoritative than 'Syntactical Connection'.—From all this it follows that the Installation spoken of in the text in question is that by one who does not belong to any of the three castes.

SŪTRA (50).

[FINAL SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS THE INFERIOR 'SAUDHANVANAS' THAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE MEANT, ON THE STRENGTH OF CERTAIN MANTRA-TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

Everyone not belonging to any of the three castes is not a '*Rathakāra*'. '*Saudhanvana*' is the name of a certain caste; it is this caste '*Saudhanvana*' that is meant; this caste is slightly '*inferior*' to the three castes,—it is a distinct caste, neither *Shūdra*, nor *Vaishya* nor *Kṣattriya*, and it is for persons of this caste that the text in question lays down the Installation of Fire.—"How do you know that?"—We learn this from well-known usage and also from certain *Mantra-texts*.—(*a*) There is the *Mantra*, '*Saudhanvanā ṛbhava shūrachakṣasaḥ*' (Rgvēda, 1. 110. 4);—the *Mantra* to be used by the *Rathakāra* at the Installing of Fire is '*Ṛbhūṇāntu*, etc';—hence it follows that the '*Saudhanvanas*' are the same as '*Ṛbhavaḥ*'; and '*rbhavaḥ*' are '*rathakāras*',—as is indicated by the *Mantra*—'*Nemin nayanti rbhavo yathā*' (Rgvēda, 8. 75. 5), which shows that the '*Ṛbhavaḥ*' are those who fix up the tyre of the chariot-wheel; and it is the '*Rathakāra*' (Chariot-maker) that fixes up the tyre of the Chariot-wheel. [Hence the *Rathakāra* is the same as *Rbhu*].

From all this it follows that the Installation spoken of in the sentence in question is that by persons who do not belong to any of the three higher castes, and who are also not *Shūdras*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13) : '*Niṣādasthapati-nyāya*' : *The* '*Niṣāda*', *who does not belong to one of the three higher castes, is entitled to perform the* '*Raudra-sacrifice*'.

SŪTRA (51).

THE 'STHAPATI' (CHIEF) SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BE A 'NIṢĀDA'; BECAUSE SUCH IS THE SENSE OF THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

The *Raudra-sacrifice* is enjoined in the text—'*Vāstumadhyē raudram charum nirvapēt yatra rudrah prajāh shamayēt*'—['At the centre of the residence one should offer cooked rice to *Rudra*; whereupon *Rudra* would keep the children at peace'].—In connection with this sacrifice it has been declared—'*Ētayā niṣādasthapatim yājayēt*' ['This sacrifice should be performed for the *Niṣāda-chief*'].

In regard to the exact signification of the compound '*niṣādasthapatim*' ('*Niṣāda-chief*') there arises the following question—Is the person meant by this word a person included among those who have been declared (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇas*) as entitled to perform sacrifices? or is he distinct from those?

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows:—'The *Niṣāda-chief* is included among those who have been already declared to be entitled to perform sacrifices; because it is only one of those that has the capacity to perform sacrifices, being possessed of the requisite learning and Fire; anyone other than those would not have the requisite learning and Fire, and as such, would be devoid of the capacity to perform sacrifices.—The term *niṣāda-chief* could not apply to anyone of those entitled to perform sacrifices'.—The answer to this is that the said term would not be applicable; as the compound would be taken as a *Genitive Tatpuruṣa*—'*niṣādānām sthapatih*',—and would thus stand for the *Chief of the Niṣādas* [and this *Chief* himself need not be a *Niṣāda* who is not among those entitled to perform sacrifices].—Thus then the text in question should be taken as asserting the title of one whose title has been already established."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The* '*Sthapati*' (*Chief*) *should be taken to be a* '*Niṣāda*', *because such is the sense of the word.* A *Niṣāda* himself should be understood to be the 'Chief'.—"Why?"—*Because such is the sense of the word*; that is, the term '*niṣāda*' can directly denote the *Niṣāda* only; a 'Chief of the *Niṣādas*' (who is himself not a *Niṣāda*)—it could indicate only indirectly (figuratively);—and when there is a conflict between 'Direct Denotation' and 'Indirect Indication', the right course is to accept the *Direct Denotation*, not the *Indirect Indication*.—The Opponent might argue thus—"What has been urged does not affect our position; the term '*niṣāda*' (in our case also) denotes the *Niṣāda* only;

all that we say is that it should be taken in the Genitive case [so that the compound means '*the sthapati*, Chief, *of the Niṣādas*']".—This, however, cannot be right; as the Genitive ending is absent; as a matter of fact, we do not find the Genitive ending here.—Says the Opponent—"On the strength of the *elision* (that always takes place in compounds), the sense of the Genitive is understood".—True, it is so understood; but it is understood not from *elision*.—"Then, from what?"—It is understood from the 'indirect indication' by the term '*niṣāda*'; [i.e., the term '*niṣāda*' in the compound is taken as *indirectly* indicating '*niṣādānām*', 'of the *Niṣādas*'; while *directly* it denotes the *Niṣāda himself*]; and it has been already explained that *Indirect Indication* is weaker (than Direct Denotation); the interpretation of the compound ('*niṣādasthapatiḥ*') as a *Karmadhāraya*, whereby the term '*niṣāda*' qualifies the term '*sthapati*'—[and the compound thus means *the chief who is a Niṣāda*]—is more logical [than the *Genitive Tatpuruṣa*, suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣin*]. Because in the *Karmadhāraya* compound, the two terms retain their natural connotations; and the Accusative ending (appearing at the end of the compound '*niṣādasthapatim*') becomes connected, in common, with both the terms ('*niṣāda*' and '*sthapati*'); hence the term '*niṣāda*' as occurring in the compound is understood to be the *Niṣāda marked by the sense of the Accusative*. Under the circumstances, if one were to impose upon it the sense of the *Genitive*, he would be assuming what is not expressed at all.—From all this it follows that the *Sthapati*, Chief, that is meant, should himself be a *Niṣāda*.

SŪTRA (52).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

We find the following text as indicative of the same conclusion—'*Kūṭam dakṣiṇā*' ['A false coin is the sacrificial fee'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 1 8. 9. 1),—where a coin is mentioned which is current among *Niṣādas* only: a 'false coin' is of use to *Niṣādas* only, not to *Āryas*; consequently such coin would be in the possession of *Niṣādas* only.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Every individual member taking part in a 'Satra' shares its Results.*

SŪTRA (1).

INASMUCH AS EACH MAN HELPS IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE DESIRED END, THE TITLE TO THE PERFORMANCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ACCRUING TO EACH.

Bhāṣya.

There are the following texts—'*Dvādashāhēna prajākāmam yājayēt*' ['For one desiring offspring, he should perform the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice']; —'*Ṛddhi-kāmā upēyuḥ*' ['Those desiring prosperity should take to the sacrifice']; —then again, with a view to diverse purposes, '*Ēvaṅkāmāḥ satramupēyuḥ*' ['Desiring such and such a thing, they should take up the *Satra*']; —'*Saptadāshāvarāḥ chaturviṁshatiparamāḥ satramāsīran*' ['Not less than seventeen and not more than twenty-four should perform the *Satra*'].

In regard to all this, there arises the question—Who is entitled to perform the *Satra*? Is it each individual person desiring the whole fruit of the *Satra*? or the whole group, as a group, desiring that fruit?

Objection (to the question)—"In the text the persons desiring the fruit are spoken of as several in number; how then can there be any possibility of each of them singly being entitled to perform the sacrifice?"

Answer—The text contains the term '*ṛddhikāmāḥ*' ('*persons desiring prosperity*'); this is applicable to persons having the qualification of *desiring prosperity*, taken collectively as well as severally; and it is not possible to restrict it to *several persons*; it is for this reason that there arises the question as to whether the term entitles each of the persons severally or all of them collectively.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It is not possible for each person singly to perform a sacrifice which can be performed only by several performers; then again, we understand from the words of the text that the whole Group collectively as desiring the fruit is the *performer* of the sacrifice; and the result of an action cannot accrue to one who is not its performer;—the text does not speak of any single person as the *performer*; —hence the result must accrue to all the persons collectively; it may be that parts of the result accrue to the individuals singly; but the whole result must accrue to the whole group in common."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The result following from the *Satra* should be taken as accruing to each person desiring that result;—why?—*because each man helps in the accomplishment of the*

desired end; that is, when an act is done by several persons together, each of them helps in the accomplishment of the desired end; and further, the result of an act should always accrue to the performer of the act, and in the case in question, each of the persons concerned is the *performer of* the *Satra*.—Says the Opponent—"We have already pointed out that no single man can do what has been declared as to be done by several men".—Our answer to this is that each of them can certainly perform the *Satra*, when we take him independently by himself; that is, it is possible for each of the men concerned to undertake the performance by himself on his own account; in which case, in order to make up the prescribed number of 'performers', he would secure the co-operation of others by persuasion and other methods;—in this case even a single man would accomplish and secure the desired end for himself; while each of the others also helps in it; and thus all of them are 'performers' in the sense that they are all required to be there as such [for if they were not there as 'performers', the sacrifice would not be a *Satra*, and hence would not bring about the desired result]. Thus then, even in a case where all of them undertake the performance collectively, the result should accrue to each of them severally.

SŪTRA (2).

THEN AGAIN, IT IS IN ITS VERY ORIGIN THAT THE ACT IS CONNECTED [WITH THE NUMBER OF MEN]: THE CASE OF SEVERAL MEN PERFORMING THE SAME ACT WOULD BE LIKE THE SEEING OF AN ANIMAL BY SEVERAL MEN.

Bhāṣya

Then again, there is no incongruity in one and the same act being performed by several men.—It might be argued that—"there is certainly this incongruity that when one man is doing the act, what would the second be doing at the time?"—The answer to this is that there would be this incongruity in a case where the act were one meant to be done by turns, in a case, however, where the act is meant to be done conjointly, it is quite possible for several men to take part in it at the same time. For instance, in the case of '*seeing an animal*'—a horse or an elephant,—each man that sees it has the whole perception of it; in the same manner, there would be common action in regard to the *Satra*; the things used at the sacrifice would belong to all in common, and it would be into the common *sacrificial* (*Āhavaniya*) *Fire* that the *Adhvaryu priest* would throw in the offerings; and in this act all the men concerned would be 'performers' in common.

Then again, the *connection with the several men* in this case is not one that has been laid down (in a subsidiary injunction) separately from the injunction of the sacrifice itself; in fact, it is in the very originative injunction of the sacrifice that the connection of the sacrifice with the *number* (plurality of performers) has been spoken of. If it had been spoken of in a separate injunction after the originative injunction of the sacrifice, then the declara-

tion might be taken to mean that the result must accrue to the several men collectively. Such cannot be the meaning when the connection occurs in the originative injunction itself.

From all this, it follows that each of the performers is connected with the whole Result of the *Satra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *There should be only one Performer at the Darsha and other such sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"INASMUCH AS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF SACRIFICES, IT IS ONLY THE 'MAN' THAT IS SPOKEN OF, AS MANY AS LIKE MAY TAKE PART IN THE PERFORMANCE."

Bhāṣya.

We have the texts—'*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices']; '*Jyotistomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotistoma sacrifice*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the performances at these sacrifices to be done by one, two, or more men without any restriction? or should it be by *one only*?

[*Question objected to*]—"It has been already explained in Chapter III (3. 7. 18) that the fruit of the act accrues to the performer."

Answer—When the fruit accrues to the performer, then due significance must attach to the singular number,—this we are going to explain later on. But that is precisely what is questioned here, and is going to be settled later on.

On this question then, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'*As many as like may take part in the performance*'—'How so?'—Because *it is only the man that is spoken of*; the man alone is spoken of; the words of the text having enjoined the *sacrifice* in connection with the *Man* has served its purpose, and hence it cannot preclude the possibility of one or two or more men performing that sacrifice. As a matter of fact, it is not the *Man* that is enjoined in connection with the *sacrifice*,—the injunction does not mean that 'the man should accomplish the sacrifice' or that 'the *man* should accomplish the result by means of the *sacrifice*';—what it means is that 'the *man* should attain the result by means of the *sacrifice*'. So that the *man* is not an accessory either of the *sacrifice* or of the *accomplishment of the result*; if he had been accessory, either of the sacrifice or of the accomplishment of the result, then, in that case, the *Number*, being itself an accessory, could qualify the other accessory, *Man*.—When, however, the Man is not an accessory, if the Number were to qualify him, it could do so only indirectly as an *indicative*, not as a *qualification*; and in that case the Singular Number could not be regarded as significant; and under the circumstances, the Singular Number could not qualify, at a single stroke, all the things that may be spoken of and that may be capable of being so qualified—*Question*—'How then do you get at the idea of the *Man* being the principal factor?'—*Answer*—[That is due to the following facts]—There is no need for the appearance of the result, nor for the appearance

of the sacrifice; what is always desired is that the man's own self should become connected with the result; and that every action should be done to that end;—otherwise (if this were not so desired) then an act, even though enjoined, would never be performed; and the injunction itself would become entirely futile.—From this it follows that *as many as may desire may perform the sacrifice*,—it may be performed by one or two or more men.—This same conclusion is clearly indicated by the following texts—(*a*) '*Yuvām hi sthaḥ svarpatī*' (Rgvēda 9. 19. 2), where it is clear that the words are addressed to *two sacrificers*; and (*b*) '*Ūtī aṅgiramvadavaḥ*', etc. (Rgvēda 9. 6. 2. 1), where it is clear that it is addressed to *several sacrificers*.—Thus it is clear that a sacrifice may have two or more performers."

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued* AN OBJECTION TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT 'BOTH THE IDEAS ARE EQUALLY EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS OF THE INJUNCTION.'"—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya

The Opponent may bring forward the following argument—'*Both the ideas are equally expressed by the words of the injunction*; that is, the words of the injunctions express both the ideas - (1) one should accomplish the sacrifice and (2) one should attain the result of the sacrifice.—How so?—Because we actually derive these two notions from the words. Under the circumstances, we cannot be sure as to which of the two we are to reject (as not really expressed). Hence we must accept both to be equally expressed.—It might be argued that it is not right for the same sentence to have two meanings.—But the answer to that is that it must be right to accept that as the meaning of a sentence which is found to be actually expressed by it. Hence in the case in question, the only right course is to take both the ideas to be equally expressed.—Such being the case [and at least one meaning of the text being that one should accomplish the sacrifice], the *Man* appears as an *accessory* of this accomplishment of the sacrifice; and hence the singular *number* used in connection with him must be regarded as significant [and the sacrifice should have only *one* performer]'."

SŪTRA (5)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded* PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE ABOVE OBJECTION]—"THE WHOLE THING BEING FOR THE SAKE OF THE MAN, HE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN ACCESSORY (TO THE SACRIFICE), BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT, ASSUMED WITHOUT REASON;—SPECIALLY AS MAN IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR"

Bhāṣya

"[*Reply*]—What has been urged in the preceding *Sūtra* cannot be right; because *the whole thing being for the sake of Man*,—i.e., the Man being

the predominant factor,—*he cannot be regarded as an accessory.*—So long as a reason is not adduced, we cannot accept any other (different) idea; and the idea of Man being the subordinate factor is certainly *other* than—*different from*—the idea of his being the predominant factor. That in the present connection, the man is meant to be the predominant factor is clear from the fact that it is only thus that the text can have any sense. Thus it is not possible for the *Performer*, Man, to be regarded as the subordinate factor; specially as there is only one Injunction; there is only one injunctive text; and if that one text were to enjoin either the appearance of the result or the appearance of the sacrifice, then the Performer could not be enjoined directly by himself; if the Performer were enjoined directly by himself, then the sacrifice or the result could come in only as subservient to him. All this cannot be done simultaneously; because being enjoined by himself is one thing, while for the man to be enjoined as subservient to something else, or for that something to be enjoined as subservient to the man, is a totally different thing. For instance, in a case where Devadatta is recognised as shooting arrows with both hands,—this shooting cannot be done by both hands simultaneously; in fact what happens is that at the time that he shoots with the right hand, then with the left hand he is bending the back of the bow, and does not do the shooting with the latter, because it is otherwise engaged;—in the same manner, in a case where Man is enjoined as the predominant factor, the Sacrifice or the Result is recognised as the subordinate factor,—because the injunction is otherwise engaged (in pointing to the predominance of the *Man*); consequently, neither of these latter is recognised as the predominant factor.—From all this it follows that the Man is not a subordinate factor, in relation to either the Sacrifice or to the Result; and as many as may like,—one or two or several persons—may take part in the performance of the sacrifice."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THE MAN SHOULD BE TAKEN AS MENTIONED ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF THE PERFORMANCE (OF THE ACT), HIS RELATIONSHIP (TO THE ACT) BEING INDICATED BY THE MENTION OF THE 'DESIRE',—IN EVERY CASE THERE IS A DISTINCT INJUNCTIVE TEXT IN RELATION TO EACH OF THE THINGS (THAT ARE MEANT TO BE ENJOINED),—AS WE FIND IN THE CASE OF THE 'BLACK ANTELOPE-HORN'.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa view.*

The Performer should be taken as mentioned only for the sake of the performance of the act, and not independently by himself.—"Why so?"—Because what the injunctive term '*yajēta*', 'should sacrifice', signifies is that 'one should accomplish the sacrifice', or that 'one should accomplish something by means of the sacrifice'; so that, so far as the *Man* is

concerned, it is his mere *existence* that is implied, not the fact of his being either the *accomplisher* or the *receptacle* of the Result.—As for the term 'desiring heaven' ('*svargakāmaḥ*'), all that it denotes is *desire for heaven*, and does not include in itself any special feature, either of the Man himself or of any one else.—And in matters like the one under consideration, we have no other reliable means of knowledge except the Verbal Texts. [Hence what is not expressed by the words of the Texts, we cannot accept as being denoted as the predominant factor; that is why the *Man* cannot be regarded, in the present connection, as the predominant factor.]

Says the Opponent—"In what manner is the connection between the Man and the *desire* comprehended?"

It is indicated by the mention of the 'desire'. Even when it is not stated in so many words, 'one who desires results' desires it for himself, not for any other person. In a case where both things are meant to be spoken of, *there is a distinct injunctive text in relation to each of them*; for instance, we have the two texts—(*a*) '*Kṛṣṇaviṣāṇayā kaṇḍūyati*' ['One should rub his body with the Black Antelope-Horn'],—and (*b*) '*Chātvālē kṛṣṇaviṣāṇām prāsyati*' ['Throws the Black Antelope-Horn into the pit']—(Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 3. 8) [where the *Rubbing of the Body* and the *Throwing of the Horn*, both being meant to be enjoined, there is a distinct text for each]. In the same manner, in a case where there would be two distinct injunctive texts, there alone could both *predominance* and *subservience* of the Man be comprehended. In the case in question there are not two distinct injunctive texts; the Man is however clearly spoken of as the subordinate factor in the injunction '*bhāvayēt*' ('should bring into existence'), wherein the 'sacrifice' appears either as the *instrument* or the *objective* [the sense being either that 'the man should bring into existence, or accomplish, the result by *means of the sacrifice*', or that 'he should bring into existence, i.e., accomplish, the *sacrifice* itself']. As for the predominance of the *Man*, that is only implied indirectly through the mention of the connection of 'desire'; the fact being that no one requires the mere appearance of Happiness by itself, what the Soul of the Man desires is his connection with the happiness;—thus it is that the predominance of Man is indirectly implied by this *connection*, and not directly expressed by any Vedic Text.

Thus Man being the subordinate factor, the singular number pertaining to him must be regarded as significant.

SŪTRA (7).

[*Objection*]—"[THE DESIRE] MAY BE [FOR THE RESULT] ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER PERSON",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya

The Opponent may argue as follows:—"The man who desires Heaven for another person can also be spoken of as 'desiring heaven' ('*svargakāmaḥ*'); so that one man may perform the sacrifice with a view to the attainment

of Heaven by another person; and thus would upset the conclusion arrived at before, regarding *the result of enjoined actions accruing to the performer* (Sū. 3. 7. 13)."

SŪTRA (8)

[*Answer*]—THERE IS NO CONNECTION IN THE CASE OF AN ACT DONE FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya

We do not mean that 'one should not perform the sacrifice with a desire to lead to another person's attainment of Heaven',—nor that the term 'desiring heaven' does not express one desiring heaven for some one else';—what we do mean is that under such circumstances, the *other man* does not obtain the Result—"Why should he not obtain the result?"—Because of the text containing a particular ending,—in the word *yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'), as also in the word *ādadhīta*' ('should install') in the text 'the *Brāhmana* should install the Fire during spring' [in both cases there is the *Ātmanēpada* ending, which clearly expresses the idea that the result following from the action spoken of must accrue to the man himself who performs the act, *not to any other person*] If a similar ending is found in the text speaking of the desire (result), it must be taken as a reference to this same idea

SŪTRA (9)

[*Objection*]—'THE DESIRE FOR A PARTICULAR RESULT MAY BE THE CONTINGENCY [UNDER WHICH THE SACRIFICE MAY BE PERFORMED FOR ANOTHER PERSON]"—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA]

Bhāṣya

[Says the Opponent]—'If you hold the opinion that the term 'desiring heaven' is not incapable of denoting *the person desiring heaven for another person*,—and that one man does not perform a sacrifice for another simply because in that case no results are accomplished,—then, it may be possible for one to perform such a sacrifice (vicariously), with a view to obtaining the results mentioned in the *Sūktavāka-hymn*, wherein we read the words—'*Āshastē* '*yam yajamānah āyuṛāshāstē*' ['This sacrificer hopes for longevity'] (Taitt. Brā 3. 5. 10. 4)—where the *Hotr-priest* (who recites the hymn) points to the sacrificer who has engaged him to officiate on his behalf;—and that these words contain the injunction of Results (in the shape of *Longevity*) is clear from the fact that the reciting of the *Sūktavāka* itself has already been enjoined in another text—'*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*' ['One should offer the *Kusha-bundle* with the *Sūktavāka*']. It is only when the *Mantra*, '*Āshāstē*, *etc*' is taken as an injunction of results, that it is possible for the *Kusha-bundle* to be offered with the *Sūktavāka* (in accordance with the latter injunction); otherwise, an unseen

(transcendental) result would have to be assumed.—From this it follows that it is possible for one to perform a sacrifice for another person, for the purpose of bringing about incidental results."

SŪTRA (10).

[*Answer*]—THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE IT IS COMPULSORY (NOT CONTINGENT).

Bhāṣya

Answer—What has been argued above is not possible; as the *incidental* result also should accrue to the same man to whom the principal result accrues. It is only thus that the installation of Fire can be done by one for himself; and there is no peculiarity in the case of the Installation being done for oneself (which is not present in the case of other acts also); and we know that in the case of Installation, all kinds of results—incidental as well as principal—accrue to the man who does the *installing*.—Then again, in the case cited, it would be inconsistent for the sacrifice to be both 'compulsory' and 'prospective' (optional): that is to say, if the act of sacrificing (offering of the *Kusha-bundle*) were done (by the *Hotṛ*) for the purpose of his employee attaining 'longevity', then the said could not be *compulsory* (as it would be done only with a view to a particular desired end); on the other hand, if the act were compulsory, then it could not be prospective (done only with a view to a certain desired result).

From all this it follows that our view does not go against any conclusions already arrived at (under Sū. 3 7. 18); as the *Man* has not been laid down as the predominant factor; he is, in fact, a subordinate factor; and hence the singular number must be significant; so that there can be only *one* sacrificer to each sacrifice.

SŪTRA (11).

[*Objection*]—"BUT IN CERTAIN TEXTS, THE ACT HAS BEEN ACTUALLY INDICATED AS TO BE DONE [BY MORE THAN ONE PERFORMER]," —IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

The following argument has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*:—"The following texts clearly show that a sacrifice may be performed by two and more persons—(*a*) '*Yuvām hi sthaḥ svarpatī*' [Rgvēda 9. 19. 2), which shows that this *Mantra* should be used in the case of there being *two sacrificers*,—and (*b*) '*Ēte asṛgramindavaḥ*' (Rgvēda 9. 52. 1), which shows that this *Mantra* is to be used in the case of there being *several sacrificers*. All this shows that acts may be performed by two and more sacrificers."

This argument has got to be refuted [which we do below]—

SŪTRA (12).

THAT CANNOT BE; THESE ARE PARTICULAR CASES WHERE THE ACT IS ACTUALLY DECLARED TO BE SUCH AS TO REQUIRE TWO OR MORE PERFORMERS.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged above is not possible in all cases. In fact, in connection with the texts quoted, they actually declare the presence of two and more sacrificers;—just as it is in the case of the *Ahīna* sacrifices (*Satras*), where a large number of performers have been actually enjoined; and this injunction becomes effective only when they are actually performed by the several sacrificers.—[But these are special cases, specially provided for; but that cannot apply to the case of other sacrifices].—Hence we conclude that as a rule, only one man is to perform a sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Even a 'prospective' sacrifice, when commenced, must be continued to the end.*

SŪTRA (13).

BY REASON OF THE COMMENCEMENT, THE ACT MUST BE FINISHED; BECAUSE THE 'COMMENCEMENT' OF AN ACT IS A CONTINGENCY UNDER WHICH IT HAS TO BE CARRIED ON.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain acts laid down in such texts as—'Desiring offspring, one should perform a sacrifice'; —'Desiring a village, one should perform a sacrifice'.

In regard to such acts, there arises the question—When one such act has been commenced, must it be carried on to the end? Or it may be carried on or abandoned, as one may like?

The natural answer to this question [and the *Siddhānta*] is that the act must be carried on to the end.—Why so? What the text says is that 'Desiring such and such a result, one should perform a sacrifice'; and the meaning of the verb 'should perform a sacrifice' they explain to be that it lays down *the act from its beginning to its end*; that is, the verb denotes an operation beginning with the commencement and ending with its completion;—and it is not like the act of 'cooking' or of 'giving away'; in the case of the action of 'cooking', it is the mere presence of the *act of cooking* that is expressed; it does not mean that having been commenced, it must be carried on to the end.—It is in this sense (of the complete act) that people in ordinary life also understand all verbs. In fact, what the injunctive text enjoins is not really the effort of man to commence an act; because people do not necessarily commence only what has been enjoined; but they necessarily carry on to the end what has been enjoined. Hence what the verb denotes is not both the *commencement* and the *completion*,—but the *completion* only; and the commencement comes in only as necessarily implied in the *completion*. Hence we conclude that it is *completion* of the act that is denoted by the verb. When, thus, what is denoted is the *completion* of the act, it is this that should be taken to be enjoined as *to be done*; and there is no injunction, as *to be done*, in regard to the mere *commencement* of the act. Hence the *commencement* of an act is not necessary, what is necessary is the *completion* of what has been commenced. Consequently, after the commencement of the act, if the desire for the particular result (desired to be obtained by means of that act) should cease,—or if the result should be actually acquired (before the completion of the act),—even under these circumstances, the completing of what has been commenced is absolutely necessary.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, what is enjoined as to be done is what is desired by the man."

Not so; what is desired by the man is expressed *by the sentence* ('Syntactical Connection'), while the idea that *the sacrifice should be performed* is obtained from 'Direct Assertion'.

From all this it follows that when a man 'desiring a village' has commenced a sacrifice, he must complete it. The mention of the desire for village' thus is only a contingent condition;—and when an act is declared as to be done when that contingency has come about, that act (started under that contingency) has to be completed even though the contingency may have ceased to exist It has been enjoined that what has been commenced should be completed; and this *completing* has to be done even when the said contingency may have ceased to exist; because what has *ceased to exist* cannot be said to have not *come into existence*; and it is the *coming into existence* of the contingency,—not its *continued presence*—which is the contingency (under which the act is to be done). Hence it follows that even when the desire for the Result has ceased, what has been commenced must be completed. Because the *commencement* of the act is the contingency under which it started, and it should also be the contingency under which it should be carried on to its end.

SŪTRA (14)

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION]—"IN FACT, INASMUCH AS THE MAN ONLY WANTS THE RESULT, THERE CAN BE NO COMPULSION; JUST AS THERE IS NONE IN REGARD TO WHAT HAS NOT BEEN COMMENCED"

Bhāṣya

The particle 'vā' ('in fact') sets aside the view expressed above.

"*In fact, there can be no compulsion*,—why?—*because the man only wants the result*; what is laid down by the Injunctive text is only that the act mentioned is the means to be employed by one 'who wants the result',—i.e. who is desirous of bringing about the result;—and it is not the idea that *it should be done* that is laid down by the text. Because if the idea that *it should be accomplished* were laid down, it could refer either to the *sacrifice* or to the *Result* [as it is only these that can be *accomplished*],—it could not refer to the Result; because when a man desires something, he does not need to be told that *he should accomplish it*; he himself knows it very well that he has to accomplish the result that he desires; what he does not know however is the *means* of accomplishing that result;—this is what he wants to know; so that to him the teaching is addressed that *sacrifice* is the required means,—i.e. the desired result is to be accomplished by means of the sacrifice.—It cannot be the *sacrifice* that is desired to be accomplished; as this would be inconsistent with the perceptible fact that the performance of a sacrifice is a source of discomfort (and as such cannot be desired); there is no such inconsistency, however, when it is something else that is meant to be accomplished *by means of* the sacrifice. Further, if the *sacrifice* itself were meant to be accomplished, then, it would be necessary to assume

a result for it; but there is no authority for any such assumption. Then again, the injunction that *it should be accomplished* is possible only in regard to things that are capable of being accomplished.—From all this it follows that the *sacrifice* cannot be what is meant *to be accomplished*.—What then is done by the injunctive text is that the desired result is referred to as *what is to be accomplished*, and then in reference to that result, the *sacrifice* is enjoined as the *means*.—From this it follows that the sacrifice need not necessarily be completed; just as an act that has not been commenced need not be commenced,—similarly what has been commenced need not be completed.—As for the argument that what is indicated by 'Syntactical Connection' is set aside by what is declared by 'Direct Assertion',—this has been already answered.—Hence we conclude that there can be no compulsion (in regard to the completing of what has been commenced)."

SŪTRA (15)

[*Answer*]—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE MUST BE COMPULSION, BECAUSE IT (COMMENCEMENT) IS A CONTINGENCY UNDER WHICH THERE MUST BE COMPLETION, IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE AN INCENTIVE TO THE PERFORMER.

Bhāṣya.

Commencement is the contingency under which there must be *completion*.—How so?—*Because it should be an incentive to the performer*.—What is the incentive?—Firmness of determination; the man who always completes what he has commenced is not blamed by cultured people—'he is only brave at commencing things, which he never sees through, he is not one with whom one should associate in business';—such blame from cultured people is undesirable, hence it is necessary that when an act has been commenced, it should be completed.

Says the Opponent—"Why should cultured people blame such a person?"

The answer to this is that they do blame such persons; the fact is there; what is the use of seeking for the cause (of such blame)?

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In the case of ordinary temporal acts, it is not necessary that what has been commenced must be completed.*

SŪTRA (16)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"TEMPORAL ACTS ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE SCRIPTURAL ACTS, AS IN THEIR CASE ALSO, THERE IS AN IDEA OF THE PRESIDING DEITY DERIVED FROM THAT SAME SOURCE."

Bhāṣya.

Some one has commenced erecting a house, or a cart, or a chariot;—after some time the desire for the finished thing has ceased,—or he has got, by other means, what he wanted.—now in regard to this case, there arises the question—should the man necessarily complete what he commenced to do? Or might he give it up when he likes?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows.—"*Temporal acts* also, after having been commenced, must be completed, just like *Scriptural acts*, these ordinary temporal acts also must necessarily be completed.—'Why so?'—Because *in their case also there is an idea of the presiding deity derived from that same source*; i.e. from that same source we can derive the idea of a presiding deity in the case of ordinary temporal acts also.—'From what source?'—From the scriptures, there are texts speaking of the 'scriptures' of carpenters; and there also we recognise the functionings of presiding deities; there being such notions as 'preside over the Eastern quarter, and such others' [illegible] such other quarters'.—Such being the case, if there is blame by the cult[illegible]ured in the case of not completing a commenced act, wherein there is some functioning of deities spoken of in the scriptures (as there is in the case of Scriptural acts),—then these latter also have to be completed.]"

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"THEN AGAIN, IN THE CASE OF FAILURE, THEY LAY DOWN ORDINANCES (FOR EXPIATION)."

Bhāṣya.

"In the case of the *failure* of temporal acts, *they*—i.e. the Carpenters—[illegible]*m*; such as—'If the spoke (for instance)—*lay down ordinances for expiation*—[illegible]*ana* should be fed on milk-rice', *Indrabāhu* should be tied, and a *Brāhm*[illegible]rpose of an unseen transcendental effect,—then it could not be so unless it [illegible]ts, had its source in the scriptures.

, Even though it be taken only as a preventive of repetition of the same accident, even so, the ordinance is honoured; [and as such it may itself be regarded as a scripture]"

SŪTRA (18)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SOURCE OF THE ACTS IN QUESTION IS NOT SCRIPTURAL, THEY CANNOT JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF A SCRIPTURE, THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DICTATED BY THE NEEDS (OF MAN). IT IS ONLY IN THE CASE OF WHAT CANNOT BE KNOWN (BY THE ORDINARY MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE) THAT THE SCRIPTURE CAN SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE

Bhāṣya

The particle '*tu*' (in reality) implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

What we assert is that *the source of the acts in question is not scriptural*. You infer the existence of a scripture (for carpenters) from their *Smṛti* (rules and regulations), it is true that there can be no *Smṛti* (rules) without a corresponding *scripture* and without a *Smṛti* there could be no books dealing with carpentry,—but what we hold is that, there *is* certainly a *Smṛti* (rule) in the case, but it is in the form—It is when built in such and such a manner that a house or some such thing becomes beautiful,—and not in the form 'From the performance of this act of *building*, there follows an *unseen transcendental result*'—As regards the house being 'beautiful', that can be known even without a scripture, and being thus known, it could be remembered (in the form of *Smṛti rules*) Thus there is no need for assuming a *scripture* as the basis for the said *Smṛti* rules (which have been shown to be based upon ordinary experience) If, without a scripture, there were nothing to indicate the act then alone would there be need for a scripture, and in that case alone would there be a justification for assuming such a *scripture* From all this we conclude that the act in question is not one laid down *in the scriptures* It is only in the case of an act which is laid down in the scriptures, or which deals with a deity, that cultured people censure the performer if he leaves it half done

Says the Opponent—'In connection with the acts in question also, certain duties have been accepted,—offerings should be made to such and such a deity towards the East, and to such another in that other quarter'"

The duties that cultured people accept are in relation to the *Man*, not in relation to the house (he is building), hence what has been urged does not affect our position

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ADHIKARAṆA (5): '*Kalañja-nyāya*': *Evil befalls a man on the performance of a prohibited act.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF PROHIBITIONS, AS THERE IS NO POSITIVE ACT (PRESCRIBED), THERE MAY BE PERFORMANCE OF THOSE THAT ARE PROHIBITED; SPECIALLY BECAUSE INACTION [I E. AVOIDANCE OF ACT, WHICH IS WHAT IS REALLY LAID DOWN IN THE PROHIBITIVE TEXTS] IS SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT."

Bhāṣya.

There is a teaching to the effect—'*Na kalañjam bhāksayitavyam, na lashunam, na grñjanam*' ['One should not eat *Kalañja*, nor *Lashuna*, nor *Grñjana*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the teaching mean that, if a man is desirous of obtaining certain rewards, he should not eat these things, and one who does not seek for any reward may eat them? Or that they should be avoided by all and under all circumstances?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The things should not be eaten by one who seeks for certain rewards,—as for one who does not seek for a reward, there is no restriction, he may or may not eat them.—Why so?—It is a sort of restriction that is laid down here—'Such and such a thing should not be eaten'.—Now this can have two meanings—either that '*non-eating* should be done', or that 'eating should *not be done*'. If the meaning accepted is the former one,—that is, that 'one should do the *eating qualified by negation*',—then the potential affix '*tavya*' (in '*bhakṣayitavyam*') *directly denotes* the *non eating*,—the negative word 'not' qualifying what is expressed by the root '*bhakṣa*', 'to eat'; and it is through the operation of '*eating*' that the '*not*' becomes connected with *what should be done*.—[Read '*nañ sambadhyatē*', without '*na*',—as in MS. C].—If, on the other hand, the meaning accepted be the second one that what *should be done* is what is expressed by the negative particle 'not',—then, this connection could be done only by the *indirect indication* of 'Syntactical Connection';—and the act *to eat* would qualify the *negation*.—Now as between 'Direct Denotation of a word' and the 'Indirect Indication by Syntactical Connection', Direct Denotation is certainly more authoritative than Indirect Indication. Consequently, the meaning accepted should be the former one—that 'non eating should be done'.—Now, '*non-eating*' is *negation of eating*; and thus cannot be *what should be done*; hence what is taught here as *to be done* is the *mental act* involved [i.e. the *making up of the mind*, the *determination*, not to eat]; it is only in this manner that the *eating* becomes qualified by 'not',—and first of all there is this connection

between the *eating* and the *negation*,—and then the injunction or teaching. —Thus then, just as in the case of such observances as '*Nodyantamāditya-mīkṣēta*' ('one should not look at the rising sun'),—which go to make up the '*Prajāpativratas*',—a particular reward accrues to one who observes them,—while no sin attaches to one who does not observe them,—so should it be in the case in question also; *specially because inaction is something quite different*; that is, the text in question does not contain the prohibition of any *positive act*, what it teaches is only *inaction*; and, as a matter of fact, the act of *eating* which would be prohibited is something quite different from the *making up of the mind* (not to eat), which is of the nature of *inaction*."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—[IN THE CASE OF THE TEXT CITED, 'ONE SHOULD NOT LOOK AT THE RISING SUN'] WHAT IS TAKEN TO BE ENJOINED IS A POSITIVE ACT TENDING TO FULFIL A DEFINITE PURPOSE, ON THE GROUND THAT THE SCRIPTURAL TEXTS SHOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE,—[IN THE CASE OF THE TEXT 'KALAÑJA SHOULD NOT BE EATEN', ON THE OTHER HAND], THE SAID TWO CONDITIONS ARE NOT PRESENT AND THERE IS A DEFINITE TRANSGRESSION OF INJUNCTION INVOLVED IN THE DOING OF THE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

First of all, we are answering the analogy that has been cited.—As regards the *Prajāpativratas, it is only right that what is taken to be enjoined is a positive act tending to fulfil a definite purpose*; because, in that case, what is taught is an *observance*;—and what is taught as *to be done* is tending to bring about welfare, and what is taught as *not to be done* tends to bring *evil*.

Question—"How do you know that in the case of the *Prajāpativratas*, it is an *observance* that is enjoined as to *be done*?"

Answer—That it is so is clear from the fact that the injunction of the *Prajāpativratas* has been introduced by the sentence—'Now follow the observances for the student';—'observance' is a mental operation, the making up of the mind that 'I shall not do such and such an act';—and when the question arises as to what the observances are,—there follows the injunction 'He should not look at the rising sun'; which means that 'he should make up his mind so that he may not look at the rising sun, and that he should keep up this determination'.—And in this it should be understood that a definite purpose is served by the keeping up of this determination. Specially as in reference to these same observances, there is a further declaration—'Thus does he not become beset by sin', which means that by keeping the observance he escapes the contact of sin.

In the case of the prohibitions under consideration—'*Kalañja* should not be eaten' and the like,—on the other hand, *the aforesaid two conditions are not present*. Because in this case a definite *act* is prohibited,—and it is not mere *inaction* that is enjoined; hence when a man does eat *Kalañja*, it is *not* that he does not transgress the prohibitive injunction. In the other case, by *looking at the rising sun*, one does not transgress an injunction; because the said *looking* has not been prohibited; the text concerned only enjoins an *observance*: so that if one keeps that observance, he obtains its reward,—[and if he does not keep it, he does not obtain that reward]. In the case of the *Kalañja* on the other hand, the *eating* of it has been definitely prohibited.—"How do you know that?"—We deduce this from the fact that in this case, the text in question has not been prefaced by the introductory words 'now follow his observances'.—Nor in this case does the text lay down the mental operation, the determination, that '*Kalañja* shall not be eaten'; because in the phrase '*na bhakṣayitavyam*' ('should not be eaten'), the term '*bhakṣayitavyam*' means that *eating should be done*,—and this is negatived by the particle '*na*' ('not'); all this by *Direct Assertion*. So that it is only in this interpretation that the well-known meaning of words becomes preserved; while the other interpretation involves *Indirect Indication*; and when there is conflict between *Direct Assertion* and *Indirect Indication*, the former is more authoritative than the latter. For these reasons, the text in question must be taken as a *prohibition*.

Says the Opponent—"The text may be a prohibition; but in this case we do not find any evil effects spoken of (as following from the doing of what has been prohibited); so that the act, even though prohibited may be done.—If it be urged that evil effects could be assumed, then our answer is that that cannot be done, as there is no authority for it.—The requisite authority is there in the shape of *Presumption*, based upon the fact that, otherwise, the teaching would be meaningless (if the doing of the prohibited act did not lead to evil results)'.—That also is not possible; as it is quite possible that there should be a meaningless teaching due to ignorance (on the part of the teacher). *Hence no evil effects can be assumed.*"

Answer—It is quite true that no evil effects "can be assumed", because they are already there [they need not be assumed].—"How so?"—It is there in the form that, as soon as a man would do the act (i.e. eat *Kalañja*), all cultured men would censure him, calling him 'one who has fallen off from all the rewards of any good acts that he might have done'; and this in itself would be a very *great evil effect*.

From all this it follows that the *Kalañja* should *never* be eaten. In fact, it is just like the advice that 'one should not present his finger before a snake', where, on account of the knowledge that evil effects are sure to follow, one never presents his finger before a snake. Similarly no one ever puts his foot upon a thorn. The case of the prohibitions in question is exactly like these.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Following of the Teacher' and such other duties are to be performed after the 'Upanayana'-Initiation.*

SUTRA (21)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE DUTIES ENJOINED SHOULD DEVOLVE UPON ONE FROM HIS VERY BIRTH."

Bhāṣya.

Certain duties laid down in the *Smṛtis* are the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*; as also certain practices which have attained the dignity of *duties*; for instance 'The Teacher should be followed, and saluted', 'An old man should be welcomed by rising from the seat, and he should be duly honoured'.

In regard to these, there arises the question – Are these duties incumbent upon men from their very birth? Or do they become so after they have been initiated?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They are incumbent upon men from their very birth, as they have been enjoined without any distinction 'Why so?'—As a matter of fact, they have been enjoined for *man* in general, and one becomes a *man* as soon as one is born;—hence it follows that the duties in question devolve upon men from their very birth."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SUTRA (22)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THEY SHOULD DEVOLVE UPON HIM ALONG WITH THE UPANAYANA-INITIATION BECAUSE THEY ARE SIMILAR TO [THE DUTIES LAID DOWN IN] THE VEDA.

Bhāṣya

The phrase '*apa vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrva-pakṣa*.

The duties should devolve upon him along with the Upanayana-Initiation—'*Upāya*' here stands for '*Upanayana*';—*because they are similar to the duties laid down in the Veda*; that is to say, *Smṛti* stands on the same footing as the *Veda*, it having been explained above (under Sū. 1. 3. 1) that the duties laid down in the *Smṛtis* are the same that have been laid down in the Veda. And all the duties laid down in the *Veda* have been declared to be such as devolve upon one *after the Upanayana*;—and the duties in question, which are enjoined in the *Smṛtis*, are also as good as laid down in the Veda;—hence it follows that these should devolve upon one only *after the Upanayana*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7) : '*Agnihotra-nyāya*' : *The Agnihotra and other sacrifices laid down as 'life-long' should be performed only at their own time.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE REPEATED PERFORMANCE, NOT BEING AN AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE, SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED FOR THE SAKE OF THE MAN [AND HENCE SHOULD BE DONE CONSTANTLY]".

Bhāṣya.

We have such texts as—(*a*) '*Yāvajjīvamagnihotram juhoti*' ['One should perform the Agnihotra as long as he lives']; (*b*) '*Yāvajjīvam darsha-pūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta*' ['One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as he lives']; and it has been explained (under *Adhyāya* II) that these sacrifices have been enjoined for the sake of the *Man*; and hence their repeated performance could not be an auxiliary to the *sacrifice*.

Now the question that arises is—Are the offerings (that constitute these 'life-long' sacrifices) to be made constantly (every moment of one's life)? Or, not constantly (only at stated times)?

On this question the *first Pūrvapakṣa* (A) view is as follows:—"The performance has been enjoined *for the man*;—hence during the time that one remains a *man*, he should do it constantly.—'But we have texts laying down the *evening* and the *dawn* as the time for the *Agnihotra*-offerings and the *Moonless Day* and the *Full-moon Day* as the days for the offering of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.'—The performance that is to be repeated constantly cannot be meant to be complete in all details; hence if some of the performances are not performed at the prescribed times, that deficiency in regard to time only cannot vitiate the performance as a whole."

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE; HENCE THE REPEATED PERFORMANCE IS TO BE REGULATED BY EXIGENCIES."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not possible for a man to go on offering and offering libations at every moment of his life; all that can be meant by 'life-long performance' is that he should make the offerings whenever he can;—no man can ever go on making the offerings continuously; because he must take his food

and must go about. Hence the offerings are to be made at all such times as may be without detriment to his other commitments and needs."

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THE OFFERINGS HAVE BEEN ENJOINED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO STATED POINTS OF TIME

Bhāṣya.

The view, that "the offerings are to be made at all such times as may be without detriment to the man's other commitments and needs",—*is not right*; because definite points of time have been prescribed, in such texts as—'The *Agnihotra* offering should be made in the evening, it should be made in the morning, after it has dawned'; and 'One should perform the *Pūrnamasa* sacrifice on the Full-moon Day and the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice on the Moonless Day'.—From this it is also clear that the offerings cannot be made continuously.

Says the Opponent—"Strict observance of the time is not essential, as there may be performances that are slightly defective in details"

Answer *Time* is not *a detail*; it is a *cause*, the *occasion*, for the performance, as has been explained already Hence it follows that, as it has not been enjoined as to be done at any but the stated times, the offerings, even though made at other times, would be as good as *not made*. Hence it is only *at the stated times throughout one's life*, that the sacrifice is to be performed.

SŪTRA (26).

INASMUCH AS WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF TIME, THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINING THE STATED TIME.

Bhāṣya

There are texts indicative of the same conclusion—'*Apa vā esa svargāllokāt chhidyatē yo darshapūrnamāsayājī san pūrnamāsīmamāvāsyām vā atipātayēt*' ['If the performer of *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* passes over the Full-moon Day or the Moonless Day, he becomes cut off from heaven'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4).—If the offering were to be made at all times, how could there be a 'passing over' of any time at all?—From this also it is clear that the performance is not to be repeated continuously.

ADHIKARAṆA (7) : '*Agnihotra-nyāya*' : *The Agnihotra and other sacrifices laid down as 'life-long' should be performed only at their own time.*

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[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE REPEATED PERFORMANCE, NOT BEING AN AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE, SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED FOR THE SAKE OF THE MAN [AND HENCE SHOULD BE DONE CONSTANTLY]".

Bhāṣya.

We have such texts as—(*a*) '*Yāvajjīvamagnihotram juhoti*' ['One should perform the Agnihotra as long as he lives']; (*b*) '*Yāvajjīvam darsha-pūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta*' ['One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as he lives']; and it has been explained (under *Adhyāya* II) that these sacrifices have been enjoined for the sake of the *Man*; and hence their repeated performance could not be an auxiliary to the *sacrifice*.

Now the question that arises is—Are the offerings (that constitute these 'life-long' sacrifices) to be made constantly (every moment of one's life)? Or, not constantly (only at stated times)?

On this question the *first Pūrvapakṣa* (A) view is as follows:—"The performance has been enjoined *for the man*;—hence during the time that one remains a *man*, he should do it constantly.—'But we have texts laying down the *evening* and the *dawn* as the time for the *Agnihotra*-offerings and the *Moonless Day* and the *Full-moon Day* as the days for the offering of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.'—The performance that is to be repeated constantly cannot be meant to be complete in all details, hence if some of the performances are not performed at the prescribed times, that deficiency in regard to time only cannot vitiate the performance as a whole."

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE; HENCE THE REPEATED PERFORMANCE IS TO BE REGULATED BY EXIGENCIES."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not possible for a man to go on offering and offering libations at every moment of his life; all that can be meant by 'life-long performance' is that he should make the offerings whenever he can;—no man can ever go on making the offerings continuously; because he must take his food

and must go about. Hence the offerings are to be made at all such times as may be without detriment to his other commitments and needs."

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[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THE OFFERINGS HAVE BEEN ENJOINED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO STATED POINTS OF TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The view, that "the offerings are to be made at all such times as may be without detriment to the man's other commitments and needs",—is not right; because definite points of time have been prescribed, in such texts as—'The *Agnihotra*-offering should be made in the evening, it should be made in the morning, after it has dawned'; and 'One should perform the *Pūrnamasa* sacrifice on the Full-moon Day and the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice on the Moonless Day'.—From this it is also clear that the offerings cannot be made continuously.

Says the Opponent—"Strict observance of the time is not essential, as there may be performances that are slightly defective in details."

Answer—*Time* is not *a detail*: it is a *cause*, the *occasion*, for the performance, as has been explained already. Hence it follows that, as it has not been enjoined as to be done at any but the stated times, the offerings, even though made at other times, would be as good as *not made*. Hence it is only *at the stated times throughout one's life*, that the sacrifice is to be performed.

SŪTRA (26).

INASMUCH AS WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF TIME, THE INJUNCTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINING THE STATED TIME.

Bhāṣya.

There are texts indicative of the same conclusion—'*Apa vā ēsa svargāllokāt chhidyatē yo darshapūrṇamāsayājī san pūrṇamāsīmamāvāsyām vā atipātayēt*' ['If the performer of *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* passes over the Full-moon Day or the Moonless Day, he becomes cut off from heaven'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4).—If the offering were to be made at all times, how could there be a 'passing over' of any time at all?—From this also it is clear that the performance is not to be repeated continuously.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Agnihotra and other acts are to be repeated at their own time.*

SŪTRA (27).

THE PERFORMANCE SHOULD BE REPEATED WHENEVER THE TIME COMES; BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED IN THEIR VERY ORIGIN.

Bhāṣya.

There are the following texts—(*a*) '*Pradoṣē agnihotram hotavyam vyuṣṭāyām prātaḥ*' ['The *Agnihotra* is to be offered in the evening and again in the morning, after it has dawned']; —(*b*) '*Paurṇamāsyām paurṇamāsīna yajēta amāvāsyāyāmamāvāsyēna yajēta*' ['On the Full-moon Day, one should perform the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, and on the Moonless Day, one should perform the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question Should the offering be made only once in the evening, or on every evening? Only once in the morning, or on every morning? Similarly, should the *Paurṇamāsa* be offered only once on the Full moon Day, and the *Amāvāsya* sacrifice on the Moonless Day only once? or on every Full moon Day and every Moonless Day?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "The injunctive text would be obeyed by a single performance, and there is no rule regarding repetition on every occasion"

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta* *The performance should be repeated whenever the time comes*; that is, each time that the prescribed time comes, the performance should be repeated; why? *because they are related in their very origin*; that is to say, whenever the act in question originates—i.e whenever it is enjoined, it is connected with the particular time; —it has also been declared that all declarations of time are for the purpose of laying down a contingent condition; and hence whenever that contingency presents itself, the action to be done under that contingency must be performed. It is for this reason that whenever the prescribed time comes, the performance has to be repeated.

SŪTRA (28)

TO THE SAME EFFECT THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Apa vā ēṣu, etc.*' ['If the performer of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice neglects either the Full-moon Day or the Moonless Day, he becomes cut off from heaven'] (Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 5. 4); which clearly shows that the performance has to be repeated whenever the prescribed time arrives.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the Darsha and other sacrifices, whenever the contingencies like 'breaking' occur, the Homa contingent on them should be repeated.*

SUTRA (29)

SIMILARLY ALSO THOSE THAT ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN THE MIDST OF SACRIFICES

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices we read—'*Bhinnē juhoti skannē juhoti* ['One should offer *Homa* whenever there is a breakage, one should offer *Homa* whenever there is spilling']

In regard to this, there arises the question Would the needs of the injunction be met by a single *Homa* offered on a *single* breakage and on a *single* spilling? Or at *every* breakage and *every* spilling?

The answer to this is supplied by applying to it the details of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*: The *Pūrvapakṣa* here is the same as the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, and the *Siddhānta* here also is the same as the *Siddhānta* there That is to say the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "the needs would be fulfilled by a *single* offering of the *Homa*", and the *Siddhānta* is that—inasmuch as the Breakage and the Spilling are the contingencies under which the *Homa* should be offered, -the *offering* should be repeated with every *breakage* and every *spilling*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Following of the Teacher' and such other duties should be performed whenever the occasion arises.*

SŪTRA (30)

THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THOSE ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS 'DUTIES' ON THE BASIS OF 'CUSTOM' AS THOSE ALSO ARE MEANT FOR THE MAN

Bhāṣya

There are certain duties (not laid down in the *Veda*, but established by *Custom*) such as 'The Teacher should be followed and saluted' 'The old man should be welcomed by rising from the seat, and he should be respected'.

In regard to these acts, there arises the question—'Are these to be repeated whenever the Teacher comes?' Or would the duty be fulfilled by doing it only once?

In answer to this, we have the *Sūtra*—*The same should be the case, etc.*, which applies the conclusions of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* to the present one; so that the view that was the *Pūrvapakṣa* there should be treated as the *Pūrvapakṣa* here, and that which was the *Siddhānta* there should be accepted as the *Siddhānta* here—That is, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the duty becomes fulfilled by a single performance", and the *Siddhānta* is that as the occasions are so many contingent conditions, the act has to be repeated whenever the occasion presents itself

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The repayment of the 'Three Debts' is compulsorily incumbent upon the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya.*

SŪTRA (31).

FOR THE BRĀHMAṆA, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE, THE ACQUIRING OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE BEGETTING OF OFFSPRING ARE ESSENTIAL,—AS THEY ARE SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECLARATION OF 'DEBTS'.

Bhāṣya

We have the following texts—'*Somēna yajēta*' ['One should perform the *Soma sacrifice*'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 5. 6. 1),—'*Garbhāṣṭamēsu brāhmanamupanayīta*' ['The Brāhmana should be initiated in the eighth year from conception'].—'*Prajām utpādayēt*' ['One should beget offspring']

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these duties compulsory (essential), or not compulsory (unessential)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—'they are *not essential*, being connected as they are with particular desirable results."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The duties in question the performance of the *Soma sacrifice*, *being initiated into Vedic Study* and *Begetting of Offspring*—are essential for the *Brāhmaṇa* (the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*)—Why? *Because they are spoken of in connection with the declaration of 'Debts'*, in the following text—'*Jāyamāno ha vai brāhmanastribhirrnavān jāyatē, yajñēna dēvēbhyāh, brahmacaryēṇa ṛṣibhyah, prajayā pitrbhyah, sa vai tarhyanrno bhavati yadā yajvā brahmachārī prajāvān*' ['When the *Brāhmana* is born, he is born beset with three debts,—(1) that to the *Devas*, of *sacrifice*, (2) that to the *Ṛṣis*, of *Studentship*, and (3) that to the *Pitrs*, of *offspring*; he becomes absolved from these—by (1) *sacrificing*, (2) by *becoming a student*, and (3) by *begetting offspring*'] (Taitt. Sam. 6. 3. 10. 5).—Thus description of the three acts as the means of repaying the Debts, could be applicable to the acts only if their performance were absolutely necessary, hence they must be regarded as *essential* (compulsory)

Says the Opponent—'An indicative text by itself alone cannot establish any conclusion; some reason should be stated, of which the text may be indicative (and corroborative)."

Answer—There are other texts where these same acts have been laid down apart from any desirable results—(*a*) '*Vasantē vasantē jyotiṣā yajēta*' ['One should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (Soma) sacrifice during each spring']; —(*b*) '*Yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti*' ['One should offer the *Agnihotra* as long as he lives']; —(*c*) '*Yāvajjīvam darsha-pūrṇamāsabhyām yajēta*' ['One

should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as he lives'];—(*d*) '*Vidyāmadhīyīta*' ['One should acquire learning']:—(*e*) '*Prajā utpādayitavyā*' ['One should beget offspring']. —These texts clearly establish the essential character of the acts in question; and this same fact is corroborated by the indicative text quoted at the outset.

[*Supplementary Adhikaraṇa.*]

There is a further matter also to be considered in this connection. The Sūtra says '*For the Brāhmaṇa* the performance of the *Soma-sacrifice*, *the Acquiring of Knowledge*, and the *Begetting of Offspring* are essential, as they are spoken of in connection with the declaration of debts'. The question that arises is Are these acts, *Soma-sacrifice* and the rest, essential *for the Brāhmaṇa* only, and they are *not essential* for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*? Or are they *essential* for all the three?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows. "These are *essential* for the *Brāhmaṇa* only, **not for** the other two. why? because we read in the text quoted 'When the *Brāhmaṇa* is born, etc.', where the *Brāhmaṇa* is the only one mentioned, which clearly shows that the duty laid down is essential for the *Brāhmaṇa* only, not for the other two."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*: The duties are essential for all "How so?"—The injunctive text that lays down these acts,—i.e. those texts that do not speak of any desired results, lay them down without any distinction; and what is laid down without distinction must appertain to all; hence it follows that the acts are compulsory for all.

Says the Opponent 'But the text 'When the *Brāhmaṇa* is born, etc. etc.' speaks of the *Brāhmaṇa* only"

Answer—It is true that in this text the *Brāhmaṇa* only is mentioned; but it is not this text which enjoins the essential character of the duties; that character is enjoined by the other text which does not speak of any desired result: and the text in question merely refers to them for the purpose of eulogising the offerings. Hence we conclude that the mention of the *Brāhmaṇa* does not indicate that the duties are *not-essential* for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*; in fact, the *Brāhmaṇa* has been mentioned only by way of an illustration; what is really meant is that 'when a *Brāhmaṇa* or a *Kṣattriya* or a *Vaishya*, is being born,—and is born, and has been born'. [Hence the duties should be regarded as *essential*, *compulsory*, for all the three castes.]

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYAYA VI.

PĀDA III

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *In the case of the 'compulsory Acts', it is not absolutely essential to perform all the auxiliary details.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ACT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY WHEN THE PERFORMER HAS THE CAPACITY TO PERFORM ALL (THE AUXILIARY DETAILS), AS THE ACT IS LAID DOWN AS SUCH"

Bhāṣya.

In the *Baherchu-Brāhmaṇa* we read—'*Yāvajjīvam agnihotram juhoti*', '*Yāvajjīvam darshapūrṇamāsam juhoti*' ['One should perform the *Agnihotra* as long as one lives', 'One should perform the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as one lives'], which means that the *Agnihotra* is a compulsory act, and that the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* are compulsory sacrifices.

In regard to this second declaration regarding the sacrifices,—which is quite distinct from the first declaration where they are spoken of as to be performed with a view to a definite result (i.e. in the texts '*One desiring heaven* should perform the *Agnihotra*', '*One desiring heaven* should perform the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*'), there arises the question 'Is it only one who is capable of performing all the auxiliary details of these sacrifices that is entitled to undertake their performance? Or is it permissible to perform the sacrifice even without some auxiliary details?

Under *Adhyāya* XI (II. 1. II 19), the discussion is going to be in reference to the first declaration of the sacrifices with auxiliary details as to be performed with a view to a particular result, while on the present occasion we are going to deal with the second declaration of the sacrifices as *compulsory* acts. [Hence there is no repetition.]

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"***The act should be undertaken only when the performer has the capacity to perform all the auxiliary details, as the act is laid down as such***; that is, that man alone should undertake to perform a sacrifice who is able to act according to the injunctions in its full detail;—***because the act is laid down as such***; i.e. the act laid down in the text in question as *compulsory* is the same as that

spoken of in connection with particular desirable results; hence it follows that its performance should be complete in all details.—Further, the term '*darshapūrṇamāsa*' (contained in the text in question) is expressive of the particular sacrifice complete in all its details.—'How so?'—As a matter of fact, what is laid down as to be done on the Full-moon Day is a sacrifice along with all its details; and what is laid down as to be performed on the Moonless Day is a sacrifice along with all its details;—what is laid down as to be done on the Full-moon Day is the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice; and what is laid down as to be done on the Moonless Day is the *Amāvāsyā* (or *Darsha*) sacrifice;—and we have seen that what has been laid down as to be done on the Full-moon Day—or on the Moonless Day,—is a sacrifice with all its details:—hence it follows that it is the sacrifice along with all its details that is spoken of by means of the term '*darshapūrṇamāsa*'.—Such is the opinion of *Jaimini*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE PERFORMANCE EVEN IF ONLY A PART [OF THE AUXILIARY DETAILS] IS PERFORMED; BECAUSE THE FULFILMENT OF THE PURPOSE PROCEEDS FROM THE PRINCIPAL ACT; ALL THE REST IS ONLY AN EMBELLISHMENT, BECAUSE IT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF THAT ACT.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*Api vā*', ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

Even if only a part—of the auxiliary details—is performed, *there should be performance* of the Principal Act. Because whether the act is performed along with its auxiliary details, or without these details,—the fulfilment of the purpose proceeds in any case from the Principal Act itself;—and the performance of all the auxiliary details serves only *as an embellishment*.—"What embellishment?"—The embellishment is in this form that from the performance of the Principal Act along with its auxiliaries follows *attainment of Heaven*, while from that of the Principal itself, without the auxiliaries, follow other results. Thus then, the man having commenced the performance of the Principal Act along with all its auxiliaries with the avowed aim of attaining Heaven,—if he is unable to perform some of the auxiliaries,—even from such performance, which would be wanting in part of the auxiliary details, some results would certainly accrue to him.—For these reasons the text in question should be taken as speaking of the Principal Acts only; the two terms '*Agnihotra*' and '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*' also denote the Principal Acts; the other acts, which form their auxiliaries, only subserve the purposes of those Principal Acts.

SŪTRA (3).

FROM THE NON-PERFORMANCE OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT THERE FOLLOWS EVIL; THIS IS WHAT DISTINGUISHES IT FROM THE AUXILIARIES; BECAUSE THE SAID EVIL HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRINCIPAL ACT ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

We have the following text which speaks of evil following from the omission of the Principal act—'*Apa vā ēsa, etc.*' ['He verily is cut off from heaven who, being a performer of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, omits to perform them on the Full-moon Day and the Moonless Day'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 5. 4). This text, speaking of an evil effect following from the omission of the Principal Act, makes it clear that that Act alone is compulsory.

SŪTRA (4).

[*Objection*]—"BUT ACCORDING TO JAIMINI, THERE IS NO DISTINCTION MADE AMONG THE (PRINCIPAL AND AUXILIARY) ACTS; BECAUSE THERE IS ONLY ONE COMPREHENSIVE INJUNCTION OF THE PERFORMANCE AS A WHOLE; HENCE THE INJUNCTION SHOULD INCLUDE ALL THE ACTS."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"There is no such distinction as that 'these acts are auxiliaries and those the Principals'; *because there is only one comprehensive injunction of the performance as a whole*;—this is what Jaimini has declared; hence the text—'One should perform the *Pūrnamāsa*-sacrifice on the Full-moon Day and the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice on the Moonless Day'—should be taken as enjoining all the acts (*Principal* as well as *Auxiliary*)."

SŪTRA (5).

[*Answer*]—EVEN ON THE PERFORMANCE OF A SINGLE AUXILIARY, THE RESULT WOULD FOLLOW, BECAUSE THE PRINCIPAL IS ALWAYS DISTINGUISHED [FROM THE AUXILIARIES]; AND IT IS JUST AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER SACRIFICES.

Bhāṣya.

Even though a single auxiliary may be performed, [and the others are omitted and the performance of the Principal becomes defective on that account], yet, even from the defective performance of the Principal Act,

the result would follow.—"How so?"—*Because the Principal is distinguished*—i.e. the Principal is always distinguished from the auxiliary details; and the result follows from the act named '*Agnihotra*', and from the act named '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'; and it is this act so named that is laid down (in the texts under consideration) as to be done; so that that act which has been laid down as to be done on the Full-moon Day is the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice and that which has been laid down as to be done on the Moonless Day is the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice,—as laid down in the text '*Vaiṣṇavyaikādaśakapālo 'māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*' ['The cake baked upon eight pans, dedicated to Agni, should not be omitted on the Moonless Day and the Full-moon Day'] (Taitti. Saṁh. 2. 6. 3. 3). Thus it is that on the Full-moon Day, the cake is offered to *Agni* and to *Agni-Soma*, and Clarified Butter is offered to *Agni-Soma* and other deities; and on the Moonless Day the Curd-Butter-mixture is offered to *Agni*.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"the injunction that 'the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice should be performed on the Moonless Day' and the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice on the Full-moon Day' lays down the Principal sacrifice along with its auxiliary details, so that what the term '*Darsha-pūrnamāsa*' denotes is the Principal sacrifice along with all its details [and hence there should be no performance of the Principal sacrifice alone]". But this is not so; it is after the signification of the term '*Darsha*' and the term '*Pūrnamāsa*' has been already settled and recognised that there follows the further injunction of that same sacrifice along with its auxiliaries, in reference to a definite desirable result.

Thus it is not true that either the term '*Agnihotra*' or the term '*Darsha pūrnamāsa*' denotes the Principal Act *along with its auxiliaries*; and what is laid down (in the texts under consideration) as to be done is the '*Agnihotra*' and also the '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'.

It is just as in the case of other sacrifices. That is, just as, between the *Original Archetype* and its *modified ectype*, the accessories of one do not necessarily enter into the other, so the accessories of the sacrifice meant for the obtaining of certain results do not necessarily enter into that same sacrifice when performed as a *compulsory* act (and not for the obtaining of any results).

SŪTRA (6)

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE MENTION OF 'COMPLETION' EVEN WHEN THERE IS INFRINGEMENT OF THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text—'*Tadēva yādṛk tādṛk hotavyam*' ['That same oblation may be offered in some way or the other'] (Taitt. Brā. 1. 4. 3. 5),—which shows that even when there is some defect in the details, the act of offering is regarded as *complete* all the same.

SŪTRA (7).

FURTHER, BECAUSE AN EXPIATION IS LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

There are certain expiatory rites laid down as to be performed, contingent upon the infringement of the injunction (of details),—and these rites form part of the Principal Sacrifice; such rites, for instance, as 'One should offer an oblation on breakage'.—If a performance defective in details were futile, what would be the use of such rites and in connection with which sacrifice?—From this it follows that there should be performance of such acts even though there be some defect in the details.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *In the case of Prospective Acts done with a view to a desirable result, any defect in the auxiliary details makes the act nugatory.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE 'PROSPECTIVE ACTS' BECAUSE OF THE MAN BEING DESIROUS OF OBTAINING THE RESULTS."

Bhāṣya.

There are several 'prospective acts' [acts done with a view to securing a definite result], such as—(*a*) '*Aindrāgnamēkādashakapālannirvapēt prajākāmaḥ*' ['Desiring offspring, one should offer a cake baked upon eleven pans, dedicated to *Indra-Agni*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 1. 2);—(*b*) '*Sauryañcharunnirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' ['Desiring Brahmic glory, one should offer cooked rice to Sūrya'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 3);—(*c*) '*Vaishvadēvīm sāṅgrahāyaṇīm nirvapēt grāmakāmaḥ*' ('Desiring a village, one should make an offering to *Vishvadēva-saṅgrahaṇi*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 9. 2).

In regard to these and such other 'prospective' sacrifices, there arises the following question—Is such a sacrifice fruitful even when its performance is defective? Or is it fruitful only when it is free from defects?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*So also in the case of the prospective acts*; i.e. in their case also (as in the case of the Compulsory Acts), even when the performance is defective, the sacrifice does bring about its fruit.—Why so? Because *the man is desirous of obtaining the results*; that is, if even the defective performance of the act were fruitful, then any one eager to obtain that fruit would be entitled to undertake it; otherwise the title to undertake the performance,—which in the words of the text are most general in their application—would have to be restricted, without any reason, to only such persons as may be able to perform the act in all its details [and this would mean the exclusion of all those who, though eager to obtain the fruit, would be unable to perform it in all its details].—'It would be by reason of his incapacity that the man would not be entitled to perform the act'.—He might be unable to perform the act along with all its auxiliary details; but the Principal Act itself he would be quite capable of performing; and hence to the performance of that he should be perfectly entitled."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT CANNOT BE SO, AS [THE PRINCIPAL ACT ALONE BY ITSELF] IS NOT RELATED [TO THE FRUIT];—THE VEDIC TEXT BEING THE ONLY MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THIS MATTER.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa.*

It cannot be so;—what has been asserted regarding the act bringing about its result, even when its performance is defective, is not possible; because *the Principal Act by itself alone is not related to the fruit*; that is, as a matter of fact, the Fruit has been declared to follow from the Principal Act *along with all its auxiliaries*, and not from the Principal by itself alone. Hence, even though the mere Principal Act might be mentioned, yet an act like those under discussion [i.e., those that are performed with a view to certain results] could not be done in this manner; because the Principal Act, by itself, has no connection with the Fruit.—Further, things like those we are considering are such as have only the Vedic Text as the source of knowledge regarding them; and the Vedic text speaks of the fruit as following from the *Principal Act along with all its auxiliaries*, as we shall explain later on (under Sū. 11. 1. 1. *et seq.*)—From all this it follows that acts like those we are considering should not be performed in a defective manner.

SŪTRA (10)

FURTHER, THERE IS NO SIN INVOLVED IN THE OMISSION OF THE ACT.

Bhāṣya

In the case of the Prospective acts, any omission of the Principal Act is not spoken of as involving sin,—as there is in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*;—and from this also it follows that there should not be a defective performance of the act in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Difference in the material used does not make the Sacrifice different.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN A DIFFERENT MATERIAL IS USED, THE ACT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT, BECAUSE ACTS SUBSIST IN THE MATERIAL."

Bhāṣya.

It has been declared that the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice should be performed with the *Cake*, and it is laid down that the cake should be made of *Vrīhi*-corn.

In regard to this we consider the following question—If the said sacrifice were performed with *Nīvāra*-corn (instead of *Vrīhi*), would it be the same sacrifice? Or, would it become a different sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows. "*When a different material is used, the act should be regarded as different*,—i.e. as another sacrifice.—'Why so?'—*Because acts subsist in the material*, as a matter of fact, a difference in the substratum indicates a distinction so that the act subsisting in the *Nīvāra* is different from that subsisting in the *Vrīhi*: that the substratum is different is clear, and from the difference of the substratum, there follows difference of the form also—Thus we conclude that the sacrifice at which a different material is used should be regarded as a different sacrifice.'

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE SAME ACT,—BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE, THERE BEING NO DISTINCTION IN THE FORM OR IN THE NAME, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE GENUS 'COW', AND A COMMON NAME IS APPLICABLE, AS IN THE CASE OF ANIMALS

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*apa vā*' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

It should be regarded as the same act, even when the material is different. In the case of an ordinary act—such as *moving* or *falling*, there is the same notion of 'moving' or 'falling' even though the thing moving or falling may vary; and the act is not regarded as in any way different or defective. And the reason for this lies in the fact that the form of the act is not different, nor does its name differ.—[Whether the moving is done by *Devadatta* or *Yajñadatta*, the *form* of the moving remains the same, and in both cases the name applied to the act is only 'moving'; similarly in

the case in question, whether the *Darsha*-sacrifice is performed with *Vrīhi* or *Nīvāra*, the *form* and *name* of the sacrifice remain the same].

"But there is a clear difference in the substratum."

Our answer to this is that we admit that there is difference in the substratum; but that does not make a difference in what subsists in the substratum; because the two things [the substratum and the subsisting thing] are different. For instance, even though the garland or the cloth may vary, the difference in it does not make the man wearing it different.

"Even in this case, the self of the man wearing one garland may be regarded as different from his self when wearing the other."

That cannot be; people could say so (with reason) only if they perceived some difference (in the man's self); as a matter of fact, however, no such difference is perceived.

Says the Opponent "This clear difference is certainly there, that while one (self) has ceased to exist, the other is actually present.—If you say that 'the former has not ceased to exist',—then we deny this, because before it is actually perceived, there is no proof for its existence: hence it must be taken as having ceased to exist. Then again, the act (of *moving*, for instance) is never recognised as anything apart from the *thing* that is moving,—and the reason for this lies in the fact that it is never found apart from the thing.—'But, in that case, how is there the same notion of 'moving' (even when the things moving are different)?' Our answer to this is that *that* is due to the fact that the factor of going from one place to another is found to be common to all, so that when a thing goes to another place and comes back, it is said to be 'moving', and the *mover* is perceptible, and so also is the other place (to which it has gone); hence it is spoken of as having 'gone' and as having 'come back' [and it is this factor of going to one place from another that is common to all cases of *moving*, so that, even though the individual acts of *moving* are distinct from one another, yet they are spoken of by the common name of 'moving' on the ground of the said common factor *Tantraratna*]."

[The answer to this is as follows]:—It is true that *what has ceased to exist* is different from *what has not ceased to exist*; but this other act also, though different, is one that is spoken of by the same term 'sacrifice'; and there is no variation in the generic entity 'sacrifice' (which remains constant); nor can it be denied that this is spoken of by the same name.

From all this it follows that even if a man were to perform the sacrifice with *Nīvāra* corn, he would be doing what has been enjoined; and all that the performer wishes to do is what has been enjoined, and not anything new. The name also—such as '*Darsha*' or '*Pūrṇamāsa*'—applies to the said generic entity; just as among animals, the generic name applies to the whole genus, not to any particular individual only.

"What is the use of all this discussion?"

The use will be made clear in course of the consideration of the next *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In the case of a compulsory act, and in that of the non-compulsory act which has been commenced, if the prescribed material is spoilt, it should be completed with a substituted material.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"INASMUCH AS THE VEDA IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY IN THESE MATTERS, WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF WHAT HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED, THERE SHOULD BE NO INTRODUCTION OF ANOTHER THING, BECAUSE IT IS NOT SANCTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

The *Agnihotra* and other compulsory sacrifices form the subject-matter of this *Adhikarana*.

In connection with these there arises the question If, in course of the performance, the prescribed material should become spoilt, should the performance be continued with a substituted material? Or should it be abandoned at the point already reached?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'*In the absence of the prescribed thing, there should be no introduction of another thing*,—and the performance should be abandoned at the point already reached.—'Why so?'—*Because it is not sanctioned*: in fact, if a sacrifice has been laid down as bringing about a certain result when performed with *Vrīhi* as the material,—then, if it is performed with *Nīvāra* as the material, it cannot bring about the said result.—For this reason, under the circumstances stated the sacrifice should be abandoned at the point already reached."

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE, IN SOME CASES THE SUBSTITUTE IS DISTINCTLY PRESCRIBED."

Bhāṣya.

In some cases, a substitute is clearly laid down—'If one cannot obtain *Soma*, he should extract the juice from the *Putīkā*'. If it were generally permissible to carry on the performance with a substituted material, there need not have been a special injunction in connection with a particular case. As a matter of fact, however, we do find an injunction of this kind; hence it follows that in a case where there is no such injunction, there should be no substitution.

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE INTRODUCTION (OF ANOTHER THING); BECAUSE WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED IS EQUALLY FULFILLED (IN BOTH CASES).

Bhāṣya.

There should be introduction—of the substituted material;—"why so?"—*because what has been enjoined is equally fulfilled in both cases*; that is, what has been enjoined by the Injunction of the 'sacrifice' is the same in both cases,—it makes no difference whether that *sacrifice* is performed with *Vrīhi* or with *Nīvāra*; and it is absolutely essential that the sacrifice should be proceeded with, in the case of all compulsory acts, —and also in that of those others which have been already commenced.

SŪTRA (16)

THE INJUNCTION (OF A PARTICULAR SUBSTITUTE) THAT WE HAVE IN SOME CASES IS FOR PURPOSES OF RESTRICTION

Bhāṣya

It has been argued above (under Sū 14) that "in some cases the substitute is distinctly prescribed"—The answer to that is that *the Injunction that we have in some cases is for purposes of restriction*, that is, in the absence of *Soma*, several substitutes being possible, the Injunction restricts the choice to one only and lays down that the *Putikā* is the only plant from which the juice should be extracted.—Hence we conclude that the *performance is to be carried on with a substituted material*

SŪTRA (17).

THE TEXT IS CERTAINLY A RESTRICTIVE ONE ONLY BECAUSE THERE IS A DESIRE TO USE THE THING (ON ACCOUNT OF ITS SIMILARITY TO SOMA)

Bhāṣya

Question—'How do you know that the text in question serves the purposes of restriction?'

Answer—We deduce it from the fact that the *Putikā* is already recognised as a likely substitute for *Soma*.

"In what way is it so recognised?"

There is a desire to use the thing, there is always a desire to use a similar substance; as we are going to explain (under 6. 3 27); and the presence of the desire indicates the likelihood of the *Putikā* being used.—From this it follows that the text in question is purely restrictive in its character.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *There can be no substitute for the Deity, the Fire, or the Mantra, or the Action,—if any of these happen to become defective.*

SŪTRA (18).

FOR (*a*) THE DEITY, (*b*) THE FIRE, (*c*) THE MANTRA-TEXT, AND (*d*) THE ACTION [THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE], BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO A TOTALLY DIFFERENT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) *Deity*—such as is spoken of in the text '*Āgneyo'aṣṭākapālaḥ*' ['The cake dedicated to Agni'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 2. 6. 3. 3) and so forth; (*b*) *Fire*—such as is referred to in the text—'*Vaidāhavaniyē juhvati tēna sō'sya abhiṣṭaḥ pūto bhavati*' ['When one makes the offering into the Āhavanīya Fire, his desired object becomes fulfilled'] (Taitt. Brā. 1. 1. 10.6); (*c*) *Mantra-text*,—'*Barhirdēvasadandāmi, etc.*' ['I am chopping grass, the seat of the deities'] (Taitt. Saṁ. 2. 6. 1. 1);—(*d*) *Action*,—such as those spoken of in texts like 'Offers the *Samid*', 'Offers the *Tanūnapāt*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—When there is a flaw in (*a*) the *Deity*, or (*b*) in the *Fire*, or (*c*) in the *Mantra text*, or (*d*) in the *Action*,—is a substitute to be adopted or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the performance is to be carried only with a substitute".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*: In the event of 'there being a flaw in the Deity or the Fire or the Mantra-text or the Action,'—there can be no substitute.—"Why?" *Because it is related to a totally different purpose*; that is, what may be substituted would be different from the original Deity, etc.; and what is different from these cannot serve the purpose served by these.

"What is the purpose served by them?"

(*a*) As for the *Deity*, it serves to accomplish the purpose of becoming the recipient of the offering; for instance, it is with reference to *Agni* as the recipient of the offering that the 'Cake baked upon eight pans' is offered on the Full-Moon and Moonless Days; the Deity that has been laid down in connection with other offering-materials,—that deity with those other offering-materials would not accomplish the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice [it would accomplish a totally different sacrifice]; for, if an offering is made to a Deity other than the one prescribed, that other Deity could not accomplish the purpose served by the prescribed Deity; and if the offering were made to that other Deity, it would not be the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice.—Hence there can be no substitute for the *Deity*.

(*b*) Similarly if there is a defect in the *Āhavanīya Fire*, spoken of in the text '*Yadāhavaniyē jūhoti, etc.*',—no other Fire can be substituted,—nor any other material.—"Why?"—*Because it is related to a totally different purpose*; that is, what is substituted cannot serve the purpose that is served by the *Āhavanīya Fire*.—"Why?"—The purpose served by the *Āhavanīya* Fire is a transcendental one; hence what is effected by the offering being thrown into the *Āhavanīya Fire* cannot be effected by its being thrown into any other Fire. Because the common term 'sacrifice' is not able to include that into which the offering is thrown; nor does the position of what is offered accord any visible help to the sacrifice in any way.—Hence there can be no substitute for the *Fire*

(*c*) Similarly in the case of there being a flaw in the *Mantra*, another *Mantra* cannot be substituted. The purpose served by the *Mantra* is that it reminds one of the act or of the means of its accomplishment; in the absence of such a reminding, there could be no performance of the act. Under the circumstances, if, on account of a deficiency in the *Mantra*, the performer utters other words to make good the deficiency,—then, having previously uttered the words of the original *Mantra* in its well-known meaning, he could not deduce the same meaning from the other words that he brings in as the substitute. If it be held that, 'though he has already understood the meaning of the original *Mantra* (and has thereby become reminded of the Act and its means), he would understand it again by uttering the substituted words i.e. derive the same knowledge out of these latter words',—then, in that case, it would be entirely futile to wait and seek for the utterance of the substituted words; because there is no authority for the idea that the knowledge in question should be derived from words; what authority there is is to the effect that the necessary 'knowledge' (reminder) should be derived from the special words '*Barhirdēvasadanandāmi*, *etc.*'; and under the circumstances, it would be entirely futile to seek for (any substitute) other words. Hence there can be no substitute for the *Mantra-text*.

(*d*) Lastly, where there is a flaw in the Act, any other act cannot be substituted for it;—*because it is related to another purpose*; that is to say, the *Darsha-Paurnamāsa* sacrifices have got to include the *Samit-sacrifice*; if then some other sacrifice were performed in place of the *Samit-sacrifice*, the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* would not include that sacrifice.—Hence there can be no substitute for the *Action*.

SŪTRA (19).

FURTHER, AS REGARDS THE DEITY, IT IS ONE FOR WHOSE SAKE SOMETHING HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the Deity there is yet another reason why there can be no substitute. The Deity is that entity for whose sake something has been enjoined. If, then, another deity were substituted in place of the

one for whose sake that something has been enjoined, it could not be a 'deity' in the right sense of the term; specially because that entity alone can be a 'deity' which is enjoined to be one,—not one that is not so enjoined.—Further, 'deity' is a relative term; so that an entity can be the 'deity' of that alone in connection with which it has been enjoined,—not of any other; the term 'Deity' being a *relative*, not a *generic*, term.—For this reason also there can be no substitute of the Deity.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *A forbidden substance should not be used as a substitute.*

SŪTRA (20)

THAT ALSO WHICH HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN (SHOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED); BECAUSE THE DECLARATION OF THE PROHIBITION IS WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION

Bhāṣya

There are certain things the use of which at sacrifices has been forbidden, such, for instance, as *Varaka* and *Kodrava* and *Māsa* are not fit for being used at sacrifices.'

The question that arises is that in the event of the prescribed substance having become spoilt, should such a forbidden thing be used as a substitute or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that 'it may be substituted, in accordance with what has been said under Sū. 6. 3. 15. to the effect that '*there should be introduction of another thing because what has been enjoined is equally fulfilled in both cases* (Sū. 15)."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*.—*That also which has been forbidden should not be substituted*.—because it has been declared without any qualification or reservation that *Māsa*, *Varaka*, and *Kodrava* are not fit for being used at sacrifices: so that the very connection of these with any sacrifice has been forbidden,—the sense of the prohibition being that these grains should never be admitted as accessories to a sacrifice. If they were substituted, they would certainly become admitted as accessories to a sacrifice. Hence we conclude that they should not be substituted.

ADHIKARAṆA (7) : *There can be no substitute for the 'Master of the Sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (21)

SIMILARLY, FOR THE MASTER OF THE SACRIFICE' [THERE CAN BE NO SUBSTITUTE]; BECAUSE THE RESULT ACCRUES TO HIM, AND THE RESULT FOLLOWS FROM THE ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

The *Agnihotra* and such other acts form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*.

In regard to this there arises the question if there be a flaw in the 'Master of the Sacrifice', should another 'Master' be substituted or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "another should be substituted;—why ?—because there should be introduction of another thing because what has been enjoined is equally fulfilled in both cases (Sū. 15)".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*: *Similarly for the Master of the Sacrifice,* what ?—*there can be no substitute*, why ? *because the result accrues to him*; as a matter of fact, that person is to be regarded as the 'Master of the Sacrifice', (*a*) who desires to obtain the result expected from the performance of the sacrifice, (*b*) who, by means of gifts, secures the services of the Priests,—and (*c*) who makes an offering of what belongs to him. If such a person could be substituted, he would have to do all that has to be done by the 'Master';—if he did all that, then he would himself become the 'Master', and not a 'substitute'; because it would be he who would obtain the result; because that man secures the result who does the 'giving away' or 'offering', as has been explained under Sū. 3. 7. 18, where it has been declared that the fruit of the enjoined act accrues to the performer'.—From all this it follows that there can be no substitute for the 'Master of the Sacrifice'

ADHIKARAṆA (8): '*Satra-nyāya*': *At the Satra, if there is some flaw in one of the 'Masters', there may be a substitute for him.*

SŪTRA (22).

IN A CASE WHERE MANY PERSONS ARE ENGAGED, ANOTHER PERSON MAY BE BROUGHT IN,—AS THAT WOULD SAVE THE ACT FROM BECOMING DEFECTIVE

Bhāṣya.

Satras are the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*; these have been laid down in such texts as—'*Saptadashāvarāh sātramāsīran*', ['At least seventeen men should take up the *Satra*'].

In regard to these, there arises the question—If there should appear some disqualification in any one of the seventeen men engaged as 'Masters' ('sacrificers'), should another man be brought in as a substitute or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"there should be no substitute for the Master (as settled in the foregoing *Adhikarana*).

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In a case where a sacrifice has been undertaken by several 'sacrificers' (masters),—if some one *becomes* disqualified, another *man should* be brought in;—in this way, there would be no deficiency in the sacrifice, that is to say, *the presence of seventeen sacrificers* (Masters) is a necessary factor in *Satras*; hence in the absence of this number, the performance would be defective; consequently for the purpose of making up the requisite number of men, another man has to be brought in.

Objection—"The number seventeen has been laid down in connection with 'sacrificers' (Masters of the sacrifice), and the new man brought in would not be a 'Master' consequently the prescribed number could not be regarded as made up (with the addition of the new man)."

Answer—It is true that the number made up would not pertain to the 'Masters'; in fact, that number it is impossible to make up in the case in question, what can be done, however, is that the duties of the 'Master' should be performed by 'at least seventeen men'; and this becomes possible by the addition of the new man. [*See next Adhikaraṇa.*]

Thus we conclude that in the case of *Satras*, it is necessary to bring in a substitute for the 'Master'.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the 'Satra', the man substituted is not a 'Master of the Sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"HE MUST BE REGARDED AS A 'MASTER', BECAUSE HE IS ENDOWED WITH THAT CHARACTER."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the new man brought in at the *Satra* (as a substitute for one of the seventeen 'masters'), there arises the question—Is this substitute to be regarded as a 'master', or as a mere officiator?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*He must be regarded as a 'Master'*;—why?—*because he is endowed with that character*, i.e. he is equipped with the character of 'Master'. as a matter of fact, the man who is brought in is made a 'Master', because on one of the 'Masters' having become disqualified, the other man that is brought in can be a 'substitute' only if he also is made a 'Master' For this reason the man should be regarded as a 'Master'."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, HE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN 'OFFICIATOR', BECAUSE HE IS SUPPORTED

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the man *should be regarded as an officiator*', -why?—*because he is supported*, as a matter of fact, he is supported (remunerated) by the remaining (sixteen) masters'; one who is remunerated,—whose services are paid for,—cannot be a master', the man who obtains the reward of a sacrifice is the master' of that sacrifice, one who only works for the benefit of another person is only an officiator', and he does not obtain the reward of the sacrifice.—"Why so?"—It is only one who performs the sacrifice from beginning to end who obtains its reward, such is the signification of the verb ('sacrifice'), which denotes the act of *sacrificing* from beginning to end.

Objection—"But (if the new seventeenth man is not a 'master') then the subsequent performance of the *Satra* by the remaining (sixteen) persons would be defective, as there would not be '*seventeen* masters' (which is an essential condition in a *Satra*); and doing something defective, these men also would not be 'Masters' (in the correct sense); and if they are not 'Masters', they also cannot obtain the reward."

Answer—What is laid down in the texts is not that 'there should be at least seventeen men in the securing of the reward', because the number

(of man) is not a factor in the securing of the reward; it is a factor in the carrying on of the duties; the sense of the text being that 'the duties of the Sacrificer (Master) should be performed by at least seventeen men'; and these duties are actually performed by the substitute (though he does not become a 'master' and a partaker in the reward); though he cannot partake in the reward, they bring him in for the purpose of fulfilling the conditions of the pledge (that there shall be *seventeen* men performing the duties of the 'master'); and the man brought in has no concern with the reward.

SŪTRA (25)

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND A TEXT SPEAKING OF THE REWARD AS ACCRUING TO THAT MAN (WHO HAS BECOME DISQUALIFIED)

Bhāṣya

There is a text which speaks of the reward accruing to the man (who formed one of the seventeen persons who commenced the performance of the *Satra*) who has succumbed to fate— If any one of those initiated for a sacrifice should happen to die, he also partakes of the reward of that sacrifice'; [which shows that the man in whose place the new man has been brought in, still continues to be the 'master', so far as the sharing in the reward is concerned; though he cannot perform the duties of a 'Master'].

From all this it follows that the substitute is only an 'officiator'.

ADHIKARAṆA (10) : *At the Satra, the substitute of a 'Master' should have the 'embellishments' prescribed for the 'Master'.*

SŪTRA (26).

HE SHOULD HAVE THE 'EMBELLISHMENTS' OF THE 'MASTER', AS HE HAS TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES

Bhāṣya.

It has been settled that, from among the several 'performers' of the *Satra*, if one should become disqualified, another man should be substituted for him.—The question that arises now is Is this substitute to have the 'embellishments' of the 'Master', or those of the 'Officiating Priest'?

The *Pūrvapaksa* view is that—'he should have the embellishments of the 'Officiating Priest': —why? because he performs the sacrifice on behalf of another person, and one who sacrifices for another person is an 'Officiating Priest' (not of the Master).'

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*. *He should have the embellishments of the 'master'*; because he has been declared to be one who is to perform the duties of the 'Master'; and when a man takes up the duties of another man, he becomes connected with the embellishments of the latter; just as the *Sruk* becomes connected with the embellishments of the *Sruk* (when it is made to perform the functions of the latter).

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *When the prescribed Material has been spoilt, it is only a material similar to it that can be substituted in its place.*

SŪTRA (27).

A SIMILAR MATERIAL (SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED); AS THERE IS ALWAYS A DESIRE TO USE A SIMILAR THING.

Bhāṣya.

It has been settled that when the prescribed material has been spoilt, the performance should be carried on with a substituted material.—Now there arises the question—Should the performance be proceeded with with any material that may be obtained? Or only with such material as may be similar to the original one?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"any material may be taken up".

Against this we have the following *Siddhānta*.—*A similar material*;—where a new material is taken up, it should be one that is similar to the original one.—"Why so?"—All words are denotative of genus; and as such though the 'genus' is what is taken to be spoken of in the Vedic texts, yet the genus cannot have any direct bearing upon any action. Consequently when a material comes up as a means of accomplishing an act, and hence as an auxiliary to it,—the genus to which the material belongs, and which thus qualifies and differentiates that material, becomes an auxiliary to that act; because all the particular features of an individual are qualified and differentiated by its *Genus*;—and it is the particular feature that is auxiliary to acts. So long as the genus has not been recognised, the material to be taken up must be one which is found capable of fulfilling the needs of the situation;—and when such a material has been taken up, some of the particular features (of the original material) would become included therein; and the advantage in this is that the material that is taken up is very much similar to the original one.—From this it follows that when the *Vrīhi-grains* have been spoilt, *Nīvāra* grains (which are most similar to *Vrīhi*) should be substituted.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *When the prescribed Material has been spoilt, it should not be substituted by a material that has been prescribed as an option to it.*

SŪTRA (28).

IN THE CASE OF OPTIONAL ALTERNATIVES, IF THE MATERIAL WITH WHICH THE SACRIFICE HAS BEEN BEGUN [HAPPEN TO BE SPOILT, THE MATERIAL TO BE SUBSTITUTED IN ITS PLACE SHOULD BE ONE SIMILAR TO IT], BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT HAS BEEN DESIGNATED.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣtoma* there is the *Agnīsomīya* animal, laid down in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīsomīyam paśumālabhatē, etc.*' ['If the man on being initiated, sacrifices the animal dedicated to *Agni-soma*', etc.] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6). In connection with this animal, we have the injunctions—'He ties the animal to the post of *Khadira-wood*', 'He ties the animal to the post of *Palāśha-wood*', 'He ties the animal to the post of *Rohitaka-wood*'.—It may be that the performance having commenced with the post of *Khadira-wood*, that post becomes lost (or spoilt); in regard to such a contingency, there arises the question—Which other wood should be substituted? Should it be some wood *similar to the Khadira*? Or should it be one of the optional alternatives prescribed?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the other optional material should be substituted;—why so?—because the optional alternative is directly asserted in the Veda, while any wood 'similar to the *Khadira-wood*' has not been directly mentioned in the *Veda*; hence, it is the optional alternative that should be substituted".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of optional alternatives*, if the material with which the sacrifice has been begun happen to be spoilt, the material to be taken up in its place should be one that is *similar* to the original material. Because when the performance has been commenced with one material, that material becomes *designated* as an auxiliary to it; while the other optional alternative is not so designated. So that when the performance has been commenced with the *Khadira-wood*, the two other kinds of wood,—the *Palāśha* and the *Rohitaka*, are not auxiliaries to it; because so long as the *Khadira-wood* is there, these two cannot be used at the time; and what cannot be done is as good as not laid down in the Veda. Consequently at a performance where the *Khadira-wood* has been adopted, the other two woods should not be brought in at all, for the simple reason that they are not auxiliaries to the performance; and if the *Khadira-wood* that had been adopted becomes lost or spoilt, a wood *similar* to it should be sought out [and the performance proceeded with with that wood].

SŪTRA (29).

[*Objection*]—"THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING NOT SANCTIONED BY THE VEDA"—IF THIS IS URGED [then our answer would be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If your view is that a wood *similar* to the *Khadira* should be brought in, -then the bringing in of such a thing would be an act that is not *sanctioned by the Veda*. Hence, by reason of its being sanctioned by the Veda, the optional alternative should be brought in."

SŪTRA (30).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THAT IS NOT AN AUXILIARY AT ALL.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested would not be right; because in the performance (which has been begun with one material), the other optional alternative material would not be an auxiliary at all; because that performance would be one at which the *Khadira-wood* has been adopted, and this one wood being designated, by reason of that designation, the other two woods are as good as not prescribed at all.

Says the Opponent—"If there were no designation, then their auxiliary character would be inconsistent; hence the two woods should be taken as prescribed.—'What if it is so?'—If this is so, then, in the absence of the wood that had been adopted, the two woods would be taken as prescribed."

It is not so, we reply. Because in that case, the declaration would be a contingent one; that is, to be adopted only when the particular contingency would be there; the contingent declaration being—'The other two woods, *Palāśha* and *Rohitaka*, should be taken up *under the contingency of the Khadira not being there*'.—"What is the harm in that?"—The harm is that the same thing would be *required* as well as *not-required*,—which would be highly inconsistent.

Then again, the embellishments too should be done to the *Khadira-wood*; and when a wood similar to that is actually taken up, under the impression that it is *Khadira*, -then, under the impression that they have been laid down, those embellishments are performed in connection with them; while with the declared optional alternative, the embellishments have no connection at all.

From all this it follows that the substitute adopted should be that which is *similar* to what had been adopted at the outset.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The Putīkā is a substitute for Soma.*

SŪTRA (31).

IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A 'SUBSTITUTE'; EVEN THOUGH, IN THE ABSENCE OF SOMA, THERE MAY BE OTHER THINGS MORE SIMILAR (THAN PUTĪKĀ) TO THE SOMA,—AND ON THAT ACCOUNT, THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE PUTĪKĀ MIGHT BE UNREASONABLE. —YET IT IS THE PUTĪKĀ THAT SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE DECLARATION; ANYTHING ELSE COULD BE SUBSTITUTED ONLY IF THERE WERE NO SUCH DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

There is the declaration—'If one cannot obtain *Soma*, one should extract the juice of the *Putīkā*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this to be taken as an injunction of the *Putīkā* as to be used under the contingency of the absence of *Soma*? Or as restricting the choice of a substitute (for *Soma*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be taken as the injunction of the *Putīkā* as to be used under the contingency of the absence of *Soma*.—Why?—Because there is actual injunction; and as for the substitute, it is never enjoined; it comes to be adopted as a matter of course, for the purpose of accomplishing what has to be accomplished (when the original enjoined substance has become useless);—the *Putīkā*, on the other hand, we find to be actually enjoined;—and such an Injunction would be useful only if it were taken as laying down an optional alternative. From all this it follows that the *Putīkā* should not be regarded as a *substitute* [it should be regarded as an *optional alternative*]."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—It should be regarded as a *substitute*.—Why?—When the means of accomplishing a sacrifice is lost (or destroyed), another means (in the shape of the *Putīkā*) is taken up for its accomplishment,—on account of the absence of the prescribed (*Soma*).—"But it would be unreasonable to select the *Putīkā*, because there are other things *similar* to *Soma*."—Our answer to this is that this selection is done on the basis of the express declaration; that is to say, the *Soma* not being available, there are several things, more or less similar to *Soma*, which present themselves as likely to be taken up; and from among these things, the declaration in question serves to restrict the choice to the *Putīkā*,—this special declaration being necessary because the resemblance of the *Putīkā* to the *Soma* is slighter (than that of many other things).—"Why so?"—Well, the sacrifice that has been commenced has got to be performed; under the circumstances, some substance or the other would

have to be brought in, even though there were no declaration to that effect; —now, what is already recognised as to be done or used does not need to be enjoined; there can be only a *reference* to (or reiteration of) what is already known.—"But why should there be this *reiteration*?"—The answer to that is that what is only slightly similar to *Soma* may not be generally recognised as to be used, hence for the purpose of laying down that thing, a *reiteration* becomes necessary.

The purpose served by this *Adhikarana* is that, if the *Putīkā* is a *substitute*, then on the loss of the *Putīkā*, the substance to be used should have to be similar to the *Soma* (not to the *Putīkā*); whereas if the *Putīkā* is enjoined as another substance (as an optional alternative to *Soma*), then on the loss of the *Putīkā*, the other substance to be used should have to be similar to the *Putīkā* (not to the *Soma*). [Vide *Adhikarana* 15, *below*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *When the substituted material becomes spoilt, the fresh material to be used should be one that is similar to the original material.*

SŪTRA (32).

THERE CAN BE NO 'SUBSTITUTE' TO A 'SUBSTITUTE', BECAUSE BOTH STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING.

Bhāṣya.

The question to be considered now is as follows:—In a case where the prescribed material has been secured,—and on its being spoilt, a substitute has been brought in and the performance proceeded with,—then, if this substituted material has also become spoilt,—what sort of fresh material should be brought in? Should it be one similar to the substituted material? Or one similar to the originally prescribed material which had been spoilt?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "when the substituted material is spoilt, the new material brought in should be similar to this substituted material,—in accordance with the principle arrived at in a previous *Adhikaraṇa (twelfth)*".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*.—*There can be no 'substitute' to a 'substitute'*;—why?—*because both stand on the same footing*; that is to say, just as the first substitute was brought in for the purpose of being used like the original prescribed material—and not for being used *as a substitute*,—so the second substitute also is to be brought in for being used like that same original prescribed material, and not for being used *as a substitute*.—From this it follows that the fresh (third) material brought in should not be one similar to the substituted (second) material;—in fact, one similar to the original (first) material should be sought out.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *Even in a case where the substitute itself is a prescribed one,—if it becomes spoilt, the new material brought in should be similar to the original material, not to the substitute.*

SŪTRA (33)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN A CASE WHERE THE SUBSTITUTE IS ONE THAT HAS ITSELF BEEN PRESCRIBED IN THE VEDA, (IN THE EVENT OF ITS BEING SPOILT) THE NEW MATERIAL SHOULD BE ONE SIMILAR TO THAT SUBSTITUTE ITSELF, BECAUSE IN THIS CASE THE SUBSTITUTE IS ONE THAT IS IMMUTABLE"

Bhāṣya

The question (arising out of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) to be considered now is—How should it be in a case where the substitute is one that has itself been prescribed in the Veda? For instance, it has been laid down that if one cannot obtain *Soma*, he should extract the juice of the *Putīkā*'; now when the *Putīkā* also is spoilt, should the new material to be brought in be similar to the *Putīkā* or to the *Soma*?—[In the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it has been decided that it should be similar to the original material: and according to that, the new material should be similar to the *Soma*. But the cases dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* would appear to be those in which the substituted material had been brought in by virtue of its similarity to the original material, and not by virtue of any injunction regarding itself. In the case now put forward, the substituted material, *Putīkā* has been brought in, not because it is similar to *Soma*, because, as already pointed out before, there are other things that are more similar to *Soma*,—but because it has itself been laid down as to be used as a substitute.]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In a case where the substitute is one that has itself been laid down in the Veda, the new material should be one similar to that substitute itself.* Because parts of the *Putīkā* have been laid down as to be used in *the absence of Soma*;—and in the case in question, there is *absence of Soma*;—it follows therefore that parts of the *Putīkā* should be used [and parts of the *Putīkā* can be present only in such substances as are similar to the *Putīkā*.]"

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THE DESIRE IS FOR SECURING 'SOMA'.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣa*; because the desire that the performer has is, not for the securing parts of *Puṭikā*; what is emphasised (by the text laying down the *Puṭikā* as substitute for *Soma*) is its similarity to *Soma*; it is thus that the injunction of the *Puṭikā* serves a visible purpose (of securing something like the desired *Soma*); if the injunction were of something dissimilar to the *Soma*, then it would be necessary to assume some unseen (transcendental) result as following from the use of that substance.—Hence it follows that the material to be brought in should be one in which the similarity to the desired *Soma* is present. —even though it be *not similar* to the *Puṭikā*; and stress need not be laid upon similarity to the *Puṭikā* itself.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The prescribed material brought in having been spoilt, if another supply of the same is available, then the performance should be proceeded with with this fresh supply.*

SUTRA (35).

IF THE PRINCIPAL MATERIAL IS OBTAINABLE, THEN THE PRINCIPAL ITSELF SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN; AS IT IS ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PRINCIPAL THAT A SUBSTITUTE IS BROUGHT IN.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where the prescribed material has been spoilt,—and the man going out to seek for a substitute, comes by the prescribed material itself,—should he bring in a substitute? Or should he make use of the second supply of the principal prescribed material itself?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"a substitute should be brought in; as he had made up his mind to use the substitute, he would be true to his determination only if he brought in the substitute;—hence a substitute should be brought in".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When the Principal is available, that itself should be brought in. Because it is only when the prescribed material is not there that the substitute is brought in as a make-shift; and further, if the prescribed material is used, then all its parts are what are required; whereas if the substitute is used, the proper parts are only a few (i.e. only those that constitute the points of similarity to the Principal Material).

As regards the argument that, "this would involve the impropriety of abandoning the determination (of using the substitute)"—we ask—Is there impropriety in adopting what has been enjoined, or in what is open to censure by cultured people?—[And in the case in question, the cultured people would certainly censure that course of action in which the substitute would be used even when the Principal prescribed material was available.]

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *When the performance has been commenced with a substituted material, it should be completed with that material, even if the Principal Material becomes available in the interval.*

SŪTRA (36)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"EVEN WHEN THE PERFORMANCE HAS ALREADY COMMENCED (WITH THE SUBSTITUTED MATERIAL) [THE PRINCIPAL MATERIAL SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE]"

Bhāṣya.

At the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices, the prescribed material having been spoilt, the substitute has been brought in, and a few rites performed with it,—if, after this, a fresh supply of the prescribed material is obtained, —should this latter be taken up for use during the rest of the performance? Or should the performance continue and be completed with the substituted material?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows —'*Even after the performance has commenced* (with the substituted material) the prescribed material (when obtained) should be brought in, as it has been already pointed out that *it is only in the absence of the Principal that a substitute is brought in* (Sū. 35). Consequently, the substitute should not be used (when the Principal has been secured)"

SŪTRA (37)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO, AS IT WOULD BE USELESS

Bhāṣya

Not so; when the *Khadira-wood* (prescribed for the making of the Post) not being available, the animal has been tied to the post made of *Kadara wood*, —if the *Khadira* becomes available, what would the man do with it, when the tying has already been done? It is only for some purpose that the *Khadira* should be brought in, not merely for the sake of bringing in the *Khadira*. —Hence we conclude that under the circumstances in question, the prescribed material should not be brought in.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *Even though the substitute be fitter than the Prescribed Material for 'embellishment', it is the latter that should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (38)

WHEN THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUBSTANCE AND EMBELLISHMENTS, GREATER REGARD SHOULD BE PAID TO THE SUBSTANCE: AS THE EMBELLISHMENTS ARE FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya

When the Animal-sacrifice has commenced, it is found that the piece of *Khadira-wood* (the primary, prescribed substance) available is not fit for being chiselled and undergoing other embellishments, while there is a piece of *Kadara* (which is generally substituted for *Khadira*) which is larger and very much fitter for undergoing the embellishments; there then arises the question Which of the two should be taken up for use?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "the piece of *Kadara* should be taken up, as otherwise, the Embellishments would have to be given up".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*: *When there is conflict between the Substance and Embellishments, greater regard should be paid to the substance*, not to the embellishments.—Why? Because *the embellishments are for the sake of the substance*; that is, all that the embellishments do is to make the substance fit for use. If the embellishments are dropped, the substance remains and can be used; but when the substance is not there, then there can be no embellishments; so that in this case there would be neither the substance nor the embellishments. In fact, the substance is the door through which the embellishments go in (to help in the final result), —such being the idea countenanced by the scriptures; hence when the substance is not there, their door having been destroyed, the embellishments could not go in to help the Final Transcendental Result.—Hence it follows that under the circumstances stated, the piece of *Khadira-wood* should be taken up for use.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *If the Primary Substance available is not fit for use, then, the substitute should be taken up, even in the presence of the Primary.*

SŪTRA (39).

WHEN THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN 'USE' AND 'SUBSTANCE', GREATER REGARD SHOULD BE PAID TO 'USE': AS IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SUBSTANCE, THE SUBSTITUTE HAS TO BE BROUGHT IN; AND BECAUSE SUBSTANCES ARE FOR THE PURPOSES OF 'USE'.

Bhāṣya.

At the time that the Sacrificial Post is going to be made, it is found that the piece of *Khadira-wood* that is there is not fit (strong enough) for incapacitating the animal (to be tied to it), while there is a piece of *Kadara-wood* which is quite fit for the purpose,—the question then arises—Which of the two should be taken up for use? the *Khadira* or the *Kadara*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *Khadira* should be taken up for use; because that is what has been prescribed; hence by taking it up, one does what is enjoined by the scriptures; if, on the other hand, he brought in the substitute, he would do what is not enjoined;—hence in the case in question, the substitute should not be used."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*: *Where there is conflict between 'use' and 'substance', greater regard should be paid to 'use';*—the substance is brought in only for the sake of its 'use'; for instance, the wood is brought in only for the purpose of making the Post by being tied to which the animal would become incapacitated;—and it is not brought in simply for the sake of being brought in. In fact, by bringing in the *Kadara*, one would be going against the injunction of the material (for making the Post), but he would accomplish the *use* (purpose) all right; while by bringing in the (useless) *Khadira*, he would be going against both (the substance being, by itself, worthless; and the purpose not being served at all).—Hence in the case in question, the *Kadara* should be brought in.

It has been declared that *in the absence of the substance, the substitute is to be brought in*; and substances are meant only for the sake of the *use* to which they can be put. [Hence when a substance is unfit for use, it is as good as non-existent.]

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *If the Primary substance is just sufficient for the main purpose only, not for all the purposes,--still that is what should be taken up.*

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SUBSTITUTE SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN ALSO AFTER A PART OF THE WORK HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED."

Bhāṣya.

At a performance, the *Vrīhi* corn (which is the prescribed Primary substance) is just enough for the single libation of the *Dvyavadāna*, while there is also the *Nīvāra* corn, which is enough for that offering as also for all the other purposes, the question that arises is—Which of the two substances should be taken up for use?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—Also when a *part of the work*,—in the shape of the one offering of the *Dvyavadāna*—*has been done* (with the Primary substance) the substitute should be brought in—Why?—Because in this way alone would the remaining purposes be accomplished."

SUTRA (41).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY ONLY A PART SHOULD BE PERFORMED [THAT ALONE WHICH CAN BE DONE WITH THE PRIMARY SUBSTANCE]; BECAUSE THAT MUCH ALONE OF THE WORK IS CAPABLE OF BEING ACCOMPLISHED WITH IT AND THE REST OF THE 'USES' ARE ALL EQUAL IN THAT THEY ARE ALL AUXILIARY TO THE MAIN USE,—SUBSERVING AS THEY DO ONLY THE PURPOSES OF THE SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya

The phrase *apy evā* ' (in reality ') serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

With the small quantity of *Vrihi* corn that is there, the main part of the work—that is, the offering of the *Dvyavadāna*—should be accomplished.

-Why?—*Because that much alone of the work is capable of being accomplished with it*, in all cases, that much of the work alone is done with a thing which can be done with it; if the rest of the work—the other purposes cannot be accomplished with that substance,—those being only such factors as are subordinate to the main purpose,—it would not be right to reject the main thing for considerations of the subordinate factors;—because a real *auxiliary* is that which helps the *Primary*, not that which mars it;—in the case in question, if the rest of the purposes were accomplished

with the substituted material, they would deprive the Primary offering of the character of '*being Vrīhi*'; and yet 'being *Vrīhi*' has been directly declared to be a factor in the main offering as in the text 'one should perform the sacrifice with the *Vrīhi*-corn'.—From this it follows that no heed need be paid to the rest of the purposes (to be served by the substance). If there were no distinction between the auxiliaries as 'primary' and 'secondary', then heed would have had to be paid to them;—but the distinction is there:—hence it follows that under the circumstances stated, the substitute should not be used.

We find a text also indicative of the same conclusion 'The offerings may be made somehow or other' [which indicates that where there is just enough of the Primary substance for the main offering, the rest of the offerings may be made *somehow or other*].

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *When the portion of the cake sliced for making the offering becomes spoilt, another cake has to be brought in.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE 'TWO PIECES' BECOME SPOILT, ANOTHER SLICE SHOULD BE CUT OUT OF THE REMAINDER OF THE CAKE; BECAUSE IT IS MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Yadāgnēyo'-ṣṭākapāla 'māvāsyāyām paurnamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*' ['On the Full-Moon and the Moonless Days, one should not omit the offering of the Cake baked *upon* eight pans to *Agni*']. (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 3.)—Out of this Cake, 'Two Pieces' (constituting the offering to *Agni*) having been cut out, become spoilt: the question that arises is—Should the 'Two Pieces'-offering be again cut out of the remaining portion of the Cake—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*When the Two Pieces' become spoilt, another slice should be cut out of the remainder of the Cake.* Why so?—*Because it is meant for that purpose*: that is the material (Cake) has been got ready for being offered to *Agni*;—hence the offering to *Agni* has got to be accomplished;—when the 'Two Pieces' have been destroyed, the sacrifice still remains to be accomplished;—and it is the sacrifice that the man needs to perform;—this sacrifice as prescribed can be accomplished only by means of the offering to Agni;—such being the case, why should the offering not be made? Consequently it is necessary that another 'Two Pieces' should be sliced out of the remainder of the Cake."

SUTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ANOTHER CAKE SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN, BECAUSE OF THE DEFINITE DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, another cake should be brought in, and the other 'Two Pieces' should *not* be cut out of the former cake. Why?—*Because of the definite declaration.* There is the definite declaration—'A slice should be cut out *from the centre*; and from the *first half*'; the 'Two Pieces' are con-

nected with the 'offering into Fire'—as laid down in the text—'One should offer the *Two-pieces* into the fire';—and it has been further specified as to be cut out of the *centre* and the *first half*:—now that portion of the cake which had been cut out of the centre and the first half, and which, on that account, was connected with the offering in question, -having been spoilt,—if the offering were made out of the remainder of the same cake, then it would have been made of a substance *not* cut out of the 'Centre' and the 'first half'.--" The second offering could be sliced out of the *centre* and the *first half* of what remains of the Cake [so that the difficulty pointed out would disappear]." -The answer to this is that what has been enjoined as to be offered is the piece cut out of the *centre* and the *first half* of the *entire cake*, not of any other thing.

Or, the term '*nirdēshāt*' ('definite declaration') in the *Sūtra* may be explained as follows:--The following text *definitely declares* that when one substance has been destroyed, another substance should be brought in—'If *all the offering-materials of the performer are destroyed or spoilt or stolen*, he should make the offering to all the deities with Clarified Butter',—where it is laid down that when an offering-material is lost, Clarified Butter should be used. From this it follows that the second 'Two Pieces' should not be cut out of the remainder of the Cake.

Another person has explained the term '*nirdhēshāt*' to mean 'because the remainder has been laid down as to be used for other purposes'—i.e. all those uses that have been laid down as to be made of the *Remnant*.

This explanation, however, is not right; because sacrificial materials are not obtained for the purpose of these *uses of Remnants*; and as a matter of fact, until the accomplishment of all that is to be done with the sacrificial material, no other use should be made of it. Hence the *Sūtra* cannot have the meaning suggested.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *When the slice cut out for the 'Sviṣṭakṛt' offering has become spoilt, another slice shall not be cut out for it.*

SŪTRA (3).

IN REALITY, ALL THAT IS TO BE DONE WITH THE 'REMNANT' SHOULD BE OMITTED; BECAUSE THAT IS DONE FOR A SPECIAL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

[The '*Sviṣṭakṛt*'-offering is laid down as to be made out of the remnant of the material used at the sacrifice]; in a case where the portion carved out of the Remnant for this offering has been spoilt, there arises the question as to whether another portion should be carved out of the remnant—or not.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"A fresh portion should be carved out of the Remnant.—Why?—Because in this case, the first portion is carved, not out of the *whole* of the 'second half',—but out of that part which is nearest to the performer. Because as a rule, whenever there is need for carving, it is done out of the part nearest to the agent; hence when the portion is carved out of it, what is done is in strict accordance with what has been prescribed.—Hence it follows that another portion should be carved out of the Remnant."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*All that is to be done with the Remnant should be omitted*;—why?—*because that is done for a special purpose*; there is a special purpose for which the portion is carved out of the remnant;—this purpose being the *disposal* of the Remnant;—and the 'Disposal' helps the performer by clearing the space;—it is for the purpose of securing this clearance that the special method is laid down in the shape of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering, by means of which the required disposal and the consequent clearance are to be brought about. Such being the case, if, on being taken out for being offered, the substance (portion of the Cake) should get spoilt,—the clearance intended to be done by its means will have been already effected; and it would not be the motive for any further *taking up*. Then again what the injunction says is that 'what is to be disposed of should be disposed of by means of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering';—and the thing being spoilt, there would be nothing that *is to be disposed of*; hence the *Sviṣṭakṛt-offering* would *ipso facto* be dropped.—After the principal offering has been made (at a sacrifice) what remains is to be used for all those acts that are prescribed as to be done with the Remnant; hence when one portion has been carved out (for the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering, and spoilt), what remains has to be used for the other acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The Priests alone shall eat the Remnant.*

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'EATING OF THE REMNANT' SHOULD BE DONE BY OTHERS, AS THERE IS THE SPECIFIC DECLARATION;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE PRIMARY ACT."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; at which there are 'eatings' to be done at the time of the *Prāshitra*, the *Chaturdhākaraṇa*, and the *Shaṁyuvāka*.

In connection with these, there arises the question—Are these eatings to be done by the priests mentioned in the context of (i.e. actually engaged in) the sacrifice? Or by other persons?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The eating of the Remnant is to be done by persons other than those engaged in the sacrifice.—Why?—Because *there is a specific declaration*; the *Adhvaryu* and other priests (engaged in the sacrifice) have been specially declared as partaking in the eating of the *Iḍā*-remnant, in the text, '*Yajamānapañchamāḥ iḍām bhakṣayanti*' ['The priests, with the Sacrificer as the fifth, eat the *Iḍā-remnant*']; and hence the declaration has been made for the purpose of precluding all other persons who would be likely to do the *eating*; and the sense of this is that the priests specially mentioned here are to eat the *Iḍā*-remnant only.—Just as in the case of the text '*Āgneyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ*'—['The cake baked upon eight cakes is to be offered to *Agni*'] (Taitt. Sam. 2. 6. 3. 3),—what is done is that the 'Two Slices' are specified from among all those things in regard to sacrificing with which there is no restriction; and this text cannot be taken as an Injunction, as what it speaks of is already known;—nor can it be taken as a reiteration, as that would be entirely useless;—it has, therefore, to be taken as a Preclusion, whereby it serves a useful purpose.—In the same manner in the case in question, the declaration quoted should be taken as indicating the preclusion (from other eatings) of the five persons named (i.e. the four principal priests with the Sacrificer as the fifth).

Further, if the eating were to be done by only those who are engaged in the sacrifice, then there would be difficulties in the case of the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice; there are so many 'eatings' to be done at that sacrifice that *if* all were done by the few persons actually engaged in the sacrifice, they would all die (of over-eating)."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE DONE BY ALL (THOSE ENGAGED IN THE SACRIFICE), AS IT IS THOSE THAT ARE CONGREGATED THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The eating should be done *by all*—i.e. by all those engaged in the sacrifice; the eating serves the purpose of bringing about an 'embellishment',

in the men; the men thus embellished would go about the performance; and as there are no grounds for discriminating among them, all those that are congregated at the sacrifice should do the eating.

SŪTRA (6).

AS FOR THE 'SPECIFIC DECLARATION', IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN AN ADDITIONAL DETAIL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (under Sū. 4) that "there is the specific declaration [viz.: 'The priests, with the sacrificer as the fifth, eat the *Iḍā*-remnant'] (which shows that the persons herein named are *not* to do the eating)".—But in reality, the 'specific declaration' *serves the purpose of laying down an additional detail*,—i.e. the fact of the other persons (priests) partaking in the eating having been already indicated by the fact of their working at the sacrifice, the text quoted serves to declare that the Sacrificer also is to do the eating, as the *fifth* person; so that the declaration is for the purpose of pointing out the possibility of the Sacrificer doing the eating; hence it cannot be taken as precluding the persons (from all eatings other than that of the *Iḍā* remnant).

SŪTRA (7).

AS REGARDS THE PRIMARY,—IN REGARD TO THAT, THERE IS THE CLEAR VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged that in connection with the Primary offering (of the *Cake baked on eight pans*), it is only the 'Two slice-offering' that is spoken of.—But in that case, we admit of Preclusion, on the strength of the clear text. Specially as that text contains no injunction of anything new.—On the other hand, the text, 'The Priests with the Sacrificer as the fifth eat the *Idā-remnant*', actually enjoins the *Sacrificer* (as the eater, who is not already known as such). And when there is a doubt as to whether a text should be taken as an Injunction or a Preclusion, the better course is to take it as an Injunction; as in the case of Injunction, the words are taken in their natural sense; while Preclusion involves three objectionable features—the abandoning of the natural meaning of the words, the acceptance of another meaning and the setting aside of what is already known.—From all this, it follows that the eating should be done by the persons engaged in the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (8).

[*Objection*]—"BUT THE PRECLUSION SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged that—"if only the persons engaged in the sacrifice were to do the eating, then this would be impossible in the case of the

Ashvamēdha sacrifice, where there are many *eatings* to be done (too many for the few persons engaged in the sacrifice)".—This has got to be refuted [which is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (9).

THAT DOES NOT AFFECT THE CASE IN QUESTION, BECAUSE IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Ashvamēdha-sacrifice* the persons engaged shall not eat all there is to eat, i.e. if they were to eat it all, they could not complete the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice [as they would die of over-eating]; in this case the performance of the *Ashvamēdha* sacrifice is directly enjoined by a Vedic text, while the eating of all the remnants is to be done at it only by virtue of the general law (that the ectype is to be performed like the Archetype; and at the Archetype of the *Ashvamēdha*, all the eating is done by the Priests engaged in the sacrifice); and when the latter conflicts with the former, it is only natural that it should be set aside; [hence at the *Ashvamēdha*, all the eatings are not to be done by the Priests engaged in the sacrifice];—in the case in question, on the other hand, there is no such conflict; hence in this case all the eating is to be done by the persons engaged in the sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Expiatory Homa is to be performed when either the whole or a part of the Pan is broken.*

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—EVEN WHEN ONLY A PART IS BROKEN, THE EXPIATORY HOMA SHOULD BE PERFORMED, BECAUSE THE CONTINGENCY IS PRESENT THERE.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which it is declared— When the pan breaks one should offer *Homa*', 'When the material is spilled, one should offer *Homa*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the expiatory *Homa* to be performed only when the whole Pan is broken, and when the whole *of the material is spilled? Or also when only a part is broken or spilled?*

Question— When is the pan to be regarded as broken *wholly* and when as broken *in part*?"

When it has been smashed to pieces and is absolutely unfit for use, it is regarded as *wholly broken*, when however, even though a piece has been broken, the pan remains fit for use, it is said to be *broken in part.*

The apparent answer to the question [which is also the *Siddhānta*] *is* that the expiatory *Homa* is to be performed also when the pan is *broken in part.*—'Why?"—*Because the contingency is present there*, that is, the *breaking* is there, as what is *broken in part* is also 'broken', and when the contingency (*being broken*) is there, the contingent rite must be performed

SŪTRA (11)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA'S *argument against* SIDDHĀNTA]—"IN REALITY THERE IS TO BE NO EXPIATORY HOMA WHEN THE PAN IS WHOLLY BROKEN, BECAUSE IT HAS BECOME ENTIRELY UNFIT FOR USE AND THE EXPIATION IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING THE PAN USEFUL"

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the view set forth in the preceding *Sūtra.*

"*There should be no expiatory Homa when the pan is wholly broken*; because the expiation is for the purpose of embellishing or purifying what has been *spoilt.*—'Why so?' Because what is wanted is not the *offering of Homa*, but the thing that has undergone breakage; as it is with this

latter when duly embellished and purified that the performance is to be carried on; it is with this view that the expiatory *Homa* is performed. Nothing can be done with the pan that has been smashed to pieces; hence in that case, the expiation would be futile. With the pan broken in a part, on the other hand, work can be done; hence when the pan is only partly broken, the expiation should be performed."

SŪTRA (12)

[*Answer to the* PŪRVAPAKṢA *argument*]—IT SHOULD BE DONE, BECAUSE THE CONTINGENCY IS THERE—THE 'HOMA' IS NOT AN AUXILIARY (EMBELLISHMENT) OF THE (BROKEN) PAN, BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH SOMETHING (THE MAIN SACRIFICE) WHICH IS ESSENTIAL (ETERNAL, EVERLASTING), HENCE IT CANNOT BE SUBSIDIARY TO THE PAN, BECAUSE THIS LATTER IS SOMETHING NOT-ETERNAL (EPHEMERAL).

Bhāṣya.

The expiatory *Homa* should be performed, even when the Pan is wholly broken.—"Why?"—*Because the contingency is there*; i.e. the contingency in the shape of 'breakage' is there; and when the *contingency* is there, the *contingent* must be performed.

It has been argued that "the Expiation is for the embellishment or purification of what has been spoilt".—But, as a matter of fact, the *Expiatory Homa* is not an auxiliary (embellishment) of the (broken) Pan;—why?—*because it is connected with something eternal* [i.e. all the details of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice are in reality prompted by the resultant *Apūrva* of that sacrifice; and this is an eternal or essential factor—*Tuptikā* and *Tantraratna*]; and by virtue of this connection, the *Homa* in question is as good as eternal or essential,—while the 'breakage' is an ephemeral factor; and what is eternal is never enjoined for the benefit of what is ephemeral; so that, if a detail of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices is eternal or essential, it cannot be taken as helping what is ephemeral.—Why?—Because what is ephemeral may not be there at some point of time; how then could the eternal factor help it when it is non-existent?—"What is the harm in that?"—There will be this difficulty that the eternal factor would not be able to help it; and hence the assertion that the 'eternal factor would help' would be meaningless.—If, however, the *Homa* is something *contingent*—[that is, while, as a detail pertaining to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, it is eternal, its actual performance would be contingent upon there being a 'breakage' of the Pan],—then the said difficulty would not arise. Hence our view of the case is the right one; under this view, the *Homa* would be performed when there is breakage of the Pan,—and when there is no breakage, it would not be performed.—Under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, on the other hand, there would be the difficulty that there can be no connection

between the *eternal* (*Homa*) and the *non-eternal* (Breakage of the Pan).—From all this it follows that the expiatory *Homa* is to be performed whenever there is any breakage (either *wholly* or *in part*).

SŪTRA (13).

FURTHER, INASMUCH AS ACCESSORIES ARE MEANT TO SUBSERVE THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE, THEY CAN BE USED APART FROM THIS LATTER ONLY WHEN THERE IS A DIRECT DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya

An accessory can be regarded as subserving the purposes of another accessory only when there is a direct declaration to that effect. In accordance with the 'Context', all the accessories,—the *Homa* as well as the Broken Pan,—subserve the purposes of the Primary Sacrifice; the *Broken Pan* is not enjoined as the receptacle of the *Homa*; because, if the Broken Pan were the receptacle, then no other *Homa* could have been enjoined; as in that case the Broken Pan would be taken to be an accessory of the Primary Sacrifice; and this would militate against the connection of that sacrifice with the *Āhavanīya* Fire (which is the prescribed receptacle for all *Homas* offered in course of the sacrifice).—"But in view of the distinct declaration, the two (the *Āhavanīya Fire* and the *Broken Pan*) could be taken as optional alternatives (for being used as the receptacle of *Homa*)."—That cannot be possible; because as for the Declaration ('*Bhinnē juhoti*'), it could be taken as laying down the 'breakage' (of the Pan) as a contingency under which the *Homa* should be performed [hence it is not necessary to take the Broken Pan as the receptacle of *Homa*]; and also because the *Homa* has been directly enjoined by the text (*Bhinnē juhoti*; which therefore cannot be taken as enjoining the receptacle). So that the injunction of the *Homa* (by the text) is got at from the direct meaning of the words of the text, while that of the Broken Pan as the accessory can be got at only through the indications of 'Syntactical Connection'. Hence the Broken Pan cannot be regarded as the receptacle (of the *Homa*).—"Even when 'Breakage' is regarded as the contingency (under which the *Homa* is to be performed), there can be no injunction of another *Homa*, as the text could enjoin the contingency only for the particular *Homa* mentioned in the context."—That cannot be; because, the contingency (or condition) is what is *not predicated*; hence if the contingency were enjoined (and hence predicated), then it would not be a *contingency* at all.—If then, it were taken as the *subject*,—and that for which it is a contingency were also a *subject*,—then there could be no connection between two *subjects*.—Then again, what is enjoined in the context is not that '*Breakage* should be done',—but what is enjoined is the other thing mentioned (i.e. the *Homa*), as to be done after the *Breakage* has occurred.

SŪTRA (14).

"IN CONNECTION WITH THE BREAKAGE [THERE IS SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO BE DONE]",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer will be as in the following *Sūtra.*]

Bhāṣya.

The following argument might be brought forward—"There is a text which clearly indicates that the Broken Pan is to be repaired—'May I repair the Pan by means of the *Gāyatrī* of a hundred syllables'. [So that when the Breakage is meant to be repaired, then the *breakage* could not be taken as a contingency under which the *Homa* would be performed, which *Homa* would render the Pan fit for further use.—If this were so, then there would be no point in repairing the broken Pan]."

To this our answer will be as follows—

SŪTRA (15)

THAT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE WHAT IS SPOKEN OF IN THE TEXT QUOTED CANNOT BE SUBSIDIARY TO THE BREAKAGE.

Bhāṣya.

The *repairing* spoken of in the text quoted cannot be regarded as subsidiary to the Breakage; because as a matter of fact, the Breakage cannot be repaired by means of either a *Homa* or a *Mantra*. Even if it could be repaired by means of clay, the notion that it is 'broken' would still be there.

SUTRA (16)

IF THE DECLARATION OF ITS BEING THROWN INTO WATER WERE TAKEN AS RELATING TO THE CASE OF TOTAL DESTRUCTION, THEN IT WOULD BE MEANINGLESS

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the total destruction (of the Pan), we have the text—'The broken pan they throw into water'; such being the case, any embellishment of it would be useless. [Hence the *Homa* cannot be regarded as an embellishment of the Pan.]—"But it could be picked out of the water and then placed upon the Fire."—Not so, we reply; because it has been declared that 'he sets up *another* (pan)'.

From all this it follows that what is laid down in the text '*Bhinnē juhoti*' is a contingent auxiliary of the Main Sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *'Kṣāmēṣṭinyāya':—In the case of burning, it is only when the whole cake is burnt, that the expiatory Act is to be performed.*

SUTRA (17).

BUT IN THE CASE OF BURNING, THE EXPIATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED ONLY WHEN THE WHOLE (CAKE) IS BURNT; AS THE BURNING OF A PART OF IT IS UNAVOIDABLE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, we read—'*Atha yasya purodāshau kṣāyatah tam yajñam varuno grhnāti, yadā tad haviḥ santiṣṭhēta atha tadēva haviranirvapēt, yajño hi yajñasya prāyaschittiḥ*' ['When the two Cakes are burnt, Varuna seizes that sacrifice; if that offering is to be completed, that same offering should be offered; a sacrifice being the only expiation for a sacrifice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the expiatory offering to be made when the whole of the Cake is burnt? Or when a part of it is burnt?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"When the contingency is there it should be offered when either the whole or a part is burnt (in accordance with the conclusion of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*)".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of Burning, the expiation should be performed only when the whole Cake is burnt.*—The particle '*tu*', 'but', implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*. In the case of burning, the expiation is to be performed only when the whole of the Cake is burnt.—"Why so?"—*Because the burning of a part of it is unavoidable*; it is not possible to avoid the burning of a part of the Cake; because when a substance is in contact with fire, small portions are sure to be burnt. For instance, for the purpose of baking the lower part of the Cake, it is placed upon heated pans, and for the baking of its upper part live charcoal is heaped upon it; and under the circumstances, the burning of parts of the Cake cannot be avoided; so that, even though the expiation is spoken of as contingent, it would practically become compulsory; and in that case no significance would attach to the mention of the contingency 'when the cakes are burnt, etc.'—From all this it follows that the expiation is to be performed only when the whole Cake is burnt.

SŪTRA (18).

[*Objection*]—"THE EXPIATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON THE BURNING OF A PART; BECAUSE WE FIND A TEXT INDICATING THAT CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right to hold that the Expiation is to be performed only when the whole Cake is burnt; as it can be performed when a part only is burnt; because the contingency of 'burning' is present in that case also; what is *partly burnt* is certainly *burnt*; hence if the Expiation were not performed when the Cake would be partly burnt, then what is prescribed would be *not done*; and this is not right.—Then again, the text says 'if that offering is to be completed, that same offering should be offered'; where the offering of the same material is laid down; and this would not be possible when the whole of the cake would be burnt. Hence it follows that the expiation is to be performed only when the Cake is *partly* burnt."

SŪTRA (19)

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, THE SAID OFFERING WOULD BE MADE WITH ANOTHER SUBSTANCE; AS FOR THE CONTINGENCY (UNDER WHICH THE EXPIATION IS TO BE PERFORMED), THAT MUST BE TAKEN TO BE AS LAID DOWN IN THE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vī*' ('*in reality*') *indicates the rejection of the Pūrva-pakṣa* view. The view asserted—that the expiation is to be performed even when only a part of the Cake is burnt,—is not right; in fact, the Expiation is to be performed only when the whole cake is burnt. The contingency under which the Expiation is to be performed has been laid down in the text—'When the two cakes are burnt', where what is meant is the burning of the *whole* cake, not a part of it; in fact, there should be no expiation on the burning of only a part; because such partial burning is inevitable.

Then, as regards the argument that the text—'If that offering is to be completed, etc.'—is found to lay down the completing of the sacrifice with the burnt substance [and this can apply only to the *partly* burnt substance]; —the answer to that is that the expiation is to be performed when the contingency of the 'destruction' happens; and even if the material used at the expiation is a different one (from the burnt one), it would be performed all the same (and the main sacrifice duly completed after that). Hence this argument does not affect our position.

SŪTRA (20).

[*Objection*]—"IT CANNOT BE SO; SINCE THE TERM USED IS 'TAD HAVIḤ' ('THAT OFFERING')"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent may urge the following argument—"If the view is that a different substance may be used to complete the performance,—then this is not possible, as the text uses the term 'that offering' ('*tad havih*'),—in the sentence 'if that offering is to be completed, etc.';—under the circumstances, if the expiation (and the rest of the main sacrifice) were performed with a different substance, the term 'that offering' would not be applicable to it".

SŪTRA (21).

[*Answer*]—THE TERM 'OFFERING' ('HAVIH') SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE 'SACRIFICE' (THE ACT OF OFFERING, NOT THE MATERIAL OFFERED), ON THE GROUND OF THE PRESENCE OF THE MATERIAL AS THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURE IN THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya

The term '*havih*' in the text under consideration should be taken as standing for the *sacrifice*,—the *act* of offering; so that, when the text speaks of 'the *offering* being destroyed', what is meant is the destruction of the *sacrifice at which that offering-material is used*.—"But the secondary and figurative meaning of a word can be accepted only when its direct meaning is not applicable, not otherwise."—The answer to this is that, in the case in question, the direct meaning is *not* applicable.—"How so?"—If the direct meaning were accepted, then the sentence would have to be construed as—'if the offering is to be completed, the sacrifice should be completed with that same material'; and in this there would be syntactical split; and further, the words would be meaningless; because what is *to be completed* is the *sacrifice*, not the *offering-material*; hence the term 'that offering' is a mere reference to the occasion (contingency) for the expiation. One great advantage in taking this as a mere *reference* is that the same expiation becomes applicable to cases where the sacrifice to be completed (after the burning of the original material) is one at which the material used is different (from the cake).—"But how can the term '*havih*', which signifies *offering-material*, be used in the sense of the *act* (of offering)?"—That, we reply, is due to *the presence of that material as a distinguishing feature*

in the sacrifice; so that the sacrifice connected with the *offering-material* is spoken of as the 'offering'. Just as Devadatta, who is distinguished by *courage* (which is a characteristic quality of the Lion), is figuratively spoken of as the 'lion', similarly the act of sacrifice is figuratively spoken of as the 'offering', '*havih*'.

From all this it follows that the expiation is to be performed only when the Cake has been *wholly burnt*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Pañchasharāva-offering' should be made even when only one offering-material is spoilt.*

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE AS IT IS DECLARED IN THE TEXT",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya

We have the text—'*Darsha-Pūrnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices']; —in connection with that there is the following declaration—'*Yasyobhayam havirārtimṛchchhēt aindram pāñchasharāvamodanam nirvapēt*' ['If one's both offering-materials should undergo deterioration (become spoilt), he should offer cooked rice in five platters to Indra'] (Taitt. Brā. 3. 7. 1. 8).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should the 'Five-platter-offering' be made when *both* offering-materials are spoilt? Or should it be made on either of them being spoilt?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows.—"If you ask—on the spoiling of what is the offering to be made?—our answer is that it should be made on *both* being spoilt—'Why?'—Because *it should be as it is declared in the text*; what is directly declared, that alone should be accepted; and in the case in question, what is declared is that the offering is to be made when *both* the materials are spoilt;—what is declared should be accepted as meant to be significant; otherwise the terms 'offering-material' and 'both offering-materials' would be synonymous.—From all this, it follows that the 'Five platter-offering' is to be made only when both the offering-materials are spoilt."

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO, BECAUSE THE ACCIDENT IS THE CONTINGENCY (UNDER WHICH THE OFFERING IS TO BE MADE); AND THAT CONTINGENCY IS SPECIFIED AS THAT OF THE 'OFFERING MATERIAL'.

Bhāṣya.

The view that has been urged above is not right.

The '*accident*' meant here is *the deterioration of a certain thing*; and this is the *contingency* (under which the offering is to be made); and this contingency is specified here as being the *becoming spoilt (deterioration) of the offering-material*; now this 'deterioration of the offering-material' may be taken as the contingency, collectively as well as severally [i.e. the

deterioration of both materials, or of only one material, may be accepted as the contingency under which the offering in question should be made]; and it cannot be further specified by the qualification 'both'; if it were so specified then, the sentence would be split up into two parts—(1) 'The Five-platter offering is to be made on the deterioration of the offering-material' and (2) 'the deterioration should be of both materials'.

Says the Opponent—"If you cannot brook the qualification of the *Deterioration*, then it should not be qualified by the 'offering material' either".

Answer—We admit of qualification by offering-material', because without some qualification, the text would be meaningless; i.e. if we had the text simply in the form '*yasya ārtimrchchhēt*' (He whose become spoilt'), without any qualification, then it would mean the 'deterioration' *of anything*, and as in the case of every man, there is something or other which may be deteriorated,—his *action*, his *walking*, even his *thinking*,—the mention of any condition (upon which the offering should be contingent)—such as is found in the text in question, '*yasya, etc.*'—would be absolutely incongruous (and futile)—Hence it is necessary that the deterioration' should be qualified, and thus qualifying is done by the 'offering material', so that the condition on which the Five-platter offering is contingent is the connection between the 'offering material' and the deterioration', and this connection can be very well *directly declared* by the Vedic text,—as for the connection of *both* the materials, on the other hand, this would only be indirectly indicated by 'Syntactical Connection', and 'Syntactical Connection' is always weaker than Direct Declaration

Says the Opponent—"The connection between the 'deterioration' and the 'offering-material' also is indicated by *Syntactical Connection*"

Answer—The coming about of the 'deterioration' is understood to be spoken of by *Direct Declaration*, and if the connection of offering-material' as also of both' were taken to be intended, then the Direct Declaration would be very much weakened That is why the presence of the connection of 'both' is not pointed out as the condition— Why then is the term 'both' there?'—It is there as a reference to the established fact that the offering is to be made on the deterioration of one, as well as on the deterioration of the other It is in this sense that we have the words 'If one's both offering materials should be spoilt'.

Question—"Why cannot 'deterioration' as qualified by both terms ('offering-material' and 'both') be regarded as the condition for the offering?—The meaning being that the offering is made by one whose *offering-material as qualified by 'both'* becomes deteriorated"

Answer—Why do you think that the condition of the offering should be such '*deterioration*' as is qualified by a qualified thing (the 'offering material' *qualified* by 'both')?

The Opponent replies—"We do so on the ground of the proximity of the *qualified* thing. That is to say, as a matter of fact, what is mentioned in close proximity to 'deterioration' is the *qualified* thing ('offering-material' *qualified by 'both'*)."

What would be the result if this were so?

"The result is that 'deterioration' *qualified by both* ('offering-material' and 'both') becomes recognised as the condition of the offering."

The answer to all this is as follows:- The 'favourite of the gods' (stupid man) should be asked this question:—Even for a man for whom the qualified thing (the 'offering material' qualified by 'both') is in close proximity with the 'deterioration',—is the *unqualified* thing (the 'offering-material' only, without the qualification 'both') excluded by the use of a cudgel?—"What if it is not excluded?"- If it is not excluded, then this is what happens the 'deterioration' of the unqualified thing also becomes a condition for the offering of 'Five-platters'—"But certainly the term 'both' would qualify the 'offering-material'." Not so; so long as the term 'both' is not connected with the term 'offering material', it cannot qualify the *material*.—"But then the term 'both' would certainly become connected with the term 'offering-material' by reason of their close proximity."—Even so it would not be able to do the qualifying; because it can never serve the purpose of *excluding* anything [and what does not *exclude* anything cannot be a *qualification*]. Says the Opponent—"But on account of its denoting a particular thing, it must be exclusive in its function; just as in the case of the sentence *Bring the white cow*', when this is addressed to persons, they do not bring the *black* cow; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the term 'white' differentiates the required (white cow) from the *black* and other cows'. Our answer to this is as follows:—The case cited is not analogous to the one under consideration. In the case of the cow, it is not that the thing is marked by the genus 'cow' and *then* its *bringing* is enjoined. If it were so, then, in that case also the term 'white' would not have qualified it. What is enjoined in this case is the *bringing*, which is the principal factor, qualified conjointly by the two qualifications ('whiteness' and 'genus, *cow*').—In the case in question, on the other hand, what is enjoined is the 'Five platter-offering' to be made when the thing is found to be characterised by 'deterioration' and by the 'genus, *offering-material*' separately.— But what is the reason that when the principal factor is denoted by the verb (as in the case of the 'bringing' of the cow) the two qualifications are taken as qualifying it conjointly, while in the case of the other thing, they qualify it separately?"—The answer to this is that in the case of the Principal Factor, the Genus or the Quality is spoken of only for the purpose of being connected with it; and hence in this case, through one and the same sentence, the Principal is understood to be qualified by both these qualifications; and hence the performer is satisfied only when he performs it as thus qualified by both; so that if the Principal were performed as qualified by only one of the two qualifications, what would be done would be not what is laid down.—In another case, however, where *what is denoted by the verb* (that is, the *act*) is spoken of in reference to what is marked by the *genus*, it is so spoken of in relation to all similar qualifications; so that in this case the performer would be satisfied if the act were done as qualified by only one of the qualifications; as for the other qualification, -that of being marked by the *genus*,—it has been already said that he would be satisfied with it. It is in reference to that case that it has been said—'Why cannot one do what is not forbidden?'—In the case

where *what is denoted by the verb* is the principal factor, it is not related to what is marked by the *genus*; so that, even if other things belonging to that genus be not included, the Principal factor becomes accomplished all the same; the Principal becomes duly equipped with its accessories; and nothing that is laid down becomes ignored. In that case, therefore, the qualification is all right. In the case in question, however, it is not so; as all that is declared in this case is that the *Five-platter-offering* is to be made on the deterioration of the substance which belongs to the genus of 'offering-material'; and this cannot be excluded by any qualifying declaration which does not lay down an actual prohibition.

Then again, even if the term 'both' were connected with 'offering-material', the 'deterioration' could not be taken as connected with both ('offering-material' and 'both').—"Why so?"—Because the term 'both' is connected with the 'offering-material', not with the term 'undergo deterioration', so that even though the term 'both' is there in close proximity, what the *deterioration* is connected with is only just that which is denoted by the term 'offering-material'; and what is so denoted is a general thing, without any qualifications.—From this it follows that the *deterioration* qualified by both ('both' and 'offering-material') cannot be taken as the condition for the 'Five-platter-offering'.

The *deterioration* may be held to be qualified by both ('offering-material' and 'both') in view of the fact that the term 'both' ('*ubhayam*') has that case ending which is the substratum (basis) of the *deterioration*."

That is not right. The presence of the particular case-ending in the word '*ubhayam*' can make this a qualification of the *offering material* ('*havih*'),—because these two have the same (nominative) case ending:—it cannot make it a qualification of 'deterioration'; because between '*ubhayam*' *as qualified by* '*havih*' and '*ārtim*', the case ending is not the same ('*ubhayam havih*' having the *Nominative*, and '*ārtim*' the *Accusative*, ending).

'Even though they do not have the same case-ending, yet, by virtue of the proximity of the term 'deterioration', thus *deterioration* would be taken as qualified by '*ubhayam*' ('*both*') *as qualified by* '*havih*' (*offering-material*)."

That cannot be, unless the words concerned are in need of mutual connection, mere proximity cannot be effective (in connecting them); for instance, in the case of the expression—'*Ithāryā rājñaḥ puruṣo dēvadattasya*' [where the word '*bhāryā*' is connected with '*devadattasya*', not with '*rājñaḥ*', though this latter is nearest to it,—similarly '*puruṣaḥ*' is connected with '*rājñaḥ*', not with '*dēvadattasya*'].

"The 'deterioration' would be understood as being qualified by 'both', by reason of both the words occurring in the same sentence."

That cannot be; even when words occur in the same sentence, if any one of them is such as is not required by another, it is not construed with that, even though it forms part of the same sentence; for instance, in the sentence—'*Ashvēna vrajati shvētēna paṭēna āvṛtaḥ*'—the *whiteness* is not taken as a qualification of the *Horse*, which is not wanted by the former [because it is taken as a qualification of the *cloth*].

The Opponent may argue as follows 'The term 'both' would be taken as connected with the 'offering-material' qualified by 'deterioration' ".

That also is not possible. As a matter of fact, the term 'undergo deterioration' is not taken as a qualification of the 'offering-material'; it is taken as the condition for the Five platter offering' In fact, if the deterioration of the offering-material were taken as connected simultaneously with the term both and with the term Five-platter-offering', then there would be a syntactical split

"The term both' may be taken as connected with *what is marked by the genus offering material*' (*ubhayam* has to be supplied after '*sambaddham*' says *Tuptikā*], and then the term undergo (deterioration)' may be connected with the term both as qualified by the offering-material' "

Even so there would be a syntactical split From all this we conclude that the deterioration qualified by both (offering-material and 'both') cannot be taken as the condition for the Five platter offering'.

Says the Opponent Just as in the case of *what is denoted by the verb* being the principal factor, the *deterioration as qualified by both* (offering material' and both) has been regarded (*Text*, page 685 *lines* 4 *et seq.*) as the condition of the offering and not as qualified by *one* of them, in the same manner, in the other case also it would be as qualified by *both* that it would be regarded as the condition and yet though qualified by its own self if the Deterioration happens to be qualified by only one of the two (offering material and both) it ceases to be the condition; why then should this distinction be made'

The answer to this is as follows Under our view, the two qualifications are treated as what are to be *taken up by themselves* while under your view they are treated as mere *differentiating adjuncts* (of something else).

What if they are treated as *differentiating adjuncts*'

Our answer is that what follows from this is that the substance is differentiated by the genus offering material , something has got to be asserted in regard to it , if this *sam bang* were said without being properly differentiated it could not be known to *what* it appertains, or it might be regarded as appertaining to all substances Thus then, as in both these cases the thing would be unqualified the genus offering material would be mentioned as differentiating or marking the substratum of that genus Thus being done, there are two things that are possible (1) that which belongs to the genus offering material is what has deteriorated , or (2) that what belongs to the genus *offering material* is both Now if what is meant is that what belongs to the genus *offering material* is what has deteriorated', then it follows that what belongs to the genus offering-material', – whether it be both or not both —when *deteriorated*, is the condition (under which the Five platter offering is made) If, on the other hand, what is meant is that what belongs to the genus offering material' is 'both', then in that case, the deterioration is not qualified by the 'offering material , and when the deterioration' is not qualified by 'offering-material', it is not possible that the term 'both shall qualify the *offering material*. "Why so ?" Because the qualifying could be done only in the form 'that which belongs to the genus *offering-material*

is both';—and it would be necessary to say 'if that thing belonging to the genus offering-material which is *both*, *should become deteriorated*';—and how could this connection between the 'deterioration' and the qualified 'offering-material' be secured? Specially as the two terms 'offering-material' and 'both' could not be uttered over again for the purpose of qualifying the 'deterioration'. And when these could not be pronounced over again, then,—even though the term 'offering-material' would not be uttered for the purpose of characterising, in common, the 'deterioration' and the substratum of 'both',—yet, in its unqualified form, it would be a characteristic of the 'Deterioration',—and also, in its unqualified form, it would be a characteristic of 'both';—if, however, the two together ('Deterioration' and 'both') were meant, then it would be necessary to repeat the words over again; and in that case, there would be syntactical split.—Thus, if the term 'both' be connected with the *act of becoming deteriorated*, then it could not be qualified by the 'offering material', and in that case, *the deterioration of the unqualified offering material* would become the condition under which the Five platter-offering would be made – If, on the other hand, the term 'both' were connected with the word 'offering material', then, for the purpose of being connected with 'deterioration', it would have to be repeated again along with the term 'offering material', or it might be mentioned by means of the pronoun 'this', and in this case there would be the same syntactical split.

Then again, if the things have to be taken up, it is not necessary that the words should qualify each other, both might well be uttered for the purpose of qualifying the 'deterioration', and in that case, the 'deterioration' qualified by one of them only could never be regarded as the condition under which the offering was to be made —On the other hand, if what are spoken of are meant to be only differentiating adjuncts, then the 'Deterioration' could be regarded as the condition, even when qualified by only one of the two —Thus is the difference between the two cases

Then again, in the case of all words, when any word is connected with another word, it is not right, so far as possible, to connect it with a third word, even though this latter be in close proximity, -unless of course there is a declaration laying down such connection. For instance, in the case of the words— *Bhāryā rājñaḥ puruṣo dēvadattasya*', the *rājā*' cannot be taken as qualifying '*puruṣa*' (if it has been connected with '*bhāryā*'). In a case, however, where there is no way out of it, even though there are several things to be taken up, they may all be taken as connected with the principal factor, even though this latter may be far removed; because the needs of a case are always more authoritative than mere 'remoteness' – When the two things are regarded as differentiating adjuncts,- when two such adjuncts come together, and one has to be rejected, what should be rejected is the remoter adjunct.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Only those persons are entitled to eat the remnant who have done both the acts—the extraction of the juice and the offering of the Homa.*

SŪTRA (24)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE 'EATING' CONTINGENT UPON THE 'OFFERING OF HOMA' AND THE 'EXTRACTING OF JUICE'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Havirdhanē grāvabhi—rabhiṣutyāhavanīyē hutvā pratyañchah parētya sadasi bhakṣān bhakṣayanti*' ['Having, by means of stones, extracted the Soma-juice in the *Havirdhāna* and having poured the libations into the *Āhavanīya* Fire, they turn back and returning to the Assembly Room, eat the edibles']. The *extracting of the Juice* is already laid down in another text; the *offering of Homa* also has been laid down elsewhere by means of the root *yaj*', 'to sacrifice'; —these two therefore cannot be taken as enjoined by the text quoted;—nor can the order of sequence between the two acts be regarded as enjoined by it, as the order is already indicated by the very nature of the things concerned [the *extracting of the juice* must necessarily go before its being offered in *Homa*];—hence what the text can be taken as enjoining is the *eating* (of the *edibles*) by those same persons who have done the *extracting of the Juice* and the *offering of the Homa*; the meaning being that 'after the *extracting of the juice* has been done, as also the *offering of the Homa*, the *eating* should be done'.

In regard to this, there arises the following question—Is the *eating* to be done by the man who has done both the acts mentioned? Or may one *eat* on doing only one of them also?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The same should be the case with the eating contingent upon the 'offering of Homa' and the 'extracting of Juice'*; 'the same should be the case',—that is this case should be dealt with exactly as the case of the 'deterioration of the offering-material'; [i.e. just as the 'Five-platter-offering' is to be made even on the deterioration of only one of the two materials, so the 'eating' should be done even on the doing of only one of the two acts].—Why so?—Because the sentence in question cannot be construed as—'Having extracted the juice,—then, having offered the *Homa*,—one should eat'; because the sentence does not lay down the order of sequence between the *extracting of the juice* and the *offering of the Homa*, in the sense that 'those shall eat who, having extracted the juice, have offered the *Homa*'. Because this construction would bring about syntactical split,—the sentence being split

up into two—(1) 'Having extracted the juice, they shall eat' and (2) 'Having offered the *Homa*, they shall eat'. For these reasons, the *offering of the Homa* and the *extracting of the juice* cannot be taken as connected with one another; and hence the *eating* could be connected with one as well as the other; the *eating* being done on *extracting the juice*, and also on *offering the Homa*.—From all this it follows that there is to be *eating* on the doing of either one of the two acts."

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE 'EATING' SHOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON BOTH ACTS, BECAUSE IT HAS NOT BEEN LAID DOWN AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

One should do the *eating* by reason of having done both the acts;—the *eating* has not been laid down as an accessory of the acts of *offering the Homa* and *extracting the juice*.—"What would happen if the *eating* were laid down as an accessory of the acts?" What would happen would be that, in that case the *offering of the Homa* and the *extracting of the juice*, both being primary acts, the *eating*, which would be subservient to them, would have to vary with each of them. If, on the other hand, the *eating* is taken to be laid down as contingent upon both the acts, then such being the injunction, there is only one thing enjoined, and there is a single sentence, which is complete in the form—'*Having extracted the juice*, and *having offered the Homa*, they shall eat'; in this case 'they shall eat after having offered the Homa' comes in only as a subordinate clause, and so long as the main (whole) sentence is there, no (separate) authority can attach to a subordinate clause; for, if it were, then there would be rejection of the other words of the sentence. For instance, in the sentence 'one should not look at the rising sun', the prohibition is taken as expressed by the main (whole) sentence, while the injunction of looking at the sun would be expressed by the subordinate clause 'look at the rising sun'.—From all this it follows that the *eating* contingent upon any one of the two acts cannot be taken as what is laid down; what we gather from the main (whole) sentence is that there are two acts upon which the *eating* is contingent. Under the circumstances, if the *eating* were done in any other manner, there would be an abandonment of what has been enjoined. Consequently the *eating* should be contingent upon both the acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Re-installation of Fire should be done when both the Fires go out.*

SŪTRA (26)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]- "THE RE-INSTALLATION SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE MANNER OF THE 'COOKED RICE' [OFFERED ON FIVE-PLATTERS]

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Agnihotra*, we read *'asaṃdhāvanuparāgau abhinimlocheṭ, yasya rātrāvuparāgāt, punarādheyamēva tasya prāyashchittiḥ'* ['If the two Fires kindled by one should go out and at the same time the sun should rise (or set), Re-installation of the Fire is the only expiation for him'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Re-installation of the Fire to be done on the going out of either one of the two Fires (*Āhavanīya* and *Gārhapatya*)? or on the going out of both?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—*The Re-installation should be dealt with in the manner of the 'Cooked Rice'*; just as in the case of the Expiatory offering of the Cooked Rice on Five Platters, it is made on the deterioration of either one of the offering materials,—so also the Expiatory rite of *Re-installation of Fire* should be performed on the going out of either one of the two Fires; as otherwise there would be a syntactical split.

[The *Siddhānta* says] Just as in the text—Herein I shall sacrifice,—herein I shall perform pious deeds,—with this motive does he kindle the Fires—[Read *'etēṣvevaṃēva tatsaṃdadhāti'*, as in MSS. *C* and *D*]—[there are two Fires mentioned, so in the case in question also, the *going out* of both the Fires must be meant to be the contingency under which the Re-installation is to be performed].

[This last sentence appears to have no connection with the preceding sentence in the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* which should be taken as ending with the first *'iti'* after *'prasaṅgāt'*. The *Ṭuppīkā* declares this sentence to form part of the statement of the *Siddhānta*—*'Siddhāntagranthoyam'*. On this the *Tantraratna* adds the following explanation—The passage, if taken as part of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, can only mean that—Just as in this text from the *Shatapatha*, either one of the two Fires is mentioned, so should it be taken to be in the case under consideration—'If the two fires, etc.'". But as a matter of fact the text from the *Shatapatha* does not speak of *either one* of the Fires (in fact it speaks of two Fires); and hence the case cited is not applicable to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. It should therefore be taken as part of the statement of the *Siddhānta*, being inserted in a wrong place by careless copyists.]

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON THE GOING OUT OF BOTH (FIRES), BECAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE SAME THING

Bhāṣya

As a matter of fact, the Expiation laid down in the present instance (in the shape of the *Re-installation of Fire*) consists in the producing of the same thing that has been destroyed,—as the visible motive of the act is—how to secure the thing again, it is with this motive that the *Re installation* is done The distinctive feature of this act of *Re-installation* is that *two* Fires are produced together, not separately So that, if only one were to go out, it could not be possible to *re-establish* that *one* alone, as in that case the *Re-installation*, if performed, would be defective—"But the second Fire also could be re-installed"—Now, if this second Fire were the *Āhavanīya*,—then as the other (former) *Āhavanīya* would be already there, to serve the purposes of the Homa-offerings, the second (re installed) *Āhavanīya* could not serve the purposes of the Homa offerings at all,—as a matter of fact that Fire alone is *Āhavanīya* which has been produced for the purposes of the Homa-offerings; because this name '*Āhavanīya*' is connotative of *Embellishments*; and a name that is connotative of embellish ments cannot be applicable if even one of the connoted embellishments is absent, and this also is an embellishment of the Fire that it serves the purposes of Homa offerings, this is what we understand from the text 'One offers *Homa* into the *Āhavanīya* Fire' (Taitt Brā 1 1 10 5) For these reasons there would clearly be a defect if only one Fire were to go out and only one to be re installed, and this defect would vitiate both the Fires Consequently if only one Fire goes out, there should be no *Re-installation*, simply because there can be no proper *Re installation* in that case

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Five-Platter-offering' is a distinct act.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'FIVE-PLATTER OFFERING' SHOULD BE TREATED AS A SUBSTITUTE: AS IT IS THE SUBSTANCE THAT IS MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Yasya ubhayaṁ havirārtimārchchhēt aindram pañchasharāvamodanan nirvapēt*' ['If both the offering-materials should undergo deterioration, one should offer, to Indra, cooked rice on *Five Platters*'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 7. 1. 8).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'Five-Platter-offering' a substitute for the material that has undergone deterioration? Or is it a distinct act by itself, to be performed under a certain contingency?

Question—"How can it be regarded as a substitute?—and how a distinct act?"

Answer—If the sentence is construed as '*Pañchasharāvam nirvapēt*'—'*nirvapēt*' meaning '*kuryāt*' [the meaning of the sentence being, 'one should prepare the Cooked Rice on Five Platters'],—then, in that case, the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters* would be regarded as a substitute for the *Curd-Butter-Mixture* (*Sānnāyya*). If, on the other hand, the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters* is connected with the deity (Indra), and not with 'preparing' ('*nirvapēt*'),—the meaning being that 'One should make the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters, Aindra*, i.e. dedicated to Indra',—then, the sentence would be regarded as laying down a sacrifice to be performed under the particular contingency (of the offering-materials *deteriorating*).

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The Five-Platter-offering should be regarded as a substitute, because what is mentioned is a substance.* That is, the 'Cooked Rice on Five Platters' should be treated as a substitute for the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*;—why?—*because what is mentioned is a substance*; that is, what is mentioned in connection with the '*nirvāpa*' (preparation) is the *substance* (Cooked Rice on Five Platters), and not its connection with the deity, *Indra*.—Why?—Because when taken in this sense, the sentence would contain the injunction of the *nirvāpa* (preparation),—and this enjoining would be done directly by the words of the text; while in the other case, if the sentence were taken as laying down the connection between the substance and the deity, the injunction in this case would only be indirectly indicated by *Syntactical Connection*; and this would be weaker in authority than the direct signification.—From all this we conclude that the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters* is a substitute (for the Curd-Butter-Mixture)."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, WHAT THE TEXT LAYS DOWN IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SUBSTANCE AND THE DEITY; AND HENCE IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE INJUNCTION (OF A DISTINCT ACT); SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE TWO DEITIES CANNOT BE SPOKEN OF (BY THE WORD 'AINDRA').

Bhāṣya.

What is enjoined is a *sacrifice*, a distinct act; because the text lays down the connection between the substance (*Cooked Rice*) and the deity (*Indra*); what we find the text laying down is that 'one should make the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters, Aindra*' (dedicated to *Indra*). If this were not taken to be the meaning, then the term '*aindram*' would have to be regarded as a wrong reading (because it would be meaningless); or the word '*aindram*' would have to be taken as an unreal reference to the deities, *Indra* and *Mahēndra*, as a matter of fact, however, *these two deities cannot be spoken of by means of the word* '*Aindram*'; i.e the two deities *Indra* and *Mahēndra*—cannot be referred to by means of the term '*Aindra*'.—If (in order to avoid these difficulties) the term '*Aindram*' were taken as an adjective (qualifying the 'Five Platter-offering'), then there would be a syntactical split.

'But we have pointed out that *Direct Denotation* is more authoritative (than *Syntactical Connection*)."

True, that is so, but under the other view, there would be a more unreasonable rejection of Direct Declaration, as it would make the term '*Aindra*' entirely superfluous (meaningless)

ADHIKARAṆA (10) : *The 'Five-Platter-offering' is subsidiary to the contingent Darsha-sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE SUBSTITUTE : BECAUSE IT TAKES ITS PLACE."

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises now is -Is the aforesaid contingent offering of *the Cooked Rice on Five Platters* to be regarded as a substitute of the *Darsha-sacrifice*, or not ?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows : -'*It should be regarded as the substitute, because it takes its place* ; the offering in question should be regarded as the substitute for the *Darsha-sacrifice* ;— why ? *because it takes its place* ; this offering has been declared as to be made on another sacrifice (*Darsha*) being spoilt ; as such, it can serve its purpose only if it is not subsidiary to that other sacrifice ; if it were subsidiary to it, then, as being done for the sake of what has become useless, it would itself be useless ; that the original sacrifice has become useless is shown by the fact that it has become defective (by reason of the deterioration of the offering-material) ; that the *Darsha*-sacrifice has become spoilt is clearly perceptible ; while *that the sacrifice should be performed* is learnt from Verbal texts, -but what has become spoilt (i.e. the *Darsha*) is certainly useless, and as such should not be performed ; the offering in question, however, is one that should be made ; and hence it is understood to be a *substitute* for what has become spoilt."

SŪTRA (31)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ITS SUBSIDIARY : BECAUSE IT IS CONNECTED WITH A PARTICULAR CONTINGENCY.

Bhāṣya

The offering should be regarded as one that has been enjoined as a subsidiary (to the *Darsha*-sacrifice) ; because, as a matter of fact, the offering has been laid down as to be performed under the contingency of the offering-material having deteriorated ; now, three courses are possible : (1) a distinct result should be regarded as following from the contingent offering by itself ; or (2) the purpose that would have been served by the *Darsha-sacrifice* is served by the offering in question ; or (3) the offering in question is subsidiary to the *Darsha*-sacrifice. (1) The offering in question cannot be regarded as bringing about a distinct result of its own ; because such a result (not having been mentioned in any text) would have to be assumed.

(8) Nor can it be regarded as serving the purpose that would have been served by the *Darsha-sacrifice*;—why?—because such is not the declaration; we have no declaration to the effect that the offering in question serves the same purpose as the *Darsha-sacrifice*. Even though the offering has been laid down as to be made, yet it is not possible to determine which of the said three courses should be adopted; and yet the injunction that *the act should be done* would have some sense only if some one of the three courses were possible

Says the Opponent—"The text laying down the offering in question may be interpreted as follows—'When both the offering materials undergo deterioration, one should accomplish by means of this offering (of the *Cooked Rice on Five Platters*) what he desires to accomplish';—and what does he desire to accomplish?—the result of the *Darsha sacrifice*. [And in this sense the Offering must be treated as the substitute for *Darsha*.]"

Our answer to this is as follows—As there is no connection (of the Offering) with any word speaking of the result, such connection, if possible at all, could be got at only through *Syntactical Connection*, while the performance of the sacrifice has been laid down by a Direct Declaration, and *Direct Declaration* is stronger in its authority than *Syntactical Connection*, hence the Offering cannot be regarded as serving the purpose that is served by the sacrifice (*Darsha*)

What then is the use of the Offering?

It is subsidiary to the *Darsha*.

'But there is no declaration to this effect either—that *it is subsidiary to the Darsha*"

The answer to that is that the text laying down the entire procedure of the *Darsha*-sacrifice includes the Offering in question, because it has been laid down in close proximity to that sacrifice, the sense of the whole being—'One should accomplish the desired result by means of the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* sacrifices along with all their subsidiaries, -and if there be a deterioration in the offering-materials used at these, the procedure to be adopted should be as follows (i.e. the offering of *Cooked Rice on Five-Platters* should be made)'—From all this we conclude that—when the offering-material has undergone deterioration the purpose that cannot be served by the *Darsha*-sacrifice (by reason of this deterioration) becomes served by it when this procedure is adopted—Thus then, the offering in question should be regarded as a subsidiary to the *Darsha sacrifice* to be performed under the particular contingency mentioned

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The Expiatory Vishvajit is to be performed by one who, having pledged himself to perform the Satra, omits to perform it.*

SŪTRA (32)

THE 'VISHVAJIT' SHOULD BE PERFORMED WHEN ONE DOES NOT PROCEED TO PERFORM THE 'SATRA', FOR, IF THE ACT (SATRA) WERE PERFORMED, THE DESIRED RESULT WOULD FOLLOW FROM THAT ITSELF

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Sarvābhyo vā ēsa dēvatābhyah sarvēbhyaḥ prsthēbhyaḥ ātmānamāguratē yaḥ satrāya āguratē, vishvājitā atirātrēṇa sarvaprsthēna sarvavēdasadakṣiṇēna yajēta, sarvābhya ēsa dēvatābhyaḥ sarvēbhyaḥ prsthēbhyaḥ ātmānam niṣkrīnītē*' ['One who pledges himself to perform the *Satra* pledges himself to all deities, and to all *Prṣthas*; he should perform the *Vishvajit Atirātra* at which all the *Prṣthas* are used and the entire property is given away as the sacrificial Fee; thus does he redeem himself from all deities and all *Prṣthas*'].—Here the *Vishvajit* sacrifice is laid down as to be performed under the contingency of one's pledging oneself to perform the *Satra*.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Vishvajit* to be performed by one who, having pledged himself to perform the *Satra*, proceeds to perform the latter? Or by one who, having pledged himself, does not proceed to perform it?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"One who proceeds to perform the *Satra*, as well as one who does not proceed to perform it,—both should perform it; as the text makes no distinction;—or, we may take it that it is the man who proceeds to perform the *Satra* who should perform the *Vishvajit*;—why?—because (as has been decided in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) acts like the *Vishvajit*, which are performed under certain contingencies, are subsidiary to another sacrifice; how then, can the *Vishvajit* be subsidiary to a sacrifice which is not performed?"

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Vishvajit should be performed when one does not proceed to perform the Satra*; that is, when there is no performance of the *Satra*, then alone should the *Vishvajit* be performed.—"Why so?"—What we read in the text is that—'When one pledges himself to perform the *Satra*, he should perform the *Vishvajit Atirātra*'; which means that, 'when one who pledges himself with the words *I shall perform the Satra*, he should accomplish his purpose by means of the *Vishvajit* sacrifice',—that is, the purpose which he sought to accomplish by means of the *Satra*, he should accomplish by means of the *Vishvajit*.—"How so?"—The meaning of the text appears to be that

'When one pledges himself, he should perform the said sacrifice,'—i.e. he should *accomplish his purpose* by means of that sacrifice; it does not mean that he should accomplish the *sacrifice*; because the *sacrifice* has been mentioned as a subservient factor —' How is it known that the *sacrifice* is a subservient factor?" —Because it has been spoken of by means of a word with the instrumental ending ('*vishvajitā*'). If it were meant to be the predominant factor, then, it would be necessary to assume a result from it;—while under the view (in which the sacrifice is a subservient factor), the result following from it is just what is mentioned in the text itself (i.e. that 'he redeems himself, etc.')

SŪTRA (33)

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS MENTION OF 'REDEMPTION'

Bhāṣya

In the same text we read— He redeems himself from all debts, and all *Prsthas*, this description of the *Vishvajit* as 'redemption' would not be proper if the performance of the *Satra* were proceeded with, [as in that case there being no omission on the part of the performer, there would be nothing from which 'redemption' would be called for]. Hence we conclude that the *Vishvajit* is to be performed only if the performance of the *Satra* is not proceeded with.

Says the Opponent— Why cannot we interpret the sentence as follows 'Having pledged himself to perform the *Satra*, one should perform the *Vishvajit*,'— so that there would be some connection between the *Vishvajit* and the *Satra* at the time of *pledging*?'

That cannot be, the *Satra* is a qualification of the *Pledging*, and if the *Vishvajit* and the *Satra* were connected (construed together) it would be a far-fetched construction. Further, the Vedic text itself connects the *Vishvajit* with the *man*, in the form 'the *man* should perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice'.—and not with *Satra*, in the form 'the *Vishvajit* belongs to the *Satra*'.

Then again, it is only under our view that the term 'having pledged himself' can have some sense —If the *Vishvajit* were subsidiary to the *Satra* (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin*),—then, it would come in in the very nature of things and should not have to be specially declared —Nor can the words '*Āgūrya yajēta*' ('Having pledged himself, one should perform the sacrifice') be construed as laying down the immediate sequence between the *pledging* and the *sacrificing*, as the acceptance of that would mean the acceptance of what is not expressed by the words at all because all that is expressed by the words is that the acts of *pledging* and *sacrificing* have the same nominative agent, even the *precedence* (of the act of pledging) need not be taken to be expressed by the words—as it is implied by the nature of the acts concerned. For these reasons, the *Vishvajit* is to be connected with *pledging* only. And such being the case it follows that the *Vishvajit* should be performed by one who, having pledged himself, does *not* perform the *Satra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The terms 'Varhiṣ' ('Grass') and 'Vatsa' ('Calf') are indicative of the time of the 'Vrata', Penance.*

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE MENTION OF THE 'CALF' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINING THE PENANCE"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* we read—'*Varhiṣā vai paurṇamāsē vratam upayanti, vatsēnāmāvāsyāyām*' ['At the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice they keep the penance by the *Grass*, and at the *Darsha*-sacrifice, by the *Calf*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the enjoined Penance to be kept *by means of the Calf*? Or does the term 'Calf' only indicate the *time* for the Penance?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—'What is enjoined in the text is the Penance that is to be kept *by means of the Calf*; in the declaration that 'at the *Darsha sacrifice* one should keep the Penance by means of the calf',—the factor that is new (not already known) is the connection between the penance and the 'calf'; hence that is what should be taken as enjoined by it; and by the injunction of the said connection, both become enjoined—the *Penance* as well as the *Calf*".

SUTRA (35).

[SIDDHANTA]—IN REALITY, WHAT IS LAID DOWN IS THE TIME FOR WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY LAID DOWN ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE WHAT IS SPOKEN OF HERE IS THE PRESENCE OF WHAT HAS ALREADY COME INTO EXISTENCE

Bhāṣya.

What is laid down in the text in question should be taken to be the Time for what has been already laid down,—in another text.—"Why?"—*Because what is spoken of here is the presence of what has already come into existence,* and not what is in course of coming into existence.—"How do you know that?"—Because the *Penance* has already been previously laid down in the text 'They keep the penance of living upon food without meat, but abounding in clarified butter'; and the only factor that is not already known is the *Time* for the penance; and this is what is laid down in the text in question.

SŪTRA (36).

ALSO BECAUSE (IN THE OTHER CASE), THE EXACT MEANING CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

Bhāṣya.

[Under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view], the exact meaning of the sentence '*Vatsēna vratamupayanti*' cannot be determined.—(*a*) Does it mean that 'the calf is to be made to keep the Penance,—in this sense the Penance being kept (*upagata*) *by the Calf* ('*vatsēna*')?—or (*b*) that 'the penance shall be kept (i.e. the food eaten) with the *Calf* used in place of the hand',—in this sense also the Penance being *got at* (*upēta*) *by the Calf* ('*vatsēna*')?—or (*c*) that 'one should keep the Penance while keeping the calf near him'?—It cannot be determined what the exact meaning of the sentence is. Because (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*) all that the word ('*vatsēna*') connotes is the instrumentality of the Calf, and not the procedure (of the Penance); so that all that the sentence says is that 'one should keep the Penance of which the Calf is the instrument (means) of accomplishment'; —in what manner this is to be done remains still undefined; so that the exact meaning is not made quite clear,—as to what it is that is done *by the Calf* in regard to the Penance,—or whether it may be taken as doing anything at random.—Then again, if the Calf were desired to be connected with the Penance, then it would be something that is not subservient to any other thing; while as a matter of fact, the Instrumental ending (in '*vatsēna*') clearly shows that *it is* subservient to something else; as the Instrumental ending conveys the sense of being the *best instrument*.—From this also it follows that the mention of the 'Calf' is for the purpose of laying down the *time* (for the Penance).

SŪTRA (37).

[*Says the Opponent*]—"BUT THE CALF SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SUBSIDIARY TO THE PENANCE, BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT DECLARATION."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued (by the *Siddhāntin*) that, as the Penance has been already enjoined elsewhere, its mention in the text under consideration should be taken to be a mere *reference* (or reiteration).—This is quite true;—But what has been said regarding the text being meant to enjoin the *time* for the Penance,—*that* is not right. Because as a matter of fact, the *Calf* is enjoined as subsidiary to the *Penance*.—How do you know that?—*Because such is the direct declaration*; for taking the Calf as enjoined, there is the authority of the Direct Declaration of the Veda; while, if we took the injunction to be that of the *Time*, then the word would have to be taken in the indirect figurative sense;—and when there is a doubt as to which should be accepted, as between Direct Declaration and Indirect Figurative Indication, it is the Direct Declaration that should be accepted as the most logical.—From this it follows that the *Calf* is subsidiary to the *Penance*."

SŪTRA (38).

[*Answer*]—IN FACT IT IS TIME THAT IS INDICATED; THERE IS NO INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, it is *Time* that is indicated; and it is not the *Calf* that is enjoined. In fact, the text—'At the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice they keep the Penance by Grass, and at the *Darsha*-sacrifice, by the Calf'—is not an injunction at all.—"How do you know that?"—Because it is connected as one sentence with another injunction; the actual Injunction is found in a subsequent text—'Before the removers of the calves, the Husband and Wife should take their food' [Read '*mapākartrordampatī*, as in MSS.];—[this food consisting of what abounds in Clarified Butter but is without meat,—the taking of this food being what is meant by 'Penance' in the present connection]. When this Injunction is already there, if the text under consideration also were taken as an Injunction, then there would be a syntactical split. As for 'reference' (or reiteration), there are such references, very often, to things already enjoined. Thus then, the fact of the *Calf* being a subsidiary to the *Penance* (which is already laid down in the Injunction just quoted), it cannot be taken as unknown (and hence needing to be enjoined in the text under consideration); while the *Time* (for the Penance) has not been laid down elsewhere (and as such needs to be enjoined).

SŪTRA (39).

FURTHER, THE CALF CAN SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACT IN QUESTION (PENANCE).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible to connect the Calf with the Penance; because, in regard to the act in question (Penance), the Calf can serve no useful purpose.—For this reason also the *Calf* cannot be regarded as subsidiary to the *Penance*.

SUTRA (40).

FURTHER, THERE IS NO WORD ACTUALLY EXPRESSING THE IDEA OF THE MEAT.

Bhāṣya.

There is no such declaration as that 'one shall kill the calf, cook its flesh and then eat it'; nor do we find any word actually expressing the idea of meat; for the term 'calf' denotes the genus 'calf', and is never used in the sense of *meat*.—For this reason also the term 'calf' should be taken as indicating the *time* (for the Penance).

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The time indicated by the terms 'Grass' and 'Calf' is applicable to all cases—that in which the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used, as well as that in which that mixture is not used.*

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IF THE TIME IS INDICATED, THAT CAN PERTAIN ONLY TO THE CASE WHERE THE CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE IS USED; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVES TO THAT EFFECT."

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood that the term 'Calf' has been mentioned for the purpose of indicating the *Time* (of the Penance).—Now there arises the question—Does this *time* pertain to only that case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used? Or also to the case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is not used?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*It can pertain to that case only where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used.*—Why?—Because we read—'Before the removers of the calf, the Husband and Wife should take their food'; and in the case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is not used (and hence milk is not needed), there is no 'removal of the calf'; hence the time indicated (by the *removal of the calf*) can pertain to only that case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used, the 'removal of the calf' being clearly indicative of this conclusion."

SŪTRA (42)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO BOTH CASES; AS THE REMOVAL OF THE 'CALF' IS MEANT ONLY TO BE INDICATIVE OF THE PARTICULAR TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'evā' ('in reality') rejects the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.—As a matter of fact, the time pertains to the case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used, as also to the case where the said Mixture is not used.—"Why?"—*Because the removal of the calf is meant only to be indicative of the particular time.* In the *Penance* itself there is no need for the *Removal of the Calf*; there is need, however, for the *Time*; and that which is needed there is indicated (by the word 'calf').

"But why should the *Removal of the Calf be taken as* indicative of the particular *time*?"

Because it can only subserve the purpose of something else. As a matter of fact, the *calves* are removed (from the cows) for the purpose of obtaining milk; and in this alone they serve a visible purpose; in any other case, it would serve only an invisible (transcendental) purpose; it is for this reason that the *Removal of the Calf* is not declared to be secured for its own sake.

It has been argued that—"in view of indicatives to that effect, the *time* can pertain to only that case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is used".—But this is not right; because in that case also where the said Mixture is not used, the *time* does not cease. That is, in a case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is not used,—it may be that there is no *Removal of the Calf*; but it is not that the *time* indicated by the *Removal of the Calf* is not there; and in the case in question, it is the *time* that we need, not the *removal of the Calf*. For instance, when it is said—'You should come at *Conch-time*',—*the time indicated by Conch-blowing* is there even in a village where the Conch is not blown at all; and hence the said 'coming' is not omitted;—in the same manner, even though there may be no actual *Removal of the Calf*, yet the *Penance* in question would be performed when the time indicated by that *Removal* arrives, and it would not be omitted at that time.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The phrase 'along with the branch' lays down the time.*

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'BRANCH' IS SUBSIDIARY TO THE 'KUSHA-BUNDLE',—LIKE THE 'MIXING'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta*' (laying down the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as to be performed by one desiring heaven); in connection with that we read—'*Saha shākhayā prastaram praharti*' ['He throws in the *Kusha-bundle* along with the Branch'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Branch* subsidiary to the *throwing in of the Kusha-bundle*, the relationship between the two being that of the subsidiary and its use? Or does it mean that the Branch is to be thrown in at the time of the *Throwing in* of the Kusha-bundle?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The Branch is subsidiary to the Kusha-bundle, like the mixing*; that is, in reality, the Branch is a subsidiary to the *Kusha-bundle*.—"Why?"—Because in the text '*Saha shākhayā prastaram praharati*' ('He throws in the Kusha-bundle along with the Branch'), there is the Instrumental ending in the word '*shākhayā*' due to the presence of the particle '*saha*', in the sense that the thing spoken of by means of that word is a subordinate factor (according to Pāṇini 2. 3. 19); hence the *Shākhā, Branch*, must be taken as subordinate to the *Prastara, Kusha-bundle*; because the term '*prastaram*' appears with the Accusative ending, and there is the Instrumental ending (in '*shākhayā*') due to the presence of the particle '*saha*'; and the Instrumental ending denotes the subordinate, and the Accusative ending, the principal factor.—'But the *Branch* renders no help to the *Kusha-bundle* (by virtue of which it could be its subordinate).'—True, it renders no visible help; but it does render invisible help;—just as in the case of the 'mixing' (of the Soma-juice with milk); that is, just as in the case of the text '*Payasā maitrā-varuṇam shrīṇāti*' ('He mixes with milk the Soma-juice to be offered to *Mitra-Varuṇa*'), by virtue of the co-existence of the Accusative and Instrumental endings, an invisible help is understood as rendered (by the *milk*, to the *juice*),—*so in the same manner in the case in question also.*"

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION OF TIME; BECAUSE BOTH ARE ALREADY THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The text should be taken as an injunction of time—"why?"—*because both are already there*;—that is, the *Kusha-bundle* is already there as laid

down for the purpose of keeping the *Sruva* on it;—the *throwing in of this Kusha-bundle* at a particular time has also been enjoined in another text;—hence it (the throwing in of the *Kusha-bundle*) must be taken as reiterated in the text under consideration only for the purpose of laying down the *disposal* of the Branch (which has been already used in the removing of the Calf).

Says the Opponent—"The *Kusha-bundle* may be taken as reiterated; but the *Branch* should be taken as enjoined in the text in question".

Our answer to this is that, *both are there already*; that is, the Branch has been already enjoined in a previous text, as to be used in the removing of the Calf; now the question arises regarding its being mentioned again, in the text under consideration—is the Branch enjoined here as subordinate (to the Kusha-bundle)?—or is it mentioned only as to be disposed of?—It is found that *its disposal* serves the visible purpose that, on the removal of what is no longer required, there is room, ever so little, secured for moving about. There is, however, no visible result following from the contact (of the Branch) with the other place to which it is thrown. Hence the *throwing in* of the Branch must be regarded as a *disposal*. And as there is no more use for it, the time for that disposal of the Branch is indicated (as that at which the *Kusha-bundle* is thrown in).

"But the Instrumental ending denotes the subordinate factor; and this ending we find with the term '*Shākhā*' (Branch)."

Our answer to this is that the Instrumental ending in the word '*Shākhayā*' has the sense of the Accusative; and the Accusative ending in '*prastaram*' has the sense of the Instrumental.

"How do you know that?"

The presence of the particle '*saha*' ('along with') indicates that both the things are to be *thrown in* at one and the same time;—so that that thing the time for whose being thrown in is already known (from other sources) should be regarded as mentioned in the text under consideration only for purposes of *reference*, while that whose time for being thrown in is not known should be regarded as mentioned for the purpose of being enjoined. It is the time of the throwing in of the *Branch* that is not known,—while that of the *Kusha-bundle* is already known; hence the mention of this latter must be for the sake of what is not known, and hence it must be the subordinate factor; while the mention of the other should be regarded as the principal factor; and the principal or predominant character is always denoted by the Accusative ending; and yet in the case in question we have the Instrumental ending with what is the principal factor (i.e. the *Shākhā*, Branch; hence it is that this Instrumental should be taken as having the sense of the Accusative); while the Instrumental ending denotes subservience to another; and yet in the case in question we have the Accusative ending in what is the subservient factor (i.e.—the *Prastara*, Kusha-bundle; hence it is that this Accusative should be taken as having the sense of the Instrumental). Thus it is that neither of the two case-endings is used, in the present text, in its own natural sense.

SŪTRA (45).

ALSO BECAUSE THE BRANCH DOES NOT SERVE THE PURPOSE OF EMBELLISHING THE KUSHA-BUNDLE.

Bhāṣya.

The Branch is not found to render any visible help to the Kusha-bundle; in fact, when grass (*Kusha*) is being burnt, no piece of wood (Branch) can render any help to it; it is the grass that would help the wood (in burning). For this reason the Branch cannot be taken as subserving the purposes of the Kusha-bundle.

SŪTRA (46).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE COULD BE ('THROWING IN' OF THE BRANCH) APART (FROM THE KUSHA-BUNDLE).

Bhāṣya.

Question—"What is the use of all this discussion? Even if the Branch is subsidiary to the *Kusha-bundle*, the *Branch* would be disposed of at the time of the *throwing in* of the *Kusha-bundle* [and this is all that the *Siddhāntin* insists upon]."

Answer—If the *Branch* is subsidiary to the *Kusha-bundle*, then, when this latter is being thrown (into the Fire), it cannot be thrown in without the *Kusha-bundle*; on the other hand, if it is not subsidiary to it, then it can be thrown in even without the *Kusha-bundle*. We have already explained that the Branch should be thrown in *at the time* of the Kusha-bundle (being thrown in). *From all this it follows that there could be throwing in of the Branch apart from the Kusha-bundle*; that is, it is for reasons explained above that, even apart from the *Kusha-bundle*, there could be the 'throwing in' of the *Branch*.

SŪTRA (47).

THE 'UPAVĒṢA' ALSO WOULD BE THERE IN ONE CASE ONLY.

[The *Upavēṣa* is a piece of wood, six inches long, cut out from the root end of the Branch and used for the stirring of the Fire at the time of the preparation of the Curd-Butter-Mixture.]

Bhāṣya.

If the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were correct [i.e. if the *Branch* were subsidiary to the *Kusha-bundle* and formed part of the offering of this latter], then, whether or not the material used were the *Curd-Butter-Mixture*,—in either case—the *Branch* would be there; and hence the '*Uparēṣa*' also would

have to be made in either case.—If however, the *Siddhānta* view is correct, [i.e. if the Branch is brought in only for the purpose of removing the calf, and is thrown into the Fire, not as an *offering*, but only as a *disposal* of a thing no longer required], then the Branch would be there only in cases where the *Curd-Butter-Mixture* was used, and hence could be *disposed* of also only in that case;—and the *Upavēṣa* also would be made only in that case,—not in any other.

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA V.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Darsha' sacrifice, in connection with the 'Abhyudayēṣṭi', there is 'displacement of Deities' due to certain contingencies.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TEXT CONTAINS THE INJUNCTION OF A DISTINCT SACRIFICE TO BE PERFORMED ON ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSGRESSION OF TIME INDICATED BY THE RISING (OF THE MOON); AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'FIVE-PLATTER-OFFERING'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the following text—'*Vi rā ēnam prajayā pashubhirardhayati, vardhayatyasya bhrātrvyam yasya havīrniruptam purastāchchandramā abhyudēti; trēdhā taṇḍulān vibhajēt. yē madhyamāḥ syuḥ tānagnayē dātrē purodāshamaṣṭākapālam nirvapēt, yē sthaviṣṭhāstānindrāya pradātrē dadhamshcharum, yē kaṇiṣṭhāstān viṣṇavē shipiviṣṭāya sarpiṣē charum*'[1] 'If the moon rises when the offering-material has been prepared, it deprives him of his offspring and cattle, and prospers the same for his enemy; he should divide the rice into three parts—(1) those that are of the medium size shall be made into cake baked upon eight pans and offered to *Agni-Dātr*; those that are of the largest size should be cooked and offered with curds to *Indra-Pradātr*; and those that are finest shall be cooked and offered in boiled milk to *Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*'] (Taitti. Sarh. 2. 5. 5. 2).

[What is meant is this—The performer thinks that the Moonless Day has arrived, and has begun to make preparations for the *Darsha*-sacrifice which is to be performed on that day;—he finds that in the early morning, the Moon has risen;—this proves that he has made a mistake in regard to the date; for this transgression then he would suffer in his offsprings and cattle; as an expiation therefore he has to make the three offerings out of the material that he had got ready.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the passage enjoin a distinct sacrifice, to be performed on account of the transgression relating to time?—or does it lay down simply the displacement of the original deities (and the introduction of others) in reference to those same offerings that are made in connection with the original sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"When the transgression of time is discovered on the rising of the Moon,—on account of that transgression, there is a sacrifice to be performed,—and it is this distinct sacrifice that should be taken as enjoined in the text.—Why?—When they make a cake out of the medium-sized rice and offer it to *Agni-Dātr*,—the

cooked rice of the large-size with curds to *Indra-Pradātr*,—and the finest rice to *Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*,—this must be taken as a distinct sacrifice, because it is spoken of as connected with a result and the enjoyer of the result;—just as in the case of the 'Five-Platter-offering', it is taken as a distinct sacrifice, by reason of the mention of a distinct substance and a distinct deity;—so also in the case of the *Pashu-kāmēṣṭi*, in connection with which we read—'One who desires cattle should perform the sacrifice on the Moonless Day and then remove the calves;—then out of the larger-sized ones, he should make a cake, baked upon eight pans and offer it to *Agni-Sanimat*,—the medium-size ones should be cooked and offered in boiled milk to *Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*; the finest ones he should cook and offer in curds to *Indra-Pradātr*';—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the offerings laid down should be regarded as a distinct sacrifice.—Further, in connection with the original sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), we do not find any deity mentioned specifically in relation to any substance; all that is mentioned there is 'the cooked rice in boiled milk'; and at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, no *boiling* is done at the time of the rise of the Moon; hence the sacrifice spoken of in the text in question must be regarded as totally different (from the original *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*)."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT MEANS ONLY A DISPLACEMENT (OF DEITIES),—AS THE OFFERINGS ARE THERE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, what is meant is only *a displacement of deities*.—Why?—*Because the offerings are there*; that is, the offerings are the same as those at the original *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*; and so long as they are there, there can be no connection between the materials and the deities,—on the basis of which connection a distinct sacrifice could be assumed. Hence there is no distinct sacrifice; it is the same offering-materials with regard to which different deities are laid down.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE THE WORDS OF THE TEXT ARE EXPRESSIVE OF THE SAME IDEA

Bhāṣya.

The words of the text are such as are expressive of the idea that there is displacement of deities,—for instance, for those that are middle-sized, a deity other than the original one is enjoined; it is only the deity that can be taken to be enjoined in this text, because the substance is the same as that laid down in connection with the original sacrifice, and it is only the particular deity mentioned in the text which is not already so enjoined.

"But when the text is taken as enjoining a new deity, how is it that it is not open to the objection that it involves the injunction of several accessory details?"

The answer to this is that in no one of the sentences (composing the passage in question) is there any injunction of several accessory details; for instance, in the sentence 'he should divide the rice', the only thing *enjoined* is the *dividing*, all the rest is only *referred to*; hence this explanation is not open to the said objection.—In regard to the 'middle-sized' rice, it is only the deity *Agni* that is *enjoined*, all the rest, Cake, etc., is only *referred to*.—In regard to the 'large-sized' ones,—for these as mixed with curds, it is only the deity *Indra* that is *enjoined* in this sentence.—As regards the third sentence, the *boiling* is indicated by the needs of the situation (without boiling, no rice could be cooked), the character of 'cooked rice'—along with sense of the 'Locative' (in '*Shrtē*'), which also is indicated by the needs of the case,—is only *referred to*; hence in this sentence what is enjoined is the deity, *Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*, in reference to the rice along with the boiled milk; all the rest is only *referred to*.—Thus our explanation is not open to the objection (of a single sentence enjoining several accessory details).

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND A REPETITION OF CURDLING.

Bhāṣya.

The text indicates the repetition of the curdling-process.—"How so?"—We read thus—'If he fears that the Moon may rise (and the day may thus not be the Moonless Day) then he should prepare the offering-materials at midnight, and should keep by the unhusked rice; half of the curd he should put into the milk for curdling it,—not the other half; if the Moon does rise, then the next day he should curdle the milk with this latter half and use it; if the Moon does not rise, he should feed the Brāhmaṇas with the curd'.—Now, if the offerings laid down in the text form a distinct sacrifice, the rice, the curd and the boiled milk—all these would have to be regarded as things to be secured; and these would be the ordinary (not sacrificial) things that would be secured; as at the time that they would be secured, the functioning of the original sacrifice will not have commenced; under the circumstances, if the curd were not spoilt, then, as the curd would already be there when the next day the *Darśa*-sacrifice comes to be performed, it would not be necessary to repeat the curdling process; for at the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* also that same curd would be there; hence there would be no second curdling process needed.—On the other hand, if what is laid down is the displacement of deities due to a particular contingency,—then, as in the curd already kept, the rice will have been cooked, it would be necessary to have the second curdling in connection with the milk obtained for the *Darśa*-sacrifice.—Thus then, the repetition of the Curdling-process would be possible only if the sentence is taken as laying down deities (in place of the original ones).

SŪTRA (5).

[IN THE CASE CITED BY THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN] THERE IS INJUNCTION, AS IT IS SOMETHING NEW.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"just as in the case of the *Pashu-kāmēṣṭi*, the text, 'One who desires cattle should remove the calves after performing the *Darsha*-sacrifice', is taken as laying down a distinct sacrifice [so should it be in the case in question also]".—This has got to be refuted; and in refutation of this we argue as follows—In the case of the *Pashu-kāmēṣṭi*, it is only right that the text should be taken as enjoining a distinct sacrifice;—why?—*because it is something new*; in that case there is no sacrifice mentioned which has been already enjoined elsewhere; the sacrifice spoken of is begun after the completion of the *Darsha*-sacrifice, as is clear from the phrase 'after performing the *Darsha*-sacrifice'; and as the sentence speaks of the 'offering' connected with a *substance* and a *deity*,—and there can be no connection between the substance and the deity without the former being *given away* to the latter.—it implies the act of *sacrifice*.—Such, however, is not the case with the text under consideration; in this case it is the original sacrifice that is recognised as spoken of, and it is only the connection of the substance used at that same original sacrifice with a different deity, that is enjoined; and hence this is not open to any objection.

SŪTRA (6).

IN THE CASE OF THE 'FIVE-PLATTER-OFFERING' [IT IS ONLY RIGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT SACRIFICE], BECAUSE THERE IS DEFECT IN THE MILK, IN THE OTHER CASE HOWEVER, THE SUBSTANCE IS NOT DEFECTIVE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"just as in the case of the *Five-Platter-offering*, it is a distinct sacrifice that is enjoined, so should it be in the case in question also".—This has to be refuted, and in refutation of this, we argue as follows—In the case of the *Five-Platter-offering*, it is only right that it should be regarded as a distinct sacrifice, because the material in that case has become defective (spoilt), in regard to which the Deity is laid down; and hence in that case the substance has got to be enjoined as something that must be secured; and when a fresh substance is secured, and the Deity also is a new one, then the connection between these (in the form of a *sacrifice*), which has not been previously enjoined, should naturally be taken as enjoined.—In the case that we are considering, however, the substance has not become defective (it remains the same as that of the original sacrifice), hence we take it that it is in reference to that same substance that fresh deities are enjoined in connection with the same original sacrifice. For these reasons, there can be no objection to this explanation.

SŪTRA (7).

[*Objection*]—"THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH THE CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE ALSO",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If it be urged that—"There has been a defect in the Curd-Butter-Mixture also (which is the substance used at the original *Darsha*-sacrifice); because on account of the rising of the moon, that also has become defective through the transgression of the right time",—[then our answer is as follows]—

SŪTRA (8).

NOT SO; BECAUSE THAT (CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE) HAS NOT BECOME DEFECTIVE,—THE CONDITIONS BEING EQUALLY APPLICABLE (TO BOTH CASES).

Bhāṣya.

It is not so; in the case of the 'Five-Platter-offering' the substance has become defective, while in the present case, it remains unspoilt.

"But certainly the substance in the present case has become defective on account of the transgression of time."

It has not become defective; *because the conditions are equally applicable*; the laying down of the expiation on the rise of the Moon is applicable to the case in which the substance has become defective, as also to the case in which the substance has not become defective, by the transgression of the time. In fact, the Deity can be enjoined in regard to the substance that may be used at the wrong time also; it is only when the substance has been destroyed that no such injunction of Deity is possible in regard to it.

SŪTRA (9).

AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE 'BOILED MILK', IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING (A CERTAIN QUALITY).

Bhāṣya

It has been argued that—"no Deity is enjoined in the text, in regard to the original substance; as all that is mentioned is 'the cooked rice in milk'; and no boiling has been done at the time of the rise of the Moon";—this has got to be refuted; and in refutation of this, we urge that the mention of the 'boiled milk' is for the purpose of indicating a certain quality,—'boiled milk' standing for *that which possesses the qualities of boiled milk.*

[What should be done according to this conclusion is, that in expiation of the transgression of the time, the *Darsha*-sacrifice itself is to be performed, but the offerings are to be made to the deities mentioned in the text we have been considering,—and after this *Darsha* has been performed, then there should follow the ordinary regular *Darsha*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *At the Upāṁshu-sacrifice there is complete Displacement of the Deity and hence of the 'Upāṁshuyāja' itself.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'UPĀṀSHUYĀJA', AS THERE IS NO DECLARATION (OF OTHER DEITIES), IT SHOULD BE DONE AS AT THE ORIGINAL SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Abhyudayēṣṭi*, there arises a further question—[At the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there are offerings of *Cake*, as also of *Clarified Butter*; the latter being called '*Upāṁshuyāja*';—in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it has been decided that in the event of there being a transgression regarding time, the performer should perform the *Abhyudayēṣṭi*, which consists of the *Darsha*-sacrifice itself, with this difference that the original deities of the *Darsha* are replaced by others specified in the text quoted; the text quoted has mentioned the offerings of the *Cake*; but at the *Darsha*, in addition to the offerings of *Cake*, there are offerings of *Clarified Butter* composing the *Upāṁshuyāja*; hence]—Is there to be the same 'displacement of deities' at the *Upāṁshuyāja* also—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows:—"The *Upāṁshuyāja* should be performed like the original sacrifice;—why?—*because there is no declaration (of other deities)*; i.e. in the case of the offerings dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, there was a declaration of other deities, in the text—'Cakes made of the medium-sized rice should be offered to *Agni-Dūtr*; the larger-sized rice cooked with curds, to *Indra-Pradātṛ*; and those made of *the finest rice cooked with boiled milk, to Viṣṇu-Shipiviṣṭa*'; but in connection with the *Upāṁshuyāja* (at which the offerings consist of *Clarified Butter*, not of *Cakes*), there is no such declaration of other deities; hence [when it is performed as part of the expiatory *Abhyudayēṣṭi*] the *Upāṁshuyāja*-offerings should be made to the same deities as those at the original *Darsha-sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE DISPLACEMENT (OF THE DEITIES), BECAUSE OF THE PECULIAR NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY CONCERNED, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE OTHER OFFERINGS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*nā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

There should be displacement—of (deities, at) the *Upāṁshuyāja*.—For what reason?—*Because of the peculiar nature of the activity concerned*; in the last *Adhikarana*, the ground for the displacement of deities consisted in the fact that certain rites were performed at the wrong time.—"Why should that be a ground (for it in the present case, of the *Upāṁshuyāja*)?"—In the former case, what happens is, not that on the rise of the Moon, the different kinds of rice are brought in for the purpose of being *divided*, but that the *dividing* is laid down of that offering-material after the preparation of which the Moon has risen,—for the man who has transgressed the time as evidenced by the rising of the Moon.—"How do you know that?"—Because it is not specified by whose fault the Moon has risen; in fact, it is everybody's fault! The fault of the transgression lies in the rites being proceeded with at the wrong time, such being the case, the 'offering-material' cannot be specified as 'rice';—consequently the 'dividing' laid down in the text should apply to the *Upāṁshuyāja* also.—Now, what the sentence 'He should divide the rice into three parts' has been taken to do is to displace the original deities, and what the injunction lays down is that 'the division should be made'—Why so?—Because the subsequent sentences lay down details regarding that division'—in the form 'this substance should be offered to that deity and that to that other', but even that substance in regard to which there is no specific allocation also becomes included under the general term 'divide'. For these reasons, just as there is 'division' in other cases, so there should be in the case of the *Upāṁshuyāja* also [and hence, in this case also there should be displacement of the Deities] Or (we may go a step farther) the original Deity having been disconnected from the substance, and there being no other deities named (as they are in the case of the *Cake*) in connection with that substance,—the *Upāṁshuyāja* itself would drop out [as without a Deity, there can be no sacrifice]

[As a matter of fact, the *Upāṁshuyāja* is performed in connection with the *Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice, not in connection with the *Darsha* sacrifice, hence the passage speaking of the rising of the Moon is not applicable to it; hence the *Adhikarana* has to be taken as more or less *hypothetical*; that is, in case the *Upāṁshuyāja* also were performed in connection with the *Darsha*, it should be dealt with in the manner explained above.—Such is the opinion of the *Nyāyamālāvistara*.—Such also appears to have been the opinion of the other commentators, as the *Tuptikā* has the following remarks—'The *Upāṁshuyāja* is performed during the *Pūrnamāsa*, not during the *Darsha*, nor does the author of the *Vrtti* agree to take this as a *Hypothetical discussion*, hence on the face of it, the *Adhikarana* would appear to have been wrongly brought in, but it is not so, because as a matter of fact, in the *Bahvrcha Brāhmana*, the *Upāṁshuyāja* has been actually laid down as part of the *Darsha*-sacrifice also']

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Abhyudayēṣṭi' should be performed even though the offering-material may not have been actually prepared.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE PERFORMED ONLY WHEN THE OFFERING-MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PREPARED; BECAUSE IT IS SO MENTIONED."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same text as before, there arises the further question—Is the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* to be performed if the Moon rises after the offering-material has been actually *prepared*? Or also before it is prepared?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The *Abhyudayēṣṭi* should be performed only if the Moon rises after the offering-material has been secured and prepared.—Why?—*Because it is so mentioned*: the text speaks of *consecration*—'If a man's offering-material has been prepared'.—From this it is clear that what is enjoined is not applicable to the case where the material has not been actually *prepared*."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED EVEN IF THE MATERIAL HAD BEEN BEGUN TO BE DEALT WITH (WHEN THE MOON ROSE); AS THAT WOULD FULFIL THE CONDITIONS (UNDER WHICH THE ABHYUDAYĒṢṬI SHOULD BE PERFORMED).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

What is laid down (regarding the performance of the *Abhyudayēṣṭi*) should become applicable to any case where the procedure with the offering-material has merely commenced at the wrong time [and not necessarily when it has proceeded to the point of the materials having been *prepared*];—because that is enough to provide the contingency (under which the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* is to be performed), as laid down in the text '*Yasya haviḥ abhyudēti, etc.*', where the 'offering-material' is mentioned as an indicator; so that the condition laid down in the text is the 'rising of the Moon' in reference to the offering-material;—this '*haviḥ*', 'offering-material', can be such a contingency only when it has commenced to be actively dealt with, not till it is lying passive;—hence the phrase '*haviḥ abhyudēti*' should be taken to mean 'if the Moon arises when the material has begun to be dealt with'; and we cannot qualify the material as being actually 'prepared';

as in that case there would be a syntactical split.—If the sentence were construed as 'If the material has been prepared,—and not if it has not been prepared', then there could be no such assertion as 'if the Moon rises'.—
—From all this it follows that the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* is to be performed even if (on the rising of the Moon) the offering-material has *not* been actually 'prepared' [it is enough if it has begun to be dealt with].

SŪTRA (14).

THE OTHER WORD IS PURELY INDICATIVE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"the qualifying term 'prepared' is actually present in the text—' *Yasya havirnirvaptam*, etc.' ".—But as a matter of fact, the word 'prepared' is *purely indicative*; standing for anything being 'proceeded to be dealt with'.

SŪTRA (15).

WE ALSO FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is also another text which points to the same conclusion: '*Na yadyagrhītam.....sakṛtphalīkṛtān*' ['If the Moon rises before the offering-material has been taken up, the following well-known procedure should be adopted:—On the previous day, there should be secured milk and curd as offering-materials; curdling also is to be done; they let loose the calves; those same they again remove; they remove them in the afternoon by means of a stick of *Palāsha-wood*,—all this is indeed known as to be done on the Moonless Day; even if he do not intend to perform the sacrifice, if the material is duly consecrated, and then the Moon rises, then he should prepare the unhusked rice in another way'].—This text lays down an entirely different procedure to be adopted in the case of the Moon rising *before the material has been taken up*; and thus indicates that if the Moon arises *after the material has been taken up*,—even though it has not been *prepared*,—the expiatory sacrifice (*Abhyudayēṣṭi*) should be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *In the case of the Abhyudayēṣṭi being performed on the Moon rising before the material has been prepared,—the material should be prepared and consecrated for the deities of the modified sacrifice, 'Abhyudayēṣṭi'.*

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE EVENT OF THE MOON RISING BEFORE THE MATERIAL HAS BEEN PREPARED, THE PREPARATION AND CONSECRATION SHOULD BE DONE FOR THE DEITIES OF THE ORIGINAL SACRIFICE,—SAYS ĀSHMARATHYA; ON THE GROUND THAT THOSE DEITIES ARE SPOKEN OF AS TO BE DISPLACED ONLY AFTER THE 'RICE' HAS BEEN SECURED."

Bhāṣya.

It has been settled that if the Material has merely begun to be dealt with (before the Moon rises) it fulfills the conditions under which the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* is to be performed.—Now the question that arises is—Are the contingent 'displacement of the original deities' and 'introduction of other deities' to be done after the 'preparation', when the material has been turned into 'rice',—and the 'preparation' itself is to be done for the original deities; after the Moon has been seen to rise? Or should the 'preparation' be done for the new deities connected with the modified sacrifice (of the *Abhyudayēṣṭi*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In the event of the moon rising before the material has been prepared, the subsequent preparation and consecration should be done for the deities of the original sacrifice,*—so the teacher Āshmarathya has held.—'Why so?'—*Because those deities are spoken of as to be displaced after the rice has been secured*; in fact, we find the displacement of the deities after the grains have been prepared and turned into *Rice*; the text—'*Yasya havirniruptam purastāt chandramā abhyudiyāt trēdhā taṇḍulān vibhajēt*'—speaks of the 'dividing' of the Rice after the Moon is found to have risen; and this could not be possible until the grains had been turned into *Rice*. Thus then, so long as there has been no 'preparation', there can be no 'rice'; hence the deities of the original sacrifice cannot be displaced; consequently, the subsequent 'preparation' should be done for those same original deities."

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE 'PREPARATION' SHOULD BE DONE FOR THOSE (DEITIES) WHO PARTAKE OF THE SUBSEQUENT OFFERINGS,—SO SAYS ĀLĒKHANA; ON THE GROUND THAT THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE DEITY IS DUE TO THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('but') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

Those deities who partake of the subsequent offerings,—for them, should the 'preparation' be made;—so has taught the teacher Ālēkhana.—Why so?—*Because the displacement of deities is due to that*,—i.e. to the fact that the process of the sacrifice has commenced at the wrong time. Consequently, the deities of the original sacrifice should be regarded as already displaced (by reason of the said fact); hence the subsequent preparation and consecration of the materials should be for those other deities who partake of the subsequent offerings (at the *Abhyudayēṣṭi* sacrifice).

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *If the Abhyudayēṣṭi is performed after the Material has been partly 'prepared',—the remaining portion of it should be 'prepared' silently, without reference to any deity.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"IF THE HANDFULS OF CORN HAVE BEEN PARTLY 'PREPARED', THERE IS NO DISPLACEMENT (OF THE DEITIES); AS THEY ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE 'PREPARATION'."

Bhāṣya.

When the 'preparation' of the 'Four Handfuls' of corn has been commenced, but not finished, [if the Moon happen to rise], then there arises the question—What has been prepared is already 'prepared'; but what remains,—is that to be prepared and consecrated to the deities of the original sacrifice? Or to those mentioned in connection with the modified sacrifice (*Abhyudayēṣṭi*)? Or only silently (without the name of any deity)?

On this question, the first *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows—"When the material has been partly prepared—i.e. half-prepared—there should be no displacement of the deities.—Why?—Because the Deity is subordinate to the 'Preparation' (consecration), not to the 'handfuls', and the Preparation and Consecration (already done) have been done with reference to those deities (i.e. the deities of the original sacrifice).—How so?—Part of the material having been already prepared, all that remains to be done is to repeat the same process for making up the number 'four'; and hence it is this repetition that is done again. And as the Preparation has been done already (though partly), the Deity has not been removed, and when that same act of Preparation is repeated again, it is only right that the Deity should still remain *undisplaced*. Hence it follows that the preparation and consecration should be done to the deities of the original sacrifice. The later 'handful' of the corn is not a distinct material (other than the previous handfuls which have already undergone 'preparation'), by virtue of which difference, the original deity could be displaced. Because what is done later on is only that the requisite number of the Preparation and Consecration is made up.—From all this it follows that there is no displacement of the deities of the original sacrifice."

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"THE CONNECTION IS WITH WHAT DOES NOT BELONG TO THE ORIGINAL SACRIFICE, AS THE PLACE OF THE DEITIES OF THE ORIGINAL SACRIFICE HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE OTHER DEITIES."

Bhāṣya.

[*Second Pūrvapakṣa*]—"The Material is not to be consecrated to the deities of the original sacrifice.—To whom then?—To the deities mentioned in connection with the modified (*Abhyudayēṣṭi*) sacrifice.—Why so?—Because we find it spoken of as connected,—not with what is already there in connection with the original sacrifice, but—with such particular deities as are not connected with the original sacrifice. Because the sentence 'The Rice should be divided into three parts, etc.' already lays down that the material should be wrested from the deities of the original sacrifice, and be consecrated to the deities of the modified sacrifice; because these latter have by that time taken the place of the former. Hence we conclude that, when the material has been only half-prepared, the original deities are set aside and new ones come in; consequently the remainder of the preparation and consecration should be done in connection with the deities of the modified sacrifice."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE OTHER (HALF), THE CONSECRATION SHOULD BE DONE SILENTLY.

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as there is absence of the other half,—as connected with any deity,—the subsequent preparation and consecration should not be done in connection with any deity; [i.e. it should be done silently].—If there were consecration in connection with a deity, then one-half of the material would be consecrated to one deity and the other half to the other deity; so that it could not be ascertained whether the consecration had been to one deity or to the other. For these reasons, the best course would be to consecrate the material silently (without reference to any deity); as otherwise, in one case or the other, there would be bound to be a breach of what has been determined before.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Whether or not the Curd-Butter-Mixture is the material used,—the Expiatory Sacrifice must be performed if the Moon rises.*

SŪTRA (21).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THERE IS MENTION OF THE CURD-BUTTER-MIXTURE, THERE SHOULD BE NO PERFORMANCE OF THE EXPIATORY SACRIFICE IN A CASE WHERE THAT MIXTURE IS NOT USED."

Bhāṣya.

The same *Abhyudayēṣṭi* is the subject for consideration. In connection with that we read—'Cooked rice in curd, cooked rice in boiled milk'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the expiatory sacrifice contingent on the rising of the Moon to be performed only in a case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is the material used? Or in all cases, without any restriction?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The expiatory sacrifice is to be performed only in a case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is the material used.—Why?—*Because there is mention of the Curd-Butter-Mixture*;—in the words 'rice cooked in curd, rice cooked in boiled milk', we have the mention of the Curd-Butter-Mixture; in a case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is not used, there would be no 'boiled milk' or 'curd'; hence the expiatory sacrifice could not be performed; if it were performed, it could only be defective."

SŪTRA (22).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN BOTH CASES, ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE VEGETABLE SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'tu' ('in reality') rejects the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

In reality the expiatory sacrifice should be performed *in both cases*.—and not only in that case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is the material used;—because of the mention of the vegetable substance in the same text—'Those *grains* that are medium-sized,—large-sized, finest',—where the vegetable substance (*grains*) is mentioned; and this can be used (at the expiatory sacrifice) even by one who does not make use of the Curd-Butter-Mixture. Hence the expiatory sacrifice cannot, without some reason, be omitted even by one who does not make use of the Curd-Butter-Mixture; consequently it should be performed in both cases (where the said Mixture is used, as also where it is not used).

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"THIS CANNOT BE, AS IT WOULD RENDER THE SACRIFICE DEFECTIVE",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer will be as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"in a case where the Curd-Butter-Mixture is not used, as there would be neither *Curd* nor *Boiled Milk*, the offering could not be one in which *Curd* has been used as a *means*; so that in such a case there would be a defect in the act".

This is what has got to be refuted; [and this refutation is put forward in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (24).

NOT SO, BECAUSE IT IS NOT AN EMBELLISHMENT OF IT

Bhāṣya

What has been urged is not right In the matter of the cooking of rice, the *Curd* has not been spoken of in the text as the substance in which the rice is to be cooked; all that the text says is that 'just as the larger-sized grains are offered to *Indra-Pradātṛ*, so also is the *Curd*',—all that is enjoined being the connection of the Curd with the *particular deity*, not with the *cooked rice*. If connection with the latter were taken as enjoined, then there would be a syntactical split, the construction being—'The larger-sized grains are to be offered to that particular deity,—and the grains are to be cooked in Curd'.—As for the Locative ending (in '*dadhan*', 'in the curd'), it is only a reference to something already known Consequently the association of the rice with the curd and other things is not meant to be essential; they are meant only to be the differentiating factors in the offerings. Hence it follows that, merely because milk and curd are not used, that can be no reason why there should be no displacement of the deity' in connection with the larger-sized grains, because even though the Curd-Butter-Mixture be not used, the grains would be cooked in water.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Vishvajit' sacrifice should be performed as soon as the performance of the 'Satra' has been proceeded with.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE VISHVAJIT, DUE TO BE PERFORMED ON SOMEONE RETIRING AFTER THE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN PARTLY DONE, SHOULD BE PERFORMED AFTER THE PURCHASE (OF THE SOMA); BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF 'DIVISION'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Yadi satrāya dīkṣitā atha sāmyuttiṣṭhēran somamapabhajya vishvajitā atirātrēṇa sarvastomēna sarvapṛṣṭhēna sarvavēdasadakṣiṇēna yajēran*' ['After they have been initiated for the *Satra*, if they retire after it has been partly performed, they should divide the *Soma* and perform the *Vishvajit Atirātra*, at which all hymns and songs are used and at which one's entire property is given away as the sacrificial fee'].

[That is, at the *Satra*, after the seventeen sacrificers have been initiated and the performance proceeded with, if anyone of them wishes to retire from it, he should take out his share of the *Soma* and, with it, perform the *Vishvajit*.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Vishvajit* to be performed on the retirement of a sacrificer after the *Soma* has been purchased? Or on his retirement even after the mere commencement of the *Satra*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"On the retirement of someone after the sacrifice has been partly performed, *the Vishvajit should be performed after the Purchase*—of the *Soma*.—'Why so?'—*Because of the mention of 'division'*. The words of the text are 'They should *divide the Soma* and perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice'; those who would retire before the *Soma* has been purchased, could not have any division or share in the *Soma*; hence, if the *Vishvajit* were performed under the circumstances, it could only be a defective performance. From this it follows that the *Vishvajit* should be performed only when persons retire after the *Soma* has been purchased."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON RETIREMENT AFTER THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SATRA HAS COMMENCED,—AS THE REQUIRED CONTINGENCY WOULD BE THERE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vai*' ('in reality') rejects the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

There should be performance of the *Vishvajit*, if someone retired after the *Satra* had merely commenced [and not necessarily, after the stage of the

Soma-purchase].—Why?—*Because the required contingency would be there.* The contingency that has been laid down as under which the *Vishvajit* should be performed is 'retirement after partial performance';—and this would be there as soon as the performance had commenced; there is no ground for specifying that contingency as *that which comes after the Purchase of the Soma.*

SŪTRA (27).

THE OTHER PART OF THE TEXT IS MERELY INDICATIVE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"if they were *to* retire before the Purchase of the *Soma*, as there could be no sharing (division) of the *Soma*, the *Vishvajit*, if performed, would be defective".—This has to be refuted. The refutation is as follows:—The 'division' (of *Soma*) is not what is enjoined here; if it were, then there would be a syntactical split, the construction being —'if they retire after partial performance, they should perform the *Vishvajit sacrifice*,—*and after they had made a division of the Soma*'. *For this* reason, the word 'having divided' should be taken as a *reference*. "But in what manner is it *already known* that it can be *referred to* here?"—Well, in all cases, when people are retiring from business, there naturally follows a division of the assets; and it is thus 'division of all assets' that is indicated by the mention of the 'division of the Soma'; the text thus indicating that 'the Soma should be divided as also the other things'.

From all this it follows that whenever persons retire from the *Satra*,—either *before* or *after* the Purchase of the Soma,—they should perform the *Vishvajit-sacrifice.*

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Initiation should continue for Twelve Days.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN REGARD TO THE EXTENT OF THE INITIATION, ONE MAY DO AS ONE LIKES; AS NO DISTINCTION HAS BEEN MADE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Ēkā dīkṣā, tisra upasadaḥ pañchamim prasutaḥ;.....tisro dīkṣāḥ, dvādasha dīkṣāḥ*', etc. ['One initiation, three *upasads*, the extracting of Soma-juice on the fifth day;.. three initiations, twelve initiations']; —where the extent of the initiation is variously laid down (as extending over *one* day, *three* days, *twelve* days).

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is there to be no restriction—one may adopt any extent one likes? Or, must there be *twelve* initiations?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In regard to the extent of the initiation, one may do what one likes*;—i.e. there is no hard and fast rule.—Why?—*Because no distinction has been made*; the texts have made no distinction among the various numbers; and one may adopt any number that one chooses."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD EXTEND OVER TWELVE DAYS; BECAUSE OF A TEXT POINTING TO THAT CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

One should adopt the 'twelve days' Course'.—Why?—*Because of a text pointing to that conclusion*. '*Liṅgāt*' means *indicative power*.—"What is it that points to, or indicates, that conclusion?"—There is the text—'Having been initiated for twelve days, one should beg for support' (i.e. beg for what is needed for the sacrifice);—here the '*twelve days' Course of Initiation*' is spoken of as the only course, which is obligatory, not optional;—so that if one adopts the course *always*, he cannot adopt any other course. Hence the choice is restricted to the '*twelve days*' Course'. As for the other courses, they might be adopted at the ectypes of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; so that the injunction of these also would not be absolutely futile.

[The above is the presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa* according to the *Bhāṣya*. Neither Kumārila (in the *Ṭupṭīkā*) nor Maṇḍana Mishra (in the *Mīmāṁsānukramaṇikā*) accept this presentation. According to them *Sūtras* 28 and 29 embody two distinct

Adhikaraṇas.—In the former *Adhikaraṇa* (Sū. 28) the question is—At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* should there be *twelve days' Initiation*? Or is there no restriction?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that there must be the 'twelve days' Course'.—The *Siddhānta* is that there should be no restriction.—In the second *Adhikaraṇa* (Sū. 29), the question is—Is there entire option in all the ectypes of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*? Or is there any restriction?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that, according to Sū. 28, as there is absolute option at the archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there should be option in the case of all ectypes also.—The *Siddhānta* is that at the ectypes—specially at the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice—the *twelve days' course* alone should be adopted.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the 'Gavāmayana' sacrifice, the Initiation should be done before the Full-Moon Day of the month of Māgha.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"IT SHOULD BE DONE ON THE FULL-MOON DAY; THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS TO ANY PARTICULAR FULL-MOON DAY: BECAUSE THERE IS NO SPECIFICATION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Gavāmayana* we read—'*Purastāt paurnamāsyāḥ chaturahē dīkṣēran*' ['They should proceed with the Initiation on the fourth day before the Full-Moon Day']. In regard to this, there arises the question—Which Full-Moon Day is meant here?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this point is as follows:—"It should be done on the Full-Moon Day,—there is no restriction as to any particular Full-Moon Day.—Why so?—Because *there is no restriction*, i.e. there is no word used which would refer to any particular Full-Moon Day."

SŪTRA (31).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—BUT FROM WHAT FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE FULL-MOON DAY OF THE MONTH OF CHAITRA."

Bhāṣya

The particle 'tu' ('but') serves to set aside the view put forth in the preceding *Sūtra*.

"It is not true that there is no restriction (as to which particular Full-Moon Day is meant): because the Full-Moon Day meant should be that of the month of *Chaitra*.—'Why?'—*From what follows immediately*; after having spoken of the Full-Moon Day in the text in question, the text goes on, in the next sentence, to describe towards the end of the passage, the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Chaitra*—'They should initiate the sacrificer on the fourth day before the sacrifice: this Full-Moon Day of the month of Chaitra is the opening season of the year'.—In view of this supplementary text, we conclude that the Full-Moon Day spoken of in the text in question must be that of the month of *Chaitra*,—in accordance with the principle laid down under *Sūtra* 1. 4. 29—that 'In doubtful cases, a definite conclusion is arrived at with the help of subsequent passages'."

SŪTRA (32).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE THE FULL-MOON DAY OF THE MONTH OF MĀGHA; BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE 'ĒKĀṢṬAKĀ'.

Bhāṣya.

In term 'tu' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the views set forth in the preceding *Sūtras*. It is not right to say that it is the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Chaitra* that is meant; because in reality, the particular Full-Moon Day meant should be that occurring in the month of *Māgha*.—"Why?"—*Because of the mention of the Ēkāṣṭakā*; in connection with the Purchase (of the *Soma*) we find the mention of the *Ēkāṣṭakā* in the text 'For them the Purchase is effected at the *Ēkāṣṭakā*'. From this it follows that the Purchase of the *Soma* can be done at the *Ēkāṣṭakā* only, for the sacrificer who has been initiated on the fourth day before the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Māgha*,—not on that of the month of *Chaitra*. This is the indicative called 'force' (of words); and the indicative word always sets aside what is indicated by Syntactical Connection.—From all this it follows that the Full-Moon Day before which the Initiation is done is that of the month of *Māgha*.

SŪTRA (33).

[OBJECTION]—"THERE ARE OTHER (ĒKĀṢṬAKĀS) ALSO".—IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer will be as given in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If you hold the view that 'the Full-Moon Day meant is that of the month of *Māgha*, as it is only thus that the *Purchase of Soma* would be accomplished on the *Ēkāstakā*',—then, this cannot be right; as every *eighth day* of every month is an '*Ēkāstakā*'; as declared in the text 'There are *twelve Ēkāṣṭakās*'. Hence what has been urged by the *Siddhāntin* does not affect the *Pūrvapakṣa* view."

SŪTRA (34).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE THE NAME 'ĒKĀṢṬAKĀ' IS APPLIED TO THE EIGHTH DAYS OF THE OTHER MONTHS, ONLY FIGURATIVELY; IT IS ONLY THE EIGHTH DAY OF THE ONE MONTH OF MĀGHA THAT IS DIRECTLY CALLED 'ĒKĀṢṬAKĀ' IN COMMON PARLANCE.

Bhāṣya

What has been urged in the preceding *Sūtra* cannot be right; because to the eighth days of the other months the term '*Ēkāṣṭakā*' applies only

secondarily (indirectly); primarily it applies to only that which comes after the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Māgha*;—and when there is a conflict between the primary and secondary significations of a word, it is the primary one that should be accepted. Hence the Full-Moon Day meant must be taken to be that of the month of *Māgha*.

SŪTRA (35).

ALSO BECAUSE THE OMISSION OF THE INITIATION IS SPOKEN OF AS BEING MADE GOOD (BY THE PURCHASE).

Bhāṣya.

Says the text (Taitti. Saṁ. 7. 4. 8. 2)—'They should initiate on the *Ēkāṣṭakā*; this *Ēkāṣṭakā* is the wife of the Year'; then having enjoined the Initiation on the fourth day before the Full-Moon Day, it goes on—'For them, Purchase is accomplished on the *Ēkāṣṭakā*, thereby they rectify the *Ēkāstakā*'. Here it is declared that, if the *Ēkāstakā* has been omitted at the Initiation, it is rectified by the Purchase (of the Soma); which clearly shows that it is the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Māgha* that is meant. In connection with the offering made on this eighth day of *Māgha*, we have the following *Mantra*—'*Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti rātrim dhēnumivāyatīm saṁvatsarasya yā patnī sā no astu sumangalī—iti astakāyai surādhasē svāhā*' ['Whom people welcome, as they do the milch cow coming home in the evening,—she who is the wife of the Year—may she be the harbinger of prosperity to us! this offering is to *Aṣṭakā* the worshipful!']. This *Mantra* clearly indicates that the *Astakā* meant is the one in the month of *Māgha*.

SŪTRA (36).

ALSO BECAUSE PLANTS ARE DESCRIBED AS RISING UPON ITS APPEARANCE.

Bhāṣya

The following text shows that plants and herbs shoot forth on the appearance of the *Astakā*—'Herbs and plants and trees shoot forth on its arrival' (Taitti Saṁ. 7. 4. 8. 3);—here we have the mention of the sprouting out of trees and herbs on the advent of spring; it is during the spring that they sprout out. This also shows that the eighth day of *Māgha* is meant (which is followed by the spring).

SŪTRA (37).

ALL THE TEXTS ARE INDICATIVE OF THIS SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

(1) The first indicative is the text—'Those who initiate them on the *Ēkāstakā* initiate at an inconvenient time' (Taitti. Saṁ. 7. 4. 8. 1); that time is called 'inconvenient' when people feel uncomfortable; and people feel uncomfortable when there is much cold; hence it follows that it is the

eighth day of the month of *Māgha* that is called the '*Aṣṭakā*'.—(2) The second indicative is the text—'Those who initiate on the *Aṣṭakā* initiate at the rotation of the Year'; here the term 'rotation' stands for the sun's passage from one side of the equator to the other [and this takes place in the month of *Māgha*].—(3) The third indicative is the text—'They betake themselves to the Final Bath, not welcoming the water'; if they had been initiated on the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Chaitra*, they would certainly welcome the water (as the weather becomes warm by that time); hence this also shows that it is the Full-Moon Day of the month of *Māgha* (when it is cold and hence a bath is not very welcome).

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *If the Initiation is put off, the restrictions relating to it should also be put off.*

SŪTRA (38).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THE TIME OF INITIATION IS PRESCRIBED,—IF IT IS PASSED OVER, THERE SHOULD BE NO PUTTING OFF OF SUCH ACTS AS ARE ESSENTIAL, AS THEIR TIME WILL HAVE ARRIVED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Tasmād-dīkṣito na dadāti na pachati na juhoti*' ['Therefore on being initiated, one shall not make any gifts, nor cook, nor offer oblations'].

[At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, on the fifth or seventh or eighth day from the day of *Initiation*, there is *Extracting of the Soma-juice*;—after all the three stages of this have been finished, there comes the *Avabhṛtha Bath*;—after which the restrictions imposed upon the Initiate, that he shall not *make a gift* and the rest, cease.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—If, on account of some obstacle emanating from man or from God, the time of Initiation is passed over and the Initiation is put off [and as a necessary consequence the Juice-extracting and *Avabhṛtha Bath* also are postponed],—will the *making of gift, cooking and offering of oblations* [i.e. the cessation of the restrictions imposed upon the Initiate] also be put off—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They shall not be put off; because the acts of *making gift, cooking and offering libations* are essential, as is clearly shown by such Vedic texts as 'One should offer the *Agnihotra* throughout his life'; and they can be omitted only on those days on which the *Jyotiṣṭoma* along with its accessories is laid down as to be performed; so that, barring those days, on all other days, the acts in question must be performed,—as they have not been prohibited in reference to the days following those on which the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is to be performed;—hence the acts in question must be performed (they should not be put off), because their time will have arrived; [even though for some reason the Initiation, etc. might not have been performed, yet the *time* will have arrived all the same; so that the *Agnihotra* and such acts must be performed even before the *Avabhṛtha*]."

SŪTRA (39).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE PUT OFF, BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED FOR ONE WHO HAS BECOME INITIATED; THE CONDITION REMAINS THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

The particle 'vā' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

It has been held (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that there should be no putting off of the acts of *making gifts* and the rest. —But that is not right; *in reality, they should be put off*;—why?—*because they have been prohibited for one who has become initiated*; i.e. they have been forbidden *for the initiate*,—not in reference to the *time of initiation*. If it were taken to mean the latter, then it would involve recourse to indirect indication; while in our explanation, the words are taken in their direct sense. Till the *Avabhṛtha Bath* is performed, the man remains an *Initiate*. So that *the condition remains the same*, i.e., the sole condition for the not-doing of the acts in question is that the man is an *initiate*; and this is equally present in both cases—during the time of the performance of the *Jyotiṣtoma*, as well as after the lapse of that time. From all this it follows that the acts in question should be put off (till after the *Avabhṛtha Bath*).

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *Where the Jyotiṣṭoma has been put off, the 'Retrospective Homas' (Pratihomas) shall not be performed.*

SŪTRA (40).

IN THE SAID CASE THERE IS NO 'RETROSPECTIVE HOMA'; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE PREVIOUS HOMAS.

Bhāṣya.

In the case (dealt with in the preceding *Adhikarana*) where the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has been put off [by reason of the continuance of the restrictions regarding not doing the acts of *cooking* and the rest], the *Agnihotra* and other Homas have not been performed (during the interval),—should the man count the omissions and perform the corresponding *Retrospective Homas* [which have been prescribed as expiation for the omission of such essential acts as the *Agnihotra* and the like] -or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The omissions should be counted and the corresponding 'Retrospective Homas' should be performed.—Why so?—Because the said *Homas* (of the *Agnihotra* and the rest) have been laid down as acts that must be performed; so that, even when they have been omitted (at the right time), they have to be performed; as it is only thus that their *essential character* (as acts that must be performed) is maintained. But of all those acts, it is only the Principal one that is essential; and for the performance of that, much heed need not be paid to the time prescribed for it,—the case being like that of the flowing river; hence, even though the prescribed time may have passed off, yet the omitted acts should all be counted up and their Principal parts alone should be performed. Just as the payment of fooding and wages being essential, even when the right time has lapsed, it is all counted up and paid up,—similarly in the case in question also."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—***In the said case there is no 'Retrospective Homa', just as in the case of the previous Homas.*** It is only when one has omitted to do *what ought to be done* that he should do it (subsequently),—not when the act omitted is one *that ought not to be done*;—and in the case in question, the acts (of *Agnihotra* and the rest) are such as *ought not to be done* (during the interval); because they have been forbidden (during that time).—*Just as in the case of the previous Homas* (viz.: those connected with the *Pravargya* day), unless there is transgression of the prescribed time, the mere fact of their being *not done* does not entail the performance of the 'Retrospective Homa',—so should it be also in the case of the *Homas* in question.

SŪTRA (41).

ALSO BECAUSE THE TIME IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

Further, predominance attaches to the time; because it is the time that has been declared to be the occasion for the performance of the *Homas*;—and so long as the said time has not arrived, the *Homa* in question cannot be treated as *enjoined*; even though the Opponent restricts the performance to the Principal part only, yet for that also, the *time* is a necessary condition; and the time, resembling a flowing river, having flown away, the *Retrospective Homa* need not be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *In a case where the 'Udavasānīyā' has been put off, the 'Retrospective Homa' should not be performed.*

SŪTRA (42).

ALSO AFTER THE 'AVABHṚTHA BATH', TILL THE 'UDAVASĀNĪYĀ-IṢṬI' [IF CERTAIN HOMAS ARE OMITTED, THERE SHOULD BE NO 'RETROSPECTIVE HOMA']: BECAUSE THEY ARE PROHIBITED ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

The question to be considered next is—After the *Avabhṛtha Bath*, and before the *Udavasānīyā-Iṣṭi*, if certain *Homas* (like the *Agnihotra*) happen to be omitted by reason of obstacles due to an act of man or God (which leads to the putting off of the *Udavasānīyā-Iṣṭi*),—should the 'Retrospective Homa' be performed—or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The 'Retrospective Homa' must be performed; because after the *Avabhṛtha Bath*, the man has become freed from 'Initiation' (and its attendant restrictions); because the freeing of the man from the Initiations is the very purpose for which the *Avabhṛtha Bath* is performed; and hence after that it becomes incumbent upon the man to perform the Homas (of the *Agnihotra* and the rest); and as these have *not* been performed [it follows that the expiatory 'Retrospective Homa' must be performed]."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—After the *Avabhṛtha*, and before the *Udavasānīyā-Iṣṭi*,—if the *Homas* have been omitted, there should be no 'Retrospective Homa'.—"Why?"—*Because they are prohibited acts*; there is a clear prohibition of the *Agnihotra* and other *Homas* in the following text—'The *Agnihotra* should be performed through this (*Udavasānīyā*) *Iṣṭi*, which resembles the Fire-laying Rite'; —here there is a distinct prohibition of the *Agnihotra* prior to the *Udavasānīyā-Iṣṭi*; and thus prohibition persists till the time to which the *Udavasānīyā* has been put off. It is only thus that the direct meaning of the text becomes accepted; under any other explanation, recourse would have to be had to an indirect indication.—Thus then, being prohibited, those *Homas* are such as ought not to be done; and as such, when they have not been done (no wrong has been done, and hence) there is no expiatory 'Retrospective Homa'.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *When the 'Retrospective Homa' has been performed, the performance of the Agnihotra and other acts, which had been omitted, should commence in the evening.*

SŪTRA (43).

IN CASE THE 'RETROSPECTIVE HOMA' IS PERFORMED, THE AGNIHOTRA AND OTHER HOMAS (IN RETROSPECT) SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN THE EVENING.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the cases cited (in the last two *Adhikaraṇas*), there arises the question—In the event of the 'Retrospective Homa' being performed, should the retrospective performance of the *Agnihotra* and other *Homas* commence in the evening? Or in the morning?

Question—"It has been settled that there is to be no 'Retrospective Homa' [How then can this question arise?]."

Answer—We take it for granted that it *is* performed, and then proceed to discuss the said question; so that the present is a purely *Hypothetical Discussion*; and it is introduced here with the view that it may be of use in the case of other similar instances.

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "there can be no restriction, as the performance is necessitated by the needs of the case [hence it should be done whenever the need arises]".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—If the 'Retrospective Homa' is performed, then that retrospective performance of the *Agnihotra* and other *Homas* should commence in the evening—"Why so?"—Because it was with the evening-performance of the *Agnihotra* and other *Homas* that their omission began, and hence their retrospective performance should commence at the same point and should go on in the same order.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *At the 'Ṣoḍashin Terminus' of the Soma-sacrifice, the Retrospective Performance of the Agnihotra and the rest should be done in the morning.*

SŪTRA (44).

BUT AT THE 'SOḌASHIN', IN THE MORNING.

Bhāṣya.

If the *omission of the Homas* spoken of in the preceding *Adhikaraṇas* happen to occur during the *Ṣoḍashin Terminus* (which comes after the *Agniṣṭoma Terminus*) of the Soma-sacrifice,—then there arises the question—Is the retrospective performance of the *Agnihotra* to begin in the evening? Or in the morning?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"it has been explained in the foregoing *Adhikarana* that the retrospective performance of the omitted *Homas* is to commence in the evening; and it follows that the same conclusion should apply to all cases".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*But at the Ṣoḍashin, in the morning*; that is, at the *Ṣoḍashin Terminus* (which is performed during the night), it is the morning performances of the *Agnihotra* and other *Homas* that become omitted; hence their retrospective performances also should commence with the morning-*Agnihotra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15) : *The Homa to be performed on 'breakage' and such other contingencies is auxiliary to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*

SŪTRA (45).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE EXPIATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN ALL CASES WHERE THE OCCASION ARISES; THE DEFECT (SOUGHT TO BE RECTIFIED BY THE EXPIATION) APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Bhinnē juhoti, skannē juhoti*' ['One should offer *Homa* when there is breakage; one should offer *Homa* when there is spilling'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this expiation consequent upon *Breakage* or *Spilling* to be performed at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* only? Or in all cases, wherever there is *Breakage* or *Spilling*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows:—"Whatever expiation is prescribed in any context should be performed wherever there is any *Breakage* or *Spilling*.—Why?—*Because the defect applies equally to all*; the contingency under which the expiation is to be performed is the common one of *Breakage* or *Spilling*; and this is what is meant to be the 'defect' spoken of here.—Through 'Context', the expiation should pertain to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* only, but through 'Syntactical Connection', it pertains to other sacrifices also. and 'Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'.—Hence it follows that the expiation is to be performed in all cases of *Breakage or Spilling*"

SŪTRA (46)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE IN THE SAME CONTEXT; BECAUSE THE WORD IS THE SOLE BASIS FOR IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is only when there is *Breakage* or *Spilling* in the *same context* that the expiation is to be performed.—Why?—*Because the word is the sole basis for it.* The (expiatory) *Homas* in question are syntactically connected with what occurs in the same context; hence it is that the word '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') forms the basis for the notion of the sacrifice accompanied by the *Homa* in question. Such being the case, the *Homa* can serve a useful purpose only if it helps that particular sacrifice (in whose context it is spoken of); otherwise, a result would have to be assumed, where there is no sentence speaking of such a result. For this reason, the indication of 'Syntactical Connection' becomes rejected by this very fact of there being

no result (following from the expiation if performed apart from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*); and on the basis of this fact, due regard should be shown towards the indication of the 'Context' [and the *Expiatory Homa* should be taken as connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* only].

SŪTRA (47).

ALSO BECAUSE THE OTHER ACTS ARE NOT MODIFICATIONS (ECTYPES) OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

Either the *Agnihotra* or the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (or such other sacrifices) is not a 'modification' (Ectype) of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. If they *were* Ectypes of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, then, on the *breakage* or the *spilling* occurring at that sacrifice also, the *Expiatory Homa* in question would have been performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The meaning of the term 'vyāpanna', 'spoilt'.*

SŪTRA (48).

WHEN THE 'VYĀPANNA' SUBSTANCE IS SPOKEN OF AS TO BE THROWN INTO WATER, WHAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE WORD IS THAT 'IT IS UNFIT TO BE EATEN BY ĀRYAS'.

Bhāṣya.

We read—'*Vyāpannamapsu praharati*' ['What is spoilt, one should throw into water'].

The question that arises is—"What is meant by a thing being *spoilt*?"

The answer to that is that a thing is called '*vyāpanna*', 'spoilt', when it is vitiated, rendered defective, by some action—"What is it that is so *spoilt*?"—That thing is called 'spoilt' which is unfit for being eaten by Āryas, such as what is vitiated by the presence of hair or an insect, or polluted by some other polluting circumstance

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *Even when there are several simultaneous 'disconnections', the Expiatory Rite should be performed.*

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF SIMULTANEITY (OF SEVERAL DISCONNECTIONS), THE EXPIATION SHOULD NOT BE PERFORMED; AS THE DECLARATION SPEAKS OF A SEPARATE DISCONNECTION."

Bhāṣya.

Question: In a case where there is disconnection between the *Prastotṛ* and the *Udgātṛ*, as also between the *Udgātṛ* and the *Pratihartṛ* (at one and the same time),—should the prescribed expiation be performed or not?

[At the morning *juice-extraction*, when the Priests are going to recite the *Bahiṣpavamāna Hymn*, they go out of the House in a line, one following the other and catching hold of the end of his loin-cloth, if any one of them loses hold of the cloth of the other, there is a break in the line; this is what is meant by 'Disconnection';—and the expiation laid down for this disconnection is that—(1) if the *Udgātṛ* happen to let go the other's cloth, then the sacrifice should be finished then and there and no sacrificial fees should be paid; and (2) if the line be broken by the *Pratihartṛ*, then, at that same performance, one should give away his entire property'. The question that arises is that, when the line is broken by both these priests, should, or should not, the prescribed expiation be performed?]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In the case of simultaneity, the expiation should not be performed.*—Why?—Because *the declaration speaks of a separate disconnection*; what the texts lay down is an expiation on a separate disconnection. The 'disconnection' in the case in question is brought about by two persons, while what the text speaks of is the expiation when the disconnection is brought about by only one person,—either the *Udgātṛ* or the *Pratihartṛ*;—that disconnection which is brought about by one man along with another man is not 'brought about by one man'; if it were done by one man, then it would be done by him; what would be there to be done by the other man?—From all this it follows that when two priests become disconnected at one and the same time, there is to be no expiation."

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE EXPIATION, BECAUSE THE CONTINGENCY HAS OCCURRED; IT IS ONLY THE TIME THAT IS ONE AND THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the expiation should be performed even in the case of simultaneity; because in that case also, the contingency has occurred,—in the shape of the *disconnection*, of the *Udgātṛ* and that of the *Pratihartṛ*. In a case where there is disconnection of two persons, both are disconnected,—one as well as the other; because 'disconnection' is only the separation of two persons who have been together; and it subsists in both the persons also; as the separation is done by one independently of the other; and so also by this other (independently of the former).—*It is only the time that is one and the same*; and the sameness of the time does not make the two *disconnections* the same.—From all this it follows that even in a case where there are simultaneous disconnections, the expiation should be performed.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *In the case of simultaneous disconnections, there should be option between 'no Sacrificial Fee' and 'the Entire Property as the Fee'.*

SŪTRA (51).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE TWO BEING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where there is disconnection of both the *Udgātr* and the *Pratihartr*, there arises the question—[There being two courses laid down, (1) the finishing of the sacrifice without paying any Sacrificial Fee and (2) finishing it with one's entire property as the Sacrificial Fee]—should there be an option between 'No Fee' and 'Entire Property as Fee'? Or should it be both together?

To this question, the natural answer is that *the two courses being mutually contradictory, there should be option*; that is, the two courses laid down are inconsistent with one another,—in one case *no fee* being given, and in the other, one's *entire property* being given; hence there should be option.

SŪTRA (52).

[OBJECTION]—"IN FACT, BOTH THE COURSES COULD BE ADOPTED IN DIFFERENT PERFORMANCES."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*nā*' ('in fact') sets aside the view set forth above.

"It is not right that there should be *option*; because both the courses are equally enjoined; it is only thus that the declaration of the entire procedure including all the details becomes followed. If there were an option, in one case one alternative would be rejected. Hence both the courses should be adopted together.—As for the argument that 'on account of the two courses being mutually contradictory, there should be option',—our answer is that *both the courses could be adopted in different performances*; it is for this reason that the injunctive term 'should sacrifice' has been repeated twice; so that when action would be taken in accordance with one injunctive word, one course (*no fee*) would be adopted,—and when the action would be taken in accordance with the other word, the other course (*entire property as fee*) would be adopted. In this manner, there would be no inconsistency.—For this reason, both the expiations should be performed."

SŪTRA (53).

[ANSWER]—NOT SO ; AS ONLY ONE COURSE CAN BE ADOPTED AT ONE TIME.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as has been suggested.—Why ?—*Because only one course can be adopted at one time.* In fact, the same sacrifice would have to be repeated over again, if, in the event of either of the two courses being not adopted, the sacrifice were regarded as defective ; in that case, in the event of the entire property being given away, the sacrifice would be defective, as the course of 'no fee' would not have been adopted ; the adopting of one course cannot imply the following of the other course. Then again, the 'giving of no fee' and the 'giving away of the entire property' do not constitute the principal factors ; it is the *sacrifice* which would become connected with the performance equipped with accessory details (like the Sacrificial Fee and the rest).

From all this, it follows that there should be option between the two courses.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *In a case where the two Disconnections occur one after the other, the Expiation performed should be the one laid down in connection with the later Disconnection.*

SŪTRA (54).

IN THE CASE OF ONE (DISCONNECTION) COMING AFTER THE OTHER, THE FORMER IS WEAKER,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY.

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises next is—In a case where the Disconnections occur consecutively, is the expiation to be performed to be that contingent upon the former Disconnection? Or that contingent upon the latter?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Greater regard should be paid to the former one; i.e. when the former Disconnection has occurred, and the performance of the expiation contingent upon it has become necessary,—so long as it is there, one cannot do anything incompatible with it; in fact, what is incapable of being done can never form the object of an injunction; and there can be no doubt that it is the recognition of the former Disconnection that comes first. For this reason, if there were something to be done which would not interfere with it, there would be nothing wrong in *that* being done.—'But where would the other alternative be adopted?'—In a case where the second Disconnection would occur alone by itself.—From all this it follows that greater regard should be paid to the former."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In the *case of one Disconnection coming after the other, the former is weaker.*—Why?—Whenever a verb speaks of something to be done, there is the concomitant notion that 'it should be done in the way it can be done'. In the case in question, what is to be done can be done only in the way of rejecting what is due to the former contingency, not in any other way. Hence the text in question must be taken to mean that 'the expiation to be performed should be one adopted after the rejection of that contingent upon the former Disconnection'.

Says the Opponent—"As soon as the conception of the former expiation appears, it follows that any other conception to the contrary must be wrong".

Reply—But so long as the second conception has not actually appeared, it cannot be pointed out that 'it is so and so'. Nor is it true that the first conception cannot appear until the second one has been denied; consequently the conception that is yet to come cannot be taken as denied by the first conception. When the second conception does actually appear, it can appear only as rejecting the former conception; and thus

being itself rejected, the first conception cannot set aside the second conception;—just *as in the case of the original Primary*; that is, in the performance of the Ectypes, the details appertaining to the original Primary Sacrifice are set aside by those appertaining to the Ectype itself; and here too, the reason is the same (as the one we have put forward above),—namely, that the conception of what appertains to the Ectype cannot appear without setting aside the previous conception of what appertains to the original Primary Sacrifice. And it is the conception of the accessory appertaining to the original Primary that should be taken as appearing first; because the performance of the Ectype stands in need of the knowledge of the original Primary.—"But in this case, what appertains to the Ectype sets aside what appertains to the original Primary, on the ground that, while the former is directly declared (in a Vedic text), the latter can find room in the performance of the Ectype only indirectly through Inference (based upon the General Law that 'the Ectype should be performed in the manner of the original Primary')."—But as a matter of fact, even though directly declared, it could not set aside the other, if the meaning of the verb were not as we have explained above. Even though the conception of what pertains to the original Primary would be there, it would be set aside in the performance of the Ectype, simply because it could not be adopted.

From all this it follows that it is only reasonable that the latter conception should be regarded as more authoritative.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *Even when the Disconnection is that of the 'Udgātṛ', the Entire Property should be given as the Sacrificial Fee.*

SŪTRA (55).

IF THE UDGĀTṚ HAPPEN TO BE THE LAST, THEN AT THE SECOND PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE, THE ENTIRE PROPERTY SHOULD BE GIVEN AWAY; AS IN THE OTHER.

Bhāṣya.

In a case where the Disconnection of the *Pratihartṛ* comes first and then that of the *Udgātṛ*,—as an expiation of the latter Disconnection, the performance of the sacrifice should be finished at that same point without any Sacrificial Fee, and then the second performance of the sacrifice should be taken up.—In regard to this latter performance, there arises the question—At this second performance, what should be the Sacrificial Fee? Should it be 112 (gold pieces; which is the Fee prescribed for the sacrifice under normal conditions)? Or the Entire Property (which is the Fee payable in cases where there is Disconnection of the *Pratihartṛ*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be a hundred and twelve.—Why?—It is thus declared—'At that performance, one should give what one had intended to give at the previous performance'; and at the previous performance, the Sacrificial Fee payable was the one that has been prescribed for the normal *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is 112); hence it follows that at the second performance (which would be the normal performance), the Fee should be 112."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—At the second performance, one should give away the *entire property*,—*as in the other*—i.e. as on the previous day, the entire property would have been given away.—"Why should the *entire property* have been given away on the previous day?"—In consequence of the *disconnection of the Pratihartṛ*; at the *disconnection of the Pratihartṛ* (which had taken place on the previous day, prior to the disconnection of the *Udgātṛ*), the Fee 'intended to be given' must have been 'the entire property', in supersession of the 112 (the normal fee prescribed for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).—"But on the previous day, he had intended to pay 112 also (the normal fee)."—True; but by the giving away of the 'entire property', that (112) also becomes given away (as part of the 'Entire Property'); hence it is the 'Entire Property' that should be taken as 'what was intended to be given on the previous day'.—"But it is possible that one's 'entire property' may be less than 112."—Not so; when the normal fee is 112, the 'entire property' must be more than that.—Then again, on the previous day, the man could not have intended to give 112;—that alone is said to be 'intended to be given away'

which is actually given away subsequently;—and 112 is not actually given away on the previous day;—hence that cannot be regarded as 'intended to be given away'. If there were such a notion, it would be entirely false; while we have to deal with what is absolutely true.

"The 'entire property' also has been precluded (by the 'no fee' consequent upon the subsequent disconnection of the *Udgātṛ*); hence that also cannot be regarded as 'intended to be given'; and such a notion would be entirely false."

Not so, we reply. The performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that we are considering is that which is accompanied by a repetition (due to the disturbance caused by the disconnections and the consequent expiations); and while it is true that in the first performance, the giving away of the *entire property* is precluded as being inconsistent with the 'no fee'.—yet, in the second performance, the giving away of the *entire property* is actually enjoined; and in this there is no inconsistency; because it is practically the same performance of the same sacrifice—and at this same was the *Pratihartr* disconnected;—hence 'the entire property' precludes the 112, and becomes 'what is intended to be given'.—From all this it follows that in the case in question, the *entire property* is to be given away.

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *If there is 'disconnection' at the 'Ahargaṇa sacrifices', all the sacrifices do not have to be repeated.*

SŪTRA (56).

IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'AHARGANA' SACRIFICES, THAT ONE SACRIFICE ALONE HAS TO BE REPEATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF WHICH THE 'DISCONNECTION' HAS OCCURRED, BECAUSE EACH OF THE SACRIFICES IS A DISTINCT ACT.

Bhāṣya.

There is a set of sacrifices (*Dvādashāha* and the rest) which are called by the collective name '*Ahargaṇa*'; during the performance of this set of sacrifices, if, on any day, the 'disconnection' of the *Udgātr* occurs (and as a consequence, the performance is finished at that same point without any sacrificial fee, and the performance of the sacrifice has to be repeated],—there arises the question—At the second performance, should the entire set of sacrifices be repeated? Or only the one at which the disconnection has taken place?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The entire set of sacrifices should be repeated;—why?—because the entire set becomes defective by reason of the non-performance of the sacrifices that would have followed the point at which the disconnection took place, hence the entire set should be repeated."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—That alone should be repeated *at which the disconnection has occurred.*—Why?—*Because each of the sacrifices* (making up the '*Ahaṅgaṇa*') *is a distinct act*, that is, each sacrifice stands by itself, and no one sacrifice is auxiliary to another. Then again, the word in the text is '*istvā*', which means 'having completed the *sacrifice*',—not 'the sacrifice *along with its auxiliaries*'; the other sacrifices of the set, which would help in the entire performance, are already there, and will accord the required help. Hence only that one has to be repeated (during which the disconnection has taken place).

End of Pāda v of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA VI.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Satra' all the sacrificers should be such as belong to the same 'Kalpa'.*

SŪTRA (1).

IN A CASE WHERE SEVERAL PERSONS JOIN TOGETHER IN SACRIFICING, THEY SHOULD ALL BELONG TO THE SAME 'KALPA'; AS IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THERE WILL BE FREEDOM FROM DEFECT; AS IN THE CASE OF THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

Satras are the subject-matter of the present discussion; these are spoken of in such texts as—(*a*) '*Saptadashāvarāh satramāsiran*' ['At least seventeen persons should take part in the *Satra*'];—(*b*) '*Ya evaṁvidvāṁsah satramāsate*' ['Those who knowing thus undertake the *Satra*'];—(*c*) '*Ya evaṁvidvāṁsah satramupayanti*' ['Those who knowing this have recourse to the *Satra*'].

In regard to these *Satras*, there arises the following question—Are persons belonging to the same *Kalpa* and those belonging to several *Kalpas* entitled to join together for the performance of a *Satra*? Or must they all belong to the same *Kalpa*?

Question—"What is the meaning of persons 'belonging to the same *Kalpa*'?"

Answer—There is a rule to the effect that—'The *Nārāshaṁsa* should be the second *Prayāja* for persons belonging to the following *gotras*—*Rājanya*, *Atri*, *Bādhryashva*, *Vasishtha*, *Vainya*, *Shunaka*, *Kanva*, *Kashyapa* and *Saṅkṛti*; and it should be the *Tanūnapāt* for others'.—According to this rule, some persons (those mentioned first) belong to the '*Nārāshaṁsa-Kalpa*', while 'others', belong to the '*Tanūnapāt-Kalpa*'.

To the question propounded above, the natural answer that suggests itself is that—In a case where several sacrificers join together, those alone should undertake the *Satra* who belong to the same *Kalpa*.—Why so?—*Because it is only thus that there will be freedom from defect*; otherwise, the performance would be defective for that man whose *Kalpa* would not be followed in the performance; [that is, if some of the seventeen belong to the *Nārāshaṁsa-Kalpa* and the rest to the *Tanūnapāt-Kalpa*, then in the performance of the second *Prayāja*, if the *Nārāshaṁsa* is adopted, the performance becomes defective to that extent, for those of the sacrificers whose second *Prayāja* should be the *Tanūnapāt*];—and just as in the case of the original Primary Sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*), unless the performance is free from defects, the

desired result is not obtained, so also in the case in question, the proper result would not follow (when the performance is defective).

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ARGUMENT]—"IN FACT, ON THE STRENGTH OF DIRECT DECLARATION (EVEN PERSONS OF DIFFERENT 'KALPAS' MAY JOIN TOGETHER),—AS IN THE CASE OF THE HEAD [OR THE 'ĀSHIRA' CURD]."

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*' ('in fact') rejects the view set forth above.

"It is not correct to say that persons belonging to diverse '*Kalpas*' are not entitled to join together (in the performance of a *Satra*); in fact, they also are perfectly entitled.—'How so?'—Because it is open to all men, without any distinction, to be performers of the sacrifice, and there is no prohibition regarding persons belonging to diverse '*Kalpas*'.—'It has been pointed out that if persons of diverse *Kalpas* join together, then the performance becomes defective (for some of them).'—Our answer to this is that, even so, it should be permissible *on the strength of the direct declaration*; the general injunction includes all persons—also those belonging to diverse *Kalpas*. Under the circumstances, the *defectiveness* would be set aside, *as in the case of the Head*; that is, there is the injunction that 'one should place the human head' (Taitti. Sam. 5. 2. 9. 2), and this touching of the heads of dead bodies, even though forbidden in *Smṛtis*, is done on the strength of the direct declaration [without incurring any sin or defect); and it should be the same in the case in question also; [i.e. even persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas* should be admitted on the strength of the general injunction, and thus should not be the cause of any defectiveness in the performance].

"Or we may read '*āshiravat*' (in place of '*shiroat*', in the *Sūtra*). The meaning in this case would be as follows.—There is the injunction that 'at the *Ṛtapēya* one should live on Clarified Butter',—for the purpose of obtaining this Clarified Butter a cow is brought over, milked, and sent away; and then, for the securing of the *Āshira-Curd* (needed for cleaning the *Soma*), they bring in another cow, on the strength of a direct declaration;—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the admission of persons of diverse *Kalpas* might be permitted on the strength of the direct declaration."

SŪTRA (3).

[ANSWER]—IT CANNOT BE SO: BECAUSE THE DECLARATION IS NOT IN REFERENCE TO ANYTHING.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—'persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas* also are entitled to join together in the *Satra*'; but this is not right; in fact, only persons belonging to the same *Kalpas* can be so entitled.—Why so?—

Because it is only thus that there can be freedom from defectiveness.—It has been argued that "even though defective, the sacrifice would be regarded as duly accomplished, on the strength of the direct declaration".—But that cannot be; because *the declaration is not in reference to anything.* On the strength of a declaration, only that much can be assumed without which assumption the declaration remains meaningless; in case the declaration (regarding the performance of *Satras*) had been made in reference to persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas*, then, with a view to save the declaration from becoming meaningless, it might be assumed that persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas* also may join in the performance of the *Satra*. As a matter of fact, however, the declaration in question has not been made in reference to persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas*; and this declaration would serve a useful purpose if taken in reference to persons belonging to the same *Kalpa*. From all this it follows that persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas* are not entitled to join together (for the performance of *Satras*).

SŪTRA (4).

[OBJECTION]—"THEY SHOULD BE ENTITLED; BECAUSE IT IS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE,—LIKE THE UDUMBARA" POST.

Bhāṣya.

"Persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas* should be entitled to join together at the *Satra*.—Why?—Because the *Kalpa* is for the purposes of the sacrifice; i.e. for persons belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha* and other *gotras* the *Nārāshaṁsa-Kalpa* is only a means for the accomplishment of the sacrifice;—and the act of sacrifice is common to all persons; so that, even when it is accomplished by means of another's *Kalpa*, it is accomplished all the same for all men. Just as, when it is laid down that 'Having made the *Udumbara Post* of the same height as the sacrificer, they cover it up',—by whosoever's height the Post is measured, the sacrifice performed with that post becomes accomplished for all other sacrificers also.—The *Siddhāntin* might argue thus—'[When the text lays down the *Nārāshaṁsa* as the second *Prayāja* for certain performers] the Syntactical Connection connects that *Prayāja* with certain particular persons (not with all); and this would set aside the fact of its being for the purposes of the sacrifice (and hence pertaining to all persons),—which fact is indicated only by *Context* [and *Context* is weaker than *Syntactical Connection*].'—It is not so, we reply; because if that were so, then a result would have to be assumed.—'But in the other case also, it is necessary to assume a transcendental result.'—To that our answer is as follows—True, it has to be assumed; but it is assumed, in that case, on the strength of the actual declaration of the entire procedure being taken to be syntactically connected as 'one sentence'; while in the other case, the declaration also would have to be assumed, and then the Syntactical Connection with it.—It might be argued that 'it might be syntactically connected with some declaration found somewhere in the Veda'.—Even so, the Syntactical

Connection, so assumed, being with a sentence out of the Context and far removed,—would be far more complicated than that based upon the declaration in the same Context."

SŪTRA (5).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THAT (KALPA) IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted above is not possible; *as that is the predominant factor*; i.e. the *Kalpa* in question is something that subserves the purposes of the Man.—"How so?"—For persons belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha* and other *gotras*, the *Nārāshaṁsa* (as the second *Prayāja*) forms an integral part of the sacrifice; and when, for any man, something is an integral part of the sacrifice, that sacrifice accomplishes its results for him only when it is associated with that something; hence the sentence should be construed to mean that, for persons belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha gotra*, the sacrifice accomplishes its results only when it is associated with the *Nārāshaṁsa*.

SŪTRA (6).

AS REGARDS THE 'UDUMBARA POST', IT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE,—LIKE THE PAN.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "as in the case of the *Udumbara Post*, so it should be in the present case also".—But as a matter of fact, the *Udumbara Post* subserves the purposes of something else; and the sacrificer is found to be declared as an accessory (to the Post, as supplying a measure for its height).—"But in the case of the Post also, the declaration of the entire procedure might indicate the predominance of the man (sacrificer)."—That does not affect our position. In the case of the Post, if it has been measured by the height of one sacrificer, it becomes 'a post measured by the sacrificer's height', for all men; while in the case in question, the 'Kalpa' adopted by one sacrificer does not become adopted by all.—It is in this sense that the Post is subservient to the purposes of something else,—*like the Pan*; i.e. just as when it is declared that 'With the Cake-pan they winnow the husks', the husks are understood as to have been winnowed by means of the Pan which is really meant for something else (the baking of the Cake),—in the same manner in the case of the Post also.

SŪTRA (7).

[OBJECTION]—"IT COULD BE DONE BY ANOTHER ALSO",—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer would be as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

If you urge the following argument—"The measuring of the Post is done by the sacrificer; this purpose can be served by the sacrificer at a certain

sacrifice by himself, or by another *sacrificer*; so that the measuring could be done by the sacrificer of another performance also,"—[then our answer is as follows]—

SŪTRA (8).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THERE IS ONLY ONE SACRIFICER SPOKEN OF; THE OTHER HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IT; AND THERE IS NOTHING TO QUALIFY THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

Our answer is as follows—The sacrificer of another performance cannot come in (as supplying the measure of the height of the Post). There is nothing to qualify the term 'sacrificer', with the help of which there could be any restriction (as to which *sacrificer* is meant); but this much is certain that only *one* sacrificer is meant; so that the 'work to be done by the sacrificer' cannot be done by *two* persons; and hence no other sacrificer can be brought in.—Says the Opponent:—'The *one* man may be some *other* sacrificer, who will do all that is *to be done by the Sacrificer*."—That cannot be so; because the entire declaration of the sacrifice along with its accessories is addressed to the person who desires the results expected to follow from that sacrifice. Further, in regard to the measuring of the Udumbara Post, the word 'sacrificer' has not been qualified in any way; hence no other sacrificer can come in.

SŪTRA (9).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT, INASMUCH AS THERE IS A COMBINATION (OF PERSONS BELONGING TO DIVERSE 'KALPAS'), THE CONTINGENCY CEASES, BECAUSE WHAT IS LAID DOWN IS SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO THE PERFORMANCE BEING BY PERSONS OF THE VASHIṢṬHA-GOTRA ONLY,—JUST AS THERE IS IN THE CASE OF THE 'BṚHAT' AND 'RATHANTARA'."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"In the case of there being several sacrificers, there is a combination of persons belonging to diverse *Kalpas*, and hence *the contingency ceases*;—why?—*because what is laid down is specifically in regard to the performance being by persons of the Vashiṣṭha-gotra only*; i.e. at such a performance the use of the *Nārāshaṁsa* (as the *second Prayāja*) is *contingent*,—and in another case (where the performance is by persons of other *gotras*), the use of the *Tanūnapāt* (as the *second Prayāja*) is *contingent*. Now in a case where both these persons are performing the sacrifice jointly, the performance cannot be accomplished by either of them singly; hence no *one* of them is the *performer* in this case;—so that, if the person belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra* alone is not the only performer, then what is contingent upon that

being the case (e.g. the use of the *Nārāshaṁsa*) cannot be done; nor that which is contingent upon the other condition (of the performer belonging to a *gotra* other than *Vashiṣṭha*);—each of these nullifying the other.—*Just as in the case of the 'Bṛhat' and 'Rathantara'*; that is, when the text declares that 'the *Bṛhat-Rathantara Pṛṣṭha* should be used', then what is intended to be accomplished cannot be accomplished by the use of either the *Bṛhat* alone or the *Rathantara* alone; as in that case, neither the *Bṛhat* alone nor the *Rathantara* alone is the condition laid down —Similar are the circumstances attending upon the case we are considering"

SŪTRA (10).

IN REALITY, THE CONNECTION BEING WITH THE PERFORMANCE AS A WHOLE, IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CESSATION, SPECIALLY BECAUSE HE IS RELATED TO IT AS THE 'MASTER'.

Bhāṣya

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth in the preceding *Sūtra*.

To the *performance as a whole*, each single person is related only as a performer,—hence there should be no cessation of the contingent details.—"But how can there be a performance of the act *as a whole*?"—*Because he is related to it as the Master*'; the persons belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha* and other *gotras*,—by themselves,—are related to the act as 'Master'; the act is beneficial to men, and as such, it can bring its fruit to each of them, thus it is that each of the persons would be the 'performer' of the act;—and consequently, all the details contingent upon such a person being the 'performer' should come in.—Just as in the case of the declaration 'give this to Tunda's mother', the thing is given to her, even though she is the mother of both *Tunda* and *Daṇḍika* (and not of *Tunḍa* only); and this on the ground that the whole of her is the *mother of Tunḍa*, and her *motherhood* is not distributed (in parts) between her sons The case we are considering is similar to the case cited.—From all this it follows that persons belonging to diverse 'Kalpas' are not entitled to join in the *Satra*.

SŪTRA (11).

IN THE CASE OF THE TWO SĀMANS (BṚHAT AND RATHANTARA), THEIR CONNECTION IS WITH A PART OF THE ACT, DUE TO ITS PROLONGATION, HENCE THEY COME TO BE RELATED AS ACCESSORIES, IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT IN THAT CASE THERE IS EXCLUSION.

Bhāṣya

It has been argued that "the present case should be dealt with like the case of the *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara Sāmans*".—This has got to be refuted.—

As regards the two Sāmans, Bṛhat and Rathantara, they are connected with a part of the action due to the contingent prolongation of the performance; so that, in that case, both the *Sāmans*, not one of them, are the means of accomplishing the act. The connection of the *Sāmans* is with *a part of* the Hymn,—not with the *entire* Hymn; and the *Sāman* is spoken of here as a subordinate accessory, the Hymn being the predominant factor; hence it is only natural that in this case there should be exclusion.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *To the performance of the 'Kulāya-sacrifice', the King and his Family-Priest are both jointly entitled, even though they belong to different 'Kalpas'.*

SŪTRA (12)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT IS ONE PERSON QUALIFIED BY DUALITY HENCE THEY SHOULD BELONG TO ONE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE HAND"

Bhāṣya

There is the text—'*Ētēna rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajēyātām*' ['Desiring absorption, the King-Family Priest should perform this (*Kulāya*) sacrifice'].

In regard to this there arises the question—'Who are the persons meant?—The *two Family Priests of the King*? Or the *King and his Family-Priest*?'

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—The *two Family-Priests of the King* are meant—How?—The Dual ending appears at the end of the term '*purohita*' (family-priest), and as such it can only signify the *duality* of what is denoted by that term,—it is the *Family Priest* who is directly denoted by that term, not the *King*,—because the term '*purohita*' can denote the *Purohita* (Priest) only, while it is only through indirect indication of both the persons simultaneously being the substratum of *duality* that the Dual ending could take in the *King* also.—'But *one King* could not have *two Family-Priests*, because the injunction regarding the Priest is in the form *should appoint the priest* ('*Purohitam ernīta*'), where the singular number attached to the Predicate must be regarded to be significant'—The answer to this is that, what we have suggested would be possible on the strength of the Direct Declaration (where the term '*purohitau*' actually appears with the Dual ending); and what is there that could not be regularised by Direct Declaration? It is for this reason that *two Priests* should be understood to be spoken of—Just as in the case of the declaration '*Añjalinā juhoti*' ('Offers the oblation with joined hands'), the *two hands* of the *same person* are understood to be meant, though, ordinarily, it is not right for the left hand to be used for this purpose [yet, when the text declares in so many words that the oblation is offered by the *two hands*, the use of the left hand becomes regularised;—in the same manner, in the case in question, though, ordinarily, it is not possible for a King to have two priests, yet, when it is so declared, two Priests will have to be employed]"

SŪTRA (13).

[ANSWER TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE SUCH CANNOT BE THE MEANING OF THE WORD.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('but') implies the rejection of the view set forth in the above *Sūtra*.

It cannot be so:—i.e. it is not right that there should be *two Priests*;—why?—*because such cannot be the meaning of the word*; the word ('*rājapurohitau*') cannot signify *two Priests*;—one King can have only one priest, as is made clear by the singular number attached to the predicate in the injunction '*Purohitam karoti*' ('appoints the *priest*'), where due significance must attach to the singular number.—"It has been pointed out that there would be two *Priests* on the strength of the declaration to that effect."—The answer to that is that the idea in question cannot be based upon a declaration; because what the term 'Priest' connotes is a certain degree of *embellishment*; so that even though appointed, one would not be a 'priest' (unless he had that embellishment).

SŪTRA (14).

FURTHER, INASMUCH AS THE PURPOSES ARE SEPARATELY MENTIONED, THE CONNECTION SPOKEN OF CANNOT BE WITH TWO PERSONS OF THE SAME KIND.

Bhāṣya

The purposes are found to be spoken of separately—'*Spiritual Power* is the glory of the *Brāhmaṇa*, *Heroism* is the glory of the *Kṣattriya*'—which means that each of these two castes is connected with each of the two purposes.—From this also it is clear that *two Priests* are not meant—(one *Kṣattriya* and one *Brāhmaṇa* are meant).

SŪTRA (15)

AS REGARDS THE HAND, IT IS SUBSIDIARY; HENCE THE CONNECTION COULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS BEING WITH ANOTHER (RIGHT HAND).

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, under Sū. 12) that "it is for this same reason that the two hands of the same man are taken as forming the *Añjali* (even though ordinarily, the left hand is regarded as unfit for use)".—In the case of the Hand, it is only right that it should be so; because *it is subsidiary*; i.e. in the forming of the *Añjali* ('joined Hands'), the left hand is subsidiary to the right hand; as without the left hand there could be no *Añjali*; certainly the two right hands are not called '*Añjali*'.—

Hence in the case in question, 'the King *and* the Priest' should be meant.—"The compound '*rājapurohitau*' may be expounded as an *Ēkashēṣa* compound, standing for '*the King's Priest*' *and* '*the King's Priest*' (i.e. two royal priests); so that two royal priests may offer the sacrifice in question."—The answer to this is that two 'royal Priests' cannot be 'desirous of absorption'; it is only *the King along with his Priest* who can have a common purpose in view,—not one Priest along with another Priest; because both of them would be called 'Priests' by virtue of *acting* for the King,—and *not* of *desiring* the King. Then again, the term 'Priest' connotes a certain degree of embellishment.—"Under your view, a recourse to *indirect indication* becomes necessary."—The answer to that is that, in the absence of Direct Assertion, recourse may be had to Indirect Indication; for instance, when it is said that 'he is sitting in the Fire', what is meant is (not that he is actually sitting *in the fire*, but) that 'he is sitting in the hot pit' [the term 'fire' being taken as indirectly indicating the *hot pit*, as what it directly denotes, the *actual fire*, is not applicable].

From all this it follows that 'the King *and* the Priest' are meant by the compound '*rājapurohitau*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The Brāhmaṇa alone is entitled to perform the Satra.*

SŪTRA (16).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SATRAS ARE FOR ALL CASTES; AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

Satras form the subject-matter for consideration. They have been laid down in such texts as—'Those who, knowing this, betake themselves to the *Satra*', 'those who knowing this undertake the *Satra*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the *Satras* for all the three castes? Or for *Brāhmaṇas* only?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*Satras should be for all castes*;—why?—*because there is no distinction*; the texts speak of no such distinction as that '*Satras* are for such and such castes, and not for such others'. Hence it follows that all three castes should be entitled to perform *Satras*."

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also we conclude that *Satras* are for all the three castes.—'For what reason?'—*Because we find texts indicative of the same conclusion.* Says the text—'For the *Brāhmaṇa*, one should sing the *Brahma-sāman* called *Bārhadgira*, for the *Kṣattriya*, that called *Pārthurashma*, and for the *Vaishya*, that called *Rāyobājīya*'; this text relates to the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice (which is a *Satra*), and speaks of the *Brahma-sāman*; and herein we find the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* also mentioned. This also shows that all the three castes are entitled to perform the *Satra*."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE FOR BRĀHMAṆAS ONLY; AS THE OTHER TWO CASTES CANNOT OFFICIATE AS PRIESTS.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'तु' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not true that *Satras* are for all the three castes; in fact *they should be for Brāhmanas only.*—Why?—*Because the other two cannot officiate as priests*; as a matter of fact, Priesthood has been forbidden for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*; and a performance of the *Satra* (at which the *sacrificers* themselves act as *Priests*) would become defective if the sacrificers themselves did not act as priests.—From this it follows that *Satras* are to be performed by *Brāhmanas* only.

SŪTRA (19)

[OBJECTION]—'IT COULD BE SO, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE DIRECT DECLARATION'.—IF THIS BE URGED [then the answer would be as given in the following *Sūtra*]

Bhāṣya

Says the Opponent—'Your view is that if the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* were to perform the *Satra*, the performance would be defective (as they could not act as priests, and at a *Satra* every sacrificer must act as a priest)';—but on the strength of Direct Declaration that 'at the *Satra*, the sacrificers are Priests', the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*, when performing the *Satra*, could act as Priests.—But who are the *Sacrificers*? All those, even *Kṣattriyas* and *Vaishyas*, who, desiring the particular results, undertake the performance of the *Satra*, are to be regarded as its Sacrificers; and, as such, on the strength of the declaration quoted above, Priesthood should be taken as enjoined for all of them.—On this, the following argument may be urged—The declaration speaks of the *Priesthood* of only those persons for whom it is possible, and it is possible for *Brāhmanas* only, as it has been distinctly forbidden for the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*, so that the injunction of Priesthood cannot apply to these latter.—But it is not so; just as the declaration in question is taken as injunctive of the hitherto unknown Priesthood of the sacrificing *Brāhmanas*,—so also the same declaration may be taken as injunctive of similar Priesthood of the sacrificing *non-Brāhmanas* also.—From all this it follows that even *Kṣattriyas* and *Vaishyas*, when duly invested with Priesthood, can perform the *Satra*."

SUTRA (20)

[ANSWER]—WHAT THE DECLARATION LAYS DOWN IS ONLY 'MASTERSHIP'

Bhāṣya

It cannot be as has been urged in the preceding *Sūtra*.—It is 'Mastership' that is laid down in the text 'With such and such desires they should undertake the *Satra*', it does not lay down 'Priesthood'.—"But *Priesthood* has been laid down in the text 'Those who are sacrificers are the Priests'".—The answer to this is that that also is not so; why?—because even this sentence is not to be construed so as to make the term 'those who are sacrificers', the Subject, and the term 'priests', the Predicate; as in that case *Priest*

hood would be predicated as a consecratory auxiliary to the *Sacrificers*, and not the *Sacrificers* as auxiliaries to *Priesthood*; and under the circumstances, the *Priesthood* would not be recognised as serving any purpose at the sacrifice in hand, and an unseen embellishment or consecration would have to be assumed;—and that also would have to appertain to the *Sacrificer*,—which again would be another unseen (transcendental) factor. From all this it follows that in the said sentence, the *priestly functions* are not laid down for those who are already *Sacrificers*; all that is laid down is that the *priestly functions* are not to be performed by any other persons (besides the sacrificers); so that in construing the sentence, the term 'priests' should be the Subject, and the term 'those same' should be the Predicate; the meaning being that 'the Priests are those same who are the sacrificers, none others', so that by conversion, the sacrificers are enjoined as the performers of the *priestly functions*, and persons other than these are excluded. In this way the priestly functions serve a useful purpose at the sacrifice in hand, and no unseen or transcendental embellishment for the sacrificer is enjoined – It might be argued that – the idea of the priestly functions being performed by the sacrificers might itself lead to the assumption of a transcendental result following from the adopting of this procedure"—Our answer to that would be that under the other view also, it would be necessary to assume a transcendental factor in the shape of the embellishment of the sacrificer; –and an objection that applies equally to both views should not be urged against one of them.

SUTRA (21)

[OBJECTION]—"THOSE TWO (KṢATTRIYA AND VAISHYA) MIGHT BE REGARDED AS 'MASTERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD', AS THERE CAN BE NO INCONGRUITY IN THAT"

Bhāṣya

'The *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* might be regarded as performers of the functions of the 'Masters of the Household' (in connection with the *Satras* performed by them), in the performance of those functions there is no necessity of 'priesthood'; hence they would involve no incongruity (as there is in the case of their being regarded as 'Priests', *priesthood* having been forbidden for them)."

SUTRA (22).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE, AS IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBILITY OF PROCEDURE (KALPA).

Bhāṣya

It cannot be right to hold that the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* would perform the functions of the Master of the House. Because in that case *there would be incompatibility of procedure*: For instance, for the *sacrificers* (who are *Brāhmanas*), the cup would contain *Soma-juice*, while for others

(who are *Kṣattriyas* or *Vaishyas*) it would contain the 'Fruit-mixture' (consisting of Banyan-shoots and other things); and secondly, for *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Brahma-sāman* would be the *Bārhadgira*, while for *Kṣattriya*, it would be the *Parthurashma*; and for *Vaishyas*, the *Rāyobājīya*.—Hence this view also cannot be accepted, that the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* would perform the functions of the 'Master of the House'.

SŪTRA (23).

THE INDICATIVE TEXT QUOTED SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THE 'AHĪNA' (NOT TO THE 'SATRA'); BECAUSE 'MASTERSHIP' BELONGS TO THE OTHERS (I.E. PRIESTS)

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged above (under Sū. 17) that "there are texts indicative of the same conclusion".—This has got to be refuted.—In refutation, we state as follows:—It is the *Ahīna* that is going to be spoken of as '*Satra*' (in certain texts) [and it is the *Ahīna* to which the text quoted refers, not to the *Satra*]; because (at the *Satra*), the 'mastership' has been predicated for the Priests; hence inasmuch as the Priests are the 'masters', there can be no *Satra* for *Kṣattriyas* and *Vaishyas*. Hence the text quoted should be taken as pertaining to the *Ahīna-sacrifice* (not to the *Satras*).

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *To the performance of the Satra only those are entitled who either belong to the Vishvāmitra-gotra or to the same 'Kalpa' as these.*

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE SATRA IS FOR THOSE ONLY WHO BELONG TO THE VASHIṢTHA-GOTRA; BECAUSE THE BRAHMANSHIP IS RESTRICTED TO THEM."

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood that *Satras* are for *Brāhmaṇas* only, not for *Kshattriyas* and *Vaishyas*. Now the question arises—Are the *Satras* for all *Brāhmaṇas*? Or for those only who are of the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra*? Or to all others, except those belonging to the *gotras* of *Bhṛgu*, *Shunaka* and *Vashiṣṭha*?

The answer that suggests itself first is that—"it is for *all Brāhmaṇas*, as there is no distinction; there is no such distinction made as that 'the *Satra* is for such and such *Brāhmaṇas*, not for such others'. Hence it must be for all *Brāhmaṇas*".

As against this, there is the following view:—"It is for those only who belong to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra*, because the office of the *Brahman Priest* is restricted to them. That is, the *Satra* is for persons of the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra*;—why?—because the office of the *Brahman-priest* is restricted, in the text—'a person of the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra* becomes the *Brahman-priest*'. From this it is clear that *Satras* can be performed by those only who either belong to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra*, or to the same *Kalpa* as those."

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, IT MAY BE FOR ALL; BECAUSE OF THE DENIAL."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Satra* should be for all, because there is no distinction.—'But it has been declared that one who belongs to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra* becomes the *Brahman-priest*.'—It is not so; because that view is subsequently denied, when it is said—'Any one who studies the section on *Stoma* should be the Brahman-priest'.—'If that is so, then why should it be taught that the person belonging to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra* should be the *Brahman-priest*?'—That statement is for the purpose of eulogising the section on *Stoma*, the meaning being that 'the *Stoma*-section is so important that one who studies it, even though he may not belong to the *Vashiṣṭha-gotra*, is capable of performing the functions of one belonging to that *gotra*'."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE OFFICE OF THE HOTṚ-PRIEST IS RESTRICTED TO ONE BELONGING TO THE VISHVĀMITRA-GOTRA,—PERSONS BELONGING TO THE GOTRAS OF BHṚGU, ŚUNAKA AND VASHIṢṬHA CANNOT BE ENTITLED (TO PERFORM SATRAS).

Bhāṣya.

Persons belonging to the *Bhṛgu* and other *gotras* are not entitled to perform *Satra*.—Why?—Because the office of the *Hotṛ-priest* has been restricted to one who belongs to the *Vishvāmitra-gotra*, in the text—'One belonging to the *Vishvāmitra-gotra* becomes the *Hotṛ-priest*'.—From this it follows that the only persons entitled to perform *Satras* are those who belong to the *Vishvāmitra-gotra* and those who belong to the same '*Kalpa*' as these.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *To the performance of Satras the only person entitled is one who has installed the Fires.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"INASMUCH AS THE VIHĀRA-FIRE IS ALL-POWERFUL, THE SATRA MAY BE FOR THOSE ALSO WHO HAVE INSTALLED THE FIRES"

Bhāṣya.

Satras are the subject-matter of the present *Adhikarana*, they being declared in such texts as—'Those who knowing this undertake the *Satra*'; 'Those who knowing thus have recourse to the *Satra*'.

In regard to these *Satras*, there arises the question—Are the *Satras* for those who have installed the Fires, as well as for those who have not installed them? Or only for those who have installed the Fires?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They are for both—those who have installed the fires, as well as those who have not installed them.—Why so?—Because the *Vihāra-Fire* (*Āhavaniya*) *is all-powerful*; that is, the *Āhavaniya* fire set up by one man is capable of helping all men; whose acts become accomplished by the said Fire even though installed by another person. And as the act can be accomplished by the Fire belonging to any other person, it follows that *Satras* may be performed even by those who have, as well as those who have not, installed their own Fires."

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION, IN RELATION TO THE SĀRASVATA-SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with the *Sārasvata-Satra*, we find the following indicative text—'Those who, *without having installed their own Fires*, perform the *Satra* go to Heaven on chariots belonging to others'.—This clearly shows that *Satras* can be performed by those also who have not installed their own Fires.—From this also it follows that the *Satra* is for all persons."

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE AN EXPIATION HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED."

Bhāṣya.

"An expiation has been prescribed in the following text—'If the Fires of an *Agnihotrin* become mixed up with other Fires, a cake baked on eight pans should be offered to *Agni-Virichi*';—here an expiation is prescribed as to be performed on the mixing up of the Fires;—the mixture meant here can only be possible with such Fires as have not been duly installed, not otherwise.—From this also it follows that *Satras* may be performed by those persons who have not installed their own Fires."

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THEY MUST BE FOR THOSE ONLY WHO HAVE INSTALLED THEIR OWN FIRES; BECAUSE OF THE PRECEDENCE OF IṢTIS.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, *Satras are for those who have installed their own Fires*, not for those who have not installed the Fires.—Why so?—*Because of the precedence of Istis*; that is, it has been declared that *Soma-sacrifices* [and *Satras* are *Soma-sacrifices*] are preceded by the performance of *Iṣtis*, in the text—'One should perform the Soma-sacrifice, *after having performed the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices*'; so that the *Jyotiṣtoma* (which is the Archetype of *Soma-sacrifices*) must be preceded by the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*; and through the General Law (that 'Ectypes should be performed like the Archetype'), this 'precedence of *Istis*' becomes applicable to *Satras* also (these also having the *Jyotiṣtoma* for their Archetype).—From this it follows that *Satras* cannot be performed by those who have not installed their own Fires.—[Because the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* cannot be performed without these Fires, and the *Satras* must be preceded by the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*.]

SŪTRA (31).

ALSO BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION OF THE FIRES IS PROMPTED BY THE MAN'S OWN PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Fires are prompted by the man's own purpose.—How so?—Because of the special (*Ātmanēpada*) ending; in the injunction of Fire-installation, we find the *Ātmanēpada* ending used—'*Agnin ādadhīta*'; which shows that the purposes of one man cannot be served by means of the Fires installed by another person, even though the Fires may have been installed for sacrificial purposes.

SŪTRA (32).

FURTHER, THERE IS A VEDIC TEXT INDICATING THE UNITING (OF FIRES).

Bhāṣya.

There is a text to the effect, 'going to offer the *Sāvitra* oblations, they should unite the Fires'; this also indicates that *Satras* are for those only who have installed their own Fires. [The *Sāvitra* oblations are offered at the *Satras*; and unless a man has his own Fires, how can he *unite* them ?]

Though the *Adhikaraṇa* remains incomplete, in so far as the (*Pūrvapakṣa*) argument based upon indicative texts has not been refuted,—yet the author proceeds with the consideration of another topic in the following *Adhikaraṇa*. —[The refutation required under the present *Adhikaraṇa* follows later on, under Sū. 35, below.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Juhū' and the other vessels should be secured afresh, which would belong in common to all the sacrificers at the Satra.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE BEING A DOUBT IN REGARD TO THE JUHŪ AND OTHER VESSELS, ONE SHOULD BE FREE TO DO AS HE LIKES; BECAUSE THE VESSELS DO NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW IN THE WAKE (OF THE SACRIFICER)."

Bhāṣya.

The question to be considered now is—[At the performance of the *Satra*], should the sacrifice be performed with the *Juhū* and other vessels belonging to any one of the sacrificers (forming part of the ordinary equipment of his daily *Agnihotra*)? Or should new vessels be secured, belonging in common to all the (seventeen) sacrificers?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The performance should be carried on with the vessels got from any one of the sacrificers.—Why so?—Because in every case his own vessels do not follow in the wake of a sacrificer wherever he goes; there being no such hard and fast rule as that 'the Sacrificer should carry on the performance with his own vessels'.—Hence it follows that the sacrificers may perform the sacrifice with vessels belonging to others."

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD SECURE OTHER (FRESH) VESSELS WHICH WOULD BE COMMON TO ALL THE SACRIFICERS; AS THERE WOULD BE INCONGRUITIES (IN THE OTHER CASE);—ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SANCTIONED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The view set forth above is not right. The right view is that new vessels should be secured which would belong in common to the (seventeen) sacrificers.—Why?—*Because there would be incongruities*; there would, for instance, be this incongruity that, if the vessels belonging to any one of the sacrificers were brought in for use,—and if that sacrificer happened to die,—there would be the difficulty that, there being the law that—'The *Agnihotrī* should be cremated along with his fires and sacrificial vessels',—if all his vessels were burnt with him, the performance of the sacrifice by the other sacrificers would become stopped; if (in order to avoid this) they proceeded to finish

the sacrifice with those vessels, the cremation of the dead man's body would become vitiated. On the other hand, there would be no incongruity if other new vessels were secured which would be common to all the sacrificers. Hence this latter is the course that should be adopted.

SŪTRA (35).

THE EXPIATION WOULD BE PERFORMED UNDER ABNORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* refutes the argument (urged in Sū. 29) based upon an indicative text.

Under our view the expiation would be quite possible.—How ?—When people are passing through or staying in a desolate place, or in a forest, —if danger arises from robbers or wild animals, their Fires might get mixed up with the Forest-fire [and thus would be quite possible in cases where all the persons concerned are such as have installed their own Fires].—Or the Expiation may be taken as applying to a case where several persons with installed Fires are living together (where there is a possibility of their Fires becoming mixed up).

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *All the three castes are entitled to the 'seventeen Sāmidhēnīs'.*

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CONNECTION WITH THE ECTYPAL SACRIFICE, THE MENTION OF THE PERSON SHOULD RESTRICT THE PERFORMER; BECAUSE THE NUMBER IN QUESTION IS AN ACCESSORY OF THE SACRIFICE: AND THE NUMBER DOES NOT PERTAIN TO OTHERS; THE CONNECTION SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Adhvarakalpa*' sacrifices,—such, for instance, as the '*Āgrayaṇēṣṭi—Pashu*',—form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*; in connection with these 'seventeen *Sāmidhēnī* verses' have been spoken of.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all the three castes entitled to these sacrifices?—Or the *Vaishya* only?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"In connection with such ectypal sacrifices, the performer becomes restricted by the mention of the person.—Why so?—Because the sacrifice—the *Adhvarakalpa* and the like—has the number in question ('seventeen') for its accessory; and this number has been spoken of in connection with the *Vaishya*; so that it is the *Vaishya* alone who could perform the sacrifice in its entirety; because the number *seventeen* being an accessory of the sacrifice,—if this number 'seventeen' were adopted by a *non-Vaishya*, it would be wrong; as that number has not been enjoined in regard to persons other than *Vaishyas*; hence, by reason of this disqualification of theirs, the injunction 'should sacrifice' would (in this case) not apply to *Brāhmaṇas* and *Kṣattriyas*."

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA CONCLUDED]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF AN INDICATIVE TEXT; AS IN THE CASE OF A PARTICULAR SACRIFICE".

Bhāṣya.

"There is the following text indicative of the fact that the number 'seventeen' pertains to the *Vaishya* only—'*Saptadasho vaishyaḥ*' ['The *Vaishya* is the seventeenth']; this indicates that the number 'seventeen' is specially related to the *Vaishya*;—from which it follows that sacrifices like those under consideration are for the *Vaishya* only; just as a particular sacrifice (the *Vaishya-stoma*) is for the *Vaishya* only—as laid down in the text—'The *Vaishya* should perform the *Vaishya-stoma* sacrifice', where the sacrifice is definitely associated with the *Vaishya*. The same should be the case with the number 'seventeen' also."

SŪTRA (38).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THE CONNECTIONS (OF THE TWO SENTENCES) ARE DIFFERENT; THE ACCESSORY (NUMBER 'SEVENTEEN') IS ONE OF WHICH THE 'SACRIFICE' IS THE 'PRINCIPAL'; BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION IS NOT CONNECTED (WITH IT).

Bhāṣya

What has been set forth above is not right. *Because the two connections are different*: There is one sentence 'For the *Vaishya*, seventeen *Sāmidhēnī* verses should be recited',—and there is a totally different sentence in connection with the *Adhvarakalpa* and the rest—'One should recite seventeen'.—Then again, the accessory has for its 'principal' (is subservient to) the *sacrifice*; and the *sacrifice* is not subservient to the accessory.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then, wherever the *sacrifice* is, its accessory must be there; and not that wherever the accessory is, the *sacrifice* should be there. It is through the accessory that the sacrifice would pertain to the *Vaishya*. In fact, the *sacrifice* pertains to all the three castes, and it requires the accessory.—Then again, of the accessory as belonging to the *sacrifice*, there is a distinct injunction,—and that injunction is not connected with the *Vaishya*; in fact, that injunction speaks of an accessory which has no connection with the *Vaishya*.—"But at first it speaks of it as connected with the *Vaishya*."—Not so; because of the predominance of the *Vaishya*; as a matter of fact, in the previous injunction, the *Vaishya* is only spoken of as the predominant factor.—From all this it follows that all the three castes are entitled (to the use of the number 'seventeen').

SŪTRA (39).

AS REGARDS THE PARTICULAR SACRIFICE, THE CONNECTION OF THE VAISHYA BEING A NECESSARY FACTOR IN IT, IT IS ONLY RIGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE PARTICULAR CASTE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "as the *Vaishya-stoma* sacrifice is restricted to the *Vaishya*, so should it be in the case in question".—But in the case of the *Vaishya-stoma*, it is only right that it should be so; because it is distinctly prescribed for the *Vaishya*; and so it becomes restricted on the strength of the words of the text itself. Hence in that case there is nothing wrong.

End of Pāda VI of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA VII

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Father and other relatives are not to be given away at the Vishvajit sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN ONE IS GIVING AWAY HIS PROPERTY, HE SHOULD GIVE ALL WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vishvajit* sacrifice we read—'*Sarvasvan dadāti*', ['He gives away all that is his own'].

In connection with this, there arises the question—Should everything, whatever is called 'one's own'—even Father, Mother and the like—be given away? Or only that which is called 'one's own' in the sense of his being master of it, is to be given away?

The *Pūrvapaksa* view on this question is as follows—'*Without any distinction*, everything—even Father, Mother and the like—should be given away.—*Objection*. 'But *Giving* implies the cessation of the ownership of the giver, and the creation of another's (recipient's) ownership, and it is not possible for one's ownership of his Father and other relations to cease, in no way can one's Father cease to be his Father'—The answer to this is as follows—True, the Father does not cease to be one's Father; but he can be made the servant of another person, and in reality, *giving* means only the creation of another's ownership, the surrender of one's own ownership comes only by implication—From all this it follows that all should be given away.'

SŪTRA (2)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ONLY THAT (SHOULD BE GIVEN) OVER WHICH ONE IS MASTER, ANYTHING OTHER THAN THAT CANNOT BE GIVEN AWAY.

Bhāṣya.

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

That alone over which one has *ownership*, in the sense of *mastery* over it, should be given away,—nothing else.—Why so?—Because only that can be given over which one is master, *anything other than that cannot be given away*; that is, one cannot renounce *one's* ownership over his Father and other relatives.—"But certainly it is possible to make them the servants

of another person ".—The answer to that is that as a matter of fact, there can be no giving away of that property over which one has no mastery. Nor can it be right to treat one's Father and other relatives as *servants*. He for whom this would be right might give away the Father !—Says the Opponent —" When it is said that whatever is called 'one's own' should be given away, it follows that the Father and other relatives also are to be given away. [As they are certainly called '*one's own* Father' and so forth]; and hence in regard to this, one might ignore the *Smṛti* (which lays down that the Father should be respected and should not be treated as an inferior) and try his best to establish his *mastery* over him ".—The answer to this is that the term 'one's own' is applied to his own wealth and relatives *severally*, not collectively. So that the requirements of the injunction (of giving away 'all one's own') having been fulfilled by the giving away of *all one's wealth*, there can be no justification for including the *relatives* under the 'all', who, in fact, cannot be given away. Nor, therefore, is it necessary to reject any *Smṛti-rules*. Then again, in accordance with the General Law (that 'the Ectype should be performed in the manner of the Archetype') the giving away of such things as the *cow* and the like having become admissible, on this ground also, the 'all' must be restricted to *one's wealth*; and this being done, the requirements of the Injunction become fulfilled; and thus there can be no reason for taking in the *relatives*.—From this it follows that the Father and such relatives are not to be given away: and that alone should be given away over which the man's 'ownership' is in the nature of 'mastery' over it.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *At the Vishvajit sacrifice, the Earth should not be given away.*

SŪTRA (3).

THE EARTH CANNOT BE GIVEN AWAY; BECAUSE IT BELONGS TO ALL MEN WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same 'giving away of one's *entire property*', there arises the question—Can the Earth be given away or not?

Question—"What is meant by the 'Earth' here?"

Answer—What is meant is the substance, the terrestrial globe made up of earth-particles; mere land (fields) or clay is not what is meant here.

On the above question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"As there is nothing particular about it, the Earth can certainly be given away; because the term 'one's own' is applicable to it in the sense of 'mastery over it'; and it is quite possible, by an operation of the mind, to surrender one's ownership over it".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta—The Earth cannot be given away*; people are found to be owners of lands (fields), not of the entire terrestrial globe.

Says the Opponent—"One who happens to be the Lord of the whole Earth may give it away".

Even he cannot give it away, we reply.—"Why?"—Because the enjoyment that the 'Lord of the Earth' derives from his ownership of the Earth is precisely like that which other men have; and there is no difference in the enjoyment. In fact, the peculiarity that his 'Lordship of the Earth' gives him is only this that, by reason of his being engaged in the protecting of the corns and other produce of other people, he receives a share out of these,—which alone he *possesses*, not the Earth; and there is nothing peculiar in regard to his ownership over such supporting and preserving etc. of all living beings as are done by persons inhabiting the Earth, and in that sense done by the Earth itself.—From all this it follows that the Earth cannot be given away.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *At the Vishvajit, the Horse and such animals cannot be given away.*

SUTRA (4).

INASMUCH AS IT IS WHAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THIS RESPECT, THESE ANIMALS DIFFER FROM OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Vishvajit* sacrifice, there arises the question—Can *horses* and such animals be given or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "inasmuch as the giving away of one's *all* has been laid down, Horses also should be given away".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—That should not be given away, the giving of which is something that *should not be done*; and the giving of the Horse is what *should not be done*. In fact, this is what distinguishes the Horse from other things that its giving has been forbidden in the following text in connection with the *Vishvajit* itself—'One should not give animals with nails, and one should not accept the gift of animals with two rows of teeth'.—For this reason Horses should not be given away.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *At the Vishvajit, only such 'entire property' may be given away as is already there.*

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO, WHAT IS PERMANENT CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH THINGS IMPERMANENT.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Vishvajit* sacrifices, there arises the following question—When it is said that 'one should give away his entire property', does it mean that all the paraphernalia that a man can have—such as earthenware vessels and the like,—should be acquired and then given away, along with those that can be acquired? Or that he should give away what he actually possesses at the time, and it is not necessary to acquire what is not already there?

Question—"Why should there be any such doubt *on the point*?"

Answer—The question arises from the fact that both interpretations of the words is possible. The words, for instance, may be construed (*a*) as predicating the *giving away*, the meaning of the Injunction being that 'all possible belongings—which all?—all those things that are useful to man, such as beds and the like,—should be given away',—or (*b*) as predicating the 'entirety', the sense of the Injunction being that 'what is meant to be given away is that *all* which can be given away'. If it is the 'giving away' that is taken as predicated [as in (*a*)], then even those vessels specially made for the purpose,—which are not already there to be given,—should have to be secured and then given away; while, on the other hand, if it is 'entirety' that is taken as predicated, then there is to be 'giving away' of only those things that are already there (and hence, can be given away).

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows: "The vessels made specially for the purpose should be (obtained and) given; because if 'giving away' is taken as predicated, then the 'Direct Assertion' becomes accepted; while in the other case, only 'Syntactical Connection' would be honoured;—between these two, greater authority attaches to 'Direct Assertion'. Hence it follows that the newly-made vessels and such things should be (obtained and) given away."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta—Also what is permanent can have no connection with things impermanent.* The particle '*cha*', 'also', connects this statement with what has gone before; the sense being that it has been settled that Horses should not be given, and the *vessels specially made for the purpose also* should not be given. Because in the text in question, the mention of the 'giving' at the *Vishvajit* sacrifice is only a reiteration of the 'giving' that has been enjoined in connection with the Archetypal sacrifice, and which, therefore, is a permanent factor, coming *into the Vishvajit on the strength of the General Law* (that 'the Ectype is

to be performed in the manner of the Archetype'); while the vessels that would be specially made for the purpose, and the other things that might be acquired (for the purpose of being given away), would be impermanent factors (because they have not been enjoined in any Vedic text); and for this reason, these latter could not be all collected at any performance of the *Vishvajit* sacrifice. Because the actual making of some of these newly-made vessels would be dependent upon the *giving away* at the *Vishvajit*; and these would thus be contingent, *not* permanent; while what is enjoined by the General Law is something permanent, to be given away under certain contingencies (such as the performance of the *Vishvajit*, for instance).—For these reasons it must be admitted that what is predicated is the *entirety* of those things whose *giving away* is already possible. And it is quite natural that, when the direct meaning of the words is not acceptable, that indicated by Syntactical Connection should be accepted.—From all this, it follows that new vessels are not to be specially made for the purpose and then given away.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the Vishvajit, there should be no giving away of the Shūdra-servant who is serving one solely for the purpose of learning his Dharma.*

SŪTRA (6).

THE SHŪDRA ALSO (SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN AWAY), BECAUSE HE IS THERE FOR BEING INSTRUCTED IN HIS DUTIES.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Vishvajit* sacrifice, there arises the question—Should the *Shūdra* servant be given away or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "inasmuch the *entire property* has been laid down as to be given, the *Shūdra* servant also should be given away".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*The Shūdra also 'should not be given away'* thus-clause has to be brought in here also—Why so?—*Because he is there for being instructed in his duties*; that is, he has come to serve the man for the purpose of being taught his duties, says the text—'The *Shūdra* presents himself before a man of one of the three higher castes with the view that by serving him he would acquire (knowledge of) *Dharma*'.—If such a *Shūdra* were given away to another person, it is possible that he may not be willing to leave (the man whom he has been serving); and if he went unwillingly, he would not acquire the knowledge of *Dharma* that he seeks. No *Shūdra* should be acquired as property against his will; if one did acquire a *Shūdra* illegally, he might give him away, but one who has come only for learning *Dharma* cannot be given away.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the Vishvajit, that 'entire property' alone should be given which is there at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee.*

SŪTRA (7).

THAT PROPERTY ALONE SHOULD BE GIVEN AWAY WHICH IS FOUND THERE AT THE TIME OF THE PAYMENT OF THE SACRIFICIAL FEE; AS THAT ALONE CAN BE GIVEN AWAY.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Vishvajit*, there arises the following question—At the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, must all the wealth that the man has had before that time be necessarily brought,—as also what is not yet come, but is coming after that time,—all this is to be given?—Or only that should be given which is actually there at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"That also should be given away which has been in the past, and is going to be in the future, the 'property' of the man; because what has been enjoined is the giving away of every kind of property".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*That property alone should be given away* which is found there at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee,—not what was there before, or is coming after, that.—Why so?—Because what is predicated (and enjoined) here is *entirety* in reference to the *giving away* of the property; and as this *giving away* is to be done at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, the said reference also can be to that same time. Hence it follows that that alone should be given what is actually there at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the Vishvajit, even after the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, the remaining accessory details should be performed.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"AS THERE WOULD BE NOTHING LEFT, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE SHOULD END WITH THAT (PAYMENT OF THE SACRIFICIAL FEE); BECAUSE A SACRIFICIAL ACT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED ONLY WITH MATERIALS."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the same *Vishvajit*, there arises the question Should the performance of the *Vishvajit* be given up at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee?—Or all the materials should not be given up, and the remaining sacrificial details should be completed with those materials?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The sacrifice should be given up at the said point.—'Why?'—*As there would be nothing left* -- Why should there be nothing left?'—Because it has been laid down that 'at the *Vishvajit* one should give away *all* as the fee', and unless there are materials, no sacrifice can be performed to its conclusion. Hence the performances must end with the payment of the Fee."

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, SOMETHING SHOULD BE KEPT BACK; BECAUSE THE COMPLETE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE HAS BEEN CLEARLY ENJOINED."

Bhāṣya.

The term 'or' implies the rejection of *Pūrvapakṣa* (A).

"*Something should be kept back*; i.e. at the time of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, the whole property shall not be given away, that much of it should be retained which would be needed for the completion of the performance.—'Why so?'—*Because the complete performance of the sacrifice has been clearly enjoined*; what the injunction 'one should perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice' means is that one should perform it *from beginning to end*. An it is only when the man is completing it that he should give away as t Fee all that can be given. Consequently the sacrifice should not be giv up at the point of the Sacrificial Fee."

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"WE ALSO FIND A TEXT POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"It is only when the above course is adopted, that the following text becomes explicable—'Having come out of the *Avabhṛtha Bath* he should put on the calf-skin'. This could be possible only if the performer retained some of his belongings."

SŪTRA (11).

[OBJECTION AGAINST THE PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—'BUT, THE RIGHT COURSE IS THAT THE ENTIRE BELONGINGS SHOULD BE GIVEN AWAY. THE REMAINDER OF THE SACRIFICE WOULD BE PERFORMED WITH MATERIALS OBTAINED AFRESH.'

Bhāṣya

The term 'but' implies the rejection of *Pūrvapakṣa* (B).

The right course is that the entire belongings shall be given away (nothing shall be kept back); as it is then that the words 'should give away the entire property' become justified.—As regards the *completion of the performance*, which has been clearly enjoined, what we say is that what remains of the sacrifice shall be performed *with materials obtained afresh*'.—

"Our answer to this objection is as follows:—

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER]—"THIS CANNOT BE, BECAUSE THE 'OBTAINING OF FRESH MATERIALS' IS AN IMPERMANENT (UNCERTAIN) FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, the obtaining of fresh materials is an uncertain (impermanent) factor, while the performance of what remains of the sacrifice is essential (permanent), and there can be no connection between these two. Hence some of the materials should be kept back."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, AT THE INITIATION ITSELF, THERE IS AN ASSIGNMENT; SO THAT WHAT IS LAID DOWN AS TO BE GIVEN AWAY IS NOT WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE. HENCE THERE WOULD BE NO INCONSISTENCY.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'in reality' implies the rejection of the above views.

It is not right that some part of the materials should be kept back.—As a matter of fact, *at the Initiation itself there is an assignment*,—in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* which is the Archetype (of the *Vishvajit*); and through the General Law the same is understood as to be done at the *Vishvajit* also; the assignment of the materials is in the form—(*a*) 'this is for the purpose of the sacrificial performance proper', (*b*) 'this is for being eaten', and (*c*) 'this is for winning over the priests (i.e. the Sacrificial Fee)'.—Now it is only the last item—what is meant to be given to the Priests,—in regard to which the 'entirety' has been enjoined [i.e. it is the portion assigned for the Fee that is meant when it is said that 'the whole property should be given away'].—"How is that?"—Because the 'giving away of the property' is only reiterated for purposes of reference,—what is predicated is 'entirety': and certainly the 'giving of what should not be given' can never be predicated (or enjoined); nor can that be given which has been assigned for the purposes of the sacrificial performance, or for the purposes of being eaten.—Thus there would be no inconsistency (in the rest of the sacrifice being performed with what remains of the materials that had been assigned for the performance, and which, on that account, could not have been given away with the Sacrificial Fee).

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *Even when the Vishvajit forms part of the 'Ahargaṇa', the entire property should be given as the Fee.*

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE SAME SHOULD BE DONE IN CONNECTION WITH [THE VISHVAJIT PERFORMED IN COURSE OF] THE 'AHARGAṆA'; AS ALL (VISHVAJIT) ARE ALIKE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Aharyaṇa Aṣṭarātra* sacrifice, in connection with which we read—'*Athaitasyāṣṭarātrasya vishvajidabhijitam ēkāhāvabhitaḥ, ubhayato jyotirmadhyē ṣaḍahaḥ : pashukāmo hyētēna yajēta*' ['The two *ekāha* sacrifices, *Vishvajit* and *Abhijit*, come on the two sides of the *Aṣṭarātra*; between two *Jyotiṣṭomas* comes the *Ṣaḍaha*; one desiring cattle should perform this sacrifice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—When the *Vishvajit* is performed as part of the *Ahargaṇa* (as spoken of in the text just quoted), should the Sacrificial Fee be the 'entire property' (as laid down for the *Vishvajit*)? Or a hundred and twelve (as laid down for the Archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*)?

The natural answer to this question is that the 'entire property' should be given away as the Fee—Why so?—*Because all Vishvajit sacrifices are alike*; so that, in accordance with the General Law, the details of the *Vishvajit* in question shall be just those same as those belonging to the *Vishvajit* performed in connection with its Archetype (*Jyotiṣṭoma*). Hence we conclude that the entire property should be given away.

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN REALITY, A HUNDRED AND TWELVE SHOULD BE GIVEN,—AS AT THE ARCHETYPAL SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

"In reality, a hundred and twelve should be given; it should be as at the archetypal sacrifice;—and the archetypal sacrifice in this case is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; in connection with which details have been prescribed; all the requisite details are not found to be laid down in connection with the *Vishvajit*. Hence a hundred and twelve is what should be given [as the Fee at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is only a hundred and twelve)."

SŪTRA (16).

[REPLY TO PŪRVAPAKṢA]—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THAT IS NOT AN ACCESSORY OF THE VISHVAJIT.

Bhāṣya.

'But' implies the rejection of the view set forth (under Sū. 15).

What has been suggested cannot be.—Why?—Because 'a hundred and twelve' is not an accessory belonging to the *Vishvajit*. In the present instance, as the *Vishvajit* has been mentioned by name, it must be taken with its own accessories; hence the Sacrificial Fee shall be that which has been prescribed in connection with the *Vishvajit* itself (i.e. the 'entire property'), not that prescribed for the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (i.e. 'a hundred and twelve').

SŪTRA (17).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is also an indicative text clearly pointing to the same conclusion.—"What is that indicative text?"—The text is—'He suffers in the matter of his cattle who does not give away the entire property at the *Vishvajit* sacrifice';—this shows that the Fee to be given at the *Vishvajit*—even when performed as part of the *Aharganṇa*—should always be the 'entire property'.

[Kumārila demurs to this view. According to him, the *Siddhānta* is that 'a hundred and twelve' should be the fee at the *Vishvajit* when forming part of the *Aharganṇa*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9) : *One whose wealth is less than 'a hundred and twelve' is not entitled to perform the Vishvajit.*

SŪTRA (18)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS IT IS AN ECTYPE, BOTH (SHOULD BE ENTITLED); BECAUSE THERE IS NO DISTINCTION"

Bhāṣya

It is well known that at the *Vishvajit*, one should give away his entire property. In connection with this, there arises this question—Is one whose property is just 'a hundred and twelve', or more, or less, also entitled *to perform the Vishvajit*? Or only *one who has 'a hundred and twelve'* or more?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that— *inasmuch as it is an ectype, both should be entitled because there is no distinction*, we find no such distinction as that 'he alone is entitled to perform it whose wealth consists of just 'a hundred and twelve', or one whose wealth is more than that, or one whose wealth is less than that. Hence it follows that all men are entitled to perform the *Vishvajit* sacrifice."

SŪTRA (19)

IN REALITY, ONLY ONE POSSESSING MORE (THAN 'A HUNDRED AND TWELVE') SHOULD BE ENTITLED (TO PERFORM THE VISHVAJIT); BECAUSE OF THE COUNTER-EXCEPTION.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that all men are entitled to perform the *Vishvajit*.—'Who then is entitled to it?' One who possesses 'a hundred and twelve', or more.—Why so?—*Because of the counter-exception.* In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find a counter exception made in favour of 'the entire property'; after having enjoined the fee of 'a hundred and twelve', the text goes on to say— The Priests are to be secured with this, *or with one's entire property*'; which means that 'if the Priests be not willing to undertake the work for the prescribed fee (of *a hundred and twelve*), then, they should be won over even by the gift of one's *entire property*. If the men are not willing to undertake the work for 'a hundred and twelve', they would be much less willing to do it for anything less than that. So that what is to be given at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is either 'a hundred and twelve' or 'the entire property';—and both these become admissible at the *Vishvajit* (which has the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype);—and it is only one of these two that is emphasised in connection with the *Vishvajit* when it is said that 'the entire property should be given away'. This however cannot be treated as an Injunction, as the giving away of the entire property has

already been spoken of in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself; all that this assertion does is to assert that what has been spoken of before (in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) as only a possible alternative is the only alternative to be adopted here (in connection with the *Vishvajit*); and if this restriction is all that is done in this sentence, then what is asserted here must be the same as that spoken of in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—and as at this latter it was to be '*a hundred and twelve* or more, the *entire property*', it must be the same at the *Vishvajit* also. And from this it follows that one who possesses less than 'a hundred and twelve' cannot be entitled to perform the *Vishvajit*.

SŪTRA (20).

ALSO BECAUSE IT WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH (THE ARCHETYPE)—LIKE THE 'QUARTER'.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*cha*', 'also', has a cumulative force.

For the following reason also, the 'entire property' is to be given away; when more is given, the 'hundred and twelve' also becomes included therein; [so that it is in keeping with what is done at the Archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*; which would not be the case, if *less* than 'hundred and twelve' were given].—Just as in the case of the 'quarter'; when a full coin is given, its *quarter* also becomes given; similarly in the case in question (when one gives away his 'entire property', 'a hundred and twelve' would be given away). [But this could be so only if the man's entire property were *not less* than 'a hundred and twelve'. This is another reason why only such persons should perform the *Vishvajit*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *When, in connection with 'Fire-Installation', it is said that 'unmeasured wealth should be given', only another and a higher number is meant.*

SŪTRA (21)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE TERM 'UNMEASURED' IS USED, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS NEGATIVING THE NUMBER OF WHAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENJOINED,—BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT SIGNIFICATION OF THE TERM"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with *Fire-Installation*, we read—'*Ēkā dēyā, ṣaḍ dēyā, dvādasha dēyāshchaturvimshatirdēyāh, shatam dēyam, sahasram dēyam, aparimitam dēyam*' ['One should be given, six should be given, twelve should be given, twenty-four should be given, a hundred should be given, a thousand should be given, an *unmeasured gift should be given*']

In regard to this, there arises the question—What does the clause '*aparimitam dēyam*' mean? Does it lay down a *prohibition*,—the meaning being that the 'measured gifts' that have been spoken of—'*one* should be given' and the like—*should not be given*?—Or is the '*unmeasured* gift' something positive, and the *giving* of this is enjoined as to be done?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows —"When we find the term 'unmeasured' used, we say that it negatives the number of *what has been previously enjoined*,—i.e. the things numbered 'one' and the rest.—Why?—*Because such is the direct signification of the term*, when we hear the term 'measured', we understand it to mean *counted*;—this in the present case is 'one', and the rest,—and it is all this that is negatived by the negative prefix (in the term '*a parimitam*', *un* measured'). By interpreting the term thus we preserve its direct signification;—otherwise, the well known meaning of the term 'unmeasured' would be abandoned, and it would be only through *Indirect Indication* that it could be assumed to mean 'much' For these reasons the words should be taken as prohibiting the giving of all that can be *measured* or *counted* ('*parimitam*')."

SŪTRA (22).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY ONE MORE ALTERNATIVE,—BEING MENTIONED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

Bhāṣya

In reality, it should be treated as one more alternative, one more form of gift; just as 'one should be given' is one alternative gift, so also is the

clause in question ('an unmeasured gift should be given'); hence it follows that what is here mentioned is similar to what has been mentioned in the previous clause.—"In what does its *similarity* to the previous one lie?"—In both cases there is *Direct Declaration* of what is asserted: in the previous clause ('one should be given'), the *giving* is enjoined by means of the term '*dēya*' ('should be given'), and in the other clause also we find the same term '*dēya*' ('*aparimitam dēyam*'); and when the term is there, it can certainly enjoin the 'giving' If, on the other hand, 'negation' were taken as predicated, this could be done only on the basis of 'Syntactical Connection'; and this would be weaker than 'Direct Declaration'.—Hence what is laid down in the clause in question must be one more alternative gift.

As for the argument that this interpretation would go against the well known meaning of the *negative* term in '*a parimita*' ('*un*-measured'),—the meaning of the term ('*aparimita*', 'unmeasured') as a rule does always set aside the etymological meaning (derived from the component parts of the word).

Says the Opponent—'But when you take the term 'unmeasured' as positive, you are not accepting any well known meaning of the word as a whole; what you are doing is to have recourse to *Indirect Indication*,—your idea being that what is *many* cannot be *measured* or *counted*: hence 'unmeasured' indicates *many*."

That is not so. In fact, the term *aparimita* ('unmeasured') does *directly denote* things that are so *many* (or *much*) that they cannot be measured (or counted); when, for instance, it is said 'his wealth is *immeasurable*', what is understood is that it is *much* It is analogous to the case of such terms as (*a*) '*kushala*' ('clever') and (*b*) *praviṇa*' ('expert') (*a*) The term '*kushala*' etymologically means 'one who chops Kusha grass', so that when a man is found to possess many of those qualities that are found in a *clever Kusha-chopper*, he is called *kushala*' (clever), the term '*kushala*', by this 'ascension' (*roha*), so to say, being regarded as actually expressive of 'cleverness' by Direct Denotation (*Rudhi*) (*b*) Similarly the term '*praviṇa*' etymologically means 'one who is expert in playing upon the Lute', and when a man is found to possess those qualities that are found in an *expert Lute player*, he is called '*praviṇa*' (expert); the term '*praviṇa*' being regarded as directly denotative of 'expertness'.—In the case in question also, even though (correctly speaking) there is *Indirect Indication*, yet, on the strength of the Direct Declaration in the Veda, it is treated as *Direct Denotation* -And thus the Direct Denotation of the term 'unmeasured' as a whole sets aside the denotation of its component part (the negative particle); just as we find in the case of the term '*ashvakarna*' (where the meaning of the component parts signifies 'Horse's Ears', while as a whole the term is taken as signifying a *tree*).

From all this it follows that the clause in question lays down a fresh alternative gift.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The term 'unmeasured' should be taken as standing for 'more than a thousand'.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE CAN BE NO RESTRICTION, AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION."

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood that the clause containing the term 'unmeasured' lays down another alternative gift.—Now follows the question—Does 'unmeasured' mean *less than a thousand*? Or *more than a thousand*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*there can be no restriction, as there is no distinction*; that is, because all that the word signifies is 'many' (or *much*), therefore beyond that there can be no distinction made which would indicate whether *more* or *less* than 'a thousand' is meant; and when no such distinction can be made, then, whatever course may be adopted (whether *more* or *less* than a thousand is given), it may be regarded as right. Hence *there can be no restriction*".

SŪTRA (24)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT MUST BE MORE (THAN A THOUSAND), BECAUSE THE TERM SIGNIFIES 'MANY' ('MUCH'), AND BECAUSE THE OTHER (NUMBER) IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY.

Bhāṣya.

The particle 'tu' ('in reality') implies the rejection of the view set forth above.—It is not right that either more or less than a thousand' may be given; it is *more* (than a thousand) that should be given.—Why?—*Because the term 'aparimita', 'unmeasured', signifies 'many' (or 'much');* people use the term 'unmeasured' in the sense of *many* (or *much*), as has been already pointed out. But 'many' (or 'much') is a relative term; a thing is spoken of 'many' (or 'much') when it is *more* than something else; so that until there is a correlative, the connotation of the term remains incomplete; just as 'son' is a relative term, and is used in connection with some other person, never otherwise; and what this correlative is is determined by finding out what the context deals with and what is in close proximity to the relative term in question. In the case in question, in close proximity to the term 'unmeasured', we find the term '*sahasram*', 'thousand'; hence we conclude that the term 'unmeasured' stands for *more than a thousand*.

SŪTRA (25).

A COMMENDATORY STATEMENT ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

"How so?"—There is the text—'The *unmeasured* is superior', which shows that 'thousand' is less than the 'unmeasured'.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *'Parakṛti' (statements descriptive of the doings of others), and 'Purākalpa' (statements descriptive of past events) are to be regarded as 'Arthavāda' (commendatory statement).*

SŪTRA (26)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A) *continued*]—"PASSAGES DESCRIPTIVE OF THE DOINGS OF MEN AND PASSAGES DESCRIPTIVE OF PAST EVENTS ARE TO BE REGARDED AS (INJUNCTIONS) MEANT FOR MEN, BECAUSE THE DESCRIPTIONS MUST BE FOR SOME PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya

Passages descriptive of the doings of other people (*Parakṛti*) and *Passages descriptive of past events* (*Purākalpa*) form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*; such, for instance, as—(*a*) '*Bakā Dālbhyā* held the opinion that you must cook *māṣas* for me, as verily they do not accept other offerings',—this is *Parakṛti* (descriptive of the doings of other people), and (*b*) as an example of *Purākalpa* (descriptive of past events), we have the passage—'The ancients came up with flaming brands, they were struck down by *Asuras* and *Rākṣasas*', and so on.

In regard to these, there arises the question 'Are these passages *Injunctions* meant for men in general? Or for only such men as are descendants of the persons mentioned? Or are they only Commendatory Statements?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows: "These are Injunctions, and are meant for men in general.—Why?—Because the description contained in the passages *must be for some purpose*, it must be with a view to a certain end in view that such descriptions are made; the purpose being that by the mention of the connection of the act with particular persons, the act becomes commended; and what is commended comes to be actually done. Thus the passage must be taken as an Injunction, the sense being—'such and such a person has done this act, therefore others also should do it'."

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A) *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NEGATION OF WHAT IS MENTIONED IN THEM."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, we also find that Injunctions like those contained in the passages in question are sometimes negatived, in such texts—'But one should not act like that'; and there can be a negation of only that which

has been previously known (through an Injunction) as *to be done*. For this reason also, the passages in question should be taken as Injunctions."

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIAL MENTION (OF PARTICULAR PERSONS), WHAT IS ENJOINED SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THOSE (DESCENDED FROM THE SAID PERSONS),—JUST LIKE THE 'FIVE-SLICED OFFERING'."

Bhāṣya

"We concede that what is contained in the passages under consideration is an Injunction meant for men; but, inasmuch as persons belonging to particular *gotras* are actually named in the passages, what is enjoined should be taken as meant for men belonging to those same *gotras*; what is indicated by the commendation is that 'the act should be done',—and it is found to be spoken of in connection with persons belonging to particular *gotras*;—hence it follows that the act enjoined should be done by persons belonging to those same *gotras*.—Just as in connection with the Five-sliced (*Pañchāvatta*) offering', it is said that 'the Five-sliced offering is meant for those belonging to the *Jamadagno-gotra*', and hence it is taken as meant for only persons belonging to that *gotra*: the same should be the case in the present instance also."

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—'INASMUCH AS THE PASSAGE CONTAINS AN INJUNCTION—AND THE VEDA MENTIONS CERTAIN PERSONS (IN CONNECTION WITH THAT INJUNCTION),—THE MENTION OF THESE SHOULD BE TREATED AS COMMENDATORY."

Bhāṣya

The term 'but' implies the rejection of the view set forth in the preceding *Sūtra*.

"The passage contains an Injunction; such being the case, the mention of the names of persons should be taken as commendatory. As a matter of fact, the Veda has put forward a commendation in regard to the *Injunction*, not in regard to the *person enjoined*; the naming of the person is only for the purpose of commending the Injunction. What the Injunction declares is an *act*, and what the commendation means is that 'inasmuch as the act enjoined has been done by such a person, it must be right';—in this the person is mentioned not as connected with the doing of the act, but as something to be eulogised.—'Why so?'—Because there is no other commendatory word in the text.—Further, if we take the sentence as mentioning the *act*, we admit the *direct denotation* of the words, while if we take it as asserting the connection of the act with the person, we admit

what is indicated by *Syntactical Connection* : and the latter is, on that account, weaker in authority.—From all this it follows that the sentence contains an Injunction, and that for *all men*, not only for those descended from the person named."

[The difference between *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) and (C) is that, according to (A), the sentence is a pure Injunction, while according to (C), it is partly Injunction and partly Commendation.]

SŪTRA (30).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A COMMENDATORY STATEMENT, BECAUSE IT IS COMPLEMENTARY TO AN INJUNCTION; HENCE IT MUST BE TAKEN AS A PURE REITERATION.

Bhāṣya.

The view just set forth is also rejected by the use of the term 'in reality'.

The passage in question is not an Injunction meant for persons belonging to the same *gotra* as the persons named,—nor an Injunction for all men;—in fact it is not an Injunction at all;—in reality it is only a commendatory statement.—"Why so?"—*Because it is complementary to an Injunction*; in connection with the *Parākṛti* passage quoted, they put forward a totally different injunction as contained in the text 'Therefore one should eat only such things as grow wild in the forest';—and in connection with the *Parākalpa* passage quoted, they put forward the injunction contained in the text—'They should cook it in the fire of the Householder and then offer it'. It is not possible for two separate injunctions to be connected syntactically, and the construction of the two passages quoted—*Parākṛti* and *Parākalpa*—if they were taken as Injunctions—would be entirely different from what it would be when they are taken as containing only commendatory statements: they could not be taken as Injunction and Commendation at one and the same time (as it has been suggested under Sū. 29).—From all this it follows that the passages in question are purely commendatory.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The term 'thousand years' stands for 'thousand days'.*

SŪTRA (31)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*continued*]—"THE 'THOUSAND-YEAR SACRIFICE' MUST BE TAKEN AS BEING FOR THOSE WHOSE LIFE-SPAN IS OF THAT EXTENT,—IT BEING IMPOSSIBLE FOR HUMAN BEINGS"

Bhāṣya

There is the 'Thousand-year Sacrifice' laid down in the following text—'*Pañchapañchāshatastrirtah saṃvatsarāḥ. pañchapañchāshatah pañchadashāḥ. pañchapañchāshatah saptadashāḥ, pañchapañchāshatah ēkaviṃshāḥ. rishvasyāmamanam sahasrasaṃvatsaram*' 'Fifty-five with threefold *Saṃvatsara*, fifty-five with fifteen, fifty-five with seventeen, fifty-five with twenty-one; the *Rishvasyāmamana* is a Thousand-year Sacrifice'.

In regard to this, there arises the following question—Does this passage mean that only those Beings are entitled to the sacrifice mentioned who live for a thousand years? Or for human beings? If for human beings then, what does it mean, from among several meanings suggested later on (in the following *Sūtras*)? Or is the term '*saṃvatsara*', 'year', to be taken here in the sense of 'day'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows:—The sacrifice can only be for those who live for a thousand years. Why so?—*Because it is impossible for human beings*, among human beings, such a long life is impossible; it is only Gandharvas and such other Celestial Beings who have such a long life, as has been described in the *Smṛtis*.

SŪTRA (32)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)—*concluded*] "THERE IS A COMMENDATORY TEXT WHICH ALREADY INDICATES THAT THE PERFORMERS OF THE SACRIFICE ARE BEINGS OTHER THAN HUMAN"

Bhāṣya

"There is the following text—When *Prajāpati* was creating the creatures, evil Death attacked Him; He performed austerity for a thousand years, with a view to get rid of the evil'; the 'austerity' here referred to is clearly the 'Thousand-year Sacrifice' [and it is spoken of here as having been performed by *Prajāpati*]; from which it follows that the sacrifice is not for human beings."

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, IT MUST BE MEANT TO BE PERFORMED BY HUMAN BEINGS, AS IT IS THEIR SPHERE OF ACTIVITY."

Bhāṣya.

The term 'or' implies the rejection of the view [*Pūrvapakṣa* (A)] set forth above.

"The sacrifice is not for *Gandharvas* and other celestial beings: it is human beings that are to be taken as entitled to the performance of the sacrifice.—Why?—*Because it is their sphere of activity*; that is, scriptural Injunctions have been found to appertain to the activity of human beings, as they alone are capable of fulfilling all the details of actions laid down in the Injunctions—'But human beings cannot live so long.'—*Answer*: They can attain longevity by means of medicines."

SŪTRA (34).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT POSSESS THAT CAPACITY.

Bhāṣya

No medicines have been found to possess the capacity of prolonging life to the extent of a thousand years. All that they are capable of doing is—the improving of digestive powers, the removal of wrinkles and grey hair, the improving of voice and complexion and the resuscitation of memory,—they are never found to bring about longevity.— From the improvement of voice and complexion and other signs, we shall infer a longer life also."—That is not possible we say,—"Why?"—Because there is the text declaring that 'a man's life extends to a hundred years' ('*Śatāyurvai puruṣaḥ*'); and this would not be true if a man were to live longer.—"We may expound the compound word '*Śatāyu*' as '*Śatāni āyuḥ yasya*', 'one whose span of life extends over *hundreds* of years'"—Numerals are not compounded in this fashion; nor are they expressive (even when formed). The learned people have also declared that 'there can be no compounding of words with the *dual* or the *plural* endings'.

SŪTRA (35).

[FURTHER REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—ALSO BECAUSE NO CONNECTION HAS EVER BEEN PERCEIVED.

Bhāṣya.

Never have medicines ever been found to be connected with such longevity (as extends over a thousand years); and until such a connection has been actually perceived there can be no inference from it.—"There could be an inference from general premises: Medicines are actually found to bring about smaller degrees of stability, and it stands to reason that, if they

were repeatedly taken, they would become more and more effective and would bring about a permanent stability in the body. Though there is the declaration 'The man's life-span extends to a hundred years', yet we find people actually living longer than that."—The answer to this is as follows:—The premiss suggested is not true beyond doubt; even though it may be that the medicines used bring about all that is possible in the way of the stability of the body, even to such an extent as has never before been perceived;—for instance, when walking, people may attain all the speed possible, but by mere repetition they could not proceed even four miles, during the whole of their human life. So that in the case in question as there would be no connection (between the *medicines* and *longevity*), it would always be open to doubt whether or not people (using the medicines) would secure longevity; and if this remains doubtful, there can be no inference from that premiss; and in the matter of imperceptible things, nothing can be accepted without sufficient proof.—From all this it is clear that without doubt there are no persons living so long (as a thousand years),—and this is what has been asserted regarding human beings.

Question—"What then does the text mean?"

[In answer we have the following *Sūtra*, which sets forth the third *Pūrvapakṣa* view.]

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—'WHAT IS LAID DOWN SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A 'FUNCTION FOR GENERATIONS',—SAYS KĀRṢṆĀJINI; AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A SINGLE MAN"

Bhāṣya

"If the sacrifice is meant for human beings, then it must be regarded as a '*Function for Generations*', this is the opinion that has been held by the teacher, *Kārṣṇājini*.—'For what reason?'—*Because it is impossible for one man*. The Injunction is for men, and no single man can complete the sacrifice; it being then necessary to find out how the sacrifice could be performed, the only possible course appears to be that several capable men should undertake the performance,—and their descendants would carry on what has been begun and would finish it in due course of time."

SŪTRA (37).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE ENTIRE PERFORMANCE SHOULD BE CONNECTED WITH A SINGLE PERFORMER, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE DONE BY A SINGLE PERSON.

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood (under Sū. 3. 7. 18 *et seq.*) that the fruit of actions laid down in the scriptures accrue to the performer; and also that that man alone is entitled to perform a sacrifice who is capable of doing it.

For these reasons, the theory of the sacrifice in question being a 'function for generations' cannot be accepted.—"What then does it mean?"—What it is taken to mean is that the mere knowledge and reciting of the text (laying down the sacrifice) is a duty; and in support of this there is the Vedic declaration that 'the Veda should be studied' [and the text in question is part of the Veda] 'Then in that case, on the strength of the text, it should be believed that if people perform the sacrifice in question, then longevity increases"—Thus also cannot be accepted; as there is no ground for such a belief; in support of such a belief, we have neither a scriptural text nor any other source of knowledge.— Presumption would be the requisite proof, as without such a notion, the text would be useless".- The answer to this is that it would not be useless, the mere *reading* of the text would be productive of an 'unseen result, and in a general way, it is much simpler to assume an 'unseen result in general than to assume the particular unseen result that longevity increases - Or it may be admitted that the passage does become useless; it is better to admit that than to assume a result for which there is no reason Two hundred and fifty men might be initiated for the performance and these would finish the sacrifice in four years.' -But this would militate against the number of performers fixed by ordinance, this has been done by such ordinances as '*not more than twenty-four* and not less than seventeen persons should undertake the performance of a *Sutra*'.- "In order to save a text from becoming useless, we might give up the fixed number — That would not be right, since there is a result following from the mere reading of the text (which thus cannot be regarded as *useless*) Hence the solution suggested is not right

Question- 'What then is the meaning?'

Answer- It is as follows —

SŪTRA (38)

THERE BEING MUTUAL INCONSISTENCY, ONE OF THE TWO TERMS MUST BE TAKEN IN THE INDIRECT FIGURATIVE SENSE, -SAYS LĀBUKĀYANA

Bhāsya

In this case, *one* of the two terms must be taken in an indirect figurative sense; either the term '*samvatsara*' (year) is to be taken as standing for what is *not-samvatsara*, or the term *pañchapañchāshatah*' is to be taken in a figurative sense —Why so?—*Because there is mutual inconsistency*, if both the terms are taken as laying down what is directly expressed by them, then there is an inconsistency.- How?- There would be syntactical split if it were the 'fifty five', and *not* the 'years', that were threefold'; on the other hand, if the 'years' were 'threefold', then the 'fifty five' could not be so —By reason of this inconsistency, one or the other one of the two expressions must be taken in an indirect figurative sense —Such is the opinion that has been held by the teacher, *Lābukāyana*.

SŪTRA (39).

IT IS THE TERM 'YEAR' THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN AN INDIRECT FIGURATIVE SENSE: BECAUSE IT IS SOMETHING VARIABLE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been said that *one* of the two terms should be taken in its indirect figurative sense; it has got to be decided which one it is to be. That is what is explained here. It is the term '*saṃvatsara*', 'year', that should be taken as used here in an indirect figurative sense. Why so?—*Because it is something variable*; as a matter of fact, the connotation of the term 'year' is variable; for instance, (1) there is the 'year' called '*sāvana*' ('solar'), consisting of a definite number of days, (2) then there is the 'year' consisting of the three seasons—Winter, Summer and Rains, and (3) lastly there is the 'lunar year': and it can therefore be referred to in several ways. As for the term '*pañchapañchāshatah*' on the other hand, it connotes a definite number, and ceases to be applicable if that number is less even by *one*.

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—"THAT WORD ('SAṂVATSARA', 'YEAR') SHOULD BE TAKEN AS IN THE CASE OF THE ARCHETYPE BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT SHOULD BE APPLICABLE HERE."

Bhāṣya

"In connection with the *Gavāmayana* sacrifice (which is the Archetype of the *Sahasrasaṃvatsara* sacrifice), *months* have been spoken of, and it has been explained that in that context the term '*Saṃvatsara*' ('year') stands for the *month*, the text being 'it is the month that is the *year*'. Consequently in the present instance also, it must be 'fifty-five *months*' that are meant; hence 'Thousand Years' should be taken as standing for 'Thousand *Months*'. - 'But in that case the term *Sahasrasaṃvatsara*, *Thousand-year sacrifice*, would not be applicable.'- The answer to that is that the term '*Sahasrasaṃvatsara*' is only a name, and it does not connote an accessory detail (in the shape of the *period of time*); and certainly a mere name is never enjoined (or predicated); and so long as it is not enjoined, it can be applied on the basis of any connotation that may be found suitable."

This view [*Pūrvapakṣa* (D)] also is not acceptable; this also is open to the same objection. Because even so ['thousand *months*' would mean over 83 years, and] no man would live so long as to complete this course (of 83 years), because it would have to start after his marriage, Fire-installation and the Soma-sacrifices [so that by the time he would complete the '*Sahasrasaṃvatsara*' sacrifice, he should have become very much more

than 100 years old]; and the inevitable result would be that, if one were to undertake the performance of this sacrifice, his life-span would be spent up before the sacrifice is completed.—So that it would appear more reasonable to assume an unseen result to follow from the mere reading of the text (enjoining the sacrifice).

"In that case, inasmuch as the *Dvādashāha* is the Archetype, we may take it as 'fifty-five twelve-days'; in support of this we have the text saying '*Twelve-night periods* are the replica of the *year*'; [so that 'Thousand years' would stand for 'Thousand *Twelve-days*', which would mean only a little over 33 *years*]; and this will not be open to the said objection (of the period being too long for a man's life-span)."

This is not possible; because in the text quoted.—'*Dvādasha vai rātryaḥ saṁvatsarasya pratimāḥ*' ['*Twelve-nights* are the replica of the *year*']—the term '*rātri*' ('night') is not dependent for its connection upon the term '*saṁvatsara*' ('year'), because it is connected directly with the term '*pratimā*' ('replica'). Further, the phrase used in the original text is '*pañchapañchāshataḥ trivṛtaḥ*' and the term '*trivṛt*' ('threefold') has been found to be used in the sense of 'Twelve *Days*', not 'Twelve *Nights*'.—From all this it is clear that what has been suggested in the *Sūtra* (40) is not right.

SŪTRA (41).

[FINAL SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE TERM SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR 'DAYS', AS IT IS THE NUMBER OF DAYS THAT ARE REFERRED TO (IN THE TERM 'TRIVṚT').

Bhāṣya.

The term 'in reality' implies the rejection of the view set forth under the foregoing *Sūtra*; it is not true that what are meant are 'Fifty-five *twelve-day-periods*'; because it is *days* that are referred to in the term '*trivṛt*'. Hence the term '*saṁvatsara*' ('year') must be taken as standing for 'day'.

Or (the *Sūtra* may be explained in the following manner):—The term 'in reality' implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa* view. What are meant are not 'fifty-five *months*', but '*days*'. Because at the *Dvādashāha*, what forms the subject of the Context is the '*Trivṛt*' *Day*; and the term '*saṁvatsara*' ('year') has been applied to the *day*, in the following text—'The Sun is all the seasons; when the Sun rises, it is *Spring* (*Vasanta*); when it is forenoon, it is *Summer* (*Grīṣma*); when it is midday, it is *Rains* (*Varṣā*); when it is afternoon, it is *Autumn* (*Sharat*); when the Sun sets, it is *Winter* (*Hemanta*) and *Mid-winter* (*Shishira*)'; in this way all the seasons are gone through during the day; and all the seasons go to make up the *year*. It is for this reason that the *Day* is spoken of by means of the word '*saṁvatsara*' ('year').

Then again, in the phrase '*pañchapañchāshataḥ trivṛtaḥ*', the number 'fifty-five' pertains to the *Trivṛts*;—the '*Dvādasharātri*' (Twelve nights) do not constitute the *Trivṛt*; as the *Trivṛt* is only one *day* during the

Dvādashāha sacrifice;—any co-ordination between the number of '*Trivṛt*' and the *Dvādasharātra* could not be possible on the basis of *Direct Denotation*; it could be got at only through the indirect indication of the relationship of the *Trivṛt Day*;—on the other hand, the *Trivṛt Day* is a direct reference to the *number*; hence its co ordination could be got at by *Direct Denotation*;—and *Direct Denotation* is more powerful than *Indirect Indication*.—From all this it follows that when the text speaks of 'fifty five' in connection with '[illegible]r', it is *days* that are meant.

End of Pāda VII of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VI.

PĀDA VIII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Only a person who has not installed the Fire is entitled to perform the 'Chaturhotṛ-homa'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE HOMA, EVEN THOUGH INDEPENDENT AND NOT SUBSIDIARY TO A SACRIFICE, SHOULD BE OFFERED INTO THE CONSECRATED FIRE; BECAUSE IT IS PRECEDED BY THE IṢṬI; AND BECAUSE THE INSTALLATION (OF FIRE) APPERTAINS TO ALL (OFFERINGS)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chaturhotr-homas* we read '*Prajākāmam chaturhotrā yājayēt, chaturgṛhītamājyam gṛhītvā chaturhotāram vyācakṣīta purēna grahēṇārdham juhuyāt taduttarēṇārdham*' ['If a man desires offspring, one should sacrifice for him with the *Chaturhotr-mantra*; taking up the *Chaturgṛhīta* Clarified Butter, one should recite the *Chaturhotṛ-mantra*, and with the first cup he should offer one-half of it and with the second cup, the other half'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are oblations like these to be offered in Fires consecrated through the performance of the *Pavamāna-Iṣṭi*? Or also in Fires not consecrated?—There are other alternatives also which will be discussed in due course.

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) is as follows:—"Oblations like those in question should be offered into the consecrated Fires, even though it be not subsidiary to any sacrifice. Though the *Darśa-homa* oblations are independent (and self-sufficient) and as such do not require any details from any other sacrifices,—yet the nature of the *Āhavanīya* and other Fires is such that they call for the Homa and other offerings, on account of such Vedic texts as—'When one offers an oblation into the *Āhavanīya Fire*, his desires become satisfied'. Thus all Homas being preceded by the *Iṣṭi* (*Pavamāna*), it follows that oblations like the one in question should be offered into the consecrated Fires."

SŪTRA (2).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—BUT THE FACT THAT THE 'CHATURHOTṚ-HOMAS' HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF AS 'IṢṬI' SHOWS THAT THEY ARE TO BE OFFERED INTO UNCONSECRATED FIRE.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'but' sets aside the view set forth in Sū. (1).

As a matter of fact, the *Chaturhotr-homas* are to be offered into unconsecrated Fires; this is clearly shown by the following text—'This *Iṣṭi*, *Chaturhotr*, is for one who has not installed the Fires'; this means that though, as a rule, there are no '*Iṣṭis*' for one who has not installed the Fires, yet the *Chaturhotr-oblations* constitute the *Iṣṭi* for him alone;—and this clearly shows that oblations like these (*Chaturhotr*) are to be performed by one who has not installed the Fires. Hence they should be offered into unconsecrated Fires.

Says the Opponent—"A mere indicative reason proves nothing, an injunctive text should be pointed out".

In answer to this we have the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (3).

THERE IS AN ACTUAL INJUNCTION, IT BEING SOMETHING NOT ALREADY KNOWN.

Bhāṣya.

The following would be the requisite Injunction in regard to offerings not subsidiary to any sacrifice—'*Eṣā anāhitāgnīḥ kriyā*' ['Such is the performance by one who has not installed the Fires']. It is when taken thus that the declaration (herein contained) serves a useful purpose; otherwise a mere assertion would be useless; and the sentence quoted has the Injunctive force. Hence it should be taken as the injunction of offering *Homa* into unconsecrated fires.

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"THIS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL OBLATIONS", BECAUSE THERE IS NO DISTINCTION.

Bhāṣya.

Says a third party—"We admit that the text quoted is an Injunction; but we do not admit that it applies to only such oblations as are not subsidiary to a sacrifice; as a matter of fact, *it should apply to all oblations*—those that are subsidiary to a sacrifice, as also those, like the *Chaturhotr-homa*, which are not subsidiary to a sacrifice.—Why so?—*Because there is no distinction*; there is no such distinction as that 'what is laid down here pertains to such oblations as are subsidiary to a sacrifice, and not to those that are not subsidiary to a sacrifice'.—Hence what has been laid down (regarding oblations being offered in unconsecrated fire) should apply to all oblations."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE ARE NO SACRIFICES THAT CAN BE PERFORMED BY ONE WHO HAS NOT INSTALLED THE FIRES; HENCE WHAT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN HERE APPLIES TO ONLY SUCH OBLATIONS AS ARE NOT SUBSIDIARY TO ANY SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'in reality' implies the rejection of the view set forth in the *Pūrvapakṣa.*

As a matter of fact, the detail that has been laid down applies to only those oblations that are not subsidiary to a sacrifice, and not to those that are subsidiary to a sacrifice.—Why so? —*Because there is no sacrifice for one who has not installed the Fires*; as a matter of fact, there are no sacrifices to be performed by one who has not installed the Fires; —and if a subsidiary to a sacrifice were done by itself alone (not along with the sacrifice to which it is subsidiary), it would serve no useful purpose; because no other result can be assumed to follow from it, as there would be no authority for such an assumption. As for the declaration, there is another purpose that might be served by it; it cannot justify the assumption that a sacrifice may be performed by one who has not installed the Fires.—From all this it follows that what has been laid down applies to such oblations as are not subsidiary to a sacrifice.

SŪTRA (6)

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE MERE REPETITION OF THE MANTRA; AS THERE IS NO FIRE"

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the view just set forth.

"Oblations like those in question are not to be offered into the unconsecrated fire.—Why?—Because the Installation of Fire is a necessary auxiliary to all kinds of sacrifices. —'But there is the declaration to the effect that *this is the Iṣṭi for one who has not installed the Fire.*'—That is not what it means, we reply; this declaration may be taken as a commendation *of the repetition of the Mantra*; what have been commended in the declaration just quoted are those acts that are in the form of repeating certain *Mantras*, —not all the *Chaturhotṛ-oblations*. It is only thus that such passages as 'One should pour oblations into the *Āhavaniya Fire*' can serve a useful purpose."

SŪTRA (7).

[ANSWER]—INASMUCH AS THE ACT HAS BEEN EULOGISED AS AN 'IṢṬI', IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS 'HOMA'; THE MENTION OF 'FIRES' IS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY PARTICULAR ACT, HENCE IT MAY APPLY TO OTHER ACTS, IT CANNOT APPLY TO THE OBLATIONS IN QUESTION

Bhāṣya

It has been argued that "the declaration that 'the act done by one who has not installed the Fires is similar to the *Iṣṭi*' refers to repetitions of *Mantras*"—But that is not so. The declaration is not to be construed as 'This act that is done by the person who has not installed the Fires is similar to the *Iṣṭi*'.—Why?—Because the mere reiteration of similarity would be useless. While in the other interpretation, the declaration would be an Injunction and as such serve a useful purpose, the injunction being—'This act of *Iṣṭi* is to be done by one who has not installed the Fires', thus the commendation of the *Iṣṭi* must be regarded as a reference to the *Homa-oblations*, because '*Iṣṭi*' is *sacrifice*, and that same, when accompanied by the further act of throwing the oblations into some receptacle (Fire or Water), becomes *Homa*'—It has been argued that 'the consecrated *Āhavanīya* Fire is for the purpose of all kinds of *Homa*".—But the declaration that has been quoted to that effect is not with reference to the *Chaturhotr oblations*, but to *Homas* in general, without any specification, and as it cannot apply to the *Chaturhotr homas*, it could be applied to other *Homas*; while as for the *Chaturhotr homas*, these have been declared as to be done by one who has not installed the Fires, hence the consecrated *Āhavanīya Fire* cannot be an auxiliary to these *Homas*.

SŪTRA (8)

[OBJECTION]—"THEY MUST BE FOR BOTH, LIKE THE 'PITRYAJÑA'."

Bhāṣya

"It is not right to say that the *Chaturhotr-homas* are to be offered by only one who has not installed the Fires; because, as a matter of fact, *they must be for both, like the Pitryajña*; just as the *Pitryajña* is performed by one who has installed the Fires as well as by one who has not installed the Fires;—similarly would the *Chaturhotr-homas* also be performed by both.—How do you know this?—It has been already explained that if the declaration is taken as a mere reiteration, then the *Homas* should be performed by those who have installed the Fires; while if it is taken as an Injunction, then the *Homas* should be performed by one who has not installed the Fires. When both the interpretations are possible, it cannot be right to reject what is clearly expressed by the words.—Hence we conclude that the *Chaturhotr-homas* are to be performed by both—one who has installed the Fires, as well as one who has not installed the Fires."

SŪTRA (9).

'[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, THE MENTION IS OF ONE WHO HAS NOT INSTALLED THE FIRES; BECAUSE THE FIRE HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED WITH REFERENCE TO ANY PARTICULAR ACT

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the *Chaturhotr-homas* should be performed by both (one who has installed the Fire, and one who has not installed them).—Why?—Because the declaration is in reference to one who has not installed the Fires. The person to whom the declaration—'This *Iṣṭi* is for one who has *not* installed the Fires'—is applied is not one who *has* installed the Fires; because the force of the declaration does not justify that interpretation. Even if the declaration were taken as commendatory, that would not be incompatible with our view. Lastly, it has been already explained that the text '*Homa* is to be offered into the consecrated *Āhavanīya Fire*' does not refer to the *Chaturhotr-homas* only.—From all this it follows that *Homas* like those in question are for men who have not installed the Fires.

SŪTRA (10).

AS REGARDS THE PITRYAJÑA, IT HAS BEEN REPEATED AFTER HAVING BEEN ALREADY LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "the case of the *Homas* in question would be like those of the *Pitryajña*".—But in the case of the *Pitryajña* it is only right that it should be performed by one who *has* installed the Fires, as well as by one who has *not* installed the Fires; because after having been laid down in connection with one who *has* installed the Fires, it is repeated again—'It should be done also by one who has *not* installed the Fires': this text, saying that 'it can be done *also* by one who has not installed the Fires', makes it possible for the *Anvāhārya offering* to be cooked on the unconsecrated Fire. In the case of the *Chaturhotr-homas* on the other hand, we do not have both these declarations; here there is only one declaration to the effect that 'It is the *Iṣṭi* for one who has *not* installed the Fires',—the term 'also' not being there. Hence the case of the *Chaturhotr-homas* is not analogous to that of the *Pitryajña*.

[Mandana Mishra makes a separate *Adhikarana* which is only a corollary to what has been said under Sū 5. The question is—Are all *Chaturhotr-homas* to be done in unconsecrated Fire? Or only those that are not subsidiary to a sacrifice? The *Siddhānta* is that those that are subsidiary to a sacrifice can be performed only in consecrated Fires and hence only by those who have installed their own Fires.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The Homa in connection with the 'Upanayana', 'Brahmic Initiation', is to be offered into the Unconsecrated Fire.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN GOING TO PERFORM THE 'BRAHMIC INITIATION', ONE SHOULD 'INSTALL' THE FIRES; BECAUSE THERE IS 'HOMA' TO BE OFFERED"

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Upanayamāne'bhijuhuyāt*' [When going to perform the Brahmic Initiation one should offer the Homa with three Mantras'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Homa* to be offered into Fires consecrated by the rites of Installation'? Or into unconsecrated ones?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows: "*When going to perform the Brahmic Initiation, one should install the Fires*;—why?—*because there is Homa to be offered*,—into the *Āhavanīya* (consecrated) Fire,—according to the text 'When one offers *Homa* into the *Āhavanīya* Fire, thereby has desired end is fulfilled'. From this it follows that these *Homas* (connected with the *Upanayana*) are to be offered only after *Fire-installation* has been done."

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, LIKE THE 'SACRIFICE OFFERED BY THE NIṢĀDA-CHIEF', THE HOMAS ARE TO BE OFFERED INTO THE 'ORDINARY' FIRE BECAUSE THEY PRECEDE THE ACQUISITION OF LEARNING

Bhāṣya.

It is not the right view that the Homas in question should be offered after the Installation of Fire; the right view is that they should be offered in the *ordinary* (unconsecrated) Fire,—why?—*because they precede the acquisition of learning*; i.e. these *Homas* are offered for the purpose of acquiring learning; while it is only *after* one has acquired learning that he becomes entitled to perform the Fire-Installation Rites,—as before that he has not the requisite capacity:—hence it is not possible that the *Homas* in connection with Brahmic Initiation should be offered *after* the Fire-Installation.—In fact, it should be as in the case of the sacrifice offered by the Niṣāda-chief (which is offered in *unconsecrated* Fires). [Vide *Adhikaraṇa* (3), below].

SŪTRA (13).

THEN AGAIN, 'FIRE-INSTALLATION' IS CONNECTED WITH 'WIFE'.

Bhāṣya.

'Fire-installation' has been declared to be 'connected with wife';—and the 'taking of wife' comes after the acquisition of learning;—from this also it follows that 'Fire-installation' cannot precede (the *Homas* offered at the Brahmic Initiation).

Says the Opponent—"The 'taking of wife' that is done *before* Fire-installation would serve the purposes of sacrificial acts, while that which is done *after* the Fire-installation,—on the strength of the declaration to that effect,—would serve the purpose of begetting offspring".

This is answered in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (14).

THE 'TAKING OF WIFE' DONE AFTER THE FIRE-INSTALLATION WOULD BE WRONG, BECAUSE IT IS BY MEANS OF SACRIFICIAL ACTS THAT THE FIRES ARE BROUGHT TOGETHER.

Bhāṣya

The 'taking of wife', if done after Fire-installation, would be *wrong*;—why?—because the *Āhavaniya* and other Fires are *brought together by means of sacrificial acts* [so that for these acts the wife would be essential, and this would have to be done *before* the Fire-installation]. Then again, it has been settled that the Fires are installed by man for his own purpose. Hence it is not right to say that the 'taking of wife' could be done at both times (i.e. *before* as well as *after* the Fire-installation).

SŪTRA (15).

"IT WOULD BE AS IN THE CASE OF THE ŚHRĀDDHA",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer would be as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Just as the *Piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña*' is performed by one who has installed the Fires as well as by one who has not installed the Fires,—so would the 'taking of wife' be done by both".

This has got to be refuted (which is done below)—

SŪTRA (16).

THAT CANNOT BE, AS THAT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE VEDIC DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged above cannot be done; as such a course would be contrary to the Vedic declaration. If it were taken as suggested, and

the 'taking of wife' were done before the acquisition of learning, this would be contrary to the declaration that the 'taking of wife' should come *after the acquisition of learning* [and learning is essential for Fire-installation].—"But the marriage done before the acquisition of learning would be for a definite purpose, and would be different from the marriage laid down as to be done *after* the acquisition of learning."—That cannot be; because it is just for the regulation of the marriage for a purpose that the time is restricted (to *after the acquisition of learning*) and the Brahmic Initiation also is for the purpose of being able to perform the sacrificial acts; and if this were done after the marrying of the second wife, there would be an incongruity.

SŪTRA (17).

INASMUCH AS A SINGLE WIFE SERVES ALL PURPOSES, THE PURPOSE OF BEGETTING A SON SHOULD NOT PROMPT (A SECOND MARRIAGE).

Bhāṣya.

It might be argued that — The wife taken *before* Fire-installation serves the purposes of *sacrificial acts, while that taken after the Fire-installation* would serve the purpose of begetting offspring; so that there would be no *incongruity or inconsistency*".

The answer to this is as follows.—What has been suggested is not right; because *the wife* (once taken) *serves all purposes*, and she could not be regarded as being for the purposes of offspring only. It has been declared (under 6-1-13) that 'the desire for results proceeding from sacrifices is equally present in the woman also'.—For this reason also there cannot be two marriages.

Then again, we find the following declaration in *Smṛtis*—'In matters relating to Duty, Property and Pleasure, she shall not be neglected'; and if a second wife were taken, the first one would certainly be neglected. For this reason also there should not be two marriages. One and the same wife would serve both the purposes—of sacrificial acts and of begetting offspring.—And this *wife is to be taken after* the acquisition of Learning.

From all this it follows that the Homas in connection with the Brahmic Initiation (which precede the acquisition of Learning) cannot be offered in consecrated Fires [as consecration of Fires can come only *after Marriage*, and it has been shown that there can be no marriage *before the acquisition of Learning*.]

SŪTRA (18).

BUT IN VIEW OF WHAT IS DECLARED REGARDING THE SOMA-DRINKER (NOT TAKING A SECOND WIFE), IT FOLLOWS THAT ORDINARILY A SECOND MARRIAGE IS PERMISSIBLE; HENCE ONE MAY MARRY (A SECOND TIME).

Bhāṣya.

[*The Siddhāntin demurs to part of what has been said under the preceding Sūtra*]—We admit that before the Brahmic Initiation there can be no wife;

but when it is said that 'there can be one and only one wife', we cannot admit that. Just as there is the *Smṛti-text* that 'The wife should not be ignored in matters relating to Duty, Property and Pleasure', and that 'while there is a wife endowed with virtue and offspring, one should not take another',—similarly we have also the *Smṛti-text* to the effect that 'on the failure of one, one should take another'. Hence if one's wife is not endowed with virtue and offspring, he should certainly take another.

What is declared regarding the Soma-drinker,—thus is a reference to the *Arthavāda*-passage 'The Soma-drinker should not marry another wife', which (denying the second wife to the Soma-drinker alone) shows that ordinarily a second wife may be taken.

SŪTRA (19).

AS REGARDS THE 'PITṚYAJÑA', IT IS REGARDED AS TO BE PERFORMED BEFORE FIRE-INSTALLATION (ALSO), BECAUSE A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT IS ACTUALLY FOUND.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"How then are there both times for the *Pitṛyajña* (i.e. before Fire-installation as well as after it)?"

Answer—To that effect we find a distinct declaration—'It may be performed also by one who has not installed the Fires': it is on account of this express declaration that the *Pitṛyajña* is performed even before Fire-installation.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The 'Sthapati-Iṣṭi' is to be performed with unconsecrated Fire.*

SŪTRA (20)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'STHAPATI-IṢṬI' SHOULD NECESSITATE THE CONSECRATION OF FIRE, LIKE THE PRAYAJAS, WHICH SHOULD END WITH THE 'IṢṬI', AS IT IS MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE ALONE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Sthapati-Iṣṭi*' (Sacrifice performed by the *Niṣāda* chief) enjoined in the text 'One should offer a sacrifice for the Niṣāda chief'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Should this sacrifice be performed in Fires consecrated with the Installation-rites? Or in the ordinary (unconsecrated) Fires?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows —'It should be performed in consecrated Fires. How so?'—Because of such declarations as '*Homa* should be offered in the *Āhavanīya* Fire'—'But for the *Shūdra*, there can be no *Āhavanīya* Fire, and hence the said declaration cannot apply to the case in question' The answer to this is that it is just the said declaration that would necessitate the installing of the *Āhavanīya Fire*; just as the force of the General Law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype') necessitates the performance of the *Prayājas*, though these latter have not been spoken of in any text—Further, the *Āhavanīya Fire*, which has been set up only for the purpose of the particular sacrifice, *should end with that* sacrifice, that is, the Fires having been consecrated solely for the purpose of performing the sacrifice in question, they should end upon the completion of that sacrifice; their maintenance has been declared to be for the visible purpose (of providing the receptacle for the offerings made at the sacrifice); and hence when that purpose has been served, they need not be maintained any longer'

SUTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN THE ORDINARY FIRE; BECAUSE THE 'INSTALLATION OF FIRE' IS NOT AN AUXILIARY TO ALL (ACTS).

Bhāṣya.

The phrase 'in reality' implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

The sacrifice in question should be performed in the *ordinary* Fire, not in *consecrated* ones.—Why?—*Because the 'Installation of Fire' is not an*

auxiliary to all acts: as a matter of fact, the Fires are auxiliary to the acts, and 'Installation' is auxiliary to the *Fires*, not to the *Acts*. As there is no authority, in the shape of 'Direct Assertion' and the rest, for it, the Installation cannot be necessitated by the Act; in fact, on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection', it should be regarded as necessitated or prompted by the Fire. Then again, what comes into the sacrifice by virtue of the General Law is only what is due to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice (which is the Archetype of the sacrifice in question), and not what is due to the substance used.—From all this it follows that the *Sthapati-Isti* is to be performed in ordinary Fire.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Expiatory Sacrifice of 'Avakīrṇi-Pashu' should be performed in the unconsecrated Fire.*

SŪTRA (22).

THE 'AVAKIRṆI-PASHU' SACRIFICE ALSO SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS THE FOREGOING (STHAPATI-IṢṬI), BECAUSE THE TIME FOR THE INSTALLATION OF FIRE HAS NOT ARRIVED.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Avakīrṇi-Pashu*' sacrifice has been laid down in the text—*Brahmachāri avakīrṇi nirṛtam gardabhamālabhēta*' [The Religious Student who has become an *avakīrṇin* (by emitting his semen) should sacrifice an (one eyed) ass to *Nirṛti*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question Should Fires be 'installed' for the purpose of this sacrifice? Or should it be offered like the *Sthapati-Iṣṭi* (in the ordinary Fire)?

The words of the *Sūtra -The Avakīrṇi-Pashu sacrifice also should be dealt with as the foregoing*—mean to extend the application of the whole of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* to the present case; so that the *Pūrvapakṣa* of this *Adhikaraṇa* is the same as the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, and the *Siddhānta* also is the same. That is, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "Fire-installation is done for all acts, hence the *Avakīrṇi*-sacrifice also should be offered in consecrated Fires"; and the *Siddhānta* view is that the time for Fire installation has not yet arrived (for the Student, and he can offer a sacrifice only in an unconsecrated Fire); that is to say, the time for Fire-installation (which is after the man has married and got a son) cannot have arrived for the Student; hence this sacrifice also must be performed in the ordinary Fire.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *'Daiva acts' should be performed at stated times, such as the 'Northern Solstice of the Sun' and the like.*

SŪTRA (23).

'DAIVA ACTS' SHOULD BE PERFORMED (*a*) DURING THE 'NORTHERN SOLSTICE', (*b*) DURING THE DAYS OF THE 'EARLIER FORTNIGHT', AND (*c*) ON AN AUSPICIOUS DAY,—BECAUSE THERE ARE SMṚTI-DECLARATIONS AND ALSO A DESCRIPTIVE PASSAGE AND AN INDICATIVE TEXT, POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter here consists of the '*Daiva* acts', *Upanayana* (Brahmic Initiation) and the rest.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these '*Daiva* acts' to be done at any times, without any restriction? Or should they be done only during the Northern Solstice, during the days of the earlier fortnight and on an auspicious day?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "they may be done at any time without any restriction."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—They should be done only during the 'Northern Solstice', etc.—Why? Because (*a*) there is the *Smṛti text*—'The *Daiva* acts are to be done at these stated times', (*b*) there is also the following passage descriptive of the form of divine beings—'The Northern Solstice and the days of the Earlier Fortnight constitute the very form of divine beings'. As a matter of fact, we do not know the form of divine beings,—but the fact that '*Daiva* acts' are done at the stated times indicates, by this relationship, the form of those beings;—and (*c*) lastly, there is the following text also indicative of the same conclusion—'The morning is for divine beings, the midday for human beings, the afternoon for *Pitṛs*'.—From all this it follows that *Daiva* acts should be done at the times stated.

SŪTRA (24).

AND ALSO THE WHOLE ACT SHOULD BE COMPLETED DURING THE DAY.

Bhāṣya.

During the day;—there is a further peculiarity that the whole act should be completed during the day and shall not be done at night.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): '*Pitrya*' *acts are to be done at stated times,—such as the* '*later fortnight*' *and so forth.*

SŪTRA (25).

PITRYA' ACTS ARE TO BE DONE AT TIMES OTHER THAN THOSE.

Bhāṣya

The *Shrāddha* and other '*Pitrya*' acts are to be done (*a*) during the later fortnight and (*b*) in the afternoon; *because there are Smṛti-texts, descriptive passages and indicative texts to that effect.*

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'begging' and the 'buying' that form part of the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice are compulsory and essential.*

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE SHOULD BE 'BEGGING' AND 'BUYING' ONLY WHEN THE THING REQUIRED IS NOT THERE ALREADY,—AS IN ORDINARY LIFE"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the following text (*a*) *'Dvādaśha rātrīrdīkṣito bhikṣām yāchīta'* ['For twelve nights, the Initiated Sacrificer should beg for livelihood'],—and (*b*) *'Somam krīṇāti'* [He buys the Soma'].

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the man to beg for livelihood only when he has nothing to live upon? and is the man to buy the *Soma* only when he does not possess it already? Or are these acts to be done in both cases—when the *food* and the *Soma* are there already and also when they are not there?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—*'There should be 'begging' and 'buying' only when the means of livelihood and the Soma are not there already.*—Why?—Because the 'begging' and the 'buying' are done only for the purpose of securing the things wanted; and if the things are already there, the acts would be futile, and what is futile should not be done, even though it be enjoined. Hence we conclude that the acts should be done only when the thing wanted is not there; *as in ordinary life*; in ordinary life it is only when one does not possess a thing already that he begs for it or buys it; similarly it *should* be in the case in question also."

SŪTRA (27)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE COMPULSORY, BECAUSE IT HAS ITS USE.

Bhāṣya.

The 'begging' and the 'buying' should be compulsory, to be done when the thing required is there and also when it is not there. In this way, the 'begging' and the 'buying' have their use. It has been laid down as prompted (required) by the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and not by the thing wanted [hence it serves the useful purpose of helping in the accomplishment of the result of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which it could not, if it were done only for the securing of the thing concerned]; and hence it must form an essential (compulsory) part of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Nor is there any such declaration as that

'the act in question is to be done only when the thing is not there'. In fact, the acts in question have been laid down as necessary factors in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and it would have to be assumed that the *non-existence of the thing* has been mentioned as the occasion (or contingency) under which the acts would be done. And such an assumption would go against the words of the text. Hence the meaning is that at this sacrifice only such things should be used as have been specially embellished by being *begged for* and *bought*; otherwise its performance would be defective. It follows from this that the 'begging' and the 'buying' should be done, when the thing required is not there as well as when it is there.

As for what has been said regarding 'ordinary life',—in ordinary life action is determined by things, not by words, people act in accordance with the state of things, and not in accordance with words, in the case of *Vedic* acts on the other hand, it is only by means of words that things are known, and hence actions should be done in accordance with words. Hence it follows that the acts in question are to be done, also when the thing required is there already.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrifices, such acts as 'Living on Milk' are compulsory and essential.*

SŪTRA (28).

THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH—(*a*) EATING, (*b*) DIRECTING, (*c*) CLOTHING, (*d*) THE OFFERING OF THE SAÑJÑAPTA-HOMA, AND (*e*) THE RECITING OF THE MANTRA SPEAKING OF 'ENMITY'.

Bhāṣya

(*a*) In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'The *Brāhmaṇa* should live upon *milk*; the *Kṣatriya* on *gruel*; the Vaishya, on *Curdled milk*';—similarly (*b*) in connection with the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the following *direction*—'Bring up the washing water, also bring the fuel and the grass, wash the *Sruk*, gird up the loins of the wife, come up with the Clarified Butter';—similarly, (*c*) in connection with the *Vājapēya*, we read—'The clothing is of grass';—(*d*) At the *Pashu-sacrifice*, there is the *Sañjñapta-Homa* laid down in the following text—'When the animal makes a noise or strikes the chest or feet, one should offer the *Homa* with the *Mantra* "*Agnirmā tasmādēnaso vishvān muñcha tvam ha sah*"'; lastly (*e*) there is the *Mantra* to be recited 'He who is inimical towards me, or to whom I am inimical'.—These texts form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*.

In regard to these, there arises the following question—(*a*) Is it only when there is no other food that the man is to live upon *Milk* or *Gruel* or *Curdled milk*,—or even when there is other food available?—(*b*) Is that man alone to be *directed*, who, if not directed, could not understand what is to be done, or even when he knows and understands it?—(*c*) Is the man to wear cloth of grass only when that of cotton yarns is not available,—or also when other clothes are available?—(*d*) Is the *Sañjñapta-Homa* to be offered only when the animal makes a noise, or strikes its chest and feet?—(*e*) Lastly, should the *Mantra* in question '*Yasmānnō'dhā yaṁcha vayam dviṣmaḥ*' be pronounced by only a man who is inimical to others, or to whom others are inimical,—or even when the man hates, or is hated by, no person?

The principles of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* have been extended to the present case also. So that the *Pūrvapakṣa* here is the same as in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, and the *Siddhānta* also is the same. That is, the Pūrvapakṣa view is that "the acts in question are to be done only when the things required are not there already", while the *Siddhānta* is that everyone of the acts is compulsory (essential), *because it has its use* (Sū. 27, above).—The reasoning also is the same here as there (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*).

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *Eating in the latter part of the night is not essential.*

SŪTRA (29)

WHAT MIGHT BE DISASTROUS SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL (COMPULSORY)

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we read *Madhyandinē aparārātrē vā vratam vratayati* ('Takes food either at midday or in the latter part of the night').

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'taking of food in the latter part of the night' essential, compulsory? Or not essential, not 'compulsory'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—*it is compulsory, because it serves a useful purpose* (Sū. 27).

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*What might be disastrous should not be regarded as essential or compulsory.* As a matter of fact, a man should take food only at a time when he feels that he would be able to digest it, at a time however when he feels that he will not be able to digest the food properly—if he were to take food, it would be *disastrous*; and if through indigestion, the sacrificer should die, the procedure would stop, and when the procedure stops, all would stop.—From this it follows that the taking of food at the time in question should not be regarded as essential or compulsory.

'ADHIKARANA (10): *A hypothetical discussion : The animal sacrificed to 'Agni-Soma' must be a Goat.*

SŪTRA (30)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE INJUNCTION SPEAKING OF THE 'ANIMAL', THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRICTION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SPECIFICATION"

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma*, there is an animal dedicated to *Agni Soma*, mentioned in the following text— Being initiated, one should sacrifice the *animal* dedicated to *Agni Soma*'.

In regard to this there arises the question—May *any* animal be killed? Or must it be a *Goat*?—This question arises in view of what is going to be explained

Question—"For some people (*in one Vedic Rescensional Text*) it has been clearly asserted that 'the *goat* is offered to *Agni Soma*', and what is laid down in one Rescensional Text is applicable to all [Under the circumstances, why should there be any doubt on the point?]"

Answer—The whole of this discussion is a hypothetical one, being based upon the hypothesis that the actions laid down in different Rescensional Texts are different [so that, though the *Goat* has been mentioned in one text, that cannot be applicable to people who do not belong to that particular rescension].

On the said question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows *The injunction being of animal* (in general), *there can be no restriction*, when something has to be dedicated, it is a particular thing that can be dedicated, not the genus 'animal', it is a thing that *helps* in the *fulfilment* of the *action*, hence without the *thing*, there can be no *dedication*, that is why a thing (a particular animal) is secured (for the sacrifice), and when the *thing has been secured, there need be no restriction, any particular thing may be dedicated*—*The reason for this lies in the fact that there is no specification*, in regard to the individuals related to (included under) the genus 'animal', we do *not find* any specification. Hence it follows that any animal may be taken up (for dedication)"

SŪTRA (31)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT MUST BE A GOAT, BECAUSE OF THE MANTRA-TEXT

Bhāṣya

The term 'in reality' sets aside the view set forth above.

It is not the right view that anything wherein the genus 'animal' subsists may be taken up (for being sacrificed to *Agni Soma*). There is a

ground for restricting the thing to be dedicated, in the shape of the text of the following Mantra—'*Agnayē chhāgasya vapāyā mēdasō 'nubrūhi*'; here we have the *Mantra-text* clearly indicating the *goat*. If then, the *Goat* were not the animal secured for the purpose, the use in the *Mantra* of the word indicative of it would have no meaning Hence it follows that what the injunctive text lays down is the dedication *with reference to the Goat*;—this restrictive injunction being based upon the *Mantra-text*.

SŪTRA (32).

[OBJECTION]—"WHAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH ABOVE CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS IT INVOLVES THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya

"What has been set forth in the foregoing *Sūtra* cannot be right; no *Mantra-text* can restrict anything so long as there is an Injunction that is against it. As a rule, in a case where the texts do not speak of any definite substance, it is only an indefinite substance that should be used. Hence it is not right to restrict the thing to be defined, on the basis of a *Mantra text*. In fact, a *Mantra* can define only what needs to be defined. In the present case the words (of the Injunction) make it clear that all that needs to be defined is defined through the genus 'animal'; and consequently the *Mantra text* has not force enough to define anything.—Further, under the *Siddhānta* it would be necessary to *assume* a Direct Declaration of the entire procedure on the basis of the *Mantra-text*, while, under the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the thing is already well-defined. and it would have only to be included in the Direct assertion of the Procedure. Then again, the denotation of the term 'animal' as consisting in the genus 'animal' is something totally different from the denotation which is restricted to the *Goat*. From all this it follows that the *Mantra-text* cannot restrict the 'animal', against the words of the Injunction."

SŪTRA (33).

"IT IS LIKE THE MENTION OF THE 'GOTRA-ṚṢIS'—IF THIS IS WHAT THE SIDDHĀNTIN SAYS [then our answer would be as in the following *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"You, *Siddhāntin*, may offer the following explanation—The genus 'animal' is not to be withdrawn from other animals; as in the case of *Gotra-ṛṣis* it is said—'He selects the *Gotra-ṛṣis*, he selects three', there is a general statement (of *ṛṣis* in general) followed by a particular one, which restricts the number to *three* only; all that is meant being that only *three*, and not the others, are intended to be emphasised,—similarly in the case in question, the genus 'animal' is mentioned with a view to emphasise the one particular animal, *Goat*, not the other particular animals."

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE SIDDHANTIN'S EXPLANATION]—"THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION, IT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED."

Bhāṣya.

"What has been suggested is not right. In the case in question, the particular thing to be dedicated (i.e. the goat) has not been *enjoined* (it is only indicated) in the Mantra text. While in the case cited (that of the *Gotra-ṛsis*) the selecting of the priests has been enjoined, that is, the connection of the particular number 'three' has been clearly enjoined, and hence no other number can be admitted. Similarly, inasmuch as the term '*ārṣēya* (*Gotra-ṛsis*) has been used, what is *not-ārṣēya* cannot be admitted,—the force of the term 'three' also is such that the denotation of the term *ārṣēya*' becomes restricted within the limits of the particular number enjoined. In the case in question, on the other hand, the *Mantra-text* has no such force; and hence there can be no restriction."

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTIN'S REJOINDER]—IN REALITY, THERE IS RESTRICTION BECAUSE BOTH TERMS DENOTE THE SAME THING. IN THE CASE OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY THEM BEING DIFFERENT, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF SEPARATELY.

Bhāṣya.

In reality there is restriction, because both the terms 'animal' and 'goat'—*denote the same thing*,—the *animal* is the generic entity and the Goat and others are particular entities—'How so?'—Because they are all spoken of in co-ordination, e.g. 'the goat is an animal', 'the camel is an animal', 'the ram is an animal', 'the bull is an animal'. Such being the case, the words of the *Mantra text* in question are not incompatible with the term 'animal'; hence the *goat* also may be taken to be actually enjoined (by the injunction which lays down the sacrificing of the 'animal') as to be sacrificed, all that happens on coming across the *Mantra-text* (which speaks of the *Goat*) is that it comes to be understood that where the Injunctive sentence has used the generic term '**animal**', it has used it with a view to speak of the one particular animal ***Goat***, and not any other particular animals. In fact, the mention of the 'preparation' of the goat is found to be mentioned, which indicates that the term 'animal' is meant to stand for the *Goat*; just as in a case where the *yoke-strap* is mentioned, and such things as the shaft and the wheel are near by,—if someone says 'bring the *aksa*' ('*aksa*' denoting several things, *eye*, ***dice***, *axle*, and so forth), it is understood that what the speaker is speaking of is the *axle* of the wheel, and not the *gambling dice*.—In case the things denoted by the terms 'animal' and 'goat' were totally different, and they were spoken of separately, then the two

might be taken as entirely different; in that case the injunction could not be restricted to the *Goat only*; and as the Goat would not be enjoined, the *Horse* (or any other *animal*) might be admitted. –Further, if the *Goat* were admitted, there would be this fact in its favour that it would be something indicated by the *Mantra text*. If the term 'animal' were taken as actually denoting the *goat*, then on the *goat* being admitted, there would not be any possibility for the admitting of other animals; hence (with a view to avoid this) we take it that by the direct denotation of the term 'animal' all the other animals also become capable of being admitted, and it is the indicative power of the *Mantra text* that does the restriction to the *Goat* only

SŪTRA (36).

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"IN FACT, THERE CAN BE NO RESTRICTION: BECAUSE THE TWO THINGS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT,—THIS DIFFERENCE BEING PROVED BY DISJUNCTION AND DIVERSITY OF NAMES"

Bhāṣya

'*In fact, there can be no restriction*, any animal may be brought in,—*because the two things are entirely different*—*animal* is one thing, and *Goat* is a totally different thing; and the co-ordination is between the two *things*, not between the two *words*'—'How is it known that the two things are entirely different?'—Because of *disjunction*, and because of the *diversity of names*; there is '*disjunction*' that some *animals* are not *goats*; similarly there is this 'diversity of names' that one is called 'Goat' while the other is called 'animal', and when the names are different it is only reasonable that the things should be different—Then again, it is because the two things are different that we find both the words used in the same sentence—'*Pashum chhāgam ānaya*', ('Bring the *animal*, *goat*'),—otherwise (if both were one and the same), then the purposes of the sentence would have been fulfilled by only one word, and one of the two words would not be there; as a matter of fact, however, both are there,—hence it follows that *animal* is one thing and *goat* is a totally different thing; and from this it follows that there can be no restriction, and *any* animal might be brought in."

The following is a refutation of the above view, *apart from the Sūtras**:—Even if the two things are different, there must be restriction—"Why?"—Because the *Mantra* (which speaks of the *Goat*) is included in the declaration of the entire procedure of the sacrifice; the sacrifice is understood to be something accomplished by means of the *Mantra*; and if we adopted the *Mantra*, we would be making the sacrifice effective only if we brought in the *goat* (which is mentioned in the *Mantra*); because the *Mantra* leaves no

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* The *Tantraratna* has the following interesting note here—What this refutation sets forth is not 'apart from the *Sūtra*', it is all embodied in the *Siddhānta-Sūtra*—'*Navā, prayogasamavāyitvāt*': the *Bhāṣyakāra* did not see this *Sūtra* and hence said '*it is apart from the Sūtras*'.

option. On the other hand, if we brought in some other animal, the *Mantra* would no longer be applicable, and if we gave up the *Mantra*, we would not be making the sacrifice quite effective, and would thereby be going against the Veda.—[Read '*tēna*' for '*ato na*'].—It may be that an animal other than the *Goat* is also an 'animal',—but we cannot admit that animal, lest we make the sacrifice defective.—From all this it follows that it is only the *Goat* that should be admitted.

Says the Opponent—"By admitting the Horse, we need not abandon the *Mantra*, as that same Horse may be called '*Chhāga*' (*Goat*) in the sense of one *whose movements have been cut off*; the horse whose movements have been cut off is a '*chhāga*', because this term is derived from the two roots '*chhid*' (to cut off) and '*gam*' (to go), [and hence etymologically, the term '*chhāga*' means 'one whose movements have been cut off', and as such can apply to a *horse* who has been reduced to that condition]". ['This argument is embodied in the following *Sūtra*.]

SŪTRA (37).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE FORM AND THE INDICATIVES."

Bhāṣya

"There is the text 'In some cases they may be with testicles (entire)': this would have some sense only if, in the absence of such a text, they would always be without testicles. [And this indicates that the animal may be one that is generally castrated; and this would include the *Goat* as well as the *Horse*]: consequently the Horse 'with movement cut off' would also be regarded as a '*Chhāga*' (Goat) and hence fit for being admitted to the sacrifice."

The answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (38).

THE FITNESS OF THE GOAT FOR ACTION DOES NOT DEPEND UPON ITS 'FORM AND INDICATIVES'.

Bhāṣya.

The fitness of the goat for action does not depend upon 'form and indicatives'; the term '*Chhāga*' (Goat) does not signify 'one whose movements have been cut off'; it is one composite whole and is well-known as having a totally different denotation; which cannot be set aside by any merely etymological signification. Hence the *Horse* can never be called a '*Chhāga*' (*Goat*).

SŪTRA (39).

BY REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE FORMS (OF DIFFERENT ANIMALS) THE TERM CANNOT BE TAKEN (TO BE INDICATIVE OF A DEFINITE AGE); IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A TERM DENOTING A DEFINITE GENUS

Bhāṣya

This *Sūtra* should be taken as following upon (and answering the argument expressed in) the following words:—"Why cannot the term '*Chhāga*' be taken as connoting a definite age? All these words—(*a*) '*Chhāga*', (*b*) '*Chhāqala*' and (*c*) *Vasta*' connote the varying ages [of the goat, (*a*) Kid, (*b*) Goat, (*c*) Billy-goat]; similarly the term '*horse*' also might be connotative of the same age (as the term 'goat')".

The answer to this (as given in the *Sūtra*) is as follows:—It cannot be as has been suggested. It is true that the word '*Chhāga*' is connotative of age, but it can connote the age only as belonging to the *Goat* (not to other animals); just as the term '*Shona*' ('Chestnut') connoting a colour, connotes the colour belonging to the genus *horse*, and not any other.—Thus then, *the forms of different animals being different*, the term '*Chhāga*' cannot be taken as connotative of the *age only*, in fact, *it should be treated as a term denoting a definite genus*, i.e. as connoting the age belonging to a particular genus or kind (of animal).—For these reasons, the animal to be sacrificed should be restricted to the *goat* only.

SŪTRA (40).

"IT MAY BE REGARDED AS A MODIFIED FORM".—THAT CANNOT BE; AS IT IS INBORN.

Bhāṣya

This *Sūtra* also is to be taken as following upon a few words.

Says the Opponent—"In the present instance, the term '*Chhāga*' (goat) may be regarded as 'a modified form' of such words as '*Ashva*' ('Horse') and the like. There is some part (the vowels for instance) of these latter words, '*Ashva*' and the rest, that is found in the term '*Chhāga*', though there are some others that are different. Hence the Horse ('*Ashva*') also may be called '*Chhāga*' (goat)"

The answer to this is as follows:—*That cannot be, as it is inborn*: that is, the relationship between the *Name* and the *Named* is something 'inborn', as has been explained (under Sū. 1. 1. 5); so that no name can be the *modification* of any other. Hence the Horse can never be the *Goat*; and it is the *goat* alone that should be brought in.

SŪTRA (41).

THE QUALIFICATION SPOKEN OF CAN BE REGARDED ONLY AS ACCIDENTAL, BECAUSE IT IS NOT MEANT BY THE INJUNCTION TO BE PRESENT IN THE ANIMAL.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* also is to be taken as following upon certain words.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the term '*Chhāga*' (goat) be taken as applied to an animal on account of the *hole* ('*Chhidra*'), which is spoken of in the text—'When they cut out its omentum, there is a *hole* in the animal'."

That cannot be, we reply. Because the presence of the 'hole' in the animal is not countenanced by the Injunction, in fact, the injunction is that 'one should kill an animal that is not defective in limbs', hence the animal sacrificed should be *without a hole*. Further, we have already explained that the denotation of the word '*Chhāga*' as a whole (which denotes the *goat*), cannot be set aside by any etymological signification (such as 'having *Chhidra* or hole').—From this also it follows that it is the *Goat* only, and not horse or other animals, that should be brought in.

SŪTRA (42).

THE TERM MUST BE DENOTATIVE OF THE 'GENUS', BECAUSE WORDS ARE, AS A RULE, USED IN THAT SENSE, AND BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THUS THAT IT CAN BE EXPRESSIVE.

Bhāṣya

The term '*vā*' implies emphasis.—Inasmuch as the meaning of the term as a whole cannot be set aside by its etymological meaning,—the term '*Chhāga*' must be taken as denotative of the *genus*. Thus alone can the expressiveness of the term as a whole be maintained. It is in this sense of 'genus' that terms are, as a rule, found to be used;—for instance, in such sentences as speak of offering the omentum and the fat of bulls, goats, rams to all divinities'; such assertions are possible only when the *genus* is denoted. Restriction also is generally based upon what is found to be *as a rule* (i.e. in most cases) (i.e. upon induction). For instance, when a writing is *fine* as a rule, i.e. generally, it is regarded as 'fine'.

From all this it follows that it is the *Goat* alone that is to be brought in (for being sacrificed).

[4]It is not necessary to explain the purposes served by a discussion that is purely *hypothetical* (as the present one is).

End of Pāda viii of Adhyāya VI.

End of Adhyāya VI.

ADHYĀYA VII.

PĀDA I

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Details like 'Prayāja' are prompted by (for the purpose) of the 'Apūrva' (Transcendental Result).*

SŪTRA (1)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THERE BEING A DIVERSITY OF PRINCIPALS, THE SUBSIDIARY DETAILS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RELEVANCY BECAUSE THE VEDA IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY IN THE MATTER

Bhāṣya

The first six discourses have discussed the procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* and other sacrifices the details of which are directly prescribed, the second six discourses are now going to discuss the procedure of the *Indrāgna* and other sacrifices the details of whose procedure have not been directly prescribed

[Kumārila demurs to this statement He says—This is not correct the right statement would be In the earlier discourses we have discussed the *direct injunctions* bearing upon the Archetypes as well as Ectypes, and with the seventh discourse begins the treatment of transference *by implication*, of details from the sphere of one sacrifice to that of another —*Tuptika*]

Now if it be a fact that those details that have been prescribed under the context of the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* and other sacrifices become prescribed in connection with all the sacrifices, then those same details would supply all that is needed by the *Indrāgna* and such other sacrifices, which would have to be performed in that same manner, —in that case, there would be no need for the second six discourses —It, on the other hand, the details prescribed under the context of one sacrifice are to appertain to that sacrifice only, then the *Aindrāgna* and such other sacrifices would be devoid of all details, and in that case, the question would arise—(*a*) are there to be any details in connection with these latter sacrifices—or not ?—(*b*) if they are, then, what are those details ? How many are they ? How are they to be adopted in practice ?—It is for the consideration of these questions that the author begins the second six discourses.

Discourse VII declares that there *are* details in connection with these other sacrifices.—Discourse VIII explains that such and such details appertain to such and such a sacrifice,—Discourse IX explains the *manner* of the performance of those details,—Discourses X, XI and XII explain that only so many of the details, and no more, are to be adopted in actual practice.

In this connection, first of all we consider the following question—Are the details required for the accomplishment of the sacrifice?—i.e.—Are they laid down for the purpose of making the sacrifice fully effective? Or are they required for the purpose of accomplishing the *Apūrva*?—i.e. for the bringing about of the *Apūrva*?—If they are required for the purposes of the sacrifice, then, they would serve the purposes of all sacrifices; while if they are required for the purpose of bringing about the *Apūrva*, then they must be restricted in their application to that one sacrifice in whose context they have been laid down.—Now which is the right view on this question?

The right view is that the details are required for the bringing about of the *Apūrva*; it is the *Apūrva* that leads directly to the fruit of the action, while the sacrifice by itself (without the *Apūrva*) brings no fruit; and that effort alone is fruitful which is applied to what brings a fruit. Hence we conclude that the details are required for the purpose of bringing about the *Apūrva*.

Now follows the *Sūtra* of the reverend Teacher—

There being a diversity of Principals, the subsidiary details should be assigned to them in accordance with their relevancy. '*Principals*'—i.e. the *Apūrvas*; they are the predominant factor because they bring about the fruits; and it is the predominant factor that is called the 'Principal';—the '*Diversity*' of these *Apūrvas* has been explained (under Discourse II) as being due to the *Difference of words* and other conditions.—When there is such 'Diversity' among the 'Principals', *the subsidiary details should be assigned to them in accordance with their relevancy*; i.e.—the details shall appertain to that same sacrifice to which they are relevant, i.e. in whose 'context' they are laid down;—*because the Veda is the sole authority in this matter*; i.e. the Veda is the only effective authority for knowing—to which particular *Apūrva* a certain detail appertains; Sense-perception and the other means of knowledge are of no use in this matter. And on the basis of the Vedic text, the details must appertain to that same sacrifice in whose context they are spoken of, because what is spoken of as appertaining to one cannot appertain to another; for instance, the lands and clothes that belong to *Devadatta* cannot belong to Yajñadatta.—From all this it follows that the assignment of the details is to be done in accordance with the Context.

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION TO THE SIDDHĀNTA]—"IN FACT, THE DETAILS SHOULD ALL APPERTAIN TO ALL SACRIFICES; BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE 'SACRIFICE' AND THE 'APŪRVA'; AS IN THE CASE OF ANIMALS."

Bhāṣya.

"In fact, it is not right that the assignment of the details should be done in accordance with the Context;—then what?—*they should all appertain to all sacrifices*; they should be treated as equal: i.e. as equally related to

all sacrifices.—Why so ?—Because there is no differentiation between the '*Utpatti*'—which stands here for the *sacrifice*, which brings forth the *Apūrva* —and the '*artha*'—which stands for the *Apūrva*, because that is the *purpose* for which the sacrifice is performed ;—there is no 'differentiation' between these two—the *Sacrifice* and the *Apūrva*, —because all *Apūrvas* are related to sacrifices, and it is in connection with sacrifices that the details are enjoined ; in fact they are all spoken after the injunctive term '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') ; but they cannot appertain to the sacrifice, as this latter is fruitless ; and not appertaining to the *sacrifice*, they are taken as appertaining to the *Apūrvas* related to the *Sacrifice* —and his '*Connection with Apūrva*' belongs equally to all sacrifices ;—hence all the details must appertain to all the sacrifices.—*Like the properties of animals* ; that is, the case in question is analogous to that of the properties of animals ; for instance, when it is said that 'the cow should not be touched with the foot', though what is spoken of is spoken of in connection with the *genus* 'cow' (which is what the term 'cow' denotes)—yet it being found that it cannot appertain to that *genus*, it is taken as appertaining to the *individual cows* which are related to the *genus* 'cow' ; and inasmuch as this *connection with the genus* '*cow*' is equally present in all cows,—the dark, the tawny and the pigeon-coloured ones,—what has been spoken of (*not touching with the foot*) is taken as appertaining to *all* the cows. Similarly should it be in the case in question also.

"It might be argued by the *Siddhāntin* thus :—The analogy is not correct ; in the case cited, the details—*not touching of the cow with the foot*, etc.—have been enjoined in connection with *cows in general*, while in the case in question, the details have been laid down in connection with one particular sacrifice,—in all such texts as *One should perform the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice*, *One should perform the Jyotistoma sacrifice* ; and for this reason the details thus laid down must appertain to only that *Apūrva* which is related to that particular sacrifice,—and not to all *Apūrvas* (or all sacrifices).

"Our answer to this is as follows :—The sentence 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice' cannot be taken as enjoining the details of any particular sacrifice. -Why so ? -Because if the sentence enjoins the details, then the *sacrifice* must be taken as only *referred to* (for purposes of that injunction of details)--the sense being—'When one performs the sacrifice, he should do it in this fashion' ; on the other hand, if the *sacrifice* also is taken as enjoined by the sentence, then it cannot be connected with the details ; because there cannot be any connection between enjoined (and predicated) factors. If then there is only a *reference* to the *sacrifice* (in the term 'should sacrifice'), then the reference would be to all sacrifices, without any distinction. Hence the details should be taken as appertaining to all sacrifices.—'But there is the term *darsha-pūrṇamāsa* which would specify the *sacrifice* (to which the details would belong).'—The term '*darsha-pūrṇamāsa*' cannot specify the *sacrifice*. Because it could be either injunctive or a reference ; if it is a reference, then it could be so only for the purpose of connecting the sacrifice with the details, and so far as the two sacrifices (*Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*) are concerned, their connection with the details is already accomplished by the said reference.—'But it could serve

the purpose of *exclusion*, the meaning being that—'*The Darsha-Pūrnamāsa alone should be performed in this manner, and no other sacrifices*'.—This also is not possible; because the word does not signify the *exclusion of others*.—'This could be done by the process of *Preclusion*'.—No *Preclusion* is possible in this case; if there were another sentence which asserted the connection of the details with *every sacrifice*, then alone could this second sentence serve the purposes of *preclusion*. Inasmuch as there is no other sentence asserting the connection of all sacrifices with the details, the same sentence (the one under consideration) would do the *assertion* (of the connection of all sacrifices) as well as the *negation* (of the connection of all except the one sacrifice), and thus could certainly be a burden that would be too heavy for one sentence.—'In that case, what would be connected with the injunctions of details would be, not the term 'should sacrifice', in the sense that *one should perform sacrifice in this manner*, with what *then?—with the term darsha pūrnamāsa, because their connection with* this latter term is *direct*,—in the sentence 'One should sacrifice with the *Darsha-pūrnamāsa* sacrifice',—while that with the injunctions of details is only *indirect*. What then would be the meaning of the sentence? It would be that 'one should perform the *Darsha pūrnamāsa*'. This cannot be possible, as in that case the details would remain unconnected and floating. How so?—What the verbal affix in the term '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') lays down is that the *Darsha-pūrnamāsa should be performed*, how then could there be any connection of the details, either with *all sacrifices* or with any particular sacrifice? In fact, there being no injunctive affix, the details would remain unconnected. This objection does not affect our position, we shall bring about the connection of the details, *not* by means of the *sentence*, then by what?—by the *Context*.—How? When it is enjoined that a certain act should be done there arises the need to know the procedure of the act—in what manner it is to be done,—it is then that the details come to be connected through the *Context*, the idea being that '*the act should be done in such and such a manner*'. This is not possible. At the time that the *Darsha pūrnamāsa* are laid down as to be performed, there is no desire to know the procedure of those sacrifices, because their procedure is already known; and when the desire to know the procedure is not there, there is no 'Context', because it has been declared (under Sū. 3. 3. 11) that 'That which is not otherwise connected becomes connected through context, because *details of procedure are always wanted*'. 'Under the circumstances, in this sentence details are not enjoined for the sacrifice, nor does it lay down that the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* should be performed, what is done is that the two words in the sentence *Darshapūrnamāsābhyām yajēta* refer to a particular sacrifice and lay down details for it, the construction being—*when one should perform the Darsha pūrnamāsa sacrifice, he should perform it in such and such a manner*'.—Even so, the word '*Darsha-pūrnamāsābhyām*' cannot be a *reference*, as such is not the ordinary signification of the Instrumental ending. A reference is made to something that has gone before, while what is signified by the Instrumental ending is *something new*, and as such must be predicated (and enjoined), and if it were thus predicated and enjoined, the sense deduced would be a most

incongruous one—'The *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices are the instruments of *sacrifice*'. From all this it follows that the best view of the case is that 'the details are enjoined with reference to the sacrifice'.—'But even so, there would be no connection with the word *darshapūrṇamāsābhyām*.'—It would certainly be connected, as being connotative of *time*; it would be the reiteration of a pretty common fact; it is a pretty common fact that sacrifices are generally performed about the time of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. As for the Instrumental ending, that could be taken as based upon the implied subordinate character of the time.—Under the circumstances, all the details should appertain to all sacrifices."

SŪTRA (3)

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE DETAILS ARE AUXILIARIES TO THE INJUNCTION (OF THE MAIN SACRIFICE), THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED (TO THEIR CONTEXT) BY REASON OF THE DIVERSITY OF APŪRVAS' SPECIALLY AS THE 'SACRIFICE' IS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya

In fact the text laying down the details is an auxiliary—a part—of the Injunction of the sacrifice. [When it is said that 'One should perform the *Darsha-pūrnamāsa* sacrifice'] what is meant is that 'the *Darsha-pūrnamāsa* sacrifice should be performed, in the following manner, by *kindling the Fires* and so forth'. In the injunction the *sacrifice* is spoken of as a subordinate factor; the term '*Darshapūrṇamāsa*' denotes a *sacrifice*;—so that in the particular sentence (*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta*') the sacrifice is spoken of as an instrument, the meaning being that '*by means of the set of sacrifices called Darsha pūrṇamāsa*, one should bring about something else'; it is this *something else*,—and not the *sacrifice*—that is enjoined as to be brought about or accomplished; and this something is the *Apūrva*.

"As a matter of fact, in the sentence we read that 'one desiring heaven, should perform the sacrifice', where we find the mention of a definite result (in the shape of *Heaven*); so that it is this result that should be taken to be what should be accomplished."

True, a result is mentioned; but this result is not brought about by the *Sacrifice*; as it appears after the Sacrifice is past and gone; what is brought about by the Sacrifice is the '*Apūrva*' [and it is the *Apūrva* that leads to the result]; and it is for this reason that the *Apūrva* is regarded as what should be brought about; and that which is to be brought about is what is connected with the procedure. Hence it follows that the Details (which constitute the Procedure) appertain to the *Apūrva*. Of these *Apūrvas*, there is diversity; and *by reason of the diversity of Apūrvas*, the details *should be restricted to their respective contexts*.

"Under this view, how would the *Sacrifice* be specified by the term '*Darshapūrṇamāsa*'?"

Answer—The sentence in question does not specify a sacrifice; what is really expressed by it is *the bringing into existence of the Apūrva* as qualified by both the words ('*darshapūrṇamāsābhyām*' and '*yajēta*'); just as in the sentence '*Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ēkahāyanyā somam krīṇāti*' ['He buys the Soma with a heifer, red, with tawny eyes, one year old'] [see 3. 1. 12].

"The analogy is not correct. In the case cited, the substance (heifer) is totally different from the qualification (*red*, etc.); hence it is possible for one *to qualify the other*; *in the present instance, on the other hand*, the 'Sacrifice' itself is '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*', and hence it is not possible for one to qualify the other."

In the present instance also, the word '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') stands for *sacrifice in general*, and '*darsha-pūrṇamāsa*' for one particular sacrifice; and the *general* is different from the *particular*.

"Even so the bringing about of the sacrifice in *general* would be spoken of by *Direct Assertion*, while that of the *Particular* sacrifice would be only indicated by *Syntactical Connection* and both these could not take place at the same time".

[Kumārila, in *Tuptīkā*, demurs to this explanation.]

If that be the case, then we accept, not what is asserted directly by the words, but what is indirectly indicated by Syntactical Connection.—Why so?—Because, if what is directly asserted were accepted, the term '*darsha-pūrṇamāsa*' would become meaningless, because this term would, in that case, be co-extensive with the term '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice').

SŪTRA (4).

IN THE CASE OF ANIMALS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE COMMON CHARACTERISTIC, WHAT IS MENTIONED MAY BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO ALL INDIVIDUALS.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū. 2) that as in the case of 'animals' (what is mentioned is applicable to all individuals,—so in the present case also the details laid down should appertain to all sacrifices);—but in the case of the animal, what is mentioned is a detail (that it should not be touched with the foot) in connection with the whole *genus* (not with any one individual cow); because what is denoted by the word ('cow') is the *genus*,—and it is only because the detail is found to be applicable to the *genus*, that the *genus* is taken as indicating the individual with which it is concomitant; just as in the case of the phrase '*gaṅgāyām gāvaḥ*' ('cows on the Gaṅgā'; where it being impossible for the *genus* 'cow' to be in the river, the word 'cow' is taken as indicating the *individual* cows). This *concomitance* (with the *genus*) is present in the case of all *individual* cows, and hence it comes to be taken as appertaining to all;—it is for this reason that in this case *it may be taken as appertaining to all individuals*.—In the case of the sentence '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta*' on the other hand, the *sacrifice* is clearly spoken of as the subordinate factor, and hence the details are not taken as laid down with a view to the *sacrifice* at all; in fact,

they are laid down with a view to the *Apūrva*; hence this is what has been put forward (in Sū. 3).—Hence the citing of 'animals' as an example is not right.

SŪTRA (5).

[*Objection*]—"BUT IT CANNOT BE SO, BECAUSE OF NON-SEPARATION".

Bhāṣya.

The term 'but' implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

"It is not right to say that the Details are required by and appurtenant to the *Apūrva*; because as a matter of fact, they are appurtenant to the *Sacrifice*.—Why so?—*Because of non separation*; that is, the Details cannot be separated from the *Sacrifice*; the Details are clearly declared to be a *substance* or a *deity* or a *mantra*; and the act of 'sacrifice' is only that act in which a *substance* is offered to a *deity* with a *mantra*; thus there is a clear perceptible relationship between the *Sacrifice* and the *Details*; while with the *Apūrva*, this relationship could be only inferred. In reference to the Result also, the subordinate character of the Sacrifice is quite patent, as declared in the sentence 'Desiring heaven, one should offer a sacrifice'; while in reference to the *Apūrva*, its subordinate character could be only inferred;—and Perception is more authoritative than Inference.—From all this it follows that the Details are appurtenant to the *Sacrifice*.—'It has been already explained that the sacrifice is something ephemeral, and as such incapable of bringing about the result at another time; so that the Details performed in connection with it would also be unable to bring about the result'.—The argument set forth here, we refute in the following manner: It would be like the drinking of oils; just as when oil or clarified butter is drunk,—though this drinking is ephemeral, yet it brings about, at another time, such results as the improvement of intelligence, memory, strength and so forth;—in the same manner the sacrifice also would bring about its result at another time;—what is the use of assuming an unseen and unheard of factor in the shape of *Apūrva*?"

SŪTRA (6).

[*Objection concluded*]—"FURTHER, ONE SENTENCE BEING TAKEN AS SERVING TWO PURPOSES HAS BEEN FORBIDDEN."

Bhāṣya.

"According to the view set forth above, all the details would appertain to all sacrifices. Further, *Prayājas* are performed at the *Aindrāgna* and other sacrifices; hence (according to our view by which the *Prayāja* as a detail appertains to all sacrifices), it becomes quite possible for those *Prayājas* to appear at the *Saurya* sacrifice; and also for the *Kṛṣṇala* to be offered at each *Prayāja*, according to the injunction that 'One should offer the *Kṛṣṇala* at each *Prayāja*' (which latter injunction appears in connection with the *Saurya* only). Otherwise (if the *Prayāja*, as a detail, did not appertain to all sacrifices), it would be necessary to take the injunction ('one should

offer the *Kṛṣṇala* at each *Prayāja* ') as laying down the *Prayājas* (in connection with the *Saurya*), and also the offering of *Kṛṣṇala* at those *Prayājas*; and in this way the sentence would have to serve two purposes, and this '*serving of two purposes*' *has been forbidden*.—From this also it follows that the details are appurtenant to the *Sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (7).

[*Answer*]—IN REALITY, THE DETAILS SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE APŪRVA, BECAUSE THERE IS NO INJUNCTION IN REGARD TO THE SACRIFICE, HENCE THERE IS DIFFERENCE AMONG ACTIONS (DUE TO DIFFERENCE AMONG APŪRVAS).

Bhāṣya

It is not true that the Details appertain to the *Sacrifice*. *The Details should appertain to the Apūrva*;—the term '*chodanā*' in the *Sūtra* we take to mean *Apūrva*; hence the meaning of the Sūtra is that, because the Details serve the purposes of the '*chodanā*' i.e of the *Apūrva*, therefore they must appertain to the *Apūrva*: the reason for this having already been given as 'because it is only thus that they can be conducive to the bringing about of the result'.

It has been urged by the Opponent that 'the connection of the Details with *Sacrifice* is clearly perceptible".—Our answer to this is that *there is no injunction in regard to Sacrifice*; the term '*utpatti*' here we explain as 'sacrifice'; so the meaning is that in regard to Sacrifice, there is no injunction to the effect that the Details appertain to the Sacrifice;—all that happens is that they are spoken of, and are performed, in connection with the Sacrifice; but this fact does not make them subservient to the purposes of the Sacrifice. For instance, though the *colour* is spoken of in connection with the *cloth*,—in such sentences as 'one colours the cloth',—and it is also done or produced in the cloth—yet it does not subserve the purposes of the cloth; it subserves the purposes of the man or woman (who wears the cloth). Similarly, in the case in question, the Details that are spoken of and performed in connection with the *Sacrifice* would subserve the purposes of the *Apūrva*; as it is only thus that they would serve a useful purpose.—For this reason,—i.e. because the details subserve the purposes of the *Apūrva*,—there would be difference among actions.

It has been urged by the Opponent that 'the fact of the Sacrifice being subordinate to the result is clearly perceptible".—But as a matter of fact, the Sacrifice does not bring about the Result, without having brought about an (intervening) *Apūrva*; that is why the Sacrifice is recognised as the indirect (mediate) cause (of the result);—one thing becomes recognised as the *cause* of another also when it brings about this latter indirectly (through another intervening factor). For example, when one cooks food with cow-dung, it is regarded as 'cooked by chaff' (the chaff having been eaten by the cow and turned into cow-dung).

It has also been urged that "the result would follow from the sacrifice at some future time, just as from the drinking of oils".—Our answer

to this is as follows:—In the case of the *drinking of the oils* also the result does *not* appear *at some other time*; because its result consists in the equilibrium of the bodily-humours; and this appears immediately after the *drinking*; as for the improvement in strength, robustness and the rest, all this results from the proper digestion of food. Hence the case cited is not analogous to the case in question.

SŪTRA (8).

[*Objection*]—"EVEN SO, IT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO ALL, BEING COMMON, LIKE THE NAME."

Bhāṣya.

"Even though it be the *Apūrva* that 'prompts' (needs) the Details, yet every one of such details *should appertain to all, being common, like the name*. All *Apūrvas* have the common name '*Apūrva*';—like the name, the detail pertaining to this also should be the same;—as in the case of the '*Bāhīka*' (people of the Panjab); when it is said 'a Panjabi has come as guest, prepare for him barley-meal', this same barley-meal is prepared for any and every *Panjabi*;—or when it is said 'in cases of disease in the Eye, *mudga and rice* should be eaten, and in cases of diseases of the stomach, *milk* [i.e. (*a*) ewe's milk, (*b*) milk and *Bilva*-fruit or 'milk of the *Bilva*-fruit] should be drunk', then in every case of 'eye-disease', *mudga and rice* is eaten, and in every case of 'stomach-disease', milk [i.e. ewe's milk, (*b*) milk and *Bilva*-fruit or milk of *Bilva*-fruit] is drunk;—similarly in the case in question all the details that have been laid down in connection with one *Apūrva* would appertain to all *Apūrvas*.

"Further, there are certain Brāhmaṇas belonging to the *Rescension* called '*Aruṇa-Parāshara*'; among their texts, there is the following *Smṛti-text*—'The details of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* appertain to all *Iṣṭis* and also to the *Agnīsomīya*' and so on, ending with the words—'all those archetypes and ectypes'. This text clearly indicates the view that we have set forth above (i.e. that the Details appertain to all sacrifices).

"From all this we conclude that, even though prompted by the *Apūrvas*, the Details are appurtenant to all sacrifices."

SŪTRA (9).

[*Answer*]—IN THE CASE OF NAMES, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE, BECAUSE THE FACT REMAINS THE SAME AND BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE. IN THE CASE OF SACRIFICE, HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS IT IS A MATTER AMENABLE TO 'WORDS' ALONE, THE ACCESSORY DETAILS OF ONE CANNOT APPERTAIN TO ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya.

We set forth the answer to what has been urged above.—It has been urged that the present case may be treated as the case of the '*Bāhīka*' (Panjabi).

Our answer to that is that *in the case of names it may be so, because the fact remains the same. Residence in the Panjab* is a fact, one's connection with a certain place; and this remains the same, constant, in all residents of the Panjab; and the liking for a particular kind of food (Barley-meal) is due to that fact, of residence in the Panjab, and it is not due to the personal idiosyncracy of any man.—How is this known?—*Because it is a matter of previous experience*; the matter has been subject of previous experience; several times people—residents of the Panjab, as well as others not so resident, have been fed, and from deduction it has been found that *fondness for Barley-meal* is due to residence in the particular country, and not to the idiosyncracies of any person. For this reason in the case of such names as '*Bāhīka*' (Resident of the Panjab), what has been urged by the Opponent may be possible.

In the case in question, however, *sacrifice* is amenable to only one means of cognition, the *word* (of the Veda); and hence it cannot be known, by any other means, to which particular *Apūrva* certain Details appertain; —and through the Vedic Word, they are found to be restricted to particular *Apūrvas*;—and *Apūrvas* are distinct (not one and the same). Hence it follows that the Details laid down in connection with one *Apūrva* cannot appertain (apply) to another.

SŪTRA (10)

"BUT THERE IS THE SMṚTI-TEXT",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged by the Opponent (under Sū. 5) that there is a *Smṛti-text* (to the effect that the Details of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are the same as those of all *Iṣṭis*, etc. etc.'—What is the answer to that?

SŪTRA (11).

[*Answer*]—IT IS NOT SO; AS THE SMṚTI-TEXT IS PRECEDED BY SOMETHING ELSE.

Bhāṣya.

The *Smṛti-text* quoted is preceded by something else: There is, as is going to be explained, a general law governing the application of details, in the form—'The procedure shall be like that of the original Primary'; and it is only the details thus made applicable to the minor sacrifice that are referred to in the text quoted,—on the basis of the general law just quoted; and it is not an injunction of any details that have not been already enjoined; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the application of Details is regulated by the said general law.

SŪTRA (12).

INASMUCH AS THE MATTER IS AMENABLE TO THE 'WORD' ALONE,—AND AS THE DETAILS ARE RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR CONTEXTS,—THEY COULD APPLY ELSEWHERE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A 'WORD' TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* states the Final Conclusion; in the Final Conclusion we have the statement of the Reason and of the Proposition. Thus the meaning is as follows:—Because matters are as explained above, therefore,—*inasmuch as the matter*—of *Fire-kindling* and other details—*is amenable to 'word' alone*,—and as they are *restricted* to distinct contexts,—*they could apply elsewhere only on the basis of a 'word' to that effect.* For instance, the *Rāṣṭrabhṛt-offerings* have been laid down in the following text, occurring in the section on 'Fires':—'*Gandharvāpsaraso vā ētamunmādayanti, ya unmādyatē ētā vai gandharvāpsaraso yadrāṣṭrabhṛtam, tasmai svāhā, tābhyaḥ svāhēti juhoti*' ['*Gandharvas* and *Apsarases* intoxicate him, and he becomes intoxicated; these *Gandharvas* and *Apsarases* are the *Rāṣṭrabhṛt*; to them they offer libations saying—*Svāhā to the Gandharvas, Svāhā to the Apsarases*']; and these *Rāṣṭrabhṛt* offerings, thus laid down in connection with the 'Fires', are declared to be applicable to the Marriage-Rite, in the following text:—['*Ētēṣām rāṣṭrabhṛto juhoti abhyātānān juhoti*']. 'At this one should offer the *Rāṣṭrabhṛt* offerings and the *Abhyātāna* offerings'. [So that there is thus latter direct text applying, to the Marriage-Rite, the details laid down originally in connection with the Fires].—In the absence of any such text (extending the application of Details), the Details must remain restricted to their own original contexts.

Such being the case, sacrifices like the *Aindrāgna* remain without details [as no details are laid down directly in reference to these sacrifices]; and it is the consideration of such sacrifices that is taken up by the second six-chapters of the *Sūtra*.

Now under Discourse VII, it is asserted that sacrifices like the *Aindrāgna* do have their details; and these come to them by '*Atidēsha*', 'Transference'. '*Atidēsha*' is that process by which the Details laid down in connection with one sacrifice are extended beyond that sacrifice and transferred to (i.e. connected with) another sacrifice. For instance, after having directed the feeding of *Devadatta* in the following terms:—'*Devadatta* should be fed on Rice, Pulse, Meat and Sweet cakes',—one 'transfers' or extends the same process to the case of *Yajñadatta* in the words—'Yajñadatta should be fed like Devadatta'. They have the following couplet also (defining *Atidēsha*)—

'*Atidēsha* is that process whereby a Detail becomes extended in its application *from* the Primary Act *to* other *acts* similar to it; such is the rule'.

This 'Extended Application' (or Transference) can be done either by name or by a declaration. The *name* that is made such a means is of three kinds—(*a*) name of the act, (*b*) name of the 'Embellishment' and (*c*) Etymological name. *Declaration* is of two kinds—(*a*) Direct (Perceptible) and (*b*) Indirect (Inferred). Of these, the *Indirect (Inferred) Declaration* will be dealt with later on; the Direct one is going to be considered now.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The Details of the 'Shyēna' sacrifice are 'extended' to the 'Iṣu' sacrifice by the direct declaration 'The rest of it is like the Shyēna'.*

Bhāsya (Introductory to *Adhikaraṇa*)

There is an *Ēkāha* (one day) sacrifice, by name *Isu*', and another, by name '*Shyēna*', both of these are 'malevolent' (calculated to bring about the death of someone) —In connection with the *Isu* sacrifice, — having laid down a few details the text goes on to say, 'The rest of it is like the Shyēna'.

In regard to this, the question is: Is it a mere *reference* or an *Injunction*? If it is an Injunction, then it is a case of 'Extended Application', extending the application of the Details of the *Shyēna* to the *Isu* — If, on the other hand, it is a mere reference, then it is not a case of 'Extended Application'.

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is set forth in the following *Sūtra*:-

SŪTRA (13)

[PŪRVAPAKSA]—"THE TEXT 'SAMĀNAM, ETC', SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A REFERENCE TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENJOINED ELSEWHERE—BECAUSE THE SACRIFICE IN QUESTION IS ONE THAT IS PRECEDED BY ANOTHER

Bhāsya

"In the text '*Samānam itarat shyēnēna*' ['the rest of it is like the *Shyēna*'] we have a *reference to what has already been enjoined elsewhere*; i.e. it is a mere *Reference* (not an *Injunction*).—Why?—*Because the sacrifice is one that is preceded by another*; that is, the *Isu* is preceded by the *Jyotistoma* (which is its Archetype) and hence the procedure at it should be the procedure of the *Jyotistoma*. Since *Jyotistoma* is the Archetype of the *Isu*, the Details of the *Jyotistoma* come to it under the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like its Archetype');—the *Shyēna* also has the *Jyotistoma* for its Archetype, and hence the said details find a place there also; [so that all the requisite details for the *Isu* having been obtained from the *Jyotistoma*] all that the text in question can be taken to be is just a *reference* to those details which have come from the *Jyotistoma* as common to both the *Shyēna* and the *Isu*.

"Further, the term '*itarat*', 'the rest' [in the sentence '*Samānam itarat shyēnēna*'] cannot stand for what does not exist; because the term '*itarat*'

cannot apply to what is not near at hand, it is always applied to things near at hand. For instance, when it is said '*itaraḥ prāvāro dīyatām, itaraḥ kambalo dīyatām*' ['*give the other cloak, give the other blanket*'], what is near at hand is given, and not any cloak or any blanket. In the case in question the details that are near at hand are those pertaining to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; hence the sentence in question must be a reference to *these*; they having been already enjoined by the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype')."

SŪTRA (14).

[OBJECTION TO THE PURVAPAKṢA]—"'[IT IS THE INJUNCTION OF THE DETAILS] OF THE SHYENA'—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer will be as given in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Objector to the *Pūrvapakṣa*—'If your view is that the sentence in question contains a reference to the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—then that is not so; because it contains the injunction of those details that belong specifically to the *Shyēna*,—such as the *red-turban* and the rest.—How so?—Because the text mentions the *Shyēna*; it is when the term '*Shyēna*' is taken as specifying the details meant that the presence of the term '*Shyēnēna*' can have any sense; otherwise it would be meaningless. Because those details that belong to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are applicable equally to all the ectypes of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—all *Ēkāhas*, *Ahīnas* and *Satras*; so that so far as these details are concerned, the assertion '*samānamitarat*' ('the rest is similar') would mean exactly the same thing as '*samānamitarat shyēnēna*' ('the rest is similar to the Shyēna') [so that the term '*Shyēnēna*' would be entirely superfluous]."

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION]—"THAT IS NOT SO: BECAUSE OF NON-PROXIMITY."

Bhāṣya.

"The sentence in question cannot be a reference to those details that belong specifically to the Shyēna.—Why?—Because of non-proximity. As a matter of fact, the term '*itara*' ('the rest') stands for what is near at hand; and the term '*Shyēna*' does not bring the specific details of the *Shyēna* any nearer to the *Iṣu*.—As for the fact of the term '*Shyēna*' being a specific name,—its being *non-specific* might be objectionable in the case of the sentence being an injunction; if it is taken as a mere reference, then

nothing being enjoined, what is there that would be specified? The details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* being common to all, would naturally belong to the *Shyēna* also; and hence a reference is quite possible.—From all this it follows, that the sentence in question is only a *reference* to the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT MUST BE THE OTHER WAY, BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THUS THAT THE SENTENCE WOULD BE LAYING DOWN SOMETHING NOT ALREADY KNOWN;—THE TERM 'ITARAT' TOO HAS THE SENSE OF 'OVER AND ABOVE' ('FURTHER', 'REST'),—OVER AND ABOVE WHAT FORMS PART OF THE JYOTIṢṬOMA; AND IT WOULD BE THIS THAT WOULD BE SPOKEN OF BY THE WORD 'SAMĀNAM' ('LIKE', 'SIMILAR').

Bhāṣya

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', implies the acceptance of the view other than the one set forth above. In fact the sentence should be taken as the Injunction of those details that belong specifically to the *Shyēna*, and a mere reference to those belonging to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—"Why so?"—*Because it is only thus that the sentence would be laying down something not already known*; in this way it would enjoin something new, and as such would prompt a new set of activity; if it were a mere reference to what is already known, it would not prompt any new activity, and as such would be futile.

"But the term '*itara*' stands for what is near at hand [and it is the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that are near at hand, and hence these must be taken as referred to]."

The answer to this is that the term '*itara*' does not always express what is near at hand; it often expresses what is similar to what has been said before, though it may not be near at hand; it always expresses *what is left* (the rest). When, for instance, the term '*itara*' is used in connection with *clothes*, in the sentence 'Give the blanket to *Devadatta*, the silk-piece to *Viṣṇumitra*, the linen to *Yajñadatta*, and *the rest* to *Chaitra*'—it is the *cloth* that is given (to *Chaitra*), not either gold or silver. In the case in question, the term '*itara*' has been used in reference to details over and above those of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; hence here also it should express 'over and above', and hence become expressive of 'more', 'over and above'.

If, on the other hand, the term '*itara*' be taken as expressing the details belonging to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and also connotative of *what is near at hand*, then one or the other of these two denotations, 'over and above' and 'what is near at hand', must have to be abandoned. If the term be taken as standing for what is near at hand,—and its sense of 'over and above' be rejected,—then the sentence would be a mere reference, and as such futile; the word '*Shyēna*' would have to be regarded as one which is not

meant to be significant. If, on the other hand, the idea of 'what is near at hand' be abandoned, and the sense of 'over and above' be admitted, then there would be no incongruity at all. It is for these reasons that the author of the *Sūtra* says that *the term 'tarat' has the sense of 'more'* ('*over and above*'). Consequently the details that are meant to have their application extended are just those that belong specifically to the *Shyēna*, and which are 'over and above' those that belong to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—*and it would be those that would be spoken of by the word* '*samānam*', like', 'similar', and in this case the term '*Shyēna*' retains its significance.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The texts 'Ētadbrāhmaṇāni, etc.' extends, in reference to the 'Five offering-materials the application of the Injunction along with the Commendatory Statement.*

Bhāṣya (Introductory).

Among the '*Chāturmāsya*' sacrifices [consisting of the four *Satras*—(1) *Vaishvadēva*, (2) *Varunapraghāsa*, (3) *Shākamēdha*, and (4) *Sunāsīriya*],—in connection with the *Vaishvadēva*, the *Āgnēya* (cake, baked upon eight pans) and the other materials have been prescribed [altogether *eight* in number; viz.: (1) the *Āgnēya Cake* baked on eight pans, (2) the Cooked Rice dedicated to *Soma*, (3) the Cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Savitr*, (4) Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sarasvat*, (5) Cooked Rice dedicated to *Pūsan*, (6) the Cake baked on seven pans, dedicated to the *Maruts*, (7) the Curdled Milk dedicated to Vishvōdēvas, (8) the Cake baked upon one pan, dedicated to *Dyāva-Prthivi*],—the details also of these have been laid down.—In connection with the *Varunapraghāsa*, only (five out of the eight) materials have been mentioned, and then it has been added—'These five materials have the same commendatory Brahmana texts as the other materials'.

In regard to this the question that arises is—Does the 'extended application' laid down in this last sentence refer to the Commendatory texts alone? Or to the entire section including the Commendatory texts and the corresponding Injunctions of Details? [That is, does it mean that only the Commendatory texts relating to the remaining three materials are to be applied to the *Varunapraghāsa*? Or the Commendatory texts along with the corresponding three materials?]

Question—"How can there be an extended application of the Commendatory text only?"

Answer—As there is in the case of such descriptions as—'*Pampākulāya-pratimāsheha vrksāh*' ['The trees assemble the nests round the Pampā Lake'].

Question—"In the case under consideration, which are the *Injunctive*, and which the Commendatory, texts?"

Answer—The Injunctive texts are—'The grass-bundle is thrice bound up,—the fuel is thrice bound up,—there are nine *Prayājas*, nine *Anuyājas*', and so forth (which lay down the details in connection with the *Vaishvadēva Satra*); and the Commendatory texts are—'These Materials are sacred to *Vrtraghna*' and so forth (which eulogise the eight Materials laid down in connection with the *Vaishvadēva Satra*).

On the aforesaid question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is thus set forth [in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'FIVE MATERIALS', THERE IS 'EXTENDED APPLICATION' OF THE COMMENDATORY TEXTS ONLY, BECAUSE THESE ARE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY."

Bhāṣya.

"In regard to the *Five* Materials (that are mentioned in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*), it is said—'These five Materials appear at all points of time'; and hence these have been called '*Pañcasañchara*': now *in connection with these 'Five Materials' there is extended application of the Commendatory texts only.*—Why so?—*Because these are in close proximity*; i.e. the Commendatory texts are in close proximity to the (mention of the) Materials; because it is these Commendatory texts,—and not the texts injunctive of the accessory details,—that are syntactically connected with the Injunctions (of the Materials).—What if it is so?—What follows from this is that it is only then that the statement 'The Brāhmaṇa-texts relating to these are the same as those relating to the previous ones' becomes possible; for the Brāhmaṇa-texts relating to the Materials are just those by which they are enjoined; for what other relationship except that of *Injunction and Enjoined* can there be between the Brāhmaṇa-text and the Material? And as a matter of fact, these Materials are enjoined by the Commendatory texts, not by those Injunctive texts that enjoin the accessory details; as the things that are enjoined by the Injunctions of Details are not materials.—From this it follows that there is 'extended application' of the Commendatory texts, not of the Injunctions of Details.—Then again, even in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, some details relating to the *Vaishvadēva* have been enjoined; for instance, in the text 'They churn the Fire, etc.';—and if these were to come to the *Varuṇapraghāsa* by 'extended application' also,—as they would, if Injunctive texts also were to come in by 'extended application',—then the separate enjoining of these details (in the text just quoted) would be meaningless.—From all this it follows that it is only the Commendatory texts that come in (to the *Varunapraghāsa*) by 'extended application'."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE OF THE WHOLE, BECAUSE THE TERM USED IS A COMMON ONE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that there is 'extended application' of the Commendatory text only; in fact, there should be such application (or transference) of the entire section including the Injunctive and the Commendatory texts.—Why so?—*Because the term used is a common one*; i.e. a general term has been used; the term used is 'Brāhmaṇa-text', which is a general one, applying

to the Injunctive as well as to the Commendatory texts; so that if the term includes the Injunctive texts just as much as the Commendatory texts, then it must mean the 'transference' (or extended application) of the former also.—It has been argued that "the Injunctive texts have no relationship with the offering-materials".—It is true that the relationship between them is not one of *Injunction and Enjoined*, but certainly there is the relationship of rendering help.—"What help?"—The help that it enjoins the details relating to the Materials. And when this relationship is there, it is only logical that, on the strength of the generic term 'Brāhmaṇa-text', there should be 'transference' of the whole section.

SŪTRA (19).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text indicative of the 'transference' of the Injunctive texts.—"What is that indicative text?"—There is the text—'*Varuṇapraghāsēṣu triṁshadāhutayo vājino yajanti āhutīnām sampattyai triṁshattvāya*' ['At the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, there are thirty oblations, etc. etc.']; this shows that at the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, there are *thirty* oblations. There could not be this number of oblations if the Injunctive texts were not 'transferred'.—Hence it follows that they must be 'transferred'.

SŪTRA (20).

[*Objection*]—"THIS CANNOT BE; AS IT WOULD INVOLVE THE INCONGRUITY OF LAYING DOWN WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer will be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"It has been argued above (under Sū. 17) that if there were transference of the Injunctive texts, then there are certain texts which would become useless, as laying down what will have been already enjoined in these transferred Injunctive texts.—What is the answer to that argument?"

This *Sūtra* is meant only to be a reiteration of a previous objection.

SŪTRA (21).

THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH INCONGRUITY; AS THE TEXT IN QUESTION SERVES THE PURPOSE OF OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the objection in question is as follows:—Even when there is 'transference' of the Injunctive texts, the laying down of the

'Churning of the Fire', etc., would not be useless; as it would serve the purpose of another offering material, –for instance, of the '*Māruti*' (*āmikṣā*, curdled milk, dedicated to the Maruts) of the *Dakṣiṇa-Vihāra*. Consequently the text quoted by the Opponent cannot be taken as lending support to the view that there is to be no 'transference' of the Injunctive texts.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The text, 'Ētadbrāhmaṇaḥ, etc.', indicate the 'transference' of the Injunctive and Commendatory texts to the 'Ēkakapāla' and the 'Aindrāgna'.*

SŪTRA (22).

SIMILAR IS THE CASE WITH THE 'ĒKAKAPĀLA' AND THE 'AINDRĀGNA' (MATERIALS).

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Vaishvadēva*, the *Ēkakapāla* ' has been laid down as the offering-material, in the text—' *Dyāvāpṛthivīya ēkakapālaḥ* ' [' The cake baked upon one pan, dedicated to *Dyauḥ-Pṛthivī* '];—in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa* also, the ' *Ēkakapāla* ' has been laid down, in the text ' *Kāya ekakapālaḥ* ' [' The cake baked on one pan, dedicated to *Ka*, Brahmā '];—again, in connection with the latter, another material has been laid down, in the text, ' *Aindrāgno dvādashakapālo mārutyāmikṣā* ' [' The cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Indra-Agni*,—the curdled milk dedicated to the *Maruts* '] –Now in connection with *Sākamēdha* sacrifices also, the *Ēkakapāla* and the *Aindrāgna* are both laid down in the text— *Aindrāgna dvādashakapāla, indrāya vṛttraghnē charuḥ, vaishvakarmana ēkakapālaḥ* ' [' The cake baked on twelve pans, dedicated to *Indra-Agni*,—the cooked rice dedicated to *Indra-Vṛttrahan*,—the cake baked on one pan, dedicated to *Vishvakarman* ']. And in connection with this last, there is the declaration—' *Ētadbrāhmaṇa aindrāgnaḥ, ētadbrāhmaṇa ēkakapālaḥ, yadbrāhmaṇa itarasha* ' [The *Aindrāgna* has the same *Brāhmaṇa*, and the *Ēkakapāla* has the same *Brāhmaṇa* as that and that other '].

In regard to all this, the conclusion (*Siddhānta*) is thus stated (in the *Sūtra*) *Similar is the case with the 'Ēkakapāla' and the 'Aindrāgna'*;—i.e. similar to that of the 'Five-Material-Offering' (dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*); so that in this case also there is 'transference' ('extended application') of the entire section, including the Injunctive as well as the Commendatory texts, and for the same reasons (as those set forth in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*).

This *Sūtra* is meant only to state a well-ascertained fact, as introducing the next discussion.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the 'Sākamēdha' sacrifice, there is 'transference' of the 'Ēkakapāla' connected with the 'Varuṇapraghāsa'.*

SŪTRA (23).

THE 'ĒKAKAPĀLA' CONNECTED WITH THE 'VAISHVADĒVA' IS THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY OF ALL 'ĒKAKAPĀLAS', BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'AGRAYAṆA' WE FIND THE 'OFFERING OF THE WHOLE' AND 'NO TURNING BACK', AND ALSO BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AVABHṚTHA BATH, THERE IS THE DECLARATION OF A SINGLE 'DOUBLE-SLICING'

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Sākamēdha* we read—'*Etadbrāhmaṇa Ēkakapālaḥ*' ['The *Ēkakapāla* has this same *Brāhmaṇa-text*'].

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Is the '*Ēkakapāla*' here spoken of that pertaining to the *Vaishvadēva*? Or that pertaining to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—It should be the *Ēkakapāla* pertaining to the *Vaishvadēva*.—Why?—Because it is in connection with that that the following details have been prescribed—'Having adorned it, and filled it up, one should offer it in silence, etc. etc.'; the *Ēkakapāla* pertaining to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, on the other hand, has no details prescribed in connection with it,—hence it is only in reference to the former that we could say—'this act should be done like that (*i.e.* the *Vaishvadēva*)'.—Hence it is the *Ēkakapāla* pertaining to the *Vaishvadēva* that should be taken to be meant (in relation to the *Sākamēdha*).—'Inasmuch as the *Ēkakapāla* is mentioned along with the *Aindrāgna*, it should be taken as the one pertaining to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*'.—Not so; because it is only necessary that two things belonging to the same *Parva* should be spoken of together; but there is nothing incongruous in two such things being mentioned together as do not belong to the same *Parva*. Hence it is the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Vaishvadēva* that should be taken as meant."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—It is the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Varuṇapraghāsa* that is meant.—Why?—Because the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Vaishvadēva* is the original primary of all *Ēkakapālas*.—How do you know that?—Because *in connection with the Āgrayaṇa we find that there is 'offering of the whole' and 'no turning back'*; i.e. at the *Āgrayaṇa*, there is offering of the whole of the *Ēkakapāla* dedicated to *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī*, and also the 'absence of turning back',—as is shown in the following text—'*Yat sarvahutam karoti sā tvēkā parichakṣā, hutohutaḥ paryāvartatē sā dvitīyā, ājyasyaiva dyāvaprthivyau yajēta*' ['That the whole is

offered is the first step; what is offered again and again and turns back is the second, but one should offer to *Dyāvā-Pṛthivī*, Clarified Butter only']. This text contains the injunction of the offering of Clarified Butter, and indicates, the 'offering of the whole' *Ēkakapāla*, as also of 'no turning back', as being possible.—On the basis of this indication, and also on the basis of the declaration that the 'double-slicing' should be done only once,—in connection with the *Avabhṛtha-Bath* there is the definite declaration that 'He slices twice out of this same *Ēkakapāla*'; it follows that there is to be no 'double-slicing' anywhere else. All this has been prescribed in connection with the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Vaishvadēva*. From this it follows that the *Vaishvadēva* is the original primary of all *Ēkakapālas*.

"What if it is so?"

It follows from this that the details of the *Vaishvadēva* are admissible in connection with the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Sākamēdha* also (directly under the General Law that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype'); and any 'transference' of these same to the *Sākamēdha* would be entirely useless. On the other hand, there are certain details that belong specifically to the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, and they are not admissible at the *Sākamēdha* (by any other means, except 'Transference'); hence in regard to these, 'transference' would be of use. From this it follows that in the text in question, it is the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Varuṇapraghāsa* that should be taken to be meant.

Says the Opponent—"What you have put forward is only an indicative text;—where is the injunction?"

The injunction we shall point out later on under Sū. 7. 3. 26.

"Which are the Details (of the *Ēkakapāla* of the *Varuṇapraghāsa*) which are meant to be 'transferred'?"

They are -that 'the *Sruk* should be of gold or of Shamī wood' and so forth.

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya VII.

ADHYÀYA VII.

PÀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Terms like 'Rathantara' stand only for the 'music' to which the verses are set.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE NAME OF A SĀMAN MUST BE TAKEN IN THE SENSE THAT HAS BEEN TAUGHT."

Bhāṣya

We have the text—'He sings the *Rathantara* over two verses' [The *Sāman* sung over the verse '*Abhi tvā shūra nonumaḥ, etc.*' is called '*Rathantara*']; and then we have such texts as 'He sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses' [This extends the application to the three verses '*Kayānashchitra ābhuva, etc.*' which are called '*Kavatī*', the normal music over which is the '*Vāmadēvya*', which are sought to be shifted by the transferred '*Rathantara*'].

The question here is—When the text ('Sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses') transfers the '*Rathantara*' to the *Kavatī* verses,—what is it that is transferred?

"It is clear that what is 'transferred' is what is denoted by the words like '*Rathantara*'."

True; but that itself is not quite known what is exactly denoted by such words.

"It has been settled that the name '*Sāman*' applies to the music (Sū 1. 4. 3)."

What has been so settled is going to be objected to now; and then we shall come to a definite conclusion.

"If the conclusion is the same that has been settled, why should there be any objection?"

The objection is put forward and discussed, with a view to confirm (and ratify) the conclusion already arrived at; just like fixing the post by digging and shaking it.

What is the answer to the question that suggests itself first?

"It is this—Learned people apply the term '*Sāman*' to the music to which a verse is set, which undergoes many modifications in the shape of *Stobha* (Pause), accent, time and repetitions, and which has such divisions as *Prastāva, Udgītha, Pratihāra, Upadrava* and *Nidhana*. Hence there is

the doubt (as to whether the term '*Rathantara*' is to be taken as standing for the words of the verse or for the music to which they are set).

"'But it has been already explained that, inasmuch as the words in question (*Rathantara* and the rest) are used only when there is music, they should be taken to be connotative of that embellishment which is called *music*.'

"True it has been so explained; but it is that same explanation that is being objected to here. In fact, the words in question are not connotative of any *embellishment* (of the words).—Why?—Because they are used at a time when the sacrifice is not being performed; as a matter of fact, the *Sāman* is used (sung) when the performance is not going on; and operations of the nature of 'embellishments',—such as *washing, examining, cleaning* and so forth—are not performed when the performance is not going on; because apart from the performance, they would be entirely useless. If, on the other hand, the terms stand for the *Mantra-texts* themselves (and not for the *music*), then,—in accordance with the rule that 'the Veda is to be read',—the reading would be rightly done at the time that the sacrifice is not being performed. Hence the terms in question should be taken as names of the *Mantra-texts*.—Further, because of the difference in the names. There is a difference of names also,—such as '*Rathantara*', '*Bṛhat*' and the like.—This diversity of names would be useless (if the words stood for musical embellishment), as the embellishment is one only (not diverse); so that in that case, the single name 'music' would suffice. If, on the other hand, they are names of the texts, then the diversity of names is only right and proper.—Further, if the *Rathantara* were mere *music*,—and the *Bṛhat* also were *music*,—there would be no justification for such different names as 'this is *Rathantara*, that is *Bṛhat*'. It is quite justifiable if they are names of *Mantra-texts*.—Lastly, there is diversity of modification also; i.e. each *Sāman* is found to have a distinct modification of its own; we find each *Sāman* having a distinct modification of its own. This would not be possible (if the terms stood for the *music*), as the *music* is one only. As a matter of fact, we find a diversity in the modifications only when there is diversity in the nature of the embellishment; for instance, *Thumping* brings about the *rice* (husked grains), and *Pounding* brings about the powder (flour); one and the same process of embellishment does not give us the *rice* as well as the *flour*.—If on the other hand, the terms in question are names of texts, then as the verses are diverse, it is only right that there should be diversity in the modifications.—For these reasons the terms in question should be taken as names of texts.

"It is in view of these facts that the final answer is given in the *Sūtra*:—*The name of the Sāman should be taken in the sense in which it has been taught*; that is, the words that are names of '*Sāman*' are to be used in the sense in which they have been taught by expounders to their pupils.—'What is it that has been taught?'—It has been taught that *Sāman* is the verse set to music in the form of *Stobha* and the other divisions; and it is in this sense that the word should be used.—Why so?—Because words like '*Rathantara*' are the names of the texts."

SŪTRA (2).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—BUT A WORD CANNOT BE USED FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN ITS OWN;—(*a*) BECAUSE WORDS DENOTE MEANINGS;—(*b*) BECAUSE ONE IS DISTINCT FROM ANOTHER. THE ONLY CONNECTION POSSIBLE IS THAT WITH THE ACT (OF SINGING).

Bhāṣya.

The term 'but' implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right to take the terms as standing for the text.—Why?—The point to consider in this case is that, when it is declared that 'one sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses' (*a*) should it be taken as extending the use of the '*Abhivati* verses' [i.e. the verses beginning with '*Abhi tvā shūra nonuma*' (Ṛgveda, 7. 32. 22) over which the *Rathantara Sāman* is normally sung] for the purpose normally served by the '*Kavati* verses' (i.e. the verses beginning with '*Kayā nashchitra ābhuva, etc.*,' Ṛgveda 4. 31. 1)? Or (*b*) are the *Kavati* verses to be made the container (receptacle) of the *Abhivati* verses?—(*a*) Now, it is not possible to 'transfer' the *Abhivati* verses to the use to which the *Kavati* verses are put.—Why?—*Because words denote meanings*; the use of words lies in the expression of meanings;—and when it is said that 'One should *sing* the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses', it is not possible that the meaning expressed by the *Kavati* verses should be expressed by the *Abhivati* verses. From this it follows that there can be no 'transference' of *use*.—(*b*) Nor can the one set of verses be taken as the receptacle of the other; *because one is distinct from another*; i.e. no word can subsist in another; words must remain distinct from one another; so that the words '*Abhi tvā shūra, etc.*' (i.e. the *Abhivati* verses) are quite distinct from the words '*Kayā nashchitra, etc.*' (i.e. the *Kavati* verses). In fact, the only connection with the words that is possible is that *with the act*,—the act of *singing*. Hence it follows that there can be no 'transference' of the one for the other as its *receptacle*.—Both these alternatives, (*a*) and (*b*) being impossible, the name ('*Rathantara*') cannot be taken as standing for *the verse-text* (*as set to music*) [which is the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A)].

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, BEING USED FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSE, THEY MIGHT BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY TO THE OTHER TEXTS; AND OF THIS ACTION, THERE MUST BE SOME PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Abhivati* verses (over which the *Rathantara is* sung), while used for their own normal purpose, might be regarded (on the basis of the declaration under consideration, 'Should sing the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses') as auxiliary to the *Kavati* verses.—'How can the words *Sings the Rathantara over the Kavati verses* be taken to mean that the former

are to be auxiliary to the latter?'—They can mean that, in the same manner as, in the case of the declaration, 'If one fails in regard to any *rite*, he should offer the *Jaya*-oblations' [where the *Jaya*-oblations are treated as auxiliary to the other rite; *vide* Sū. 3. 4. 25–27].—'What purpose of the *Kavatī* verses would the *Abhivatī* verses serve?'—Some transcendental purpose may be assumed.—'But why?'—Because it is an *action* that is spoken of in the text 'Sing the *Rathantara* over the *Kavatī* verses', and there must be some purpose to be served by that action; just as in the case of the *Prayājas* there is a purpose (assumed) to be served by the action."

The objection to this view (*Pūrvapakṣa* B) is just this, that it is necessary to assume a purpose for the action. Hence this view also is not well-conceived.

SŪTRA (4)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"THE WORD ALONE (MIGHT BE USED)"—IF THIS IS URGED [then it would be refuted as shown under the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that the use of the *Abhivatī* verses as auxiliary to the *Kavatī* verses is not well-conceived,—then let the word alone be used; the meaning being that the word '*Rathantara*' may be used in regard to the *Kavatī* verses; i.e. the *Kavatī* verses should be spoken of by the name '*Rathantara*'.—How so?—When a word is uttered, the first and foremost idea that is brought about is that of the *word* itself; and it is only because no practical use can be made of the *word* as such that the use becomes understood (secondarily) as that of the *being* expressed by the word; as in the case of the word '*Gāmānaya*' (the first idea is that the word '*go*' is to be *brought in*; and it is taken as standing for the animal *cow*, only when it is found that no *bringing in* of the *word* is possible].—In the case in question however (as it is a case of *singing*), the use that is possible is of the word only, not of what is expressed by it. Hence we shall take the term '*Rathantara*' as standing for that word itself."

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C) *refuted*]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE IT IS INBORN.

Bhāṣya.

The view just set forth (under Sū. 4) is even worse than the previous one.—Why?—*Because it is inborn*; that is, the relationship between the *Name and the Named* is inborn, eternal; so that a word cannot express anything other than that to which it is eternally related; for instance, the term 'Cow' can never express the *Horse*.

SŪTRA (6).

FURTHER, IN THIS CASE THE DECLARATION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

Under the view set forth under Sū. 4, the declaration of 'transference' would be meaningless; and it would be laying down something which (according to the view under reference) cannot be done.

The author of the *Vṛtti* has explained this *Sūtra* to mean that 'the Scripture dealing with the singing of *Sāman*,—i.e. the section *Ukthya*—would be meaningless'; and what he means is that, so far as possible, it cannot be right to regard all the effort that cultured people put forth in the matter of singing *Sāman* as useless.

[If the text 'Sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses' be taken as referring to the introducing of the word '*Rathantara*', then all that is laid down in the section dealing with *Ukthya* with regard to the *singing* of the *Rathantara-Sāman*, over the *Kavati* verses, would have to be regarded as meaningless; and this would be highly improper, as the singing and its details have all been adopted in practice by all cultured people.]

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—"IT MAY BE THE TRANSFERENCE OF THE SOUND [THAT IS MEANT]"—IF THIS IS PUT FORWARD [then the answer would be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If you think that it would not be right to take the 'transference' as that of the *name* (the word, '*Rathantara*'),—then it may be of the sound; in common parlance, the *sound* is spoken of as '*Sāman*'; for instance, when it is said '*Susāmā dēvadattaḥ*', what is meant is that his *sound* or voice is good; and 'sound', 'voice', 'tone' are all synonymous terms; and all these are spoken of as '*Sāman*'; and the *Rathantara* is a *Sāman*; hence it is of this *sound* that there is to be 'transference'."

SŪTRA (8).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THE THING BEING NON-EXISTENT, THE DECLARATION COULD NOT BE APPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that there would be transference of the 'sound'.—Why?—*Because the thing being non-existent*; i.e. the thing—the 'sound' of the *Abhivati* verses—cannot be present in the *Kavati* verses.—"It is

because it is non-existent that it would be brought into existence."—The answer to that is that it is not possible even to *bring it into existence*; it is absolutely impossible to reproduce, in the *Kavaṭī* verses, the *sound* expressive of the syllables of the *Abhivaṭī verses*; if it could be reproduced, then they would not be *Kavaṭī* at all. If then, it cannot be brought into existence,—and it is not already there,—then the declaration that 'One should sing the *Rathantara* over the *Kavaṭī* verses' could not have any connection with any other word. From this we conclude that there can be no 'transference' of the *sound*.

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (E)]— 'THEN, THE SOUND (OF THE ABHIVAṬĪ) WOULD BE THERE IN THE UTTERANCE (OF THE KAVAṬĪ): AS THERE ARE VOWELS AND CONSONANTS THAT ARE COMMON TO BOTH.'

Bhāṣya.

The term *tu* ', then ', implies the setting forth of another view.

If it is not possible to reproduce the 'sound' of the *Abhivaṭī* in the *Kavaṭī*,—then the declaration, 'Sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavaṭī* verses', may be a *reference*.—How so?—We proceed to explain: Of the declaration '*Kavaṭīṣu rathantaram gāyati*', there are two constructions possible—(*a*) 'Sings that *Rathantara* which is in the *Kavaṭī* verses', and (*b*) 'It is the *Rathantara* that one sings over the *Kavaṭī* verses';—it has been pointed out that, of these, the latter, 'it is the *Rathantara* that one sings over the *Kavaṭī* verses', is not possible if the *sound* is regarded as the '*Sāman*' (*Rathantara*),—because, it has been pointed out that it is not possible to introduce the sound of the *Abhivaṭī* into the *Kavaṭī*. But the former construction is quite possible: viz. 'Sings that *Rathantara* which is in the *Kavaṭī* verses'; [in this case there is no introducing of any new sounds that are not already there].

'But this also is not possible, because there *is* no *Rathantara* in the *Kavaṭī* verses.'

"It is in answer to this that we have the *Sūtra—The sound would be there in the utterance*; i.e. *the sound* of the *Abhivaṭī* verses *would be there in the utterance* of the *Kavaṭī* verses. How? Because *there are vowels and consonants common to both*; i.e. many vowels and consonants found in the *Abhivaṭī* verses are *common in the Kavaṭī verses*; i.e. are present in the *Abhivaṭī* as well as in the *Kavaṭī* verses. Thus then the sound in relation to those common vowels and consonants that are present in the *Abhivaṭī* verses (and hence in the *Rathantara*) would be present in the *Kavaṭī verses* also. And it is the presence of this sound that is referred to in the sentence '*Kavaṭīṣu rathantaram gāyati*' (in the sense that 'one sings that *Rathantara* which is there in the *Kavaṭī* verses', in the shape of the said common sounds). Hence we take the sentence in question to be a *reference* to the *sound*."

SŪTRA (10).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"We find a text also pointing to the fact that the *Rathantara* is present in the 'latter two verses'.—'What is that text?'—It is as follows—'I do not perceive the *Rathantara* in the latter two verses,—with this view *Viśvāmitra* performed austerities; I do not perceive the *Bṛhat* in the latter two verses,—with this view *Vasiṣṭha* performed austerities'. It is only when a thing exists and is not perceived that an attempt is made for perceiving it; for instance, one lights a lamp for the seeing of the jar that is there, not for the seeing of the *Hare's Horn*. From this it is clear that there are *Rathantara* and *Bṛhat Sāmans* sung over the two latter verses; and it is to this that there is a reference in the text in question."

SŪTRA (11).

[REFUTATION OF PŪRVAPAKṢA (E)]—BUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATER VERSES, THERE WOULD BE NO MODIFICATION SPOKEN OF; HENCE IT MUST BE JUST AS IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'but' implies the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right to hold that there is reference to the *sound*.—Why?—Because, if such were the case, then there would be no modification spoken of in connection with the later verses, and hence these later verses would have to be used just as they are found in the original text,—just as they were read at the time of reading the Vedic text (without the music); and in that case, if the text 'Sings the *Rathantara* over the later verses' were a mere reference, it would not lead to any activity, and as such, would become useless.—For these reasons it is not right to take the text as a reference to the *sound*.

SŪTRA (12).

FURTHER, THERE WOULD BE AN INCONGRUITY AMONG THE WORDS.

Bhāṣya.

There would be an incongruity among the names of *Sāman*—'*Rathantara*' and the rest,—as used in such texts as '*Rathantaram uttarayoḥ, Bṛhaduttarayoḥ*'.—"How so?"—We are going to explain it. The '*sound*' being what is called '*Sāman*', the term '*Rathantara*' or '*Bṛhat*' is used in the sense of a particular sound consisting in a set of sounds occurring in a definite order; if this order of sequence among the sounds is disturbed at

any point, there is an incongruity (inapplicability of the name). Hence it cannot be right to hold that the sound is what is denoted by the term '*Sāman*', and that it is this *sound* that is referred to in the text ('Sings the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses').

Says the enquirer—"You have rejected all the possible views on the subject. Then does it mean that there is to be no use (of the *Rathantara*) at all (in connection with the *Kavati* verses)?"

The *Pūrvapakṣin* replies [and puts forward the view that is *Pūrvapakṣa* (F)]—"The 'transference' should be of the *verse* itself [not of the *verse set to music*, as propounded in *Pūrvapakṣa* (A)].—'But it has been explained that no transference of one verse into another verse is possible.'—True; but there would be transference in regard to *place*; when it is said that '*Kavatiṣu rathantaram gāyati*', it is true that it is not possible to sing the *Rathantara* over the *Kavati* verses; hence we can take it as referring to *place*; the meaning being that 'the *Rathantara* is to be sung *in place of* the *Kavati* verses'; the construction (the sense of the Locative) being just like what we have in such expressions as '*agnau tiṣṭhati*' ('stays in the fire'), '*kūpē tiṣṭhati*' ('stays in the well'). Or it may be taken as referring to the details; the sense of the term '*rathantaram*' being that 'the characteristic details of the *Rathantara* are to be extended (transferred) to the *Kavati* verses', such details, for instance, as 'when the *Rathantara* is going to be introduced, one should think, in his mind, over *Prithivi*' and so forth; this 'transference' being like what there is in a case where the Teacher having gone abroad, the pupil is told that 'the Teacher's wife is your Teacher', the meaning of which is that the service that is due to the Teacher should be rendered to the Teacher's wife,—the service being 'transferred' to the Teacher's wife."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE RIGHT VIEW IS THAT THE TERM SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DENOTING AN ACTION; BECAUSE IN THIS THE WELL-KNOWN SIGNIFICATION OF THE WORD WOULD BE ACCEPTED; AND ALSO BECAUSE THE MODIFICATORY EMBELLISHMENT CONCERNED IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, it is not the right view that "the term '*Nāman*' applies to the verse and it is the transference of the verse that is meant by the text, and that we may take it as indicating either the *place* or the characteristic details" (as set forth under Sū. 12).—Because recourse to Indirect Indication is permissible only when there is no other way.

The right view is that *the term should be taken as denoting an action;* i.e. words like '*Rathantara*' should be taken as denoting the action of *singing* as an embellishment.—Why so?—The grounds for this have been already explained under Sū. 1. 4. 3, where it has been declared that 'The name *Sāman* is applied to the *music*'; it has been seen there that the term '*Sāman*' is applied to the *verse qualified by music*; and there can be no conception of the *qualified* entity until the *qualification* has been conceived; hence it is this factor of *qualification* that is really denoted (by the word '*Sāman*'), and it is from this idea of the *qualification* thus obtained that there arises the idea of the *qualified* thing which is associated with the qualification; hence in the connotation of the term '*Sāman*', there is not the least touch of the *verse* (text); and on that same ground we declare that it denotes the *singing* (music).

Further, in this the well-known signification of the word would be accepted, as a matter of fact, the word '*gāyati*' ('sings') is well known as signifying the act of *singing*.—"What is this *act of singing*?"—It consists in the pronouncing of words in a particular manner;—this is what is spoken of as '*gāyati*' ('sings') or '*gānam karoti*' ('does the singing');—and it is this act which is denoted by the terms '*Rathantara*' and the like; as is clear from the fact that this term ('*Rathantara*') has been used (in the text in question) along with the verb '*gāyati*' ('sings'), and also from the force of the Accusative ending (in '*rathantaram*'); just as in the case of such expressions as '*Āsāritakam gāyati*', '*Vardhamānam gāyati*'.

"We also find terms expressive of *words* (verbal texts) being spoken of along with the verb '*gāyati*', in such expressions as '*Gāthām gāyati*' ('sings a song'), '*Ṛcham gāyati*' ('sings a verse')."

True; but the construction of the words has to be altered; what the expression means is 'Embellishes the verse with singing' ('*gānena ṛcham saṃskaroti*'); because the ordinary construction, as it stands—which would be '*gānēna karoti ṛcham*' (as '*gāyati*' means '*gānam karoti*')—would be absurd.—Hence the term '*Rathantara*' should be taken as denoting the *music*.

For the following reason also the term '*Rathantara*' should be taken as denoting the *music*.—*Because the modificatory embellishment concerned is not different from others.* In the case of the various *Sāmans* (*Rathantara* and the rest) we find that the words of the verses undergo modifications; for instance (in the singing of the verse), short syllables become long and long ones become short, the 'broad' (in accent) becomes 'mute' and the 'mute' becomes 'broad'; and these *modifications* do not differ from other modifications which are of the nature of *embellishments*; for instance, by the embellishing modification of *Threshing* the *Vrīhi* corn becomes the husked *rice* and by the embellishing modification of *Pounding*, the rice-grains become flour.—From all this it follows that what is denoted by the words '*Rathantara*' and the like is the *embellishment in the form of singing* (*music*) of the words (of the verse); and it is the transference of this *music* that is meant by the text ('*Karatīgu rathantaram karoti*').

SŪTRA (14).

FURTHER, THE 'SĀMAN' (RATHANTARA AND THE REST) IS FOUND EVEN WITHOUT A SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya.

Further, the Sāman is found even without a substance,—the Sāma-vedins use the term 'substance' ('*dravya*') in the sense of *verse* (*Ṛk*), hence '*without a substance*' means *without a verse*; thus then, the meaning of the *Sūtra* is that, as a matter of fact, the *Sāman* is found (to be spoken of as) without a verse; for instance, there is the text—'*Prajāpatērhṛdayam-anṛcham gāyati*' | He sings the *Prajāpati-hṛdaya* without a verse'|; here we find that the particular *Sāman*, '*Prajāpati-hṛdaya*' by name, is spoken of as appearing (being sung) without a verse;—if the term '*Sāman*' denoted the *verse*, how could the '*Prajāpati-hṛdaya* (which is a *Sāman*) be *without a verse*? If, on the other hand, the term '*Sāman*' stands for the *music*, then, there can be music even without a verse; and in that case it becomes possible to 'sing the *Prajāpati-hṛdaya* without a verse'.—For this reason also the term '*Sāman*' should be taken as standing for the *music*.

Says the Opponent—"We have already pointed out that if the term '*Rathantara*' stands for the *embellishment* (music), then its employment at any time other than at the performance would be absolutely futile."

In answer to this, we have the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (15).

ITS EMPLOYMENT WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEARNING IT; IN FACT, IT TAKES DIFFERENT FORMS WITH DIFFERENT BASES; THE PURPOSE SERVED BY THESE IS SUPERPHYSICAL, BEING, AS IT IS, A MATTER OF INSTRUCTION.

Bhāṣya

Its employment, at a time other than that of a sacrificial performance, *would be for the purpose of learning it*,—i.e. for learning and practising it. *With different bases*,—that is, the basic things being different,—i.e. diverse,—*it takes different forms*; i.e. the music assumes different forms with the varying bases; and hence it has got to be learnt and practised with each individual verse (which is the basis for the Sāma-music), for the purpose of acquiring efficiency and expeditiousness at the time of actual sacrificial performance;—it is like the case of the *Bhūmirathika* (ground-charioteer); just as the *ground charioteer* draws the figure of the chariot on the ground and carries on his practice (by means of drawings) and thus exercise and practice come useful to him at the time of the actual performance.

As regards *the purpose served by these*, *Rathantara* and other *Sāmans*, it is *superphysical*,—it cannot be seen in the ordinary world, like the purpose that is served by *Threshing* and other embellishing acts.—Why so?—

Because *it is a matter of instruction*; i.e. it is only taught as between the Teacher and his pupil—that such and such music is called '*Rathantara*', and it is found to be nothing visible in the ordinary world.

Thus it is found that the objection, that "it is employed at a time other than that of a sacrificial performance", has no force at all.

Another argument has been urged on the basis of the *difference of names* (among the various *Sāmans*, '*Rathantara*', '*Bṛhat*', *etc.*).—The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (16)

PARTICULAR NAMES ARE APPLIED TO IT (THE MUSIC), BY REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE MODULATIONS.

Bhāṣya.

Though the embellishment is one only, in the form of 'music', there would be particular names applied to it;—why?—*by reason of the difference in the modulations*; though as *music*, it is one and the same in all cases, yet there are peculiarities; and it is on the basis of these peculiarities that there are different names; such as '*Āsāritaka*', '*Vardhamānaka*' and so forth; as a matter of fact, the music known as '*Āsāritaka*' has peculiarities which are distinct from the peculiarities of the music known as '*Vardhamānaka*'; similarly in the case cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, the peculiarities of the music known as '*Rathantara*' are distinct from the peculiarities of the music known as '*Bṛhat*'. It is on this ground that there are different names.

SŪTRA (17).

THEN AGAIN, VERSES THAT FORM THE 'BASE' ('YONI' OF THE SĀMAN) AND ARE SPOKEN OF AS 'TO BE RECITED' (SHASYA) ARE ENJOINED EQUALLY WITH OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

'*Yonishasyā*' means that which is '*yoni*' (base of a *Sāman*) and also '*shasyā*' (spoken of as to be *recited*); and what is meant is that those verses that are '*yoni and shasyā*' are enjoined equally with those others that are not '*yoni*' and are yet '*shasyā*'—in the following texts—'*Yāmyāḥ shaṁsati*' ('Recites the verses sacred to *Yama*'), '*Shipiviṣṭavatīm shaṁsati*' ('Recites the verse containing the word '*Shipiviṣṭa*');—[In these two texts, two verses are spoken of as to be 'recited', *shasyā*, which are not the 'base' of any *Sāman*];—'*Rathantarasya yonimanushaṁsati*' ('Recites the verse *which is the base of the Rathantara-Sāman*'), '*Bṛhato yonimanushaṁsati*' ('Recites the verse which is the base of the *Bṛhat-Sāman*');—[In these two latter texts, we have two verses spoken of as to be *recited*, '*shasyā*', which are also the 'base' of a *Sāman*].—"In what respect are these two sets *equal*?"—They are equal in this sense that both have been spoken of by means of the word

'*shaṁsati*' ('recites'). There are two words '*stauti*' and '*shaṁsati*' which, though equally expressing *the act of eulogising*, have yet their exact spheres strictly limited; that the term '*stauti*' is applied to cases where the *Mantra-texts* are *sung*, while the term '*shaṁsati*' is applied to cases where the texts are *not sung*; that such is the restricted meaning of these terms is clear from the texts—(*a*) '*Pra-u-gaṇa shaṁsati*', (*b*) '*Niṣkaivalyam shaṁsati*', and (*c*) '*Ājyair stuvatē*', (*d*) '*Pṛishṭhair stuvatē*' [the *Mantras* mentioned in (*a*) and (*b*) are to be *recited*, and those mentioned in (*c*) and (*d*) are to be *sung*].—Thus then, inasmuch as in the text quoted above, the base of the *Rathantara* has been mentioned along with the verb '*shaṁsati*', it clearly shows that that base is *not sung*;—now it is only if the *Rathantara* itself were *music* that an *unsung* verse could be its '*base*'; otherwise (i.e. if the '*Rathantara*' meant the verse, then) no verse could be spoken of as '*the base of Rathantara*'.—From all this it follows that the name '*Sāman*' applies to the *music*.

SŪTRA (18).

FURTHER, THE 'SĀMAN' IS FOUND MENTIONED EVEN IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS NOT ITS 'BASE', AND IT IS ALSO FOUND MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH A 'BASE' DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM ITS REAL BASE'.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In the following text, the *Sāman* is found to be mentioned in connection with a verse which is not its '*base*'—'*Sthālyām saktvavadhīyatē ityāhuryat bṛhad gāyatrīṣu kriyatē api chainām rujati na cha asyām saṁbhavati*';—here we find the *Bṛhat-Sāman* mentioned as being *sung* over a verse in the *Gāyatrī-metre* (and deprecated);—as a matter of fact, the '*base*' of the *Bṛhat-Sāman* must be a verse in the *Bṛhatī-metre*;—now if the term '*Sāman*' stood for the *verse*, then there would be no possibility of the *Bṛhat-Sāman* (which *ex-hypothesi* would be the same as the *verse* in the *Bṛhatī-metre*) to be sung over a verse in the *Gāyatrī-metre* [and hence the deprecation of it would be meaningless];—on the other hand, if the term '*Sāman*' stands for the *music*, then it would be possible for the *Bṛhat-music* to be sung over the verse in the *Gāyatrī-metre*; and hence a reference to it in the text quoted.—in the words '*yadbṛhat gāyatrīṣu kriyatē*',—becomes quite intelligible.

(*b*) Similarly, the following text shows that the *Sāman* is used also in connection with a '*base*' which is different in character from its own base'—'*Yo vai vichchhandasi sāmabhati sa ṛcham saṁsṛṇāti sāma vā vililekhati sāma saṁsṛṇāti ṛcham vilikhati*' ['*If one modifies the Sāman to fit a wrong metre, he destroys the verse and ruins the Sāman, or destroys the Sāman and ruins the verse*'];—what this means is that when a *Sāman* is sung with a wrong metre, there must, in course of the adaptation, be some modifications made either in the *music* or in the words of the *text*; in these modifications, as between the *music* and the *verse*, that which is '*reduced*'

is said to be 'ruined', and that which is 'increased' is said to be 'destroyed'. All this would be possible only if the term '*Sāman*' stood for the *music*, and not if it stood for the *verse*. The 'modifying' also spoken of in connection with the *Sāman* would be possible only in the *music*, never in the *text* of the verse. If the term '*Sāman*' stood for the *verse*, then it would always have to be read as in the text of the *Veda*, and there could be no 'modification' of it.—For this reason also the term '*Sāman*' must be taken as standing for the *music*.

SŪTRA (19).

[*Objection against Sū.* 15]—"WHEN THE BASE IS ONE ONLY, THERE CANNOT BE A DIVERSITY OF FORMS".—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 15) that 'its employment is for the purpose of learning it'. Against this the following objection is urged:—"*When the base is one only, there cannot be a diversity of forms*, the *Rathantara-music* is a thing different from the *Bṛhat-music*; so that when the *Rathantara-music* is learnt, the *Bṛhat-music* remains *unlearnt*; hence it is only right that after the *Rathantara-music* has been learnt, the *Bṛhat music* should be used (sung) even at a time other than that at which a performance is going on, for the purpose of being learnt.—But the *Rathantara-music* by itself is a single thing; and when one has learnt its use in connection with its base, there can be no need for learning the same music in connection with the subsequent verses. And at any time other than that of the performance, there can be no propriety in using the said *music* which is only an embellishing factor (and can be of use only during a performance). —From all this it follows that the term *Sāman* does not stand for the embellishment (in the shape of *music*)."

The answer to this objection is given in the following *Sūtra* —

SŪTRA (20).

IT SHOULD BE THERE ALSO, BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER THINGS; AS IN THE CASE OF 'COOKING'.

Bhāṣya.

There would be a diversity of forms in the case cited also.—"Why so?"—*Because it would not have been accomplished in connection with other things*;—i.e. in connection with other verses; as the 'base' would be different;—*as in the case of cooking*; just as there is a single object 'Cooking' by name, yet it assumes diverse forms in connection with diverse things; for instance, the 'Cooking' of rice is of one kind, while

that of *molasses* is of a totally different kind; so that the man who has learnt the cooking of rice cannot know how to cook molasses, unless he learns it.—Thus it is only right that even in the case cited the music should be used even at times other than that of a performance.

SŪTRA (21).

THERE IS COMPATIBILITY ALSO OF THE WORDS.

Bhāṣya

In the manner explained above, compatibility is secured among the terms denoting the *Sāman*, and those denoting the *verse*; for instance, in the text '*Kavatīsu rathantaram gāyati*', the term '*Kavatī*' stands for the verses, and the term '*Rathantara*' stands for the *Sāman* (music); otherwise (under any other view) either the term '*Kavatī*' would have to be taken as indirectly indicating *place*, —or the term '*Rathantara*' as indirectly indicating the *characteristic details*.

From all this it follows that the term '*Sāman*' (*Rathantara*, etc.) stands for the *music*.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya VII

ADHYĀYA VII.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Names like 'Agnihotra' are indicators of the 'transference' of details.*

SŪTRA (1).

IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE TERM IS THE NAME OF AN ACTION: WHEN IT OCCURS ELSEWHERE, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATING THE 'EXTENDED APPLICATION' OF ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

It was declared in the beginning of the *Adhyāya* that we would explain later on instances of the 'transference of details by means of Names'. this is what is going to be explained now.

In connection with the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, we read—'*Māsamagnihotram juhoti*' ['He offers the *Agnihotra* for a month']; and it has been found (under 2. 3. 24) that this *Monthly-Agnihotra* is distinct from the compulsory *Daily Agnihotra*. Now we are going to consider the presence of the term '*Agnihotra*' in the text quoted.—For what purpose has it been used here?—On this point we proceed with the statement of the *Siddhānta* view:—*It has been explained that the term is the name of an action,—when it occurs elsewhere, it should be taken as indicating the 'extended application' of accessory details. It has been explained* that the term '*Agnihotra*' is the name of an action,—at the very outset, under Sū. 1. 4. 4, 'There is another injunction of that accessory';—when *the said term occurs elsewhere*—i.e. in connection with *Homa* offered at the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, it should be taken as indicating the 'extended application' of details; i.e. the details of the *Daily Agnihotra* should be understood to be 'transferred' to the *Monthly Agnihotra* through the name '*Agnihotra*'.—Why so?—The explanation of this is that here we have the name of one act applied to another act; and when the name of one thing is applied to another, it implies the similarity of the former to the latter;—in a case where such similarity is already known, there is mere *reference*; as in the case of the expression 'Devadatta is a *lion*' [where the qualities of the lion are already known to be present in the man]; but in cases where it is not already known, it is taken as enjoined (predicated); e.g. in the expression 'Make lions of this flour' [where the making of the flour similar to the lion is enjoined]. In the case in question, the fact of the *Monthly-Homa* being similar to the *Daily Agnihotra* is not already known; and hence it is this similarity that is taken to be enjoined in the sentence 'He offers the *Agnihotra* for a month',

—which means that this monthly offering is to be made in the same manner as the *Daily Agnihotra*.

Question—"The text has been construed to mean that 'the *Monthly Agnihotra* is like the *Daily Agnihotra*'; but the affix '*vati*', denoting *likeness*, not being there, whence can this notion of *likeness* be derived?"

Answer—It is deduced from *association*, the term '*Agnihotra*' is related to a sacrifice, and it can indicate the details associated with that sacrifice, such as *milking of the cow* and the rest, and when it can indicate these, it can also extend their application; so that even without the '*vati*'-*affix* (denoting *likeness*), the idea in question can be got at.

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION TO SIDDHĀNTA'—'IN REALITY, BOTH (THE SACRIFICES) SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INDEPENDENT AS BOTH ARE EQUALLY ENTITLED (TO THE NAME).'"

Bhāṣya

The two particles '*vā*' and '*api*' have been put in the reverse order; the usual phrase is '*api vā*'.

'In reality, both these sacrifices should be regarded as independent.—and the *Homa* of the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana* should not be regarded as preceded by (dependent upon) the Homa of the *Daily Agnihotra*; it is only the name that is common to them.—Why so?'—Because both are equally entitled to the name, i.e. the *Homa* of the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana* also is entitled to the name 'Agnihotra',—just as in connection with the *Daily Agnihotra*, there are the words '*agnihotram juhoti*', so also are these same words present in the text laying down the *Monthly Agnihotra* ('*Māsam agnihotram juhoti*'), the name thus being present in connection with both sacrifices, there is no ground for making any such discrimination as that the name ('Agnihotra') applies to the *Daily*, and not to the *Monthly*, sacrifice. Thus the name must be taken as common to both, and hence the name cannot be made a ground for the 'transference' of the details (of the *Daily Agnihotra*, to the *Monthly Agnihotra*)."

SŪTRA (3).

[*The Siddhāntin's Reply*] BUT THE NAME IS INBORN.

Bhāṣya

The relationship between the *Name and the Named* is *inborn*; so that a name should be always taken as applying to that thing alone to which its relationship is known to be *inborn*,—and not to any other thing also; because, if it did apply to both, then there would be no fixity of denotation, and hence no confidence in the signification of words; it has been declared already that 'it is not right that a word should have more than one meaning'. When the name ('*Agnihotra*') therefore cannot apply to both

sacrifices, it has to be taken as denoting the *Daily Agnihotra*, and as applied to the other for the purpose of asserting its likeness to that *Agnihotra*; thus there is no reason for taking the name as directly denoting the Monthly sacrifice. Consequently the name should be taken as indicating the 'transference' of the details (from the *Daily*, to the Monthly, sacrifice).

Says the Opponent—"But why should you say that the *name of the Daily Agnihotra* has been applied to the *Monthly Agnihotra*, and not that the name of the *Monthly Agnihotra* has been applied to the *Daily Agnihotra*?"

In answer to this, we have the following *Sūtra*—

SŪTRA (4).

BY REASON OF THE PERCEPTIBLE PRESENCE OF ACCESSORY DETAILS (IN CONNECTION WITH THE DAILY SACRIFICE), THE NAME (AS APPLIED TO THE MONTHLY SACRIFICE) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATING THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE DETAILS. *IN THE ABSENCE OF THESE DETAILS, THE NAME WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD.*

Bhāṣya.

In the *Daily Agnihotra*, the presence of the accessory details is perceptible; i.e. we find the accessory details laid down directly in connection with it; such as—'the milking of the cow is to be done in this way,—the milk is to be boiled in this way,—the rice is to be cooked in this way,—the fuel used at the *Agnihotra* should be *Khadira*,—the oblations should be offered in this way', and so on.—From this *perceptible presence of accessory details*, it follows that the name really applies to the *Daily Agnihotra*, and when it is used in connection with the *Monthly* sacrifice, it must be regarded as indicating the performance of the said *milking of the cow* and other details; i.e. as indicating the 'transference' of those details.—As for the *Monthly Agnihotra*, there are no accessory details laid down in connection with it; and in the absence of such details, the *name would not be understood*; i.e. it could not be understood why the name '*Agnihotra*' had been applied to the sacrifice.

Or, the *Sūtra* may be explained as follows—*The presence of accessories is perceptible*; i.e. in the *Daily Agnihotra*, the Material and the Deity are directly laid down—'Offers the oblation of curds', 'Offers the oblation of milk', 'Offers an oblation to *Agni and to Prajāpati* in the evening'.—From this perceptible presence of accessories, the term should be regarded as the name of a sacrifice, the name of an act;—the sense being that 'the *Homa* offered in this manner is named *Agnihotra*'. As for the other *Homa* (the Monthly one), its accessories are not laid down; and in the absence of such accessories, it would remain unknown; i.e. it could not be known what sort of *Agnihotra* it was.—"The Month would be the form of that *Agnihotra*".—The Month cannot be a part of the action; it is a property pertaining to the

performer.—Further, what the sentence in question does is to lay down the 'Agnihotra' in reference to the 'month'; and *not* to represent the *Agnihotra* by the Month.

From all this it follows that '*Agnihotra*' is the name of the *Daily Agnihotra*, and the name as applied to the other (the Monthly sacrifice) only serves to 'transfer' the likeness of the Daily sacrifice to the *Monthly* one.

Question—"Is thus then the universal rule—that whenever the name of an action is applied to another, it transfers to the latter the accessory details of the former?"

Answer—That is certainly the principle hitherto arrived at.

As against the said universal rule (as an exception to it) we have the following *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The name 'Prāyaṇīya' does not indicate the 'transference' of details.*

SŪTRA (5)

BUT IN THE CASE OF THE SATRA-SACRIFICE, THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SERVING THE PURPOSE OF EXPRESSING A QUALITY.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Gavāmayana* we read—'*Vaishvānaro jyotiṣṭomaḥ prāyaṇīyam aharbharati*'; [where the first day of the *Gavāmayana* is called '*Prāyaṇiya*']; at the *Dvādashāha* also, the first day is called '*Prāyaṇīya*', as declared in the text—'*Prāyaṇīyo'trātrāḥ*'. These two sacrifices spoken of as '*Prāyaṇiya*' must be taken as distinct from one another, on the same principle of 2. 3. 24, as that which proved (in the last *Adhikaraṇa*) the two *Agnihotras* to be distinct. But in the present case, even though the name '*prāyaṇiya*' has been applied to the second sacrifice, it does *not* indicate the 'transference' of the details of the first, to the second, sacrifice.—What then is it? The declaration *serves the purpose of signifying a quality*.—How so?—It has been explained (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) that it is by indirect figurative indication that a Name indicates the transference of details;—but such indirect indication can be admitted only when the direct denotation of the words is not admissible;—in the present instance, however, it is only the direct denotation that is admissible; whereby the word denotes a quality; and hence by reason of the presence of the quality in the shape of the action, the name applies to the sacrifice by direct denotation; the name '*prāyaṇīya*' denoting 'that with which they start the work' ('*Prayanti anena*'),—i.e. that with which the performance

of the *Sutra* begins.—The supplementary declaration also indicates the same meaning of the name 'He places the *Jyotiṣ* first',—the sense being that 'since *Jyotis* is *Prāyaṇīya*, therefore, *Jyotis* is made the first'; this is the sense of the sentence 'he places the *Jyotiṣ* first'. From this it follows that in the present case there is no indication of 'Transference' by the Name.

[The term '*prāyaṇīya*' denotes *the first*. both the sacrifices in question are equally entitled to being called 'the first'; hence this case is not analogous to that of the two '*Agnihotras*', where, by reason of the presence of details in connection with the *Daily Agnihotra* only, the *Monthly Agnihotra* had to be taken as entitled to the name '*Agnihotra*' only indirectly. Hence in the present case, the application of the name '*Prāyaṇīya*' to one act does not mean the transference of that act to the other act, which also is named '*Prāyaṇīya*'.]

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The presence of the term 'Sarvapṛṣṭha' indicates the 'transference' of all the six 'Pṛṣṭhas'.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA] — "WHEN THE VISHVAJIT SACRIFICE IS SPOKEN OF AS 'SARVAPṚṢṬHA', WHAT IT STANDS FOR ARE THE 'PṚṢṬHAS' CONNECTED WITH THE JYOTIṢṬOM; BECAUSE THE VISHVAJIT IS PRECEDED BY IT, THE TERM 'PṚṢṬHA' IS APPLICABLE (TO THEM)."

Bhāṣya

There is the text—'*Vishvajit sarvapṛstho bhavati*' ['The *Vishvajit* sacrifice is *Sarvapṛstha*, i.e. *having all the Pṛstha-hymns*'].

In regard to this, we proceed to consider the question—Is this a mere *Reference*? or an *Injunction*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"It is a mere reference. Why so? It is only that which is *without* 'all the *Pṛṣṭhas*' in connection with which 'all the Pṛṣṭhas' could be *enjoined*; that which already has 'all the *Pṛṣṭhas*', what would be the use of enjoining the same with regard to *that*? As a matter of fact, the *Vishvajit* already has 'all the *Pṛṣṭhas*'. How so? *Because the Vishvajit is preceded by it*,—i.e. because it is preceded by the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the Hymns of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* become admissible into the *Vishvajit*; and among them are the four hymns, *Māhendra* and the rest, these are the 'all' for this sacrifice, which, by reason of these Hymns, becomes *Sarvapṛṣṭha* ('having all the *Pṛṣṭha* hymns').—But these hymns are not *Pṛṣṭhas*'—The answer to that is that *the term pṛṣṭha is applicable to them*; i.e. as a matter of fact, the term '*pṛṣṭha*' has been applied to the said hymns in the text 'There are seventeen *Pṛṣṭha* hymns'. From all this it follows that the text in question is a mere *reference*."

[What the *Pūrvapakṣa* means is that (1) the four *Stotras* connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are admissible into the *Vishvajit*, (2) the name '*pṛṣṭha*' has been applied to those hymns, (3) hence it is already a sacrifice 'with all *pṛṣṭhas*';—(4) what is already known to be admissible need not be enjoined; (5) hence when the name '*sarvapṛṣṭha*' is applied to the *Vishvajit*, it can be taken only as *referring* to the four hymns that come into it by virtue of the general law that 'the Ectype (*Vishvajit*) is to be performed like its Archetype (*Jyotiṣṭoma*)'.]

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THEY SHOULD COME FROM THE 'ṢADAHA' SACRIFICE; AS IT IS IN CONNECTION WITH THAT THAT THERE ARE INJUNCTIONS (OF PṚṢṬHAS).

Bhāṣya.

The text in question cannot be a *reference*.—What is it then?—It should be taken as an Injunction; a mere *reference*, not prompting any activity, would be useless.—Then again, in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are not *several Pṛṣṭhas* to which the term ('*Sarvapṛṣṭha* in the text in question) could be a reference;—in connection with the *Ṣaḍaha* sacrifice, however, there are *several Pṛṣṭhas*; *as it is in connection with that* (*the Ṣaḍaha sacrifice*) *that there are Injunctions*,—such as 'From among the *Pṛṣṭhas*, there is the *Rathantara Pṛṣṭha*', and so forth.—For these reasons the name ('*Sarvapṛṣṭha*', appearing in connection with the *Vishvajit*) should be taken as an Injunction, laying down the 'transference' (of the details of the *Ṣaḍaha* sacrifice).

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The following indicative text points to the same conclusion—'*Pavamānē rathantaram karoti, ārbhavē bṛhat, madhyē itarāṇi: nairūpam hotuḥsāmē, vairājam maitrāvaruṇasya, raivatam brāhmaṇāchchhaṃsinaḥ, shākvaram-achchhāvākasya*' [(1) 'At the *Pavamāna*, he sings the *Rathantara*; (2) at the *Ārbhava*, the *Bṛhat*; in the middle, the others; (3) the *Nairūpa* is the *Sāman* of the *Hotṛ*-priest, (4) the *Vairāja* is that of the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, (5) the *Raivata* is that of the *Brāhmaṇāchchhaṃsin*, and (6) the *Shākvara* is of the *Achchhāvāka*']:—this text which lays down the assignment of the *Sāmans* clearly indicates the *Pṛṣṭha-hymns* pertaining to the *Ṣaḍaha*-sacrifice [at which, on each of the six days, they sing each of the following *Pṛṣṭhas*—(1) *Rathantara*, (2) *Bṛhat*, (3) *Nairūpa*, (4) *Vairāja*, (5) *Shākvara* and (6) *Raivata*,—exactly the same and in the same order as those mentioned in the text just quoted].

SŪTRA (9).

THE NAME 'PṚṢṬHA' USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE JYOTIṢṬOMA IS APPLIED TO THE HYMNS AFTER THEY HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE [I.E. IT IS NOT 'INBORN'].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that '*the term pṛṣṭha is applicable* to the hymns recited at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*'.—Our answer to this is that this

name '*pṛṣṭha*' (as applied to the hymns connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) is not 'unborn' [i.e. its relationship to the said hymns is not *inborn, eternal*]; when the hymns are spoken as 'these Pṛṣṭhas', this name is applied to them after they have come into existence [and is purely adventitious, circumstantial]; this naming of them would be justifiable only if they were already known by that name; but as a matter of fact, they are not known by that name.—"Why then are they referred to by that name (in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)?"—That is due to the presence (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) of an indicative (of that name), in the shape of the *Māhendra-hymn*, which also happens to be a *Pṛṣṭha*.—On the other hand, the fact of the hymns connected with the *Ṣaḍaha* being *Pṛṣṭhas* is well known; because there are injunctions to that effect, as already explained (under Sū. 7), consequently, if the name '*pṛṣṭha*' in the text in question is taken as standing for the *Pṛṣṭhas* of the *Ṣaḍaha* sacrifice, the direct denotation of the term '*pṛṣṭha*' becomes accepted; while in the other case (if taken as standing for the hymns of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), it would have to be taken in an indirect figurative sense.—From all this it follows that the text indicates the 'transference' of the *Pṛṣṭhas* connected with the *Ṣaḍaha*.

SŪTRA (10).

[*Objection*]—"THERE IS INJUNCTION OF TWO (ONLY)"—IF THIS IS HELD [the answer would be as in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"If your view is that the text in question contains the injunction of the *Pṛṣṭhas* connected with the *Ṣaḍaha*,—that cannot be right;—why?—because the term '*sarvapṛṣṭha*' (if it is an Injunction) has to be taken as consisting of two parts, it should enjoin the *Pṛṣṭhas*, as also the fact of their being 'all'.—'That may be so; what is there wrong in that?'—The wrong, we say, is that it is impossible; if the term '*pṛṣṭha*' enjoins the *Pṛṣṭhas*, then it cannot be qualified by the term '*Sarva*' ('all'); if the term '*pṛṣṭha*' were taken as a mere *reference*, then the said qualification would be possible; but the *Pṛṣṭhas* would remain *unenjoined*; but while the *Pṛṣṭhas* are not there, how could their 'being all' be enjoined? So that both the injunctions are impossible.—What is possible however is to take the text '*Sarvapṛṣṭho bhavati*' as enjoining the 'being all' as relating to the *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara* which have been enjoined and are therefore admissible; the meaning of the injunction (of 'being all') being that *both*, the *Bṛhat* as well as the *Rathantara*, are to be used, and not only one. This interpretation is not open to the objection pointed out above. Hence the text should be taken as enjoining these two (*Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*)."

SŪTRA (11).

[*Answer*]—NOT SO: BECAUSE THE TERM "SARVA", 'ALL', IN THAT CASE, BECOMES MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as explained above.—Why?—Because the term '*Sarva*', 'all' *in that case becomes meaningless*,—devoid of sense. The term 'all' always stands for *many* things; and it cannot rightly stand for *two* things only.—Thus incongruity is not there if the text is taken as laying down the *Pṛṣṭhas* connected with the *Ṣaḍaha* (as their number is *six*). "But in that case also, the term '*Sarvapṛṣṭha*' will have two parts and the consequent incongruities (as shown above)"—Our answer to that is that it will not be so; it will be only the 'being *all*' of the *Pṛṣṭhas* that would be enjoined, not the *Pṛṣṭhas* themselves. "It has been already pointed out that if the *Pṛṣṭhas* are not there, in reference to what would the 'being all' be enjoined?" The answer to that is that what is enjoined by the text is *the 'being all' of the Pṛṣṭhas*;—and this has got to be accomplished (in obedience to the injunction);—but it cannot be accomplished without the *Pṛṣṭhas*;—so that naturally the *Pṛṣṭhas* also will have to come in. In this manner, the term ('*sarvapṛṣṭha*') would not have two denotations, and the use of the term '*Sarva*', all', would become justified.

From all this we conclude that the text lays down the 'transference' of the *Pṛṣṭhas* of the *Ṣaḍaha*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The name 'avabhṛtha' indicates the 'transference' of all details connected with the 'Soma'.*

SŪTRA (12)

SIMILARLY THE 'AVABHṚTHA' TRANSFERS THE DETAILS FROM THE 'SOMA'

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, we read *'Vāruṇyā naiṣkāśena tuṣairshchāvabhṛtham yanti'* [They proceed to the *Avabhṛtha* with the *smearings of the curdled milk* and with the *Husks*']

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the text enjoin, in regard to the *Varuṇapraghāsa* the *Husks* and the *Curdled-milk smearings* in connection with the *Water-sprinkling* (in all directions) which is done at the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* (and which therefore is to be done also at the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, which is an ectype of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*)? Or does it indicate the 'transference' (to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*) of the details of the *Avabhṛtha* connected with the *Soma*'?

On this question the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—The text should be taken as laying down the details in reference to the *Water-sprinkling* connected with the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*, as this we presume to be the notion that arises from the proximity—this connection with the details of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* being in close proximity (to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*) by virtue of the general law (that the ectype is to be performed like the archetype)—But this would not be *Avabhṛtha* (which is what the text speaks of *avabhṛtham yanti*)—The answer to this is that the term *'avabhṛtha'* does appear in connection with the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* also, in the text *Eṣa vai darshapūrṇamāsayoravabhṛthaḥ* [This is the *Avabhṛtha* at the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*']'

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*: *Similarly the Avabhṛtha transfers the details from the Soma*, i.e. just as the *Prathas* are transferred from the *Sadaha*, so in the present case the details are transferred from the *Avabhṛtha related to the Soma*.—How so?" The grounds for this have already been explained under Sū. 7. 3 1. above

SŪTRA (13)

[*Objection*] THE DETAILS SHOULD COME FROM THE ORIGINAL ARCHETYPE (DARSHA PŪRṆAMĀSA)"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*]

Bhāṣya

"It has been argued by us that the text in question may be taken as

an injunction of accessories in reference to the *Avabhṛtha connected with* the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* :—what is the answer to that ?"

Thus *Nūtra* is intended to be introductory to what follows in the next *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (14).

THAT CANNOT BE, AS (IN CONNECTION WITH THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA, THE MENTION OF THE 'AVABHṚTHA') COULD BE ONLY FIGURATIVE.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right.- Why ?—Because there is no *Avabhṛtha* at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* "But we find the text '*Eṣa vai darsha-pūrṇamāsayoravabhṛthaḥ*'". -True, there is this text; but that does not impart the character of '*avabhṛtha*' to what has been spoken of.—"Why ?"—The explanation is as follows Of the sentence '*Eṣa vai darsha-pūrṇamāsayoravabhṛthaḥ*', two interpretations are possible: (1) it may be taken as laying down the connection, with *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, of a thing which has been recognised as having the character of '*Avabhṛtha*'; just as when it is said that '*Devadatta is Yajñadatta's son*', what is expressed is the relationship to *Yajñadatta*, of *Devadatta* who has been recognised as having the character of 'son';—or (2) it may be taken as asserting the character of '*Avabhṛtha*' in a thing which is recognised as being connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, but is not recognised as having the character of '*Avabhṛtha*';—just as, when it is said that 'This mango is *Yajñadatta's* son', what is asserted is the character of 'son' (i.e. *being dear*) in the *mango* whose relationship to *Yajñadatta* is already recognised. —Now, in the case in question, the connection of *Water-sprinkling* with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is already known through the 'Context',—what is *not* recognised is its *having the character* of '*Avabhṛtha*'; hence what the text asserts is this character of '*Avabhṛtha*' in the *Water-sprinkling*; but it does not actually become *Avabhṛtha*.—"Thus *Water-sprinkling* also may be *Avabhṛtha* – [what is the harm ?]"— That cannot be right; because it is not reasonable for one term to have more than one denotation.—'How then is the word used (in connection with the Water-sprinkling) ?"— Such use is due to similarity (between *Water-sprinkling* and *Avabhṛtha*).—'What *similarity* ?"—There is the similarity that both are *connected with Water*; on which basis the *Water-sprinkling* has been eulogised as 'this is *Avabhṛtha* itself'; just as (in the sentence 'This mango is Yajñadatta's son') the *mango* is eulogised as 'son'. For all these reasons, the conclusion is that in reality there is no *Avabhṛtha* at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; and hence the text in question cannot be taken as laying down accessory details.

SŪTRA (15).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS

Bhāṣya.

The above conclusion is also supported by an indicative text.—"What is that indicative text ?"—It is this—'*Nāyurdām juhoti, na sāma gāyati*,

na vā gamanamantram japati' ['He does not offer the Āyurdā-oblation; he does not sing the *Sāman*; he does not recite the *Gamanamantra*'];—here we have the denial of the details related to the *Soma*, which indicates the possible admissibility of those details.—From all this it follows that the text indicates the 'transference' of the details of the *Arabhṛtha* connected with *Soma*.

ĀDHIKARAṆA (5): *The material used at the Avabhṛtha of the Varuṇapraghāsa sacrifice should be 'Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings'.*

SŪTRA (16).

WHEN A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN ENJOINED, THAT SAME SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE USED,—BECAUSE THERE IS THE DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT IF NO SUBSTANCE HAD BEEN ENJOINED, THEN ALONE COULD THE CAKE BE USED, ON THE GROUND OF ITS HAVING THE 'HUSKS' FOR ITS ORIGINAL SOURCE.

Bhāṣya

It has been explained (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) that the *Avabhṛtha* at the *Varuṇapraghāsa* sacrifices takes in the details of the *Avabhṛtha* at the *Soma*.—In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following question—At this sacrifice (Avabhṛtha of *Varuṇapraghāsa*), what is the substance to be used?—Is it the Cake?—Or 'Husks' and 'Curdled Milk-Smearings'?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It is the *Cake* that should be used. Why?—Because the Cake comes into it through 'transference' based upon the name ('*Avabhṛtha*', which transfers the details of the Avabhṛtha of the *Soma*, at which latter, *Cake* is the substance used).—But *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* are the substance directly declared."—"True, that is the substance directly declared; but it is not what can be regarded as *enjoined*; because what is enjoined is the *Avabhṛtha* in the words '*Avabhṛtham yanti*' ('they proceed to the *Avabhṛtha*'); under the circumstances, if the same sentence were taken as enjoining the *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings*,—then there would be a syntactical split,—'(*a*) They proceed to the performance of the *Avabhṛtha*, and (*b*) that with the substance *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings*'.—'For what purpose then is the declaration of the Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings?'—It is entirely useless, having no connection with the sacrifice at all."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*—*When a particular substance has been enjoined, that same substance should be used*; that is, in the case in question, a particular substance has been enjoined, in the text—'They proceed to perform the *Avabhṛtha* with *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings*'; hence the sacrifice should be one in which the substance used is *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings*.—"Why so?"—*Because there is the declaration to that effect*; i.e.—*the Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* is directly declared; while the *Cake* could come in only through inference, by 'transference'.

"The *Cake* also is directly declared, through the *name* ('*Avabhṛtha*')."

Even though directly declared, yet (coming in by Transference) it comes in only in a general way; while the *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* come in as specifically mentioned; and the particular always sets aside the general. –Then again, the Cake is only indirectly indicated, while the *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* is directly declared, and as between Direct Declaration and Indirect Indication, the acceptance of the former is more reasonable. Hence at the sacrifice in question, the substance used must be the *Husks and Curdled Milk Smearings*.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "the *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* cannot be connected with the *Avabhṛtha*, because, if it were, then there would be syntactical split." –Our answer to that is as follows: –If the *Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* were enjoined apart from the *Avabhṛtha*, then there would be syntactical split: what however is actually enjoined is that *new type of Avabhṛtha at which the substance used is the Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings*; so that there is nothing incongruous in the injunction of an act (sacrifice) along with a particular accessory detail. If, on the other hand, *the Husks and Curdled-Milk-Smearings* were not enjoined, then its mention in the text would be entirely meaningless. –Hence we conclude that at the sacrifice in question the substance used must be the *Husks and Curdled Milk-Smearings*.

If no substance had been enjoined, then alone could the Cake be used, on the ground of its having the Husks for its original source; i.e. if no particular substance had been directly laid down, then alone could the Cake be used, by reason of its having the husks for its source, –as a matter of fact, however, a particular substance (*Husks, etc.*) has been directly laid down, hence the Cake cannot be used.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *'The term 'vaiṣṇava' does not indicate the 'transference' of the details of the Ātithya.*

Bhāṣya,

(A) In connection with the *Ātithya*, we read—'*Vaiṣṇavo navakapālo bhavati*'; ['The Cake baked upon nine pans is to be dedicated to Viṣnu']; —(B) and in connection with the *Rajasūya*, we read—'*Pūrvasmin triṣaṁyuktē vaiṣnavastrikapālaḥ*' ['At the previous *Triṣaṁyukta*, the Cake baked on three pans is dedicated to Viṣnu'].

The question to be considered is this—In the sentence 'At the *Triṣaṁyukta*, the Cake baked on three pans is *dedicated to Viṣnu*',—does, -or does not—the term 'dedicated to Viṣnu' mean the 'transference' of the details of the *Ātithya* (in connection with which also, the same term, 'dedicated to Viṣnu' has been used)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The term does mean the transference of these details.—Why?—Whenever a term has been used in connection with a sacrifice of which the details have been prescribed,—if that same term is found used in connection with another sacrifice, whose details have not been prescribed,—then the indication of that term is that the details of the former are to be transferred to the latter sacrifice;—this is what has been made clear under 7. 3. 1. In the present case, we find that the term 'dedicated to Viṣnu' has been used in connection with the *Ātithya*, the details of which have been prescribed,—and it is found to be used (in *B*) in connection with the *Triṣaṁyukta* sacrifice, of which the details are not prescribed;—hence it follows that the term indicates the transference to this latter, of the details of the former."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

SŪTRA (17).

IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY THE INJUNCTION OF AN ACCESSORY; IT COULD NOT INCLUDE THE DETAILS, BECAUSE IT IS EQUALLY PRESENT (IN BOTH).

Bhāṣya.

The term in question should be taken as enjoining an accessory; what it enjoins is an *accessory of the Ātithya sacrifice*,—in the shape of the connection of Viṣnu as the deity; hence it cannot include within itself the details of that sacrifice.—"Why so?"—*Because it is equally present in both*; i.e. the term is equally there, in connection with the *Ātithya* and the *Triṣaṁyukta*; just as it enjoins the *deity Viṣṇu* at the *Ātithya*, so it does also at the *Triṣaṁyukta*;—and it is only if this direct denotation of the term were found to be inapplicable that there could be a justification for taking the term as indirectly indicating the transference of the details (of the *Ātithya*);—in the present case however the direct denotation of the term—viz. the injunction of the *deity Viṣṇu*,—is found to be quite compatible;—hence it cannot be taken as indicating the said details.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Words like 'Nirmanthya' are not indicative of the 'transference' of details.*

SŪTRA (18)

THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH TERMS LIKE 'NIRMANTHYA'.

Bhāṣya.

(A) In connection with the *Agnīsomīya* Animal, the *Nirmanthya Fire* has been laid down.—(B) Again, there is a text in connection with the *Agni*-sacrifice, beginning with the words '*Sādhyā vai devāḥ*', and ending with '*Nirmanthyēnēṣṭakāḥ pachanti*' ['They bake the bricks on the *Nirmanthya Fire*'] [The term 'Nirmanthya Fire' means 'Fire produced by the rubbing together of two sticks'].—(C) There are two things connected with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* (1) the *Grass*, and (2) the *Clarified Butter*; and both of these are spoken of also in connection with the *Pasha* sacrifice,—and with certain details—(1) the *Grass*, in regard to which there is the detail 'Covers the Post-hole with Grass', and (2) the *Clarified Butter*, in regard to which there is the detail 'Anoints the Post with Clarified Butter'.

Now in regard to this, there arises the question—Do the words like '*Nirmanthya*' include (in their denotation) the related details, or not?

In answer to this question, the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* is extended in its application to the present instance:—*The same is the case with terms like* '*Nirmanthya*'; that is, just as it has been found to be in the case of the term '*Vaiṣṇava*'; for here also the term '*Nirmanthya*' is taken in its etymological sense, denoting the *Fire produced at the time of the action by the* '*rubbing together*' ('*manthana*') *of two sticks*.—Similarly the terms '*barhis*' ('Grass') and '*ājya*' ('Clarified Butter') are denotative of substances.—So that all these three have their purposes fulfilled by signifying their direct denotations, and as such cannot include (extend their denotation to) the details. Hence we conclude that terms like these do not include the details in their denotation.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The words 'dvayoḥ praṇayanti', 'fetch the Fire at the Two', do not indicate the 'transference' of the details relating to 'Soma'.*

Bhāṣya

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice (of which there are four parts (1) *Vaishvadēva*, (2) *Varuṇapraghāsa*, (3) *Sākamēdha* and (4) *Sunāsīrīya*), we read '*Dvayoḥ praṇayanti, tasmāt dvābhyāmēti*' ['They fetch the Fire at the two, hence they go up with two']. This 'Fetching of Fire' is found to be laid down with certain details, in connection with the *Soma sacrifice*; while in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, it is found to be laid down without any details.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'Fetching of Fire' spoken of in connection with the *Chāturmāsya* meant to be that connected with *the Soma sacrifice* (with its details)? Or that connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*, set forth in the *Sūtra* itself:—

SŪTRA (19)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'FETCHING OF FIRE' MEANT SHOULD BE TAKEN TO BE THAT CONNECTED WITH THE SOMA-SACRIFICE; BECAUSE THE OTHER NEED NOT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED AT ALL."

Bhāṣya.

"*The 'Fetching of Fire' meant should be taken to be that connected with the Soma-sacrifice.*—'Why so?'—*Because the other*,—i.e. that connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—*need not have been mentioned at all*; as its admission into the *Chāturmāsya* would be secured by the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype',—the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* being the Archetype of the *Chāturmāsya*). 'But how can the term *Fetching Fire*, which denotes merely the *Fetching of Fire* in general, signify the particular *Fetching of Fire* (related to the *Soma-sacrifice*)?'—It is through indirect indication, we reply; like the term '*tirtha*'; just as the term '*tirtha*' denotes only *a ford*, *a descent into a river*, yet, sometimes it is taken in the sense of *a particular* ford or descent into a river, which is peculiarly sacred and conducive to merit,—e.g. in the expression '*tirthayātrām gatah*' 'gone on pilgrimage to *a* sacred place').

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"THE PROHIBITION OF THE 'UTTARA-VĒDI' ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"There is the prohibition contained in the text—'They do not go to the *Uttaravēdi* at the *Vaishvadēva*, nor at the *Sundēvīya*'; this prohibition would have a sense only if what is prohibited were possible [so that this indicates the possibility of the *Uttaravēdi* in connection with the 'Fetching of Fire' at the *Chāturmāsya*]; and the *Uttaravēdi* can be there only in connection with the 'Fetching of Fire' at the *Soma-sacrifice*,—there being no *Uttaravēdi* at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE 'FETCHING OF FIRE' MUST BE TAKEN TO BE THAT RELATED TO THE ARCHETYPE; BECAUSE IT IS NOT A PROPER NAME.

Bhāṣya

The 'Fetching of Fire' spoken of here must be taken to be that related to the Archetype—i.e. to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*.—"Why so?"—*Because it is not a proper name*, i.e. the term 'Fetching of Fire' is not the proper name of the 'Fetching' related to the *Soma sacrifice*; that is to say, the term is not specifically expressive of that *Fetching of Fire*; if the term were specifically expressive of that 'Fire-fetching', then it could denote the same in the case in question also; as a matter of fact, however, the term is the generic name of what is signified by its component parts (*Pra+nayana*); that is, it expresses the *fetching* (*nayana*) *forward* (*prāk*); so that all that it can signify is the *fetching forward* of the Fire, hence it must be taken as signifying that; and as this is present in the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, which is in close proximity (to the *Chāturmāsya*), by accepting the said signification, the notion of the latter does not become set aside.

As regards the argument that "it would be as in the case of the term *tīrtha*'", our answer is as follows:—The term '*tīrtha*' also really denotes only *ford* (or *descent into river*) *in general*; as for the expression '*tīrtha-yātrām gatah*', it is used generally after certain particular fords have been spoken of; and it is on this account that the term is understood as referring to a particular place of pilgrimage. In a case where the term is used by itself (without reference to any particular places), it denotes only *Ford* in general; as for instance, '*Tīrthē snāti tīrthamēva samānānām bhavati*' [Bathes at a ford, and thereby becomes like a ford among his equals'].—Then again, so long as a term can be taken in its directly denoted sense, there can be no justification for accepting an *indirectly indicated* one;—and in the present case, the *directly denoted sense* (*Fetching in general*) is quite compatible;

hence the *indirect indication* (of the particular *Fetching* connected with the *Soma*-sacrifice) should not be accepted.

SŪTRA (22).

THE MENTION (OF FETCHING RELATED TO THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA) MAY BE TAKEN TO BE (*a*) FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRECLUSION, OR (*b*) FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING AN ACCESSORY, OR (*c*) FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMENDATION.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"It has been argued above that '*the other need not have been mentioned at all*' (Sū. 19); what is the answer to that?"

The answer is as follows:—*The mention may be taken to be* (*a*) *for the purpose of preclusion*—the sense being that 'they fetch the Fire *at the two*—not at *the four*,—*or* (*b*) *for the purpose of indicating an accessory*; *or* (*c*) *for the purpose of commendation*, continued in the expression 'Hence they go up with two'.—Now (*a*) in every case of *Preclusion*, there are three objections;—(*b*) as for an accessory, there is none mentioned at all;—(*c*) hence the only alternative left is that it is for the purpose of commendation.—"But *Commendation* also would be futile, as the *Fetching* is already admissible through the injunction itself".—The purpose served by the commendation we shall explain under the following *Adhikaraṇa*, under Sū. 24.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The words 'Fetch the Fire to two' means the Fetching of it at the two middle parts of the Châturmasya.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'FETCHING OF FIRE' SHOULD BE DONE AT THE FIRST AND LAST PARTS BECAUSE OF THE PROHIBITION RELATING TO THE 'UTTARAVĒDI'"

Bhāṣya

There is the text 'They fetch Fire at the two parts'.

In regard to this there arises the question—at which two parts shall the Fetching be done?

The apparent view being that there is no restriction, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—*The Fetching of Fire should be at the First and Last Parts*.—why?—*because of the prohibition relating to the Uttaravēdi*; the *Uttaravēdi* is prohibited in the text—'At the *Vaishnadēva* they do not go to the *Uttaravēdi*, nor to the *Sunāsīrīya*' [*Vaishnadēva* and *Sunāsīrīya* are the *first* and *last* parts of the *Châturmāsya*]. What is meant by this 'Fetching of Fire' is the placing of Fire on the *Uttaravēdi*; hence whenever there is the 'Fetching of Fire', there should be the *Uttaravēdi*; and there can be prohibition only in regard to such place and time at which the thing prohibited is likely to be, and as a matter of fact, the *Uttaravēdi* is there only at the First and Last parts of the *Châturmāsya*; hence the 'Fetching of Fire' should be done at these two parts"

SŪTRA (24)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE AT THE TWO MIDDLE PARTS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENDATORY DECLARATION REGARDING 'GOING'.

Bhāṣya.

The 'Fetching of Fire' should be done at the two middle parts;—why?—because *of the commendatory declaration regarding 'going'*; the fetching of Fire at the two middle parts is spoken of in the commendatory declaration—'*Therefore they go up with two*'. *These two parts are described as* 'two thighs' in the text—'These two, the *Varuṇapraghāsa* and the *Sākamēdha*, are the *two thighs* of the sacrifice';—*thighs* are the limbs whereby *going (locomotion) is accomplished*; hence the sense of the commendation comes to be this 'There are two thighs of the sacrifice—the *Varuṇapraghāsa* and the *Sākamēdha*,—hence *they fetch the fire at these two*; hence it is

that the sacrifice is accomplished by means of these two *thighs*,—by the *fetching of Fire* they become strengthened, on account of the multiplicating of details at the Fetching-rite'.—This is the purpose served by the commendatory declaration.

As regards the argument based upon the 'prohibition of the *Uttaravēdi*',—our answer is as follows—

SŪTRA (25).

THE PROHIBITION REGARDING THE UTTARAVĒDI IS IN REFERENCE TO AN ISOLATED DECLARATION THEREOF.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice, the *Uttaravēdi* has been spoken of without reference to any particular part of that sacrifice, in the text—'*Upātra vapanti*' ['They place the Fire on this'], and it is of this isolated declaration that there is the prohibition put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣin* ['They do not go to the *Uttaravēdi*, at the *Vaishvadēva*'].—"But as a matter of fact, the text '*Upātra vapanti*' occurs at the end of the sentence declaring the accessories of the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, and hence the '*atra*' ('at this') must refer to the *Varuṇapraghāsa* [so that the declaration of the *Uttaravēdi* is not *isolated*; it is connected with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*]."—That cannot be; through 'Context', the said declaration should pertain to the *Chāturmāsya* itself (not to any particular part of it); if the declaration of the *Uttaravēdi* had pertained to the *Varuṇapraghāsa* in particular, then all the other three parts would have been mentioned in the prohibitive text (which however mentions the *Vaishvadēva* only).—"The declaration of the *Uttaravēdi* might pertain to the two parts (the *Varuṇapraghāsa* and the *Sākamēdha*)".—Our answer to that is that the *context* does not belong to any *two parts*, it belongs either to the *Chāturmāsya* as a whole or to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*; if the context belonged to the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, then there could not be the mention of *two* parts in the prohibition; hence the declaration (regarding the *Uttaravēdi*) must be regarded as pertaining to the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices as a whole.

"Even with all this, we have learnt from the commendatory declaration that the Fetching of Fire should be done at the two middle parts of the *Chāturmāsya*; why, then, should the 'Fetching of Fire', thus known already (through the commendation) as to be done, be mentioned again?"

The purpose of this has not been mentioned; and no other purpose being there, we might regard *Preclusion* as the purpose served by it. But objections against Preclusion have been set forth before. Hence the second mention of the Fetching of Fire should be taken as being for the purpose of laying down accessories.—"But there is no accessory here".—The accessory is mentioned in the shape of the placing of Fire on the *Uttaravēdi*; hence the second *Fetching of Fire* must be taken as being for the purpose of the said 'placing of Fire' on the *Uttaravēdi*.

[Kumārila does not accept the above presentation of the last two *Adhikaraṇas* 8 and 9. According to him, all these seven Sūtras, from 19 to 25, constitute a single Adhikaraṇa, where three views are set forth :—(1) that the '*Praṇayaṇa*' meant for the *Chāturmāsya* should be that connected with the Archetype, *Darshā-Pūrṇamāsa*—this is the *first Pūrvapakṣa* ; —(2) that it should be that connected with the Soma-sacrifice,—this is the second *Pūrvapakṣa* ; and (3) that it is an entirely independent *Pranayana* for the *Chāturmāsya* only,—this is the *Siddhānta* ; and the further conclusion is that this independent *Praṇayana* is to be done at the *two middle parts*.—See *Ṭupṭīkā*, pp. 159-160 ; also *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, Vol. II, p. 22.]

ĀDHIKARAṆA (10): *Such words as 'Svarasāma' and the like are indicative of the 'transference' of details.*

SŪTRA (26).

THE TERMS 'SVARA-SĀMAN', 'ĒKAKAPĀLA' AND 'ĀMIKṢĀ' ALSO [ARE TO BE TAKEN AS INDICATIVE OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF THE DETAILS]; BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

(A) (*a*) *In connection with the Gavāmayana sacrifice, we read—'Abhito divākīrtyam ahastrayaḥ svarusāmāno bhavanti'* ['At each of the two ends of the *Divākīrtya Day*—i.e. the one day at the centre, between the two 'Half-year-periods—there are three days called *Svara-sāman*']; in connection with these *Svarasāma-days* (i.e. the sacrifices performed on those days), certain details have been laid down,—such as 'they are seventeen', 'they are taken up by the continuous *Atigrāhyā*', and so forth.—(*b*) Then elsewhere we read—'*Pṛṣṭhyaḥ ṣaḍahaḥ dvau svarasāmānau*' ['There are six days related to the *Pṛṣṭhas*, there are two *Svarasāma-days*'].—(B)—(*a*) In connection with the *Vaishvadēva* (at the Āgrayaṇa sacrifice), we read—'*Dyavāpṛthivya ēkakapālaḥ*' ['The Cake baked on one pan, dedicated to *Dyaus-Pṛthivī*']; and in relation to this *Ēkakapāla* Cake, there are certain details laid down—'Offers the *Sarvahuta* oblation', 'Makes the offering, without turning back'.—(*b*) Again elsewhere we read—'*Kāya ēkakapālaḥ*' ['The Cake baked upon *one pan, dedicated to Ka*'].—(C) (*a*) Again in connection with the *Vaishvadēva*, we read—'*Vaishvadēvyāmikṣā*' ['The Curdled-Milk dedicated to the *Vishvēdēvas*']; and in connection with this Curdled-Milk, certain details have been laid down. (*b*) Again elsewhere we read '*Maitrāvaruṇī āmikṣā*' ['The Curdled-Milk dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*'].

In regard to all this, there arises the question—(A) Does,—or does not,—the term '*Svarasāman*' occurring in the second sentence (A) (*b*) indicate the transference of the details of the *Svarasāma* days connected with the *Gavāmayana* [mentioned in sentence (A) (*a*)]?—Similarly (B) does,—or does not—the term '*Ēkakapāla*' occurring in the sentence (B) (*b*) indicate the transference of the details of the *Ēkakāpala* mentioned in (B) (*a*)?—Lastly (C) Does,—or does not,—the term '*Āmikṣā*' as occurring in the sentence (C) (*b*) indicate the transference of the details of the *Āmikṣā* mentioned in (C) (*a*)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Every one of the three sentences in question *is the injunction of an accessory, and it could not include the details, because it is equally present in both* (Sū. 7. 3. 17); hence the terms in question do not indicate the transference of the details."

In answer to this, there is the following *Siddhānta*:—*The terms* '*Svarasāman*', '*āmikṣā*' *and* '*ēkakapāla*' *are to be taken as indicating the transference of the details.*—Why so?—*Because we find indicative texts*; we find such an indicative text as leads us to conclude that every one of the terms in question is indicative of the transference of details.

(A) As regards the term '*Svarasāman*',—after having declared that 'There are six days connected with the *Pṛṣṭhas*, and two are *Svarasāma-days*', the text goes on to say—'*Tatra yat tṛtīyam saptadashānahaḥ tat trayastriṁshasya sthānam abhipa.yāharanti, sa uttarāvām stomānāmavyavāyāya; tryāṇām cha saptadashānām anūchīnatāyāḥ*'. Now if these two *Svarasāma* days (the seventh and eighth days of the *Ṣadaha*) also take in the details of the *Gavāmayana*, then they also would have the *seventeenth* hymn; and in this way we get the seventeenth hymn thrice, on three consecutive days (one, the last day of the *Ṣadaha* and the seventh and eighth days, the *Svarasāma* days, following that day); and thus we get the *continuity* spoken of in the commendatory words '*Trayāṇām saptadashānām anūchīnatāyai*'

[At the *Ṣaḍaha* sacrifice, on the six days the use of the following six hymns respectively becomes possible under the general law (relating to the Archetype and the Ectype)—(1) *Tṛcī* (3), (2) *Pañchadasha* [15], (3) *Saptadasha* [17], (4) *Ēkaviṁsha* [21], (5) *Trinava* [27] and (6) *Trayastriṁsha* [33];—but what the text quoted lays down is that on the sixth day, the *seventeenth* hymn should be used instead of the *thirty-third*; and in commendation of this there are the words '*Trayāṇām*, etc.'—And on the *Svarasāma days*, there is the *seventeenth* hymn.—What is secured by this is that we have the *seventeenth hymn* on the sixth day of the *Ṣadaha*, and on the two following days (the seventh and the eighth) which are *Svarasāma days*, and as such take in the seventeenth hymn. This is the 'Continuity' which is one of the details laid down in connection with the *Gavāmayana*.]

(B) Similarly in connection with the *Āgrayaṇa* sacrifice, having laid down 'the Cake baked on one pan, dedicated to *Dyaus-Pṛthivī*', the text goes on to say—'*Yat samahitam karoti sā tu ēkā parichakṣā; huto hutaḥ paryāvṛttatē sā dvitīyā; ājyasyaiva dyāvapṛthivyau yajēta*';—here the sentence enjoins the use of *Ājya* (Clarified Butter) [in place of the '*Ēkakapāla*', Cake baked on one pan]; and in connection with this same, this sentence indicates the presence of the two features of '*Sarvahoma*' and '*Aparyāvṛtti*', which are the details connected with the *Vaishvadēva*, [at the second offering of *Ēkakapāla*].

(C) Lastly, in connection with the '*Curdled-Milk dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa*', we read—'They do not deal with the whey'; this prohibits the *offering of whey*, which is a detail related to the *Vishvēdēvas*, and thereby indicates the possibility of such details finding place therein.

From these indicative texts we learn that each of the three terms in question ('*Svarasāman*', '*Ēkakapāla*' and '*Āmikṣā*') is indicative of the transference of details.

What has been said above regarding the 'offering of whey' is on the understanding that the said offering is an act of 'disposal' and hence stands on the same footing as the '*Sviṣṭakṛt* offering'.

Says the Opponent—"You have cited indicative texts; how do you establish the fact of the details actually finding place in the respective sacrifices?"

Answer—The admission of the details is got at by *Indirect Indication*, and Indirect Indication is accepted on the basis of the said indicative texts.

SŪTRA (27).

OR, IT MAY BE DUE TO THE INJUNCTION (OF CHARACTER) BEING COMMON.

Bhāṣya.

(A) The character of '*Svarasāman*' is common (to the *Gavāmayana* and the *Ṣaḍaha*);—(B) The character of '*Ēkakapāla*' is common (to the offering to *Dyauṣ-Pṛthivī* and the offering to *Ka*);—and (C) the character of '*Āmikṣā*' is common (to the whey offered to *Vishvēdēva* and that offered to *Mitra-Varuṇa*); and the admissibility of the details would be determined according to the principle explained below under the Sūtra '*Yasya liṅgamartha-saṁyogāt*' (8. 1. 2).

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *In such expressions as 'Vāso dadāti', 'gives the cloth', the term 'vāsas', 'Cloth' stands for the genus.*

Bhāṣya.

Somewhere in the Veda, it is said—'*Vāso dadāti*' ('gives away cloth'), '*Ano dadāti*' ('gives away the cart').

What is to be considered in this connection is—does—or does not, the use of the word '*vāsas*' (Cloth), or '*anas*' (cart) indicate the *act* (of *weaving*, which is involved in the making of the *Cloth*, or of *wood-cutting and the rest* involved in the making of the *Cart*)?—In this connection it has been said that what has really got to be considered is—are these two words used in the sense of the *actions* (involved in the making of the two things)? Or in that of the two *genuses* ('Cloth' and 'Cart')? If they are used in the sense of the *actions*, then their presence in the sentences would mean that the *actions* (the actual operations) have to be performed at the time of the *giving*; if, on the other hand, they are used in the sense of the genuses, then it does not mean this.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"The two words are to be taken as used in the sense of the *operations* (of *weaving* and *wood-cutting*, etc.).—Why so?—Because they are found to be applicable only when the operations have been there; that is to say, the two words are applied to that substance—*Yarns*, or *wood*—over which the weaver or the carpenter has performed the *operation* (of *weaving* or *wood-cutting*, etc.); they are never applied before the said operation has been performed; hence it follows that the words are used as standing for those operations.—It is on the basis of this notion of the words standing for the *operations* that we have the following—

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THE PRODUCT OF AN OPERATION IS SPOKEN OF, WHAT IS INDICATED AS TO BE DONE IS THAT OPERATION; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE 'YŪPA' ('SACRIFICIAL POST').

Bhāṣya.

"When a thing like *Cloth, which is the product of an operation*, is spoken of, what is indicated as to be done is that operation.—How so?—*As is found in the case of the Yūpa*; the term '*yūpa*' is applied on the basis of such operations as *cutting* and the rest,—and whenever it is used, it indicates the performance of all those operations; so also in the case in question'

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS THE MATERIALISED THING (THAT SHOULD BE GIVEN); BECAUSE THE OPERATION DOES NOT FORM PART (OF THE DENOTATION OF THE TERM).

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the above is as follows:—The two terms are not used on the basis of the operations.—Why?—Those terms whose use is based upon certain definite conditions are used only when those conditions are present; e.g. terms like '*Daṇḍin*' ('Man with the stick'), '*Chhatrin*' ('Man with the umbrella'). The words in question however are found to be used when the operations are not present, being used in reference to the *genus* only.

The following argument is urged here—"What really happens is that the speaker uses the term after having inferred the operation from the *genus* denoted by the term [so that the word is really used on the basis of the operation]".

Our answer to this is as follows—There can be no reason for abandoning the perceptible basis (in the shape of the genus) of the use of the term, and assuming its basis in the operation which is not perceptible.

It has been argued that—"The term is used only after the operations (that have brought into existence the thing denoted by the term)".—Our answer to this is that prior to the operation, the genus was (there, but) unmanifested; and it becomes manifested by means of the operation; it is for this reason that the term is used after the operation.

From all this it follows that the terms in question should be taken as used on the basis of the *genuses* (denoted by them).

Such being the case, what is to be done (in accordance with the injunction 'gives away cloth', or 'gives away the cart') is that *the materialised thing* should be given [and not that the operation of *weaving*, etc. should be performed].—"Why so?"—*Because the operation does not form part of the denotation of the term*; as a matter of fact, the operation does not enter into the denotation at all; as there is no term denoting the operation.—As regards the *Yūpa* (Sacrificial Post), in connection with that *Cutting* and the other operations have been directly laid down by the texts [which is not the case with such ordinary things as the *Cloth* and the *Cart*]; hence the analogy is not correct.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *At the 'Gargatrirātra', the 'Kindling' is done of the ordinary unconsecrated Fire.*

SŪTRA (30).

WHEN THERE IS A DOUBT, IT SHOULD BE THE ORDINARY FIRE,—AS THAT SERVES ALL PURPOSES.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Gargatrirātra*, they sing the *Ājyadoha Sāmans*;—in connection with these we read—'*Agnimupanidhāya stuvate*' ['They sing the hymns after having kindled the Fire'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this Fire that is kindled, the *ordinary* unconsecrated fire? or the *Vedic Fire* (Fire consecrated with Vedic rites)?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be the consecrated *Vedic Fire*.—Why?—Because that Fire has been brought into existence for the performance of all rites, the words used by the consecrator being 'Whatever rites I shall perform, and whatever rites I am entitled to perform, etc.' Hence in the case in question, it is the *Vedic Fire* that should be kindled."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When there is a doubt, it should be the ordinary Fire, as that serves all purposes.* That is, whenever there is a doubt as to whether the *ordinary* or the *Vedic* Fire should be used, it is the *ordinary* one that should be used.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "the *Vedic* Fire has been brought into existence for the performance of all rites, and hence it is the *Vedic* Fire that should be kindled".—Our answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (31).

IT CANNOT BE THE VEDIC FIRE, AS ITS PURPOSE HAS BEEN EXPRESSLY DEFINED.

Bhāṣya.

The Fire meant in the present connection cannot be the *Vedic* one—that is, that Fire which has been brought into existence according to the method prescribed in the scriptures; because the purpose of such a Fire has been expressly defined by the scripture itself,—'He pours oblations into the *Āhavanīya Fire*' [It is the *Vedic* Fire that is called '*āhavanīya*'], and so on. If the Vedic Fire were taken as serving the purpose of all rites, then the express declaration of its purpose would be meaningless. Hence it is the *ordinary* Fire that should be kindled. In the case of the ordinary Fire, it could be regarded as *serving all purposes*, in the sense that it is kindled

in connection with each act that is to be performed with it; so that in the case of the ordinary Fire, there is no inconsistency in its serving all purposes and yet having its purposes expressly defined.

Question—"Why cannot the *Dhaiṇa* Fires (i.e. the Fires that have been taken to the seats of the *Agnīdhra* and other priests) be kindled for the purpose in question [i.e. in connection with the singing of the *Ājyadoha-Sāmans* at the *Gargatrirātra*]?"

The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (32).

THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF THESE OTHER FIRES ALSO WOULD BE LIKE THE SAME; THEY BEING SIMILAR (TO OTHERS).

Bhāṣya.

Of these other Fires,—i.e. of the Fires that have been taken to the seats of the priests—*the coming into existence is like the same*,—i.e. (like the *Vedic* Fire); these also cannot serve the purpose of all rites.—Why so?—Because they are *similar*; i.e. these Fires are similar to the other Fires; i.e. the purpose of these also has been expressly defined,—in such texts as, 'Seated to the east, he pours Clarified Butter on to the Fires that have been taken to the Priests' seats'.—From this it follows that these also are not the Fires that have to be kindled in the case in question.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The term 'yūpa' used in the sentence 'Upashayo yūpo bhavati' does not indicate the performance of the consecratory rites in connection with the Upashaya.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE CONSECRATED: BECAUSE THE TERM CONNOTES CONSECRATION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Ēkādashinī* (the group of eleven Sacrificial Posts), we read 'The *Upashaya* is a Sacrificial Post' [This *Upashaya* is the eleventh Post, set up to the South of the other *ten*].

In regard to this *Upashaya*, there arises the question—Is it something consecrated—so that the *cutting* and other consecratory acts are to be done to it,—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*It should be consecrated*, the *cutting* and other consecratory acts should be done to it;—why?—*because the term connotes consecration*; as a matter of fact, the term '*yūpa*' (Sacrificial Post) is used on the basis of consecration, and as such it cannot be applied to a post unless the consecratory acts have been performed; hence it follows that the consecratory acts should be performed (in connection with the *Upashaya*, which is the eleventh *Sacrificial Post*)."

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THE UPASHAYA DOES NOT FORM AN AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE [IT NEED NOT BE CONSECRATED]; [AS FOR THE NAME 'SACRIFICIAL POST'] THAT APPLIES TO IT FIGURATIVELY, BY REASON OF THE TERM CONNOTING CERTAIN QUALITIES (OF THE SACRIFICIAL POST).

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the consecratory acts are not to be performed in connection with the *Upashaya*.—Why?—*Because it does not form an auxiliary to the sacrifice.* The consecratory rites are performed in connection with the piece of wood (out of which the Post is made) with the view that through this wood-piece, they would become connected with the sacrificial act,—and the sacrifice performed with the animal tied to the Wood-piece thus consecrated would accomplish the desired transcendental result.—As regards the particular post, called '*Upashaya*', no animal is tied to it; so that if any consecratory rites were performed in connection with it, they would be

futile.—"On the strength of the declaration, those rites may be taken as serving some unseen purpose".—The answer to this is that, in this case, there is no such declaration as 'this Sacrificial Post should be made'; all that the text does is to mention an existing fact—'The *Upashaya* is a Sacrificial Post'—"As a matter of fact, in the absence of the consecratory rites, even the mention of *the Upashaya being a Sacrificial Post* as an existing fact, would not be right".—Our answer to this is that the name ('Sacrificial Post') would be applicable to the *unconsecrated Upashaya figuratively*; just as in the case where the sacrificer is called 'the Sacrificial Post'—'*Yajamāno yūpaḥ*'.—Says the Opponent—"In that case the name is applied figuratively by reason of similarity (between the *Sacrificer* and the *Sacrificial Post*); how would it apply to the *Upashaya*?"—The answer to this is that *the term connotes certain qualities*; i.e. the term 'Sacrificial Post' connotes certain qualities—embellishments—of the Sacrificial Post; and some of these embellishments of the Sacrificial Post,—such as cutting, scraping and the rest,—are done, though silently (without *Mantras*) in the case of the *Upashaya* also; and it is on the basis of these that the name 'Sacrificial Post' is applied to it,—though it is not really a 'Sacrificial Post'. Just as the maiden after bath, even though not decked in ornaments, is regarded as so decked even with a single string of the garland,—so though only partly 'consecrated' (embellished), the *Upashaya* is spoken of as *consecrated* (Sacrificial Post) by way of being eulogised.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *In the sentence 'Pṛṣṭhairupatiṣṭhantē', 'They worship with Pṛṣṭhas', the term 'pṛṣṭha' stands for the words of the verses.*

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnihayana*, we read—*Pṛṣṭhairupatiṣṭhantē*' ['They worship with *Pṛṣṭhas*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question (A)—Are the details of the '*Pṛṣṭha*' to be applied to the *Pṛṣṭhas* used at the *Agnihayana*?—or not?

What are those characteristic details?

There are two kinds of these details—*General* and *Special*; such syllables as '*Him*' are the general details, and the special details are the following—'When singing the *Rathantara* one should think, in his mind, of the Earth; of the Sea, when singing the *Bṛhat*' and so forth.

What then is the *Pūrvapakṣa* view?

First of all what we have to consider is the question (B)—Is the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' denotative of an *act* or of a *substance*?

"But it has already been decided, under Sū. 1. 4. 3, that the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' is the name of an *act*."

But in connection with those same injunctions that have been dealt with there, there are such declarations as—'Seventeen *Pṛṣṭhas*', 'the *Vairupa Pṛṣṭha*', 'the *Vairāja Pṛṣṭha*' [all which seem to indicate that the term denotes a *substance*]. It is for this reason that we are considering this question in connection with the text 'They worship with *Pṛṣṭhas*'.—What then is the right view on this question?

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers]—

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TERM 'PṚṢṬHA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE ACT; AS IT IS ENJOINED AS SUCH." [This is the answer to question (B), the subsidiary question of the *Adhikaraṇa*].

Bhāṣya.

"*The term 'Pṛṣṭha' should be taken as standing for the act*;—why?—*because it is enjoined as such*; i.e. the injunction of '*Pṛṣṭha*' in the text in question is similar to that injunction where the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' has been recognised (under 1. 4. 3) as standing for an act; the present injunction is like that same.—'Wherein does the similarity of this injunction lie to that injunction?'—The similarity lies in the fact that the same term '*Pṛṣṭha*' has been used in both cases; that is, in the case of the other injunction (dealt with under 1. 4. 3), the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' has been found to be denotative of the *act*;—it is that same term that is used in the injunctive text in question;—hence it follows that here also it should be understood

to be denotative of the *act*; as there is no ground for making any distinction. If, in the present case, some other denotation were assumed for the term, the term would come to have more than one denotation.—'What is the harm in that?'—The harm is that whenever the term would be uttered, its meaning would be doubtful,—there would, in fact, be no comprehension of the meaning;—so that no practical purpose would be served by the term; and it is for practical purposes only that words are used; as for other means of determining the exact meaning of the term, any such means would be dependent upon the *Context* and such other extraneous factors. On the other hand, if the term has only one denotation, its meaning is comprehended by itself, independently of all extraneous factors.—Thus it is seen that it is not right to attribute more than one meaning to a term; and consequently the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' should be taken as the name of an *act* (in the text in question also).—If then, the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' is the name of an act—and the acts enjoined in the text in question (by the term '*Pṛṣṭhaiḥ*') were those same that have been enjoined in the other injunctions (dealt with under 1. 4. 3).—then the mention of these acts in these latter would be meaningless. If then, in order to avoid this incongruity, it be held that what the present text enjoins is *the act of worship* (and not the acts enjoined in the other injunctions),—then, in that case, the *Context* would become ignored. For these reasons we take the present text as laying down *similarity*,—the words 'they worship with the *Pṛṣṭhas*' being taken as meaning 'they worship with *acts similar to the Pṛṣṭha*'.

"Now this similarity can be there only through the details of the act; hence it follows that the details of the *Pṛṣṭha* should be adopted in the *case in question—[this is the answer to Question (A), the main question of* the *Adhikaraṇa*]."

SŪTRA (36).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE TERM 'PṚṢṬHA' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR SUBSTANCES; BECAUSE WHAT IS LAID DOWN IS THE ACT OF 'ADDRESSING' AND HENCE THERE WOULD BE AN INCONGRUITY.

Bhāṣya.

It is not the right view that "the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' stands for act";—the right view is that *the term 'Pṛṣṭha' should be taken as standing for substances*,—i.e. substances in the shape of the words of verses; and hence it is denotative of such verses as '*Abhi tvā śūra nonumaḥ*' and the like.—"Why so?"—*Because what is laid down* (in the text in question) *is the act of addressing*; the text '*Pṛṣṭhaiḥ upatiṣṭhantē*' means that 'they *address* with the *Pṛṣṭhas*'.—"How can the term ('*upatiṣṭhantē*'), which is denotative of *worship*, be taken as denoting the act of *addressing*?"—This would be so by reason of the peculiar (*Ātmanēpada*) ending (in the term '*upatiṣṭhantē*'). When the root '*sthā*' with the prefix '*upa*' takes the *Ātmanēpada* ending, this ending denotes *an act of which a mantra is the instrument* (means); and *Mantra* is the instrument of the act of 'addressing'

(the deities), not of the act of 'worshipping'; because 'worshipping' is done either with the *body*, or with the *mind* [so that in this case the instrument is the Body or the Mind, not the *Mantra*]. Hence it follows that what is laid down in the text is the act of *addressing*.

Such being the case, there would be the following incongruity (in the *Pūrvapakṣa* view)—If (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' were assumed to stand for *acts*, then that would militate against the *Ātmanēpada*-ending; as in that case the *Mantra* would not be the instrument of the act;—if, on the other hand, the sense of the *Ātmanēpada*-ending is observed, then that becomes incompatible with the injunction of the act of worship; in fact, in that case, it becomes inevitable that the verb should signify the act of *addressing*. As between these two horns of the dilemma, the reasonable course is to observe the sense of the *Ātmanēpada*-ending; and in that case the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' would come in useful as figuratively indicating the *Mantra* which is instrumental in accomplishing the *Pṛṣṭha* (i.e. over which the *Pṛṣṭha* is sung); and the *Ātmanēpada* is justifiable only when there is instrumentality of the *Mantra*.—From all this it follows that the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' stands for those *Mantras* that are instrumental in the accomplishing of the *Pṛṣṭhas*.

Says the Opponent—"This is not right; that the text lays down the act of *worship* is expressed directly by the word ('*upatiṣṭhatē*'); while the fact of its expressing the act of *addressing* is only indirectly indicated by the indicative signs of the *Ātmanēpada*-ending; and certainly no indicative sign can set aside Direct Assertion".

Answer—There is no setting aside of Direct Assertion in this case. What the verb '*upatiṣṭhatē*' literally means is *standing near*,—and this *standing near* is for the purpose of *addressing*; the meaning of the sentence being that 'in order to accomplish the act of *addressing*, one should stand near the Fire',—such being the direct denotation of the root '*sthā*' by virtue of the *Ātmanēpada*-ending. Hence there is no contradiction involved in our view.

Says the Opponent—"Even so, the *Mantra* is the instrument of the act of *addressing*, not of the *standing near*; so that the absence of all connection between the *standing near* and the *Mantra* still remains; and in that case the juxtaposition of the two ('*Pṛṣṭha*' and '*Upasthāna*', '*standing near*') in the sentence '*Pṛṣṭhaih upatiṣṭhatē* would be meaningless".

Answer—While accomplishing the act of *addressing*, the *Mantra* does become the instrument of '*Upasthāna*'; inasmuch as it accomplishes the purpose of the 'standing near'; if it were purposeless, it would not be done at all.

From all this it follows that the term '*Pṛṣṭha*' stands for the *Mantra-texts* [*Answer to Question* (*B*)];—and when it stands for *Mantras*, then there is no room for any details; as there are no details in connection with *Mantras*, these being entirely without details—[*Answer to Question* (*A*)].

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya VII.

ADHYĀYA VII.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *In connection with the 'Saurya-charu,' there are certain details of Procedure.*

SŪTRA (1).

INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO INJUNCTION OF THE PROCEDURE, THE SACRIFICE SHOULD TAKE IT IN FROM WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE.

Bhāṣya.

[Instances of 'transference' indicated by Nāma have been dealt with so far; now we are going to deal with cases where the 'transference' is *inferred*.]

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we read—'*Sauryam charum nirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' ['One desiring Brahmic glory should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya*'].—In regard to this—(*a*) it has been understood under Sū. 2. 3. 14 that a sacrifice is enjoined here; —(*b*) it has also been explained under Sū. 6. 1. 3, that 'as between the *Sacrifice* and its *Result*, the Sacrifice is the subordinate, and the Result the principal factor;—(*c*) further, it has been pointed out, under 2. 1. 5, that the *Sacrifice* brings about an unseen force (*Apūrva*), and from this force, at some future time, follows the Result.—Thus, in view of all these conclusions, what the sentence 'One desiring Brahmic glory should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya*' means is that 'By means of the *Saurya* sacrifice, having brought about the unseen force, the man desiring Brahmic glory, should accomplish this glory for himself'.

Objection—"In a case where the sacrifice is spoken of by means of a word with the Instrumental Ending, it is right that it should be regarded as a subordinate factor; e.g. in the sentence '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*'; in the case of the text in question ('*Sauryam charum nirvapēt*'), however, there being no Instrumental Ending, whence is the sense of the *Instrumental* obtained?"

Answer—What is the use here of the *Sacrifice* being spoken of by means of a word with the Instrumental Ending,—when it is in the very nature of things that actions are subordinate to their Results? In fact, even in cases where the Instrumental Ending does appear, it is ineffective, as the sense of the Instrumental is already got at.—Similarly, in cases where the Accusative Ending is used—as in the sentence '*Agnihotram juhuyāt*',—we might either alter the case-ending (changing '*agnihotram*' into '*agnihotrēṇa*'), or regard the sense of the 'most desired' (which is connoted by the Accusative Ending) as not meant to be significant; or we may even

regard the case-ending as meaningless;—but in no case can the idea of the action being subordinate to the Result be got over. Hence it follows that in the sentence in question ('*Sauryam charum*, etc.') what is laid down is the bringing about of the Unseen Force by means of the Sacrifice. Now here, the *Sacrifice* is well known as something of common experience; but it is not known in what manner the Unseen Force is brought into existence by its means; because all that the text says is that 'one should bring about the Unseen Force by means of the Sacrifice'; and the procedure of how it is to be brought about is not laid down. In the case of things where the Procedure is well known,—as in the case of the injunction 'one should cook rice',—all that the injunction teaches is that 'the act ought to be done'; where however the Procedure is not known, such actions are enjoined along with the Procedure; as we find in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.—Thus then, the conclusion is that since the Procedure whereby the Sacrifice would bring about the Unseen Result has not been laid down in the injunctive text, therefore the injunction is, to that extent, incomplete.

Objection—"If the Procedure is there in the world, it must become known; if it is not there, how can it ever become known?"

Answer—True, the Procedure is there—both *ordinary* and *Vedic* (scriptural); the *ordinary* procedure is that observed in the case of the *Sthālīpāka* in connection with the *Pārvanashrāddha* and such other acts; and the *Vedic* procedure is that observed in the case of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices.—Now in the case in question, if the injunction of the *Saurya*-sacrifice is to be taken as preceded by, and dependent upon, the injunctions of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices,—and the meaning of the injunction is taken to be that 'The Unseen Force is to be brought about by means of the *Saurya-sacrifice* in accordance with the *Procedure* already learnt (from the preceding injunctions)',—then alone it is right that the injunction of the *Saurya*-sacrifice itself should contain no injunction of its procedure;—and as a matter of fact, the injunction of the *Saurya*-sacrifice does not contain an injunction of its procedure;—hence it follows that, *inasmuch as there is no injunction of the Procedure, the Sacrifice should take it from what has gone before* (Sū.),—i.e. it should be taken as having the same procedure as that which has been already laid down (in the preceding injunctions of other sacrifices).

Question—"There are some people who take the term '*yajēta*' to mean 'should bring about the Sacrifice', and the term '*juhuyāt*' as 'should bring about the Homa' [and do not take them to mean 'should bring about the Unseen Force by means of the Sacrifice, or Homa']. Do not these people need to find out what the details (of the acts) should be?"

Answer—Certainly, they do need to find it out. Though it may be that (for these people) the Sacrifice, having its process already known, may be duly offered to the prescribed deity,—yet, when it comes to be performed for the purpose of obtaining a particular result, there is need to find out its accessory details;—because no results follow from an act that is

performed without its details.—"How do you know that?"—When a man offers an impure substance,—while he is himself unclean, or lying down, or with feet raised.—with his left hand, or with his foot,—somehow or other to a Deity,—he does not obtain the result of the offering; such is the opinion of all cultured people;—on the other hand, if the man offers a pure substance,—at a clean place,—while he is himself self-controlled, facing the east,—with his right hand,—with mind collected,—and with proper *Mantras*, —and in due accordance with rules,—to the proper deity,—he does obtain the result;—such also is their opinion.—Thus it is clear that wherever a sacrifice has been laid down as to be performed for the obtaining of a result, it must stand in need of definite accessory details.

From all this it follows that sacrifices like the *Saurya* must need certain accessory details; and when the need is there, it is to be met,—in the case of the sacrifice which is itself a Primary Sacrifice—by being connected with the details that may be found to be laid down in close proximity (with reference to other sacrifices);—and in the case of the sacrifice which is an Ectype of another original Primary Sacrifice,—by being connected with those details that may be *inferred* [i.e. implied under the general law that the Ectype is to be performed like its Archetype].

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The Procedure to be adopted at the 'Saurya' sacrifice should be 'Vedic'.*

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE THE 'ORDINARY' ONE, BECAUSE ITS FUNCTIONING HAS BEEN SEEN."

Bhāṣya.

Now we proceed to consider the question—Is there no restriction as to whether the Procedure adopted at the '*Saurya*' sacrifice may be either the 'ordinary' or the 'Vedic' one? Or must it be the 'ordinary' one? Or the 'Vedic' one?

The first idea is that there can be no restriction, as there are no grounds for making a distinction.

Against this we have the following, which is the *Pūrvapakṣa* view:—"*It should be the 'ordinary' one*; i.e. it—the method of Procedure,—*should be the 'ordinary' one*;—why?—*because its functioning has been seen*; the functioning of the 'ordinary' procedure has been seen in several instances; for instance, at the '*Sthālī-pāka* in connection with the *Pārvaṇa-shrāddha*', at the 'Cooked Rice offering at the *Aṣṭakā*', at the '*Āgrahāyaṇī* sacrifice', and so on in several cases, where an Unseen Force is brought about by the sacrifice,—we have seen the functioning of the 'ordinary' Procedure. From these cases we deduce the affirmative premiss that 'whenever a sacrifice produces the Unseen Force, such is the Procedure adopted';—[then comes the minor premiss] 'this *Saurya* sacrifice is a *sacrifice* (bringing about the Unseen Force)';—[then comes the conclusion] 'the same should be the Procedure to be adopted'."

SŪTRA (3).

"IT MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT, WHERE THERE IS A DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT."

Bhāṣya.

"The question is put—'Is this the universal rule—that in all cases, the Procedure must be the *ordinary* one?—Such appears to be the case'.—Our answer to this is that *it may be different from the ordinary, when there is a declaration to that effect*; that is, in a case where there is a declaration to the effect that the *Vedic* Procedure should be adopted, the 'ordinary' procedure shall not be adopted; because in that case, on the strength of that declaration, the *Vedic* Procedure should be adopted; as in the case of the *Upasads* and the *Gṛhamēdha*."

SŪTRA (4).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY MEANS OF THE INDICATIVE; BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE IS SUBSERVIENT TO IT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is *by means of the Indicative* that the Procedure *should be determined.*—Which one should it be?—That which would be indicated by the Indicative. In the present case, the Indicative points to the *Vedic* Procedure;—hence the *Vedic* Procedure is the one that should be adopted.—"What is the Indicative?"—It is as follows—In connection with *Saurya-offering of Cooked Rice*, it is declared—'At the *Prayāja*, he offers the oblation of a gold-piece'; similarly in connection with the offering to *Indra-Bṛhaspati* it is said—'He lops off half of the Grass, not the other half,—the half that he has himself lopped off he spreads on the altar, not the other half'; again—'At the *Pitṛyajña*, he does not appoint a *Hotṛ*, nor an *Ārṣēya*'. All these indicative texts point to the conclusion that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Saurya*-sacrifice should be the *Vedic* one.—"How so?"—*Because the Indicative is subservient to it*; i.e. the Prayāja and the rest are all *subservient to*,—subserve the purposes of—the 'Unseen Force' brought about by the sacrifice laid down in the *Veda*; and hence it is only when the sacrifices would be performed in accordance with the Procedure laid down in the Veda that they would bring about the said Unseen Force; and in that case alone could such declarations be justifiable as—'Offers the gold-piece at each *Prayāja*'.—From all this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Saurya*-sacrifice should be determined to be the *Vedic* one.

SŪTRA (5).

[*Objection* (A)]—"NOT SO; BECAUSE THE TEXTS HAVE NO REASON BEHIND THEM; AS THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DECLARATIONS DESCRIPTIVE OF EXISTING THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' means 'it is not so'. The Opponent says—"It is not right that the *Vedic* Procedure should be adopted at the *Saurya*-sacrifice; because the indicative texts quoted cannot serve the purpose of restricting the choice to the *Vedic* Procedure.—'Why?'—*Because the texts have no reason behind them*; it is only when a declaration has reason behind it that it proves its objective,—and the texts quoted do not have any reason behind them. In fact it is not right that the *Vedic* Procedure should be adopted (at the *Saurya*-sacrifice); because that Procedure is restricted to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices by 'Context' and the other circumstances.—'What then is the meaning of the indicative texts that have been quoted?'—The answer to this is that *they should be taken as declarations descriptive of existing things*; for instance, the

declaration that 'He lops off half of the Grass, not the other half' can refer only to a case where the *Grass* is actually there; because what is asserted here can apply only to such Grass as is actually there;—in the case of the *Saurya*-sacrifice, however, there is no *Grass*. [Hence the declaration can have no bearing upon the *Saurya*-sacrifice.]—Similarly the other declaration also—'He does not appoint the *Hotṛ*, nor the *Ārṣṭiṣa*'—should be taken as descriptive of an existing fact—'If it is descriptive of an existing fact, then it is useless'.—What can be done, when there *is* no useful purpose served by it?—As for the declaration 'At each *Prayāja*, he offers the golden piece', it would apply to the *Prayājas* themselves—'But how can this same sentence lay down the *Prayājas* as also *the offering of the gold-piece at the Prayāja*? Such an interpretation would involve a syntactical split'.—In that case it may not be taken as laying down the *Prayājas*, it may be taken only as laying down *the offering of the gold-piece at the Prayāja*;—and the performer will naturally perform the *Prayājas* also, as without performing the *Prayāja*, there could be no offering of the gold-piece *at the Prayāja*.—Thus (inasmuch as none of the texts quoted has any bearing upon the *Saurya*-sacrifice), there is no text indicative of the fact that it is the *Vedic Procedure* alone that should be adopted at the *Saurya*-sacrifice; on the other hand, for reasons already stated (under Sū. 2 and 3), it is clear that it is the *ordinary* Procedure that should be adopted at it."

SŪTRA (6).

[*Objection* (B)]—"INASMUCH AS THE SIMULTANEOUS ADOPTION OF THE ACCESSORY DETAILS WOULD BE MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE, THERE SHOULD BE ADOPTION (OF ONE OR THE OTHER) ACCORDING TO THE PURPOSE SERVED BY THEM."

Bhāṣya.

"[The *Siddhāntin* may say]—'Why cannot both the Procedures be adopted together?—What would be the advantage of this?—The advantage would be this that the need of all the sacrifices for both Procedures would not be set aside by either one of the two only being adopted'.

"The answer to this is as follows:—If both were to function together,—then if the sacrifice were entirely completed by means of one Procedure only, the functioning of the other would be entirely incompatible (absurd).

"Thus there being *mutual incompatibility* between the simultaneous functioning of both, *—there should be adoption of one or the other according to the purposes served by them*; i.e. only one of them should function at any one sacrifice.—'But how can the functioning of only one Procedure secure the adoption of the accessory details according to the purposes served?'—When certain accessory details have already appeared for certain purposes at the original Primary Sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), those details would appear at the Ectype (the *Saurya*) also for the same purposes. Otherwise, if the other Procedure were adopted, the details of that would not come in

in accordance with the same purposes as those of the details mentioned above; because the purposes of the above-mentioned details would have been already served by those details themselves. It is for this reason that it is only when there is functioning of only one Procedure that the details are adopted in accordance with the purposes served by them; thus it is that the words of the *Sūtra* '*Yathārthakalpanā syāt*' has been taken to mean that 'only one of them should function at any one sacrifice'.—And if only one Procedure has to be adopted, it should be the *ordinary* one, for reasons already set forth above (under Sū. 2 and 3)."

SŪTRA (7).

[*Answer*]—IN FACT, INASMUCH AS [THE VEDIC PROCEDURE] HAS CLAIMS [TO BE ADOPTED], THE CHOICE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THAT, BECAUSE THE ACCESSORY DETAILS ARE EXPRESSIVE OF THAT CONCLUSION: SPECIALLY BECAUSE THESE DETAILS ARE CONNECTED [WITH THAT PROCEDURE], —AS IN THE CASE OF NAMES;—AND AS IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'DHĒNU' CONNECTED WITH THE TERM 'KISHORA'.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' ('in fact') implies the rejection of the views set forth above.

It would not be right to hold that the *Ordinary* Procedure should be adopted at the *Saurya* sacrifice; in fact, *the choice should be restricted to the Vedic Procedure*.—"Why?"—Because the Vedic Procedure *has claims to be* adopted; as a matter of fact, the Vedic Procedure also has claims of being adopted at the *Saurya*; because that Procedure also provides a method of bringing about the Unseen Force. And when both the Procedures (*ordinary* as well as *Vedic*) have equal claims to be adopted, it is the *Vedic* one that should be actually adopted;—*because the accessory details are expressive of that conclusion*; that is, the accessory details, in the shape of the *Prayāja* and the rest, being found at the *Saurya* and other such sacrifices are expressive of—point to—the said conclusion that the Procedure to be adopted at it should be the *Vedic* one.—"Why so?"—*Because these details are connected—with that procedure*; and hence, through association, they point to it;—*as in the case of Names*;—i.e. just as the name '*Agnihotra*' applied to the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana* is expressive of a sacrifice and as such brings along with itself all the details connected with that sacrifice,—because in the absence of those details, the application of the said name would be improper; and hence it is understood that those details are present at that sacrifice;—in the same manner, in the case in question also, it being found that the presence of the *Prayāja*, etc. (at the *Saurya*) would not be proper if the Procedure were not *Vedic*, it is understood that the Vedic Procedure also must find room there.—"In the absence of reasons, a mere indication

cannot prove anything".—True, that is so; but the reason has already been stated—*inasmuch as the Vedic Procedure has claims* (Sū.).

It has been argued that "it is the *Ordinary* Procedure whose functioning is visible".—Our answer to that is that, even though the functioning of the *Ordinary* Procedure be possible, yet the choice should be restricted to the *Vedic Procedure*.—"How so?"—*As in the case of the term 'dhēnu' connected with the term 'kishora'*; that is, in the case of the expression '*Kṛṇakishorā dhēnuḥ*',—even though the term '*dhēnu*' has been found to be used in the sense of the newly-delivered *cow*, yet by reason of the name ('*dhēnu*') being applicable to *newly-delivered animals in general*, it has claims of being applied to the newly-delivered *mare* also; and that in the particular expression quoted, the term does stand for the newly-delivered *mare* is admitted on the basis of the indicative word '*kishora*' (which stands for the *colt*, the young one of the *mare*, not of the *cow*). Similarly in the case in question also, even though the functioning of the *Ordinary* Procedure may be seen, yet, by reason of both being equally 'Procedure', and hence having equal claims to be adopted, it should be taken as restricted to the *Vedic* Procedure only, on the basis of the indicative texts (quoted under Sū. 4).

SŪTRA (8).

[*Objection*]—"IN FACT, BECAUSE THE ORIGINS (OF THE ACCESSORY DETAILS) ARE EQUAL, THEREFORE THEY SHOULD FIND ROOM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES."

Bhāṣya.

"In fact, the choice cannot be restricted by means of Indicative texts.—'Why?'—*Because the origins are equal*; that is, the origins of the accessory details—*Prayāja* and the rest,—are equal; i.e. all of them appear as subsidiary to the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices, not as subsidiaries among themselves.—'What then?'—If the *Anuyāja* and the rest were subsidiaries to the *Prayāja* and the rest, then,—in accordance with the law that 'where the Primary there its subsidiaries',—the presence of the *Prayāja* would lead to the inference of the presence of the *Anuyāja* and the rest; when, however, they all equally belong to other Primaries,—the presence of the *Prayāja* might lead to the inference of the presence of the *Prayājas* and the details of the *Prayājas*,—not of the *Anuyāja* and the rest.—Hence we conclude that the Indicative text cannot be the basis for determining which Procedure is to be adopted.

"It has been argued that it would be 'like the Name'; our answer to that is as follows—In the instance cited (that of the name '*Agnihotra*' being applied to the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*), it was only right that the name of one act being applied to another act should indicate the transference of the details of the former act to the latter; as has been already explained. Further, in that case there is the injunction that 'the oblation should be offered in the manner of the *Agnihotra*', while in the present instance, it is a mere

reference; hence there is no possibility of even the *Prayāja* and the rest coming in,—what to say of the *Anuyāja* and the rest?—Hence the case of the 'name' bears no analogy to the case in question.

"From all this it follows that *they should find room in their respective spheres.* That is to say, the Details should be adopted in connection with those same *Apūrvas* (Transcendental Results) in reference to which they have been prescribed."

The Siddhāntin says—In the case of the text *one should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to Sūrya*, the verb may be taken as *enjoining* the Principal offering and also *declaring* its auxiliaries.—'But how can that be done?'—As a matter of fact, if a 'Principal' were spoken of without its auxiliaries, it could not serve any purpose.—Thus then, when *all* the said auxiliaries have been rendered admissible in the manner explained above, the choice of a few particular ones might be made on the basis of the indicative texts that we have quoted.

To this the Pūrvapakṣin makes the following answer:—

SŪTRA (9).

"THE 'ENJOINING' (OF THE PRINCIPAL) AND THE 'DECLARING' (OF THE AUXILIARIES) BY ONE AND THE SAME WORD IS INCOMPATIBLE"

Bhāṣya.

"It is not possible for one and the same word to do the *enjoining* of the 'Principal' and also the *declaring* of the Auxiliaries.—Why?—Because it is only after the Principal has come into existence that it needs the auxiliaries; and it is through this need that these are taken in. Hence what has been suggested is not right.—Then again, if the word '*nirvapēt*' ('should offer') were taken as enjoining the auxiliaries also, then these latter also would be related to the Result; and as such they would lose their 'auxiliary' character itself. Hence this view also is not acceptable.—Thus the only alternative left is that the *ordinary* Procedure should be adopted".

SŪTRA (10).

[*Answer*]—IN FACT, THE 'INJUNCTION-APPENDIX' SHOULD APPLY TO THE INJUNCTION, IN THE SAME MANNER AS TO THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY: AS WE FIND INDICATIVES POINTING TO THAT CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the 'Injunction-Appendix' should apply to the Injunction—i.e. to the Injunction of sacrifices like the *Saurya*; and no 'ordinary' details should find place in them.—"What is the meaning of 'Injunction-Appendix' ('*vidhyanta*')?"—It means the '*Appendix*' (*anta*) of the '*Injunction*'

('*vidhi*').—"What is an 'Injunction' ('*vidhi*')?"—That sentence is called 'Injunction' on coming by which a man either takes up, or desists from, activity; such a sentence is called 'Injunction' because it *enjoins* a definite thing. For example, in common parlance, when it is said '*Devadatta gām abhyāja shuklām*' ('Devadatta, lead the cow, the white one'), the word '*abhyāja*' ('lead') is the *Injunction* and the rest is the *Appendix* to that *Injunction*;—similarly in Vedic literature also, the sentence 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice' is the *Opening Injunction*, while the *Appendix* to that Injunction consists of the whole section of the Brāhmaṇa-text dealing with 'Cake-offerings', barring the (aforesaid) Principal Injunction, as it is in association with the whole of the *Appendix* that the said *Opening Injunction* prompts the man to activity tending to the bringing about of the Transcendental Result; it is for this reason that it is called the 'Appendix' to that Injunction.—Similarly, the sentence 'One should perform the *Soma-sacrifice*' is the *Opening Injunction*, and the whole of the section of the Brāhmaṇa-text dealing with 'Soma-offerings' is the *Appendix* to that Injunction.—This is what is meant by the term 'Injunction-Appendix' (as used in the *Sūtra*).

Now, in the case of the *Saurya* and other such sacrifices, we have the *Opening Injunction* (enjoining the sacrifice itself), but there is no *Appendix* to that Injunction. So that in their case also the said *Injunction-Appendix* should have to be assumed.—"How?"—Whenever a sentence is found to be incomplete, it can be completed either by supplying additional words or by remote (indirect) construction (i.e. by connecting it with words separated from it); and this latter method of 'remote construction' is superior to that of 'supplying additional words'; because in the latter case such words have to be introduced as do not occur in the *Veda*, while in the former, the words with which the sentence is construed are such as are contained in the *Veda* itself. It is for this reason that a remote Brahmaṇa-text is assumed to be the completer of the sentence that is found to be incomplete; for instance, such Brāhmaṇa-texts as 'Should sacrifice *Kapiñjala-birds* to *Vasanta*', 'Should offer *Kalaviṅka-birds* to *Grīṣma*'.—From all this it follows that the Procedure to be admitted to the *Saurya* sacrifice should be the *Vedic* one.

Objection—"If the remote Brāhmaṇa-text is taken as the *Appendix* (sequel) to the Injunctive text in question, then it cannot be construed where it stands, and thus it becomes like the 'dancing peacock'; when the peacock dances, some feathers become exposed while others disappear (and this goes on changing continuously); in the case in question, the text disappears from one place and appears in another."

This does not affect the case at all. Because the connection (presence) of the Brāhmaṇa-text where it actually occurs is perceptible, while its connection with the (remoter) Injunction is only inferred; and what is *inferred* cannot set aside what is *perceptible*.

"In that case it comes to this that the text cannot be construed with the Injunction in question, as such connection would be contrary to the other perceptible connection."

That would be so if there were real incompatibility between the two; as a matter of fact, however, there is no such incompatibility; hence the text could be construed where it occurs, as also with the remoter Injunction in question.

This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūtra—The 'Injunction-Appendix' should apply to the Injunction, in the same manner as to the Original Primary.*

Says the Opponent—"What is meant by the term '*prakṛtivat*' ('in the same manner as to the Original Primary')? In fact, it is in the eighth *Adhyāya* that it is going to be determined what is the 'Original Primary' of what".

What is meant by the term is as follows:—The *Injunction-Appendix* (i.e. the Procedure) would come in like that of the Original Primary; that is, the Procedure at a sacrifice would be like that of that particular sacrifice which is its Original Primary (Archetype); for instance, the sacrifice which has the *Āgnēya* for its Original Primary will obtain its procedure from the *Āgnēya*; that of which the *Agnīṣomīya* is the Original Primary will obtain it from the *Agnīṣomīya*; and so on, in all cases.

"But why cannot the *ordinary* 'Appendix' be assumed for the Injunction (of the *Saurya*)?"

Answer—As there is no *ordinary* 'Injunction', there can be no *ordinary* 'Injunction-Appendix'; how then can one be assumed?

"Let the ordinary Procedure be adopted; why need there be any assumption of the *Appendix* to the Injunction?"

Answer—The Procedure admissible in the case is the *Vedic*, not the *ordinary*, one.

"But why?"

We find Indicatives pointing to that conclusion (Sū.),—that is, texts indicating the admission of the *Prayāja* and other details (as explained under Sū. 4, above).

SŪTRA (11).

[*Objection*]—"INASMUCH AS (THE ADOPTION OF THE VEDIC PROCEDURE IS) BASED UPON INDICATIVES,—IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO SUCH INDICATIVE, THE 'ORDINARY' PROCEDURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED."

Bhāṣya.

"If it is entirely on account of Indicatives that the *Vedic Procedure* is taken as the one to be adopted (in the case of the *Saurya*), then, *in a case where there is no such Indicative*, the 'Ordinary' Procedure should have to be adopted; e.g. in the case of the sacrifice enjoined in the sentence—'If one's brothers happen to die, one should offer the Cake baked upon eleven pans, dedicated to *Indra-Agni*'."

SŪTRA (12).

[*Answer*]—INASMUCH AS THE 'INDICATIVE' HAS THE SUPPORT OF OTHER THINGS,—AND AS THE INJUNCTIVE TERM IS COMMON TO ALL,—THE MATTER COULD BE DETERMINED EVEN BY A SINGLE INSTANCE; AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'RICE IN THE POT'.

Bhāṣya.

The answer to the above is as follows:—What has been said might have been true if the adoption of the *Vedic* Procedure were based entirely upon Indicatives;—as a matter of fact, however, it is not based entirely upon Indicatives.—"Then on what is it based?"—It is based upon the 'Appendix to the Injunction';—and the 'Appendix to the Injunction' also is based upon Reason;—and this Reason is equally applicable to all sacrifices, those that are 'Ectypal' (i.e. come into the Ectype by virtue of its being the Ectype of an Archetype and hence deriving its details therefrom) as well as those that come in by virtue of Indicatives.—"How so?"—*Because the injunctive term is common to all*; in the injunction of sacrifices, there is the same injunctive term; the *Opening Injunction* is there in the case of all sacrifices,—not so the *Appendix to the Injunction* (which is not there in all cases); but still on account of the needs of the case, even those Opening Injunctions that have no *Appendix* of their own are also connected with the *Appendix* occurring elsewhere in the *Brahmaṇa-text*.—Now, if such an Indicative, supported by reason, is found even in one case,—it indicates the admissibility of the same details into all those sacrifices to which the said reason is applicable. Just as in the case of rice-grains being cooked together in a pot, on pressing one grain, one infers that all the other grains have become cooked,—on the ground that the same cause that tended to the tried grain becoming *soft*, has been present in the case of other grains also. From all this it follows that in the case of all sacrifices (whose Procedure has not been expressly laid down), the *Vedic* Procedure should be adopted.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 2) that—"It is the functioning of the 'Ordinary' Procedure that is visible (in all cases)".—Our answer to that is that what the Opponent is putting forward here is an affirmative Universal Proposition, and such a proposition can be accepted as true only when it is found to be infallibly true in all cases; the proposition that is urged, however, is not infallibly true (it is fallacious); because there are several sacrifices, such as the *Gaṇayāga* (Communal Sacrifice) at which the *Ordinary* Procedure is not found to be adopted. Consequently the reason 'because its functioning has been seen (is visible, in all cases)' is not valid.

As for the argument that—"the claims of the *Vedic* Procedure being only partial, the Indicatives also could only rest on that (and hence have only a partial application)",—our answer is as follows: The 'claims' are based upon the fact of there being a fresh procedure;—the presence of

such a Procedure can only be based upon a verbal text;—and what is learnt from the verbal text is that the Procedure belongs to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, not to all sacrifices. Hence there can be no 'claims' in the case of all sacrifices. From this we conclude that the admissibility of a Procedure is determined by the 'Appendix to the Injunction', not by anything else.

[The Opponent raises an entirely new objection]—"Why cannot the sentences enjoining the *Ectypal* sacrifices (*Saurya* and the like) be accepted in their incomplete form, as they are? Why should there be any 'completing' of them (by the importing of an 'Appendix' from elsewhere)?"

Answer—If they are incomplete, they become useless:—"Let them be useless;—what is the harm?"—In that case it is not possible for them to be accepted by cultured people.—"The acceptance may be due to a mistake".—When cultured people make no mistake in regard to a single consonant or vowel, how could they make one in regard to such a large body of texts? Why too should it be regarded as a mistake? It has been explained under Sū. 1. 2. 8 that 'all these texts are equally *scriptural*'. Even if there had been a mistake committed by the learned, it could not have been perpetuated for many thousands of cycles. It is only right too that the texts should be completed on the basis of their requirements. This is the reason why we do not accept them as they are, incomplete?

Thus it becomes established that it is the Vedic Procedure that should be adopted (at the *Saurya*, etc.).

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *At the 'Gavāmayana', the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the 'Ēkāha'.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"AT THE 'AHARGAṆA', THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE 'ĀDASHĀHA', BECAUSE THEY HAVE ALL GOT THAT FOR THEIR ARCHETYPE; AS FOR THE NAME PERTAINING TO THE 'ĒKĀHA', IT WOULD BE DUE TO THE COMING IN OF ADDITIONAL DETAILS.—LIKE THE 'ĒKĀHA' SACRIFICE ITSELF."

Bhāṣya.

After having enjoined the *Satra*, in the sentence 'People desiring offspring should have recourse to the *Gavāmayana*', the text goes on to add '*Jyotirgaurāyuḥ*' [mentioning the three names '*Jyotis*', '*Gauh*' and '*Āyus*' of the three parts of the *Gavāmayana* and also of three independent sacrifices].—It is going to be explained under Sū. 8. 1. 17 that the 'appendix' (Procedure) at the *Gavāmayana* should be that of the *Dvādashāha*.—Thus then, at the *Gavāmayana*, the details of the *Dvādashāha* would come by the general law (relating to the Archetype and the Ectype); and of the *Ēkāha*-sacrifices also, some of the details come in, being mentioned as such by their respective names. Now those *Dvādashāha-details* that are not incompatible with the *Ēkāha-details* come, in due course, to be performed at the *Gavāmayana*; but there are some *Dvādashāha-details* that are incompatible with the *Ēkāha-details*; and in regard to these, there arises the question—which of the two details shall be performed—those of the *Dvādashāha*? Or those of the *Ēkāha*?

[We are now going to deal with cases where there is a conflict between the details whose 'transference' is indicated by *Name*, and those whose transference is indicated by inference (through the general law regarding Ectype and Archetype). At the *Gavāmayana*, there are three 'Days' (Daily Performances)—*Jyotis*, *Gauh* and *Āyus*. The *Gavāmayana*, being an 'Ectype' of the *Dvādashāha*, the three parts of it (*Jyotis* and the rest) take in the details of that *Dvādashāha*, through inference based upon the general law;—one of these details being the sacrificial fee of 'One Hundred'. On the other hand, the *name* '*Jyotis*' as applied to these indicates the application of the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, by which the sacrificial fee should be 'One Thousand'.—Which of these two Fees shall be given?—That is the question.—*Subodhinī*]

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is thus set forth in the *Sūtra*:—"*At the Ahargaṇa the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the Dvādashāha, because they have all got that for their Archetype*; i.e. because they have the *Dvādashāha* for their *Archetype* (Original Primary), therefore the details

thereof come into the *Gavāmayana* through the 'Appendix'.—'But this goes against the name of the sacrifice'.—No, it will not go against the names '*Jyotiṣ*' ('*Gauḥ*', '*Āyuṣ*'); as these would be applicable *by reason of the coming in of additional details*,—that is, by the coming in of details of the modifications of Hymns and Songs in addition to those pertaining to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—*like the Ēkāha sacrifice itself*; that is, just as in the case of the *Ēkāha-Jyotiṣ*, the name '*Jyotiṣ*' is applied on the basis of additional details,—even though the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are already there,—so the name '*Jyotis*' is applied for the purpose of indicating the presence of additional details which are not found at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—and there is no incompatibility between these additional details and those that belong to the *Dvādasāha*. Hence it follows that when there is incompatibility between the details of the *Dvādashāha* and those of the *Ēkāha*, it is the former that should be adopted."

"There is another explanation of the second half of the *Sūtra*—'*Adhikāgamāt tadākhyam syāt ēkāhavat*'. At the *Dvādashāha*, there are certain details other than those at the *Ēkāha*,—such, for instance, as '*Ābhiplavo'nvaham bhavati gorivītamanvaham bhavati*' (?);—and it is by reason of these additional details coming in that the name is applied to it—This the *Ahan* (Day-sacrifice) *is related to the Dvādashāha*, and is named *Jyotis* and *Āyus*.—"How is this?"—*Like the Ēkāha*; i.e. the same *Ēkāha* comes to be named '*Jyotis*', etc. when there enter into it those special details which are over and above those pertaining to its Archetype the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; similarly, in the case in question, those same names would be applied figuratively, on the basis of this similarity to the *Ēkāha* that here also additional details come in addition to those of its Archetype, the *Dvādashāha*;—exactly as the *one-day Vishvajit* has been called '*Ṣaḍaha*' (Six-day-sacrifice) by reason of the presence thereat of those *Pṛṣṭhas* that pertain to the *Ṣaḍaha*—and we had the declaration 'That *Ēkāha* (One-day-sacrifice) they call the *Ṣaḍaha*'. (See above, Sū. 7. 3. 6 *et seq.*) Similarly in this case also.—And as the *name* will apply only figuratively, it cannot be taken as indicating the 'transference' of details."

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT."

Bhāṣya.

"From an Indicative text also we conclude that it is the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* that should be adopted.—'What is that Indicative text?'—It is this—'*Dvābhyām lomāvadyati, dvābhyam tvacham, dvābhyāmasṛk, dvābhyām māṁsam*' ['He takes out the furs out of two, the skin out of two, the blood out of two, the flesh out of two']; having started with these details, which pertain to the *Ṣaḍaha* sacrifice, the text goes on to say,—

'*Yad dvādashopasado bhavanti ātmānamētanniravadayatē*' ['*If there are twelve Upasads*, etc. etc.']; here we have an indication of the presence of 'twelve *Upasads*', which is a feature of the *Dvādashāha* sacrifice; and this would be possible only if the whole set of details pertaining to the *Dvādashāha*, even those incompatible with those of the *Ēkāha*, were admitted. If that were not so, then there would be only *six Upasads*, which is a feature of the *Ēkāha*.—From this we conclude that the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* should be adopted."

"The following is another text indicative of the same conclusion—'*Yasyāturiktamēkādashinyāmālabhēran na priyam bhrātrvyamatirichyēta, atha yad dvau dvau pashū samasyēyuḥ kanīya āyuḥ kurvīran, yadyētē brāhmaṇavantaḥ pashava ālabhantē priyam bhrātrvyam atyatirichyatē na kanīya āyuḥ kurvīta*';—this indicates the presence, in connection with the *Ēkādashinī* (the eleven Posts) of the '*Vihāra*' [Pasture-ground] which is a feature of the *Dvādashāha*.—How?—It is only when there is '*Vihāra*', that an 'excess' of animals is possible,—and it is for fear of this excess that there is a combination of two animals each;—if the details admitted were those of the *Ēkāha*, then there could be no '*Vihāra*'; and in that case the declaration here made would not be justifiable.—Hence it follows that the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* should be adopted."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE THERE IS THE NAME OF THE SACRIFICE; AS FOR THE 'ADDITIONAL DETAILS', THERE IS NO VERBAL AUTHORITY FOR THEM.

Bhāṣya.

Not so, the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* should not be adopted; it is that of the *Ēkāha* that should be adopted.—"Why so?"—Because the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* (which is the Archetype) is admissible only under the *General Law* (relating to the Archetype and its Ectype),—while that of the *Ēkāha* is admissible through *Name*; and the *Name* is more authoritative than the *General Law*:—why?—because it is directly perceptible; the Name is directly perceptible (in the Veda); while the General Law functions through Inference.—"But the *Injunction-Appendix* (Procedure) also is perceptible".—True, but it is perceptible only in relation to the Archetype; in its relation to the Ectype, it is purely *inferential*. As for the *Name*, it is perceptible, in relation to the Ectype also; and Perception is more authoritative than Inference.—Hence it is the Procedure of the *Ēkāha* that should be adopted.

"It has been explained that the *Name* only serves the purpose of admitting additional details."

The answer to this is as follows:—*As for the 'additional details', there is no verbal authority for them*; i.e. there is no word signifying the additional details; all such terms as '*Jyotiṣ*' and the rest are the names of *actions* (sacrifices),—as has been made clear under Sū. 1. 4. 2.

It has been asserted (in Sū. 13) that "the name would be due to the coming in of additional details".—Our answer to this is that Additional details come in, by virtue of declarations, not by virtue of *Names*.

As for the argument that "when the details are absent, the name is not applied",—as a matter of fact, there is no occasion on which the names in question—'*Āyus*' and the rest—have not been applied to the sacrifice in question; how then can it be said that the Name has been seen to be absent (not applied) when the details have been absent?

Then there is the argument that 'the names *Jyotiṣ*' and the rest are not applied to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*".—But the reason for the name *Jyotiṣ*' not being applied to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* lies in the fact that they are distinct actions, and not in the fact of its having none of its details

From all this it follows that, when there is incompatibility, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Ēkāha*.

The following is the refutation of the second explanation (proposed on p. 64 of the *Text*) of the second half of *Sūtra* 13—*Adhikāgamāt tadākhyam syāt, ēkāhavat* :—If the name is applicable figuratively, then it can be only a *reference*, and as such useless. Hence we conclude that the Name should be treated as indicating the transference of details.

SŪTRA (16)

[*A suggested refutation of the Pūrvapakṣa*]—WHAT IS INDICATED SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A PROPERTY OF THE GROUP, APPLICABLE BY REASON OF SERVING THE SAME PURPOSE, AS IN THE CASE OF SUBSTANCES.

Bhāṣya

The indicative has been cited, in the shape of the presence of the twelve Upasads'. The refutation of this argument is as follows—*What is indicated should be taken as a property of the Group*; the indicative that has been cited (the presence of *twelve Upasads*) is a property of the Group—As a matter of fact, the *Dvādashāha* is a 'Group of Days' (a Group of Twelve Day-sacrifices), and is enjoined with a view to a definite result, in the text 'Persons desiring prosperity should have recourse to the *Dvādashāha*', the *Gavāmayana* also is another 'Group of Days', enjoined for the same purpose of accomplishing a definite result, and it is by virtue of this serving of the same purpose as the *Dvādashāha*, that it takes in the details of the *Dvādashāha*,—not through the force of the General Law (relating to Archetype and Ectypo).—*As in the case of substances*; in the case of substances, it is found that the details laid down in connection with the *Vrīhi* become applicable to the other substances by virtue of their being substitutes for *Vrīhi* and serving the same purpose,—and *not* through the force of the General Law. The same is the case with the present instance.

SŪTRA (17).

[*The above refutation criticised*]—IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS TO THE 'APŪRVA', THE 'GROUP' BEING A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged under the preceding *Sūtra* is not right.—Why?—*Because the property belongs to the Apūrva*; that is, *the presence of twelve Upasads* is a property of the *Apūrva*, not of the 'Group'.—How so?—Because *the 'Group' is a subordinate factor*, it is the Days' (the Day-sacrifices) that constitute the 'principal' factor in this case, and the number 'twelve', occurring in the name '*Drādashāhēna*' is subordinate to those 'Days', i.e. it is their qualification, and an action is always regarded as subsisting in what is *qualified*, not in the *qualification*; for instance, when it is said '*rājapurusah ānīyatām*' ('Let the King's man be brought up'), what is *brought up* is the *Man*, not the *King*:—or when it is said *mrstam bhunktē Dēvadattah*' (Devadatta eats savoury food'), what is understood to be eaten is vegetable or Pulse. In all cases it is the Principal Factor that is understood to be the substratum of the action.—What if it is so?'—What follows from this is that the Result is brought about by the 'Days', not by the 'Group', and the Details belong to that which brings about the Result. Thus it is that the *presence of twelve Upasads* is not a property of the 'Group', and such being the case, the details cannot find room in the *Gaṇāmnāna* by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the *Drādashāha* (as suggested under Sū. 16).—

For these reasons the refutation put forward under Sū. 16 is not right.

SUTRA (18).

[*Another criticism of the Refutation suggested in Sū.* 16]—IN THE CASE OF SUBSTANCES, THE DETAILS (PROPERTIES) DO BECOME ADMISSIBLE BY VIRTUE OF ONE SUBSTANCE SERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE OTHER.

Bhāṣya

The instance of 'Substances' has been cited (in *Sūtra* 16). But in the case of *Substances*, it is only right that there should be a transference of details (or properties); because in that case when the *Nīvāra* serves the same purpose that is served by the *Vrīhi*, the former takes in the details of the latter. In the case in question, however, the *presence of twelve Upasads* is not a property (or detail) belonging to the 'Group' at all; hence the very reason put forward is vitiated, consequently, the instance of 'Substances' that has been cited is not analogous.

Question—How then do you explain the Indicative text that the *Pūrvapakṣin* has put forward (under *Sūtra* 14)?

The answer to that is set forth in the following *Sūtra*.—

SŪTRA (19).

WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE GOT AT BY INDICATION IS ALREADY THERE DIRECTLY.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Gavāmayana*, the first 'day of the *Dvādashāha*' is that which is called '*Prāyaṇīya-atirātra*'; it is of this latter that *the presence of twelve Upasads* is a detail; hence when this is adopted, it is the *Principal sacrifice that is adopted*; while if *the presence of six Upasads* were adopted, it would be the detail belonging to the subordinate sacrifices *Jyotiṣ* and the rest; and there is no reason why the opportune adoption of the Principal should be superseded (by the adoption of the Subordinates). Thus it is for the honouring of the Principal that *the presence of the twelve Upasads* is admitted; so that what is sought to be got at by means of Indication is actually secured by the most direct means; and not indirectly through the General Law; specially as the *General Law* is weaker than *Name*. It is also going to be explained later on that 'When there is a congregation of conflicting details, it is the more numerous one that should be adopted' (Sū. 12. 2. 22). 'Or, it should be the principal one, by reason of the injunction of the Apūrva, as in ordinary experience' (Sū. 12. 2. 23).

[The whole of the above explanation of Sū. 19 has been rejected by Kumārila. He says as follows:- The whole of this is improper. As a matter of fact, the term '*prāyaṇīya*' is not indicative of the transference of details, hence how could there be any possibility of the coming in of the *Twelve Upasads*? Hence at the *Prāyaṇīya*, as also at the *Uttarātra*, the Procedure should be that of the *Jyotiṣ* sacrifice. Then again, the *Sūtra* 12. 2. 22, which appears to have been quoted by the *Bhāṣya* as '*Pūrvapakṣa*', is not a *Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra* at all, in fact, it embodies the Siddhānta position that 'When there is a conflict between two sets of details, one set being more numerous than the other, then that which is more numerous should be adopted (12. 2. 22), while when they are equal in number, the Principal One should be adopted (12. 2. 23). We are therefore offering another explanation of the *Sūtra* (3. The Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* is applicable to a large number of Days, while that of the *Ekāha* is applicable to a fewer number; hence, the more numerous being adopted, naturally the *Twelve Upasads* become directly adopted. *Tuptīkā*.]

As regards the second indication that has been cited (under Sū. 14)- in the shape of the mention of the *Vihāra* in connection with the *Ekādashini*,—the answer is as follows:

SUTRA (20).

AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE 'VIHĀRA' (IN CONNECTION WITH THE EKĀDASHINI), IT IS ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED; BECAUSE ISOLATED DECLARATIONS ARE ALWAYS TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY.

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any sacrifice, the '*Vihāra*' has been enjoined in connection with the *Ekādashin* (the Eleven Posts), in the following texts—

(*a*) 'The animals should be those born of these'; (*b*) 'Day by day they should kill those animals; on the first day they should kill that dedicated to *Agni*; on the second, the ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*; on the third day, the ram dedicated to *Soma*; and at the end, that dedicated to *Varuṇa*; then, reversing, on the first day, they should kill the animal dedicated to *Agni*; on the second day, the ewe dedicated to *Sarasvatī*; on the third day, the ram dedicated to *Soma*; and at the end the animal dedicated to *Varuṇa*'.—Inasmuch as isolated declarations (i.e. those not made in connection with any particular sacrifice), are always taken as pertaining to the Original Primary,—all the above details were taken as finding place in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is the Original Primary in this case); but, in view of the fact that there are not several *days* in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is performed in a single day), and hence the above-mentioned details cannot find room there,—they had to be taken over to another *Original Primary*, in the shape of the *Dvādashāha*; but there also, what is said regarding the 'reversing' was found to be inapplicable to the *Jyotis* and other constituents of the *Dvādashāha*: hence they went over to the third *Original Primary*, in the shape of the *Gavāmayana*: hence what has been sought to be got at through transference of details from the Archetype to the Ectype, through the General Law, is really something that has come to the *Gavāmayana* directly, in the manner explained above (and not by 'transference' from the *Dvādashāha*).

End of Pāda IV of Adhyāya VII.

End of Adhyāya VII.

ADHYĀYA VIII.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Declaration of the subject-matter of the Adhyāya.*

SŪTRA (1).

NEXT FOLLOWS THE TREATMENT OF PARTICULAR CASES [OF 'EXTENDED APPLICATION' OR TRANSFERENCE].

Bhāṣya.

The Seventh Discourse has dealt with the matter of 'Extended Application' in general,—the general principle arrived at being that 'when certain sacrifices, like the *Jāuraqua*, do not have their details laid down, there are extended or transferred to them the details from those sacrifices which, like the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, have their details laid down.'

Now we have to consider the following question—when details are transferred to a sacrifice, are they transferred from all the sacrifices (that have their details laid down for them)? Or from only one (such) sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that they should be transferred *from all*, as there is no ground for making a distinction.

The answer to this is that when the sacrifice has all its requirements fulfilled by the details transferred from one sacrifice, there is no reason why those of any other sacrifice should come into it

This is quite true; but it cannot be (easily) determined the details of which particular sacrifice are to be transferred to which one? And it is for this purpose that the consideration of particular cases becomes necessary—in order to determine that the details of this particular sacrifice are to be transferred to that.

This is what is declared in the beginning of Discourse VIII—*Next follows the treatment of particular cases*;—'*next*'—i.e. next to, after, the general treatment of 'Extended Application',—we are going to deal with particular cases of it, and each such case shall be explained at its own time.

[Properly speaking, the *Siddhānta of this Adhikaraṇa* is what is stated in the next *Sūtra*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The details 'transferred' are those of a particular sacrifice.*

Bhāṣya.

The principle underlying all particular cases of Transference is stated in the following *Sūtra* :—

SŪTRA (2).

THAT SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED OF WHICH THERE IS SOME INDICATIVE BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION BETWEEN THAT INDICATIVE (AND THAT WHICH IS TO BE TRANSFERRED), AS IN THE CASE OF NAMES.

Bhāṣya.

That Vedic Procedure *should be transferred* to an Ectypal Sacrifice of which there is *some indicative*,—either in word, or in sense, in the Injunction of that ectypal sacrifice or in the sentence mentioning its auxiliaries. Why so? *Because there is connection between that indicative and what is to be transferred*—that is, these two—the indicative and the particular Procedure in question have been found, in the past, to be related,—and between two related things, when either one is perceived, it brings to the mind the other, even though this latter is not perceived,—through Inference, *as in the case of Names*; for instance, when we find the name '*agnihotra*' used in connection with the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, it at once brings to the mind all the details of the Daily *Agnihotra*—"How does that affect the case under consideration?"—It is thus:—When there is a new sentence (incomplete in certain respects), it comes to be construed with any such parts (expressions) as may come to the mind and be found capable of supplying what is wanting in the former sentence, for instance, the words 'one should perform the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice' in the opening of an Injunction, it stands in need of the 'Injunction-Appendix' asserting *in what manner* the said sacrifice is to be performed,—and as such, it becomes construed with that entire section which deals with Fire-kindling and other details, and which comes to the mind by reason of the textual connection: the whole sentence thus standing in the form—'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices *in such and such a manner*.' Similarly (in the case in question), the 'Opening of the Injunction' laying down the Ectypal Sacrifice should become construed with any such Vedic 'Injunction-Appendix' (setting forth the Procedure) as may come to the mind. For instance, there is the 'Opening of an Injunction' to the effect that 'One, desiring Brahmic Glory, should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya*' ('*Sauryam charum nirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*');—and when this stands in need of a declaration as to the *manner* in which the offering is to be made, several Procedures

may come to the mind at the same time;—thus it is found that in this injunction, there is the peculiar word '*nirvapēt*' in the sense of 'offering', which is specially connected with the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, and through this indicative—in the shape of the word '*nirvapēt*',—this Procedure (of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice) becomes indicated as the one to be adopted at the *Saurya*,—thus means that the entire procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—which is made up of several procedures connected with the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices that are performed in course of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*,—should be adopted at the *Saurya*;—but it is next found that the *Saurya* sacrifice has the same deity or the same vegetable substance that forms the special feature of some one of those sacrifices that make up the *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* (e.g. the *Āgnēya*);—and through this specific indicative, it is decided that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Saurya* should be that of the *Āgnēya*,—and the conclusion thus arrived at is that 'The Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya* should be offered, *in the manner of the Āgnēya*' Similarly in other cases—'The Cake baked upon eleven pans and dedicated to *Agni Vaisnava* should be offered *in the manner of the Agnīsomīya*', and so on in all cases

Perceiving that the declaration of such rules in connection with each individual sacrifice would be much too cumbrous,—and desiring to avoid it, the Author of the *Vrtti* has used the common expression '*prakṛtivat*' ('like the original archetype') [thus postulating the general law that 'the Ectype is to be performed *in the manner of its original Archetype*'

Thus the conclusion is that where the slightest common factor, in the shape of a word, or sense, or offering material, or deity, or the form and other qualifications of these,—happens to be perceived, the Procedure indicated by that should be adopted

All that is necessary has been said briefly by the author (in the present *Sūtra*), in what follows, we have only an elaboration of the same Principle,—set forth for the benefit of his pupils—In this connection, they also cite the following couplet—

'Having spread out a vast net, the sage has explained things in brief also; verily learned people always wish to adopt the brief as well as the elaborate method'

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The Details of the 'Iṣṭi' are not transferred to the 'Soma-sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE PROCEDURE OF THE 'Iṣṭi' SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT THE 'SOMA SACRIFICE', BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ALREADY IN OPERATION."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Jyotiṣṭomēna svar.ṅ kāmo yajēta*' [Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice'].—In regard to this there arises a question as to the Procedure to be adopted at this sacrifice: From which sacrifice would the Procedure be 'transferred' to this *Jyotiṣṭoma*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The procedure of the 'Iṣṭi' should be adopted at the 'Soma-sacrifice', because it has been already in operation*', that is the procedure to be adopted at the *Soma* (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) sacrifice should be that of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*.—'Why?'—*Because it has been already in operation*, as a matter of fact, the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* has already been in operation at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* (Initiatory) and other *Iṣṭis*, such as the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, the *Iḍāhvā*, the *Prāyaṇīyā*, and the *Paśu*, and it is after these have been performed that there follows the *Soma-sacrifice*; and from the fact of the particular Procedure that has been in operation, it follows that the same should be adopted at this *Soma-sacrifice* also. For instance, when it is said—'Devadatta should be fed, Viṣṇumitra should be fed, also Māṭhara, Kaundinya, and Bhāradvāja,'—it is inferred that the term 'should be fed', which has been in operation in connection with the first two names, should be connected with the last three names also. From all this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Soma* should be that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*."

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with the *Soma-Sacrifice*, we find the declaration *Tasya-śatamkṣhatam prayājānuyājāḥ*' ['There are in it a hundred *Prayājas* and *Anuyājas*']; and the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas* are details connected with the *Iṣṭi* (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*); from this it follows that the Procedure adopted at the *Soma* should be that of the *Iṣṭi*."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE 'SOMA-SACRIFICE' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INDEPENDENT SACRIFICE, BECAUSE IT HAS ITS ENTIRE PROCEDURE LAID DOWN.

Bhāṣya.

The '*Soma*' is an independent sacrifice, and as such it does not borrow its details from any other sacrifice.—Why so? *Because it has its entire procedure laid down*; it has been explained that 'when the procedure of a sacrifice is not laid down, that sacrifice should be regarded as dependent upon another' (*Sūtra* 7. 4. 1);—in the case of the *Soma-sacrifice* however, it is found that its Procedure *has* been laid down;—hence it follows that it is independent

[According to Kumārila the statement of the *Siddhānta* in the *Sūtra* and in the *Bhāṣya* is incomplete, in his opinion, it should have been stated in this form 'When a sacrifice has all its required details laid down in proximity to itself,—and *all its requirements are thereby met*, then alone it can be regarded as having its entire procedure laid down, and hence *independent*.]

SŪTRA (6).

ALSO BECAUSE THE ABSENCE OF 'POURING WITH THE SRUK' HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A PERMANENT FEATURE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*, there is the following description of the absence of 'Pouring of Clarified Butter with the *Sruk*' '*Ghṛtam vai devā vajram kṛtvā somamaghnan sruchau vihā, tasmāt sruche somabhavanāvīdyate, na somamājyenābhighārayanti*' ['The deities made Clarified Butter the thunderbolt, and struck the *Soma* with the arm-like *Sruks*, therefore the *Soma*-offering is not contained in the *Sruk* and *they do not pour Clarified Butter over the Soma*'.—This statement can be right only if the *Soma* is an independent sacrifice; if it has the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa* for its original archetype, then the Clarified Butter must be poured over the *Soma*, which must be offered with the *Sruk* [as this is what is done at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*]; and in that case, the statement quoted would be wrong From this also it follows that the '*Soma*' is an independent sacrifice.

SŪTRA (7).

"IT MAY BE AN INJUNCTION";—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent] "Your view is that, 'because we find the mention of the absence of *Pouring with the Sruk*, the *Soma* should be regarded as an

independent sacrifice'; but why cannot the sentence quoted be taken as an *Injunction* prohibiting the *Pouring with the Sruk* which would come in at the *Soma-sacrifice* by virtue of its having the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* for its original Archetype?"

This Proposition having been put forward, the following *Sūtra* refutes it.

SŪTRA (8)

THAT CANNOT BE, BECAUSE IT IS SUPPLEMENTARY TO ANOTHER SENTENCE.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence in question cannot be an Injunction.—Why?—*Because it is supplementary to another sentence*; there is another injunction in this connection (to which the sentence in question is supplementary);—that injunction is in the form of the following *Mantra*:—'*Amshuramshustē dēva somāpyāyatām*' ['O divine *Soma*' may each piece of yours prosper']: and it is to this that the sentence quoted ('*Ubhayam vai dēvāh*, etc.) is supplementary.—"How do you know that?" It is deduced from the fact that it is required as commendatory to the said injunction. The whole passage stands thus:—'When they extract the juice from the *Soma*, if they make use of the *Sruk* in the place of hands, or if they introduce clarified butter,—they kill the *Soma*', it is with this view that the *Mantra* says—'*O divine Soma' may each piece of yours prosper*.' In this way they satisfy the *Ksatra* as well as the *Iksatra* of the person who has secured the *Soma*. [Here we have the injunction declaring that the *Sruk* should not be used and that the Clarified Butter should not be introduced, and as a commendatory supplement to this we have the passage quoted before under Su. 6]; if this also were an Injunction, then there would be a syntactical split; hence it cannot be regarded as an Injunction.

SŪTRA (9)

ALSO BECAUSE THE 'ABSENCE OF FASTING' IS MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the *Soma-sacrifice*, a possible contingency is mentioned—'If one went forward *without fasting*, they would drag him to the other world with his neck tied up'. If the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* were meant to be adopted at the *Soma-sacrifice*, *Fasting* would be an essential factor, and there would never be any possibility of there being 'no fasting'; hence no such contingency could be spoken of.—From this it follows that the '*Soma*' is an independent sacrifice.

SŪTRA (10).

THE PRESENCE OF SOME DETAILS RELATED TO 'IṢṬI' CAN BE EASILY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

The presence of the '*Prayājas and Anuyājas*' has been brought forward as indicating that the details of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* find place in the *Soma*,—the text quoted being, 'There are a hundred *Prayājas and Anuyājas*'.—But what are spoken of collectively in this text are those *Prayājas and Anuyājas* which appear at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* and the other sacrifices that are auxiliary to the *Soma*.—"What is the reason for this view?"—The reason is that as a matter of fact, the *Soma* is an independent sacrifice by itself, and the said number of *Prayājas and Anuyājas* are actually present at the said auxiliaries; and hence these *Prayājas and Anuyājas*, being auxiliary to its auxiliaries, can be spoken of as auxiliaries to the *Soma* itself; just as the Sacrificial Post is spoken of as auxiliary to the *Vājapēya* (though it is auxiliary to the *Paśu-sacrifice* which is auxiliary to the *Vājapēya*).—From all this it follows that the *Soma* is an independent sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Details of the 'Iṣṭi' are to be transferred to the 'Aindrāgna' and other sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (11).

AT THE 'IṢṬIS', THE PROCEDURE OF THE DARŚA-PŪRṆAMĀSA SHOULD BE ADOPTED

Bhāṣya.

The '*Iṣṭi*'-sacrifices are the subject matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—those that are laid down in such texts as—'*Aindrāgnamekādashakapālam nirvapēt prajākāmaḥ*' ['One desiring offspring should offer the Cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Indrāgni*'].

In regard to these, there arises the question—At these *Iṣṭis* which is the Procedure that should be adopted?—may it be that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* or that of the *Soma* (optionally)? or must it be that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* alone?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"There is no restriction, there is a Procedure laid down in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, and there is also one laid down in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*;—the *Iṣṭis* in question stand in need of a Procedure;—it has been already explained that at each sacrifice there can be only one Procedure;—we do not find any grounds for differentiating between the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and that of the *Soma*,—hence it follows that there can be no restriction [and one or the other may be adopted optionally]."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the 'Iṣṭis', the Procedure of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa should be adopted*; no reason has been adduced in the *Sūtra*, as it is well-known—"What is that reason?"—The reason lies in the fact that in the injunction of the *Iṣṭis*, there are factors that indicate the details of their original Archetype.—"What is that indicative?"—The indicative is in the form—(1) of the mention of the deity by means of the nominal affix, (2) of the presence of Baking Pans, and (3) of the presence of the root '*nirvapati*',—all these being found in the injunction of the *Aindrāgna Iṣṭi*—'(1) *Aindrāgnam*—(2) *ēkādashakapālam*—(3) *nirvapēt*'; in the injunction relating to the archetype (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) also, we have the sentence '(1) *Aindrāgnaḥ*; (2) *dvādashakapālaḥ*'; and also (3) the root '*nirvapati*', in the injunction—'*Agnihotrahavaṇyā havīṃṣi nirvapati*'.—It has been explained above, under Sū. 8. 1. 2, that the Procedure to be adopted is determined by the indicatives pointing to the original Archetype.—From all this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Iṣṭis* should be that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—This is what has also been made clear by such declarations as 'At each *Prayāja* one offers libations of the golden piece'.

Even in the case of those *Iṭis* where there are no indicatives pointing to the archetype, the same principle should apply,—in accordance with the maxim of 'the grain in the Pot' [if one of the grains put in the pot for cooking is found to have become cooked and softened, all the rest are taken to be cooked; in the same manner, if one *Iṣṭi* has been found to be such as must take in the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, all the other *Iṣṭis* should be taken to be the same].

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *In connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya-Pashu', the Procedure of the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa' should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (12).

ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'PASHU' SACRIFICE; AS WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THAT CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agnīṣomīya-Pashu* [Animal sacrificed to *Agni-Soma*,—we proceed to consider the question—Is the Procedure to be adopted that of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*? or that of the *Soma*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* [that is, either may be adopted optionally].

In answer thereto, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*Also in connection with the Pashu-sacrifice, because there are texts indicative of that conclusion*, i.e. at the *Pashu sacrifice*, the Procedure adopted should be that of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*. "Why so?"—*Because we find texts indicative of that conclusion* (*a*) '*Ekādasha prayājān ekādasha anuyājān*' 'Eleven *Prayājas*, eleven *Anuyājas*'], also (*b*) '*Srucyamāghārya juhvī pashumanakti*' ['Having poured the clarified Butter in the *Sruva*, one anoints the animal with the Juhū']. [All these details are related to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*].

Says the Opponent—"You have pointed out indicative texts, whence do you deduce the possibility of the adoption of such a Procedure?"

That is deduced from the similarity in the injunctions.

"What is that *similarity*?"

The *similarity* lies in the fact of both injunctions being directly clear and manifest

"What is the *clearness* there?"

It lies in the clear mention of the Substance and the Deity—'*Agni-somīyam pashum*' ['The *animal* (substance) dedicated to *Agni-Soma* (deity)']:—similarly in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read of '*Aindram payah*' ['*Milk* (Substance) dedicated to *Indra*' (Deity)].

The injunction of the *Soma*-sacrifice on the other hand is not equally clear and manifest. [Hence the Procedure of this sacrifice cannot find place in the *Pashu-sacrifice*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Savanīya' and other 'Animal-sacrifices', the Details of the 'Agnīṣomīya-Animal-sacrifice' are to be adopted.*

SUTRA (13).

AT THE OTHERS (I.E. 'ANIMAL-SACRIFICES'), THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE 'AGNIṢOMĪYA'.

Bhāṣya

The *Pashubandha-sacrifices*,—the '*Savanīya*', the '*Nirūdha-Pashu*', the '*Sautrya*' and the rest—form the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*.

In regard to these, the question is—Which is the Procedure to be adopted at these?—That of the *Darsha Pūrṇamāsa*? Or that of the '*Daikṣa*'? It is the *Agnīṣomīya*-sacrifice that is called '*Daikṣa*', because of its being connected with *Dīkṣā* (Initiation).

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be adopted at the sacrifices in question."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the other 'Animal-sacrifices', the Procedure adopted should be that of the Agnīṣomīya*; that is, at the *Savanīya* and other *Animal-sacrifices*, the procedure adopted should be that of the *Agnīṣomīya*-sacrifice; because the injunction of '*alabhata*' (killing) is common to all these, and also because of all these being equally enjoined as '*Pashu*' (Animal-sacrifice). This is what is indicated by the text—'*Vapayā prātaḥsavane charanti, puroḍāshēna mādhyandinē, anūbandhyayāsavanē*' ['They deal with the omentum at the Morning Extraction, with the Cake at the Midday Extraction, and with limbs at the Third Extraction']; this indicates the use of the *Omentum*, the *Cake*, and the *Limbs*. In some cases, there is a difference also indicated; as when it is said that 'the Sacrificial Post is to be of *Udumbara* wood', the use of the post is indicated.—From all this it follows that the *Agnīṣomīya* is the original Archetype of all Animal-sacrifices

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *At the 'Ēkādashina-Animal-sacrifice', the Procedure to be adopted is that of the 'Savanīya'.*

SŪTRA (14).

AT THE 'EKĀDASHINA' ANIMAL-SACRIFICES, THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE 'SAVANĪYA'; BECAUSE WE FIND THE MENTION OF 'TWO ROPES'

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are the '*Ēkādashina*' Animal-sacrifices, laid down in the texts beginning with—'*Kṛṣṇashirsā āgnēyāh*' ['The black-headed animals are dedicated to *Agni*'], and ending with—'*Anuṣṭāñcha āgnēyēna vājayati, mithunam sārasvatyā karoti, prajanayati saumyēna*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Which is the Procedure to be adopted? That of the *Agnīṣomīya*? Or that of the *Savanīya*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it is the Procedure of the *Agnīṣomīya* that should be adopted".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the 'Ēkādashina Animal-sacrifices, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the 'Savanīya'*; the term '*sautyā*' in the *Sūtra* is taken as standing for the *Savanīya*, on the ground of the *Savanīya* animal being connected with the time of *juice-extraction*, '*Sūtyā*'; and it is the Procedure of this '*Savanīya*' Animal-sacrifice that should be adopted at the '*Ēkādashina*' sacrifices.—"Why so?" *Because we find the mention of 'two ropes'*, in the following sentence—'*Agniṣṭhā dvē dvē rashanē ādāya dvābhyām rashanābhyām ēkaikam yūpam pariṣvajatē*' ['The *Agniṣṭhā* takes up two pairs of ropes and each pair of ropes he ties round each Post']. If the sacrifices had the *Agnīṣomīya* for their archetype, then only *one* rope would have been used [as only *one* rope is used at the *Agnīṣomīya*].

"Why cannot this sentence (speaking of 'two ropes') itself be taken as an injunctive text? [and not as a mere reference to the two ropes laid down in connection with the *Savanīya*]?"

If the sentence were taken as an injunction, what it would enjoin would be that the *Agniṣṭhā* is to take up the two ropes; if then the *duality of the rope* were also taken as enjoined, then there would be a syntactical split; hence the number 'two' in connection with the ropes taken up has been taken as only a *reference*.

"An indicative has been pointed out by you; in what manner do you get at the requisite injunction?"

Answer—Both (the *Savanīya* and the *Agnīṣomīya*) being equally 'animal-sacrifices', [and as such as enjoined as to be performed], the connection with the time of *juice-extraction* ('*Sutyā*') is an indicative as to which one of the two is to be adopted; it is thus that the requisite injunction is got at.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *At the 'Animal Group-sacrifices', the Procedure to be adopted is that of the 'Ēkādashina'.*

SŪTRA (15).

THE PROCEDURE OF THE SAID [ĒKĀDASHINA] SACRIFICES SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT THE [ANIMAL] 'GROUP-SACRIFICES'; BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH EACH ANIMAL WE FIND A 'SACRIFICIAL POST' MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

The 'Animal Group-sacrifices' form the subject-matter of this *Adhikarana*. They are laid down in such texts as- 'In the spring, one should sacrifice three bulls with a mark on the forehead',—'One desiring food, should sacrifice a white goat dedicated to *Mitra*, a black goat to *Varuna*, at the junction of waters and of herbs'

In regard to this the following question is to be considered—Which is the Procedure to be adopted at these?- that of the *Agnīṣomīya*? Or that of the *Ēkādashinas*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"on account of reasons already adduced, it is the Procedure of the *Agnīṣomīya* that should be adopted".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Procedure of the said sacrifices should be adopted at the group-sacrifices*; that is, at the 'Animal Group-sacrifices, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Ēkādashina*-sacrifices—"Why so?"—*Because in connection with each animal, we find a 'Sacrificial Post' mentioned*,-in the following text—'*Yat triṣu yūpēṣu ālabhēta vahirdhāsmāt indriyam vīryam dadhyāt, bhrātṛvyamasya janayēdēkayūpa ālabhēta*' ['If one kills the animals at the three Posts, it puts outside him, the virility of his organs, and creates an enemy for him, therefore one should kill the animal at a single Post'];—here, in reference to the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, *three* Posts are prohibited and only one is enjoined; and such a prohibition would be justifiable only if the Procedure of the *Ēkādashina* were admissible at the *Sautrāmaṇī*; as it is only at the *Ēkādashina* that there is a *Post* with each of the animals. In case the *Sautrāmaṇī* had the *Agnīṣomīya* for its archetype (and obtained its procedure from that), there would be only one Post [there being only *one* at the *Agnīṣomīya*]; and hence in that case there would be no sense in the prohibiting of *three* Posts—From all this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted at the Animal Group-sacrifices should be that of the *Ēkādashina*.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *At the 'Undefined Sacrifices', the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the 'Soma' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (16).

AT THE 'UNDEFINED SACRIFICES' THE PROCEDURE OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE SHOULD BE ADOPTED.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text '*Abhijitā yajēta*' ['One should perform the *Abhijit* sacrifice'],—also others [laying down the *Vishvajit* and similar sacrifices; which are called 'undefined', because in connection with these neither the *Substance* nor the *Deity* is laid down].

The Question is—Which is the Procedure to be adopted at these sacrifices?—that of the *Soma*-sacrifice? Or that of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*?

The *Pūrvapaksha* view is that—"As there are no grounds for discrimination, there should be no restriction."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*At the 'undefined sacrifices, the Procedure of the Soma-sacrifice should be adopted.*—"What is the meaning of 'undefined'?"—It connotes *the absence of substance and deity*; it is through the *substance* and the *Deity* that a sacrifice becomes *defined*; and the injunctions of the sacrifices in question do not mention the substance or the *Deity*;—e.g. '*Abhijitā yajēta*' (where neither the substance nor the deity is mentioned). At all these 'undefined' sacrifices, the Procedure of the *Soma-sacrifice* should be adopted.—"Why so?"—Because of their being similar, in being 'undefined'; the injunction of the *Soma*-sacrifice also is 'undefined', '*Jyotishtomēna yajēta*' (where neither the substance nor the deity is mentioned).—"But in regard to the *Soma*-sacrifice, there is the other injunction—'*Somēna yajēta*' ['One should sacrifice with *Soma*'], which is well-*defined* [as the *substance* is mentioned]."—Even so, as the deity is not mentioned, it remains 'undefined'.

Similarly, there is another 'undefined' injunction—'*Dīkshāyēna yajēta*' [where also no substance or deity is mentioned]; and in regard to this the following text indicates the presence of the *Dīkshaniyā* and the other auxiliaries of the *Soma-sacrifice*.—'At the *Dīkshaniyā*, the sacrificial fee consists of 12 measures of gold, and at the *Prāyaniyā*, 21 measures'.

From all this it follows that at the 'undefined' sacrifices, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Soma-sacrifice*.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *At the 'Ahargaṇa' sacrifices, the Procedure to be adopted is that of the 'Dvādashāha' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (17).

AT THE 'GAṆA-SACRIFICES', [THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED SHOULD BE] THAT OF THE 'DVĀDASHĀHA.

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are the '*Ahargaṇa-sacrifices*' beginning with the '*Dvirātra*' down to the *Shatarātra*.

In regard to these there arises the question—Which is the Procedure to be adopted?—That of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*? or that of the *Dvādashāha*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Soma* (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) sacrifice."

In answer to this, there is the following *Siddhānta*:—*At the 'Ahargaṇa' sacrifices the Procedure adopted should be that of the Dvādashāha*.—"Why so?"—Because of the similarity of the Injunctions; (*a*) '*Dvādashāhēna yajēta*' (the Injunction of the *Dvādashāha*), and (*b*) '*Dvirātrēṇa yajēta*' (the Injunction of *Dvirātra*, the first *Ahargaṇa* sacrifice) are alike; then the term '*ahan*' (contained in the name '*Dvādashāha*') is denotative of the 'day and night',—and so also is the term '*rātri*' (contained in the name '*Dvirātra*')—This is the verbal indicative. For material indicative, there is *the character of* '*gaṇa*' (group) (which is common to both *Dvādashāha* and *Dvirātra*); it is only a *group* that can help another *group* with the characteristic features of the group; no such help can be rendered by the '*Ēkāha*' (which is a single day's affair). The text—'Cuts off the fur from two animals and flesh from the two', and so on—indicates the presence of the 'Twelve *Upasats*', which are peculiar to the *Dvādashāha*, at the *Dvirātrāhaṇa* which is an '*Ahargaṇa*' sacrifice).

From all this it follows that the *Dvādashāha* is the Archetype of the '*Ahargaṇa*' sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *At the 'Saṁvatsara-Satras', the Procedure of the 'Gavāmayana' should be adopted.*

SŪTRA (18).

THE PROCEDURE OF THE 'GAVĀMAYANA' SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT ALL 'SAMVATSARA-SACRIFICES'.

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are the '*Saṁvatsara-Satras*', '*Ādityānāmayana*' and the rest.

In regard to these, the question to be considered is—Which is the Procedure to be adopted at these?—that of the *Dvādashāha*? or that of the *Gavāmayana*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* should be adopted".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The Procedure of the Gavāmayana should be adopted at all the Saṁvatsara-sacrifices.* The term '*ayanam*' in the *Sūtra*, we take as standing for the *Gavāmayana*, because of the connection with the term '*go*', in the sentence '*Gāvo vā etat satramāsata*' "The cows sat at this *Satra* (*Gavāmayana*)"]; it is the Procedure of this *Gavāmayana* that should be adopted at the *Saṁvatsara-Satras*.—"Why so?" (*a*) Because of the '*Saṁvatsara*' (year) being the common factor.—(*b*) Further, the text 'The wives sang' indicates the presence, at the *Saṁvatsara-Satras*, of the details of the '*Mahāvrata*'; and (*c*) the text 'The Priests sang' indicates the presence of those details at the *Sahasrasaṁvatsara-Satra*.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *Among the 'Nikāyins' (Serial Sacrifices) the Details of the preceding members are adopted in the succeeding ones.*

SŪTRA (19).

AMONG 'SERIAL SACRIFICES' THE PROCEDURE OF THE FIRST SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT THE SUCCEEDING ONES.

Bhāṣya.

'*Nikāya*' stands for that grouping of several factors wherein they appear in a serial order, one after the other; those that fall under such grouping are called '*Nikāyin*', 'serial'. As examples of such Serial Sacrifices, we have the '*Sāhasras*' and the '*Sādyaskras*'; among these, in connection with the first one, certain details have been laid down, while the succeeding ones have no details laid down regarding them.

In regard to these latter, then, there arises the question—Which is the Procedure to be adopted? That of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*? Or that of the first of the serial group?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"as the injunction of these is *undefined*, it is the Procedure of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that should be adopted (according to Sū. 16)".

In answer to this there is the following *Siddhānta*—*Among 'serial sacrifices' the procedure of the first should be adopted at the succeeding ones.*—Why?—Because *the character of being members of the series* is common to them; for instance, the number 'thousand' is common to all of the '*Sāhasra*' series, and the character of '*Sādyaskra*' is common to all of the '*Sādyaskra*' series; and so on, in the case of other 'serials' also.—In connection with the first of the '*Sāhasra*' series, having prescribed the sacrificial fee of 'a thousand' the text goes on to apply the same to the succeeding members of the series—'While the latter cow of the *Sāhasra* becomes ready, he goes from this world to the other world'—Similarly, in connection with the first of the '*Sādyaskra*' series, having laid down 'the entire, three-year old calf with which *Soma* is bought, etc.', the text goes on to indicate the same as applying to the succeeding members of the series—'The female cow with which *Soma* is bought, etc.'—From all this it follows that the details of the first find room in the succeeding members of the series.

ADHIKARAṆA (13) : *There is no transference of the 'fruit' and other such details.*

SŪTRA (20).

THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFERENCE OF (*a*) THE FRUIT, (*b*) THE OBLIGATION, (*c*) THE AGENT, AND (*d*) THE GROUPING, BECAUSE THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF THE ACT (OF SACRIFICE) ITSELF AND THE SAID DETAILS ARE RELATED TO THAT.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) The Fruit, (*b*) the Obligation, (*c*) the Agent, and (*d*) the Group form the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa*. [In the case of *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*]- (*a*) the *Fruit*—is in the shape of *Heaven*;—(*b*) the *Obligation*—is that it should be performed regularly throughout life; (*c*) the *Agent*—is the Person desiring Heaven; (*d*) the *Grouping*—is in the shape of the two sets of sacrifices, which constitute the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is there, or is there not, the transference of these (from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) to the *Saurya* and other setypes (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "in accordance with the principle enunciated in *Sūtra* 8. 1 11—viz.: 'the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* should be adopted at all *Iṣṭis*', the details in question should be transferred to the *Saurya*, etc."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—There is to be *no transference of* (*a*) *the Fruit*, (*b*) *the Obligation*, (*c*) *the Agent, and* (*d*) *the Group*.—"Why so?"—*Because there is no transference of the act of sacrifice itself*, and the *Fruit and the rest are related to that*. There is no transference of the act of sacrifice itself;—why?—what are transferred are the details that fall within the scope of 'Procedure' (Injunction-Appendix), while the sacrifice does not fall within the scope of the 'Injunction-Appendix'; in fact it falls within the scope of the 'Opening of the Injunction': and hence it is not transferred; and when there is no transference of the *Sacrifice*, there can be no 'transference'—or extended application—of the *Fruit*, the *Obligation*, the *Agent*, and the *Group*.—Why?—*Because these are related to that*; i.e. (*a*) as regards the *Fruit*, it is found to be mentioned in connection with the sacrifice enjoined in the text 'One should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice'; hence it can be there only where the sacrifice is;—at the *Saurya* and other sacrifices, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* is not present; hence the Heaven also cannot be there.—(*b*) Similarly, the *Obligation* also is *related to* the sacrifice, being laid down in the text 'Throughout life one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice'; how could such an *obligation* exist apart from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*?—(*c*) Similarly the *Agent* is *related to* the sacrifice, as spoken of in the text —'The person desiring Heaven should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*';

how too can he exist apart from these two sacrifices?—(*d*) Lastly, the *Grouping* also—of *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices that go to make up the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—can never be present at the *Saurya*, where these sacrifices themselves are not present?—From all this it follows that there can be no transference of the *Fruit*, etc.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE WHAT IS TRANSFERRED IS THAT WHICH SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

Further, there is transference of details, for the purposes of the sacrifice,—i.e. for the purpose of helping the performance,—and the *Fruit* and the other details in question do not help the performance. (*a*) As regards the *Fruit*,—it helps (benefits) the man (the performer), as has been explained under Sū 3. 1. 5—(*b*) The *Obligation* also is not a property of the performance; this is a property of the Man, as has been explained under Sū. 2. 4. 2.—(*c*) The *Agent*,—the Person desiring Heaven,—does not subserve the purposes of the performance; in fact it is the performance that subserves the purposes of the Man desiring Heaven; because the *person desiring Heaven* is not enjoined for the performance, in the text 'Desiring Heaven one should perform a sacrifice'; it is the performance that is enjoined for the man desiring Heaven,—the meaning being that 'the man desiring Heaven should perform a sacrifice', i.e. he should not do anything else.—(*d*) Lastly, the *Grouping* does not serve the purposes of the Performance; it serves the purpose of the *Fruit*, as spoken of in the text 'One desiring Heaven should perform the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*' Thus then, inasmuch as these—*Fruit*, etc.—would not serve any purpose of the Performance, their transference to the Performance would be entirely useless.

SŪTRA (22).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya

Says the Opponent—"If the Fruit and the rest are not to be transferred because they are *related* to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, then the *Prayāja* and the other details also should not be transferred, as these also are *related* to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*"

The answer to this is as follows: Though the *Prayāja* and the rest have been enjoined in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*, yet they become transferred to the *Saurya* and other ectypes, by virtue of the 'Injunction-Appendix' (i.e. as forming part of the *Procedure*, which is what is always transferred); the *Fruit* and the rest, on the other hand, are not transferred by virtue of the 'Injunction-Appendix' (*Procedure*). Under the circumstances, these could be transferred only if there were a Vedic text directly declaring such transference; as a matter of fact, however, *there is no such Vedic text*;—hence, *as there is no Vedic text*, they are not transferred.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *There is no 'transference' from the Archetypal Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa, to the ectypal 'Saurya', of the 'Milking Vessel' and other things which are used at the archetype for a special purpose.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF SUCH ACCESSORIES AS ARE USED (AT THE ARCHETYPE) WITH A VIEW TO A PARTICULAR RESULT, THERE SHOULD BE 'TRANSFERENCE'; BECAUSE THEY ARE RELATED".

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* are those accessories that are used (at the Archetype) with a view to a particular result; for instance [in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read ('*Chamasena apaḥ prinayati*'—*grahaṇena pashukāmasya*' ['Fetches water in the *cup*; in the *milking vessel* for one desiring cattle']; 'In the case of one desiring a village' one should recite, as *Prātipada*, the *Mantra*, '*Upasmai gāyatā narah*, etc.' and so forth.

In regard to these, the question to be considered is—Are these accessories that are used at the Archetype with a view to special results to find place in the *ectypal* sacrifices (like the *Saurya*)? Or not?

On this question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* set forth in the *Sūtra* itself—"*In the case of such accessories as are used at the Archetype with a view to a particular result, there should be 'transference', because they are 'related'*": i.e. the accessories in question should come in (to the ectypal sacrifice);—why?—*because they are related*; that is to say, the *milking vessel* is 'related' to the *fetching of water* [i.e. it is used for this purpose],—as spoken of in the sentence 'Fetches water in the milking vessel'; this 'Fetching of water' does find place in the ectype (*Saurya*); and when the main factor comes in, that which is related to that must also come in; for instance, when the canvas is pulled up, the picture resting on that canvas also becomes pulled up.—Then again, as a matter of fact, the *Cup* (used for fetching water) does become transferred' (from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, to the *Saurya*);—so also is the Post made of *Khadira-wood*,' which is to be used for one who desires strength (transferred from the archetype to the ectype);—in the same manner the 'milking vessel' also should be transferred; and when the 'milking vessel' is transferred, the particular desired result also becomes transferred.—From all this, it follows that there should be transference of all those accessories that are used with a view to special results."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE EXCLUSION [OF SUCH ACCESSORIES] AS THE FUNCTIONS ARE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

There should be exclusion of such accessories as are used at the Archetype with a view to a particular result; that is, these should not come in at the Ectypal Sacrifice.—Why?—Because *the functions are different*; that is, for instance, the function of the *Milking Vessel* is different from that of the *Cup*,—the *Cup* subserving the purposes of the sacrifice [as the fetching of the water in the *Cup* merely helps in the accomplishment of the Sacrificial performance, there is no other result following from it], while the *milking vessel* subserves the purposes of Man [as it is not needed for the accomplishment of the sacrifice, it is used only for the purpose of securing a special result for the performer], this distinction has been clearly explained under *Sūtra* 4. 1. 2.—Now why should any such thing come into the Ectype as does not subserve the purposes of that sacrifice? Wherever it comes in, it does so merely for helping in the performance of the sacrifice.

Similarly with the *Pratipada* [to be done with the *Mantra* '*Upāmnaṃ gṛiyatā naraḥ*, etc' for one who desires to acquire a village]

From all this we conclude that there should be no transference of such accessories as are used at the Archetype with a view to special results.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"in the case of the injunction that 'for one desiring strength, the Sacrificial Post should be made of *Khadira-wood*,' there is transference (from the Archetype to the Ectype), and in the same manner there should be transference in the case in question also".—Our answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (25).

IN REALITY [IN THE CASE OF THE KHADIRA-POST], THERE SHOULD BE TRANSFERENCE, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CHARACTER AND THE ACCESSORY CONCERNED IS ONE THAT SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

In cases like that of the '*Khadira-Post*', *there should be transference*;—why so? *—because there is no change in the character*; that is, in the *Khadira-Post*, there is no change in the character of *subserving the purposes of the sacrifice*; in fact the said Post also subserves the purposes of the sacrifice, as has been explained under *Sūtra* 4. 3. 5.—and when it subserves the purposes of the sacrifice, it should naturally be transferred,—like the *Palāśa*-wood; and when the Post is transferred, the corresponding 'desire for the particular result' also becomes transferred; this desire is fulfilled by means of the *Khadira-Post*; and the Post is actually made of *Khadira-wood*; hence it would naturally fulfil that desire.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *At the 'Saurya', there should be option between the two 'Abhimarshana (Touching) —Mantras'.*

SŪTRA (26).

AT ONE SACRIFICE, THERE SHOULD BE OPTION BECAUSE, THE INJUNCTION BEING ONE, THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENTIATION.

Bhāṣya

There is the text- '*Sauryam charum nirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' ['One desiring Brahmic glory, should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to Sūrya'] - At the Archetype of this *Saurya*,—i.e. at the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*,—there are two 'Touchings', laid down in the following text—'At the *Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice, one should do the *Touching* with the *Chaturhotr-mantra* (i.e. the *Mantra* beginning with '*Pṛthvi hotā*'); and at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice, one should do the *Touching* with the *Panchahotr-mantra* (i.e the *Mantra* beginning with '*Agnirhotā*')—Under the general law these two *Touchings* of the Archetypal *Darsha Pūrnamāsa* become admissible to the ectypal *Saurya*.

Then arises the question—which one of the two *mantras* (*Panchahotr* or *Chaturhotr*) is to be used in connection with the *Touching* done at the *Saurya*? Is it that when the *Saurya* is performed on the *Paurnamāsī* day, the *Touching* should be done with the *Chaturhotr-mantra*,—and when it is performed on the *Amāvāsyā* day, it should be done with the *Pañchahotr mantra*? Or is there to be option in both cases—one might use the *Panchahotr* or the *Chaturhotr*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there must be *restriction* (not *Option*),—why?—because by so doing the General Law becomes followed; at the Archetype, restriction has been made (that at the *Paurnamāsa*, one should use the *Chaturhotr-mantra* only, and at the *Darsha*, the *Pañchahotr-mantra* only); and the General Law makes the same restriction applicable to the case of the Ectypal *Saurya*".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*At one sacrifice*—i.e. at the *Saurya*,—*there should be Option*—Why?—*Because, the Injunction being one, there can be no differentiation*; as a matter of fact, there is a single Injunction, in the form 'Desiring Brahmic Glory, one should offer Cooked Rice dedicated to *Sūrya*'; and hence *there can be no differentiation*; i.e. both the *Touchings* are admissible at it;—inasmuch as both serve the same purpose; both together could not be admitted;—hence there must be Option.

As for the argument that "there is restriction at the Archetype",—our answer is that that restriction is based, not upon *Time*, but upon the

Group; [i.e. the *Chaturhotṛ-mantra* is used at the *Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, not because it is performed on the Full Moon day, but because that *Mantra* is connected with that *Group* of sacrifices which go by the name of '*Pūrṇamāsa*'; similarly with the *Pañchahotṛ-mantra* at the *Darsha*].—At the *Saurya*-sacrifice, however, these two groups are not there.

"If that is so, then the *Touching* itself need not be done at the *Saurya*, on the ground that the two groups (with which the *Touchings* are connected) are not there at the *Saurya*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—The *Touching* would not be admissible at the *Saurya* if it had been laid down as pertaining to the two *Groups*; as a matter of fact, however, the *Touching* is not to be done to the *Groups*; it has to be done to the component parts of the groups, and is attributed to the groups only figuratively;—the *Saurya* also is a modification of one of those component parts; and hence the General Law makes the *Touching* admissible at the *Saurya* also

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *At the 'Saurya' sacrifice the Details of the 'Āgnēya' are to be transferred.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THERE SHOULD BE OPTION, BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE IS COMMON".

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained under Sū. 8. 1. 11, that the Procedure to be adopted at the *Saurya* is that of the *Darsa-Pūrnamāsa*; but the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* sacrifice consists of several component acts, like the *Āgnēya* and the rest.

The question that arises is—Is the Procedure to be adopted at the *Saurya* to be that of any one of the many acts that go to make up the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*? Or should it be that of one particular act, the *Āgnēya* only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"*There should be option*; —why?—*because the indicative is common*. That the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* is to be adopted at the *Saurya* has been taken to be indicated by the sentence 'At each *Prayāja*, one should offer a gold-piece'; and this indicative is applicable to the Procedure of all the acts (that go to make up the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*), and as it would be impossible to adopt the Procedure of all these acts, there must be option."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED (TO THAT OF ONE ACT): ON THE GROUND OF THERE BEING A SINGLE THING (DEITY); SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS AN ECTYPE AND IS DEPENDENT UPON WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE.

Bhāṣya.

The Procedure to be adopted should be restricted to that of the *Āgnēya*.—"Why?"—Because *there is a single thing*; i.e. because there is a single *deity*, just as there is only one deity at the *Āgnēya*, so there is only one deity at the *Saurya*, and this affinity is taken as indicative of the fact that it is the Procedure of the *Āgnēya*, and the *Āgnēya* only, that is to be adopted at the *Saurya*: specially because *it is dependent upon what has gone before*, as a matter of fact, the *Saurya* is preceded by something else (its archetype, *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*), and as such it stands in need of the Procedure laid down in connection with that predecessor; being as it is an *Ectype*; the *Saurya* is an Ectypal modification, and all Ectypal modifications are dependent upon what has gone before, as their own injunctions

(by themselves) are incomplete; it is for this reason that in their case the Procedure to be adopted is determined by indicatives; as has been explained before;—in the case in question, there is the indicative in the shape of the said affinity of there being a *single deity*;—hence it follows that it is the Procedure of the *Āgnēya* that is to be adopted at the *Saurya*.

SŪTRA (29).

[*Objection*]—"AS THERE IS NO DIRECT ASSERTION, IT CANNOT BE SO", —IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"What has been suggested would be all right if the singleness (of the deity) were directly asserted; as a matter of fact, however, it has not been directly asserted.—How so?—The deity in both cases has been pointed out by means of the nominal affix—in the terms '*Saurya*' and '*Āgnēya*'; and it is not known (from the text) whether the term '*Saurya*' means 'that which has *one Sūrya* for its deity', or 'that which has *two* or several *Sūryas* for its deity'; similarly in the case of the term '*Āgnēya*' also".

SŪTRA (30).

[*Answer*]—THERE IS [A DEFINITE INDICATION OF 'SINGLENESS'], AS THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

We do have a definite indication of *singleness*.—"How so?"—*As there is an indicative text*; there is a text indicating the singleness.—"Which is it?"—Towards the end of the passage (dealing with the *Saurya* sacrifice), we have this text—'*Amum ēva ādityam ēṣēna bhāgadhēyēna upadhāvati sa ēvainam brahmavarchasam gamayati*' ['*This* same *Āditya* he approaches with his destiny, it is he who leads him to Brahmic Glory'].—[Here only *one Āditya* or *Sūrya* is mentioned]—In connection with the *Āgnēya* also, there is the following text—'*Angiraso vā ita uttamāḥ.... ...Agnimēva svabhāgadhēyēna samardhayati*' [where also only *one Agni* is mentioned].

SŪTRA (31).

SIMILARLY WE FIND OTHER INDICATIVES ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

We find *singleness* directly asserted in the *Anuvākyā-mantra*; e.g. in connection with the *Āgnēya*, there is the *mantra* '*Agnirmūrdhā divaḥ*, etc.' (where '*Agniḥ*' is in the singular);—and in connection with the *Saurya*,

there is the *mantra* '*Udutyam jātavēdasam*' [where '*jātavēdasam*', which stands for the *Sūrya*, is in the singular].

Objection—"The pointing out of these two indicative texts is a superfluous repetition (after Sūtra 30)."

Answer—It is not a superfluous repetition; one is found in the Injunction and the other in the *Mantra*; that which is found in the Injunction is what makes the thing concerned directly admissible; and that which is found in the *Mantra* is only indirectly indicative of what has been already admitted.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *In cases of conflict between the indications of 'offering material' and 'deity', the transference of details is governed by the affinity of 'material'.*

SŪTRA (32).

WHEN THERE IS CONFLICT, THE PROCEDURE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE 'OFFERING MATERIAL', AS THE ACTUAL ACT IS FOUND TO BEAR UPON THE MATERIAL

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) There is the text—'*Aindram ekādashakapālam nirvapēt*' ['One should offer the cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to *Indra*']—Similarly there is the text '*Āgnēyam payah*' ['The milk dedicated to *Agni*'].

In regard to these there arises the question—(*a*) which is the Procedure to be adopted at the *Cake-offering* laid down in (*a*)? Is it that of the *Curd-Butter-offering*, on the ground that this latter also (like the *Cake-offering* in question) has the same deity *Indra*, -the *affinity of deity* being the stronger indicative? -Or is it that of the *grain-offering*, on account of the affinity between the materials offered (*Grains* and *Cake*, which latter is also made of grains),- the *affinity of substance* being the stronger indicative?—Similarly which is the procedure to be adopted at the *Milk-offering* laid down in (*b*)? Is it that of the *grain-offering*, which (like the Milk-offering in question) has the same deity, *Agni*,—the *affinity of deity* being the stronger indicative? Or is it that of the *Curd-Butter-offering* on the ground of the affinity between the materials offered (*Milk* and *Curd-Butter*),—the affinity of *material* being the stronger indicative?

On this question, the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows -"The *affinity of deity* is the stronger indicative. Why? Because it is the principal factor, as a matter of fact the deity is always noted to be the principal factor-being expressed by such terms as '*aindram*', '*āgnēyam*' and the like [as the Being for whose benefit the offering is made], the material, on the other hand, is always noted to be the subordinate factor (something offered for the benefit of another), consequently, when there is a conflict between these two (*Deity* and *material*), the most reasonable course is to follow the indication of the principal factor, because the functioning of the Principal factor cannot be obstructed by anything, while the functioning of the subordinate factor would be obstructed by the Principal factor itself From all this it follows that the *affinity of the Deity* is the stronger indicative."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*When there is conflict, the Procedure should be determined by the offering-material*; that is, in a case where there is a conflict between the indications of the *Deity*

and of the *material*, the Procedure to be adopted should be determined by the indications of the *material*.—"Why so?"—Because *the actual act is found to bear upon the material*; that is, the *act* (of *sacrifice*) consists in the *offering* (surrendering) of the *material* to the *Deity*; and this act is found—seen—to bear upon the *material* (offered); that is to say, it is the *material* that is actually seen to be given away.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then it means that the *material* is more nearly related to the act (of offering),—and it is the closeness of relationship which acts as the indicative.—"The *Deity* also is related to the *sacrifice*, inasmuch as there can be no sacrifice without the deity." Our answer to this is that it is true that the *Deity* is related to the *sacrifice*; but it is related only as a remote (indirect) auxiliary,—it is not that is itself offered to this extent, it is an extraneous auxiliary. From all this it follows that the *affinity of material* is the stronger indicative.

SŪTRA (33).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS WITH THAT THAT THE ACT IS CONNECTED.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the act (of *offering*) is enjoined in connection with the *material*; for instance, in the denotation of such terms as '*aindram*' ['that which has *Indra* for its deity'] and '*āgnēyam*' ['that which has *Agni* for its deity'], it is the *material* that is the principal factor. "What if it is so?"—If it is so, then it means that it is the *material* that is uppermost in the mind, and as such serves as the indicative. For instance, it is only when the *smoke* has been *recognised* as existing and not merely by its *existence* that it serves as the indicative of fire.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, the terms '*aindram*' and '*āgnēyam*' denote the *Deity* also; hence the deity also is there in the mind."

In answer to this we have the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (34).

THE DEITY IS SPOKEN OF AS A QUALIFYING FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Deity is mentioned only as a *qualifying* factor; and it is the *material* that is mentioned as the factor *qualified*;—what persists and is uppermost in the mind is the *qualified factor*; the qualifying factor ceases after having qualified the other factor.—"How do you know that this is so?"—We learn it from the fact that it appears in connection with a qualified factor. For instance, when it is said—'*rājapuruṣaḥ pūjyaḥ*' ['The *King's officer* should be honoured'], it is the '*Puruṣa*', the *Officer*, that is honoured, not the '*rājā*', King (who is the qualified factor in the

compound); similarly in the case in question, when the words used are '*aindram payaḥ*' ('the milk dedicated to *Indra*'), it is the *material* (the milk) that comes to the mind, not the *Deity* (*Indra*); and it has already been explained that that alone can serve as an *Indicative* which comes to the mind.—Hence it follows that the affinity of the *material* is the stronger indicative; so that the Procedure adopted at the *Cake-offering to Indra* should be that of the *Āgnēya*; and that adopted at the *Milk-offering to Agni* should be that of the *Curd-Butter-offering*.

Another explanation of the *Sūtra* (34) is as follows:—The *Sūtra* is to be taken as following after the following argument (of the Opponent)—"It has been declared that *the affinity of material is the stronger indicative*; but this cannot be right;—why?—because the whole effort involved in the performance of sacrifices is for the purpose of propitiating the Deity, as when the Deity is pleased, He rewards the performer with the fruit of his act; we read in the text that 'Indra, being propitiated, rewards him with cattle'; and when once an act has been recognised as the means of propitiating *Indra*,—whenever at any future time, one finds it necessary to propitiate *Indra*, one has recourse to that same act. From this it is clear that the affinity of the Deity is the stronger indicative."—The answer to this is as follows:—It would have been so if the result had come from the Deity; as a matter of fact however, it is from the *sacrifice* that the result follows; this is clear from such texts as 'Desiring Heaven, one should perform the sacrifice'.—As for the assertion that 'Indra, being propitiated, rewards him with cattle', the explanation of this is that—

The Deity is spoken of as a qualifying factor (Sū. 34).

That is, as a matter of fact, the Deity is an auxiliary to the sacrifice; and it is only by way of eulogy that he is spoken of as the 'rewarder'; just as we find in the case of such assertions as 'The village has been given to me by the Minister', 'The village has been given to me by the Army-commander'; neither the Minister nor the Army-commander has the authority to give away a village; the King alone has that authority, and yet the officer, who is only subordinate to the King, is spoken of as the *giver*, by way of eulogy.—Hence the conclusion is that for reasons already adduced, the affinity of *material* is the stronger indicative.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The 'offering of one Hundred Gold-pieces' should take in the Details of the 'Grain-offering'.*

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE GOLD SHOULD TAKE IN THE DETAILS OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER: AS BOTH ARE OF THE NATURE OF 'TEJAS' ('ESSENCE')."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Prājapatyam ghṛtē caruṁ nirvapēt—shatakṛṣṇalam āyuṣkāmaḥ*', ['One should offer Rice Cooked with Clarified Butter, dedicated to *Prajāpati*; one desiring longevity should offer a hundred gold-pieces'].

[In regard to this, the question is—At *the offering of the gold-pieces*, should the details adopted be those pertaining to *the offering of Clarified Butter*? Or those pertaining to *the offering of grains*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The gold should take in the details of the Clarified Butter*; that is, the Procedure adopted (at *the offering of the gold-pieces*) should be that of the *Upāṁshuyāja*.—Why so?—Because of the commonality of 'Essence', i.e. both (Gold and Clarified Butter) have the common character of being of the nature of 'Essence'; that is, *Gold is* the 'essence' of *stones*, and *Clarified Butter* is the 'essence' of *cows*. Or, the meaning may be that *Gold*, being brilliant in colour, is bright; and *Clarified Butter* also, being oily, is bright.—On the ground of this similarity, the *offering of the Golden Piece* should take in the details of the *Upāṁshuyāja*."

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE MANY OF THE DETAILS CAN BE ADOPTED".

Bhāṣya.

"There are several details relating to the *Clarified Butter* that can be adopted in connection with the *Gold-pieces*; such, for instance, as 'Looking at' and the like; as for the details relating to *grains* on the other hand, there are many that would have to be omitted (in connection with Gold-pieces); such for instance as the 'Threshing' and the like.—From this also it follows that the details to be adopted at the offering of Gold-pieces should be those relating to Clarified Butter."

SŪTRA (37).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS THE PROCEDURE OF THE GRAIN-OFFERING (THAT SHOULD BE ADOPTED), BECAUSE OF SOLIDITY.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the Procedure to be adopted at the offering of *gold-pieces* should be that relating to the offering of *grains*;—why?—*because of solidity*; that is, gold is solid, and grain also is solid. "Between the two *similarities* [(1) that between *Gold* and *Clarified Butter*, in the shape of *being of the nature of 'Essence'*, and (2) that between *gold* and *grain*, in the shape of being *solid*], what ground for differentiation is there [by virtue of which the *Siddhāntin* prefers the (2)]?"—There is no ground for differentiation; but, in support of 'solidity' there are two reasons (as explained below); while in support of the 'nature of *essence*', there is only one reason, that of the possibility of many details being observed.

SŪTRA (38).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'CHARU' ('COOKED RICE').

Bhāṣya

In the text—'*Prājāpatyam charum*'—we find the term '*charum*' ('cooked rice'); and this term '*charu*' connotes the *grain*; this is a very strong indicative of the Grain(—procedure being adopted)

SŪTRA (39)

FURTHER, BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF 'COOKING' IN IT.

Bhāṣya.

We find that '*Cooking*' *in it*,—i.e. in Clarified Butter—is spoken of in the text '*Ghṛtē shrapayati*' ['Cooks in Clarified Butter'].—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then what follows is that, if (as according to the *Siddhānta*) the *cooking* comes in through the Procedure of the grain-offering, then this text ('Cooks in Clarified Butter') will enjoin *Clarified Butter only*, while if (as according to *Pūrvapakṣa*) the Procedure adopted were that of the *offering of Clarified Butter*, then the said text would have to be taken as enjoining both, the *Cooking* as well as the *Clarified Butter*; and this would involve a syntactical split.

Of *Sūtra* (39), there is another explanation also—

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, we find the *Clarified Butter* mentioned directly; hence the Procedure adopted should be that of *the offering of Clarified Butter*".—In answer to this we have—

Sūtra (39)—BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF 'COOKING' IN IT; that is to say, the *Cooking* in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* (which is the Archetype of *grain-offerings*) is found mentioned as to be done in *Clarified Butter*; this is a similarity that the *gold-offering* bears to the *grain-offering*, in relation to an accessory detail (of the *cooking in Clarified Butter*); and there are the other two similarities in relation to the *material*—viz. (1) *Solubility*, and (2) the name 'Cooked Rice'.—These similarities constitute very strong indicatives (in favour of the Procedure of the *grain-offering* being adopted).

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *In regard to the 'Honey' and 'Water', the details to be adopted are those relating to the Clarified Butter connected with the Upāṁshuyāja.*

SŪTRA (40).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—'IN REGARD TO HONEY AND WATER, THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE MILK-OFFERING: BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF 'BEING LIQUID'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Chitrā* sacrifice, we read—'*Dadhi madhu ghṛtam dhānā udakam taṇḍulāḥ, tatsameṛṣṭam prājāpatyam bhavati*' ['Curd, Honey, Clarified Butter, Fried Grains, Water, Rice,—these together form the offering to *Prajāpati*']

[In regard to this the question arises—In connection with the offering of *Honey* and *Water*, should the Procedure adopted be that of the *Milk-offering*, or that of the *offering of Clarified Butter*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In regard to the Honey and Water, the Procedure adopted should be that of the Milk-offering*;—why?—*because of the similarity of 'being liquid'*; that is, Honey and Water are liquid and so also is Milk".

SŪTRA (41).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE OFFERING OF CLARIFIED BUTTER, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF COLOUR.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, these two (Honey and Water) should follow Clarified Butter; that is, the Procedure adopted at the offering of Honey and Water should be that of the *Upāṁshuyāja*.—Why so?—*Because of the similarity of colour*; Honey and Water are of the same colour as Clarified Butter.

SŪTRA (42).

ALSO BECAUSE THE DETAILS CAN BE ADOPTED.

Bhāṣya.

"There are many details relating to *Clarified Butter* that can be adopted in connection with Honey and Water, such as '*Utpavana*' ('sprinkling')

and the like; while there are details relating to the *Milk-offering* that cannot be adopted,—such as 'milking the cow' and the like.

SŪTRA (43).

FURTHER, BECAUSE THE PREVIOUS (SIMILARITY) IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE (TO THIS CASE ALSO).

Bhāṣya

The reason that has been adduced previously (in Sū. 40)—viz., the *similarity of 'being liquid'*—is equally applicable here also; as Clarified Butter also becomes liquefied by contact with fire.—Hence it follows that at the offering of Honey and Water, the Procedure adopted should be that of the *Upāṁshuyāja*

End of Pāda i of Adhyāya VIII.

ADHYĀYA VIII.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *At the 'Vājina' and the 'Sautrāmaṇī' offerings, the details to be adopted should be those pertaining to the 'Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"AT THE OFFERINGS OF THE 'VĀJINA' (WHEY) AND THE 'SAUTRĀMAṆI', THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE 'SOMA-SACRIFICE' BECAUSE OF THE APPLICATION OF THAT TERM"

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with *Chāturmāsya* sacrifices, the 'Vājina-offerings have been laid down, in the text—'The *Vājina* (whey) is to be offered to the *Vājins*'.—(*b*) Similarly, in connection with the *Sautrāmaṇi*, there are certain offerings of wine, laid down in the text—'One should take up the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*, that dedicated to *Sarasvatī*, that dedicated to *Indra*'.

In regard to these two, there arises the question which is the Procedure to be adopted?—that of the *Soma-sacrifice*? Or that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is stated as follows: "*At the offerings of the 'Vājina' and the 'Sautrāmaṇi' the procedure to be followed should be that of the 'Soma-sacrifice'*; that is, the Procedure of the *Soma-sacrifice* should be adopted.—Why so?—*Because of the application of that term*, that is, because the term '*Soma*' has been applied to the offerings in question. As a matter of fact, we find the term '*Soma*' applied to the offerings in question, in the text—'*Somo vai vājinam*', '*Surā somaḥ*' ['*Whey* is *Soma*', '*Wine* is *Soma*']. In reality, the *Whey* is not *Soma*; nor is *Wine Soma*, nor is there any resemblance between these two things and *Soma*; and it is only on the basis of resemblance or similarity that the name of one thing can be applied to another. Hence what these texts do is to lay down the *similarity* (between *Whey* and *Soma*, and between *Wine* and *Soma*), and the only similarity that can be laid down is that due to the presence of the details of the *Soma-sacrifice* at the *Whey-offering* and at the *Wine-offering*; no other similarity is possible.—Thus this is a case of the 'transference' of details, not through *Procedure*, but through *Name*, as in the case of the *Agnihotra* at the *Kundapāyināmayana* (see above under 7. 3. 1 *et seq.*)."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE 'ANUVAṢAṬKĀRA'."

Bhāṣya.

"The presence of '*anuvaṣatkāra*' also indicates the details of the *Soma-sacrifice*; the said presence being spoken of in the texts—'*Vājinasyāgnē vihītyanuvaṣaṭkaroti*', '*Sūnṛtā vihitya anuvaṣaṭkaroti*.'

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE 'EATING' ON INVITATION."

Bhāṣya.

"'Eating on invitation' is a detail that belongs to the *Soma-sacrifice*; as it is in connection with that sacrifice that we read—'*Shēsam samam vi vibhajya samupahūya bhakṣayanti*' ['The Remnant they divide equally and eat after invitation']."

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"THE PRESENCE OF DETAILS AS (*a*) 'KRAYAṆA' (BUYING), (*b*) 'SHRAYAṆA' (PREPARING), (*c*) 'PURORUK', (*d*) 'GRAHAṆA' (HOLDING) WITH 'UPAYĀMA', (*e*) 'ĀSĀDANA' (PLACING), (*f*) 'VĀṢA' ('LIVING'), AND (*g*) 'UPANAHANA' (WEARING)—ALSO (INDICATES THE SAME)."

Bhāṣya.

The following text clearly shows the presence, at the *Wine-offering*, of the '*Krayaṇa*' (Buying) and other details pertaining to the *Soma-sacrifice*—'(*a*) With lead, *buying* a sexless animal, (*b*) he *prepares* the *Āshvina*-cup with flour;—(*c*) there is one *Puroruk* and one *Vājyā*; (*d*) with the mantra *Upayāmagṛhītosi*, etc. he *holds* the *Āshvina*-cup; (*e*) having held it, he *places* it; (*f*) for three nights they *live* together; (*g*) they wear linen clothes, etc. etc.'—If this passage were an independent injunction (and not a mere reference to the details pertaining to the *Soma*), then the sentences would have to be regarded as serving several purposes, as they would in that case be enjoining several such details as *Lead*, *Buying*, and so forth.

"From all this it follows that at both the offerings in question,—the '*Whey*' and the '*Wine*',—the procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Soma-sacrifice*."

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PROCEDURE SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE MATERIAL; BECAUSE THEY ARE PRODUCTS OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, by the affinity of the material, it would be determined that the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—Why so?—*Because they are products of it*; that is, the *Wine* and the *Whey* are products of the material offered at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; the Wine being the product of *grains*, and the Whey being the product of the Curd-Butter.

SŪTRA (6).

THE TERM 'SOMA' HAS BEEN APPLIED BY WAY OF PRAISE.

Bhāṣya.

The reason put forward by the Opponent (in *Sūtra* 1) is "*because of the application of the term 'Soma'*."—Our answer to this is as follows:—The term '*Soma*' has been used in the text in question, for the purpose of *praising*, not for the purpose of *enjoining*; as there is no injunctive word; in fact, what the sentences 'Whey is *Soma*', 'Wine is *Soma*', mean is only the praise of the Whey and the Wine as similar to the *Soma*, on the ground of their bringing about excellent results, just as in the sentence '*Devadatta* is a lion', the man is praised as being like the lion.—Hence the present case cannot be treated as one of 'transference of details' through Names

SŪTRA (7).

THE OTHERS ARE DISTINCT ASSERTIONS.

Bhāṣya

As regards the details of 'buying with lead' and the rest [that have been brought forward under Sū. (3), above], they have been distinctly mentioned in the texts; and as they are not otherwise admissible, they have to be taken as enjoined by the sentences quoted.—As for this leading to the contingency of the sentences serving several purposes, that cannot be avoided; as the sentences *do* actually lay down certain acts with accessory details

SŪTRA (8).

THE DECLARATION ALSO (POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION).

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Shaṭpairēva dīkṣaṇīyām āpnoti, tokmabhiḥ prāyaṇīyām, siṁhalomabhiḥ ātithyām*' ['One accomplishes the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* by means

of grasses, the *Prāyaṇīyā* by means of barley-blades, the *Ātithyā* by means of lion's hairs']. If the offerings in question were only forms of the *Soma* sacrifice, then the *Dīkṣaṇīya* and the rest would come into them directly (through that same sacrifice, as the original Archetype); and if they were so directly admissible, then there would be no justification for speaking of their accomplishment by means of the 'grasses' and other things.

SŪTRA (9).

FURTHER, WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE 'PASHU-PURODĀSHA' (CAKE OF THE ANIMAL-SACRIFICES

Bhāṣya.

We find the 'cups' in question spoken of as '*pashu-purodāsha*' (Cake of the Animal-sacrifices);—as a matter of fact, however, the *Pashu*-sacrifices have no *Cakes*, the only 'cakes' they have is in the shape of the *Cups*;—but the Cups are *Cups*, not *Cakes*; they could therefore be rightly spoken of as 'Cakes' only if they took in the details of the Cake-offering.—From this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted must be that pertaining to the *Cake-offering* (i.e. the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*).

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Pashu-offering' takes in the details of the 'Curd-Butter-offering'.*

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE 'ANIMAL-OFFERING' SHOULD BE TREATED AS A MODIFIED FORM OF THE 'CAKE-OFFERING', BECAUSE OF THE DEITY BEING THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice, there is the offering of the 'Animal' dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, laid down in the text—'On being initiated, the man kills the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Animal-offering a modified form of the Cake-offering? Or of the Curd-Butter-offering?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The Animal-offering should be treated as a modified form of the Cake-offering*:—why?—*because of the Deity being the same*; i.e. the Animal is dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, and the Cake also is offered to the same Deity."

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS BESPRINKLING."

Bhāṣya.

"The text '*Adbhyastvauṣadhibhyo juṣṭam prokṣāmi*' [which speaks of the 'besprinkling' of the Animal] shows that the 'besprinkling', which is a detail pertaining to the *Cake*, is done to the *Animal*."

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"LASTLY, BECAUSE OF THE 'HEATING'."

Bhāṣya.

"'*Heating*' is a detail that pertains to the Cake, and it is found, in the following text, to be spoken of in relation to the Animal—'*Āhavanīyāt ulmukēna pashum paryagnikaroti*' ['With a burning stick out of the *Āhavanīya Fire*, he *heats* the Animal'].—From all this it follows that the Animal-offering is a modified form of the Cake-offering."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHÀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD TAKE AFTER THE CURD-BUTTER-OFFERING, BECAUSE THIS IS PRODUCED OUT OF THAT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Animal* should take after the *Curd-Butter*, not after the *Cake*.—"Why?"—*Because this is produced out of That*,—that is, it is out of the *animal* that the Curd-Butter is produced as also the *Animal*;—hence the two are closely related; and *close-relationship* is an indicative (of common details), -and it has already been explained above (under Sū. 8. 1. 17) that the *affinity of material* is a stronger indicative than the *affinity of deity*.

SŪTRA (14).

ALSO BECAUSE ITS VESSEL IS FOUND MENTIONED

Bhāṣya

'*Its vessel*'.—The *Ukhā* is the vessel that contains the Curd-Butter; and this *Ukhā* is found mentioned in connection with the Animal-offering, in the text—'*Yadi pashavaikhāyām pachēt*' ['If one cooks the animal in the *Ukhā-pot*'].

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The details of the 'Milk-offering' are transferred to the 'Animal-offering'.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A MODIFIED FORM OF THE CURD: BECAUSE THE SHAPE IS SIMILAR TO IT."

Bhāṣya.

[It has been decided that the 'Animal' is a modified form of the 'Curd-Butter'.—The question that arises now is—Is it a modified form of the *Curd*? Or of the *Milk*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"Even though the 'Animal-offering' is a modified form of the 'Curd-Butter-offering'.—yet it should be treated as a modified form of the *Curd*, not of the *Milk*.—Why so?—*Because the shape is similar to it; the 'shape' meant here is solidity.*"

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD TAKE AFTER THE MILK; AS THE TIME IS THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the 'Animal' should take after the 'Milk', not the 'Curd';—because the *Animal is* offered in the immediate time (i.e. as soon as it is killed), and *Milk* also is offered in the immediate time; the Curd on the other hand takes two days' time, and it is intercepted by the Milk (which must come in before the Curd); and to that extent the Curd cannot be so intimate (with the Animal).

SŪTRA (17).

BECAUSE OF IMMEDIATE CONNECTION WITH THE ANIMAL.

Bhāṣya.

Then again, the Milk is immediately (directly) connected with the *Animal* (Cow), and to that extent what is most nearly connected with the Animal is the *Milk*, not the *Curd*.

SÛTRA (18).

FLUIDITY IS COMMON (TO BOTH).

Bhâṣya.

Fluidity is common to both, the Animal as well as the Milk; the Animal also becomes liquefied; and so also is the Milk.—Hence it follows that the 'Animal-offering' is a modified form of the 'Milk offering'.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Āmikṣā' (Curdled Milk) takes in the details of the 'Milk'.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE 'CURDLED MILK' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE MODIFIED FORM OF BOTH, BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED OUT OF BOTH."

Bhāṣya

The 'Curdled Milk' is offered to *Vishvēdēvas*. [In regard to this there arises the question—Is this Curdled-Milk-offering to take in the details of the *Milk-offering*? Or those of the *Curd-offering*? Or those of both?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*the Curdled Milk should be regarded as the modified form of both*—Curd and Milk,—*because it is produced out of both*: as a matter of fact, the Curdled Milk is brought into existence by both Curd and Milk, and hence it cannot be right to say that it is the modified form of one, not of the other;—hence it must be regarded as the modified form of both."

SŪTRA (20)

[SIDDHĀNTA (A)]—IT SHOULD TAKE AFTER ONE ONLY, AS THE INJUNCTION IS ONLY ONE.

Bhāṣya.

The Curdled Milk should take after only one either the *Curd* or the *Milk*, -not both;—*because the Injunction is only one*, in the form—'The Curdled Milk to be offered to *Vishvēdēvas*';—and the needs of this single Injunction would be fulfilled with only one Procedure;— hence the Curdled Milk should take after only one substance.

It has been argued by the Opponent that it is not right to make any distinction (between *Curd* and *Milk*, as the Original Primary of the *Curdled Milk*). In answer to this we have the following view (set forth by a second Opponent)—

SUTRA (21)

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"IT SHOULD TAKE AFTER THE CURD, BECAUSE BOTH ARE SOLID."

Bhāṣya.

"The Curd is solid; the Curdled Milk also is solid; while the Milk is liquid;—this is the distinction between the two;—hence the Curdled Milk should be regarded as the modified form of Curd."

SŪTRA (22).

[SIDDHANTA—*Final*]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD TAKE AFTER THE MILK, AS IT IS THE MILK THAT IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR, AND THE CURD IS THERE ONLY FOR SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE MILK, AS IN THE ORDINARY WORLD.

Bhāṣya

It is the *Milk*, not *Curd*, that becomes modified into 'Curdled Milk',—*because Milk is the predominant factor*.—"Wherein does the *predominance* of the Milk lie?"—It lies in the larger quantity, in 'Curdled Milk', there is a larger quantity of Milk and a smaller one of Curd. *The Curd is there only for subserving the purposes of the Milk*, that is, the Curd is put into the Milk only for the purpose of *thickening* the Milk,—*as in the ordinary world*: in the ordinary world, Curd is put into Milk only for the purpose of thickening the Milk.—"How so?"—When there is no Curd, the same thickening is done with another acid substance, such as Sour Gruel for instance; and to the Milk thus thickened also, the same name '*āmikṣā*' ('Curdled Milk') is applied; in fact the *Curd* is the acid substance that has been specially laid down (as to be used for the thickening of the Milk), only with a view to an unseen transcendental purpose. It follows from this therefore that it is the Milk which, coming into contact with an acid substance becomes thickened and hence called '*āmikṣā*' ('Curdled Milk');—and if it is the Milk that becomes the 'Curdled Milk', then it is only reasonable to conclude that the 'Curdled Milk' is a modified form of *Milk*.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO BECAUSE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE IS THUS MAINTAINED.

Bhāṣya.

The characteristic feature, of *freshness*, can be maintained only if the *Curdled Milk* is regarded as a modified form of Milk. The offering made to *Vishvēdēvas* should be something fresh; if then, the Curdled Milk were the modified form of *Curd*, then this *freshness* would become excluded.—"But the offering to *Vishvēdēvas* might also be made in two days"—In that case the characteristic feature of *freshness* would become excluded. That *freshness* is the characteristic feature is indicated by the text 'Do partake of good Milk';—if the 'Curdled Milk' were a modified form of *Curd*, then it would have to be offered after two days,—by which time it would no longer remain 'Milk'; and in that case what is said in the text just quoted would not be applicable. From all this it follows that the Curdled Milk is the modified form of Milk, and therefore there can be no details relating to the *Curd*.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The details of the 'Dvādashāha', are adopted with due differentiation regarding its dual character of 'Ahīna' and 'Satra'.*

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'DVĀDASHĀHA' IS A 'SATRA' AS WELL AS AN 'AHĪNA'; HENCE IT OPERATES BOTH WAYS; AS IT IS A SINGLE SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

The *Dvādashāha* sacrifice is composed of the following units—(1) *Dvādashāha*, (2) *Ahargaṇa*, (3) *Prāyaṇiya*,—*Atirātra*, (4) *Prsthya*, (5) *Sadaha*, (6-8) The three *Chhandomās*, (9) *Ārtvākya*, (10) *Ahah*, (11) *Udayaniya*, (12) *Udayaniya-Atirātra*.—This *Dvādashāha* sacrifice is called '*Satra*' as well as '*Ahīna*'—"How do you know that?"—We know this from the teaching of learned men; they have taught that 'the *Dvādashāha* is a *Satra* as well as an *Ahīna*'; in the matter of the meanings of words the teaching of learned men is the only source of knowledge.—It is with special reference to these two names that the several characteristic details of the *Dvādashāha* have been laid down, in the following texts—'One, two or many persons shall perform the *Ahīna* sacrifice,—initiated priests shall perform the sacrifice for them',—'Seventeen Brāhmanas, with the sacrificer himself as the seventeenth, shall proceed to perform the *Satra*', and so forth. Names also are determined by characteristic functions:—e.g in the case of such names as '*brāhmana*', '*parivrāt*', '*vānaprastha*'.—Now under Adhyāya X, it is going to be explained that—(A) 'The *Dvādashāha* is regarded as a *Satra*, because the name '*Satra*' is applicable to it (*a*) on account of the injunction containing the verbal roots *āsana* (to sit at) and *upāy* (proceed to), and (*b*) on account of the plurality of *sacrificers*' (Sū 10 6. 59), and (B)—'It is to be regarded as an *Ahīna*, (*a*) because the injunction contains the verbal root *yajati* (to sacrifice), and also (*b*) because there is no restriction regarding the number of sacrificers' (Sū. 10 6. 60).—It has also been explained (under 8. 1. 17) that the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha* is to be adopted at all sacrifices of the '*Aharyaṇa*' Group, such as the *Dvirātra* and the rest.

Now, the question that arises is—When the Procedure of this *Dvādashāha* is transferred to its *Ectype*, is it transferred in both forms (*Ahīna* and *Satra*)? Or is there some restriction and differentiation,—i e. in some cases in the form of *Ahīna*, and in others, in the form of *Satra*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*It operates both ways, because it is a single sacrifice*; that is, the *Dvādashāha-procedure* should become transferred in both forms.—"Why?"—*Because it is a single sacrifice*; that is, the *Dvādashāha* is a single sacrifice, with both forms, as explained above; and in its operation, we do not find any grounds for

making any such distinction as that 'in this case it operates as *Ahīna*, and in that other, as *Satra*'. Hence we conclude that it must operate (become adopted) in both forms.—'If a single act operates in both forms, there can be no need for the second operation'.—Well,—inasmuch as it is a single sacrifice, there would be Option; just as there is in regard to the 'Touching' at the modified forms of the *Āgnēya* (See Sū. 8. 1. 26)"

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE ROOT 'TO SACRIFICE', THE TRANSFERENCE SHOULD BE IN THE FORM OF 'AHĪNA', BECAUSE THE ECTYPE IS SPOKEN OF IN THE SAME TERMS AS THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya

In reality, it is not right that in all cases the *Dvādashāha-procedure* should be adopted in both forms, for, as a matter of fact, in the case of the Ectype which is spoken of in terms of the root '*Yaji*', 'to sacrifice', the Procedure adopted should be that of the *Dvādashāha in the form of 'Ahīna'*; and, as a necessary corollary to this, in the case of the Ectype spoken of in terms of the root '*ās*', 'to sit', or '*upāyi*', 'to proceed to', the Procedure adopted should be that of *the Dvādashāha in the form of 'Satra'*.

"Why so?" *Because the Ectype is spoken of in the same terms as the Archetype*, as a matter of fact, the Ectype is always spoken of in the same terms as the Archetype; consequently what is the Archetype of which Ectype can always be determined on the basis of the similarity of the terms used in the Injunction. The *Dvādashāha* in the form of '*Ahīna*' has been enjoined in terms of the root '*Yaji*', 'to sacrifice',—in the text—'*Dvādashāhēna prajākāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring offspring, one should *sacrifice* with the *Dvādashāha*'], while in the form of the '*Satra*', it has been enjoined in terms of the roots '*āsa*', 'to sit' and '*upāyi*', 'to proceed to',—in the text, *Dvādashāham ādhikāmā upēyuḥ, Dvādashāham ādhikāma upasīran*' ['Those who desire prosperity should *proceed* to the *Dvādhāha*; those who desire prosperity should *sit at* the *Dvādashāha*'].

SŪTRA (26).

THE SACRIFICES FROM THE 'DVIRĀTRA' DOWN TO THE 'ĒKĀDASHARĀTRA' ARE OF THE NATURE OF 'AHĪNA'; AS THEY ARE ENJOINED IN TERMS OF THE ROOT 'YAJI', 'TO SACRIFICE'.

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent asks—"Which of the *Aharganṇa*-sacrifices are enjoined in terms of the root 'to sacrifice'—at which the procedure adopted shall be that of the Dvādashāha *in the form of 'Ahīna'*? And which of them are

enjoined in terms of the root 'to sit' or 'to proceed to'—at which the procedure adopted shall be that of the Dvādashāha *in the form of* '*Satra*'?"

Answer—The sacrifices from the '*Dvirātra*' *down to the* '*Ēkādasharātra*' *are of the nature of* '*Ahīna*'; and at these, the procedure adopted is that of the Dvādashāha *in the form of* '*Ahīna*'. And the reason for this lies in the fact that these sacrifices have been enjoined in terms of the root 'to sacrifice',—in such texts as '*Dvirātrēṇa yajēta*' ['One should *sacrifice* with the *Dvirātra*'].

SŪTRA (27)

AT THE SACRIFICES BEGINNING WITH THE 'TRAYODASHARATRA', THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED IS THAT OF THE 'DVADASHĀHA' IN THE FORM OF 'SATRA', BECAUSE THESE HAVE BEEN ENJOINED IN TERMS OF THE ROOTS 'TO SIT' AND 'TO PROCEED TO'

Bhāṣya.

The injunctions of these sacrifices are in the form—'*Trayodasharātram ādhikāmā upēyuḥ*', '*Chaturdasharātram ādhikāmā apāsīran*' ['Those desiring prosperity should *proceed to the Trayodasharātra*', 'Those desiring prosperity should *sit at* the *Chaturdasharātra*']

In a friendly spirit, we set forth another explanation:—(*a*) Inasmuch as the *Ahīna* is enjoined in terms of the root 'to sacrifice', the character of '*Ahīna*' belongs to the *Dvirātra* and the rest, as these also have been enjoined in terms of the root 'to sacrifice'.—(*b*) Inasmuch as the *Satra* is enjoined in terms of the roots 'to sit' and 'to proceed to', the character of '*Satra*' belongs to the *Trayodasharātra* and the rest, as these also have been enjoined in terms of the same roots.

SŪTRA (28)

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Agniṣṭomo vai prajāpatiḥ, sa uttarān ēkāhānasṛjata, tamētam dvirātrādayo' hargaṇāḥ ūchuḥ tvamasmān mā hāsīḥ iti, tadēṣām ahīnatvam*' ['*Agniṣṭoma* is *Prajāpati*, he created the later *Ēkāha* sacrifices; to him said the *Dvirātra* and other *Hargaṇas*—Do not please abandon us, herein consists their character of *Ahīna*'].—This text clearly shows that the *Dvirātra* and the rest are of the nature of '*Ahīna*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *At the 'Pañchadasharātra' and other 'Aharganas', the Details to be adopted should be those of the 'Satra'.*

SŪTRA (29).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE 'PAÑCHADASHA ĀTRA' IS OF THE NATURE OF AN 'AHĪNA', BECAUSE IT HAS THE 'ATIRĀTRA' AT ONE OR THE OTHER END SO ALSO, THE 'KUṆ A-PĀYINAMAYANA';—AS THE CHARACTER OF 'AHĪNA' HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BELONG TO SUCH SACRIFICES AS FULFIL THE SAID CONDITION."

Bhāṣya.

[In regard to the *Pañchadasharātra* and the *Kundapāyināmayana*, the question arising as to whether these are '*Satra*', or '*Ahīna*'] the *Pūrvapaksa* view is as follows:—"The *Pañchadasharātra* and the *Kundapāyināmayana* are both *Ahina*. Why? Because they *have the 'Atirātra' at one or the other end*; both of these have the *Atirātra* at one or the other end; hence they must be *Ahīna*.—(A) In connection with the *Pañchadasharātra*, we have the text—'*Trivrdagnistutagnistomah, trirātro dasharātra udayanīyo 'tirātrah*' [where the *Atirātra* occurs at the end].—(B) In connection with the *Kundapāyināmayana* there is the text—'*Māsamagnihotram juhoti,..... dasharātro mahāvratam udayanīyo 'tirātrah*' [Here also the *Atirātra* comes at the end].—As a rule, that which has the *Atirātra* at one or the other end is an *Ahina*.—'How do you know that?'—*Because the character of 'Ahīna' has been declared to belong to such sacrifices as fulfil the said condition*,—i.e. those that have the *Atirātra* at one or the other end,—in the text—'Because a sacrifice has the *Atirātra* at one end, therefore it must be an *Ahīna*'.

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS 'AHĪNA'."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Pañchadasharātra* has been clearly spoken of as '*Ahīna*', in the text 'Because it has the *Atirātra* at one end, therefore it must be an *Ahīna*'.—For this reason also it must be regarded as '*Ahīna*'."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE TWO SACRIFICES MUST BE REGARDED AS 'SATRAS'; BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN ENJOINED IN TERMS OF THE ROOT 'TO PROCEED TO'.

Bhāṣya

The two sacrifices in question must be regarded as '*Satras*', not '*Ahinas*';—why?—*because they have been enjoined in terms of the root 'to proceed to'*. For instance, in connection with the *Pañchadasharātra*, the injunction is—'Those who desire prosperity *should proceed to* this *Pañchadasharātra*'.—In connection with the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana* also, the injunction is 'Those desiring prosperity *should proceed to it*'.

Question—"Between the two indicatives cited, (one by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) which is in the shape of *another sentence* (speaking of the *Atirātra* at one end), and the other (by the *Siddhāntin*), in the shape of the *Injunction* (being in terms of the root 'to proceed to'),—which is the more authoritative?"

Answer—That which is contained in the Injunction is more intimately related, while the other is remotely exterior.—There is yet another difference between the two indicatives:—That which is itself always an *Ahina* cannot be eulogised as being *Ahina*; it is by way of an argument that we have the declaration '*Because* it has the *Atirātra* at one end, *therefore* it must be an *Ahina*'; now if this argument does prove the conclusion, then the sacrifice in question would be an *Ahina* even without the declaration;—if it does not prove the conclusion, then, it does not become established by the mere declaration. The text in question therefore is not a *declaration*, but a mere *reference*, for the purpose of eulogising the sacrifice;—now it is not possible for what is itself an *Ahina* to be eulogised as '*Ahina*' on the ground of *having the Atirātra at one end*; because it is an inseparable qualification of every *Ahina*. On the other hand, such an eulogy is quite possible for what is itself a *Satra*,—the sense of the eulogy being—'Because it has the *Atirātra* at one end, therefore it is *Ahina*,—while by itself it is a *Satra*,—hence having a dual character, it is superior *to* the other *Satras*'.

SŪTRA (32)

THE TEXT INDICATES THE SIGN OF 'SATRA'.

Bhāṣya.

The following text indicates the sign of '*Satra*' in the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*.—'*Gṛhapatirgṛhapatiḥ subrahmaṇyaḥ subrahmaṇyaḥ*'; it is only at the *Satra* that '*Gṛhapati*', 'Master of the House', as such takes part; as declared in the text—'The Priests, with the *Master of the House* as the seventeenth, should proceed to the *Satra*';—it is at the *Satra* that his presence is

needed for the purpose of carrying on such functions of the 'sacrificer' as subserve the purposes of the sacrifice,—all other functions of the sacrificer having been excluded (from the *Satra*).—From all this it follows that the two sacrifices in question are *Satras*.

End of Pâda i of Adhyâya VIII

ADHYĀYA VIII.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): (*A*) *The 'Shuchidaivata' takes in the details of the 'Āgnēya';—(B) the 'Agnāvaiṣṇava' takes in the details of the 'Agnīṣomīya'.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'HAVIRGAṆA' SACRIFICES, THE LATTER SHOULD TAKE AFTER THE LATTER, BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY OF POSITION."

Bhāṣya.

The 'Haviṛgaṇa' sacrifices are the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*,—(there being two sets of these sacrifices) (1) one set laid down in the texts—'One should offer the Cake baked on eleven pans, dedicated to Agni-Viṣṇu,—Cooked Rice, dedicated to Sarasvati,—Cooked Rice, dedicated to Bṛhaspati', and (2) the second set laid down in the texts—'One should offer the Cake baked on eight pans to Agni-Shuchi,—to Agni-Pāvaka and so forth.—[In the corresponding Archetypal Sacrifice, there is *first* the 'Āgnēya offering', and *second*, the *Agnīṣomīya*-offering'.]

The question that arises is—Is the Procedure to be adopted at (2) *the offering to Shuchi* that of (2) the *Agnīṣomīya*, and the Procedure to be adopted at (1) *the offering to Agni-Viṣṇu*, that of (1) the *Āgnēya*? Or is it the other way about?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In the case of the 'Haviṛgaṇa' sacrifices, the latter*,—i.e. 'the offering to *Shuchi*' *should take after*—be regarded as the modified form of *the latter*—i.e. *Agnīṣomīya*, and the former,—i.e. the offering to *Agni-Viṣṇu* should be regarded as the modified form of the former,—i.e. the *Āgnēya*. Why so?—*Because of the similarity of Position*; that is, by reason of their place in the order of sequence (in the two sets); i.e. in the case in question the *offering to Shuchi* occupies the *second* place in the order of sequence (among the '*Haviṛgaṇa*' sacrifices), and the *Agnīṣomīya-offering* also occupies the *second* place at the Archetypal Sacrifice; —similarly, in the other case, among the '*Haviṛgaṇa*' sacrifices, the *offering to Agni-Viṣṇu* occupies the first place in the order of sequence, and the *Āgnēya-offering* occupies the *first* place at the Archetypal Sacrifice. —Thus then, on the basis of the indicative in the shape of the *similarity of Position*, the *former* takes after the *former*, and the *latter* after the *latter*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE MATTER SHOULD BE DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE DEITY; BECAUSE THAT IS SCRIPTURAL, THE OTHER BEING NOT-SCRIPTURAL.

Bhāṣya.

The Procedure should be determined,—not by the 'Position' (of the offerings),—but *on the basis of the Deity*,—i.e. on the basis of the similarity of Deities.—"Why?"—Because the Deity is *scriptural*,—i.e. is spoken of directly by means of such terms as '*Agnēvaiśvaram*' and '*Agnayē-Shuchayē*';—while *the other*,—i.e. Position,—*is not-scriptural*; i.e. the Position is not directly spoken of by any words of the texts, it is only presumed on the basis of the consideration of a number of sacrifices in the lump. "What if that is so?"—If that is so, then this is what happens.—The notion of the Deity, being derived immediately from the Injunction of the Act concerned, becomes the predominant factor, while the other, i.e. the notion of 'Position', is brought about by the order of sequence—and as such, becomes the subordinate factor. Under the circumstances, the most reasonable course is to give preference to the predominant factor.—Hence we conclude that the Procedure adopted at *the offering to Agni-Shuchi* should be that of the *Āgnēya* (because at both there is only *one Deity*), and the Procedure adopted at *the offering to Agni-Vaiśvānara* should be that of the *Aindra-vaiśvānara* (because at each of these, there are *two Deities*).

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The details of the 'Dvādashāha' are to be adopted at the 'Triṛt-Ahan' offerings in connection with the 'Janaka-Saptarātra'.*

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHEN THERE IS AN INJUNCTION OF A GROUP, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION OF THAT WHOSE INDICATIVE SIGN IS THERE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'AGNĒYA'"

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Janaka-Saptarātra*', we read—'*Chatvāri trivṛnti ahāni bhavanti*' ['There are four *Ahan-offerings* with the *Triṛt-Stoma*']; —in another place, we read again, '*Nava trivṛnti ahāni bhavanti*' ['There are nine *Ahan-offerings* with *Triṛt-Stoma*'].

There arises the question—Do these texts mean that there should be repetition (*four* times and *nine* times) of the *first* 'Ahan-offering' which is associated with the *Triṛt-Stoma*? Or do they lay down the particular *Stoma* (*Triṛt*) in connection with the several '*Ahan-offerings*' that form part of the *Dvādashāha*?

The *Pūrvapaksa* view on this question is as follows:—"*When there is an injunction of a group*, there should be repetition of that *whose indicative sign is there, as in the case of the Āgnēya*, i.e. in a case where there is an injunction of a group, as in the case in question—there should be repetition of that—i.e. the first '*Ahan offering*', —of which the indicative sign, —i.e. the presence of the '*Triṛt-Stoma*' is there,—because of the similarity of the Injunction; —as in the case of the '*Āgnēya*' (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*), —spoken of in the text '*Agnayē pāvakāya—Agnayē shuchayē*'—it has been decided that there should be repetition of the Procedure of the *Āgnēya*, on the ground that the deity is one and the same and the Injunctions are similar. In the same manner, in the present case also, there should be repetition."

SŪTRA (4)

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SEVERAL DISTINCT 'AHAN-OFFERINGS' (SHOULD COME IN), BECAUSE IT IS A MULTITUDE; AND IT IS ENJOINED THROUGH AN INDICATIVE OF THE ACTUAL OPERATION.

Bhāṣya.

What should be done is, not the repetition of the First '*Ahan-offering*', but the performance of the several distinct '*Ahan-offerings*'—that pertain to the *Dvādashāha*.—Why so?—*Because it is a multitude*, when it is said that

'There are four *Ahan-offerings* with *Trivṛt-Stoma*', it is a *multitude* (of offerings) that is spoken of;—the number 'four' is one that subsists in (four) distinct things: and hence it must belong to separate *Ahan-offerings*;—as a matter of fact, in connection with the *Janaka-Saptarātra*, there are *four distinct Ahan-offerings* which pertain to the *Dvādashāha*, and which come into the *Saptarātra* by virtue of the General Law. It is these four that are referred to (in the text in question) for the purpose of enjoining, in regard to them, the *Trivṛt-Stoma*; and it cannot be right to take it as enjoining the number 'four' with reference to those several *Ahan-offerings* which have the *Trivṛt-Stoma*.

SŪTRA (5).

THERE ARE ALSO TEXTS INDICATING THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

When it is said that 'there are four *Ahan-offerings* with *Trivṛt-Stoma*, of which the *Agniṣṭoma* is the foremost',—what are understood to be meant are *those Non-Agnistomas of whom the Agnistoma* is the first,—and not *all Agnistomas*; for instance, when it is said that 'that with which the Ball is to be cut is to be made of metals of which Iron is the foremost',—it is not understood to mean *all Iron* [it means *other metals*, with *Iron* as the first and foremost].—If the repetition of the '*Trivṛt*' were meant, then all of them would be *Agnistomas*; as it is the *Agniṣṭoma* that has the *Trivṛt-Stoma*.

From all this it follows that what is laid down in the text in question is the presence of the *Trivṛt-Stoma* at all those *Ahan-offerings* pertaining to the *Dvādashīna* which find room at the offering in question (which is a modified form of the *Dvādashāha*) by virtue of the General Law

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The details of the 'Ṣaḍaha' are adopted at the 'Ṣaṭ-triṁshadrātra'.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"EVEN THOUGH THERE IS REPETITION OF THE TIME, YET,—INASMUCH AS THE ACTIONS ARE DIVERSE [THE DETAILS ADOPTED SHOULD BE THOSE OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA] SO SAYS BĀDARI."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with a certain sacrifice (the '*Ṣaṭ-triṁshadrātra*'), we read—'*Ṣaḍahā bhavanti, chatvāro bhavanti, Pañchalī bhavanti*' ['There are *Ṣaḍahas*, they are four; there are *Pañchāhas*'].

In regard to this sacrifice, there arises the question—Are the details to be adopted at it to be those of the '*Ahan* offerings' comprising the *Dvādashāha*? Or those of the *Ṣaḍaha*?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows.—"*Even though there is repetition of time*,—i.e. though what is asserted in the text is the repetition (four times) of the time of *Ṣaḍaha*, yet the teacher Bādari has held that the details to be adopted at it are those of the '*Ahan*-offerings' comprising the *Dvādashāha*. Why so?—*Because the actions are diverse*; what the term '*Ṣaḍaha*' here stands for are the *Six Sautya offerings measured by a day*; and the words of the text '*chatvāraḥ ṣaḍahāḥ*' speak of these six-fold offerings being diverse; the number 'four' subsisting in (and denoting) distinct units. If only one sextuple sacrifice—the *Pārthika* or the *Ābhiplavika*—were meant to be repeated, then the expression used would have been '*chaturahaḥ*', as a matter of fact, we have the expression '*chatasṛiṇāṁ ṣaḍahāḥ*', which clearly stands for *twenty-four* '*Ahan-offerings*'; and this Injunction of a multitude of '*Ahan offerings*', containing an indicative of the Archetype, indicates the adoption of the Procedure of the *Dvādashāha*. Hence it follows that at the sacrifice in question, the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the several '*Ahan-offerings*' comprising the *Dvādashāha*."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—JAIMINI, HOWEVER, HOLDS THAT THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION OF THE 'ṢAḌAHA'; BECAUSE THE NUMBER DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 'AHAN-OFFERINGS' DIRECTLY.

Bhāṣya.

The teacher Jaimini has held that *there should be repetition* of the well-known *Pārthika* '*Ṣaḍaha*'.—Why?—*Because the number does not apply to the 'Ahan-offerings' directly*; the number 'twenty-four' is applied to the

'*Ahan-offerings*' only through Inference; *i.e.* it is inferred from the fact of there being 'Quadruple *Saḍaha-offerings*'; so that the cognition of the 'Quadruple *Saḍaha*' has to come first, and it is only on cognising it and then computing its number that we arrive at the notion of the number 'twenty-four'; just as in the well-known instance of the inference of *Fire* from *Smoke*, one cognises the *Smoke*, then the *Fire*. Such being the case, if some one were satisfied with had his needs met by—the notion of *Smoke*, he would not care for the later cognition of *Fire*. In the same way, in the case in question, as soon as the cognition of the '*Saḍaha*' has appeared, it becomes recognised that it is *the Procedure* of that which has to be adopted; and the enquirer having his needs met by this notion, what would he do with the notion of the number 'twenty-four' that might be cognised later?—From this it follows that in the case in question, there should be repetition of the *Saḍaha*.

It has been argued that "the number subsists in distinct units; and hence it would be rejected if there is mere repetition of the same (*Saḍaha*).

Our answer to this is as follows. The term '*Saḍaha*' (in the text in question) is taken as standing for the well-known *Saḍaha* which is near at hand; now this *Saḍaha* has no direct connection with the number 'four'; hence it could come about only through repetition, just as in the case of the *Upavāsa*, the *Prayājas* and the *Anuyājas*.

Even for one (our Opponent) who takes the words 'Four *Saḍahas*' as laying down *Twenty four Ahan-offerings*, at the time that the *Daśarātra* (Ten-Ahan-offerings) have been performed, the remaining number (*fourteen*) could be made up only by repetition, as there are not so many distinct *Saḍahas* available.

Thus then, the objection being applicable to both views, it cannot set aside one of them.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The details of the 'Dvādashāha' are adopted at the 'Saṁsthā-gaṇa' sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'SAṀSTHĀ-GAṆA' SACRIFICES, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION (OF THE JYOTIṢṬOMA); AS THE NAMES USED ARE THOSE BELONGING TO IT.

Bhāṣya.

The subject-matter of discussion are the '*Saṁsthā-gana* sacrifices', spoken of in the texts- '*Agniṣṭomaḥ* (*a*) *Pañchokthyaḥ*, (*b*) *Shatāgniṣṭomam*, (*c*) *Shatātirātram*' and so forth [where there are three '*gaṇa*', Multiple, sacrifices mentioned, (*a*) consisting of *Five Ukthyas*, (*b*) consisting of *a hundred Agniṣṭomas*, (*c*) consisting of *a hundred Atirātras*; these are called '*Saṁsthā-gaṇas*', because they are multiples of (*a*) the *Ukthya*, (*b*) the *Agniṣṭoma*, and (*c*) the *Atirātra*, all of which are '*Saṁsthās*', *Terminuses*, of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].

In regard to these, what is to be considered is—what is laid down in these texts—is it a repetition of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*? [When, i.e. the '*Pañcho kthyaḥ*', 'Five-ukthya', sacrifice is laid down, does it mean that the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, of which the *Ukthya* is one of the Terminuses, is to be repeated *five* times?] Or are they so many '*Ahan offerings*' accompanied by the said *Saṁsthā* [i.e the Five *Ahan-offerings* accompanied by the *Ukthya*]?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*In the case of the 'Saṁsthā-gaṇa sacrifices there should be repetition*,—i.e there should be repetition of the same primary *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice—Why so?—Because *the names used are those belonging to it*: i.e. the names '*Agniṣṭoma*', '*Ukthya*', '*Ṣoḍashin*', and '*Atirātra*' (which are the various Terminuses of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) have been given to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself; it is in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that these *Saṁsthās* (*Agniṣṭoma* and the rest) have been enjoined; and hence it is quite possible for it to be indicated by these names; so that what the sentence should be taken as doing is to indicate the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and lay down the particular number (*Five* or *Hundred*) in reference to it (and this number can be made up only by repetition). On the other hand, if the sentence were taken as laying down the several *Ahan-offerings*, as also the particular *Saṁsthā* (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*),—the meaning of the text being that 'the *Saṁsthās* performed should be of the *Ukthya*, and they should be *five* in number',—then this would involve a syntactical split.—Hence we conclude that there should be repetitions of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS THE ARCHETYPE (OF THE 'AHAN-OFFERINGS' THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE 'SAṂSTHĀS'; BECAUSE OF JURISDICTION; THE NAME BEING DUE TO THE CONNECTION OF THE PARTICULAR 'SAṂSTHĀ'.

Bhāṣya

It is not right that there should be repetition of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; in fact, *it is the Archetype that should be taken as to be accompanied by the 'Saṃsthās'*; -i.e. the *Ahan-offerings* comprising the *Dvādaśāha* (which is the Archetype of all '*Gaṇa*-Multiple-offerings') should be accompanied by the particular *Saṃsthās* mentioned (*Ukthya* and the rest).—Why so?—*Because of jurisdiction*; as a matter of fact it is the said offerings that are entitled to come in by virtue of the General Law (relating to Archetypes and Ectypes); hence if these are brought in, the General Law becomes obeyed.

Objection—"But the names '*Agniṣṭoma*' ('*Ukthya*' and '*Atirātra*') clearly denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

Answer—Not so.—"Why?" Because the name *is due to the connection of the 'Saṃsthā'*, that the particular sacrifice in question is named after *Agniṣṭoma* ('*Shatāgniṣṭoma*') is due to the connection of the *Saṃsthā* of that name; the name is not meant to denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma* Sacrifice; in fact, the name in question can denote a sacrifice at which the particular *Saṃsthā* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is present; it cannot denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma itself*. It might be argued that "in this way, the text would come to serve several purposes" It will not come to serve several purposes; as a matter of fact, all that the text would lay down would be the particular '*Saṃsthā*' in connection with those five *Ahan-offerings* whose admissibility has been already indicated by the injunction of the 'Multiple' character of the sacrifice, the compound word '*Shatāgniṣṭomam*' itself denotes a *Multiple sacrifice* with the two qualifications (the number, *Hundred* and the particular *Saṃsthā*, the *Agniṣṭoma*) In this way the text serves only one purpose, just as in the case of the sentence 'The red-turbaned priests operate'

Under the above explanation, the character of the number subsisting in distinct units remains preserved.

From all this it follows that the text in question speaks of the 'Ahan-offerings' comprising the *Dvādashāha*.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *At the 'Shatokthya' and other 'Multiple Sacrifices', the additional Hymns should be brought in from the Jyotiṣṭoma.*

SUTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ADDITION SHOULD COME FROM THE 'MULTIPLE SACRIFICE', BECAUSE THEY HAVE THAT FOR ITS ARCHETYPE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text '*Shatokthyam bhavati, Shatātirātram bhavati*'. At the two 'Multiple Sacrifices' here spoken of (viz. the *Shatokthya* and the *Shatātirātra*), the *Ahan-offerings* of the *Dvādashāha* Sacrifice come in,—these *Ahan offerings* are in most cases accompanied by the *Ukthya-Samsthā*,—hence, in accordance with the words, '*Dvau agniṣṭomau shatokthyam bhavati*', it would appear as if the additional hymns were to come out of the two *Agniṣṭomas*, while according to the words, '*Shatātirātram bhavati*', it appears that the addition should, in all cases, come out of the Sacrifices named after the term '*rātri*' (i.e. *Day*, '*Ahan*').

The question that there arises therefore is this—Is the addition to be brought over from the *Dvādashāha*? Or out of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*The addition should come over from the Multiple Sacrifice*:—why?—*because they have that for their Archetype*; i.e. all these Multiple '*Ahan-offerings*' are modified forms of—(—have for their Archetype)—the *Dvādashāha*, hence the Procedure to be adopted at them should be that of the *Dvādashāha*; hence if the addition comes out of the *Dvādashāha*, the General Law becomes honoured.—We conclude therefore that the addition should come out of the Multiple Sacrifice.

SUTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ADDITION SHOULD COME OUT OF THE 'EKAHA' ('ONE-DAY') SACRIFICE BECAUSE THEY STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING WITH THE OTHERS.

Bhāṣya

In reality, the addition should come out of the 'One-day' Sacrifice—of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—not out of the *Dvādashāha*.—Why?—Because they stand on *the same footing with the others*; that is, there is an 'equality' between the '*Ahan-offerings*' comprising the *Dvādashāha* and those that comprise the 'offerings' that are modified forms of the *Dvādashāha*;—the 'equality' being that these also—as well as those others—require the *Samsthā* from another source;—beggars therefore cannot beg from those who are themselves beggars,—so long as there is some one who can supply the need.

and who is *not* himself a beggar.—"What does this mean?"—As a matter of fact, no '*Saṁsthā-hymns*' have been laid down in connection with the *Dvādashāha*;—hence they require these from somewhere else, where these *have* been laid down;—similarly in connection with the Ectypal *Ahan-offerings* also, the said hymns have not been laid down;—hence these latter also can have their needs supplied only from somewhere else, where they *have* been laid down;—and it is only in connection with the *Jyotiṣtoma* that the hymns have been laid down;—hence the conclusion is that the addition of these hymns should come out of the *Jyotiṣtoma*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *In cases where a certain 'Ahan-offering' is declared to be 'connected with the Gāyatrī', this connection should be brought about by the introduction of Mantras that are inherently of the Gāyatrī metre.*

SUTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"IN CASES WHERE THE 'GAYATRI' IS SPOKEN OF, THERE SHOULD BE DELETION IN THE ORIGINAL METRES; BECAUSE IT IS THESE ORIGINAL METRES THAT ARE ENTITLED TO COME IN; ALSO BECAUSE IT IS THE NUMBER (OF SYLLABLES) ONLY THAT IS DENOTED BY THE TERM 'GAYATRI', AS IT IS NEVER FOUND APART FROM THAT NUMBER;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'AGNIṢṬOMA'."

Bhāṣya.

The question of 'addition' has been discussed; we now proceed to discuss the question of 'deletion'.

There is the text—'*Vājapēyēna ṣtvā brhaspatisavēna yajēta*' ['After having performed the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, one should perform the *Brhaspatisava*'];—in connection with this *Brhaspatisava* it is declared that 'this *Ahan-offering* is connected with the *Gāyatri* metre'.

In connection with this what is to be considered is—Is the *Ahan-offering* to be made '*Gāyatra*' ('*connected with the Gāyatri-metre*') by deleting the syllables contained in the *Mantras* used at the Archetypal sacrifice, which are in the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagati* metres (which contain more syllables than the *Gāyatri*)?—Or by bringing into it fresh *Mantras* from the Tenth *Maṇḍala* of the *Ṛgveda*, which are inherently in the *Gāyatri* metre itself?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is stated in the *Sūtra* itself—"*In cases where the Gāyatri is spoken of, there should be deletion in the original metres*; that is, in cases where the *Gāyatri* metres are mentioned,—as in the case of the declaration that 'this *Ahan-offering* is to be connected with the *Gāyatri*'—*a deletion*—removal—should be made of certain syllables of the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagati* metres of the original sacrifice.—Why so?—*Because it is these original metres that are entitled to come in*; as a matter of fact, by virtue of the General Law relating to Archetypes and Ectypes, the verses of the Archetypal sacrifice, in the *Triṣṭup* and the *Jagati* metres, are recognised to be admissible at the Ectypal sacrifices in question; under the circumstances, if other verses were introduced, it would be counter to the notion already obtained in regarding to the metres

of the original sacrifice.—'The verses in *Gāyatrī* metre have been prescribed directly, and it is only right that these should set aside the others which would come in only by virtue of the General Law.'—Not so, we reply.—'Why?'—Because, *it is the number* (of syllables) only that is denoted by the term '*Gāyatrī*'.—'How do you know that?'—*Because it is never found apart from that number*; that is, the term '*Gāyatrī*' is never used apart from the number 'twenty-four'; it is never found as opt when the number (of syllables) is *twenty-four*; it is never applied to verses in the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagatī* metres which do not have 'twenty-four' (syllables).—Hence, it follows that the term '*Gāyatrī*' is expressive of the particular number; hence (in order to secure this number) deletion should be made of certain syllables (in the verses in *Triṣṭup* and *Jagatī* metres).—*Just as in the case of the Agniṣṭoma*; i.e. just as when it is said that 'there is the *Shatāgniṣṭoma*', the *Ukthya* is removed out of the *Aha*-*offerings* of the *Dvādashāha*,—so should it be in the present instance also."

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"THE TERM 'GĀYATRĪ' IS APPLIED, IN A NATURAL WAY, TO WHAT ARE OTHER THAN GĀYATRĪ."

Bhāṣya.

"On the basis of the understanding that the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes only a definite *number* (of syllables), the term '*Gāyatrī*' is applied in a natural manner to verses in the *Jagatī*-metre, which is *not-Gāyatrī*,—in the text, '*Vī hi dve gāyatryau ṛkā jagatī*' ['Two verses in the *Gāyatrī* metre make one in the *Jagatī*']. It is only when the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes only the number (*twenty-four*) of syllables, that this assertion could be justified, on the basis of the fact that the *Jagatī-metre* contains *twice-twenty-four* syllables. On the other hand, if the term '*Gāyatrī*' meant a *verse*, then there could never be *two verses* in the *Jagatī*; so that the assertion just quoted would be wholly wrong.—From this also it follows that the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes the *number*.—Pointing to the same conclusion there is another text—'Three *Anuṣṭūps* make four *Gāyatrīs*' [$32 \times 3 = 24 \times 4$]."

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"IF IT BE URGED THAT—'THERE IS NO TEN IN TWENTY'—[then the answer is as in the following *Sūtra*]."

Bhāṣya.

"Someone might argue thus—'The number *Ten* is not there in number *Twenty*,—because one number cannot subsist in another number; as Number is a *quality* and no *quality* can subsist in another *quality*; hence the number *Twenty-four* cannot subsist in the number *Forty-eight*; hence even

if the term *Gāyatrī* is denotative of a number, any such assertion as that *one Jagatī makes two Gāyatrīs* would be absurd And an objection which is applicable to both parties should not be urged by one against the other.'"

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

"Our answer to the above objection is as follows:—We do not say that one number subsists in another number; what we say is that among the syllables qualified by the number *Forty-eight*, there are two parts of twent-four each,—and not that there are two verses.

"Then again, the presence of one Number does not necessarily exclude another number; if it excluded it, *then there would be only one number*, and then, of the man who had *ten* cows, it could not be said that 'there are two groups of five'; and yet such an assertion is actually made; hence it follows that one Number does not necessarily exclude another number."

Or (*Sūtras* 14 and 15 may be explained in the following manner).—

Sūtra (14) [*objection against the Pūrvapakṣa*]—'WHAT HAS BEEN SAID CANNOT BE RIGHT, BECAUSE TEN IS PRESENT IN TWENTY. That is, even when the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes the number, there need be no deletion of syllables (in the original metres).—Why?—Because the *Ten* (syllables) are already present in the *Twenty*.—What if it is so?—If it is so, then, if twenty syllables have been taken up, *ten* also become taken up, so that when one has used the verses in the *Triṣṭup* and the *Jagatī* metres, verses in the *Gāyatrī* metre also have become included therein Hence the verses in the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagatī* metres (of the original sacrifice) should be used (at the Ectype) as they stand; whereby the General Law relating to Archetypes and Ectypes becomes observed, and the particular *Aham-offering* becomes duly *connected with the Gāyatrī*.'

Sūtra (15)—[*Pūrvapakṣin's answer* to Sū. 14]—"THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE NUMBER. That is, it is *not* true that when the *Jagatī* or the *Triṣṭup* has been taken up, the *Gāyatrī* also becomes taken up—Why? Because as a matter of fact, the Number becomes subsidiary to the sacrifice only by qualifying something that helps in the accomplishment of that sacrifice; and in the case in question what helps in the accomplishment of the sacrifice is not any *part* of the *Jagatī* or the *Triṣṭup*, but the verses in the *Jagatī* and *Triṣṭup* metres themselves."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY, THE TERM SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DENOTATIVE OF A SUBSTANCE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT DOES NOT APPLY TO ALL THINGS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes the *number* (twenty-four). In fact, *on account of the quality, it should be taken as denotative of the substance*,—i.e. denoting a substance which contains twenty-four syllables.—Why so?—*Because it does not apply to all things*; if the term were a numeral word (denoting the number *twenty-four*), then it would apply to all those things—herd of cattle and the like,—which would be twenty-four in number;—as a matter of fact, however, it does not apply to all those things;—hence it follows that it is not a word denotative of Number.

SUTRA (17).

THERE WOULD BE REGULATION OF THE DENOTATION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'GO'.

Bhāṣya.

As in the case of the term '*go*' (Cow), its (etymological) denotation extends *over all moving things in general* (the term literally meaning 'anything that moves'), yet it is regulated and restricted in its application to only that *moving thing* (animal) which has the *dewlap* and other features, and the term '*go*' is regarded to be denotative of this particular animal only,—similarly in the case of the term '*Gāyatrī*', the most reasonable course is to take it as denotative of the *verse* (with *twenty-four* syllables).

SŪTRA (18).

ALSO BECAUSE THE NUMBER HAS ANOTHER TERM DENOTATIVE OF IT.

Bhāṣya

There is already the term 'twenty-four' which is denotative of that number; hence for its denotation it does stand in need of the other term '*Gāyatrī*'; because the name of a thing is only meant for usage, and usage is accomplished by a single name.

SŪTRA (19).

WHILE THE OTHER HAS NO OTHER TERM DENOTATIVE OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

The other—i.e. the verse (with twenty-four syllables)—*has no other term denotative of it*; that is, it has no other name; and for purposes of usage that also needs a name; hence when the term '*Gāyatrī*' is taken to be one denotative of the verse, it fulfils a definite purpose; while, by denoting the

number, it would be serving no useful purpose. For this reason also the most reasonable course is to take the term '*Gāyatrī*' as denoting the *verse*.

From all this it follows that in the case of the *Bṛhaspatisava*, verses in the *Gāyatrī-metre* should be introduced.

SŪTRA (20).

[IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'AGNIṢṬOMA'] INASMUCH AS THE TERM IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE, IT IS MADE SO QUALIFIED BY THE DELETION OF THE 'UKTHYA',— [WHICH CANNOT BE THE CASE WITH THE TERM 'GĀYATRĪ'].

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (in Sū. 12) that the term '*Gāyatrī*' should be dealt with like the term '*Agnistoma*'.—Our answer to this is as follows:—The term '*Agniṣṭoma*' is not applicable to anything else,—while the term '*Gāyatrī*' *is* applicable to the *verse*;—all that the term '*Agniṣṭoma*' denotes is that the offerings in question should end with the *Agniṣṭoma*;—now it is not possible for the *Ahan-offering* of the *Dvādashāha* to 'end with the *Agniṣṭoma*', except by the deletion of the *Ukthya*;—hence it becomes necessary to delete the *Ukthya*.—The case of the term '*Gāyatrī*', however, is different; it has been already pointed out that it is denotative of the *verse* (with twenty-four syllables);—and as a matter of fact, this particular *verse* is *not* secured by the deletion of syllables (in the *Jagatī* or *Triṣṭup*).—Hence the case of '*Agniṣṭoma*' is not analogous to that of '*Gāyatrī*'.

SŪTRA (21).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INDICATED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

The presence of the *Ukthya-hymns* at the *Shatāgnistoma* is not indicated by the scriptures; hence they are set aside by the character of 'ending with the *Agnistoma*', which *is* indicated by the scriptures. In the case in question, it is quite the reverse: It is the presence of the *Gāyatrī* verses that is indicated by the scriptures, while that of the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagatī* verses would be based entirely upon Inference; and hence these latter cannot set aside the *Gāyatrī* verse.

SŪTRA (22).

THE NAME ('GĀYATRĪ') IS INHERENT IN THE VERSES; HENCE IT IS ONLY INDIRECTLY (FIGURATIVELY) THAT IT COULD APPLY TO THOSE THAT ARE NOT IN THAT METRE.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"It has been pointed out above that the term '*Gāyatrī*' is actually found in the sense of the particular number, in the text—'Two *Gāyatrīs* make one *Jagatī*'.—What is the answer to this?"

Answer—We have already said that '*Gāyatrī*' is a name that belongs to the verse inherently; hence, *because the name is inherent in the verse*, when it is found applied to a group of twenty-four syllables that form part of the *Jagati*, this application should be regarded as *indirect* (figurative). It is not right to attribute more than one meaning to a term, so long as it can be avoided.—"On what basis does the figurative application of the name rest?"—It rests on the similarity of the size.—the size of one *Jagati* being equal to that of two *Gāyatrīs*; it is in this sense that we have the assertion that 'Two *Gāyatrīs* make one *Jagati*'; just as we have in the assertion—'Two *Kauravas* (residents of *Kuru*) make one *Vāhika* (resident of the Punjab)'.

In fact, the assertion quoted by the Opponent is for the purpose of eulogising the two *Gāyatrī* verses.—"How so?"—It is laid down that 'The initiation of the *Vaishya* should be done with *two Gāyatrīs*';—this appears to be an improper assertion; because the initiation of the *Vaishya* should be done with the *Jagati*,—as the *Vaishya* has been declared to be '*Jāgata*' (related to *Jagati*) Hence the meaning of the sentence is that 'what is done with *two Gāyatrīs* is as good as done with the *Jagati*';—this is what is meant by the assertion that 'Two *Gāyatrīs* make one *Jagatī*'.

Thus it is found that what has been urged is no reason for taking the term '*Gāyatrī*' as denoting number.

SŪTRA (23).

"BUT THERE IS A DISTINCT DECLARATION",—IF THIS IS URGED—

[then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"What has been just said may be urged in the case where the term '*Gāyatrī*' is used by way of *reference*; what would be the explanation where it appears as an *Injunction* (where it forms part of the predicate),—as in the text 'Three *Anuṣṭups* make four *Gāyatrīs*'.—'What difference does the word appearing as Injunction make?'—The difference is this: when a word appears as Injunction, there is action in accordance with it; and as a matter of fact, it is not possible to *make four Gāyatrī* verses of three *Anuṣṭups*; what *can* be made are only *four times twenty-four* (the number). Thus the term '*Gāyatrī*' in this case must stand for the *number*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—

SŪTRA (24).

IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

It is only in the one instance cited that the term '*Gāyatrī*' may denote *number*; it is not found to do so anywhere else.—"If the term is not

denotative of *number*, how has it become so denotative in the instance just cited?"—The answer to this is that such injunction (or predication) is done figuratively also; for instance, in common parlance, people say—'Make lions of these lumps of flour', in Vedic literature also, we find such assertions as—'They worship with *Pṛṣthas*';—now, because in the one instance cited, the term 'lion' is found used in the sense of the *figure* of the lion, it does not follow that the term 'lion' is denotative of that figure; or the term '*pṛṣtha*' is denotative of *mantra* (because in the one instance cited, it is found used in that sense).—Even when a term indicates something figuratively, such indication is not something which is not expressed by the term at all, because it is while the term denotes its own direct meaning that it indicates the figurative one also, if it were to abandon its direct denotation, it would not do any indicating at all.

Thus then, this reason also does not prove the conclusion desired by the Opponent.

SŪTRA (25).

IF THE TERM 'GAYATRI' WERE TAKEN AS DENOTING THE NUMBER, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN OPTION AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

At the Primary Sacrifice—of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*—*there would be an option* if the term '*Gāyatrī*' were to be taken as denoting the Number In connection with that sacrifice we read—'*Gayatryā paridadhyāt*' ['He should wear it with the *Gāyatrī*']; such being the assertion, there would be an option between the '*Ājuhotā*' *mantra* (Rgveda, 5 28 6) [which is in the *Gāyatrī-metre*] and the group of *twenty-four syllables* obtained by deleting the remaining syllables of the *Jagatī*;—and when there is option, then, in one case, the *Ājuhotā-mantra* would be rejected; which cannot be proper, so long as it can be avoided.

For this reason also the term '*Gāyatrī*' cannot stand for the *number*.

SŪTRA (26).

'INASMUCH AS THE VERSE HAS BEEN LAID DOWN AS AN ACCESSORY, IT COULD NOT BE AS STATED",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"There can be no option at the Primary Sacrifice;—why?—*because the verse has been laid down as an accessory*; as a matter of fact, in connection with the Primary Sacrifice, it has been accepted that it is the (*Gāyatrī*) *verse* that is to enter into the performance;—it is *verses* that have been laid down as the *Sāmidhēnī-mantras*; under

the circumstances, if one were to do the 'wearing' without the *verse*, the character of *having the verse for its accessory* would become set aside. It is for this reason that at the Primary Sacrifice, the 'wearing' would, in all cases, have to be done with the '*Ājuhotā*' verse; so that the 'wearing' would be done with the '*Gāyatrī*', and the character of having the *verse* for an accessory would also be maintained. [So that there would be no option]."

SŪTRA (27).

THE SAME THEN SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE ECTYPAL SACRIFICE ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

With the Ectypal Sacrifice—i.e. with the *Bṛhaspatisava* in question—*also*, the case should be the same as with the aforesaid Primary Sacrifice.—that is, at the Ectype also, it has been accepted, on the basis of the General Law of the Archetype and the Ectype, that the performance has to be done with *verses*; hence there also, if *verses* (and not mere *numbers*) are employed, the *Ihan-offering* would be done with the *Gāyatri*, and the character of having the verses for accessories would become maintained.—Hence it follows that there need be no deletion of syllables (in the *Jagatī*).

SUTRA (28).

AND THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALITY IS OVER THE WHOLE.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'and' here is used in place of 'but'; in several cases 'and' is used in place of 'but'; e.g. in the expression '*Kiñcha* (and) *iha bhavati*' (which really means '*Kintu* (but) *iha bhavati*')

The quality—i.e. the number *Twenty-four*—is present *over the whole*—i.e. over the entire *Ājuhotā-verse*,—not over a part of it; hence when that verse is used, the character of *having the verse for its accessory* becomes maintained, as also the Number. As regards the *Bṛhaspatisava*, though the number 'Twenty-four' may be present in parts of those (*Jagatī* verses) that are admissible into it by the General Law,—yet, if the number is taken up in that form (as subsisting over parts of verses), the character of *having verses as accessories* is not preserved; it *is* preserved if original *Gāyatrī* verses are brought in.—From this it follows that if the term '*Gāyatrī*' were denotative of Number, it would not be possible to bring in the original *Gāyatrī* verses.

Some people set up the following explanation of the *Sūtra*.—The man who holds the term '*Gāyatrī*' to be denotative of Number should be asked the following question:—Why do you restrict yourself to the *number* (twenty-four) as subsisting in the *syllables* only? Why do you not take in the number as subsisting in other things,—such as cups and ladles, for

instance? As for the text, it appears in the most general form—'This *Ahan-offering* is *connected with Gāyatrī*';—and if the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes the quality of Number, this must refer to the number of all things (not of the syllables only) [Hence if the number of syllables in the *Jagatī* is to be reduced to *twenty-four*, by deletion, then the number of all other things also should be made *twenty-four*].

SŪTRA (29).

"IT CANNOT BE AS URGED, AS WHAT WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IS A WELL-ESTABLISHED FACT"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

The Opponent might argue as follows:—"It is reasonable to admit only that meaning of the term '*Gāyatrī*' which is well-established, well-known; and the term is so known to be denotative of the number (twenty-four) as subsisting in *syllables* only,—not as subsisting in all things. This is the reason why we have not admitted the number as subsisting in *all things*."

This argument should be answered as follows:—

SŪTRA (30).

IT SHOULD BE SO IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO

Bhāṣya.

Just as the term '*Gāyatrī*' has been found to be used in the sense of the *number of syllables* only,—similarly it has been found to be used in the sense of *verses* only (of twenty-four syllables), not in that of any other thing, or of any prose-piece (of twenty four syllables); and just as (in your case) being found to be used in connection with the number of *syllables* only, it is not recognised as applicable to things other than syllables,—similarly, inasmuch as it has been found to be used in the sense of *verses*, it cannot be right to apply it to things other than verses.

Says the Opponent—"Though the term '*Gāyatrī*' denotes *verses*,—even so, there should be deletion of syllables.—Why so?—Because of the conditions of the Archetype; as a matter of fact, by virtue of the General Law relating to the Archetype and the Ectype, the verses that are admissible at the *Brhaspatisava* are those in the *Triṣṭup* and the *Jagatī* metres,—which are what are used at the Archetype; and they do not become abandoned (if these same are used after deleting all the syllables except *twenty-four*); these *parts* of the *Jagatī* and *Triṣṭup* verses are quite capable of being spoken of as '*Gāyatrī*' on the basis of the similarity in the number of syllables. In this manner, both the injunctions become followed,—that relating to the Archetype as well as that relating to the Ectype."

The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (31).

IF, EVEN IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO DOUBT, THE MATTER WERE TO BE DETERMINED BY THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARCHETYPE, —THEN THE SAME MIGHT BE THE CASE WITH THE TERM 'SHARA' ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

If, even in a case where there is no doubt,—no certainty at all, as regards the exact signification of the term '*Gāyatrī* as enjoined,—the term '*Gāyatrī*' were to be taken as denoting what is *not-Gāyatrī*,—then, in the case of the injunction of '*Shara*' as the '*Grass*' to be used,—the term '*Shara*' might be assumed to stand for *Kusha*, and the *Grass* used, in accordance with that Injunction, might consist of *Kusha* itself.—Or some difference between the two cases should be pointed out (why the assumption is possible in the case and not in the other).

SUTRA (32).

"ACTUAL USAGE IS FOUND [TO BE THE DISCRIMINATING FACTOR]",— IF THIS IS URGED—[then the answer is as given in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

"The discriminating factor is found in the shape of *actual usage*; as a matter of fact, the term '*Gāyatrī*' has been actually found to be used as denoting the number 'Twenty-four' *as subsisting in syllables*,—in the text, 'Two *Gāyatrīs* are one *Jagatī*'. It is on this basis that we make the said assumption."

SŪTRA (33).

THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH 'SHARA' ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*Shara*' also is found to be used in the sense of *kusha*, in the text, 'The *kusha-forest* is *shara-forest* itself'.

SŪTRA (34).

"THIS IS FIGURATIVE"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"In the sentence quoted, the term '*Shara*' has been used figuratively; in fact, what the sentence 'this *Kusha-forest* is *Shara-*

forest' asserts its similarity (between the *Kusha* and the *Shara*) in the matter of length and thickness of the blades; and the word '*Shara*' is really used in its own primary sense; if it renounced its primary meaning, how could it signify anything? Hence it follows that the term '*Shara*' is here used in the sense of the *Shara-grass* itself, not in that of the *Kusha-grass*."

SŪTRA (35).

THE SAME SHOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE OTHER SENTENCE ALSO.

Bhāṣya.

The same should be the case with the other sentence also—i.e. the sentence 'Two *Gāyatrīs* are one *Jagatī*'; here also the term '*Gāyatrī*' has been used figuratively, as already explained before; that term also, while denoting its own primary meaning (the *verse*), brings about (figuratively) the notion of what is similar to it. Hence the term is used in the sense of *verses*, not in that of *number*. From all this it follows that the term '*Gāyatrī*' does not denote the number (*Twenty-four*); and hence there need be no deletion of syllables (of the *Jagatī* and *Triṣṭup* verses).

SŪTRA (36).

THE TERM CANNOT APPLY TO ANY PART OF A VERSE ONLY; AS THE SENSE IS NOT COMPLETE.

Bhāṣya.

If only a part of the *Triṣṭup* or *Jagatī* verses is taken, the sentence remains incomplete; and no sense can be expressed by an incomplete sentence,—while it is for the expressing of a sense that *Mantras* are used; so that the use of the *Mantra* itself would be futile.—Hence it follows that the term '*Gāyatrī*' cannot apply to what are only portions of the *Triṣṭup* and *Jagatī* verses,—and that at the *Bṛhaspatisava* only those verses are to be introduced which are inherently in the *Gāyatrī-metre*.

End of Pāda iii of Adhyāya VIII.

ADHYAYA VIII.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The term 'Darvihoma' is the name of an Act.*

SŪTRA (1).

'DARVIHOMA' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE NAME OF A SACRIFICE, BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE TERM 'HOMA'

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Yadēkayā juhuyāt darvihomam kuryāt*' ['When one offers one oblation, he performs the *Darvihoma*'].

In regard to this term '*Darvihoma*', there arises the following question—Does this contain the injunction of an *accessory* (meaning '*Homa*', *oblation*, to be *offered with the* '*Darvi*', *Ladle*)? Or is it the Proper name of an *act* of 'offering'?

The answer to this question is as follows—*Darvihoma should be regarded as the name of a Sacrifice*,—i.e. the proper name of a particular act—why?—*because of the presence of the term* '*homa*'; we find the term '*homa*' in the compound '*Darvihoma*'; in fact, that term forms the predominant factor in the compound,—the term '*darvi*' being the subordinate factor;—and *Homa* (oblation-offering) is an *act*.

Or the term '*homasamyogāt*' (of the Sūtra) may be taken to mean 'because of the mention of the act of oblation-offering by the term *juhuyāt, offers an oblation*' (in the text), the term '*juhuyāt*' clearly speaks of an *act*; and the phrase '*Yadēkayā juhuyāt*' is made up of that term.

Thus the conclusion is that the term is the name of an act. This conclusion remains uncontroverted for the present [and is going to be controverted by the *Pūrvapakṣa* set forth under Sū. 5 below]. In the meantime, we proceed to consider another matter (connected with the *Darvihoma*).

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The term 'darvihoma' is a name applicable to 'Vedic' as well as 'Non-vedic' acts.*

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE NAME SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPLICABLE TO 'ORDINARY' (NON-VEDIC) ACTS; BECAUSE THE PERFORMER HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF THROUGH THAT TERM."

Bhāṣya.

If the term '*darvihoma*' is the name of an act, then there arises the question—Is the term '*darvihoma*' the name of ordinary (Non-vedic) acts laid down in *Smṛtis*,—such, for instance, as the *Aṣṭakā* and the like?—Or is it the name of all acts, *Vedic* as well as *Non-vedic*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*The name should be taken as applicable to Non-vedic acts*; the term '*darvihoma*' should be regarded as the name of ordinary, *Non-vedic*, acts;—why?—*because the performer has been spoken of through that term*; the performer of the acts in question is spoken of by means of the term '*darvihoma*' in the following text—'*Shiniināṁ dārvihomiko brāhmaṇaḥ, ambaṣṭhānāṁ dārvihomiko brāhmaṇaḥ*' ['The *Dārvihomika Brāhmana* among the *Shini-people*; the *Dārvihomika Brāhmana* among the *Ambastha-people*']; as a matter of fact, when a man does an act, he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the *lopping* is called the 'lopper', the man who does the *cooking* is called the 'cooker';—hence if the term '*darvihoma*' is the name of the *Aṣṭakā* and such acts, then alone can the performer of these be called '*dārvihomika*'. From this it follows that the term in question is the name of ordinary (*Non-vedic*) acts"

SŪTRA (3).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE NAME OF ALL ACTS: BECAUSE IT IS FOUND APPLIED TO THE "VĀSTU-HOMA".

Bhāṣya.

The term in question *should be taken as the name of all acts*—*Vedic* as well as *Non-vedic*;—why?—*because it is found applied to the 'Vāstu-homa'*; in the following text the name is found applied to the *Vāstu-homa*, which is a *Vedic* act:—'*Yadākayā juhuyāt darvihomam kuryāt, puronuvākyāmanūchya yājyayā juhoti sadevatatvāya*' [where the latter half refers to the *Vāstu-homa*].

Opponent—"This text appears to show something quite to the contrary: The sentence '*Yadākayā juhuyāt darvihomam kuryāt*' clearly indicates that what is spoken of here as '*darvihoma*' is *not* the *Darvihoma*

itself [but that which may be regarded as such]. If the oblation spoken of were the *Darvihoma* itself, then it would be one and the same act spoken of by means of the two words; and in that case there would be no justification for the assertion that 'when one offers one oblation he performs the *Darvihoma*' ['*Yadêkayâ*, etc.']."

The answer to this is as follows:—If the name '*Darvihoma*' is applicable to *Non-vedic* acts only, and not to *Vedic* acts, then even the 'one oblation' offered could never be *Darvihoma* [as the *Oblation-Offering* is a *Vedic* act]; and in that case it would not be right to assert that 'when one offers the one oblation, he performs the *Darvihoma*'. Hence the assertion should be taken as indicative of the fact that *Vedic acts* also are *Darvihoma*

"Even so, you point out only an indicative; whence do you get at the direct admissibility?"

The direct admissibility is got at from the fact of the term '*Homa*' being a general term (including *Vedic* as well as *Non-vedic* offerings).

From all this it follows that the term in question is the name applicable to *Vedic* as well as *Non-vedic* acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The term 'Darvihoma' is the name of 'Homa', oblation into Fire.*

SŪTRA (4).

IN REALITY, THE TERM APPLIES TO ACTS ENJOINED THROUGH THE ROOT 'JUHOTI' (TO OFFER INTO FIRE); BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THAT TERM.

Bhāṣya.

It has been settled that the term '*Darvihoma*' is the name of *Vedic* as well as *Non-vedic* acts.

The question that arises next is—Is the name applicable to all acts—those enjoined through the root '*yajati*' ('to Sacrifice'), as well as those enjoined through the root '*juhoti*' ('to offer into Fire')?—or is it applicable to only those enjoined through the root '*juhoti*' ('to offer into Fire')?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "it should apply equally to all".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—It should apply to *Homa* (offering into Fire) only,—not to *Sacrifice*;—why?—*because of the presence of that term*; i.e. because of the presence (in the name) of the term '*Homa*'; the term '*Homa*' (in '*Darvihoma*') signifies the act of *offering into Fire*, not that of *sacrificing*; hence it could apply to the act of *sacrifice* only figuratively.—From this it follows that the term '*Darvihoma*' is the name of the act of *offering into Fire*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The term 'Darvihoma' is not injunctive of an accessory.*

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE TERM SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE NAME OF A SACRIFICIAL ACCESSORY; AS IT CLEARLY LAYS DOWN A DEFINITE THING."

Bhāṣya

The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues against the conclusion arrived at (under Sū. 1), which was left uncontroverted.—"It has been asserted that the term '*Darvihoma*' is the proper name of an act; but that is not so; as a matter of fact, *it should be taken as the name of a sacrificial accessory*; i.e. as enjoining a sacrificial accessory;—why so?—*because it clearly lays down a definite thing*; the term is clearly understood as laying down a definite object.—the term '*Darvihoma*' meaning '*Homa*'—'offering into Fire'—'*darvyā*'—'with the *Ladle*'; [so that it is the object, *Ladle*, that is clearly laid down as the instrument of the *offering*]; in this interpretation both the terms—'*darvi*' and '*homa*'—retain their well-known signification.—From this it follows that the term contains the injunction of a sacrificial accessory."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE, AS REGARDS NON-VEDIC ACTS, THE 'LADLE' USED AT THEM IS ALREADY KNOWN THROUGH CUSTOMARY PRACTICE, AND AS REGARDS VEDIC ACTS, OTHER THINGS HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to take the term as laying down a sacrificial accessory.—Why?—(*a*) As regards *Non-vedic* acts, the Ladle to be used at them *is already known through customary practice*,—it being well known that the offering into Fire is to be done by means of the Ladle 'which has its handle towards the root and which has its bark removed'; and being well known, it does not need to be enjoined.—(*b*) Then as regards *Vedic* acts, other vessels and implements have been prescribed in connection with offerings into Fire,—such as the *Sruva*, the *Chamasa* and so forth; under the circumstances, if the *Ladle* (*Darvi*) also were laid down for the same purpose, it would have to be taken as an optional alternative to them; which would be most unreasonable: because there is a direct

injunction of the *Sruva* and other implements—in such texts as '*Sruvēṇa juhoti*' ('One makes an offering into Fire *with the Sruva*'), while there is no such injunction of the *Ladle*; so that in the case of this latter, the injunction could only be *inferred*.

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE ANOTHER IMPLEMENT IS FOUND MENTIONED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darvihoma* we find an entirely different implement (other than the *Ladle*) mentioned,—in the text, '*Bhūtēbhyastvēti ūrdhvam sruchamudgṛhṇāti*' ['Saying *bhūtēbhyastvā*, one holds aloft the *Sruk*'] [where the *Sruk* is mentioned as the implement to be used at the *Darvihoma*]. From this it follows that the name '*Darvihoma*' is not injunctive of a sacrificial accessory.

SŪTRA (8).

SIMILARLY, IN CONNECTION WITH FIRE AND THE OFFERING-MATERIAL ALSO (OTHER VESSELS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED).

Bhāṣya.

It might be argued that—"[If there are other implements laid down for the *offering*] the Ladle might be used in connection with the (*a*) *Fire* or (*b*) the *Offering-material*; the compound '*Darvi-homa*' being taken (*a*) as '*Homa*'–'Offering'—'*Darvau*'—'in the Ladle' (the Ladle being the receptacle of the Fire),—or (*b*) '*Homa*'–'Offering'—'*Darvēḥ*'—'of the Ladle' (the Ladle being the material offered)."

Our answer to this is as follows:—*Similarly in connection with the Fire and Offering-material*—also, i.e. just as the *Ladle* cannot be used as an implement, so also it cannot be used in connection with *Fire* or the *Offering-material*; because as a receptacle for the offering, a different thing has been laid down, in the shape of the *Āhavanīya* Fire—in the text '*Yad āhavanīyē juhoti*',—and as the *Offering-material also*, something quite different has been laid down, in the shape of the Cake and other things.—Thus the *Ladle* could not be used even for the purposes of the *Fire* and the *Offering-material*.

SŪTRA (9).

THE CONNECTION WITH THE PURPOSE HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been already explained by us that the purpose served by Fire cannot be served by anything else; for instance, it is Fire alone that can serve the purpose of *burning*, *cooking* and *illumining*; no other thing can serve all this purpose; hence the *Ladle* could never be laid down as serving the purpose of *Fire*

From all this it follows that the name '*Darvihoma*' should not be taken as laying down a sacrificial accessory; it must be taken as the name of a particular act.

[This *Adhikaraṇa* has not been taken as distinct from the preceding ones—by Maṇḍana Miśhra.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'Darvihoma' is an independent act by itself.*

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained that the term '*darvihoma*' is the name of an act.—The question to be considered now is—Are the *Darvihoma* offerings independent acts? Or do they borrow the details from other acts?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) view is as follows:—"They are not independent acts;—why?—because no Procedure has been laid down in connection with them. As a rule, when an act has no Procedure laid down in connection with itself, it borrows the details from another act in connection with which the Procedure has been laid down;—the *Darvihomas* are acts in connection with which the Procedure has not been laid down;—it follows therefore that they are dependent upon other acts"

"This being so, the next question that arises is—On what act are they dependent?—In answer we have the following *Sūtra* –

SŪTRA (10).

"IT IS THE PROCEDURE OF THE SOMA-SACRIFICE THAT SHOULD BE ADOPTED AT IT, BECAUSE OF 'INDISTINCTNESS'."

Bhāṣya.

"*At it*—i.e. at the *Darvihoma*—*the Procedure of the Soma-sacrifice should be adopted*;—why?—*because of indistinctness*; the injunction of the Soma-sacrifice is 'indistinct' (in the sense that the Deity and the Offering-material are not mentioned in the injunction of the sacrifice itself,—as explained under 8. 1. 16);—and the injunction of the *Darvihoma* offerings also is 'indistinct' (in the same sense),—appearing as it does in such forms as '*Bhinnē juhoti*' ('offers the Homa on breakage');—hence, on the basis of the similarity of these injunctions, the Procedure to be adopted at the *Darvihoma* should be that of the *Soma-sacrifice*"

SŪTRA (11).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION WITH THE SYLLABLE 'SVĀHĀ'; ALSO BECAUSE THE SYLLABLE 'VAṢAṬ' IS USED IN COURSE OF THE SOMA, THE OTHER IS PRECLUDED.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('in reality') indicates the rejection of the view set forth above.

It is not right to adopt, at the *Darvihoma*, the Procedure of the Soma-sacrifice;—why?—*because of the connection with the syllable 'svāhā'*; *Darvihoma* offerings are connected with the syllable '*svāhā*',—the *mantras* used being '*Pṛthivyai svāhā*', '*Antarikṣāya svāhā*'.—"What if that is so?"—*Because the syllable 'vaṣaṭ' is used in course of the Soma-sacrifice, there is preclusion*; i.e. in course of the *Soma-offering*, the syllable used is '*vaṣaṭ*', hence there is preclusion of the other; because both the syllables ('*svāhā*' and '*vaṣaṭ*') are expressive of the act of *offering* [and hence both cannot be used]: so that if the Procedure adopted is that of the *Soma-sacrifice*, the syllable used should be '*vaṣaṭ*'; and in that case the mention of the syllable '*svāhā*' would be meaningless. If the two syllables are regarded as optional alternatives, then too there would be this incongruity that each of the two would be rejected in one case or the other—If, on the other hand, the *Darvihoma* offerings are regarded as independent acts, then there is none of all this incongruity. Hence it follows that the said offerings are independent acts by themselves.

SŪTRA (12).

BECAUSE THE TERMS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*juhoti*' is entirely different from the term '*yajati*';—the Soma-sacrifice has been enjoined through the term '*yajati*', while the *Darvihoma* offerings have been enjoined through the term '*juhoti*';—the transference of details has been held to be possible only in the case of injunctions being similar;—hence for this reason also it cannot be right to adopt, at the *Darvihoma*, the details of the *Soma-sacrifice*.

"But it has been pointed out that there is this similarity in the two injunctions that both are *indistinct*."

The answer to this is as follows—While there is *similarity* between the two on the ground of 'indistinctness', there is dissimilarity (or difference) on the ground of the term '*yajati*' being used in one case (and '*juhoti*' in the other case); and it is only when a number of actions enjoined through the term '*yajati*' are found to be 'indistinct', that there is transference of details among them; just as, though there is similarity among several sacrifices on account of the offerings at all of them consisting of grains, yet at the *Saurya*, the procedure adopted is that of the *Āgnēya* on the ground of both these having only *one* deity.

SŪTRA (13).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as we find indicative texts, it follows that the procedure to be adopted at the *Darvihoma* is *not* that of the *Soma-sacrifice*:—In connection with the *Audumbarī-Homa*, having laid down the use of the

syllable '*svāhā*', the text goes on to say, in relation to the sentence laying down Clarified Butter—'*Ghṛtēna dyāvāpṛthivī āpṛṇētyantarā kaṇḍā juhoti, āmūlāt avasrāvayati, bhūmiyatē svāhākaroti*'.—If the procedure of the *Sōma-sacrifice* were meant to be adopted, the syllable to be used should have been laid down as '*vaṣat*' (which is peculiar to the *Soma*),—not '*svāhā*'.

SŪTRA (14).

[*Objection*]—"THE SYLLABLE 'SVĀHĀ' IS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT (MODIFIED) OFFERING,—LIKE THE NUMBER 'SEVENTEEN'; HENCE THE ADOPTION OF THE PROCEDURE (OF THE SOMA) DOES NOT BECOME PRECLUDED MERELY BY VIRTUE OF THE INDICATIVE TEXT,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE ANIMAL."

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers the argument put forward (in the preceding *Sūtra*) on the basis of the indicative cited—"It has been argued that in connection with the *Audumbarī-Homa*, the use of the syllable '*svāhā*' is found to be mentioned as a well-established fact, which indicates that the Procedure of the *Soma* is not to be adopted.—Our answer to this is as follows:—*The syllable 'svāhā' is for the subsequent offering, like the number 'seventeen'.*—In connection with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, the number *seventeen* has been mentioned in an isolated sentence 'Recites the *seventeen Sāmidhēnī* verses'; and as all that is spoken of in an isolated sentence goes with the Primary Sacrifice, the said number *seventeen* has been taken as related to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; but it becomes set aside by the number *fifteen* which pertains to the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa* by virtue of its Context;—and consequently the number *seventeen* (thus deflected from the *Primary*) becomes connected with the modified form of that Primary.—[*Vide* above, 3. 6. 9.]—Similarly, in the case in question, the syllable *svāhā* has been mentioned in an isolated sentence—'Offering-materials are offered to deities either with the syllable *svāhā* or with the syllable *vasat*';—as in the case of the *Sāmidhēnī*, this syllable becomes inclined to enter into the two Primary Sacrifices—*Soma* and *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*;—but becoming precluded therefrom by the syllable '*vasat*', it becomes deflected from the Primaries to that extent and finds place in the other offerings.—Under the circumstances, *the adoption of the Procedure of the Soma-sacrifice does not become (entirely) precluded,—as in the case of the Animal.*—In connection with the Animal, the number *seventeen* having been declared, the Procedure of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* does not become precluded,—because of the fact of the number '*seventeen*' being directly laid down in a text. In the same manner, in the case in question, inasmuch as the syllable '*svāhā*' has been directly declared, the mere perception of the Indicative does not preclude the adoption of the Procedure of the *Soma-sacrifice*."

The term '*punaḥ*' (in the *Sūtra*) has no significance (it is superfluous),—just like such expressions as '*Kimpunaridam*' ('What to say of this!').

SŪTRA (15)

[*Answer to the above objection*]—IN REALITY, IT CANNOT BE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT OFFERING, AS IT IS OF USE (AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE ITSELF), AND OF WHAT PERTAINS TO THE PRIMARY, THERE CAN BE PRECLUSION ONLY WHEN IT IS OF NO USE.

Bhāṣya

It has been argued that the syllable *svāhā* is for the subsequent (modified) offering. But it is not so.—Why?—*Because it cannot be for the subsequent offering, as it is of use*, as a matter of fact, it serves a useful purpose at the Primary sacrifice itself,—in connection with the *Āgneyādi homa* offerings, as also in connection with the two *Pārvaṇa homa* offerings, where the *mantra* used is '*Pūrṇamāsāya svāhākṛtāya svāhā*' where the syllable '*svāhā*' comes in). *Of what pertains to the Primary, there can be preclusion only when it is of no use*, if the syllable '*svāhā*' were of no use at the Primary sacrifice, then alone could there be preclusion, by virtue of the isolated sentence, of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' at the *modified offering*,—which latter syllable would come in at it as pertaining to its Primary Original [i.e. the syllable '*svāhā*' would displace the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' at the modified offering, only if that syllable could not be used at the Primary sacrifice itself]; as a matter of fact however, it does serve a useful purpose at it,—hence it cannot be regarded as being for the subsequent (modified) offering.

And when it is not for the subsequent offering, then the text quoted—'*Bhaumyaṭē svāhākārau*'—does become rightly indicative of the fact that the Procedure of the *Soma sacrifice* has no place at the *Darśahoma* offerings.

SŪTRA (16)

[*Objection*]—AT THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE, IT WOULD NOT FIND A PLACE'—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as in the next *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya

Says the Opponent—"If your view is that the syllable '*svāhā*' cannot find place in the *Nāruṣṭahomas* or in the *Pārvaṇa homas*,—then, it would not be possible for that syllable to find place in the *Nāruṣṭahoma*, even when this latter is performed in connection with the Primary sacrifice; and there also the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' would have to be admitted: as this latter has been laid down in connection with the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* without any qualification, in the following text—'*Dvyakṣaro vaṣaṭkāraḥ, ēṣa vai prajāpatiḥ saptadaśo yajñē annaṃyāttē*'—'But the syllable *svāhā* also has been directly mentioned.'—True, it has been *mentioned*; the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*', on the other hand, has been *enjoined*; that is why of this latter we have the Injunction.—In fact, the sentence '*Nāsya yajño*

vyathatē prajāpatau yajñēna pratitiṣṭhati' (where '*prajāpati*' stands for the syllable '*vasat*') serves to set aside the syllable '*svāhā*' which would come in only by virtue of being *mentioned*; because, in the case of mere *mention*, the injunction is purely inferential, and as such is set aside by an Injunction which is direct.—If then the syllable '*svāhā*' cannot find place at the primary, then it must find room at the subsequent (modified) sacrifice."

SŪTRA (17).

[*Answer*]—IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT, WHAT COMES LATER IS WEAKER.

Bhāṣya.

The answer given to the above objection is as follows:—It is not right that the syllable '*svāhā*' should be taken as set aside by the syllable '*vasat*'.—Why?—Because it has been explained (under Sū. 3. 3 14) that whenever there is a conflict among Direct Assertion and the other means of determining subsidiary character, that which comes later is weaker than that which has gone before;—now, in the case in question, there is conflict between 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context',—the *Context* indicating the syllable '*vasat*', while the syllable '*svāhā*' would come in by virtue of its being syntactically connected with the words of the *Mantra* used at the *Nārāśaṁsas*,—and Syntactical Connection is always stronger than Context—"The syllable '*vasat*' signifying the act of *giving away* may be used after the syllable '*svāhā*'."—But the uttering of the syllable '*svāhā*' does not accomplish the *offering*; how can the syllable '*svāhā*', which has *not* been laid down as meaning *offering*, serve the purpose of bringing about the *offering*? Even if it were laid down as meaning *offering*, how could the offering-material be offered to the deities by means of the syllable '*svāhā*' or '*vasat*'? "Inasmuch as both the syllables—*svāhā* and *vasat*—have been laid down in connection with the Primary sacrifice, what is said in reference to no particular sacrifice becomes meaningless."—It is for this reason that we say that it would serve the purpose of laying down the fact of the two syllables ('*svāhā*' and '*vasat*') signifying the act of *offering*.—From all this it follows that the *Darvihoma* offerings are not the modifications of the *Soma-offering*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—"OR, THE DETAILS OF THESE WOULD COME FROM THE 'IṢṬI'; AS THESE DETAILS ARE ALREADY OPERATIVE, THEIR INJUNCTIONS WOULD BE THERE."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*', 'or', indicates the taking up of another view.

"The term '*Tachchodanāḥ*', 'Details of these', stands for the *Darvihomas*; the meaning is that the details of procedure that would be adopted at the *Darvi-*

homas would be just those subsidiary *Homas* that form part of the *Darsha-Pūrnamāsa*—'What are those?'—They are the *Nāriṣṭahomas*.—'Why should these be adopted?'—Because these are the *Homas* that are *already operative*; that is, these *Homas* are found to be operating in all '*Iṣṭi*', as well as in all '*Pashubandha*', sacrifices; and when a feature has been actually seen with an act in most cases, it is inferred to be there even when it is not actually seen; for instance, when a man has been seen to do good to others in many cases, it is he who is inferred to have done the good that has been done by some unknown man. For this reason the *Nāriṣṭahomas* should be adopted at the *Darvihomas*."

SŪTRA (19)

'ALSO BECAUSE OF THE FORCE OF WORD-

Bhāṣya

"There is also the *force of words*—in the shape of the similarity of Injunctions of the *Darvihomas* and the *Nāriṣṭahomas*, the injunction of *Homa* at the *Nāriṣṭahomas* is in the form '*Nāriṣṭān juhoti*', while that of the *Darvihoma* is in the form '*Bhinnē juhoti*'—and through this similarity of Injunctions, there should be adoption of the details.'

SŪTRA (20)

"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION"

Bhāṣya.

"There is a text also which points to the conclusion that the *Darvihomas* derive their details from the *Nāriṣṭahomas*.—'What is that indicative?' In connection with *Agnihotra* we read—'*Yadi kīṭo'vapadyēta antaḥparidhi nināyēt*' [If an insect should fall in, it should be put under the *Paridhi*];—again in connection with *Agni*, we read—'*Antarvādi tiṣṭhan nāvadrāni juhoti*' ['Standing within the Altar, he offers the oblations to *Savitṛ*";—the *Paridhi* as well as the *Altar*, being of use at the Primary as well as the Subsidiary sacrifices, are parts of the *Nāriṣṭahoma*; so that what has been declared in the two texts just quoted would be possible only if the details of the *Nariṣṭahomas* were operative.—Hence it follows that the details of the *Nāriṣṭahomas* are to be adopted at the *Darvihomas*."

SŪTRA (21)

[*Answer to Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*) *set forth in Sū.* 18]—WHAT HAS BEEN CITED AS INDICATIVE OF DETAILS CANNOT BE SO INDICATIVE, AS IT IS THE ABSENCE OF THE DETAILS THAT IS THE REASON.

Bhāṣya.

What has been cited as indicative of the adoption of the details of the *Nāriṣṭahoma* cannot be so indicative; that is, it does not prove what

it has been cited to prove.—Why so?—Because *it is the absence of the details that is the 'reason'*; that is, in connection with the *Tryambakas*, it has been thus declared—'They say that *Tryambakas* are unstable: fuel and grass are not got together: the *Prayaja*-sacrifices are not offered; the *Sāmidhēni* verses are not recited'; this text, having declared the unstable character of the *Tryambakas*, puts forward the absence of fuel and the rest as the reason in support of that declaration. If the *Nāristahomas* were to find room in the *Darvihomas*,—then the *Fuel*, the *Grass* and the *Sāmidhēnis* would all be present at the *Tryambakas*, as all these three are of use at the Primary as well as the Subsidiary sacrifices. And in that case the *absence* of these, being non-existent, could not serve as a reason for the declaration in question.—For this reason the *Nāriṣṭahomas* cannot find room at the *Darvihomas*

SŪTRA (22).

"IT MAY BE AN INJUNCTION,"—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the following *Sūtra*].

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent argues—"If you think that what has been cited is not an *indicative*, then why cannot it be taken as an *Injunction*? The Fuel and the rest being admissible on the ground of the *Nāristahomas* being the required Primary, the text that prohibits the use of these, being regarded as an Injunction, would lay down something not already known If it were a mere *reference*, it could not lead to any activity, and as such, would serve no useful purpose"

This assertion having been made, the author refutes it in the following *Sūtra*—

SŪTRA (23).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS IT IS SUPPLEMENTARY TO ANOTHER INJUNCTIVE SENTENCE.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence in question cannot be an Injunction.—"Why?"—Because there is another text which contains the Injunction—viz. '*Ādityam charum nirvapēt punarūtya gṛhēṣu*' ['Returning to the house, one should offer Cooked Rice to *Aditi*']; and the sentence in question is supplementary to this Injunction.—"How do you know that?"—Because the Injunction just quoted stands in need of what is said in the sentence in question. After having declared the defect in the sentence—'The *Tryambakas* are unstable', the text goes on to say 'Returning home, one should offer Cooked Rice to Aditi,—this is Aditi,—this is stability,—inasmuch as it is herein that *Āditya* rests.' It is clear from this that the offering to *Aditi* has been enjoined for the purpose of remedying the said defect of *unstability*; the two sentences therefore are construed together. In between these two sentences come in all those sentences that speak of "The

Fuel and Grass, etc."; and it is only reasonable that these latter also should be construed with,—and taken as supplementary to,—that same Injunction. Under the circumstances, if these were taken as Injunctions, they would have to be separate sentences; and this would militate against the aforesaid syntactical connection among the three sets of sentences; and it would also involve the incongruity of interrupted (far fetched) construction. As a matter of fact also, the sentences in question have no injunctive force, being as they are in the form of *reference* (mere description).—For these reasons, these sentences cannot be regarded as Injunctions.

Question—"What is the reason that though both the sentences are equally *indicative* in their character, that speaking of 'under the *Paridhi*' is not regarded as proving anything, while the other one is accepted as an effective proof?"

Answer—This difference between the two sentences, we shall point out later on (towards the end of this *Adhikaraṇa*).

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"THE PROCEDURE THAT SHOULD COME IN SHOULD BE THAT OF THOSE SACRIFICES AT WHICH THE HOMA IS OFFERED INTO THE OTHER TWO (FIRES): AS THERE WOULD BE NO INCONGRUITY INVOLVED IN THIS."

Bhāṣya.

"*The Procedure to come in (to the Darvihomas) should be that of those Sacrifices at which the Homa is offered into the other two Fires*,—i.e. that of the *Paśnīsaṁyājas*.—Why so?—*Because there would be no incongruity involved in this*,—such as has been pointed out (in Sū. 21) in the case of the adoption of the Procedure of the *Nāriṣṭahomas*; as in this latter case it was the 'absence of the details' that was the 'reason'. As for the *Paśnīsaṁyājas* on the other hand, the 'Fuel and the Grass' and the '*Sāmidhēni* verses' do not form part of them at all; and hence there is nothing incongruous in the mention of their absence. These also are Sacrifices *that are already operative*, and these also have been enjoined through the root '*juhoti*' (reasons urged in Sū. 18, in favour of the *Nāriṣṭahomas*);—the injunction being in the form '*Saha patnyā juhoti*'.—From all this it follows that the Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Paśnīsaṁyājas*"

SŪTRA (25).

[*Answer to above Pūrvapakṣa (C)*]—AT THAT SACRIFICE, GRAIN-OFFERINGS HAVE BEEN ENJOINED,—AND THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADOPTED ON THE CORRESPONDING OCCASIONS.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted above cannot be right.—Why?—Because *at that Sacrifice*—i.e. at the *Darvihoma*—*grain-offerings have been laid down*—

viz. 'The Cake at the *Tryambakas*, *Karambha-vessels*, Rice' and so forth;—*and these would have to be adopted on the corresponding occasions*; i.e. these *grain-offerings* occupying the same position (at the *Darvihoma*) as the Clarified-Butter-offerings (at the *Patnīsaṁyājas*) would have to take in the characteristic details of the Clarified-Butter; and yet it is not possible to carry out these details in connection with the *grain-offerings*; in fact, even if they were carried out, they would serve no useful purpose; so that the General Law (of the Ectype being performed like the Archetype) would be set at nought. Thus it is clear that there is no need for the details of the *Patnīsaṁyājas* to be adopted at the *Darvihoma*. As for the *Yājyā* and the *Anuvākyā*, they could be carried out by means of another *Mantra*, and the purposes of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' would be served by the syllable '*svāhā*'.

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)]—"ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATIVE, THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED SHOULD BE THAT OF THE SUBSEQUENT 'HOMAS'."

Bhāṣya.

"The Procedure to be adopted should be that of the *Piṣṭalēpa-homa* and the *Phalīkaraṇa-homa*;—why?—*on account of the Indicative*; i.e. because of the common factor of *Grain-offerings*; so that this view is not open to the objection urged against the case of the *Patnīsaṁyājas*,—where it has been pointed out that the details adopted would serve no useful purpose. Because in this case, the details connected with *Grains*,—such as *cooking* and the rest—could certainly be carried out.—Hence it is the Procedure of these two *Homas* that should be adopted at the *Darvihoma*"

SŪTRA (27).

[*Answer to Pūrvapakṣa (D)*]—BUT THESE TWO (HOMAS) ARE OF THE NATURE OF 'DISPOSAL'; HENCE THE 'DARVIHOMA' CANNOT BE REGARDED AS THE 'MODIFIED FORM' OF THESE.

Bhāṣya.

But—what has been suggested cannot be accepted;—why?—because the said two *Homas* are of the nature of 'Disposal offerings'; while the *Darvi-homas* are 'Principal offerings'; the difference between them therefore is immense; while transference of details between sacrifices has been held to be based upon *similarity*.

It has been argued that the details relating to the *grain-offerings* can be carried out. But as a matter of fact, being of the nature of 'Disposal offerings', the two *Homas* in question cannot serve to indicate the transference of *cooking* and such other details. Hence for that same reason

it is not possible for the *Darvihoma* to have these two *Homas* for their original Archetype; nor would it be right (even if it were possible).

Hence this (fourth) *Pūrvapakṣa* view also is not right.

Thus it is found that the *Darvihomas* cannot borrow the details from any other sacrifices. Hence it follows that they must be regarded as independent sacrifices by themselves.

SŪTRA (28)

WHEN THERE IS A COMMINGLING OF CONFLICTING INDICATIVES, IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF DETAILS, BECAUSE INJUNCTIONS ARE INHERENTLY RESTRICTED IN THEIR SCOPE, AND HENCE WHAT THEY ENJOIN CANNOT BE TRANSFERABLE, SUCH TRANSFERENCE IS PERMISSIBLE ONLY WHERE THERE IS A DISTINCT DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Where there are indicatives in support of both sides, why should it be concluded that there is to be no transference of details?"

Answer—*When there is a commingling of conflicting indicatives*, it is not right to accept the transference of details in accordance with these indicatives;—why?—*because the injunctions are inherently restricted in their scope*; as a matter of fact, the text of the Injunctions is such as limits their scope; some injunctions are found in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and some with the *Soma*, *hence what they enjoin cannot be transferable*; if they are transferred to any act other than that in connetion with which the Injunction is found, then the 'context' becomes annulled. It is for this reason that it is concluded that there is to be no transference or borrowing of details from any other sacrifice (in the case of the *Darvihoma*)

Question—"Is this then the universal rule that there is to be no transference of details at all?"

The answer to this is that *Transference is permissible only when there is a distinct declaration to that effect*, e.g. in the case of the marrage-rites of the *Rāstrabhṛts*—In cases where there is no such declaration, the acts in question must be regarded as independent.

Question—"What is the answer to the two indicatives that have been quoted (under Sū. 20)—(*a*) 'If an insect fall in, etc.', (*b*) 'Standing within the altar, etc.'?"

Answer—Inasmuch as these assertions have no reason in their support, they have to be taken in a figurative sense,—'*Antaḥparidhi*' being taken as standing for the *place* of the *Paridhi*, and '*Antarvēdi*' for the *place* of the altar,—because neither the *Paridhi* nor the *Altar* is actually present (at the *Darvihoma*). Just as in the case of such assertions as '*rajani mē kaṇḍuyati*' ('The *Paint* is itching'), '*tilako mē spandatē*' ('The mark on the forehead is

throbbing'),—when there is no *paint*, nor the *forehead-mark*, the terms 'paint' and 'forehead-mark' are taken as figuratively standing for the *spot* where they are generally found.

[This last Question and Answer has been taken by Mandana Mishra as a distinct *Adhikarana*.]

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