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THE RACE QUESTION IN CANADA
POST-WAR BRITAIN
AMERICA COMES OF AGE
ENGLAND'S CRISIS
IMPRESSIONS OF SOUTH AMERICA
EUROPE'S CRISIS
SUEZ AND PANAMA
THE MEDITERRANEAN

CANADA

An International Power

by

ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED



Translated from the French by
DORIS HEMMING

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PREFACE

EXACTLY thirty years have passed since I published a book entitled *Le Canada, les Deux Races*. Before embarking upon this study of contemporary political problems, I had concluded my third trip to Canada. My first was made as early as 1898.

I do not propose to bring this earlier book up to date, for so much water has flowed under the bridges since then that mere revision would not suffice. Nor do I intend to write a book on the same lines as before, because the psychological analysis which I then made of the two groups, English and French, still holds good today. When one penetrates deeply enough, one finds that peoples change very little. I should simply be repeating myself, and that is the negation of intellectual work.

I believe, however, that there remains another book to be written — a book about a new Canada which scarcely existed at the beginning of the century. The British Commonwealth, which formerly consisted of a sovereign metropolis and its colonies, has now become a federation of autonomous nations, equal in rank, and virtually independent. On Vimy and other battlefields of the 1914-18 War Canada acquired, one might even say conquered, an international status which was confirmed by her admittance as a distinct political entity into the League of Nations.

In the present book, then, I propose to limit myself to this new aspect of Canada, which is international, not merely American or British as in the past. I shall nor undertake either a geographical or historical study of Canada, nor shall I make an economic inventory, nor even a political analysis. My subject is at once wider and more restricted in scope, for I shall try to describe the international position of Canada in the economic and political equilibrium of the twentieth century. I shall study her geographical contacts, her racial structure, her place in world markets as both producer and consumer, the possibilities

P R E F A C E

awaiting her in the realm of culture, her exceptional role of interpreter between the United States and England, and finally, her chance of survival as an independent nation.

Since the publication of my first book I have made several more journeys to Canada, and I have followed its evolution with the same intense interest that I previously devoted to studying the regime of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, which now seems so long ago. I spent the year 1915 with the First Canadian Heavy Battery, acting as interpreter for the Canadian Army in France. Shortly after the Armistice I was a member of a Mission which was sent by the French Government to the Canadian Government. I crossed Canada from Quebec to Victoria three times, in 1914, in 1919, and in 1935. I have seen the Canadian people in prosperity and in depression, in war and in peace, at home and abroad.

The singular complexity of a country which is American geographically, British politically, largely French in origin, and yet world-wide in its international preoccupations, seems to afford the subject matter for an absorbing study. Although the present book is entirely different from my earlier one, it may also be considered its sequel.

Paris, 1937

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

TEN years have passed since the first edition of this book was published, and what years they have been! The world has emerged transformed from a war which has upset the relationship not only of nations but even of continents. This is especially true of North America, for owing to the decisive part it played in the struggle this continent now ranks first among those on which western civilization rests. Canada, being a leading member of the northern section of the New World, now finds herself in a fresh relationship to both Great Britain and Europe.

This book had to be revised; indeed more than revision was necessary. Although the structure still stands, I felt that it had to be completely rewritten. In point of fact the main characteristics of the first edition proved even after a decade to be essentially sound. I had foreseen what the Canadian attitude would be in the event of war; I had anticipated American collaboration; I had even indicated as early as 1935 Canada's fundamental position in intercontinental aviation in view of her northern frontier; finally, the country was already sufficiently industrialized to forecast the extraordinary manufacturing future that today is in process of development.

Thus there was no reason to make any radical change in the general plan of the book, but fresh personal contacts were needed. Thanks to the kindness of the Canadian Government, who invited me to visit the Dominion at the close of the war, I was able in 1945 to travel from coast to coast, from Quebec to Vancouver, and then north to Whitehorse in the Yukon. I breathed the clear air of Canada once more, and was able to appreciate the immense effort she had made in the war. I was also able to estimate her new status in North

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

America, in the British Commonwealth, and among the nations of the world.

The title of this book, *Canada, an International Power*, expresses even more strongly today than it did before the war the important role filled by this country. Henceforth Canada will hold her own among the powers which have something to contribute to international discussions.

Paris, 1947

THE GEOGRAPHICAL
ASPECT

CHAPTER I

EUROPE AND AMERICA CONTRASTED

§ 1

At the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of any study of Canada, one must reiterate that Canada is American. History occasionally loses sight of this fact, but at every step geography imperiously recalls it. And yet a political bond does exist with the Old World, and herein lies the novelty and uniqueness of the Canadian problem.

Everyone knows that the continents of Europe and America do not resemble each other; in fact the very atmosphere is different. To appreciate America a European observer must change his mental attitude, his sense of proportion, and even his vocabulary. Our idioms no longer apply; in fact we almost hesitate to use them in these new surroundings. Overseas, let us remember, we are foreigners; even the English are in Canada, although officially they call it British North America. First of all we must note the essential differences between the two continents.

What after all is Europe? A civilization derived from a certain race of people, but above all from a certain harmony existing between these people and the environment in which they have always lived. European civilization rests on a triple foundation of race, culture, and methods of production. Our culture comes from the Greeks, whose intellectual tradition we have inherited. Our ideal of the individual is derived immediately from the eighteenth century, but fundamentally it arises out of Christianity itself, which taught us the now somewhat jeopardized doctrine of respect for the human being. Our industrial methods, even allowing for recent Americanizations,

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have also emerged from eighteenth-century craftsmanship, which saw the birth of the steam engine, of the division of labour, and of mass production. The spirit of invention, the refusal to submit to the inevitable, individualism concealing the germ of revolt which in itself is creative — all these things are characteristic of the European genius.

One may say that such characteristics are equally applicable to the whole of western civilization — to the whole of the white race which is now overflowing the borders of Europe. True, but this magnificent civilization, which has transformed the world in the past, could have arisen, and can continue to thrive, only under certain clearly-defined geographical conditions. There is also no doubt that it could have evolved only by the incomparable artisanship of the white race. Further than that, however, it required the framework of a continent constructed as it were, in human proportions, being big without being colossal, and where Nature herself is never overpowering, never out of proportion to man himself.

'The statement of Protagoras, that *man is the measure of things*,' wrote M. Paul Valéry, 'is characteristic, and essentially Mediterranean.' ¹

Could we also say 'European'? In our old continent we have the impression that Man dominates Nature, and that he has tamed and civilized her to a point where she no longer appears under her original guise. But, in conquering Nature, the European has adapted himself to her. He understands and respects the inexorable laws of Time, which have taught him to build solidly. The past is always present in this part of the world even when we turn towards the future, for our culture is based on tradition. We navigate in deep waters like a boat with three thousand years under her keel. It is this maturity, which we share with Asia, that distinguishes us from America. The price we pay for it is an economic depletion, a gradual impoverishment of the possibilities of Nature, and a reduction of the margin between the actual and the potential.

¹ Paul Valéry, *Varidé*, III, p. 256.

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Out of this arise unmistakable consequences, both social and political. As the burden of producing wealth becomes steadily heavier one naturally wonders if it would not be easier to share existing wealth rather than create anew: the slightest additional effort makes for revolution. In 1939 the density of the population of Europe apart from Russia was 188 inhabitants per square mile, compared with only 18 in North America, so in our overcrowded continent quarrels over territory take on a bitterness which the peoples of sparsely populated countries do not understand. With us a war of conquest is an ever-present menace like a black cloud obscuring the future and taking the very heart out of the younger generation.

When we turn to America what strikes us in contrast is the grandeur, the vastness of Nature. The new continent is not built on the same scale as ours. Niagara, the St. Lawrence, the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, the western prairies are more like Asia or Africa than like our countryside. To find anything approaching the same scenery in Europe we must go far to the north or to the east — into Scandinavia where there are pre-Cambrian massifs resembling the Canadian Laurentian Shield, or into the immensity of Russia which really is not European at all.

Europe is delicately moulded, like a hand with tapering fingers outstretched towards the sea; America has the contour of a massive fist, or a heavy piece of furniture, solid but unadorned. In the New World Nature dwarfs Man. He is not fashioned on that same vast scale, though he is apt to boast so soon that he has been able to overcome the elements.

The relationship between the American and the forces of Nature with which he must contend has profoundly marked his attitude, his reactions, and his psychology. The man of the New World is nearer to primitive Nature than we are. Though he may be better equipped with the comforts of life, yet at heart he is simpler. His apparent conquest of Nature, brilliant and rapid though it may be, is deceptive. In his haste he refuses to recognize obstacles. He brutally attacks Nature and,

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in so doing, fails to understand her. Are we quite sure that he has subdued her? We realize, though he himself may not, that the lack of a peasant civilization indicates the American farmer's inability to identify himself with the soil he tills. The American is impatient of delay. He does not believe the proverb that warns: Time always has its revenge. So both the rhythm and the social atmosphere of Europe and America are completely different because the two continents are not of the same age.

Everyone knows — or believes, for it may not be true — that individual success is possible in the existing order, and since it is easier to produce than to distribute, the law of least resistance makes Americans conservative. Why fight to obtain territory when there is already more than can be developed? Being already so richly endowed the Americans are not interested in conquest. To them European wars and the fortification of frontiers seem incredible, useless, and fundamentally wrong. Nor do they understand colonial policy since they have their whole empire within their own frontiers. 'How wicked these Europeans are!' they say to themselves. Yet imperialism also exists in the New World though under a different form. Obviously it is not only two continents, but two different ages that are at variance. We are mature, almost old; the Americans are young, so young that they sometimes seem puerile. Each of the two worlds approaches problems from an entirely different angle. Are we really contemporaries?

I have spoken of the white race, of Europe, of the West; but the meaning of these terms varies, and must be defined. At one time they were synonymous: when the white race was limited to Europe, and when Europe consisted of the entire western world. Since the sixteenth, and especially since the eighteenth century, this correlation has been disappearing. Examined closely, not all Europe appears western in the sense in which we have tried to define western traditions. East of Vienna and the Elbe — or east of the Oder if you prefer — where we first come into contact with Nature on a grandiose scale asserting her rights against Man, we have the impression

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that we are no longer in Europe. Here the influence of Greece and Rome, in the shadow of which Christianity was developed, is no longer uncontested. The regions which were dominated by Rome are easily distinguishable, for the others are of a different hue. We may wish to believe in the unity of Europe, but even if we do succeed in maintaining it or re-establishing it, it will no longer coincide with the unity of western civilization as a whole.

The white race is no longer entirely European, since one branch has developed and prospered overseas. Now that it has spread beyond Europe's confines and adapted itself to new geographic conditions that are bound in the long run to transform it, our western civilization may continue to be racial, but it is no longer continental. Out of this fact has arisen the conception of a Western World extending beyond our continental boundaries — one in which the centre of gravity cannot be exactly defined. The British Empire is a symptom of this shifting, since it is no longer strictly English, and yet it is not European. Besides, more people speak English on the American Continent than anywhere else.

These somewhat subtle distinctions serve to modify the fine unity of the simple terms, Europe and America. Yet they allow us to maintain a bridge between the two continents, and, in so doing, lead us to a better understanding of such European characteristics as have a chance of survival in the New World.

§ 2

We have discussed the contrast between Europe and America; let us now examine another fundamental topic, namely, the unity of the entire American continent, North and South. In common parlance one speaks of 'the Americas' as if the two were quite distinct. But I personally have always felt that their difference is less marked than their resemblance, and that there is an atmosphere common to all the countries of the New World, due mainly to the very fact that they are new.

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Show me in the United States, in Canada, in the Argentine, or above all in Brazil, even one landscape which resembles western or central Europe or the Mediterranean! To a geographer who already knows the north, South America does not appear strange. The Andes and the Rockies are the same mountain range. If we could fold one continent over on top of the other, we should find an amazing similarity. Chile would correspond to British Columbia, both having forests, fiords, and glaciers; Peru would find its counterpart in California, with tawny barren hills intersected by oases; and finally the high Andean plateaux in Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela are remarkably like Utah, Arizona, and Mexico.

On the Atlantic side we find the same symmetry, though less accentuated. The tropical atmosphere of Brazil, which is humid and sombre, occurs again not only in the Antilles but also in Louisiana, and even reaches Alabama and Georgia. In a sense, the distinction between the Pacific and the Atlantic coast is more marked than the difference between the two hemispheres. In the great plains the same striking resemblance between north and south appears at every turn. The Argentine pampas are like the American and Canadian prairies, having the same vast open spaces, the same clear sky, and the same crops; one seems to be back in the Dakotas, or Saskatchewan. And similarly, as one approaches the mountains near Mendoza or Cordoba, one inevitably thinks of Denver or Calgary.

Thus the geographic relationship of the two continents is obvious. The Latin and Anglo-Saxon peoples in the New World both tread the same soil, breathe the same air, produce and market the same goods in the same economic conditions, and react to international problems in the same way. Pan-Americanism, in so far as it is free from the taint of imperialism, expresses the fundamentals of this continental sistership. Canada belongs to this great family, notwithstanding the fact that she is distinguished from the other American countries by a geographical peculiarity. It so happens that, as both continents are wide in the north and taper off in the south, the northern

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hemisphere has more arctic regions and the southern hemisphere has more tropics. Owing to the immense Northland to which there is no counterpart in the southern hemisphere, Canada is unique among the nations of the New World and is therefore somewhat tempted to stand apart from the others.

The resemblance between the two Americas that I have stressed so far is geographical. Historically they have followed separate paths. The Anglo-Saxon Protestants of the North, and the Latin Catholics of the South, have produced distinct civilizations, each retaining in one way and another the marks of their origin. As a result there are at work in the Americas two distinct influences, which are contradictory rather than complementary. The first, historical, produces the same type of civilization in America as in Europe, and the other, geographical, tends on the contrary to separate the old continent from the new by giving America a personality that is becoming increasingly distinct from Europe. The Americas seem to have a north-south axis, and also an east-west one. The former is geographic and is the principal one because it results from the very conformation of the continents themselves. It is expressed by the majestic geological folds, by the vertical arrangement of the climatic zones, and by the natural trend of commerce. It is even to be seen in the flow of public opinion. One feels that its effects are inevitable, and that, in the end, it will overcome all resistance.

Such are the views of the eminent geographer, M. Baulig, who declares that while a relief map of Europe shows that traffic of every kind moves east and west along the parallels of latitude, in Northern America circulation develops more readily north and south along the meridians of longitude. Climatic conditions vary gradually and imperceptibly as we pass from north to south, but they are precise and distinct when we go across the continent from east to west, and particularly when we come to the western mountain ranges. Although the white races continued their trans-Atlantic migrations by marching steadily westward along the parallels of

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latitude, and although this historical fact has been perpetuated by political frontiers and the railway lines, yet, on the other hand, contrary currents also exist, currents which are more in conformity with the physical nature of the continent in its fundamental division into east, centre, and west. This division arises from the architectural structure of the continent, and it cannot be obliterated by technical manipulation.¹

If, according to M. Baulig's vigorous thesis, the north-south axis is inherent in the architectural structure of the continent, the east-west axis, on the contrary, is essentially historical and artificial; it is maintained more by momentum than by the nature of things. It is thus that the initial influence of Europe with its own geographic division into Mediterranean and Nordic has been perpetuated in these new territories, though in point of fact this European influence is becoming more and more foreign as the years go by.

Which axis will prevail in the end? Will geography finally efface the play of history? If so, the American nations will gradually become more alike, pan-Americanism will prevail, and possibly there will be no Canada. If history, on the contrary, succeeds in maintaining its hold indefinitely, Europe will remain a factor in the destinies of America. By overcoming a gravitation which now seems irresistible, Canada will fall back on her east-west axis, and will maintain a separate existence and a personality of her own.

It is under the symbol of the compass, therefore, that we must embark on any serious study of America, and consequently of Canada.

We are fully aware of the difficulties of the task. In order to speak with any assurance of the continent of America, one must appreciate its sense of proportion, which is different from ours; its climate, which seems frankly exotic to us; its colours and its perfumes; its rhythm, and above all its *tempo*, which is a combination of feverishness, optimism, and lightheartedness, and which is not attuned to our more precarious equilibrium.

¹ *Géographie Universelle*, Vol. XIII (North America, p. 5).

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And yet we must not turn our backs entirely on old Europe. Aside from the factors of geography, if we wish to comprehend America fully we must hark back to its spiritual sources which had their origin in the Old World. In order to understand Canada fully we must examine English puritanism, the Anglican Church, and the French Catholic tradition. It is a delicate task to decide what must be attributed to geography and what to tradition. In this continent of quantities any admixture of qualities must be subtle. It reminds one of certain complex atmospheres in the Near East.

The Canadian problem — for there is one — arises from this duality, which is more marked there than anywhere else in the New World. Canada, as we were at pains to recall in the opening sentence of this study, is American; and yet it is the only country in America which has kept a non-American political allegiance. A unique relationship with both the United States and the British Empire has resulted from this diversity of ties. Canada has maintained excellent contacts, and as a result, in spite of her small population, she has a political influence which we must be careful not to under-estimate.

Canada's political personality is the result of this equilibrium between two attractions. If this equilibrium were upset, her very existence would be jeopardized, for a Canada that was purely English would be inconceivable in North America, while a Canada that was entirely American could not have existed as a separate entity. This is the way that the Canadian problem — the North American problem if you prefer — is taking shape in the post-war world. The traditional balance between Britain and the United States seems to be compromised, and at the same time the ties between Canada and Britain are also relaxing owing to the crisis through which the latter is now passing, a crisis which is the outcome of a glorious war effort that seems to have been rather too much for her. Also as a result of the war Canada and the United States have become more intimate than ever.

On the other hand Canada's position as an independent

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political power has been strengthened by her magnificent contribution to the victory of the Allies, by her rapid industrialization, by her immense natural resources unsuspected until yesterday, and finally by her location on the principal airways of the world. Thus we have a country which will henceforth rank among the powers that influence international politics. Her role will be even more significant as the mediator between the English bloc and the American bloc, for together these two provide the indispensable cement for the largest community in the world that owes its language and its civilization to the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Yet there still lurks the danger that Canada may be eventually absorbed by the United States in one form or another. Another latent peril is that in a war between the United States and Russia, Canada would be placed, like a new American Belgium, between the hammer and the anvil.

CHAPTER II

GEOGRAPHY AND THE CANADIAN PROBLEM

THAT there should be a country called Canada distinct from the United States is a mere accident of history, in fact a political paradox. Nature has not conferred upon Canada any particular personality of her own. There is no geographical difference to separate her from her great neighbour to the south. It is a problem to determine wherein lies Canada's centre of gravity: politically it is in England, and geographically it is in the United States—in either case outside her own boundaries. Her very existence is connected with this problem; for a purely British Canada could never be anything but a colony, and an American Canada could only be a group of states in the Union. Later we shall discuss the political relationship with England, but first let us fix Canada's position geographically in the American continent, a continent which, as we have already pointed out, possesses remarkable unity.

§ 1

From a geographical point of view Canada is merely the northern extension of the United States. There is no natural boundary between the two countries, but merely a political frontier along the parallel of latitude. The very straightness of the boundary betrays its artificiality. One is reminded of the shapeless contour of Poland. A witty American who described South Dakota as the 'state without end' might equally well have been referring to Canada.

'I remember some years ago,' he wrote, 'a friend explained to me that every time I went to the post office I crossed 45° north. I had not been aware of it. He pointed to the exact

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place, near a tree, and ever afterwards I found myself stepping high when I passed over the spot so as not to trip. But a state that must depend for its boundaries on such map-makers' devices is unfortunate.' ¹

In Canada there is plenty of space. With her three and a half million square miles she is not conceived on the European plan. Her area, greater even than that of the United States owing to her immense northern wilderness, is typically American. Her enormous size is less noticeable in the east where the distances are still, to our way of thinking, reasonable enough; but in the west and north they are overwhelming. From Quebec to Vancouver is over 2500 miles, including 750 from Winnipeg to the Rockies, and 500 from Calgary to the Pacific Ocean; the distance from Quebec to the Labrador coast again is 750 miles, while from Lake Ontario to the Hudson Bay is almost 625, and from Edmonton to the Arctic Ocean 1250. The area of Canada is thirty times that of the British Isles and accounts for 27 per cent of the whole area of the British Empire.

The separate Canadian provinces, however, are more or less on the scale of the countries of Europe. Manitoba is twice the size of the British Isles; Ontario is equal to France and Germany together; and Quebec to France, Germany, and Spain. Such astronomical figures are hard to grasp. To appreciate them fully one must travel over these vast spaces.

Three and a half million square miles! As big as Europe. But let us not linger over statistics, for after all they are only theoretical, because the area of Canada that has so far been developed is relatively small. Owing either to the nature of the soil or to the climate, it will be impossible ever to make use of much of Canada's territory. A map of the density of the population ² shows that the districts that have been effectively cultivated after three centuries of colonization and development still amount only to a long thin strip glued to the American frontier. Although this strip spreads out on the western prairies, its width is strictly limited in the St. Lawrence valley where it is hemmed

¹ *These United States*, p. 263 (T.I.).

² See Map on p. 49.

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in by the Laurentian shield whose rugged bluish horizon poetically marks the end, the northern limit of human habitation. Since her zone of occupation is extremely narrow, Canada is a state which lacks body. Therefore she is always tempted to seek a centre of gravity outside her own borders.

Yet in taking our inventory of Canada it would be quite wrong to consider the vast northern area simply as a liability, for on the contrary its existence constitutes a factor of great importance to the Canadian personality. Referring again to the symmetry between the American continents in the northern and southern hemispheres, Canada admittedly has its counterpart in the wheatlands of the Argentine, while British Columbia and Alaska correspond to Chile. But the great Northland, because of the unusual shapes of the two continents, has only a puny counterpart in Patagonia. The Northland is thus peculiarly Canadian and the only Arctic country in either continent.

The effect of the North on the Canadian individuality is noteworthy. Its importance lies less in its economic value than in what one may term its mystic appeal. Many countries — and they are to be envied — possess in one direction or another a window which opens out on to the infinite — on to the potential future. The open sky thus becomes part of their frontier, and to them it acquires a symbolical, almost a spiritual significance. In the United States it is the West; in Germany it is the East — that East which Hitler with his ambition for organization hoped to develop unfettered; in our Algeria it is the South, and in South Africa, in the heroic days of Cecil Rhodes, it was the North — 'My North' as he passionately called it. In Canada the frontier which abounds in poetry and latent hopes is less the West as in the United States than the Northwest, or simply the North. What an attraction it had for the pioneers, the backwoodsmen and mining prospectors, for missionaries like the Oblat Fathers, and also for poets and painters! They all felt, and not without reason, that here was a land that was limitless. In these new countries people speak with their eyes

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shining of the 'limitless possibilities', 'the unbounded potentialities' that still await them. How often have I heard such expressions of hope in America and Australia!

No Canadian will ever disown the North, for to him it is a boundless territory of unknown possibilities. Doubtless it is some obscure instinct that makes him resent as a criticism any remark by a foreigner about the severity of these lands which in truth do demand the maximum of man's energy. They have never forgiven Voltaire for referring to their country as 'a few acres of snow', and many are still angry over the vigorous description of the rude life of the pioneers around Lake St. John given in *Maria Chapdelaine*. Yet the North is always there like a presence; it is the background of the picture without which Canada would not be Canada.

But the Canadian North must be considered from still another angle, as a link between the various continents. Terrestrial distances, of course, become shorter as we approach the Poles, and for this reason Canada finds herself particularly well placed to serve as an intercontinental or imperial highway. The Fathers of Confederation already realized this in 1867, and so did the English statesmen from whom they received encouragement. Both were determined that this route by land and sea between England, the Far East, and Australia should remain entirely British. Modern posters advertising the Canadian Pacific Railway and its maritime services, 'The C.P.R. Spans the World', express this same idea.

What is new, however, is the importance that the Northland has gained as a result of aviation. In future the most direct air route between America and Europe, or between America and Asia, will pass northwards over Canada. From the United States to England planes will travel by way of Labrador and Greenland; from the United States to Japan or Siberia via Alaska, the best way will be across either British Columbia or the Canadian prairies east of the Rockies. In 1935, when an American squadron bound for Alaska alighted at Edmonton, the capital of Alberta suddenly realized that it was on the route to Asia.

THE CANADIAN PROBLEM

Throughout the 1914 war Canadian skies remained empty and silent. During the war of 1939, however, these same skies were fairly humming with air traffic.

It is a privilege for a country to be situated on a great international highway: a greater privilege, perhaps, not to be! But Canada cannot escape her destiny. She realizes, she cannot help realizing, that in the event of another world war she will be the first to be threatened. The attack this time will no doubt come not from the east or the west but from the north. Consequently Canada not only claims her rights but also accepts her eventual responsibilities as an Arctic nation. As a matter of policy it must keep in constant contact with the North right up to the Pole. This doctrine, though not recognized in principle by the United States, expresses an essential aspiration of the Canadian nation.

As far back as 1846 Disraeli, who was far ahead of his time, said in the House of Commons, 'I am not one of those who believe that the destiny of Canada must inevitably be annexation with the United States. Canada possesses all the elements of a great independent country. It is destined, I sometimes say to myself, to become the Russia of the New World.'

§ 2

Although Canada's problem is due in part to its continental and intercontinental location, it also arises from its geological structure, and from the position in relation to one another of its various regions. Although a detailed description of the geological structure hardly lies within the scope of this study, a brief reference to certain relatively simple characteristics is necessary, since they constitute an essential part of the country's personality.

When I look at a geological map, or simply recall my own personal experiences, what impresses me most is the enormous mass of the Laurentian Shield. This, the oldest geological unit in North America, is an intricate mass of granite and schists and




FIG. 2.—THE LAURENTIAN SHIELD

THE CANADIAN PROBLEM

metamorphosed sedimentary strata with many igneous intrusions of pre-Cambrian age, all deeply eroded, reduced to a featureless plateau and finally subjected to intense erosion in the last glacial period. The Laurentian Shield covers an area of 2,800,000 square miles and completely encircles Hudson Bay. It cuts diagonally across the Northwest, and borders the northern shores of the Great Lakes and also the north side of the St. Lawrence Valley, and finally dominates the Gulf of St. Lawrence. North of Lake Superior the Laurentian Shield is over 300 miles wide, and it extends 600 miles east and west of Hudson Bay. It is always recognizable by its dark blue line of hills which blot out the horizon.

One is instinctively reminded of Sweden and Finland, with their hard rocks, their meagre deposits of soil, their sheltered pools of brown water, and their endless forests. Such glaciated topography does not allow water to drain well, so there are innumerable lakes. The rivers are alternately stagnant or broken by rapids, and therefore cannot be navigated except by Indian canoes. This intractable region is rich in mineral resources, and especially suitable for generating hydro-electric power. The twentieth century realizes this and will no doubt make better use of it than its predecessor did. As we travelled between Toronto and Winnipeg I kept looking out of the window of the railway carriage, and here are the impressions that I still retain of this region:

For the first twenty-four hours the scenery was always the same. We were passing across the Laurentian Shield with its pre-Cambrian rocks, the oldest in the world. These rocks were rugged and bare, and grey or mauve in colour with seams of pink granite. Then an endless forest of birch and fir trees, and lakes of steel blue which changed to coffee colour as we approached them. The motionless trees were reflected in the calm still waters, and occasionally we passed a swiftly flowing river tumbling over its pebbles and frothing its waters into foam. But my outstanding impression is one of immobility, of grandeur, and of sadness. The scene was devoid of dynamism.

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At the foot of the Shield lies the St. Lawrence Valley where the French Canadians first settled. Vast empty spaces are here enclosed within the long lines of the horizon stretching wide and low, with glimpses towards the north of the poetical bluish frame of the Laurentian Mountains. The rivers are enormous, often as wide as an arm of the sea as they flow with rapid currents between their wooded banks. All this in a limpid atmosphere with silvery colouring that is almost metallic. There is something intangibly new about this air as if it had not yet been breathed by man, or tainted by the close atmosphere of cities. This is indeed the countryside of Chateaubriand. It is essentially American — eastern American — and entirely unlike anything in Europe, unless perhaps the shapeless scenery of Russia with its enormous rivers.

The rough framework of the rest of the continent consists of two ridges. In the east the Appalachians run parallel to the Atlantic northeastwards from Alabama to Newfoundland. They join up with the Adirondacks, a small advance spur of the Laurentian Shield. Much more extensive and complex are the Rockies, which cover all of the extreme west of Canada. They are Tertiary and Palaeozoic on their eastern slopes. On their western side, where they form the Cascade range, they are Mesozoic.

In the centre, between these two ridges, lies the great plain narrowing towards the north between the converging slopes of the Laurentians and the Rockies.

One August day at another stage of the journey between Winnipeg and Saskatoon I watched the immense wheat-covered prairie roll by. I thought of the sea as the unbroken plains stretched away absolutely flat, with not a hill to be seen, not even the slightest rise in the ground as far as the distant horizon. The soil is violet, brown, almost black. The fields which have just been harvested are dotted with sheaves of wheat the colour of toast. Here and there a meadow of tender green. The sky is blue with diaphanous clouds, so light that it would be impossible to associate them with rain. A kindly wind

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blows, swaying the wheat, shaking the leaves, and giving life to the land in the same way as it does to the sea.

The farms are tucked away among clumps of thin trees — oaks, poplars, and birch — which occur at regular intervals in this great field of wheat. In spite of the black earth, which shows only where it has been ploughed, the landscape is light in tone. The contrast with the Laurentian Shield is complete. Here we are in settled country, but before we came out on to this plain we had only the silence and emptiness of the desert. . . . Now and again we come upon a little dry valley beneath which runs no doubt an underground river, for its presence is revealed by the trees being greener and growing more closely together in rows. These valleys are uninhabited, secret and wild, for this is not a land of rivers and streams.

It is interesting to study the horizon. In the far distance a low line, almost a thin band of pale blue, encloses the scene like a narrow frame. One feels that it is infinitely far off, away in the endless unknown. I thought of the landscape of Beauce, but the atmosphere here is clearer, and there is something spacious and immense about this plain. This country is akin to the pampas, to the South African veldt, or the steppes of Russia. It is not conceived on at all the same scale as Europe. Towards the northwest the plain becomes less flat, or, as the Canadians would say, we come into rolling country. The soil becomes finer and finer until it is almost a shiny black. It is harvest-time and I can see the reaper-and-binder at work in the fields, loaded with ripe wheat the sumptuous colour of old gold. Here, stylized, is all the poetry of the harvest. If I were a decorator, I should never tire of transposing this picture into designs for textiles or tapestries.

The rivers are lazy, slow, uncertain, and meandering. There are a few marshy ponds which look rather shallow, surrounded with reeds among which one can distinguish wild duck. In the Laurentians the lakes are sinister, but these, when the sun sets over this immensity, are simply melancholy. After the sun has disappeared the sky is empty, cloudless, and marvellously light.

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The air is so lucid that one loses all sense of distance. A row of grain elevators seems to be close at hand in a bend of the road, but actually they are half an hour's train journey away. Occasionally there is a rise in the land like a ground swell, and the train crosses over them as if they were the calm waves of the ocean left behind in the wake of a ship. At a junction a railway line branches off and one can follow it as far as the horizon by its telegraph poles. A train setting out on this line, with its locomotive puffing away, made me think of a boat leaving port and going forth to lose itself in the blue distance.

Now let me recall the Rocky Mountains as I saw them from an aeroplane travelling between Whitehorse in the Yukon and Vancouver.

I left Whitehorse at three o'clock in the afternoon in splendid weather, so fine, perhaps, that a fall in the barometer could be expected. Towards the west the Rockies stood out clearly on the horizon, pink and mauve, with copper-coloured reflections where the leaves were already tinged with rust, the first sign of autumn. The general tone was light. In spite of their fir trees these mountains are not northern in character although they are situated at a latitude of 60 degrees north, and there are no meadows such as one finds in the Alps. Apart from their numerous lakes and magnificent springs of water, they are rather like the Atlas Mountains. We looked down on them perpendicularly as we flew over their bare summits and well-wooded slopes, and somehow they made me think of the spine of an elephant, grey or ochre in colour, vigorous and round.

The shadows are now sharply defined, for by this time it is four o'clock, and they gradually become inky blue. The foliage of the trees is admirable — firs in the background, but plenty of poplars turning yellow, the fresh lemon yellow that heralds the autumn. Some of the ridges, which are neither bare nor wooded but simply covered with grass, glow with brilliant hues such as red, green, and ochre, like a piece of leather that has been worked by an Oriental craftsman.

The many lakes are all at different levels, some blue, others

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azure green, and others the indefinable green of the Mosque of Brousse. Others again are as dull as ditch-water. One can pick out the Liard River, a tributary of the Mackenzie which flows into the Arctic Ocean. It is wide, sinuous, and cumbered with sandbanks, but always with plenty of water. From a dried-up river-bed it is easy to trace how it wandered about in earlier times, forming arabesques that it repeated again and again. No settlement here, nor indeed any sign of life. Gold prospectors making for the Klondyke sometimes went this way, but they did not always arrive. Civilization has set down an occasional airport in this vast emptiness, but they seem to be in a foreign land to which they do not belong.

Then it was night, and we saw nothing as we passed over the dividing line of the Pacific slope. At Prince George, when the aeroplane descended from the clouds, the runway was streaming wet. The air was mild, humid, and delicious, with that smell of the New World, where Nature is still the mistress of man. At Vancouver we came down in driving rain. The air had a tang of the sea, and we were welcomed by a salt wind, just as you are at Havre or Fécamp when you emerge from the station. We had now arrived on the Pacific slope.

Let me tell you next how we crossed the Rockies and saw the prairies again, this time by air.

When we left Vancouver the weather was fine but misty, and we could get only a glimpse of the sea and of the mountains which dominate the harbour. In the haze there is something almost Japanese about these mountains reminding me of Kaki-mono; after all the Far West is the forerunner of the Far East. The coastal plain was covered with clouds through which we could just discern in the distance the highest peaks covered with snow, but we could easily see the neighbouring heights and the many narrow, winding lakes which fill in the longitudinal valleys. Most of these lakes are the same dark blue as Lake Lucerne. We were soon aware that we had passed the great divide, for the clouds seemed to be glued to the western slope. Towards the east the sky was clear, except for a few

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stray vapours which shook the aeroplane slightly each time it passed through them.

We are now between the two principal chains of the Rockies, and above a cluster of peaks severed by deep valleys. The mountain spurs are extraordinarily sharp, and on the side away from the sun the shadows are clearly defined. There is little snow, and once again it seems less like Switzerland than like the Andes in southern Chile. Towards the north the view is bounded by an immense horizon of mountains. As in the Cevennes there are successive levels, and in the background a profile as stylized as one of those guide-book panoramas which are specially drawn to enable the tourist to recognize the different peaks. Some of these peaks are called after the presidents of administrative bodies and so forth.

As we travel inland we suddenly leave the last mountain chain behind and emerge on to an endless plain extending towards the east. When the aeroplane flies over this vast expanse the effect is magnificent. It is like an ocean reaching as far as the horizon, but one that is neither green nor blue, but pink or pale yellow, the colour of wheat, the colour of a dream. The sky is unbelievably light; in fact the entire scene is unreal and in striking contrast to the East and the West which we have just left. The sun sets and the mountains stand out clearly against the dying light. Very soon as we leave them behind they become quite small, and then one can discern only a serrated line far to the west. Try as I will I cannot describe this colouring: it is so velvety, so elusive, like the downy white surface of a freshly-gathered plum. One feels that the country lying out there on the Pacific coast is another world, a world that is mysterious and far away.

The plain as the day closes in takes on dark, strong colouring — the yellow of the wheat which is almost old gold, and the very dark green of the trees. So we have a combination of yellow and green, and yet gold is always the keynote. The landscape is not unlike our Causses district for the basic colours are the same; it also resembles the Beauce, partly on account of

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the rich tone of the soil when it has been turned up by the plough. But here everything is on a grander scale; in fact it is chiefly because of its spaciousness that this country is so wonderful. The sun sets exactly as it does over the sea, quite red, sinking into a mist the colour of a blood orange. Apart from a few little black puffs drifting westwards there are no clouds. The sunset is full of light and glory but the east is becoming sinister, livid, almost cadaverous. The soil is like mushroom purée and then quite black. Presently nothing is visible except the puddles reflecting the fading light. It is now night and our arrival at Regina is charming, for the city appears brilliantly lighted out of the darkness. By its street lamps we could see that it was laid out geometrically in regular squares. The lighthouse on the airport swept the horizon as if it were the sea.

The outstanding features which give the country its individuality are first the heavy mass of the Laurentian Shield, then the vastness of the prairies, and lastly the high relief of the mountain range which dominates them on their western side. With the exception of the Laurentians, which are essentially Canadian, the other regions are simply continuations of the United States, a fact which is of the utmost consequence, not only geographically but politically as well.

§ 3

Because of the very nature of its geographic make-up the Canadian climate lacks diversity. This is most important, as we shall see again when we study the economic aspect. We have here a country which is essentially continental, but which is much more influenced by the North Pole than by the Gulf of Mexico, or even by the neighbouring oceans. The warm chinook winds from the south sometimes reach the prairies, but more often a bitter gale from the north seems to come straight from the Pole itself. It is remarkable how little the sea atmosphere penetrates inland. On the Pacific coast it does not pass beyond the first slopes of the Rockies, and as for the Atlantic

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it actually influences eastern Canada less than it, in its turn, is influenced by the mainland. The paradox is that when the ocean meets the Gulf of St. Lawrence it seems to assimilate the climate of the continent. In all these characteristics, Canada is more like Asia than Europe.

The various climatic zones are scarcely different from one another. This is because the climate, being continental rather than meridional, falls into vertical zones prolonging those of the United States. When I crossed Canada from the Pacific to the Atlantic in the month of February, I remember that a soft rain was falling on the west coast, but in the Rockies and on the prairies the snow lay white on the ground under a brilliant sun. In Toronto it rained again owing to the mild humid influence of the Lakes, but when I reached Quebec there was snow and cold and the St. Lawrence was completely frozen over. When I made the same journey in the opposite direction in the summer, from June to September, I recall a warm persistent rain in the east, grilling heat in the centre, then a fresh mountain breeze on the other side of the prairies, and finally in Vancouver and Victoria the mild weather of the Pacific.

The only region in which the atmosphere seemed to be influenced by the south was on the American frontier in the Rockies, where the climate of the high plateaux of Mexico, Arizona, and Utah seemed to have been projected northwards. These valleys reminded me more of North Africa, however, than of Scandinavia. Everywhere else Canada was Nordic, almost Arctic. Therefore, unlike the United States or even the Argentine, or Roumania (which she resembles in some ways), she can never be a country complete in herself. There can never be any question of an autonomous economy. To give her her due, she has achieved her independence contrary to the dictates of geography itself.

The country thus falls naturally into several different regions. From east to west there are four good districts, separated from each other by undeveloped areas. The Maritime Provinces, with their forests and mines and some fine agricultural land;

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then the St. Lawrence Valley, the seat of the first colonizations and still the main centre of Canadian civilization; then the western prairies, more recently colonized by wheat growers; and lastly British Columbia, a land of forests, mines, and fisheries, but clearly concerned with the attractions, preoccupations, and problems of the Pacific.

Interspersed between these regions, which have been particularly blessed by Nature, are three others which by contrast are mediocre and difficult to develop. The *hinterland* of the Maritimes, including Gaspé, is the first barrier. Then on the plateau north of Lake Superior and Lake Huron we find a scanty covering of trees, hard unyielding rocks, and a glaciated horizon which is the very essence of sterility. Finally the Rocky Mountains, impressive in their grandeur and solitude, endowed with mineral wealth and magnificent for tourists, are devoid of population. Naturally the Far North must be classified apart, with its vast territories devoted to hunting, fishing, mining, missions, and adventure.

This brings us to the conclusion that there is bound to be lack of contact between the developed regions. Travelling by train from the Maritime Provinces of the Atlantic coast to Quebec takes 24 hours across an empty wilderness; from Toronto to Winnipeg requires 48 hours by rail over a rocky desert, sparsely sprinkled with trees but without soil or vegetation; from Calgary to Vancouver, another 24 hours through magnificent country where one feels, however, that humanity has made only a precarious impression. Each of these regions, rich or poor, empty or populated, corresponds to an adjoining region in the United States, of which it is merely an extension. For this reason the Maritime Provinces are irresistibly attracted towards New England, the Valley of the St. Lawrence towards New York, the prairies towards the American West, and British Columbia towards the American Pacific coast. Vancouver is more intimately connected with Seattle than with Quebec, St. John, N.B. with Boston rather than with Calgary. In spite of a political frontier which in reality does not separate, there is

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something more here than mere resemblance and relationship. Geographically the environment is the same; the people are the same and the life is the same.

§ 4

In the entire configuration one sees plainly something that might endanger the political unity of Canada. This unity is essentially based on the east-west axis which arises from a continuous movement in that direction of population, of colonization, of the railways, of confederation, and of the British or Imperial allegiance — it is part of the permanent relationship of Europe. But the attraction of the United States also provides a perpetual orientation from north to south, owing to its proximity, its resemblance, and its similarity of interests, all of which tend to compromise the political unity of Canada.

The Canadian problem lies in the inherent contradiction of a country which is American in its geographical position, its physical nature, and its whole atmosphere, but whose political existence relies on an initial, and so far unbroken, bond with a political community outside the New World. In this we recognize the two contrary axes of the American continent, and the struggle between history and geography of which it is the theatre. Nowhere is this struggle so intense as in Canada, where it is at once a source of weakness and of strength. The weakness is that of a country which is hybrid and divided, and which is not sure of itself. It cannot choose between the United States and England without destroying itself in the process. Hence arises the uncertainty of a heterogeneous people — British, French, and American — who are not sure they want the degree of cultural unity that would be necessary for the definite achievement of their personality.

But at the same time this weakness, which is caused by the country's very complexity, also gives birth to an undeniable strength. Canada is the only country in America which has kept its political link with Europe, and therefore it has an in-

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timacy of its own with the older civilizations on which is based the culture of all the western world. Canada is American, but it is also British and authentically French. Though it may be tempted to drift into a continental provincialism called isolationism which has not spared the United States, it is compelled by its position in the Empire to be international. The role of interpreter, which its governments well know how to fill, raises it above its own level. From the point of view of Europe, it is useful to have in North America a distinct political individuality called Canada.

II

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CHAPTER III

POLITICS AND POPULATION

§ 1

WE have felt justified in saying that there is no geographical necessity for the existence of a special political unit called Canada. Nevertheless this political unit does exist. There is a Canadian state, a Canadian people, and a Canadian nation. History has been the determining factor—history, dominated by chance events without which it might have been entirely different. Let us now recall the essential stages of the territorial formation of Canada in so far as they have been inseparably linked with the development of her population.

The first period brings us to the end of the French domination and to the independence of America. La Nouvelle France in the eighteenth century consisted of the whole of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi basins, while England possessed all the Atlantic coast from Alabama up to Newfoundland including Acadia, her sovereignty over the latter having been confirmed in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht. Rupert's Land in the Far North, which had been claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company since 1670, was only vaguely defined on the south and east. After French rule had been brought to an end by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the English territory extended over the entire continent east of the Mississippi, except for Florida. The French population which still remained on the banks of the St. Lawrence obtained a treaty guaranteeing the protection of their language, their religion, and their land tenure. The rights accorded in this initial agreement are still maintained by their descendants, who realize that they are of prime importance to the status of the French Canadian population.

The British domain was soon curtailed when an independent

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American power was constituted. The Treaty of Versailles in 1783 liberated the former British colonies, which became the United States. It also demarcated a frontier which has remained practically unchanged ever since, and which extended between the U.S.A. and Canada from the Atlantic to the headwaters of the Mississippi. The British Canadian element, which was small in comparison with the French, was reinforced by the mass migration of the United Empire Loyalists. These were the Americans who, remaining faithful to the King of England, settled in Acadia, on the northern shore of Lake Ontario, and in the Eastern Townships not far from Montreal. The essential characteristics of Canada were thus constituted both by the distinct French population and by the arrival of this wave of 'loyalists' to reinforce the small existing English population.

The second period extends from the American Revolution to the Canadian Confederation in 1867. The division of the country into Upper and Lower Canada by the Constitutional Act of 1791 recognized two distinct provinces, the one French on the east, and the other to the southwest of the Ottawa river. This separation, which arose from the racial structure of the map, was destined to last in spite of a temporary constitution from 1841 to 1867 when Upper and Lower Canada were united into a single province. The two provinces came into being again when Quebec and Ontario were formed at the time of the Confederation.

As the nineteenth century gradually came to its close, attention began to be directed towards the west. As early as 1825 a treaty had fixed the exact boundary between the Russian territory of Alaska and the Hudson's Bay Company's lands which were stretching farther and farther towards the west. By a series of equally important agreements from 1814 to 1846, the frontier between the United States and Canada was peaceably fixed along the 49th parallel of latitude. The British possessions now extended out to the Pacific. In 1849 the island of Vancouver was granted to the Hudson's Bay Com-

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pany, but was surrendered in 1858 when it was constituted a Crown Colony (as it still remembers!). Also in 1858 the mainland opposite the island received the same status. The two colonies were united in 1866 when British Columbia was formed.

Meanwhile, the Maritime Provinces had also been steadily evolving. These territories had been acquired in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1720 Nova Scotia was created, and by 1758 it had its own legislature. Prince Edward Island was founded in 1768 and New Brunswick in 1786.

The only bond that these territories had in common was that they all belonged to England, for the political personality of Canada, although already present in the minds of her statesmen, still did not exist.

In 1867 the British North America Act, by uniting the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia in a single confederation, created the Dominion of Canada. The Northwest Territories were transferred in 1870 to the Confederation, to which was also added in the same year the newly-formed province of Manitoba. British Columbia in 1871 and Prince Edward Island in 1873 rallied in their turn to the Dominion, which was now complete. Since then only minor changes have been made in the boundaries, such as a rectification in Alaska in favour of the United States in 1903, and on the Labrador coast in favour of Newfoundland in 1927. Without this union, which became necessary on the morrow of the American Civil War, the British colonies, scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, would not have resisted the latent menace of absorption by their powerful neighbour.

In 1867 the task of organizing the great unexplored regions still remained to be done, and so far it has already absorbed three generations of patient effort. In 1880 Canada inherited the English claim to the islands of the Arctic, and in 1882, detaching themselves from the Northwest Territories, the districts of Saskatchewan, Assiniboia, Alberta, and Athabaska set themselves up as distinct administrative units. Twenty-three

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years later Saskatchewan and Assiniboia on the one hand, and Alberta and Athabaska on the other, became the present autonomous provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta; and in 1912 Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec were considerably enlarged. In 1898 Yukon Territory was created, and in 1918 the remainder of the enormous Northwest was divided into three territories, Franklin, Kcewatin, and Mackenzie.¹

This complicated territorial development showed an unwavering determination to create a unified British community stretching from ocean to ocean, and to keep it distinct from the United States. During this period of construction, politics held the forces of geography in leash. The Canadian Pacific Railway, promised to British Columbia in order to induce her to join the Confederation, established Canada on an axis running from east to west. Without the transcontinental railway, which was essential to the very existence of the Dominion, the north-south tendency would certainly have prevailed, breaking up the country into isolated sections which sooner or later would have joined the United States. We must not even yet regard the matter as definitely settled. If the desire for a united Canada, which is strong among the leaders but very slight in certain provinces, were to weaken, the latent attraction towards the south would reassert itself. It is a question of desire and it varies according to the composition of the different parts of the population.

§ 2

When the last census of Canada was made in 1941 it was found that the population had risen to 11,506,665 inhabitants. In 1871, when the first census of the Confederation was made, the figure was only 3,689,257, and in 1901 on the eve of the great development of the West it amounted to 5,371,315. Thus we have an immense territory with a relatively sparse population

¹ For further geographical data see *An Historical Atlas of Canada*, by Lawrence J. Burpee (Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd.), 1927.

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amounting to an average of no more than 2.99 inhabitants per square mile. This calculation is of course mere theory, since it includes the whole of the empty North. Yet even in the districts which have been effectively developed, the population still is extraordinarily small, concentrated in a narrow band glued to the American frontier.

This fact presents several fundamental problems. Should this mediocre population be regarded as pathological, or is it not normal at the present time, taking into account man's increase in efficiency? Doubtless we must admit that the territory of a first-class power, one which intends to play a leading part in the world, should be at once densely populated and extensive in area. Nevertheless when a large country has a small population there are great advantages. Sweden is a case in point. But how about Canada? Even today with only 11 million inhabitants she plays a more important role in international affairs than many countries with far more people. Yet what does a population of 11 millions amount to when other countries have 200, 300, and even 500 millions?

The distribution of Canada's population is significant. There are, it is true, two fairly dense zones with at least 25 inhabitants per square mile and often many more — I mean first the districts north of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and secondly the valley of the St. Lawrence. There are also a few areas in the Maritime Provinces with a fair density. Then come four zones with a population of less than 25 inhabitants per square mile: up-country in the Maritime Provinces, the few parts of northern Ontario and Quebec which have been colonized, the western prairies, and in British Columbia the coast and a few valleys. The rest, as Shakespeare says, is silence!

The following table of provincial populations gives an authoritative review of the demography of the country: ¹

¹ All the statistics given in this book are (unless otherwise stated) obtained from the *Canada Year Book*, published annually by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

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	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Per cent of Dominion Total</i>
Maritime Provinces	1,310,410	10
Ontario and Quebec	7,119,537	62
Western Provinces	2,421,905	21
British Columbia	817,861	7
Yukon and Northwest	16,942	0.14

The centre of gravity thus lies decidedly to the east, since the five provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island contain over two-thirds of the population.

The proportion of the West in the total increased steadily up to 1931. The share of the Maritime Provinces on the contrary fell from 20.8 per cent in 1871 to 9.7 per cent, while Quebec and Ontario increased from 61 per cent to 76 per cent. In the Prairie Provinces the figure jumped from 1.6 per cent to 22.7 per cent, and British Columbia from 0.9 per cent to 6.7 per cent. Since 1931 the tendency has been reversed, for the population of the West has declined slightly from 22.7 per cent to 21.05 per cent. It is estimated that during the depression 95,000 people left Manitoba, 187,000 emigrated from Saskatchewan, and 95,000 from Alberta. The war, which followed soon after, opened up a new period of evolution during which people left certain old settlements to seek out new centres of attraction. In 1881 the centre of gravity was still at Valleyfield in the Province of Quebec, but between 1921 and 1931 it had shifted towards Lake Superior to a point a little to the north of Sault St. Marie, after which it dropped back somewhat. No doubt the movement towards the West will be resumed. The trend might even be towards the Northwest, who knows?

Canada had 3,689,000 inhabitants in 1871, and 11,507,000 in 1941. Thus her population trebled in seventy years, but the rhythm varied. During the first phase development was comparatively slow. From 1871 to 1901 the population increased from 3,689,237 inhabitants to 5,371,315, or about 15 per cent per decade, though from 1891 to 1901 the rate was only 11.13




FIG. 3. — DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION: CENSUS 1931

Each small black dot represents 1000 inhabitants in rural communities or 1000-2000 inhabitants in urban areas. The larger dots represent populations of 5000-10000 inhabitants. The circles represent towns, and their size is in proportion to the population. ——— line north of which prospecting is practically non-existent, except along certain rivers

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per cent. This was before the West was opened up by the enormous tide of immigration which streamed over the prairies. During the second phase development was very rapid. From 1901 to 1931 the population rose from 5,371,315 to 10,316,786 or about 25 per cent per decade (34·17 per cent from 1901 to 1911, 21·94 per cent from 1911 to 1921 and 18·08 per cent from 1921 to 1931). The three provinces of the West which had only 409,000 inhabitants in 1901 reached 2,355,000 in 1931, or an increase of 47 per cent.

The way for such rapid expansion was prepared first by the cession to the Dominion in 1870 of the vast undeveloped territories of the Northwest, and secondly by the completion in 1886 of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which opened up the lands for colonization. Also, as the American West was beginning to fill up, the 'last best West' alive with possibilities and promise was now in Canada. The heavy immigration of the first fourteen years of the twentieth century, which on the eve of the war had almost reached the figure of 400,000 people a year, provided an ever-increasing army ready to develop the country. To this development of the West must be added the industrial expansion of the East during the same period, and also the influx of British capital up to the war, with an even greater volume from the United States after the peace of 1918. It is not surprising that in such favourable circumstances people felt that Canada's steady progress would go on unchecked.

In fact, with the rest of North America, Canada was borne along on the rising tide of the marvellous prosperity which the United States had enjoyed without a break from the Cuban War up to the world depression of 1929. During the third phase, from 1931 to the war of 1939, the pace slackened, and the increase in population amounted to only 10·89 per cent from 1931 to 1941. The depression virtually brought immigration to a standstill, so that this was merely the natural increase provided by births. The war, as we shall see presently, brought with it renewed prosperity.

If we consider, not the development of the country, but the

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actual volume of its effective population, then we must admit that it is still mediocre and unsubstantial. Although certain regions, such as the St. Lawrence Valley, are well populated — paradoxically enough even over-populated — others, like the West and British Columbia, are still only superficially occupied. But the West is rich. It should be colonized by the East, and the latter could direct towards those great empty but promising spaces the excess of population from the regions which are already full, and where the birth-rate continues to be high. History, however, shows that the competing appeal of the South is dangerously powerful. The Canadians of the East, crossing a very near frontier, feel more at home in the factories of New England than in the far-off atmosphere of the prairies. This centrifugal attraction is a peril which, if it is to be overcome, requires unceasing vigilance.

One wonders whether Canada will ever have a large population, and considering the way the new continents are being colonized it is rather doubtful. From now on the trend will be towards the towns and mining districts, for mechanized agriculture needs very few hands on the farms. As we shall see later on, practically no manpower is required to harvest the enormous grain crop on the Western Prairies. There is still a call for settlers to go to districts like the Peace River in Alberta, but they are the exception. Since 1931 it is the towns that have absorbed 60 per cent of the increase. Canada's rural population amounts to only 45·7 per cent today, but on the other hand she possesses some very large cities. Greater Montreal now has 1,139,000 inhabitants, Greater Toronto 900,491, Greater Vancouver 351,491, Greater Winnipeg 290,540, Greater Ottawa 215,022, Greater Quebec 200,814, Greater Hamilton 170,110, and Greater Windsor 121,112. . . .

The obvious consequence of a sparse population in the existing economic order is that the domestic market is not sufficient to absorb Canada's products, which naturally are abundant with such resources, and so they must be exported. The country cannot, therefore, constitute an economic unit, closed if need be,

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like the United States. Therefore the economic attraction of its great neighbour is as irresistible as if the universal law of gravity also operated mathematically in the world of trade. In discussing the Dominion's relations with the United States one must always bear in mind the map of her population.

§ 3

Hitherto we have dealt with the numbers rather than with the composition of the population. Now Canada is not homogeneous, either demographically or racially.

As a rule we do not study nearly enough the demographic age of a country. It is not the same in the long-established populations of Eastern Canada as it is in the West, where they are newer and still in process of evolution. The coefficient of masculinity—the proportion of men to women—is always interesting, for it discloses fairly accurately the degree of the social evolution of a people, old countries having more women, and young countries more men (Fig. 4, page 53). In 1941 Canada had 105 men to 100 women, so it still must be classed among the younger countries.

Oddly enough the Canadian population, at any rate up to 1931, has become more marked in its masculinity since the end of the nineteenth century, which is tantamount to saying that it has become rejuvenated.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Men per 100 Women</i>
1871	102
1881	101
1891	103
1901	105
1911	111
1921	106
1931	107
1941	105

The great movement of immigration, which began in 1900 and naturally brought an excess of men into the country,




FIG. 4. — PROPORTION OF MEN TO WOMEN IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(BY PROVINCES OR STATES)

1. More than 110 men to 100 women
2. Between 100 to 110 men to 100 women
3. More women than men

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explains this evolution, which has varied in intensity from one decade to another. The 1929 slump is reflected in a slight decline, for the proportion of 107 men to 100 women in 1931 fell to only 105 in 1941. We can draw some interesting conclusions from the following table for 1941 which shows the masculine coefficient for the various provinces.

<i>Province</i>	<i>Men per 100 Women</i>
Prince Edward Island	107
Nova Scotia	105
New Brunswick	105
Quebec	101
Ontario	103
Manitoba	107
Saskatchewan	114
Alberta	115
British Columbia	114
Northwest Territories	144
Yukon	179

In the East the population is well established, notably in the province of Quebec, where since 1763 the French element has not been increased by immigration but simply by its own vigorous birth-rate. In the West, on the contrary, where the population is still in process of formation, the equilibrium towards which the two sexes are naturally tending has not yet had time to find its proper level. This phenomenon is true not only of Canada, for if we tabulate the populations of even a few of the American states on the 1941 basis, we discover the same result:

<i>State</i>	<i>Men per 100 Women</i>
Massachusetts	95
South Carolina	97
Georgia	96
Illinois	101
North Dakota	109
Montana	115
Nevada	125

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These figures manifestly reveal a situation parallel to that of Canada, although the latter developed a generation later.

So far as their demographic vitality is concerned the people of every country have an age, and this may be ascertained by pyramiding the ages of its inhabitants. As it grows older a country consequently has more old people than young, which tends to modify its social balance. In this respect Canada is in course of evolution from youth towards maturity. Between 1871 and 1941 the percentage of persons under 20 years of age fell from 52·6 to 37·5, while those over 60 years rose from 5 to 10·2. Incidentally the 1911-21 decade showed a temporary increase in the proportion of young people and a decline in the number of old. The census further reveals that the population of certain provinces is young and in others it is older. In 1941, for example, the Province of Quebec, which heads the list, had 21·2 per cent of persons under 20 years of age, while British Columbia had only 14·8 per cent; but on the other hand Quebec had only 8 per cent over 60 years against 13·4 per cent in British Columbia. Roman Catholicism accounts for the first case, and the American attitude towards birth control for the second. This evolution is exceedingly complex, for certain provinces such as British Columbia are young in material development but old in the vitality of their population. Other provinces on the contrary are more developed materially although their people are younger: Quebec is a case in point. Such conditions give rise to factors which are varied and subtle, and these we shall study later from the psychological point of view.

When we come to study racial origin we find everywhere this same lack of homogeneity. The Canadian people bear the mark of their initial political formation today, just as they did a hundred years ago. After she became British, Canada was not able to absorb the French group, and the English element, increased by the 'loyalists', simply settled alongside without assimilating or making any impression upon it. Although the recent cosmopolitan immigration into the West is adapting itself

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to the Canadian type, that does not mean that it is becoming British for that reason. As a matter of fact the American people are no less composite, but there one finds a definite effort to assimilate all new-comers whoever they may be. The French Canadians, on the other hand, enjoy special treaty rights and as they are determined to remain a distinct race they constitute a block which is not amenable to unification. Furthermore, in the United States the policy of assimilation is exerted in favour of a definite civilization which is at once Anglo-Saxon and American, and no alternative is possible. In Canada one finds competition between a French Canadian civilization maintaining its own individuality, a British civilization enjoying the prestige of England, and an American civilization turning for its example, its basis, and its very being, to the powerful southern neighbour.

Thus Canadian nationality undoubtedly is a problem. It exists, but if it is to persist it is essential that all Canadians, whatever their tradition, must be first and foremost Canadians. Now even in my own acquaintance are some who are 'French Canadians', not simply 'Canadians'. I know others whose culture is so completely American that any hope of a national personality of their own seems to be out of the question. Others again have remained so purely English that their British reactions come before their strictly Canadian reactions. Finally, in British Columbia and strange as it seems among certain French Canadians in Quebec, there are those who regret the colonial regime, and who in their heart of hearts are tempted to place more confidence in the government at London than in the one at Ottawa. Such British rather than imperial sentiments are becoming rarer, but to some extent they still retard the full bloom of a national Canadian consciousness.

CHAPTER IV

THE FRENCH ELEMENT

§ 1

IN Canada in 1941, out of a total of 11,506,655 inhabitants, 3,483,038 were French Canadians. Those of British origin numbered 5,715,904, leaving 2,108,128 others belonging to the white race but who were neither British nor French, and finally 199,585 Indians, Chinese, and Japanese. These figures emphasize the relative importance of the French group.

This group, which today amounts to several millions, is descended entirely from the 65,000 French from the western departments of France (Ile de France, Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Charente, Brittany), who were abandoned on the banks of the St. Lawrence by the Treaty of Paris in 1763.¹ Cut off from intercourse with France from which they received no further reinforcements, their only hope of survival lay in their own vitality. That, as we see, has not failed them, for these millions of French relying on their own resources have written in the New World an astonishing page of history. Their old Mother Country forgot them for over a hundred years, though it is true in 1855 the frigate *La Capricieuse* made a famous and quite exceptional visit. Then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, she suddenly rediscovered them, and has since maintained a passionate interest which has never wavered.

A map of the French Canadian population (Fig. 5, page 58) reveals two principal groups: one in the province of Quebec, overflowing on the west into Ontario, and the other in the

¹ See the excellent book by Georges Langlois, *Histoire de la Population Canadienne Française*, published in 1934 by Albert Lévesque, Montreal.




FIG. 5. — LOCATION OF THE FRENCH CANADIAN POPULATION

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Maritime Provinces, particularly in New Brunswick. Secondary groups, less compact but constituting important minorities, are found partly in Ontario in the neighbourhood of Detroit, partly north of the Great Lakes around Sault St. Marie and in the Temiskaming district, and finally, a few scattered over the western prairies with small concentrations in Winnipeg and Edmonton. Although numerically small we must add those of the far North where French Canadians, both whites and half-breeds, are met with everywhere from the Atlantic to the Rockies.

The French population, taken by provinces, is as follows:

	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>French Canadians</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Maritime Provinces	1,130,410	244,993	21.5
Quebec	3,331,882	2,695,032	80.9
Ontario	3,787,655	373,990	9.8
Prairie Provinces	2,421,905	146,505	6.0
British Columbia	817,861	21,876	2.7

As this table shows the French Canadians are by far the most important group in the St. Lawrence Valley, in fact in this part of the country they are the basic element of the population. We must, however, make an essential distinction here, without which we cannot understand the dominating influence of the French in this whole region. Although they amount to only 9.8 per cent of the population of Ontario, this is offset by the fact that they are 80.9 per cent of the population of Quebec — that province literally belongs to them! In the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta they number only 6 per cent. Yet this mediocre figure gives a false impression, for here they are to be found almost everywhere forming compact groups, speaking their own language and fully conscious of their own individuality. They have not penetrated beyond the Rocky Mountains, however, and in British Columbia they account for only 2.7 per cent of the population.

The stages of the vigorous French Canadian development are

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easily traced. In the St. Lawrence Valley, the original theatre of their occupation, their prolific birth-rate caused them to spread like a drop of oil. They first captured practically the entire province of Quebec, and they then began to overflow into the neighbouring province of Ontario. In 1901 only five counties remained in Quebec with an English majority: Argenteuil, Brome, Huntingdon, Pontiac, and Stanstead; by 1941 they were reduced to two: Brome where the French account for 47 per cent and Pontiac with 43 per cent. In the farm lands of the St. Lawrence Valley below Montreal, the French Canadian majorities usually attain 95 per cent and even higher: 99.3 per cent in the county of Beauce and 99.9 per cent in Bagot. In Montreal out of a total of 1,138,431 inhabitants, 719,240 or 63 per cent are French; and in Quebec 187,271 out of 202,882 or 92 per cent.

Their peaceful conquest of eastern Ontario is not less striking. In the four eastern counties of Prescott, Glengarry, Stormont, and Russell, on the boundary of the Province of Quebec, although in 1881 the French Canadians amounted to only 32,600 souls out of 93,358, or 35 per cent, they attained by 1901 51,935 out of 111,374 or 46 per cent, and in 1941 63,182 out of 119,617, or 52 per cent (in Prescott they even amount to 81 per cent).

Similarly in New Brunswick (where they are called Acadians), their biological pressure seems to be irresistible:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Acadians</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1871	285,594	44,907	16
1911	351,889	98,611	28
1931	408,219	136,999	33
1941	457,401	163,934	35

A second stage of their development consisted in colonizing territories which are near by but not adjoining, such as the district around Lake St. John which they opened up at the end of the nineteenth century. The districts of Abitibi, Temiskaming, and Nipissing, all on the boundary between Quebec

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and Ontario, represent a more recent example of the same colonization. In Abitibi the French form almost the entire population, in Temiskaming over two-thirds, and in Nipissing almost half.

A third stage, contemporary with the second one, carried the French Canadians into the West when that part of the country was being developed. Conditions here were not the same, for there was no direct contact between Quebec and the prairies. The colonists from the shores of the St. Lawrence, who went out to settle these new lands which differed so entirely from the country they had hitherto cleared and developed, were on the same footing as the mass of immigrants from Europe or the United States. They did not have the benefit as they had had at Lake St. John or Abitibi of a near-by starting point. Many of them actually arrived in the West by way of the United States. For this reason their settlements were sporadic, but they never dispersed, and their colonies always retained a certain individuality. Gradually the French population has ceased to be a local phenomenon limited to the eastern provinces. We must not exaggerate this trend, but we should be wrong to overlook it, for the movement is not over yet. The Peace River district in Alberta, which still remains to be colonized, is receiving a great many French Canadian settlers.

Government statistics give us the exact numerical position of the French element, which in 1941 represented 30.03 per cent of the total population, although in 1931 it was only 28.22 per cent. This French Canadian population is mainly concentrated in a massive block in the Province of Quebec where it amounts to 81 per cent of the population, and in most districts accounts for nearly every one. Of the 3,483,038 French Canadians 88 per cent belong to the St. Lawrence group, 7 per cent to the Maritime Provinces, and 5 per cent to the West. Expressed in cold figures, their development has been remarkable, as is disclosed in the following table:

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French Canadian Population

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Approx. Increase</i>	<i>Relation to Total Population Per cent</i>
1763	65,000		
1871	1,082,940		31·07
1881	1,298,929	216,000	30·05
1901	1,649,371	350,000	30·71
1911	2,054,890	406,000	28·51
1921	2,452,743	398,000	27·91
1931	2,927,990	475,000	28·22
1941	3,483,038	555,000	30·03

Thus although real progress has been great relative progress has amounted to nothing at all, indeed there was even a set-back during the period of unfettered immigration. The pace forward has been resumed since 1931, and the tendency is all the more striking if we consider the various regions separately. Whether in Quebec or New Brunswick, the French element is steadily increasing until the movement seems to be irresistible. This fact is replete with consequences, and well they know it. The English are becoming anxious for if this progress, real and relative, becomes still more marked, serious problems are bound to arise.

§ 2

What are the factors which have enabled this race, apparently doomed to disappear at the time of the Treaty of Paris, to develop and prosper?

The first assuredly is religion, which has kept the French Catholics distinct from the English Protestants. This difference in religion is vital, for it expresses the contrast between two civilizations, two traditions, and two conceptions of life. The French population and the Catholic community do not of course coincide exactly, for as the French amount to only about 30 per cent of the total population and the Catholics to 43·3 per cent, there is obviously a margin of non-French Catholics. The

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French Canadians are practically all Catholics, the proportion being 97 per cent over the whole country, and reaching 99 per cent in the province of Quebec.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the primary role in the preservation of the French Canadian tradition has been played by the Church. The priest, by preserving and guaranteeing the idea of the 'family', has constituted a most effective bulwark for this little people, and has protected them from the risk of disintegration. It is he who, now as in the past, holds them together, physically and morally, and gives them the true conception of their own racial, linguistic, and spiritual individuality. The French Catholic of Canada no doubt is Canadian, and the oldest Canadian, but he still is different from the rest. One may also say that he is American in the sense that he belongs to the New World, but he must not be confused with the Catholic of the United States, nor yet with the Irish or English Catholic.

In addition to this religious bond, there is also among the French Canadians a purely racial consciousness. I wonder if it alone would be sufficient to assure the cohesion of the race, or indeed if it would have been sufficient in the past.

The most important influence exerted by the Church lies in education, which, from the primary to the superior schools and even to the universities, is entirely in its hands. Above all it maintains its spiritual discipline over every phase of the life of the people, be it private or family, social, political, or economic. No aspect of their existence escapes its control. This priestly supervision could not have been effective for so long had it not kept the French Canadians completely immune from external influence. They have been kept free from contact with any ideas which might be considered dangerous germs. If one agrees with the aim in view, then this course is the essence of wisdom. If any intimacy, however slight, is allowed to develop with circles where the American spirit flourishes, the work of centuries may be endangered. We are forced to conclude that without their priests the French Canadians could not have remained intact — in other words they would not have survived.

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Their use of the French language is the outstanding symbol of their unity. If it is to continue it must be taught in the schools as the principal language. In the province of Quebec this is guaranteed by the Treaty of 1763 and is never questioned. In the English-speaking provinces the establishment of separate schools in which French is the principal tongue has met with obstinate ill will. However, it is usually agreed that French, even if it is not to continue as the principal language, shall at least be taught in the infant classes for a few years before English commences. This meets the essential difficulty, for as the twig is bent so will it grow.

This educational policy can be carried out only where the community is sufficiently important to stand alone. Elsewhere there is little hope especially for isolated cases, for experience proves that these are rapidly engulfed in their Anglo-Saxon surroundings. They are all the more vulnerable as the language they use professionally in the factory or office is English. It is not usually realized that 96 per cent of the English Canadians do not understand French, although on the other hand 33 per cent of the French Canadians speak English. This applies particularly to the French in the towns, and notably to the liberal professions. Yet 62 per cent, especially in the country, speak nothing but French, and 5 per cent speak nothing but English — or as the Americans would say, 'they have passed'.

The census statistics make another distinction between those who are French by race and those who are French by language. A man whose father is French is French by race, but to be French by language, French must be his native tongue. In Quebec and New Brunswick and to a certain extent also in Manitoba race and language coincide, which signifies that all those who are French by race still speak their own language. This is the result of the way they cling together and live in communities. In the English provinces this is not the case, for when a French Canadian is left to himself he gives in and adopts the language of the majority. In British Columbia, for example, only 51 per cent of the French speak the language of

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their birth, and in Nova Scotia 62 per cent. In business it is obviously an advantage to be bilingual and this is where the French Canadian scores, but there is a latent temptation to abandon French whenever the individual strays from his own people.

On the other hand the language is in permanent danger of corruption. The French Canadians speak a good provincial French, which has stood the test of time, and has been considerably purified during the past thirty years. The peasants speak an authentic country dialect with a hint of the past, whereas cultivated circles speak very correctly, though in the towns Anglicism is creeping in. It is with pleasure that we listen to picturesque old-fashioned expressions like the following, which reveal a desire to avoid English corruption:

Le char, instead of *le train*
Le petit char, instead of *le tramway*
L'engin, instead of *la locomotive*
Les lisses, instead of *les rails*
L'orateur, instead of *le président*
Le fourgon à boyaux, instead of *la pompe à incendie*
Les erreurs clericales, instead of *les fautes d'impression*

But unfortunately there are others, shameless camouflages of English which sound rather shocking:

Le char à steam, for *machine à vapeur*
La job, for *l'emploi*
La plume fontaine, for *le stylo*
La watcher, for *l'observer*

This invasion is becoming irresistible in technical language, in sports, and on the cinema. The continental atmosphere, which is American rather than English, threatens to impregnate everything, making it difficult for any but the well-educated to maintain the tradition of pure French correctly spoken.

If pure French is to continue, it will be because it is employed by the Church in the sermon, in confession, and in the daily

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activities of the parish, for otherwise it risks being corrupted even in family life. The priest, in a word, should be French-speaking. At first sight this problem may seem simple, for obviously the French Canadian priest is passionately devoted to the language, well knowing that it constitutes the first line in his system of defence.

True, but the Church, being a universal institution, does not feel that the language of Catholics should necessarily be French. On the contrary she may consider that in North America English represents the most effective means of spiritual communion since it is spoken by over 95 per cent of the population. Without having the slightest hostility towards the French language where it is generally spoken, she may impose definite limits to its expansion, since one-third of the Canadian Catholics use the English tongue. Naturally no difficulty arises when a French-speaking ecclesiastic is chosen in the province of Quebec, since no alternative is ever suggested. When a priest or a bishop has to be appointed to a parish or a diocese situated on a linguistic borderland the problem becomes singularly delicate, all the more so as the choice of an individual according to which language he speaks may in the end Anglicize or Frenchify the district in question.

Thus whether they wish it or not, the ecclesiastical authorities are dragged into politics. Bitter quarrels arise far exceeding in gravity the point at issue, and usually disclosing local rivalry between the Irish and the French, as well as the need for the Church to allocate separate zones of influence for each of the two languages.

A little trick, which really settles nothing, consists in appearing to give satisfaction to the French Canadian element of some diocese by sending them as bishop a Mgr. Dupont (as we shall call him), who, however, does not speak French. Somewhere else the Church tries to appease the opposite camp by appointing a Mgr. Fraser (shall we say), a pure French Canadian in spite of his name! This by-play is important, for the future of the diocese is at stake.

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It is interesting to show the situation in some of the Ontario dioceses where disputes have arisen:

<i>Diocese</i>	<i>Percentage of French Canadians in Catholic Population</i>	<i>Bishop</i>	<i>Nationality</i>
Haileybury	76	Mgr. Rhéaume	French Canadian
Alexandria	71	Mgr. Couturier	English
Ottawa	76	Mgr. Forbes	French Canadian
Northern Ontario	60	Mgr. Hallé	French Canadian
Pembroke	50	Mgr. Ryan	Irish
Sault St. Marie	48	Mgr. Dignan	Irish
London	36	Mgr. Kidd	English
Toronto	11	Mgr. McGuigan	Scottish
Peterborough	18	Mgr. O'Connor	Irish
Kingston	17	Mgr. Spratt	Irish
Hamilton	4	Mgr. McNally	Irish

The final decision in the appointment of bishops is made outside the Canadian boundaries by the authorities at Rome, who have the right to say how far from the religious point of view the domain of the French language should extend. The Holy See appears inclined to leave to the French their present territory, but does not seem disposed to allow them any increase in an English-speaking North America. The Church refuses to identify itself completely with the small minority who speak the French tongue.

The French Canadians have been allowed to survive thanks to their religion and their language, but it is owing to their birth-rate that they have increased in such prodigious proportions. In spite of an inevitable tendency to decline, the birth-rate in the province of Quebec, traditionally enormous, is still high. It was 80 per 1000 in 1765, and as high as 40 in 1875. Since then it has dropped to 37 in 1913, 33 in 1925, and 25 in 1934. Actually the real level is higher than this, for these statistics include the English minority. The French birth-rate is over 30 per 1000 in many counties, especially in recently colonized districts. Contrary to expectations it has not declined much in

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the big cities, as it still was 20 in Montreal in 1933, and 28 in Quebec. Therefore, even today the French Canadians are still prolific — at least such is a foreigner's impression. Big families even in the towns seem to be the rule, in contrast to the small families of the English and especially of the Americans.

This fecundity was offset in the nineteenth century by an exceptionally high death-rate, amounting until 1897 to over 20 per 1000. Since then an efficient effort has been made to introduce more hygienic conditions, and as a result this figure declined to 10.3 in 1941, so that in spite of the falling birth-rate the rate of survival remains at 16.5 per 1000, which is considerable. This accounts for an increase of about 555,000 in the French Canadian population in the decade of 1931-41 (Fig. 6, page 69).

This phenomenon cannot be appreciated unless it is compared with the statistics of the other racial elements in Canada:

<i>1941</i>	<i>Birth-rate per 1000</i>	<i>Death-rate per 1000</i>	<i>Survival Rate per 1000</i>
Entire country	22.2	10.0	12.2
Quebec	26.8	10.3	16.5
Ontario	19.1	10.5	8.6
British Columbia	18.4	11.1	7.3

As this table shows, the birth-rate is low in the English community of Ontario, and lower still in British Columbia which is strongly influenced by the United States. The French Canadian increase is thus important, and would have very important consequences in the future if these were the only factors to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, such persistent fecundity in the present century, and especially on a continent where birth control has become the rule, must be considered a phenomenon of the greatest significance.

Will it last? To answer this we must find out why it has lasted up to the present. The first reason is that the Church takes a firm attitude against birth control, and its instructions given through the confessional and enforced by rigorous




FIG. 6. — BIRTH-RATE BY PROVINCES (1934)

1. Very high: over 25 births per 1000 inhabitants
2. High: between 20 and 25 births per 1000 inhabitants
3. Average: between 15 and 20 births per 1000 inhabitants
4. Low: under 15 births per 1000 inhabitants

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penances are generally followed. Secondly it is worthy of note that in a new country people do have large families. Here they feel that there will be no difficulty in establishing their children when they grow up in the near-by city, in the United States, in the West, or in the regions of the North that will be opened up by that time. Perhaps this custom, which has now gained momentum until it has become an unquestioned tradition, plays an important role in this respect; at any rate it is the thing to have big families and so it continues. . . . Yet in spite of all this reasoning, the underlying tendency of the continent leads to biological sterility, and this influence may prove too strong. The lead of the French Canadians is, however, undisputed, and even with a lower birth-rate it is likely to continue.

Finally, I feel that the vitality of the French Canadian community is the result of a certain attitude towards life and work, which is found nowhere else in America. This is a Catholic conception, and is linked up with various traditions inherited from old-time France. It takes the form of a moral discipline of the family, exerted under the direct influence of the Church. Thus it respects values which are considered out of date elsewhere, especially in the New World. It believes in hard work, commends thrift and self-discipline, accepts the doctrine of large families as a Christian duty, and restricts ambition to sensible proportions. Such thoughtful asceticism is the very negation of Americanism. Its principles are contrary to the underlying inspiration of the American civilization, even in its Catholic form. No compromise is possible, and if we dare look at the matter frankly we must admit that any assimilation by the French Canadians of American customs would mean the complete abandonment of their own traditions. They will survive only in so far as they refuse to be Americanized. The existence on the North American continent of a distinct people, ethnically different from their surroundings, is a curious paradox. Again one wonders if it can possibly last.

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§ 3

If the birth-rate, the death-rate, and the rate of survival were the only things to be considered, the biological success of the French Canadians would be assured. But the question is more complex. There are other factors which determine the future of the Canadian people as a whole, and the fine asset side of the French position has a correspondingly heavy liability side as well. The disadvantage of the very strong defensive position that we have outlined is that clerical discipline is dearly paid for. As a result of circumstances, and because the Church believes that it is working for the salvation of the race which has been entrusted to its care, it has assumed functions which are excessive and abnormal, yet which it is unwilling to relinquish. The Church like certain parents finds it hard to admit that its spiritual children, being now full-grown, are emancipating themselves. The priest tolerates no independence. If any activity arises outside of his sphere he insinuates himself into it and imposes his will, or else prevents it from becoming effective. Even today it is not easy for a French Canadian to exist if he has incurred the ill-will of the ecclesiastical authorities, as has been proved by recent examples in literature and the Press. The Church instinctively tries to absorb the flower of the race by intensive recruiting — the most brilliant child in the family is naturally destined for the priesthood — and this makes it difficult for any culture to develop beyond its jurisdiction. Now if the French Canadian civilization is to be complete, it must build up a culture of its own, and not rely solely on a Catholic culture; the nuance is important.

The birth-rate, which it is the custom to applaud, also exacts a heavy penalty. For many generations it has been accompanied by a correspondingly high death-rate, especially among new-born babies. These two phenomena are closely linked together, and probably the recent progress in reducing the death-rate will result in a reduction in the number of births. The stamina of the race no doubt will be improved — at

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the present time in the country districts the people are sturdy but in the cities they are showing signs of weakening. Owing to the custom of having large families it has been difficult to assure satisfactory hygienic conditions. When a woman has already borne twenty children, as does occasionally happen, how can she possibly have sufficient vitality left to give birth to more who will be healthy?

There has been considerable improvement in the past few years, but previously in excessively prolific families not enough care was given to bodily health, especially as the people were influenced by the ecclesiastical tradition of not paying too much attention to the body. The natural consequence of this variety of circumstances and excessive fertility has been to maintain a lower standard of living in comparison with that of English Canadians. In France we admire these 'fine families', but we must not overlook the fact that in English-speaking circles in America they are an object of commiseration, almost of reproach, and are regarded as the sign of an inferior civilization.

In the light of the above observations, one easily discerns the perils which may threaten the future of the French Canadian race. The most serious seems to me to be the complete change in character which is sure to result from the fact that this formerly rural people is now largely urban. In the province of Quebec, the countryside in 1871 still contained 80.5 per cent of the total population, but this proportion has now fallen to 37 per cent. This movement is general, but it is most accentuated on the shores of the St. Lawrence. It is evident that as a result the French Canadians risk losing their traditional qualities, for these were indissolubly linked up with the peasant life they are now abandoning.

In the cities Americanization lies in wait, ready to throw itself at their heads and seize them by the throats. Once they have been enticed into the American atmosphere of movement and noise, so different from that in which their ancestors were bred, how can they hope to resist? When this proletariat has been completely severed from the soil and transplanted to an

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urban setting exactly like the U.S.A., it will lack those reserves of spiritual nourishment which formerly provided its racial defence. The appeal of standardized comfort will prove irresistible. I do not suggest that these masses will cease to be French. They can continue to speak the French language, corrupted with Anglicisms perhaps, but in spirit they will have difficulty in remaining distinct.

Thus the real danger lies not so much in Anglicization as in Americanization. When they are simply confronted by the British, the French Canadians form 30 per cent of the population of Canada, and this minority is sufficiently important and compact to enable them to hold their own, today as yesterday. When we consider the North American continent as a whole, however, the French Canadians (even including the Franco-Americans in the United States) amount to only 5 millions out of 150 millions or 3 per cent. In the end the sheer weight of these 150 millions is bound to overwhelm them.

A second danger appears in the migratory movements which may diminish the number of French, or possibly increase their racial rivals. Owing to its high birth-rate, the province of Quebec is always menaced by over-population, so the excess is obliged to go elsewhere. The important thing is that it should not be lost. If it flows towards the large Canadian cities, the result may be as we have suggested a loss in quality, but that is all. After all the liberal professions must be recruited, and experience shows that the villages furnish talent of the first order. Again, if those who are leaving go out to colonize the West or the Far North, there is nothing in this solution of the problem to hinder the national development of the French. On the contrary it is to such united groups of settlers that we owe the opening up of the districts of Lake St. John, Abitibi, Temiskaming, and others farther afield in the Northwest but always in Canada. The province of Quebec, following a most enlightened policy, organizes and then subsidizes this type of migration.

Such has not always been the case, however. In the past

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when the son left his home in the village, more often than not the line of least resistance counselled him to direct his steps towards the United States. The life of the pioneer, especially in the North, was hard. How much more tempting was the prospect across the border, in a country very like his own with work at higher wages! In the latter half of the nineteenth century when the New England cotton industry was developing rapidly, it drew a large part of its requirements of factory labour from the Quebec countryside. At this time the French Canadians in their hundreds of thousands established themselves in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and with no thought of returning. According to American statistics, in 1932 there were 371,000 immigrants whose parents had been born in Canada. The total 'Franco-American' population amounted to over a million, though some even put at the two million mark the number of Americans of French Canadian origin throughout the United States. How much better for the French Canadian group if these *émigrés* had remained in their own country!

This French Canadian exodus is only one aspect of the question. While the French are losing part of their population through emigration, with no hope of being able to make good the loss from elsewhere, the English-speaking element can on the contrary augment itself by immigration. So long as the settlers come from the British Isles this goes without saying, but even with immigrants from other sources the result is the same, for in the end assimilation always works in favour of the Anglo-Saxon race. The advantage which the French Canadians owe to their high birth-rate can thus be counterbalanced. This was proved when their percentage declined owing to the intensive development of the West in the early years of the century.

The British majority might be tempted to overwhelm the French Canadian minority not merely by their own British numbers, but also by 'packing the house' with immigrants, as the result of reopening the country to immigration. This

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eventuality, improbable as it may seem, is still quite possible. At any rate it widens the scope of the discussion and brings us to an examination of other elements that make up the Canadian population.

CHAPTER V

THE ENGLISH CANADIANS

§ 1

THE English Canadians in 1941 numbered 5,715,904 out of a total of 11,506,655 inhabitants or 49·7 per cent.

They are of three different origins. First, those who came overseas from the British Isles, such as the Scots who arrived in Nova Scotia before the fall of Quebec, and other British colonists who settled in the St. Lawrence Valley after the Treaty of Paris, and since then all over the country. Then, secondly, those who came from the United States, the great influx of United Empire Loyalists who settled in the Maritime Provinces, the eastern townships in Quebec, and at Kingston, Ontario. Finally, separate mention should be made of the intensely English groups which the English garrisons left behind them at Halifax and Victoria. These cities, still filled today with retired officers and their descendants, are imbued with the true 'colonial' spirit.

The difference between the English and French Canadians is that the former have never lost contact with their homeland, from which they continue to receive reinforcements. The bond moreover is not merely demographic, but also social, religious, and political. In their new surroundings many of them are as English as ever in sentiment; in fact one cannot be sure at first sight if one is speaking to a Canadian of English stock, or to an Englishman who has recently settled in Canada. On the morrow of the American secession, England expected a rupture would come within the next few generations, but it has never taken place. Nevertheless there is an essential difference between an English Canadian and an Englishman who has settled in Canada. Although in appearance they are simply two English-speaking Canadians, psychologically they are not the same.

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Geographically the British domain is as follows:

The Maritime Provinces (except the north of New Brunswick);

Ontario (except the counties bordering on Quebec);

Western Quebec (especially part of Montreal and part of the eastern townships, now reduced to two counties only);

The Prairies (except for numerous foreign groups which have not been assimilated);

The cities of Victoria and Vancouver, and several valleys in British Columbia.

Thus apart from the province of Quebec the British element is to be found everywhere, constituting an appreciable part of the population:

	<i>Per cent</i>
Maritime Provinces	70·8
Quebec	13·6
Ontario	72·0
The Prairies	47·8
British Columbia	69·8

In the Maritime Provinces the proportion in New Brunswick is only 62 per cent, and Quebec of course will always disrupt the racial unity of the country.

British supremacy is incontestable in certain zones such as Ontario and British Columbia, and to a lesser degree Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Once French rule had been eliminated, the conquerors were able to colonize the country without hindrance. They alone peopled these immense territories, until the competition of mixed immigration sprang up in the West to mitigate or at least defer their victory. The only region in which their offensive has completely failed is the province of Quebec, where it encountered a block on which it could make no impression.

It must be admitted that in the days of pioneering on the frontiers of civilization the English were not always the most capable. On the other hand an English-speaking migration of fine stock undoubtedly played a decisive part in the development of the Canadian West. This great West was organized

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and built up by an élite of British descent who came from the East. From the political point of view this aspect of the east-west movement is most important, for it has contributed more than anything else to Canadian unity in its British form. In the Maritime Provinces and Ontario it became a tradition for people with exceptional energy and initiative to migrate towards the West where there were plenty of careers awaiting their ambition. Thus Nova Scotia sent the best of her sons to Montreal and later beyond the Great Lakes. In this way a group of men was formed of outstanding political and economic ability, and they helped to maintain the British spirit in spite of American influence which increases as one approaches the Pacific. West of Winnipeg almost every bank manager one meets is a Scotsman who has come from the Maritime Provinces, usually from Nova Scotia. In the United States the New Englanders and notably the Bostonians played a similar role in opening up the American West.

The British element according to the census of 1941 represents 49·7 per cent of the population of Canada, and 8 per cent actually were born in Great Britain. (The latter figure was 11·4 per cent in 1931, and in accordance with this trend the proportion of British was 52 per cent.) The following table shows that ever since 1871 their proportion has been declining:

<i>Year</i>	<i>British Canadians</i>	
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
1871	2,110,502	60
1881	2,548,514	58
1901	3,063,195	57
1911	3,896,985	54
1921	4,868,738	55
1931	5,381,071	51
1941	5,715,904	49

Their real progress has been substantial because they have drawn their strength from two sources, births and immigration. As opposed to this, however, they have had to compete on two different fronts, against the French Canadian birth-rate

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and against foreign immigration. As a result the proportion has been falling behind fairly steadily, and as the years pass Canada must tend to become less British.

Statistically exact as they are, the proportions quoted above give a false impression for they do not disclose how powerful a thing British influence still is, though it is not wholly a matter of the racial composition of the population. This situation, however, is reflected in certain compact racial groups. For example in Prince Edward Island the British element represents 82·8 per cent of the population, in Nova Scotia 77 per cent, in Ontario 72 per cent, and in British Columbia 69·8 per cent. Also we must bear in mind that the West has been developed, though not exactly peopled, by a ruling class of Scottish and English who migrated there from the Mother Country or from the Eastern Provinces. One meets them everywhere, occupying important executive positions in Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver, and maintaining a tradition which is effectively British in a country which otherwise seems to be becoming more American every day. Many of these leaders—usually of Scottish Presbyterian stock—hail from the Maritime Provinces, a fact which is usually not sufficiently emphasized.

§ 2

Examined closely, the sense of the term British is elusive, for today it stands only for a political allegiance. Racially and socially it can be broken up into different elements. Having presented the British front—in reality that of the English language—let us now consider in turn the position of the English, Scottish, and Irish elements in Canada.

The English, according to official statistics, constitute 51·9 per cent of the British group: 2,968,402 out of 5,715,904. They are 25·8 per cent of the entire population, and are the most important element in the British section. We find them especially strong in Ontario (where they amount to 53·5 per cent of the English-speaking people), in the southwest of the

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Province of Quebec (50 per cent), and in British Columbia (56·4 per cent). So far as it is possible to ascertain their occupations one gathers that they are principally civil servants, soldiers or the sons of soldiers, Anglican rectors, wealthy farmers, etc. In a word they form a middle class with a tinge of conservatism, tradition, ritual, and good form, and are rather inclined to be slow. More recently, however, advanced ideas akin to those of the British Labour Party have appeared in these circles. The C.C.F.,¹ the most radical party in Canada, has been largely recruited among people of English origin, a change which must not be overlooked as it reflects a similar change in the Mother Country. By contrast the real Canadians — the Canadian Canadians — look very conservative!

The English population of every kind and class, Socialist and Conservative alike, resents the French Canadians with a hostility which is instinctive and congenital. Nothing can be done about it. There is a total lack of understanding, or even of a desire to understand. I really believe that at heart, and without thinking things out, the chief thing they have against the French is that they are there! In these circumstances the deep-seated, chronic antagonism of the two provinces of Quebec and Ontario no longer seems to be paradoxical.

The Scots are much less numerous, amounting to only 1,403,914 or 24·5 per cent of the British group, and 12·2 per cent of the total population. One meets them principally in the Lower Provinces and in the West:

<i>Region</i>	<i>Per cent of the English-speaking Population</i>
Prince Edward Island	34·4
Nova Scotia	26·8
Manitoba	34·4
British Columbia	18·6

They are relatively numerous in Montreal, whereas Toronto is more Anglo-Irish in character, having been settled by people from both Eire and Northern Ireland. In the Northwest and

¹ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

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the Yukon one finds them among the prospectors. Certain counties are so Scottish that until quite recently people still spoke Gaelic. The characteristics of the Scots are well known: great workers in contrast to the English who sometimes have a reputation for indolence; proverbially economical to the point of meanness, while the English are inclined to be spendthrifts, or at least imprudent in their private affairs; inordinately proud of their clans, and at the same time sticklers for equality; marvellous business men; and finally democratic in temperament, in contrast to the hierarchic spirit which never fails the Englishman be he ever so far to the Left.

Scotsmen have played an outstanding part in the development of Canada. To the task they brought a serious belief in democracy inspired by reform, and this spirit has permeated education. Scarcely less important is the way they form the solid backbone of the banking profession, where they stand out as notable personalities with considerable influence. In the Montreal telephone directory, the Macs fill six pages. Tear them out, and Montreal is no longer a financial capital, but simply an immense French village with a little English garrison! The Scots do not mix much with the other British elements, but on the other hand are on quite friendly terms with the French Canadians. Mixed marriages, which are fairly frequent, often produce people called McDonald or Forbes, who paradoxically are French in everything except name! This Scottish tinge explains many things in Canada. A Canadian once summed up the three characteristics which distinguished his country from the United States as the climate, the Northland, and the mark of the Scot!

Finally come the Irish, who number 1,267,702, or 22.1 per cent of the English-speaking group, and 11.1 per cent of the total population. Apart from the fact that they usually live in the big cities, one cannot say that they are concentrated in any particular district. They can be subdivided into two fundamental groups, according to whether they are Irish Catholics — the real thing! — or Irish Protestants from Ulster. The latter

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make up the fanatical Protestant element, and are consistently behind the anti-Catholic and anti-French movement in Ontario, where the Orangemen present a replica of the Ku Klux Klan or a sort of Protestant Tammany. Discussing this subject with a well-informed observer of Canadian affairs, he assured me that one cannot understand the Orangemen in Toronto and the bitter hostility which exists between Protestants and Catholics there, unless one has previously studied the situation in Belfast and Londonderry — in fact in Northern Ireland.

So far as the French Canadians are concerned, the Irish Catholics are not much better disposed towards them than the Irish Protestants are; though they both are Catholics, they speak different languages and are jealous of each other. We thus have a traditional rivalry between two minorities, both of whom are relegated by the English to a lower level, and they detest each other all the more on this account. In the bosom of the Church this Franco-Irish hostility has become chronic. The Irish priest is often a personal enemy of the French Canadian priest, hence the importance of the Bishop's nominations to which we alluded earlier.

A comparison of the census returns of the English-speaking population shows that since 1871 the English have increased from 33 per cent to 51·9 per cent of the total in 1941, while the Irish have fallen from 39 per cent to 22·1 per cent, and the Scots have simply maintained their position (26 per cent and 24·5 per cent).

Such statistics suggest that the Irish group is attracting fewer recruits, or is becoming less alive to its own individuality than are the other two. This observation is significant when one recalls the distinct role played by each race in the Canadian community.

The Irish represent — or did in the past — a demagogic ferment of excitement, discord, and disorder, but also of personality. They provided the agitators and the leaders. The Scots on the contrary are factors of cohesion and bring an essential feeling of solidity which is valuable. They also staff

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the world of commerce and finance, in addition to providing an excellent personnel of professors and Presbyterian ministers. As for the English, less gifted according to general opinion and to tell the truth not very popular, they constitute the social bulwark on which the British tradition rests. In this respect one sees in them what the French Canadians have never been — a ruling class, in fact until lately one might have said a conquering class. They are collectively organized for the direction of the country and at heart — and sometimes not only at heart either! — mindful that they are the conquering race. The French in Canada often give the impression of being superior to the others owing to their individual talents, but as a group one must admit without hesitation that the English occupy the higher level.

§ 3

Let us now try to ascertain the conditions that have led to the maintenance and development of this powerful British element. They are obliged to defend themselves biologically against the French, who are liable to overrun them like tropical vegetation. Socially they must be on their guard against American absorption, which is tending to substitute the very different ideal of a continental North America in place of a British North America. Such problems bring into question the survival of the British as a distinct entity. This brings us to a study, in relation to the British Canadians, of the same factors as we examined earlier in connection with the French. For our purpose we must consider their religion, language, birth-rate, and their attitude towards life itself.

Recently the Catholics have increased slightly and the Protestants have declined slightly, but otherwise the following analysis made in 1941 shows that little change has taken place since 1871.

	1941	Per cent
Protestants	6,135,046	53·3
Catholics	4,986,552	43·3
Others	385,057	3·3

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To what religions do the British belong? If we consider them separately, we find that 86·5 per cent of them are Protestants and 13 per cent are Catholics, and practically none are Atheists. The position of the British in the churches may be summed up as follows: they make up 76·8 per cent of the Protestant element in contrast to a mere 1·5 per cent of French Canadians; they account for 15·5 per cent of the Catholics as against 67·7 per cent of French Canadians. In a general way one may say that the English Canadians are Protestants, and the French Canadians are Catholics, always bearing in mind, of course, that the English-speaking Catholic minority is by no means negligible, whereas there is no French Protestant minority at all, apart from a few Swiss and a handful of isolated personalities.

But the Protestant Churches, as everyone knows, differ radically one from another, so much so that it is necessary to consider them individually: The United Church has 2,204,875 members, making 36 per cent of the total Protestant population; the Anglicans number 1,751,188 members, which is another 28 per cent; Presbyterians add 829,147 members or 13 per cent; and the Baptists have 483,592 members or 8 per cent, so that these four denominations together represent 85 per cent of the Protestants in the country. The Methodists do not appear in the list, as they were included in the United Church where they make up about two-thirds of the total. The United Church is a fairly recent attempt at amalgamating some groups of the Protestant denominations. Half the Presbyterians, however, refused to consent to this fusion, and so did the Anglicans and the Baptists. Protestant unity is thus anything but an accomplished fact, which is not surprising since each of these Churches corresponds to a certain social strata, almost to a certain British type. The Anglicans are recruited in a somewhat aristocratic way, and are naturally bound up with the honours and influence that one expects to find in the national Church that is holding the Empire together. The Methodists, absorbed into the United Church but not yet digested, represent the middle class, bordering at once on mediocrity on the Left and on wealth

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on the Right. The Baptists are smalltown folk—better not join their ranks if you are a snob, for the Anglicans would be much more to your liking.

The appeal of the different denominations is not only a matter of class, but also of national origin. Of the English 39 per cent are Anglicans, and 32 per cent United Church of whom no doubt many were previously Methodists. Of the Scots, 30 per cent are Presbyterians, to whom must be added the greater part of the Presbyterian section of the United Church. As for the Irish, 32 per cent—the real Irish,—are Catholics, 32 per cent belong to the United Church, and 17 per cent are Anglicans.

The *Daily Colonist* of Victoria made a suggestive inquiry in its issue of August 25th, 1935, which disclosed that the Smiths were either Anglican or Methodist, while the Macs were Presbyterian to a man. In a list of 700 Presbyterian ministers, there were only three Smiths, while out of 875 Anglican parsons and bishops one found eight times as many, 25 to be exact. In 1925 the Methodist preachers who bore this name numbered 36, and in 1935 the United Church contained 52. As for the Macs, they filled two columns of the Presbyterian Year Book and numbered 120. About 25 per cent of the Presbyterian pastors were Macs. There were four Presbyterian Macs for one Anglican Mac, but there were only two Presbyterian Joneses against 11 Anglican Joneses.

Judging from this, the two currents, English and Scots, have remained relatively distinct. The Presbyterians are definitely in the majority in the Maritime Provinces which are largely peopled by Scots; more Anglicans in Ontario and British Columbia where there are more English; and more members of the United Church in the prairies, where the mixed population includes both English and Scottish.

How far can we consider Protestantism as an instrument working to perpetuate the British influence in Canada? To tell the truth, it is a two-edged sword. No doubt there is a general Protestant feeling which is authentically Anglo-Saxon

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and inseparable from the English language. In Anglo-French relations, to be Protestant means to be English! Yet, in another sphere it may play a different role, acting against British influence and favouring Americanization.

Here the distinctions already noted between the various denominations hold good as well; in fact we could easily classify the Churches according to their British or American inspiration. In the first rank and easily in the lead, Anglicanism constitutes a first-rate agent for British unity. In the eyes of its congregation it stands as a national Church, reuniting millions of English people all over the world under the same symbols of loyalty. In the same way many Frenchmen although they may be non-practising Catholics will go to Mass when they are abroad, especially if they are very far away from France. The Presbyterian group also turns back to Europe for its spiritual source, which again strengthens the allegiance to the Old Country. But the Methodist and Baptist Churches on the contrary are so American in spirit, in organization, and in tradition, that they submit to the continental attraction of the U.S.A. without mental reservations. Even when they wish to be national like the United Church, they are more attached to the religious family of the New World than to that of the Old.

The English language like the Protestant religion is also a two-edged weapon. In Canada it is spoken by the British element, and in fact by everyone. In this respect it is national, and there is no prospect of its ever being replaced by French. It is thus an instrument of British influence, as is proved by the passionate resistance to the teaching of French everywhere outside the province of Quebec. Yet English is the tongue common to all the inhabitants of North America, so in this sense it ceases to be just British. It is English if you will, but it would be more accurate to label the North American accent as simply American. In Canada people do not speak in exactly the same way as they do in the United States, but it usually takes a keen ear to detect the difference, which is further proof of the unity of the North American family. A few Canadians

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do speak English as they do in England, but the majority speak with a definite American accent. The Oxford accent sounds affected here just as it does in the United States; in fact Englishmen who come to Canada on business or to attend conferences are well advised to drop it.

We can thus conclude that the English language is a factor of Canadian political unity, not only with regard to the French who are obliged to learn it, but also with regard to the cosmopolitan immigrants who cannot be assimilated until they have adopted it. When English Canadians protest against the tolerance shown towards the languages of the minorities, they show that they realize what is required to consolidate the Canadian personality under the British aegis. Their indignation at the idea that another language besides English should be spoken in Canada arises assuredly from the fact that the Anglo-Saxons are admittedly lazy when it comes to learning foreign languages. Actually 96 per cent of the Canadians of British origin speak only English! Even the leaders of the political parties, who should in their own interests be able to get into direct contact with the electorate in Quebec, can usually only stammer out the ordinary courtesies, and when absolutely necessary manage a few words of comic French. But it is ingenuousness even more than laziness.

Voltaire, in *L'Ingenu*, railed against exactly this state of mind, which after all is common to most peoples. The Abbé St. Yves asked the Ingenu which of the three languages he liked best, Huron, English, or French. 'Huron, without a doubt,' replied the Ingenu. 'Not really!' cried Mademoiselle de Kerkabon. 'I always thought that French was the finest language after Low Breton.' They then fell to discussing the multiplicity of languages in use, and decided that, had it not been for the Tower of Babel incident, French would have been spoken all over the world.

In Canada the English language has gained the day, but its use does not help the English cause. Through it Americanism is insinuating itself everywhere without let or hindrance. The

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radio, the press, the theatre, and the cinema all diffuse American conceptions just as the wind scatters seeds. Certain parts of the Quebec countryside, where they speak almost nothing but French, are fairly immune, but the English Canadian is absolutely defenceless. The only resistance he can offer against this insidious assimilation is to become excessively British, and so try to emphasize the difference between Canada and the United States.

We must now study the statistics of births and deaths, as we did in the case of the French Canadians. This is the weak point in the British armour. The death-rate in the English provinces is low, no doubt, as it amounts to only 10.1 per 1000 in Ontario and 10.2 in British Columbia, but the rate in the province of Quebec has also fallen to the same level. It is in the domain of infant mortality that the English maintain their obvious advantage, having only 46 deaths per 1000 births in Ontario and 37 in British Columbia against 76 in Quebec. (The latter figure was even as high as 127 between 1926 and 1930.) The English birth-rate is showing signs of weakness, however. In 1933 it declined to 18.1 in Ontario and to 13.5 in British Columbia, whereas in French Quebec it is still just over 25. In 1941 it jumped to 19.1 and 18.4 in the two English provinces, but this was probably due to the war and is unlikely to happen again. Thus the contrast between the French and English-speaking districts is complete. This is especially evident when we compare Quebec with those provinces which are socially the most Americanized, such as, for example, British Columbia.

English Canadians, influenced by public opinion in Britain and the United States, consider it scandalous for a country to have a high death-rate coincident with a high birth-rate, though the British now seem to be changing their attitude on this point. The aim should be to bring both rates down simultaneously. Malthus is largely responsible for Anglo-Saxon ideas on this subject. There are too many people in the world, he contended, and certainly there are too many for the machine

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age, so people no longer consider it a duty to give birth to many children. Quality counts above all, and raising the standard of living means raising the standard of morality. In this respect the attitude of the Protestant Churches goes directly counter to the doctrines laid down by the French Catholic priests. As a result there is complete disparity in the rhythm of reproduction of the two races. We need only recall that the survival rate in Quebec was 16.5 per 1000 in 1941, as against only 7.3 in British Columbia. If the French and English Canadians were to embark upon a biological duel, the latter would be sure to lose.

In such a contest the antagonism would be not so much between two reproductive capacities, as between two different ways of looking at life. According to the ethics of French Canadian Catholicism, the individual is obliged to live within a social framework encompassed by a series of rites which punctuate the passage of the days and years. He submits to the effective direction of a spiritual hierarchy, which extols to the faithful the beauty of sacrifice, the value of discipline, and the virtue of the family. English Canadian Protestantism, on the other hand, puts the accent on man's personal and moral responsibility to his own conscience, with no need for intervention on the part of a sacramental priesthood. In their eyes the development of a material civilization is, in fact if not in doctrine, a form of moral dignity. When the Catholic ideal of renunciation is set aside in this way, the door is open wide to Americanism, which teaches that material progress prevails over spiritual preoccupations.

Between these two perils of Catholicism and Americanism, can we still visualize a Canada tinged with British colour and preserving her integrity? No doubt she will succeed best in her effort to resist Americanism by relying upon Anglicanism, as it furnishes a bulwark at once moral, aesthetic, and social against American vulgarity. Would such a course not run the risk of tempting her towards Catholic ritual, which is already influencing the Anglican Church and thus forfeiting some of

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the inspiration of the real British Protestant? Have no fear. The Anglican looks down from a height upon these French people with their allegiance to Rome, and deems them socially inferior. Because of this resistance to the temptation of neighbours on two fronts, it is possible to conceive of a truly Canadian attitude, but with a British background and a foreground composed of endless subtle shadings.

CHAPTER VI

IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION

THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN POPULATION

§ I

As we have already said, the victory in a biological duel would certainly go to the French. But the outcome would be modified by immigration, and this presents the demographic future of the Dominion in a new light.

Immigration has played a leading part in the peopling of the American continent, for the whole of the white population has been brought in from outside. Though this vast human displacement has been going on for five centuries, it reached its maximum proportions only during the last hundred years. It should rank among the greatest events of history, even surpassing in scope the barbarian invasions of Europe, since it has brought into being a new section of our race, and the one which is capable of becoming, if not the most numerous, at least the richest and most powerful.

Almost all the white people in North America come of ancient stock that went forth from this very old continent of Europe. Yet collectively they have acquired a new personality, arising from the adaptation of old blood to natural surroundings that are much younger, and also from the mingling together in a melting pot of breeds that are dissimilar and scarcely contemporary. The very atmosphere they breathe imparts to them a freshness and originality—in short, turns them into Americans. This applies to Canada quite as much as to the United States.

Historically, the peopling of the United States took place in three successive waves or tides: the first, up to their independence, furnished a stock that was mainly British; the second,

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in the middle of the nineteenth century, added to this initial foundation a complement of Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians which has left an indelible mark; the third, from about 1880 up to first world war, poured in a wave of Slavs and Mediterraneans which taxed to the utmost the country's hitherto uncontested power of assimilation.

The evolution of Canada presents a parallel to the American example, but with a lag in time, as if the prestige of her great neighbour had irresistibly induced her to follow on after an interval. One distinguishes three phases in the peopling of Canada: the first, from its origins to the end of the nineteenth century; the second, covering the first fourteen years of the twentieth century; and the third, which commenced after the war period and terminated with the world crisis of 1929.

The French must be regarded as the oldest element in the initial formation of the Canadian people, since their earliest colonists left Europe over 250 years ago. When their descendants today lay claim to the unqualified term Canadian, they are fully within their rights. The English Canadians by comparison are new-comers, whether they be the descendants of the English immigrants in the eighteenth century, of the United Empire Loyalists, or of the colonization which at the beginning of the nineteenth century populated Ontario with English. Although the sources of French immigration dried up completely after 1763, the fundamental elements of the Canadian people are thus still in existence.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, immigration into Canada was reduced to a mere trickle, amounting, from 1881 to 1902, to 1,284,000 or only 58,000 people a year. The reason was that the Canadian West, though then being organized, was still not equipped to receive immigrants. Also the era of falling prices, which began to spread all over the world in 1873 and continued till about 1895, was producing to the full its depressing effects. Canada was more depressed by this stagnation than immigration statistics indicate, because a large proportion of her immigrants in this period did not remain.

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Until the turning point at the end of the nineteenth century immediately preceding the opening up of the West, the relative position of the French and Anglo-Saxon elements remained almost unbroken. The British and people crossing the border from the United States comprised 84 per cent of these settlers, the remaining 16 per cent being made up of elements other than Anglo-Saxon. This immigration coincided with the wave of English, Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians entering the United States between 1840 and 1890.

The great period of Canadian immigration took place at the beginning of the present century, or to be exact from 1903 to 1914. The causes of this sudden expansion are easily traced. In the first place there was the appeal of the West, which was being opened up to colonization. The construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which had been finished since 1886, was beginning to bear fruit, and after 1904 the completion of two more transcontinental railways, the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern, added fresh incentive. Meanwhile the Liberal Government, which had come into power in 1896 under the premiership of Laurier, embarked on a vigorous immigration policy. He was determined that Canada should have her share of the strong current of immigration which was moving from Europe overseas to America. At the same time he solicited British capital, because the immense regions still lying empty in the West obviously could not be exploited without enormous funds. Such were the immediate causes of this revival of immigration. They would not have been sufficient, however, had there not been a definite rise in the economic temperature of the world as the result of the reversal in the trend of world prices. We breathed freely again — as I well remember — in the exhilarating atmosphere of a thriving commerce which filled our seaports at high tide.

The volume of immigration swelled at this time to astonishing proportions. The total number of immigrants in the twelve years from 1903 to 1914 rose to 2,677,319, a yearly average of 223,000, instead of 58,000 as in the preceding period. From

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1912 to 1914 the average actually rose to 362,000, and in the exceptional year of 1913 it reached 400,873! During the 1902-11 decade, the Canadian population increased more by immigration than by the survival rate of births over deaths, the two figures being 1,659,000 and 854,000. At the same time these new-comers were changing in character. Immigration from Great Britain was still important as our table shows, but settlers from the United States were almost as numerous:

<i>Period 1903-14</i>		
<i>Origin</i>	<i>Immigrants</i>	<i>Per cent of Total</i>
British	1,087,283	41
United States	842,109	31
Others	747,927	28
	2,677,319	

The dominating note, however, was the foreign element, which had never previously attained such proportions. It included many Nordics, Germans, and Scandinavians, who are somewhat akin to the English Canadians in civilization. A cosmopolitan type was introduced by Slavs and Mediterraneans who appeared for the first time in compact groups. Contrary to what is generally believed an important proportion of the new arrivals between 1903 and 1914 settled in the East, although the main current or 54 per cent of the total was destined for the West:

<i>Region</i>	<i>Per cent of Total</i>
Maritime Provinces	4
Quebec	15
Ontario	27
Prairie Provinces	42
British Columbia	12
	100

The West immediately acquired a special outlook which it still retains, making it quite different in character from Quebec and Ontario. I visited Winnipeg in 1904 at the moment that

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this tide of immigration was beginning to sweep in. Nothing will give a better idea of its diversity than the statistics of foreigners who were in 1903 passing through this gateway to the West. Winnipeg had become a veritable centre of distribution for the new colonists: ¹

English	20,224
Canadians from the East	16,514
Americans	12,698
Ruthenians	9,514
Germans	7,852
Scottish	7,536
Norwegians	4,363
Swedes	3,877
Canadians returning from the U.S.A.	3,338
Italians	2,975
Irish	2,521
French	1,156
Hungarians	1,047
Russians	732
Poles	725
Icelanders	692
Hebrews	605
Finns	556
Belgians	493
Danes	481
Dutch	381
Bohemians	322
Austrians	297
Galicians	256
Swiss	156
Rumanians	129
Slovaks	99
Greeks	77
Armenians	13
Australians	8
Bulgarians	5
Arabs	4
Brazilians	2

The first world war naturally brought this influx to an end. Actually during the five years from 1915 to 1919 the average

¹ Figures given by the Commissioner of Immigration at Winnipeg.

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fell to only 68,848 entrants. Furthermore, as three-fifths of them came from the United States, the number from continental Europe was reduced to practically nothing. But with the return of peace immigration revived and continued until 1932 when it slowed down again owing to the world depression. During a first period, from 1919 to 1930, 1,476,634 new citizens came into Canada, or an annual average of 123,050. These people were inspired by the prosperity of the Dominion which had been enriched by the war, and also by the prestige of everything American in the eyes of a ruined Europe.

During the second period this movement practically ceased. From 1931 to 1938 only 130,244 settlers arrived, or 16,255 a year. Canada suspended her immigration activities, closed her depôts in the United States and even in Great Britain, in fact refused permission for foreigners to enter the country except on a visit. During the entire period between the two wars the character of the immigration was about the same as before, though perhaps it was rather more cosmopolitan. In the year 1928, for example, the British accounted for 33·4 per cent and the Americans for 17·9 per cent, while Germans, Ruthenians, and other foreigners made up 48·7 per cent. As in the period previous to 1914, half were bound for destinations in the East and half in the West.

The second world war naturally brought almost to a close anything that was left of this trickle of immigrants into the Dominion. During the five years from 1939 to 1943 their total number did not exceed 53,730 or 10,000 annually. Migration was now practically dead and in this Canada was not exceptional. On the morrow of the world catastrophe it was obvious that everything connected with the movement of peoples would have to begin again under entirely new conditions.

Let us now consider exotic immigration, which in the strict sense of the term consists of immigrants not belonging to the white race. The American coast of the Pacific Ocean exerts a magnetic attraction over the yellow race. Owing to their unlimited capacity for work and their low standard of

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living, they succeed there; and without doubt were they allowed to compete freely, they would eventually dominate the western slope of the Rocky Mountains. This tide has been stemmed, however, by regulations supported by military force, so that today there are very few Asiatics on these shores and the problem is merely a local one, especially now that the last war has eliminated Japan from the political scene. It would be an illusion to think that any real solution has been reached, however, for the pressure of the population of the one continent upon the other still continues. According to the census of 1941 there were 34,627 Chinese in Canada, chiefly in British Columbia. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, following on a series of defensive laws since 1885, controls, and in fact makes impossible, any further immigration. As for the Japanese, in contrast to the Chinese they have settled with their families and now number 23,149. They are also almost all in British Columbia. After the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 the Tokio Government were obliged to regulate the issue of passports, and as a result practically no Japanese were admitted after 1929. Whatever fate may be in store for the Japanese in the future, this is no longer a burning question. The immigration of Hindus from India, though fairly heavy since 1907, has latterly been reduced almost to nothing by appropriate measures. From the narrow point of view of officialdom, the barrier has proved effective, but the problem extends beyond simple frontier regulations, and fundamentally still remains to be reckoned with. We shall return to it later when we discuss the racial security of the country.

§ 2

Let us now analyse the racial composition of the Canadian people, as presented by the excellent statistics of the 1941 census.

Together the first two groups form the basis of the population of which they constitute four-fifths. Further analysis of the balance shows that 11·3 per cent of the total population

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originated in central, western, and northern Europe, 1·1 per cent in the Mediterranean area, and 6·3 per cent in Slav and eastern Europe. All except 183,297 inhabitants belong to the white race, and of these 125,521 are Indians and Eskimos.

<i>Origin</i>	<i>Inhabitants</i>	<i>Per cent of Total</i>
British	5,715,904	49·7
French	3,483,038	30·1
Continental European	2,124,416	18·7

Certain provinces have a marked demographic accent. For example Ontario is 72 per cent British, Quebec 88·9 per cent French, and the Prairie Provinces 48 per cent cosmopolitan. Although the same cannot be said of most of the Latin American countries south of the Rio Grande, we may conclude that Canada is preponderantly white as distinct from Asiatic and Red Indian, and British and French rather than cosmopolitan. Nevertheless these cosmopolitans, who have come from Europe (apart from France), are numerous and their assimilation is a very real problem.

The assimilation of every immigrant means a struggle within his very being. The first factor is historical: he must break the ties which still bind him to his native land. The second is geographic: he must accustom himself to the soil and the climate. The third is social: he must adapt himself to a new environment. When we speak of Canadian assimilation, however, this third factor is not clearly defined, for the environment will be French in Quebec, and English or even American everywhere else. Thus the alternatives are assimilation to the French or to the Anglo-Saxon type. The French group, as we have shown, can absorb individuals, but in the end this assimilation of foreigners works in favour of Anglo-Saxon culture and the English language.

Assimilation is rapid, almost immediate, for British and Americans, easy for Germans and Scandinavians, but slow for Ukrainians, Slavs, and Mediterraneans. The latter hold aloof in their own villages, speaking their own language, keeping to

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their own religion and their own particular customs, but in time they learn English and finally fuse into their surroundings. To the Ukrainians and Poles, the West in its featureless immensity recalls their native land, and this makes it easier for them to adapt themselves. The Catholic Church, in spite of resistance within itself, favours English as being the most convenient means of communication for the faithful in America.

Assimilation invariably does take place, just as it does in the United States and for the same reasons. It is continental in character. The former European becomes North American, but not inevitably British or Anglo-Saxon. A distinction thus arises between different types of citizens. The veritable test of British assimilation is the civic sense, the recognition of social collaboration as a duty which is so remarkable among well-bred English people. Now the immigrant more often than not does not acquire this sense. He gets profit and nothing more out of the community that has received him.

Traces of his original characteristics which have not entirely disappeared may still be discerned as in a palimpsest through the veneer of his assimilation. In a splendid passage Maurice Barrès recalls these haunting survivals: 'The tents which the nomads set up in the evening in their new country lack the stability of the old-established houses, but what joy for these wanderers to mingle with the early inhabitants, and to chant with them the morning hymn which secretly they embellish with memories of the songs they learned in the past in foreign lands.'

In the light of these different elements and their respective reactions the problem of Canadian population is clearly defined. The French Canadians, being unable to add to their numbers by either immigration or assimilation, are reduced to depending on their birth-rate, while immigration and assimilation continue to reinforce the English-speaking section. This brings us to the conclusion that although immigration is not the principal factor in peopling the country, it acts as a regulator and directly affects the composition of the population. When

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immigration ceases or even declines, the percentage of French Canadians rises; when it revives, this percentage diminishes, to the benefit of the Anglo-Saxon element. In these circumstances immigration, or at least the attitude adopted towards immigration, becomes a political matter.

This equilibrium is liable to be further modified by another factor, namely emigration. This brings us back to the question of the axis which serves as the *leitmotiv* of this book. The east-west current brings immigration over from Europe, and directs it westwards across the continent towards the prairies and British Columbia. But the north-south current is always present, silently, anonymously, persistently, irresistibly, and fatally turning men's minds towards the United States.

At times the movement is in the other direction, as for example at the beginning of the present century when the American farmers were ready to exchange their cultivated lands for virgin soil in the Canadian West. Basically, however, the attraction is towards the south, as if the great mass of the American nation were blindly obtruding its presence in fulfilment of the universal law of gravitation. The reasons are simple enough. In times of prosperity, or even when there is not an acute depression, American prestige shines like a sun. In the neighbouring country which is more modest, people feel that in this theatre, which is vaster and more brilliantly lit up, there must be more chances of success, and so there are.

The Canadians who are tempted to leave their own country belong to all classes and all races. Among them are workmen looking for employment at higher wages, like the French Canadians who emigrated in hundreds of thousands into New England; there are engineers, professors, industrialists, and business men of all kinds, ambitious young fellows who find Canada too small — all going forth to make their fortunes more quickly on the other side of the frontier. The atmosphere of the two countries is so much alike that they become assimilated almost immediately.

The great Canadian journalist, Mr. John W. Daffoe, gave the

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following striking examples of this migration: 'An inquiry some years ago showed that 13 per cent of the graduates of Canadian universities were living in the United States. A university in the Maritime Provinces gave American addresses for 34 per cent of its graduates. Some years ago the entire graduating class in engineering in a Canadian university found within a year occupations in the United States.'¹

These deserters act in perfectly good faith, for as the two countries are so similar they do not feel that they are being traitors. There are also the immigrants from Europe, who declare quite frankly that they have every intention of going on farther and are only stopping in Canada *in transit*. This whole frontier gives the impression of a dam that has not been made properly water-tight, for it cannot retain the population which keeps draining away through gaps which cannot be stopped. The attraction of far-off fields is not sufficient to account for this chronic leakage. However, circumstances do exist within the country itself to render it inevitable, i.e. a high birth-rate coinciding with the heavy immigration of the past forty years. As the increment from these two sources cannot be immediately absorbed, part of the old population has been obliged to emigrate.

The loss through this persistent emigration is enormous. The Government Statistics Bureau estimates the amount of this human deficit by the following calculations:

Decade	1901-10	1911-20	1921-30	1931-41
Total population at beginning of decade	5,371,315	7,206,643	8,787,949	10,376,786
Natural increase	853,566	1,150,125	1,325,256	1,221,786
Immigration	1,847,651	1,728,921	1,509,136	250,530
Total	8,072,532	10,085,689	11,622,341	11,829,102
Actual population at end of decade	7,206,643	8,787,949	10,376,786	11,506,655
Loss through emigration	865,889	1,297,740	1,245,555	322,447

¹ *Canada, an American Nation*, John W. Dafoe, p. 101, Columbia University Press, 1935.

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Let us now add up these figures to obtain a general idea of what has taken place during these forty years. The gains by the natural increase of births and by immigration amount to 9,807,071, which when added to the original population in 1901 should give 15,238,386 in 1941. But the official count of the 1941 census gives only 11,506,655 inhabitants. The loss—or lack of increase if you prefer—during these forty years is equal to the difference between 11,506,655 and 15,238,386 or 3,731,731 units. This corresponds to the number of people who have emigrated, which is equal to one-third of the population. The report of the Commissioner of Immigration at Washington for the year 1932 shows that 3,337,345 Canadians were then living in the United States, a figure which confirms that of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Travelling along the border in the States of both the northeast and northwest, one has the impression that the country is filled with Canadians. Hotels often reserve their first floor for the Canadian Club, which is not regarded as a foreign club in any way.

Such a haemorrhage, when one realizes it, is a cruel loss which definitely must be written off, for although some emigrants do return the great majority are swallowed up by the American masses. North-south the trend is irresistible, in spite of occasional eddies moving in the other direction. The Canadian Government is rowing against the current, and it will be interesting to see if this almost fatal attraction changes at all in character during the post-war period. If so it may prove to be simply the ebb and flow of people across the North American continent considered as a unit. In this case the medical term haemorrhage is not suitable. Instead one should speak of it as frontier migration taking place within a single continental organism.

§ 3

We are now ready to come to certain conclusions with regard to the future of the Canadian population, or at least to make a

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few comments. In the first place we may say that it is mediocre in volume compared with the United States, or even with England. Thirty years ago people, especially Imperialists, used to say that the day would come when Canada would have a larger population than the mother country! Today this no longer seems possible. The ten-year increase has been steadily becoming less since 1901: 34·2 per cent, 21·9 per cent, 18·1 per cent down to 10·09 per cent in 1941. The experts predict that this figure will drop still further in the coming years, to 8·3 per cent in 1951 and 6·3 per cent in 1961, and this will result in a population of only 13,250,000 inhabitants. So in spite of the enormous size of her territory, Canada seems to be destined to remain a community of secondary importance between the two great demographic masses of the United States and Great Britain—or should we say the United States and Russia?

For any rapid increase to take place, immigration must be revived on a large scale. Now in this respect we must realize that the nineteenth century and the period up to 1914 offered exceptional circumstances. Europe wished to divest herself of her excess population, which the new countries were ready to receive. At the same time the surplus capital which had accumulated in the old countries and was now looking for an investment was being attracted overseas, to be used in opening up virgin territories. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth Canada was developed under this system, according to which Europe dispensed both emigrants and capital.

But in the period between the two world wars conditions began to change. Although the old continent was still overflowing with people, they were no longer anxious to leave home to make their fortunes abroad. They now had a standard of living, mediocre no doubt, which they felt should be guaranteed by the Government. For its part the Government no longer wished to see this surplus population depart, preferring to keep it at home as a source of strength. In any case, where could these emigrants go? The new communities closed their doors

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at the slightest sign of depression, for fear of absorbing undesirables and creating unemployment. In the United States the quota laws of 1921 and 1924 virtually amounted to exclusion, and even in Canada the immigration policy since 1930-31 has also been on the defensive.

What attitude is the Canadian Government likely to take in the future? People in the Dominion hold many different opinions, for everyone looks upon immigration from his own particular angle and according to his own interests. To the tradesman the immigrant is a customer, to the industrialist he is a consumer and eventually a factory hand, to the English a factor in increasing the Anglo-Saxon percentage of the population. All these people would welcome a return to the policy of the open door. The local authorities, however, know that the new-comer if he is unemployed becomes a charge on the rates; the worker regards him as a competitor; while the French Canadian is well aware that an immigrant is considered to be a weapon directed against him. One also comes across the argument that in the present age of machinery a large population is no longer needed to develop the country. Thus the discussion continues, with a great deal to be said for each side.

If the problem is approached simply from the economic angle, one gathers that Canada will not look for a heavy influx of settlers as she did in the past, but will seek in an entirely different spirit a limited immigration of high quality. Agricultural workers and farm hands are scarcely required today, nor is industrial manpower. But technicians, engineers, and skilled workers are certainly needed to direct the factories which were tremendously developed during the war, and are still insufficiently staffed.

The argument would be quite different if the question were considered from the aspect of political rivalry, on which we touched earlier. The discussion then would be dominated by the proportion of French Canadians in the population. This percentage would soon increase if a policy of limiting immigration numerically were to last any length of time. That is

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exactly what has been happening and doubtless accounts for the fact that the proportion of French rose 2 per cent in a decade reaching 30 per cent in 1941, after having remained stationary for a very long time. This will create serious problems, far surpassing cold statistics. Experience teaches us that racial minorities are treated benevolently when they are declining for they are not dangerous then, but they arouse fierce antagonism when they are increasing. The French Canadians are 30 per cent of the population today, but what will happen if they become 35 per cent, or 40 per cent, or, who knows, one day perhaps 51 per cent?

It is unlikely that the situation will ever be reversed and that the French Canadians will attain the majority, but if they did the English would never be willing to accept second rank numerically. They would revolt. They might even prefer to secede, or to be annexed to the United States. This, I repeat, will not happen, but even a trend in this direction is sufficient to arouse a latent hostility, and bring about defensive measures. Would not the English group, for example, be tempted deliberately to consider fostering an artificial type of immigration in order to furnish themselves with recruits? Supposing that such a reversal of policy could be carried through Parliament without the consent of the French, the answer would raise questions of psychology, even of politics, but also to an important extent of the economic equilibrium of the country.

III

THE ECONOMIC ASPECT

CHAPTER VII

AGRICULTURE

I. THE FRENCH CANADIAN PEASANT

§ I

CANADA is essentially a country of natural resources that justify the impression that they are unlimited. As they are developed her manufacturing industries are being steadily expanded at the same time. The important role she played in the last war, especially in producing munitions, has greatly hastened this aspect of her progress, so that henceforth she will rank as one of the great industrial nations of the world.

In 1941 the country's total production was made up as follows:

	<i>Per cent of Total Production</i>
Manufactures	46.50
Agriculture	20.14
Mines	10.55
Electric power	3.88
Forestry	8.93
Fisheries and furs	1.42

As for the net value of total output, primary production accounted for 45 per cent and secondary or manufacturing production for 55 per cent. This distinction it must be admitted is becoming more and more difficult to define, and statisticians are obliged to become more flexible and to make their entries under more than one heading. This is necessary because on the American continent more than anywhere else intensively mechanized industrial methods in both theory and practice have penetrated irresistibly to the heart of agriculture, and are even carried on in the virgin forests. Such contrasts apply

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properly to America, which had been the pioneer in mechanization. More and more one meets manufacturing operations at every stage, from raw material production at one end of the scale to urban distribution at the other.

In agriculture especially, mechanization is now intervening to increase the scope of the cultivator. In the new countries this evolution is rapidly modifying, almost to the point of reversing, the established equilibrium between the urban and rural population. Every activity on the part of the farmer now necessitates a corresponding activity from another man in the city. This explains why the percentage of urban population in Canada rose from 32 per cent in 1891 to 54.3 per cent in 1941, the provinces with the largest urban population being the following:

	<i>Urban Population Per cent</i>
Quebec	62
Ontario	63
British Columbia	54

In contrast to this group, the Maritime and Prairie Provinces have remained largely rural, although even here the urban element represents an important minority:

	<i>Per cent</i>
Manitoba	44.2
Saskatchewan	37.0
Alberta	38.5

It is essential to grasp the significance of this urbanization, for although it admits of dangers which seem obvious to us in Europe it is normal in the New World, for it is in keeping with the spirit and methods of our time. Nevertheless it undoubtedly reflects a complete change of civilization.

The agricultural development of Canada extends over three phases which succeed one another and yet coincide. In its early days the country was given up to fishing, hunting, and trapping, which are still continued particularly by the French Canadians




FIG. 7 — MAIN TYPES OF FARMING

1. Mixed Farming 2. Wheat 3. Dairying 4. Grazing 5. Fruit

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and the Scots. Then came the first agricultural establishments, when part of the population settled along the shores of the St. Lawrence. Thanks to the French, a European peasant tradition was implanted in this way in the New World, but with the notable difference that in a young country cultivation had to be carried out on a more extensive scale. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the two great natural resources, wood and wheat, were systematically exploited in conformity with advanced technical methods that were gradually perfected. Lumbering in its various forms put the most distant pioneer into contact with the most highly developed type of industry, and wheat farming with mechanized methods soon became the law of the West. Although these three phases still exist simultaneously they are not really contemporary. The French Canadian of today is the same as the French Canadian of yesterday, and herein lies his strength; the cultivator of the West has no past but he may exist tomorrow, and his whole force lies in the present and the future; but the people of the Far North are eternal.

A classification of the various regions reveals differences which are no less important (Fig. 7, page 111). First, the East is especially devoted to mixed farming—cereals, cattle, dairy products, fruit, and vegetables—which in many ways still belongs to the peasant tradition. Here, however, we are aware of the double influence of the neighbouring forest, and of the American civilization of the great cities. Then, secondly, in the western prairies as well as in the fruit-growing districts of Niagara and British Columbia, we find ourselves confronted with the most modern types of farming. Thirdly, come those regions which are only now being cleared of the forest. As they combine mixed farming with the spirit of the pioneer rather than with that of the peasant, we must classify separately the regions which are still being opened up. This zone includes the *hinterland* of the St. Lawrence in both Quebec and Ontario, and the country fringing the wheat belt in the West on the edge of the Laurentian Shield. Still farther on begins the endless

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domain of fishing and trapping, the land of adventure and poetry.

Each of these different types of production has its own market. The first and third groups sell their goods locally, and as their activities are diversified they have been little affected by hard times. The second, American in character, exports on the contrary enormous quantities to the international markets. As its very law of existence is relentless specialization, it must bow beneath the lash of world depressions. This farm production is made up as follows:

	<i>Per cent</i>
Wheat and coarse grains	55.1
Dairy produce, poultry	19.7
Livestock	19.2
Fruits	3.6
Furs, tobacco, flax, clover, maple products, honey, etc.	2.4

Several social types are linked up with this division of agricultural production. Two in particular stand out clearly, forming the opposite poles: the French Canadian, peasant, pioneer, and superior in the practice of traditional virtues, is bound up with mixed farming and is scarcely interested in exports. The other, whom we shall describe as American, is superior in technique, an agricultural industrialist rather than a farmer. He is devoted to the machine and to specialized production, but is dependent on international consumption. We have purposely over-simplified this classification for the sake of clarity, for there also exist other important intermediary types, such as the Ontario farmer of English and Scottish descent who is an agriculturist born and bred. He recalls the substantial German peasants of Central Europe and the Danube Basin, but at the same time he is very like the American farmer. There is also the Ukrainian or Polish immigrant who has arrived more recently on the western prairies. He brings with him the oldest peasant tradition of all, and yet he can be Americanized very rapidly once his roots with his fatherland are severed. Finally the Japanese in British Columbia, who toils unremittingly and

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subsists on a standard of living with which it is impossible to compete. His mere presence is an uneasy reminder that Asia is close at hand.

These different types of humanity, their contacts with each other, and their combination in a new political community, create a distinct problem. They do not adapt themselves according to the same rhythm, for the American type progresses too quickly for the European peasant who clings persistently to his early traditions. The latter is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the problem, and at times one wonders whether there is really room in North America for the peasant conception.

§ 2

The French Canadian is a peasant. The Americans delight in announcing aggressively that they have no peasants in the United States! Actually they have only agricultural industrialists, people who have broken away completely from the patrimony of the old rural civilizations. The term 'peasant' no doubt is equivocal, for it suggests a serf attached to the glebe. But in employing it in the French sense which carries no sting, we are tempted to reply that if America did have peasants she would be much better off! The strength and dogged resistance of this type of humanity was shown up clearly by the depression of 1929, especially in the New World.

One soon perceives that the real strength of the French Canadian peasant is that he has remained true to his tradition. He is a countryman, in touch with Nature, and attached to the soil whether he be a lumberjack or a farmer. If this race is urbanized to excess, as is happening in the province of Quebec where the cities are now absorbing about two-thirds of the population, it loses the source of its vitality. Its moral fortress lies in the countryside, in the rural parishes where the priest can still gather his flock around him. There the old Canadian type is still unspoiled by outside influences, but we may well wonder how long it can last. For it to survive we must have the consent

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of the women and children, and here again we must turn to the *curé*, the essential piece in the system, on whom depends any hope of resistance. But have no illusions, he is definitely on the defensive.

One should distinguish between the arable lands which have given rise to the peasant type, and the forest zones which have necessitated the pioneer. In Eastern Canada the farmer is the *habitant* who tills the soil, and it has been the same soil ever since the early days of the French colonization. It is astonishing to find how narrow is the strip of cultivated land. In the St. Lawrence Valley one is immediately confronted with the Laurentian mountains on the edge of the Laurentian Shield. From the heights of the Dufferin Terrace at Quebec one can discern only a few miles away that blue line which marks the end of human habitation; beyond it rock and forest still wait to be conquered. This is the domain of the pioneer. The immense North Country comes down so close that one can almost touch it with the hand.

The Canadian peasant seems unexpected and paradoxical in the New World. He is the symbol of tradition and stability, and without knowing it, like M. Jourdain, he is following a philosophy of life which is associated with the countryside of France and is quite distinct from that of the United States. One feels his fundamental opposition to Americanism the moment that one comes into contact with him. His qualities as a rural farmer are classic. He is a worker, never shrinking from physical effort; he is thrifty; he is much less of a speculator than the American, and not in such a hurry. His ideal is to live on the land and from the land, to bring up his children on it, to establish them on it, and finally to hand it on to them. That is all. There is a Biblical grandeur in such simplicity.

The essential factor is the attachment to the soil. It is this which makes the French Canadian so exceptional in a continent where they buy, sell, and swap farms like stocks and shares. The American has cut adrift from the anchor which in the past has enabled mankind to survive the storm. The Canadian, on the other hand, holds the wholesome qualities of the earth as sacred

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and still regards a home on the land as the best security. As in the old-established rural communities he has the capacity of drawing both pleasure and profit from tilling the soil. What M. Mauriac said about the French peasant applies equally well to the Canadian: 'It requires exceptional anchors to attach to the land that part of humanity which feeds the rest.'¹

There are two definitely opposed conceptions of what man may demand from the land. On the one hand is the type of agriculture with which one can make a living but not grow rich. It is a mode of life, but not a means of making a fortune. This is exactly what the American cannot abide, for he wants to get rich, and get rich quickly. True, he will cultivate the land, often exceedingly well, but he is more preoccupied with buying and selling it, and putting by a visible cash profit which he can mobilize if he wishes to go elsewhere. Above all he neither knows how to wait nor wishes to learn. He has lost the instinct for Time, which is the safeguard of the peasant. The latter, on the contrary, knows that he can obtain a living from the land, but that it is unwise to expect much more. The profit, the benefit, to which he looks forward does not appear in book-keeping, for the most successful rural balance sheet is not based on two-and-two-make-four. The priest and the family doctor understand these things better than the expert and the social service worker. But how old-fashioned all this is, and how un-American!

In the French districts of the St. Lawrence Valley the average farm consists of a hundred acres, and is run by a peasant proprietor. These farms are all alike, long rectangular bands lying perpendicular to the road, with the house situated at the end. The way in which the land has been divided up can easily be seen when one looks down over the countryside from the terrace at Quebec. Mixed farming is the rule, producing cereals, milk and butter, chickens, vegetables, and a few fruit trees. It is what the Germans call *natural wirtschafft*. The family lives on the farm which is a complete production unit. They consume much of

¹ François de Mauriac, *La Provence*, p. 36.

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what is produced and they sell what they can in the neighbouring market, which is often the big town. The farmer himself does the work with the assistance of his wife, his sons, and his daughters, without depending much on hired labour or machinery. He is always in touch with the Church. This system gives satisfactory results. Technically it is inferior to the American, but it is not industry disguised and can still be called agriculture.

In order to decide whether there is anything here worth saving, we must not look at the matter as experts purely from the accountancy point of view. As is the case in Europe the peasant does not take his own work into account, at least not all of it, when calculating his costs. He saves in order to establish his children on neighbouring farms, or to round off his own holding. He also borrows being a man of the New World but less than the American, for property mortgaged in his eyes is 'property owed'. As he moves about more than we do in France one finds a good many farmers in the West who have come from Quebec. In the height of prosperity others earn more than he does, but he weathers hard times better, especially as having inherited his farm he has not paid too much for it. He was jeered at during the boom, but he seemed very wise during the slump. If prosperity returns he will be laughed at again for not keeping up with the times and the ways of the New World. Who is right? Perhaps the American conception of agriculture will have to be revised one day, and, meanwhile, are they not asking the French Canadian farmer to go too far and too quickly? Like the mythological figure, Antheus, he has to keep touching the soil if he is to remain strong or even to survive.

§ 3

The clearing of new land is still essential. Farms are not subdivided but remain the same size as in the past, partly because of the low productivity of agriculture and partly because it is customary to hand on the property intact to the eldest son. Therefore, in the regions which have already been developed,

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sooner or later there is not sufficient cultivated land to go round. In spite of a low density per square mile over-population already exists, so part of the family is forced to migrate. The factory near by or in the United States offers an outlet for workmen, and the city awaits those entering the liberal professions or commerce. But the traditional career, always open to the man with initiative, is that of the pioneer.

The traditional task of clearing new land is inconceivably hard. The forest is there, and the pioneer must conquer it. First the trees must be felled one by one. If they are saplings, it may be possible to cultivate the soil in the following year, but if they are full-grown the stumps will not rot away for seven or eight years, and they cannot be removed until then. Meanwhile the pioneer sells the timber, picks up a job here and there, or works on a neighbouring farm. Often he has to be supported by his relatives. Excellent technical progress is being made, however, and the stumps can now be blown up by means of powerful explosives, which speeds up this formidable task considerably. Yet where the forest is dense the pioneer must still do a good deal of hard shoulder work.

The French Canadians resent being held up to admiration for their pioneering, and give a cool reception to novels written by foreigners in which this aspect of their national life is described at length. Yet they have a genius for this difficult and magnificent work, which daunts both the English and those who have become Americanized. Scots, Scandinavians, and Finns know how to pioneer, but in Canada it is still the descendants of the French — and strange as it may seem this includes a few French from France — with their simple needs and powers of endurance, who are best able to tackle the job. Such negative qualities are seldom found now in America, where they are more likely to be despised than regarded as virtues.

Around Lake St. John the forest has long since been attacked and also along the Richelieu River, in the Gaspé Peninsula, at Abitibi and Temiskaming. On the prairies a partially wooded or park-like territory situated north of the wheat belt is being

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seriously colonized, and so farther to the northwest is the Peace River district, recommended by alluring prospectuses as 'colonization de luxe'. Along the edge of these territories a career is still open to the pioneer, and also in the Great North near Lake Athabaska, Great Slave Lake, and Peel River.

In Canada there are certain districts which the French Canadian seemed destined to appropriate. Wherever there are insuperable difficulties one is sure to find him. On the open prairies where there are no trees to be cleared he is no better than anyone else, but among rocks and forests, where streams babble over the stones — there he is in his element. Even in the intermediary zones, half forest and half clearing, he will throw himself heart and soul into a family effort at mixed farming.

In 1935 I visited a farm beyond the wheat belt not far from Edmonton, Alberta, where the country is somewhat wooded. The farmer, a French Canadian who had previously been established at Lake St. John, had bought the land in its virgin state, a single quarter section of 250 acres. He and his two sons had cleared it with machinery. It was not without emotion that I witnessed their first crop of wheat growing in a field where trees had stood only a year before. We no longer have such beginnings in Europe! This farm was much the same as it would have been in Quebec. The family consisted of the farmer himself; his wife, who went to market; his two daughters, who took care of the house but spoke hardly any English; two stalwart sons, one in charge of the animals and the other in charge of the machinery. They had fifteen machines, a repair shed, and two private motor-cars. Then I was taken to see the pigs, the chicken-run, and the vegetable garden — it was at the time of the depression but the subject was not even mentioned!

When we reflect on the loss of vitality which the French Canadian race has suffered as a result of the exodus into the towns and into the New England cotton mills, we can well understand how a new doctrine of colonization was developed towards the end of the last century. It was really based on the spirit of national preservation. 'Keep our people together

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in a land where they can maintain their own individuality', was the watchword of that great leader, Father Labelle. The development of Lake St. John and other similar districts was the result. When the Laurier cabinet proposed a new trans-continental railway, the Grand Trunk Pacific, as part of their platform at the 1904 elections, the French in the lower St. Lawrence were interested only in the section which would link Quebec City with Winnipeg by the northern route. They saw, and with reason, a new basis for French expansion where their people would not be lost to their own country.

Since then the Government of the province of Quebec has followed this colonization policy, for it reflects a definite conviction on their part. Under its present form, existing parishes are first developed by sending out and financing colonists who complete the work of clearing. New parishes are also opened up. The Government furnishes the social framework by subsidizing the colonists—men, women, and children—who form the initial population. They also take care to provide priests to give the necessary moral support. The aim always is to colonize, but the essential condition is the establishment of a definite French Canadian group.

The difficult thing about such an enterprise, especially in a country like Canada, is to recruit people who are really going to settle down in good faith. When things are going badly everywhere, they accept their lot, and for want of something better will go forth to open up arduous country. When prosperity returns, however, they are tempted to leave the forest and migrate to the towns or to the United States, a temptation which is especially strong among the women. When one thinks of the contrast between this rough life and the material comfort of the American standard of living, what anchor—to borrow Mauriac's expression—can possibly hold them to the land which they are supposed to be bringing within the pale of civilization? It is no use trying to restrain them. Success lies perhaps in getting them to accept frankly a certain conception of life—the one for which the priest has become the champion.

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In a letter dated July 8th, 1935, in reply to one from me asking for information, a French Canadian of Quebec, who is closely associated with this fine work of colonization, wrote the following significant passage: "These advantages are offered to all who wish to become colonists, and have been accepted by the colonization societies. There are no restrictions with regard to racial origin or religious belief . . . But I am definitely of the opinion that the French Canadians will be almost the only ones to profit to any extent by this policy. Our roots, which for a generation have been running along the surface, should now penetrate deeply underground. You will understand as well as I do the strength which we shall derive from this. Our parishes, like mushrooms, will spring up everywhere, especially to the northwest of Quebec beyond the Laurentian Mountains. The country is rough, but so is our race. The struggle will be hard, but once again Nature will be conquered by our people. I look forward to a day when they will overflow naturally into northern Ontario, where already they have made a foothold. They will first surround with their parishes the little mining towns that are bound to multiply in this vast region, which is so rich in mineral wealth.

'Elisée Reclus loved Canada, and Canada returned his love in full measure. Reclus was an intimate friend of Mgr. Labelle, our colonizing *curé*, who towards the end of last century did such marvellous work in the inhospitable Laurentian country. Reclus once wrote to him more or less to this effect: "My Dear Old Labelle: Send your colonists towards the north, far from the American frontiers. Send them where the winters are long and the climate rigorous, where families are numerous and the race is strong." The dream of these two men is now being realized, and on what a scale! I should like to be still in this world twenty-five years hence, for I believe that by that time we shall have made astounding progress.'

We have all heard the much-quoted rejoinder of the Commissioner of National Defence who, when the German army threatened his town in 1870, ordered the commander of a

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battalion of militia to hold up their advance. 'What if they arrive in overwhelming numbers?' he was asked. 'Fight until you are all killed,' was his light-hearted reply.

Seated at my work table, surrounded not by trees which must be felled but with documents which must be read, I sometimes feel like such an armchair general when I encourage our Canadian friends to go out into the forest and conquer it. And yet, if their race is to survive, it will be, as Elisée Reclus has said, by accepting a stern rule of life and not by emulating the American standard of comfort, which they describe with such pride when they come over to France. In the United States they firmly believe that the happiness and degree of civilization of a people is measured by its standard of living. Although this doctrine does not reject work, effort, or enterprise, on the other hand it does condemn all sense of restraint, economy, and voluntary sacrifice. Now up to the present the French Canadians owe their progress essentially to a different and almost contrary inspiration.

The problem to consider is whether Canada, situated so close to the United States with its prodigious standard of living, can retain her peasants. In order to resist this attraction which is already draining away her people, should she not take the initiative herself and become, to a certain extent, Americanized? Are not her peasant folk, in the atmosphere of North America, something of an anachronism?

The pre-war agricultural depression, confirming as it did the trend of our times, presented yet another problem which cannot be ignored. Can America, with an urban system which is out of touch with its rural foundation, live indefinitely without peasants? Will she not be obliged to accept an agricultural policy, which, though adapted of course to her new conditions, is yet definitely linked up with peasant traditions? The serious slump which occurred between the two world wars clearly showed that the agricultural industrialist of the strictly American type could not weather an economic blizzard with any real resistance. It is to the agricultural industrialist as he is found in Canada, that we propose to devote our next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

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2. THE WESTERN WHEAT GROWER

§ 1

A vivid contrast exists between the French Canadian peasant and the wheat producer of the West; it is a contrast of farming technique, of attitude towards life, and even of degree of civilization.

Economically wheat is of vital importance to Canada, especially in its international aspect. To celebrate the coronation of Edward VII at the time when the prairies were first beginning to be colonized, the Canadians erected in London on the route of the procession a triumphal arch made of sheaves of wheat. Since then Canada has become the greatest wheat exporting country in the world, supplying as much as 48.6 per cent of international requirements in 1925-26. During the prosperous years which preceded the crisis of 1929, 30 per cent of the exports from the Dominion consisted of wheat, and in 1934 when the depression was at its worst it still accounted for 20 per cent, or 23 per cent if flour is included.

This expansion is comparatively recent, for it goes back only to the first years of the present century. It is linked up with the growth of the three western provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. A new country has thus arisen beyond the Great Lakes, entirely different in tradition from the historical region of the St. Lawrence. The old opposition between Upper and Lower Canada, between Ontario and Quebec, still exists, but it is overshadowed today by the contrast between the atmosphere of the East and of the West. This has completely altered the equilibrium of the country.

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The great progress made during the 1914 war brought Canada's wheat area up to twenty-five million acres. Since then she has ranked fourth among the wheat-growing countries of the world, coming after Russia, the United States, and India. Over nine-tenths of this area is in the three prairie provinces, forming a triangle: Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton (Fig. 7, page 111). The base of the triangle from Winnipeg to Calgary is about 625 miles. This triangle is bounded on the south by a stretch of prairie grassland, and on the north by a sparsely wooded region which extends as far as the Laurentian Shield where habitation ceases and the density of the population falls to one person per square mile! In conformity with the trend towards the west, which is also taking place in the United States, Manitoba as a producer of cereals has gradually fallen behind the other two provinces. So far as wheat production is concerned Winnipeg is still incontestably the financial and commercial capital of the West, but Regina is destined to be the geographical centre of the wheat belt.

How vividly one recalls this country: an immense plain, almost devoid of trees, absolutely flat, as wide as the ocean but rising at times in undulations like a powerful ground swell. The sky is unbelievably clear, and the air as exhilarating as at sea; the very spaciousness fills one with an elemental enthusiasm. The delicate colours of the landscape fade at the horizon into luminous tints of yellow or mauve; the few rivers are torpid or muddy. In describing his journey across the Northwest M. Paul Morand remarked: 'The ears of wheat undulated as in Samson and Delilah, two Hungaries and four Roumanias placed end to end.'¹

Why should this region be devoted almost exclusively to wheat? Its predominance is obviously due to the formation of the plain, which stretches away unbroken as if the whole country were one immense field. It is therefore exceptionally suitable for the use of machinery. The nature of the soil, rich in silt, lends itself and so does the climate, which stores up moisture

¹ Paul M^lrand, *Rien que la Terre*, p. 17.

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under the snow, and then in summer distributes all the sunlight required even quite far north, thus forming a curious northern bulge in the isotherms. No country could be better adapted to the cultivation of cereals; in fact it is now one of the principal granaries of the world.

In the development of Canadian wheat-growing there have been three main periods. Between 1900 and 1914 everything was getting started; then came the first world war which brought marvellous years of expansion and lasted until 1919; this was followed by the great depression which went on until 1939, when the second world war finally brought it to an end. A fourth period then began, with renewed prosperity that still continues.

Let me now describe a farm in Saskatchewan near Regina which I visited in 1945. Regina is an oasis of trees — maples, poplars, and willows growing like a garden in the midst of the desert. From the top of its tallest building, a monumental hotel like a tower, one can look out on to this green island surrounded by the golden countryside extending bare and unbroken to the farthest sky-line. But this is not the desert. On the contrary these are the richest wheatlands in the world. The roads are laid out geometrically cutting one another at right angles like the streets in an American town, and here and there we can discern a few farmhouses. The latter are little groups of wooden buildings, enclosed by a few scraggy trees which cannot flourish owing to the constant wind. In this great open country which Nature certainly endowed in one of her generous moods, there is a dynamism which recalls the sea. One thinks too of the alfoeld in Hungary, of the South African veldt, and of the Argentine pampas. And yet there is a notable difference, for here material civilization has reached its peak and mechanization is at its best. It is interesting to analyse these things from the technical, economic, social, and even psychological points of view.

So about twenty miles from Regina I visited this large farm, the property of an American from Iowa who had settled in

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Canada in 1907. Today he has about 4000 acres all under wheat. His farm — if I may be permitted to use the term for something so different from what the word farm means to us — consists of a wooden house very like what the Americans would call a 'frame' house, and a number of outbuildings. The latter are square or rectangular, also built of wood and painted white. One of them is used to store the grain, and several others to house the agricultural machinery. There is a workshop for repairs, a small windmill to supply the electric power, and finally a little way off a shed for the reserves of petrol.

The agricultural machinery is magnificent, and represents a considerable outlay of capital. There are combines, sowers, and harrows, and also various kinds of tractors, some with such queer profiles that they look like prehistoric monsters. My host's personal motor-car is in a special garage, and there is a stable for three cows which are grazing near by, the only green field for miles and it is fenced in with barbed wire charged with electricity. But not a horse, not even a mule! In these parts the horse is out of date and is only raised for meat. To tell the truth I did not see a single horse during my whole stay.

There was no kitchen-garden near the house, no orchard, no chicken-run, none of the things which mean a farm to us. There was a small flower-garden, however, full of colour. The few trees surrounding the house were poor specimens, for the fact is these farmers do not like trees in spite of the protection they give from the wind, for it seems that they get into the way of the machinery. Anyhow trees do not grow well in this country. These people like space, and perhaps also those who concentrate on a single crop are a bit lazy and do not want to know about anything else.

We went out into the fields where the wheat was being harvested. Two combines were at work each driven by one man. A third man was watching the buckets on an endless chain as they dumped the wheat into the granary. As labour is thus reduced to a minimum, farmhands are no longer needed. A holding of 640 acres, they said, is easily run by a single farmer

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who needs help only for exceptional work. They showed me a sowing machine which will cover over 200 acres in one day and which can be used to spread fertilizer. The owner of the big farm I visited gives steady work to two men one of whom is a mechanic, and the most he ever employs is five.

This very fact shows that farming conditions have changed completely. Agriculture is not short of labour although the farms are becoming larger and larger, absorbing the smaller ones as a logical consequence of mechanization. Like the machinery in mass-production factories all these machines must be kept at work, for this unavoidable necessity applies to agriculture as much as to anything else. There is no work here for the peasant or the craftsman, and what there is seems to be very like factory work. The 'august gesture of the sower' belongs to the past, for today the farmer tends to be more of a mechanic than anything. Although still attached to the land the past generation were already taking to machinery, but the present generation are born mechanics. Instinctively these young people love automobiles and motors, and tinkering about with machinery and repairing it.

These things express the spirit and gifts of a different era. Here we are in a new world, one which is not the world of the village but the world of the factory. Anyway there are no villages on these empty plains, only isolated farms and far away the big city with its completely urban outlook. Besides, neither a village nor a hamlet could serve any useful purpose, for what are twenty or thirty miles to a farmer who buys everything he needs in town? Even the small town is becoming almost useless. About fifty miles from Regina, a city of 50,000 inhabitants, there is a settlement of about 30,000-40,000, but it is doubtful whether a town of this intermediate size will ever be created.

During the past ten years there has been an increasing tendency for wheat growers to live only part of the year on their farms. They pass the winter in their town houses and go to their farms only when they are needed in the early spring, leaving their wives and children behind. The latter join them in

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the summer, and stay on in the country until the autumn. The farmer's wife in these circumstances is not the farmer's wife as we know her. She is not expected to see to all the lesser products of the farm, for in this country they simply do not exist. This kind of exploitation does not provide anything for the farmer to live on. He goes to town for all his provisions, so paradoxically it is the town which feeds the farmer! When there is a bad crop and he has no reserves he can starve to death on his own farm, or join the queues of unemployed in the nearest city. Unfortunately this is what has often happened.

The character of a region like this and the way it is settled have undergone an astonishing change. During the depression Saskatchewan did not increase its population, on the contrary. Was this simply due to the depression or was it not also the result of mechanized cultivation which produces more with fewer hands? The yield in these districts may be low per acre but it is extraordinarily high in relation to the manpower employed. Everyone knows how the countryside has been losing its population. This certainly is true of the prairies and not as a result of any dissatisfaction with the district either. It is simply owing to a logic which is irresistible and beyond man's control. It remains to be seen whether man can without serious consequences divorce himself from the soil, and treat it not as a mother that he loves and cherishes but as a raw material which has to be manufactured. Among the grain growers and better-class technicians who have gone into the great adventure of mechanization, more than one today is tormented by this agonizing question.

§ 2

Having as much as 6,000,000 acres of arable land under wheat and a small population of only 11½ millions, Canada obviously cannot absorb all her enormous production, so naturally she depends on the international market. In 1938 she harvested 360 million bushels, and from 1942 to 1945 she averaged

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400 millions. On the eve of the second world war when she was exporting about two-thirds of her crop she was considered the world's greatest exporter of wheat. She attained this important position only recently, however; in fact this development had scarcely begun when I first visited North America in 1898. As the following table shows, her production was accelerated by the high prices paid during and after the first world war. The peak was reached in the record year of 1928, only to fall again to less than 300 million bushels in 1934 and 1935 owing to the depression and also to adverse weather conditions.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Wheat Output</i>
1900	47 million bushels
1911	227 " "
1915	392 " "
1928	566 " "
1934-35	275 " "

Prior to the 1914 war Canada ranked fourth among the world's exporters of wheat:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Per cent of International Requirements before 1914</i>
Russia	24
United States	16
Danube Countries	16
Canada	14

During the war, when there were no shipments from Russia and the Danube Basin, an undreamed-of opportunity opened up for non-European countries such as the United States, Argentina, Australia, and above all, Canada, and by 1917-18 the latter was supplying 46 per cent of the world's exports. Her predominance continued for some time after the war. From 1924 to 1929 Canada furnished an average of 39 per cent of international exports, and even 48 per cent in 1925-26 when the United States was supplying 22 per cent, Argentina 19 per cent, and Australia 12 per cent.

The Canadians may have believed that this exceptional position would become normal in time, but this was hardly likely.

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The depression which recently settled on their wheat export trade was in reality very largely the liquidation of the abnormal conditions created by the war. A revival not only of European production but also of European exports was inevitable. Each country, whether well adapted to it or not, began to produce wheat again and even more than before. In 1934 Germany produced 166 million bushels, and Italy 232 million, while Russia, Roumania, Algeria, and even France exported it. In addition insurmountable customs barriers were raised to defend their national production from foreign competition, even by countries depending upon imports. Their war experiences led them to further their nationalist aims by a battery of infinitely diverse and most effective customs tariffs, quotas, licences, import monopolies, preferential treaties, control and depreciation (more or less voluntary) of currencies, price-fixings, premiums, even including domestic regulation of flour milling. The countries which exported the most were naturally the most affected, and in the case of Canada this was the principal cause of her difficulties. As a result from 1928 to 1933 her exports declined to half. The competition of other exporters, who were better placed in some respects, exaggerated the crisis. The Argentine actually succeeded in capturing from her for the year 1934 the first place in the international market, by supplying 35 per cent of the world's export trade while Canada followed with 32 per cent.

There are, however, other aspects of the wheat crisis which may be simply circumstantial, but which, on the contrary, may be destined to last. For example, the *per capita* consumption of bread has declined considerably during the past generation, in France from 492 lb. in 1909-14 to 418 in 1929-34, and in England from 363 lb. to 297 lb. Furthermore Europe, which traditionally had been a large importer of wheat, now had difficulty in paying for it owing to the depreciation of her currencies.

From then on the depression was accentuated by the fact that grain was hard to sell and stocks in Canada kept piling up. The Western farmers found that two-thirds of their income had dis-

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appeared, for 60 per cent of it came from wheat. Finally people began to leave the prairies in a great wave of emigration. Thanks to the preferential tariff England was still buying 70 per cent of Canada's wheat exports, but that left 30 per cent to be disposed of elsewhere, in open competition on the international market and not on the sheltered Empire market. By 1939 this problem had not been solved, and even in the present post-war conditions the future is still uncertain.

Once again the return of prosperity was simply due to the war. The farmer has regained his confidence now that his product is in demand, but the Government with the hardships of the depression still in mind is putting on the brakes. In an effort to wean these inveterate devotees of monoculture over to mixed farming, it has been advising them to sow less wheat, and actually it was only in 1944 that an increased acreage was permitted. The consequences to the Canadian West are important, for during the war it lived under a regime of price controls. The farmers sold their wheat at the nearest elevator, where it was turned over to the Wheat Board which bought the entire crop at a fixed price. When the Board had sold all the crop, the carry over, if any, was given back to the farmers who thus were associated with the profits of the transaction but not with the losses which were borne by the State. To all intents and purposes this amounted to a guaranteed minimum price. The commercial structure remains the same as under a free regime, for the brokers without risk to themselves are still responsible for certain operations which they carry out for Government account.

It will now be interesting to analyse the present post-war position, and consider the dangers which face the Canadian grain growers. Certain conditions, without necessarily being permanent, seem to be in the nature of things and therefore likely to last for a while at least.

First of all Canada depends on the price of wheat on the international market, a price over which naturally she can exert little direct influence. Now this price varies considerably.

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Before 1914 it was about a dollar per bushel, but it rose to almost two dollars between 1915 and 1919, to fall again to 60 cents or about half the level of 1914. In 1945 it again touched two dollars. Such fluctuations are fraught with danger, especially if one has borrowed when prices were high — and in view of American psychology the temptation to borrow is very great. When one has bought, borrowed, and built up a whole system on the basis of a high wheat market, when the banks have lent 50 per cent on security that is likely to depreciate by three-quarters, then the whole edifice is liable to fall to pieces, and all the more so since there is only one crop. In addition we are dealing with a farming community that has few reserves, simply because they have nothing of the peasant in their make-up.

Here again we are confronted with the dangers of a single crop, for the grower takes his profit all at once at harvest-time and the rest of the year he has no money coming in. He lives neither from the farm nor even always on the farm. This is the exact reverse of the *natural wirtschaft* which in a general way expresses the peasant farm. Now monoculture requires exports and foreign markets, and these are subject to sudden price changes over which the grower has no control. When the market drops he has nothing in hand but a product that he does not know what to do with. Exports imply purchasing power on the part of the foreign buyer, and are therefore dependent on general world prosperity. Wheat may be in demand but that is not enough, for the importer must also be able to pay for it. As we shall see presently this is a disquieting pre-occupation for an exporting country like Canada. In a ruined world how is she going to find customers that are financially sound?

A single crop and the attraction of high prices involve several other dangers. During the first world war the wheat market reached undreamed-of heights, and this induced growers to cultivate land which was unsuitable. They planted wheat in districts where the rainfall was less than 20 inches a year and consequently liable to drought. When there was a hurricane

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the wind carried away all vegetable matter, so what was left was merely soil deprived of its humus and it soon dried up completely. The farmers should never have tampered with the light buffalo grass for it holds the earth together. The Indians considered it unwise to plough up this light soil and they warned the white men often enough, but the latter wanted to get rich and would not listen.

There were terrible dust storms in the 1930-40 decade, and in this region periods of drought recur at regular intervals. Defensive measures are now necessary, such as planting rows of trees, ploughing alternate furrows or ploughing without turning the sod, and building terraces to prevent erosion. These methods are difficult and require great care. They belong to an agricultural tradition that goes back a thousand years, one which we still practise in France on our Mediterranean coast. The New World has been inclined to laugh and pity us, but now it is in the same predicament as we are and is facing the same problems. The American in his fine youthful enthusiasm thought that he could sever the ties which bound him to Nature, but Nature always insists on her rights.

Mechanized agriculture is not a way of living. It is just a means of making money. In their haste to get rich these colonists 'mined the land', as they say in the West. Their methods, semi-industrial and performed with excellent technique, required only a few periods of intense work at seed-time and harvest, leaving them meanwhile with plenty of liberty to run around in motor-cars or take an express train to Florida or California. The danger is that apart from the mechanical aspect these 'miners of the land' are not interested in the life of the countryside, nor in a tradition of farming that has stood the test of centuries. Many of them believe that they can eliminate it almost entirely, and that the time has come when agricultural machinery has freed them from their former dependence on hired labour. Their wives and daughters, especially if they have had a good 'American' education, refuse to take care of the garden, the chicken, and the farmyard. The

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farmer himself cannot be bothered with keeping livestock in addition to his wheat, for animals are a nuisance.

'What, no cows?' exclaimed a French Canadian visiting the West, to a farmer who confined his efforts to wheat. 'You would balance your books better if you had a few.'

'I leave that to someone else,' was the reply. 'When I lived down East I had plenty of cows. I know all about them and I am through!'

During the 'fat' years the West thinking of nothing but wheat was determined to get a full year's profit out of three months' work, although in the East men with mixed farms were ready to work for twelve months for much the same result. There is something unhealthy about this Western view which cannot last. The divorce from the soil has been made easy by the progress in communications. The automobile has played a tremendous part in the evolution of America, as no doubt will be appreciated in the future. It keeps people from taking root, for anyone can move if he wants to. Apart from the fact that the wheat farmers are called agriculturists, they have little in common with the traditional farmer who is wedded by love or interest or perhaps both to the soil he cultivates.

That there is something vicious about this system is revealed by the fact that it cannot stand up to a depression. The peasant survives, supple and bending like a reed before the storm, protected by the very modesty of his needs. As for the 'land-miner', if he is not successful he simply tries to keep up appearances, or more often he loses hope and disappears in the city where he looks for a job. He is dominated by forces which are stronger than he is: the bank, the railway, and the grain elevator. He loathes them all, and tries to protect himself by turning to politics and membership in the Grain Growers' Association.

Nevertheless he does enjoy periods of wonderful prosperity such as during the second world war, but this prosperity usually is the result of exceptional circumstances. As we have said, the Canadian Government is still mindful of the last depression. It has reason to be anxious,¹ too, for during the good times which

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followed Canada's entry into the war the West went back to its traditional single crop methods, and it is very doubtful if they will succeed in times of peace.

I cannot refrain from pondering on the contrast between the Western Canadian farmer's superior technique which commands our admiration, and the need for a wiser attitude towards life and its possibilities. This sort of lesson has been handed down to us in the fables of every age as part of the wisdom of nations — but America was inclined at first to turn aside from such wisdom. She liked to think that such platitudes did not apply to a young continent with a future still before it, in an era when the machine is in the ascendant. In the West there is nothing technically that the machine cannot do; its limitations lie in the economic and international fields. But I shall return to this point later on.

CHAPTER IX

INDUSTRY

§ 1

THE study of Canada's natural resources and her manufacturing development immediately raises a problem of considerable magnitude, viz. the degree of industrial processing which a country at a given moment in its evolution is capable of applying to the natural products of its soil. In this respect countries seem to vary in age. Some are young, for they export their raw materials without transforming them; others are old — adult, if you prefer — for they on the contrary import raw materials in order to manufacture and re-export them after this transformation; others again are at a transition stage, exporting their products after only a partial processing, or possibly manufacturing them completely for their home markets alone. Canada has passed remarkably quickly from the first stage to the second, thanks to two exceptional circumstances. On the one hand, being situated close to the United States they have carried her along in their wake, and on the other hand, her part in the second world war has proved to be a decisive factor.

The essential characteristics of her natural resources are their richness, their immeasurable volume (the extent of Canada's reserves is hardly suspected even today), and their youth, by which I mean the margin still waiting to be exploited. In the United States, after squandering raw materials for several generations, they are beginning to realize that a time will come when this margin, in so far as certain products are concerned, will finally be exhausted. But in Canada they still talk of 'unlimited' possibilities, and moreover they have every right to do so. They have three principal resources, each capable of 'unlimited' exploitation: wheat, timber, and a whole series of minerals.




FIG. 8. — CANADIAN FOREST ZONES

1. British Columbia forest zone
4. Northern forests (sparse)

2. Southern forests
5. Treeless arctic zone

3. Northern forests (dense)
6. Treeless; prairies and wheat belt

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After studying the wheat situation we are beginning to wonder if this abundance is an unmixed blessing. 'What shall we do with it?' the Canadians have sometimes said to themselves. The wealth is there nevertheless, and it would be foolish to pretend that they would be better off without it.

In 1941 forest products represented 8.93 per cent of the net value of the national production. The forests cover 1,153,000 square miles, a third of the area of the country (Fig. 8, page 137). In extent this is greater than Russia in Europe, even with the addition of Sweden and Finland. Three-quarters can be utilized, and though depletion is not quite counterbalanced by annual growth, this loss amounts to so little that these resources can certainly be considered as inexhaustible. The map shows three distinct forests: One in the east in Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritime Provinces, consisting mainly of pine, maple, and birch; a second in the north with birch, spruce, maple, and trees belonging to the cypress family; and a third on the Pacific coast composed of arbutus and coniferous trees which are celebrated for their beauty. In the east the forest covers about three-fifths of the territory, but in British Columbia less than one-third. One receives a lasting impression of reserves; in fact these are the reserves of the entire continent and the United States can no longer dispense with them.

The mines, representing 10.55 per cent of the total, rank second among the primary products, coming after agriculture and before forestry. Nevertheless these minerals stand for something far more important than this apparently mediocre percentage indicates. Because of their future prospects which are already well established in certain cases, they have gained a position of special prestige for Canada in financial circles. This has been of considerable assistance in her recent development.

Iron ore is mined in small quantities only, not because there is none but because owing to its location it is cheaper to import it from the United States. On the other hand Canada holds first place in the production of nickel, asbestos, platinum, and radium; second in the case of gold, aluminium, mercury, and

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molybdenum; third for copper, zinc, lead, silver, and arsenic, and fourth for magnesium. The Dominion is especially rich in non-ferrous and light-weight metals which are of outstanding importance in twentieth-century technique. Even before the last war she held a virtual monopoly in certain cases notably with nine-tenths of the world's nickel and three-fifths of the asbestos. This mineral wealth is found chiefly in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Recent developments and future possibilities are, however, attracting attention to the North, which accordingly is becoming increasingly important, as we have already noted. Only yesterday the development of this region was still impracticable, but today the aeroplane and the radio have made it quite feasible. This fact seems entirely to have transformed Canada's economic personality.

In so far as fuel and power are concerned, special observation must be made regarding both coal and oil on the lines of what we have said regarding iron ore. Considerable reserves of coal exist but they are located at the geographical extremes of the country, in Nova Scotia, Alberta, and British Columbia. In view of the immense distances across the country from east to west, it is to the interests of each region to import from the corresponding region in the United States, more especially as the greater part of the Canadian population is spread along the frontier. Out of an average consumption of 30 million tons 12 to 15 million are supplied by the country itself, and almost the entire balance is imported from its great neighbour. During the last war, although consumption rose to 46 million, the output remained about the same. As for oil, future prospects are good, though what is being produced in Alberta and at Norman Wells still does not amount to much. Nevertheless there is a strong demand, which was increased to meet the needs of a mechanized army in the war. Thus, as in the case of coal, the country still depends on the United States.

With hydro-electric power on the contrary we return to the domain of 'unlimited resources' (Fig. 9, page 140). The undeveloped supplies of power are immense—25 million h.p. at




FIG. 9. — HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER IN CANADA
(North excepted)

Water power

1. Developed sites
2. Partly developed sites
3. Undeveloped sites

Capacity of sites

4. 1000 h.p. to 100,000 h.p.
5. 100,000 h.p. to 1,000,000 h.p.
6. Over 1,000,000 h.p.

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ordinary minimum flow of which 10 millions have already been harnessed. This gives Canada second rank in the world, coming after the United States, but first if we calculate the *per capita* output. This brings us back to the Laurentians, as they play the leading role owing to their innumerable lakes formed during the Ice Age. Thanks to these lakes which act as natural reservoirs at different levels, and to the hundreds of rivers where deep sluggish stretches are followed by rapids, the water is first stored up and then suddenly let loose. In this way the Laurentian Shield provides an immense wealth of hydro-electric power, which accounts for over nine-tenths of the country's production.

The Rocky Mountains and the Northwest also have waterfalls enough to satisfy countries less richly endowed, but it is the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba that are the most important for they are flanked by the Laurentian Shield. This vast area, which at first appears sterile and devoid of hope, is thus a source of potential wealth which has never yet been estimated. In the nineteenth century when coal and the steam engine dominated the world, the Laurentians seemed of little or no value, but in the present age of electricity Canada possesses in them a priceless advantage, perfectly adapted to the needs of our time.

§ 2

Given this background, what sort of industrial production are we likely to find? It is a big subject, extending beyond the Canadian borders and really embracing the whole question of the industrialization of young countries overseas. In the simple economic equilibrium of the nineteenth century, the New World exported foodstuffs and raw materials, and hardly thought of using anything but imported manufactured goods for their own needs. Today these adolescents are emancipating themselves, and are now contesting the remnants of the colonial pact—remnants which amounted to much more than was realized at

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the time. How far are they justified for example in setting up permanent industries of their own? Has Canada normally reached the stage of industrialization? Can she maintain it at the exceptionally high level which she attained during the second world war? If so, in which branches of production?

We must first consider the amount of motive power and raw materials at her disposal. In an age of steam she would be badly placed, for her coal beds, as we have said, are located far from her industrial centres. Coal mines in Alberta are about as useful to eastern Canada as the Donetz Basin is to France. But water power abounds especially on the edge of the Laurentian Shield, and it is so easily transported that it can be used almost anywhere and at low cost. In the twentieth century this is what matters. As for raw materials, the Dominion possesses wood and cereals in profusion, and, like the poetic land of Cipango, the North with its far-off mines abounds in various metals. Having said this much, however, we have come to the end of the 'unlimited resources'.

They are not very varied in type, for they are severely limited by the northern climate. If necessary the mining of iron ore might be developed, and also the production of wool, but neither cotton, silk nor rubber, nor indeed any of the other principal colonial products are to be found in these parts. They can easily be imported, you will say. True, but owing to the geographic disposition of the continents and the direction of the existing trade routes, England, even after two wars, having the *entrepôt* market of London at her disposal, is in a better position than British North America for securing the raw materials which the industry of the world may require. Although Canada may not be at a disadvantage in open competition, she is not well placed either. If it is a question of possessing raw materials on the spot and not being obliged to import them, the United States and Russia are obviously better off.

Another limitation results from the mediocrity of the Canadian home market. It may seem strange to use such a term in connection with a country with an area of three and a half

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million square miles, but one must not forget that it contains only 11½ million inhabitants. Even taking into account a relatively high purchasing power *per capita*, Canada is at a grave disadvantage when she launches into industrialization. Any hope of mass production vanishes as there are not sufficient consumers inside the tariff walls. Therefore output cannot be standardized, nor can the specialization of the various factories in the same industry be carried to its maximum. They are thus condemned to a diversified type of production which is costly. Exports can be considered, but only at the international price level which presupposes either dumping and is difficult to continue for long, or else concentration on certain industries where advantages exist. This introduces still another limitation and one which is incompatible with a policy of protection.

The Canadian market does benefit, however, from one exceptional advantage — paid for, it is true, by serious risks — in her close proximity to the United States. The word proximity is hardly strong enough, for the two countries have a common economic atmosphere and are in this respect both the same country. The attraction exerted by the 140 million people to the south is irresistible. The continental unity of North America has no counterpart anywhere else in the world. Neither the economic intimacy between France and Belgium or Switzerland, nor that between Austria and Germany before the Anschluss, can compare with the familiarity between Canada and the United States. No form of protection or defensive policy has ever succeeded in impairing it. Canada manifestly profits by it, for she participates without effort on her own part in the magnificent vitality of her neighbour. Any technical progress achieved in the United States is immediately extended to her; she benefits from their equipment, their capital, and their technical experts as if they were her own. Were it not for the tariff there might as well be no frontier, and if a regime of free trade were ever seriously established, the complete customs union would open up possibilities of economic development which would literally be incalculable:

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The reverse of the medal is that the Canadians in spite of themselves inherit a costly mode of living, as one does when sharing a flat with a wealthy friend. The Canadians must keep up to the mark or their people will be attracted across the border. This is no mere supposition, as their chronic emigration has abundantly proved. The American atmosphere has a direct repercussion on Canadian tastes, habits, wage level, and conditions of work, all of which inflate the cost of production just as they do in the United States, where, except when mass production enters in, costs naturally tend to be high. If Canada is dearer than Europe though cheaper than the United States, her cost of production tends to rise to the North American level. In order to defend herself against her giant brother she is almost bound to become Americanized. In any event she is always threatened with becoming a mere annex, a brilliant second but only a second just the same. Any other development is, I do not say impossible, but artificial as she wants to maintain her own personality. Once again the *leitmotiv* of the north-south axis exerts its influence.

The same applies to labour, for here again contradictory factors come into play. We must be like a canny peasant from Normandy who refuses to make a direct statement for fear of compromising himself. Let us say that on a continent where wages are high, Canadian wages are by comparison not unduly so; but that they are high when one thinks of Europe. The French Canadians must be placed in a separate category, for owing to their excessive birth-rate and the way they are drifting into the towns they constitute an abundant supply of relatively cheap labour. Capital is glad to employ them for they are docile, and disciplined by their priests according to a tradition which belongs neither to their own continent nor to the present day. They are more dependable than the Anglo-Saxons, and although less technically skilled they are very handy.

As a matter of fact labour in Canada is generally dearer than in England or Europe, but about 15 per cent to 20 per cent cheaper than in the United States. On the whole the wage level

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is American for it must compensate for extra winter expenses. The Canadian workman has adopted the standards of the New World, for he arrives at the factory in his car, wears gauntlets at work, is well equipped and well housed. Often he is a member of the American Federation of Labour or the C.I.O., which frequently obtains for him, in spite of the frontier, the same advantages that he would have in the United States. Thus everywhere we go we find the same atmosphere in the two countries.

This relationship is even more striking when it comes to the remuneration of executives, engineers, and experts generally. A splendid type is graduating from the Canadian universities — from the English-speaking ones at any rate, although progress is being made in the French-speaking ones as well. But apart from these recruits, Canada can have as many technicians as she needs from across the border. Yet as we shall see presently the needs of an industry which expanded enormously owing to the war are such that the Canadian demand for skilled workers, foremen, and engineers is far from satisfied.

§ 3

When we value Canada's bridge hand, we find that she holds a few marvellous trumps — economic youth, and practically unlimited water power and raw materials. But there are weak cards too — the small home market and lack of diversity in the products of her soil. Owing to her natural wealth, especially in forest products and wheat, she is bound to figure among the great international producers. This is her strong point and no one can take it from her. But again there is a double handicap, for not being able to adopt mass production owing to her small population she cannot compete with the United States, nor even imitate them except under artificial conditions. Having an American wage level, it is also difficult for her to struggle against a European or even an English technical level that is equal or even superior at a more modest remuneration. We therefore

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conclude that Canada will succeed better in industries where raw materials and water power are the principal requirements, but that the further one goes up the manufacturing scale, the more her advantages tend to disappear. However, she is still at an advantage in the many instances which have become more numerous since the war, where the industrial atmosphere of the United States seems to have flowed northwards across the frontier.

In the light of these remarks, let us now classify the Canadian industries into three main groups. The first comprises those which produce under the best conditions as regards costs and therefore can compete internationally with anyone. These are, generally speaking, industries carrying out the first stage of transformation only, and producing semi-finished products. They are mainly industries which benefit either from an abundance of raw materials on the spot or easily imported, or else those that depend on large quantities of cheap hydro-electric power available where needed. When these conditions are fulfilled, common sense suggests processing the raw materials only to the point of semi-manufacture, and then exporting them.

These are the true Canadian industries, which should logically be developed in Canada. Woodpulp, paper, aluminium, and all forms of electro-metallurgy and electro-chemistry come within this category. Geographically they tend to be located less according to the source of their motive power, which is transportable, than at the geometric centre to which their raw materials can easily be brought, and from which their products can be conveniently shipped or exported to the retail markets. These manufacturing centres are usually situated at the mouth of a river from which goods can be sent by boat either inland or overseas. Quebec, Ottawa, and Vancouver are examples, or points on the Saguenay. We may assume that owing to the favourable circumstances in which they are evolving, these industries should be able to hold their own against international competition, for high wages make little difference as abundant water power is the essential factor.

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The real test is their ability to export. The war has had a profound effect of course on international trade, but we submit the following pre-war figures as they still show the general trend:

<i>Product</i>	<i>Per cent of Total Output Sold Abroad</i>
Pulp	66 in 1908, 16 in 1934 ¹
Newsprint	92 in 1934
Paper	71 in 1934
Spirits	63 in 1929
Lead	66 in 1929
Zinc	77 in 1929
Artificial Manures	75 in 1919

In the second group we shall place industries which turn out finished products, such as woollen and cotton textiles. These derive no advantage from local raw materials, and can defend themselves against foreign competition only by a tariff. It is not that they are unsound, but that they cannot prosper except in an artificial atmosphere. They work almost exclusively for the home trade, and their initial weakness lies in the small size of their market.

This is particularly striking in the case of cotton manufacturers, who cannot adopt methods of mass production because their local clientele is so exacting that they are obliged to offer a varied range. This is a drawback for which no other element in the cost price can compensate. Their machinery is excellent, often ultra-modern, but it is expensive as duty usually has to be paid when it comes into the country. Labour is relatively dear in comparison with Manchester, where, in addition, the weavers and the spinners are probably more highly skilled. The bill for raw materials is rather heavier than in Lancashire, for though cotton must be imported to the banks of the St. Lawrence the same as to the Mersey, the British *entrepôt* market by handling it in enormous quantities could in the past furnish it more

¹ The Canadian Government believes in exporting forest products in as highly manufactured a state as possible.

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cheaply to their own textile mills. In short, Canada can undertake to manufacture cotton textiles and may even succeed in doing so, but she cannot withstand all-out international competition. She dare not expose herself even to English competition without some defence, so any concession or preferential tariff is immediately resented.

This evidently marks a point in imperial policy beyond which the Dominion cannot pass without sacrifice. Therefore this industrial group, which is established in the East, must be considered artificial. This does not mean that it should not survive, but simply that it soon encounters a limit due in reality to its inability to export. Even in the prosperous year of 1929, the percentage of production exported in these industries remained extraordinarily low: 0.6 per cent for cottons, 0.7 per cent for woollens, and 7 per cent for ready-made garments.

A third and rather numerous group of industries which is particularly interesting to study includes those which on closer examination prove to be merely branches of the industry of the United States. These belong to mass-production enterprise on an enormous scale, with headquarters on the other side of the boundary, but which have been established in Canada within the tariff barrier in order to have access to the Canadian market, and also to enjoy the preferences reserved for the Dominion in the rest of the Empire. Such enterprises have no really autonomous existence in Canada. Their technical operations are carried out there certainly, but all effective inspiration and direction come from across the border. The progress made in cutting down costs through mass production becomes possible in a country with a small population only because they depend less on the Canadian economic background than on the advantage of participating in a much larger market. Their manufacturing plans and designs are drawn up by specialists in centralized offices in the United States. Many individual parts are made at Detroit or Chicago according to ultra-standardized and highly economical models, and are then assembled in the factory in Quebec or Ontario. The same applies to the alloca-

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tion of territories market-wise and to the organization of production. Everything is decided in the spirit of a cartel, by an arbitrary authority at a distance beyond the frontier.

Such enterprises, although registered under Canadian statute and having Canadian personnel—I shall not dwell on the origin of their capital—may be considered as branches of a parent house. I would say of a foreign parent house if the two occupants of the North American continent could really be considered foreign to each other. These industries vary in their dependence on the United States. Motor-cars and pneumatic tyres are important examples, and agricultural machinery, but the latter only to a certain extent—for the Massey Harris Company is purely Canadian. Almost all are situated in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. Here again we find an important export capacity. In 1929 the automobile industry exported 35 per cent of its production, the tyre industry 39 per cent, and agricultural machinery 51 per cent. If we count Canada as an exporter in this instance, most of the credit must be given to the larger entity of North America.

§ 4

In 1929 at the close of a remarkable period of prosperity which led to the world depression, the principal Canadian industries, classified according to the net value of their production, appeared in the following order:

	<i>Per cent of Total Production</i>
Foodstuffs, and industries derived from agriculture	23
Wood, pulp, and paper	20
Iron, steel, and heavy industries	15
Minerals and metals	14
Textiles	10
Electric power	6
Chemical industries	4

Geographically manufacturing is carried on mainly in the East. The province of Ontario furnishes nearly half the value

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of the industrial production, and Quebec about one-third. Actually it is in this part of the country, between the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Valley, and the Laurentians, that the necessary water power and labour is found as well as the most concentrated local market. The financial centres of Montreal and Toronto are there too to provide the capital, and finally, it is situated close to the greatest industrial region of the United States. Secondary groups occur in British Columbia, Manitoba, and the Maritime Provinces, but we may be permitted to say that, generally speaking, the Valley of the St. Lawrence makes one think at once of Canadian industrial activity.

It is important to note that the three groups of industries analysed above are all more or less equally important. The first is important because it relies upon the natural resources with which the country has been especially blessed; the second because its success depends upon the deliberate policy of the country, and because it is linked up with the development of the East; and the third, because it brings the Dominion into close participation in the life of the United States. I feel that Canada can hardly abandon any of these three groups without seriously injuring herself, for each one in its own way is bound up with her personality. In the first place we naturally think of the development of a young country, which is exploiting its resources and normally exporting them after they have passed the first stage of manufacture and which can be carried out better on the spot than anywhere else. In the second case there is the determination which invariably exists in countries on the road to maturity to become as complete and diversified as possible by manufacturing as much of their own needs as they can. Finally in the third case we find a circumstantial development due more to neighbouring than to internal initiative, which introduces into the national life a ferment of intense activity and progress. Such was the situation on the eve of the war.

In 1939 Canada was only a third-rate industrial power. To-day, however, as a result of her war effort she comes immediately after the first three industrial powers in the world, the

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United States, Russia, and England. In four years she has made as much progress as in a quarter of a century in normal times, and in addition she has set up completely new industries within her borders.

Although she had formally declared war, Canada did nothing exceptional during the 'phoney' war from September 1939 to Dunkirk. Then from June 1940 onwards England relied on her, not only for the support of her armed forces but also for war supplies. Great Britain was able of course to turn out war materials on a very large scale, but the needs of the struggle were so urgent that they exceeded even her capabilities. Also, owing to the air raids it seemed unwise to concentrate too much war industry close to a continent which was no longer under the control of the Allies. Now Canada was not prepared to undertake this gigantic task, but she accepted it none the less. England furnished the specialized machines, and sent technical experts overseas to explain how to use them.

With this strong backing the Government took the idea of co-operation really seriously. A plan of action was drawn up, and a new Minister was put in charge of the newly created Department of Munitions and Supply. Existing factories were developed, those lying idle were revived, others were remodelled to meet special needs, others again were built new from the ground up. Canadian industry was subjected to Government drive, regimentation, and control. From then on the State controlled not only price and wage levels, but it also allocated raw materials and such goods as could be spared for the needs of the civilian population. If it was necessary to embark on something new, a factory or factories as required were erected at Government expense, State-owned companies were created, or private industry was instructed to proceed with this particular work.

To this lead from the top the country responded with a magnificent effort, and a whole series of industries arose overnight. The navy wanted ships so the Government formed a number of companies, and although it was the sole shareholder they were run with as much imagination and flexibility as they would

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have been under private ownership. Other companies which were already in existence were taken over or given Government support. Shipyards were humming with activity from coast to coast—in Montreal, at Quebec, and Sorel, in St. John, Halifax, and Pictou, and in the Pacific ports of Vancouver and Esquimalt. One stage of the work of assembling was done in Ontario 1000 miles from the sea. In 1939 Canada had only 30 dry docks, employing 4000 workmen, and not a single new merchant vessel had been built in 25 years. At the close of the war there were 90 shipyards employing 100,000 men. By the end of 1944 1000 new ships had been built; of these 500 were warships, 300 were boats of 10,000 tons, and this without counting 6500 smaller craft.

Then the Canadians embarked on the manufacture of optical glass according to the latest American methods. The leaders of industry were given the task of setting this new venture on its feet, and with very advanced technique and using highly specialized materials they were soon in the forefront of progress.

We have alluded earlier to Canada's wealth of non-ferrous and light metals, so I shall only mention aluminium in passing, and the sensational effort that was made to increase production from 71 500 tons in 1938 to no less than 492,500 tons in 1943. The industrial centre of Arvida on the Saguenay River, which was created from scratch by the Aluminium Company of Canada, gives a stupendous impression of power.

At Sarnia a factory was built to make synthetic rubber, and its output today is sufficient to take care of the requirements of the Canadian home market. But this still is not everything, for all the while the Dominion was turning out munitions and other war supplies, equipment for railroads, telegraphs, and cables, and also the endless tools and apparatus that an army must have in the twentieth century.

This manufacturing effort was undertaken chiefly in the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, but according to the political and military needs of the moment many other parts of the Dominion were drawn in as well. Neverthe-

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less these three provinces, with the addition of Sydney in Nova Scotia, seem to have become as in the past the normal industrial centres of the Dominion. The West, having no coal and being far from the sea and from all large consuming centres, does not seem to be destined for this type of development.

What are the future prospects for this newly created war industry? The Government and the public generally are anxious to see it survive and fit into peace-time conditions; moreover the State is disposed to hand it over so far as possible to private enterprise. Also, the Canadians want England to transfer to them certain industries of her own, and give them the benefit of her experience and technique. The truth is that the rhythm of Canada's war-time development so far exceeded her normal economic expansion, that her equipment is now too great for the technique that is available. Her qualified personnel has not kept pace with the needs of an industry which must expect in future to reinforce both its skilled workers and its executives.

Once again may I emphasize the fact that Canada's home market obviously cannot absorb an output that is the result of these exceptional circumstances, so in this field as in several others she is at the mercy of the export market. No doubt at the close of a devastating war the needs of the world are enormous, almost unlimited, but although there are plenty of customers how many of them can pay? In this respect as the Dominion shares the marvellous expansion of the rest of the North American continent, her problems and those of the United States are much the same.

Canadian industry has thus entered upon a new phase. Being composed of elements that are many and varied, the economic life of the country is singularly complex. It involves international relationships which enlarge its horizon and raise it to a position which is far greater than the modest figure of the population would justify.

CHAPTER X

CURRENCY AND FINANCE

§ 1

CANADA has always depended upon her foreign trade to balance her economy and in this respect conditions are hardly likely to change much in the future. She has always been obliged to import tools and equipment, manufactured articles and anything else which cannot be obtained from her own soil, so she has had to export on a very large scale to pay for all these things, and also for capital for her own development. A favourable balance of trade was all the more necessary since, being a debtor nation, she has had to service and pay off her foreign debts. In the twenty years prior to 1939 her imports amounted on an average to 87 per cent of her exports, a typical trade balance for a young nation that was paying off its debts in goods.

Canada's position was healthy enough but it was vulnerable, for it depended on the international market over which she had no direct influence. As an additional aggravation her exports consisted mainly of wheat, of which two-thirds were sold abroad, and forest products of which three-quarters consisted of paper and newsprint, the latter being shipped almost entirely to the United States. There was still another drawback, for each of these exports was addressed to a single client: England taking all the wheat and the United States all the paper.

Thus although Canada was no longer a colony, she was dependent upon economies which were much larger and more complex than her own. As a matter of fact her two chief customers, England and the United States and they alone, represented four-fifths of her foreign trade. In 1938 no less than 63 per cent of her total imports came from the United States

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and 18 per cent from Great Britain, although in the nineteenth century the position was the reverse, for Britain then was her principal source of supply. In 1870 Canada bought 56 per cent of her imports in the Mother Country. This situation was bound to change, if only because of the geographic factor. From 1932 onwards the Ottawa agreements doubtless increased Canada's British purchases somewhat, but Nature is always working in the opposite direction. The truth is that the United States is the natural source of supply for whatever the Dominion needs.

When we come to exports the position is rather different, for in this case England is the best customer: 41 per cent of Canada's total exports went to her in 1938 while the United States took only about 33 per cent. Nevertheless, although she came second, the great neighbour provided an extremely important market. As a matter of fact trade between Canada and the United States really is not foreign trade at all. Trade across the frontier would be a better description. Accordingly the economic policy of imperialism as expressed in the Ottawa agreements was both precarious and artificial.

§ 2

Being a new country Canada has required capital for development. It is estimated that by 1931 out of a total of \$31 billions of capital invested in the country, \$6½ billions or 15 per cent was foreign. Meanwhile the Canadians themselves had managed to invest some \$1,800,000 in foreign securities. Yet on the eve of the 1939 war, and although her people had begun to accumulate and even export their own savings, Canada was still dependent on foreign funds and therefore was to a certain extent a debtor nation.

This non-Canadian capital was either American or British. In the nineteenth century the British investment was by far the largest, and even in 1914 it amounted to 71 per cent of the total compared with 24 per cent from the United States. But

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the first world war reduced this proportion to 57 per cent by 1919 as against 39 per cent for the Americans. By 1929, however, American investments were decidedly in the ascendant, being 61 per cent as against 36 per cent. In Canada the British have put their money mainly into railway stocks, public utilities, and trust companies. By means of official representatives they look after these interests with care, and thus have an opportunity of exerting an influence that is at once discreet, subtle, and efficient. These financial ties imply the existence of political ties whose importance can hardly be exaggerated.

As for American capital, it is being directed largely towards railroad and industrial shares and the mines. In many industrial and mining enterprises their interest will account for two-thirds or even four-fifths of the total. Often instead of subscribing to shares or purchasing bonds they prefer to create an entire enterprise, or obtain control of natural resources in a big way. We must not imagine that the Canadians regard this support as foreign intervention that they are obliged to put up with against their will. There is so much interpenetration and intermingling of Canadian and American interests that no one on either side of the boundary sees anything abnormal about these investments, or feels that they involve the slightest political danger. Once again Canada and the United States hardly seem to be two different countries, and in the long run the danger may lie in this very fact.

From the various entries that we have noted, it is easy enough to draw up the Canadian balance sheet. On the credit side we must put down first and foremost the favourable balance of trade, for it usually amounts to about \$200 millions. Then come tourists' expenses amounting to some \$60 to \$80 millions, an entry of great importance, for an enormous number of people are always travelling north from the United States. Finally, exports of gold which are regarded not as currency but as merchandise. On the debit side come interest and dividends to be paid on borrowed capital, amounting to about \$300 millions; then freights, commissions, etc., representing services for

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which the Canadians have to depend on the foreigner, and these amount to some \$60 or \$80 millions.

In a good year when prices are high, exports easy, and tourists plentiful, Canada is a creditor, for her excess of exports offsets the payments that have to be made. There is then a surplus of capital for investment, as for example in the long period of prosperity that lasted from 1923 to 1929. But in a bad year when prices are low and times are hard, the weight of the interest to be paid abroad becomes heavier as exports fall away. The result is an adverse balance. This was the case in the years following the Wall Street crash of 1929, the effects of which were felt in Canada from 1931 onwards.

From this we conclude that Canada, being a borrowing country, must make sure that she always has a favourable trade balance, for her very existence depends on it. In this respect she is classified among the young countries which finance their foreign loans by exporting goods. It is really quite simple. Yet the situation is complicated by the fact that, within this equilibrium, the Dominion is a creditor in her relations with England and a debtor in her relations with the United States. The result is a complex position in which the monetary repercussions are particularly interesting.

Canada is situated between the pound and the dollar — her own currency is of course the Canadian dollar. When she exports wheat to England she is paid in pounds sterling, but when she buys American products she must settle the account in dollars. On the eve of the 1939 war Canada was as usual a creditor of pounds in London and a debtor of dollars in New York. She then took the obvious course, i.e. sold her pounds in New York in order to obtain the dollars she needed. At that time such transactions could be carried out easily enough, but naturally she was anxious to obtain as favourable a rate of exchange as possible for her pounds. In these circumstances it was to her interest to have a strong pound with which she could buy dollars without difficulty. In these relationships Canadian money found its own level, acting like a syphon between two

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reservoirs. Canada can never dare risk losing touch with either the pound or the dollar.

Yet there is a shade of difference! If the Dominion ever finds that she can no longer associate herself with the pound she will become more closely allied to the dollar, for it is the American dollar that is really vital to her economy. It is a question of proximity, of continental intimacy. When the Stock Exchange opens in Montreal the New York Stock Exchange is opening too, but in London the Stock Exchange opens five hours earlier. This difference in time is profoundly significant. In this matter the attraction is not west-east but north-south. This continental axis dominates the whole situation. So the Canadian complex is a dollar complex.

Foreign transactions such as we have described are the outcome of a magnificent system of multilateral trade that was handed down from the nineteenth century. It was based on free trade and in the last analysis on Western civilization itself. If this remarkable structure is destined to disappear in the future, it will mean a definite retreat in the evolution of human affairs. It will be a sad day if we replace international trade with a regime of barter, bilateral agreements, and economic compartments. Such a regime would be only half-civilized compared with the automatic mechanism and perfect precision which earlier generations in their wisdom were able to set in motion.

§ 3

The second world war seriously disturbed the balance of this mechanism. Since the return of peace Canada has become more than ever a creditor of pounds in London, but she can do nothing with these pounds for they can no longer be exchanged for dollars. Canada was a splendid source of supply during the war, and in order to pay her England used her own exports so far as they went. She then liquidated some of her foreign holdings, and also made good use of the dollars brought in by

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the American troops who were quartered in the British Isles, and this moreover was considerable. Otherwise Canada found herself in possession of pounds which for the moment were quite useless. A credit policy was the obvious solution, and this is what the Dominion adopted. In 1942 she voted a gift of a billion dollars to England for war supplies, and in addition \$700,000,000 standing to Canada's credit at sight in London was turned into a loan. In 1943 a further billion dollars was set aside to provide supplies for the Allied nations. This policy aimed at easing the debtor so far as possible, partly because Canada wished to do business with Britain in future, and partly because she was not only a client in difficulty but also a Mother Country with every right to special treatment.

After the war the problem continued without any fundamental change, although both countries tried to bring about a general liquidation of all their war-time financial operations. In the present circumstances England is carrying on negotiations of this kind all over the world, and discussions often become rather bitter. But with Canada they have taken place in an atmosphere of complete cordiality. In any case common sense certainly counsels the creditor not to be too hard on the chief buyer of Canadian wheat.

In view of the agreement of the 6th March, 1946, the debt which Great Britain contracted with the Dominion over the Commonwealth Air Training Plan, amounting to \$425 millions, has been wiped out entirely. A further arrangement provides for the cancellation of any war debts still existing between the two countries. Thus so far as Canada is concerned the United Kingdom is freed from all obligation to repay a debt amounting to some \$150 millions. However, this relief will not mean any effective disbursement for the debtor, for it will be charged against the total of a new loan of \$1,250,000 millions at 2 per cent. The terms of repayment are to be fixed later, but they are sure to be as considerate as possible. Finally, the loan without interest, which was agreed upon in 1942 in order to consolidate such sterling balances as had

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accumulated up to that date, is now prorogued, again without interest, for a further period of five years.

The traditional position is now reversed, and henceforth Canada will be the lending country. Actually the sale of British investments has been heavier there than anywhere else. The total amount of Canadian securities which Great Britain was obliged to requisition and restore falls not far short of a billion dollars. On the other hand the Dominion has paid off her foreign public debt and has also acquired extensive credits in England, credits which certainly she has consolidated on the most generous terms. This confirms and accentuates an underlying current which is steadily decreasing the British share of Canada's foreign investments, while the United States' share is increasing:

Relative Amounts of Capital Invested in Canada

	<i>United States Per cent</i>	<i>Great Britain Per cent</i>
1914	24	71
1919	39	57
1929	61	36

Today British capital amounts at best to a quarter of the American. In the past this was a most effective source of influence, but apparently it will not be at the disposal of the Old Country in future.

So far as the United States is concerned Canada is still a buyer who is anxious to pay cash for her imports so far as possible. During the war the Ottawa Government was always preoccupied with the problem of maintaining a reasonable rate of exchange with her great neighbour. It refused to join them in their lend-lease arrangements. By the Hyde Park Agreement of May 1941, it was agreed that during the war the United States should buy enough Canadian goods to enable Canada to pay for her own purchases. The idea was to put their relationship on a basis of barter and balanced exchange, but at the same time the Dominion strictly limited her imports in order

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to avoid getting into debt. May I say here that this presented no difficulty, as the Canadian position was much more favourable than was realized at first sight? During hostilities the American Government, as we know, undertook tremendous public works on Canadian territory, notably the Alaska Highway and the oil pipe-line at Norman Wells. This meant sending a great many workmen across the border, and they spent freely, leaving a large deposit of American dollars behind them. In consequence Canada's account with the United States was always settled with ease in spite of the breakdown in international currency exchanges.

Being a source of supply for the Allied Nations, Canada presently found herself with an export balance that was so favourable that it was almost fantastic. In 1938 this excess amounted to \$172 millions, but in 1942 it had reached \$741 millions, in 1943 it was \$1,266 millions, and \$1,681 by 1944. Meanwhile interest and dividends to be paid abroad had declined considerably. On the other hand the money received from tourists had been increasing for some time and seems likely to reach enormous proportions in the future. Canada is a holiday resort for the United States in much the same way as Switzerland, Italy, and the South of France have always been for the rest of Europe.

Canada thus is in a very strong position. She played a magnificent role in the war, no doubt of that, for she deliberately accepted her share of the risks and burdens of the struggle. She worked hard for victory, and yet she did not suffer from the war, not economically at any rate. Experience has proved that the great difference is not between countries that fought in the war and those that did not, but between those who were invaded and those who fought on someone else's territory. There is all the difference between invasion and sending out an expeditionary force. The Canadians simply sent their troops abroad and so did the Americans, and so did the British in 1914. For them this terrible period, therefore, was not one of crisis and impoverishment, far from it!

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But what is going to happen tomorrow? What sort of an international balance can Canada find now?

§ 4

In the future more than ever before Canada will be an exporting country. She will export wheat, forest products of all kinds, and non-ferrous metals, and since she has now become the fourth industrial nation of the world it will also be quite normal for her to export an increasing list of manufactured articles. But who will be her customers?

Her most natural customer of course is the United States, for the American demand for certain Canadian products is enormous, almost insatiable in fact. The American press for example could not continue publication without Canadian newsprint. In any case the two countries are situated so close to each other and have so much in common that there is bound to be a steady trade between them. The desire for closer commercial relations is becoming more and more apparent, and there is even talk of lowering their Customs tariffs. Imperial preference as laid down in the Ottawa Agreements, which are still in force, never seemed to meet with the complete approval of Canadian opinion. On its side American policy aims today at persuading England to abandon her system of preferences within the British Commonwealth. No doubt a Customs union between Canada and the United States may come eventually, but meanwhile though they are always talking about Continental free trade there is no sign of it so far. The Canadian Government—the Government, not public opinion—seems to doubt the wisdom of reducing its foreign trade to an exclusive dialogue between the two North American neighbours. A defensive instinct, which is basically political rather than economic, counsels it to seek an equilibrium that will be more flexible, and more varied commercially.

Quite apart from their sentimental attachment to the British tie, Canadians always have their good customer in mind, for

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Britain is an important buyer of wheat and other foodstuffs, and also of metals and minerals. She will need these things tomorrow just as she did yesterday, but it remains to be seen whether she can pay for them. As she is now deprived of her former 'invisible exports', obviously she will not be able, for a while at least, to import more than she can export. Such at any rate is the British policy, magnificent in its clarity, its energy, and in its determination to recover her former greatness. Canada understands the situation perfectly, and her attitude shows her full confidence in the Mother Country.

The difficulty will be whether the Dominion can buy in Great Britain or not. One immediately thinks of textiles, china-ware, and other specialized manufactures, but the list is soon exhausted. One cannot ignore the fact that, much as they wish to favour the Old Country, Canadian consumers really prefer American goods for their everyday requirements. Nevertheless if Britain is to buy wheat and pay for it, she must also be able to export on as large a scale as in the past. She will certainly find new markets throughout the world, but they may not happen to be in Canada. In any event she has already committed herself to a regime of multilateral trade.

We can well understand that Canada is wedded to the international money market. One can of course picture an American world, even a North American world, living alone on its own resources. This point of view is very popular in the United States and, almost instinctively, isolationist opinion always comes back to it. But Canada could never be satisfied with this solution. She cannot just sell to the United States and Britain, or to the United States, Britain, and the British Empire. Unless she has a much wider clientele than this she will be left exposed to the shocks of international depressions, a danger which she knows only too well. She is a large country with a small population, but she is on good terms with the rest of the world. She realizes perfectly clearly that her prosperity is linked up with the reorganization of the entire globe.

Now the world can reorganize only on a basis of multilateral

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trade and this necessitates an exchange that is both real and complementary — an exchange of goods, not credits. Is such reorganization possible? No one desires it more sincerely or more urgently than Canada does. The Government at Ottawa was one of the most convinced supporters of the old League of Nations, and today it is one of the most convinced supporters of the United Nations. Canada's international outlook is incontestable, being based at once on conviction and self-interest of course. If every other country were inspired by the same sentiments, the future of the world would look much rosier than it does today.

CHAPTER XI

CANADA'S PLACE ON THE INTERCONTINENTAL AIRWAYS

§ 1

CANADA is rich in two essentials: the natural resources of her vast territory and her geographical position on the map of the world, the latter advantage having been discovered only quite recently. In the past twenty years her place among the continents has been transformed by the aeroplane in a way that can only be described as fantastic. As a result, the development of the Great North has undergone a sensational revolution, and at the same time it turns out that the Dominion, and notably her northern regions, are situated on the direct routes between the most civilized parts of the globe. This is a trump card of first importance, but it is also a terrible danger.

From early times mariners have been aware of the existence of the Great Circle. Ever since the end of the nineteenth century Canada has benefited from being the terminus of the shortest route across the Atlantic between Europe and North America; this route has also been used by imperial British connections between England, Australia, and the Far East. The Canadian Pacific Steamships, those great liners built like yachts which make up the fleet of Empress ships, have long plied between Liverpool and Montreal, Vancouver and Yokohama, and Vancouver, Auckland, and Sydney. The slogan, 'The C.P.R. spans the world', does express an actual fact, an achievement dating as far back as the end of the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless the North lay empty and silent. The Laurentian Shield, that compact mass of archaic rocks, contained mineral wealth whose importance was suspected, but it had to be left untouched. It was virtually impossible to provide transportation in a region that was not only uninhabited, but at the

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mercy of bitterly cold weather during the winter. The Great North still remained what it had always been since the days of the first settlers, the land of the trapper, the Indian, and the missionary. It was ruled by three influences, all equally powerful, and they will continue to rule it until new influences in their turn are established reflecting the conditions of the times. These three influences are the Hudson's Bay Company, the Oblat Fathers, and the Canadian Mounted Police. Yet this never amounted to a great deal, and geographically led nowhere. The Yukon gold rush did liven up the Northwest for a moment, but that was soon over. The adjoining territory of Alaska never seemed to be a passage; it was simply a barrier like an *Ultima Thule* beyond which lay nothing but the Arctic Ocean and the North Pole. This coast was so completely isolated that its military security was unquestioned.

The aeroplane has now upset this equilibrium completely. In the future it will be possible to develop the Great North, but it will be done under conditions that the last generation never even dreamed of. On the other hand Canada now finds herself placed on continental air routes which already seem to be the axes of the future. Marvellous possibilities are looming up but it is the end of security, for the Pole has become a zone of imperialism and will eventually be a field of battle. We must now look at Canada from an entirely new angle, and consider her with a new scale of values. Let us try to bring ourselves up to date, for events are moving quickly in this part of the world.

§ 2

In the Great North we must distinguish between the Laurentian Shield, the Mackenzie River Valley, the Yukon and the foothills of the Rockies, and the vast territory in the Province of Quebec which lies between Hudson Bay and Labrador. The mineral wealth, as we have said, is enormous, but its extent is still hardly realized for little more than 5 per cent of the whole

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region has even been explored. Yet the amount that has already been developed is quite important—oil at Norman Wells, gold in the Yukon and the Mackenzie Valley, uranium at Great Bear Lake, and non-ferrous metals at Yellowknife. Moreover this list represents only a beginning, and the point to emphasize is that since the advent of the aeroplane and the radio this work is being carried out under entirely new conditions. Food supplies can be sent to isolated posts by air, and the radio keeps them in close and constant touch with civilization. On the other hand, thanks to mechanization and the increased power of explosives, the task of clearing the land has acquired a rhythm of speed which only yesterday was unheard of.

Thus although the possibilities of exploitation are boundless, the problem of settling the country is not so easy and the population probably will always be thinly scattered. However that may be, the Great North which only yesterday figured as a liability in the Canadian balance sheet is likely to be a splendid asset in the future. Perhaps the existence of this Great North is the finest and most original aspect of the Dominion's geographic personality.

This *Ultima Thule*, as we have said, has now become a passage, but a passage to what? It is the air route towards the North and towards eastern Asia, and then — and this is the great innovation of our time — towards the Pole, for tomorrow the Pole will be, and even today it appears to be, the most direct route from continent to continent. In these conditions the Canadian North has become a frontier, a frontier that eventually will be threatened, and which the Army must therefore be prepared to equip. This is a new point of view, a new preoccupation, which has radically altered the whole aspect of Canada's political problem.

§ 3

In the present age of the aeroplane, the idea of distance and of communications between the various parts of the globe has

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undergone a change which can only be described as revolutionary. It was Paul Morand, I think, who wrote that the moderns have invented only one full-sized vice, and that vice is speed. Banishing distance has upset the relationship between men and things, for we do not travel in the same way by air as we do by land and sea. As long ago as 1809 that far-seeing genius, Sir George Cayley, said that the air was an ocean that was navigable and uninterrupted, and it came right up to the threshold of every house. Every place in the world can now be linked up with every other place by a non-stop flight, and therefore air routes can be established simply by determining the points of departure and arrival. Civil aviation will make the most of this situation no doubt, and already it is taking advantage of intermediary landing grounds to pick up traffic and to refuel and look over the 'plane. Military aviation on the contrary is chiefly concerned with direct non-stop routes, so prefers as far as possible to follow the arc of the Great Circle.

In this respect Canada can be considered as particularly well placed, but also as particularly threatened. So far as the relations between the American continent and northern Europe and north-eastern Asia are concerned her position is better than that of the United States, because distances diminish as we go towards the north. The flight from New York to Paris via the Azores is 4700 miles, but from New York to Paris via Newfoundland and Ireland it is only 3660. In these conditions and especially when we bear in mind the favourable position of the Maritime Provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, we soon see that all the arcs of the Great Circle uniting Chicago with various points on the Euro-Asiatic continent pass through Canada (Fig. 10, page 169); when the terminus is very far off they go through the Arctic regions and even over the Pole. From Chicago to Tokio it is 8125 miles via San Francisco and Honolulu, but only 6250 miles via Edmonton, Alaska, and Kamchatka. From Chicago to Calcutta it is 11,425 miles by way of San Francisco, Honolulu, and Shanghai, but only 7500 by the arc of the Great Circle crossing Hudson Bay, the Pole, and

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central Siberia. From Chicago to Moscow it is 9750 miles by Alaska and Siberia, 5750 miles by Newfoundland and London, but only 5000 by the arc that goes through Labrador, Greenland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic.

We have noted that the Chicago-Calcutta arc of the Great Circle passes over the Pole, and that the Chicago-Irkutsk arc




FIG. 10. — GREAT CIRCLE ARCS

in the same way crosses the Arctic Circle. These glacial regions have acquired a new importance now that they have become a passage, and they certainly were not important before. In this respect Canada is in a key position, since all the quickest air routes between the United States and the geographic bloc of Europe and Asia have to cross her territory, especially if the terminus happens to be farther on. Accordingly our previous conception of Canada must be revised.

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The airways between Europe and Canada by the North Atlantic have now taken shape, and no matter what the trade combinations may turn out to be their future development will be pretty well along the following lines: from New York to Lisbon will be by the Azores (eventually by Bermuda); between New York, Montreal, and England by Botwood (Newfoundland) and Foynes or Shannon (Ireland), or more or less along the arc of the Great Circle; between New York, Canada, northern Scandinavia, and northern Russia by Goose Bay (Labrador), Julianehaab (Greenland), Reykjavik (Iceland), Norway and Sweden, again more or less following the arc of the Great Circle.

Mention must be made here of the 'Crimson' air route which was used during the war for direct communications between the Canadian West and Britain. It went by way of Vancouver, Edmonton, Churchill (Hudson Bay), Baffin Island, southern Greenland, Iceland, and Prestwick (Scotland). From this survey we can see that Canada's excellent position is chiefly due to her northern territories. A city like Montreal, and eventually Winnipeg, will be called upon to play a role of first rank at the head of an intercontinental air line.

When we consider the airways between North America and Asia, three routes now appear to be shaping themselves. Between Winnipeg and central Siberia the direct route immediately turns north to the Mackenzie region, crosses the Arctic Ocean, alights on the Taimyr Peninsula and ends on the steppes of western Siberia. Between Edmonton and eastern Siberia, Manchuria, and farther on southern Asia, the route passes by way of Whitehorse in the Yukon and the Behring Straits. This airline has the advantage of flying over country that is mapped and familiar, with good visibility, and little danger of icing except in the south. The third route leaves Vancouver, follows the Alaska coast down to the Aleutian and Kuril Islands, eventually reaching Japan. This airline has already been used commercially and no doubt in the future it will carry a good deal of traffic, but it has the serious drawback of passing over a

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region of rain, cloud, and fog where icing-up would be a constant danger.

No doubt in future there will be rivalry among these three routes. The first one will be Winnipeg's favourite, Edmonton will prefer the second, and Vancouver the third. In any case the first two are not likely to develop commercially to any extent while the U.S.S.R. continues its present attitude of aeronautical isolation. The Edmonton route to Siberia via Alaska was extraordinarily active during the last war, as it was used for supplying United States aeroplanes and war material to Russia. The city of Edmonton, which up to 1935 seemed to be the last outpost of civilization on the way to the vast emptiness of the Great North, suddenly found itself situated on one of the great highways of the globe, when in that year the route between the United States and Alaska was studied and then adopted. It was a promotion of which the city was at once proud and rather frightened. And not without reason, for it may be that future invasions will pass that way.

The famous Northwest Passage, that dream which haunted the imagination of our ancestors, has now been achieved. It has not been by sea this time, however, but by land and air, for the Pan-American route via Alaska, the airway that links up North America with the Far East, has turned the discoveries of the first explorers into a reality. Edmonton only twenty years ago was still a quiet little prairie town on the last frontier of habitation. Beyond that there were a few scattered settlements, on the Peace River for example, and then silence. In the far distance lay the fabulous land of the Yukon and the Klondyke with the mirage of gold, and the marvellous hope of a future which perhaps was already left behind.

The last war turned this part of the world into a hive of activity, a nerve-centre. At the beginning of 1942, a few weeks after Pearl Harbour, the Japanese menace extended across the northern Pacific, and it then seemed fairly certain that if the United States lost control of the sea, communications with Alaska would be cut as there was literally no practical overland

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route. It was accordingly necessary to plan a highway, a spare route, which would not be exposed to attacks on the coast. To build a road east of the Rockies became of vital importance, thus continuing to the north the magnificent conception of the Pan-American highway uniting Cape Horn and Cape Nome.

But alongside this road an airway had to be laid out to provide rapid communication between America and Russia, as both were engaged in the common struggle. The airline, which has been kept up ever since, starts at Edmonton and continues with airports at Grande Prairie, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, Whitehorse, and on to Fairbanks in Alaska. These aerodromes, among the finest in the world, are strictly standardized, and one feels that no expense has been spared to build them to accommodate a maximum flow of traffic. The flight from Edmonton to Whitehorse takes six or seven hours over country which seemed, as I looked down upon it, to be made up of tremendous plains, forests, and mountains.

In 1942 when a Japanese offensive through the Aleutians seemed to be imminent, the plan was to use this air route to keep in touch with Alaska as it seemed to afford the greatest security. So it was equipped at all possible speed, complete to the last detail, even with a luxury that compels admiration as it is in such striking contrast to the virgin forest on every side. Under the same inspiration the overland route, now famous as the Alaska Highway, was finished in an amazingly short time (Fig. 11, page 173). Its total length is 1500 miles. To be exact it starts at Dawson Creek, 438 miles from Edmonton, and goes from there to Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, Whitehorse, and on to the boundary of Alaska and its capital, Fairbanks. When it is finally completed it will go right to Nome.

It was agreed that the United States should construct the road although it lies for the most part in Canadian territory, and six months after the end of hostilities it was to be handed over to Canada. The very simplicity of this agreement suggests a collaboration between the two countries in which there is not

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a trace of suspicion or of ulterior political motive. The defence of a continent is at stake, the defence of a civilization.

In the construction of this highway American engineers added still another record to the many they already hold. It was on the 2nd of February 1942, less than two months after




FIG. 11. — THE ALASKA HIGHWAY

Pearl Harbour, that the United States War Department decided to embark on the project. On the 9th March, the first gang of workers arrived at Dawson Creek in weather 30 degrees below zero. By the 22nd of the following November, the first convoy of motor-cars drove over the entire highway. Thus it took actually less than eight months to complete this tremendous

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piece of work. It is known as the Alaska Highway, as Alcan, or far better still, just as the route.

These road-builders had to contend with bitter cold and snow in the winter, against mud in the spring, mosquitoes in summer, spongy muskeg, forests, rapids, and I don't know what else besides. But today Dawson Creek and Fairbanks are linked up by a continuous, well-kept road as wide as a boulevard. An automobile can travel from one end to the other in sixty hours and motor lorries in fifty. It was the famous bulldozer that made everything possible. It advanced like a fighting chariot over a track that usually was merely improvised as the work was being carried out at such speed. It was all quite fantastic. Guided by Indians who knew the country the scouts went first, while aeroplanes roared overhead. These were followed by surveyors who laid out the road. Then the bulldozer, proceeding like an elephant in the jungle except that it had a host of workers in its train—men armed with shovels and supported by another lot of machines to deal with the ground as it was cleared. No fewer than 10,000 soldiers and 5000 civilians were employed on this great enterprise, which dwarfs by comparison anything the Romans ever did in their day.

Now that peace has been established and Canada is in possession of the route, what is she going to do with it? Its commercial usefulness is doubtful, at least so far as international or intercontinental communications are concerned, for it is more economical to go up the coast to Alaska by boat. Tourists eventually will make use of it, for the scenery is very fine. But its main purpose will be to transport foodstuffs, petrol, and spare parts to the aerodromes that are dotted all along the road. Experience has proved that every airline must logically be shadowed by a road overland as part of its basic structure. One can safely predict too that mineral prospecting will bring a good many colonists to settle along this road, and that in the end a railway also will be built. How far we are today from the Northwest Passage so passionately sought by the early navigators!

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Although it has a history of only fifty years, the Yukon is a land of epic poetry. The Klondyke boom goes back to 1896, and already it seems to belong to an earlier era. Yet even today Whitehorse is just a frontier town in the American sense of the word. When the construction of the route was at its height, this little centre of 3000 inhabitants temporarily increased its population to 50,000. It consists of a few blocks of wooden houses — mostly what the Canadians would call log cabins. As the streets are only 'dirt tracks' and not paved, they throw up clouds of dust every time an automobile passes by. The station is the terminus of the railway from Skagway on the Pacific coast.

Then there is a very blue river, the Lewes, a tributary of the Yukon, which flows swiftly between its steep, rocky banks. White steamers with five storeys like the legendary river boats of the Mississippi go down it in two days to Dawson City, once a famous gold-mining town, but they take five or six days to come upstream again. On a tableland overlooking the town is the ultra-modern airport, very fine with its mile-long runway, but it seems to belong to another century. This is the frontier in the mystical sense of the term, a door opening on to the future, to effort, to discovery and dreams. Even today, if we stray to the right or to the left, man's foothold amounts to nothing, and Nature remains intact. In Europe we hardly realize how impenetrable Nature can be, how impossible it is for man to tame her. Her strength is much greater than he thinks.

In the woods around Whitehorse I was shown the traces of the old trail along which the first gold prospectors arrived in these parts. The trail is surprisingly narrow, hardly more than a yard wide, in fact just enough for a man to pass between the trees with a dog, a horse, and a very light cart. One can still see the flat wooden slats that were laid on each side of the path to provide rails for these vehicles of fortune. I can never contemplate without emotion these symbolical traces of human effort. But all this belongs to an earlier epoch. The prospectors of yesterday were the craftsmen of mineral research, working

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alone and revelling in this solitude with its risk of adventure. They were visionaries, often real poets. Today prospecting is mechanized, and carried out under the direction of powerful companies with enormous capital at their disposal. A page has been turned, I said to myself, as we drove at top speed along the Alaska Highway only a few yards away from the legendary trail. Later I thought so again when I looked down from the aeroplane on to that wonderful road as it faded into the distance towards Alaska and Asia.

So long as Russia keeps to her present policy of isolation, the great intercontinental highways cannot be developed commercially. The Northwest Passage goes overland only as far as Alaska; in the air no doubt it will be organized later, but for the moment we can only guess the main direction of the routes that will be adopted in the future. As a matter of fact we can be pretty certain that the Chicago-Moscow itinerary will pass through Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, and Scandinavia; that the Chicago-Calcutta airline will touch at Edmonton, Cape Nome, Nagaev, Vladivostok, Peking, and Chungking; that the Chicago-Hanoi route will go farther to the south, crossing through Edmonton, Juneau, Anchorage, Tokyo, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. But whatever the solution may be, Canada is there on the spot:

§ 4

In the wars of the future the North Pole seems likely to play a role of major importance. At the present stage of bombing technique, the problem consists in having an aeroplane carry a bomb—atomic or otherwise—a distance of four or five thousand miles and then come back—if it does come back. This solution has been generally accepted, but everything probably will be changed when the V2.s are developed further and perfected. In this case no adequate solution has been reached, but there may be some tangible progress in the very near future. As yet it is merely a question of going as quickly

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as possible by the shortest route from one point of the globe to another.

Now the great industrial regions of the world, those which count in the balance of the continents from the economic and




FIG. 12. — DIRECT POLAR ROUTES BETWEEN AMERICA AND ASIA

military point of view, and permit the great powers and the great powers alone to undertake a total war, are all situated between the 45th and 60th degrees of latitude north. These are the industrial districts of New England and the Middle West in the United States, the black country in England, Flanders, the Ruhr, Silesia, and the Donetz Basin, and the

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Ural-Kuznetsk district in Russia. It is quite obvious that in future it is these outstanding centres of production that the belligerents will strive to obtain.

From an American base on the 45th parallel to an Asiatic or European base on the same latitude, the direct air route passes over the Pole (Fig. 12, page 177). The outlying districts of Canada and Russia—Victoria Land and the Taimyr Peninsula—are very close indeed to the Pole, in fact Victoria Land is only 1500 miles away and the Taimyr Peninsula just over a thousand. From the 50th degree of latitude north in America to the same degree in Asia it is only 5625 miles; from the 40th it is only 675 miles, but of course this is only by going by the direct route over the Pole.

Thus these vast northern regions have now become interesting in a way that they have never been before. In the future each belligerent will want to be able to fly without interference from the enemy, and therefore air bases must be established as far forward as possible, and there must be intermediate landing grounds as well. These bases and airports will be very different, we imagine, from anything we have seen in the past. They will doubtless provide storehouses for reserve supplies of petrol, and their runways will be perfectly maintained. Above all their radio-goniometric substructure will embody all the latest devices for detecting the approach or presence of enemy aircraft. This equipment will not only be offensive but defensive as well, for the menace will not end with the atom bomb. We must now count on the peril, no less disquieting, of airborne invasions.

The political consequences, both military and geographic, are impressive, for a new world front, the Arctic front, is taking shape. Two powers hold almost this entire front: the U.S.S.R., with its Siberian coastline extending for 4965 miles, and Canada, within the borders of the American continent, with exactly 4000. We have mentioned Canada for political reasons, but in truth we are not considering a Canadian front, but one common to both Canada and the United States who together

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must protect the unity of the North American continent. This front goes far beyond the narrow domain of a flag, for it represents the defence of a community of civilization. From this arises a polar imperialism — ice-water imperialism if you like!

Russians, Americans, and British, all are now obliged to take an interest in the Pole, but the Russians so far have done much more in this respect than the others. According to the sector theory, which is supported by both the U.S.S.R. and Canada, the sovereignty of the powers possessing an Arctic front should extend right up to the Pole. The United States refuses to accept this theory, but this fact does not prevent complete collaboration with Canada. It looks as if the smaller nations, which hitherto have occupied territories where effective polar bases have been established, will not be able from now on to claim full sovereignty over them. Iceland and Greenland, for example, will no longer depend upon Denmark for their military defence, nor Spitzbergen upon Norway. Everyone realizes the interest that the United States has taken in Greenland and Iceland, and also the vigorous policy with which Soviet Russia has been developing the Arctic region of Siberia. In this part of the world opposition will obviously be between the great powers.

Where does Canada stand? We have noted the short distance which separates the Pole from her Great North. We have also mentioned the Crimson Route, an itinerary of purely military interest used during the war to link up Vancouver and Prestwick via Hudson Bay and Greenland. All the routes that unite the New World with the Old cross the polar regions. From Seattle to Leningrad it is 5172 miles by the parallel arc but only 3035 by the North Pole.

From this one grasps the full significance of Canada's Arctic front, and notably that of the outlying territories of Victoria Land and Prince Albert Land whose proximity to Asia has suddenly been revealed. Obviously Canada has become the keystone of North American defence, just as the Siberian Arctic is the keystone of North Asiatic defence. In this matter, make

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no mistake, the Dominion is more American than British. She is already taking military measures in conjunction with the United States to equip her northern front, and during the past war technical experiments and manoeuvres were carried out by organized army corps. Operation 'Eskimo' was undertaken on the prairies of north Saskatchewan to study the effect of dry cold on military operations. Operation 'Polar Bear' dealt with conditions of wet cold, and its theatre was the Rocky Mountains in British Columbia. Operation 'Lemming' concentrated on perfecting the type of motor transport used in the Great North. A great deal of information of this kind was obtained, but it is all still at the stage of trial and error.

A systematic campaign to acquire more knowledge of the Arctic regions has been set on foot in accord with the United States in what might be described as a statutory collaboration. For example, the *Midway*, an American aircraft carrier of 45,000 tons, was sent on an endurance test to the Beaufort Sea, the Behring Straits, and the Behring Sea. Again, the experimental flights of the Lancaster bomber, *Aries*, were planned to determine the exact position of the magnetic pole, in order to make the 'plane independent of the compass and allow it to be navigated either by radar or the stars.

Finally a full-dress military expedition was staged in 1946 to study the conditions and limitations of human endurance and mechanical resistance in the polar climate. The expedition left Churchill on Hudson Bay on February 15. It was composed of forty-five members, travelling in twelve snow-mobiles of a type previously studied when Canada expected to take an important part in the British expedition to Norway. The aim was to create a series of posts on the Arctic front between Baffin Island and Alaska, and it was the first time that motor-cars had ever been driven across the Arctic Circle. The era of dog sleighs, at least for this kind of work, seems to have come to an end. Foodstuffs for the party were brought by 'plane from Churchill to Fort Radium, Norman Wells, Victoria Land, Fort Nelson, Dawson Creek, and Edmonton. Two Americans, two

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Englishmen, one Peruvian, and one Chilian observer accompanied the expedition, which is known by the name of 'Musk Ox'. But all this is simply a beginning, for such manœuvres are bound to be repeated again and again.

§ 5

The great events which have altered the economic and political balance of the world have invariably shifted its principal highways. At the time of the astonishing discoveries of the Renaissance, the Mediterranean route to the Far East was replaced almost overnight by the South African route when Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1498. Owing to this discovery the countries bordering on the Mediterranean were superseded by those bordering on the Atlantic. A readjustment which is just as significant is now taking place in the polar regions. Only yesterday the North Pole was merely a land for explorers, the legendary domain of the heroes of Jules Verne, and of men who devote their lives to Arctic research. Today it has become the possible — indeed probable — theatre of future conflicts, when each side will try to control the northern skies in the same way as the great powers yesterday tried to control the waves. In less than twenty years the face of the world has been completely altered. The trend of political and military policy is not the same as it was even a few months ago, and from day to day as new techniques are perfected the situation is being modified still further.

Is this for the good of humanity? On this subject I recall the words of welcome addressed by Ernest Renan to Ferdinand de Lesseps, when he admitted him as a member of the French Academy on the 23rd of April 1885:

"The classic saying, 'I come not to bring peace but a sword,' must frequently have crossed your mind," he said. "Now that you have cut through it, the isthmus has become a defile, that is to say a battlefield. The Bosphorus by itself has been enough to keep the whole civilized world embarrassed up to the present,

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but now you have created a second and much more serious embarrassment. Not merely does the canal connect two inland seas, but it serves as a communicating passage to all the oceans of the globe. In case of a maritime war it will be of supreme importance, and everyone will be striving at top speed to occupy it. You have thus marked out a great battlefield for the future.'

One is tempted to transpose these magnificent but terrible lines to suit the situation today. What is Canada thinking, now that she has become one of the nerve-centres of the globe?

IV

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CHAPTER XII

CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL STATUS

§ 1

CANADA'S political problem results from a duality of allegiances both of which seem to be an innate part of her destiny. Although geographically American, Canada is, at the same time, the one country in the New World which has ties outside the continent of America. Although autonomous and even independent within the British community she still is not completely independent. Nor is she united, for the French are still a distinct element, and the immigrants of cosmopolitan origin become Canadians when they are assimilated without ever having been English. In the end everybody will probably be Americanized. Economically we have seen that conflicting interests exist between the various regions. The industrial East is opposed to the agricultural West; British Columbia has little in common with the older provinces on the Atlantic. As the country stretches out in a ribbon extending indefinitely from east to west, these contrasts exert a centrifugal action which may eventually become dangerous.

There is, however, a desire for union which has prevailed up to the present time in all circumstances and in spite of many temptations. Three-quarters of a century ago the British faced the future of Canada with singularly little optimism. Their experience of American secession, still comparatively recent, seemed to presage a similar separation. Canada would inevitably be absorbed by the United States, they said, or possibly, according to a favourite formula, would break away peacefully 'as ripe fruit falls from the tree'. Yet her evolution has been quite different, for although independence has been

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realized, it has not been accompanied by separation in any form. This is so unprecedented that it awakens the admiration of all political thinkers, who marvel at such wisdom. There is a difference between Canada and the United States, and psychologically this difference is fundamental. In Canada there is no revolutionary tradition with regard to England, nor even a trace of the mentality of a colony that has revolted or been set free. And yet no definite solution appears to have been reached, though perhaps, as the sage has said, there never is a solution to anything. So after all the future remains uncertain.

§ 2

'Geographically, and also historically, one can distinguish three British Empires.' This significant remark was made by Sir Alfred Zimmern. From the point of view of geography, the first group consisted of the settlement colonies which became the Dominions; the second was made up of the exploited colonies corresponding more or less to the Crown Colonies; and finally the scattered group of naval or air bases, and oil and coal stations. Similarly, from the historical approach, it is easy to trace three chapters in imperial history: first, the Empire of the Colonial Pact, based upon force and the mercantile theory. This empire died in 1783 from too much restraint with the loss of the United States. Second, that of colonial autonomy and economic liberty, victoriously carried on throughout the nineteenth century and terminated less by coming to an end than by expansion into the third. This was the Commonwealth, founded on the independence and equality of the Dominions. It is more than an Empire—the term is already out of date—being in reality a federation of nations. There might even be a fourth Empire, an Anglo-Saxon community in which England would not necessarily be the centre. Such an eventuality is hardly likely, though within the bounds of possibility. The constitutional development of Canada should be studied in conjunction with this imperial evolution.

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We must carefully note the extra-American character of Canadian policy.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, as part of the liberal policy inaugurated about 1840, England set up a form of Empire which was based on the autonomy of the settlement colonies. The Mother Country—in reality the metropolis—maintained a high-handed control over general policy, as was her sovereign right. Thus imperial unity was fully safeguarded. Under this regime, which was prolonged into the opening years of the twentieth century and which I personally saw in actual practice, Canada was satisfied with the right to manage her own internal affairs as she pleased. She did not appear to be anxious to influence British foreign policy, nor even to have her own sovereignty recognized to any extent. She was engrossed in the problems of her continental development, and therefore, provided their interests were not neglected nor sacrificed by Downing Street, the Ottawa Governments congratulated themselves on leaving London to carry out on their behalf a host of international negotiations which were both costly and difficult.

Canada did not object to this dependence on the metropolis. It was from England, the sovereign State, that the Dominion derived the power to make her own laws, a power which had been granted to her and theoretically could be withdrawn. This dependence was manifested in the presence of a Governor-General, uniting in his person two distinct functions. In internal matters he was an impartial arbiter, and, like the King of whom he was the lieutenant, he could not be held responsible; but he became a British agent once more whenever the question at issue went beyond the colonial sphere. Fortified with instructions, verbal at any rate, he was chiefly concerned with maintaining Canadian policy in harmony with that of the Empire. Had he not shown consummate tact, the figure of the proconsul might have emerged from behind that of the viceroy.

But the principle of autonomy, which had lain in the minds of the colonials since the time of Durham and Elgin, was eventually bound to develop to its logical sequence. England

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applied the brakes less by her statesmen who were being steadily won over to the Liberal conception, than by her civil servants who were slower to change. At each demand from the colonics, the Colonial Office declared that that was the end of the Empire . . . And yet the logic of the situation always won out in the end. Canada thus obtained the right to set up her own tariff, to control her own budget, to govern herself freely, and to lead her own life without outside interference. Little by little the Governors-General ceased to exert the rights which they retained in theory. 'Do what you are told,' became the essence of their instructions. This regime, in which precedents were imperceptibly transforming themselves into rights by a sort of acquisitive prescription, already contained the seeds of independence.

Very soon, as it happened, the domain of strict autonomy no longer sufficed. Once the Canadian Government had been authorized to set up its own tariff, eventually a tariff against England herself, was it likely to abstain from discussing its fiscal relations with foreign countries? But here barring the road rose up the fiction of British sovereignty, in virtue of which all separate negotiations seemed to mean a claim, or at least a desire for independence. The British Government found a compromise which for several generations seemed to be sufficient. The colonies did not receive the right to make treaties, but they were allowed to conduct their own commercial negotiations. The British ambassador presented the colonial negotiator as a matter of form to the foreign government; then he retired, to appear again only at the last moment, when with great formality he appended his signature to a diplomatic document in which he had scarcely collaborated. The real negotiator by courtesy was also asked to sign, but in the midst of so much diplomatic pomp he became once again a very humble figure indeed, lost in the majesty of the British Empire.

Though it flattered the snobbishness of some colonials, to others such diplomatic haughtiness was very distasteful. Nevertheless this *modus vivendi*, which expressed the English genius

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for compromise to perfection, worked marvellously well. The signature of Great Britain, symbol of sovereignty, saved everyone's face. One may argue that England was releasing the substance to chase the shadow, but this very shadow had a real prestige value. This was especially so since in this purely formal tutelage, there was sometimes the possibility of intervening behind the scenes. The protocol, this ritual of policy, thus became a bulwark of imperial unity.

Under such a regime which almost until yesterday was the imperial scheme, the metropolis conceded almost everything, and yet officially kept everything intact. To say that all Canadians were pleased with this solution would be going too far. They realized its advantages, but the feeling was growing that their independence should be recognized. Sir John A. Macdonald was aware of this national consciousness, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier emphasized it when, at the turn of the century, he proudly proclaimed almost as part of his platform, 'Canada is a nation!' But with this idea new demands were raised which the preceding generations had never thought of. Hitherto they had been content with semi-independence in practice, though not by right, but in future they would not be satisfied with anything less than official recognition.

They lost patience with the outworn English conceit (apparently it existed within the Empire as well as elsewhere!) of regarding 'colonials' (a slightly disdainful term) as second-rate Englishmen. The tone of the Colonial Office, which thought it was still administering Canada's affairs fifty years after independence had been granted, irritated Canadians to exasperation. Finally, the secrecy of the Foreign Office, which carried on imperial policy without consulting them, began to shock them as an intolerable anachronism. It was clearly apparent by about 1910, that the traditional *modus vivendi* of the nineteenth century was no longer in keeping with the aspirations of a community which was no longer a colony and which rejected the term as beneath its dignity.

A school of thought, which was growing in numbers under

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the brilliant inspiration of John S. Ewart, author of the *Kingdom Papers*, and to which Laurier certainly rallied after his fall from power in 1911, defined the limits of the political bond with England as a simple personal union under the same sovereign. This great prime minister did not wait until he had gone into opposition to claim explicitly on behalf of Canada the right to possess her own diplomatic corps.

A superficial observer would almost be justified in jumping to the conclusion that the imperial ties were seriously weakening, but he would be mistaken. Coinciding with their desire for a recognition of independence, there was also a growing sentiment among Canadians in favour of the Empire and its unity. In truth they may have feared imperial centralization but they had no wish for separation, for after 1890 the idea of American annexation went out of date. On the contrary they were proud of belonging to the Empire, and eager to give tangible proof of their devotion. The preferential tariff in 1897 and the Canadian participation in the South African war were turning points.

England's great wisdom at this juncture was that she realized that, although apparently contradictory, the two tendencies of colonial opinion could be combined to strengthen the Empire, though not without transforming it. By a happy chance a new imperialist school which took this spirit into account was formed in England at about this time. Chamberlain's imperialism, in spite of his sincere respect for colonial autonomy, nevertheless involved a tendency towards centralization which would have stood in the way of the inevitable evolution of Canada's colonial personality. In a sense he went beyond Gladstonian Liberalism which he had ceased to represent, for his aim was to rejuvenate certain characteristics of the Colonial Pact, and to renew the tradition of this 'first Empire' which had disappeared with so little regret. But under the influence of Cecil Rhodes, of Sir Alfred, later Lord Milner and one of the militant apostles of the 'Round Table', a new doctrine emerged after the South African War. It was no longer a question of

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young British colonies gathering around the metropolis like children at their mother's knee, but a conception of imperial unity which meant complete equality for all its parts.

Henceforth, to borrow a saying from Pascal and apply it to this political constellation, the Empire should be like 'a sphere in which the centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere'. Unity of sentiment between the members was to be the true and essential tie. 'I believe,' Rhodes had declared as early as 1883, 'that each colony on which self-government is conferred should constitute practically an independent republic . . . But I also believe,' he added, 'that the colonials should avail themselves of all the privileges which are provided for them by the tie which binds them to the Empire.'

Such formulae, whether he knew it or not, expressed to the letter the aspirations of a Canada arriving at political maturity, and wishing, without leaving the Empire, to affirm her unrestricted independence. They also corresponded to the outlook which predominated more and more in the English governing class on the eve of the first world war. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, it is significant to find Sir Edward Grey for the first time taking the assembled prime ministers into his confidence in matters of foreign policy. Already we have the atmosphere of collaboration between equals which was to be the rule in the Empire during the war of 1914. This was the embryo of the 'third Empire' which has been evolving with all its consequences ever since.

The war naturally developed aspirations that had previously been vague and inarticulate. After their magnificent co-operation in the heroic struggle England could no longer treat the Dominions as her wards to be inspired and directed. The English people, however, did not all see matters in this light. The Canadian officers often complained during the first world war that they were not treated by British staff officers with the consideration which is reserved for social equals—again the same error, the same lack of understanding that the Colonial Office had shown fifty years earlier! An entirely different

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attitude was shown by the statesmen who collaborated with the ministers from the Dominions on equal terms.

The Imperial War Cabinet, which was created in 1917 to deal with exceptional circumstances, united the members of the British War Cabinet and the colonial prime ministers into a supreme executive council. For this reason, the theory and practice of the Imperial Constitution — if we may thus refer to a group of institutions which deliberately prefer not to be formulated — evolved more quickly than they would have done in normal times. After the Imperial War Conference of 1917, a vitally important meeting because of the orientation of policy which it decided, it was recognized without reserve that the Dominions should henceforth be considered as fully grown nations, and that they were justified in possessing, even in the conduct of foreign affairs, their own point of view corresponding to their own special interests. At the same time it was declared, emphatically and by common agreement, that this proclaimed independence in no way threatened the solidarity of the imperial tie.

Addressing the conference on April 16th, 1917, Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, said, 'The policy of according absolute control in our domestic affairs and complete autonomy in our local administration, far from having slackened the ties which unite us to the Empire, has on the contrary greatly strengthened them.' The ninth resolution of the conference contained a formula which is essential both in its novelty and in its import. It stated that all future revision of imperial status should be based upon the full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of the same imperial community.

Since before the 1914 war the Dominions, as we have shown, have enjoyed an independence that has been almost complete. The new factor is that they are agreed that henceforth this independence shall be officially recognized, even by foreigners — in other words that they shall be given an international status. It was in this spirit that they obtained the right to affix their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles, following but along-

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side that of Great Britain. They also voted separately at the League of Nations, of which they became members through being part of the British Empire no doubt, but at the same time as political entities on their own account.

From this moment and for this reason a new conception of the Empire took the place of the one that had prevailed since the middle of the nineteenth century. There was no longer a sovereign Mother Country surrounded by colonies, autonomous and deferential, nor yet a unified Empire, with, as its executive, a cabinet which was imperial simply because it was British. Henceforth, according to the terms adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1926 — which in reality only confirmed what was already in existence — 'Great Britain and the Dominions are within the Empire autonomous collectivities of equal status; they are in no way subordinate one to the other, and from no point of view, domestic or foreign; but they are united by a common allegiance to the same crown, and freely associated as members of the community of British nations.'

Commenting upon this vital clause, the Hon. Ernest Lapointe, a Canadian cabinet minister, added a definition which is scarcely less important: 'This declaration, this affirmation of the status of the British nations, is not a unilateral article emanating from Great Britain, nor from any one part of what is commonly called the British Empire; it is not a charter granted by a superior power to subordinate territories. It is a recognition, by equals and associates, of a condition accepted by all.'¹

The British genius, thanks to its traditional suppleness, thus created — or allowed to be created — a new type of political community of which history affords no other example. We have just enumerated its basic principles, but the Statute of Westminster (1931) managed, almost, to deprive these principles of all the logic they contained. No act of the British Parliament can in future apply to the Dominions except at their request.

¹ The Hon. Ernest Lapointe, 'Le Statut International du Canada', *Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne*, December 1927.

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The Colonial Validity Act of 1866 annulled completely all colonial legislation which was contrary to British legislation, but this provision now ceases to exist. As the Imperial Conferences of 1929 and 1930 abolished any veto from London on laws enacted by the Dominions, it follows that the British Parliament now legislates only for territory which is strictly under its control, namely the United Kingdom and the Crown Colonies. This theory has not been carried to its logical conclusion, however. For the constitutions which created the Canadian Confederation in 1867, and the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, were the result in each case of a vote in the British Parliament and can only be amended by a similar vote. Now, at the express desire of the interested parties themselves, it continues to be the case until further notice. This reservation, to which we shall return presently, will allow us to glance at certain contradictions in the Canadian personality.

In spite of this hitch in the harmony of the system, the fact remains that, without undue haste but with a will that has never deviated no matter which party was in power, Canada has assured herself of all the organs of sovereignty. Although Australia made much more stir about it she follows a long way after, and for reasons which can be readily surmised. Ireland must obviously be classed apart. In the transformed Empire it is Canada that represents, even more than the Union of South Africa, the type of Dominion which has evolved towards independence. It was only after the second world war that Australia adopted a similar attitude.

§ 3

We must study this new order of things under its principal aspects, and especially in so far as it modifies Canada's relations with either her old metropolis or with foreign powers.

So far as Canada's relations with England are concerned, it is admitted that since the 1926 Conference and especially since the Statute of Westminster, the only bonds existing between

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the two countries are those of personal union under the same sovereign. If anything to the contrary still remains in the statutes, such as for example the necessity of intervention by the Parliament in London in the case of any revision of the British North America Act of 1867, or the maintenance of the appeal to the Privy Council, we must see in them only verbal survivals destined to disappear, unless it be that many Canadians continue to regard arbitration by an older, impartial, and distant body as a valuable guarantee. But, having made this reservation, all trace of subordination is henceforth wiped out, and we are in the presence of two States of equal status. Senator Dandurand once strikingly expressed it this way: 'I am not willing to be a subject of the subjects of the King. I consider myself a direct subject of the King, the same as any citizen of London.'

England in these circumstances is only a *primus inter pares*, the British Parliament is no longer an Imperial Parliament any more than the British Government is an Imperial Government. In the old metropolis, which is no longer a metropolis, the change has been accepted in good faith though not without regrets. The significance of the Crown itself has also changed. For the English it is indivisible, but the Canadians are also pleased to consider that the King of England is also King of Canada, or at least, and not without a touch of subtlety, King in Canada. The doctrine is now admitted. Actually it was as King of Canada, supported only by his Canadian Ministers, that Edward VIII in July 1936 unveiled the national monument erected to the memory of the Canadian soldiers who fell at Vimy Ridge.

In view of this it would seem to be logical for the Dominion to have a flag of her own. This flag, it must be admitted, is rather difficult to design owing to the many, varied, and ultimately contradictory symbols which it must contain to satisfy everyone. Up to the present none of the designs submitted has been accepted. Meanwhile it is the Union Jack that one sees everywhere, though with the tricolour where there are French

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Canadians. The Governor-General hoists a special flag of his own, not the Union Jack, thereby emphasizing a territorial separation which must not be overlooked.

The Viceroy in effect represents the King, who is English in England but supposed to be Canadian in Canada. Hitherto Canada has used the British seal, but at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 she used her own seal for the first time. In the same way the right of grace, a royal prerogative, is exerted by the Viceroy but on the advice of the Canadian Government. Similarly in the case of honours which are conferred by the King, but again on the advice of whatever Canadian Ministers are responsible, although it could be argued that this advice is unnecessary. When George VI came to America on the eve of the 1939 war he presided over a session of Parliament and signed the bills in person, officially in his capacity as King of Canada. His appearance in person for the first time confirmed the establishment of a new regime.

In this system the Viceroy continues to be as before the representative of the Crown; but he is only this and no more, as there can be no further question of his being considered as a British agent. In virtue of a custom which seems likely to continue, his choice is suggested to the King by the Canadian Government itself, without the English Cabinet having anything to say. He might even not be an Englishman — there is nothing to prevent it.

The Conservatives in Canada seem to prefer an outstanding member of the aristocracy who is imbued with etiquette, but the Liberals are attracted rather to an outstanding civil servant or someone with an intellectual reputation, but they are not at all hostile towards the peerage which still enjoys great prestige. It would be wrong perhaps to conclude that, because he no longer receives instructions from London, the Viceroy's duties are merely decorative. It is certainly understood that he shall not interfere — he would not be forgiven if he did — but like a Prince Consort if he is clever and well informed he can still exert a great deal of influence. Also, it is easily seen that

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his secretary is always chosen with great care. The policy of a great Viceroy may have lasting consequences. He is an example, a living symbol of good form, in a continent where it is tempting to lapse into easy democratic manners; he inspires and even creates institutions which survive him; and in cultural matters he interprets Canada to herself. Finally, by his mere presence, he maintains the link with Great Britain.

On the other hand, the function of being a direct political liaison is outside his province. He is no longer the channel of official communication between London and Ottawa. At the time of the first world war the practice arose of direct correspondence between British and Dominion Prime Ministers, a copy of the proceedings 'for information' being handed to the Governor-General. But even this copy is now dispensed with, since he is no longer in any sense an intermediary. A succession of diplomatic substitutes has been set up to replace this out-of-date machinery. For many years Canada has had her own High Commissioner in London, and the British Government has now nominated one in its turn at Ottawa. For the latter post they must avoid appointing a man who is too much of a diplomat, as his attitude might suggest a foreign ambassador; nor yet too much of a political personality, whom the Canadians might suspect of wishing to intrude in their affairs. Up to the present the choice has been made among personalities noted for their technical experience or their knowledge of the relationship between England and the Dominions. With tact they have moved in diplomatic circles as if they were not part of the family—it is sometimes said that the American Ambassador seems to be more at home! The whole business is very clever. Thus a rejuvenated political bond is being reconstructed, and seems to be functioning with complete efficiency.

From this survey we see that the Imperial Conference of 1926 only confirmed practices which had been in existence ever since the first world war. Yet it is easy to understand that the old British tutelage in official matters cannot long survive the birth of this new spirit. Not that the Canadians had asked for

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any new powers with regard to negotiations, for they had all these powers already, but simply that they were beginning to tire of the symbolic intervention, even discreet, of a permanent diplomatic chaperon. Back in the days of the Laurier Government, a department of foreign affairs was created at Ottawa. A time came, however, shortly after the Treaty of Versailles, when the Canadian Government went a step farther and insisted that its treaties should bear only its own signature.

The conflict over procedure between London and Ottawa in February and March 1923 marked a decisive point in the evolution of Canada's diplomatic status. It was a question of a treaty concerning the halibut fisheries in the north Pacific Ocean. It had been negotiated directly, as was customary, between the Governments at Washington and Ottawa. When it was finally concluded, the British Ambassador to the United States was prepared as usual for a joint signature, British and Canadian, with the British signing first of course. But, acting on the instructions of the cabinet of which he was a member, the Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, insisted on signing alone. He kept to his point, and succeeded in making London accept it. Hitherto England had been rigid over matters of procedure, but now for the first time she gave way.

This event was of great consequence, since after the Imperial Conference of 1923 this practice became the recognized custom. It was admitted from then on, and incidentally confirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1926, that in future all governments in the Empire should have the same right to enter into negotiations, to conclude them, and even to sign treaties with foreign powers in the name of the King. Previously such treaties had been concluded in the name of the British Empire. If it is a question of interests pertaining to Canada only, they are now naturally always in the name of the King but only in respect of the Dominion of Canada. The Canadian plenipotentiary, accredited by the Crown, alone will append his signature, using as we have said the Canadian seal. In 1895, in a celebrated

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dispatch, Lord Ripon, the British Minister for the Colonies, expressed the opinion that granting colonial governments power to negotiate treaties without the assistance of the British Government was not compatible with the maintenance of imperial unity. The future will decide whether he was right.

The power to negotiate and make separate treaties evidently involves the right to create a separate and permanent diplomatic representation, and also the right to receive duly accredited diplomatic agents. Many powers have long had their consuls-general in Canada, but the hostility of the official British attitude prevented them from carrying out effective diplomatic functions. Prior to the war of 1914, with the exception of the Canadian Commissioner-General in Paris who did not have diplomatic rank, the Canadian Government had not established any permanent representation abroad, not even in Washington where negotiations over Canadian affairs are almost a daily occurrence.

At the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, owing to the recognition of the new international status, it was quite natural that the Ottawa Government should consider creating a permanent and special representation in the American capital. England acquiesced, though not without reserves and reluctance. London suggested a Canadian Minister Plenipotentiary who would be an adjunct to the British Ambassador, a collaborator and member of a sort of imperial embassy, who would remain to satisfy their prestige as *chargé d'affaires* in the absence of his chief. Another plan that has been suggested—to save face as usual—would be to appoint a Canadian as British Ambassador to the United States. Whatever the form, it was bound to be rather a delicate role to fill, and no doubt it was for this reason that the project, though contemplated ever since 1920, was not carried out until 1926. But considerable water has flowed under the bridge, and while they were trying to make up their minds the question came to fruition. Mr. Vincent Massey, the first Canadian Minister Plenipotentiary appointed to Washington, was established there, not as an

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adjunct to the British Ambassador, but with his own offices, and with complete independence of action. Since then the combination has functioned without friction thanks to the perfect loyalty of the English, and this time it is the Canadians who seem perfectly at home on the banks of the Potomac.

It was not surprising that in 1928, by agreement with the interested powers, the Canadian Government should proceed to create two new legations, one in Tokio and the other in Paris, while France decided to transform her consulate-general in Canada into a legation. The new minister was none other than our old friend M. Philippe Roy, former Commissioner-General, who under various titles had represented his country in France for twenty years. He was then accredited to the President of the Republic, who previously had not been authorized by a jealous officialdom to recognize him. As Ottawa was now receiving various foreign ministers, the Canadian capital for the first time became a diplomatic centre, elevating itself in keeping with its new international status. In December 1945, at the close of the second world war, Canada appointed ambassadors to a great many countries and ministers to others. General Vanier, for example, came to France as Canadian Ambassador.

One final step remained to be taken along this path, which logically enough they wished to pursue to the end. This was the institution of a Canadian citizenship in the true sense of the term, distinct from British citizenship. This came into effect by a law passed in 1946. Henceforth Canadian citizenship exists quite apart from British citizenship, so that an Englishman of England is not *ipso facto* a citizen of Canada. Yet for once the Dominion did not carry matters to their logical conclusion, for she was not willing to have Canadians give up their British citizenship. As a result though an Englishman is no longer a Canadian in Canada, a Canadian is still English—British to be exact—in the old metropolis. This is in reality a homage rendered to the Mother Country, which is still the Mother Country, and a tribute to the British community from which the Dominion has no intention of ever being separated.

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§ 4

The future will disclose whether the Empire comes out of this evolution stronger than before. For what may prove to be a long phase, it will assuredly tap new sources of life and moral strength. But exactly how much remains of imperial unity?

The Crown is the essential, the unique symbol, supported by certain prerogatives whose prestige should not be despised even in America. The right of pardon, of conferring honours, of the use of the seal, and of Royal procedure has been strictly preserved for the Viceroy. The Dominion Government having first demanded and then obtained all sovereign rights, the only constitutional link now existing between the various parts of the Empire is a personal union. The exception is the appeal to the Privy Council in civil matters — criminal appeal to Westminster has not existed in Canada since 1888. And the right of appeal, while it lasts, is a survival of actual union. But is the fiction of Royal unity sufficient to compensate for the factors of dissociation which are growing with increasing force?

In truth, the circumstances into which Empire unity can be translated into common political action are becoming increasingly rare. The second world war, however, provided an example, but this time it was because the whole system seemed to be in mortal danger. In peace-time things look different. In the immediate past the direction of foreign affairs, British or imperial, were one and the same, and remained by common consent the exclusive domain of the Foreign Office. Today the right to formulate a general policy for the Empire considered as a whole belongs only to the peoples who compose it, when they are represented at the Imperial Conferences. Their agreement can create a policy, but any member that declines to be a party to it can keep his international liberty. In the intervals between these sessions during which no permanent organ of the Conference exists, the Foreign Office when an urgent measure has to be dealt with is in fact and by tacit consent charged with any decision and its execution.

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The political leadership of England in the imperial community has thus persisted up to a certain point, by habit as it were. But as the Dominions become more conscious of their international individuality, the old blending of the British and imperial roles — the word 'imperial' is going out of date — will diminish, whereas the independence of the Dominions — another old-fashioned phrase — will become more clearly defined as they become independent powers, or think they are. The idea that in future each of the partners can have its own foreign policy — a conception formerly considered fatal to the Empire — is now, in spite of certain regrets even in Canada, accepted as perfectly natural.

The Canadian Government, being ahead of the other Dominions in this respect, has evolved a doctrine of perfect clarity. Without denying the solidarity of the Empire, they insist on remaining sole judge of the obligations it involves for them, even in case of war. The old formula that a treaty signed by England is binding upon the Empire, in their opinion, is out of date. They no longer consider themselves bound, except when having been consulted and asked to co-operate they have expressly given their consent. The new procedure, adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1926, which specifies whether an international engagement has been entered into 'on behalf of Great Britain' or 'on behalf of the Dominion of Canada', leaves no doubt on this subject.

Ever since the first world war this desire for a separate policy of action has been affirmed under many different circumstances. In 1922, for example, at the time of the Chanak incident, when without sufficient preparation Canada was asked to collaborate in the defence of the Dardanelles, she declined. In 1924 the Canadian Prime Minister declared he did not wish to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, as he had been party neither to its preparation nor to its discussion. Again in 1926, England contracted the Locarno Treaty alone without obtaining the support of the Canadian signature. Finally in September 1939 it was as a result of her own decision and without recourse to any auto-

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matic obligation that Canada made up her mind to enter the war.

The attitude is always clear and always the same. Canada commits herself when her interests are involved, but she no longer considers herself as part of a whole, but as a distinct and independent personality. Therefore, alongside English policy, there is a Canadian policy, which must be taken into account. Under these conditions the term Empire in the Roman sense no longer applies to the British system throughout the world. The term Commonwealth which is gradually replacing it corresponds to a different conception. The individuality of the parts will even in the end do away with the idea of the group. 'The Empire,' a Canadian humorist said to me, 'is like a leopard, of which one sees only the spots. The spots are the Dominions, but as for the leopard, well, there ain't no sech animal!'

We seem to be getting back to the old medieval discussion of realism and nominalism. So far as I personally am concerned, I cannot help believing in the unity of the British group in the world. But it is less in the form of a State, of an empire in the Roman sense of the term, than of a community of people holding the same political views, better still of the same civilization, extending to all subjects of the King in the world and comprehensible more or less to all Anglo-Saxons.

The problem which arose at the end of the nineteenth century has been resolved by Canada's acquiring independence without leaving the Empire. I hesitate to say Empire, for the word virtually has been dropped. Yet not entirely, for the Tories and Imperialists still use it, although most people speak of the British Commonwealth. The term Empire, at any rate in the Dominions, is falling into disuse, for it has depreciated in meaning until it now refers simply to the 'colonies' as distinct from the 'Dominions'. One would then say 'Commonwealth and Empire', the Empire being included in the Commonwealth. The situation is so new and the change has come about so quickly that there is still nothing definite in the vocabulary to express it. In these circumstances the term Dominion no

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longer means what it did when it was adopted in 1867 at the time of the Canadian Confederation. Sir John A. Macdonald suggested 'the Kingdom of Canada', but it was the English who objected, for they were afraid that the American Republic would not like a country in the New World to be called a kingdom. So they fell back on the more modest word, Dominion, which did not give the slightest impression of independence. Today they have come back to the word 'kingdom', for King George VI himself when he was in Ottawa in 1939 referred to his 'Kingdom of Canada' in the Speech from the Throne. Yet as a rule, and perhaps because they are in despair over these lexicological difficulties, people just say 'Canada' and leave it at that.

CHAPTER XIII

BRITISH INFLUENCE

§ 1

At first sight the impressions one obtains of the English Canadians are clear, but on closer acquaintance subtle distinctions arise and the fine simplicity vanishes. There is the Englishman, born in England, who has recently migrated to Canada and who is still intensely English. There is his son who is being brought up in Canada in an atmosphere of loyalty to Britain, and who seems to be part of a British garrison. Then there is the Canadian of British origin, who is still mindful of this fact although he has become assimilated to American surroundings. Alongside him is the English-speaking Canadian, whose family arrived so long ago that he is out of touch with the Old Country. In each of these types one must still sort out the English from the Scots and the Irish, not forgetting the descendants of the United Empire Loyalists, whose ancestors were American for several generations even before they were Canadian. To these we must finally add a medley of others of foreign origin who also speak English. The gradations of the political tints in these different groups are as delicate as the colours on an artist's palette.

One may say that the Englishman in Canada is English before he is Canadian; to tell the truth he has never ceased to be English and would be surprised if anyone took him for anything else. His allegiance, in so far as British nationalism has a territorial allegiance, lies outside the country; politically his heart is far away, somewhere in the northwest of Europe in some corner of the British Isles. He is not the one to favour a display of independence, the creation of a separate diplomacy, or obtaining the right to sign treaties. On the contrary, he

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regrets these things, and sadly disclaims any innovations which sap imperial unity. At heart, though he does not always admit it, he has a 'colonial' mentality. Apart from the liberties which he prizes like the rest of his compatriots, he has no wish for a new nationality or citizenship, which to him could not replace the elementary pride in being English. In case of war he reacts immediately as a 'Britisher', and rushes to the flag—to the British flag. We all know English people of this type, for they are the same the world over.

The attitude of the English Canadian is different, for he is first of all a Canadian and feels that he is distinct from the English. We must admit that he does not like them and is always running them down. They are, he says, proud, disdainful, intimidating, and incomprehensible. They are not good mixers, they do not become assimilated, and they are not the right 'temperature'. In short, these brothers are strangers to each other, and the English Canadian is much more at ease with the Americans. But we must be careful here—this Canadian who does not like the English loves England, and, moreover, he clings to the British tie, to the British connection. In his case this sentiment has nothing incompatible with his Canadian independence. The laws which hold the British family together are mysterious. One can love one's family, even be devoted to it, without liking every one of its members! The chilliness which one often notices between Canadians and English when they meet—and of which, it seems, there was more than one example at the Ottawa Conference in 1932—has no political repercussions, just as, on the other hand, there are none resulting from the obvious personal sympathy which brings Americans and Canadians together.

England and the British community can thus count on the support of the English Canadians, always allowing for the fact that the Dominion comes first. Also, England must not demand Canadian support for a measure which is too strictly English, or which may be suspected of being imperialistic. Once these conditions have been fulfilled, their devotion to the Common-

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wealth is complete, and its value is not lessened by saying that it is a function of their interest in Canada in the wider sense of the term. The part they played in the second world war is there to prove it. But between this attitude and the one indicated above, there are so far as the English Canadians are concerned an infinite number of gradations. Thus if England herself were to go to war, it would be difficult to say how far the spontaneous reaction would be English, Canadian, or Imperial. What we do know by experience is that in matters of secondary importance Canadians are inclined to regard English 'Imperialism' with a certain amount of suspicion. But if the Mother Country were in mortal danger, filial sentiments would appear even in circles where they are supposed to be out of date.

Having arrived at this point, if we are asked how far Canada is still British, we shall have to answer in canny Norman fashion, and say that for a year when apples are plentiful their apples are not up to much, but that for a bad apple year then theirs are all right! In transposing this precious formula, the *chef-d'œuvre* of a peasant wisdom, we should suggest that for an American country the Dominion is English, and for an English country it is American. According to whether one arrives in Canada having come from the United States or from England, one or other of these two impressions is invariably received. We may say that Americanism in Canada is aggressive and glaring, while British influence is subtle and not immediately apparent, but such judgments must be carefully weighed. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, countries such as Australia and New Zealand are tinted with English influence in rather a different way, but when one considers that Canada shares a boundary of 3000 miles with the United States, is it not rather wonderful that a British North America should exist at all?

From the point of culture and civilization, British influence is certainly present, but it is weak. One is aware of it in certain churches, notably the Anglican, in some of the universities and colleges which are imbued with English snobbishness, and of

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course in the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto. But the atmosphere definitely is American and there is nothing to be done about it. Apart from a few circles which are both ultra-loyal and snobbish, Canadians speak very differently from English people. In Australia the national accent is Cockney, but here it is Yankee. When I had been in Canada several months, I was surprised to find that even I instinctively felt that an 'Oxford accent' was a pose. 'Why can't he talk like everyone else?' was the comment, obscurely suggesting the instinct for equality which dominates the New World. Now this aggressive representative of a linguistic aristocracy was merely speaking English, but I must confess that outside Europe it did sound a bit queer!

It is just the same with sports. The national game is baseball, as in the United States. Colleges which fan the imperial flame extol cricket, but the crowd will have none of it. They want to play the same games as the Americans do. Yet British culture has deposited a vigorous ferment in Canada, especially in education where English influence is noticed at once, and Scottish even more strongly. One cannot say, however, that the intellectual life of the country depends largely on England. A mere line on the map does not mean that 140 million people who are near at hand are less likely to be taken as models than 40 millions who are far off.

Having made these important observations, we are apt to forget the rest. We may say that Canadian institutions are deeply imbued with British inspiration which still holds its own even today in spite of geography, and therefore the Dominion occupies a place apart in the American continent. A real frontier separates Canadian institutions from those of the United States. The list may be long, but it is so significant that we shall enumerate it.

Let us begin with the parliamentary spirit. The New World, which in constitutional matters invented the president, adheres to the tradition of the tribune or plebiscite, and not to that of governments responsible to the assembly. This observation

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applies not only to the United States, but also to Latin American countries, where ministers are simply the deputies of all-powerful presidents. Canada, however, is attached to an entirely different system in which a cabinet is responsible to a parliamentary majority. The political life of Ottawa is genuinely American in many ways, but its atmosphere is still remarkably English. There is no President of the Republic — no Republic of any sort — no Congress, but instead there are a Viceroy, a Prime Minister, a House of Commons, in fact a whole procedure inspired by Westminster. A Lincoln, a McKinley, and a Wilson are authentic products of the new continent, but one has the impression that a Sir John A. Macdonald and a Sir Wilfrid Laurier and a Sir Robert Borden more readily take as their models great English parliamentarians such as Disraeli, Gladstone, and Asquith. These Canadian statesmen are very American if you will, yet from this point of view they form a distinct group, and when they come to London they are carried away by British prestige. It was very much so in the case of Laurier, although he was French Canadian. The great difference between Canada and the United States lies in the fact that Canada has not severed her ties with England. From the colonial point of view there is something revolutionary about the American language, something which one does not find on the banks of the St. Lawrence.

In the Canadian legal world the English lesson has also left a lasting impression. Justice, in this country of liberalism, has been able to preserve its impartiality and moral authority. When Canadians are asked what they consider is the chief difference between the Dominion and the neighbouring Republic they will usually say that it is the way justice is administered, and the Americans agree with them. In this matter the current from the east was able to retain its essential vigour, to the undoubted advantage of the community. The Canadian professions are similarly organized. They are grouped into corporations under royal patronage the same as in England, and this again constitutes a solid link in the relations between

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the Dominion and the Mother Country — one to which we do not generally attribute sufficient importance. This provides a social structure which is both efficient and stable in comparison with other American countries, which obviously suffer from the lack of it.

As we have already said, the Anglican Church is essentially British in its outlook. Indeed this link with the Empire is so apparent that the Established Church in England has never even dreamed of being separated from the State. Sometimes when they are far from home French people feel that they ought to attend Mass even if they are not practising Catholics, just to show that they are French. In the same way the English cling to their Anglican Church.

Along with ecclesiastical ritual must also be classed English procedure which still persists on all official occasions in Canada. The opening of Parliament by the Governor-General, the receptions at his official residence, Rideau Hall, and the levees which he holds when he is on tour throughout the country, are all further examples of British influence, and are likely to impress an observer with the extent to which they are non-American. What a contrast between an audience with the President of the Republic at the White House, and one with the Governor-General at Ottawa! The personal courtesy and the gracious welcome are the same, but in the second case there is an aloofness that is intended really to stress the inaccessibility of royal majesty. Such official procedure would be impossible in the United States owing to the American Revolution, but it is still respectfully accepted in Canada. The public regard it as a reminder, as a lesson in good form, which does not endanger their liberty and prevents in some measure the standard of courtly manners from declining. As a result there is much more dignity and formality in Canada than there is in the United States.

We feel here the part played by the Crown, which paradoxically continues to enjoy in this democratic society a feudal element of personal loyalty. It is sometimes said that the King

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is the crowned president of the imperial republic, but I am inclined to disagree. No doubt Canada behaves like a republic, but the people's attitude towards the sovereign is personal. Their devotion, even affection, also embraces in a more general way the whole of the royal family. The King does not trouble anyone — he is so far away — but they know that he exists and, curiously enough, the recent technical progress in broadcasting has accentuated the personal character of the ties which attach him to his subjects. I was in Canada when King George V broadcast his Jubilee address to his subjects over the radio. The effect was staggering! Since then George VI and Queen Elizabeth have visited Canada, and in these circumstances the British sovereign was in point of fact King of Canada.

§ 2

British influence is still very real, and is exerted in a number of different ways. In actual practice, for example, it appears as if it had preserved the essentials of its traditional position. The old colonial status has ceased to exist, yet foreign powers have not received any official notification. Canadians still remain the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, and even if they have voluntarily set up a Canadian citizenship this does not mean that they have given up their title to being subjects of a sovereign living in England. They continue, though no doubt of their own free will, to rely upon the British consulate in countries where there is no Canadian diplomatic or consular representative. Their passports are issued by the Canadian Government, but in the name of the King, thus establishing their British nationality. This British nationality, as we know, embraces each and all of the citizens of the various nations in the Commonwealth, so that, from a foreigner's point of view, British nationality maintains its historic unity. In Canada all official effigies are English — the King and members of the royal family appear on the stamps and on the Federal bank-notes. At Ottawa they are working on a combination for a

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Canadian flag, but as yet they have found nothing suitable. Up to the present the Governor-General has always been an Englishman.

I realize that on the reverse side of each one of these various ceremonials, I could find a correction which satisfies Canadian vanity: the Dominion is independent, Canada is Canadian, the King functions only by means of a signature which he would never refuse to grant — all this is true, and yet, since we are in a British country, we must be careful not to under-estimate the significance of recognized ritual. In its form it perpetuates an unbroken tradition which is linked up with a living source. This continuity probably is one of the main reasons why Canada is so different from the United States.

This structure actually does shelter an English influence which is all the more subtle as it is exerted in secret, silently, leaving no trace. Without appearing to alter anything, England has an incomparable way of imperceptibly directing people, governments, and races to her own ends. We must remember that propaganda (I purposely use this unpleasant expression) if allowed to be seen would immediately provoke an indignant reaction: "The meddlesome intruders!" But nothing ever does appear. Here is the Governor-General with his little court, assisted by a secretary selected from one of the great families of the Old Country, and usually he is remarkably keen and well informed. Naturally he contributes in his own time to the work of consolidating the British tie. Or again, in the business world, there is a visitor, someone from the City who has come to have a chat, or an expert from the Bank of England whose counsel is sought. He is not hailed with the cordiality extended to the American brother from across the border, with whom Canadians get along perfectly because he is so like themselves — good heavens, no! But do not imagine that they listen to the Englishman with less attention. There is something indefinable which protects him, and lends moral authority and above all confidence to his monosyllabic advice.

Socially, as we have said, this Englishman is a foreigner who

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lowers the temperature slightly by his mere passage, but politically he penetrates without difficulty to the interior of the Temple, even to the Holy of Holies. Even in the United States we find that the English have the same prodigious capacity for penetrating right to the place where essential decisions are made. There, in spite of Irish protestation, 'Perfidious Albion' manages at the right time and place to make her counsels heard. All the more so in Canada, where every town in the West as well as in the East contains a governing clique of English-speaking people, who are ready to be influenced and keep the liaison intact. London completes this elusive pressure by conferring honours, and throwing open the doors of high society and even the Court to those who are socially ambitious. With a few rare exceptions, experience so far has proved that this power of absorption, of seduction — if I may remove from the word any insulting meaning — is nearly always irresistible. It now remains to be seen to what extent Britain, exhausted and ruined by the war, a debtor where formerly she was a creditor, will be able to enjoy this prestige in the future. I present the question, but we shall have to wait for a reply.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FRENCH CANADIAN INFLUENCE

§ 1

THE position of the French Canadians is just as complex as that of the Canadians of British origin. It is determined by many contributing factors: history, race, religion, culture, interests, sentiment, affinities, ill-will, regrets, and future hopes. As we already know, these people are French by race and history, British by allegiance, and American by geography. In order to explain their attitude, we must understand their relationship to France, England, and the United States, as well as to the continents of America and Europe. We must further study their attitude towards the Canadian confederation, for after all they are apt to look upon it as something in which they do not form a part.

§ 2

To what extent are the French Canadians French? My personal impression is that they are genuinely French, in their physical traits which distinguish them from the English, in their vivacity, in their ease of speech, in a word, in their bearing. Their race is again apparent in their individual gifts of intelligence and expression, which make them, in spite of their peasant qualities, the best barristers, excellent doctors (as even the English realize), brilliant exponents of the liberal professions, and remarkably clever politicians. In a mixed assembly one can pick them out even before they speak, particularly, I think, because they are not phlegmatic. From all these points of view,

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we in France must voluntarily admit that they are members of our family.

But their immediate resemblance ends here. Living for nearly two centuries under British rule has greatly Anglicized them, and they have become so accustomed to it that they do not wish to change. In this respect it is we, the French of France, and not the English, who are foreigners to them. This is particularly striking in parliamentary tradition, where they have accepted and assimilated not only British spirit and methods, but even British formalities. A few of them mingle confidently in our political circles, but they are the exception. Ordinarily they are more at ease in London. Laurier, in his courtesy, was reluctant to give his impression of the French regime, but one soon saw that he reserved his admiration for Westminster. The Canadian Nationalist, Bourassa, was not afraid, however, to write: 'I am a Liberal of the English school. I am a disciple of Burke, of Fox, of Bright, of Gladstone, and of all those Little Englanders who have made England and the Empire what they are today.'¹ Nor is French influence any more apparent when it comes to social customs, which were English in the past but have now become completely Americanized in so far as dress, furniture, household equipment, and even cooking are concerned. This is not surprising, as these are the conditions which prevail on another continent whose destiny cannot but be different from ours.

The sentiments of the French Canadians towards France are the result partly of our common origin, and partly of their separation from us. They are proud to claim the honour of belonging to the eternal fellowship of France, and the *tricolore* which floats wherever our language is spoken is the visible sign of their fidelity. The feeling that they are part of the French family is very widespread. Many of them on their first visit to France feel instantly that they are at home in their Mother Country, and they blossom out with unfeigned delight. Above all, they like our simple manners, and the freedom of our social

¹ Speech in the House of Commons at Ottawa, 13th March 1900.

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life. From the moment that they board the liner of the Compagnie Transatlantique, they breathe more freely for having escaped from English aloofness, and the rigidity of a social regime which knows no respite.

But let us not generalize too far. How many others, although retaining their love for France in theory, actually do not succeed in getting accustomed to her! This is because they have become too different, and it must be admitted have socially ceased to be French. They suffer, quite wrongly, from an inferiority complex, and are persuaded that the Parisians will laugh at their accent. Perhaps they do not feel at home until they return to the familiar atmosphere of London. Paris and the French, they have to confess, did not please them!

The position is more serious still when it comes to a question of French politics and the French Government, for here, though it seems banal to mention it, they feel themselves separated from us for ever. They have no regret whatever at having accepted the British regime. There is not and never has been any *irredentism* in Canada! We lost contact with them after 1763, and the French of the St. Lawrence had every right to feel that the Mother Country, henceforth unworthy of the name, had abandoned them. Further, the revolution of 1789, by directing France along a path which the old colony loathed, turned out to be an event of still greater magnitude in the history of these relations. The French Canadians are democratic, but in the Anglo-Saxon manner. The French Republic was bound to displease them, partly because they are Catholics and it is laical, but also because they are conservative, sometimes so conservative that they are quite mid-Victorian. In spite of their politeness on the subject, one may say that the Republic of Gambetta, of Ferry, and Clemenceau has never succeeded in making itself appreciated in the St. Lawrence Valley—sometimes even polite formalities have been lacking.

I shall never forget the scene just after the first world war at the residence of the Lieutenant-Governor of the province of

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Quebec, who was officially receiving a French mission. After the usual toast to the King, everyone awaited the no less formal toast to the President of the French Republic, but all we heard was the fantastic wording, 'à la France éternelle!' The archbishop was present, explained someone officiously. . . .

Such a contrast in political outlook is sufficient to explain why our former compatriots have no wish to return to the fold, but their reluctance is aggravated by the great divergence in the destinies of the two continents. The French Canadians consider themselves among the oldest inhabitants of America, and they feel that their destiny lies in the New World. When they see old Europe plunging into an abyss of quarrels that menace her very existence, they stiffen up with bitter brutality and refuse to be implicated. Thus, as Americans, they deny any close relationship with either France or Europe.

§ 3

The French Canadians accept the British regime because it guarantees them the essentials of religion and language, in other words, it allows them to remain distinct.

The fundamental texts in this connection are the Treaty of Paris (1763) which formally recognized the right of the defeated to profess their faith and worship freely in conformity with the Roman Church within the limits of British law; later the Quebec Act (1774) which, confirming the earlier religious concessions, admitted the use of the French language in official documents, thus putting the two races on the same footing. These principles have been reaffirmed in all later enactments, such as the Constitutional Act of 1791 which created the two Canadas; the Act of Union of 1840 which reunited them; and the British North America Act of 1867 which formed the Confederation. The text of the latter was voted by the British Parliament and therefore cannot be amended, even today, except by its vote; and let us not forget that the initial guarantee of 1763 was the result of a treaty signed by the English power.

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The French Canadians at any rate do not forget it, for they consider that their rights as a minority derive from this treaty with England. This is the explanation of their loyalty to the British connection, a loyalty of which the sincerity is beyond question. We should specify, however, that this loyalty is addressed to England, but not to a Canada which had no political existence at the time that these engagements were undertaken. If left to herself tomorrow, Canada possibly might not ratify them.

The policy of the leading French Canadian clergy expresses this attitude very clearly. Instinctively they dislike the English Protestants, fearing the effect on their flock of any contact with them. I once heard a priest — in fact I think he was a bishop — declaim from the pulpit in his savoury accent, '*Sachez le français* (he pronounced it *frança*), *mais pour l'anglais* (he said *l'angla*), *apprenez-le pas trop bien!*'

This was just a case of local resistance, but when it is a question of high policy the British regime has no more devoted partisans. It is not so much a matter of the heart as of the head, as Mgr. Plessis showed when he said to the English Governor: 'His Majesty has no more devoted subject in this province than I, but my devotion goes only as far as my conscience and no further.' As a matter of fact whenever the British connection has been seriously threatened, the co-operation of the French clergy, at least of the higher ranks, has never been found wanting. In 1775 and 1812 against American menace, and even at the time of the rebellion of 1837 and, more recently during the two world wars — indeed we may say that ever since 1763 the Church has been an essential factor of British rule in Canada. With its immense moral authority it advises political loyalty to its French-speaking adherents. In exchange it obtains by tacit consent a free hand in a domain which is more or less reserved for it.

The pastoral letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Quebec, on the occasion of the Jubilee of George V in 1935, marvelously expresses the principles on which this attitude is based.

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It merits being quoted as an admirable lesson in political wisdom.¹

It first describes the spirit of co-operation which the Empire has every right, in the circumstances, to expect from the French Canadian clergy: 'May we recall that we have needed neither a command nor even the expression of a desire on the part of the civil authorities to realize our duty in this matter.' This after all is the doctrine of the Church: 'The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments expressly enjoin us to respect the person of the Sovereign, and to obey his just laws.' And such doctrine, it may be useful to remind a conquered race, applies to Canada as to anywhere else: 'Do not object that no spiritual attachment exists between us and those who have become our masters through the fortunes of war. This was not chance, for there is only Providence.'

The argument, as we indicated earlier, is that the English regime has guaranteed to the French their essential privileges: 'For those who calmly review the history of our province during the past two centuries, is not this the place to admit that there is every evidence that a mysterious Providence has enveloped it with tenderness? And, to this end, notwithstanding human views and passions, Providence has caused the sceptre of the Kings of England to protect us with its world-wide prestige, guaranteeing our essential rights, through vicissitudes into which it is not our design to enter here.' In point of fact, is the Church not accorded a privileged position in Canada?

'Concerning our religious liberties, for example, it so happens that, by the help of Providence, the Catholic Church is better situated here than in almost any other country in the world . . . By tacit mutual agreement, and reciprocal esteem, an advantageous relationship has been maintained between the Church

¹ Pastoral letter No. 17 from the very eminent Cardinal Archbishop of Quebec and from our Seigneurs, the Archbishop and Bishops of the Civil Province of Quebec, on the occasion of the Jubilee of His Majesty George V, given at Quebec at the Cardinal's Palace, April 8th, 1935.

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and the State. In Canada, and especially in our province, the Church has generally been able to develop in an atmosphere of happy liberty, and her sons have been able to benefit thereby. The civil authorities adopt a respectful attitude towards her, and are not indifferent to her consideration.'

This loyalty on the part of the Church, which is based on gratitude, also serves the French Canadian race: 'It was due to their appreciation of their pastoral duties, and to their loyalty on the one hand and their tactful firmness on the other, that our venerable predecessors prevailed upon our fathers to adopt the new regime, and twice at least they preserved Canada for Great Britain . . . Is there an enlightened patriot or loyal Canadian who does not admire the courage and undeviating prudence of these Bishops, these saviours, one may say, of the French race in America after the conquest?'

The destiny of the French Canadians has not fundamentally changed, however, since the Treaty of Paris, and it is still within the British Empire that the possibilities of their development are greatest: 'The new political conditions in which Canada finds herself within the Empire should not hinder the free expression of our patriotic sentiments. Far from opposing the development of our culture and the maintenance of our tongue, these conditions may rather open up still wider fields. It remains for us to control events in conformity with the law. The Empire is British; it is established in actual fact that there is no exclusive language, and that the Empire embraces different civilizations. The moment may be perhaps never more propitious for our element, by its activity and importance, to claim its appointed place in the sun, under the regime which Providence in its own way has ordained for us.'

This vigorous doctrine is that of leaders who appreciate political necessities, and in human affairs know how to relegate sentiment to the place where it belongs. When the French Canadian politicians reach a certain height in their careers, they logically adopt a similar attitude. Like the Church, they also realize that the English regime has allowed the French race

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to live, but that left to itself it would run the risk of being absorbed by the United States. They are, therefore, in favour of a policy of collaboration with the English in Canada in matters concerning the Confederation, and with the English in England in imperial affairs.

This collaboration, exerted first at Ottawa and later followed up in London, never fails to transform those who practise it. Through personal friendships, they link up with the élite in Canada and in England. They submit to the influence and the prestige of the wonderful parliamentary tradition, and eventually receive its honours. Many finally become thoroughly British in sentiment, like Laurier, who used to say that he was British to the core. Others, who have confined themselves more closely to their own country, contract at Ottawa a certain loyalty to the Confederation, which some of their followers object to, considering it almost a betrayal. In certain die-hard circles they would be treated almost as 'collaborators'.

Nevertheless the mass of the public, and even such local leaders as the lesser clergy and members of parliament, do not allow the arguments of high policy to get the better of their own feelings. In their hearts they know full well that the attitude of their leaders is justified, but in the more limited circle of their own personal activities they see something quite different, namely, the necessity of defending the French Canadian in some obscure corner of the battle-field against the English Canadian, of making no concessions, and of jealously avoiding anything that might resemble a compromise. They know that there exists a King of England, now also King of Canada, to whom they owe, without any passionate devotion, a certain loyalty; but to them 'the English' are the English living in Canada, or the English Canadians next door who have been their rivals for over a century. As a whole, and without attempting to analyse, they hate everything that is English. Perhaps they are simply sulking — France is their mother, but England is their stepmother!

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§ 4

England has accepted, no doubt with regret, the fact that the French Canadians have remained distinct. They have not been Anglicized in the past, nor will they be in the future. It needs little reflection to realize that the United States would not have accorded to the conquered race of 1763 the guarantees which have allowed their Church, their schools, and their language to survive. The American is an assimilator, and a thorough one at that! He is so convinced of his rights that he is almost childish about it. Annexing Canada to the United States would simply have meant that the French element would have been absorbed.

Now we have not minimized the peril of Americanization, which for the French Canadians is far more serious than Anglicization. It is not so much a political danger that they fear, as the risk of being totally engulfed both by a great neighbouring country and by the atmosphere of the continent in which they live. Still, from the point of view of the American continent, a French Canadian is an American, and therefore we must admit that a certain degree of Americanization was inevitable.

Beyond a certain limit, the French Canadians cannot maintain their integrity. The Church alone realizes this. For more than a century, and not without success, she has been busy keeping her flock within a *cordon sanitaire* in order to prevent them from being contaminated by the English Protestants. She is now faced with a whole conception of life which is incompatible with the morals she is trying to instil. In an address given at Quebec by Cardinal Villeneuve on January 8th, 1934, to the members of the Security Leagues, this point of view was forcibly brought out into the open:

‘Actually it is dogmas which are at stake, not mere rules of morality. The world no longer believes in original sin, nor does it accept the theory that this sin has left in us the weakness of the flesh and the rebellion of the flesh to the dictates of reason. It not only legalizes the fire of covetousness, but proclaims that

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the fire should be stirred up. Once this postulate is admitted, everything else in the customs of today can be explained. They have pushed the disorders of the flesh still farther. They have tried to base it on an imaginary science, whose fragile hypotheses have proved false each in turn. There is nudism, the selection of persons for eugenic breeding, the sterilization of defectives and mentally deficient, onanism, and the practice of contraception. In many countries such matters are placed in the hands of the authorities, and are even included in the legal code under pretext that it is necessary for the progress of the race. The Church will not cease to fight against such falsehoods and such corrupting artifices.'

The Cardinal did not mention the United States, but his warning applied literally to the fascinating temptations of that Americanism which optimistically puts its confidence in human energy and almost sanctifies production. This peril, which is becoming more menacing every day, has the effect of reinforcing the devotion of the Church to the British regime, which they regard as a counterweight or sort of insurance. 'Better the devil you know than the devil you don't know.' So they accept the English as something that they know and can cope with and which is not altogether fatal; and in the end they rely on these same English for fear of something worse.

Thanks chiefly to his rural isolation the French Canadian has managed pretty well so far to defend himself against an Americanization which threatens to absorb him. The very development of the Dominion is tending to make this Americanization irresistible. Both the French Canadian living on the farm, and the French Canadian of the city if he is living in the midst of a solid group of his own people, will resist; but the French Canadian who is alone in a town, or who perhaps has crossed the frontier, or maybe has cast in his lot with some industrial proletariat, these are obviously less secure. This resistance is becoming more and more uncertain although still not impossible, for conditions are much less favourable than they were in the past.

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In point of fact although still rural until recently, the majority has now become urban, for statistics show that there are 54 per cent in the towns as against 46 per cent in the country. In 1871 the proportions were 77 per cent in the country and 23 per cent in the towns. There is another serious aspect of the situation to which I have already referred, and that is that although the French Canadians undoubtedly make up 30 per cent of the population of Canada they are only 3 per cent of the population of North America — an islet in an ocean. Still, there are islets in the ocean which have always existed.

§ 5

The external relations of the French Canadians are not limited to France, England, and the United States. Strange as it may seem, a chapter can be written about the relationship which exists between the French and English Canadians within the country just as if these were external relations. It is a *modus vivendi* without cordiality. When one becomes acquainted with both circles, one is astonished to find how widely they are separated. Even in cities of mixed population like Montreal they do not mingle, but live on the same streets in extraordinary ignorance of each other. A certain professor in the French university admitted that he had never met his opposite number in the English-speaking university, although the latter was a well-known man.

A certain member of the English social set did not even know the name of one of the most important French Canadians. Since the French speak English it is not so much the language as the religion which separates the two communities, and above all their different outlook on life. The very air they breathe is different, although in both cases their furnishings — taking the term in its wider sense — are uniformly American. I remember having breakfasted with a French Canadian in Montreal and having dined with an English Canadian family in Toronto on the same day. The contrast was quite a shock to my senses.

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It was like experiencing different pressures in a diving bell. Involuntarily I thought of the uncompromising formula of Maurice Barrès: 'Prayers that do not mingle.'

And yet, in spite of their persistent reticence, the *modus vivendi* works well enough, because the two races are obliged to exist side by side, and because in the end they begin to appreciate the estimable qualities that each possesses. In Ontario my general impression was that their rivalry is subsiding, and that the majority is not averse to making certain concessions to the minority. Also, in the social and political ruling class as well as in business, personal relations seem to be closer. Possibly out of sheer snobbishness the French Jonahs are allowing themselves to be swallowed whole by the British whale, but it also happens that the fashionable English set is receiving distinguished members of the French minority, bag and baggage, without asking any remuneration. The English play the game well, so anyone who has once been accepted is well treated.

But fundamentally there is no real agreement, no fusion; in fact, a marked lack of mutual confidence exists. The French Canadians fear that their co-citizens may eventually cease to respect the guarantees of 1763 and 1774, notably in matters of education; and that if Canada indulges her instinct for assimilation she may no longer accord the French group the right to remain apart. The English Canadians, on the other hand, are suspicious of French loyalty, unjustifiably so, and above all they despise their conception of life, their papacy, their mediocre standard of living, and their birth-rate which to an Anglo-Saxon seems ridiculous, even scandalous. Since the conquest 186 years have passed, and yet they still are not resigned to the presence of this heterogeneous element which they cannot assimilate. They tolerate it with an impatience which increases as the French Canadians grow in numbers. The Orangemen are the noisy expression of this ill-will, but many others lend their tacit consent, and others approve almost without realizing it.

What is the real national sentiment of the French Canadians?

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If I can rely on what they themselves have told me, their only instinctive feeling of patriotism is towards their province, not towards Canada as a whole. French Canada to them is the only reality.

'The French Canadian,' writes M. Louis D. Durant, 'is essentially a peasant, both as an individual and in his family life. The Canadian fields, which he has often traversed, ploughed, and harrowed, are the only place he knows, and it is there that he has anchored the full devotion of his soul. The Canadian countryside is his home, his native land.' And although there came the conquest, to what extent can we say that he has been willing to share that homeland of his with the conquerors? 'One day he found himself abandoned in the presence of a stranger who did not speak his tongue, who did not worship in his way, and who, moreover, was at no pains to conceal the fact that henceforth it was he who was to be master. That day Jean Baptiste, letting his gaze wander over the horizon spread out before him, felt clearly and strongly that this was his home, and that no power, no arrogance, no astuteness could alter the fact that these houses, these fields, these churches, these roads belonged to him, and to him only.'¹

I believe that if the people in any country with a peasant population were to be questioned as to their patriotism, they would give the same reply, especially where they have experienced the vicissitudes of conquest. Therefore it is not surprising that the majority of French Canadians do not feel any really patriotic sentiment towards the Confederation. The Federal political leaders, who play their part in the government of the Dominion, have risen above this level, but even their patriotism comes from the brain rather than from the heart. When they are travelling abroad, or living in foreign countries, their homesickness may be for the Dominion as a whole, but the average French Canadian of the province of Quebec, especially the

¹ *Les Canadiens Français et l'Esprit National* (Inquiry made by the Action Française).

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peasant, looks upon Canada merely as a cold, legal entity to which he need not always be strictly loyal. We must remember that the man from Quebec feels as much of a foreigner in Toronto as he does in New York!

If we try to find out what they really have at heart, we shall conclude that all French Canadians desire one thing and one thing only, and that is the development of their race as a distinct unit, and the preservation of their integrity. There are slight variations in the way this subject is approached. The clergy, especially those at the top, concentrate on keeping the French Canadians within the fold of Catholicism, which means that they must remain French within the British regime. Political leaders like Laurier, who was the most illustrious of them all, also wish to develop the French Canadian race, but they consider that the best way is for it to take its legitimate place in the Dominion. They believe in accepting such obligations as arise, and they favour the spread of Canadian nationalism. Bishops and Federal Ministers — at any rate when they are in power — can easily agree on a joint programme of this kind.

Although it has the same general characteristics, the Nationalist conception, which really expresses the deep-seated feelings of the French Canadian people, represents rather a different point of view. No doubt the Nationalists aim at the defence, pure and simple, of their own language, personality, culture, and definite political individuality just as the others do. But this sometimes differs slightly from the purely Catholic point of view, which argues that the French Canadian should remain Catholic because it makes him a better Frenchman! There is a slight difference in meaning here, and actually many Nationalists — 'dyed-in-the-wool Canadians', as the saying goes — consider that the centre of gravity of French Canadian unity is not necessarily religion. Among the young one may find traces of anti-clericalism. To those who are uncompromisingly French, the province constitutes the real environment in which they can develop a useful national activity. The Federal and the Imperial

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bond are mere formalities in their eyes, worthy of no patriotic sentiment, no sacrifice, and no concession whatever.

Such certainly is the outlook of the great majority of the French—at any rate this is the impression one receives the moment one sets foot on Canadian soil. This conception had already taken shape at the time of my first visit to Canada at the end of the nineteenth century. It had been brought into being partly by the persecution of the French schools in Manitoba, and partly by Canada's participation in the South African War which aroused undisguised opposition among the French. Similar circumstances, notably the two world wars, have since revived the movement from time to time, never failing to rally an important section of the younger men.

§ 6

Being in possession of these various factors, we can now ascertain the political attitude of the French Canadians.

First let us consider their attitude towards Canada itself. We have already seen that the only thing that really interests them is the possibility of developing freely and in their own way. The Confederation as it was conceived in 1867 seems very vague and distant to them, something which concerns a few of their leaders but leaves the masses indifferent. They accept it, however, but only on condition that it is strictly interpreted and that the province remains more important than the Federal organization. The men who inspired this great political act included many noted French Canadians. Undoubtedly they all desired unity, but as they have set up provinces endowed with extensive powers, and since the Federal authority has not imposed its superior will, local nationalisms have been allowed to continue undisturbed.

'There never has been any question of uniting the country either morally or nationally,' writes M. Albert Lévesque, a French Nationalist, 'but simply to create a basis of political union between two conflicting nationalities which are destined

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to live side by side in the same physical surroundings, where mutual assistance is indispensable . . . To have united the two Canadian peoples in a single political State is the only moral significance of the Confederation of 1867.¹

This interpretation shows that the province of Quebec is afraid of a confederation which might become too powerful, and consequently it systematically, even passionately, defends the rights of the provinces against any encroachment by the Federal authority. In Nationalist circles the English character of the Federal administration is sharply criticized as they consider that the French element is not represented as fully as it is entitled to be. At Ottawa the atmosphere is British, they say, and French Canadian M.P.s imperceptibly become just Canadians, which implies a compromise, and to the Nationalist mind virtually a betrayal.

'Our uneasiness increases,' continues M. Lévesque, 'when a Beatty, a Thornton, a King, a Lapointe, and even a Bourassa talk of national unity, of the Canadian nation, of patriotism which is exclusively Canadian, and all this while they invoke the spirit and the letter of the Dominion constitution.'

The controversy is extremely interesting, for it involves the very guarantees of the minority's existence. Traditionally, the French Canadians have found adequate security only in the word of a foreign power, for, as they say to themselves, a minority representation in a confederation cannot possibly give the same assurances. For this reason the people of Quebec, although they have no sentiment whatever with regard to England, insist upon retaining the appeal to the Privy Council (in civil matters), and refuse to have the right to amend the British North America Act transferred from the Imperial Parliament to Canada itself. Many French Canadian leaders, who are imbued with the Federal spirit and Canadian sentiment, think differently. M. Lapointe, for example, a legal authority of first rank and a genuine French Canadian,

¹ Albert Lévesque, *La Jeunesse Française et la Confédération Canadienne* (Inquiry made by the Action Française).

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considered that the political maturity of the Dominion had reached a point where it should be allowed to divest itself of the last traces of colonial independence, but that this should not imperil the future of the French Canadian. This was also the view of Senator Dandurand, the veteran Canadian statesman.

The logical development of Canada favours this view, which no doubt in the end will carry the day. But the underlying instinct of the French Canadian is inclined to move in another direction. We can discern a latent feeling of separatism, not as regards England since complete independence appears to be impossible, but from the Confederation. Just as some of the English in British Columbia would willingly revert to the colonial status without Canadian allegiance, so one meets French Canadians in Quebec who say that they would like to see a French-speaking Dominion on the banks of the St. Lawrence, under the protection not of the Confederation, but of Great Britain. Perhaps this is simply the survival of a state of mind which I remember having encountered in 1898, but one cannot ignore it nor yet pass it over in silence.

If such is the sentimental attitude of the French Canadians, we may wonder what national duties they are ready to fulfil. To defend the British regime in Canada if it is attacked, no doubt, and in this connection we recall the famous saying of Sir Etienne Paschal Tasché, that 'the last cannon shot on American soil in defence of the English flag would be fired by a French Canadian'.

The Nationalist leader, Bourassa, wrote in much the same vein only a few years after the Anglo-French crisis of Fashoda: 'If the English and French were to find themselves in conflict one could count on the loyal neutrality of the French Canadians. Again, if, in circumstances that are most improbable, the French fleet were to attack the Canadian coast, one could count also on the French Canadians for home defence.'¹

But it is not for the English flag that they would march, and

¹ Henri Bourassa, 'Les Canadiens Français dans l'Empire Britannique', *Monthly Review*, October 1902.

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it would be very difficult to persuade the defenders to go beyond the frontiers. This is almost the position of the peasant clinging to his fields. If British Columbia is threatened there will be people in Quebec who will say, or will think, 'Your war . . .', as once happened, it is said, at Marseilles. All the more reason should their duty to the Empire be involved.

Their leaders if they are in power cannot always decline, just as Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Government was unable to avoid participation in the South African War. But French Canadian opinion always lags behind, feeling that its only duty is towards Canada, one might even say only towards French Canada. 'The French Canadian,' writes M. Durant again, 'is a Canadian, nothing more. His rights stop at the boundaries of his territory, and he feels and believes that there, also, is to be found the limit of his duties.'¹

These lines in their crystalline brevity admirably sum up the attitude of the French Canadians during the two world wars, and the spirit in which they interpreted what might be their obligations towards either France or England. As a matter of fact, they simply did not go, or if they did their contribution could not be compared in any way with that of the English Canadians. Here we touch upon two circumstances of deep significance in which the French-speaking Canadians clearly showed, or gave the impression, that they constituted a separate element in the Dominion.

During the first world war, out of the 619,636 men who made up the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the French numbered only about one-tenth of the total although they account for 28 per cent of the total population of the country. The famous 22nd Battalion, which covered itself with glory, is only an exception to prove the rule. During the period when the army was recruited exclusively from volunteers, the French-speaking sections of the country gave a mediocre reply to the appeal that was made to them. Later, when conscription was

¹ Louis D. Durant, *Les Canadiens Français et l'Esprit National* (Inquiry made by the Action Française).

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established by the Military Service Act of October 13th, 1917, the province of Quebec acted like a little Vendée, for the 'good fellows' were those who refused to serve, and hid themselves in the woods. The facts are neither contested nor contestable, although precise figures are not available. Of course, many French Canadians did do their duty brilliantly. So before we condemn, let us at least try to understand.

We must first avoid interpreting too rigorously the figures giving the relative racial composition of the troops. It is true that the French Canadian proportion was very low, yet we must not overlook the fact that the English-speaking contingent included a considerable number of men who had been born in the Old Country and who should honestly be classified as English rather than Canadian. In the first contingent which arrived at the front before March 1915 the *British born* accounted for 64 per cent, and out of all the volunteers who joined before conscription became law they made up 49 per cent. If there had been in Canada as many *French born* as there were British born, the French-speaking contingent would have undoubtedly been very much more important. This consideration modifies to a certain extent the contrast between the keenness of the English Canadians and the reluctance of the French Canadians. Nevertheless, taking everything into consideration there is no doubt that the French Canadian element provided only a very mediocre proportion of the Canadian army during this war.

Let us look into the reasons that can explain or justify such abstention.

In 1914 French Canadian opinion ran high against the English in Ontario, who were threatening to close the schools of the minority. M. Bourassa, the Nationalist leader, had long been encouraging his compatriots to be on their guard against British Imperialism. 'We are ready to defend Canadian territory,' he declared, 'but European quarrels are none of our business!' The French Canadian clergy were all the more inclined to share this way of thinking as they had been deeply

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moved by the 'Combist' policy, and were losing no opportunity of presenting France as a decadent country, justly meriting the wrath of God.

When the volunteer army was being recruited, the French Canadians, therefore, were scarcely prepared for the surge of feeling which attracted to the colours masses of English Canadians and still more of the English living in Canada. At the very beginning, however, before they had recovered from the first shock, the French Canadians seem to have been stirred, and they might have volunteered in greater numbers if on the one hand their parliamentary and religious leaders had urged them to do so, and if on the other hand — I wish to emphasize this — the Canadian Government had not stumbled from one blunder to another.

At that time the Canadian army was being organized by British Canadians in the British spirit, and as a unified force in which the desire to give the French element its proper place never seems to have existed. The recruiting agents sent into the province of Quebec were English and Protestant, so it is not surprising that they did not succeed! Then the minority asked for regiments of their own under French commanders. When a peasant from Quebec is lined up in a battalion in which his language is not spoken, he finds himself isolated and a stranger, and as he was sometimes treated as an inferior one can guess that he felt that he was being snubbed. He joined the colours with the idea of serving France, and then they turned him into an English soldier! The simplest possible reaction was for him to protest that he did not want to fight for the English!

It was about the time that these difficulties began to loom up that M. Bourassa intensified the Nationalist campaign, which he had been conducting for years with incomparable vigour in *Le Devoir*. He turned down any suggestion of taking part in the war, and his influence over the province of Quebec, and notably over the parish priests, was so great at that time that no one in French Canada dared oppose him. The Liberal opposition, led by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and recruited chiefly

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from the French districts, could have started a movement in favour of joining up voluntarily, had it appealed either to their loyalty to England or to their sympathy for France, their old motherland. But the Liberal leaders were mainly busy with preventing M. Bourassa from laying hold of a political field that they intended to keep. So they halted half-way, murmuring no doubt all the right and proper things, but not giving the impression of throwing themselves body and soul into the struggle. Certainly they recognized that they had a political duty to discharge to England and a moral one to France, but they felt these duties were limited, so they talked of sending money and clothing when what was needed was men. In the end they refused to vote for conscription, and voluntarily remained outside the National Government which they had been asked to join. Behind them the local politicians did not hesitate to proclaim that French Canadians should not be sent to Europe to be killed, that they were needed in America where their real work lay, and where they could safeguard the future of their race. Unless we are greatly mistaken this argument carried weight, for it responded to an instinctive conviction that the duty of the French Canadian is to Canada — to French Canada and nowhere else.

It is difficult for the French to understand how such matters as the schools in Ontario or the English recruiting sergeants could have been put into the balance alongside the very existence of France, which then certainly was at stake. It was the instinct for local survival, blind but powerful, which determined the stay-at-home attitude. The English Canadians looked on with bitterness mingled with contempt, and when they recall it even today their anger rises to the gorge.

'In the South African War,' wrote an English Canadian friend to me, 'the French Canadians were hostile to our taking part, from which we concluded that they were not ready to fight for England. In the last war their record frankly was bad, so that this time we came to the conclusion that they could not make up their minds to fight for France either. We are now

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wondering for whom, or for what, they would be disposed to fight.'

The second world war has shown that the attitude of the French Canadians has not changed. In 1939 when Canada decided to take part in the struggle, the Liberal Cabinet which was then in power had to take into consideration a state of mind which they well knew existed in the Province of Quebec. Accordingly they undertook not to resort to conscription in recruiting the army which was to go to fight in Europe, and actually they did succeed in building up a large overseas force. However, when France was defeated a far greater effort was necessary, so without accepting conscription the Government tried to regain their freedom of action which they had limited by their earlier undertaking. The plebiscite of the 27th April 1942 gave them their liberty, but 72 per cent of the votes cast in Quebec were in the negative. In 1945 when the percentage of men enrolled in the army amounted to 40 per cent for the whole country, only 24.5 per cent had gone from Quebec.

Later on we shall study in greater detail this episode of Canadian history, as it is of profound significance. For the moment let me merely emphasize the fact that as in the first world war, and in spite of the advice of the higher ranks of the clergy and their political leaders at Ottawa, there was no response to this appeal in French Canadian circles. The mass of French-speaking people recognized their duty as Canadians in the narrower sense of home defence, but their duty to the Commonwealth did not touch them, and their duty towards France seemed very remote. This did not alter the fact that a great many French Canadians did share in the fighting and even fought heroically. This circumstance, however, does not offset a current that runs very deep.

§ 7

Let us now leave the solid ground of analysis, and risk ourselves in the uncertain world of supposition. An independent

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French Canada is a visionary idea—a separate French Dominion is all that is conceivable. If the day were to come when the French were in the majority in the Confederation—an hypothesis which is improbable but nevertheless not impossible—I believe that the English Canadians would not remain in the Union. If on the contrary the French Canadians were simply a growing minority, as is quite likely, their influence would probably be exerted in three directions: first, in resistance to federal centralization; secondly, in persistent opposition to Imperialism; and finally in a cold but reliable loyalty to the British connection for fear of the United States. We should like to remark in passing that, so long as this minority does not become a majority, the future of the British in North America can easily be adjusted to the changing situation.

If the French Canadians are to profit by their opportunity they must show that they are capable of creating a culture of their own, for mere numbers, even if they become impressive, will not give them any real power. This culture, of which one can already discern the elements, will be traditionally French and Catholic, geographically American, and politically based on English institutions. It is doubly handicapped by being excessively dependent upon the Church, and by a provincialism which is sometimes suspicious of any close intimacy with France.

As we have already said, French culture owes a great deal to the Catholic clergy: a well-established language with some excellent writers; a fine classical tradition with all its advantages; a surviving link with European culture, and the moral stability which is the result of unremitting spiritual discipline. Yet these very clergy are doing this Canadian culture a disservice. All instruction is in their hands, and their first preoccupation is to recruit for the priesthood, for which they take the best of their pupils. Their second preoccupation is to exclude anything they fear, and in this way they sterilize many seeds which might have grown and flourished. Their third preoccupation is to stifle anything that is carried on without their assistance.

We must recognize the fact that they have not given the

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French Canadians the technical education which would have allowed them to claim their proper place in the economic structure of the country. Although excellent in the liberal professions, the French Canadians for the most part still know little of how industry has been developing. In the factories the executive is English or American, and the mass of workers are French. They are now trying to catch up but they are very far behind. One feels that they are dissatisfied with their schoolmasters for not having directed their pupils into the most useful walks of life, fearing no doubt that contact with industry would corrupt their minds.

Then, again, in their cultural relations with France the Canadian clergy have shown themselves singularly reticent and suspicious. The old country, having lived through 1789, appears dangerous to them, so they send us their young men with misgiving, and on their return they submit them to a sort of quarantine in case they develop some infectious spiritual disease.

But a regime based on such strict control is suitable only for quite undeveloped people. The only outstanding personalities that it promotes are ecclesiastics, as otherwise, if a man is to make his mark, he must break away completely. As the community is at present constituted, it is impossible for French culture to develop independent of Catholic culture, so the latter has necessarily a sterilizing effect. Looking back over the past fifty years, we find that French Canada has produced a great number of distinguished, often brilliant, individuals, but it has not provided that collective élite which is essential to place it in the first rank in business, in science, in the arts, and in intellectual creativeness. What they need in their relations with the English is prestige.

There is a latent provincialism on the banks of the St. Lawrence, which considers that French Canadian culture can flourish alone on its American territory. There is also a certain distrust, from which the clergy are not exempt, which appears whenever one alludes to thoughts or ideas from France. It is a

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sort of instinctive retreat which is most disconcerting. Yet there are in France living springs of intellectual inspiration from which the young country should not deprive itself. It would therefore be worth her while if French Canada were to work for the preservation of France. Many Canadians seem to think so.

CHAPTER XV

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

§ 1

THE relationship between Canada and the United States is exceptional; indeed there is nothing quite like it anywhere else in the world.

In the first place Canada does not love the United States. On the contrary she is rather afraid of them, because she is determined to develop her own political individuality. This feeling, latent but very real, is shared by all Canadians. It is apparent among the thinking English Canadians, and still more so among the French. At the same time, and without being contradictory in any way, the Canadians undoubtedly like the Americans. An American is one of themselves, and less of a stranger than an Englishman.

Actually these two peoples have grown up like brother and sister, developing from the same colonial stock, having lived side by side, as we are too apt to forget, for 150 years before the Americans seceded. From the past they have both inherited the same faith in democratic self-government, as well as the same common patrimony of American civilization to defend which they would soon unite. The consequence is a natural intimacy, which is as complete as that of the Siamese twins with a common circulation of blood.

The paradox of the Dominion is that in spite of being perfectly loyal to the Commonwealth it is essentially North American. This is no mere geographical expression, for the visible signs and repercussions of this North American unity are endless. There is the same material structure in both Canada and the United States, their customs are the same in

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every way, the same methods of work in factories and offices, and the same amusements. Canadians like the American cinema, the American radio, American sports, and American papers, and could not do without them. An inquiry held in Kingston, Ontario, showed that of the eighty-four different journals and magazines sold in the town, only fifteen were English or Canadian. In spite of the English or Scottish influences on which we have already dwelt, the Churches and universities are evolving in this sea of Americanism.

But the most important feature is the standard of living which is common to both countries at the American level, in contrast to the European or Asiatic level. Anglo-Saxon America is thus all on the same social level and this creates an irresistible bond between the two countries. Because of the common material level of existence, Canadians are riveted, economically and socially, to the United States. They would never be willing to link up with Europe at a lower level, and there you have an argument against which neither sentiment nor politics will prevail. *Canada is loyal to the Commonwealth but still more loyal to the North American way of living*, and this leads to the undisputed conclusion that she must preserve this North American civilization, this common patrimony, common — I stress the word — not to Canada and England but to Canada and the United States.

§ 2

All the vexations in the world are not enough to enable politics to set up an effective barrier along a frontier which after all is only a line on a map. In daily life each of the Canadian provinces carries on closer relations with its neighbouring state across the border than it does either with England or even with the other Canadian provinces. There is a natural affiliation that is quite independent of the flag; the Maritime Provinces with New England, Western Ontario with Michigan, and British Columbia with the American Northwest. When I

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was in Vancouver, for example, there was a convention of combined Kiwanis clubs from British Columbia, and the States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. The atmosphere which was of the utmost cordiality was neither Canadian nor American, but — how shall I express it? — rather North Pacific. One had the impression that these groups did not include California nor the Prairie Provinces, but were the spontaneous representatives of a regional community which took no account of frontiers. This is another example of our theory of the compass and of the imperious attraction which is exerted from north to south. It turns all the structural lines of the continent round to the vertical position.

We must accept the fact that American intimacy is inseparable from the Canadian personality. The attitude of the people towards the King and the President of the United States is particularly striking. Their loyalty to the Crown is very great, and the people sing 'God Save the King' with conviction! But they talk much more about the Man at the White House, and not as foreigners either. They follow what is happening in the United States much more closely than what is happening in England. The Grangers, the Non-Partisan League, the New Era, the New Deal, and all the rest, are like domestic politics, and their repercussions have a direct and incontestable effect on Canadian opinion.

Two travellers whom I met on the road in 1935 were talking about the New Deal, President Roosevelt, and the Lindbergh Case, but they were not preoccupying themselves in the slightest with England which seemed as far away to them as China. I wondered if they even knew the name of the British Prime Minister! When it comes to telling the time it is noon in Montreal when it is noon in New York, but it is five o'clock in the afternoon in London and nothing can be done about that!

It is the same way with trade which, as we have seen, is like internal commerce, and is so intimate that it tends to become more competitive than complementary. Even in spite of the tariff and other forms of official discouragement, trade adapts

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itself naturally to the circumstances, like vegetation taking advantage of every opportunity until it becomes absolutely irresistible.

'Take down the fence, or even lower it by a rail or two,' wrote Mr. Dafoe, 'and the tide of commerce rises like a flood.'¹ One can easily imagine what would happen if free trade, in the Cobden sense, were effectively introduced. Would Canada be able to survive? This, from the Canadian point of view, is the explanation of their anxiety to have a tariff which will indirectly guarantee their political independence.

The barrier between the two countries is very weak. When one travels towards the West across the 'great open spaces' one is no longer aware of its existence. One falls into a dollar complex — from which it is impossible to shake oneself free. Everything is American — the way one talks business, the money one spends, and even the reasons for spending it. One of my travelling companions in the train from Winnipeg to Regina explained for my benefit how Canada was being swallowed up, remarking that there is not the slightest use making any effort against it.

'We can't help it,' he said, 'it is overwhelming. The British speak of £ s. d. What is a shilling? What is a pound? I don't know. Too far away. But I do know what a dollar is, and a cent. At the time of the Ottawa Conference an American said to me, "The English can do what they like for aught I care. I shall go on selling to Canada just the same."'

Do not imagine that the Canadians take these inroads of Americanization at all tragically. They submit as a matter of course, and get so little worked up that by common consent all quarrels are adjusted by commonplace discussions as to what will be in the best interests of both. Even the gunshots fired across the border in pursuit of rum-runners did not let loose the outbursts of passion from which Europe could so easily have stirred up a few wars. 'Peace with friction for a century' as Mr. Dafoe so justly summed up the situation.

¹ John W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation*, p. 114.

§ 3

The Americans really like the Canadians, whom they look upon as 'good fellows and the same as our own people'! They enjoy being in Canada for they always feel at home, whether they are living there or only visiting the country as tourists. On the eve of the war it was calculated that, taking the good years with the bad, an average of twenty-five million people annually cross the frontier. In the holidays, or when a convention is being held (yesterday the great attraction was that Canada had escaped prohibition), the hotels are filled with animated crowds of friendly people who roll up in droves. In the hotel lounges French embroideries and Indian birchbark souvenirs are displayed so that the visitors may feel that they are away on a trip, but they could just as well believe that they were still in their own home town. When they migrate to Canada for good, they are easily assimilated and soon become excellent citizens.

Ought we to believe that these good comrades who wear their heart on their sleeve are thinking of annexing Canada? That they once wanted to do so is evident, first in the war of 1812, and then after 1840 when Canada became autonomous and was slipping away from England; again after the American Civil War when the United States acquired Alaska; and even as recently as 1911 when the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Washington, Mr. Champ Clark, in the debate on the proposed reciprocity treaty, brought up the question of annexation in a speech which was devoid of the usual oratory precautions. Today, however, all this seems to be forgotten. The political relationship between the two countries is so rigidly correct, so cordial, that it could well serve as an example for others. No ulterior motive is allowed to penetrate these official discussions. The American interests which control Canadian enterprises are strictly careful to mind their own business. There is no longer an annexation problem. Indeed it is remarkable how little interest the Americans take in Canada.

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When one is in the United States one does not find much Canadian news in the papers. . . . And yet when one talks to a great many Americans, as it is so easy to do, one gathers that they consider that annexation, or some form of absorption, is inevitable — manifest destiny, as President McKinley once said in another connection.

What do the Canadians think of this prospect? As we know there have been traces of annexationist sentiment at times, and the last intrigues were still perceptible at the end of the nineteenth century. In my youth I myself was acquainted with Goldwin Smith, who was notoriously a partisan of union with the United States. No doubt one could find even today more than one Canadian to whom the idea is not entirely displeasing. But the British tradition has long militated in another direction and counsels holding aloof. What would have been the significance of the gesture of the United Empire Loyalists, if 150 years later Canada were to go over to the Star Spangled Banner? The Confederation of 1867 was the reply to this external temptation, and since then there have been other factors which are proving to be the true cause of Canadian unity: the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, then the Grand Trunk Pacific now merged into the Canadian National Railway, Canada's participation in the first great war and her glorious record at Vimy, her membership in the League of Nations with a vote of her own, and finally her contribution to the second world war which was even greater than in 1914. We may consider that this definitely settles the question.

Or, on the other hand, if we choose, we may argue in the opposite direction. Let us consider that the discussion is still open, and examine the various factors as if they were spread out on a slab before us. During the second world war Canada and Great Britain collaborated in defence of the Commonwealth, but there was even closer collaboration between Canada and the United States in defence of the North American continent and of their common American civilization. Although

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she would have been on guard against any imperialistic proposals, Canada consented without the slightest scruple, without the least hesitation, to sit alongside her powerful neighbour on the Joint Board of Defence. It was after all a continental matter in which the Mother Country had little to say.

This intimacy is all the more striking as in point of fact the Canadians are Americans and neither Europeans nor English. Many English people visiting Canada, especially clergymen on missions, cannot be persuaded that these Canadians who are so proud of their citizenship in the New World can possibly be loyal British subjects at the same time. Nevertheless they are. But when the traveller who has just arrived from the Mother Country takes the liberty of running down the United States, his raillery, although he is one of the family, sounds so tactless that the Canadians protest and stiffen up in defence of their own continent. Such incidents which are of daily occurrence suggest the following problem which will become fundamentally important in the future: With an American culture whose centre of gravity lies outside Canada's frontiers, is it possible to found a lasting Canadian nation?

§ 4

Seen from the above angle, Canada has gained the day on two points. With regard to England she has won her independence without breaking the connection, a satisfactory solution in every way. With regard to the United States she has been able to make them respect her desire and her right to live her own life, and again the solution seems to be satisfactory since there is no further talk of annexation. Here we have a State with its own institutions and its own policy, but is it a nation?

Canada exists in the form of a Confederation. This is a cold legal theory which is accepted by the Canadians as a fact, but it does not stir their emotions. Yet when they sing 'O Canada' at the end of a banquet, one can easily see that it comes from the heart. The idea of Canadian unity still entails certain reser-

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vations, especially among the French Nationalists. Similarly, whenever the logic of independence is carried a little too far, the Imperialists protest in the name of a British patriotism which goes even deeper. Are the latter really Canadians, or simply English people living in Canada?

The fact that Canada as a nation does not come first in the hearts of all her people makes one reflect. For some it is England that comes first, and for others their province; it may be that if their continent were threatened the feeling for North American solidarity would rank above all else. The permutations of these complex allegiances can be classified like the colours of the spectrum. Thus, a Canadian can be:

1. English, Canadian, North American (a combination less frequent today than in the past).

2. French, Canadian, North American (the majority of the French Canadians).

3. Canadian, English, North American (most English-speaking Canadians).

4. Canadian, French, North American (a combination found chiefly among French Canadians who have federal interests).

5. Canadian, North American, English (a feeling which is latent rather than conscious, but which circumstances might easily bring to light).

6. Canadian, North American, French (an eventuality included mainly for symmetry!).

7. North American, Canadian, English (a common type in the past, but one which may easily reappear).

It seems to me that I could put a goodly number of surnames under No. 1, and as many as I like under No. 2 and No. 3; but although I know some, I should have difficulty in finding many among my acquaintances for No. 4. As for No. 5, I know plenty of people whom I should range without hesitation under this heading, in spite of protestations in some cases. For No. 7 I should have to look for recruits in No. 3 and No. 5, and there again I feel that I should have no lack of names to suggest!

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If our reasoning is accurate, we can see fairly well how Canadian national sentiment is being formed — or rather has not entirely succeeded in being formed. In so far as it does exist it has been inspired by leaders who are ahead of the masses, and who are certainly going farther than the mandate they have received. Men such as Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Robert Borden, Dandurand, Lapointe, Bennett, and Mackenzie King have conceived, realized, and consolidated a Canadian nation whose image is clear in their own minds. It is opposed, however, even among their own followers, by rival fidelities such as the imperialism of the British, the nationalism of the French, and the autonomous tradition of various provincial groups. These leaders have overcome the attraction towards America, but is their victory complete? After all, this American attraction is still a latent danger.

Nevertheless, the consciousness of a Canadian patriotism is increasing daily, and it will keep on growing as long as the Canadian State continues to exist. It is mainly a political patriotism, and it would have to be supported by a culture to acquire the foundation it needs. This is where, in spite of a sentimental attachment to the country, Canada seems to be so unreal. In British North America — the very name is at once complex, contradictory, and insufficient — we can no doubt discern an English (or Scottish) culture, a French culture, and an American culture, each dominated by a centrifugal attraction. The young Canadian, who is brought up according to British tradition and sent by his family to complete his studies in England, runs the risk of returning home with an English accent. Another young man, whose parents have sent him to a university in the United States to give him the education which the New World requires, will return with an American accent. The young French Canadian, little as he may wish it, is obliged to be bi-lingual if he is to succeed, and he may end up, like Sir Wilfrid Laurier and others who have earned a Federal reputation, by speaking English with a French accent and French with an English accent.

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How can any true Canadian culture come out of this? The University of Laval with its strictly French Canadian atmosphere, does not reflect the rest of the country in the slightest. Hart House, a most interesting effort at Toronto University, expresses a return to the British tradition in the English sense of the term, but it cannot be considered as truly Canadian. A business man in Toronto or in any of the little Ontario towns is an American, even if he happens to be of 'Loyalist' descent and is devoutly and passionately British in sentiment; and his culture can hardly be distinguished from that of an American citizen.

We have already suggested the rudiments of a Canadian culture which would be Anglo-French in its origins and its institutions, but American in its geographical atmosphere, with a touch of poetry and grandeur from the Far North. The culture which is now taking shape is endowed with great feeling. It finds expression in poetry, and in pictures into which the artists have put their heart and soul. If, however, it does not manage to come completely into being, either because it is sterilized by tradition, choked by provincialism, or absorbed by Americanism, then the work of political creation which has now reached fruition may perhaps prove to be insufficient to assure the country's true independence.

CHAPTER XVI

CANADA AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

§ I

CANADA made a notable contribution to the second world war. In 1939 her army amounted to only 4800 men, but by 1945 it numbered 750,000 of her citizens of whom 460,000 men and 20,000 women went overseas with the fighting forces. The Royal Canadian Air Force actually represented a third of the Empire's air strength. Canadian casualties were 37,964 killed and 64,990 wounded. Further, in the five years of war, Canada increased her manufacture of war material to a point where it amounted to half her production. She was thus a vital source of supply, not only for England and Russia but even for the United States, for she ranked fourth among the producers, and came second as an exporter of war materials. These figures speak for themselves. Why should she have thrown herself whole-heartedly into a distant struggle in which she had no direct concern?

In the beginning Canada was not threatened, in fact the very expanse of the Atlantic saved her from any possibility of invasion. Also she had the advantage of being protected by the United States which in the nature of things she could count on. President Roosevelt made this quite clear in a speech at Kingston in August 1938, when he made the following solemn promise: 'If Canadian territory is ever menaced by any foreign power, I give you my assurance that the United States will not stand aside with arms folded.' Thus Canada as much as any other country in the New World benefited by the Monroe Doctrine. In these conditions the safety of the Dominion was guaranteed, and moreover quite independent of England. And

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yet on the 10th September 1939 the Canadian Government declared a state of war.

This decision was a matter of conscience, not an obligation. According to the time-honoured doctrine which was accepted by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1914, Canada is at war the moment that Great Britain is at war. But according to the new doctrine laid down in the Statute of Westminster, the extent to which the Dominion takes part in a war is left to the free vote of her Parliament. This vote was taken on the 10th September 1939 exactly seven days after England had declared war. According to the statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, Canada's war effort was entirely voluntary, made in response to an appeal of blood and race, the free expression of a free people without any formal obligation on their part.

'Canada's decision to enter the war was an immediate decision,' he said. 'I announced that, if Britain took up arms in defence of freedom, our government would ask Parliament to place Canada at Britain's side. When war came, there was no hesitation. As soon as Parliament could act, Canada was at war.'¹

But why? Mackenzie King said it was in response to an appeal of blood and race. That applies to some Canadians but not to all. Doubtless the reason lies much deeper. One can understand that as a member of the British Commonwealth the Dominion could not allow it to perish without risking her own liberty to save it. In any case could Canadian liberty survive in a totalitarian world that was spreading its tentacles across the oceans? Thus it was not so much a question of England or even of the Empire as the defence of the British system throughout the world, or better still the defence of a civilization. Already in the eighteenth century people in North America believed by conviction in the rights of man, that he was entitled to lead his own life, express his own opinions, and be politically free. This, however, was completely contradicted

¹ Speech made by Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada in London, 11th May 1944.

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by German ambitions. In the United States they were still thinking along these lines, so when they in their turn came into the war it was for the same reasons as Canada.

Let us add that Canada was also obliged to intervene for domestic reasons of her own. No doubt she could have let Britain get out of the mess herself, but then lacking the counterweight of the Mother Country she would have leaned too far towards the United States. This instinctive precaution no doubt played its part in her decision. It was thus as an independent partner, with full knowledge of the step she was taking in intervening in international affairs, that she decided to play a part in the struggle that was out of all proportion to her very small population. The very presence of an American Dominion in a European war is a fact of great importance.

§ 2

Canada not only sent her men into the struggle but she also waged a war of *matériel*. She enrolled an army of 750,000 men, first on a voluntary basis and then — but only after the autumn of 1944 — by compulsion. The latter method, however, yielded only 16,000 conscripts. On the other hand her industrial production was positively staggering. The conditions under which she co-operated in a world war were rather complicated. First of all there was Anglo-Canadian collaboration to protect Great Britain and the Atlantic seaboard of Canada; but there was also collaboration with the United States in the general pursuit of the war, for the special defence of the North American continent and in the struggle against Japan.

The Anglo-Canadian collaboration consisted less in the defence of the Dominion which was not directly threatened than in the defence of Britain, and beyond Britain of the Commonwealth itself. In the beginning the Ottawa Government wanted to conduct a war of *matériel*, confining the Dominion chiefly to the manufacture of munitions and other war supplies. After Dunkirk they realized that there was nothing for it but to engage

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in total war, and it was only then that Canada threw herself without reserve into the battle. It was in these circumstances that the army with its various services was built up on land, on sea, and above all in the air. As a result of the British Air Training Plan Canada became the principal training centre for the airmen of the Allied Nations, of whom more than 100,000 took the courses. At the same time a Canadian war industry was created to turn out munitions and other requirements, while the production of foodstuffs and raw materials was intensively increased. In this way half the national production was eventually devoted to the war.

So far as Great Britain was concerned the method adopted was continuous consultation, either with the British General Staff or with the Cabinet Ministers of Britain and the other Dominions. It must be emphasized, however, that Canada definitely refused to set up any permanent organization for political or military co-operation. No doubt she feared that if she did so she might jeopardize her liberty, and compromise even slightly a conquest which seems to mean everything to her, her independence within the Empire. Imperial unity is in no way lessened by this reticence, and one might even say that its sentimental ties have been strengthened by this war collaboration. Close friendships were formed between British and Canadian airmen, and the Canadians always felt that by defending England that they too were making a contribution to saving the Commonwealth. One can easily understand the psychology of their attitude—these men were grateful to the Mother Country for affording them an opportunity of giving such splendid service. And yet even after these stirring events Canada is perhaps not so intimate with England as she was before. This may be because she is now economically emancipated, but chiefly because she has become more closely linked with the United States than ever.

Canada's war effort and its remarkable efficiency can only be appreciated if we bear in mind that her territory adjoins the United States, and that she is an integral part of the American

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continent. Her relationship with England was entirely different from her relationship with the United States, for in the latter case she was carrying on an intimate collaboration across a common frontier. Also they had a common purpose, the defence of the same continent and of the same civilization. This defence was carried out by pooling their resources in complete confidence, reciprocity, and, let me repeat, in complete intimacy.

This collaboration began even before the United States came into the war. On the 16th August 1940 President Roosevelt and the Canadian Prime Minister met at Ogdensburg, and they then decided to set up a Joint Board of Defence. This was to be a permanent body which would organize the defence of the continent. On the 20th August Great Britain in agreement with Canada ceded various bases in the North Atlantic to the United States. The bond that was established in this way cannot be considered as a temporary policy, indeed according to Mr. Mackenzie King's own statement it was a question of 'a contribution to the foundation of a new world order based on friendship and goodwill'.

On the 20th April the two statesmen met for a second time at Hyde Park in order to develop their Ogdensburg agreement still further. They then mapped out a common plan of work to avoid overlapping and to benefit by mass production methods — in short to work on a truly continental basis. Even at that time, without having declared war, the United States were contributing in actual fact to the Allied cause. They had proclaimed lend-lease, and they were assisting Great Britain in every way they could. It was only after Pearl Harbour that they carried on open warfare, but one can say that from Dunkirk onwards they were really involved in the struggle.

Canada's attitude towards her great neighbour should be exactly defined. She was party to the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence which was more than she ever accepted in her co-operation with Great Britain, for in this case it was the defence of her own continent. Nevertheless she was careful not to become too dependent on the United States, so she

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voluntarily stood aside from lend-lease in order not to be indebted to her partner. It was understood that the United States would buy as much from Canada as they were selling to her, and in this way a balance was struck which to all intents and purposes amounted to barter.

These precautions were wise, but when we see the spirit in which the agreement was carried out they seem hardly to have been necessary. Mutual confidence can be complete between people who are so similar that they do not even notice their differences. There were a great many Americans in Canada during the war, and this might easily have led to incidents . . . to impatience, for they certainly made their presence felt. They sent experts, troops, and veritable armies of workers who collaborated with the Canadians in the construction of aerodromes, pipe-lines, and the Alaska Highway. Yet there was no friction. They could not possibly have been more intimate, for they all felt that they were working at a common task, in defence of a common patrimony. From this point of view — materially and morally — England seemed to be much farther away than the United States.

§ 3

The position of the French Canadians in the war is overshadowed by the problem of conscription. The Liberal Government that was in power in 1939 had definitely decided to take part in the war, but with past experience in mind it realized that it would not obtain the vote of its French Canadian members if it did not give up conscription. On this point Sir Ernest Lapointe declared: 'The Province of Quebec in a general way will never accept conscription for overseas service. Such also is my personal opinion. I have been authorized by my colleagues of the Province of Quebec to declare as a member of the Federal Cabinet that we shall never consent to conscription, and that we shall not remain in any Government that tries to bring it in.' It was with this reserve that Canada came into the war.

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In the beginning the Dominion thought that she would chiefly have to provide munitions and other war supplies, and that enlistments would be sufficient to provide for any engagements in which her army took part. But after Dunkirk it was realized that more men would be needed. The Government then asked Parliament to pass the National Resources Mobilization Act which established the principle of conscription, but only for home defence and not to fight in Europe. Mackenzie King, an astute politician, saw that he was on dangerous ground. The Government was still bound by an engagement undertaken in 1939 and it needed the French Canadian vote. After Pearl Harbour the need for reinforcements increased still further, and the Government felt that it had to be released from its promise not to resort to conscription. On the 27th April 1942 it put the question before the country in a plebiscite which resulted in 2,921,206 votes in favour of giving it liberty of action and in 1,608,609 against. Although it had thus regained its freedom, the question could not be settled for the French Canadians were still opposed.

We must recall that in 1941 the French made up 30 per cent of the population of the Dominion, and 81 per cent were in the Province of Quebec. Now they had come into the war with a bad grace, and this was a decisive factor. Taking the country as a whole the enlistments of males between 18 and 45 years of age amounted to 40 per cent. In the Province of Quebec, however, only 24·5 per cent had volunteered, compared with from 41·5 per cent to 49·2 per cent in the English-speaking provinces. This does not mean that the French Canadians are not brave. A great many of them actually did go to the front, though not in the same proportion as the rest of the population. Their attitude simply was that this was not their war. Why? An English Canadian joined up in order to defend the Commonwealth, in other words a British community, a British language, a British civilization, and more especially British institutions. If he happened to be of British parents or was actually born in the Mother Country, he defended the British Isles as his own.

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country. The French Canadian could not look at things in this light at all. He was positively offended if anyone appealed to his imperialist sentiments and asked him to enlist to defend the Empire. In Ontario this appeal meant something, but in Quebec it fell on deaf ears. There they said to themselves, 'This is an English war. Let us keep out of it.'

Such at any rate was the instinctive reaction of the local leaders, of those who were closely in touch with the people, of priests with country parishes, and of French members of Parliament. We are certainly ready to protect Canada, they said, but we are not going to let the English send us to fight overseas thanks to conscription. Let the English go and get themselves killed if they wish, but as for us we shall stay on our own national soil. And they also said secretly to themselves, 'The French Canadian percentage will increase by that much more!'

It is interesting to note that this hostility of the peasant towards conscription belongs to a certain French tradition which we find even in France, in the Vendée for example. Also, it could definitely be felt in the resistance movement of the *Maquis*. I well remember how unpopular Jules Ferry became because he sent conscripts to fight in Tonking. An old military law dating to the period before the first world war stipulated that territorials could not be sent to fight beyond the boundaries of France.

With this explanation we understand better, I think, why the plebiscite of the 27th April 1942 resulted in 72 per cent of negative votes in the Province of Quebec.¹ In certain rural counties where the people are entirely French the negative percentage was still higher: Beauce, 97 per cent; Kamouraska, 96 per cent; Champlain, 95 per cent; and Lotbinière, 94 per cent. The reaction was just the same among the French in both the Maritime and the Western Provinces.

One can easily see that although this plebiscite was in the

¹ The actual figures were 2,921,206 in favour and 1,608,609 against. The army voted 251,108 in favour and 60,885 against; the civilian vote was 2,670,098 in favour and 1,547,724 against.

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affirmative so far as figures went, it was of no practical use to the Government even if it did release them from the letter of their engagement. Yet the principal French leaders had done their best, in fact three French Canadian members of the Cabinet at Ottawa had voted in favour, and so had Cardinal Villeneuve, Archbishop of Quebec. But up and down the countryside the priests did not follow suit. French Canada was just as hostile to the war as it had been from the beginning. Of this statistics published on the 31st October 1941 furnished sufficient proof: Province of Quebec, 60,195 enlistments out of 3,319,640 inhabitants, or 1.81 per cent; Ontario, 147,198 out of 3,754,652, or 3.9 per cent; Maritime Provinces, 4 per cent; Manitoba, 5 per cent; British Columbia, 4.5 per cent.

Although the Government had been given a mandate to introduce conscription it naturally hesitated to do so. Then, in order to embarrass it, the Progressive-Conservative opposition brought the whole question out into the open, and by emphasizing the French Canadian attitude revealed the shocking discrepancy between the contributions to the war being made by the two races. During the autumn of 1944 the problem of reinforcements began to be acute. There was heavy fighting in Holland and Northern Germany and more men were needed. The Minister of War, Colonel Ralston, demanded authority to introduce conscription, and when the Cabinet refused he resigned. General MacNaughton, the most popular general in the Canadian Army, was appointed as his successor. His plan was not to send unwilling conscripts overseas, but rather to try to get over the difficulty by stimulating voluntary enlistments. However, the need for reinforcements became more and more urgent, and in the end he did send 16,000 conscripts to Europe.

This was not a general proclamation of conscription, and yet that is how French Canadian opinion regarded it, for they felt that the Government had gone back on its word. As was to be expected opposition in the Province of Quebec increased with renewed violence. All the old arguments were trotted out, 'The voluntary system has brought in quite enough soldiers.'

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'We have already done our full share.' 'There is nothing new to justify conscription.' 'England has on her own territory hundreds of thousands of men who are not fighting, so let us do the same.' And they added in an undercurrent of propaganda, 'Remember, an army is not made up of ghosts! Conscription will take farmers, workmen, everybody. You yourself may be the next conscript!' One can guess the elementary force of such talk, especially if it happened to be addressed to a young man who dreaded being called up, or worse still to his mother. But above all the French invariably came back to the old argument: 'The Province of Quebec has never accepted the war, and has only allowed its members of Parliament to vote for it on the condition that there would be no conscription.'

The whole affair suddenly came to an end, and the 16,000 conscripts were all that were ever sent overseas. But General MacNaughton was no longer popular, in fact he could not even find a constituency to elect him to Parliament. The agitation soon subsided. Public opinion, even in Quebec, did not hold the incident against the Mackenzie King Cabinet, for they were returned to power without difficulty in the 1945 elections. But relations between the two races became much more hostile. The English Canadians are more inclined than ever to regard the French Canadians as bad partners, and they cannot forget that their percentage of the population is steadily going up. As the 1914 war brought similar resentment to a head, the country is making no progress whatever with regard to its racial unity.

§ 4

As a world power Canada has emerged from the war stronger than ever before. She has attained a new stature owing to the exceedingly effective part she played in international affairs. Yet, though she made considerable sacrifices the war was not waged on her territory, and among the belligerents this is what makes the essential difference. So she has not come out

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weakened, but on the contrary better equipped industrially, and ready to play an important role in the peace. Her sentimental ties with the Empire — or rather with the Commonwealth — are closer than ever, and her loyalty to the British system is unshaken. On the other hand her intimacy with the United States, which in a way is physical, has increased. She is more definitely aware of the continental solidarity of North America, and of the unity of its civilization. She has accepted the need for a common defence of this common patrimony, common, let me repeat, not to Canadians and British but to Canadians and Americans. Thus Canada has become as a result of this war more American than ever. One wonders if she has not become completely American in the continental sense of the term. In this there is an eventual danger which cannot be ignored.

CHAPTER XVII

CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

§ 1

THE foreign policy of Canada is based on three essentials which are relatively simple and easy to summarize. They are first, the assertion of a distinct political status in international affairs; secondly, protection against menace from overseas powers; and thirdly, economic considerations connected with the development of natural resources and the maintenance of the export trade. Whichever way we turn, we are sure to be confronted by one or other of these three propositions.

The attitude Canada adopts is a function of either her proximity to the U.S.A., her connection with Great Britain, or her international trade, which in turn depends upon the maintenance of peace. The combination would not be especially involved if the technical formation of Canada were not so diverse, but in the circumstances we must resign ourselves to a series of complicated explanations.

§ 2

Being in North America, Canada has only one neighbour, the United States—but what a neighbour! The relations which arise from this fact dominate her entire foreign policy. The common boundary of over 3000 miles inevitably presents many serious problems, especially as the intimacy of the two countries leads to continual intercourse. They are like two tenants living in the same apartment house, indeed on the same storey! As we noted in the case of their commercial relations, we are dealing here less with questions of foreign policy than of the internal domestic policy of North America. In fact it is

scarcely a question of policy at all since fortunately any matters to be settled are relegated by common consent to the domain of legal procedure. They quarrel certainly, but always in the same way as one does in the civil courts; and consequently, they do not fight. Such is the enviable spirit in which that model institution, the International Boundary Commission, carries on its discussions. Any explanation which fails to take this geographical fact into account will miss the crux of the situation.

This gives a clear insight into the nature of Canadian independence. It is quite obvious that the Dominion cannot defend itself against the United States. In case of war, any resistance would be so completely impossible that no one ever dreams of it or prepares for it. The only possible course would be passive resistance, with recourse to moral suasion. These remarks will seem futile to my Canadian readers, as they are convinced, and rightly so, that they have absolutely nothing to fear from this quarter.

'Canada and the U.S.A. have kept the peace for so long,' wrote Mr. Dafoe, 'that the possibility of war between them no longer finds a place even in popular imagination. The thing to Canadian minds is inconceivable. The traditional European policies of defence, when propounded to Canadians as necessary for their security, seem amazing in their absurdity.'¹

The atmosphere of North America assuredly justifies this outlook, and though we cannot possibly compare it with European conditions yet we can learn a lesson from it. We reflect, at the same time, that Canada — and well she knows it — is free only so long as relations are friendly, and so she dare not adopt any policy that would be liable to irritate her overwhelming neighbour. She could not, for instance, expropriate, as Mexico did, the American capital invested in her territory, nor, let us say, cut off the electric power which she exports across the frontier. Therefore it is essential to maintain good relations between the two countries, and this is the cardinal preoccupation of every Canadian Government, no matter to

¹ John W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation*, p. 93.

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which party it belongs. I should not be surprised if it were uppermost in their minds, and came even before their anxiety not to annoy the English.

But we should be wrong in our interpretation if we believed that Canada feels that the proximity of the United States is not on the whole advantageous. On the contrary she considers it as a valuable guarantee of her security, since if ever she were menaced by a foreign power the Monroe Doctrine obviously would protect her. In any case this was explicitly declared by President Roosevelt in 1938 in his Kingston speech to which we have already referred. One then thinks of Germany and of Japan, but this co-operation would be assured no matter what country were to threaten Canada. Some tactless commentators have even suggested that the Monroe Doctrine would protect her against England herself if the latter undertook to intervene in this prescribed area! This point is ridiculous, and I am only quoting it in order to emphasize the strictly continental character of the problem. Canada's protection — and those concerned are under no illusion about it — in no way depends upon the British fleet, but rather upon the military power, upon the immense potential force of the United States. The second world war brought this aspect into the limelight: it is a question of a North American solidarity from which Britain is excluded.

One might be tempted to think that the independence that Canada has won from the Mother Country might be lost again on the other flank, since from the moment when she is willing to rely on someone else for her defence she has descended again to the status of a protectorate. This is not the Canadian attitude, however. They consider that this joint defence is a patrimony, common to the two countries, and all the more so since they for their part are making an effective contribution. Although this position may appear to be subordinate it does not seem so to them, for the prevailing impression is that of a community not of a protectorate.

Public opinion arising from this community of interests is so

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identical that on any international question whatever the spontaneous reaction of both countries is, nine times out of ten, exactly the same. There is no need of diplomatic influence, of an exchange of notes, or of conversations between ambassadors. No, the American atmosphere being the same on both sides of the boundary naturally suggests the same replies, arising from the same moral reflexes, from the same instinct to distrust Europe, and the same 'White American' complex. At Geneva, for example, where the United States were not represented, the Canadian delegate often expressed on his own initiative a point of view which would have been that of the American delegate had he been there. It is sometimes said that Canada interprets the United States to Europe, and this is perfectly true. Even when interest or prudence dictates this attitude, however, the Dominion adopts it without pressure and of her own free will.

§ 3

The British connection involves a series of relationships of an entirely different order, which maintain Canada within a non-American system, and oppose an east-west attraction to the trend from north to south.

Even though she has become independent, the Dominion cannot do without the Mother Country. It is a question of sentiment, whereas there is none in the case of the relationship with the United States in spite of their cordiality. It is also a matter of policy, for even though the Empire may not directly provide military security it confers a prestige which is a form of international security. Then again, although England is no longer Canada's best customer she is still a very important one, and finally she counterbalances the American colossus, whose physical pressure would otherwise become unbearable. In the political domain this bond with the old country, and in a wider sense with the Commonwealth, is just as vital as the link with the United States is in the continental domain. The com-

bination of these two elements is essential to the political existence of Canada, for her independence is made up of the equilibrium which results from this double dependence. This equilibrium was compromised during the second world war, but it exists none the less and is still a political factor that Canada cannot ignore.

It is in Canada's interest to maintain this balance at all costs. If the first principle of Canadian policy is to keep on friendly terms with the United States, there is another which is not one whit less important, and that is to do everything possible to preserve cordial relations between the United States and England. Any rupture, even a serious difference of opinion between London and Washington, would put the Ottawa Government in an impossible situation, for it would not know which side to choose. Certain overwhelming arguments—geography, security, and community of outlook—might incline her to the side of the United States, but automatically there would be a passionate reaction on the part of the British element. If the point of issue were serious, this might lead to civil war and break up the entire country.

Canada is thus apt to intervene in Imperial policy, and even more closely in English policy, in order to obtain solutions which are acceptable to the United States. Thanks to the good offices of the Dominion the American viewpoint is thus represented and supported in the very heart of the Empire, which is therefore drifting towards America and away from Europe. There is nothing either astonishing or disconcerting in this when we recall that Canada herself is American.

In this connection it is curious to watch the English attitude. The British Government might be tempted to make use of Canada in order to influence the policy of the United States in favour of Great Britain. Undoubtedly various subtle influences are working in this way, but on the surface England's chief aim in this connection seems to be to avoid, at all costs, ever placing Canada in the delicate position of having to choose between either the United States or England. In the period between the

two wars it was in this spirit that time and again London gave way to Washington, and if on behalf of European interests a third party encouraged the British Government to resist, Canada protested indignantly, as in Corneille's *Nicomède*: 'Ah, don't embroil me with the Republic!'

Such anxiety to avoid the slightest shock to a state of affairs, which though precarious may yet be enduring, is an essential basis of Imperial policy. It must be admitted that it coincides with the desire, not only of Canada, the country chiefly interested, but also of the other Dominions. This was the attitude that Field-Marshal Smuts expressed with considerable force in the great speech he made at the banquet given by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in 1934.

'The Dominions,' he said, 'have even stronger affiliations towards the United States than Great Britain has. There is a community of outlook, of interests, and perhaps of ultimate destiny between the Dominions and the U.S.A. which in essence is only the first and the most important of them. Through the Dominions, British policy is ultimately tied up with the United States much more closely than appears on the surface. That fundamental affinity, coming from the past, stretching to the future, is, or must be, the real foundation of all British foreign policy. Any policy which ignores it, or runs counter to it, is calculated to have a disruptive effect on the Commonwealth as a whole. We are here on bedrock, which we ignore at our peril!'

It may be that this conception sacrifices the substance for the shadow, the shadow here being the prestige which England obtains by keeping Canada within the Empire, and this is no small thing. The role of Great Britain in international affairs would be very different, if the fear of losing Canada in a dispute with the United States were relegated to second place. The fact that it has been given first place has allowed Canada on several occasions to wield a decisive influence in the determination of Imperial policy. At certain moments decisions have been taken, less in London and from the English point of

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view, than in Canada and from the American point of view, so that the centre of gravity of the Empire seemed actually to have been displaced. 'Rome is no longer in Rome . . .'

The most striking example was, without doubt, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921. The Foreign Office, supported by Australia and New Zealand, and also by British Columbia, were in favour of renewing it, but American opinion was violently opposed. To the Americans it seemed like treason, for it broke the solidarity of the white races. Mr. Meighan, the Canadian Prime Minister, was doubtless in a better position than anyone to understand the English arguments, being British, a conservative, and an Imperialist. Nevertheless, he reacted as a North American, for he was anxious above all to avoid a policy which would not have the collaboration of the United States in the Pacific. When the Imperial Conference was debating this grave decision, he opposed renewal. His innate fear was that the Dominion might be implicated in a conflict in the Pacific, in which England and the United States would not be on the same side. Therefore it was necessary for the two great Anglo-Saxon countries to act in unison on an agreed policy, and the Conference finally rallied to this point of view. From this emerged the Washington Naval Treaty, but Canada had been able to make her own decision and impose it on the others.

'It is not surprising,' writes Mr. J. Bartlet Brebner of Columbia University, 'that Canadian interest and policy revealed themselves to be quite similar to the interest and policy of the United States, for they sprang from a North Americanism whose roots in time and experience were of equal depth in the two nations.'¹

The attention paid to British policy is understandable in view of Canada's position in case of war. According to the nineteenth-century doctrine which we have already considered, the Empire is one in case of war, for when England is at war

¹ J. Bartlet Brebner, 'Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference' (*Political Science Quarterly*, March 1935).

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the Dominion is at war also. But as we have seen, the Canadian Government refuses to admit this conception, for the country reserves the right to decide whether or not it should take part in England's wars. However, the question remains unanswered, at least politically if not juridically, for no matter what attitude is adopted the various alternatives all involve dangerous risks either at home or abroad. A declaration of neutrality would be practically equivalent to severing the Imperial tie, for the British elements in Canada would regard it as treason. Passive belligerency would expose the country to enemy attack; but active participation as in 1914 and 1939, as we know, arouses the protests of those who do not wish to fight 'for England', arguing that it is no concern of theirs. The consequence is that Canada cannot afford to disinterest herself from any policy, even a general policy, which Great Britain might adopt, since she is, if not necessarily dragged in, at least implicated in a British war whether she likes it or not. Thus with all its advantages, the British connection also has its disadvantages.

It should be possible to analyse the principles which determine the Canadian attitude. If England is in mortal peril, a Canadian army will intervene to help to defend her as she did during the two world wars. There is no formal engagement, however, for the Canadian parliament is still master of the situation and will make its own decision. Yet it would be impossible to refuse as the pressure of the British element in the Dominion would be irresistible, for they fully realize that what they have to defend is not so much England as the British system throughout the world, or in a wider sense the Anglo-Saxon civilization. If circumstances compel Canada to intervene, one can also count on the intervention of the United States sooner or later — likely later! — for the same reason, to save the English-speaking civilization from disappearing in disaster from the face of the earth.

If on the other hand it is simply a question of an 'English' war which is not considered vital to the Commonwealth, the attitude changes completely and the Canadian Government

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reserves the right to act in conformity with the interests of the Dominion. No doubt there would be a difference of opinion, according to the racial origin of the population and the stage it had reached. The English would say, 'Ready, aye, ready!' but the French would exclaim that the country was being dragged into an English adventure which was of no interest to them. The Canadians in general, as well as their Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, consider that so long as it is not a matter of life and death English interests are quite distinct from Canadian interests. In Canada as in the United States people are inclined to distrust what they regard as English Imperialism, of which they disapprove and for which they decline to take any responsibility. So they lag behind, as in the Chanak incident, which was so typical and incidentally established a precedent. Chanak dates back to 1923, but today in her 'colonial' policy, in the strict sense of the term, England can no longer count without preparation and negotiation on Canadian support.

The Ottawa Government confirms its right as a matter of principle to adopt a policy of 'Canada First'. It realizes that, as it belongs to the Commonwealth, it is always liable even in spite of its precautions to be implicated in some new adventure. So the desire for preventive measures on its part is only natural. In order to circumscribe its responsibilities, we find it specifying that it will not be implicated in certain treaties which should be considered as English and not Imperial. For example the Treaty of Lausanne was earmarked in this way in 1923, and so was Locarno in 1925. If England pursued too active a policy in Europe and the Far East which might involve her in a war, Canada probably would not approve. Oddly enough one finds even in this British Dominion a reflection of the distrust of 'perfidious Albion' which is so ingrained in the Irish and is shared by so many Americans.

British diplomacy enjoys great prestige but even in the Dominions, or at least in Canada, it is credited with a Machiavellianism of which it would be prudent to beware. 'For the

bright eyes of England,' they say, 'do not let us be persuaded to embark on a policy that does not concern us!' No doubt it is because they feel this way that the Canadians are no longer at ease when they line up behind England or alongside her, even under the aegis of the United Nations. They are afraid of being used as pawns, but they believe that in the new international organization which was set up at San Francisco they will find a guarantee against imperialism, for England will have to subordinate her own interests to the interests of the United Nations. Canadian duties are thus submerged in a wider and therefore less compromising solidarity.

§ 4

This recourse to some form of League of Nations corresponds all the more to Canada's political tendencies, for owing to her economic structure she is bound to have an international outlook. As she is obliged to export a large proportion of her raw materials, and as England and the United States cannot absorb all her production, she must keep in close contact with world markets. As we have shown in the preceding pages, her future depends upon the existence or the re-establishment throughout the world of a regime of international free trade — or at least more liberal ideas than at present — which will allow her to export to other countries besides England and the U.S.A. This is the price of her independence.

'More than any country in the world Canada is the result of political, not economic, forces,' wrote Dafoe, 'and the economic disharmony between its geographical subdivisions is too great to be adjusted by policies of national exclusiveness. Unless we can trade with the outside world our condition must be one of stagnation, with a standard of living falling to ever lower levels, and with increasing strains upon the bonds that keep our federation together.'¹

We gather from this commentary, which we owe to one of

¹ John W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation*, p. 119.

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the most vigorous political brains the country has produced, that the double chapter of Canada's relations with the United States and England does not exhaust the problem of her foreign relations. This gives her an international outlook, for it is her duty to preserve somewhere in the world a relic of economic liberalism, which depends in its turn upon the maintenance of peace, not only between England and the United States but generally throughout the world. In this new series of relationships which extend beyond the boundaries of the British and North American systems, we must single out various problems.

In the new order the Japanese problem is no longer acute. Having one boundary on the Pacific Ocean, Canada cannot ignore Japan, a client with whom she can be on satisfactory commercial relations if she humours her a little. This aspect of the question has survived the Nipponese defeat. The existence of Japan, however, is manifest under another aspect, especially in British Columbia where there is a large Japanese colony. This colony may be more numerous than official statistics disclose, and if vigilance were ever relaxed it probably would grow surreptitiously at an alarming rate. A Japanese victory would have made this threat formidable indeed, but defeat has made it less urgent or at any rate it is now possible to take effective precautions. The attack on Pearl Harbour came like a thunderbolt, producing much the same effect in Canada as in the United States. Consequently the problem of the Far East remains of vital interest to Canada, for in her Far West she is one of the Pacific powers. The demographic pressure of the Orient, overpopulated by contrast with a half-empty North America, is a phenomenon that all the countries bordering on the Great Ocean must take into account.

The war against Japan belongs to the past, but another menace is already looming up on the horizon. In case of war between the United States and Russia, or between England and Russia, Canada would inevitably be drawn in. As we have shown the threat in either case would come not from the west

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as before, but from the northwest or the north by way of the pole, so that Canada would be completely exposed on her Arctic front. It will no longer be left to the Canadian Government to decide whether to take part in the struggle or not. The tempest will break out with no time for formal pronouncements. Canada will not even be given an opportunity to say whether she wishes to take her place within the framework of a war of much greater scope. It is no longer a question of the defence of Canada but rather the defence of North America, and in a more general way the defence of an entire civilization emanating from Europe and America. Belgium in the last two world wars found herself in a position similar to what Canada's may be tomorrow. The latter has no illusions, and as I have already said she is facing up to the possibility and is preparing for it.

Once again we must speak of the United States, for it is from this quarter that real protection will come; in fact the protection eventually afforded by the United Nations will not weigh heavily by comparison. Thus it is not for the sake of security that Canada is supporting the new international organization, but owing to her political convictions. As an American power the Dominion has no need of international institutions for herself, but she does need them for others.

Her various relationships permit us to measure almost with the precision of a delicate scales the quantity of Americanism (in the wider sense of the term) that she can accept, the quantity of British solidarity she can absorb, and how much international spirit she wishes to maintain. Although invited to become a member of the pan-American Union where a place is apparently waiting for her, she has not seen fit to join it up to the present time. The North American bond leads her naturally to the intimacy with the United States which we have described, but the solidarity of the New World as a whole seems to her to be less certain. After all she feels that she is a distinct entity, although bound by her ties with the Empire. Not that there is anything incompatible about this, but simply that she already

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belongs to another system which — the objection has a certain importance — is not a republican system. Thus she is sympathetic, may even collaborate, but always with a subtle reserve which up to now has kept her from going too far. Will she ever take the step? Possibly.

However, given the American character of the Dominion which is becoming more marked every day, it is natural that she should be inclined to become more closely associated with the Latin countries of the New World. In addition now that she has become industrialized she is looking for markets, and South America opens up interesting possibilities. Latin American countries, in spite of the fact that they also are making industrial progress, are still in the market for the manufactured articles which Canada is usually in a position to supply. Of course she is competing with the United States, but then, as the Canadians quite justly remark, there are times when being just a small power and not liable to give offence is an obvious advantage. So a serious effort is being made in this direction, and Canadian diplomatic representatives are working everywhere to establish themselves permanently in this new market. 'After all,' the French Canadians argue, 'are we not Latins too?'

§ 5

The argument which we have developed throughout this book leads us to the conclusion that Canada, like Belgium and for the same reasons, remains a precarious creation, and yet it is quite possible that under present conditions she may carry on almost indefinitely. She has been in existence long enough and has been sufficiently active to have acquired a political personality of her own which she will not give up.

At this point we of the Old World are constrained to ask whether it is to our interest that Canada should survive as a member of the British Commonwealth. In view of her position and her influence in the Commonwealth, we realize that she is inclined to draw England away from Europe, and to displace

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the centre of gravity of the English-speaking countries by attracting it towards the west. In this connection it was interesting to watch the intervention of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Bennett, at the International Economic Conference in London when he urged, in fact entreated, the British Government to vote with President Roosevelt against the whole of the European continent combined. In so doing he was working in a sense against Europe, by upholding the conception of a world-wide extra-European Empire. We may say, and not without reason, that an England, freed both from the need of considering Canada and from the dependence upon America which this consideration entails, would automatically return to the fold of the older continents. This is true, but at the same time her lustre which now serves to enhance Europe's own prestige would, unless we are mistaken, be diminished. So Europe as well would be sorry to see the Dominion leave the Empire and retire to an entirely American setting.

So long as she remains an integral part of the British system, Canada will continue to look towards London, in other words towards Europe. Were she to detach herself from this centre of attraction, she would gravitate without any counterpoise about the United States. Because of the present regime in Canada the presence of Europe continues to be felt in the New World, and so constitutes a paradox in an America which has otherwise entirely freed herself from the past. The thread is thin, but it still holds. In its double aspect, French and English, it still seems worth preserving, and France would certainly be extremely sorry to see it broken. This role of liaison is all the more important since Canada within the past few years has become one of the powers that count in world affairs. It is this new development that we have tried to show in this book.

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