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History of Educational Thought

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ULICH, HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

MADE IN U. S. A.

TO E. AND B.
MY COMPANIONS

Preface

Indissolubly connected with the many changes of our times is a transformation of our attitude towards learning. During the past century scholars have been too proud of the accumulation of facts. There was in their minds the more or less conscious assumption that progress in knowledge was guaranteed to the degree that they were capable of registering and describing the variety of data to be found in the past and the present. This assumption is true if we consider knowledge to be acquaintance with things and events; but it is not true if we believe that knowledge ought to be a means towards wisdom and personal maturity.

But are we really justified in blaming particularly the last two or three generations for cherishing the ideal of material completeness? Probably not; for in all centuries the majority of scholars have been too easily satisfied with mere fact-gathering, and only a few have asked, "To what end is all this professional busy-ness?" Not that great thinkers have ever objected to thorough research and to a decent respect for exactness; but they have wished a scholar to remember that knowledge, first of all, ought to help man to understand himself, his professional and civic duties, and his relation to the physical and spiritual universe.

No doubt demands like these are raised again with new intensity in our time, which in contrast to happier decades has brought us face to face with the demons of destruction dwelling in the under-grounds of every civilization.

This book has been written with an intense awareness of this situation, for in the field of education, with which it is concerned, there also has arisen the contrast between external magnitude of knowledge and inner certainty. We have developed new methods of research and analysis and most promising techniques of measure-

ment; we know more and more details about the educational systems of the past and of foreign countries; we comfort ourselves with the idea of lengthening the school age—yet we all feel that the effort has not yielded the harvest we expected. Instead of enjoying a wholesomely stimulating diversity of method, opinion, and action within an embracing unity of thought, we are in a growing atmosphere of verbalisms in which ideas of freedom and tolerance, human dignity and justice lose more and more of their concreteness and practical challenge.

It would be unfair to blame the educators alone for this disorder within their domain. If our whole civilization has lost the necessary balance between quality and quantity, how can education remain exempt? For even more strongly than other spheres of thought, education is contingent upon the general state of civilization. On the other hand, we must not forget the responsibility of education for the continuation and improvement of human standards. No civilization can survive which has become forgetful of the persistent concerns of man. Whole nations are waiting for help in the process of physical and spiritual reconstruction of our shattered culture.

One can deal with the ultimate motivations and goals of education *more philosophico*, as I tried to do in my *Fundamentals of Democratic Education*,¹ or one can attempt to clarify them by dint of the developmental approach. The latter method has been tried in this book on the history of educational thought. Rather than concentrate on the history of educational institutions, which often change or perish with the ages, I have attempted to bring to life the ideas which have worked as directing and abiding forces beneath the surface of education and have continued to send elements of vitality into our present civilization. In addition, I have tried to explain the leading ideas in the history of Western education, not in abstract terms and by use of the customary “isms” but in concrete terms of the life, the work, and the thinking of great men. In this way the student may be led to understand how all profound and progressive thought and action emerge from the hopes and conflicts of men which he can reconstruct in his own mind. Unless

¹Robert Ulich's *Fundamentals of Democratic Education*. American Book Company, New York, 1940.

we help the student of education to transform events of the past and the abstract words he finds in books into living experience, we fail to enrich his life by historical and philosophical instruction.

Naturally a book such as this requires selection. Even within the assumed frame of reference, it was necessary to omit thinkers who deserve our respect as much as do those who are included. But it is perhaps better to expose oneself to some sins of omission than to overwhelm the student with too many and indigestible impressions.

It is regrettable that this book had to be restricted to our Western civilization, for the time is ripe for a history of educational thought which conceives of our Western world as only a part of the total civilization of mankind. Particularly in the thought of Asia could we find sources of profound wisdom. We sometimes forget in our Western conceit that, in spite of all their philosophical richness, Europe and the countries with typical European civilization have failed to produce anything which deserves to be called a world religion. Confucius, Lao-tse, Buddha, Isaiah, Christ—all have sprung from Asiatic soil. And, whether or not we like to admit it, they have done more for the education of mankind than all other great men together.

Inevitably, both the selection of authors and the interpretation of their thought have been influenced by my own philosophical convictions. No historical work of significance has ever been written without some principle of evaluation. But this does not mean that in explaining the work of prominent minds one has always to impose his own opinion upon other people. Such an attitude would be irreverence to both the great authors and the reader. Rather, out of a respectful analysis of the life and thought of the prophetic leaders in education, there may evolve for the student a body of fundamental and critical ideas which will carry more weight with him than could any judgment suggested from outside. Only at the end of the book have I ventured some concluding remarks which summarize the persistent elements and problems in educational thought. It is hoped that these concluding remarks will help prove the value of historical and philosophical studies for our own planning at a time when a principal re-examination of the theory and practice in education is more necessary than ever.

For a more intimate understanding of the ideas described in this book I have in preparation, as an addition to my own essays, a volume of extended readings fitted to lead the student towards a knowledge of the original documents of the history of educational thought. There is something about the mental climate of a great document of thought which no secondary analysis can replace. In addition, I hold that no profession can flourish which does not measure its standards in the light of the ideas and ideals of its great geniuses, and that no field of knowledge can persist, or avoid the reproach of superficiality, in which people talk about great men and their books without reading them. Often our most conscientious teachers fall the prey to new fads clothed in a presumptuous technical jargon because they lack in knowledge of their tradition. Thus they have no criteria available which could help them to distinguish original and profound thought from merely transient ideas and experiments. Unfortunately, the immediate publication of these readings, which would form a second and larger volume than this one, meets now with considerable difficulty. But they are waiting to appear in times more propitious to contemplative studies than ours.

ROBERT ULICH

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Contents

PLATO.....	1
ARISTOTLE.....	25
PLUTARCH.....	44
QUINTILIAN.....	51
JESUS OF NAZARETH	61
THE ANCIENT CHURCH.	72
THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH.. . . .	89
THE HUMANIST EVOLUTION.....	102
I. Formative Period.	102
II. The Early Classicists	108
III. Luther.	114
IV. Erasmus of Rotterdam	130
V. Ignatius of Loyola and the Jesuit System of Educa- tion.	149
VI. Montaigne.....	156
THE NEW METHOD OF THINKING.....	162
I. Francis Bacon.....	162
II. René Descartes.....	169
III. Galileo and the Conflict Between Faith and Science... .	173

THE AWAKENING OF THE MIDDLE CLASS SPIRIT	
The Commonwealth Educators	178
JOHN AMOS COMENIUS.....	188
JOHN LOCKE	200
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.....	211
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN	225
THOMAS JEFFERSON	242
JOHANN HEINRICH PESTALOZZI	258
JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART	271
FRIEDRICH FROEBEL.....	284
RALPH WALDO EMERSON...:	292
JOHN DEWEY.....	315
CONCLUDING REMARKS ...	337
BIBLIOGRAPHY .	351
INDEX	405

Plato

(ca. 428 B.C.—ca. 348 B.C.)

[PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION]

Any attempt at molding the thought of Plato and of the main figure of his dialogues, Socrates, into a rigid system is bound to distort the true spirit of these men. The famous "Socratic irony" represents an extremely complex and subtle attitude; it smiles not only at the adversary but also at its own wisdom; it is playful in face not only of the trifling but also of the serious; and it produces contradictions not only for the sake of arguing but for the deeper cause of showing that life itself is full of contrasts. Yet neither Socrates nor Plato was a skeptic; they opposed the sophists and were willing to die for the eternal truth they believed to exist behind and within the areas of life.

What we can learn from contact with such men as these is not this or that bit of knowledge, but profoundness. That observation is true even when the answers they offer to their questions are historically conditioned and inapplicable in our time.

Most of us, before really understanding any of Plato's dialogues, have heard vaguely of his "idealism," as being in contrast to modern empirical and realistic thought.

How did Plato arrive at his idealistic conception of the world? His wondering mind asks the question: how is it possible that the thousands of fugitive phenomena we perceive around us are not merely atomistic sensations, but parts of a "world" with meaning and order? And how does it come about that, when we speak, our neighbor hears not only sounds coming from our mouths but "words" which he "understands" as having reference and significance? Plato's answer is that fundamental ordering and unifying forces must exist in the universe. And these forces, in a way which is beyond explanation, must be reflected in our minds; they render us capable of realizing meanings and interrelations within the mass

of our impressions and of feeling a transcendent harmony between our own lives and the psychic forces of the universe. Without these pervasive energies we could not have the inspiring consciousness of freedom and creative spontaneity; we would not be "men thinking," but either mechanical automatons or bewildered animals.

This "unity of ideas," or *logos*,¹ cannot be described with the same concreteness as "this table" or "that tree" before our eyes. Yet for Plato it is endowed with a higher degree of existence or reality than the things we can see and grasp. It is true and real in the sense in which a law in nature, a rule in a game, or logic in correct thought is true and real.

Does this belief in a *logos* within or behind the world of things deviate so fundamentally from the philosophy of the modern critical scientist, who often is inclined to see in Plato the very opposite of his own empirical attitude? The modern scientist also believes that his thinking refers to some kind of truth or reality which persists even after he has finished his specific experiment and which represents something "logical," or a *logos*, in spite of the constant change in the visible world. Otherwise the scientist's research would not correspond to its object nature, nor would the discovery made by one scientist be understood by the other scientists, regardless of whether they live in other countries or other periods of history, or speak another language.

The immanent order of the universe, or the *logos*—whatever one wants to call it—appears to us not only in so far as we reason, but also in so far as we feel in ourselves the urge toward the good and the beautiful. So we read in the dialogue *Charmides*:

Knowledge alone does not make us do well and be happy, not even if it be knowledge of all the other knowledges together, but only if it is of this single one concerning good and evil.²

¹The use of the term *logos*, in the sense of the ultimate unity of ideas, is not typical of Plato. But we may use it here, as well as in the section on Aristotle, in accordance with the later Stoic, Neoplatonic, and Christian tradition.

²Reprinted by permission of the publishers from *Plato*, with an English translation by H. N. Fowler and an Introduction by W. R. M. Lamb, 6 vols. (Loeb Classical Library); Book VIII, *Charmides*, *Alcibiades I* and *II*, p. 83, §174. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1927.

The greatest of all human faculties is the capability of searching not only for what is true and what really "is" but also for what "ought to be." The *Eros* of which Socrates speaks in the *Symposium*, the harmony and the proportions we discover in the growth of plants, in music, and in the movements of the stars, man's feeling of an embracing love for all that resembles divine creativeness, beauty, and perfection—all these powers flow into nature and us through the mysterious channels which connect individual life with the soul of the whole.

From this source we receive the incentive for the improvement not only of ourselves but also of our society. And in this purpose Plato was so intensely interested that we may call it the core of his philosophy. For what other purposes did he write his great "utopias," *The Republic*¹ and *The Laws*,² but to set up goals for concerted moral and social action? The noble sublimity in Plato's philosophy makes us almost forget that he had a life full of conflicts and disappointments in a period when Greece was shattered to pieces and in utter need of moral and educational regeneration. The Athenian *polis* had been defeated by the Spartans. Common faith and customs had crumbled; teachers and philosophers were necessary in order to give the people, through reasoning, what earlier generations had achieved through tradition, voluntary loyalty, and communal responsibility. Plato himself would have considered his work a failure if it had contributed only to philosophy and not also to the education of men.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

One who wishes to understand the deepest of what Plato has to say about education should immerse himself in the poetic symbolism of the *Symposium*. He ought to pay special attention to

¹Plato: *The Republic*, with an English translation by Paul Shorey. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1930-1935.

²Plato: *The Laws*, translated by R. G. Bury. 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1926.

the narrative of Socrates about his conversation with the noble woman Diotima of Mantinea, who told him that *Eros*, or Love, the son of Plenty and Poverty, creates in man the instinct of immortality and the desire for the good and the beautiful. *Eros* inspires man also with the vision of the everlasting harmony of the universe of which we are a part.

But instead of commenting on the *Symposium*, which is too great a work of art to tolerate logical analysis, let us concentrate on *The Republic* and *The Laws*, using at the same time pertinent ideas of other Platonic dialogues.

No form of human existence seems to Plato so well worth aiming at as the harmony of the *anér kalós k'agathós*, the man beautiful and virtuous. Plato starts by emphasizing the necessity of sound interaction between body and mind as the basis of all education. But according to his theory of the *logos*, he extends the idea of harmony beyond merely individual accomplishment into the realm of a cosmic metaphysics. Only a person trained to incorporate into his own existence the beauty and harmony of the divine universe will be able to obey the call of *Eros*, to harmonize his instincts and volitions under the guidance of universal principles, and to subject his conduct spontaneously to the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice. Only such a person will be the perfect citizen, because he has learned "how both to rule and to be ruled righteously."¹ Men imbued with this psycho-physical harmony will do their duty in a joyful mood and help to build up a sound community.

If—after laying this general foundation—we try to find the most important pillars in the Platonic philosophy of education, we discover that it rests mainly on the four moral concepts of worth, wisdom, service, and political leadership.²

¹*The Laws*, Book I, § 643 E; Vol. I, p. 65.

²There are throughout the dialogues of Plato several, not always identical, definitions of social and individual ethics which could also be used as basic concepts for his educational philosophy. One of the most famous is to be found in *The Republic*, Book IV, § 428 E f. There it is said that a perfect individual as well as a perfect State will contain the four qualities of wisdom, courage, temperance (or, better,

The Greek term for worth, or virtue, is *areté*. It demands not only moral convictions, good intentions, and a moral conscience but also the ability of adequate practical action. Therefore *areté* presupposes *techné*, the term from which such modern words as "technics," "technical," and so on have been derived. Consequently, the Greeks can speak not only of the *areté* of a human person but also of the *areté* of a tool. A weapon, a plow, and a house have *areté* if they are fitted to serve the purpose for which they have been created. They must have a proper structure, their effect must not be impeded by unnecessary trifles, and they must show the highest degree of adequateness to their total purpose.¹

Under normal circumstances, a person endowed with *areté* may hope to become happy and to achieve wealth and honor. And as the Greeks conceived of the good and the beautiful as effluences of the same divine energy, *areté* and beauty also are akin. Beauty is not mere decoration and ornament; it expresses harmony and adequateness. Our modern architects, who strive to mold into one unity structure, proportions, appearance, and purpose, have come very close to the Platonic concept of *areté*.

Applied to man, the Greek ideal of virtue would be not only a moral character, as such, but the "man beautiful and virtuous" and efficient, one of the most embracing ideals of humanity.

Now we understand why Plato considers knowledge, or wisdom, the second of the four pillars in his edifice of educational thought and believes in the connection of morality and knowledge much

self-discipline), and justice (which in the sense used by Plato has much to do with social equity and stability). This classification—though subject to logical criticism, as is any list of virtues (for overlapping can hardly be avoided)—became of great importance in the history of philosophy because the Catholic Church adopted it very early for its own use. It regarded the four Platonic virtues as *natural*, in distinction to the *Christian* virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The *natural* and *Christian* virtues combined formed the *Seven Cardinal Virtues*. (Cf. H. Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers*, pp. 44 and 133 f. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925.)

¹See Julius Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher*, pp. 105, 174, 237. Leipzig, 1928. See also Werner W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, translated from the German manuscript by Gilbert Highet, *passim*. 2 vols. Oxford University Press, New York, 1939-1943.

more than we are inclined to do. For him human perfection is impossible without man's knowing how to transform his intention into reality. Consequently, growing insight into the nature of life ought to serve as a motivating power in the education of man.

But there is a still deeper reason for the unity of the good and the intelligible. Virtue and reason, the good and the true, are, according to Plato, different but essentially identical expressions of the cosmic order. Man alone is given the blessing of perfecting himself through increasing insight into the essence of the world. In realizing himself and striving for a good life, he goes beyond the narrowness of his ego and submits voluntarily to the laws of Being. This is man's, and only man's, freedom and dignity. And *paideia*, the Greek word for "planful education," is the attempt of the older generation to instill into the younger the capacity for fulfilling the eternal mission of man. Or, one could also say, education is the reflection of the *logos* in the life and change of human generations.

Education is the process of drawing and guiding children towards that principle which is pronounced right by the law and confirmed as truly right by the experience of the oldest and the most just.¹

But man lives not only as an individual. A Christian ascetic of the Middle Ages could imagine fulfilling divine purpose by withdrawing from the society of men into the desert, but how could a Greek achieve *areté* and become an *anér kalós k'agathós* without working with his fellow men?

Here the third and fourth of the fundamental concepts of the Platonic philosophy of education enter in—namely, the concepts of political service and political leadership; in Greek terms, the problems of the *polis* and of the *aristoi*.

Politics played an intensive role in the lives of both Socrates and Plato. With regard to Socrates this is not surprising to those who

¹Reprinted by permission of the publishers from *The Laws*, translated by R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library), Book II, §659 D. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1926. This edition is referred to hereafter as: *The Laws*.

I know of his bravery as a soldier in battle, his interest in the public life of his city, and his death as a political martyr. With regard to Plato, the opinion has frequently been advanced that he preferred the aristocratic leisure of the philosopher to political responsibilities. But this is true only in a very restricted sense. As we know from his *Seventh Epistle*,¹ he did not voluntarily choose this aloofness from the political arena; according to his own testimony, his early ambitions were political. But there was no place for a man of his conscience. He could but disapprove of the political machinations of the aristocrats, among whom he had his relatives; and he was forced to react similarly when the democrats came to power. The aristocrats tried to draw his friend Socrates into a wicked plot; the democrats sentenced him to death with the charge of impiety. Thus Plato became a political refugee in his own country, like many honest and socially minded people in our times who are bound to choose between resignation or the sacrifice of their conscience. We learn from other parts of Plato's *Seventh Epistle* that he threw himself into serious moral conflict and physical danger when, as a man of about sixty years of age, he accepted two invitations extended to him by the family of the rulers of the Sicilian kingdom of Syracuse to give them political advice on the reconstruction of their turbulent empire.

A man of such genuine, though impeded, political interest could not fail to see that a full realization of virtue would never be possible without the citizens' devotion to the welfare of their commonwealth. For man's best intentions and knowledge are condemned to remain abstract unless he is given the chance for honest political service. But he will not be given such freedom unless he helps to conquer it from day to day.

Thus we understand why Plato devoted his two largest and perhaps most influential works, *The Republic* and *The Laws*, to the problems of the State. He wished to picture a State which would be the political image of the *logos*, one in which, conse-

¹*The Platonic Epistles*, translated with Introduction and Notes by J. Harward, p. 115 f. Cambridge University Press, London, 1932.

quently, statesmanship and education would be twins, for both aim at the realization of a higher order in life. Such an attempt led him by necessity to choose the literary species of a *utopia*; for a plain painting of the reality of political institutions, as they exist here on earth, can never be an image of perfection.¹

The most productive way of dealing with Plato's political works is to ask to what extent we can learn from comparing his problems with ours. In so doing we will find that the difference of more than two thousand years has not modified the character of the social problems of mankind fundamentally, though, with the change of the environment, they may need different solutions.

We must remember that Plato neither lived in, nor thought of, a democratic society in our modern sense. Even today democracy is an ideal, and nowhere complete reality. Athens was certainly still farther from the ideal than our modern democratic republics. The full citizens were a minority in comparison to the less privileged aliens and the unprivileged slaves. According to recent estimates, there lived in the Athenian state during its best period, *circa* 431 B.C., not more than 45,000 Athenian citizens. The slaves outnumbered them four or five times.² Plato's unawareness of the injustice inherent in this situation would be unbelievable if we did not know that nothing is so difficult for a human being as to raise into critical consciousness the very foundation on which his own society and its traditions rest. Even the most astute-minded does not know how much he takes for granted.

Among the citizens of Athens there was no real equality. The period of Plato was one of class struggles between the old aristocracy and the common citizens. The aristocrats, when in power, exploited their fellow men, whereas the democrats, when their turn came, used their influence to have the public offices distributed

¹We omit here *The Statesman* because for our specific purpose this Platonic work would not add much new material.

²Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, translated by Hannah D. Kahn, edited and revised with an Introduction by Arthur Livingston, p. 358. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1939. It must be said that all such numerical estimates are based on insufficient evidence and are highly controversial.

without any account being taken of quality and aptitude. Thus Plato could not fail to see that in spite of all differences both parties were similar in their disrespect for the welfare of the commonwealth, each group putting its own interests above those of the whole.

Therefore the fourth fundamental concept in Plato's political philosophy, the concept of statesmanship, became for him of paramount importance. As is natural with a man disillusioned by rigid party systems, Plato's views cut across typical political alignments. He believes in the statesmanship of "the many" as little as in the generosity of the wealthy.

His conservatism is reflected by his proposal to keep separated the three social castes—namely, the tutors or guardians, the warriors, and the business and working class—the principle being "that one man can not practice many arts with success." Translated into modern terms, Plato's three social castes would denote the statesmen with the office of directing the policy of the commonwealth, the armed force (army and police), which has to give effect to the decisions of the statesmen, and the general civilian population, which has to provide for material needs. Yet Plato's conservatism is not built exclusively on the principle of heredity. The guardians or warriors should not hesitate to accept the unusually talented son of a tradesman into their ranks. But as Plato believes that children of well-bred families have by far a greater chance for leadership than others, his society would nevertheless be one of extreme stability.

The radical element displays itself in Plato's recommendation of economic communism and abolition of family life among the ruling classes of the State. Only those can be good guardians who are not tied to the interests of property nor led astray from their duties toward the commonweal by their love for wives and children. Centuries later, ideas not unsimilar to those of Plato again emerged in history. The Catholic Church imposed celibacy on its clergy, and the Bolshevik revolution tried to abolish individual property.

PLATO'S EMPHASIS ON AN ELITE

After denoting the four main moral forces in Plato's social philosophy—namely, worth, wisdom, political service, and political leadership—the question arises as to the means for a constant re-creation of these forces within society.

In doing this we meet a striking similarity and at the same time a difference between the ideas of the ancient sage and our modern views. The similarity lies in the emphasis on education. Education is, for Plato, the central source of the moral energy of a community. Therefore the children of all parents, being children also of the state, have to be led up to a certain level of culture. The difference lies in the fact that Plato—at least in *The Republic* (*The Laws* are more democratic in this respect)—is mainly interested in the training of an elite, and much less in the education of the "common man" with his practical and vocational interests.

This attitude results not only from Plato's individual leanings but also from the economic and industrial life of older societies. Life was simple and unexperimental, agriculture, trade, and craftsmanship each consisting of a relatively fixed body of practical skills transmitted through apprenticeship from one generation to the next. If a man did not devote himself to politics or philosophy, what reason did he have to bother with theory?

This attitude springs also from the belief that a merely utilitarian training has nothing to do with education in a deeper sense.

But we must not allow our description of education to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man's upbringing, we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up education: the education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argu-

ment would confine the term *education*; whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name *education*.¹

We already know that in Plato's State the chosen ones would have to pay a high price for the privilege of a perfect liberal education. They would never enjoy the ties and attachments of family life. Even procreation and nursing would be regulated by the State. Life would be depersonalized and void of the warmth of the bonds of blood. Discipline and duty would prevail over all other human interests.

DILEMMAS IN PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Plato's educational scheme acknowledges only tradition and rejects experimentation. There is censorship and control not only over the schools and the general upbringing of youth, but also over the people's religion. Plato is convinced that the decay of his city is due to the abandonment of the simple customs of the forefathers.

Nothing, as we shall find, is more perilous than change in respect of everything, save only what is bad. . . . For if there exist laws under which men have been reared up and which (by the blessing of Heaven) have remained unaltered for many centuries, so that there exists no recollection or report of their having been different from what they now are, then the whole soul is forbidden by reverence and fear to alter any of the things established of old. By hook or by crook, then, the lawgiver must devise a means whereby this shall be true of his State. Now here is where I discover the means desired: Alterations in children's games are regarded by all lawgivers . . . as being mere matters of play, and not as the cause of serious mischief; hence, instead of forbidding them, they give in to them and adopt them. They fail to reflect that those children who innovate in their games grow up into men different from their

¹From *The Laws*, Book I, §§ 643 E and 644 A; Vol. I, p. 65. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

fathers; and being thus different themselves, they seek a different mode of life, and having sought this, they come to desire other institutions and laws.¹

Out of this conservative attitude Plato develops a strong appreciation for the unwritten ancestral customs, pervading the more instinctive life of a nation:

For it is these that act as bonds in every constitution, forming a link between all its laws (both those already enacted in writing and those still to be enacted), exactly like ancestral customs of great antiquity, which if well established and practiced, serve to wrap up securely the laws already written, whereas if they perversely go aside from the right way, like builders' props that collapse under the middle of a house, they bring everything else tumbling down along with them.²

Even the inventors of new games, new sports, and new melodies are punishable as corruptors of morals.

It conforms with this conservatism that Plato regards habituation or, as we could also say, "conditioning" as one of the main instruments of education. He plans the most just and advanced State. What he would actually achieve, here as with his laws concerning nurture and procreation, is a society without any incentive to improve itself through experimentation and democratic co-operation.

A decisive contrast between Plato's love of a free and liberal life and his reactionary emphasis on conditioning and stability runs through his whole system. That is one of the reasons why he came to be admired by both conservatives and radicals; yet it is disturbing for those who are not satisfied with picking out convenient passages in a great man's work for the confirmation of their own ideas, but are desirous of understanding the author himself.

¹From *The Laws*, Book VII, § 797 E; Vol. II, pp. 35 and 37. See also Book II, § 659 D; Vol. I, p. 111. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

²From *The Laws*, Book VII, § 793, B-C; Vol. II, pp. 19 and 21. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

Even taking into account Plato's fascination with the stability of the Egyptian and Spartan civilizations, one wonders that he could think of amalgamating the regimentation he recommends with the liberal spirit of the Periclean age. It is all the more astonishing in view of the fact that Plato himself at several places treats people's belief in law and regulations in an ironical mood.¹

There can be no doubt that Plato sometimes approximates modern "totalitarianism." He does so institutionally, through recommending censorship and the complete subordination of schools to the control of the polis, and even morally. There is a fundamental ethical issue involved in the following sentences of the third book of *The Republic*:

✓ "But further we must surely prize truth most highly. For if we were right in what we were just saying and falsehood is in very deed useless to gods, but to men useful as a remedy or form of medicine, it is obvious that such a thing must be assigned to physicians, and laymen should have nothing to do with it." "Obviously," he replied. "The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account of enemies or citizens for the benefit of the State; no others may have anything to do with it, but for a layman to lie to rulers of that kind we shall affirm to be as great a sin, nay a greater, than it is for a patient not to tell his physician or an athlete his trainer the truth about his bodily condition, or for a man to deceive the pilot about the ship and the sailors as to the real condition of himself or a fellow-sailor, and how they fare." "Most true," he replied.²

It is the fundamental difference between totalitarian and non-totalitarian philosophy that the latter subjects the conduct of the State to general moral laws; whereas totalitarianism places the in-

¹See *The Laws*, Book VII, § 800, Vol. II, pp. 41 f.; and § 807, Vol. II, pp. 65 f. Cf. *The Republic*, with an English translation by Paul Shorey (Loeb Classical Library), Book IV, §§ 423 E-427 C; Vol. I, pp. 329 f. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1930-1935.

²Reprinted by permission of the publishers from *The Republic*, with an English translation by Paul Shorey (Loeb Classical Library), Book III, § 389 E f.; Vol. I, p. 215. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1930-1935. This edition is referred to hereafter as: *The Republic*.

terests of the State above all. Now this is exactly what Plato does through forbidding the ordinary citizen to lie, but allowing the leaders to do so in the interest of the community.

One could reply that Plato's permission of a double morality testifies only to his realism, which we have already discovered in his thinking. For history knows of very few, if any, great and successful statesmen who would always have dared to harmonize their political actions with their individual moral standards. When we previously referred to Plato's realism, we did it with regard to his deep and unerring sense for the character and conflicts of reality and not to the kind of pseudo-realism which makes a principle out of the sad expediency of politics. No matter how many names we may give the human trend to surrender individual ethical responsibility to the ambiguities of political or corporate morale, whatever we may call it—Machiavellism, *raison d'état*, or political realism—it represents one of the most disastrous, if not the most disastrous, ethical conflict in the history of the human race. Not only is this double-faced morality in strict contradiction to all the other ideas of Plato,¹ it is in itself a tragic phenomenon that one of the greatest philosophers proved himself incapable of finding a solution of this dilemma. However much modern totalitarianism and other forms of crooked politics were forced to distort Plato's philosophy for the purpose of finding respectable ancestors in the history of human thought,² in respect to "lying for the benefit of the State" they can, unfortunately, call him as a witness.

PLATO'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

Modern educational authors have tried to press Plato's ideas on the structure and sequence of education into our modern categories of elementary, secondary, and higher schooling. This is difficult for two reasons; first, because of the general differences between

¹See particularly the end of Book IX of *The Republic*.

²See Joachim Bannes, *Hitlers Kampf und Platons Staat; Eine Studie über den ideologischen Aufbau der nationalsozialistischen Freiheitsbewegung* (Berlin, 1933); and Walter Becher, *Platon und Fichte: die königliche Erziehungskunst* (Deutsche Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftslehre, xiv. Jena, 1937).

Greek and modern civilization, which do not allow an easy transfer of terms; secondly, because Plato himself lays much more value on the spirit than on the external organization of education. In regard to the latter he is rather careless, and he even contradicts himself in the course of his thinking. If, at the risk of violating the principle of philological exactness, we fuse *The Republic* and *The Laws* into one system, we arrive at the following structure of Plato's ideal school: From birth to about six years of age, a child's body and healthy habits have to be developed. During the first three years of life, sanitary nursing is most important. From three to six, sports, games, plays, and songs are the best means of good breeding.¹ In this period also, the basis for courage and self-discipline has to be laid by exposing the child to pleasure and pain, and the basis for reverence for tradition by inculcation of the elements of the great national myths. Plato clearly foresees the result of modern psychological research, "that the beginning in every task is the chief thing, especially for any creature that is young and tender; for it is then that it is best molded and takes the impression that one wishes to stamp upon it."² At the age of six a child should begin a more formal education. Boys, and girls too, should receive their initial military training in the form of gymnastics, practiced with a view towards war. Simple and dignified music, conducive to the cultivation of noble emotions, ought to prepare them to combine, in their later life, the courage of the warrior with the refined enjoyment of peace. Dance and song ought to be cultivated as expression of religious sentiments. All this is a nobler occupation than the pursuit of war, since:

The highest good . . . is neither war nor civil strife—which things we should pray rather to be saved from—but peace one with another and friendly feeling.³

¹*The Laws*, Book VII, § 794; Vol. II, p. 21 f.

²See *The Republic*, Book II, § 377; Vol. I, p. 177. Also *The Laws*, Book I, § 643 D; Vol. I, p. 65.

³From *The Laws*, Book I, § 628 C; Vol. I, p. 15. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

A regular school life begins for both boys and girls, controlled by a "law-warden," a director of education.¹ Reading, writing, and the rudiments of mathematics have to be taught. Gymnasia and schools, open to all, ought to be built; teachers ought to be appointed:

... and no father shall either send his son as a pupil or keep him away from the training-school at his own sweet will, but every "man jack" of them all (as the saying goes) must, so far as possible, be compelled to be educated, inasmuch as they are children of the State, even more than children of their parents. For females, too, my law will lay down the same regulations as for men, and training of an identical kind.²

Plato wishes that all the means of education be concentrated systematically toward bringing about a full and mature personality. In this process mere guidance and information, as well as mere conditioning and habituation, would fail. They are effective in the pursuit of the virtues of temperance and courage, but a person endowed with these qualities may still be narrow, unpleasant, and perhaps socially dangerous unless he possesses also the virtues of wisdom and justice. All these virtues must be molded into an organic whole.

For this purpose a forming power within the human personality is necessary, strong enough to harmonize the body with the mind, aesthetic with moral demands, and the more instinctive drives with intellectual maturity. Here lies, for Plato, the deepest sense of gymnastics and music. Gymnastics is much more than mere physical exercise, and music is much more than what we understand by musical training. They both aim at a cultivation of the body and the emotions, as the foundation upon which to build later a sound intellectual life. They have to prepare the total person for achieving "good speech, then, good accord, and good grace, and good rhythm."³

¹*The Laws*, Book VII, § 809; Vol. II, p. 71.

²From *The Laws*, Book VII, § 804 D; Vol. II, p. 57. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

³*The Republic*, Book III, §400 D; Vol. I, p. 255; and § 404 B; Vol. I, p. 267.

In order to understand the meaning for the Greeks of the two arts of music and gymnastics, we must remember that their culture developed in close connection with religion and especially with the great public religious festivals. In these festivals religious ceremonies were combined with athletic games and theatrical performances of sacred character. Some citizens played the leading parts, while others formed the choirs, singing hymns accompanied by solemn dances. For them this unity of body and art still existed, but later it became only a dream in the souls of poets and composers.

Thus gymnastics is not only sport and military training, it is also dancing and rhythm; and through these it joins with music, which is also dancing and rhythm and, in addition, melody and poetry. For many centuries, particularly after the period of the Renaissance, humanists and educators looked to Plato as one of their great leaders toward individual perfection. But very few have realized the full significance of Plato's conception of a harmonious and productive interaction of all physical and mental functions.¹ Only men such as Goethe (in his "Pedagogical Province," a part of the novel *Wilhelm Meister*) and Froebel (in his philosophical and educational work) showed themselves in accord with Plato. Both arrived at their educational outlook not through any imitation of the Greek philosopher but through their own experience and thinking, though they lived in an atmosphere full of direct and indirect Platonic influences. Nowadays, in consequence of a new understanding of the interaction of physics and psyche, we are able to grasp again the deeper meaning of Plato's musical education. Yet, if we wish to revitalize his principles, we must recognize that our period is too far from natural simplicity, too technical, and too specialized. Nevertheless, even under these conditions, much could be learned from Plato.

¹The fact that Plato, on several occasions, especially in the third book of *The Republic* (§ 403 D; Vol. I, p. 265), speaks of chronological sequence of the teaching of music and gymnastics does not contradict our emphasis on unity. Even at these places gymnastics and music are thought of as supporting each other, only that some years of life are devoted more to the one field, and other years to the other field.

The other point in Plato's education of the adolescent which we have difficulty in understanding is the dominant role of mathematics. This role has nothing to do with modern theories of formal discipline. Rather, it can be understood if we remember the enthusiasm of the Newtonian era for mathematics and the natural sciences. Both periods—the Pythagorean-Platonic and that of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton—experienced the intensive spiritual satisfaction that lies in the discovery of a mysterious unity between certain logical operations of our mind and the laws of the universe. Imagine the inspiration and hope which the gradual overthrow of the medieval magical aspects of the world and the discovery of the laws of modern physics instilled into the minds of the humanist and rationalist era. Imagine Spinoza's attempt at building up an eternal philosophy "more geometrico," and all the great and wonderful dreams of our forbears, which, in spite of much disillusion, revolutionized our thinking. Then we can conceive what the philosopher-mathematicians in the Platonic period felt at the first dawn of systematic conceptual thinking, when by means of arithmetic, geometry, acoustics, and mechanics they discovered a logically exact discipline of thinking, displaying fundamental relationships between reason and nature. The proud word of the Sicilian Greek Archimedes, living about two centuries after Plato, that he needed only a place to stand and he would move the earth, is but the striking expression of an immense belief in the power of the human mind. Plato was interested not in moving the earth but in improving society. He wished to use mathematics for guiding his guardian-students toward the realization of the Abiding within the flux of things, to show them the eternal dimension in reality, and to lead them, in this way, toward rational mastery over themselves and their environment.

Nevertheless, in order to express his deepest ideas, Plato did not think of a mathematical formula. For this purpose he uses poetic-mythical analogies, as in the famous allegory of the den,¹ where he illustrates the limitations of men's sense impressions and their in-

¹*The Republic*, Book VII, § 514 f.; Vol. II, p. 119.

ability to perceive more than the mere shadows of reality, or in his use of the symbol E^1 for explaining the endless cycle of life and mortality, and of freedom and bondage.

The non-specialist, we could say "holistic," character of Plato's concept of education can also be elucidated with reference to his distrust in thinkers who fail to connect their special studies with the general and human purpose of thought. Only knowledge which is "useful, . . . for [the] investigation of the beautiful and good,"² enriches the souls of men. Therefore the mathematician, who does not go "far enough to bring out . . . [the] community and kinship"³ of his science with the other sciences and is incapable of considering all of them in their mutual affinities, is not a true thinker, however "expert" he may be. "For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters [mathematics] are reasoners and dialecticians,"⁴ says one of the participants at the dialogue on *The Republic*, without being contradicted by his friends. Also, philosophy itself has—according to Plato—fallen into disesteem "caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers."⁵ Neither the scholar nor the sophist is a philosopher in the Platonic sense; only the man who will be able "to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline"⁶ as are required for the understanding of life in its totality.

The insistence on fullness of experience serves as guiding principle also for the higher stages of Plato's scheme of education. After the first years of adolescence, intellectual studies are interrupted in favor of intensive physical training and military service. They require four years, and only then may the young man, now at the age of twenty, return to theoretical studies, provided he has excelled among his comrades. He is now sufficiently matured to enter upon the first level of higher education. Higher education,

¹*The Republic*, Book X, § 617 D f.; Vol. II, p. 505 f.

²*Ibidem*, Book VII, § 531 C; Vol. II, pp. 193, 195.

³*Ibidem*, Book VII, § 531 D-E; Vol. II, p. 195.

⁴*Ibidem*, Book VII, § 531 D-E; Vol. II, p. 195. Cf. *ibidem*, footnote "e".

⁵*Ibidem*, Book VII, § 535 C; Vol. II, p. 211.

⁶*Ibidem*.

for Plato, consists of the endeavor to strengthen the power of seeing relationships, to which mathematical training was considered as the first initiation. Learning becomes now the acquisition of fundamental methods of thinking; in other words, it becomes "dialectical."

For he who can view things in their connexion is a dialectician [or a real philosopher]; he who cannot, is not.¹

This is one of the profoundest statements of Plato; at the same time, one of the most puzzling, if seen in the total context of his thought. The same man who appears as an authoritarian in his system of education toward citizenship, and as a believer in absolute truth, confesses that he cannot conceive of a comprehensive mind which is not dialectical, that is, of dynamic nature and willing to see the contrasts inherent in every phase of life. Is this not a *contradictio in adjecto*? Or are we allowed to solve the apparent dilemma by supposing that Plato wishes the feeling of security only for stabilizing the souls of the common men, whereas the rulers in his ideal State of justice and verity must know about the tragic inconclusiveness of all human thinking? For only then are they really wise.

The students with the greatest capacity for dialectical comprehension, "those . . . who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements," will at the age of thirty be elevated to the ranks of candidates for leadership in the State. They will devote the next five years of their lives, between thirty and thirty-five, to still higher dialectical studies. Here again we meet one of the surprising riddles in Plato's *Republic*. "It will be your task"—so Socrates says to the teachers of the prospective guardians—"to prove and test them by the power of dialectic to see

¹From *The Republic*, Book VII, § 537 C; Vol. II, p. 219. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press. While the education of early youth and adolescence is discussed in both works, *The Republic* and *The Laws*, the higher levels of man's development toward wisdom and statesmanship are referred to only in *The Republic*.

which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses and go on to being itself in company with truth.”¹

What can it mean to recommend to prospective statesmen “to disregard the eyes and other senses”? The problem becomes still more puzzling if we hear that the same men, after the five years of studies are passed, will be compelled to return to the practical tasks of the State, “to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience,” and to prove whether “they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.”²

“To disregard the eyes and other senses and go on to being itself in company with truth” is the symbolic expression of the mental act of self-identification with the Absolute, as we know it from Oriental religions and the Pythagorean schools, the Neoplatonic sects and the philosophy of Plotinus, and from medieval and modern mystics who believe in the possibility of experiencing the Divine immediately. They all describe this act of intuition as one in which the mind makes itself independent of the senses, transcends the conditions of the body, and unites with the overwhelming light and power of the Holy and Absolute. Only men able to go beyond themselves and the foreground of life into real Being, or, to use Plato’s own analogy, to go out of the den of darkness into the light of the Abiding—only such men can judge what in the flux of things is of merely fleeting value and what of permanent value.

So it is not a mere world-escaping contemplation or ascetical self-annihilation which Plato recommends. As he warns his friends against the danger of mistaking dialectics for the idle amusement of arguing,³ so he also warns them against the danger of individualistic self-satisfaction imminent in a pure *vita contemplativa*. Life is, first of all, responsibility—responsibility not only for one’s self,

¹From *The Republic*, Book VII, § 537 D; Vol. II, p. 219. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

²From *The Republic*, Book VII, § 539 E; Vol. II, p. 229. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

³*The Republic*, Book VII, § 539 B; Vol. II, p. 227.

but primarily for one's country. Therefore the experience of unity with God receives its value only if the mystic feels at the same time his unity with men struggling and striving. Only so can he really help them. He will be attached to them and join their daily joys and sorrows, yet he will be detached from the things unimportant, because he knows of the deepest attachment which man can achieve, that is, to the things eternal.

When after fifteen years of public service the best of the nation have reached fifty years of age, then let

. . . those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all; and when they have thus beheld the good itself, they shall use it as a pattern for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn, devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy; but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city's sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity. And so, when each generation has educated others like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials and sacrifices for them as to divinities, if the Pythian oracle approves; or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.¹

PLATO'S INFLUENCE

If one understands the influence of Plato's educational thought on posterity in the broadest sense of the word, namely, as the radiation of Plato's ideas on the culture of mankind, then dealing with this influence is almost the same as dealing with the development of philosophical thought in its various ramifications. For even in periods when most of Plato's works were rather unknown, as in the Middle Ages, his role could be compared to that of the

¹From *The Republic*, Book VII, § 540 A-B; Vol. II, pp. 229 and 231. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

builders of our old cathedrals. People live in their shades, enjoy their beauty, and draw comfort and inspiration from their silent solemnity; but the name of the architect himself is hidden behind the veil of history.

Much smaller is the influence of Plato's ideas on education proper, though in a diluted state some essentially Platonic concepts about education were transmitted into the classrooms of the monastery schools and the scholastic universities of the Middle Ages. But in comparison to Aristotle, Plato's influence was small, though not absent. During the Renaissance he inspired the humanist teachers in their fight against monkish schoolmasters, as he inspired the humanist philosophers in their fight against monkish Aristotelianism. Since then all humanist or neo-humanist movements in education have started with the battle cry: "Back to Plato!"

But only a few in each of these periods understood the deeper educational intentions of Plato. His ideas proved to be too comprehensive, artistic, and dialectical to serve as pragmatic principles for the pedagogue, who preferred to teach languages and to read with his pupils the Socratic dialogues for linguistic or, in the best case, theoretical-philosophical training. Plato's ideal of an education of both sexes, his ideal of a combination of gymnastics and musical education, his belief that education ought to be a process continuing through life and perpetually interlocking with practical experience and action, his conception of the true philosopher—all these aspects were far beyond the horizon of the schools in later periods, just as they were in Plato's own time.

The spirit of Plato cannot be pressed into the typical school systems supported by parents who want their children to be adapted to the prevailing social or professional standards. Plato himself chose to lay down his educational plans in the framework of utopias, and with his sublime ironical mind he smiles, sometimes condescendingly, at his own "daydreaming."

What, then, is the historical and practical sense of such works as *The Republic* and *The Laws*?

One could ask the same question in respect to the work of any cultural or religious prophet, or even in respect to any great human ideal. Though their aims are never completely realized, without them the world of men would be poorer and even more aimless than it is anyhow. For these great creations of the mind give us perspective and a sense of proportion for what is august and what is mediocre. They perform the eternal task of rescuing man from indulging in self-satisfaction or from being drowned in despair over his own deficiency, because they ask the profound questions about the mission of humanity, and thus they provide the great challenges from which the best in each generation receive ever-new inspirations.

Aristotle

(384 B.C.—322 B.C.)

PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

In the history of thought, Plato and Aristotle have often been represented as two great contrasts of mental attitude.

In 1834 the German poet Heinrich Heine, then living in Paris, wrote about the battle between idealists and materialists waged in all European countries and attempted to prove that the beginning of this great philosophical controversy can be found in the contrast between the Platonic and the Aristotelian attitude. Has anybody succeeded, so he asks, in harmonizing the ideas of these two thinkers?

No, in truth, no! . . . Plato . . . only knows innate or rather con-nate ideas. Man brings his ideas with him to the world, and when he becomes conscious of them, they seem to him like memories of an earlier existence. . . . With Aristotle, on the contrary, all is clear, significant, and certain . . . for he draws everything from experience, and knows how to classify everything most accurately. Therefore, he has always been the model for all empirical philosophers. . . .

Plato and Aristotle! They are not only two systems but the types of two different kinds of human nature, which, since ages beyond the mind's grasp, under all forms or disguises, have always been more or less opposed. So they fought all through the Middle Ages, till this our time, and this battle is the most significant summary of Christian Church history. Plato and Aristotle are always discussed under other names. Visionary, mystical, Platonic souls have revealed unto them from the depths of the soul, or of feeling, Christian ideas and corresponding symbols. Practical, classifying, Aristotelian natures form from these ideas and symbols a fixed system, a dogma, and a cultus. The Church at last embraced both these natures of men, one entering the camp of the secular clergy, and the other that of monasticism, but who still kept up a constant feud. The same antagonism manifested itself in the Protestant Church, in which the division between pietists and orthodox corre-

sponds to a certain degree to that between Catholic mystics and dogmatics.¹

Brilliant though Heine's analysis is, one must nevertheless doubt its correctness. If Aristotle had represented only strict empirical opposition to idealism, he could not have become one of the teachers of the Catholic Church; and its canonic theologian, Thomas Aquinas, could not have built his dogmatic edifice on the system of Aristotle, whom he often calls "the Philosopher" or "the Master" or "the Teacher." In addition, the rise of scientific empiricism in the sixteenth century was almost identical with a fight against Aristotelianism. However, one could say that this kind of Aristotelianism was the medieval version which did not represent the true spirit of the master. Certainly if we consider his philosophical intent or his method of approach to the problems of life, Aristotle is more empirical than Plato. But being empirical in method does not necessarily lead to the rejection of an idealist metaphysics.

Thus we must conclude that the difference between Plato and Aristotle is one of degree, not of essence. Plato's "idealism" is not at all disinterested in experience; it starts from an extremely realistic observation of life. On the other hand, we will soon find that Aristotle's "empiricism" ends in a metaphysics with strong idealistic elements.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO

If we now examine in somewhat more detail the relationship between Aristotle and his teacher Plato with reference to their educational ideas, we first discover several very essential similarities. All that Aristotle says in the Seventh and Eighth Books of *The Politics* about the relationship between the State and education betrays the direct influence of Plato. Both consider education as a branch of statecraft and as the most important means of upholding the institution of the *polis*. Both criticize the Athenians for their lack of a unified public system of education and recommend

¹Heinrich Heine: *Works*, translated from the German by Charles Godfrey Leland; Vol. V: *Germany*, in 2 vols.; Vol. I, p. 79. London, 1892.

measures which, for a people accustomed to more private forms of schooling, would have meant a complete revolution in the upbringing of the younger generation.

Now nobody would dispute that the education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver. Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted to the particular form of constitution. . . . For instance, the democratic spirit promotes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy; and the best spirit always causes a better constitution. Moreover, in regard to all the faculties and crafts, certain forms of preliminary education and training in their various operations are necessary, so that manifestly this is also requisite in regard to actions of virtue. And inasmuch as the end for the whole state is one, it is manifest that education also must necessarily be one and the same for all and that the superintendence of this must be public, and not on private lines, in the way in which at present each man superintends the education of his own children, teaching them privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit. . . . And one might praise the Spartans in respect of this, for they pay the greatest attention to the training of their children, and conduct it on a public system.¹

Aristotle, like Plato, held the education of a liberal man to be contingent on two more or less physical factors. The first of them is a sound body with sound instincts. "Nature," Aristotle says, "gives us the capacity to receive virtue."² But the natural endowment of a person is not a mere chance factor; it is determined by a person's psycho-physical heredity. In order to develop the native potentialities inherent in a person, a second factor is indispensable, namely, habituation. Here, as at some other occasions, Aristotle refers expressly to Plato: "Hence the importance, as Plato points out, of having been definitely trained from childhood to like and

¹Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Aristotle's *The Politics*, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library); Book VIII, I, §§ 1-3, p. 635 ff. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1932. This edition is referred to in the following as: *Politics*.

²Aristotle: *The Nicomachean Ethics*, with an English translation by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library), II, i, § 3, p. 71. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1926. This edition is referred to in the following as: *Nic. Ethics*.

dislike the proper things. This is what good education means."¹ In *The Politics* he says: "It is plain that education by habit must come before education by reason."²

On the basis of this early habituation there ought to be ingrained in the minds of the young a sense for the noble values of life.

It is therefore not difficult to see that the young must be taught those useful arts that are indispensably necessary; but it is clear that they should not be taught all the useful arts, those pursuits that are liberal being kept distinct from those that are illiberal, and that they must participate in such among the useful arts as will not render the person who participates in them vulgar. A task and also an art or science must be deemed vulgar if it renders the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue. . . . And even with the liberal sciences, although it is not illiberal to take part in some of them up to a point, to devote oneself to them too assiduously and carefully is liable to have the injurious results specified. Also it makes much difference what object one has in view in a pursuit or study; if one follows it for the sake of oneself or one's friends, or on moral grounds, it is not illiberal, but the man who follows the same pursuit because of other people would often appear to be acting in a menial and servile manner.³

With this definition of a liberal education we have already touched the problem of its goal. According to Aristotle, every normal being wants to be happy or, in the Greek term, to achieve *Eudaimonia*.⁴ But lasting happiness—though a dream anyhow—can not even be approximated if we hunt for pleasure. In order to have a comparatively happy life, we must subordinate our thought and action to a rational principle.

¹*Nic. Ethics*, II, iii, § 2; p. 79.

²*Politics*, VIII, iii, § 2; p. 645.

³From *Politics*, VIII, ii, §§ 1-2; pp. 637 f. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

⁴The Greek term *Eudaimonia* is very inadequately translated by Happiness. Happiness connotes too much a passive attitude and the idea of comfort. *Eudaimonia*, on the other hand, means originally to be possessed by, or to live with, a good spirit. (*eu* = good plus *daimon* = spirit). It combines doing good, doing things well, and, consequently, being happy. Cf. Aristotle's definition of *Eudaimonia* in *Nic. Ethics*, I, iv; p. 11. Cf. also *Nic. Ethics*, I, x, § 2; p. 47 f. ("especially for us who define happiness as a form of activity").

Aristotle says:

If we declare that the function of man is a certain form of life and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle, and say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that the good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or, if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover, this activity must occupy a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.¹

This living according to a rational principle, or in harmony with the *logos*, involves man's being educated or educating himself toward the search for guiding ideas of permanent character. Only in this way can he achieve *areté* to the degree of perfection attainable for mortal beings and co-operate with like-minded men toward the realization of a dignified society. Without the *logos* behind them, men would be nothing but an undirected crowd or "bunch of people."

Aristotle, as well as Plato, lays decisive stress on the introduction of a rational factor into human conduct. As this rational principle is not conceived as a merely accidental invention of men, but as the reflection of the divine on the human sphere, it follows with logical necessity that the highest activity, and the greatest and most lasting happiness of man, can be found only in contemplation of, and unity with, this ultimate power. From this unity comes elevation, purification (*kátharsis*), and the capacity for a right decision in the vicissitudes of life. Therefore *theoría*, in the sense of contemplation of divine things, is for Aristotle the same as "lifting the eyes of the soul to the divine light" for Plato, or as

¹From *Nic. Ethics*, I, vii, §§ 14–16; p. 33. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

contemplation for the medieval religious, and the *amor intellectus dei* for Spinoza.¹

* But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation.²

But just as Plato's "philosophers" are not permitted to dwell in the light of the sun without ever returning to those who live in the darkness of the den, so for Aristotle participation in the *logos* is undesirable without an increased sense of active responsibility. He would not even consider spiritual isolation as a potential source of human richness, for his thinking is much too total to conceive of a high intellectual development without an adequate growth of practical virtues. The Aristotelian or, if one generalizes, the Greek combination of a theoretical with a pragmatic attitude finds classical expression in the following sentences:

. . . it is by the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth is really tested, since it is there that the final decision lies. We must therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them to the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts we may accept them; if found to disagree we must deem them mere theories.³

DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO

We see from the previous analysis how delusive is the assertion of a complete contrast between Plato and Aristotle. However, this

¹See *Nic. Ethics*, particularly X, vii.

²From *Nic. Ethics*, X, vii, § 1; p. 613. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

³From *Nic. Ethics*, X, viii, § 12; p. 627. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

assertion could not be so often repeated unless it corresponded to at least a partial truth. In order to discover this truth, let us now concentrate on the dissimilarities between the two thinkers.

There is first a remarkable difference in their attitudes toward life. When Plato observes, he does so in order to transcend reality toward the sphere of the ideal. Aristotle, on the other hand, prefers to dwell on his observations and their objects. He examines and describes, and if he transcends things, he goes through them, whereas Plato treats them as symbols. Plato represents the more intuitive, mathematical, and dialectical type of philosopher. Aristotle, though he is all that, too, is also the collecting and systematic scientist. Plato's attitude toward the world is such that its surface does not concern him as something ultimate. Consequently, he is not only the enthusiast and the radical reformer, in spite of his emphasis on conservatism, harmony, and balance; he is at the same time the artist, full of humor and irony. Often enough he may have gone with his master Socrates where nobody could see them and there split with laughter over the world's folly—which is not to say that they did not weep over it the next hour.

Aristotle does not indulge in such caprice. He was first Plato's most sagacious disciple; but later his conscience no longer allowed him to follow his master. The Platonic-Romantic type may call Aristotle dry, but at least he tries to be reliable, as far as is in his power.

Plato became the writer of utopias and the most artistic dialogue we know, the *Symposium*. Aristotle also wrote dialogues which, unfortunately, have been lost; but even if they had been preserved, we would probably still see his greatest contribution in his systematization of thought. Even small parts of his work sufficed for the medieval man to bring himself up to a level where he could organize his own philosophical problems. From Aristotle the professors of the universities of Paris, Bologna, and Oxford received a refined logical method, accurate definitions, and a whole world of new ideas. More and more of Aristotle's books were read in Latin translations, and from them the Christian scholars borrowed

not only their philosophy but also their views about nature. Divinity took so much from him that Luther could blame the theological faculties for being more interested in the heathen Aristotle than in the teaching of Christ.

But can we wonder that the medieval scholars were fascinated by Aristotle? Where else could they find this combination of a profound sense for metaphysics—even though it was not exactly theirs—with developed interests in social life as well as in nature?

Men with such differences in their philosophical attitudes as Plato and Aristotle must also deviate in their opinions as to the character and validity of ideas. For Plato ideas point at a transcendent reality. For Aristotle they point in that direction also, but their primary function is that of forming and ordering principles immanent in reality as it lies concretely before men. Out of this concept of the immanence of ideas in reality Aristotle must arrive at the conclusion of a creative and consistent design in all nature, or, as the technical terminology has it, at a teleological¹ aspect of existence. The world, accordingly, is a continuous process of formation, that is, of realization of purposes which do not come from outside but operate as dynamic drives within all life.² We learn to understand these inner purposes of reality through thoughtful action, through wise experimenting and observation, through science, and, most of all, through contemplation. Here again, in his appreciation of the intuitive intellect as the noble instrument

¹*Telos*=end plus *logia*=theory or study.

²In this context Aristotle's concept of Entelechy (*Entelecheia*): (*en*=in plus *telos*=goal), as explained in the second book of *The Soul* and the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, is of particular importance. According to this concept, every living thing possesses an inherent energy which combines the tendency both to grow and, while growing, to form itself. This forming energy is the entelechy of a thing—in direct translation, the "immanent aiming power." The more a person understands how to combine his growth organically with his inherent form, so that one enhances the other, the more he realizes his own self and will be able to live a harmonious and productive life.

The concept of entelechy was later taken up by Leibnitz. It has been revived in modern science and philosophy, particularly by Bergson and the neo-vitalist school of Hans Driesch. For a modern application of the concepts of entelechy and form to the problem of education, see Robert Ulich, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education*, Chapter II. American Book Company, New York, 1940.

of man to identify himself with the divine, Aristotle is in accordance with Plato. Contemplation is the highest of all human achievements. All the others, even the practical virtues, contain necessarily an element of strife and bind men to the mortal, whereas contemplation is an end in itself.

The activity of contemplation may be held to be the only activity that is loved for its own sake; it produces no result beyond the actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look to secure some advantage, greater and smaller, beyond the action itself.¹

At another place Aristotle says:

Such a life as this [of complete happiness achieved through intellectual contemplation], however, will be higher than the human level; not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.²

Naturally, such an attitude pleased the minds of the medieval divines and made them inclined to pass a relatively mild judgment on other places in Aristotle's philosophy that were certainly not in harmony with the Christian gospel.

However, though both Aristotle and Plato arrive at similar conclusions as to the highest values, their approach is different. If two wanderers climb one day up to the peak of a high mountain from two different sides, they enjoy, at the end of their labor, the

¹From *Nic. Ethics*, X, vii, § 5; p. 615. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

²From *Nic. Ethics*, X, vii, § 8; p. 617. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

same view, but during their advance they see different parts of the world. Consequently, their total recollections of the day will vary. Even when looking down from the same peak, their impressions will not be totally alike. For the character of the past always tends to color the immediate.

To transfer our analogy from the physical to the spiritual level, Plato, contemplating the world of ideas, is convinced that the grandeur of his view is nothing but a recollection of an earlier form of psychic existence in which the human soul was still united with the divine. Aristotle, on the other hand, supposes that the richness of his psychic impressions is primarily due to certain rationally explicable mental faculties and to the expansion of knowledge which results from unraveling more and more qualities of existence. The Platonic type will revel in the mystical union with the divine, in comparison with which all earlier concrete experiences are insignificant. The Aristotelian type will not consider these concrete experiences as an inferior level of reality but will see their function as like that of steps in a staircase. Seen in the total system, the lower ones are just as important as the highest.

Aristotle, in consequence of his observing, collecting, and analytical attitude, was predestined to enrich the *globus intellectualis* of his time with all the sciences made available by the almost incredible curiosity of the Greek intellect. He was the founder of the idea of a universality of knowledge, of a *Polymathia*.¹ We remember Plato's intellectual interests: music, mathematics and astronomy, and then dialectical philosophy. With Aristotle an enormous area opens itself for intellectual pursuits. He himself wrote treatises on physics and biology, psychology as the study which lies in between the natural sciences and the humanities, politics as the most important of the social studies, and finally philosophy proper, to be divided, if we use modern terms, into theory of knowledge and logic, aesthetics, ethics, and metaphysics. And as there exists for Aristotle no difference in importance between the different sciences, each of them being just as necessary

¹*Poly* = much plus *mathia* = knowledge.

as the other for an understanding of the universe, he does not acknowledge a definite hierarchy of sciences with the more abstract disciplines at the top. All "scientific knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are of necessity."¹ Hence, in whatever field of knowledge we may work, we have to discharge the same duty of thorough observation and logical proof of our assumptions.

If one considers the progress of human thought primarily as a progress in scientific methodology, he sees the greatest contribution of Aristotle in his analysis of the forms of thinking. Through it Aristotle provided the scholar with the first elements of logical self-control. In different treatises on logic, which some centuries afterwards came to be known as the *Organon*, partly also in his psychological works *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*, Aristotle explored the forms of sense perception and thinking, the character of concepts and conclusions, the subjective and objective factors in knowledge, as well as the principles, underlying inductive and deductive methods of research. Through his work he tried to combine the more empirical and sensualist schools of Democritus and the Sophists with the intellectualism of Socrates-Plato, acknowledging the merits of both and prophetically pointing the way toward a synthetic understanding of the different mental processes involved in scientific thinking. We cannot claim that philosophy and science after Aristotle have succeeded in following this path to its end. They have replaced many of his assumptions by more accurate statements, but the gains made have often been offset by new predicaments.

It has always been difficult clearly to divide the theory of knowledge and logic from psychology, because the moment we ask for the character and criteria of thinking we are apt to ask also for the development and functioning of psychic processes in the individual. So Aristotle, being the founder of systematic logic, brought together also the first elements of a science of psychology. In consequence of his intellectual attitude, he devoted particular interest

¹*Nic. Ethics*, VI, vi, § 1; p. 341.

to the psychology of learning, laying in this way the basis for one of the most fundamental interests of education.

¶ The instruments through which, according to Aristotle, man perceives his environment are the senses. But sensing or perceiving, in order to be transformed into a somewhat lasting experience, needs both memory and the power of conceptualization. If a person's senses, memory, and conceptual powers are sufficiently matured, he cannot help but wonder at the colorful and changing world around him. He also feels the necessity of mastering this world as much as possible, for only in that way can he survive and achieve what we are all longing for, namely, inner balance and productivity—in other words, happiness. So man possesses two powerful motivating forces for his development: curiosity and the desire for happiness. Without them his potential strength, which nature has given him in the form of “energy” (*enérgeia*), would lie fallow. With them he pursues his tasks with perseverance. He tries to expand his contact with men and the world; he learns because he delights in knowing; and with his increase of knowledge there comes an increase of interest in new experiences. Learning, therefore, is a never-ending process of growth. The task which is incumbent on the educator is to observe the psychological as well as the ethical conditions of his charge's constitution, in order to help him find his way from infancy toward intellectual and moral maturity. To wit, this means *his* way and not everybody's way, for only a person who knows his individual strength and limitations is able to develop his self adequately while growing and learning. In other words, only the educator deserves that name who leads his pupil to discover where and of what kind are his own creative powers, and who thus helps him in his endeavor to become a living form.¹

The stages of this development are dependent on physical age, but to grow older is not necessarily to grow wiser, for old people can be immature fools. True maturity is always the result of total

¹See the explanation of Aristotle's concept of entelechy and form in the footnote on page 32.

self-evolution. Through it an individual rises from primarily sensory contact with his environment toward rational understanding of it. In learning to understand the conditions of his own health and happiness he discovers at the same time the great principles which govern the universe, for they are essentially the same.

ARISTOTLE, THE EDUCATOR

Let us now envisage Aristotle's educational thought in its architectural wholeness.

Education, he says, must count on sound physique of the educand. Therefore right diet and proper gymnastics are basic. But they cannot do all, for the development of an individual is largely determined by hereditary factors—not only physically, but also with respect to his psychic qualities. What we call “a healthy nature,” in the broadest sense of the word *healthy*, is a mixture of endowment and accomplishment. In consequence of the importance of heredity, good race is of paramount importance. At several places Aristotle emphasizes that education must rely on nature and develop its potential energies. This recognition, however, does not lead him toward any educational naturalism. He knows that in order to become culture, nature needs stimulations, effort, and art. “For all art and education,” he says, “aim at filling up nature's deficiencies.”¹

The educator can be successful only if working with a disciple who is willing to absorb suggestions and to undergo co-operatively all exercises and labor requisite for the development of a morally and intellectually formed character. Fortunately, a person endowed with a healthy nature wants to learn and to know, is inclined to imitate, which is the basis of the fine arts,² and desires to live co-operatively with other people.³ Behind all these and similar

¹*Politics*, VII, xv, § 11; p. 633.

²Aristotle: *The Poetics*; Longius, *On the Sublime*, translated by W. Hamilton Fyfe; Demetrius, *On Style*, translated by W. R. Roberts (Loeb Classical Library). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1927. See Chapter III of *The Poetics*, §§ 4 and 8, pp. 13 and 15.

³*Politics*, Book III, iv, § 2; p. 201.

efforts works a powerful urge, as a sort of prime mover. It springs from man's natural desire for happiness. Since happiness, in the Greek sense of *Eudaimonia*, comes only from a productive, well-balanced, and virtuous life, a healthy person will feel a genuine interest in the realization of values. This interest in a happy and productive life is likely to stimulate the energies of a person, not only intensively but also extensively. Thus he will try to develop all his potential strength through self-cultivation and through contact with his environment. Only a healthy interaction of all energies guarantees a full growth.

Energy appears first in a young person more as an unreflective power than as one regulated by reason. As this instinctive power may develop passions of most diverse quality, the educator has to see to it that constructive passions gradually gain power over the negative ones. Fortunately—this is only another version of the Aristotelian theory of interest—the educator can here avail himself of a natural quality of his charge. A normal individual will feel a "genuine pleasure" (*Oikeia Hedoné*) in fulfilling the tasks of life, provided they are within the compass of his talents and dispositions.

For the regulation of the passions, one of the most indispensable means is habituation through repeated exercise, or, as modern psychologists would say, conditioning. In this way certain dispositions and attitudes are prepared. It is only a translation from Aristotle if in Roman and medieval writers we find the phrase: *Consuetudo altera natura* ("Habit is man's second nature").

But Aristotle sees more clearly than some modern psychologists that habituation, or conditioning, is in itself nothing but a technical process unable to generate out of itself the ends which it ought to serve. Theoretically we can habituate a child, an adult, or ourselves toward the bad as well as toward the good.

Therefore man needs criteria as to whether he ought to prefer this or another direction for the formation of his habits. These criteria can be found only through reason, for reason provides insight into the laws of nature and mind. Thus the educational process ends in the sphere where man, through a

divine and only metaphysically explicable fact, is connected with the *logos*.

But just as education "ends" in reason and *logos*, so it "begins" with them. The phrase "it ends" is correct if we refer to the psycho-physical growth of a single individual. He is first habituated and educated without himself possessing the capacity of deliberation and decision. This capacity comes only with increasing maturity.

But the end becomes a beginning if education is viewed as an historical and objective social function which takes hold of the individual before he himself is able to decide whether he wishes to be educated or not. The human race, unlike animals, has been able to develop education as one of its cultural functions, and to transmit it from one generation to the other, only because it is not merely dependent on, or mechanically reacting to, its environment. Rather, the human race is able to detach itself from its surroundings, to understand and examine them, and to select, reject, and prepare conditions according to experiences and principles. Hence education, in the sense of mastering one's self and his environment, is ultimately based on rational and moral decisions of which the human race, and only the human race, can avail itself because of its affinity to a universal *logos*.

Therefore we can just as well say that education begins with, as to say that it ends in, the *logos*. From it flows the power of reason¹ and judgment which enables man to acquire the most essential of all requisites for a good life—initiative, decision, and the sense for proportion or the right mean. Only people endowed with this sense can avoid extremes which would throw them out of balance and even turn their virtues into vices.

Virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. For example, one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these feelings at the

right time, on the right occasion, toward the right people, for the right purpose and in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue.¹

The tendency toward the right mean cannot fail to create in a person "the chief of virtues," namely, justice. For "the just is the proportionate." But he will also feel the desire of achieving a systematic understanding of the principles which ought to underlie his actions and decisions. Aristotle's pragmatic and inductive mind demands that knowledge serve as a guide in all important problems of life.

Therefore the educated man wants more than knowledge "in one department," nor can he be satisfied with mere "conclusions that follow from first principles."² He wants also to develop in himself the power of apprehending these first principles, and this power is intuitive intelligence or intuition.³

When a man combines finally the virtues of justice, courage, and prudence with methodical knowledge, and all these qualities with a true conception of the ultimate principles themselves, then he is wise.

The wise man . . . must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of these principles themselves. Hence wisdom must be a combination of

¹From *Nic. Ethics*, II, vi, §§ 9-12; p. 93. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

²*Nic. Ethics*, VI, vii, § 2; p. 343.

³The Greek term is *nous* (*Nic. Ethics*, VI, vi, §§ 2 ff.). This term has been translated by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library) partly by "intelligence," partly by "intuitive intelligence." Aristotle seemingly lays much value on the *creative* or *intuitive* character of *nous* as contrasted with the other, the discursive, faculties of the mind. German philosophy could use, in this context, the distinction between *Vernunft* and *Verstand*. *Vernunft* indicates the more comprehensive and intuitive; *Verstand* indicates the primarily logical power of the mind. According to Aristotle, science and research would ever be condemned to remain within the same circle of the already known and never reach beyond it, unless men were able to avail themselves of the particular intuitional power contained in *nous*. Cf. E. E. Spicer, *Aristotle's Conception of the Soul*, p. 98 f. University of London Press, 1934.

[intuitive] intelligence and scientific knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.¹

Aristotle, like all Greek thinkers, appreciates both the theoretical values² and the practical virtues,³ not only for the value they attach to the individual but also for their social usefulness. It is one of the noblest characteristics of all virtues that they prepare their bearer to live co-operatively with his fellow men and to develop in himself and in others friendly affections.⁴ This ability is one of the essentials of good life.

✓ A man endowed with theoretical and practical wisdom will, if contemplating the world around him, pierce its surface and try to reach into its deeper dimensions. And in acting, he will not only give to his fellow men the best of himself, but he will realize values of objective and general character. Then he has achieved the degree of perfection of which a human being is capable, and the circle of education is closed. His work will have brought him close to the goal instinctively desired by all men, namely, happiness. But his state of happiness no longer results from mere biological and instinctive drives; it has become a moral and rational achievement. It has been shifted to a level higher than the merely natural. It then includes the elements of lastingness, of never-ending responsibility, and of freedom; it is happiness in the full sense of *Eudaimonia*.

ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE

The analysis of Aristotle's system of education explains why it has always served as one of the richest sources of philosophical and educational thought.

¹From *Nic. Ethics*, VI, vii, § 3; p. 343. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

²Virtue and prudence. Cf. *Nic. Ethics*, VI, xii § 3; p. 365.

³Courage, liberality, serenity, justice, sense of proportions, etc. The defectiveness of all translations becomes nowhere so evident as in any attempt at rendering the Aristotelian ethical concepts into modern vernacular. Even the Loeb translation does not do them justice. Cf. *Nic. Ethics*, II, vii, §§ 2-16; p. 99 f.

⁴Aristotle devotes to the treatment of friendship not less than two books of *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Books VIII and IX).

His philosophy provided not only the logical tools but also, to a large degree, the wisdom which enabled such men as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas to create a systematic Christian philosophy. In addition, Aristotle provided the material basis for the typical curriculum of late Antiquity. To a degree, even the modern curriculum of a high school or a university shows traces of his influence. The systematic catalogues of all the older European libraries use, though with many modifications, the Aristotelian classification of knowledge. The so-called *Septem Artes Liberales*, taught in the Scholastic schools of the Middle Ages, and serving as patterns of liberal training up to the eighteenth century, are based on Aristotle's work.¹ Much of what has been said for centuries—and is said today—in defense of a liberal education is Aristotelian in nature.

But it happened with Aristotle as with Plato. Late Antiquity and the medieval school admired Aristotle's words and the logical technique behind them, but the essence of his genius was foreign to them. They were unable to keep up his spirit of independent inquiry. Consequently, also, his ideas on education were not realized. Aristotle starts from an essentially dynamic, independent, and comprehensive concept of man. But Antiquity between 300 and 500 A.D., the centuries of its decay, was a period of eclectic and imitative *Encyclopedias*; from them the Middle Ages up to the eleventh century and longer borrowed their secular knowledge. Even later, when in the period of Scholasticism the western mind again became creative, its belief in all the concrete details of the biblical revelation prevented it (in spite of all worship of him) from understanding fully Aristotle's philosophy and its educational aspects.

¹The Seven Liberal Arts were Grammar, Dialectics, Rhetoric, Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy. The first three disciplines formed the *Trivium* of the Middle Ages; the latter four, the *Quadrivium*. For the history of the Seven Liberal Arts see: Thomas Davidson, *Aristotle and the Ancient Educational Ideas*, p. 239 f. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1907), and Paul Abelson, *The Seven Liberal Arts; A Study in Medieval Culture* (Columbia University, Teacher's College, New York, 1906).

With the rise of Humanism and the experimental attitude in the period of the Renaissance, the sacred authority of "the Philosopher" was shaken; many of his ideas, especially those concerning nature, are today of only historical interest. Yet our modern philosophy and science still use terms and categories coined by Aristotle, and many of the problems he divined are still in the center of philosophical discussion.

There is something eternal about Aristotle and about his master, Plato.

Plutarch

(ca. A.D. 46-120)

Members of a scholarly debating club could divide into two camps, one attacking and the other praising the merits of Plutarch.

The critics could maintain that it is impossible to discover any original idea in Plutarch's works. Certainly he was an extremely well-read man, but his *Parallel Lives*, in which he describes the deeds and thoughts of Greek and Roman heroes, are more edifying stories than results of historical research, and to a large extent they are responsible for many of the pious mistakes about the grandeur of Antiquity transmitted from one generation to the next. His *Moralia* are a collection of wordy exhortations and practical suggestions about almost anything worthy or unworthy of being discussed, from the education of children and the best way of listening to lectures, to advices about married life and about "flesh eating"; and from considerations concerning the "face appearing within the orb of the moon," to discussions of the problem whether water or land animals are the cleverer.

Where, so the critics of Plutarch could continue, is there any systematic inquiry into the philosophical and particularly the metaphysical premises of his assumptions about God, man, and the universe? Everywhere there are contradictions, and each of them is expounded with the same paternal dignity as the other. Nowhere are there any signs of a really deepening influence of Plutarch on the development of philosophic thought. He furnished a kind of noncommittal moralistic literature for the headmasters of the old classical schools. In Plutarch they could find the mixture of nationalism and piety suited to the breeding of a young gentleman of the old European ruling classes, who had to understand how to combine the incompatible, namely imperialism, and a Christian conscience.

The other camp, the admirers of Plutarch, could say that life has not been created for system makers, but produces out of its

inexhaustible resources ever-new situations, each of which must be understood in its uniqueness. Logical coherence and consistency may violate the truth of changing realities; therefore those who do not wish to plumb the metaphysical abysses of every question may betray more wisdom and intellectual refinement than arrogant philosophical absolutists. And is it not more worthy to imbue and inspire people, young and old, with the spirit and ideals pervading the leaders of mankind than to insist on all the petty verities which little minds call "exactness"? If sometimes people are inclined to look disdainfully at the attempt at amalgamating diverse elements of thought, should we not remember that a certain syncretism, or blending of unharmonious elements, is characteristic of all great civilizations? To base life on the logic of just one system of thought would mean death. If the old classical schoolmasters liked Plutarch, they showed a better instinct than some modern teachers, who may know more about the psychology of learning than their colleagues of older times but know less about the complex psychology of a mature civilization and the introduction of youth into it.

If now we invite an objective judge to explain, and if possible to reconcile, the conflicting camps, what would he say? He would first refer to the cultural conditions of the period of Plutarch. It is no longer the era of Plato and Aristotle, with its turbulent political life and its grandiose production of ideas. Two centuries have passed since the loss of Greek independence to the Romans, with the consequent fusion of the two civilizations. The *Pax Romana*, an almost universal peace of the old world since the reign of the great Augustus, has brought new wealth and hope to the countries around the Mediterranean. They all are tired from the cruelties of long wars, and they enjoy the combination of the cultural achievements of the Greeks with the organizational talent of the Romans. But it had been not wisdom on the part of the Greeks but their defeat and exhaustion that had led to their incorporation into the Roman Empire. Their narrow concept of the *polis* had not allowed them to become united among themselves.

So, after endless internal wars, they had fallen prey first to the Macedonians and then, together with them, to the Romans. In the meantime, the flower of one generation after the other had been killed on the battlefields, the cities sacked, and men and women sold as slaves. Can we wonder that the creativeness of the people vanished, together with their political freedom?

It is one of the saddest of historical facts: a people with an artistic and intellectual capability which allowed it to lay, within a span of two hundred years, the basis for the next two thousand years of cultural development among the European nations, a race which in the times of Aristotle created the essential categories for an international system of thought, nevertheless could not free itself from the fetters of a narrow and deadly nationalism. Only at one other phenomenon may people look hereafter with the same feeling of dismay, namely, at Europe during the first decades of the twentieth century. For, considering our present means of communication, all Europe is smaller today than was Greece in the centuries before Christ.

But there was still another reason for the decline of the cultural productivity of the Greeks—their incapacity to merge intellectual speculation with empirical research. We often believe that the Greeks were merely speculative, unproductive in the applied sciences. That is but partly true. As a matter of fact, the Greeks had excellent physicians, admirable architects, and geometers with an astounding insight into the problems of physics. But their economic system, with the slaves doing the practical work, their social prejudices, which forbade the gentleman to engage in “illiberal” mechanical pursuits, and, finally, the relatively thin population prevented them from a systematic application of their scientific knowledge. In addition to statesmanship and military service, only abstract thought fitted the patterns of a noble life; thus applied sciences remained separated from the stimulating and integrating influence of pure thought, and pure thought, on the other hand, failed to enrich itself through contact with great practical problems. Naturally, things deteriorated still more when Hellas, after

its conquest by the Romans in 146 B.C., lost a vital reason for its social and educational interests, namely, responsibility for the state, even though the Romans left to the defeated people a certain amount of local self-administration. There remained much political oratory, but it was a show without real foundation.

It would, nevertheless, be erroneous to consider the development from the republican eras of Greece and Rome toward the reign of the Roman emperors as completely negative from a cultural standpoint. One could describe it as a period of amalgamation. Political amalgamation was accompanied by cultural unification. Different civilizations touched each other and learned to live together, and they fused to such an extent that not even New York could present a more international picture than the streets of Rome, Athens, or Alexandria in the times of Plutarch. This character of a somewhat tired, yet saturated and amalgamated, civilization explains the ripe wisdom in men such as Plutarch, his power of projecting himself into the most diverging ideas and personalities, and his disinclination for metaphysical speculations. Comparison, which is always the fruit of old age, shows that there can be many different answers to the same question. The effect of old culture shows also in Plutarch's emphasis on a rather formal education and on many other, sometimes very petty, formalities in life. Better to be pedantic, so he thought, than to face disorder and chaos. Often with the fading of religious loyalties and of intrinsic values, a certain tendency toward extrinsic regulation sets in. Where natural vitality and inspiration no longer exist, intellectual considerations and a certain amount of formal coercion must fill the gap. In such times people become retrospective.

To be sure, when the Greeks, in their period of youth, recited the songs of Homer, it was also a certain retrospectivism. All primitive periods display a sometimes inflexible adherence to the past. But there is a great difference between the traditionalism of a young civilization and that of an old one. The traditionalism of a young civilization is organic and of religious character; it is *mythos*. The traditionalism of an old people is deliberative, rational,

and historical; and if the gods appear, they are no longer reality but decorative images for an essentially conceptual type of thinking.

If there arises in such an old period a man with a genuinely conciliatory, amicable, and noble mind, he is bound to show the eclectic type of mentality which some may admire in one such as Plutarch, and which others may thoroughly dislike. But it is natural that educators and humanists have felt themselves attracted to a man who, with Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, represents the best ethical tradition of late Antiquity. Not only the simplicity of Homer and the profoundness of Plato but also the sympathetic wisdom of Plutarch prove the richness of the ancients.

Of course, concerning all syncretism, one may say that if colors run into each other, they do not necessarily produce a picture. Especially in religion and philosophy, where finite thought attempts to reach into the ultimate sources of life, the creativeness of a period shows most distinctly. There tradition, discipline, and wisdom cannot replace originality, which is the product of grace and divine afflatus. Neither Plutarch nor the other moralists of his period showed any religious or metaphysical creativeness. They lived partly on an old religious folklore, which had for them more artistic than other value, and partly on the great systems of thought of the classical period, without being able to add anything essential to them. Only the "most divine Plotinus," living about one and a half centuries after Plutarch, brought Greek philosophy once more—and for the last time—to such a height of religious inspiration that the rising Christian theology could overcome it only by absorbing it.

It must be said in honor of Plutarch that he did not meddle with all kinds of mystical theories and cults which at the time spread from the Orient over the Roman Empire. For such meddling he was logically too well disciplined, and too proud of his Greek tradition. He was not influenced by the Jewish, the Egyptian, or the Persian cults. Being eclectic intellectuals, Plutarch and men of his kind could perhaps satisfy the minds of the more philosophical of

their contemporaries, but they could not inspire the hearts of the emotionally hungry masses. This vacuum became filled, later on, by the Christian gospel.

In education, however, the Plutarchian type has some mission. Education is to a large extent the preservation and selection of values discovered and tested by experience; it lives on the wisdom of great men, whose works it is good to know and to quote; it needs habituation oriented toward high standards, and an optimistic belief in the teachability of the human race through the medium of reason. All of this can be found in Plutarch's ideas on education. He has taken them mostly from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoic and Epicurean schools of philosophy. Like the other Greeks, he lays stress not alone on tradition, habit, and reason as the elements of good breeding, but also on physical hygiene and on environment; hence his emphasis on the careful selection of friends and servants. Many of the practical suggestions of Plutarch go through the Middle Ages, are held in high esteem by the humanists of the Renaissance, and remain the pattern of aristocratic education up to our times. Sir Thomas Elyot, who in 1531 wrote the first important treatise on education in the English language, *The Boke Named The Governour*, translated parts of Plutarch's works. And Locke borrowed from Plutarch not only his methods but also his ethics, which fitted excellently into the older, aristocratic gentleman-ideal.

Plutarch taught that the master of an exemplary household, the leader in community and state, and the wise guardian of his honor and fortune must combine self-control with loyalty and courage, and piety with a certain degree of generosity. He must show a certain acquaintance with the fine arts and philosophy; he must cultivate friendship with men of character; and he will surely be happiest if he does not expect too much from life, but takes it with a considerable amount of reserve. Who would doubt that a "Christian gentleman" would like to see his children reared in such a spirit and arriving at such respectable standards? Even the Fathers and Saints of the Church deigned sometimes to mention with kind

approval the moral precepts of the heathen Plutarch, wondering that a man without knowledge of the revelation could come so close to the truth.

In evaluating the work of Greek moralists like Plutarch, we ought not to forget that the Latin part of the Roman Empire broke down in the fifth century A.D., whereas the Greek part defended its civilization until 1453. Then its capital, Byzantium, or Constantinople, fell after heroic resistance before the assault of the Turks, unaided by the great European countries whose rulers liked to be addressed as "Christian monarchs." Under the influence of the historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with their one-sided predilection for the Roman Republic, we are still today inclined to consider the Eastern Roman Empire, after the period of the Teutonic migrations, as the domain of political and cultural reaction and formalism. Yet historians with judgment ought always to respect the fact that a thousand years is a long life for an empire under such difficult conditions as those of the Byzantine realm, and that such endurance, in all likelihood, does not stem only from good luck, but also from cultural achievements. One of these achievements was a highly formal but nevertheless unusually efficient system of education, one which the Western European countries during all the Middle Ages rightly considered far superior to their own. Certainly the selecting and ordering wisdom of men like Plutarch helped to provide the cultural basis of the Byzantine Empire, which stood as a bulwark against the invasions from Asia and as the sanctuary of ancient thought in centuries of darkness.

Quintilian

(ca. A.D. 35-95)

There is one essential difference between the Roman Quintilian and the three Greek thinkers we have discussed so far. The Greeks were all philosophically minded. Even Plutarch, though not a systematic and metaphysical thinker, was profoundly interested in the theoretical problems of life and human conduct. In contrast to them, the orator Quintilian, in his main work *Institutio Oratoria* ("Institutes of Oratory"), published shortly before the end of the first Christian century, is primarily concerned with the practical side of education, especially with the education of the orator, who represents to him the apogee of human perfection. The mind no longer searches into the depths of human existence; things are taken for granted. Politically, there exists the Ciceronian ideal of *humanitas*, as resulting from the fusion of the Roman organizational with the Greek cultural talent.) So well settled are these facts for Quintilian that it is not even worth his while to discuss them. He accepts the emperors as if they were the result of divine will, and he scoffs at the philosophers who, from his point of view, ought to cease threshing the old straw of metaphysical and ethical controversies.

Quintilian's attitude is to a degree understandable. Many of the philosophers whom he had occasion to observe at Rome were apparently unproductive ruminators of older ideas and were of doubtful moral character. Quintilian says:

I am ready to admit that many of the old philosophers inculcated the most excellent principles and practiced what they preached. But in our own day the name of philosopher has too often been the mask for the worst vices. For their attempt has not been to win the name of philosopher by virtue and the earnest search for wisdom; instead they have sought to disguise the depravity of their characters by the assumption of a stern and austere mien accompanied by the wearing of a garb differing from that of their fellow

men. Now, as a matter of fact, we all of us frequently handle those themes which philosophy claims for its own. Who, short of being an utter villain, does not speak of justice, equity, and virtue?¹

The other reason for Quintilian's suspicion concerning philosophy—a reason which also may meet with our sympathy—is his observation that moral standards and responsibilities do not spring from meditation about them, but from action. /

There is no other way of life [than that of a philosopher] that is further removed from the duties of a statesman and the tasks of an orator. For what philosopher has ever been a frequent speaker in the courts or won renown in public assemblies? Nay, what philosopher has ever taken a prominent part in the government of the state, which forms the most frequent theme of their instructions? None the less I desire that he whose character I am seeking to mold should be a "wise man" in the Roman sense, that is, one who reveals himself as a true statesman, not in the discussions of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.²

There remains, however, the question as to whether Quintilian, the orator, was much superior to the philosophers he despised. There was at least one of them, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, about thirty years older than Quintilian, who died as a political martyr under the reign of Nero. Quintilian evaluates his merits and alleged defects lengthily and with hardly disguised envy in the tenth book of his *Institutes of Oratory*. We could not gather from Quintilian's judgment that Seneca was a great moral character. But the historian Tacitus describes Seneca's death in words which remind us of the greatness we admire in the death of Socrates.³

¹Reprinted by permission of the publishers from *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, with an English translation by H. E. Butler, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library); Book I, Preface, §§ 15-16; Vol. I, p. 13. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1921. This edition is referred to in the following as: *Inst. Orat.*

²From *Inst. Orat.*, Book XII, ii, § 7; Vol. IV, p. 385. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

³Tacitus: *The Histories*, with an English translation by Clifford H. Moore, and *The Annals*, with an English translation by John Jackson, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library); Vol. IV, Book XV, §§ 61-63. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1925-1937.

But how did Quintilian react to imperial tyranny? He did not hesitate to sacrifice his dignity as a man, and his honesty as a literary critic, when trying to secure the favor of Domitian, who was, besides Nero, one of the most insidious emperors on the Roman throne. Domitian had spent some years of enforced retirement in an amateurish study of literature, and had entrusted Quintilian with the education of his sister's grandsons. In the *Institutes of Oratory* we find Domitian glorified as one of the great Roman authors:

I have restricted my list of poets of these names, because Germanicus Augustus [Domitian] has been distracted from the study of poetry, on which he had embarked, by his care for the governance of the world, and the gods have thought it scarce worthy of his powers that he should be the greatest of poets. But what can be more sublime, more learned, more perfect in every detail than those works to which he devoted himself in the seclusion to which he retired after conferring the supreme power upon his father and his brother? Who could sing of war better than he who wages it with skill? To whom would the goddesses that preside over literature sooner lend an ear? To whom would Minerva, his familiar deity,¹ more readily reveal her secrets? Future ages shall tell of these things more fully; today his glory as a poet is dimmed by the splendor of his other virtues. But you will forgive us, Caesar, who worship at the shrine of literature, if we refuse to pass by your achievements in silence and insist on testifying at least that, as Virgil sings,

"The ivy creeps amid your victor bays."²

In spite of his aversion, Quintilian finds himself obliged to admit that philosophy, as a kind of auxiliary science, should have a place in education. The philosophical tradition, after all, was too great to be completely disdained. The three divisions of philosophy which Quintilian sets up, rather arbitrarily, namely, "dialectic,"

¹He claimed to be the son of Minerva. It is doubtful whether he ever wrote any poetry.

²From *Inst. Orat.*, Book X, i, §§ 91-92. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

"ethics," and "physics," may—so he thinks—be of use to the orator, the lawyer, and the statesman. For dialectic helps "to know the properties of each word, to clear away ambiguities, to unravel perplexities, to distinguish between truth and falsehood, to prove or to refute as may be desired."¹

Ethics . . . is entirely suited to the orator . . . [because] there is scarcely a single one [case] which does not at some point or another involve the discussion of equity and virtue, while there are also, as everyone knows, not a few which turn entirely on questions of quality.²

"Physics" bears for Quintilian a connotation quite different from the modern one. He says:

Physics is far richer than the other branches of philosophy, if viewed from the standpoint of providing exercise in speaking, in proportion as a loftier inspiration is required to speak of things divine than of things human; and further it includes within its scope the whole of ethics, which as we have shown are essential to the very existence of oratory. For, if the world is governed by providence, it will certainly be the duty of all good men to bear their part in the administration of the state. If the origin of our souls be divine, we must win our way towards virtue and abjure the service of the lusts of our earthly body. Are not these themes which the orator will frequently be called upon to handle?³

From the historical point of view, Quintilian's opinion concerning the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy is a sign of decay. Either of them had lost its organic and full contact with life. Philosophy, which still claimed to be the noblest means for the education of man, had largely become a business of professionals who sold their ware to anybody, provided he was able to pay. On the other hand, oratory, the new rival of philosophy, had lost its political significance. For the emperors needed good bureau-

¹*Inst. Orat.*, Book XII, ii, § 10; Vol. IV, p. 387.

²From *Inst. Orat.*, Book XII, ii, § 15; Vol. IV, pp. 389, 391. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

³From *Inst. Orat.*, Book XII, ii, §§ 20-21; Vol. IV, p. 393. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

crats, administrators, and soldiers, but they no longer needed free and forceful speakers, as did the Roman Republic. But whatever the political conditions may be, if eloquence becomes the core of education, then there is always danger that expression and showmanship will try to take the place of the more substantial values.

This becomes evident if we examine Quintilian's philosophy of education somewhat more thoroughly. Quintilian rightly demands again and again that the orator cultivate not only eloquence but also his character. He must be *vir bonus dicendi peritus* ("good man and experienced in speaking").¹ But does it necessarily follow from this premise that the orator is the highest type of man, that he represents the goal of all noble education, and that he has the right to regard all other thoughts and activities of man as more or less subordinate? Quintilian's attempt to present not only the philosophical teachers of his time but philosophy as such as inferior to the *rhetor* proves that he talks about a great human tradition as a drum major talks about music. What right has a man to blame the philosophers of his time for their arrogance if he intends to set a discipline of such prevalently formal character as eloquence in the center of civilization? In spite of Quintilian's harangues about the necessity of liberal studies, Plato and Aristotle would always have considered him an "illiberal man," a salesman of partial truth and consequently of untruth. They would have listened with disgust to a statement like the following:

O that the day may dawn when the perfect orator of our heart's desire shall claim for his own possession that science [namely, philosophy] that has lost the affection of mankind through the arrogance of its claims and the vices of some that have brought disgrace upon its virtues, and shall restore it to its place in the domain of eloquence, as though he had been victorious in a trial for the restoration of stolen goods!²

¹See *Inst. Orat.*, Book I, Preface, § 9 f.; Book XII, i: Vol. I, p. 9 f. and Vol. IV, p. 355 f.

²From *Inst. Orat.*, Book XII, ii, § 9; Vol. IV, p. 387. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

The confusion between appearance and meaning, or expression and substance, goes so far in the mind of Quintilian that at another place in the *Institutio Oratoria* he confirms the statement of one of his colleagues, according to which the philosophers, when exerting their talents for the defense of virtue, "are using the weapons of rhetoric, not their own."

Under Emperor Vespasian (69–79 A.D.) Quintilian was appointed the first publicly paid teacher of rhetoric. Fortunately for the development of the Roman Empire during the next century, which was one of the happiest of European history, the emperors did not follow Quintilian's advice to rely on rhetoric for their education. Marcus Aurelius (161–180), one of the wisest sovereigns who ever ruled over a great empire, did not listen to formal oratory but went back to the great sources of Greek philosophy, particularly to the Stoics. And for the education of their higher officials the emperors preferred the science of law, which the Roman genius developed into one of the most systematic and influential systems known in the history of thought. Only with the development of Christianity did the art of speaking receive again the importance and dignity which once had adorned it in the republican times of Greece and Rome. The dignity which this art had deserved in the times of Pericles and Cato, as an instrument in the service of the *polis*, it was given in the service and worship of God.

Objectionable though Quintilian's general educational philosophy is, we may nevertheless concede that he believed in the moral mission of his profession. Certainly he taught grammar, style, posture, movements of the hands, and modulation of voice with the intention of making good, not evil, ideas more persuasive. But he failed to see the contradiction inherent in his attempt to raise a relative value—namely, beauty of expression—to the value of a supreme and absolute criterion.

This contradiction shows also in the influence he exercised on later generations.

There are few works which have built up such an elaborate and in many points exemplary system of formal education as that of

Quintilian. He is one of the greatest geniuses in the history of pedagogy, if we conceive of pedagogy as a system of devices useful for systematic and effective teaching. Even those who consider this formalism as obsolete and dangerous for the development of a sound mind must admit that his *Ars Oratoria* is a model of good craftsmanship within a given style of training and thinking. Everybody, even a modern progressive educator, could profit from him in respect to thoroughness and consistency in teaching an intellectually gifted youth.

Through his careful analysis of the techniques of teaching he provided useful prescriptions for classroom practice to the teachers of the Roman Empire at a time when instruction changed from a private to a municipal enterprise. But the period of greatest influence of Quintilian's ideas arrived in 1410, when the humanist Poggio discovered a complete codex of the *Institutio Oratoria* at the monastery of St. Gall. It was the time when the humanist movement was striving to replace medieval scholasticism, without yet having available an adequate theory of education.

Quintilian came as a real godsend. He taught the humanists not only a good deal of the history of ancient literature, oratory, and aesthetic criticism but also informed them, like his ancient Roman colleagues, about the elements of educational psychology and the practice of teaching. He told them that a variety of subjects, a more diversified and at the same time interconnected curriculum, would stimulate the child and accelerate the educative process. From Quintilian the humanists heard, to their own greatest satisfaction, how much stress the ancients had laid on the literary and stylistic side of training, and on declamation and recitation. In Quintilian the "genteel tradition," as it were, was represented to the humanists in its highest perfection. He praised the more aesthetic and artistic subjects, such as music, literature, and poetry, which the humanists wished to introduce into the curriculum and which the medieval schools had regarded insufficiently, or not at all. Quintilian had an ideal of personality very similar to that of the *uomo universale*, or educated gentleman, as

it developed during the Renaissance. Quintilian, like the humanists, possessed a high appreciation of human individuality. Therefore he disliked any harsh treatment and misunderstanding of the child. It must have made a great impression on the educational leaders of the Renaissance to read the old orator's characterization of the ideal teacher: ✓

Let him therefore adopt a parental attitude to his pupils, and regard himself as the representative of those who have committed their children to his charge. Let him be free from vice himself and refuse to tolerate it in others. Let him be strict but not austere, genial but not too familiar: for austerity will make him unpopular, while familiarity breeds contempt. Let his discourse continually turn on what is good and honorable; the more he admonishes, the less he will have to punish. He must control his temper without however shutting his eyes to faults requiring correction: his instruction must be free from affectation, his industry great, his demands on his class continuous but not extravagant.¹ ✓

Even nowadays these words could be given every young teacher as a motto for his educational career.

But if today even those of us who want to preserve the ancient heritage and its languages are unable to look at typical humanist education with a feeling of undivided admiration, and if formalism, verbalism, and "classicism" in education have been the target of severe criticism of great men from the time of Hobbes to our present period, this is also due—at least in part—to the influence of Quintilian on the Renaissance and the humanists of later times.

People often fight most vehemently against the vices they indulge in, and recommend most ardently the virtues they do not possess. So Quintilian admonishes the teacher in rhetoric to be "free from affectation," to "avoid extravagance," and to be and educate more or less a paragon of the virtue of unselfish service. Considering not only his words but also his total philosophy and its deeper personal motives, one cannot help but have the impres-

¹From *Inst. Orat.*, Book II, ii, § 5; Vol. I, p. 213. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Harvard University Press.

sion of an extremely self-centered individual. We are also led to believe that the product of his oratorical education might have been of similar nature—eager to use his education, his power of persuasion, and the charm of his appearance not only in the service of ethical ideals and for the glory of his country, but also for the glory of himself. The humanists, unfortunately, failed to sense the discrepancy between Quintilian's professed morality of old Roman simplicity and the vaingloriousness of his oratory. They were themselves vainglorious, some of them to a grotesque degree. Many of them combined their role as scholars and poets with that of rather venal courtiers. Like Quintilian they lived in an age of absolutism—though a petty one in comparison to that of the Roman emperors—and were dependent on the grace of their princes, and many of them had to compensate by show and eloquence for their feeling of political frustration.

The boundless overestimation of oratorical skill is Quintilian's most doubtful gift to posterity, for it induced the classicists of the Renaissance, and even of later periods, to enthrone eloquence *per se* as one of the highest virtues, if not the highest. Thus the ideal of *pictas et eloquentia* could be proposed to the youth of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the ideal of education, an ideal just as bastard in nature as Quintilian's combination of virtue and oratory. For eloquence, however laudable a quality, can never be placed in the hierarchy of values on the same level with piety and virtue, if taken seriously.

For the other negative influence which Quintilian exercised on the humanists he cannot be blamed personally. To be sure, he suggested to Roman parents that they ought to teach their boys first Greek and not Latin, because Latin, "being in general use" would be "picked up" by them automatically. But he did not wish by that suggestion to neglect the vernacular; on the contrary, his whole work aimed at the cultivation of a noble Latin style. In addition, let us not forget that the preference of a foreign language to the vernacular was characteristic only of the Romans living during and after the decay of the republic. Neither the ancient

founders of the Roman world power nor Plato and his contemporaries would have accepted foreign patterns of language and style as their own.

Many of the humanists, however, were encouraged by Quintilian to emphasize the learning of Greek in addition to Latin—which meant a real and profound enrichment—and at the same time to despise their own vernacular. They considered it vulgar and unwieldy to what they believed to be finesse of style. In addition, Quintilian's praise of Cicero and his criticism of other Roman writers held so much authority with the humanist schoolmasters that up to the nineteenth century the aping of Cicero's language was one of the highest objectives of Latin instruction. Thus an utterly perverted conception of the meaning of classical studies prevented many a pupil in the humanist schools of Europe from enjoying the beauty and wisdom inherent in ancient literature. How many were told to be dull and incapable of scholarly work only because their talents would not yield to the bookish demands of an imitative sort of philosophy!

But no master can be made entirely responsible for his disciples. How much would Quintilian have suffered had he been forced to listen to the stilted declamations of the humanists proud of their Ciceronian eloquence, or the Latin effusions of the schoolboys under their control.

Jesus of Nazareth

THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY

There is one dominating trend in the attitude of the ancient philosopher, namely, his emphasis on self-reliance. Not that the Greeks and Romans were unaware of man's utter helplessness in face of the great Unknown we call Destiny; on the contrary, the polytheism of the common man conceived of human life and nature as a continual series of interferences on the part of all kinds of gods and demons with the course of human events. These deities assisted or killed his wife in childbirth, they looked benevolently or hatefully at the growth of his crop, they made his cow healthy or they bewitched her udder. The legal-minded Roman saved himself from the fear of the supernatural forces through a sort of bargain which is more or less immanent in all primitive religious sacrifices; the gods received so-and-so many parts of the slaughtered animal, on which they were supposed to lay more value than on abstract veneration; they were given a beautiful dwelling place with their statues; and in compensation for these services they were required to protect the home and the community. And as the ancients were not quite sure whether their rather human gods were really the complete masters of the world, they placed some eerie and wholly miraculous sovereignties behind and above them: Kronos, the master of time and the father of Zeus; Moira, the mistress of man's fortune; and the Fates, spinning the thread of a man's life at his birth.

But during the centuries before Christ, the Greek philosophers and their friends grew out of this ancient folklore; as a matter of fact, they were somewhat embarrassed by it. The more conservative showed due historical respect, and they thought it would be good to preserve the old religion for keeping the rather irreverent crowd in awe and piety, just as the Renaissance humanists and

Voltaire and even some of our modern leaders have been interested in the Church for no other reason than the preservation of the "social order." Plato, nevertheless, found himself obliged to recommend some kind of purging and censorship to adjust the old folklore to the moral standards of his time, whereas some of the more licentious poets enjoyed (as subjects for their own frivolous poetry) the very tales which Plato wanted to eliminate.

Under such circumstances the ancient thinker was unable to build his system on the religious tradition of his forebears; it was not even fitted for sublimation. The only thing he could rely on was his own reason and imagination. So the first sages in the sixth century B.C. developed their cosmogonies and moral wisdom, and out of it spread a philosophy which saw the salvation of man, if there was any, only in his gradual self-identification with the divine laws. But man must first discover these laws. It was, consequently, a highly man-centered circle of thought in which Greco-Roman philosophy moved around.

One great question, however, arises again and again in the course of human history: To what extent can man live on his own reason, or to what extent does he need deeper resources of faith and inspiration? This question becomes particularly urgent if there are no sound social co-operation and no wholesome challenge of political responsibility, both of which entail self-reliance and a feeling of order and security. This lack was deeply felt at the end of Antiquity. In other fields of life, also, disillusion grew and weakened man's courage; the loss of a common spiritual ground turned intellectual inventiveness into a doubtful blessing. The multitude of controversial schools of thought became so great that philosophy resembled a noisy world's fair rather than a temple.

Even in the classical period of Greek philosophy, a certain resignation was mixed with all the astounding accomplishments of systematic thinking. This resignation grew in the course of time, until it ended in the admirable but tragic heroism of the great Stoic personalities who discussed the permissibility of suicide as the final triumph of man's freedom over life and its most intimate

relative, death. On the less sublime levels of intellectual and moral achievement the feeling of the exposure of the individual to the weirdness of destiny resulted in a deep sense of insecurity. According to the mental quality of different individuals, this sense of insecurity culminated in frivolity or skepticism, or found relief in substitute religions, particularly in the adoption of Asiatic and African cults.

In the midst of this course of development, there appears, among the poor villagers and townspeople of Palestine, Jesus, the son of a carpenter, who starts his teaching from the pole opposite to that of the Greek thinkers; from emphasis not on self-reliance and autonomous reason but on the feeling of man's imbeddedness in the grace and care of one Supreme Being, the creator of all existence, natural and spiritual. Jesus could do this because his own small and politically suppressed Jewish people had overcome the magical polytheism of the ancient master nations and, by virtue of the teaching of great prophets, had developed a monotheistic tradition. But whereas the dominating religious schools of the Hebrew people had turned the prophetic message into a rather cold and legalistic system of moral and ritual prescriptions, Jesus revived the emotional fervor of Isaiah's and Jeremiah's idea of the covenant that existed between the Lord and his people. Furthermore, Jehovah, the God of Israel, appeared to him not primarily as the righteous judge and leader, as he had appeared to some prophets, but as the "Father." And when, in the course of his life, Jesus increasingly identified his work with a mission received directly from Heaven, he could, in consequence of this Father-son relationship between God and man, call himself both the Son of God and the Son of Man.

This penetration of Christ's thought and experience with the Father idea made possible a combination of dignity and humility unachieved by the Greek and Roman mind; of dignity, because we are all related to a divine Father; of humility, because we are all brothers, whether of high or low estate. It also made it possible to combine a realistic insight into the eternal imperfection of man

with the long-ranged optimism about the final salvation of mankind, both characteristic of Christianity. For inasmuch as man during his earthly existence is separated from the Father, he is helpless, sinful, and imperfectible. But inasmuch as he enjoys the grace to believe in God as the final meaning of all existence, he fills his individuality with a similar and even more concrete meaning than did the Greek philosopher who, by dint of his reason, worked himself up to the understanding of the *logos*. For Christ it was the love of the Father, extended to all who believe, not human merit, that allowed this unity; for the pagans it was an accomplishment reserved for the trained intellect only.

There is a difference between Christ's idea of unity and certain later Christian conceptions of transcendence. According to Christ, man does not need to transcend totally his earthly and individual existence in order to achieve unity with God. Rather, he must first find the divine in himself or, better, find his real self through discovering that it is not an isolated ego, but that it dwells in God and God in it. This is the reason for the great stream of mysticism against which dogmatic and institutional theology has always fought, because it saw in it the danger of subjectivism, monism, and pantheism as against the dualistic system adopted by the Church. Yet official dogmatism could never dam up the well of spiritual superabundance which nourished those who trusted in immediate intuition of God. If the Church had succeeded in its suppression of mysticism, its own fate would have been desiccation. Even in the most dualistic and rationalist theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards, there is a streak of mystical attitude. How could it be otherwise when mysticism was so deeply rooted in the ideas of the founder of Christianity himself, was taken up by Saint Paul and Saint Augustine, and was revived by men like Bonaventura and Master Eckart and continually emerged in all the thinkers who through the centuries gave inspiration to the Christian tradition?

It is this very same idea of the Father-son relationship between God and man which infused into Christianity its social or, if we

wish, its inmost democratic character. If we are all related to the same divine origin, then we all have to respect one another's dignity. Some historians have derived far-reaching conclusions from this fundamental tenet. They have asserted, for example, that Christianity abolished slavery. There arises here, first, the question as to whether slavery has really been abolished, a question which people may answer differently; secondly, the knowledge that the early Church recognized slavery as an earthly institution. Generally speaking, the Church did not attack the State and the social order but considered them an evil necessity, because they helped avoid the still greater evil of lawlessness which, in consequence of man's inherent sinfulness, would have arisen without the existence of government. Yet the early Church defended the right of the individual, even of the slave, against the interference of government in the rights of religious conscience; in addition, it did not make any distinction between free and slave within the spiritual community of the Church. According to some historians, there were Christian bishops who, in their social status, were freedmen or slaves. In fact, long before the coming of Christ, Stoic philosophers had asserted the same creed of equality.¹ But the religious emphasis that Christ gave to the idea of the dignity of the human soul stirred up the social consciousness of man, and it did this even in times of the migration of nations and in the following centuries, when waves of destruction swept over the European continent.

In spite of all lip service, the leading schools of Europe have given much more time to the teaching of Greek and Latin and their cultures than to the attempt at understanding and realizing fully the spirit of the originally Oriental religion of Christ. The reason is that the "classical" tradition teaches the art of ruling men and empires much more effectively than the Sermon on the Mount. Furthermore, our modern mind feels attracted by the rationality of the Greeks, whereas the ideas of Jesus are of such profound sim-

¹Cf. William E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne*, Vol. I, p. 306, Zeno: "All men are by nature equal, and virtue alone establishes a difference between them." D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1929.

plicity that our sophistication and corruption fail to grasp and follow them. For his intuitive confidence in the omnipresence of the Father we no longer possess the necessary instinctive unity with the universe. Nor does our individualism allow us to see all mankind as a whole, as Jesus of Nazareth did.

To be sure, the idea of a sublime unity between man and God was not completely absent from Greek philosophy, especially from the different forms of Platonism. But this idea was expressed in a much more abstract fashion than in the teaching of Christ. Trained reason, philosophical thinking, and contemplation were necessary before an individual could come near to God or the *logos*. In the realm of *Weltanschauung*, as in education, only those who belong to the elite are permitted to enter the sanctum. For Christ there does not exist any such rationalism or elitism. For him the beginning of all wisdom lies in a person's capacity for throwing his whole self totally and unrestrictedly into the arms of the Father. Although intellectual endeavor may be desirable, it alone does not lead to salvation; rather it is doomed to fail unless a person first of all loses his self in the divine ground of life. The Christian law was: die, as an individual, and then become. Out of this Christian attitude emerge faith, hope, and charity. From those virtues follow all the others, including the Greek-Roman ideals of wisdom, courage, self-discipline, and justice.

The Christian virtues are not the prerogatives of the wise and learned; on the contrary, they are more difficult for him than for the simple man. For the wise and proud it is hard to understand that

Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.¹

And it is still more difficult for the masters of this world to understand how Christ can continue his sermon to the poor, the sufferers, and the peacemakers with the exhortation: "Rejoice, and be ex-

¹St. Matthew 5: 3-5.

ceeding glad; for great is your reward in heaven."¹ How, a Greek would ask, can the poor and the meek in spirit be "exceeding glad"? Christ answers: "For so persecuted they the prophets which were before you."

Here, in addition to the Father idea and its religious consequences, two other ideas emerge and distinguish Christ's thought from classical Greek philosophy; namely, the ideas of suffering and of Heaven. If unity with God is the center of Christ's experience, then quiet and courageous acceptance of all which comes from the Father must be the consequence, for nonacceptance would mean alienation, isolation, and impoverishment. Therefore we have the petition in the Lord's Prayer: "Thy will be done in earth, as it is in Heaven," and Christ's conflict between self-preservation and obedience during the hours of humiliation preceding death: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt."

How different is all this from the death of another great teacher of mankind, Socrates. In one respect, one may call Socrates' proud refusal of escape from death even more divine than the painful end of Christ. In Socrates we see no sudden attack of fear and loneliness; instead, a smiling understanding of the injustice inherent in human society, a last philosophical conversation with his friends; then the voluntary dissolution of the individual into the great Unknown. Yet Christ's struggle with death and injustice has engraved itself more deeply on the mind of humankind. Is this only because his struggle was more human than the Socratic victory? Not only this; in Christ's anxiety we sympathize with all the agony of which man is capable, and also with the deepest despair a religious mind can experience: the despair in his unity with God. The certainty of unity with the divine suddenly disappears in the threat of utter nothingness.

And at the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eloi! Eloi! lama sabachthani? My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?²

¹St. Matthew 5: 12.

²St. Mark 15: 34.

Certainly more suffering is unimaginable than this feeling of isolation of one who called himself the Son of the Father.

So we find in Christ's life, as in his religion, an enormous polarity of contrasts: scenes and ideas of natural joy, kindliness, and forgiveness beside the abyss of despair. But behind all these contrasts there waits the peace of Heaven. The idea of Heaven was for Christ probably nothing but another version of his Father idea. The human soul partakes of an eternal cosmos and, according to purity or sinfulness, will gain or lose its nearness to God's abode. This faith is, after all, an element in most of the great world religions, and its existence in Platonism allowed for the amalgamation of Christian and Greek transcendentalism during the first centuries A.D. But very soon several factors co-operated to transfigure Christ's spiritual idea of Heaven as the unity of the soul with the divine into a rather material idea of a celestial abode for the faithful. One of these factors came from the human desire for reward for all earthly sacrifices through the bliss of immortality. Another factor sprang from the fusion of Christianity and the Gnostic movement of late Antiquity, which promised a heavenly home to the soul strong enough to find its way through the world of darkness to the world of light.

So it came about that soon after Christ's death Christianity considered man's earthly existence mainly as a preparation for Heaven, particularly as the resurrection of Jesus, or his reunification with the Father, was thought to be the culmination of his life and struggle. With the development of the Christian dogma, the idea of man's nearness to God and the issuing idea of love, which we have found to be central in the thought of Christ and the great mystics, became accompanied by an "eschatology"¹ or a body of teachings about last or final things such as death, resurrection, judgment, and the millenium. Physical death was supposed to be the end of one phase of life, but at the same time the beginning of the real life. To the faithful was opened the door toward eternal salvation, and to the unfaithful the door toward hell. The Stoic

¹*Eschatos* = last plus *logia* = theory.

philosophers also reflected very much upon death. But for them the fact that the life of an individual was bound to perish was the severest limitation of human existence, to be met only by dint of heroic contempt. Saint Paul, on the other hand, was convinced that Christ, through his crucifixion and resurrection, had conquered death and mortality. He says,

For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. . . . Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule and all authority and power. For he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.¹

CHRIST AS A TEACHER

The instrument through which Christ carried out his mission was teaching. This was according to the tradition of his people, in which the Rabbi, that is, the teacher, was held in highest esteem. It was also the natural effluence of his personality which, in his feeling of relatedness to all creatures, whether beautiful or ugly, good or sinful, could not help but spend itself and let them participate in its own riches. "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God. Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein. And he took them up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them."²

When Christ spoke to the common folk of his country, he liked to use the parable in order to convey his wisdom to them. The parable was for him an artistic or didactical artifice, and it was a part of his personality, growing out of his feeling of union with the great mysteries of life. He did not think, nor could he speak, in forms of an abstract, conceptual theology. The deeper meaning of life is, for him, inseparable from life itself, with its ever-changing

¹*I Corinthians* 15: 21, 24-26.

²*St. Mark* 10. 14-16.

concreteness, and from the daily work of men. Hence the many references in his teaching to the work of the farmer in his field and his vineyard, to the family, and to business. Also, as a teacher Christ feels himself imbedded in the great entirety of the universe. For this reason his speech contains much of art and poetry. What we call in aesthetic language symbols and images are for him not analogies but forms of reality. The parable is also the kind of speech he chose out of his sympathy for those many of whom he says: "Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing, they hear not, neither do they understand."¹

If, therefore, later pedagogical writers praise Christ as a wise teacher for his use of the parable as a particular educational medium, they remain on the surface. The founder of the Christian religion is a great teacher, but not because he uses the parable. He uses this form of speech because his nature compels him to identify himself with all the universe as well as with those whom he teaches, to project himself into their world, and to ask that "they should see with *their* eyes, and hear with *their* ears, and should understand with *their* heart, and should be converted."² It took many hundred years, up to the period of John Amos Comenius, for the educational wisdom inherent in this attitude to be fully realized.

But there inheres in Christ's gospel a deeper educational claim than can be expressed in merely didactic terms. It rests on the combination of two closely interrelated tenets of Christianity which we have already mentioned. One of them is the conviction that the dignity of man imposes on him the duty of considering the human soul as an end in itself, not to be submitted to alien purposes. The other idea is that of love or charity. It springs from the same metaphysical root as the idea of dignity and ends in the same demand to respect one's fellow man. Saint Paul has expressed the gospel of charity in the eternal thirteenth chapter of his first letter to the Corinthians:

¹St. Matthew 13: 13.

²St. Matthew 13: 15.

Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.¹

It was this spirit which ever throughout our history drew men, whether great or poor, skeptical or simple, into the orbit of Christianity. At the end of one of the richest lives ever lived Goethe came to the conclusion: "However far the human mind will expand, it will never be able to surpass the majesty of the Christian gospel."

¹*1 Corinthians 13: 1-4, 6-7.*

The Ancient Church

THE MELTING AND THE DUALITY BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND ANCIENT THOUGHT

The human mind will never cease to wonder at one of the most sharply contrasted events in the history of mankind. In the Palestinian capital, Jerusalem, a strange prophet is brought before the court of the Roman governor, mocked by his soldiers, and finally crucified. He had called himself the king of the Jews and was suspect of revolutionary activities, and the potent in the country disliked that kind of rabble-rousing. On the other side of the Mediterranean, in the capital of the Roman Empire of which Palestine had become a province, the ruler Tiberius had probably not even noticed the action of his delegate. There were always rebels in the subjected countries, and if they could be eliminated, especially with the consent of prominent natives, all the better.

About three hundred years later the successors of Tiberius realized that, rather than persecute the followers of the crucified Jew, they would do better to use them for the preservation of their realm. Constantine the Great acknowledges Christianity as the religion of the empire, and everyone is invited to worship the poor carpenter's son as the Son of God. Soon after, people who cling to the pagan tradition are punished, and in 415 A.D. the fanatical Christian mob of Alexandria dares, with the toleration of the bishop, barbarously to murder the Neoplatonic philosopher Hypatia, much admired for both her intellectual gifts and her physical attractiveness, one of the last living symbols of the Greek ideal of wisdom and beauty combined. The murder occurred in the Caesareum, a famous pagan temple, which had already become a Christian church.

How did it come about that the teachings of the Jewish prophet conquered the empire of the Augusti even more successfully than the defeated Greeks had conquered their Roman victors? Why did

not the small group of his followers remain one of the many obscure sects which in the Greco-Roman world grew and decayed like mushrooms?

No religious movement can survive for more than a short time unless it contains lasting elements of productivity and hope for the human race. In such elements the Christian gospel was rich. It gave comfort to the poor and new purposes to the rich; it took the curse from suffering, death, and decay through the promise of reward and immortality; it made all men the children of one Father and taught them to love one another; through its emphasis on reverence and authority and through its connection with Jewish patriarchalism, it showed itself capable of renewing the family and creating a new community spirit among the faithful; finally, its gospel of salvation could be grasped by the simple man and contemplated by the profound thinker. There were concrete persons playing their roles, not only abstract ideas, as in the philosophical systems; on the other hand, each person and event were full of symbolic meaning and transcendent certainty. If the poor slave needed a God for the comfort of his disturbed and thirsty emotions, he had his Christ; and if the educated Platonist wanted an opportunity for applying the high art of dialectics, he could find in Christianity a broad field for the reconciliation of contradictions, such as those between the trinity and the oneness of God, between God's omnipotence and the existence of sin, or between the finiteness and the immortality of man.

It was in three particular areas that Christianity succeeded in proving its adaptability to the ancient world. We can, in this context, only mention the results of this process; to describe the process itself would require volumes.

First, Christ was made identical with the Greek *logos*. The process must have begun very early; the Gospel according to St. John begins with the words: "In the beginning was the Word [in the Greek original: *logos*], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. . . . And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only be-

gotten of the Father), full of grace and truth." This fusion between the *logos* and Christ became important because it brought Christianity into possession of a central, one may say *the* central, philosophical idea of classical as well as Neoplatonic philosophy. The Christians could now pretend that in their religion the *logos* had become personified.

While this amalgamation of the Greek idea of spirit, meaning, and order with the Son of God helped the Christian creed to invade the domain of an old and glorious philosophical tradition, the new religion also prepared itself to satisfy the more primitive people who were still attached to ancient forms of polytheism and did not want to give up their many altars. Relatively soon there was a considerable number of the Blessed and Saints, each of whom was assigned his particular place to help the faithful in all kinds of emergency. They were led by Mary, the mother of Christ, who, as the symbol of the joys and sorrows of maternity, has forever inspired the greatest artists of our civilization.

The fusion of pagan Antiquity and Christianity was supported by an astounding organizational vigor in both a dogmatic and a political sense. This vigor helped the scattered and sometimes cruelly persecuted Christian communities to build up the great bulwark of the *ecclesia triumphans* within an hostile empire. In order to compete with the philosophical systems and the religious sects, the Christian Church needed a solid body of doctrines; and in order to acquire this dogmatic unity, it had to fight much discord of opinions within its own ranks, because the primarily emotional character of Christ's teaching allowed for a dangerous variety of interpretations. The peril of confusion and disintegration naturally grew when the new militant class of Christian theologians had become strong enough to measure swords with the intellectual representatives of the pagan world. Heretics were an early phenomenon within the Church, and even such great and pious men as Origen (who died in 254) had to defend themselves against the accusation of spreading perilous ideas. In this struggle for inner strength and unity the Church soon learned to avail itself not only

of the arts and weapons of argument, but also of the advantages of the great legal tradition of the Romans and of the power inherent in a strictly regulated hierarchy. It did all this with such success that after the breakdown of the western part of the Roman Empire, the ecclesiastical authorities remained as the only valid form of organization. In addition to their religious responsibilities, they assumed many important secular functions and carried over into the era of the Merovingians and Carolingians much of the legal and administrative tradition of the Roman Empire. If in spite of all historical cataclysms there is still some continuity between Antiquity and the modern world, it is largely due to the unyielding cornerstone which the Church built under the new European civilization.

The diffusion of the gospel of Christ into worldly thought and institutions has always aroused diverging judgment. The typical ecclesiastic hierarchy and their followers see in it the wonderful dispensation of providence, the pragmatic proof of the truth of Christianity, and the indication of the final victory of the Kingdom of God over the kingdoms of this earth. Others think that in this process of expansion, dogmatization, and institutionalization the compromise between the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, on the one hand, and pagan philosophy and power politics, on the other, has gone so far that the final triumph has been on the side of secularity and paganism. This was the opinion of many religious geniuses who declared themselves unable to perceive the voice of the apostles in the arguments of the ecclesiastics and the example of Christ in the palaces of the bishops. To these critics have always belonged the great mystics of Christianity, with the exception of those who decided to regard unreservedly the institution of the Church as the "living body of Christ" and to include it in their mystical adoration.

The historian who wishes to penetrate beneath the surface of events to their deeper causes will discover a tragic law in the growth of Christianity. The will to self-realization and self-preservation inherent in great ideas and ideals compels their bearers to

look for some kind of fixation and institutionalism. But with this process there arises the danger of the distortion of these same ideas through adjustment and vulgarization on the one hand, and through dogmatism and petrification on the other. Human institutions can endure these dangers only if they constantly and courageously ask themselves to what extent their historical development with all its inevitable relativities has materialized or has abandoned the true intent of the ideas and hopes from which they issued. Certainly the founder of Christianity and the ambitious popes of the Renaissance had nothing in common. But at least the early Christian thinkers were thoroughly conscious of the perils and merits in the process of fusion with essentially heterogeneous forces in which their religion was inescapably involved.

This becomes particularly evident if we relate the problem of the osmosis between Antiquity and Christianity to the educational ideas of the growing Church. Then we realize not only the variety of standpoints taken by the Christian leaders, but also the degree of reconciliation between the gospel of Christ and secular civilization.

The first intensive contact between Christian thought and the pagan world began with St. Paul. There is the famous passage in chapter 17 of The Acts:

Now while Paul waited for them [Silas and Timotheus] at Athens, his spirit was stirred in him, when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry. Therefore disputed he in the synagogue with the Jews, and with the devout persons, and in the market daily with them that met with him. Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoics, encountered him. And some said, What will this babbler say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto them Jesus, and the Resurrection. And they took him, and brought him unto Areopagus, saying, May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is? For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears; we would know therefore what these things mean. (For all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing.) Then

Paul stood in the midst of Mars' hill, and said, Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.¹

Paul could explain the Unknown God to the Athenians only because he himself possessed a considerable knowledge of their culture. Later on, the more Christianity had to discuss its doctrine with a growing number of educated pagans, the more it had to meet the challenge of ancient learning, and the more fervent grew the argument between the defenders of Jewish-Christian isolationism and the advocates of intercultural relations.

There was Justin the Martyr, born of Greek parents who lived in the province of Samaria. He had become acquainted with the dominating philosophical systems of the period. He found inner peace only after experiencing in himself the miracle of the Christian revelation, which then for him possessed a certainty above all logical argumentation. Yet this fundamental difference between philosophical search and religious faith did not lead him to reject the first. On the contrary, Christianity was for him only the highest manifestation of the *logos*, the light of which had already shone into the minds of the great ancient thinkers.

In contrast to Justin, his disciple, the Assyrian Tatian, who before his conversion was a professional teacher of philosophy, was incapable of suppressing in himself the zeal of proselytism. In his "Address to the Greeks"² he contrasted in a perverted form of humility the "barbaric" philosophy of Israel, with its self-evident truth, with the pretentious arrogance of the Greek teachers and saw in their ideas nothing but snares and lies. This difference be-

¹*The Acts* 17: 16-23.

²See "Tatian's Address to the Greeks" in Vol. II, pp. 65-82, of Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson's *The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325*. American reprint of the Edinburgh edition, revised by A. Cleveland Coxe. 9 vols. and Supplement. The Christian Literature Publishing Company, Buffalo, 1887-1896. This edition is cited in the following as: Roberts and Donaldson.

tween Justin the Martyr and Tatian repeats itself during the whole history of Christian education. Around the year 200 the African Tertullian, one of the most passionate Christian teachers, takes the side of Tatian and attempts to show the irreconcilable contrast between Christianity and heathen philosophy. In the seventh chapter of his work *De Præscriptione Hæreticorum* ("On Prescription against Heretics"), he exclaims:

What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? what between heretics and Christians? . . . With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides.¹

Nevertheless, in his book *De Idolatria* ("On Idolatry") he admits that secular studies are requisite for any professional career, and that without them even theology would be impossible. Finally, he arrives at the paradoxical conclusion that the Christian scholar may be permitted to acquaint himself with the secular studies, but not to teach them.

On the other hand, the Catechetical school at Alexandria, probably the most cosmopolitan place of learning in the Roman Empire, harbored a Christian teacher of such tolerance and open-mindedness as Clemens of Alexandria, who in his *Stromateis* wrote the following admirable sentences:

Philosophy is not . . . the product of vice, since it makes men virtuous; it follows, then, that it is the work of God, whose work it is solely to do good. And all things given by God are given and received well. Further, if the practice of philosophy does not belong to the wicked, but was accorded to the best of the Greeks, it is clear also from what source it was bestowed—manifestly from Providence, which assigns to each what is befitting in accordance with his deserts.

Rightly, then, to the Jews belonged the Law and to the Greeks Philosophy, until the advent; and after that came the universal

¹Tertullian: "On Prescription against Heretics," Chap. VII in Roberts and Donaldson, Vol. III, p. 246.

calling to be a peculiar people of righteousness, through the teaching which flows from faith, brought together by one Lord, the only God of both Greeks and Barbarians, or rather of the whole race of men.¹

We generally consider Saint Augustine the greatest of the Fathers of the Church, also the teacher in whom Christian and ancient thought flow together most constructively. One could point to his wonderful words in *De Doctrina Christiana* ("On Christian Doctrine"), which have often been quoted by later Christian authors: *Quisquis bonus verusque Christianus est, domini sui esse intelligat ubicumque invenerit veritatem*. ("Let every good and true Christian understand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master.")² Yet the two works of Saint Augustine which are still of more than professional interest, his *Confessiones* ("Confessions") and his *De Civitate Dei* ("On the City of God"), not considering his many polemical articles against pagan philosophy, are witness of the conflict which the first great systematic thinker of Christianity felt between his faith and the philosophy of the pagan "Academicus."

Similar conflicts perturbed the minds of almost all the great theologians of the Middle Ages.

The meaning of Christ's gospel, its view of life, and its values are in many respects incompatible with those of the Greeks. The Greeks represent the belief in the autonomy of the human intellect; Christianity believes in grace and revelation. To feel the contrast of these two attitudes is not a sign of narrow-mindedness; rather, it proves a man's ability to take seriously the logic of two fundamentally different standpoints. It is narrow-mindedness only when men such as Tatian or Tertullian are unable to see the greatness that lies in the Greek desire for inquiry, and mistake their obscur-

¹Clemens of Alexandria: "The Stromata, or Miscellanies," Book VI, Chap. XVII, in Roberts and Donaldson, Vol. II, pp. 517 and 518.

²St. Augustine: *On Christian Doctrine*, translated by J. F. Shaw, third edition, p. 55. Edinburgh, 1892.

antism for faith in Christ. Many early Christian writers show, unfortunately, an appalling tendency toward superstition, deplorable even in consideration of the rather universal decline of scientific consciousness during the first centuries after Christ. Many of the early Christians also deceived themselves into thinking that the Kingdom of God was to come as an actual phenomenon within their lifetime. Why then acquire secular knowledge? Their materialistic understanding of the Kingdom of God prevented them from grasping its spiritual sense, as something which is realized in the souls of men either here and now or never.

Yet out of this conflict between the Jewish Christian tradition and Hellenic culture there grew a richness of polarities which gave to our civilization its characteristic tension and, through that, its singular productivity. The modern man still feels the Greek urge for rationality; but partly in accordance with it and partly against it, there has developed a depth of religious attitudes and expressions which originated not in the European but in the Asiatic mind of the Hebrews. We still are caught, like the Greeks and the Romans, in the ambiguous morality of nationalisms, in the conflict of empires and the struggle of classes, but our Christian conscience tells us that this should not be the final state of things. We know, from Aristotle and from our own experience, of the cyclical ups and downs of societies and governments, yet we cherish in our innermost heart some hope for progress, a hope which may be the secular form of the Christian faith in the millenium. And much though we may insist, like the Greeks, on the constant regeneration of an elite in order to guarantee high standards in our social and cultural life, we do not want to tolerate a privileged aristocracy which does not allow every man the proper amount of freedom and dignity in addition to his duties. We breathe more freely nowadays and with a feeling of relief when we travel from a country where traces of slave civilization still prevail to a country where the dignity of man is acknowledged. And this is due to our Christian heritage.

EDUCATION IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH

The duality we have discovered in the relationship between Christian faith and ancient erudition shows also in Christian education proper. There were some Christian, particularly the Catechetical, schools, with a certain liberality and comprehensiveness, especially in Alexandria. But, generally speaking, the Church, as far as secular knowledge was at stake, was not capable of competing with the schools of the pagans. This is the reason why up to the fifth century young Christians who wished to excel in the *artes liberales* had to immerge into the wisdom of Antiquity.

This situation has never been changed. In thought and in our social and international life Christianity has not succeeded in encompassing the total sphere of man's activity. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century an individual on his way to erudition had to devote much more time to Greek and Latin than to all products of Christian thought combined. When finally the ancient languages were pushed more and more toward the periphery of the modern curriculum, nobody thought of replacing them by instruction in Christianity. On the contrary, religious education declined almost at the same time as the older humanities. ~~The~~ principal conqueror of the vacant territory was the natural sciences, which in regard to their origin, particularly their foundation on mathematics, are ultimately derivatives of Greek culture.

If we peruse the writings of the Church Fathers themselves, we find that they deal relatively little with the training of youth. Of course, one could say that they were concerned with the salvation of mankind and that this is education in the highest sense of the word. History itself, according to Saint Augustine, is nothing but the fallen man's way back to God, and the most conspicuous sign of God's grace is the fact that he sent his own son to earth to suffer vicariously for the sins of Adam and his children. Thus one could interpret the Christian philosophy of history as a metaphysical philosophy of divine education. Yet, if we take *education* in the usual sense of the term, the number of essays on this subject

written by the Fathers of the Church is extremely small. A statistically minded person would perhaps find that one treatise on education stands against one hundred in the field of theology.

The reason for this unequal proportion is not only the one already intimated—that every early Christian writer considered himself an educator of mankind toward eternal values in comparison with which formal schooling was of little importance. There are other reasons also; for example, the primary interest of the early Church in the conversion of adults, the belief in salvation through faith and not through the pagan conception of knowledge and self-realization of the individual, and finally the fact that the early Christian lived in a society with a highly developed secular school system. This not only allowed the Church to concentrate its efforts on the religious side of man's development but compelled it to do so.

Nevertheless, if one takes the educational writings of men such as Basil the Great, Jerome, John Chrysostom, and Augustine—men all born after 330 A.D., who have, more unequivocally than others, left us their opinions on education proper—he can without difficulty formulate a rather coherent philosophy of Christian education.

The aim of all education, according to this philosophy, is the preparation of man for life beyond death, through imbuing his soul with the Christian virtues, particularly those of faith, hope, charity, and humility. In comparison with these virtues, all other values of both mental or physical character are of inferior quality. The various writers, however, differ considerably in their appreciation of the more secular values. Saint Augustine, for example, in his treatise *De Ordine*, with its praise of Platonic and Pythagorean wisdom, comes very close to the pagan philosophical tradition of his time. Only through the divine gift of *ratio* is man capable of establishing community with his fellow beings, for *ratio* has given him language and the art of writing. In addition, it has provided him with the capacity of numbering. Without it he would stand helpless before the infinite variety of things. On this three-

fold foundation rests all further knowledge, in the analysis of which Saint Augustine follows, with some variation, the usual theory of the *artes liberales*. He gives them, however, a mystical touch through illustrating them not primarily as ways toward secular knowledge and mental discipline, but particularly as instruments for the apprehension of the inner unity and spherical harmony of the world. To understand and be immersed in this unity is for him, as well as for the Platonists and the Pythagoreans, the highest goal of all mental endeavors. /The artist, the architect with his sense for rhythmical proportions, the poet with his talent of presenting profound "rational lies" in beautiful language, the musician with his gift of symbolizing the eternal harmony of the celestial spheres in sound and meter, and, finally, the geometrician who shows the reign of measure and order in the movements of the stars—all serve the erudite man's urgent desire to have his small ego absorbed in the great order of the cosmos.¹

According to Saint Augustine, the person capable of forming a consistent unity out of all art and knowledge deserves the title of "educated." Such a person will also experience the essential unity between reason and faith. If he understands the value of measures and numbers and feels himself capable of using them for making poetry or educing melodies out of an instrument, or if, in other words, he can conjure up harmony in his outer world, he will consider it as below his dignity to have discord and lack of harmony in his own self. After achieving this unity through merging his self with the great laws of the universe, he can dare to look into the face of God. There are no words to represent this state of blessedness; all earthly conflicts will then dissolve.²

This beautiful Augustinian treatise comes so close to the best pagan tradition that the differences between the latter and Christian theology are almost extinguished. But, as a matter of fact, Saint Augustine himself regrets later in his *Retractationes* ("Re-

¹Cf. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia*, editio Parisina altera, Tomus Primus pars prior, pp. 571-574: "De Ordine," Liber II, Chap. XI. Paris, 1836.

²S. Augustinus, "De Ordine" (*loco citato*), pp. 582-584, Chap. XIX.

tractions") that in his treatise *De Ordine* he had exaggerated the value of the *artes liberales*, that he had praised Pythagoras as if his philosophy were without faults and mistakes, and that under the influence of heathen thought he had indulged in some other heretical ideas. Also, in other writings the great bishop remains much more severely within the limits of the Christian dogma than in his *De Ordine*. For example, in *De Doctrina Christiana* ("On Christian Doctrine") he deals particularly with the relationship between the Christian doctrine and the profane sciences, and his *De Catechisandis Rudibus* ("On the Catechizing of the Uninstructed") contains elaborate instruction about the catechetical initiation of prospective converts into the principles of Christianity. The orthodox attitude of the last work explains itself easily with reference to its purpose of conversion and indoctrination. It had to show differences, rather than the similarities, between ancient thought and the Christian religion.

The other writers on Christian education we have mentioned do not approximate Saint Augustine's willingness to incorporate ancient wisdom into Christian education, nor his profound intuition in the religious values potentially inherent in all seriously pursued profane arts and studies. Nevertheless, Saint Basil the Great, father of the Greek Church, shows in his *Address to the Young Men on the Right Use of Greek Literature* (originally in Greek) not only respect for the greatness of the Greek tradition, in which he is completely at home, but also a sound appreciation of profane knowledge and of physical culture. Naturally he warns his audience of the temptations which they have to meet if they enter too deeply into the pagan edifice of art and literature. In his "Instruction Concerning the Admission and Education of Children in Monasteries," which is a part of his *Regulations for Monasterial Life*, Saint Basil shows great respect for personal decision in questions of conscience and a certain sense for individual differences in children.

John Chrysostom, who often refers to educational problems, particularly in his *Homilies on the Epistles of St. Paul*, displays

a remarkable sense for the fine intimacy and responsibilities of family life.¹ In the "Twelfth Homily on the Epistles to the Colossians" (4: 18)² he charmingly compares the child with a bridge because the child, as nothing else, can make the two parents feel how closely they belong together. In the "Tenth Homily on the First Epistle to the Thessalonians" (5: 14)³ he admonishes the teacher to be patient even with the most difficult pupil. "For there is no medicine equal to this [patience], especially for the teacher, none so suitable to those who are under rule. It can quite shame and put out of countenance him that is fiercer and more shameless than all men."⁴ In another place he clearly distinguishes wise patience from foolish softness. The latter belongs not to the teacher but to the seducer.⁵

Only in the letter Saint Jerome, the last of the four fathers mentioned, addresses to Laeta, who wants advice on the preparation of her daughter for the life in a convent, do we find a strong contempt for the most natural joys of a young human being, in spite of the Saint's tender love for children. This contempt has become prevalent in certain oppressive forms of Christian education and has led to those perversions of human nature in which the records of Christian asceticism are, unfortunately, so rich.

But even in referring to Jerome, the historian could point at one great achievement in the development from the Greco-Roman to the Christian concept of education. This achievement cannot be fully demonstrated through quotation of this or that particular sentence; it is more evident in the total spirit of Christian literature, provided one excepts inquisitorial zealots of the type represented by Tertullian. This achievement is the loving interest in

¹Saint Chrysostom: *Homilies on Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon*, in Schaff's *Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, Vol. XIII. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1890-1900.

²*Loco citato*, p. 319.

³*Loco citato*, p. 367.

⁴*Loco citato*, p. 367.

⁵"Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians," I, 1-3, *loco citato*, p. 1.

every individual, young or old, man or woman, noble or humble. For the Christian educator, neither the cause nor the goal of education is to be found in the striving for any external effect, however good and important it may be for society, not even in such intrinsic achievements as self-development, but first of all in a profound metaphysical respect for every human soul which deserves our care because it needs salvation and shares with us in the community with the Father, as proclaimed by Christ.

There are different reasons why in the centuries after Christ and during the Middle Ages this attitude did not come to so full a fruition as later in the works of men like Comenius, La Salle, Pestalozzi, and Froebel. First of all, the Church, up to the beginning of modern times, worked in a society where the division and intellectual differences among the various social classes were too great to allow for any conformity and equality in education. Secondly, for a long time, and in many cases even nowadays, the Christian churches have interpreted the Gospel primarily in terms of a fixed authority with clearly defined prescriptions for faith and conduct. Thus they often worked more toward stagnation than toward vitality. The essentially dynamic character of such virtues as faith, hope, and charity, the meaning of which has to be brought out again and again before the challenge of changing conditions, was not sufficiently seen. So authoritarianism and dogmatism often suppressed the living spirit of Christ. But however great the shortcoming of the Christian Church may have been—as of any other attempt at incorporating the transcendent into the narrow limits of human life—even the severest critic ought to keep one fact in mind: It was Christianity and its organizations which in the period of the migration of the nations and in the following centuries tamed hordes of warriors, comforted people in their suffering, and set up spiritual standards in a world of brutality through preaching *Regnum veritatis et vitae; regnum sanctificationis et gratiae; regnum justitiae, amoris et pacis*.¹

¹Preface to the Mass.

But it was not only a transcendent kingdom that the Church preached. Its effect on the organization, and through it on the cultural education, of devastated Europe in the early Middle Ages was enormous. The scholars of the Church—in the courts of the princes, the parsonages of the cathedrals, and the libraries of the monasteries—carried the remainders of the theoretical and practical wisdom of Antiquity over into more prosperous times: not only Roman law and the technique of Roman administration, not only the somewhat promiscuous cyclopedias of the Alexandrinians and their minor successors in the days of decay, but also the more practical skills of the architect, the farmer, and the gardener.

The Church made it possible for three great universal ideas to lay the foundation of a European civilization. One was the idea of a spiritual community of mankind under the leadership of the Pope, the successor of St. Peter—mixed with many earthly ingredients, and sometimes nothing but a game in the hands of politicians, but at other times a mentor of the Christian conscience. The other was the continuation of the *Imperium Romanum* in the form of the Holy Roman Empire, as founded by Charles the Great. Incomplete and often destructive though it was—particularly to the German nation itself, which had the perilous honor of harboring the imperial court—it nevertheless gave the western nations of Europe, at least for some centuries, the shadow of an idea of an international political community. The third was a common means of communication within the republic of the learned, the Latin language. Here also dangers lurked. The inevitable formality of a foreign tongue, reserved for scholars and theologians, prevented the natural emotions of men from finding genuine expression in literature. As many of the lower clergy in the early Middle Ages understood Latin very imperfectly and the people understood it not at all, the religious symbols and services, insofar as they were of verbal character, concealed their meaning rather than revealed it. The consequence was ritualism and magical tabooism instead of spiritual enrichment. Finally, the learned became separated from the streams of experience which flow from

the contact of the thinker with life. The result was often repetition and imitation instead of freshness and originality. Yet without Latin, the medieval cosmopolitan university and its philosophy would not have arisen, and there would not have been laid the foundation which has given Europe a feeling of cultural unity despite all war, hostility, and destruction.

The Medieval Church

The young student of history in our schools hears very divergent opinions about the character of the Middle Ages. Some teachers tell him about the "dark ages" of European history, and others praise the very same era above all other periods. This divergence of opinion is due not only to prejudices of political or religious origin but to a different choice of criteria. If one compares the Middle Ages with modernity in terms of scientific thinking, engineering, sewerage, and communication or the spread of public education and welfare, only an ardent glorifier of the past can deny that the Middle Ages were a rather dark period. We may, however, ask ourselves to what extent we, with all our modern achievements, have outgrown old kinds or created new kinds of superstition, cruelty, poverty, and stupefaction of the masses.

The historian has a right to judge the past by the measures of his own time; to a degree he cannot help doing so. But he has always to be aware of the limitations inherent in such judgment from the outside. On the other hand, he must also try to project himself into the life conditions and the specific tasks and problems of the era he investigates. If he does so with the Middle Ages, he cannot fail to be deeply impressed by the enthusiasm with which generation after generation, building up from a general state of decay or primitiveness, attempted to organize a new society, to acquire the rudiments of culture, and to give expression to their feelings in artistic creation. There is a profoundly affecting accord of simplicity and depth in the early medieval representations of Christ and Saint Mary. In the illuminated manuscripts and in the cathedrals of the Gothic period, craftsmanship and piety unite to bring about the effect of religious elation. And the combination of youthful adventure, symbolism, and wisdom in the Parsifal of Wolfram von Eschenbach will fascinate the minds of men as long as they can appreciate great literature. /

Regarding these accomplishments the people of the Middle Ages had not the slightest reason for looking up to the Greeks and Romans with a feeling of inferiority. If *classical* means a high degree of self-realization and perfection of expression, then the medieval churches, their sculpture, and their windows are classical to the same degree as is the Greek temple.

Nevertheless, there are reasons why in reality medieval men felt themselves culturally second to Antiquity. One reason is that for them the power and splendor of the Roman Empire was still a concrete experience, in spite of its political collapse. Much more than we generally imagine, they lived actually within the remnants of Roman edifices and viaducts. The emperors of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation considered themselves the successors of the Roman Caesars, and the political organization of the important nations which was emerging from the tumult of the early Middle Ages was shot through with Roman administrative and legal concepts. Also, the popes traced their origin back to the times of Antiquity, and the scholars and theologians of the Church in the times of Scholasticism became more and more inclined to acknowledge not one but two revelations: the Gospel and the works of Aristotle. Christ and Aristotle were regarded as both the center and the culmination of history, and their authority was supposed to be established for ever and ever. Around the ancient Greek there grew a colorful garland of myths that showed him in a role of a philosophical prophet of Christ. The same happened with Vergil whose works enjoyed an almost religious admiration; they were read more for their wisdom than for their aesthetic value. Vergil is the guide who leads Dante during his journey through the inferno and the purgatorio.

¹ In consequence of this relation to the past, medieval man had a philosophy of history decidedly different from ours. He considered his time an enclosure lying in the shadows of two immense mountains: one, the great past with the ancient philosophers and Christ; the other, the apocalyptic millenium when Christ would finally reign on earth. Consequently, the modern idea of progress

and historical development was not known to these men, as it was foreign also to the Greeks, though for other reasons. Nor was the modern desire for originality of importance to a medieval thinker or artist. This desire presupposes that the individual regards his work as of unique value and that he conceives of history as a process in which man is capable of adding essentially new ideas to old ones. Such attitudes could not emerge in the atmosphere of medieval piety and feudalism.

¹ The main reason for the reverence of the medieval scholar toward ancient wisdom was probably that he admired its quality of philosophical reasoning more than anything else. The capacity for abstract and systematic thinking is a relatively late product of civilization, as it is a relatively late product in the life of the individual. A young person has emotions and passions and often shows astounding artistic qualities, good practical sense, and perhaps even vision and intuition; but it needs an adult to interpret the world with some philosophical independence.

How youthful the Middle Ages were shows with striking evidence in the literature on education. This literature lacks individual psychological interest as well as freedom from authoritarian standards of society.) The medieval teacher regarded his work primarily as a process of transmission of knowledge and ideals from one generation to the next.

One could divide the development of educational thought between the end of the migration of the nations and the Renaissance into two periods, the first reaching up to the beginning of Scholasticism (ca. 1100), the second represented by Scholasticism, which ends with the victory of Humanism and Protestantism.

The first period contains only a very few treatises on education proper. Irabanus Maurus' treatise *De Clericorum Institutione* ("On the Instruction of the Clergy"),¹ finished in 819, deals in its first two parts particularly with the clerical profession and the

¹ *Beati Rabani Mauri Opera Omnia*, 6 vols., in J. P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus* V. 107-112; Tom. I, pp. 293-420, "De Clericorum Institutione." Paris, 1851-1852.

feasts and rites of the Church. The first fifteen chapters of the third part deal with the Bible and how to read it; then follows a brief course in the *artes liberales*, mixed with edifying considerations about Christian virtues.

One might even question whether Hrabanus Maurus' treatise really belongs to educational thought in the strict sense of the term; it deals much more with religious and professional topics and with the subject matter of the *artes liberales* in its most primitive form. It is still more questionable whether some of the writings of the Venerable Bede (ca. 673-735) or of Alcuin (735-804) can be counted as educational, for their authors were more interested in the presentation of material than in its educational effect. In any case, these works, including that of Hrabanus Maurus, contribute as little to educational thought as they contribute to knowledge. They represent compilations from older works without any distinction as to whether the sources used are themselves compilations or of original quality. There are more or less correct reminiscences or quotations from Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian; from the Church Fathers, particularly Saint Augustine and Saint Jerome; from Joannes Cassianus, a contemporary of Saint Augustine and founder of two famous monasteries in the neighborhood of Marseille; and from cyclopedias such as those of Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Isidorus of Seville. Every generation builds on the work of its forefathers; the question is whether it absorbs the past into its own creativeness or whether all it accomplishes is imitative learning. Hrabanus Maurus, for example, regards himself so little as the interpreter of his own time that in his most comprehensive work, *De Universo*, he presents the geographical conditions of Europe and even those of his own country in strict accordance with writings of the old Greek and Roman geographers; his chapters on public and private life picture not the author's own time but that of Roman Antiquity; when he deals with what the older pedagogues called *realia*, there is not the slightest trace of actuality or observation.

In the first three centuries of the second millennium of the Chris-

tian era, the great European countries begin to grow out of their intellectual infancy. Political units similar to our modern national states emerge out of previous warring centuries; the economic system changes from one of primitive barter to more elastic forms of exchange; the Crusades and explorations make distant countries known; and the concentration of people and wealth in the growing cities allows for the development of universities and other forms of culture and learning which the monasteries of old times had been unable to provide. The attitude toward the great revelations of Antiquity has not yet changed. The scholar is not yet prepared for independent research in our modern sense; he still regards himself primarily as an interpreter, synthesizer, and systematizer of the great, though not always harmonized, Christian and classical traditions. Yet the discovery of more and more works of Aristotle, and the masterful application of his ideas by the Christian theologians, renders possible one of the great classical movements in the history of philosophy, the movement of Scholasticism, with the works of men such as Bonaventura, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. To the authority of these men even the popes, originally suspicious of the increase of Aristotle's influence, have to yield. Through a relatively short period of one hundred fifty years theological thinking develops from the still awkward attempts of Abelard (1079-1142) at solving theological contradictions in his *Sic et Non* ("Yea and Nay") up to the magnificent dialectical architecture of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274). It will be difficult to find any other period in history with so rapid a growth from primitive beginnings of thought toward classical mastership.

Yet if the same observer looks for a similar growth of educational ideas within the same period, he will be disappointed. There are books on liberal education and on the education of princes. They are not without interest for historians of medieval learning and the medieval liberal curriculum. But there is little originality in these books; they borrow largely from ancient sources and present a combination of the *artes liberales* and moral exhortations.

Even the genius of Thomas Aquinas is not productive with regard to education proper. There is among his works a course of disputations *De Veritate* ("On Truth"). One of these disputations, held at the University of Paris about 1257, bears the title *De Magistro* ("Concerning the Teacher").¹ It consists of four articles, constructed in the form typical of the medieval disputation. First comes the statement of the problem, then the objections to the statement, then the answer of the conductor of the discussion, then more detailed replies to the objections, preceding the answer. The first article of the disputation "Concerning the Teacher" deals with the question: "Whether man can teach and be called a teacher, or God alone?" The second article deals with the question: "Whether anyone can be called a teacher of himself?" In the third article the disputants try to come to clarity about the argument "Whether man can be taught by an angel," and in the fourth article they question as to "Whether to teach is a function of the active or the contemplative life."

Let us try to fit for modern understanding the medieval language of the discussion, using the words of Saint Thomas as much as possible. The acquisition of knowledge—like the acquisition of virtue—consists in the development of certain potentialities which pre-exist in us. Knowledge pre-exists in "certain universal principles" which are inherent in the active intellect and which enable man to derive intellectual concepts from mere sense perceptions. Virtues pre-exist in natural tendencies of the soul "which are, as it were, beginnings of virtue." "From these universal principles all principles follow as from germinal capacities."

In these "germinal capacities" or "potentialities" certain fundamental powers or principles which are inherent in the universe express themselves. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two forms of

¹S. Thomae Aquinatis: *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Quaestio xi (*De Magistro*) (Florilegium Patristicum tam veteris quam medii aevi auctores complectens). Nova Series xiii, pp. 1-36. Bonn, 1921. The following quotations are taken from the translation of *De Magistro* by Mary Helen Mayer in her book: *The Philosophy of Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Bruce Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn., 1929.

“germinal capacities” or “potentialities.” There are, first, “active or complete potentialities.” They are at work when a physical or mental act arrives at “perfect actuality,” out of its own power, without help from outside, “as is evident in healing,” if the efficacy of nature alone is strong enough to bring a sick person to health. Secondly, these “germinal capacities” or “potentialities” may appear “in passive potentiality.” Then an existent potentiality is not given sufficient strength to arrive at perfect actuality “as is evident when fire is made from air, for this cannot be done through any power existing in the air.”

From the two different forms of potentiality there follows a two-fold manner of acquiring knowledge—the one when “the natural reason (which is the “pre-existing principle” of knowledge) of itself comes to a knowledge of the unknown, which is called ‘discovery’; the other, when someone extrinsically gives aid to the natural reason, which is called ‘instruction.’”

The teacher can help his pupil to “discover” the unknown in showing him how to reason and to apply general and self-evident principles “to definite matters.” This is to teach. The teacher, then, acts like a doctor who does not create the natural powers necessary for healing, but who “causes health in a sick person” through utilizing natural powers wisely.

Now, as the inherent principles and the potentialities of reasoning, or the “light of reason,” is “implanted in us by God,” and “since no human teaching can have efficacy except by virtue of this light, it is evident that God alone is He Who teaches interiorly and principally, just as nature heals itself interiorly and even principally.” Nevertheless, as the doctor with the help of nature is said to cure, so the teacher with the help of God can be said to teach. The role of angels in the process of teaching and the question as to whether teaching belongs more to the active than to the contemplative life are problems discussed by Saint Thomas in the third and fourth articles of his disputation, but for most modern people such problems probably no longer exist.

Through a considerable stretch of imagination one may discover

certain similarities between Thomas' ideas and modern educational psychology. One may, for example, maintain that the Thomistic idea of learning as actualization of potentialities contains the modern principles of self-activity and evolution. But in this way we do justice to neither Thomas Aquinas nor modern thought; nor does this substitution of new concepts of thinking for old conform with good principles of historical research. It would perhaps be more correct to say that the whole disputation "Concerning the Teacher" is more concerned with metaphysical than with educational problems. Certainly it is a part of an extended—and often profound—discussion of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge.

The lack of interest in education proper on the part of Thomas Aquinas becomes evident also if we turn from *De Magistro* to another treatise where one could expect some reference to education, namely, to the book *De Regimine Principum* ("On the Governance of Rulers," ca. 1260).¹

In this work, not completely finished by Saint Thomas himself but by one of his pupils, the author mentions education only once as a part of the responsibilities of a Christian monarch.

Next, the founder of a state or kingdom must mark out the chosen place according to the exigencies of things necessary for the perfection of the state or kingdom. For example, when a kingdom is to be founded, he will have to determine which place is suitable for establishing cities, which is best for farms, for camps; where the study of letters is to be pursued, where the drilling of the soldiers, where men may meet for business, and so on with other things, which the perfection of the kingdom requires.²

The brevity of this reference to "the study of letters" besides "the drilling of soldiers" could be excused with regard to the fact that in the times of Thomas Aquinas education was mainly a re-

¹Saint Thomas Aquinas: *On the Governance of Rulers (De Regimine Principum)*, revised edition, translated by Gerald B. Phelan (Institute of Medieval Studies, Saint Michael's College Philosophical Texts). Sheed and Ward, Inc., London, 1938.

²*Ibidem*, p. 93.

sponsibility of the Church and not of the State. Yet some great monarchs had shown their interest in schools and universities. Only a few decades before Saint Thomas wrote his book on government, Frederick II, of the House of Hohenstauffen, had proved to be one of the greatest promoters of culture and learning in the Mediterranean realm.

In order to do justice to the role of Thomas Aquinas as educator, one must judge him not according to his contributions to the theory or practice of education but according to his work as educator of the Catholic clergy and, through the latter, of the laity. He gave Catholic priesthood not only a unified system of theology but, through the comprehensiveness of his system, a guide in almost all important problems of life and culture. Even today Thomistic ideas influence the policy of the Catholic Church and the opinions of individual Catholics much more than is generally realized. We may, consequently, finish our considerations on Thomistic education with a very brief outline of the cultural philosophy of the great theologian.¹

There is probably no other great philosopher who is avowedly so dependent upon another thinker as Thomas Aquinas is upon Aristotle. Saint Thomas' logic and theory of knowledge, his psychology and anthropology, his natural philosophy, his ethics and politics, even his metaphysics, are unthinkable without the rediscovery of Aristotle during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

For Saint Thomas as for Aristotle, the aim of all philosophical endeavor is to have the human mind understand the order inherent in the universe and feel itself increasingly a part of it.² For this the philosopher needs a clear, rational picture of his soul, which is given him by God, through which he can participate in eternal Being. The soul possesses two faculties which, implanted

¹The following summary is primarily based on the following works of Thomas Aquinas: *De Passionibus*, *Summa contra Gentiles*, *De Veritate*, and *Summa Theologiae*. The author is particularly indebted to Martin Grabmann, *Die Kulturphilosophie des heiligen Thomas von Aquin*. Augsburg, 1925. Cited in the following as: Grabmann.

²*De Veritate*, Qu. 2 a, 2.

by God, elevate man above the animal, namely, intellect and will. *Veritas*, in the sense of inner consistency, is the ultimate aim of the total universe; therefore the realization of truth is the aim of man.¹ Nevertheless, human life is just as unthinkable without will as without intellect. Will is necessary to motivate the intellect. Only through right training and co-operation of the two can man combine the true (*rerum*) with the good (*bonum*) and thus realize the moral values of Christianity, among which Saint Thomas ranks charity highest.

His appreciation of the role of the will helps the Saint to give the emotions their proper place in human life, also. In his commentary on Isaiah, he says:

It is impossible for man to devote himself uninterruptedly to action or contemplation. Therefore he must mingle joy and cheerfulness into the seriousness of life, lest the mind be suppressed by too much severity and incapable of new inspiration toward virtuous works.²

Following Aristotle, Saint Thomas conceives of the soul as an entelechy, a living total endowed with the tendency to actualize its own inherent potentialities. It possesses intellect and will, two separate but nevertheless practically inseparable faculties. During its earthly existence the soul is connected with the body to which it imparts life and energy. In consequence of this unity—which is not degrading to the soul, but natural—all acquisition of knowledge goes through the senses (*omnis cognitio incipit a sensu*). This is good Aristotelian psychology, but with Saint Thomas, as with almost all scholastic thinkers, it remains book knowledge; otherwise they would not have relied so exclusively upon the deductive method but would have given more room to systematic observation. Yet, in contrast to other divines, Saint Thomas is interested in the physical, social, economic, and political sides of life. If the human race possesses sufficient discipline of intellect and will, he thinks it not impossible to create a Christian culture

¹*Summa contra Gentiles*, Chap. I.

²Cf. Grabmann, p. 100.

here on earth. But this goal cannot be achieved by laws and regulations alone. They will have effect only if they are voluntarily obeyed by men whose morality springs not from fear but from inner commands of virtue, particularly of charity.

The goal of all men's strivings, according to both Saint Thomas and Aristotle, is happiness (*felicitas*). Enduring happiness, for Aristotle, can be achieved only through contemplation, not through hunting for external satisfaction. Likewise, Thomas Aquinas can imagine the state of felicity only in the identity of the soul with the divine; but as a Christian he is able to give to this state of harmony more color and concreteness than the Greek philosopher did. The Thomistic *adhaerere Deo*, the Augustinian notion of *esse cum Deo*, is the Aristotelian immersion of the mind into an abstract *logos*, as well as the soul's unity with a personal and living God; it is the anticipation of eternal blessedness in heaven.

In spite of his understanding of the emotional character of man, Thomas Aquinas was primarily of the rationalist type. His great aim was to build a theo-philosophical system of unbroken unity. Only one European philosopher equals Thomas Aquinas in power of systematization—Hegel.

Systematic thinkers, with all their attention fixed on the achievement of objective and impersonal truth, are generally not endowed with a natural educational interest, particularly in relation to children. Such interest springs from a loving devotion to youth just because they are young and need guidance rather than rational arguing. If the builders of philosophical systems taught, as did Plato, Aristotle, Saint Thomas, and Hegel, they preferred to converse with adults whom they could engage in search for the solution of a problem. It is men of another type of mind, like Pestalozzi and Froebel, who care for children and ponder day and night how to find the right material and the right methods of teaching. They are not so much rationalists as mystics, inspired by a feeling of universal sympathy and eager to apply this feeling to reality.

The inner connection between mysticism and interest in children appears clearly after the Renaissance in the Pietist movements,

but it can also be shown in the Middle Ages. There was Francis of Assisi, the apostle of Christian love and poverty and the founder of an order of mendicant friars who, barefooted and girt with rope, went begging from town to town and taught the children of the poor the *Paternoster* and the *Ave Maria*. But amidst the potent princes of the Church there is John Gerson (1363–1429). He was the chancellor of the most famous university of the period (that of Paris), leader of the ecclesiastical reform movement in France, and one of the most important delegates at the councils of Pisa in 1409 and Constance in 1414–1418. Like many great mystics since Plotinus, he speaks of God as the “divine darkness” into which man has to be drawn in order to sense the oneness of all existence.

For John Gerson love is the beginning and the end of Christian experience and the tie between God and man. Love, not reason, is the *unio mystica* from which all creation flows. Love is also the source and end of education. Out of this impulse the great chancellor became a teacher and assembled the children of the neighborhood in his church, serving as their spiritual and moral adviser and confessor. When the good people of Paris wondered at this unusual condescension of a prelate and the clergy blamed him for this offense of conventional dignity, he wrote a pamphlet defending his interest in children. He called it *Tractatus de Parvulis Trahendis ad Christum* (“On Leading the Young toward Christ”).¹

The treatise consists of four “arguments.” Each begins with a quotation from the Bible which shows the educational spirit of the Gospel, and ends with the words from *St. Mark* 10: 14 which also commence the whole treatise: “Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not.” I do not hesitate to call this rather unknown treatise, especially the fourth argument, the finest piece of medieval educational literature. Many will disagree with one or another point in Gerson’s religious and educational philosophy, but few will fail to be inspired by the grandeur he shows in

¹Joannes Gerson: *Tractatus de Parvulis Trahendis ad Christum*, in *Opera Omnia*, tomus Tertius, col. 277–291. Sumptibus Societatis, Antwerpiae, 1706.

defending the dignity of the teacher, and by his understanding of the conditions in which the atmosphere of confidence between adult and child can grow.

But where there is no love, what good is instruction, as one neither likes to listen to it nor properly believes in the words heard, nor follows the commandments! Therefore it is best to forego all false dignity and to become a child among children. Yet all sins have to be avoided, and all signs of impure love have to be held at bay. Also, it must be added, that our nature is inclined to resist, as Seneca proves. Our nature prefers guidance to force. Especially gifted people have the further characteristic—as the dumb creatures, the wild animals, and the birds teach us—that they are won and influenced by flattery rather than by words of threat. Why, after all, should extremely shy children hide their sins from one whom they neither hate nor fear? One who, in addition, has convinced them that he is benevolent, loyal, and friendly? But he will not be able to convince them unless he smiles kindly at the laughing ones, encourages those who play, praises their progress in learning, and when remonstrating, avoids all that is bitter or insulting. Then the children will feel he does not hate, but loves them like a brother.

In another place, when speaking of his role as father confessor, Gerson says:

There has never, with my will, remained in my heart a trace of revenge or hatred during somebody's confession of sin, were it even the murder of his own parents.

The Humanist Evolution

I. Formative Period

No society, not even the most harmonious, enjoys complete equilibrium. There is peace if the diverse interests of the people are so harmonized that the majority, or at least the influential groups, feel relatively satisfied. There is unrest if new forces begin to struggle upward, destroying old and resistant conditions and releasing new ideas and desires.

The humanist period, which lies roughly between the beginning of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, is certainly one of accelerated motion. In order to understand its character we have first to ask the cause of the downfall of medieval society, with its dominance of ecclesiastical and feudal beliefs and institutions.

The answer can be given in a few words: medievalism was destroyed by the increasing self-assertion of the human individual as a being living here on earth and interested in using his earthly chances as intensely as possible. It would be erroneous to say, as is sometimes done, that medieval man was not also interested in enjoying his temporal pilgrimage. Men were self-interested then and will be so in every period; otherwise they would not be normal human beings. The thing which changed was not man's longing for the felicity of a full life but his opinions about what constituted happiness. If one is convinced, as medieval man was in general, that the real and by far longer part of one's existence will come hereafter, then he lives under auspices other than those of a primarily secular philosophy.

✓ But why did this secularization take place? For the people at the end of the Middle Ages life became more pleasant, or at least more interesting. The Crusades, the first mechanical discoveries,

and explorations widened their horizon and the range of their activity. Through growth of enterprise they became wealthier, and life, though perhaps more dangerous, became more attractive and worth the risk. The Aristotelianism of the scholastics not only sharpened the intellect for the rational interpretation of faith, but—against the will of the early scholastic theologians—it created doubt in faith and delight in reasoning for its own sake. Even among the pious there developed sectarian movements which made religion an individual affair and thus imperiled the role of the Church as the common and indispensable mediator between God and man.

These and other experiences increased the mental maturity, critical attitude, and practical efficiency of the more prosperous classes, and the result was a number of new virtues and also of new vices which distinguish modern man from medieval man.

As the Church went down, the State went up. People began to take pride in their specific national cultures, with particular languages and traditions, and centralized governments replaced the old feudal system, which had become too unwieldy for concerted political action because of its innumerable guilds, corporations, and complicated loyalties from man to man. Though dictatorial in a sense, the new absolutist governments and their officialdom served the interests of the productive middle classes better than had the feudal lords, who often had become a kind of privileged waylayers. The greater princely houses understood how to concentrate power and also how to represent their nations as guardians of art and learning.

✓ Whereas medieval man was taught to feel at home nowhere on earth, but to long for salvation in heaven,¹ his children and grandchildren began to establish themselves in a larger expanse of ideas and activities, in more comfortable houses, and in a better

¹Vincent of Beauvais (c. 1190–c. 1264) quotes the following sentence from Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1141): "A man attached to his fatherland is weak. A strong man is one who can feel at home in any country. Perfect is one who regards the whole world as a place of exile."

organized commonwealth. This new generation interpreted the ancient authors not merely as forerunners of Christianity; they enjoyed their pagan wisdom with genuine understanding and real friendship and without the pangs of conscience which their grandfathers had felt. Therefore the humanist or Renaissance culture which follows medievalism cannot be explained as a mere quantitative "revival of Antiquity." Antiquity was present also in the Middle Ages. The explanation lies in the rise of a new vitality, springing from all those factors which contributed to a new spirit of self-assertion and self-realization.

Some of these factors emerge as early as the thirteenth century and grow, like all deep cultural forces, slowly but steadily. Hence, in spite of the upheaval caused by the new era in almost all ways of life, it was less the result of a revolution than of an evolution. Even the great intellectual pioneers of modernity, men such as Copernicus and Galileo, appear now to the historian more as links in an organic development than as Prometheic personalities. Also, Luther and Calvin did not invent completely new ideas; they received much of their theological background from acknowledged teachers of Scholasticism, and as reformers they were preceded by such men as Wycliffe, Huss, and Savonarola. The time was ripe for change.

It was ripe because new forces rose and also because the foundation of the older civilization was corroding. The idea of the political unity of mankind, represented by the Holy Roman Empire, had vanished. The unity of a common language of the educated and with it the internationality of the mind was in jeopardy. And the third representative of cultural catholicity, the Church, was less than ever the earthly symbol of the Kingdom of God. In order to learn this we do not need to rely on the satires of vituperative humanists against the cynicism and immorality of the clergy and the monkishness and venality of the universities; we refer rather to such a devout Catholic philosopher as the Spaniard Juan Luis Vives, who was a contemporary of Erasmus of Rotterdam, Luther, and Calvin. Vives, though one of the foremost pro-

gressive educators of his time, had no interest in exaggerating the evils of a tradition which he wished to rescue from perishing. Yet the picture of the corruption of learning he draws in his work *De Causis Corruptarum Artium* ("On the Causes of the Corruption of the Arts") suffices to convince us that the medieval school system, especially the universities, was utterly degenerated.

Scholastic philosophy no longer satisfied the spiritual and philosophical search of the educated people. Even the guildsmen in the cities rebelled against the old cathedral schools and enforced a more up-to-date training for their sons. Vagabond scholars and itinerant clergymen, the so-called *Vagantes*, who had apparently formed a guild of their own, amused or excited their hearers with their satires against the greedy prelates:

*Vidi cantantem nummum missam celebrantem:
Nummus cantabat, nummus responsa parabat.
Vidi quod flebat, dum sermonem faciebat,
Et subridebat, populum quia decipiebat.*¹

("I saw King Money celebrate the Holy Mass:
King Money sang, and King Money responded.
I saw him shedding tears, while he delivered the sermon,
And laughing in his sleeves, while he cheated the people.")

Yet for centuries the same Church had ministered to almost all the cultural, charitable, and spiritual interests of Europe. Can we wonder that it was painful to break away from it, that it was difficult to learn to walk alone, and that exactly the most responsible among the new humanist educators felt intensely the difficulty of a new orientation? Most of those who did not join the Protestant movement tried to combine the Catholic tradition with the new individualistic concepts of personality, without being able to find inner harmony and stability. Compared with the quiet solemnity and pious dignity of the great scholastics, many of the professional humanists appear as a rather unsteady flock. Some were ridiculously self-centered and vainglorious, others were bookish

¹*Vagantenlieder (Carmina Burana)*, edited by Robert Ulich and Max Manitius, p. 152. Jena, 1927.

and ascetic-minded; the earliest and most interesting of them, Petrarch, combined all these traits. Like adolescents, many humanists were hypercritical about their contemporaries; but since men must admire something, they admired themselves, their clique, and Antiquity.

In concentrating on the educational aspects of Humanism, we deal first with a group of men who initiate a new educational movement through recommending a more congenial understanding of the great classical authors and their language. Unfortunately, the humanist teachers do not display much of the intuition we admire in the diaries of Leonardo da Vinci, of the grandeur we revere in the art of Michelangelo, or of the spirit of adventure shown by the great statesmen of the Renaissance. Though the deepest volitions of a vital society resonate in the ideals of education as a formal procedure of schooling, education is easily exposed to pedantry, and as subject matter it prefers to use proved and exemplary patterns. Even if the teacher wishes to do something more, the parents mostly prevent him. Therefore the interpretation of the humanist era or the Renaissance as a mere revival of ancient learning—an interpretation which we rejected previously—has a considerable portion of truth with respect to the typical educator of the period. He, more than his contemporaries, needed first of all a confirmation of his own rising concept of man by interpreting classical documents, in which he sensed a spirit congenial to his own.

This imitative or classicist form of Humanism, as we may call it, had its formative period mainly before 1500. After describing it, we will pass over to those great cultural and educational movements of Humanism which are still constituent parts of our modern consciousness. Though to a considerable degree still drawing on Antiquity, they display creativeness and vitality in fields unknown or alien to the ancient mind.

This is the case with the Protestant movement led by Luther. Erasmus of Rotterdam, who is discussed after the Protestant reformer, strangely combines a classicist with a modern mentality.

Also, the leader of the counter-reformation, Ignatius of Loyola, is, in spite of all his burning religiosity, more of a humanist than Luther. With Montaigne there appears a new, completely secular type of Humanism. This secularism, together with growing independence from Antiquity, leads over to the rationalist and scientific movements of the seventeenth century. As their representatives we have chosen the figures of Bacon and Descartes.

II. The Early Classicists

The most outstanding of the early classicists were Italians: Pietro Paolo Vergerio, the Elder, who wrote to his friend Ubertino of Carrara a treatise *De Inguenuis Moribus et Liberalibus* ("On Good Morals and Liberal Studies") about 1400; Leonardo Bruni, who wrote in 1405 *De Studiis et Litteris* ("On Studies and Letters"); Leone Battista Alberti, who in his treatise *Della Famiglia* (1443) dealt with the cultivation of the family life; Aenea Sylvio, later Pope Pius II, who composed for the young Ladislaus of Hungary a treatise *De Liberorum Educatione* ("On the Education of Youth") in 1445; Battista Guarino, who as a young man of twenty-five outlined a plan *De Ordine Docendi et Studendi* ("On Teaching and Learning") in 1459; and, finally, Maffeo Vegio, whose book *De Educatione Liberorum et Eorum Claris Moribus* ("On the Liberal and Moral Education of Children"), about 1450, may be considered the most important of the discourses just mentioned.

Most of the humanist authors dedicate some time to the eugenic and hygienic responsibilities in the upbringing of children, a topic already emphasized by later medieval writers; then they deal with the influence of good or bad examples on the behavior of the young and with the care to be taken in the selection of servants and teachers; they discuss the right mean between indulgence and severity on the part of the educator; they emphasize the necessity of good manners, cultivated gestures, and pleasing dress; and last but not least, they advocate a new curriculum. This curriculum is still based on the traditional seven liberal arts and requires an enormous amount of memorizing. Very little or no incentive is given to independent thinking, problem solving, or spontaneous activity; and, in comparison with learning, observation is almost completely neglected, except in the educational philosophy of Leon Battista Alberti, one of the great universal talents of the Renaissance, famous as writer, musician, and architect. In spite of much

interest in better methods of teaching, the typical humanist lacks a clear conception of educational method and of the learning process. In this respect it would be hard to find a decisive difference between early humanistic and older medieval education. ✓

Yet learning, for the humanist, has no longer the same purpose it had for the medieval educator. It is no longer exclusively for the sake of continuing a tradition; it is, at least in intention, designed to help the individual toward a higher degree of self-expression and a better understanding and enjoyment of life. The aim is an independent and all-round educated man, the *uomo universale*, who is not only a lover of literature but also an artist, a diplomat, a good soldier, an admirer of beauty, and a master in polite conversation. The origin of such refined aristocratic standards must be linked historically to a great cultural development which had paralleled the growth of scholastic learning in the secular sphere of life. During the period of the Crusades the Christian knight had broadened his horizon and had come in contact with the superior civilizations of the Byzantine and Arabic empires. His idea of fighting in the service for Christianity—hypocritical though it was in many respects—gave him a feeling of a mission and dignity. This Christian ideal of chivalry combined with the ideals of valiancy, comradeship, and fairness, thus producing a kind of professional ethics, comparable to that of the educated clergy and to the rising cultural aspirations of the wealthy aristocracy of the cities. Characteristic of this knightly style of life are the romantic admiration of womanhood, the emphasis on discipline and form in social life, and the appreciation of the arts. As the culture of chivalry was not a learned one, but a genuine expression of a class proud of its origin and customs, it could become the source of a powerful stream of genuine vernacular poetry, which even in the course of centuries has not lost its beauty. ✓

Also, the humanist educators appreciate poetry and the fine arts because the society of the Renaissance, like medieval chivalry, considers piety to be only one among other values; beauty and glory are also represented. History enters into the curriculum

because history is the study of man, of his fortunes and his misfortunes. Humanism also gives philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, a more independent role in education, for philosophy is the means by which a noble mind converses with its equals, liberates itself from prejudice, and discovers the dignity of great and free ideas. Thus Greek was placed on the same or even a higher level than Latin, for it was the language of Plato in which, according to the humanists, both beauty and wisdom had found their abode.

The new spirit created, at least at some places, a more friendly atmosphere between teacher and pupil. Unfortunately, the most lovable of the early humanists, Vittorino da Feltre (1378-1446), left no written work behind him. He conducted an academy at Mantua where mind and body, classical studies and Christian piety, free self-expression of the child, and character training must have been harmonized to an unusual degree.¹ No wonder that the German humanist and educator, Jakob Wimpfeling (1450-1528), looked with a mixture of envy and admiration at the spread of a new life in the schools beyond the Alps. In one of his writings he says:

There were in Germany learned and famous men, before anybody thought of Alexander.² And now we see that the wise Italians no longer teach according to his method. They acquaint their children as quickly as possible with the fundamentals of grammar, just as much as is necessary for connecting words properly. Then they lead the students to read the poets, orators, and historians. Thus they make them acquainted with the particular quality of the Latin tongue, its pleasing elegance, its special modes of expression, the beauty and richness of its style, its logical con-

¹Cf. William Harrison Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators*. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1905.

²By Alexander is meant Alexander Gallus de Villa Dei, who (ca. 1119) published the *Doctrinale Puerorum*, a Latin Grammar for boys in poetic form, based on the old and widely used *Ars Grammatica* by Donatus, a teacher of grammar in the middle of the fourth century at Rome. Alexander's *Doctrinale* explained grammar "philosophically" according to a method which forced the pupil to memorize without leading him to actual skill in the handling of Latin.

sistency, the meaning of difficult terms, and the art of convincing others. So the sons of the Italians soon acquire the capacity of following lectures about secular and ecclesiastical law and about the Scriptures, and often they enter into legal practice in an age in which my poor compatriots still argue about the vocative case, the five figures, the tricks in apposition, and the genitive case and all the other absurdities of Alexander's grammatical poem—as if this poor piece of work really deserved to be called “a poem.” The same young men, if guided by efficient teachers, could have received the poet's laurel or the doctor's cap, yet after ten or fifteen years of study they have no other answer to the question as to what they have learned but “the two parts of the Alexander.” So it happens that most of our compatriots running around with the degree of Master of Philosophy or the Seven Liberal Arts are incapable of conversing in Latin with educated people, or writing a Latin letter, or of composing a Latin poem. Nor can they tell a story or explain the shortest part of the mass, the so-called “collect”.¹

We have to grant that the humanists made a good stride forward in the methods of teaching. Their own concept of personality, combined with their eagerness to apply the ripe educational principles of late Antiquity, created a new enthusiasm in teaching. To a degree, it approached modern attitudes in its tendency to understand learning as a mode of familiarizing the young with the authority of the past and also as a way toward a richer personal life. But it was the tragedy of Humanism that the professional educators among its representatives were overwhelmed by their admiration for Homer, Cicero, and Vergil, and especially for their pedagogical master Quintilian. Perhaps European higher education would have fared better if the zealous collector of old manuscripts, the humanist Andrea Poggio, had not discovered Quintilian's *Ars Oratoria* in the cloister of St. Gall, where it had lain hidden for several centuries.

For it was mainly due to the authority of the ancient orator that

¹Translated from Chap. III, p. 130, of *Des Johannes Murmellius pädagogische Schriften*, übersetzt von Joseph Freundgen (Sammlung der bedeutendsten pädagogischen Schriften aus alter und neuer Zeit, Band 18). Paderborn, 1894. Murmellius quotes from Wimpfeling's *Weg-Weiser*, Chap. XVII, Part 2.

the masters of the Latin schools of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even those of later periods, buried the originality of many a youth in the grave of formalism. They placed *Eloquentia* (even in a foreign language) on the throne and forbade the use of any phrase that could not be found in one of the acknowledged Roman writers. In this way they condemned their beloved Latin to change from a living language, which to a degree it had been in the Middle Ages, into a dead one.

In his treatise *On the Education of Youth*, addressed to Ladislaus, the young king of Hungary and Bohemia, Aenea Sylvio recommends to the young prince the reading of history because of its importance for the interpretation of the present and for the acquisition of practical wisdom. But he warns him in the same breath against reading the chronicles of his own country, for they are, according to the humanist's judgment, without the necessary oratorical elegance and are written by uneducated authors. One must wonder that he considers it advisable for a prince to know the languages spoken in his own territory. Some humanists, in a cruel misconception of the emotional factor in the life of a child and his family, went so far as to advise parents to speak only Latin with their children. Sometimes one is inclined to question whether the humanist emphasis on a new education has anything to do with true ethical refinement. To give only one instance: the famous Maffeo Vegio, following the example of Quintilian, objects to the cruel punishment of children. He suggests a remedy: If you are angry with your children, and you hesitate to whip them, flog your servants, a procedure which will frighten your own noble offspring. As another way of education Vegio recommends that children be taken to public executions; to see a man hanging, bleeding, or burning may have a wholesome effect on the moral development of a child. Executions of criminals were, to tell the truth, a kind of public festival in earlier times, but many a simple monk of the Middle Ages would have been horrified by the pedagogical recommendations of the learned humanist Maffeo Vegio. The latter wrote better Latin, but he was an inferior man. After perusing

the books of minor humanist educators, stuffed with thousands of loosely connected quotations from ancient and Christian authors¹ and void of all originality, even the most ardent advocate of classical studies must deplore the fate of a movement which professed to love individuality and the independent spirit of Antiquity but ended in imitation.

¹How rapidly the literature on education in this period increased is shown by a French publication which, though referring to the sixteenth century, is nevertheless indicative of the general growth of educational interest in the total humanist period. It is the third volume of the *Mémoires et documents scolaires* of the *Musée pédagogique*, which has the title: *Répertoire des ouvrages pédagogiques du xvième siècle*, 733 pages of nothing but the titles of pedagogical books of the time, with short indications of their content. (Cf. Ludwig Wattendorff's *Montaigne, Über die Erziehung der Kinder*, p. 23. Paderborn, 1894.)

III. Luther

(1483-1546)

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

When in 1521 Martin Luther on his journey toward the Diet of Worms passed through the old city of Erfurt, the humanist-minded teachers of its famous university received him at the outskirts of their city. Their rector greeted him with an inspiring address, and the famous poet of the university, Eobanus Hessus, recited a poem in which he pictured Luther entering the city in the graceful company of the nine muses. The allegory was a prophecy of the beginning of a new era rising from the co-operation between Humanism and Luther's religious reform.

The day after Luther's departure from Erfurt it was not the humanist and theological professors who joined to bring about a new civilization, but the students who joined with the rowdies and the dissatisfied journeymen to pillage and demolish the houses of the clergy, even with indulgence of the magistrate. Such riots were repeated during the following years, with the result that not only the Catholic clergy but also the humanist professors and the more serious students preferred to transfer their work to other universities. Their places were taken by young enthusiasts, sectarians, and runaway friars who, according to the Protestant historian Friedrich Paulsen,¹ "preached the Evangel without any admixture of human reason." The university of Erfurt never recovered from these disturbances; it lingered on for almost three centuries, then died an inglorious death.

The rebellions of the young townspeople against a parasitic clergy and against the restrictions of the guild system and the privileges of the master families were nothing but an urban parallel

¹Friedrich Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts*, Vol. I, p. 197. Leipzig, 1919.

to the feuds of the small against the large vassals, and of the peasants against the landlords in the rural areas. The humanist movement itself was a part of the shifting cultural scene, but its followers rode on the surf of the waves without knowing their depth and power. Like professors of other periods, they indulged naively in the hope that the study and writing of books would quietly usher in the new civilization.

Only so could they deceive themselves about the real nature of their relation to the leader of the Protestant reform, Martin Luther. In the comprehensive meaning of the word, Luther, too, belonged to the great humanist movement in that he wished to deliver man from the fetters of medieval institutionalism and to give him his religious birthright of a personal relation to God. Luther welcomed also the philological achievements of the humanists and insisted on the establishment of new philological chairs in the universities. But he did not regard the study of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew as an end in itself. His reason was the following:

And let us be sure of this: we shall not long preserve the gospel without the languages. The languages are the sheath in which this sword of the Spirit is contained.¹

Nor did the kind of individualism which Luther represented foster the feeling of rational self-autonomy, as the ancient had had it. Rather, his recognition of the individual responsibility of the human soul to God—without any compromise and aid coming from appointed institutions—revealed to him the exposure and sinfulness of all human existence, both personal and social. He would have ended in despair had he not found relief in the joyful experience of salvation through faith in God's eternal grace. This "surrender" is not abandonment of moral and spiritual responsibility. On the contrary, Augustinian in character, it springs from Luther's fresh

¹Martin Luther: *Works*, in 6 vols. A. J. Holman Company, Philadelphia, 1915-1932. Cited in the following as: *Luther's Works*. See Vol. IV, p. 114, "To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools."

interpretation of the third chapter of Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans:

Therefore by the deed of the Law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the Law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the Law is manifested, being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe: for there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.¹

But the contrast between Luther and the humanists was not only of a religious nature. We know now that Luther was not of so poor and humble origin as older historians reported. But his parents certainly belonged to the common folk, and he was proud of his origin. As a curate he suffered with his flock; and a profound sympathy with his people is the source of his interest in public education, an interest entirely foreign to the large majority of the humanists who held to Horace's *odi profanum volgus et arceo* ("I hate and shun the vulgar crowd").

The great document of Luther's solicitude for his Christian fellow men are the ninety-five theses of October 31, 1517, which opened the battle of Protestantism in Germany. Their immediate cause was the inconsiderate sale of indulgences by priests and monks, organized by the great banking house of Fugger in order to give its debtor, the archbishop of Magdeburg and Mainz, count of Brandenburg, an opportunity to repay his enormous debts to both the Fuggers and the Holy See. These ninety-five theses are an educational document as much as a theological one. They are primarily concerned with the corruption and confusion which Luther had observed in his community as a result of the materialistic conception of salvation, shown in the shameless hawking of indulgences. His new theology of individual grace and faith does not yet appear in the theses; he still acknowledges the Pope as the supreme Christian authority; hoping against hope, he expects the Holy See to

¹Romans 3: 20-25.

put an end to the abuse. The main theme of the theses is expressed in the often recurring words *Docendi sunt Christiani* ("Christians are to be taught").

They are to be taught that the Pope would not estimate the purchase of indulgences as highly as real works of charity; that through the exercise of charity a person becomes better and grows in the grace of the Lord, but he does not become better through indulgences—he only makes himself free from penalty. He who sees a poor man and neglects him in order to buy indulgences does not buy the indulgence of the Pope but the wrath of God. If a Christian does not possess more than he needs for the support of his family, he ought not to exhaust his fortune for indulgences, for it is for his own sake that he purchases them. Even though the Pope is greatly in need, he much prefers the prayer of the devout to the latter's money. If the sinner through indulgences loses the fear of God, then the indulgences are more harmful than useful. The Pope—so Luther still chooses to explain—does not know the trespasses of the preachers who sell indulgences; he would rather see the Cathedral of St. Peter at Rome reduced to ashes than build it up with the skin, the flesh, and the bones of his sheep.

There is no doubt that Luther, while writing these sentences, did not want to break with his church. But when he saw his cause frivolously rejected by the hierarchy, moral indignation united with his feeling of an apostolic mission, and thus began all those great though sad events which eventually led to the irreparable split in modern Christendom. During his fight Luther always showed how inseparably the two—the theologian and the educator—were united in him. And about both aspects of his work the opinions of posterity have differed to the same extent.

In order to arrive at an honest judgment—absolute objectivity in such complicated matters is beyond human power—we must first free ourselves from all prejudices and propaganda, whether they come from the Catholic or the Protestant camp. Luther was not a heretic and a willful destroyer of a great tradition, as children are taught in most Catholic schools. The medieval tradition had

already been corrupted by the hierarchy itself; when the simple monk of Wittenberg wished to restore purity, the potentates of the Church did not listen to him; they wished to eliminate the prophet in the same way that they had eliminated Huss and Savonarola. Nor did the Catholic Church before Luther represent a united body of believers. As early as the thirteenth century the Waldenses and the Albigenses had been slaughtered for their faith, and the Dominican order had established courts of inquisition in all countries of Europe to burn heretics.

On the other hand, the typical Protestant belief that everything new, great, and enlightened in modernity is due to Luther and other Protestant reformers is also a myth. Luther hated "the damned pagan Aristotle," because, according to his opinion, Aristotle had injected the poison of intellectual pride into the body of the Church. The Protestant reformer would have sympathized much more with the conservative theologians of the twelfth century, who tried to suppress the newly discovered books of the heathen philosopher, than with Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who fused Aristotelian thought with Christian thought. For Luther, the scholar who attempts to think independently without letting faith direct his mind becomes the most dangerous enemy of himself and of mankind because he conceals his sin of isolation from the Divine under the false claim of being the high priest of verity.

The scholastics believed it to be their duty to interpret, by means of Aristotelian logic, the Christian tradition as laid down not only by Christ and the Apostles but also by the Fathers and the councils of the Church. Luther rejected this position. For him the Bible, and exclusively the Bible, was The Word which, in order to be understood, required first of all personal inspiration. Seen from the vantage point of history, Luther's theology contains nothing essentially new. To be sure, he did not lack in religious ideas of his own, but they can be found before him: in the theology of St. Augustine, with his concept of grace and faith as expressed in his work *De Spiritu et Litera* ("On the Spirit and the Letter"),

and in mystics like Johannes Tauler, whose sermons were praised by Luther as products of a "pure and sound theology."¹

Even Luther's translation of the Bible is one of many in his era, for all the great sectarian movements insisted on giving their adherents the Evangel in their native tongue.

But the search for predecessors and influences does justice to Luther no more than to any other great man; they all have their predecessors. The merit and originality of the genius lies in his ability to lift new ideas, half dormant and half awake, from the twilight of man's mind into the clear rays of consciousness, to reveal to a generation their specific historical mission, and so to guide them from exhausted fields toward new pastures of history.

Here we have the answer to the Catholic-Protestant controversy. Luther is not the willful destroyer of an old great tradition. On the contrary, the medieval chord vibrated more strongly in him than in many humanists. Nor is he the originator of our modern civilization, with its freedom of thought and research. But the trend toward more personal and immediate relations of man to God and the world, which we discovered as the underlying dynamic of the Renaissance, found in him its most powerful religious agent. This is his historical significance.

Incomplete and, in a way, narrow though the religious individualism of Luther or of such men as Calvin and Zwingli was, it dug new wells of personal spiritual vitality. No doubt the simple German, Swiss, Dutch, English, and Scotch farmers were far below the intellectual level of an educated Thomist, and there was no ecclesiastical grandeur about them when they read the Bible with their family in long winter nights. From a scientific or even from a normal psychological point of view, their conversations about grace and damnation, heaven and hell-fire, were perhaps more superstitious than learned theological discussions, albeit these simple

¹*Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters*, translated and edited by Preserved Smith. 2 vols. Vol. I, pp. 46-48: "Luther to Spalatin, Dec. 14, 1516," p. 48: "If you delight in reading pure and sound theology, like that of the earliest age, and in German, read the sermons of John Tauler." United Lutheran Publication House, Philadelphia, 1913-1918.

Protestants certainly took religion more seriously than did many a pope of the Renaissance. In addition, they had the proud feeling of reading their Bible with the same divine right as any cardinal in Rome or any professor at the Sorbonne, at Oxford, or at Wittenberg. The kind of inwardness arising from this private lay-theology motivated people to speculate about general human and philosophical problems. Early Protestant Pietism, one could say, laid the spiritual foundation for the great rationalist and idealist philosophies of the eighteenth century, just as medieval alchemy paved the way for the laboratory work of the modern chemist. Light cannot come without the preceding struggle of dawn.

Another factor contributing to the vitality of Protestantism was its relation to democratic development. In every country the Protestant movement was accompanied by social revolutions: by the socialist upheavals and manifestos of the German farmers, by the wars and hopes of the Cromwellian army, by the foundation of democratic communities in Switzerland and New England, and by the heroic fights against political and religious suppression in Holland. Even where these democratic tendencies were quenched, as they were with the help of Luther himself in Germany and partly also in the England of Cromwell, their seeds waited to sprout forth in new forms under more favorable conditions. Nothing for which people have shed their blood remains without its consequences. To what extent even new economic forces were released by the new Protestant ethics of immediacy is difficult to say, though such a relationship is not unlikely.¹

But what may have stimulated the Protestant countries most was the increase in mettle which always springs from changes and decisions in individuals as well as in peoples. Protestantism meant more than a merely spiritual transformation. For Henry VIII of England it was no spiritual experience at all, but a matter of politi-

¹See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons, with a Foreword by R. H. Tawney (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930); and Richard Henry Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism; a Historical Study* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1926).

cal expediency, and things were not essentially different in some parts of Germany. But it always involved the severance from public and private life of all the thousands of ecclesiastical institutions which had given their particular character to medieval society. The Catholic Church, with its priesthood and manifold orders, had offered shelter and career to the scions of the aristocracy, the learned sons of the common people, and every kind of broken existence which concealed its incapacity for normal life by entering a monastery. All the great works of charity had been done under the auspices of the Church, and most schools, from the primary grades to the universities, were chartered and supported by the priesthood. But it was not only the Church that changed; medieval decentralized feudalism was superseded at the same time by absolutism. This meant a reorganization of the social order, with all the new challenges, duties, and adjustments that ensue from such an event.

LUTHER AS EDUCATOR

One of the public activities most deeply affected by this change was education. It had, so far, been mainly handled by the Church, though during the later part of the Middle Ages princes, city magistrates, guilds, and minor vassals had taken an interest in it, an interest not always welcomed by the rather jealous ecclesiastical authorities. School structure and school control, as well as the curriculum, became an object of discord, for the merchants and guild masters in the cities were dissatisfied with the unpractical education of their sons. The first signs of vocational education appeared now in the cities, as they had already shown in the military education of the knights. The humanists and the Reformation gave the death blow to Catholic supremacy in educational matters. Naturally, there followed a state of disorder in the school system, as is always the case when old forms break down and a new order has not yet been found. And as the trend was from decentralization to centralization, nothing was more natural for the Protestant reformers than to appeal to the governments of states and cities

to reorganize their schools and use them as a foundation of a stable Protestant society.

Here we have the reason for Luther's two famous epistles:¹ "An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate" (*An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung*, 1520) and "To the Councilmen of All Cities in Germany That They Establish and Maintain Christian Schools" (*An die Ratsherrn aller Staedte deutschen Lands, dass sie christliche Schulen aufrichten und halten sollen*, 1524).

One could venture the statement that Luther was more advanced beyond medievalism in his educational views than in his theology. According to him, it is the meaning and the aim of education to lead the young toward that degree of piety and understanding of the social obligations which will render a Christian community possible. Such a community can be built up only by citizens who know and obey the word of God, and who respect human dignity in themselves and others.

✍ The teacher ought not to be the flogger; he is not simply the appointee of a school board but the holder of a sacred office. Humble though his work is, he does it in the name of God and as the trustee of the community. But the teacher can spread the Christian spirit among the people only if there exists an obligatory and universal school system. Thus Luther advances the idea of the responsibility of the secular authorities for maintaining and supervising the public system. God has established them to see to it that a Christian life becomes possible, and this can be done only by dint of protecting religious life and education.

In a letter to Margrave George of Brandenburg, Luther develops a plan which reminds us of Thomas Jefferson's famous plan to combine public education with the task of national selection:

It is well that in all towns and villages good primary schools should be established out of which could be picked and chosen

¹Luther's *Works*, Vol. II, pp. 61-164; Vol. IV, pp. 103-130.

those who are fit for the universities, out of which then the men can be taken who are to serve your land and people. If the towns or their citizens cannot do this, then it would be well to establish new stipends for the support of a few bright fellows in the deserted monasteries, so that every town might have one to two students. In the course of time, when the common people see that their sons can become pastors and preachers, and get other offices, many of those who now think that a scholar cannot get a living will again keep their sons in school.¹ ✓

In the elementary schools every child is to be taught the three R's and, as the first introduction to Christianity, the Catechism which Luther himself had prepared for the use of the Protestant community. Apparently the reformer expected these schools to instruct the pupils also in the elements of Latin; in his time almost all scientific and professional and the largest part of the general cultural tradition was expressed in that language.

According to Luther, the Christian endowed with faith in the grace of God does "all things gaily and freely"; and as this becomes easier in a healthy mind and body, education has to take care not only of the religious and intellectual but of the total physical and emotional development of the child. Like Plato, Luther attributes to music a particular influence on the cultivation of our emotions.

I always loved music; who so has skill in this art, is of a good temperament, fitted for all things. We must teach music in schools; a schoolmaster ought to have skill in music, or I would not regard him, neither should we ordain young men as preachers, unless they have well exercised in music. . . . Music is one of the best arts; the notes give life to the text, it expels melancholy, as we see in King Saul. Kings and princes ought to maintain music, for great potentates and rulers should protect good and liberal arts and laws; though private people have desire thereunto and love it, yet their ability is not adequate. We read in the Bible that the good and godly kings maintained and paid singers. Music is the best solace

¹*Luther's Correspondence and Other Contemporary Letters*, translated and edited by Preserved Smith, Vol. II, pp. 487-488. United Lutheran Publication House, Philadelphia, 1913-1918.

for a sad and sorrowful mind; by it the heart is refreshed and settled again in peace.¹

Music is a fair, noble gift of God, next to theology. I would not change my little knowledge of music for a great deal. Youths should be trained in this art, for it makes fine, clever people.²

The curriculum which Luther proposes for the more advanced school types resembles that of the humanists in its emphasis on ancient languages. Yet the classical studies are for him only of subsidiary value. He wanted not Humanism but religion; he wanted not an artificial culture but a Christian people with learned men among them capable of interpreting the great documents and lifting hearts upward.

The "poets and orators"³ are useful in that they enable the student to learn the languages necessary for the study of Christianity more pleasantly than would be possible by means of unimaginative grammars. In a letter of the year 1523 Luther tries to reassure the humanist Eobanus Hessus, who had expressed the fear of many of his colleagues that the new theology might make the Germans "more barbarous in letters" than they ever had been. But even here the absolutely Christ-centered philosophy of the reformer becomes evident. "Certainly it is my desire," he says, "that there shall be as many poets and rhetoricians as possible," but not for the sake of Latin poetry or rhetorics. Rather, "by these studies, as by no other means, people are wonderfully fitted for the grasping of sacred truth and for handling it skillfully and happily." This merely assistant role of the expressive arts is certainly not what the admirers of Cicero and Quintilian had dreamed of.

Yet this rather perfunctory treatment of humanist poetry comes from a man who was the author of some of our most beautiful

¹Martin Luther: *Table Talk*, translated and edited by William Hazlitt, pp. 340-341. H. G. Bohn, London, 1875.

²*Conversations with Luther; Selections from Recently Published Sources of the Table Talk*, translated and edited by Preserved Smith and Herbert Percival Gallinger, p. 99. The Pilgrim Press, London, 1915.

³Cf. "To the Councilmen," etc., in Luther's *Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 126, 128, and 129, treating on books and libraries.

religious hymns, though he considered himself only an amateur. His hymn "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God" (*Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott*)¹ still helps people to defy all earthly fear and to raise their souls to the Absolute, while the Latin poems of the humanists are buried in our libraries. When a man has poetry and music flowing out of the abundance of a great and simple heart, what else can he do but leave their stilted verses to the humanists? They wrote their hexameters in a foreign tongue, not in the vernacular; they imitated foreign models; their forging and hammering could never serve as a genuine relief and release for an excited soul; and they addressed princes and scholars, not the people. This was not poetry, according to Luther's heart.

But like the humanists, Luther thoroughly condemns the medieval methods of teaching and learning. It is difficult to find more insulting terms than those used by him in his attacks on the training which was habitual in the monkish schools. In his letter "To the Councilmen" Luther also agrees with the humanists' emphasis on history and with their doctrine that instruction should be related more closely to life.

. . . the stupid, useless and harmful books of the monks Catholicon, Florista, Graccista, Labyrinth, Dormi secure [names of Latin grammars and anthologies], and the like ass's dung, were introduced by the devil. Consequently the Latin language became corrupted and there remained nowhere a decent school, course of instruction, or method of study. . . . Was it not a cruel misfortune that a boy was obliged heretofore to study twenty years and more, only to learn enough bad Latin to become a priest and read mass? Whoever got as far as this was counted blessed. Blessed was the mother that bore such a child! And yet he remained all his life a poor ignoramus, fit neither to cackle nor to lay eggs.²

Through all his educational writings there goes a trend toward connecting the school with a man's calling. Therefore he includes the adult in his educational scheme; libraries ought to be estab-

¹Cf. *Luther's Hymns*, edited by James F. Lambert, with an Introduction by John A. W. Haas. United Lutheran Publication House, Philadelphia, 1917.

²*Luther's Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 128 f.

lished to give people an opportunity to read good books and to inform themselves about God, nature, and their nation. But like his contemporaries, and like many modern professors, he was unaware how bookish were the books he wrote and recommended for use in the classroom. Fortunately there existed in his time a well-ordered system of apprenticeship; children lived in a world of handicraft and concreteness. Even though teachers employed nothing but books, and in between the rod, the upbringing of youth was not so bookish as we may think.

Rarely in history have educational programs had such a practical effect as Luther's had. That the majority of the German princes adopted Protestantism primarily for reason of religion may be fairly doubted. It was, with most of them, a mixture of political and religious interests. However, many of them understood the necessity of reform in the school system of their country and issued exemplary school regulations which laid the groundwork for the most comprehensive popular school system to exist in any country up to the end of the nineteenth century.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that Luther increased the influence of the State and the ruling caste on Church and education to a degree that worked against the very nature of the idea of Protestantism as a movement of freedom of individual conscience. Consequently, there has always been, especially in Germany, an ardent discussion about Luther's opinion concerning the interference of government with cultural and educational affairs.

Such a discussion must be based mainly on his treatise "Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed" (*Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, wie weit man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei*, 1523).¹ Here Luther draws a clear distinction between Christian ethics, with its demand for love, brotherhood, and purity, and politics, with its external laws, intrigues, wars, and conquest. If we all were Christians and lived in the spirit of Christ, we would not need the State at all. We have to tolerate and obey it as one of the many limitations of freedom brought about by our sinfulness. There is, from

¹Luther's *Works*, Vol. III, pp. 223-273.

Luther's point of view, only one means through which the State can bridge the gap between politics and Christianity—that is, to protect those who want to live according to the Gospel and to help them to educate their children.

Unfortunately, Luther's stress on the social duties of the State remained within the concepts of benevolent patriarchal absolutism. Enlightened princes were the most Luther and his contemporaries could hope for. In addition, the Reformation was almost nipped in the bud by revolutions of social and religious character which—like the revolts of the peasants and of the Anabaptists—derived their political claims from the Protestant interpretation of the Gospel. This experience caused Luther to reject all violent application of Christian equality to politics. The tone and content of his manifesto against the rebellious farmers¹ remain the darkest shadows in the life of the reformer, even for those who fully grant him the right to protect his own movement from the suspicion of attempting to undermine the political order.

However, Luther cannot be called an advocate of the kind of absolutism that was represented later by Louis XIV of France or the modern totalitarian dictators. He never conceded to the State the right to use its authority without acknowledging its responsibility to a divine authority greater than all governments. The spiritual Kingdom of God was of higher rank than all earthly kingdoms. This ideal Kingdom tolerates no despots; nobody can take away from man his ultimate responsibility to God. Only in God and through God is man free. Not what a person "does" constitutes his intrinsic value, but what he "is," though his being will always interact with his doing, and the value of both his character and his deeds will depend on whether "he is in God and God in him."² Thus Luther's individualism is, on the one hand, against all usurpation of the divine rights of man by governments. On the

¹"Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants" (*Wider die räuberischen und mörderischen Rotten der Bauern*, 1525). Cf. *Luther's Works*, Vol. IV, pp. 248–254.

²"A Treatise on Christian Liberty" (*Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*, 1520). Cf. *Luther's Works*, Vol. II, pp. 312–348.

other hand, it is not one of *laissez faire, laissez aller*; it is religious. Here again Luther is not original. But the historical merit of such writings of Luther as his treatise "On Christian Liberty" (*Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*, 1520)¹ or "On Good Works" (*Von den guten Werken*, 1520)² lies in the revival of the idea of inwardness, as standing against the medieval institutionalism of the Church. Later this idea of Christian liberty finds its philosophical expression in Locke's writings on government and on tolerance, and in Kant's classical postulate that the human person must never be used as a means for external purposes, but always be respected as an end in himself.

The ethics of inwardness, as expressed by Luther and the German idealists, diverges in degree from the pragmatism inherent in the Greek concept of virtue, or *areté*, as explained in the section on Plato. In each of the two, in the Greek as well as in Luther's ethics, there lurks danger. The Greek concept, if carried to the extreme and isolated from the idea of *logos*, would raise the criterion of fitness and effect above all others, as a certain type of modern utilitarianism really does. On the other hand, the individualistic mystical idea of inwardness, if separated from the totality of Christian faith, can lead to a divorce of intention or "mindedness" from action and serve as a pretext for withdrawal from social responsibilities in this erring and sinful world. The result would be split personalities and political indifference. The history of Christianity offers many instances of such indulgence, unfortunately, not only in Lutheran Protestantism but in all periods of Christian history and in all churches.

Considering Luther himself, his own fight against the hierarchy is sufficient evidence of his conviction of a necessary unity between the human soul and human action. Take his famous letter to Pope Leo X. It was intended to serve as an apology. Indeed, it shows, at the beginning, all the possible humility of a subordinate priest toward the highest dignitary of the Church. But then the modest

¹*Ibidem.*

²Luther's *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 184-285.

little monk tells Christ's representative on earth to his face that he holds the Holy City to be a "pool of sin" and a "den of thieves."

Wherefore, most excellent Leo, I pray thee, after I have by this letter vindicated myself, give me a hearing, and believe that I have never thought evil of thy person. . . . In all things else I will yield to any man whatsoever: To give up or to deny the Word I have neither the power nor the will. If any man thinks otherwise of me, or has understood my words differently, he does not think aright, nor has he understood what I have really said.

But thy See, which is called the Roman Curia, and of which neither thou nor any man can deny that it is more corrupt than any Babylon or Sodom ever was. . . .¹

The letter continues in an even more offensive tone.

This is certainly not the way to reconcile a world power. But it shows the irrevocable moral urge and greatness which alone are able to change the world, and which only few men possess in many generations.

¹See "Letter to Pope Leo X," in Luther's *Works*, Vol. II, pp. 301-311.

IV. Erasmus of Rotterdam

(*ca.* 1466–1536)

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

The Dutchman Erasmus of Rotterdam was considered the umpire in matters theological by all intellectuals at the beginning of the sixteenth century. His influence reached from England to Italy and from Spain to Hungary and Poland. He and Luther were first believed to be companions in the common cause of ecclesiastical reform. Yet later they became bitter enemies, because they represented two fundamental contrasts in human attitude. Luther draws on metaphysical sources of life which kindle in a person the fire of a missionary, the disdain of death and danger, and the courage of a fighter who must win his battle irrespective of what may come later. The center of Erasmus' personality, on the other hand, is the intellect. This does not mean that Erasmus is one of these narrow talents in whom the functions of the brain have absorbed all the other qualities we expect from a fully developed personality. His intellect is nourished by an emphatic moral sense, an intense—though more sensitive than vigorous—emotional life, an unusual humor, and a vivid desire for form and beauty. Nevertheless, it is primarily through reason that his talent expresses itself.

Compare the many portraits of Luther and Erasmus which great artists of the time, such as Albrecht Dürer, Hans Holbein, Lucas Cranach, and Quentin Matsys, have left us. We see the heavy head of Luther, with its powerful cheek bones and its fat neck which forms an almost straight line between the nape and the sloping shoulders. The forehead is relatively small in comparison with the other features; and one has almost the impression of a pyramid ascending from the shoulder blades toward the vertex. Nose and jaw are fleshy and plump. Everything contrives to indicate the robust, choleric, and rustic character of a man who rebelled against the unnaturalness of celibacy; who liked a good table with jovial

friends, but who also had hours of deepest melancholy; who was utterly intemperate in the use of invective against his enemies; and who did not succumb in a life of continual fighting and excitement. But beneath high-arched and long brows there lie eyes which strangely combine the visionary glance of the prophet with the realism of the statesman. If one looks longer, he discovers deep curves at the sides of the fleshy nose which indicate inner vibration and nervousness, and a mouth which is both ascetic and aggressive, mild and severe, full of love and full of suffering. And over all this one detects an aura of simple faith which generally we find only in the faces of children. What a storm of contrasts must have blown through this man's soul, and how gratefully must he have felt the peace in the surrender of the soul to the miraculous grace of God.

The portraits of Erasmus, on the other hand, show a regular, noble, and delicate face. The portrait of 1517 by Quentin Matsys in the Palazzo Corsini emphasizes this aspect to such an extent that it is difficult to find the sign of greatness in it. It shows clear eyes, a regular Nordic nose, a mouth with thin, straight lips, evidences of an astute intellect and a sort of speculative melancholy, but no sure sign of genius. However, one of the portraits of Erasmus made by Albrecht Dürer shows the genius of both the sitter and the painter. The eyes are half closed and observing, as if a connoisseur examined an art piece. The nose is less Nordic than in Matsys's painting, but much finer, as if sampling the air. The mouth is tightly closed, as in all portraits of Erasmus; one is in doubt whether the slight contraction of the muscles at the corners indicates a smile or disdain. This man has certainly the qualities of an expert philologist and editor, of a sagacious thinker, and of a dangerous satirist. There is also a touch of hypochondria in this face; at least it shows no natural physical strength. The discipline we feel in it is entirely spiritual and intellectual, not that of a sportsman. Yet, with all the intellectuality, these features betray the kindness of a wisdom to which *nihil humani alienum est*. And if one senses something primitive and childlike in Luther, one has

the feeling that the scholar of Rotterdam, in spite of his refined intellectualism, could take a child on his knee and change the sarcastic smile on his face to one of love and tenderness. But however many traits we may discover in Dürer's Erasmus, one thing is not to be found—the enormous tension between brute animality and prophetic transcendentalism which we see in Luther. Therefore these two men could go together as long as they fought the corruption and backwardness of the Catholic hierarchy; but since Luther fought with the passion of a prophet and Erasmus as a wise rationalist, they were bound to separate later.

The contrast between Luther and Erasmus appears wherever they worked with or against each other. Luther, in spite of a certain appreciation of Antiquity, emphasizes the fundamental contrast between the ancient and the Christian world, and throws the ancient poets overboard when they might do harm to religious devotion. For Erasmus the goal of culture is the union of Antiquity and Christianity. This union, in his opinion, would resolve the conflict between reason and faith, work and grace, revelation and inquiry, self-assertion and authority. For Luther history and philosophy are great sources of information about human affairs, but there is only one thing sacred, the Christian Revelation. To call Jesus' teaching "philosophy" would have been an offense to Luther. Erasmus speaks of the "philosophy of Christ" as the greatest and most divine, to be sure, but mentions also the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Saint Augustine. In other words, Erasmus believes there are several possible acts through which God or the Spirit can communicate with man.

For Luther the Bible was a document of absolutely supernatural revelation. To subject it to autonomous inquiry meant for him the climax of arrogance, though, through fostering philological research in the domain of sacred letters, he unintentionally contributed to the critical theology. Erasmus had not yet advanced far enough to apply modern historical criticism to the Bible, but the idea as such was not foreign to him. Together with such men as the Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola and the French philologist Lefèvre

d'Étaples, Erasmus differentiated the true meaning of the Bible from its merely historical form. "The gospel hath her flesh, she hath also her spirit," he says in the *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*.¹ Medieval theologians had already interpreted the Scriptures "allegorically," thus allowing for the most arbitrary speculations. Erasmus' symbolism is on a much higher level. It is penetration through the merely accidental vestment of a biblical statement with the purpose of discovering its essential idea.

The story of the Fall, for example, is for him not a reality but the mythical symbol of the curse of imperfection laid upon man. This interpretation, if carried to its logical end, would have destroyed the traditional Christology, which explains the coming of the Savior as an act of God's merciful decision to relieve the human race from the eternal consequence of Adam's disobedience.

Erasmus' theological controversies with Luther dwell on too transcendent problems to offer valid criteria for deciding which of the contestants is right. In the controversy on the freedom or bondage of will, Luther, in his defense of the bondage of will, was certainly more consistent than his adversary.² Yet, generally speaking, Erasmus appeals to most modern men more strongly than do most of his theological contemporaries when he says that *Summa nostrae religionis pax est et unanimitas*,³ that is, "The sum of our religion is not to be found in one or the other dogma, but is peace and concord." Erasmus seems to us more rational when he rejects the theory of predestination and gives every man a chance to come to Christ, when throughout his lifetime he attacks the identification of religion and hierarchy as the central evil in Christendom, and when he declares mechanical routine in the office of the clergy

¹Erasmus of Rotterdam: *A Book Called in Latin Enchiridion Militis Christiani and in English The Manual of the Christian Knight*, p. 149. Methuen and Company, London, 1905. Cited in the following as: *Enchiridion*.

²Luther's standpoint must not be confused with modern determinism, which is based on entirely different premises. Luther denies free will with reference to God's omnipotence and Adam's fall.

³Desiderius Erasmus: *Opera Omnia*, cura J. Clerici, in 10 vols. Lugd. Bat., 1703-1706. Cited in the following as: *Opera*. See Vol. III, p. 694, "Epist. DCXIII, Jan. 5, 1522."

to be the main danger to the spirit of love and religious edification. As a matter of fact, modern Protestantism has increasingly acknowledged Erasmus as one of the forerunners of liberal theology, in spite of his opposition to Luther.

If it is the application of the critical intellect which distinguishes the modern mind from medievalism, then Erasmus, through introducing criticism, comparison, tolerance, and historicism into theology, has shown himself much more modern than Luther or Calvin.

On the other hand, it was this very same rationalism which—paradoxically enough—kept the liberal Dutchman eventually on the side of the traditional church. However much he attacked the vices of the clergy, ridiculed the futile disputations of the scholastics, and felt the dawn of a new period, he hoped it would be a rational and a liberal era. With disgust he observed the irrationalism of the Protestant preachers, iconoclasts, and rioting masses who followed in the wake of the new movement. So he was, after all, inclined to condone much of the luxury and paganism of the Renaissance popes. In questions of research and culture they had been more broad-minded than the average Catholic or Protestant.

Erasmus and Luther were in Rome at almost the same time—Erasmus in 1509, Luther in 1511. They probably saw very similar things: the venality of the higher clergy, the idolatry practiced with relics of the most spurious nature, the bullfights performed under papal protection, the blasphemies of celebrated humanist priests, and the presence of a considerable number of demimondaines. But whereas Luther never overcame the shock, Erasmus, a few years after his visit, wrote to a friend:

Had I not torn myself from Rome, I could never have resolved to leave. There one enjoys sweet liberty, rich libraries, the charming friendship of writers and scholars, and the sight of antique monuments. I was honored by the society of eminent prelates, so that I cannot conceive of a greater pleasure than to return to this city.¹

¹Preserved Smith, *Erasmus: A Study of His Life, Ideals and Place in History*, p. 115. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1923. Cited in the following as: Smith's *Erasmus*.

There is also a letter from Erasmus to Pope Leo X of the House of Medici, one of the great representatives of Renaissance paganism within the hierarchy. This letter is painful reading, even if one takes into account the dignity of the addressee and the customary flattery in humanist letters:

If your greatness is considered, most blessed Father, there is no sovereign so high but must feel some awe in addressing you. But the singular benignity of your character, which is not proclaimed by the general voice of the world, but reflected in your features and demeanor, and of which I had some taste in private intercourse when I was at Rome, inspires so much confidence, that even an individual of the humblest rank like myself does not hesitate to intrude a letter upon your Holiness. Would that I were permitted to throw myself on my knees before you, and kiss those truly blessed feet. I see and hear, how in every part of the Christian world the highest as well as the lowest are congratulating themselves on the elevation of such a Prince.¹ This especially because the House of Medici, to which the world owed also you, Pope Leo, has always fostered and honored men eminent through their sincerity and erudition. As from the Trojan horse there have come from your family within a few years excellent masters in all arts, so many Ciceros, Vergils, Platos, and Hieronymi, that this alone should encourage all lovers of the arts to hope that you, Pope Leo, have been given to the world by divine providence, that under you all excellent virtues and all liberal arts will thrive anew.²

But reading ahead, one becomes somewhat reconciled when noticing that the letter was written in order to interest the Pope in the new critical edition of the works of Saint Jerome and in the fate of the German scholars whose philological diligence had made the new edition possible. Among the men mentioned in Erasmus' letter is the famous humanist Reuchlin. When Erasmus wrote the letter, Reuchlin was on trial before the Inquisition in Rome

¹*The Epistles of Erasmus, from His Earliest Letters to His Fifty-first Year, Arranged in Order of Time*, English translations by Francis Morgan Nichols. 3 vols. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1901-1918. See Vol. II, p. 198, "Epistle 323." Cf. also *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Rotterodami*, denuo recognitum per P. S. Allen et H. M. Allen. 10 vols. Oxford University Press, New York, 1906-1941. Cited in the following as: Allen edition.

²The last two sentences are translated by the author

because of his defense of Jewish literature against the attacks of the Jewish convert Pfefferkorn. Did Erasmus include all the flattery in his letter to save his friend? It is true that the scholar of Rotterdam was sometimes too much of a diplomat, at least for such a man as Luther, but it was always in the interest of peace and culture. Much as he hated radicalism in religion and thought, because it excluded reasoning and toleration, he equally hated war and used every opportunity to display its barbaric nature.

The deepest reason why a man of Erasmus' character failed to gather his contemporaries behind him can be found in his letter to Richard Pace:

Would that some *deus ex machina* might make a happy ending for this drama so inauspiciously begun by Luther! He himself gives his enemies the dart by which they transfix him, and acts as if he did not wish to be saved, though frequently warned by me and by his friends to tone down the sharpness of his style. . . . I cannot sufficiently wonder at the spirit in which he has written. Certainly he has loaded the cultivators of literature with heavy odium. Many of his teachings and admonitions were splendid, but would that he had not vitiated those good things by mixing intolerable evils! If he had written all things piously, yet I should not have courage to risk my life for the truth. All men have not strength for martyrdom. I fear lest, if any tumult should arise, I should imitate Peter [in denying the Lord]. I follow the just decrees of popes and emperors because it is right; I endure the evil laws because it is safe. I think this is allowable to good men, if they have no hope of successful resistance.¹

Was it cowardice which brought about this lack of decision in Erasmus' soul? No, the tragedy goes deeper.

Erasmus was born in Holland, then a province of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and not yet grown toward national independence in spite of its great wealth and admirable culture. It contained two national languages and traditions, German and French. Erasmus himself was of German stock and spoke in his early letters often and with pride of "my Germany," but the

¹Smith's *Erasmus*, p. 243. Allen edition, "Epistle 1218," July 3, 1521.

Reformation filled him with disgust. He confessed in a letter to Duke George of Saxony (September 3, 1522),¹ "I am unfamiliar with the German language." He probably knew only Dutch, but made very little use of it after his fourteenth year. Only in the last minutes of his life when, struggling with death, he raised his voice to the Lord did he utter *Liebe God* ("Dear God") in the Low German he had spoken as a child when his lonely mother taught him to pray. On the threshold of eternity his inner voice broke through the barrier of Greek and Latin, revealing the tragic artificiality of his kind of classicism.

Erasmus pursued his studies in Latin and Germanic countries. But his most intimate friendship he found in England. And as is the case with so many people from the North, the country of his innermost longing was Italy.

He had neither fatherland nor vernacular in which to take root, and he had no family. His father had been pressed to take holy orders, but before ordination he fell in love with a widow, the daughter of a physician at Zevenberghen, near Rotterdam. Erasmus was one of the two sons springing from this liaison; twice he had to get dispensations from the Pope on account of his illegitimate origin. The experiences which Erasmus had with his more remote relatives were not dissimilar to those which his father had had with his own kin: in order to get rid of him and his brother, they pressed them to enter the monastery. So Erasmus became a monk, not out of his own decision but under force; it was probably the boy's love of letters which made him yield. He despised most of his own colleagues, and they disliked him and called him a heretic.

Thus the Church could not become his real abode. He was not at home in a country, nor in a family, nor in his religious order of the Augustinian Canons, nor in the Church; he was at home exclusively in the spiritual world of letters which had originated in Greece, Rome, and Palestine, and which was not understood by the

¹Erasmus von Rotterdam: *Briefe*, verdeutscht und herausgegeben von Walther Kohler, p. 309. Leipzig, 1938. Cf. also Allen edition, "Epistle 1313."

common man. It was certainly by virtue of the very rootlessness of his life that he developed his deep feeling for Christ. Christ was for him the mystical source of inner consolation, the savior of man from unrest, and the eternal center of history. But this feeling was enlightened and undogmatic, and it was as far from Catholic institutionalism as from Luther's new theology.

This spiritual mooring enabled Erasmus to remain true to himself in spite of all conflicts and vacillations. Throughout his life he defended his intellectual freedom. He never sold himself, not even for the purple of a cardinal, and even on his deathbed he showed his independence by devoting his soul to God without asking for the customary assistance of a priest. Therefore Luther may be right from his point of view, but he is nevertheless essentially wrong when in one of his table talks he accuses Erasmus of sophistry, ambiguity, and lack of seriousness.¹

ERASMUS AS EDUCATOR

Much of Erasmus' character and thought is reflected in his educational theory. We find in it the religious and moral reformer, the advocate of peace, the satirical critic of the follies of mankind, the man who hopes for the reconciliation of faith and reason, the liberal and tolerant personality endowed with a fine understanding for human nature, the admirer of classical letters, the scholar of the literary, not the experimental, type, and the wanderer without a vernacular or a nation.

Whatever Erasmus wrote expressed in one way or another his concern with a humanistic reform of Christian civilization, whether he was dealing as a theologian with the New Testament and the Fathers of the Church or as a philologist with the learning of ancient languages. In spite of all satire against the Church, his religious attitude appears in all his utterances. In this respect Erasmus definitely distinguishes himself, as a northern humanist, from his sometimes cynical and paganized Italian friends. "Hencefor-

¹*Luthers Tischreden der Mathesischen Sammlung*, herausgegeben von Ernst Kroker, p. 283. Leipzig, 1903.

ward, . . . they that use the world must be as if they used it not";¹ in other words, those who live in this world ought to live as if they did not need it. This finest formulation of medieval wisdom is not a phrase in Erasmus' mouth; it comes from his heart.

Among Erasmus' works on education we have to distinguish a group which aims at a general spiritual reform of Christian life, for example, the *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (1503), already mentioned, the first English edition of which, published in 1533, bears the title *A Booke Called in Latyn Enchiridion Militis Christiani and in Englysche Manual of the Christen Knyght*.² It pictures the *Imitatio Christi* as the continual effort towards self-discipline which alone allows us to enter into the region where man and God may meet. Mystical influences have flown into this simple and undogmatic presentation of Christian morality. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order and the greatest exponent of the *Ecclesia Militans*, disliked the book.³ Whether or not he learned from it is another question. ✓

About the relationship between the State, civilization, and education, Erasmus expresses his opinion in the *Institutio Principis Christiani* ("On the Education of a Christian Prince"), 1516.⁴ This work was published only three years after Machiavelli's famous *Principe* ("The Prince"), which symbolizes the complete emancipation of a Renaissance humanist from Christian ethics and the enthronement of *raison d'état* as the highest principle of action for a prince. Erasmus is on the opposite side of the fence. Like all the progressive people of his day, he considered a limited absolutist monarchy the best form of government. In his time this form of political organization promised, more than others, an ordered and effectual society. But if one lays more stress on the spirit than on

¹See footnote 1 on page 133.

²*Enchiridion*, p. 134.

³Cf. Ludovicus Consalvius de Camara's *Memoriale*, in *Monumenta Ignatiana*, Series quarta, *Scripta de Sancto Ignatio de Loyola*, Tomus primus. Madrid, 1904.

⁴Desiderius Erasmus: *The Education of a Christian Prince*, translated by Lester K. Born (Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, No. 27). Columbia University Press, New York, 1936.

the external form of government, he can call the *Institutio Principis* the first learned manifesto of a democrat.

In this treatise Erasmus insists that the prince and his consort should live in close contact with their subjects; they should regard themselves, and be regarded, as part of their people. Laws should serve no other purpose than the welfare of the nation; every subject, irrespective of wealth or birth, should be allowed to grow up and live with a sense of honor; crime should be fought not so much by punishment as by preventive economic and political measures; class differences and exploitation ought to be abolished; the government ought to develop the wealth of the country by a program of building and agricultural reform; finally, the Christian prince should know that a war which is not absolutely necessary for the defense of human rights is against lasting welfare and the spirit of Christ.¹

It is characteristic of European political morale that Machiavelli's *Principe* has become a "classic" in the history of European government, whereas Erasmus' *Institutio* is almost forgotten. It shows, as only his letters do, the realistic and observational capacities of the great humanist. But in contrast with the letter to Pope Leo X, it is full of dignity and candor. Though dedicated to the young Hapsburg Prince Charles, ruler of the Netherlands and later Emperor Charles V, it attacks dynastic abuses with striking directness. Prince Charles could not fail to see that many of the scholar's remarks alluded to defects of absolutism particularly characteristic of his own family.

Also, Erasmus' *Matrimonii Christiani Institutio* ("On Christian Matrimony," 1526) is intended to bring about a moral reform of Christian society. It is of particular interest for the historian of education because it contains an extensive chapter on the education of girls.

In the works of Erasmus as well as of other humanists there appears a very striking contrast. On the one hand, there is disdain

¹*The Education of a Christian Prince*, pp. 207 f.

and ridicule for the moral and intellectual status of women. Few of these learned men would have considered a woman sufficiently mature to teach. On the other hand, many humanists rebelled against the crudeness of the older family life. Their growing individualism granted at least the daughters of the aristocratic families the right to enjoy the blessings of civilization. Erasmus himself felt the refinement of the social atmosphere radiating from educated women in the house of his most beloved friend, the Englishman Sir Thomas More, and in the home of the German patrician Willibald Pirckheimer. The Erasmian sentence: *Et conjugem mihi et me illi cariores reddit eruditio*¹ ("Education causes my husband and me to hold each other more dearly") expresses better than anything else his belief in the value of intellectual culture.

But Erasmus knows also the obstacles in the way of progress. The greatest power on earth—so he explains in his *Praise of Folly* (*Moriae Encomion*, 1509)—is not piety, nor education, nor government, nor even force, but folly. Folly rules wherever human beings meet; it governs all estates, professions, and vocations, the princes of the world and of the Church, as well as the common folk. Satirical works of this kind were not rare, but the *Praise of Folly*, being written by one of the greatest scholars of the Church, became, together with the *Letters of the Dark Men* (*Epistolae Virorum Obscurorum*, 1515), the fanfare of rebellion of the educated middle classes against the medieval order of things.

Like his *Praise of Folly*, Erasmus' *Colloquies* (*Colloquiorum Formulae*) rapidly became a part of world literature. They represent a widely spread type of humanist literature, namely, fictitious dialogues, destined to introduce the student to conversational Latin.²

¹*Opera*, Vol. III, p. 746 A. Cf. also William H. Woodward, *Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education*, p. 150. Cambridge University Press, England, 1904. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York. Cited in the following as: Woodward's *Erasmus*. Some other main works indicating the growing interest in female education are: Francesco Barbaro, *De Re Uzoria*, Paris, 1513; Juan Luis Vives, *De Institutione Foeminae Christianae*, Antwerp, 1524; Sir Thomas Elyot, *Defence of Good Women*, London, 1540.

²Cf. Aloys Bömer, *Die lateinischen Schülersprache der Humanisten* (Texte und Forschungen zur Geschichte der Erziehung I), Chap. VI; p. 71 f. Berlin, 1897-1899.

Erasmus began to jot down the first of these dialogues when as a young man he had to support himself through giving private instruction. During his lifetime the colloquies appeared in several ever-enlarged editions. They prove that in the hands of a great man even seemingly trifling things become significant. Why not combine the teaching of Latin—for Erasmus still a living tongue—with the teaching of the elements of worldly life and conduct? Why not use the opportunity for some more invectives against the superstition of pilgrimages, the belief in demons and ghosts, and the absurd popish indulgences and excommunications? Why not also here, as in the letters, use the chance to praise great and liberal minds, as “the incomparable man, John Reuchlin”? And why not mock at the kind of scholastic philosophers who use thinking primarily for the purpose of confusion and words for the purpose of concealing things?

The stimulus to occupy himself thoroughly with the schoolmaster's craft came to Erasmus from his English friends. From 1509 to 1514 he lived in London and, as professor of divinity, in Cambridge. Common interests with the humanist John Colet, who had just started his school at St. Paul's, led him to compose a work *Upon the Method of Right Instruction* (*De Ratione Studii*, 1511). There he gave an account of his ideas on the right ways of instruction in the classics, on the interpretation of authors, and on the techniques of composition. In contrast to so many of his modern followers in the liberal arts, he was deeply aware of the importance of methodical teaching.

Such weight do I ascribe to right method in instruction—and I include herein choice of material as well as of modes of imparting it—that I undertake by its means to carry forward youths of merely average intelligence to a creditable standard of scholarship, and of conversation also, in Latin and Greek, at an age when, under the common schoolmaster of today, the same youths would be just stammering through their Primer. With the foundations thus rightly laid a boy may confidently look forward to success in the higher range of learning. He will, when he looks back, admit

that the essential condition of his attainment was the care which was devoted to the beginnings of his education.¹

No wonder that Erasmus became one of the first advocates of a systematic training of teachers.

Which brings me to claim it as a duty incumbent on Statesmen and Churchmen alike to provide that there be a due supply of men qualified to educate the youth of the nation. It is a public obligation in no way inferior, say, to the ordering of the army.²

In almost all his activities—as humanist, writer, editor, religious and cultural reformer—Erasmus was bound to encounter the extreme camp of Humanism, the *Ciceroniani*, who, in their admiration for pure Latin, went so far as to prohibit any use of phrases not to be found in the works of the admired master of style, Cicero. In the satirical dialogue *Ciceronianus* (1528)³ Erasmus performs a brilliant and witty *reductio ad absurdum* of the humanist fall. The first danger of this merely imitative purist movement—so he points out—lies in the fettering of the writer who, bound to a specific vocabulary and style, cannot develop his own ideas and forms of expression. Secondly, Latin itself is brought into the peril of petrification, for how can a language live which is a strait jacket to the mind? The third danger lies in the paganization of thought. If we submit completely to Cicero, we must give up Christianity; for Christ and the Christian God do not exist in the writings of the pagan, nor had he terms available for such central Christian concepts as faith and grace. Some humanists, for the holy cause of purism, had already changed the whole Christian Heaven into an abode of ancient gods. They called it Olympus. Christ was compared with Jupiter Tonans (“the Thunderer”), and Saint Mary

¹*Opera*, Vol. I, p. 530, A-B, *De Ratione Studii*. Woodward's *Erasmus*, p. 178.

²*De Pueris Statim ac Liberaliter Instituendis; or, The Argument . . . That Children Should Straight Away from Their Earliest Years Be Trained in Virtue and Sound Learning*, 1529, in *Opera*, Vol. I, pp. 489–516 A. Woodward's *Erasmus*, pp. 180–222.

³*Ciceronianus, or a Dialogue on the Best Style of Speaking*, translated by Izora Scott, with an Introduction by Paul Monroe (Contributions to Education, No. 21). Columbia University, Teachers College, New York, 1908.

was honored with the title of queen who excelled all nymphs in her beauty.

The most mature educational work of Erasmus is his *Liberal Education of Boys* (*De Pueris Statim ac Liberaliter Instituendis*, 1529). Together with *The Method of Right Instruction*, it presents a rather coherent system of humanist education, full of a genuine feeling for the responsibilities of a good teacher, and far superior to the educational literature of the early humanists of the fifteenth century.

According to Erasmus, the aim of education is to lead men toward knowledge, honesty, and independent judgment.

To dumb creatures Mother Nature has given an innate power of instinct, . . . but Providence in granting to man alone the privilege of reason has thrown the burden of development of the human being upon training. Well, therefore, has it been said that the first means, the second, and the third means to happiness is right training or education. Sound education is the condition of real wisdom.¹

This Aristotelian praise of wisdom is combined with the Christian idea that man, as a rational being, is potentially the image of God. He must never, therefore, be subjected to slavery, and he must be allowed to develop all his qualities in order to realize this sublime destiny. If he fails to do so, he may sink below the animal.

It is beyond dispute that man not instructed through reason in philosophy and sound learning is a creature lower than a brute, seeing that there is no beast more wild or more harmful than a man who is driven hither and thither by ambition or desire, anger or envy, or lawless temper.²

It is the gift of reason which unites men in a spiritual community. There exist no essential differences among nations and races as such; there are only individual differences, according to the degree of man's participation in the achievements of culture. Nor must man be subjected to unquestioned authority. Even the opinions of the ancients may be doubted.

¹*De Pueris Instituendis*, § 4. Woodward's *Erasmus*, p. 183.

²*De Pueris Instituendis*, §§ 7 and 24. Woodward's *Erasmus*, pp. 186 and 207.

His sense of the dignity of the individual makes Erasmus one of the strongest enemies of cruel schoolmasters. We have found a similar attitude in earlier humanist pedagogy; but whereas there it comes primarily from the example of Quintilian, for Erasmus the battle against maltreatment of children is a kind of holy war, the only war he was glad to fight in.

A poor master, we are prepared to find, relies almost wholly upon fear of punishment as the motive to work. To frighten one entire class is easier than to teach one boy properly; for the latter is, and always must be, a task as serious as it is honorable. It is equally true of States: the rule which carries the respect and consent of the citizens demands higher qualities in the Prince than does the tyranny of force. . . . Do schoolmasters consider how many earnest, studious natures have been by treatment of this type—the hang-man type—crushed into indifference?¹

In order to educate without the rod, the teacher must understand the nature of the child and the laws inherent in the educative process; in other words, he needs psychological insight and a workable method. In the investigation of these requisites of education Erasmus largely follows Aristotle, Plutarch, and Quintilian. But the influences from these men are intimately interwoven with Erasmus' own experiences.

Three conditions . . . determine individual progress. They are *Nature*, *Training*, and *Practice*. By *Nature*, I mean, partly, innate capacity for being trained, partly, native bent towards excellence. By *Training*, I mean the skilled application of instruction and guidance. By *Practice*, the free exercise on our own part of that activity which has been implanted by Nature and is furthered by training. Nature without skill Training must be imperfect, and Practice without the method which Training supplies leads to hopeless confusion.²

In consequence of these three "conditions," as Erasmus rather vaguely calls them, the educator must be interested in both the physical and the intellectual development of the child.

¹*De Pueris Instituendis*, § 24. Woodward's *Erasmus*, pp. 205 f.

²*De Pueris Instituendis*, § 11. Woodward's *Erasmus*, p. 191.

The physical side of education, as sport, and the cultivation of external attitudes are of much less concern to Erasmus than to the aristocratic humanists. He is not unaware, though, of the requirements of hygiene. His own physical sensitiveness compelled him to take extreme care of his health. He also follows Aristotle, Plutarch, and Vergil in their emphasis on prenatal education. But like most of the German humanists, he is more interested in the pursuits of the mind than in the exercise of the body; in addition, he is one of the first educators to represent the spirit of the rising middle classes for whom aristocracy is not confined to birth and the use of arms.

Mother Nature—so Erasmus argues in adding to the Aristotelian tradition—has endowed man with certain dispositions which the teacher must know in order to utilize them. The human being possesses imagination and other inborn or potential urges, such as self-preservation, imitation, ambition, and the desire for attachment. In appealing to these qualities the teacher can motivate the child voluntarily to undergo, and even to enjoy, the many inconveniences connected with the educational process. Therefore good education is to a large extent encouragement; the ability to combine encouragement and discipline, to mix patience and understanding properly with severity, is the criterion of the good teacher. He will also know that play for the child is not only a relaxation or pleasure but a part of his life and learning. Erasmus recommends also the use of visual aids, for education must make use of the senses in order to help the mind in its endeavor to grasp the reality behind the words.

The good teacher respects individual differences in the child, but not to the extent that he allows him to develop only some of his qualities at the expense of others. Respect for specific talents and the cultivation of “many-sidedness of interest,” as Herbart phrased it later, do not exclude each other.

Repeatedly Erasmus demands that education begin at an early age, though it is not absolutely clear how he would like to have it done. His interest in play suggests that he would respect the spe-

cific conditions of infancy to a certain degree, but probably not to the extent that we should demand today.

Needless to say, Erasmus' curriculum is one-sidedly centered on ~~the~~ classics and on expression. The vernacular receives no attention, nor do the sciences. The latter had not yet acquired any molding influence on the life of man. The Copernican theory had not yet shattered the old Ptolemaic-Christian cosmology, nor had Galileo's and other scientists' experiments reversed Aristotle's theory of the fall of bodies. Erasmus disdained the primitive experiments of his more empirically minded contemporaries, not knowing that these experiments represented the initial stage of a way of research much more decisive for the future of mankind than his own philology and the ancient works on nature which he recommended for reading. Yet in principle he was not against the study of nature; he always wished to lead the student toward a better understanding of life. Language was for him a door toward experience, not a barrier to shut it out. His *Colloquies* prove this sufficiently. They are filled with bristling actuality. There are many teachers in America, not to speak of those in other continents, who would have to fear for their positions if they discussed with their pupils subjects of such "controversial nature" as were those which Erasmus brought up in his Latin "Conversations."

ERASMUS' INFLUENCE

Erasmus died a lonely man. For his contemporaries he had become the symbol of a man incapable of decision because he had refused clearly to take a side in the religious struggle. He did so even before the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, when the battling parties were tired of the conflict and looked for an arbiter of international fame. For Luther, Erasmus was an enemy of Christ. The Catholics disliked Erasmus; later, at the reform council of Trent, 1545-1563, they put his name on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* and tried to suppress his influence in the universities.¹

¹Marcel Bataillon, *Erasmus et l'Espagne, Recherches sur l'Histoire Spirituelle du XVIe Siècle*. Paris, 1937.

Yet there are few men who have molded European education as decisively as Erasmus. He encouraged a better method of teaching and a more understanding and tolerant attitude toward the pupil, and he infiltrated the classical studies with the spirit of exactness, historical criticism, and international perspective. This allowed ancient philology to dominate the humanities until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The tragedy for Erasmus' work was that he died before the full dawn of the empirical sciences. While he was not enough of a fighter to try a unification of Protestant reformism and the Catholic tradition, he would perhaps have been broad enough as a thinker to attempt a reconciliation between the new scientific interests and the classical legacy of Europe. Thus the cleavage between the humanities and the natural sciences could have been avoided—a cleavage from which the higher schools of Europe suffered up to the twentieth century.

V. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) and the Jesuit System of Education

In 1521, when Luther at the Diet of Worms defended his Protestant doctrine before Charles V, the ruler of the German and Spanish empires, Ignatius of Loyola had recovered from the wounds he had received before Pamplona as an officer in the service of the viceroy of Navarre.

Until this time Loyola had led the life of a courtier and a soldier with all the earthly ambitions of a young nobleman. After receiving these wounds, as he lay in bed suffering from his injuries and from crude surgery, he first thought of diverting his mind through reading the typical tales of chivalry, full of love and adventure, that were in vogue among the leisure classes. But such books not being available, he read a Castilian translation of Ludolf of Saxony's *Vita Christi* ("The Life of Christ"), and one of the typical *Flores Sanctorum* ("Flowers of the Saints"). The result was a convulsive struggle in his soul between the desires and aspirations of his former life and the transcendent ideals he found realized by the Christian heroes. With the intensity peculiar to his personality, he ran the whole gamut between exaltation and despair; he underwent extreme ascetic exercises and was close to suicide; until finally the vision of the Blessed Virgin with her Son convinced him of the reality of the Spirit.

In the conversion of Loyola a fundamental psychological phenomenon becomes evident. It is not infrequent that men, under vehement impressions, completely change the goals of their aspirations and beliefs, but it is truly rare for a person to change those fundamental attitudes which result from the impact of early impressions on his nature. These attitudes remain within the new moral constellation. So it was also with Ignatius of Loyola. Had he not been wounded in battle, he would have become a general with all the great and vain passions which made a knight of his

period sought by kings, dangerous to the enemy, and beloved by ladies. All these qualities did not disappear after Loyola's conversion; they only became sublimated, acquiring through this transformation an even greater degree of intensity. His ideal was no longer to conquer foreign cities and illustrious women, but to conquer his own self, through forcing it to obey a new prince, Jesus Christ. In all his enterprises, both spiritual and organizational, Loyola never lost the characteristics demanded of an officer by the absolutist armies then appearing in Europe—discipline and initiative, devotion and self-assertion, courage and prudence.

The first written document of this new life is the *Exercitia Spiritualia* ("Spiritual Exercises"). Most modern men will no longer be able to adhere to the orthodox belief in the details of the biblical story, the repeated contemplation of which, according to Loyola, would help the human soul to merit the blessings of immortality. Yet the method and organization of these exercises in spiritual self-education will always evoke our admiration, even if we no longer believe in their content.¹

In 1523 Loyola made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, where the Franciscan Order, the guardian of the holy places, threatened him with excommunication for his imprudent religious zeal, which seemed apt to arouse the resentment of the Turkish rulers of the country. After his return to Europe in 1524, this so far academically untrained man began a period of intense literary, philosophical, and theological studies, showing such a degree of personal passion in his learning and discussions that he exposed himself several times to the reproach of heresy. Not before 1535 did he take his Master's degree at the University of Paris.

He used the last years of his studies for making contacts with men of equal zeal for the restoration of Christian faith and morality. At the Feast of the Assumption on August 15, 1534, they met with Loyola in the crypt of the Church of St. Mary on Montmartre

¹Concerning the history of self-education, see Friedrich Schneider, *Die Selbsterziehung; Wissenschaft und Uebung*, pp. 143-157: "Die Exercitia spiritualia des heiligen Ignatius von Loyola." Köln, 1936.

to take the vows of poverty and chastity and to pledge themselves to unrestricted sacrifices in the service of the Church. But this 15th of August, 1534, did not see the formal founding of the new religious "company"; the vows were still of individual character. The legal establishment of the Society of Jesus did not take place until 1539. It was confirmed by Pope Paul III in 1540 in the bull *Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae*. But in a deeper sense the legend that the Jesuit order was founded on Montmartre is right, for the spirit and the vows of the men assembled there were the real source of strength of the most zealous modern order of the Catholic Church, and the main weapon in its fight against spreading Protestantism in the European countries.

In the opening declaration of one of the foundational doctrines of the Jesuit Order, the *Examen*, its aim is described thus:

Not only to seek with the aid of the Divine grace the salvation and perfection of one's own soul, but with the aid of the same earnestly to labor for the salvation and perfection of one's neighbor.

For this purpose, it appeared, educational work was inevitable. So the order first opened, and not without hesitation, a college at Messina in 1548. That same year Loyola began his draft of the *Constitutiones*, containing the principles of organization of the order which were confirmed by the members of the Society and by Pope Julius III in 1550.

Part IV of the *Constitutiones* is devoted to the regulation of studies in the colleges; reference also is made to the plan of a more detailed treatise on educational matters.¹ After most careful preparation throughout the whole order and after fifteen years of repeated deliberations, this treatise appeared in 1599 as the *Ratio Studiorum*. It was not seen by Loyola himself, who died in 1556.

Part IV of the *Constitutiones* and the *Ratio Studiorum*—the latter being an elaboration of the first—gives evidence of the same spirit we have already found in the mentality of the *Exercitia*. Here

¹*St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum*, edited by Edward A. Fitzpatrick, translated by Mary Helen Mayer and A. R. Bull. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1938.

speaks the man with a profound experience of the heights and depths of human nature, the former soldier who knows about discipline and obedience, the great organizer with his remarkable sense for the ideal and the real, and the believer in the salvation of the soul only through Christ. We also understand from these educational regulations why the biographers of Loyola testify to the "sweetness and gentleness" of Loyola's character. He belongs to the rare people who have succeeded in harmonizing the extremes in their own nature, and who—to use a phrase of Goethe's—have achieved the greatest of which a human being is capable, namely, to know man and yet to love him.

It has been said by Jesuits themselves that perfection in organization made the Jesuits great. But nothing can be made great by organization alone, or, better, no organization can become great unless it lives on sources much deeper than executive skill and management. Mere management will never create that stream of purpose and freedom, of unity and diversity, of discipline and initiative which runs through the arteries of all lasting institutions. It shows a lack of deeper understanding of the Jesuit order if some of its historians see in it an incompatible contrast between its authoritarian and its democratic elements and conclude, consequently, that it can be nothing but an authoritarian institution. Omnipotent though Loyola and his successors were within their organization, few documents in the history of institutions ever resulted from such a degree of co-operation and democratic experience as the *Constitutiones* and the *Ratio Studiorum*. Certainly Loyola and his friends absorbed the influence of such great educators of the time as Juan Luis Vives, Johannes Sturm, and the Brethren of the Common Life. But the unifying element behind all these influences was the spirit of Loyola.

The educational means of Loyola are self-identification with the life of Christ and learning for the glory of God, whom all men and nations have to obey without difference. Yet Loyola does not forget the personality of the educand. He admires a trained intellect, but he also knows that trained intellect alone is dangerous. He

stresses habituation, persistence in effort, and repetition. The Socratic-Platonic art of dialectics (though bound to a restricted and orthodox frame of reference) is emphasized in the Jesuit cultivation of scholarly dispute. Even play and theatrical performance are used to improve the power of expression. For the realization of the Christian ideas needs not only contemplation but also the skills and virtues necessary in an active life. For this reason the Jesuit colleges paid more attention to physical training than the other school systems of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is due to all these advantages that the Jesuit colleges soon attracted the sons of the privileged classes, Protestants as well as Catholics.

Francis Bacon says in Book VI, Chapter 4, of *De Augmentis*:

As for Pedagogy, it were the shortest way to refer it to the Jesuits, who in point of usefulness have herein excelled.¹

At another place of the same work (*De Augmentis* I, 1) Bacon shows his broad-mindedness in declaring that the diligence of Jesuit colleges abroad "in fashioning the morals and cultivating the minds of youth" leads him to say "as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, 'Seeing that you are what you are, would that you were on our side.'"²

The Jesuits show respect for the individual abilities of the student, and if one combines this potent factor with their interest in effective selection and their extremely careful system of examinations, he can understand how a world still bound to more or less medieval forms of practical education, and with a shamelessly corrupt system of examinations in the universities, looked up to the Jesuit colleges as to the most effective system of training.

In reality the Jesuits became the great masters of education in all Catholic countries. In Spain, Austria, and Southern Germany they dominated secondary education; in the France of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century educa-

¹Cf. Francis Bacon: *Works*, collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, and Douglas D. Heath, in 15 vols., Vol. II, p. 494. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1904.

²*Ibidem*, Vol. II, p. 117.

tion was exclusively under their sway. Jesuit fathers worked as successful missionaries in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Through their interest in the humanities and in certain parts of the natural sciences, particularly astronomy, they contributed much to scholarship. The educational work of the order was at its zenith at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

What were the causes of the decline of the order during the eighteenth century? What caused the brief of Pope Clement XIV of 1773, which he concluded with the following words?

For the sake of peace, and because the society can no longer attain the aims for which it was founded, and on secret grounds which We enclose in Our heart, We suppress the said society.

The answer to these questions needs some qualification. Right from its beginnings the holy fervor and aggressiveness of the Jesuits had aroused much suspicion and hostility even among the Catholic clergy. Through its zealous work and its supernational organization, centralized in Rome with firm strongholds in every country, the order became an omnipotent yet secretly working agency and a state both above and within every state. With an enormous efficiency in supporting all the forces it favored, it was the most powerful friend of its friends, and the most dangerous enemy of its enemies, whether Catholic or Protestant. This situation applied to politics as well as to culture and religion. In addition, the Jesuits did not always use wisely their educational influence on young aristocrats and their power as father confessors of the ruling families. Finally, though the individual Jesuit was bound by an oath of poverty, the order as such was allowed to accept donations; it waxed richer and richer, and finally became involved in a series of capitalistic enterprises which were utterly against the spirit it professed. Even the disciplinary laws of an Ignatius of Loyola did not prove a sufficient protection against the menace of might and wealth to the morals of an institution. Thus people, governments, and even the Catholic Church hated increasingly the network of Jesuit strategy and wished to get rid of it.

From the educational point of view, there was a still more inevi-

table cause of the gradual alienation of the Jesuit Society from the spirit of the eighteenth century. In spite of all its inner elasticity, the order could not remove the fact that Loyola had tied it up with the scholastic system of theology. This system proved to be incapable of coping with the empiricism and rationalism of the age of enlightenment. Under their pressure the more worldly of the Jesuit fathers modernized themselves to such an extent that they lost contact with the spirit of Loyola; the others tried to stem the tide through fettering the free spirit of inquiry arising in the universities through censorship and co-operation with political reaction. Thus the Society lost more and more of its educational prestige and became largely responsible for the violent onslaught of the French revolution against the traditional schools of learning.

The Order was restored in 1814, due to the growth of the Romanticist reaction against the rationalism of the eighteenth century. A few hundred brothers had survived the suppression, mainly because of the tolerance shown the Order by King Frederic II of Prussia and the Russian Empress Catharine. Within a few decades the Society of Jesus again represented one of the most powerful and disputed outposts of Catholicism. In 1935 it counted about 25,000 members. The Order took up all the activities in which it had excelled during the centuries before its suppression, although, in consequence of the modern spirit and the nationalization of education in most countries, its educational activities never regained the power and expansion they had in the period of Absolutism.

The old *Ratio Studiorum* is still regarded as the fundamental document of Jesuit education, though the colleges have yielded to changes in method and curriculum in order to adapt themselves to the growth of educational theory and practice. The first slight modification of the *Ratio* took place in 1616, the second in 1832. The future of the Order will depend largely on the general role of Catholicism in the cultural and political development of our times and be contingent upon the capacity of the Jesuits to find a synthesis, not merely a compromise, between the spirit of Loyola and the intellectual aspirations of the best Catholic youth.

VI. Montaigne

(1533-1592)

The range in understanding the heights and abysses of human nature which we find in the work of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne seems to be unlimited. He possessed a power of self-analysis which made him realize to an almost incredible degree of what human beings are potentially capable. He also could study, in the France of Catherine of Medici, extremes of vileness, cruelty, and religious hypocrisy which even the keenest imagination can hardly surpass.

No wonder that there grew in the soul of Montaigne the most complete agnosticism. *Que sais-je?* ("What do I know?") he wrote as motto under an emblematic pair of scales which he had drawn as an ornament to his name. He not only said, like Socrates, his great hero, "Try to know thyself," but he also felt that "Thou canst not even know thyself."

In his essay on "Montaigne, The Skeptic," Ralph Waldo Emerson says, "Belief consists in accepting the affirmations of the soul; unbelief, in denying them."¹ But what happens if there are no such affirmations springing from the metaphysical ground of being? However, this very radicalism of questioning, which threw so many of his contemporaries into moral chaos, became for Montaigne the source of a wisdom worthy of comparison with that of the greatest of the ancients. If I do not know anything—so Montaigne reasoned—let me accept that which according to human experience and the testimony of the great men of thought and action proves to be the most productive choice. Let us live according to the Aristotelian rule of the right mean, let us devote our time partly to the service of men, partly to intercourse with great minds of the past and the present, and partly to that

¹Ralph Waldo Emerson: *Complete Works*, New Centenary Edition, in 12 vols.; Vol. IV, *Representative Men*, p. 180. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1903-1904.

kind of noble solitude which the mind needs in order to recreate itself. As it is difficult to decide whether the habits of one country are better than those of another, and as we do not know whether a new government, perhaps obtained by civil war and murder, will not create more evils than the first, or whether a new religion will bring us closer to the divine than the old one, let us not disdain the value of convention. On the other hand, let us not consider that compound of conviction and conditioning which we call "convention" as something holy. If in things within the realm of foresight and observation we have the chance of improvement, let us behave pragmatically and ask for the change which promises the greatest human effect in terms of happiness and development. All this smacks of egotism, and Emerson called Montaigne the "prince of egotists." But this statement contains only half the truth or not even that much.

To be sure, Montaigne led the life of an independent country lord and withdrew from the rabble as much as he could, in conformity with his conscience and interest. But in spite of his appreciation of noble leisure, he served as a judge and later as mayor of the city of Bordeaux. At the end of his successful administration he could say that he had offended nobody and nobody had become his personal enemy. What greater satisfaction can an honest man derive from public service than that, particularly at a time of the most dangerous religious and politic conflicts?

Montaigne traveled widely, did not criticize but appreciated foreign habits and opinions, and tried to learn from them. When the king called him for service, he came; but he never became a courtier. His castle was a refuge for many persecuted people; his own refuge in troubled times was his library. He remained unmolested by either party, Catholic or Protestant.

Montaigne's greatest delight was to set down his observations about human nature in his *Essays*, the first edition of which appeared in 1580. They have become a part of world literature, read over and over by men whom thinking and experience have taught that at the bottom of reality there lies much suffering, resignation,

and disappointment, but not necessarily bitterness and melancholy. Rather, we may strive for the freedom that comes if we dare work and love courageously and if we live without illusions about ourselves and others.

Of Montaigne's *Essays*, two are devoted to education. One bears the title *De l'Institution des Enfants* ("On the Education of Children"), the other *Du Pédantisme* ("On Pedantry"); but the responsibilities of teachers and parents are alluded to in other places also.

There is one leitmotiv to be found in all these writings, which—do not forget—are concerned with the education of the aristocrat, not of the common man. Teach the young the art of living, *hanc amplissimam omnium artium bene vivendi disciplinam* ("this greatest of all arts, that of living"),¹ which we are often "taught to live when our lives are almost over."² Everything else is subordinate to this great aim. But how to master this art? Through becoming independent individuals, with the power to judge which of the many challenges and enticements we meet may help or hurt us. But the intellect alone would not suffice to stand the wear and tear of life. We need also health and endurance and a body well geared to the mind, expressive and elastic. We must love life and action, beauty and glory; and we must have a natural trend toward excellence which springs not from a moralistic kind of righteousness but from "affection as well as reverence for virtue"³ and from a trained sense for the "right mean" on all occasions. This idea of the right mean applies also to learning.

The question should be, Who is better learned? rather than Who is the more learned?⁴

For there are too many erudite men who are not wise, who have been enervated by their studies instead of strengthened, and who

¹Montaigne: *The Education of Children*, translated by L. E. Rector (International Education Series, No. 46), p. 66, Cicero's *Tuscul. Quaest.*, IV, 3. D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1899.

²*Ibidem*, p. 56.

³*Ibidem*, p. 54.

⁴*Ibidem*, p. 92.

apply their power of thinking more to evil than to good purposes.¹

The good man, according to the standards of Montaigne, shows a good portion of self-interest and sense for the amenities of life; he cannot find any wisdom or prudence in ascetic praise of poverty. Yet he must be able to subordinate his interest to his nation and always try to be:

. . . a good and loyal subject to his prince, and a most affectionate and courageous gentleman in all that may concern the honor of his sovereign and the good of his country, and endeavor to suppress in him the desire of having any other tie to his king's service than public duty. . . . A man purely a courtier has neither power nor wit to speak or to think otherwise than favorably of his master. . . . This favor and the profit flowing from it must needs—and not without some show of reason—corrupt his freedom and dazzle his judgment.²

It is Montaigne's early deceased friend, Estienne de la Boétie, author of *De la Servitude Volontaire* ("Of Voluntary Servitude"), a tractate against the evils of court cliques and absolutism, who speaks through this warning of Montaigne's against the confusion of patriotism with servility; and it is the neglect of this warning which caused the disaster of the French nobility in 1789, and the ruin of the House of Hohenzollern under William II.

The secret of educating a gentleman, according to Montaigne's heart, is not to be found in the medieval monastery or in any kind of book learning.

This great world . . . is the true mirror wherein we must look in order to know ourselves as we should.³

Therefore Montaigne's advice is to teach the child to observe, to look at things rather than to memorize words; to travel with him when he is older, and to show him how to profit from his journeys, to open his mind for useful counsel and good examples; and—last, but not least—to aim always at the whole man.

¹*Ibidem*, pp. 97 and 108.

²*Ibidem*, pp. 39 f.

³*Ibidem*, p. 46.

I would have his manners, behavior, and bearing cultivated at the same time with his mind. It is not the mind, it is not the body we are training; it is the man, and we must not divide him into two parts.¹

In other words, the essence of education consists in activating all the qualities in the young from which they can profit morally and physically, as thinking as well as acting beings. Real learning is a process of translating outer reality into inner reality and of turning external influences into spontaneity. For a person trained in such fashion everything is a stimulus to learning.

A garden, the table, his bed, solitude, company, morning and evening—all hours and all places of study shall be the same.²

Only then will one be able to learn from books. Nothing would be more erroneous than to visualize Montaigne as an enemy of reading. Though not a systematic scholar, he was one of the greatest lovers of books. In his essays he constantly quotes, according to the custom of his time, sometimes even to a fatiguing degree; philosophy, history, the literature of the ancients are for him indispensable means of culture. But they can have good effect only in a well-prepared and active mind. Otherwise they are mere ballast.

Montaigne's influence worked directly on men who determined modern educational method and theory as decidedly as Locke and Rousseau. Much of what we consider progressive practices in schools today was anticipated by the French nobleman more than three centuries ago. Careful observation of all the conditions requisite for human maturation, the interaction of physical and mental training, the use of subject matter as a means for the development of personality and the art of living, the understanding of the learning process as fostering the child's initiative, and consequently the transformation of the school into a center of activities related to the child's natural life and future—all these ideas can be traced back to Montaigne.

¹Montaigne: *The Education of Children*, translated by L. E. Rector (International Education Series, No. 46), p. 61. D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1899.

²*Ibidem*, p. 59.

But what is perhaps more important than all specific educational suggestions is the fact that Montaigne represents the first great personality in the history of educational thought to have a completely autonomous and secular concept of man. In this respect he represents the climax of the trend, emerging during the Renaissance, to break out of the Christian dualism and put man completely on his own feet. Not that Montaigne was without interest in religion. In his youth he translated for his father, "the best father that ever lived," the *Theologia Naturalis* by Raimond de Sebonde, an interesting attempt to defend Christianity against the atheists by means of natural religion, without resort to the supernatural character of the revelation. Montaigne would have condemned any tendency to divorce education from the religious tradition. Yet his philosophy of education, as his total philosophy of man and life, is fundamentally independent of religious premises. Natural reason, experience, and philosophy serve for him as a sufficiently strong foundation for the conduct and thought of a moral and educated man. Had not Socrates, Aristotle, and Epicurus lived their admirable lives in this way? Religion was for Montaigne more a venerable convention than a necessity, as it was for most of the cultured Greeks.

The judgment on such a secular philosophy of life and education will depend on one's *Weltanschauung*. One group will consider the way from Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Montaigne as the beginning of man's liberation from the fetters of unnecessary magical concepts. For others, however, Montaigne's concept of human autonomy will mean nothing but the consummation of individualistic self-assertion and the arrival of man at a precipice from which he may suddenly fall into loneliness, despair, and the relativization of all values.

The New Method of Thinking

I. Francis Bacon

(1561–1626)

When the individualism of the Renaissance brought a new relation to the cultural tradition, ancient or Christian, man entered also into a new relation to nature. Only two years after Luther published his ninety-five theses and stirred up a whirlpool of feeling and fighting, one of the greatest universal geniuses of mankind, the Italian Leonardo da Vinci, died at the Castle of Cloux near Amboise. He left a mass of manuscripts which later generations considered *ghiribizzi*, strange products of the artist's inexhaustible imagination but unworthy of attention. Only modern historians discovered that they contained notes of a man whose urge toward observation had led him to anticipate some of the most important discoveries in optics and the science of perspective, in mechanics and statics, as well as in medicine and engineering.

Another contemporary of Luther, Nicolaus Copernicus, mathematician, astronomer, lawyer, and physician, dissatisfied with the mathematical complexity of the Ptolemaic theory, read in Cicero and Plutarch that some ancient philosophers had advocated a heliocentric theory. In the dedication of his work *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium* (1543) to Pope Paul III, he tells us that:

Starting thence I began to think of a motion of the earth, and although the idea seemed absurd, still as others before me had been permitted to assume certain circles in order to explain the motions of the stars, I believed it would readily be permitted me to try whether in the assumption of some motion of the earth better explanations of the revolutions of the heavenly spheres might not be found. And thus I have, assuming the motions which I in the following work attribute to the earth, after long and careful investigation, finally found that when the motions of the other planets are referred to the circulation of the earth and are computed

for the revolution of each star, not only do the phenomena necessarily follow therefrom, but the order and magnitude of the stars and all their orbs and the heaven itself are so connected that in no part can anything be transposed without confusion to the rest and to the whole universe.¹

Three years before the beginning of Luther's Reformation, Andreas Vesalius was born in Brussels. He became professor at some North Italian universities which were then the center of mathematical and medical research. In co-operation with certain painters, among whom was Titian's famous pupil Jan Stephan Calcar, he composed the first scientific work on anatomy, *De Humani Corporis Fabrica*, published at Basel in 1543. It was one of the great masterpieces of exact observation and gave a new turn to the science of medicine, which so far had been dependent on ancient tradition. Now it began to build on an empirical foundation.

The great scientists of the time were interested not merely in the objects of their research. As the explorer of a new country knows the value of examining every new stretch of land before venturing ahead, so the scientists of the Renaissance were conscious of the effect of right method on the quality of their work. Logic, though in a primarily deductive form, had already been one of the most ardent pursuits of medieval scholars, particularly of the nominalist William of Occam, whose influence reached far into the humanist period. This urge to reflect upon itself, characteristic of all mature reasoning, became all the stronger in the scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who knew that they were going to lead the world into a new period of thought. In their fight against the "scholastic method," they even exaggerated the contrast more than was historically correct. For the rise of empirical interests was not in complete contrast to the Middle Ages; also in this respect it is better to speak of an evolutionary development than of a revolution. Leonardo's and Galileo's studies on mechanics, to

¹Nicolaus Copernicus: *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*, Nitrnberg, 1543. Cf. John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, revised edition, p. 228. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1940.

mention only one example, were decisively influenced by John Buridan of Bethune, who was rector of the University of Paris in the year 1328.¹

Thus we find, in the period of the Renaissance, parallel to the rapid development of the sciences, a similar blossoming of a philosophy of method or "methodology."

This fact explains why, side by side with the inductive and experimental approach, represented by the natural sciences, medicine, and engineering, we find a more deductive method of discovering the laws of the universe, represented by the great philosopher-mathematicians Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant. Copernicus himself approached the problem of the mobility of the earth not in an observatory with telescopes, but in his study, surrounded by manuscripts filled with abstract computations.

But the two forms of thought, the inductive and the deductive, did not and cannot always run apart. Even the most experimental mind cannot dispense with fundamental premises of correct thinking, mathematical axioms, and principles of collecting and organizing the wealth of data. On the other hand, even the most abstract thinker will attempt to relate his thought to experience. Therefore, in the really great intellects it is much more a matter of degree in emphasis than of essence whether they lean more toward one or the other side, and sometimes even this cannot be clearly stated.

The combination of philosophical and scientific method can be shown in the works of the two thinkers who have exercised the most decisive influence on the development of modern philosophy and education, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650). The first of the two, Bacon, is, as a philosopher, characteristically English in his emphasis on empiricism, whereas Descartes represents more the rationalistic trend prevailing in the Continental philosophy of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

¹Cf. Pierre Duhem, *Études sur Léonard de Vinci*, troisième série, pp. 54-112, Paris, 1913. See also Ernest A. Moody, "John Buridan on the Habitability of the Earth," in *Speculum, a Journal of Mediaeval Studies* for October, 1941, Vol. XVI, pp. 415-425.

Yet Bacon speculated about the inductive method rather than pursue it, while Descartes speculated about abstract problems but wrote his name also into the annals of physics and applied mathematics.

Two great purposes are the inspiring motives of Bacon's work: one is to "make a small globe of the intellectual world";¹ the other is to develop a reliable inductive method of research designed to help man subject nature to his will. All previous philosophical and scientific attempts, according to Bacon, were to be condemned as guesswork, because they accepted uncontrolled premises as the foundation from which to start. Perhaps nothing shows more clearly the change of attitude from the Middle Ages, or even from the time of Erasmus, toward empiricism than the disdain which Bacon displays for Aristotle and the Greeks in general:

. . . for they certainly have this in common with children, that they are prone to talking, and incapable of generation, their wisdom being loquacious and unproductive of effects.²

So the exaggerated veneration for Antiquity has suddenly changed into contempt, though even the slightest perusal of Bacon's own work shows how much he owes to the ancients. There are many pages in his *Novum Organum* that refer to one or the other of them, either implicitly or explicitly. But modesty was never a characteristic of Sir Francis Bacon.

Bacon does not reject the deductive method completely. He calls it "Anticipation of the Mind" and believes that it may serve as a way for the "cultivation of the sciences." But the method by which alone one can determine "the degrees of certainty," or which, in other words, serves "for the *discovery* (the italics are the author's)

¹Bacon: *The Advancement of Learning*, edited by William Aldis Wright, fifth edition, p. 208, Book II, end of Chap. xxv. Oxford University Press, New York, 1920. Cited in the following as: *Adv. of Learning*.

²Francis Bacon: *Works*, with a life of the author by Basil Montagu: *Novum Organum* Book I, Aphor. lxxi; Vol. III, p. 354. Carey and Hart, Philadelphia, 1842. Cited in the following as: *Novum Organum*.

of sciences," is "Interpretation of Nature."¹ This is the method by which man may master his environment.

Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. For nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in practical science becomes the *rule*.²

Unfortunately, the establishment of "degrees of certainty" is hindered not only by defects of method but by a more general fault, namely, man's adherence to "idols and false nations."³ Four classes of idols "beset the human mind."⁴ The "idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature, and the very tribe or race of man."⁵ Our senses often deceive us, our "mind resembles those uneven mirrors, which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted, and distort and disfigure them."⁶

The second class of idols, those of the "Den":

... are those of each individual. For everybody (in addition to the errors common to the race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature; either from his own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on the mind, as it happens to be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like: so that the spirit of man (according to its several dispositions) is variable, confused, and as it were actuated by chance; and Heraclitus said well that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.⁷

The third species of idols is that of the "market." They express themselves in words, concepts, and judgments which "throw every

¹The quotations are from the Preface to the second part of the *Novum Organum*, Vol. III, p. 343 f.

²*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. iii; Vol. III, p. 345.

³*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xxxviii; Vol. III, p. 347.

⁴*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xxxix; Vol. III, p. 347.

⁵*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xli; Vol. III, p. 347.

⁶*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xli; Vol. III, p. 347.

⁷*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xlii; Vol. III, p. 347.

thing into confusion," because they spring simply from the vulgar "commerce and association of men with each other,"¹ not from the desire for clear definitions.

The last group of idols, the "Idols of the Theater" have crept into men's minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of philosophy, and also from "the perverted rules of demonstration." Here Bacon alludes to the power exercised over men by systems and sects of thought or by "many elements and axioms of sciences, which have become inveterate by tradition, implicit credence, and neglect."²

One could call Bacon's description of the "four idols" the first Declaration of Independence, a declaration of a character as fundamental as any political statement can be, though it is, like all great ideals, as unattainable to man as it is eternal in its demand upon him. Bacon himself never lived up to it. In his scientific work he failed to acknowledge the value of the Copernican hypothesis, of Kepler's new astronomy, of Vesalius' anatomy, of Gilbert's discoveries on magnetism, and of Harvey's experiments on the circulation of the blood, though he was himself among the private patients of the great physiologist. In his personal and official life he showed a vexing mixture of great and mean ambitions, and he indulged in that robust dualism between religious belief and skepticism which has contributed much to our modern talent for hypocrisy. Certainly his famous essays are masterpieces in the art of shrewd and clever sayings, and quite a few of them are even profound. But a civilization adopting their spirit fully as its own, though perhaps becoming rich and powerful for a time, would eventually collapse, for it would breathe in the atmosphere of veneration of utility and success, but not of real greatness.

How great is Bacon's influence on educational method proper? It is not different from his influence on science: directly, he has contributed nothing, but indirectly he has contributed much, perhaps even more in education than in the sciences. The scientists

¹*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xlii; Vol. III, p. 347.

²*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. xlii; Vol. III, p. 347.

did not pay much attention to Bacon's work; they found that his method of induction was too mechanical to be productive. But among the great educators there was one who listened to Bacon, though it is difficult to measure how much he really owes to him and how much to his own genius. This is John Amos Comenius, the most comprehensive and systematic among the educators of the seventeenth century. About his work we speak later.

Bacon himself expresses his ideas on methods of teaching particularly in the *Advancement of Learning*. There is a chapter on "Pedantical Knowledge"¹ in which he speaks of the "timing and seasoning of knowledges"; of the method of beginning sometimes with the easiest, and of pressing sometimes "the more difficult, and then to turn them [the pupils] to the more easy"; of "the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits"; and, finally, of "the ordering of exercises." These paragraphs contain nothing that could not be found in many educational treatises of the time. Nor do the more elaborate chapter on pedagogy in *De Augmentis*² and the essay *Of Studies*³ contain more of interest except that they express Bacon's admiration of the Jesuit schools and the "collegiate system" in contrast to the tutorial education customary in the upper classes of the time, and his appreciation of the newer humanities, such as modern languages, in contrast to the older classical curriculum. Thus the spirit of the new period extends its influence to the curriculum.

¹*Adv. of Learning*, Chap. XIX, 2, p. 182 f. *Pedantical* is used in the older sense of "pedagogical."

²Francis Bacon: *Works*, collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis, and Douglas D. Heath, 15 vols. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1904. See Vol. II, p. 492 f.: *De Augmentis*, Book VI, Chap. IV.

³*Ibidem*, Vol. XII, pp. 252 ff.

II. René Descartes

(1596–1650)

Descartes' fundamental philosophical experience is of a depth and radicalness which the versatile mind of Bacon never reached, namely, doubt in any sort of human certainty.

I do not know that I ought to tell you of the first meditations there made by me, for they are so metaphysical and so unusual that they may perhaps not be acceptable to everyone. And yet at the same time, in order that one may judge whether the foundations which I have laid are sufficiently secure, I find myself constrained in some measure to refer to them. For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable, as has been said above. But because in this case I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain. Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations. And since all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake may also come to us in sleep, without any of them being at that time true, I resolved to assume that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the "I" who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth "*I think, therefore I am*" was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I

came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.¹

Certainly Descartes conceives of his experience of self-consciousness in much too intellectual a fashion; self-awareness is not the same as "thinking"; it is of a much more complex nature. Yet he deemed this experience sufficient to serve as the starting point for showing forth a "complete chain of truth,"² among which in particular was the dualism between body and soul, the idea of a perfect being, and of free will,³ and his belief that notions endowed with the same clearness and distinctness as the idea of God must be true to the same degree.⁴ Though the highly deductive character of these conclusions is contrary to Bacon, by some strange turn in Descartes' mind they lead him to beliefs not unlike those of the English philosopher. There are, so he argues, notions of similar aprioristic clarity as those of God; we are convinced, for example, that nature is not mere chaos, but operates according to certain laws. A way to understand these laws immanent in matter, space, and time is mathematics; there is no doubt in our minds that the modes of thought which help us to solve a mathematical problem are of absolute logical necessity.⁵ Such mathematics, and particularly applied mathematics,⁶ became central in Descartes' philosophical system.

But as soon as I had acquired some general notions concerning physics, and as, beginning to make use of them in various special

¹*The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, rendered into English by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. 2 vols. Cambridge University Press, England, 1912. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York. See Vol. I, pp. 81-130: *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences*. Cited in the following as: *Disc. on the Meth.*

²*Disc. on the Meth.*, Part V; Vol. I, p. 106. Compare with this and with the following description of Descartes' philosophy his *Principles of Philosophy* in his *Philosophical Works* (*loco citato*), Vol. I, pp. 203-302. Cited in the following as: *Principles of Phil.*

³*Principles of Phil.*, Part I, Prin. xxxix; Vol. I, p. 234 f.

⁴*Disc. on the Meth.*, Part IV; Vol. I, p. 105.

⁵*Disc. on the Meth.*, Part V; Vol. I, p. 106. Also, *Principles of Phil.*, Part I, Prin. liv f. and lxxv; Vol. I, pp. 241 f. and 252.

⁶*Disc. on the Meth.*, Part VI; Vol. I, p. 119.

difficulties, I observed to what point they may lead us, and how much they differ from the principles of which we have made use up to the present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without greatly sinning against the law which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the general good of all mankind. For they caused me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.¹

So Descartes became convinced of the necessity of experiments. "They become so much the more necessary the more one is advanced in knowledge."

Like Bacon, Descartes also develops, at the end of the first part of his *Principles of Philosophy*, a theory of prejudices. He finds them in the errors of the senses to which we are particularly exposed in childhood when the mind is "so closely allied to body that it applied itself to nothing but those thoughts alone by which it was aware of the things which affected the body."² Furthermore, we unfortunately like the prejudices implanted in us during youth, and the mind shows a tendency "to fatigue itself when it applies its attention to the objects which are not present to the senses. . . . We are therefore in the habit of judging of these [objects], not from present perceptions, but from preconceived opinions."³

Descartes, notwithstanding his doubtful metaphysical premises, was a more productive scholar than Bacon. His mind was more open to the new astronomy and medicine than was that of the author of *Novum Organum*. In his *Dioptric* he contributed new ideas to the science of optics. Though his respect for pure mathematicians was not very great, he was one of the pioneers in this

¹*Disc. on the Meth.*, Part VI, Vol. I, p. 119.

²*Principles of Phil.*, Part I, Prin. lxxi; Vol. I, p. 249.

³*Ibidem*, Part I, Prin. lxxiii; Vol. I, p. 231.

discipline of thought. As a biologist he foresaw the problem inherent in the traditional theory of special creation, and he strengthened the scientific method through his attempt to reduce natural phenomena to the working of mechanical laws. Unfortunately, he disregards the principle of unity completely in his own psychology, which advocates a stern dualism between matter and mind and has caused more confusion and complication than real enlightenment, though one may grant that Descartes' radicalness in the dualistic interpretation of the soul-body relation has shown the predicaments inherent in the psycho-physical problem.

III. Galileo (1564-1642) and the Conflict Between Faith and Science

Such changes in mentality and knowledge as occurred in the period between Thomas Aquinas and Descartes inevitably convulsed the total relation of man to his spiritual tradition. Not only did the Protestants break with the Catholic Church, but the new form of empiricism was bound to conflict with both the Catholic and the Protestant clergy. In this attitude toward scientific research the Protestants were not very different from the Catholics, though the more individualistic character of Protestantism certainly paved the way for the modern concept of freedom of research. But this occurred often against, not according to, the intention of the average Protestant theologian.

Many of the first pioneers of modern research became the victims of intolerance. Johann Reuchlin was prosecuted for his philological interests in the Hebrew language; Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake for his philosophical cosmology; Michael Serveto suffered the same fate in the Geneva of John Calvin. The anatomist Andreas Vesalius was sentenced for sorcery and was granted a pardon only on the intervention of Philip II of Spain, on condition that he undertake a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On his homeward journey he was shipwrecked and died on the island of Zanthé. Copernicus preferred to present his heliocentric theory as a hypothesis; but when Galileo proved it empirically, the clash was inevitable. Hearing of the Italian's trial, Descartes preferred to destroy the manuscript of a book called *The World*, or *Cosmos*, to which he refers often in his later writings. It was probably an attempt at a comprehensive scientific theory of the universe.

It would be too narrow to explain these dark events in the history of our civilization merely as a result of the willful fanaticism of inquisitors. The inquisitors could not have exerted their influ-

ence had there not existed a terrific dilemma in the souls of many of their contemporaries. The two levels of their consciousness, the magical and the reasonable, were still unreconciled and worked against each other. Otherwise it would be inexplicable that astrology played such an important role that men of highest character and intelligence, such as the great French philosopher of government Jean Bodin, wrote a book on witchcraft,¹ and that a man like Comenius could several times in his life fall victim to false prophets. But—how far are we now?

One of the most impressive documents of the fight between reason and the bondage of dogmatism in this period of transition is a letter addressed by Galileo to the Grandduchess of Toscana.² Here Galileo refutes the attacks directed against his empirical proof of the Copernican theory, attacks which were launched against not only his ideas but also his personal qualities, especially his piety. Galileo answers these reproaches by expressing his respect for the authority of the Scripture, the sacred theologians, and the councils, but stating that there is an essential difference between theology and profane research. If theology—so he says—is called the queen of all sciences, this can be only in view of the sublimity and dignity of her pursuits, which aim at man's eternal blessedness. But it cannot be understood as a privilege of divines to talk with the pretense of authority on subjects foreign to their competence and knowledge. Therefore it would be against all laws of thinking if the teachers of astronomy were compelled to reject their own findings because the theologians consider them erroneous. In this way the scholars would be ordered:

¹Jean Bodin, *De la Démonomanie des Sorciers*. Paris, 1580.

²"Lettera a Madama Cristina di Lorena, Granduchessa di Toscana" (1615), in *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei*, Edizione Nazionale, Vol. V, pp. 309 f. Firenze, 1895. Cited in the following as. *Opere*.

For an English translation see Thomas Salusbury's *Mathematical Collections and Translations*, published in 2 parts (London, 1661), Part 1, pp. 426-460: "The Ancient and Modern Doctrine of Holy Fathers, and Judicious Divines, Concerning the Rash Citation of the Testimony of Sacred Scripture, in Conclusions Merely Natural, and That May Be Proved by Sensible Experiments and Necessary Demonstrations," written to Christina Lotharinga. Cited in the following as: "Letter."

... not [to] see that which they see, and ... not [to] understand that which they understand; but that in seeking, they find the contrary of that which they happen to meet with. Therefore before that this is to be done, it would be necessary that they were shewed the way how to make the Powers of the Soul to command one another, and the inferior the Superior; so that the imagination and will might, and should believe contrary to what the Intellect understands.

Immediately after these sentences, he implicitly refers to the scholastic theory of the twofold verity of faith and natural philosophy, and says:

I still mean in Propositions purely Natural, and which are not *de Fide* ("of Faith"), and not in the Supernatural, which are *de Fide*.¹

Yet his confidence in the general power of truth again emerges:

If for the banishing this Opinion and Hypothesis [of Copernicus] out of the World, it were enough to stop the mouth, of one alone, as it may be they persuade themselves who measuring other's judgments by their own, think it impossible that this Doctrine should be able to subsist and finde any followers, this would be very easie to be done, but the business standeth otherwise: For to execute such a determination, it would be necessary to prohibite not only the Book of *Copernicus*, and the writings of the other Authors that follow the same opinion, but to interdict the whole science of *Astronomy*; and which is more, to forbid men looking towards Heaven, that so they might not see *Mars* and *Venus* at one time neer to the Earth, and at another farther off, ... and many other sensible Observations which can never by any means be reconciled to the *Ptolomaick* System, but are unanswerable Arguments for the *Copernican*.²

Galileo was right. The Inquisition could force him to recant, but it could not prevent the Copernican theory from appearing in the textbooks of our children, whether Catholic or Protestant. Nobody in Galileo's time could anticipate that the greatest change of civilization would come not from the religious reforms with all their

¹*Opere*, Vol. V, p. 326. "Letter," pp. 441 f.

²*Opere*, Vol. V., p. 328. "Letter," p. 443.

wars and conflicts but from the quiet work of mathematicians and scientists. Not even these men themselves foresaw the effect of their endeavors, for they did not expect two events which have molded our modern era: one, the immense scope of the application of the new sciences to technical invention; the second, the use of the method of the natural sciences to explain not only "matter" but also the mind and the total cosmos.

The climax of the hopes of this intellectual development was probably reached at the beginning of the twentieth century. Today we begin to see its limits. The "machine age," while lightening the fate of men in many respects, has made it harder in others. Furthermore, the validity of a universal application of the methods of the natural sciences to the great problems of the human race has been subjected to serious doubt. Whereas in the time of Galileo dogmatic theology, with its fear of empirical research, prevented man from following his vision of truth and progress, our generation suffers from the consequences of an empiricism which tries to belittle, as irrelevant or "unscientific," everything which cannot be demonstrated in the laboratory. The result is that many of us are nowadays as helpless and untrained in the spiritual sphere of life as medieval man was in the empirical.

If it is objected that modern scientists differ from medieval theologians in that they do not use an inquisition to enforce their arguments, this, fortunately, is correct. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the abandonment of the Inquisition was due not only to the sciences but also to a general cultural development of humanity. In this development theologians have taken just as much part as anybody else. Furthermore, other forms of intolerance have arisen, such as nationalistic chauvinism, idolization or contempt of races, and the deification of political doctrines. And each of these modern tempters of mankind dons a scientific cloak in order to cheat essentially decent but credulous individuals and peoples.

Help can come only from a reconciliation between religion and free research. The conviction of man's rootedness in a common

metaphysical ground, which is the essence of religion, must also be a part of the consciousness of the scientist, in order that he may identify himself with the common purposes of humanity. On the other hand, the defenders of the faith must not bring the scientist into a situation where he has to rebel against the interference of dogmatism. Physics and metaphysics must recognize that they are but two complements of man's full existence and that they offend each other the moment either trespasses on the other's province.

All this was well known to Plato, Descartes, Galileo, Leibnitz, Newton, and Kant. They all hoped that both religion and science could help man toward understanding himself and his part in nature and history. The spiritual and scientific unity of culture that still awaits us will thus be nothing more than the realization of an old dream, the dream of the best minds of mankind since the beginning of its slow ascent toward maturity.

The Awakening of the Middle Class Spirit

The Commonwealth Educators

It will always be difficult to delineate sharply the boundaries of historical periods. Whether we want to call a period of history an entirely new one or only another link in the endless chain of being will depend on our preference for the revolutionary or the evolutionary character of human civilization.

We have already discovered the difficulty of clear historical classification in respect to the relation of the humanist period to the Middle Ages. We meet this difficulty again in the attempt to set off the educational drift of the seventeenth century from the humanist period. Was the cultural ascendance of the middle class—characterized by the most central event of the seventeenth century, the English revolution of 1648—only the final effect of dynamic forces emerging in the Reformation and in the Renaissance? And were the educational ideas of Cromwell's followers only the natural consequence of the work of Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin? We may well answer this question in the affirmative. On the other hand, if we lay stress on distinction, we may say that the humanist and Protestant movement of the sixteenth century developed largely under the protection of feudalism and absolutism, whereas the English revolution was republican in character.

Protestantism in Germany, made possible through the art of printing, was perhaps the first great mass movement which allowed the reformers to spread thousands of pamphlets over the country.¹ But those of the Protestant dissenters who tried to shake off not only the ecclesiastical but also the feudal yoke were suppressed

¹See Louise W. Holborn, "Printing and the Growth of a Protestant Movement in Germany from 1517-1524," in *Church History* for June, 1942, Vol. XI, No. 2.

in Germany as well as in most of the other countries. Luther's reforms in the field of education, though individualistic in a way, were still embedded in the old Christian transcendentalism and were untouched by any empirical tendency. With respect to authority, both the humanist and the Protestant educators of the sixteenth century, in spite of their fights against Catholic institutionalism, were looking back toward Greek-Roman-Christian Antiquity as the central period of human history. Compared with this attitude, the mentality of the progressives of the seventeenth century shows definite signs of modernity. They believed in a "New Philosophy" which, springing from Bacon's work, was of a more empirical character than that of Luther, Calvin, or Erasmus.

This does not mean that the new educational attitude arose always from strictly scientific thinking. It would need a very liberal interpretation to attribute the epithet of science to such educational experiments as were proposed by the German Wolfgang Ratke, who died in 1635. Ratke represents the same state of development in the history of education that his alchemist contemporaries represent in the history of exact sciences. Yet the idea that the teacher should make use of the vernacular and could do more and better work in a shorter time by proper use of the natural rules of learning was the motivating element in Ratke's endeavors. Thus they mark the first awkward beginning of the development of educational method which we associate with the names of Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart. Without this development a really professional training of teachers would not have become possible, for any such training depends on the existence of scientifically elaborated and communicable methods.

In order to understand the new attitude of the seventeenth century educator, we must refer again, as in the section on "The New Method of Thinking," to the initial paragraphs in Bacon's "Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature and the Empire of Man" in the *Instauratio Magna*, which read:

Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature, either

with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more. . . . Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. For nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in practical science becomes the *rule*.¹

This conviction about the interconnection between knowledge of causes and effective action creates among the new educators an intense, though often dilettante, desire to investigate the quality of mental growth and learning and to apply the findings systematically to practical education. At the same time, we find a tendency to write big encyclopedias in order to make the increasing body of knowledge available to the learner. Bacon's attempt at composing a *Globus Intellectualis* is paralleled on the educational side by the endeavor of Comenius to create a *Pan-Sophia* in which all essential knowledge is well ordered and related to certain fundamental and uniting principles governing the divine-natural universe.

No group of educators in the seventeenth century was more eager to apply new methods and ideas than the dozen or so men who tried to use the political upheaval of the English revolution (1640-1660) for thorough reforms in the school system. Perhaps there was never another group of respectable people so radical in their educational aspirations as these men. One of these so-called Commonwealth educators, John Durie (1596-1680), wrote in his *Reformed School*:

The true and proper end of Schooling is to teach and Exercise Children and Youths in the Grounds of all Learning and Virtues, so far as either their capacitie in that age will suffer them to come, or is requisite to apprehend the principles of useful matters, by which they may bee made able to exercise themselves in everie good Employment afterwards by themselves.²

¹*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. i and iii; Vol. III, p. 345.

²John Durie, *The Reformed Librarie-Keeper*, with a Supplement to *The Reformed School*, p. 4. London, 1650.

See also John William Adamson, *Pioneers of Modern Education, 1600-1700*, p. 152. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921. Cited in the following as: Adamson.

Such an individualistic and practical concept of education leads naturally to certain consequences which we would nowadays denote by the term "guidance." So Sir William Petty (1623–1687), famous in the history of economics for his use of vital statistics, says in his *Advice of W[illiam] P[etty] to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the Advancement of Some Particular Parts of Learning* (London, 1648), one of the most progressive works in the history of educational literature:

Boyes, instead of reading hard Hebrew words in the Bible (where they either trample on, or play with Mysteries) or parrot-like repeating heteroclitous nouns, and verbs, might read and hear the History of Faculties expounded, so that before they be bound Apprentices to any Trade, they may foreknow the good and bad of it, what will and strength they have to it, and not spend seven years in repenting, and in swimming against the stream of their Inclinations.¹

In modern terms this means: arrange the process of learning and teaching systematically and adapt it to the growth, the mental abilities, the expanding interests, and the future work of the child. There also appear the first glimpses of the idea of "learning by doing." William Petty, in the work just mentioned, proposes common elementary schools, which he calls *Ergastula Literaria*, or Literary Workshops, for children of all social classes above the age of seven. For "many are now holding the Plough, which might have been made fit to steere the State."² In these *Ergastula Literaria* the children ought to be "taught to observe and remember all sensible Objects and Actions, whether they be Naturall or Artificiall. . . . All children, though of the highest ranke" ought to be "taught some gentile Manufacture" as turning, making of watches and mathematical instruments, engraving, etching, carving, gardening, the making of naval and architectural models, confection-

¹*The Advice of W[illiam] P[etty] to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the Advancement of Some Particular Parts of Learning*, p. 23. London, 1648. Cited in the following as: Petty's *Advice*. See also Adamson, p. 135.

²Petty's *Advice*, p. 4. Adamson, p. 132.

ary, perfuming, and anatomical preparations.¹ The arts of drawing and designing ought to be introduced, since their use for "expressing the conceptions of the mind, seems (at least to us) to be little inferior to that of Writing, and in many cases performeth what by words is impossible."² Children also ought to use physical exercises "whether in work, or for recreation, as tend to the health, agility, and strength of their bodies."³

The whole period is filled with an intense optimism as to the effectiveness of the "new method." Everywhere books appear on inventions, on good husbandry, medicine, agriculture, manufacturing, and gardening. Holland and Flanders especially serve as examples to the English. Bacon expresses the technical and educational optimism in paragraph cxxii of the *Novum Organum*. The new inductive approach, he says, is of such a reliability that the difference of the "ingenia," that means of intellectual and imaginative talent, will no longer play any great part, *cum omnia per certissimas regulas et demonstrationes transigat* ("as it [the new method] achieves everything by the most certain rules and demonstrations"),⁴ which each person can apply as properly as the other.

We know today that nature, especially the nature of man, is not prone to yield to bare methodical skill. Nor is the process of original reasoning and discovery so mechanical that it does not need imagination and genius. Nevertheless, this youthful enthusiasm of the first empirical generations for the power of systematic procedure served as an enormous incentive in the progress of natural science; it also paved the way for the gradual entrance of scientific subjects into the curricula of the schools and universities.

When so many things could be improved by the application of better methods, why not also the training of teachers? So the educators of the seventeenth century set out to carry through what such far-seeing men of the sixteenth century as Luther, Erasmus,

¹Petty's *Advice*, p. 5 f. Adamson, pp. 133 and 134.

²Petty's *Advice*, p. 5. Adamson, p. 133.

³Petty's *Advice*, p. 4. Adamson, p. 133.

⁴*Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphor. cxxii; Vol. III, p. 368.

and Duke Ernest of Saxe-Gotha had already thought of, namely, the institution of teachers' colleges. But it would be one-sided to ascribe this tendency exclusively to the rise of empiricism. The first systematic teacher of teachers was probably the Catholic priest Démia¹ of Lyon, who in 1680 founded an institution for the training of nuns in the art of teaching. He was followed in 1682 by Jean Baptist deLaSalle, and in 1696 by August Hermann Francke, with his *Seminarium Praeceptorum* at Halle. Probably none of these men acted under the direct influence of Bacon or any of the leading natural scientists, though Francke at least was deeply interested in the natural and applied sciences and established laboratories in connection with his schools. These pioneers, who were religious men, intended to apply the gospel of Christian brotherhood to the upbringing of poor youth. Nevertheless, even they prove that a methodical tendency penetrated more and more the minds of men, irrespective of the source from which it received its impulse.

In combination with the methodical attitude, a concept of the aim of education developed which was decidedly different from the humanist attitude of the sixteenth century. It was the idea of usefulness and reality as a criterion of good education. A new educational vocabulary arose; no longer was it *pietas et eloquentia*, but "usefulness," "reality," "things instead of words." And this change of criteria occurred not only in the works of liberal-minded laymen but also in those of the clergy.

The trend toward application was closely related—particularly in England—to the growing influence of the new business and bourgeois class. If we read the works of men like Hartlib, Petty, and Durie, we are rightly surprised by the straightforwardness with which they want to direct education toward useful purposes. Nevertheless, the religious tenor which permeated their thinking was not merely a relic of a reverential past, a cloth worn for decorative purposes around a withering body. These men felt—here

¹*Nouveau Dictionnaire de Pédagogie et d'Instruction Primaire*, publié sous la direction de F. Buisson, p. 459. Paris, 1911.

also emerges the empirical trend of the time—that religious ideas are not worth much unless they change people and their dealing with each other toward the better. Thus work, politics, and education, if performed in a Christian spirit, became as sacred as, or even more sacred than, contemplation and mere inwardness.

If one wishes to understand the atmosphere of that time, he must read its Utopias. They emerge in the most diverse camps of thought and cover a relatively long period. The Catholic humanist Thomas More, as well as the Protestants James Harrington and Johann Valentin Andreae, picture cities of God realized here on earth; Bacon and, finally, Hartlib project a scientifically engineered city of men; and around the campfires of the Cromwellian army the Puritan soldiers forge their Christian democratic manifestos.

In such a time education must develop a practical social philosophy. The Hussites, the Lutherans, and the Calvinists in Geneva had already incorporated education in their planning. Some of the humanists had done similarly; and about a hundred years before the Commonwealth revolution, Sir Thomas Elyot in his *Boke Named the Governour* had told the English noblemen that only those have the right to rule who show the highest degree of social and cultural responsibility.

In the middle of the seventeenth century the interconnection of education and society becomes clearer than ever. Milton (*Of Education*, 1644) wants the school to be the spring from which the new religious republicanism flows, though he differs from his Commonwealth friends through his ardent humanism. He stresses the necessity of a wide classical and linguistic training to such a degree that one cannot but fear that most pupils undergoing such a training would get helplessly stuck in verbalism and not receive what Milton wishes them to have: "a complete and general education, which fits a man to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both public and private, of peace and war."

But, whatever we may think about the means which Milton chose for attaining his aims, he as much as his friends, and perhaps even more, represents a new ideology. In the Middle Ages and

during the Reformation education is demanded because it helps the individual to understand the sacraments and the Bible and thus to save his soul. Milton and his friends demand education for the same reason, but also because it helps the citizen to understand the tasks and problems of his nation and to participate, as a free man, in its government.

With this new attitude education receives necessarily a new and more comprehensive meaning in its relation to the body politic. Nations represented by the citizens, and not only by kings and governments, become aware of their historical destiny and begin to consider themselves the bearers of the divine mission which God has given to humanity. This new national self-consciousness serves as a powerful patriotic impulse; it is also culturally productive as long as nations conceive of their role in terms of service for a great human and religious ideal. However, with growing might and wealth, imperialistic interests are sometimes substituted for the idea of humanity. The moment this narrowing of the concept of national destiny takes place, national power in itself becomes the cause and goal of political action and uses the patriotic impulse of men for destroying the supernational unity of mankind. We are now in a stage of history when this process has reached its most catastrophic form and thrown our civilization into a crisis from which only a new realization of the real purposes of men and nations can save us.

To Milton the new republican relation between man and society appears as an active and deeply ethical responsibility of the individual to his government. Government no longer incorporates divine authority to which man has to submit; every citizen has the right and the duty to make his own social effort. He is challenged by God Himself to help in the great purpose of organizing a dignified and productive Christian society. Thus the old dualism between the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of earth begins to relent. The religious sphere penetrates the political; but, as we have already seen, there is always the danger that the political sphere may absorb the religious.

Religiously inspired republicanism motivated the English Puritans to become revolutionaries, to execute first their ecclesiastical suppressor, Archbishop Laud, and then, in 1648, their monarch Charles I, "by the grace of God King of England, France and Ireland, defender of the faith," etc. It is deeply symbolic of the historical situation that the defense of the king does not attempt to vindicate the monarch in terms of legal argumentation. It consists merely of a principal denial of the right of jurisdiction of a civil court over His Majesty's sacred Government. Two worlds meet here—transcendent absolutism and the self-assertion of the new citizen who also claims political rights of religious sanction. At the same time, the House of Commons proposes to employ property of the Church for "the advancement of Learning and Piety" and deliberates on the possibility of supporting the new political system by adequate educational measures. Behind the scene Samuel Hartlib, John Durie, and their friends work to make education a part of the revolutionary Commonwealth. They invite John Amos Comenius to come to England to give his advice. It is not their fault, but the consequence of the unrest which goes with revolutions, that their great plan of a democratic educational system tinged with strong vocational tendencies was not realized. After 1660 the political and ecclesiastical restoration swept away not only the Cromwellian republic but with it the ideal of a progressive education for the large masses of the English citizenry.

We may rightly say that an idea has not much worth before it is realized. The educational ideas of the Commonwealth suffered the fate of the political aspirations of the whole Cromwellian period. Both were crushed by reactionary forces; yet their external failure could not extinguish their inherent strength. But no new phase can emerge in human history without an idea serving as its usher.

The land where the spirit of religious republicanism found an outlet was North America. Before the outbreak of the Great Revolution, a group of English Puritans had exchanged Old England for New England to avoid the pressure of political and religious

absolutism. Economic considerations, as well as the dream of a new Kingdom of God, were in the minds of the settlers. Had they not been endowed with such a spirit, they could not have written the famous lines in one of the early New England pamphlets, *New England's First Fruits*, published in London in 1643:

After God had carried us safe to New England and we had builded our houses, provided necessities for our livelihood, reared convenient places for God's worship and settled the Civill Government: One of the next things we longed for, and looked after was to advance Learning, and perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate Ministry to the Churches when our present Ministers shall lie in the Dust.¹

And what else is the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and of the Bill of Rights but the final realization of the ideas of the Commonwealth educators within the political life of a new nation?

¹*New England's First Fruits; with Divers Other Special Matters Concerning That Country.* (Sabin's Reprints, Quarto Series, No. VII), p. 23. New York, 1865.

John Amos Comenius

(1592-1670)

COMENIUS' PERSONALITY

Almost every educational idea of Comenius can be found in some other great thinker: in Plato and Aristotle; in Cicero, Plutarch, and Quintilian; in the Church Fathers; in the mystic philosophy of Master Eckart; in the Spanish neoscholastic and humanist educator Juan Luis Vives; and in Erasmus of Rotterdam; not to mention Francis Bacon and the English reformers described in the previous section. Had Comenius employed all this already existing knowledge only in the manner of a skillful and orderly eclectic, he would not deserve the honors given him as one of the great pioneers, if not the greatest pioneer, of modern education. What makes him outstanding is the fact that he combines an unusual degree of susceptibility to foreign influences with an equally strong faculty of systematic integration. This faculty is fundamentally different from mere imitation. It enriches itself through contact with the ideas of other people, but it does not spring from them. The ultimate source of creativeness in men like Comenius is their personal intuition, observation, and imagination. This individual strength and originality in the productive genius gives also a particular depth and color to everything he says. He sheds new light on even the simple things he deals with, and later generations are inspired by his words, even if their factual content has already become a common cultural possession.

Like many of the great men of the seventeenth century, Comenius was able to combine in his mind ideas which to many of us seem logically exclusive. There is first his mysticism. He belonged to the Moravian pietists, followers of the Bohemian martyr John Huss, who was burned as a heretic in 1415 at the council of Constance. Comenius' religion brought him close to the Lutheran as well as to the Calvinist Protestants; but in many respects he was

closer to the mysticism of Master Eckart or Nicolaus Cusanus than to the argumentativeness of the Lutheran or Calvinist professors. His religion was of the optimistic, to some degree pantheistic, type. It considered man and all nature to be permeated by God's spirit, hence it was less dualistic than orthodox Catholicism or Protestantism. Strangely enough, this religious attitude opened for Comenius an avenue into the empirical philosophy of Bacon; for if God had radiated both man and nature with his spirit, how could he object to man's eagerness to discover his eternal laws, not only in the human soul but also in nature? Like Bacon, however, Comenius applied the empirical method either insufficiently or not at all; to him it was still more a thought and a desire than a thoroughly penetrating principle. He often confuses—particularly in his main pedagogical work, the *Great Didactic*—mere analogies with causal relations; in his private life as well as in his role as a bishop of his scattered Community of Brethren, he sometimes falls prey to all kinds of superstition. It was, after all, a time when spirits and demons were still considered real beings, and when otherwise sensible people hunted witches. As a Moravian Brother, Comenius was imbued with a strongly democratic concept of Christian life; membership in the Church carried with it equal rights within the body politic. This attitude brought him into kinship with the English dissenters both in Britain and on the New Continent. On the other hand, Comenius did not despise the scholastic learning; he had no prejudices against Aristotle, nor against the Spanish Catholic Juan Luis Vives, from whose psychology he learned much. To what extent Comenius was at home in the world of the humanists it is difficult to say. He appreciated the wisdom of the ancients, but Greek and Latin to him were instruments, not ends—his own Latin had more medieval character than humanist elegance; and when he felt that classical authors had offended Christian morality, he condemned them, irrespective of the aesthetic quality of their writings.

The greatest power which worked on his thinking was his own life. He began his career quietly as a teacher and minister in

Moravian communities; but when he was twenty-six years of age, the Thirty Years' War broke out. Shortly after its beginning, in November, 1620, the Protestant Bohemians lost the battle of the White Mountain. Their leaders were executed and, under the auspices of the House of Hapsburg, Pope Paul V, and the Jesuits, there began a most cruel persecution of the non-Catholics in the southern parts of the German Empire. Thus Comenius became an emigrant for the rest of his life. For some time he took refuge at the estates of his compatriot friends; then he lived as a school-master and writer in Poland, where he was elected bishop of the Moravian Brethren. In 1638 the Government of Sweden invited him to work out a plan for the organization of its school system. In 1641 Hartlib invited him to come to England. Because of the Revolution, he left England for Holland, went again to Sweden, and finally died at Amsterdam. His manuscripts and books were lost in besieged cities and burning houses.

Though he expressed much sadness on account of the deplorable state of Europe, Comenius never allowed bitterness and hatred to creep into his soul. His religious convictions, together with his experiences in many different countries, helped him to become a citizen of the world. Of course, he loved his native land and worked for its restoration; but he wished it to be a part of a great Christian human community. In this respect one might compare Comenius with Erasmus of Rotterdam, if it were not for one essential difference. Whereas Erasmus despised national peculiarities and national languages, Comenius was convinced of their value; his internationalism was not a sign of uprootedness and vague cosmopolitanism, but was the result of a love and understanding which embraced both nations and the unity of mankind as necessary parts of an organic Christian culture.

COMENIUS' EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

All these influences and experiences are melted by Comenius into his educational philosophy. This can be found in his *Great Didactic*, 1632, which was first written in Czech and later pub-

lished in Latin as a part of his *Opera Didactica Omnia*, 1657, in his *Via Lucis* ("The Way of Light"), and in many of his minor educational writings.

Let us speak first of the aims he sets forth as inherent in the process of education. In Chapter II of the *Great Didactic*, he says:

All our actions and affections in this life show that we do not attain our ultimate end here, but that everything connected with us, as well as we ourselves, has another destination. For whatever we are, do, think, speak, contrive, acquire, or possess contains a principle of gradation, and, though we mount perpetually and attain higher grounds, we still continue to advance and never reach the highest.¹

This is a clear expression of the mystical thought which came from Neoplatonism, rose again in the philosophies of the medieval and humanist mystics, found a more modern philosophical form in the systems of Leibnitz, Hegel, and Schelling, and finally reached its empirical version in Darwin's theory of evolution. (According to Comenius, life is in a continual state of development toward the divine; each inferior state contains the potentialities of a higher development, and the higher contains the lower. So the world is a purposeful and dynamic universe, with man at the head of all creatures, because he is able to understand the work of God and is his image.

In the history of education we find Comenius labeled as the first sense-realist. This label is erroneous if it relates to Comenius' basic philosophy, which is mystical and religious and the very opposite of modern empiricism. But it is not incorrect if related to parts of his psychology and methodology of learning.

Comenius distinguishes three stages of preparation of man for his eminent role in the natural and divine universe. In Chapter IV of the *Great Didactic* he says:

¹*The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius*, translated into English and edited by M. W. Keatinge, in 2 vols.; Vol. II, p. 28. A. and C. Black, Ltd., London, 1921-1923. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York. This edition is cited in the following as: *Great Didactic*.

Man is situated among visible creatures so as to be

- ✓ (i) A rational creature
- ✓ (ii) The Lord of all creatures
- ✓ (iii) A creature which is the image and the joy of its Creator.

These three aspects are so joined together that they cannot be separated, for in them is laid the basis of the future and of the present life.¹

From these premises certain consequences follow for education. In order to assume his rational function in the world, man must be "acquainted with all things." In order to dominate all creatures, man must become endowed "with power over all things and over himself"; and to prepare him for his religious mission, education must teach man "to refer himself and all things to God, the source of all." So education has three main tasks: erudition which aims at man's reason, moral education which aims at man's character and independence, and piety which aims at his understanding of God.

All this is still traditional thought, to be found in similar versions among medieval or humanist philosophers. But the realistic tendency, as well as the psychological interests of Juan Luis Vives, emerge the moment Comenius sets out to explain the ways in which education should help man to materialize the three states of his rational-moral-divine nature. For there Comenius adopts in the interest of education the Baconian idea that one must obey nature in order to master it; but at the same time he combines it with the ethical-philosophical conception of nature as it had come down to him from Cicero and Seneca, and from scholastic philosophy. Comenius says, in Chapter V of the *Great Didactic*:²

By the word *nature* we mean not the corruption which has laid hold of all men since the Fall . . . but our first and original condition, to which, as to a starting point, we must be recalled. It was in this sense that Ludovici Vives said "what else is a Christian but a man restored to his own nature, and, as it were, brought back to

¹From *Great Didactic*, Chap. IV, § 2; Vol. II, p. 36. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York.

²*Ibidem* Vol. II, p. 40. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York.

the starting-point from which the devil has thrown him?" (Liber I, *De Concordia et Discordia*.¹)

This combination of the Baconian-empirical and the Stoic-Christian concept of nature must always be remembered if we want to understand Comenius' system of teaching. The Baconian-empirical principle clearly comes to the fore when Comenius develops his ideas of teaching and learning *secundum naturam*, which means "according to the order of nature" inherent in man's mind and its physical environment. The philosophical-ethical Christian principle appears in his emphasis on sources of inspiration and wisdom which man can draw on because his nature not only is a system of deterministic relationships but is embedded in the divine.

His principles of educational method are for Comenius as certain as the metaphysical sources of education. He believes that science—as he understands it—can serve as "an immovable rock" on which "the method of teaching and of learning can be grounded." In Chapter XVI he says:

Hitherto the method of instruction has been so uncertain that scarcely anyone would dare to say: "in so many years I will bring this youth to such and such a point; I will educate him in such and such a way." We must therefore see if it be possible to place the art of intellectual discipline on such a firm basis that sure and certain progress may be made . . . by assimilating the processes of art as much as possible to those of nature.²

In pursuing this aim, Comenius develops principles which, in his opinion, help man to achieve physical and mental health, to prolong his life, and to find the universal conditions of teaching and learning which guarantee facility, thoroughness, conciseness, and rapidity in both intellectual and moral education.

We are here particularly interested in what we would call today

¹Joannis Lodovici Vivis [sic], *De Concordia et Discordia*, Vol. I, Fol. C(r). Lugduni, 1532.

²From *Great Didactic*, Chap. XVI, § 4 f.; Vol. II, p. 112. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York.

the principles of teaching. They are to be found in § 2 of Chapter XVII of the *Great Didactic*, where Comenius says:

Following in the footsteps of nature, we find that the process of education will be easy

- I. If it begin early, before the mind is corrupted
- II. If the mind be duly prepared to receive it
- III. If it proceed from the general to the particular
- IV. And from what is easy to what is more difficult
- V. If the pupil be not overburdened by too many subjects
- VI. And if progress be slow in every case
- VII. If the intellect be forced to nothing to which its natural bent does not incline it, in accordance with its age and with the right method
- VIII. If everything be taught through the medium of the senses
- IX. And if the use of everything taught be continually kept in view
- X. If everything be taught by one and the same method.

These, I say, are the principles to be adopted if education is to be easy and pleasant.¹

Certainly the way through which Comenius arrives at these principles—namely, through analogies instead of scientific investigation—could not be called empirical today. Yet, in spite of all methodical dilettantism, Comenius' profound intuition into human growth helped him to formulate the first classical laws of teaching. After the rationalists of the eighteenth century had slighted all of Comenius' work except his textbooks, a Pestalozzi and a Herbart were needed to discover anew the foundations of educational method in order to base on it a systematic organization of modern public education.

The reason for the eighteenth century contempt for Comenius was the aversion of the enlightened Voltairians for Comenius' mystical religion and his belief in all kinds of miracles and prophets. But such superstitions he shared with almost all other great men at the time of the Thirty Years' War. Still, his belief that one

¹From *Great Didactic*, Chap. XVII, § 2; Vol. II, p. 127. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York.

cannot sufficiently explain the nature and meaning of life by strict logic and inductive science, but must have recourse to metaphysics, represents an attitude of mind for which modern thought has again acquired more understanding than did the French encyclopedists of the eighteenth century. It seems a symbolic act of history that the great representative of mystical thought, Comenius, was allowed to meet and exchange views with the great representative of rationalist thought, René Descartes. In 1642 Comenius paid a visit to the French philosopher at his residence near Leyden. They realized the essential difference in their thought.¹ Descartes was convinced that philosophy should be built exclusively on certain rational principles; Comenius maintained that all human knowledge is "imperfect and defective" and that man, in order to grasp the eternal verities and to acquire inner certitude, must resort to a power above his own reason, namely, to divine inspiration. They "parted in friendly fashion" and apparently with a profound feeling of mutual sympathy; Comenius says in his notes, "I begging him to publish the principles of his philosophy² and he similarly urging me to mature my own thoughts, adding this maxim: 'Beyond the things that appertain to philosophy I go not; mine therefore is that only in part, whereof yours is the whole.'"³

THEORY AND APPLICATION

As Comenius was a writer of textbooks and in this quality known to later generations even when his educational philosophy was forgotten, we may question to what extent he proved himself capable of applying his own ideas in practice.

There is one work of Comenius' which, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, made his name known the world over—

¹*Continuatio Admonitionis Fraternalis de Temperando Charitate Zelo*, Joh. Comenii ad S. Maresium, § 59. Amsterdami, 1669. Anna Heyberger, *Jean Amos Comenius (Komenský), sa Vie et son Oeuvre d'Éducateur*, p. 64. Paris, 1928. Robert Fitzgibbon Young, *Comenius in England*, p. 49. Oxford University Press, New York, 1932.

²These principles were published as *Principia Philosophias* in Amsterdam in 1644.

³Robert F. Young, *Comenius in England*, p. 50.

his *Orbis Sensualium Pictus*. It represents an attempt to combine the learning of foreign languages with visual education and an introduction of the pupil to civilization. A picture heads every section, and the words beneath it refer to the details to be seen in it. Goethe says in his autobiography that the only book for children in his youth was Amos Comenius' *Orbis Sensualium Pictus*. The idea was not entirely new. Before Comenius there had existed books which tried to combine learning with illustration, for example, the *Ars Memorativa*, which was printed at Augsburg in 1477. But Comenius proceeded more systematically and comprehensively than had his predecessors. In addition, the time was ripe for such a combination of the *humaniora* with the *realia*.

The *Orbis Pictus* is not a full application of Comenius' own principles of education, however. The first picture, representing the idea of God, is the most abstract in the whole book and certainly does not conform to Comenius' demand that the child should be led from the known and concrete to the more remote and difficult—though we may admit that for Comenius the idea of God had the greatest reality of any in his life. Furthermore, if Comenius had followed his principle of activation, he might have invited the children to interpret the pictures themselves, instead of presenting them with a description in words.

Yet in comparison with the other textbooks written by Comenius, the *Orbis Sensualium Pictus* is by far the closest realization of his own theory. His famous *Janua Linguarum* ("Gate to Languages") represents perhaps some slight progress over the typical Latin textbooks of the time, but it relies completely on a rather dull form of memorization. The 1650 London edition of the *Janua Linguarum Reserata* and the other known editions contain merely a series of alphabetically arranged Latin sentences with English translations. In each sentence Comenius uses primarily nouns and verbs which begin with one and the same letter, in the hope that such an alphabetical arrangement would give the child sufficient mental assistance in remembering all the nonsense the author is forced to compile in order to conform to his mechanical arrange-

ment. For example, the beginning of the *Janua Linguarum Reserata* of 1650 runs thus:

*Januae Latinitatis
Fundamentum*

1. *Ab abdomine viscera
abduntur, et ex abiete
fiunt abaci.*

The Foundation of the
Gate of Tongues

1. The entrails are hidden by
the outward part of the bellie,
and Dressers are made out of
the firetree.¹

Apparently it takes mankind a great length of time and effort before it learns to apply its more intuitive insights effectively. Often theory and practice are widely separated in one and the same person; in Comenius they are less widely so than is the case with other great pioneers of human thought. For though his textbooks, with the exception of the *Orbis Sensualium Pictus*, are disappointing, his plans for the organization of instruction and division of schools, as well as the general social applications he draws from his philosophy, show more practical courage and vision than are to be found in the works of many other theologians and educators.

His idea of the fourfold division of schools based on age and requirements is the one which, in spite of deviations in detail, the modern school system follows.

The whole period [of education] must be divided into four distinct grades: infancy, childhood, boyhood, and youth, and to each grade six years and a special school should be assigned.

- | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|
| I. For infancy | $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{the} \\ \text{school} \\ \text{should} \\ \text{be} \end{array} \right\}$ | The mother's knee |
| II. For childhood | | The vernacular School |
| III. For boyhood | | The Latin School or Gymnasium |
| IV. For youth | | The University and Travel. ² |

In his social philosophy even more than in other parts of his work, Comenius shows his progressive spirit. He is interested not

¹*Janua Linguarum Reserata*, autore J. A. Comenio: *The Gate of Languages Unlocked*, p. [III]. London, 1650.

²From *Great Didactic*, Chap. xxvii, 3, p. 256. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York.

merely in education but in the progress of mankind, in the most general sense. Education is only the indispensable means of accomplishing a better society. Therefore the children of all classes, rich or poor, must be instructed thoroughly, boys and girls alike. Comenius sees clearly the obstacles: the lack of methodically trained teachers, of good textbooks, of sufficient financial support by the governments of states and cities, and the indolence of the clergy.

To you also I appeal, theologians, since it is in your power to be the greatest assistance or the greatest obstacle to my designs. If you choose the latter course, the saying of Bernhard will be fulfilled: "that Christ has no bitterer enemies than his followers, and especially those who hold the first place among them."

In the preface to his *Panegersia*, Comenius urges all mankind, and principally all Europeans, schools, sovereigns, statesmen, and theologians, to concentrate their minds on the organization of a better society.

First we must all have one and the same goal, the salvation of the human race.¹

Science, political organization, and religion must be daringly combined and remodeled.

Then we shall also be bold, as it were, in the parliament of the whole world, to proclaim how in our judgment Learning, Religion, and Government may be brought to certain given and immutable principles or bases, to their best foundation, so that ignorance and uncertainty, discussion, the noise and tumult of disputes, quarrels and wars shall cease throughout the world, and Light, Peace, Health return, and that golden age which has ever been longed for, the age of Light and Peace and Religion, may be brought to sight.²

Comenius demands the foundation of a league of nations which must be interested not only in politics and government but also

¹[I. A. Comenius] *De Rerum Humanarum Emendatione Consultatio Catholica*, Pt. I: *Panegersia, Excitatorium Universale*, Chap. xi, § 19. Amsterdam, 1606.

²Comenius: *The Way of Light (Via Lucis)*, translated into English, with an Introduction by E. T. Campagnac, pp. 8 f. University Press of Liverpool, 1939.

in "universal books, universal schools, a universal college, and a universal language." This universal language, of which also Juan Luis Vives and Bacon had thought, ought to be no longer Latin, as Vives had recommended, but an entirely new language, because Latin is, from the viewpoint of Comenius, too "full of variety in the cases of nouns, in the moods and tenses of verbs, and in its syntactical constructions" and "overflows with innumerable instances of all these anomalies." Finally, it is no sufficient "antidote to confusion of thought," for it does not possess sufficient "precision" to express "the nature of the things with which it deals, by the very sounds which it uses."

Comenius' vision of public and universal education has been realized in most modern countries, but the goal he wanted to achieve by this means—universal peace and progress—has so far remained a dream.

Now that we live again in a world full of war, persecution, and forced migrations, our sympathy for the suffering and hopes of the men living in the Thirty Years' War has received new strength. The more deeply we ourselves feel the plight of humanity, the more we understand the seeming paradox in the soul of Comenius. Driven from country to country by tyranny and inquisition, he believed not only in the infinite kindness of the Creator and in the dignity of man but also in the final realization, even here on earth, of a kingdom of sympathy and liberty.

For there is inborn in human nature a love of liberty—for liberty man's mind is convinced that it was made—and this love can by no means be driven out: so that, wherever and by whatever means it feels that it is being hemmed in and impeded, it cannot but seek a way out and declare its own liberty.¹

¹*The Way of Light (op. cit.)*, p. 18.

John Locke

(1632-1704)

One might ask how it came about that for two centuries or more the ideas of the Commonwealth educators and of Comenius were condemned to oblivion, whereas John Locke's treatise, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), became a classic. For Locke's book is less comprehensive and less original than the *Great Didactic* of the Moravian bishop, and less representative of the interests of the rising middle class than Sir William Petty's *Advice*.

The answer is that Locke provided for the educated Englishman of the eighteenth century the right mixture of progress and conservatism, whereas Petty was too revolutionary and Comenius too mystical. In addition, Locke's fame as philosopher and political writer lent to his treatise on education more significance than it would have been accorded if written by a less well-known author. According to Locke himself, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* was "rather the private conversation of two friends than a discourse designed for publick view."¹ The treatise resulted from letters which he sent during his political exile in Holland, 1683-1689, to his friend Edward Clarke. From a philosophical point of view, Locke's *Of Human Understanding* is perhaps a greater contribution to education than his *Thoughts*.

What are the elements which made Locke's educational thought so convenient for the enlightened citizen?

Since the days when Sir Thomas Elyot wrote his *Booke named the Governour* (1531), and even earlier under the first impact of the Renaissance, there had crystallized in English society an image of manly excellence, the gentleman ideal. This ideal, if estimated according to its highest aspirations, could be called the English

¹John Locke: *Works*. 10 vols. London, 1823. See Vol. IX, p. iii. Cited in the following as: *Works*. John Locke: *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, with Introduction and Notes by R. H. Quick, p. 29. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1904.

equivalent of the Greek ideal of the *anér kalós k'agathós*, though it also shows an admixture of the standards of the medieval Christian knight and the *uomo universale* of the Renaissance.¹ As a practical social element in English life, the gentleman ideal demanded a well-bred and integrated person, God-fearing but otherwise independent and self-reliant; devoted to the service of his country and his king, provided the latter respected the covenant between the ruler and the other gentlemen of the realm; open-minded, but only to the extent that it did not uproot him from the firm ground of established rules and beliefs; educated as far as it behooves a man of influence who does not wish to be confused by too much scholarship and who has too stable convictions to lose himself in the traps of speculation and the traps of "enthusiasm."

It would be wrong to say that Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* is not considerably more profound than the picture which the average upper-class Englishman in the times of William and Mary had of a gentleman. But it contained what they wanted to read in order to be confirmed that they were, generally speaking, on the right track.

There was first the liberal element. The gentleman ideal of Locke was no longer feudal as in the times of the Tudor courtiers or the Stuart cavaliers. The old hereditary nobility had decreased in number anyhow, and the crown had to admit to the peerage more and more members of the wealthy middle classes. Furthermore, Locke's gentleman ideal was anti-absolutist regarding not only politics but also religion. Thus it appealed to a free and critical mind.

¹On the development of the gentleman ideal, see the following: August Hoyler, *Gentleman-Ideal and Gentleman-Erziehung*. Leipzig, 1933.

Esmé C. Wingfield-Stratford, *The Making of a Gentleman*. Williams and Norgate, Ltd., London, 1938.

Edward C. Mack, *Public Schools and British Opinion, 1780-1860* (Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature, No. 142). Columbia University Press, New York, 1939.

Edward C. Mack, *Public Schools and British Opinion since 1860*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1941.

Cyril Norwood, *The English Tradition of Education*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1930.

When the educated Englishman read the *Thoughts* he had in the background of his mind two other works by Locke in which he had expressed his political and religious opinions. One was the *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) in which, as a political exile, Locke had rejected the reactionary theories of absolutism and divine rights of kings, paved the way for a more liberal government, and inspired people all over the world to free themselves from political tutelage.

Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others.¹

The other work was his four *Letters Concerning Toleration* in which he had given his contemporaries, all tired with a long period of religious wars and hatred, the most expressive formulation of religious liberty. In the preface to the first letter Locke himself had underscored one sentence: "Absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of."² The principal tenet defended in all these letters was the following:

The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.³

In spite of their individualism, respectable people in the England of William and Mary were far from being progressive; with reference to the people outside their own group, they believed that

¹*Of Civil Government*, Book II, Chap. vii, § 87. See *Works*, Vol. V, p. 387.

²[First] *Letter Concerning Toleration, To the Reader*, in *Works*, Vol. VI, p. 4.

³*A Letter Concerning Toleration* in *Works*, Vol. VI, p. 11.

divine dispensation had rather conservative intentions. In England after the coronation of William and Mary the limited power of the monarchy gave room to a political constellation in which the aristocracy and the wealthy, in co-operation with the High Church, agreed to keep the rights of democracy rather strictly within their own highly conformist group. The older monarchical absolutism changed into a kind of democracy of privileged gentlemen, who were greater in number and had more political rights than comparable groups in the continental countries; but the nation as a whole did not enjoy a truly democratic life.¹ The privileged classes and their church soon dominated the old Public Schools of Eton, Harrow, and Winchester, excluded the dissenters from Oxford and Cambridge until the year 1871, and cared little for the education of the large masses. When Horace Mann, not unrightly called the father of the modern American public school system, visited Europe in 1843, he arrived at the following judgment:

Arrange the most highly civilized and conspicuous nations of Europe in their due order of precedence, as it regards the education of their people, and the kingdoms of Prussia and Saxony, together with several of the western and southwestern states of the Germanic confederation, would undoubtedly stand pre-eminent, both in regard to the quantity and the quality of instruction. After these should come Holland and Scotland—the provision for education in the former being much the most extensive, while in the latter perhaps it is a little more thorough. Ireland, too, has now a National system, which is rapidly extending, and has already accomplished a vast amount of good. The same may be said of France. Its system for National education has now been in operation for about ten years; it has done much, and promises much more. During the very last year, Belgium has established such a system; and before the revolution of 1830, while it was united with Holland, it enjoyed that of the latter country. England is the only one among the nations of Europe, conspicuous for its civilization and resources, which has not, and never has had, any system for

¹George M. Trevelyan wrote in his *History of England*, p. 505: "Indeed the ostensible object of the Revolution [of 1689] was not change but conservation." (London, 1926.)

the education of its people. And it is the country where, incomparably beyond any other, the greatest and most appalling social contrasts exist—where, in comparison with the intelligence, wealth, and refinement of what are called the higher classes, there is the most ignorance, poverty, and crime among the lower. And yet in no country in the world have there been men who have formed nobler conceptions of the power, and elevation, and blessedness that come in the train of mental cultivation; and in no country have there been bequests, donations, and funds so numerous and munificent as in England. Still, owing to the inherent vice and selfishness of their system, or their no-system, there is no country in which so little is effected, compared with their expenditure of means; and what is done only tends to separate the different classes of society more and more widely from each other.¹

Locke himself was apparently convinced that only that kind of education was really worth its effort which was extended to future “gentlemen,” because if they are “once set right, they will quickly bring all the rest into order.” Certainly no society is in greater danger than one in which the men in power are not “set right,” but Locke contradicts his own ideas concerning a society of free men if he conceives of those who do not belong to his oligarchy of “gentlemen” as being nothing but “the rest” who have quickly to be brought “into order.”

We possess a document that gives us some clue as to Locke’s ideas on the education of the children of the poor, his so-called *Proposals for the Bringing Up of the Children of Paupers*, which he made in his capacity as the King’s Commissioner of Trade and Plantations. His plan was not realized, although to a degree it anticipated the establishment of the workhouses which were set up by an act of Parliament in the English parishes in 1722, and in other countries at about the same time. Many of these workhouses were worse than prisons.

Locke wished all pauper children “above three and under fourteen years of age” to attend day “working schools” in which,

¹“Seventh Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board [of Education, Massachusetts], January, 1844,” reprinted in *The Common School Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 5, pp. 84 f.

under control of teachers, they would be trained to work, in order to learn industry and to pay back to the community what it spent for their food.

We do not suppose that children of three years old will be able at that age to get their livelihoods at the working school, but we are sure that what is necessary for their relief will more effectually have that use if it be distributed to them in bread at that school than if it be given to their fathers in money. What they have at home from their parents is seldom more than bread and water, and that, many of them, very scantily too. If therefore care be taken that they have each of them their belly-full of bread daily at school, they will be in no danger of famishing, but, on the contrary, they will be healthier and stronger than those who are bred otherwise. Nor will this practice cost the overseers any trouble; for a baker may be agreed with to furnish and bring into the school house every day the allowance of bread necessary for all the scholars that are there. And to this may be added, also, without any trouble, in cold weather, if it be thought needful, a little warm water-gruel; for the same fire that warms the room may be made use of to boil a pot of it.¹

The apparent cruelty of this scheme of education is not so much Locke's personal fault as it is historically conditioned. The fate of the poor in the England of Locke was such that many children would have been less exposed to misery under Locke's "teachers" than in their homes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Locke—like Voltaire in France—distinguished his society of free men definitely from that of "the rest." There is a wide gap between the social ethics of these enlightened men and that of the Catholic humanist Juan Luis Vives² or the Moravian bishop John Amos Comenius.

Locke's hesitation to drive his progressive ideas beyond the boundaries of convention can also be proved with reference to his attitude in the emerging struggle of the "freethinkers" and the

¹Henry Richard Fox Bourne, *The Life of John Locke*, in 2 vols.; Vol. II, p. 384. (London, 1876.) See also Locke: *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, edited by R. H. Quick, Appendix A, p. 189 f. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1904.

²*De Subventionem Pauperum* ("Concerning the Relief of the Poor"), 1526.

religious tradition of his time. As an ardent advocate of tolerance, he had to defend himself against the accusation of "atheism" during his whole philosophical career. But in reality religion was for him the indispensable foundation of human development. Atheism, he thought, could not make a claim to tolerance, because it would destroy the very foundation of the sort of society on which a gentleman and a citizen of his time had the right to insist. "The taking away of God dissolves all." He also abandoned the spirit of radical inquiry when, in his famous *Essay on Human Understanding*, he saw himself confronted with the problem:

Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself; though he has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he has not left himself without witness: since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. . . . But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers; and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty: yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration.¹

Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whether anyone will please to call God, it matters not.²

To be sure, this is no longer orthodox theology, since from theology's point of view it matters very much "whether anyone will please to call" this eternal being "God." It is "natural theology," as Locke himself developed it in his treatise on the *Reasonableness of Christianity*. But Locke's own premises, as set up in the first parts of his *Essay on Human Understanding*, ought to have led him by logical necessity to a much more critical attitude with

¹*Opere citato*, Book IV, Chap. X, 1, in *Works*, Vol. III, p. 55.

²*Opere citato*, Book IV, Chap. X, § 8, in *Works*, Vol. III, p. 57.

respect to the competence of pure reason in questions of transcendent character. He left it to Kant to prove that merely logical attempts at demonstrating the existence of God are invalid, and that religious faith must draw on experiences which are primarily of emotional and moral character, though capable of rationalization. For Locke, so it seems, critical thinking was permitted to go only as far as it served the welfare of a society as he desired to have it. The social and the practical, he supposed, had their own immanent laws, and to place abstract logic instead of trained common sense and practical considerations on the apex of the hierarchy of values was, from his point of view, not reasonable but a perversion.

That such a view of life is not far from the danger of hedonism is proved by Locke's own diary. There are reflections in it on happiness and on the avoidance of misery which border on timidity and on pleasure-seeking philistinism.¹

The mixture of progressivism and conservatism which rendered Locke's general philosophy so influential can also be found in his ideas on education.

He is conservative in his almost fatiguing emphasis on private education and the right choice of the tutors—this even at a time when his aristocratic friends were already abandoning private education and were well on the way towards conquering the old "Public Schools," originally intended for serving the "poor scholar," for the training of their scions.

On the other hand, Locke, like Montaigne before him, was anti-conservative in his rejection of book learning. More successfully than the forgotten Commonwealth educators, he fought against the routine dominating the English humanist schools of his time.

Reading and writing and learning I allow to be necessary, but yet not the chief business. I imagine you would think him a very foolish fellow, that should not value a virtuous or a wise man infinitely before a great scholar. Not but I think learning a great help to both in well-disposed minds; but yet it must be confessed

¹Lord Peter King, *The Life of John Locke*, pp. 304 f. London, 1829.

also, that in others not so disposed, it helps them only to be the more foolish, or worse men.¹

The refutation of bookishness, coming from one of the greatest thinkers of the nation, certainly pleased the English aristocracy, which was on the way to building a great empire and, like all people with great practical responsibilities, was unwilling to see the active side of the human personality neglected.

Starting from the conception that knowledge has to foster, rather than to impede, the growth of an all-rounded personality, Locke demanded a method of education apt to encourage initiative, independent judgment, observation, and critical use of reason. He wanted languages taught by conversation, not by grammatical exercises and memorization; generally speaking, he preferred learning by doing to learning by imitation. Consequently, his plans for a curriculum favored such subjects as the sciences, geography, astronomy, and mathematics for introducing the young into the world of nature; the Bible, history, and chronology for developing in the young a sense of morality and human affairs and the greatness of their nation; accounting as a requisite for good husbandry; and the vernacular and modern languages as means for communication. Of the ancient languages, he wanted Greek dropped from the ordinary program of a gentleman's education; he wanted Latin taught by speaking it, like modern languages, and used merely as an instrument, not as an end in itself. Like almost all great educators of modern times, he had a high esteem for the educational value of the manual arts and of "dexterity and skill";² and, following the custom of his time, he recommended travel.

¹*Works*, Vol. IX, p. 142. Cf. *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (*op. cit.*), § 141, p. 186. See also Note to § 147, p. 229. The controversy between the advocates of real wisdom and the believers in information seems to be as old as civilization itself. Plato was engaged in this conflict, and so are we today. Confucianism admonished its disciples to discover between the knowledge of essentials (*yih*), which deals with the world of human conduct and relationships, and the knowledge of externals (*shutu*), which deals merely with facts. Confucius wants a man to be first of all a good son, a good brother, and a good friend, and "if you have any energy left after attending to conduct, then study books." (Quoted from Lin Yutang, "When East Meets West," in *The Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1942, p. 45.)

²*Works*, Vol. IX, p. 192. *Some Thoughts on Education* (*op. cit.*), § 202, p. 250.

Locke's realism appealed to the practical people of England and also to men like Franklin and Jefferson in America, Rousseau in France, Basedow and his followers in Germany; and the authors of progressive textbooks conjured in their prefaces the spirit of "the admirable Mr. Locke."

Yet one must not underestimate the resistance which the classical schools of England put up against Locke's doctrines. In the old "Public Schools" nothing changed. Locke's criticism of educational formalism had to be taken up by another great English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, who in 1861 published his essays on *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*; and by the famous scientist Thomas H. Huxley, who delivered an address on *Liberal Education: and Where to Find It* to the South London Working Men's College on January 4, 1868 (subsequently published in *Macmillan's Magazine*). Huxley says:

Well, what I mean by Education is learning the rules of this mighty game [of man with life]. In other words, education is the instruction of the intellect in the laws of Nature, under which name I include not merely things and their forces, but men and their ways; and the fashioning of the affections and of the will into an earnest and loving desire to move in harmony with these laws. . . . That man, I think, has had a liberal education, who has been so trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with ease and pleasure all the work that, as a mechanism, it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold logic engine, with all its parts of equal strength, and in smooth working order; ready, like a steam engine, to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind: whose mind is stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of Nature and of the laws of her operations; one who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself. . . .

If there be a people which has been busy making history on the great scale for the last three hundred years—and the most profoundly interesting history—history which, if it happened to be

that of Greece or Rome, we should study with avidity—it is the English. If there be a people which, during the same period, has developed a remarkable literature, it is our own. If there be a nation whose prosperity depends absolutely and wholly upon their mastery over the forces of Nature, upon their intelligent apprehension of, and obedience to, the laws of the creation and distribution of wealth, and of the stable equilibrium of the forces of society, it is precisely this nation. And yet this is what these wonderful people tell their sons: “At the cost of from one to two thousand pounds of our hard-earned money, we devote twelve of the most precious years of our lives to school. There you shall toil, or be supposed to toil; but there you shall not learn one single thing of all those you will most want to know, directly you leave school and enter upon the practical business of life. You will in all probability go into business, but you shall not know where, or how, any article of commerce is produced, or the difference between an export or an import, or the meaning of the word *capital*. You will very likely settle in a colony, but you shall not know whether Tasmania is part of New South Wales, or vice versa.”¹

Spencer and Huxley in England, and like-minded reformers in other countries, brought about a gradual recognition of the value of the natural sciences in the program of the elementary and secondary schools, and an inclusion of more modern studies even in the old classical institutions. Yet in spite of all attacks against it, classical education has existed up to the present time in Europe, under the most adverse conditions. This condition is due not only to prejudice and social inertia; it is due to the awareness of a certain part of the population that subtler conditions lie at the base of a liberal civilization than merely utilitarian interests. Locke himself would certainly have enjoyed much of the practical wisdom in Herbert Spencer’s essays, but he would not have subscribed to his platitudinous attacks against the spirit of the humanist tradition. Nor would Locke have shared the modern admiration of mere technical efficiency which leaves no room for the recognition of the deeper auspices of humanity on which civilization depends.

¹Thomas Henry Huxley, *Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews*, pp. 32, 34, and 41. New York, 1876

Jean Jacques Rousseau

(1712-1778)

ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL IDEAS

It would be difficult to find a man in the history of thought who with so much half-truth has made as deep an impression on mankind as Rousseau. Perhaps only Nietzsche can in this respect be compared with him.

What is this half-truth?

It is expressed in the first paragraph of his famous educational novel *Émile*:

All things are good as they came out of the hands of their Creator, but every thing degenerates in the hands of man. He compels one soil to nourish the productions of another, and one tree to bear the fruits of another. He blends and confounds elements, climates, and seasons: he mutilates his dogs, his horses, and his slaves: he defaces, he confounds every thing: he delights in deformity and monsters. He is not content with any thing in its natural state, not even with his own species. His very offspring must be trained up for him, like a horse in the menage, and be taught to grow after his own fancy, like a tree in his garden.¹

This idea runs like a musical leitmotiv through all the writings of Rousseau. It appeared first with amazing vigor in his *Discours ... sur cette question ...: Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer le moeurs* ("A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences"), which was an answer to the question set up in 1749 by the Academy of Dijon on the effect of civilization on morals. In his *Nouvelle Héloïse* ("Eloisa"), 1761, he showed the conflict of love with the corrupt mores of the time; in his *Contrat Social* ("Social Contract"), 1762, he developed a revolu-

¹*Émile*; or, *A Treatise on Education*, translated from the French of J. J. Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva, in 3 vols.: Vol. I, p. 1. Printed for J. Dickson and C. Elliot, Edinburgh, 1773.

tionary theory of state on the basis of the natural rights of man. So the famous first paragraph of *Émile, ou De l'Éducation*, 1762, on the purity of nature and the depravity of civilization is merely the educational variation of a general theme which has deep roots in Rousseau's own experiences.

There is first his personal life. His genius was less the result of work and discipline than a product of nature. He grasped things intuitively and without prejudice, and his language was personal and original. He felt himself really at home only among pastures and mountains. One of his deepest comforts was music. His religion, in spite of all rationalization, sprang from a strongly emotional pantheistic mysticism. In *Eloisa* he says that the eternal being cannot be seen nor heard, it can only be felt; it communicates itself neither to our eyes nor to our ears, only to our hearts. To people accustomed to the sophisticated style of the eighteenth century French society, the voice of Rousseau must have sounded like the rush of glacial waters.

If these positive sides of Rousseau's character alienated him from civilization, his deficiencies did so still more. He had a neurotic and oscillating personality which makes it extremely difficult to characterize him in unequivocal terms. Certainly he was one of these uprooted "marginal men" in whom hypersensitiveness to the ethical defects of society and personal moral laxity are strangely allied. His education did not allow a natural growth of his emotions. His mother died in childbirth; his father was unable to cultivate the talents of his son harmoniously; relatives educated him in a haphazard fashion; and afterwards he served as an apprentice to an engraver. He was cruelly treated, and as a boy of sixteen he ran away. Then a strange period of traveling, adventures, and unbalancing erotic and religious experiences began. He never arrived at sexual maturity, for he mostly mistook the beloved woman for the mother he had missed in youth, or else fell into primitive sensuality. When he came to Paris he appeared in the difficult role of a young talent who felt deeply the difference between himself and the adulterated civilization around him, particularly as

he could not cope with its habits and standards. He felt himself ridiculous, and—as always happens in such a case—was indeed ridiculed. Feelings of superiority mingled with feelings of inferiority; obstinacy, on the one hand, and morbid self-criticism, on the other, were the result.)

Experiences like these are not unusual; most of those who suffer from them appear to their fellow men as unhappy or unadjustable cranks. What made Rousseau important was, first, the combination of his maladjustment with unusual talent and, second, the fact that his criticism of society appealed to the latent feelings of the best of his contemporaries and made them aware of the utter unnaturalness of their own situation.↑

Never perhaps in European history was life more distorted than in the year when Rousseau came from Switzerland to France. First Spanish etiquette, then the French etiquette of the courts of Louis XIV and Louis XV had cramped the manners of the upper classes in a harness of artificiality. Their costumes, their wigs, their love, and their dealings with their children killed the nature in men, instead of developing it. Mechanization made itself felt both in work and in the organization of society. The tyrannical regime of absolutism contrasted strongly with the extreme individualism of the enlightened ones who dreamed of liberty and equality. Everywhere in France the Catholic Church exercised an enormous power; yet few of the leaders took its creed seriously. Even a considerable number of the higher clergy listened with delight to the arguments of naturalist philosophers and to the lascivious conversations that we find in the erotic literature of the time. Class discrepancy increased, while the cultural and economic justification of the existence of social castes had disappeared. What remained was mainly a system of monopolies, privileges, and barriers.

Thus France, and with her all Europe, listened with rapt attention when it suddenly heard the voice of a prophet: ("God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil.")

There are two main ways by which Rousseau advances his gospel of return to nature. One is the political, culminating in the *Social*

Contract; the other is the educational, with *Emile* as the final manifesto. A brief analysis of these two works will illustrate our initial statement about the fascinating half-truth of Rousseau's philosophy.

All the main ideas of the *Social Contract* can be found in earlier writers, especially in Locke and Montesquieu, and also in the ancient philosophers of government. The fascination which Rousseau's work held for his contemporaries sprang from his burning enthusiasm for the great idea of equality, his hatred of injustice, and his absolute faith in the power of the natural nobility of man. All this he expresses with the strength of a religious evangel, in language which conveys at first glance the feeling of logical cogency, even though a closer examination reveals striking contradictions. Perhaps only those of our contemporaries who suffer again under dictators can imagine the impression which such sentences as the following made in the age of absolutism:

Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains . . . liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself. . . . Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.¹

Therefore, so Rousseau says, in order to understand and to reform society, one has always to examine the character of its conventions, and especially to go back to the first convention into which society entered. This first convention occurred when men passed from the state of nature into the state of civil society. This happened when they felt that the growing obstacles endangering their self-preservation in the state of nature could be overcome only by means of co-operation. This is the "Social Contract." Of course, the question arises as to how a man can pledge his individual strength and the freedom he possesses in the state of nature

¹Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract, and Discourses* (Everyman's Library); Book I, Chap. I, II, IV, pp. 5, 6, 9. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1914.

without "harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself." Rousseau's answer is that the new covenant of men must "defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate." In such a way "each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." (In other words, the transition from the primitive state into the state of a covenant is not meant to be an abandonment but rather a higher form of nature, in which the freedom of man, imperiled by continuation of primitiveness, is preserved more effectively.) Therefore any violation of the free character of this covenant by external powers, as by kings and governments, gives society the right to overthrow the violator.

As the progressive people of the time felt that the existing governments had used their power not to preserve the original meaning of the social contract but for strengthening their own privileges, the gospel of Rousseau was understood as the proclamation of the right of revolution. By violating the social contract which had provided their original legal basis, the absolutist governments had outlawed themselves. Thus the citizen had regained his natural freedom, and from this achievement followed the right to make a new covenant for the purpose of building a social order more in accordance with the purpose of the original contract. For, according to Rousseau, governments are not divine but represent:

... simply and solely a commission, an employment, in which the rulers, mere officials of the Sovereign, exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries. This power it can limit, modify, or recover at pleasure.¹

(Rousseau, however, was well aware of the factions and failures to which the sovereign people itself was exposed.) How could one rely on it? He tried to solve this dilemma through his distinction of a *volonté de tous* ("will of all") in contradistinction to the *volonté générale* ("general will"). The *volonté de tous* is merely the accumulation of the expressions of the will of such-and-such a number of individual citizens; and as these citizens may be misled and may

¹*Social Contract (op. cit.)*, Book III, Chap. I, p. 50.

contradict one another, one cannot put his trust in their voice. In contrast, the *volonté générale* expresses not merely a quantitative factor but is identical with the common moral interest, which is above the mere sum of particular wills.

But take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences. . . . It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts.¹

This scheme involves the elimination of parliamentary representation and the curtailment of magistrates as much as possible, for "the government grows weak as the number of its members increases."

Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation: it is either the same, or other; there is no intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry through no definitive acts. Every law the people has not ratified in person is null and void—is, in fact, not a law. The people of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing. The use it makes of the short moments of liberty it enjoys shows indeed that it deserves to lose them.²

The historians of the philosophy of government have often pointed out the contradictions and predicaments in Rousseau's theory. How can the population of a great country express its will without representation? How does that rather mystical *volonté générale* emerge out of a society full of egoisms and conflicting opinions? Is the legal power of the state the result of the social contract, or does the social contract presuppose some already existing power?

¹*Social Contract (op. cit.)*, Book II, Chap. III, pp. 25 and 26.

²*Ibidem*, Book III, Chap. XV, p. 83.

One can understand why Rousseau considered all these problems of minor importance only through realizing the core in his philosophy—that is, his belief in the inherent goodness of man's nature. Allow it to unfold itself freely and it will prove its inherent goodness. In the same fashion, leave the inherent natural potentialities of society unhampered and you will have a good state. But is this really so?

ROUSSEAU'S EDUCATIONAL IDEAS

The hope of a new society as expressed in the *Social Contract* gives us the clue to the understanding of the values and defects of Rousseau's educational ideas. From a realistic point of view nothing is more paradoxical than placing *Émile's* young hero outside society for the very purpose of educating him for society. The reason for this paradox lies in Rousseau's belief that the present society is incapable of renewing itself. In consequence of its corruptness, it will always frustrate the pure development of the original nature of man. Hence dare begin anew; begin with the child. It is only through a return to his own childhood, as it were, that man may again understand what he really is, and of what he is capable. Only reborn men can bring about a new social contract and create the *volonté générale* which distinguishes itself so definitely from the accidental results of the *volonté de tous*. We must not, therefore, imagine that Rousseau really dreamed of placing all children on some kind of island. All he needed was an artistic means of explaining to a corrupt society what might be achieved if nature were allowed to take the place of artificiality in education.

Shortly after the publication of *Émile*, a number of refutations appeared, partly from those who were offended by Rousseau's alleged "atheism"—for he postponed religious education until the period of adolescence—partly from those who took a cheap delight in showing the practical impossibilities in the educational scheme of *Émile*, and partly from those who denounced him as plagiarist.¹

¹Karl A. Schmid, *Geschichte der Erziehung vom Anfang an bis auf unsere Zeit*. 5 vols. Stuttgart, 1884-1902. See Vol. IV, 1, p. 592.

In a sense, all these critics were correct. Yet they are forgotten, whereas Rousseau's *Émile* has inspired one educational generation after the other to set the fundamental principles of education against educational routine. Certainly not every pioneer in education after Rousseau, beginning with Pestalozzi, is merely a "disciple" of Rousseau. Thinking men may have much in common and still be original. Nevertheless, Rousseau's influence on the eighteenth century was enormous. It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast than that between the emotional, artistic, and extremist Rousseau and the logically disciplined and somewhat pedantic Kant. Yet it is the latter who says:

I am a scholar by inclination; I deeply feel the thirst for knowledge and the unceasing eagerness to perfect it. . . . There was a time when I believed that nothing so much but this constituted the dignity of mankind and I despised the masses which possessed no knowledge. Rousseau has set me right. He has freed me from my illusions. He has taught me to respect mankind, and I would consider myself much less useful than the ordinary worker, if I could not believe that this very insight could justify all my other thinking and help me to do my share in the restoration of the rights of man.¹

After reading this statement by Kant, it is difficult to sympathize with another great contemporary of Rousseau, Voltaire, who replied to Rousseau's *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes* ("Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind," 1755) with the following words:

Nobody has used stronger colors to paint the heinousness of human society of which, in our ignorance and credulity, we had expected so much good. Never has one spent so much intelligence on the endeavor to lead us back into the animal state. When reading your book, I hardly could resist the desire to walk on all fours.²

This letter from Voltaire symbolizes the clash of two worlds. One, the world of Voltaire, living in the hope that through the

¹Hermann Leser, *Das pädagogische Problem in der Geistesgeschichte der Neuzeit*, in 2 vols.: Vol. I, p. 420. München, 1925-1928.

²Voltaire: *Oeuvres Complètes*, nouvelle édition, Vol. VI, p. 447. Paris, 1880.

application of more reason and civilization mankind could climb the path to perfection; the other, that of Rousseau, knowing that reason is futile unless it is rooted in the soil of naturally and harmoniously developed emotions and instincts. Rousseau gave in his *Émile* the best answer he could give to Voltaire's ironical remark: return to nature does not necessarily mean going back to the animal state, but giving man an opportunity to develop himself fully and harmoniously.✓

✓ According to Rousseau, education should be "negative" up to the age of twelve, and ought to allow for the free play of nature. Though this postulate is fundamentally incompatible with the existence of a constantly intervening authority such as Rousseau's tutor, this tutor, nevertheless, does his best to harmonize his secret educational strategy with the natural conditions of a child's growth. He encourages his pupil to imitate good example. He creates scenes and experiences favorable to the right conditioning of the pupil's behavior and to his preparation for life. And as the child senses this care without feeling thwarted by it, he develops for his tutor a higher and more intimate sense of respect than could ever be created by any external authority.

✓ One thing on which the tutor lays particular stress is that the experiences of the child ought to be in harmony with his physical and his mental development. During the first year of his life, the child is not clearly conscious of his own existence.¹ In the second period of his development, that of infancy, the child learns to develop his senses through contact with his environment. The first reactions are naturally those of joy and pain. In this period, the tutor must show the great skill of distinguishing what the nature of the child really demands from what is artificial or the result of the child's caprice. He has to foster the true demands of nature and to transform caprice into productive attitudes. Books and abstract concepts have to be avoided.

The first more complicated insights into human life and its moral qualities are to be created through leading the child into situations

¹*Émile* (*op. cit.*), Book I, Vol. I, pp. 64 f.

where such experiences emerge naturally. Nor should there be any punishment except that which will inevitably come from the revenge which life takes if its laws have been violated. Does not this kind of "negative" or merely waiting education involve an inexcusable loss of time? Rousseau answers: it is only this kind of education which develops in the child all the physical and mental organs which later on he will need for a balanced, unprejudiced, and courageous life.¹

After the eleventh year of life, this concrete kind of education makes way for a more intellectual kind. The child learns to form concepts and is introduced to the elements of geography and astronomy. Together with the tutor, he builds the apparatuses required for this kind of instruction. In this way a young person develops a sense of utility and begins to ask what a thing is good for. Naturally, he relates usefulness always to his own personal advantage. This, according to Rousseau, is perfectly proper; it is the path of nature. Now the tutor introduces the first book, Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*. Émile also learns carpentry; nobody can know whether he may need the knowledge of a trade to support himself.²

(1) At about the age of fourteen, Émile is a thinking and acting being. But he is not yet educated, for there still remains the process of planting all the previous, merely egocentric experiences in the deep bed of human feeling, sympathy, and responsibility. This has to be done during adolescence, when his passions grow, when he begins to compare himself with others, to make abstractions, and to move into the deeper secrets of the universe. Now history and natural theology must be used for leading the child toward adulthood. Then the youth's nature, for the very reason that it has not been destroyed but respected as something which is in itself sacred, will discover the great moral feelings of love, justice, and duty and will enter into a deeper unity with the universe, the divine laws of which it has learned to acknowledge.

¹*Émile* (*op. cit.*), Book II, Vol. I, pp. 125 f.

²*Ibidem*, Book III, Vol. I, pp. 373 f.

In *Émile*, as in the *Social Contract*, the paradoxes are striking, even if one allows the romantic author of a novel more freedom than the logical thinker. There is no clear statement—as in all his other works—as to what Rousseau really means by nature. Sometimes the word seems to be used in the sense in which the sensualists of the eighteenth century used it, indicating the theory that all human life and development has its origin in the senses. Sometimes it is used in a pantheistic sense: in this sense nature is the divine element which permeates and renews the universe, and infiltrates it with immutable laws which we all must obey, in order to avoid punishment. If interpreted in this sense, Rousseau's concept of nature joins a great and old tradition resembling that of the Chinese *Tao*, which we have already met in Western ancient and medieval thought, and which, in America, branches into the transcendentalist movement, with Emerson, Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott as its main representatives. Sometimes Rousseau uses the term *nature* merely as a signpost to tell the reader that beyond it begins the perilous area of non-nature, or perversion. With this vagueness inherent in the concept, it is largely left to the educator to decide whether he and his pupil are still within the realm of nature or whether they have already transgressed it.

Another defect in Rousseau's educational philosophy lies in his disregard of a fact which Pestalozzi was later to discern with wonderful clarity, namely, that all renewal of society depends on the increase of love—love in a twofold sense. First, there is love in its more physical and psychological meaning. A person who is to grow into a sympathetic and balanced personality must feel the warmth of family relationships in the early years of his life. Without this experience he would be deprived of the most nourishing element in human growth. This fact Rousseau, probably as a consequence of his own childhood experiences, failed to recognize. Second, man and society need love in its more ethical sense, as it has been expressed classically in the Pauline concept of *agápe*, or charity.¹

¹I Corinthians, 13.

A further defect lies in Rousseau's unhistorical thinking, which he has in common with most of the rationalists of the eighteenth century, in spite of his antagonism towards them. It is one of the great features of enlightenment that it dared shake off the trammels of an obsolete tradition and proclaim man's right of freedom. But it failed to see that nowhere and never can man begin his civilization completely anew and uproot himself from his historical soil without being hurt and impoverished thereby. In order to build up a better future, man must combine two things: he must dare to tear out the rotten parts in the structure of the past, while at the same time he must respect those traditions which give him a feeling of the essential continuity in human existence. Otherwise he finds himself adrift on an ocean of abstract ideas which give him neither direction nor a feeling of security. The ignorance of Rousseau and his contemporaries about the complex character of human history partly explains the failure of the leaders of the French Revolution to carry their great experiment to full success. First they aroused, then they disappointed the hopes of the liberals of the world. For these liberals wished not only the overthrow of old and obsolete institutions, but the actual realization of the new ideas of liberty, fraternity, and equality, a new social contract, and a new education. Instead, they saw the strife of parties, the guillotine, Napoleon, political reaction, and instability in the political life of France and of Europe. ✓

EVALUATION OF ROUSSEAU'S WORK

It is as difficult to appraise the general historical significance of Rousseau's writings as it is to judge his merits as an educational philosopher. The revolutionary-minded critic would say that political progress—unfortunately—seems to develop only in great cataclysms, and that, consequently, it needed men like Rousseau to pull the wheels of history out of the mud of decaying absolutism. The more organically minded thinker would say that in principle there was nothing new in Rousseau's thought except his derring-do, which appealed more to the emotions than to the reason

Had people followed the more balanced political progressivism of Montesquieu, they would have been happier than they were under the banners of Rousseauism.

If one tries to pass judgment on Rousseau's educational thought in particular, a similar dichotomy of opinion will emerge. One may say that it was Rousseau's cry of *retournez à la nature* which jolted educators out of their complacent routine, changed educational methods, and influenced the attitude of parents to such a degree that childhood was no longer considered a merely inferior state of adulthood. Even the dress of children was changed. They were no longer forced to walk around like miniature adults, but were permitted to be children. What, after all, can be greater than the Copernican turn achieved by Rousseau's educational philosophy to give childhood its natural rights and to place education in the very center of human development, instead of seeing it swinging as a satellite around the Church, the State, and society?

The opponent, however, could answer that in Rousseau's times there were already educational movements under way which would have brought about organic educational reforms without revolutionary upheavals. There were the followers of Locke in England. In Germany a new educational life had started, eventuating in the Philanthropist movement. There were modernizing trends in France, springing from the Jansenists, from Fénelon and Fleury, and finally from Jean Baptiste de La Salle's Order of Christian Brothers. All these movements, if supported by a general reform of social conditions, would have transformed education more steadily and more organically. Then children would not have been exposed to danger because unwise educators and parents experimented wildly in Rousseauism; nor, perhaps, would there have been necessary that cleavage between secular and religious education from which France and other countries have suffered since the time of Rousseau.

However, if such contrasts of opinion center around an author and persist for centuries, the man must indeed have reached into unusual depths of life and thought. He does not deserve the kind

of disciples who regard each statement of the master as a gospel; rather he deserves the attention of free men who are able to preserve their own judgment even when faced with fascinating revolutionary ideas. For such men the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau will be a source of productive excitement, and they will reject a fallacious opinion shared by both his false admirers and his false critics—namely, that he is the advocate of unbridled individualism. In his political philosophy he sets the *volonté générale* against the *volonté de tous*; in his educational philosophy he is far from confusing natural methods of education with undirected educational instinctivism. It is his profound respect for the great ideal of the harmony of naturalness and discipline which led him to write his *Contrat Social* and his *Émile*. The fact that in his own life he was torn by contrasts is perhaps the very reason for the depth and intensity of his struggle as a thinker and writer.

Benjamin Franklin

(1706-1790)

FRANKLIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Franklin's importance lies in his personality, his inventiveness, his practical achievements, and the example he gave his nation. Among his contemporaries, in this country and in Europe, he was the first to realize the ideal of the rising middle class, which wished to be independent, successful, and enlightened. If one were building a pantheon for the great heroes in educational theory proper, no special niche would have to be provided for him.

Franklin came from the youngest country of the western civilization. Generally, colonial cultures remain conservative and, relatively, long dependent on the tradition of the mother countries, even if the colonists or their ancestors left their old homes in protest. As a matter of fact, the educational leaders of New England, in spite of their religious dissent and their emphasis on popular education, cherished for more than two centuries the ideal of the humanist scholar as it was established in the sixteenth century by such men as Erasmus, Sturm, and Colet. Such an attitude resulted from a natural trend toward cultural self-preservation. Surrounded by forests and "Indian savages," the colleges of Harvard and William and Mary could keep the tender flame of culture burning only through radical adherence to the tradition of European Humanism. The progressive educators of the English Commonwealth remained apparently unnoticed in America; it needed the authority of John Locke to make the first breach in the solid walls of American classicism.

But at the beginning of the eighteenth century the pedagogical zeal of the staunch Puritan schoolmasters had abated. Boston Latin School, and still more Harvard College, harbored many a boy who was more interested in his social career than in the wisdom

of Tully and sacred learning. Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1749, in his *Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pensilvania*:

Many of the first settlers of these provinces were men who had received a good education in *Europe*, and to their wisdom and good management we owe much of our present prosperity. But their hands were full, and they could not do all things. The present race are not thought to be generally of equal ability: For though the *American* youth are allowed not to want capacity, yet the best capacities require cultivation, it being truly with them, as with the best ground, which unless well tilled and sowed with profitable seed, produces only ranker weeds.¹

Yet it was Franklin's generation which, in North America, brought about not only political but also, to a considerable degree, cultural emancipation. The reason is that the decay of the older Puritan ideals occurred within a society which, as a whole, was vigorous, ambitious, and eager for new experiences, and far from general decay. It offered to young men like Benjamin Franklin more opportunity than did any European country to emerge from "poverty and obscurity . . . to a state of affluence and some degree of reputation in the world."²

Self-made men like Franklin always incline to see the essence of education in self-training. Franklin not only practiced it but made it a subject of intensive thinking. In his *Autobiography* he tells us about his "bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection."³ He lists thirteen virtues which he wishes to achieve; following great examples, he designs a scheme which enables him to check every day the results of his endeavor toward self-improvement. According to his own testimony, he must have applied his method

¹*Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections*, with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes by Frank Luther Mott and Chester E. Jorgenson (American Writers Series), p. 200. American Book Company, New York, 1936. Cited in the following as: *Representative Selections*.

See also *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, collected and edited with a Life and Introduction by Albert Henry Smyth, in 10 vols.: Vol. II, p. 388. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1905-1907. Cited in the following as: *Franklin's Writings*.

²*Representative Selections*, p. 3 (*Autobiography*). *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. I, p. 226.

³*Representative Selections*, p. 71. Cf. *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. I, pp. 326 f

of self-improvement for several years. When voyages abroad and the "multiplicity of affairs" forced him to omit it, he nevertheless carried with him his little book of moral exercises.

Franklin's list of virtues is a mixture of the older Aristotelian-Christian ethics with the typical practical morality of the Age of Enlightenment. Of the Greek-Christian sort are the virtues of temperance, silence, sincerity, justice, moderation, tranquillity, chastity, and humility. Middle-class enlightenment, as well as Franklin's own personality, appears in the virtues of order, resolution, frugality, industry, and cleanliness.

Continuous self-examination, as it goes with this kind of self-training, fosters observation. Franklin possessed a natural talent for it, but through his daily exercises he trained it to a degree which was instrumental in his success as businessman and popular writer. He is one of the most vivid American painters of human scenes, virtues, and weaknesses in all his essays, however different their quality may be in other respects.¹ But most of all Franklin displays his capacity for watching the ways of life, particularly the ways of language and the reasoning of the common man, in his *Poor Richard's Almanack*, for years the friend and adviser of the American farmer and one of the greatest educational forces in America. The *Almanack* is a typical document of rationalist practical morality; and the new farming and trading middle class were apparently more willing to accept its conclusions than the hell-fire sermons of their parish ministers, of which they were a little tired.

Franklin's unusual capacity for observation not only opened to him the hearts of his people, it also made him one of the internationally famous experimenters and one of the great statesmen of his time. In his *Autobiography* he tells us about the modest beginning of his political activities in his community. "I began now to turn my thoughts a little to public affairs, beginning, however,

¹As examples one could refer to the "Dialogue between Franklin and the Gout" (1780) and "The Art of Procuring Pleasant Dreams," *Representative Selections*, pp. 424 f. and 523 f. See also Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. VIII, pp. 154 f., and Vol. X, pp. 131 f.

with small matters. The city watch was one of the first things that I conceived to want regulation." By use of the Junto, his discussion club, he persuaded the good citizens of Philadelphia to have "a more effectual watch" through "the hiring of proper men to serve constantly in that business"; and soon as "a more equitable way of supporting the charge," the city allowed "the levying a tax that should be proportioned to the property."¹

From the improvement of the constable service he passed to the reform of fire protection, with the result that after the new plan was carried through, "the city has never lost by fire more than one or two houses at a time, and the flames have often been extinguished before the house in which they began has been half consumed." Thus it goes onward from local to national, and from national to international undertakings. He tries to discover the laws underlying the increase of population,² as had been done before him by the Commonwealth educators, to whose mentality Franklin is very closely akin, though apparently he did not know them.³ He ardently defends his country against the intention of the English government to get rid of its felons and convicts through sending them to the American colonies;⁴ finally, as a diplomat in Europe he watches every opportunity to detect the strength and the weakness of the great countries and to apply the dangerous weapon of political propaganda. He does it often in a humorous or sarcastic way, but always so that it hits the nail on the head and makes people think, instead of merely offending them.

Of course, much more than bare observation is requisite to all these accomplishments: thinking, foresight, organization, and untiring energy. But it is due to observation that all these qualities in Franklin start from a firm foundation and do not work in an ab-

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 88. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. I, pp. 352 f.

²"Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.," 1751, in *Representative Selections*, pp. 216 f. See also Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. III, pp. 63 f.

³Cf. Sir William Petty, *Political Arithmetic* (London, 1690) and *Natural and Political Observations . . . upon the Bills of Mortality* (London, 1662).

⁴"Exporting of Felons to the Colonies," 1751, in *Representative Selections*, pp. 214 f. Cf. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. III, pp. 45 f.

stract intellectual sphere. Franklin never indulged in illusions. Who was more a friend of the people than he? Yet after the success of the Revolution, he observed the people's conduct with full awareness of its instability and tendency to prefer rights to duties. He writes in a letter to Charles Carroll in 1789:

We have been guarding against an evil that old States are most liable to, *excess of power* in the rulers; but our present danger seems to be *defect of obedience* in the subjects. There is hope, however, from the enlightened state of this age and country, we may guard effectually against that evil as well as the rest.¹

Such a critical attitude was not at all due to old age or to the kind of disillusion which often occurs after a great dream has been realized. More than twenty years before the Revolution, in the first stages of marked dissension between the colonies and their mother land, Franklin writes to Governor Shirley of Boston a letter which proves that he looks through the veils of ideologies into the nature of life. He bravely defends American rights, but he does not hesitate to admit that the art of political leadership consists in producing and directing not only facts but also opinions.

It is very possible, that this general government might be as well and faithfully administered without the people, as with them; but where heavy burthens have been laid on them, it has been found useful to make it, as much as possible, their own act; for they bear better when they have, or think they have some share in the direction; and when any public measures are generally grievous, or even distasteful to the people, the wheels of government move more heavily.²

At the end of his life he repeats his observation on the importance of public opinion in his judgment about the Constitution:

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 501. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. X, p. 7. See also Franklin's "Speech in the Convention at the Conclusion of Its Deliberations" (1787), and his satire against the critics of the Constitution of 1788 in a letter to the editor of the *Federal Gazette* ("A Comparison of the Conduct of the Ancient Jews and of the Anti-Federalists in the United States of America"), in *Representative Selections*, pp. 491 f. and 496 f. See also Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. IX, pp. 607 f. and 698 f.

²*Representative Selections*, p. 263. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. III, p. 231.

Much of the strength and efficiency of any government, in procuring and securing happiness to the people, depends on *opinion*, on the general opinion of the goodness of that government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity of its governors.¹

But observation becomes for Franklin not only a requisite for efficiency but also an intrinsic element of morality. He possesses the conscience of the thoroughly trained scientific mind which has disciplined itself to admit the possibility and the right of different points of view.

In a letter to Peter Collinson of the year 1747 he writes:

SIR,

I have lately written two long letters to you on the subject of electricity. . . . On some further experiments since I have observed a phenomenon or two, that I cannot at present account for on the principle laid down in those letters, and am therefore become a little diffident of my hypothesis, and ashamed that I have expressed myself in so positive a manner. In going on with these experiments how many pretty systems do we build which we soon find ourselves obliged to destroy! If there is no other use discovered of electricity this however is something considerable, that it may *help to make a vain man humble*.²

Franklin enjoys intensely the progress which can be seen in at least one field of human activity, namely, the applied sciences. Great visions about the improvement of the material side of human life appear to him. But, he questions, will it go hand in hand with moral progress? He wishes it; his realism, however, keeps him far from rationalist utopias. In a letter of 1780 to the great English chemist Joseph Priestley, he says:

It is impossible to imagine the height to which may be carried, in a thousand years, the power of man over matter. We may perhaps learn to deprive large masses of their gravity, and give them absolute levity, for the sake of easy transport. Agriculture may

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 492. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. IX, p. 607 ("Speech in the Convention, September, 1787").

²*Representative Selections*, p. 194. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 324 f.

diminish its labour and double its produce; all diseases may by sure means be prevented or cured, not excepting even that of old age, and our lives lengthened at pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard. O that moral science were in as fair a way of improvement, that men would cease to be wolves to one another, and that human beings would at length learn what they now improperly call humanity.¹

The morality of science (not any kind of science, but science understood morally) creates tolerance. Thus Franklin is against "cutting throats"² politically or in matters of religious dogmatism. The greatest example of this tolerant attitude is his "Speech in the Convention" of 1787, the beginning of which we cannot refrain from quoting fully.

MR. PRESIDENT,

I confess, that I do not entirely approve of this Constitution at present; but, Sir, I am not sure I shall never approve it; for, having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better information or fuller consideration, to change my opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that, the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment of others. Most men, indeed, as well as most sects in religion, think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others differ from them, it is so far error. Steele, a Protestant, in a dedication, tells the Pope, that the only difference between our two churches in their opinions of the certainty of their doctrine, is, the Romish Church is *infallible*, and the Church of England is *never in the wrong*. But, though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady, who, in a little dispute with her sister, said, "But I meet with nobody but myself that is *always* in the right." "*Je ne trouve que moi qui aie toujours raison.*"³

But all his realism, critical attitude, and tolerance do not make a relativist and skeptic of Franklin. With all the defects which go

¹*Representative Selections*, pp. 420-421. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 10.

²See his letter "To Sir Joseph Banks," 1783, in *Representative Selections*, p. 459. Cf. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. IX, p. 74.

³*Representative Selections*, p. 491. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. IX, p. 607.

with labels, Franklin may be called a moral pragmatist. A sentence in a letter of 1738 to his father mirrors his ethical convictions:

I think opinions should be judged of by their influences and effects; and, if a man holds none that tend to make him less virtuous or more vicious, it may be concluded he holds none that are dangerous; which I hope is the case with me.¹

"Virtue" and "vice" are for Franklin the eminent criteria in all judgment of action. In his *Busy-Body* papers he writes:

Virtue alone is sufficient to make a man great, glorious, and happy.²

This pragmatic emphasis on virtue has led some of Franklin's critics to consider him merely an enlightened moralist without any really serious interest in the metaphysical background of life and ethics. In addition, they say, like all moralists he sometimes failed to live according to his principles. Defenders of a merely "natural" morality, who believed virtue without any admixture of religion or metaphysics was sufficient for guiding man upwards, were indeed not rare during the eighteenth century. In England and in France Franklin was surrounded by such "freethinkers"; but his friendship with them did not impede his admiration for George Whitefield, the Christian evangelist. Franklin had gone to one of Whitefield's religious meetings with the firm intention not to yield to the preacher's oratory. Notwithstanding, the evangelist moved him so deeply that during the collection he gave all the money he had in his pocket. After all, he liked efficiency, even if he found it among the fundamentalists from whom he had broken loose in early youth.

He confessed that at the age of fifteen he had become "a thorough deist,"³ like many youths of his time who rebelled against their dogmatic education. By "deism" he meant the theory which understood the universe to be created by a prime mover but, after

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 177. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 214.

²*Representative Selections*, p. 142. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 106.

³*Representative Selections*, p. 55. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. I, p. 295.

the act of creation, to be regulated by immutable forces with which even their creator could not, or no longer wished to interfere. During his first stay in London, Franklin ventured an excursion into the thickets of metaphysical speculation and composed "A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain" (1725).¹ In a rather syllogistic way, with the sureness of youth in matters concerning the universe, he argued that the attributes of God—namely, wisdom, power, and goodness—if combined with the concept of omnipresence, did not allow any distinction between vice and virtue; for if God, the *summum bonum et verum*, was present in all, how could anything be godless and sinful? This first philosophical attempt is interesting because of its mixture of deductive scholasticism, Spinozistic pantheism, and skepticism. Considering the youth and training of the author, the treatise betrays some talent. Franklin sees clearly the dilemma inherent in the Christian concept of God and of sin. If God is omnipresent and nothing happens without his will, how are godless deeds or sins possible?

But after the dissertation was finished, Franklin discovered that his own logic had lured him into an avenue which he, as a moral pragmatist, did not want to follow; he saw himself on the shortest and surest way of destroying the foundation of ethics. In addition, he could not help but observe that he and his freethinking friends were inclined to use the new philosophy as an excuse for moral laxity. Thus he gave it up. To use a famous phrase of William James, his "will to believe" showed itself stronger than the cool logic of his intellect.

The adventure, however, left its trace in Franklin's soul until his old age. When in 1786 he received the manuscript of a book against providence (it was probably the first draft of Thomas Paine's *The Age of Reason*), he answered in a form that shows an unusual degree of irritation.

I have read your manuscript with some attention. By the argument it contains against the doctrines of a particular Providence, tho' you allow a general Providence, you strike at the foundation

¹*Representative Selections*, pp. 114–128.

of all religion. For without the belief of a Providence, that takes cognizance of, guards, and guides, and may favour particular persons, there is no motive to worship a deity, to fear its displeasure, or to pray for its protection. I will not enter into any discussion of your principle, tho' you seem to desire it. At present I shall only give you my opinion, that, though your reasonings are subtile, and may prevail with some readers, you will not succeed so as to change the general sentiments of mankind on that subject, and the consequence of printing this piece will be, a great deal of odium drawn upon yourself, mischief to you, and no benefit to others. He that spits against the wind, spits in his own face.¹

Can one, however, dispense with the problem of truth so easily and decide to subordinate it to other, however valuable, purposes? Apparently Franklin never went deeper into the metaphysics of the relationship between truth and life than most modern pragmatists have. He was the man of action, not of theory; thinking was for him a means, not an end in itself; the end for him was a better life.

But is not the pursuit of truth, and of truth as such, an essential requisite for a better life? Franklin, in trying to disentangle the predicament, would probably have given the following answer: The universe is regulated by divine laws which the human being is capable of approximating. This approximation may occur by dint of the intellect, as the astronomer proves through his discovery of the motions of the planets; but the intellect is not the only tool available. Another one is action, still another our sense for right and not right, for justice and injustice—briefly speaking, our moral sense. If our moral sense and our logical thinking conflict, it betrays the fact that our approximation to the divine laws is, unfortunately, incomplete. As long as the question is pending, have we not the right to rely first of all on our moral sense and on the criterion of the greater effect, instead of setting theories above all other values? This is the hidden metaphysics behind Franklin's practical philosophy, and this metaphysics is in accordance with the tradition in English philosophy and with natural common sense.

¹*Representative Selections*, pp. 484–485. *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. IX, pp. 520 f.

With the exception of the short period of juvenile doubt, Franklin clung to his moral pragmatism during his whole life. And as he was, in spite of all his distrust in theology, fundamentally religious, his moral pragmatism merged with a transcendent creed. Through all his writings and letters there shines a profound admiration for the ultimately divine essence in life and history. Several times his mind turned to the problem of faith and he wrote down several "Articles of Belief."¹

All these documents show Franklin's suspicion with respect to dogmatic creeds. The question of the divinity of Jesus he leaves undecided—in all likelihood he doubts it—but he believes in the eternal character of the fundamental Christian values, in prayer, in the interest of Providence in individual destiny, in some kind of final judgment of human deeds, and in the immortality of the soul.

This firm ground of convictions prevented Franklin from any degeneration of tolerance into softness or indifference, irrespective of whether a moral or a political issue was at stake. He tried his best to avert a war with England, because he hated war. Had the English government behaved wisely, Franklin would have remained an ardent supporter of the idea of a great English empire, as he really was for some time. But when he saw that the natural rights of his country (which for him were identical with the divine rights of men) were offended, he became one of England's most dangerous adversaries. Yet even here he did not allow his righteous ire to overcome his tolerance. When he heard that one of his English friends, William Strahan, had voted in Parliament for the war against the American colonies, he drafted the following letter:

Philadelphia July 5, 1775.

MR. STRAHAN,

You are a member of Parliament, and one of that majority which has doomed my country to destruction.—You have begun to burn our towns, and murder our people.—Look upon your hands! They

¹See especially "Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion" (1728), his letter "To George Whately" (1785), and his famous letter "To Ezra Stiles" (1790), in *Representative Selections*, pp. 130 f., 479 f., and 507. Cf. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 91; Vol. IX, pp. 331 f.; Vol. X, pp. 83 f.

are stained with the blood of your relations!—You and I were long friends:—You are now my enemy,—and I am

Yours,

B. FRANKLIN.¹

But the letter was never sent. War between countries was for him one thing, personal relations another. Even during the hostilities he maintained, to the advantage of both sides, his relations with liberal-minded Englishmen, and when the fight was over he helped bridge the gap which had opened.

FRANKLIN'S EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

After this analysis of Franklin's general philosophy of life one could almost guess the prevailing direction of his educational thought. Education was for him a life process, going on not only in the individual, but also in the community, the nation, and mankind. Though formal schooling was indispensable in the great enterprise of civilization, yet it was only a part. The whole of education was for Franklin synonymous with the whole of life. Where virtue and welfare thrived, there was also education; when they were neglected, education could not help. As water does not run uphill, schools cannot save a corrupt civilization.

Thus Franklin's several plans and proposals relating to special educational institutions were all linked with his general ideas about the improvement of society. Read some of the questions drawn up for the Junto, the discussion club in Philadelphia which he called "the best school of philosophy and politics that then existed in the province."²

Is self-interest the rudder that steers mankind, the universal monarch to whom all are tributaries?

Which is the best form of government . . . ?

Can any one particular form of government suit all mankind?

Is it consistent with the principles of liberty in a free government, to punish a man as a libeller, when he speaks the truth?³

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 381. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 407.

²*Representative Selections*, p. 59 (*Autobiography*). Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. I, p. 300.

³William Smith, *Eulogium on Benjamin Franklin*, pp. 13 f. Philadelphia, 1792.

The need felt in the Junto for books led Franklin to set on foot "my first Project of a public nature, that for a subscription library."¹ Through this project Franklin not only procured for his city one of the best libraries then available in the colonies, but he also initiated a general movement among his American fellow citizens which rendered this country the richest in public libraries in all the world and provided an inestimable source of information and elevation.

His "Proposal for Promoting Useful Knowledge among the British Plantations in America" (1743),² from which the American Philosophical Society issued, shows Franklin's intention to serve the unity and culture of his young country through the promotion of knowledge and research, in spite of all physical obstacles to mutual communication.

When finally Franklin began to turn his interest to the reform of formal education of youth, he was convinced that nothing could be done with the existing institutions of secondary and higher learning. Already, as a boy of sixteen, he had contributed to his brother's newspaper, the *New England Courant*, a biting satire against the uselessness, idleness, ignorance, and social injustice which he considered characteristic of Harvard College.³

One can understand the resentment of a talented boy who, merely because of his father's poverty, felt himself excluded from the halls of learning. Certainly the picture he drew was satirical and not quite accurate. On the other hand, not only in America but in almost all countries higher learning was at a low ebb in the first half of the eighteenth century; and young Benjamin, together with statesmen and educators of England, France, and Germany, despaired of the possibility of reforming education with the help of the higher institutions then existing. As an influential Philadelphia

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 68 (*Autobiography*). Cf. *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. I, p. 312.

²*Representative Selections*, pp. 180 f. *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 228 f. See also *Educational Views of Benjamin Franklin*, edited by Thomas Woody, p. 58. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1931.

³*Representative Selections*, pp. 98 f. ("Dogood Papers, No. IV," 1722). *Franklin's Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 9 f.

citizen at the age of forty-three, Franklin published his "Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pensilvania" (1749). The new "Academy," for which he asked support, included the plan for a curriculum which deviated considerably from the traditional program of learning.¹ The first concern of the Academy was:

That, to keep them [the students] in health, and to strengthen and render active their bodies, they be frequently exercised in running, leaping, wrestling, and swimming. . . .

As to their studies, it would be well if they could be taught *every thing* that is useful, and *every thing* that is ornamental: But art is long, and their time is short. It is therefore proposed that they learn those things that are likely to be *most useful* and *most ornamental*. Regard being had to the several professions for which they are intended.²

He suggested two main innovations tending toward secularization and the utilization of education: one, emphasis on English and modern foreign languages (French, German, and Spanish); the other, emphasis on the several branches of mathematics and "natural and mechanic philosophy." An "English School" was proposed as an independent branch besides the Classical Department, and the methods of instruction were to be such as to lead the student to scientific experimentation, observation, and application.

While they are reading natural history, might not a little *Gardening, Planting, Grafting, Inoculating*, etc., be taught and practised; and now and then excursions made to the neighbouring plantations of the best farmers, their methods observed and reasoned upon for the information of youth? The improvement of agriculture being useful to all, and skill in it no disparagement to any.³

¹In the "Proposals" themselves Franklin omits a clear indication as to the age of the students. This indication can be found in a letter to Samuel Johnson of October 25, 1750, where he says: "I suppose the boys in this school to be generally between 8 years of age and 16, and that after they leave they may have time to learn Merchandising, Husbandry, or any other profession (that does not need the learned languages) by which they are to be supported through life. If they have estates already provided for them, they may continue longer, and make a farther progress in philosophy." Cf. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. III, p. 21.

²*Representative Selections*, pp. 201 and 202. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 390 f.

³*Representative Selections*, pp. 205-206. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 395.

For the historian of education Franklin's "Proposals" contain no fundamentally new ideas. He refers in the introductory remarks and in the footnotes which accompany the text in great number to such men as Milton, Rollin, Turnbull, Hutchinson, Walker, and particularly to Locke; yet he would not have accepted their theories had they not complied with his own judgment. His discussion about the advantages and shortcomings of the Socratic method¹ shows that he had personally reflected upon the methods of teaching. With fine understanding of the secret underlying all effective conveyance of ideas, he quotes Pope's "judicious" statement:

Men should be taught as if you taught them not,
And things unknown proposed as things forgot.

This is really the apex of educational wisdom.

Though there was theoretically nothing revolutionary in the "Proposals," the early history of the newly founded Academy, as well as Franklin's own complaints about the neglect of the English Department,² show that even America was not yet ripe for a more realistic education. After his return from long absence he discovered that the English School of the Academy had been slighted in favor of the Classical Department. With an undertone of resignation, he concluded:

But there is in mankind an unaccountable prejudice in favor of ancient customs and habitudes, which inclines to a continuance of them after the circumstances, which formerly made them useful, cease to exist.³

Not only his contemporaries but also later generations blamed Franklin for his "utilitarian" conception of education. Certainly the remark in which he calls the ancient languages "the *chapeau bras* of modern literature" was no compliment for the typical

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 17. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. I, p. 244.

²See "Observations Relative to the Intentions of the Original Founders of the Academy in Philadelphia," in Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. X, pp. 9 f.

³Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. X, p. 80.

humanist instruction of his time.¹ Yet what says the sentence in which this remark is found? It is only one of the frequent expressions of revolt going on in Franklin's period against the monopoly claimed by the classical languages with respect to any kind of advanced education.

The still prevailing custom of having schools for teaching *generally*² our children, in these days, the Latin and Greek languages, I consider therefore, in no other light than the *chapeau bras* of modern literature.

No doubt in his popular writings, such as *Poor Richard's Almanack*, or in essays like his "Advice to a Young Tradesman" (1748),³ Franklin's practical and utilitarian spirit comes clearly to the fore. He admonishes the common people, of whom he always and proudly counted himself one, never to forget that "time is money," to invest their earning profitably, and to look properly for their advantage. How otherwise could he have impressed a generation of pioneers who knew that they would perish were their feet not firmly on the ground, their hands clinging tightly to the plow, and their products sold profitably? Certainly few printed sentences awakened so much confidence in the minds of these men as Franklin's own humorous confession in the "Preface to Poor Richard, 1733":

COURTEOUS READER,

I might in this place attempt to gain thy favour, by declaring that I write Almanacks with no other view than that of the public good; but in this I should not be sincere; and men are nowadays too wise to be deceived by pretences how specious soever. The plain truth of the matter is, I am excessive poor, and my wife, good woman, is, I tell her, excessive proud; she cannot bear, she says, to sit spinning in her shift of tow, while I do nothing but gaze at the stars; and has threatned more than once to burn all my books and rattling-traps (as she calls my instruments) if I do not make some profitable use of them for the good of my family. The printer has

¹Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. X, p. 31.

²Italics are by the author.

³*Representative Selections*, pp. 196 f. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 370.

offer'd me some considerable share of the profits, and I have thus begun to comply with my dame's desire.¹

For Franklin profit without honesty is no profit, but self-deception. There can be no utility without virtue, and no virtue without some sacrifice. And much use may come from things which are not immediately profitable. That is the case with ancient languages, provided those who teach and learn feel themselves committed to help in the promotion of their own civilization. With his strong sense for history Franklin knew that they were an essential element in the preservation of a liberal civilization. He himself, in his few spare hours, learned Latin and several modern languages and read great literature widely. The end of all instruction whatsoever was, for Franklin, not one or the other kind of knowledge, nor one or the other kind of special utility, but usefulness in the sense in which the eighteenth century understood it, as the general welfare of mankind. This welfare not only depends on external factors but is inseparable from the preservation and continuous renewal of the fundamental human values:

With the whole [process of instruction] should be constantly inculcated and cultivated, that *benignity of mind*, which shows itself in *searching for* and *seizing* every opportunity *to serve* and *to oblige*; and is the foundation of what is called GOOD BREEDING; highly useful to the possessor, and most agreeable to all.²

¹*Representative Selections*, p. 169. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 196.

²*Representative Selections*, p. 206. Franklin's *Writings*, Vol. II, p. 396.

Thomas Jefferson

(1743-1826)

JEFFERSON'S PERSONALITY

If Thomas Jefferson had lived in the Italy of the sixteenth century, he would probably have become one of the great representatives of the Renaissance. His interests were of unique universality and his talents equaled his interests. He loved the ancient languages, and classical authors remained his friends throughout his life. He quoted frequently from their works, though never with the intention of embellishing an idea but always of lending it more pith and color. He cherished books as did Petrarch and Lorenzo Valla. He could write long and excited letters about astronomical events¹ and botanical problems;² nature was for him not just woods, mountains, and rivers but an inexhaustible source of inspiration for his great and all-embracing soul. As farmer and gardener, he not only cultivated the land and experimented with it but adored its beauty and fertility. He was a master architect who, like the great Renaissance builders, did not fear to lose his originality when he followed great examples.

Loving, as you do, Madam, the precious remains of antiquity, loving architecture, gardening, a warm sun and a clear sky, . . .³

¹See *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, Definitive Edition, edited by Albert Ellery Bergh. 20 vols. in 10. The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, Washington, D. C., 1907. Cited in the following as: *The Writings*. Note especially the letter to Dr. Ezra Styles, July 17, 1785, Vol. V, p. 35.

See also *Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson: Representative Selections*, with Introduction, Bibliography, and Notes by Frederick C. Prescott, p. 248 (American Writers Series). American Book Company, New York, 1934. Cited in the following as: Prescott.

²See "To Francis Hopkinson," Dec. 23, 1786, in Prescott, pp. 260 f. Cf. *The Writings*, Vol. VI, pp. 220 f.

³"To Madame la Comtesse de Tesse," March 20, 1787. *The Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 104; Prescott, p. 270.

This quotation contains the key to the melody of Jefferson's personality.

Like many of the great figures of Antiquity and the Renaissance, Jefferson was also a master in the art of friendship. His friends were, perhaps, his most influential teachers; in turn he educated them. He was devoted to his family, in such a manner as had once been demanded in the *Tratatto della Famiglia* by Leone Battista Alberti, one of the foremost humanists of the Renaissance. He was happy in the company of youth, and he considered helping them to be one of his noblest offices. In judging people, he not only valued what they did and how they expressed themselves (language was for him, who preferred to be silent and to listen, one of the great wonders of the mind), but also observed their posture and gestures. When he described the character of his friend Washington, he did not fail to mention that his stature was:

. . . exactly what one would wish, his deportment easy, erect, and noble; the best horseman of his age, and the most graceful figure that could be seen on horseback.¹

His senses were as cultivated as his mind. The letter written at Nîmes to the Comtesse de Tesse, already mentioned, begins with the following sentences.

Here I am, Madam, gazing whole hours at the Maison Quarrée, like a lover at his mistress. The stocking weavers and silk spinners around it consider me a hypochondriac Englishman, about to write with a pistol the last chapter of his history. This is the second time I have been in love since I left Paris. The first was with a Diana at the Château de Laye-Epinaye in Beaujolais, a delicious morsel of sculpture, by M. A. Slodtz. This, you will say, was in rule, to fall in love with a female beauty; but with a house! it is out of all precedent. No, Madam, it is not without a precedent in my own history. While in Paris, I was violently smitten with the Hôtel de Salm, and used to go to the Tuileries almost daily, to look at it.

¹"To Walter Jones," Jan. 2, 1814. *The Writings*, Vol. XIV, p. 49; Prescott, p. 382.

²*The Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 102. Prescott, p. 269.

But in spite of his sensitiveness to the aesthetic side of life, he never indulged in sensuality; and his love of beauty, thoroughbred horses, good wines, and the good dishes which he set before the many visitors to his exquisite home at Monticello never disturbed the equilibrium of his naturally balanced personality and the regularity of his work.

Last, but not least, he reminds us of the noblest figures of ancient times and the Renaissance in that he could give up all—the comfort of his home and his family, his beloved studies, and even his friends—for the *nobilissimum officium* of a citizen, the service of his country.

But Jefferson was richer than the aristocratic *uomo universale* of the sixteenth century. Individualist though he was, and much though his birth and status would have permitted him to cultivate his own personality as an end in itself, he was a democrat and he loved the common man. Nor was his individualism merely a spiritual conviction, as was the case with most of the religious leaders of the Reformation; it passed from a personal attitude over into social and political life. In one conviction he was unshakable to the point of one-sidedness; this was his hatred of every sort of absolutism or even monarchism. Taken out of their individual historical contexts, many of his generalizations about kings and priests could easily be proved false. His opinion of the churches was influenced by the religious wars, persecutions, and witch trials to which the older of his own contemporaries had been witness. His opinion of the monarchy was naturally colored by the acts of suppression on the part of the English crown against the American colonists, and by the impressions he received during his diplomatic activities. Indeed, it was not easy for a liberal, beholding the decline of absolutism, to appreciate its historical significance in earlier periods of European history, or to anticipate the progressive development of some modern constitutional monarchies. His letters from Europe are filled with expressions of disgust at the exploitation of the people on the part of the potent in all countries, including England.

From Paris, where he served as American minister and successor to his friend Benjamin Franklin, he wrote:

If anybody thinks that kings, nobles, or priests are good conservators of the public happiness, send them here. It is the best school in the universe to cure them of that folly. He will see here, with his own eyes, that these descriptions of men are an abandoned confederacy against the happiness of the mass of the people.¹

In another letter:

Behold me at length on the vaunted scene of Europe! It is not necessary for your information, that I should enter into details concerning it. But you are, perhaps, curious to know how this new scene has struck a savage of the mountains of America. Not advantageously, I assure you. I find the general fate of humanity here most deplorable. The truth of Voltaire's observation offers itself perpetually, that every man here must be either the hammer or the anvil.²

But he knew only too well that even his own country was not free from the temptation of delegating his freedom, even voluntarily, to dictators and monarchs. Despairingly he wrote in his *Notes on Virginia*:

In December 1776, our circumstances being much distressed, it was proposed in the house of delegates to create a *dictator*, invested with every power legislative, executive, and judiciary, civil and military, of life and death, over our persons and over our properties; and in June 1781, again under calamity, the same proposition was repeated, and wanted a few votes only of being passed. One who entered into this contest [the Revolution] from a pure love of liberty, and a sense of injured rights, who determined to make every sacrifice, and to meet every danger, for the re-establishment of those rights on a firm basis, who did not mean to expend his blood and substance for the wretched purpose of changing this matter for that, but to place the powers of governing him in a plurality of hands of his own choice, so that the corrupt will of no

¹"To George Wythe," Aug. 13, 1786. *The Writings*, Vol. V, p. 396; Prescott, p. 257.

²"To Charles Bellini," Sept. 30, 1785. *The Writings*, Vol. V, p. 152; Prescott, p. 251.

one man might in future oppress him, must stand confounded and dismayed when he is told, that a considerable portion of that plurality had meditated the surrender of them into a single hand, and, in lieu of a limited monarch, to deliver him over to a despotic one! How must he find his efforts and sacrifices abused and baffled, if he may still, by a single vote, be laid prostrate at the feet of one man!¹

Coming back from France, he again discovered reactionary tendencies within his own people. Immediately the author of the Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal") set out to buttress the Constitution with the Bill of Rights ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances").

So deeply was he convinced of the necessity of overthrowing feudalism that he belonged to the few liberals outside of France who, in spite of all the cruelty of the French revolution, believed in its necessity as well as in its ultimately beneficent effect on all Europe.

JEFFERSON'S IDEAS ON EDUCATION

More than anything else, Europe and its catastrophes convinced Jefferson of one imperative need that he had emphasized as long as he had been interested in statesmanship, namely, that of a continuous and systematic system of public education, without which democracy was bound to perish.

The first action he considered necessary for the purpose of raising the general level of education was of a more negative character—to free the people from coercion in religious matters, for there could be no democracy without religious freedom. The opportunity for such a reform was offered to Jefferson when he became a member of a committee on the revision of the constitution of Virginia

¹*Notes on Virginia*, Query XIII. *The Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 173 f; Prescott, p. 220.

(1776–1779). His Act for Establishing Religious Freedom was passed by the assembly:

That the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and un-inspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world, and through all time; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.¹

But in the same committee on revision Jefferson immediately passed over from proposals intended to remove the obstacles to religious freedom to positive propositions. Like Franklin, he suggested the establishment of a public library, but without the success of his older friend. The most essential requisite of liberty, however, Jefferson considered to be a democratic reform of the schools of Virginia. His Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, proposed to the legislature of his state in 1779, already contains the essential elements of Jefferson's educational policy. Here, as in Jefferson's whole personality, we find the most interesting mixture of aristocratic and democratic elements: the idea of an intellectual elite is aristocratic; the insistence on recruiting this elite from the talented youth of the state, even from the poorest homes, is democratic. The bill proposes—we follow here closely the description given by Jefferson himself in his *Notes on Virginia*:

... to lay off every county into small districts of five or six miles square, called hundreds, and in each of them to establish a school for teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic.²

The teacher has to be supported by the hundred, and all parents have the right to send their children to this elementary school for three years without paying tuition, "and as much longer as they please, paying for it."

¹*The Writings*, Vol. II, Appendix No. III, p. 301. Prescott, p. 253.

²*Notes on Virginia*, Query XIV. *The Writings*, Vol. II, p. 203; Prescott, pp. 232–233.

In each hundred a "visitor," to wit, a person of public merit and confidence, is entrusted with the general supervision of the elementary school and, in addition, with the task:

... to choose the boy of best genius in the school, of those whose parents are too poor to give them further education, and to send him forward to one of the grammar schools, of which twenty are proposed to be erected in different parts of the country, for teaching Greek, Latin, geography, and the higher branches of numerical arithmetic.¹

These boys, sent from the elementary schools of the hundreds to the twenty grammar schools, are to be tried out for one or two years:

... and the best genius of the whole selected, and continued six years, and the residue dismissed. By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually, and be instructed, at the public expense, so far as the grammar schools go. At the end of six years' instruction, one-half are to be discontinued (from among whom the grammar schools will probably be supplied with future masters); and the other half, who are to be chosen for the superiority of their parts and disposition, are to be sent and continued three years in the study of such sciences as they shall choose, at William and Mary college, the plan of which is proposed to be enlarged ... and extended to all the useful sciences. The ultimate result of the whole scheme of education would be the teaching all the children of the State reading, writing, and common arithmetic; turning out ten annually, of superior genius, well taught in Greek, Latin, geography, and the higher branches of arithmetic; turning out ten others annually, of still superior parts, who, to those branches of learning, shall have added such of the sciences as their genius shall have led them to; the furnishing to the wealthier part of the people convenient schools at which their children may be educated at their own expense. The general objects of this law are to provide an education adapted to the years, to the capacity, and the condition of every one, and directed to their freedom and happiness.²

¹Notes on Virginia, Query XIV. *The Writings*, Vol. II, p. 203. Prescott, p. 233.

²Notes on Virginia, Query XIV. *The Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 203 f. Cf. Prescott, p. 233.

With this project, as well as with its revision, the Bill for Establishing a System of Public Education of the year 1817, Jefferson had the same disappointing experience that Franklin had with his proposal of an English School; the public was not yet ripe for it. After frequent talk in the Assembly of Virginia, much of which was more a show than a true expression of public interest on the part of the delegates, the bill of 1779 was "amended" in such a way that its final acceptance did not alter the *status quo*. The initiative was put in the hands of the local authorities—and nothing happened. But just as Franklin's plan of a more realistic academy—though defeated in its essential points—eventuated in the foundation of the University of Pennsylvania, so Jefferson's educational endeavors between 1779 and 1817 ended at last in the founding of the University of Virginia. Jefferson could even devote the last years of his life to the presidency of the new institution, the buildings of which had been erected according to his own plans.

A careful analysis of Jefferson's different plans for a reform of higher education would bring to light some of the finest features in his own personality, as well as his opinion about the responsibility of higher education for the cultural development of this country; it would show also the manifold influences which, deriving from almost all important European countries, worked on Jefferson's mind. From the beginning of his political career, he used his wide reading as well as his sojourn in Europe for gathering all possible information on modern plans for reform in higher education, in which the period abounded.¹ Here it can be mentioned only that Jefferson's personal taste reveals itself in his insistence on an attempt at student government. It was one of the last disappointments of his life that he had overestimated the maturity of the students. He remained loyal to his own tradition in his emphasis on the secular character of the University of Virginia; he provided no chair for theology and secured full freedom from sectarian

¹See especially Roy J. Honeywell, *The Educational Work of Thomas Jefferson* (Harvard Studies in Education, Vol. 16). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1931.

restrictions. He also preferred a system of electives to the rigid curricular structure customary in the colleges of his time.

Jefferson has often been criticized for his intervention in the teaching of political science at the university, which he clearly steered toward the Republican side against the "slide into Toryism." To Madison he wrote in 1826:

In the selection of our Law Professor we must be rigorously attentive to his political principles.¹

But taking such a realistic standpoint, he preserved academic freedom better than if he had allowed a Tory to exercise his influence on the youth of Virginia. Academic freedom means respect for truth and the right of the scholar to follow his intellectual and moral conscience without persecution, but it cannot mean that the only professorship for political science available at a small university ought to be given to the representative of a doctrine opposite to the ideals of the supporters of such a university, who seriously believe that they stand for the liberal development of their country.

Like Franklin, Jefferson has been called a "utilitarian" for his disinclination for metaphysics, and for the large space which he gave in his university to the departments or "schools" occupied with science or with applied sciences. Jefferson also related the programs of study more closely to the patterns of modern professional life than the other educators in this country dared to do. In this respect he accepted ideas expressed by European liberal reformers, particularly by Condorcet in his *Rapport . . . sur l'Organisation Générale de l'Instruction* of the year 1792.²

There can be no doubt that the merits and the demerits of these European ideas are almost equal. Their merits lie in the emphasis on a free and empirical education adjusted to the culture and scien-

¹"To James Madison," February 17, 1826, in *The Writings*, Vol. XVI, p. 156.

²See *French Liberalism and Education in the Eighteenth Century; The Writings of La Chalotais, Turgot, Diderot, and Condorcet on National Education*, translated and edited by F. de la Fontainerie. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1932.

tific consciousness of the time, the liberation of scholarship from the censorship of religious and political absolutism, and the inclusion of education in the responsibilities of the commonwealth. In this way the French liberals transferred the ideas initiated by Luther and the Calvinists into the Catholic countries. The demerits of the reform plans of the eighteenth century rationalists lie in their unawareness of the dangers inherent in the appointment of sovereign governments and their bureaucracy as supreme umpires in cultural matters. In addition, the rationalist reformers of Europe advocated a rather atomistic concept of learning and research which cut the *globus intellectualis* into separate continents and thus imperiled the spiritual and organizational unity of the European university tradition. Some such unity must be preserved, together with the inevitable division of labor among the various modern professions. It can be done only through laying a general liberal foundation before specialization begins; and this was exactly Jefferson's ideal. In addition, the preservation of this unity requires a common spirit of responsibility toward the great values of mankind in the teaching of whatever subject on whatever level. This is also what Jefferson wished. Thus it depends on the definition of the term whether we may call Jefferson a "utilitarian" or not. If a utilitarian is one who wants education to free itself of bookishness and isolation and to serve all the worthy pursuits of mankind, whether theoretical or applied, then Jefferson may certainly be described as a utilitarian. But taken in this sense the word loses all distinct meaning; for what sensible educator or statesman would not fall into this category?

If, on the other hand, the term "utilitarianism" denotes a narrow conception of education, as if it were an enterprise destined for nothing but practice and profit, then Jefferson is certainly on the opposite side. How could a man of Jefferson's character be anything but an ardent supporter of the essential values of a liberal education?

Here, in spite of many similarities, is the difference between Franklin and Jefferson. For Franklin—as his autobiography shows

—everything was related to a purpose: a moral, or a scientific, or a practical purpose. When he enjoyed a certain luxury, as the china or the silver on his table, he thought how difficult it had been to earn the money for the first piece and how much they were worth. This is, after all, in character for the man who cannot easily forget the nights he has passed in toil and the sweat of labor that has been on his brow. For Jefferson, though he was born on the frontier—"the savage of America," as he called himself in Europe—a certain largeness was the most natural thing. Money was for him a basis of life, never an aim. When he augmented his estate, experimented with plants and seeds, invented new tools and made a model farm out of his property, he did it because he enjoyed it and wanted to do everything as perfectly as possible. And when his Monticello became one of the most attractive homes in America and his hospitality grew out of proportion to his income, he contracted debts, for friendship with him stood higher than money.

Jefferson disliked the cities and manufacturing which for Franklin were a kind of elixir of life. It probably cost Jefferson an effort in his inaugural addresses as President of the United States to put industry beside agriculture as one of the pillars of American wealth. Profoundly fascinated though he was by new discoveries, his attitude was nevertheless always much more that of a humanist who enjoyed the broadening of the human horizon than that of a modern technical executive. He would have admired work on a modern running conveyor for the skill, the timing, and the grandeur that goes with large-scale production, but he would have considered it deplorable; for man, not the machine, was for him the end of human effort. Therefore Jefferson considered classical studies to be the indispensable foundation of culture.

The learning [of] Greek and Latin, I am told, is going into disuse in Europe. I know not what their manners and occupations may call for; but it would be very ill-judged in us to follow their example in this instance.¹

¹*Notes on Virginia*, Query XIV. *The Writings*, Vol. II, p. 205. Prescott, p. 234.

The Romans were in his opinion a richer source of wisdom than the Greeks. He disliked all mysticism, however profound, therefore he had no understanding of Plato.

I name not Plato, who only used the name of Socrates to cover the whimsies of his own brain.¹

But Jefferson's humanism did not prevent him from joyfully including the natural sciences in the realm of human interests. On the contrary, taking all the utterances of Jefferson on learning and education together, one has some reason to believe that for him the exact sciences were the apex of intellectual effort. He considered them the purest expression of the quality from which human dignity issues, the power of reason. He was aware of living in a great era in which science succeeded increasingly in destroying "ignorance and superstition," and in blasting the road for rational and democratic ways of life. From this exalted hope the progressives of the eighteenth century received their inspiration. It was also in this hope that the limitations of their insight into the structure of human history originated. Caught in a kind of intellectual short circuit, they ascribed human suppression, vice, and weakness exclusively to lack of reason and to the attempt of "priests and kings" to extinguish freedom of thinking whenever it began to lighten the human mind. But these progressives did not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that emotional elements, such as tradition, deeply rooted beliefs, mores, greed, inertia, and—above all—the natural moral insufficiency of man, also play their parts in the complicated game of civilization. Nor could these liberals anticipate the extent to which scientific reasoning itself has its inherent limitations. They were far from clear about the intricate problem of the relationships among reason, science, and faith. Can the human intellect alone create the convictions and the faith on which, ultimately, the beneficent effect of all human effort depends, including that of reason itself? Or cannot reason, if applied to isolated purposes and divorced from all the other responsibilities

¹"To Benjamin Rush," April 21, 1803. *The Writings*, Vol. X, p. 383. Prescott, p. 342.

of man, create the same disharmony in civilization as religion, if separated from reason?

With respect to Jefferson, we must say simply that he did not think these problems through. In a letter to Peter Carr he writes:

Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.¹

But the very same letter also shows Jefferson doubting the omnipotence of reason, and particularly one of its creations, namely, science.

He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the *τὸ καλόν*, truth, etc., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this; even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.²

If one compares these two quotations he cannot fail to see a certain contradiction. The first quotation holds reason to be the supreme arbiter; it could have been written by men such as Diderot, De Volney, or Thomas Payne. In the second quotation morality,

¹"To Peter Carr," August 10, 1787. *The Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 258. Prescott, p. 274.

²*The Writings*, Vol. VI, p. 257 f. Prescott, p. 273.

or an inborn sense of right or wrong, is set above reason. Whence does this sense come? To this question Jefferson gives no answer. The answer lies embedded in his ethical humanism, which is not without a deep religious background. But he failed to make the elements of his creed explicit.

In the last analysis, Jefferson's democratic convictions also spring from his ethical humanism, not from dogmatic belief in special forms of organization. Therefore his concept of equality is far from involving a tendency toward leveling; rather, it issues from the fundamentally Christian idea of the dignity of the individual and a consequent desire to lift men from lower to higher stages of life. Every man, as man, is an aristocrat in his own right. It is this creed that led Jefferson to prefer occasional disappointment to a generally distrustful attitude toward men. It is due to the same attitude that in his political studies he turned more and more away from merely legal arguments toward a general acceptance of the doctrine of natural law and natural rights. In a letter to Roger C. Weightman, written on June 24, 1826, a few days before his death, he expresses this conviction in the following inspiring words:

May it [the American Revolution] be to the world, what I believe it will be (to some parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all), the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-government. That form which we have substituted, restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others. For ourselves, let the annual return of this day forever refresh our recollection of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.¹

¹"To Roger C. Weightman," June 24, 1826. *The Writings*, Vol. XVI, pp. 181 f. Prescott, pp. 402-403.

It was due to these ideas that Jefferson—like Franklin—regarded the existence of slavery as a disease in the American body politic.

There must doubtless be an unhappy influence on the manners of our people produced by the existence of slavery among us. . . . The man must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved by such circumstances. . . . With the morals of the people, their industry also is destroyed. . . . Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.¹

But the belief in the fundamental dignity and equality of men which Jefferson cherished did not prevent him from acknowledging differences of quality and merit. As we know, he hated, to the degree of one-sidedness, the European nobility, with the “horde of kings”² at its head; he was against any kind of hereditary privilege in this country as well as in others; but, on the other hand, he was convinced that democracy, more than any other social order, needed a “natural aristocracy.”

For I agree with you, that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. . . . The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. . . . May we not even say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of these natural *aristoi* into the offices of government?³

What else, after all, was his proposal of the school reform in his native state of Virginia but an attempt to select these natural *aristoi*?

Not without a certain feeling of melancholy do we think nowadays of statesmen like Jefferson, who combined in their nature this richness of beauty and talent. “One by one the lamps of loveliness are going out.” But should they fade for too long a time,

¹*Notes on Virginia*, Query XVIII. *The Writings*, Vol. II, pp. 225 f. Prescott, p. 242.

²*Autobiography*. *The Writings*, Vol. I, p. 151. Prescott, p. 291.

³“To John Adams,” October 28, 1813. *The Writings*, Vol. XIII, p. 396. Prescott, p. 375.

our civilization would perish with them, because there are two types of personality without which no society of free and self-reliant people can thrive. One is represented by Benjamin Franklin, the proud, industrious, and thrifty man with a trained and experienced common sense; and the other type is represented by Thomas Jefferson, the highly cultured, yet democratically minded, natural aristocrat, who expressed the guiding principle of his life most clearly in his letter of January, 1787, to James Madison:

*Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietam servitutem.*¹ ("I prefer freedom though fraught with dangers to servitude with security.")

¹"To James Madison," January 30, 1787. *The Writings*, Vol. IV, p. 65. Prescott, p. 263.

Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi

(1746–1827)

THE EVENING HOUR OF AN HERMIT

There are moments in the life of man when he grasps the essence of his existence in one visionary intuition. Such a moment occurred to Pestalozzi when his first great life experiment had broken down. At Neuhof near Zürich in Switzerland, after an emotionally unbalanced youth, he had settled down as a farmer and tried to combine agriculture with the education of the children of poor peasants, of whom there were plenty in his neighborhood. After some time he failed financially; and as an educator also he considered himself bankrupt. One evening he jotted down some aphorisms, *Die Abendstunde eines Einsiedlers*¹ ("The Evening Hour of an Hermit"), in which he tried to give an account of his educational ideas. One must read them many times in order to fully appreciate their wisdom. In a sense, all his later works were nothing but an elaboration of them. Everywhere, even in the wording, one feels the spirit of Rousseau; but there is no imitation or pupilship. Every word and idea is formed by Pestalozzi's own mind.

He starts with the Rousseauist theme of *retournez à la nature*.

Man who is the same whether on the throne or in a hut, what is he in his innermost nature? Why do not the wise tell us? Why are the greatest of our thinkers not concerned to know what their race is? Does a peasant use his ox without knowing it? Does not a shepherd care for the nature of his sheep?

And you who use man and profess that you guard and nurture him, do you care for him as the peasant cares for his ox? Do you tend him as the shepherd tends his sheep? Does your wisdom help you to understand truly your race and is your goodness the goodness of enlightened guardians of the people?²

¹The first draft of *The Evening Hour of an Hermit* was made in 1779.

²Translations from *The Evening Hour of an Hermit* are by the author.

As in Rousseau, there is in these lines not only the cry for a more natural life but also the political unrest of the period before the French Revolution. Pestalozzi, as a student in Zürich, had lived with a group of political reformers. He himself had been arrested and considered by the patricians of the city as dangerous to the stability of society. Certainly Pestalozzi believed in equality: "Man who is the same whether on the throne or in a hut." But as a true revolutionary, Pestalozzi does not remain in a merely questioning mood; he immediately passes over toward a positive answer.

Man, driven by his needs, can find the road to this truth nowhere but in his own nature.

The nursling, his hunger satisfied, learns in this way what his mother is to him: she develops in him love, the essence of gratitude, before the infant is able to utter the words "duty" and "thanks"; in the same natural way the son finds his happiness in the duties towards his father who gives him bread and a hearth to warm himself.

| So for Pestalozzi the deepest source of development and education lies in the experience of love which a person has as a child in relation to his parents. If he is put firmly on this "road of Nature," he will understand without many words the most essential moral elements of human life, namely, fellowship, peace, gratitude, and justice. He will also feel what is right for him and what is not.)

Man, if you seek truth in this way of Nature, you will find it as you need it according to your station and your career. . . .

Following the path of your nature you cannot make use of all truths. The sphere of knowledge from which man in his individual station can receive happiness is limited; its sphere begins closely around him, around his own self and his nearest relationships; from there his knowledge will expand, and while expanding it must regulate itself according to this firm center of all the powers of truth.

(So Pestalozzi supplements the idea of the essential equality of man with the idea of individuality, which man must recognize with all its strength and limitations in order to achieve productivity and

happiness.) Do not try to extend your activity over areas you cannot connect organically with your previous experiences and with the convictions from which you receive your inner balance and certainty. For the educator this means: never throw a child out of his own self. Do not engage children "in the thousandfold confusion of verbal instruction and opinions, before having trained their minds for truth and wisdom through firsthand knowledge." Only a person who has been molded by the influence of events, whose relation to himself and others he has really understood, can expose himself to the richness of life without being bewildered, because his inner certainty will direct him. "Power, strong and clear sentiments, and a sense for right application are its expression."

With this truth in mind, Pestalozzi now attacks the "artificial methods of schooling" of his time, which prefers "words to things" and forges "ahead of the free, slow, and patient course of Nature," and gives man a superficial polish which gratifies the superficial standards of modern civilization but conceals the lack of natural power within a person. From such unsound education results "the wretched and exhausting pursuit of the mere shadow of truth."

Only men educated in the "road of Nature" can understand and estimate one another, because they will develop a pure sense of simplicity and uprightness. They will also know that man can use his strength and knowledge best only in clearly defined situations. In this context Pestalozzi emphasizes the necessity of vocational and class education. This may sound surprising to those who know Pestalozzi as the prophet of equality in education; yet the two aspects are, at least from Pestalozzi's point of view, not contradictory. For his concept of equality means not uniformity but the full acknowledgment of nature as it develops diversely in different men and relates them thus to different strata and vocations of life. Everybody has to follow the "road of Nature," but it is not the same road for everybody. The less gifted have to go through other experiences and choose other tasks than do those endowed with unusual talent. If a school tried to treat the two in one and the

same way, it would kill the talent in the talented, and the possibility of proper and practical adjustment for the average, and neither of them would be happy. So differentiation is inevitable, and it contributes to the richness of human life. But above all variety starts the unity of humanity, and those who put the differences above the unity reverse the order of nature. Therefore the same Pestalozzi who is for a differentiated society and education can also say:

Whoever departs from this natural order and lays artificial emphasis on class and vocational education, or training for rule or for service, leads man aside from the enjoyment of the most natural blessings to a sea of hidden dangers.

A society with a differentiated training of youth, which does not at the same time acknowledge the democratic right of all to develop and serve mankind according to their particular abilities, is a "class society" in the negative and dangerous sense of the term. It can only end in catastrophe, as did the absolutist and patriarchal society of the eighteenth century, whose downfall Pestalozzi clearly anticipated.

So far Pestalozzi's ideas move within psychological and sociological concepts. Positive experiences in early childhood—so he says—tend to create confidence and to bring forth morally positive reactions. Through an uninterrupted series of favorable stimuli of conscious or subconscious character, an ego is being formed which will allow for a natural formation of a moral super-ego, and the result will be a mature and well-directed personality.

But later in the course of his *Evening Hour of an Hermit* Pestalozzi surprises us with a sentence which almost abruptly leads from psychology and sociology into metaphysics. He says: "God is the nearest relationship of man." So he adds to the horizontal level of contact between man and man a vertical line which connects the human being and his relations with a divine spirit. Merely sociological relationships are ethically neutral. Men can interact according to the principle of love, and also according to the drive of hatred. That they feel the first way to be superior is due—accord-

ing to Pestalozzi—not only to mere experiences but to their ties to a divine law which they have to realize in order to achieve enduring strength, peace, and wisdom.

During the period of the Prussian reaction, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Pestalozzi's books were forbidden in the teachers' colleges, allegedly because of the revolutionary and atheist character of their ideas. No doubt Pestalozzi wanted a new society in place of one of power and privileges, and certainly his religion was not orthodox or dogmatic. It represented the organic development of the best features in Protestantism which tend to dissolve formal creeds in favor of man's own personal consciousness of God. This kind of social and religious thought certainly contains a liberal and democratic element, and so it may be regarded with disfavor by those who adhere to merely hierarchical systems in politics and religion. On the other hand, it will be difficult to find another educational philosopher who has understood how to combine a realistic psychological insight into the nature of man and society so intimately with full recognition of the transcendent character of life. In this Pestalozzi comes close to Comenius, but with the difference that the Swiss stands on a higher rung of the ladder of educational development.

In all essential points Pestalozzi's ideas are as true today as they were in the eighteenth century. Also, to our social conscience his ideas are still a challenge. Have we a society today which allows that degree of natural love, and provides the children of all groups with that core of positive experiences which Pestalozzi holds to be indispensable for human health? Have we organized our school system so that it combines equality with differentiation? Do we teach in such wise that we follow the "road of Nature" without leading the child away from his own real world into a world of words for which he does not feel any responsibility? Does not the modern development of advertisement and propaganda justify Pestalozzi's prediction that "sound and speech," instead of truth and actual objects, would endanger both our minds and our society?

PESTALOZZI'S PRACTICAL WORK

In three different ways Pestalozzi elaborated the ideas laid down in his *Evening Hour of an Hermit*. First, through his own work as a practical educational reformer; secondly, through his educational writings proper; and thirdly, through his philosophical and sociological thought.

The practical work of Pestalozzi needs no detailed description here. After the failure of the Neuhof experiment, with its attempt to combine farm work with the education of children, he turned to writing, took a deep interest in the French Revolution, and joined the liberals in the Swiss Revolution of 1798. Like many of his contemporaries whose names are history, he was later on bitterly disappointed by the way in which the French *sans-culottes* materialized the ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Not only had he to admit the moral failure of the revolution itself, but he saw the cruelties of the French revolutionary groups who invaded Switzerland. After a massacre in the little town of Stans, where in September, 1798, a battle was fought between the inhabitants of the Canton of Niederwalden and the French, he took over the poor-house for children in this desolate community. There he worked until 1799, under circumstances which we can imagine only if we think now of what some humble schoolmaster may do with his children in war-torn villages of Poland or China. In 1799 Pestalozzi went to Burgdorf and established an institute for children. It was there that Krüsi joined him, to become one of his closest collaborators. As a "citizen" of the new Swiss liberal republic, he went to Paris, in order to win Napoleon to the cause of the new democracy; but he failed. In 1803, instead of a united democratic republic, federalism of the conservative type was established in Switzerland, and he was deprived of the opportunity to continue his experimental work at Burgdorf. Thence he moved to Münchenbuchsee, where another educational reformer, Fellenberg, who made a deep impression on Goethe, was working. Here, as in all periods of Pestalozzi's life, one of the most tragic features of his complicated

character appeared—his inability to collaborate with others. After the break with Fellenberg, he went to Yverdon (Ifferten) at the upper end of Lake Neuchâtel. He gave this town an international reputation through the experimental school which he established in 1805 in an old castle, and which continued its existence until 1825, two years before his death. Here also internal dissension marred the work of the school. Even his oldest collaborators came in conflict with him and with one another. Yet the school expanded, harbored more and more pupils, and attracted more and more educators and statesmen from all the great European countries. The great reform work of the elementary school, which started during the nineteenth century on the European and American continents, would have been impossible without the impetus given it by the Yverdon experiment.

In the studies of the old Swiss and German schoolmasters one could often find a reproduction of a painting of Pestalozzi, in which we see him, with a profound expression of love on his ugly and wrinkled face, embracing the children of peasants who, clad in rags, enter the simple schoolroom. The painting symbolizes the spirit of humble service to the young which was characteristic of Pestalozzi and his followers. It is this self-absorbing devotion to his work which distinguishes Pestalozzi so decidedly from Rousseau. Pestalozzi's example of "Let the little children come unto me" probably had a greater effect on modern education than all that philosophers ever said or wrote about the tasks and character of education.

PESTALOZZI'S MAIN WORKS ON EDUCATION

Of Pestalozzi's writings, *Lienhard und Gertrud* ("Leonard and Gertrude"), *Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt* ("How Gertrude Teaches Her Children"), and *Schwanengesang* ("Swansong") have become most famous. They have been translated into most of the great languages of Europe, America, and Asia, though they are only a part of his total educational opus. *Leonard and Gertrude*, like Rousseau's *Émile*, is written in the style of a novel; and like Rousseau, Pestalozzi also had the disappointing experience that

most people read and understood his work as a piece of entertaining literature and not as a great challenge for thinking and acting. In spite of these similarities, the difference between Pestalozzi and Rousseau is striking. Whereas Rousseau dreams of an educational island of social isolation and conceives of nature as something which has to be separated from society, Pestalozzi plants his story in the setting of a desolate Swiss village.

There lived in Bonnal, a mason. He was called Leonard, and his wife, Gertrude. He had seven children and some property, but he had this fault: that he often let himself be tempted to the tavern. When he was once seated there, he behaved like a madman; and there are in our village, cunning, good-for-nothing rogues, whose sole employment and business it is, to take in honest and simple people, and seize every opportunity of getting hold of their money. These were acquainted with poor Leonard, and often led him on from drinking to gaming, and thus cheated him of the produce of his labor. Whenever this had happened over-night, Leonard repented in the morning, and it went to his heart when he saw Gertrude and his children wanting bread, so that he trembled, wept, and cast down his eyes to conceal his tears.

Gertrude was the best wife in the village; but she and her blooming children were in danger of being robbed of their father, and driven from their home, and of sinking into the greatest misery, because Leonard could not let wine alone.

Gertrude saw the approaching danger, and felt it most keenly.¹

There is no bold and sweeping statement in these sentences as in the famous first sentences of *Émile*, but a complete absorption of the author in the life and griefs of his poor fellow men. In the Preface to the book Pestalozzi says:

In what is here related (the greatest part of which I have, in the course of an active life, myself observed), I have been careful never to set down my own opinions, instead of what I have seen and heard the people themselves feel, judge, say, and attempt.²

¹The above text is the beginning of the first chapter of Pestalozzi's *Leonard and Gertrude* in Henry Barnard's translation, in *Pestalozzi and His Educational System* (School Bulletin Publication), pp. 517 f. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1906.

²*Leonard and Gertrude* (*loco citato.*), p. 521.

Gertrude, the wife of the mason, educates her children in a severe and orderly manner, and yet with that unwearying love and natural simplicity which for Pestalozzi were of higher worth than all the wisdom of the learned. Gertrude represents for Pestalozzi the living symbol of the "road of Nature." She forms a center of purity within her community and slowly overcomes all the social obstacles which corruption and inertia put in her way. Finally, the feudal lord who wishes to reform the community under his rule, but does not know how to materialize his noble intentions, discovers Gertrude and her way of educating her children. Her poor home becomes a source of encouragement to him and his friends. From her practice, and not from theories, they learn what education is, and with her they transform the misery-stricken village into a place of happiness and co-operation.

In the following work, *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, Pestalozzi tried to give a systematic psychological theory of his educational method. Such attempts are always in danger of mechanizing and isolating mental processes which can be fully understood only in relation to life in its totality. Of this danger Pestalozzi was fully aware. He says:

The mechanism of physical human nature is essentially subject to the same laws by which physical Nature generally unfolds her powers. According to these laws, all instruction should graft the most essential parts of its subject firmly into the very being of the human mind; then join the less essential gradually but uninterruptedly to the most essential, and maintain all the parts of the subject, even to the outermost, in one living, proportionate whole.¹

Yet the question arises as to whether that "living, proportionate whole" can be conceived of—as Pestalozzi conceives of it—as a "mechanism" which "is essentially subject to the same laws by which physical Nature generally unfolds her powers." (Pestalozzi's idea that all learning is based on a child's realization of "sound,

¹Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi: *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children . . . and an Account of the Method*, translated by Lucy E. Holland and Frances C. Turner, and edited by Ebenezer Cooke, second edition (Standard Teacher's Library), p. 322. C. W. Bardeen, Syracuse, N. Y., 1898.

form, and number'' as the true basic elements in mental perception is more or less another kind of faculty psychology. Thus we observe a strange gap between his admirable grasp of the totality of education as expressed in *The Evening Hour of an Hermit* and *Leonard and Gertrude*, on the one hand, and the educational formalism prevailing in *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* and in several others of his methodological writings.

Historically speaking, some kind of systematization of Pestalozzi's educational experiences was necessary. The progress of humanity needs a continual interaction between intuition and analysis, practice and theory, venture and system. It is the merit of Pestalozzi's writings on method that they brought structure and purpose into the thinking and practice of the nineteenth century elementary schoolteacher. Without Pestalozzi, and later Herbart, he would have stood in bewilderment before the enormous task of organizing his classwork with a school population which rapidly grew from relatively small numbers into thousands and millions.

PESTALOZZI AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER

It was the fate of Pestalozzi, as of some other leaders in education, that his fame in this field overshadowed his other contributions, though it was in fact the breadth and generality of their interests which made all these men great as educators. Comenius, whose name historians mostly connect with his *Orbis Pictus* and the *Didactica Magna*, was the theological and political leader of his religious community and was also a great encyclopedist; Froebel, whose name lives in the memory of men as the founder of the kindergarten, was a scientist and a mystic philosopher; and Pestalozzi, in addition to his educational interests, was a prolific writer on politics, philosophy, and social problems. Quantitatively speaking, Pestalozzi's essays are as numerous in these fields as in education proper. Everywhere he defends the cause of liberty against usurped authority, of justice against suppression, and of common welfare against exploitation. Several times he dealt with the not infrequent and most horrifying result of despair and bigotry in older

societies, child murder by unmarried mothers. Like Rousseau, he and others of his contemporaries could not help but search for the laws inherent in the progress of civilization. The profoundest product of his thinking about this great historical and philosophical problem is his essay entitled *Meine Nachforschungen über den Gang der Natur in der Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts*, 1797 ("Inquiries into the Course of Nature in the Development of Mankind"). It is almost unknown in the Anglo-Saxon and even in the German-speaking countries, though it is certainly one of the greatest documents of the eighteenth century endeavor to reveal the meaning of history. It is also important because it shows more than anything else the similarity of interest between Rousseau and Pestalozzi, together with the differences in their solutions. It may well be that Pestalozzi's essay was aroused by Rousseau's *Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Mankind* and his other writings on social philosophy. Pestalozzi also starts with the hypothesis of a natural state of mankind, but he immediately objects to Rousseau's sentimental glorification of this state of man. Hobbes' pessimism seems to be much closer to him.

It is not true that the original man lived in peace. It is not true that he had divided the earth without power, without injustice, and without shedding of blood; it is not true that the origin of property is to be found in man's sense for equity and justice. [Rather it is true] that he was wading in the blood of his equals. He had to protect his cave like a tiger and to kill his own race. He claimed all soil as his own. He did under the sun what he wanted to do. He did not acknowledge law, nor any master; his only law was his own will, and what sin is he did not know.¹

Out of this state of mere biological primitiveness man has developed slowly into the state of society in which he still lives. But what is his state of society? It is not, as Rousseau says, mere show, artificiality, and deceit, but an unceasing battle raging in man between his desire for moral freedom and the animal drives which

¹Cf. Pestalozzi, *Sämtliche Werke*, 12. Band, pp. 44 and 46. Berlin, 1938. Translated by the author.

have not yet lost their power over him. He creates organizations, laws, customs, and mores, but he uses them, and even religion, not for the final ethical purposes inherent in them, but for suppression, competition, and power. The state in which we live is not yet one of justice; rather, it is a state of institutionalized injustice, regulated by law—both in our group contacts and in our international relations.

Out of this second state of history—the state of society—we have to strive for a third state in which man will find his real free and moral self. Pestalozzi shows how knowledge, property, social relations, power, honor, rulership, government, and religion appear in the biological state of primitiveness, in the state of society, and finally in the state of moral freedom, when man will succeed in identifying his nature with the inner laws of the universe.

But Pestalozzi is not satisfied with building up a mere historical construction. According to him, the development of the total race reoccurs in the life of every individual. (Each of us has in himself the primitive man, the social man, and the ethical man; and whereas society as such has not yet achieved the third state, it is the privilege of the highly developed individuals, even in the state of mere social convention, to grow beyond this state into the state of liberty. From this vantage point they are able to envisage the misery, and also the possible progress, of the human race. Society in its present state of injustice, though constantly profiting from the wisdom and courage of these advanced individuals, will nevertheless hate and persecute them, because they are the mirror in which the bad conscience of mankind reveals itself. Pestalozzi leaves open the question as to whether mankind as a whole will ever achieve perfection. The only thing he knows is that a relatively high degree of perfection may be realized in select individuals, who, though offending the complacent, will be an incentive to the courageous.

Pestalozzi wrote his *Inquiries into the Course of Nature in the Development of Mankind* in a period when, as at several other times in his life, he had reason to fear that his work would have no effect

on his contemporaries. So at the end of this essay he passes over from the more objective tone of theoretical inquiry into a personal confession.

Thousands, mere products of Nature, pass their lives in mere sensual pleasures, and they do not aspire to more. Tens of thousands slave in their workshops and in their palaces, and do not aspire to more.

But one man I know who strove for more; he was filled with an urge for purity and with a faith in mankind such as few mortals know; his heart was made for friendship, love, and loyalty.

But he was not made for this world; there was in it no niche for him. And the world, finding him a misfit, did not ask whether he was one through his own fault, or through the fault of others. It crushed him with its iron hammer, as masons who break up a stone to fill the gaps between their bricks. Even so, this lonely man believed in mankind more than in himself, and after untold suffering he learned what few mortals will ever be permitted to learn.¹

¹Cf. Pestalozzi: *Sämtliche Werke*, 12. Band, p. 166. Berlin, 1938. Translated by the author.

Johann Friedrich Herbart

(1776–1841)

HERBART'S PERSONALITY

Pestalozzi has often been characterized as a disciple of Rousseau; Herbart has not rarely been labeled a disciple of Pestalozzi. This latter statement corresponds as little to the full truth as the first. Herbart visited Pestalozzi in Switzerland while living there as private tutor to the sons of Governor Von Steiger in Bern; he was deeply interested in Pestalozzi's writings and reviewed carefully his ideas on educational method.¹ It may well be that Pestalozzi's attempts at creating a psychology of education aroused Herbart's curiosity and ambition to provide such a science as a basis for educational practice. In other respects these two men differed considerably. Pestalozzi was helplessly exposed to all the heights and depths of human emotions, absorbed to the point of self-annihilation in the care of the poor, in spite of all tenacity of effort without regularity and discipline, and incapable of reading a book thoroughly or keeping steady co-operative relations with his friends.

Herbart, on the other hand, grew up in a sheltered environment with a very regular, scholarly, and aesthetic education, which led him to mastery of the ancient and modern languages as well as of mathematics and music, and prepared him to succeed Kant in the famous philosophical chair of the University of Königsberg. Herbart, like Pestalozzi, was deeply interested in the most various aspects of life, but he was afraid of losing his own equilibrium through exposing himself too much to its vicissitudes, partly because of his

¹E.g., *Über Pestalozzi's Neueste Schrift: Wie Gertrud Ihre Kinder lehrt* (1802) ("On the Recent Book of Pestalozzi, How Gertrude Teaches her Children"); *Pestalozzi's Idee eines ABC der Anschauung untersucht und wissenschaftlich ausgeführt* (1802) ("The ABC of Sense Perception"); *Über den Standpunkt der Beurtheilung der Pestalozzischen Unterrichtsmethode* (1804), ("Judgments of Pestalozzi's Method of Instruction").

sensitive health, partly because of his urge to systematize and harmonize the diversity of experiences instead of being overwhelmed by them. His style is extremely pedantic and bookish. Not that Herbart was without deep emotions. But whereas emotions mastered Pestalozzi, Herbart mastered his; they were to serve, not disturb, his thinking. His aversion to extremes immunized him also against the exaggerations of German romantic idealism. This independence was not easy in a time when the halls of the German universities were charged with the intellectual atmosphere of the daring philosophies of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling. Though critical about many fundamental tenets in Kant's philosophy, Herbart was a Kantian in his rigorous distinction between the scientific objectivity which behooved the philosopher and the romantic subjectivism in which, at this time, so many philosophers indulged. As Kant combined the rationalism of Descartes with the empiricism of the English school of thought, so also Herbart combined the sagacity and synthesis of the German philosophical tradition with the observational talent of the English. His marriage to an Englishwoman might be held symbolic of the general trend of his nature. All these qualities show, naturally, not only in his general philosophy but also in his specific educational thought.

One could divide Herbart's writings into three groups: first, a group of logical and epistemological character, dealing with the examination of the tools and criteria of philosophical thinking; second, a group intended to clarify (primarily by dint of the historical approach) the problems of psychology, education, metaphysics, and ethics (which, like Kant, he calls practical philosophy); third, a group concerned with comprehensive philosophical systematization. He never conceived of philosophy as springing from supernatural wisdom or as hovering above the special sciences. As far as his time allowed, his philosophy was critical and scientific.

He begins his essay *Über philosophisches Studium* ("On the Study of Philosophy"), 1807, with the following words:

Which relationship should Philosophy set up between herself and the other sciences, and between herself and life? Would she like to

be considered as ruler, superior through her new and unknown weapons, menacing and formidable? Or would she rather prefer to be considered a native in her environment, as kin and friend, needy of ever-new acknowledgment and approval?

To this question he gives the following answer:

If the power of the human mind is strong enough simultaneously to expand itself into the width as well as the depth of life, then all the sciences, each separately and yet all united, ought to produce philosophy as their indispensable complement, and they ought never to cease in this endeavor. It is the limitations of the human mind which force us everywhere to divide labor, and which split knowing into portions of knowledge that philosophy has been severed from the totality of thought. . . . Thus philosophical thinking, unfortunately, has led to philosophy as a special and isolated branch of scholarship.¹

But it is the task of the real philosopher to reconcile specialization with comprehensiveness, and this can be the result only of long personal development and maturity.

Alas! if one feels the mission of a philosopher too early,—alas! if he feels it too late in his career!²

HERBART'S PSYCHOLOGY OF METHODS OF INSTRUCTION

Herbart shows his philosophical mind also in his endeavor to clarify the problems of education. As a young tutor, he made careful reports about the progress of his charges. After visiting Pestalozzi, he began to scrutinize the latter's "method." On the other hand, in his general philosophical works he constantly refers to the role of education in the formation of the human individual and his society. As professor of philosophy, he founded a famous institute for the training of teachers, where theory and practice supported each other. He was convinced that the aims of education could not

¹Translations are by the author.

²Johannes Friedrich Herbart: *Sämtliche Werke*, in chronologischer Reihenfolge, herausgegeben von Karl Kehrbach. 19 Bde. in 14. See Vol. II, pp. 230 and 234. Langensalza, 1887-1912. Cited in the following as: *Sämtliche Werke*.

be explained without reference to the metaphysical meaning of human existence, but he searched also into the detailed psychological premises of learning, in order to base teaching on a firm, methodical ground. He applied mathematical methods to psychology in his essay *Über die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden* ("About the Possibility and Necessity of Applying Mathematics to Psychology"), 1822.¹

Naturally, his educational work falls under psychology, theory of method, and theory of aim. Yet, dealing with a special field, he always keeps in mind the fact that they are all related to one another. Hence he considers psychology to be closely related to metaphysics. For without awareness of the connection of man with forces which are of trans-empirical character, all research about his nature is bound to remain on the foreground.

In the preface to the first edition of his *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* ("A Textbook in Psychology"), 1816, he emphasizes the mission of this science to clarify the so far rather confused theory of the elements of knowledge. On the other hand, he warns against mistaking experimental psychology for a complete knowledge of human nature. Such a process would lead a scholar to "remain on the treacherous surface of mere appearances."

And he may consider himself lucky if through this mistaking of isolated phenomena for the fullness of psychic life he does not distort the facts themselves, which he is proud to have discovered.²

The merits of Herbart's psychology lie first in the abandonment of primarily speculative methods of inquiry in favor of a more empirical investigation of mental life. Furthermore, Herbart exploded the theory of separate mental faculties. This theory did not prevail in earlier times so completely as we are sometimes inclined to think; nevertheless, it haunted the minds of popular writers. Herbart's third merit is that he blasted the way for a productive re-

¹*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. V, pp. 91-122.

²*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. IV, p. 297, translated by the author.

lationship between psychology, on the one hand, and mathematics, medicine, and physiology, on the other.

The defects of his psychology lie in its intellectualism, which considers ideas and their relation to one another as the sole origin of all the other mental activities, such as feeling and will, and results in a tendency to explain learning one-sidedly as a mere process of mental associations.

Yet this psychology enabled Herbart to develop the foundation for a systematic theory of learning and instruction which, though no longer tenable in all its aspects, nevertheless shows its influence even today in the different fields of psychology, from behaviorism to psychoanalysis.

Our psychic life—according to Herbart—consists of an ebb and flow of “ideas” or “presentations,” and our emotions, such as feeling and willing, are nothing but the concomitants of the endeavor of one group of “ideas” or “presentations” to dominate the psychic scene against other groups of mental phenomena, which are also struggling for the top place in the ebb and flow of our consciousness. The educator has to make proper use of this mechanic of the mind. He must know that the ideas and presentations which appear in consequence of a particular experience tend to sink down below the threshold of consciousness when new experiences arise. He must help to emerge and to remain upon the level of consciousness those ideas which he desires to utilize in the process of teaching.

In order to make these abstract ideas more concrete, one could use the following example: I am reading a book and the ideas contained in it occupy my attention. I am trying to understand them; I compare them with my own experiences; I accept or reject them. If the book is interesting, I do not do this in a climate of intellectual coolness but become excited. Suddenly somebody enters the room and tells me that a dear friend of mine has been struck by an automobile. Immediately the interest in the book and its author (or, as Herbart would say, one mass of ideas) disappears and a new interest takes complete hold of me. If the circumstances happen to be such that after a while I can return to the reading, or if experiences

similar to those aroused by the book occur in my mind with some kind of regularity, then the book will leave some permanent impression—its ideas may become a part of myself. If, on the other hand, the circumstances are such that the accident to my friend deflects me completely from my reading, and if, in addition, my regular daily work does not touch upon the ideas contained in the book, then those ideas will sink down into the unconscious sphere of my mind. This may happen so completely that after some years I do not even remember having read the book at all. Yet if, through some chance factor, I later on come across another book which arouses ideas related to the ones I have already “forgotten,” then the seemingly lost content of the book may suddenly re-emerge. Perhaps the recollection of the old book does not become fully salient; nevertheless, it will influence my reaction to the new one. In one way or another I am already conditioned.

Hence the teacher, when presenting a new idea to the child, must be concerned with three things. First, the new lesson must be connected with ideas which are either salient or potentially salient in the child's mind. This makes it easier for the child to understand and assimilate the new presentations. Secondly, the teacher must help the child retain the content of the new lesson, for this, after all, is the purpose of teaching. But in order to attain this effect, the teacher will have to pay attention to a third factor, namely, to the “interest” of the child. For “interest” is nothing but that mental urge which motivates us to overcome the difficulties which may be involved in the acquisition of the new material and to keep our attention focused toward an object. Strong interest also supports the association between the new experience and those earlier experiences which have already dropped into the subconscious. In this way the total potential energy of the child enters into the process of learning.

With this explanation of the “stream of consciousness” and of “interest,” Herbart not only laid the basis for our present theories of learning and motivation, but, as already intimated, he also paved the way for our modern hypothesis of the role of the unconscious in

the behavior of the individual. Freud, as one of his friends stated, personally acknowledged his indebtedness to Herbart.¹

But Herbart was not satisfied with this explanation of the more or less mechanically working "inner circle of consciousness." He wanted also to know under what conditions presentations or ideas can become dynamic elements in the building up of knowledge and of an educated personality. In his psychological work and also in his *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet* ("Science of Education"), 1806, he deals extensively with the mental conditions through which mere vague presentations are transformed into clear and logically coherent concepts. The most important of these conditions, for Herbart, are "analysis," which breaks a complex down into its constituent parts and relates and compares them with other parts of our experience, and "synthesis," which regroups the diverse elements according to the particular purposes of the thinking in which we are engaged.

In his chapter on the course of instruction,² Herbart distinguishes between merely descriptive, analytical, and synthetic instruction. A merely descriptive instruction "depicts" certain contents of life and history which may be attractive to the child. But even for merely descriptive instruction Herbart emphasizes the teacher's obligation to observe the law of association, and to connect the new impression with the "apperceptive mass," that is, the mass of conscious or unconscious ideas already existing in the mind and apt to be related to the new experience.

As we already know, good instruction uses the incentive inherent in interest. For this purpose the teacher must find out what kind of presentation and learning is commensurate with the child's capacity. Otherwise the school obstructs rather than assists the growth of the child's personality. On the other hand, every in-

¹See Rudolf Allers, *The Successful Error; A Critical Study of Freudian Psychoanalysis*. Sheed and Ward, Inc., London, 1940.

²Johann Friedrich Herbart: *The Science of Education . . . and the Aesthetic Revelation of the World*, translated from the German by Henry M. and Emmie Felkin, with an Introduction by Oscar Browning; Book II, Chap. V, p. 154. D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1900. Cited in the following as: *Science of Education*.

individual lives in society and must learn to comply with the objective standards and requirements characteristic of every civilization. The more advanced such a civilization is, the less can the individual be permitted simply to follow his bents and affections; rather, he must be able to direct them so that his individuality serves the civilization in and on which it thrives. Only in such wise can an individual be productive and feel himself free and happy.

Hence there arises for the teacher, on the one hand, the obligation to cultivate the interests of the child, in order to stimulate his spontaneity; on the other hand, the need not only to cultivate the child's personal interests but to introduce him to the variety of human knowledge and experiences, in order to help him in the appreciation of the fundamental values of civilized societies. Such education Herbart would call a "liberal education." Only with this background can a person become a specialist and at the same time avoid succumbing to the danger of narrowness and utilitarianism.

There ought to be a continual process of reintegration between an individual and his mental environment. One who only expands and develops many-sided interests without again and again relating these interests to his own individuality may lose himself. On the other hand, one who wishes to preserve his self by remaining in his own shell cannot realize his individuality either, but grows one-sided and, if worst comes to worst, ends by becoming a crank. Therefore, Herbart says, all instruction must aim at the development of *gleichschwebendes Interesse*, a term difficult to translate. An individual endowed with *gleichschwebendes Interesse* is one who is able to remain in a continual state of susceptibility and openness to outside impressions without losing his capacity of uniting these impressions in one harmonious whole.

This emphasis on an equilibrium of interests explains Herbart's deep concern with the program of teaching. He defines the contents of the curriculum according to the particular cultural conditions of his time, namely, the older European pattern of secondary and professional education. Thus he emphasizes, on the one hand, the humanities or social sciences, namely, languages (ancient and

modern) and history; and on the other hand, mathematics and the sciences. Through this combination the student is introduced to both the realm of humanity and the realm of nature. But Herbart is also fully aware of the fact that a curriculum has too much of a functional quality to be tied up with a rigid pattern of subject matter. He states several times that the content of a liberal education will always depend on the particular patterns of civilization. What is liberal and dynamic in one period may be stiffening and obsolete in another. Nor is there one and the same liberal education for every individual. It is much more due to the inevitable limitations inherent in any public instruction, rather than to a desire for uniformity, that Herbart advocates for secondary schools the curriculum which up to the end of the nineteenth century was more or less characteristic of the English Public School, the French *Lycée*, and the German *Gymnasium*.

Some of Herbart's disciples believed they had found a principle of instructional unity in the so-called culture-epoch theory. Every individual, they thought, repeats in his own development the development of his race. Consequently, the best form of instruction would be one which would familiarize the child first with the more primitive life, and ascend therefrom to the higher stages of human history. Since Homer represented for Herbart and his friends the classical example of a primitive yet fully human civilization, the works of this poet were considered basic for the introduction of the young into human civilization. Herbart himself did not develop a systematic theory out of his observation of the fitness of certain stages of human experiences and literature to certain stages in the development of the child. The culture-epoch theory, as well as other ideas of Herbart, was taken up eagerly by faithful disciples who pressed all the ideas into a strait jacket of rules and norms.

This transmutation of philosophy into a set of recipes had particular consequences when Herbart's so-called "steps of instruction" became the pet subject of the normal schools of the nineteenth century. In his *Science of Education* Herbart used his theory of

consciousness, interest, and the laws of association for devising four stages or "steps" of instruction, namely, "clearness" (*Klarheit*), "association" (*Association*), "system" (*System*), and "method" (*Methode*).¹ With these terms Herbart wished to indicate the necessity of a coherent method of teaching and of developing the child's powers of concentration, retention, and participation. "Clearness" means that a pupil ought first of all to see the issue clear and unclouded. This is the prerequisite for the assimilation of a new subject. The next step, "association," comes with the connection of the new ideas to notions already contained in the apperceptive mental mass of the pupil. After this is done, the third step, "system," will be reached through emphasis on a clear distinction of the different elements of which the newly associated idea consists; furthermore, it must be related to the total context and purpose of the lesson. Only thus will the student arrive at a systematic order in his ideas. The last and fourth stage in the assimilation of the subject, "method," is reached when the student is capable of adding new aspects to the issue in view and of applying his newly acquired knowledge properly to future problems. Many pupils use words without knowing what they mean and without the ability to transfer their knowledge methodically into practice. But unless this skill has been achieved, learning is incomplete.

In other chapters of his *Science of Education* Herbart explains the same process in other terms, using verbs or adjectives, instead of nouns, to characterize its main stages. Instruction, he says, ought to be, first, "concrete" or "illustrative" (*anschaulich*); second, "continuous" or "consistent" (*kontinuierlich*); third, "elevating" or "lifting up"² (*erhebend*); and fourth, "active in the sphere of

¹*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. II, p. 39; *Science of Education*, p. 126. Some English textbooks translate these terms as *clearness*, *association*, *generalization*, and *application*. In another chapter Herbart uses the terms *Klarheit*, *Association*, *Anordnung*, and *Durchlaufen dieser Ordnung* (see *Allgemeine Paedagogik in Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. II, p. 53).

²Herbart fails to give a sufficient explanation of whether he means by this term the intellectual process of elevating unclear ideas to the state of consciousness or the moral process of inspiration, or both.

reality" or "applying the discovered truth to reality" (*in die Wirklichkeit eingreifend*).¹

Though Herbart conceives of these steps as following one another, he knows that such succession can never be adhered to mechanically. All instruction must be organized according to the particular situation; in addition, the logical processes are of such complexity that they often overlap. If anybody was aware of this complexity, it was certainly Herbart. Yet for about two generations his four steps—which were later modified by his disciples into the five steps of "preparation," "presentation," "association," "systematization," and "application"²—were admired by the true Herbartians as though they were the educational gospel. The result was often routine and mechanization. Pedagogical Herbartianism replaced the living spirit of the philosopher Herbart. Nevertheless, even today many teachers could improve their instruction considerably if they learned to realize the advantage which lies in the systematic order of teaching that Herbart recommends.

ETHICS AND EDUCATION

Though Herbart contended that he could not conceive of education without instruction,³ he was also convinced that instruction plays only a secondary role in the process of education. In his *Kurze Encyclopädie der Philosophie aus praktischen Gesichtspunkten entworfen* ("Brief Cyclopedia of Philosophy"), 1831, there is a chapter on education (Abschn. I., Kap. 12, *Von der Erziehungskunst*).⁴ which, so far as we are aware, is unknown in the Anglo-Saxon world, though it contains the best summary of Herbart's pedagogical theory. There Herbart repeats his idea that the final aim of all

¹*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. II, p. 54; *Science of Education*, p. 147. Cf. also Gabriel Compayré, *Herbart and Education by Instruction*, (Pioneers in Education), p. 68. T. Y. Crowell and Company, New York, 1907.

²Herbart: *Outlines of Educational Doctrine*, translated by Alexis F. Lange, annotated by Charles De Garmo, p. 59. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1901.

³See *Einleitung zur Allgemeinen Pädagogik* in *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. II, p. 10: "Und ich gestehe gleich hier, keinen Begriff zu haben von Erziehung ohne Unterricht."

⁴*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. IX, pp. 137-151.

education is the formation of character, and that all educational activities are only means to that end, not ends in themselves. In order to make such a means of instruction, several requisites must be fulfilled. The teacher must see to it that he does not inadvertently cripple the talents of his pupil.

To create or transform the personality is beyond the teacher's power; but what he can do and what we may demand from him is to ward off dangers from his pupil and to abstain from ill-handling him.¹

In such an atmosphere the child will acquire a proper relation to society, and it will not be difficult to arouse his interest in the knowledge of the human race. At the same time it will be possible to respect the child's individuality and yet to convey to him that sense for discipline and consistency without which he will not develop character.

Thus Herbart's educational system ends in ethics; for character, according to him, cannot be achieved merely by experimentation or instruction as such, but only by the constant imbuing of the mind with moral criteria. For Herbart, ethics is anchored in metaphysics; hence education is ultimately related to transcendent values. But in spite of all his transcendentalism, Herbart's sense for psychology appears. He emphasizes the relationship between ethics and *Geschmack*, a term which denotes not only "good taste" and "tact" but "appreciation of beauty." This aesthetic character of his moral philosophy prevents him from becoming a narrow moralist. In the twelfth chapter of his *Allgemeine praktische Philosophie* ("General Practical Philosophy"), 1808, Herbart writes:

Unfortunately, it happens not infrequently that moralistic zealots, in spite of all their good intentions, manage to become more objectionable to their fellow men than people with a certain levity of mind, nay even very frivolous people. . . . Practical philosophy must not fail to show the proper limits of the very same tendencies

¹*Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. IX, p. 139, translated by the author.

it wants to awaken. . . . It would be disastrous if ethics set its aim so high that it appeared to debase the things of the world.¹

At the end of the same work he portrays his ideal man, whom we may consider also to be his ideal goal of education:

An active and mature man will not be subject to a tempestuous fate that urges him on to an unknown goal, unaware whether he is driving or being driven. On each level of life he will attempt to attain serenity and reason. He will aim to attune his soul to accord with his environment, and from his vision of the Absolute he will derive his faith in the ultimate victory of the good. He will strive to acquire a harmony of mind that will allow him to move freely, but prudently, between the finite and the infinite, between the transient and the permanent. By noble participation in the joys and griefs of human life he will be led to a fuller appreciation of the pure light of the spirit, and his deeds will reflect the elation of his soul.²

In these sentences Herbart comes close to the Aristotelian ideal of man and to the ripe humanism of the aged Goethe.

¹*Samtliche Werke*, Vol. II, pp. 456 f. ("Gen. Pract. Philosophy," Book II, Chap. 12). Translated by the author.

²*Samtliche Werke*, Vol. II, p. 458 ("Gen. Pract. Philosophy," Book II, Chap. 12). Translated by the author

Friedrich Froebel

(1782-1852)

FROEBEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF UNITY

The kind of education which the nineteenth century calls "the new education" is based mainly on the work of three men: Pestalozzi the prophet, Herbart the thinker, and Froebel, who was closer to Pestalozzi than to Herbart in his intuitive religious attitude, and closer to Herbart than to Pestalozzi in his urge toward inquiry. This intellectual urge led Froebel to study the most divergent fields of thought, and to unite them in philosophical synthesis.

What was the central experience which enabled Froebel to place his diverse experiences over one denominator? Most people would say his love for children, which expresses itself in his founding of the kindergarten, and in his famous words: "Come, let us live for our children." Yet his autobiography, which seems to be very reliable in revealing the decisive impressions in his childhood, points to something else: the keynote in Froebel's response to life and men was sounded when, as a boy, he felt deeply troubled—like many sons of orthodox ministers—by his father's condemnation of the "mortal sins" of man. He touchingly describes this impact on his youthful soul in the following words:

The way in which he [the father] spoke about these matters showed me that they formed one of the most oppressive and difficult parts of human conduct; and, in my youth and innocence, I felt a deep pain and sorrow that man alone, among all creatures, should be doomed to these separations of sex, whereby the right path was made so difficult for him to find. I felt it a real necessity for the satisfaction of my heart and mind to reconcile this difficulty, and yet could find no way to do so. How could I, at that age, and in my position? But my eldest brother who, like all my elder brothers, lived away from home, came to stay with us for a time; and one day, when I expressed my delight in seeing the purple

threads of the hazel buds, he made me aware of a similar sexual difference in plants. Now was my spirit at rest. I recognized that what had weighed upon me was an institution spread over all nature, to which even the silent, beautiful race of flowers was submitted. From that time humanity and nature, the life of the soul and the life of the flower, were closely knit together in my mind; and I can still see my hazel buds, like angels, opening for me the great God's temple of Nature.

I now had what I needed: to the Church was added the Nature-Temple; to the religious Christian life, the life of Nature; to the passionate discord of human life, the tranquil peace of the life of plants.¹

This unity between spirit and nature was confirmed for him when, as a young man, he learned the arts of forestry and surveying. When he studied mathematics and the sciences at the University of Jena, he summarized the results of these studies, not in terms of an acquired sum of knowledge, but in the following words:

I could already perceive unity in diversity.²

Because of unpaid debts, Froebel was put into the university prison. There he ran across a translation of the old Persian religious document, the *Zendavesta*, and found his belief strengthened by it. Afterwards he came under the influence of Schelling's pantheistic philosophy of the identity of mind and nature; and when, as a young man, inspired with patriotic feelings, he joined the army of liberation against Napoleon, he discovered the same law of interaction of mind and body in the courage and sufferings of the soldiers on the battlefield. Most decisively were his convictions strengthened when finally he decided to devote his life to the reconstruction of education and to the observation of the laws inherent in the bodily and mental growth of the child.

All his work, whether scientific, philosophical, social, or educational, ended in admiration for the appearance of a divine spirit in

¹Friedrich Froebel: *Autobiography*, translated by Emilie Michaelis and H. Keatley Moore, pp. 11 f. C. W. Barden, Syracuse, New York, 1906. Cited in the following as: *Autobiography*.

²*Autobiography*, p. 32.

all things growing. This experience was for him the essence of all religion. He is the representative of German transcendentalism in the realm of education. In comparison to the experience of universal unity, all the other features of religious life seemed to him of secondary importance. In his autobiography he says:

I dare not deny that although the definite religious forms of the Church reached my heart readily both by way of the emotions and by sincere conviction, and cleansed and quickened me, yet I have always felt great reluctance to speak of these definite religious forms with others, particularly with pupils and students. I could never make them so clear and living to a simple healthy soul as they were to myself. From this I conclude that the naturally trained child requires no definite Church forms, because the lovingly fostered, and therefore continuously and powerfully developed human life, as well as the untroubled child-life also, is and must be in itself a Christian life. I further conclude that a child to whom the deeper truths of life or of religion were given in the dogmatic positive forms of Church creeds would imperatively need when a young man to be surrounded by pure and manly lives, whereby those rigid creeds might be illuminated and quickened into life. Otherwise the child runs great danger of casting away his whole higher life along with the dogmatic religious forms which he has been unable to assimilate. There, indeed, is the most elevated faith to be found, where form and life work towards a whole, shed light upon each other, and go side by side in a sisterly concord, like the inward life with the outward life, or the special with the universal.¹

In his *Menschen-Erziehung* ("Education of Man"), 1826, he states his philosophical creed in the following words:

In all things there lives and reigns an eternal law. . . . This all-controlling law is necessarily based on an all-pervading energetic living, self-conscious, and hence eternal Unity. . . . This Unity is God. All things have come from the Divine Unity, and have their origin in the Divine Unity, in God alone. . . . The divine effluence, that lives in each thing, is the essence of each thing.

It is the destiny and lifework of all things to unfold their essence, hence their divine being, and, therefore, the Divine Unity itself—to reveal God in their external and transient being. . . .

¹*Autobiography*, p. 74.

*Education consists in leading man, as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure and unsullied, conscious and free representation of the inner law of Divine Unity, and in teaching him means thereto.*¹

His mystic religious experience necessarily leads Froebel to a concept of the human mind opposite to that held by Herbart. Herbart, as we saw, explained the human mind as consisting of either associating or conflicting representations. He was convinced that although the source of these representations and ideas was of metaphysical character, nevertheless in their interaction they resembled a delicate clockwork. That is the reason why Herbart considered certain features of the human mind to be accessible to quantitative methods of measurement. For Froebel, on the contrary, mental life was the outgrowth of the incessant creativeness of the Divine, and the link between man and God was for him so close that emotions, much better than logical operations, could help man understand his own nature.

FROEBEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Nevertheless, Froebel, like Herbart and Pestalozzi, believed in the possibility of discovering certain laws which could be utilized for a scientific system of teaching and education.

Did not both spirit and nature emanate from a divine energy? Then why should not certain laws, detectable in nature, be detected also in the mind? This opinion was the starting point of most philosophies of nature in Froebel's time. From this starting point there issued a great number of utterly premature and even nonsensical conclusions, but also deep insights which today, on a higher level of scientific synthesis, are regaining scholarly attention.

So without doing any harm to the ultimately religious character of Froebel's educational philosophy, one could extract from his writings a series of methodological principles. They do not possess

¹Friedrich Froebel: *The Education of Man*, translated by W. N. Hailmann (International Education Series, Vol. 5), pp. 1 f. (1-2). D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1892.

such a degree of analytical accuracy as do those of Herbart. Nevertheless, Froebel and Pestalozzi both have probably exercised a greater influence on modern progressive education than Herbart, with his more logical and pedestrian procedure.

First, on the basis of his idea of the unity of all living things, Froebel derives a new conception of childhood. Childhood is not merely preparation for adulthood; it is a value in itself and possesses its own creativeness. It participates in the divine whole with the same rights of its own as adulthood, and therefore it can claim the same respect on the part of the educator. The adult has no right to feel himself superior and to interfere with the natural conditions of childhood; rather, he must combine guidance with the capacity of waiting and understanding. Here Froebel falls into line with Rousseau and Herbart.

The second postulate which Froebel derives from his idea of unity is that of the inner relatedness of all education. This means that the educator ought to lead the child through such situations as will help him to relate his experiences organically one with another. Only thus can the child realize his own personal unity and the unity inherent in the diversity of life. Many passages in Froebel's *Entwickelnd-erziehende Menschenbildung (Kindergarten-Pädagogik)* ("Education by Development") remind us of Pestalozzi's emphasis on gradual development.

Man, in looking toward the aim of his wishes and desires . . . frequently overlooks the proper means. . . .

But this hurrying (from the germ to the fruit, from the wish directly to the fulfillment, from the desire to the aim, springing over all the necessary conditions which should be previously fulfilled) has had the saddest and most pernicious results . . . in the education of the individual as well as in that of whole communities; in the education of the nations as well as in that of the human race—even in that of all humanity. . . . This is one of the most injurious errors, if not the most injurious one, in the education of the individual as well as of all men.¹

¹Friedrich Froebel: *Education by Development. The Second Part of the Pedagogics of the Kindergarten*, translated by Josephine Jarvis (International Education Series, Vol. 44), pp. 10 f. D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1902.

From the emphasis of such men as Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel on the proper conditions of child development springs the modern insistence on a "child-centered" education and on attention to individual differences. This is certainly a great achievement. It is almost needless to assert that such a system does not allow for complete fortuity of arrangement of subject matter. Each subject ought to be co-ordinated with the total curriculum, and the curriculum itself ought to be so constructed as to reflect the fundamental requirements of our complex civilization, in addition to the child's individual interests. Such a systematic order in the curriculum is as instrumental for the steady development of a child as is the respect for his particular individuality.

Surely the two requirements of good education—respect for the proper rights of childhood and individuality on the one hand, and for system and co-ordination on the other—are not always fully compatible, particularly in a large public school system. Nevertheless, if we decide for a one-sided solution, we shall finally defeat each one of the two purposes of education: the development of a free and harmonious individual and his preparation for the transpersonal tastes of civilization.

But let us return to our analysis of Froebel's contributions.

In order to realize the divine character of the universe and his part in it, man needs his senses and emotions as well as his reason. They all are windows of the soul. Hence Froebel emphasizes the totality of educational endeavor. This can be most clearly illustrated by a paragraph of *The Education of Man*, a paragraph devoted to religious education. The right development of religious feelings—note here Froebel's nearness to Pestalozzi—depends on the "living soul-unity" between parents and child, "that clear oneness of mind, which sees life as an unbroken whole in all its operations and phenomena."¹ Only through this first instinctive feeling of a loving communion of men can the child ascend to a later realization of a metaphysical unity of the universe. Without such an instinctive experience he will always live in two different worlds

¹*The Education of Man*, (op. cit.), p. 238.

opposed to each other, one "material," the other "spiritual." Nor can he ever understand what the concept of the "fatherhood of God" means in the history of mankind.

From this belief in the ultimate oneness of all life Froebel derives some other postulates, which belong to the heritage of classical educational thought, but which have, nevertheless, been rarely followed. (These are the demand for a co-operative, instead of a primarily competitive, education; the demand for manual training, in order to unite the hand and the intellect; and, finally, the demand for a thorough study of nature.)

The finest expression of Froebel's idea of harmony in diversity is probably to be found in his concept of play. One may raise the question as to whether Froebel has been influenced by Friedrich Schiller's admirable *Letters upon the Aesthetic Culture of Man*, in which the philosopher-poet expounds the idea that play and art—for art is the most sublime form of play—are the most essential elements in the education of mankind. For Froebel, also, play is not merely a means of distraction; it is the most important phase in the spontaneous development of the child, because it allows him to exercise harmoniously all his physical, emotional, and intellectual qualities. Play combines attention with relaxation, purpose with independence, and rule with freedom. Play is for the child as ethical as devotion to his work is for the adult.

No doubt Froebel's idea of the unity of spirit and life, or of idea and form, has led him toward a fantastic kind of symbolism. Particularly the ball seems to him "a mirror of all, and of the life in all, of the general as of the particular."¹

One might rightly ask why Froebel, with his comprehensive training in so many fields of knowledge and his philosophical interests, finally concentrated his efforts particularly on the education of the pre-school child. There are two reasons for it. One is psychological. Froebel reveals an astounding insight into the importance of the early experiences of childhood for the future development of the personality. This anticipation of modern ana-

¹*Education by Development*, pp. 248 f.

lytical psychology, which he shares with Pestalozzi and Herbart, led him naturally to emphasize the importance of pre-school education. The other reason is of a sociological nature. Froebel lived in the period of the Napoleonic wars, with all their destructive influences, upon which followed the early period of capitalism and a series of social revolutions. He saw that in all these crises nobody was so imperiled as the children; therefore he went beyond Pestalozzi, who considered the reform of the elementary school as basic for the reconstruction of mankind, and fought for the establishment of the kindergarten.

But though for the layman Froebel's name is connected with the kindergarten, he is also, as we have already indicated, one of the great inspirers of modern progressive education in a more general sense. The judgment one passes on his philosophical premises will depend on one's sympathy with Froebel's Christian form of pantheism. Certainly this metaphysics allows for much romantic speculation about the nature of God and man; it exposes itself to philosophical criticism, like any other metaphysical system of thought; and it has sometimes degenerated into mere sentimentality among followers of Froebel, who did not possess his power of synthesis. On the other hand, Froebel's influence may convince us that it is not empirical exactness alone but profoundness of intuition and depth of faith which give ever-new inspiration to mankind in its struggle for a better life.

Ralph Waldo Emerson

(1803-1882)

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ABSOLUTE

There is a decisive difference of sentiment in the works of Franklin or Jefferson and those of Emerson. Though all three were optimists and believed in the future and the mission of America, the optimism of the revolutionary era is plainer and more concrete. Its leaders knew the defects of men and nations, but somehow they hoped that reason would be powerful enough to bring order into human institutions and to change a life full of shortcomings into one of happiness and freedom.

During the age of Emerson this faith in the perfectibility of earthly affairs was shaken, though twenty-three years of his life coincided with that of the author of the Declaration of Independence. What brought about this change of attitude in only two generations? The question is all the more significant because the same change befell Europe, also. The answer is that several of the great hopes of the eighteenth century had failed to materialize. In France the revolution had ended in dictatorship and world war. The hopes of the German youth who had fought on the battlefields to defeat Napoleon and to recapture German unity and freedom from their own petty sovereigns had been nullified by princes and diplomats. In England early capitalism was on the way to driving more and more craftsmen and farmers into the slums of the cities, while reckless men piled up unheard-of fortunes from the exploitation of labor and the colonies. In America, also, the battle between the farmer and big industry had begun. The Jacksonian revolution had upset the policy of the older aristocracy, which was no longer revolutionary but eager to enjoy the fruits of its fathers' deeds. The noble liberalism of the eighteenth century degenerated into a business philosophy; in all countries men endowed with an

awakened social conscience questioned whether the progress of science and inventions had contributed as much to the wisdom and happiness of mankind as the Age of Reason and Enlightenment had expected.

Thus the period of Emerson was, in a way, one of disillusion, like our own. The dimensions of crisis and war were not so great as in our time, but dimensions are not all that matter; the intensity of disappointment after so much hope and heroic effort was probably the same.

There are two ways of overcoming calamities and disillusion. Either man gives up the hopes of times more dauntless, accepts the immediate as inevitable, and prefers to the exciting climate of great ideals the sober air of realism, with all its shades from heroic stoicism to opportunism, or he transcends gallantly the misery around him and clings to an absolute faith from which even the actual and present may suddenly receive a new task and meaning.

Emerson belonged to the latter group. He hated the "indurated heterogeneous fabric of many dates and of no settled character, in which the man is imprisoned"¹ who does not care to despise "worldly relations." False respect for such relations renders the mind unfitted for the constant wars of liberation without which humanity cannot preserve its freedom.

Emerson would object to being classified in one of the typical philosophical categories by which we try to characterize thinking men. Yet he has been called a "transcendentalist," and certainly the history of philosophy will always range him with the type we may call Platonic. He says himself in his essay on "Plato, or the Philosopher":

Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought. Great havoc makes he among our orig-

¹See "Compensation," in Ralph Waldo Emerson's *Complete Works*, New Centenary Edition, in 12 vols.: Vol. II, *Essays*, First Series, p. 125. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1903-1904. Cited in the following as: *Works*, Cent. Ed.

See also *Ralph Waldo Emerson: Representative Selections*, edited by Frederic I. Carpenter (American Writers Series), p. 132. American Book Company, New York, 1934. Cited in the following as: Carpenter ed.

inalities. We have reached the mountain from which all these drift boulders were detached. The Bible of the learned for twenty-two hundred years, . . . Plato is philosophy, and philosophy, Plato.¹

Certainly this judgment is quite different from that of Thomas Jefferson, who believed that the fancies of the old, "whimsical" Greek had been blown away forever by the fresh wind of an empirical era. From Plato the philosophical line up to Emerson would lead through Plotinus, Master Eckart, Giordano Bruno, Leibnitz, Goethe, the German transcendental idealists, and Coleridge. Thus it is possible to classify Emerson historically. Also, it is not necessarily a distortion of his ideas to point out their inner coherence, though this coherence is more one of spirit than of logic.

The most fundamental and pervading trend in Emerson's life and thought is his experience of a spiritual principle behind and within all existence. Whatever name he may give it—God, the Absolute, the Over-Soul, the Supreme Law, or the Eternal Whole—he conceives of it as ever present and as permeating the total universe. It is even in our "failures and follies."² Nobody can help but feel its stream of power unless he shuts himself off artificially. It is in nature as well as in man. But only man, "the immortal pupil"³ and the climax in the evolution of the universe, can be conscious of it and feel it in himself as a constant challenge and obligation. However, it is too much the Holy Other to be fully grasped by the insufficient tool we call reason. The "Eternal Whole" appears to us in revelations which are "perceptions of the absolute law," but the moment we begin to analyze and dissect it, it evades us.

It is in this sense that Emerson's statement that "man is a stream whose source is hidden"⁴ must be understood. Also, the

¹See "Plato, or the Philosopher," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. IV: *Representative Men*, pp. 39 and 40. See also Carpenter ed., p. 231.

²"Experience," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III, p. 57; Carpenter ed., p. 177. See also "An Address Delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday Evening, July 15, 1838," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I: *Nature, Addresses and Lectures*. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 71.

³See *Works*, Cent. Ed., "Nature," Vol. I, p. 47; Carpenter ed., p. 33.

⁴See "The Over-Soul," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II: *Essays, First Series*, p. 268. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 135.

question as to how the Absolute gains "access to the private heart" and mind passes understanding. Yet that we participate in it is an absolutely valid experience to those who live in the spirit. "The definition of *spiritual* should be, *that which is its own evidence.*"¹ There is a very originally phrased yet completely Platonic statement in "The Over-Soul":

In youth we are mad for persons. Childhood and youth see all the world in them. But the larger experience of man discovers the identical nature appearing through them all. Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. In all conversation between two persons tacit reference is made, as to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common nature is not social; it is impersonal; is God.²

Persons who are aware of the presence of that "third party" in their association with nature or their fellow men speak "from within."

The great distinction between teachers sacred or literary—between poets like Herbert and poets like Pope—between philosophers like Spinoza, Kant and Coleridge, and philosophers like Locke, Paley, Mackintosh and Stewart—between men of the world who are reckoned accomplished talkers, and here and there a fervent mystic, prophesying half insane under the infinitude of his thought—is that one class speak *from within*, or from experience, as parties and possessors of the fact; and the other class *from without*, as spectators merely, or perhaps as acquainted with the fact on the evidence of third persons. It is of no use to preach to me from without. I can do that too easily myself. Jesus speaks always from within, and in a degree that transcends all others. In that is the miracle.³

The teachers who speak "from within" also speak "to the heart" and understand how to raise up even the perverted individual to the community of men, because this community is not only social

¹"Experience," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III: *Essays*, Second Series, p. 53. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 175.

²*Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II: *Essays*, First Series, p. 277. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 140.

³"The Over-Soul," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 287. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 145.

but is fundamentally religious. Only because it is religious can it be social. A society without religion is merely a crowd.

No doubt Emerson's formulations of the relation between man and the Eternal lack the historical concreteness of ecclesiastical dogma or the preciseness in definition of some philosophical systems. Emerson is a "protestant" in the most radical and purest form, in that he acknowledges only the most personal ways of contact between God and man as truly religious.

There are several reasons for this attitude. First, Emerson's personal experiences: he could not stand the routine and formality of his ministerial work, hence he abandoned it. Those by whom he felt least understood were the clergymen in Boston and the divinity schools of its vicinity, though in a deeper sense he was serving their very purposes. He lived in an age when Calvinism, in which his ancestors were bred, had steered itself into a futile defensive position against modern ideas, a position characteristic of all institutions which have lost their vitality and self-confidence.

But these reasons for Emerson's dislike of all dogmatism were probably second to two other and deeper motives. One was his humility, the virtue which for him was among the highest on the scale of values; the other was his critical philosophical sense, trained by Kant, whose influence shows in many instances, even when he does not mention Kant by name. Both these trends converged to render him suspicious of any attempt on the part of individual reason to intrude upon the *arcana Dei*. "But we must pick no locks," he says in his essay on "The Over-Soul."¹ "Why should I hasten to solve every riddle which life offers me?"² he exclaims in his article on "Worship." Emerson belongs to the same school of thinkers as Goethe, whom he likes to cite, or the Danish theologian Soeren Kierkegaard, his contemporary, whom he did not know but whom modern thinkers regard as the most revolutionary theologian of the nineteenth century. All three—Emerson, Goethe, and Kierkegaard—were interested in what modern philos-

¹*Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 283; Carpenter ed., p. 143.

²"Worship," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. VI: *Conduct of Life*, p. 230.

ophy now calls "existential thinking," or the endeavor of the feeling-reasoning mind to reach into the depth of human existence by dint of revealing its ever-new situations, decisions, and relationships to the universe. The fight of Kierkegaard against institutionalized Christianity and against Hegel's philosophy, which seemed to him the paradigm of speculative arrogance, is, in its nature, the same as the conflicts of Emerson with "a foolish consistency, . . . the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines."¹ He was suspicious of this hobgoblin's lurking even in a system so close to his own transcendentalism as that of the German romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling.²

There will always exist two essentially different types of thinkers. For one the path of reasoning ends in a well-cultivated landscape of ideas. All roads, hills, and rivers are thoroughly mapped so that everyone may find his way and know where he is. The other type would say that this kind of landscape may give to man a feeling of security, but it is not God's nature. The people who live in it forget the heights and abysses of reality and lose their sense for the magic of the primitive.

In spite of all aversion to any logical definition of the Absolute, Emerson believes that there is one experience through which this Absolute manifests itself to man with eminent clarity—the feeling of truth which we have if our moral will inspires us toward moral action. For Emerson the *summum verum*, the "highest truth," was identical with the *summum bonum*, the "highest good." Morality is for him, also, the only conceivable power in human life in the face of which all individuality becomes irrelevant.

Morals is the direction of the will on universal ends. He is immoral who is acting to any private end. He is moral—we say it with Marcus Aurelius and with Kant—whose aim or motive may become a universal rule, binding on all intelligent beings.

¹"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II: *Essays*, First Series, p. 57. Cf. Carpenter ed., p. 96.

²"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X: *Lectures and Biographical Sketches*, p. 133.

It is "binding" not because intelligent beings agree that it is useful to obey it (it is that also), but because:

It is the truth. When I think of Reason, of Truth, of Virtue, I cannot conceive them as lodged in your soul and lodged in my soul, but that you and I and all souls are lodged in that.¹

Here is the point that clarifies the essential difference between Emerson and the modern pragmatism of William James or John Dewey. In many respects the ideas of these thinkers overlap. Emerson, like James, repeatedly asserts that:

The advantage of the ideal theory over the popular faith is this, that it presents the world in precisely that view which is most desirable to the mind.²

It gives wings to man and inspires him toward greater action. But all this is for Emerson, in contrast to James, only the effect, not the cause, of our belief in the Absolute. For Emerson, as for James, there exists "the universal impulse to believe."³ But it is not the external desire for "beatitude"⁴ that leads us to decide in favor of religion. Rather, religion and the consequent sentiment of beatitude spring from our imbeddedness in something infinitely greater than our individuality. Man can choose "isolation" from the whole, but then he impoverishes himself. He may be a decent and successful scholar, but he will not inspire; for how can he be profound who has no roots, and how can he enlighten who receives no light?

Emerson's teaching is not a gospel of retreat into a realm of dreams and illusions, an "escape into an ivory tower." It is a most valiant challenge to conquer the path toward freedom and independence in all humility and simplicity of mind. In Emerson's

¹"Character," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X: *Lectures and Biographical Sketches*, pp. 92 and 98.

²"Nature," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, p. 59; Carpenter ed., p. 40.

³"Experience," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III, p. 74; Carpenter ed., p. 186.

⁴"The Over-Soul," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 269; Carpenter ed., p. 135. See also "The Divinity School Address," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, p. 125; Carpenter ed., p. 74.

famous "Divinity School Address," which caused his temporary banishment from the precincts of Harvard, we find the following sentence:

The man who renounces himself, comes to himself.¹

Like similar passages in the New Testament, this sentence expresses that wondrous give-and-take which occurs in a vivid relation between man and eternity. Only those who are capable of immersing themselves in the ultimate whole will receive in return their individuality; only they can be "self-reliant," without arrogance and isolation, because they are links in an unbroken chain at the beginning and end of which is the Absolute, or God. Only they, and not the overweening individualists, have the right to assert their personality against society, because it is their inspiration and courage on which society and all worldly institutions live.

Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. . . . Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist.²

"Conformity," according to Emerson, extinguishes the spark of democracy. For the moment people lose the Absolute in their hearts, they are on the way to admire idols. On the other hand, those who are nonconformists in Emerson's sense will always feel themselves compelled to submit all man-created work to the judgment of the Absolute. Herein lies a seeming contradiction. All religions tend to create communities, institutions, and churches; otherwise they could not reach the people and transmit their gospels. On the other hand, it is genuine religion which will always rebel against the tendency of forms and institutions to deaden spontaneity. For out of its very nature, religion must fight all those who arrogate to

¹See *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, pp. 122 and 131; Carpenter ed., pp. 73 and 78.

²"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, pp. 49 f; Carpenter ed., p. 92.

themselves the right to become the masters of freedom and conscience. Therefore the originality of religious experience has always been the strongest enemy of settled hierarchies.

There are words in Emerson's writings which remind us of Rousseau's and Nietzsche's hatred of the so-called blessings of civilization.

The civilized man has . . . lost by refinement some energy, by a Christianity, entrenched in establishments and forms, some vigor of wild virtue. For every Stoic was a Stoic; but in Christendom where is the Christian?¹

Yet Emerson's world is completely different from that of Nietzsche's superman. Emerson says:

Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string.

This sentence might occur also in Nietzsche. But we could not find in Nietzsche the following statement of Emerson's:

Accept the place the divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves child-like to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny; and not minors and invalids in a protected corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers and benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort and advancing on Chaos and the Dark.²

That is to say, in spite of all your individuality and your criticism of society, and even though you feel that you must become a revolutionary, do it in humility. Man has the right of rebellion only if he does not serve his own self, but feels himself rightly a missionary of historic providence.

¹"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 85; Carpenter ed., p. 111.

²*Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 47, Carpenter ed., p. 90.

EMERSON'S RELATION TO SCIENCE

The fear of the consequences of false intellectual arrogance leads Emerson to question the unlimited cultural effect of modern science.

Needless to say, he never shows that opposition to courageous scientific scrutiny which was, unfortunately, so often displayed by theology. For him the miracle of life becomes all the greater the more we know about it. To discover the relationship between "cause and effect" is for him one of the noble duties of the "self-reliant man":

So use all that is called Fortune. Most men gamble with her, and gain all, and lose all, as her wheel rolls. But do thou leave as unlawful these winnings, and deal with Cause and Effect, the chancellors of God. In the Will work and acquire, and thou hast chained the wheel of Chance, and shall sit hereafter out of fear from her rotations.¹

But he fears that the method of isolation and specialization, and the hypothesis of mechanical determinism which underlie all exact experimentation, may be expanded into a total aspect of man and the universe. Such a confusion of scientific method with statements about the ultimate nature of being would deprive us of the breadth of comprehension and imagination which is necessary to see even the very results of exact science in their proper relationship to the deeper concerns of man.

I see not, if one be once caught in this trap of so-called sciences, any escape for the man from the links of the chain of physical necessity. . . . But it is impossible that the creative power should exclude itself. Into every intelligence there is a door which is never closed, through which the creator passes.²

At another place Emerson says:

In inquiries respecting the laws of the world and the frame of things, the highest reason is always the truest. . . . Empirical science is apt to cloud the sight, and by the very knowledge of

¹"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III, p. 89; Carpenter ed., p. 113.

²"Experience," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, p. 54; Carpenter ed., p. 175.

functions and processes to bereave the student of the manly contemplation of the whole. The savant becomes unpoetic. But the best read naturalist who lends an entire and devout attention to truth, will see that there remains much to learn of his relation to the world, and that it is not to be learned by an addition or subtraction or other comparison of known quantities, but is arrived at by untaught sallies of the spirit, by a continued self-recovery, and by entire humility.¹

A critic may miss in these sentences the necessary caution against all kinds of metaphysical dogmatism and subjective intuitionism that scientific training is rightly proud to have driven out of its pupils. Or one may object that it is the very improvement in scientific knowledge and method which improves also our intuition. Pasteur said: *Dans les champs de l'observation le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés*, and there is certainly no necessity to confine the word "invention" merely to scientific and technical discovery; rather, the words of the French scholar hold true also of philosophy. These objections Emerson would accept. But he would reply that nothing is won if we mistake quantitative methods, properly intended for the investigation of matter, for the total instrumentality available to the human mind in its search for truth. In our attempt to avoid the traps of intuition, we may run into the ambushes of another fallacy, which forbids us any faith, unless we can submit its content to the tools of a laboratory.

To what extent Emerson's prognosis of the limitations of a merely empirical concept of man and his civilization has been correct, everybody will have to decide according to his own convictions. But Emerson would never have wished us back into a pre-scientific age only because we have not understood completely how to use the great tool of science. How could it be otherwise with a man who believes that "the universe is represented in every one of its particles"?²

In a visionary chapter in the essay on "Worship," Emerson even predicts the convergence of science, philosophy, and the humanities

¹"Nature," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, p. 66; Carpenter ed., p. 43.

²"Compensation," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 101; Carpenter ed., p. 119.

with a confidence that must astonish modern specialist orthodoxy in both the laboratories and the liberal arts departments of our universities.

Our recent culture has been in natural science. . . . Man has learned to weigh the sun, and its weight neither loses nor gains. The path of a star, the moment of an eclipse, can be determined to the fraction of a second. Well, to him the book of history, the book of love, the lures of passion and the commandments of duty are opened; and the next lesson taught is the continuation of the inflexible law of matter into the subtle kingdom of will and of thought; that if in sidereal ages gravity and projection keep their craft, and the ball never loses its way in its wild path through space—a secreter gravitation, a secreter projection rule not less tyrannically in human history, and keep the balance of power from age to age unbroken. For though the new element of freedom and an individual has been admitted, yet the primordial atoms are prefigured and predetermined to moral issues, are in search of justice, and ultimate right is done. Religion or worship is the attitude of those who see this unity, intimacy, and sincerity; who see that against all appearances the nature of things works for truth and right forever.

It is a short sight to limit our faith in laws to those of gravity, of chemistry, of botany, and so forth. Those laws do not stop where our eyes lose them, but push the same geometry and chemistry up into the invisible plan of social and rational life.¹

A great vision indeed! Some experts in the history of thought, reading this passage, may be reminded of the fancies of the romantic school of natural philosophy, particularly of Schelling, whose thought had certainly some indirect influence on Emerson. Philosophers may object that Emerson points exactly at the most crucial of all problems—that of the relationship between natural laws and human freedom of individuality—but gives no hint as to how to solve it. Yet if we disregard for a while the premature solutions of earlier periods and the riddles still before us, is the dream of Emerson so very different from that of the great pioneers of science, let us say, of Galileo and Newton? Might the day not come when, at

¹ "Worship," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. VI: *Conduct of Life*, pp. 218 f.

a higher stage of philosophical thought and empirical research, a new unity of all the sciences could be achieved?

EMERSON'S IDEAS ABOUT EDUCATION

All Emerson's writings are more or less variations of the same central scheme: man within the Absolute. This fact becomes perceptible also in his thoughts on education, which are interwoven with almost all his important utterances, and also in the special essay on the subject entitled "Education."

Children are for Emerson the purest expression of divinely inspired nature. They are still in that organic unity with themselves and the universe which most adults have forfeited. For this reason they have a surer instinct than adults and are unerring in their ability to distinguish "truth from counterfeit."¹ Emerson loved children for their grace and innocence and the charm of their frailties, and he regarded them with reverence. Again and again he repeats the idea which more than any other shows his respect for the child: "Trespass not on his solitude."² In a world mad with constant bustle and false concepts of sociality, that sentence ought to be written over the entrance of every house where adults work as guides and guardians of children. "Their mind being whole, their eye is as yet unconquered, and when we look in their faces we are disconcerted," because we feel painfully our own inferiority.

I like boys, the masters of the playground and of the street—boys who have the same liberal ticket of admission to all shops, factories, armories, town-meetings, caucuses, mobs, target-shootings as flies have; quite unsuspected, coming in as naturally as the janitor—known to have no money in their pockets, and themselves not suspecting the value of this poverty; putting nobody on his guard, but seeing the insight of the show—hearing all the asides. There are no secrets from them; they know everything that befalls in the fire-company, the merits of every engine and of every man at the brakes, how to work it, and are swift to try their hand at every part; so too the merits of every locomotive on the rails, and

¹"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 139.

²*Ibidem*, p. 143.

will coax the engineer to let them ride with him and pull the handles when it goes to the engine-house. They are there only for fun, and not knowing that they are at school, in the courthouse, or the cattle-show, quite as much and more than they were, an hour ago, in the arithmetic class.¹

This is certainly one of the most charming descriptions of the life of an old, small town. Those of us who were blessed with such a youth will always preserve the memory of it with a feeling of gratitude. It makes us understand the account of Julian, son of Nathaniel Hawthorne, Emerson's friend, that Emerson was the most loving and understanding comrade of the children in his neighborhood. When little Una had ventured to invade his study, "he laid aside the poem or the essay he was writing to entertain Una in his study, whither she had gone alone and of her own initiative to make him a call. . . . But Emerson's mind was so catholic, so humble, and so deep that I doubt not he derived benefit even from child-prattle."²

Such men we can trust when they write about education. And how similar they were, in spite of all differences—Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Emerson—not only in essential tenets of their philosophy, but also in their sublime love for the young.

This is the main duty which Emerson sets before the educator: Take care that your teaching does not destroy but deepens man's imbeddedness in that stream of life which flows from the universe.

It is ominous, a presumption of crime, that this word Education has so cold, so hopeless a sound. A treatise on education, a convention for education, a lecture, a system, affects us with slight paralysis and a certain yawning of the jaws. . . . Education should be as broad as man.³

It is, therefore, a courageous, a manly, and a demanding education which Emerson desires.

¹"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 198.

²Julian Hawthorne, *Hawthorne and His Circle*, p. 69. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1903.

³"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 133.

Our culture has truckled to the times—to the senses. It is not manworthy. If the vast and the spiritual are omitted, so are the practical and the moral. It does not make us brave or free. We teach boys to be such men as we are. We do not teach them to aspire to be all they can. We do not give them a training as if we believed in their noble nature. We scarce educate their bodies. We do not train the eye and the hand. We exercise their understandings to the apprehension and comparison of some facts, to a skill in numbers, in words; we aim to make accountants, attorneys, engineers, but not to make able, earnest, great-hearted men. The great object of education should be commensurate with the object of life. It should be a moral one; to teach self-trust; to inspire the youthful man with an interest in himself; with a curiosity touching his own nature; to acquaint him with the resources of his mind, and to teach him that there is all his strength, and to inflame him with a piety towards the Grand Mind in which he lives. Thus would education conspire with the Divine Providence. A man is a little thing whilst he works by and for himself, but, when he gives voice to the rules of love and justice, is godlike.¹

One of the main obstacles to the realization of all the great “hope” which education should hold for us is “a low self-love in the parent” which “desires that his child should repeat his character and fortune; an expectation which the child, if justice is done him, will nobly disappoint.”²

There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better or for worse as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of ground which is given him to till. . . . We but half express ourselves, and are ashamed of that divine idea which each of us represents. It may be safely trusted as proportionate and of good issues, so it be faithfully imparted, but God will not have his work made manifest by cowards. A man is relieved and gay when he has put his heart into his work and done his best; but what he has said or done otherwise shall give him no peace. It is a deliverance which

¹“Education,” in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 134.

²*Ibidem*, p. 137

does not deliver. In the attempt his genius deserts him; no muse befriends; no invention, no hope.¹

What are now, according to Emerson, the ways and methods which could help us to bring up youth in this spirit of piety and self-trust? There are no isolated methods—here, also, everything points back to a spiritual ground in the freest and widest sense of the word.

One paragraph in Emerson's essay on "Education" is in this respect of most general significance:

We learn nothing rightly until we learn the symbolical character of life. Day creeps after day, each full of facts, dull, strange, despised things, that we cannot enough despise—call heavy, prosaic, and desert. The time we seek to kill:—the attention it is elegant to divert from things around us. And presently the aroused intellect finds gold and gems in one of these scorned facts, then finds that the day of facts is a rock of diamonds; that a fact is an Epiphany of God.²

Does this mean to learn, or to teach, the symbolical character of life? It means this: do not convey facts simply as facts, and do not think that the essence of education is this or that particular knowledge. In whatever you teach, arouse the sense of wonder and reverence for the deeper causes of life. Then indeed facts will become eloquent and transparent: they will become transformed into energy, instead of remaining mere data. This energy will force the student to connect and to compare whatever he perceives; he will not only relate facts to each other horizontally but will discover that everything in the world is related to a deeper dimension, until he finally arrives at the realization of laws which permeate the universe. These laws will tell him that there is an order behind the flight of appearance, a principle within the transient, and he will see that he himself, as body and as mind, is a part of this cosmos.

This reverential feeling makes a person different from all those without a similar experience. He may not yet have "a religion"

¹"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, pp. 46 f.; Carpenter ed., p. 90.

²"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 192.

and an articulate philosophy of life, but he has become religious; he feels his "being bound" to an Absolute which includes not only him but also his fellow men and all creation.

In spite of Emerson's individualism, he does not wish to leave this kind of education to merely subjective experiences. This he would deem the same as leaving the child to chaos. Christianity and classical authors, from Plato up to Goethe, had given him a depth, calmness, and discipline of mind which very few achieve. The self-reliance and nonconformity he asks for are the result of strenuous effort and self-discipline; they are not something for "timid striplings," "desponding whimperers," and those unable to "go alone," even when they are adults. The one element of life, which is power or energy, needs the other, which is form.¹ Therefore every child must have inculcated in him "habits" and "discipline" with which to master himself and the tasks of life. "Here are the two capital facts, Genius and Drill."² (Emerson capitalizes both words.) Needless to say, this emphasis on the necessity of training and habituation would never have induced Emerson to welcome the old drillmaster. Even in teaching religion or the great authors, such a person would bar the child's way toward reverence and wonder for the great things in life. But Emerson wants, with as fine methods as are available, to make the drill and discipline in a child's work parts of a vibrant and animated process which arouses the child to exercise his natural youthful vigor even in the face of obstacles.

Fortunately, it is not the school alone that educates, nor is it the intellect. We learn most through action. Here Emerson's metaphysical convictions concerning the identity of the true and the morally good enter into his pedagogy. Give the young person a chance to prove and develop his personality through doing something worth while. Use his talents and knowledge for a purpose which spurs his moral imagination. Even good books can become enemies of a man who does not know how to apply what they

¹See "Experience," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III, p. 65; Carpenter ed., p. 181.

²"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, p. 144.

teach, either because he is not yet "ready for them"¹ or because they seduce him into mistaking a merely contemplative for an ethical life.

His belief in the unity of the true and the good and in the realization of the Absolute in man leads Emerson toward a certain pedagogical optimism. "We are born loyal. . . . We are born believing," he says in "Worship."² It is doubtful whether Emerson wished these sentences to be understood as an answer to the merely theoretical question of whether man is innately good or bad—a question which rests, anyhow, on false logical premises. But he believed that the moment a human being has realized his unique place within the universe, he cannot help but desire to live a life adequate to this insight. Then he has become a "character." Here is Emerson's profound formulation: "Character is the habit of action from the permanent vision of truth."

Emerson's optimism is no shallow belief in historical progress, emerging automatically if you only leave human nature to itself. Rather, he did not believe in progress. "Not in time is the race progressive," he says in "Self-Reliance."³ He also says: "All men plume themselves on the improvement of society, and no man improves."⁴ The clearest expression of his opinion on this subject can be found in "Self-Reliance."

Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not amelioration. For every thing that is given something is taken. Society acquires new arts and loses old instincts.⁵

Indeed, he was one of the sharpest critics of society, but optimism is nevertheless the right word for his creed. For he believed that the human race, at least in its most advanced members, is capable of deeds far greater than we dare imagine, if once it under-

¹See "Culture," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. VI, p. 142.

²See "Worship," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. VI, pp. 202 and 203.

³"Self-Reliance," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. II, p. 86; Carpenter ed., p. 111.

⁴*Ibidem*, pp. 84 and 110, respectively.

⁵*Ibidem*.

stands how to utilize fully the power of its spiritual resources. No doubt, his thorough familiarity with Indian religious wisdom encouraged him to cherish this belief. Transferred into the realm of education, it meant for him that many of the disappointments of both teacher and child could be relieved by education endowed with "spirit." This spirit expresses itself to men in "those sentiments which make the glory of the human being, love, humility, faith, as being also the intimacy of Divinity in the atoms."¹

Thus Emerson's "courageous and manly education" is far from being a merely intellectual and bookish affair which can be confined to the school building. All educates, and all can miseducate. Any subject matter, interpreted seriously, can contribute to man's endeavor to understand himself. There is, for Emerson, no strict division between the humanities and the natural sciences, so far as their educational value is concerned. Both can help man to realize his role within the universe of facts and ideas. "Nature is a discipline," and it is to the same extent "the symbol of spirit."² Show this spirit in your biology and physics, not through sermonizing, but through driving at the deeper implication of whatever problems emerge in whatever context. You then contribute more to a liberal, humane, and even religious education than a teacher who talks about Plato and the Bible but is not "within the spirit."

Full of confidence in a comprehensive scientific approach to every human task, Emerson regarded with interest the work of those of his contemporaries who were eager to introduce a more methodical attitude into education. In all likelihood he did not know Comenius' *Didactica Magna*, but he would have enjoyed it for its combination of religion with a courageous Baconian spirit, in spite of its medieval analogies. Emerson was very sympathetic with the work of Pestalozzi, with which he probably became acquainted through his friend Bronson Alcott, not unrightly called "the American Pestalozzi." Emerson quotes from one of Pesta-

¹"Worship," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. VI, p. 231.

²"Nature," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, pp. 36 and 25; Carpenter ed., pp. 27 and 21.

lozzi's later works in "The American Scholar,"¹ and his essay "Education" betrays more than a superficial knowledge of him. Emerson speaks of the "natural method" which was the current *terminus technicus* for the Pestalozzian system. Like Pestalozzi, he believes that sound education proceeds through widening circles from the mother to the family, from the family to the community, and hence into the world; he uses Pestalozzian ideas in describing the relationship between a general human and a vocational education; and he admonishes the teacher to learn how to educate children from the natural way in which they educate themselves.

EMERSON AND HIS CRITICS

Three main objections could be leveled against Emerson.

The first would come from the practical teacher. How many students, he might say, are "ready" to enjoy the depths of Greek, Christian, and Indian thought, and the works of Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe? What about the teacher's obligations to all the others who populate a modern public school or even a modern college? Emerson is well aware of these encumbrances.

Happy the natural college . . . self-instituted around every natural teacher; the young men of Athens around Socrates; of Alexandria around Plotinus; of Paris around Abelard; of Germany around Fichte, or Niebuhr, or Goethe: in short the natural sphere of every leading mind.

We could add "the natural sphere around Emerson at Concord." He continues:

But the moment this is organized, difficulties begin.

The greater part of the modern bread-and-butter students have "appetite and indolence . . . but no enthusiasm, . . . and the teaching comes to be arranged for these many, and not for those few."

¹"I learned," said the melancholy Pestalozzi, "that no man in God's wide earth is either willing or able to help any other man." See *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. I, p. 118; Carpenter ed., p. 69.

"You have to work," so he addresses the teachers, "for large classes instead of individuals; you must lower your flag and reef your sails to wait for the dull sailors; you grow departmental, routinary, military almost with your discipline and college police."¹

Yet certain elements in Emerson's educational thought will be valid at all times and in every situation. First: possess a great ideal! Know that you must aim the spear farther than it will fall. Without ideals and courageous aiming, a civilization, a nation, and its education would capitulate before the battle started. Second: under all circumstances remember that education cannot succeed unless it obeys two commandments—respect the pupil (which does not mean to coddle him), and respect yourself. Third: know that education needs enthusiasm—not just any kind of excitement, but energy derived from inspiring values. Fourth: know also that there must be drill and discipline, and show to yourself and your pupils that accuracy and inspiration, if rightly imparted, do not exclude but condition each other. Fifth: even if you have to "lower your flag," keep it flying. If you teach noble ideas with humility and devotion, maybe these ideas will suddenly reveal simple and commonly understandable human truths. Exactly the greatest and most profound of our thinkers and artists possess this element of simplicity. And if you must finally decide that the limitations of your pupils—perhaps your own limits, also—do not allow you to read Milton and Shakespeare with them, there is no reason to resort to cheap material. The literature of all great nations contains works understandable by the humblest normal human minds. In order to interest and to be understood, you need not compromise with the vulgar. Sixth: remember that even little things can be made significant and transparent, if you reveal their place in the greater order of the human and divine cosmos. And seventh: help to make your society such that it will regard its schools as but a small part of its total and general educational responsibilities. On the other hand, teach school in such a way that the pupil, after becoming an adult, will feel that his most noble

¹"Education," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. X, pp. 149 f.

and courageous deeds are but an expression and expansion of the spirit he inhaled in childhood.

The second objection to Emerson's philosophy will be that it rests on the unproved and unprovable assumption of man's contact with something for which Emerson himself has a dozen names, religious and philosophical, without ever explaining its real substance. All he does is to point at emanations of this great Unknown in the world of man and nature. But is it not possible to explain human values much more simply as results of the increased practical experience of the human race, without any resort to religion and metaphysics? One could answer to this objection that the exclusion of metaphysical assumptions is perfectly legitimate, even necessary, in all such investigations for which quantitative and mechanical methods are rightly supposed to suffice. The English physicist Lord Kelvin has said:

When you can measure what you are speaking about, and can express it in numbers, you know something about it; and when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind. It may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thought advanced to the stage of science.¹

Yet the greatest and most decisive powers in life are beyond weighing and measuring: joy and sorrow, love and horror, birth and death, decision and despair.

Here we arrive at the third objection to Emerson's philosophical attitude: He was not religious enough! Nor was he definite enough! Where is the formulation of his creed? Where is his loyalty to any dogma, to any document, and to any institution?

No doubt the emphasis on inspiration prevented Emerson from seeing that ideas must receive some external form to fashion the standards of mankind. He did not see the whole depth of the cruel yet inevitable antinomy between order and inspiration, pictured so grandiosely in Dostoevski's legend of the Grand-Inquisitor. On the other hand, Emerson hardly exaggerated the danger inherent

¹The author owes this quotation to Mr. Ordway Tead of New York.

in all institutionalization of ideas. It is exactly his type which is needed to save institutions from decay and corruption.

In his distrust of all organization, Emerson criticized American democracy.¹ He blamed it for its imitation of European patterns, its mammonism, and its equalitarianism. He did so not because he was lacking in love for his country, but because he wished a culturally productive and self-reliant America. However, an independent American civilization was for him not the same as isolationism or a complete break of the common tradition of the western nations. For that he had too many spiritual ancestors in many countries of the world. "Independence" he understood in the sense of a great duty incumbent on this country, namely, to interpret and use the great sources of human productivity in a free and courageous spirit of which he thought the older countries could no longer avail themselves.

Of similar character was his attitude toward Christianity. In a way, he secularized Christianity, if secularization means the transformation of older mythical symbols into the language of one's own time. He did so in order to rescue the living spirit of the past for the present. But if secularization means to deprive life of its transcendence, then Emerson did exactly the opposite. However, even liberal-minded people may miss in Emerson a deeper understanding of certain essential ideas of Christianity. They may refer to his failure to realize the meaning of the Cross, of death, and of the Christian interpretation of suffering. Such critics would not be entirely wrong. Emerson, of course, knew of the passions, the desperation, and the salvation of such men as Saint Augustine, but in a way all this was alien to his more Apollinian nature. He interpreted Christianity almost as Plato or Plotinus might have interpreted it, had they lived within the Christian tradition. That may imply for some that he did not understand Christ at all, and for others that he understood him better than many Christians.

¹See "Politics," in *Works*, Cent. Ed., Vol. III, pp. 133 f.; Carpenter ed., pp. 194 f.; and other places.

John Dewey

(1859—)

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCENE

It was left to the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century to apply to common school practice the ideas about educational method of men such as Pestalozzi, Froebel, Herbart, and Emerson. Several conditions had to be fulfilled before this could happen.

First, free, compulsory, and universal education had to be introduced and the school age extended. Thus the teacher had to deal with a large number of students of most different ability and background and also to relate his program and goals more closely to the complexity of modern adult life.

The second cause of the change in modern education was the rapid growth of modern vocations. All work became increasingly specialized and subdivided, and there arose new technical occupations for which the old-fashioned mode of apprenticeship no longer sufficed. These occupations required a scientific insight into the process of production and the character of the material dealt with. Therefore more and more new subjects were forced into the schools and colleges. They were not always welcomed by the traditional schoolman who, with a feeling of distress, saw the destruction wrought upon the older, clearly classified, and systematically arranged school types and curricula. But desiring prestige and lacking the older tradition of method, the teacher was stimulated to think about suggestive ways of teaching. The programs had to be adjusted to the new as well as the old demands, and some reconciliation, or at least a tolerable truce, had to be found between the older humanities and the new scientific and vocational interests. ✓ Besides these more extraneous factors, a third and more intrinsic condition had to be fulfilled before the modern conception of educa-

tion could make felt its impact on the public school system. "The new method"—as the nineteenth century phrased it—needed a psychological understanding of the child and his learning far above the merely intuitional capacities of the ordinary teacher.

As Herbart had anticipated, much improvement came through the use of mathematics, the exact sciences, and medicine. These sciences were applied to education by such men as Fechner and Wundt in Germany, Binet and Janet in France, William James, Stanley Hall, C. H. Judd, and Edward Lee Thorndike in America, Pavlov in Russia, and the psychoanalytical schools of Freud and Adler in Austria. (The knowledge thus gained was far from perfect; on the contrary, much pseudo-wisdom was willingly accepted if it presented itself as the result of "exact" methods of research. "Exactness" became the fetish of the new generation, as much as "intuition" had been the fetish of former generations. Certainly Dewey was correct when in *The School and Society* he asserted:

We cannot admit too fully or too freely the limits of our knowledge and the depths of our ignorance in these matters. No one has a complete hold scientifically upon the chief psychological facts of any one year of child life.¹

A similar critical remark appears also in *Experience and Nature*:

Too often, indeed, the professed empiricist only substitutes a dialectical development of some notion about experience for an analysis of experience as it is humanly lived. . . . Not safely can an "ism" be made out of experience. For any interpretation of experience must perforce simplify; simplifications tend in a particular direction; and the direction may be set by custom which one assumes to be natural simply because it is traditionally congenial. . . . Because intellectual crimes have been committed in the name of the subconscious is no reason for refusing to admit that what is not explicitly present makes up a vastly greater part of experience than does the conscious field to which thinkers have so devoted themselves.²

¹John Dewey, *The School and Society*, p. 89. The University of Chicago Press, 1915.

²John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 4 f. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925.

Yet in spite of all criticism that may be leveled against a young science still in search of its own methodology, one result has been achieved—a refined understanding for the psychological problems of the child.

Fourth and finally, the “new education” needed not only psychology but also a philosophy which could interpret the different trends in modern life and relate them to the problems of education.

Such philosophies appeared in all great countries, some with a more idealistic tenor and others with a more realistic tenor, but, generally speaking, with a prevailing tendency toward an empiricist and antisystematic attitude. Life as such, in its ever-changing aspects—not systems and abstractions—became the center of interest. In America it was the so-called school of “pragmatism” which expressed the new spirit most impressively. Pragmatism has often been called “the first original American philosophy” and “the typical American philosophy.” But trends of thought similar to the pragmatic had existed since the days of the Greek Sophists and had been revived in modern form (under different names) in all the more advanced countries since the eighteenth century. Nor can pragmatism be so narrowly identified with Americanism, as has sometimes been done. This country had a Jonathan Edwards, an Emerson, and a Josiah Royce. These men were idealists, and their thought is just as germane to the American mind and tradition as is Dewey’s pragmatism. Which is more “American,” a deeply religious and idealistic attitude or a pragmatic attitude? This question is not so easy to answer. For one thing, idealism and pragmatism have not infrequently been combined, as, for example, by Franklin and by Jefferson.

DEWEY’S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM ✓

The foremost representatives of American pragmatism are William James and John Dewey. As the latter is the younger and has certainly had more influence on modern education in this and in other countries than any other modern American thinker, let us

briefly describe the essence of his educational program.¹ We can do it briefly because most of Dewey's ideas are not wholly new to those who are already acquainted with the great educational thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

~ According to Dewey, education is—to modify an august phrase of Lincoln's—a process performed “of the people, by the people, for the people.” It is a social process, and it cannot be separated from the total character and tasks of society. In the school, therefore, should be concentrated all those activities which help and teach the child to share in the process and the fostering of civilization.

~ As a special form of environment, the school has been entrusted by society with the function of assimilating the worthy features of the community, of eliminating the unworthy, and of balancing the often diverse and contradictory social tendencies characteristic of modern civilization. The more the child feels that the school is an institution in which he can grow and work in connection with natural tasks such as life requires, the happier and the more productive he will be.

Moral discipline ought to be a part and an outcome of school life, not something proceeding from the teacher. When the school has become a microcosm of society, then the child will find himself in concrete social situations which will motivate him more effectively than mere verbal abstractions or extraneous discipline will. So education “is a process of living and not a preparation for future living.”²

Such a school, with the teacher as the comrade and adviser rather than the superior, requires a much finer understanding of the child's

¹We refer particularly to the following writings of Dewey on education: *My Pedagogic Creed*, 1897; *The School and Society*, 1899; *How We Think*, 1910 (rev. ed. 1933); *Interest and Effort in Education*, 1913; *Schools of Tomorrow*, 1915; *Democracy and Education*, 1916; *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922; *Experience and Nature*, 1925; *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*, 1929; *Art as Experience*, 1934; *Experience and Education*, 1938.

A complete bibliography of Dewey's writings is given in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. I), pp. 611–676. Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., 1939.

²John Dewey: *My Pedagogic Creed* (published with *The Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy*, by Albion W. Small). A. Flanagan Company, Chicago, 1910.

life and of individual differences than the old formal and disciplinary training. Here is the specific function of psychology which, besides sociology, represents (according to Dewey) the most important subsidiary science for the educator. 'The school must learn to understand better and better how to combine guidance and motivation of the child with an appeal to his natural impulses. Only so can it make intrinsic out of extraneous goals, and voluntary out of imposed goals.' Thus for Dewey, as well as for Herbart, the problem of interest becomes central. Also, with respect to their theory of the steps of thinking, the two men are in considerable agreement.¹

But there are two differences—not in essence, but in degree—between Herbart and Dewey. 'Herbart concentrates primarily on the intellectual side of interest, as is natural in view of his rationalist psychology and the type of schools and pupils he had primarily in mind. Dewey, on the other hand, wants interest and activity to be more closely related to all the diverse features of community life, manual, intellectual, emotional, and social. The other difference is that for Herbart education is to be directed toward a clearly definable goal—a mature and fully developed character. The standards as to what a character is are to be derived not from a process of continual experimentation, of trial and error, but from the acknowledgment of values which are ultimately metaphysical in character. For Dewey, the naturalist, such a conception of education would involve the denial of one of the most important factors in life—namely, "change"—and the imposition of "supernatural" and "fixed" aims on the constantly developing process of education. 'Education "must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience"; "the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing."'² Or, to use the well-known formulations found in the chapter on "Education as Growth" in *Democracy and Education*:

¹Compare Herbart's four steps and Dewey's five distinct steps in the process of thinking as explained in Dewey's *How We Think*, pp. 107 f. D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1933.

²*My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 13.

(1) The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and (2) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming. . . . Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.¹

From this it follows that:

. . . to set up any end outside of education, as furnishing its goal and standard, is to deprive the educational process of much of its meaning, and tends to make us rely upon false and external stimuli in dealing with the child.²

Through placing the dynamic and social character of education in the foreground of the discussion, Dewey has helped decidedly to pull American educational thought out of the petty concepts of pedagogy, so far prevailing among teachers, and still prevalent among large groups of American citizens. For providing this impetus no expression of gratitude extended to Dewey can be exaggerated. Through placing the ideas of action and interest in the center of his educational philosophy, Dewey has decisively challenged the handling of method and subject matter in American schools.³ The teacher is no longer compelled to determine the procedure of his lesson at home and then to convey it to the child according to schedule. Rather, method is to be understood as a way of ordering the total development of the child's powers and interest. Help him to express himself constructively in relation to the tasks accruing to him from his sharing in the life of the school and the human community at large; help him to control his action for the purpose of greater effectiveness; discover his interests and regard them as signposts indicating his future development; use examinations not for checking on externally acquired knowledge but for testing his fitness for social life—then you have the right method.

¹From John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 59 and 60. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York, 1920.

²*My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 13.

³In this connection see also the numerous works of William Heard Kilpatrick, especially his *Foundations of Method*. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1925.

With the role of the teacher realized in this way, subject matter loses its exclusiveness. "The unconscious unity and the background of all his efforts and of all his attainments"¹ lies in the child's sharing in the wholeness of social life, and social life is not cut into ready-made pieces of knowledge. Hence the old departmentalization of the curriculum and the systematic succession of studies has to give way to an elastic program of activities. This program follows the child's realization of his role in the human community and his capacity to profit from the "funded capital of civilization," and it produces in him ever-new and more effective "attitudes towards, and new interests in, experience."

This shifting of the accent of education from the acquisition of subject matter, as prevailing in the ordinary school, toward the interests and activities of the pupil has evoked violent controversy between conservative and progressive teachers. Whatever the answer may be, this controversy has caused an extremely fruitful stirring up of the routine which is the constant menace of every institution. On the other hand, some of Dewey's admirers have not always been able to combine the quality of freedom demanded by Dewey with the qualities of discipline and thorough knowledge demanded by modern civilization.

THE RELATION OF DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM TO HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRAM

We may question whether the educational ideas of Dewey are the result of mere practical observation and experimentation—for which he had opportunity as director of the School of Education at the University of Chicago from 1894 to 1904—or are part of a general system of thought. In Dewey's case the latter is true, as in the case of most great educators. Hence only an analysis of his total philosophy will allow us to arrive at a more penetrating understanding of his educational thought. For this purpose—as we shall prove later on—it is necessary to divide Dewey's development as an in-

¹*My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 10.

dependent thinker into two phases. The first phase covers the years from about 1894 to 1930. In this period Dewey developed his pragmatic system without compromise and exercised his greatest influence. The second phase, after 1930, is characterized by a certain eclecticism.

Let us deal first with the period from 1894 to 1930. Dewey himself avoids as far as possible any fixation of his philosophy to a particular ism. His interpreters have added to the well-known label of "pragmatism" the term "experimentalism," "instrumentalism," "operationalism," or "functionalism," all of which names indicate an emphasis on the dynamic, performing, and ever-changing character of life. One could also call Dewey's philosophy a "sociological" one, in that it attempts to explain human development as the result of the natural co-operation of men in society, with exclusion of any resort to metaphysical conceptions. Such conceptions are, from Dewey's point of view, nothing but the results of escape from reality, or products of a leisure class which permits itself to indulge in contemplation, leaving to others the plowing of the field and the hewing of the stones. Though Dewey makes little mention of Karl Marx in his main books, there is no doubt but that the latter's conception of culture as being the superstructure of economic life, and Auguste Comte's doctrine of positivism, have molded his thought. But it is probably Darwin who, most of all thinkers, influenced Dewey's interpretation of civilization. One could explain this interpretation as a transfer of the ideas of biological evolution, selection, and struggle for survival into the total life of man, in so far as he is not only an animal but also a thinking, creating, and reverential creature.¹

To exemplify this attitude with reference to education, we can turn to the first pages of Dewey's *Democracy and Education*. There the cause of, and reason for, education are explained primarily in bio-sociological terms.

¹See Dewey's *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought*, Chapters V and VII. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1910.

It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being. Since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals, life is a self-renewing process. 'What nutrition and reproduction are to the physiological life, education is to the social life.'¹

Ultimately education serves the human tendency to achieve satisfaction and happiness, and to avoid the disagreeable. Needless to say, these sentiments are not exclusively related to merely materialistic forms of pleasure; the most sublime mental and emotional acts are also involved. Thinking itself is—according to Dewey—a function through which man tends to free himself from feelings of tension through finding the means of changing the unpleasantness of a given unsolved situation. It is a by-product of action.²

Thus the motivation and standards of our actions, both low and lofty, lie in our desire to find ways for mastering and improving our environment. And the only way to do so is to utilize and control our manifold impressions so that they may ever lead to more effective experiences, even if the road goes through trial, error, and sacrifice. Human life is best described as an experimental process, and the best method of living is the empirical method. This method is only possible, and at the same time most necessary, in social co-operation. Society is the soil in which human nature develops. Consequently,

... the final issue of empirical method is whether the guide and standard of beliefs and conduct lies within or without the *sharable* situations of life.

It is, according to Dewey, the sin of all professedly nonempirical philosophies:

... that in casting aspersions upon the events and objects of experience, they deny the power of common life to develop its own

¹From *Democracy and Education*, p. 11. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York, 1916.

²See Dewey's *How We Think* (D. C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1933); *The Quest for Certainty* (Minton, Balch and Company, New York, 1929); and *Logic* (Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1938)

regulative methods and to furnish from within its adequate goals, ideals, and criteria.¹

· Taking this emphasis on the life-inherent character of experience, thought, and values into account, one might, in addition to many other catchwords, label Dewey's philosophy a philosophy of "immanence." · Ideals as well as principles are no longer transcendent powers, but they are "methods" for a better regulation of life, and "growth itself is the moral end."²

One of the many evils—so Dewey says—which arise from the transcendentalist and religious emphasis on metaphysical ideals and principles is the tendency toward absolutizing things which are essentially life-inherent and relative. · This absolutist tendency has made "eternal" and "sacred" commandments out of changing human experiences, and taboos out of perfectly natural phenomena. It has built fixed and static memorials for admiration and emulation instead of freeing man's inventiveness and vitality for ever-new enterprise. Innumerable prejudices, false orthodoxies, persecutions, and retardations of progress have been engendered in this way.³

· To foster experimentation nothing, according to Dewey, is so fitted as "experimental logic." · In earlier times it liberated the spirit from the weights that tradition had tied to its wings, and it will do so also in the future, particularly if applied to human progress.

The experimental logic when carried into morals makes every quality that is judged to be good according as it contributes to amelioration of existing ills. And in so doing, it enforces the moral meaning of natural science. When all is said and done in criticism of present social deficiencies, one may well wonder whether the root difficulty does not lie in the separation of natural and moral

¹*Experience and Nature*, p. 38. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925.

²See Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 177 and Chap. V. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920. See also *Experience and Nature*, pp. 396 and 425.

³Discussions of and allusions to this problem are to be found in almost all of Dewey's writings.

science. When physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the human estate, they become moral; they become part of the apparatus of moral inquiry or science. The latter then loses its peculiar flavor of the didactic and pedantic; its ultra-moralistic and hortatory tone. It loses its thinness and shrillness as well as its vagueness. It gains agencies that are efficacious. But the gain is not defined to the side of moral science. Natural science loses its divorce from humanity; it becomes itself humanistic in quality. It is something to be pursued not in a technical and specialized way for what is called truth for its own sake, but with the sense of its social bearing, its intellectual indispensableness. It is technical only in the sense that it provides the technique of social and moral engineering.¹

Under these aspects of immanence and experimentalism philosophy also will change its character. It can no longer claim to lead the procession of the sciences; it is now in the midst of them. It has "no pre-eminent status; it is a recipient, not a donor."² It becomes a social function beside many others;³ its main purpose being primarily "criticism."

These remarks are preparatory to presenting a conception of philosophy; namely, that philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were.⁴

In this capacity philosophy will achieve more than if it continues to cling to its old pew right beside theology. It will break down the division of men into hostile camps and help create a new "empirical liberalism."⁵

¹*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 172 f. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920.

²*Experience and Nature*, p. 410.

³*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Chap. I.

⁴*Experience and Nature*, p. 398.

⁵*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 101.

CRITIQUE OF DEWEY'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

In the previous sections we have attempted to give an account of the dominating ideas in Dewey's educational and general philosophy.¹ It now behooves us to enter upon a critical evaluation. In making this attempt, let us proceed in a reverse order to that of our previous scheme: begin with Dewey's general philosophy and then pass over to his educational thought.

¹Dewey is one of the most astute, if not the most astute, among the modern philosophers who try to explain the quality and purpose of human life from an immanent and sociological point of view. His work offers one of the most helpful means of understanding the functioning of the human mind within a society of men who want to communicate with one another and to preserve themselves. Dewey's work encourages an experimental and scientific attitude; it prevents us from fixing our minds on things and ideas only because we happen to find them in the storehouse of tradition; it shows what men can achieve if they rely on their reason and courage instead of clinging to their prejudice; it teaches tolerance and respect for man without unduly deifying him—in short, it is a great corrective of false ideologies as well as a guide toward active, manly virtue.

On the other hand, Dewey's philosophy provides no exception to the rule that every human expression of truth is at the same time a limitation of it. In order to understand where the shortcomings of Dewey's philosophy lie, one must know that a thinker molds his ideas not only as an advocate of new opinions but also as an opponent of old opinions. The positive and the negative side in his mind are intimately related to each other, more than he himself might care to admit.¹ We cannot appreciate Plato without the back-

¹Dewey himself is well aware of this fact. He even transplants the conflict, here alluded to, into his own personality as one the development of which "has been controlled largely by a struggle between a native inclination toward the schematic and formally logical, and those incidents of personal experience that compelled me to take account of actual material." See Dewey's "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, edited by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague, Vol. II, pp. 16-17. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930.

ground of the sophists and the decaying Athenian republic, or Saint Augustine without the disintegration of the Roman Empire which for the people of his time and culture was equivalent to the world.

• So also the historical position and significance of Dewey can be fully understood only if we trace the forces in his life and country against which he speaks.

• The most momentous of these forces is his early philosophical training. American philosophy then was mainly administered by theologians and was caught in the traps of Scotch intuitionism, which was a serious obstacle to scientific inquiry. • In comparison with this traditionalism, the dynamic character of Hegel's philosophy, with which Dewey became acquainted at Johns Hopkins University, "operated as an immense release, a liberation."¹ But that happened about forty years after the star of Hegel had gone down in his native country, in consequence of the rise of empiricism and Neo-Kantianism. And it happened forty years before the beginning of the modern European Hegel renaissance, which interprets the essence of Hegel's philosophy in the light of modern historical and scientific experience.²

• Furthermore, the decades around 1900 excelled in a sort of semi-idealism and religious lip service. • Certainly Dewey's youth coincided with a period when external prosperity concurred strangely with an utterly false phase in philosophy and religion.

• Thus Dewey acquired a profound suspicion of everything that smacked of metaphysics, transcendentalism, and dialectics. • He deemed it futile to deal with the infinite, the absolute, and the eternal, about which we know so little, and to distort at the same time the finite and the concrete, within which we could do so much

¹John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 19.

²A striking example of Hegelian formalism applied to education is Karl Rosenkranz's *Die Pädagogik als System*, published in 1848. It was translated into English in the years 1872-1874 under the title *Pedagogics as a System* (later editions under the title: *The Philosophy of Education*) and exercised a great influence in America, although the Herbartians in Germany had launched their attacks against Rosenkranz's antiquated ideas many years before 1872.

if only we dared contemplate our immediate responsibilities. Let us create conditions—so he taught—that help the good to thrive in more and more people; let us stop the avalanche of phrases with deeds both practical and constructive.

But is it really, as Dewey asserts so often,¹ the belief in the transcendent as such which has hindered men from constructive acting? That the history of churches is filled with superstition, sin, and failure no honest historian can deny. But does this result from their transcendentalism or from the deficiency inherent in human society and institutions? The religious would say that Dewey's criticism begins at the wrong end of the stick: he debases the deeper beliefs which have inspired man, and glorifies society which, without the continual awareness of persistent values, would be a still greater mass of greed and error than it is anyhow. Do not all great religions combine the spiritual element with commandments directed toward action? For Plato and Aristotle the contemplative attitude is the highest accomplishment of the human mind. But is their ethics not based on a concept of virtue (*areté*)² which would not allow them to acknowledge as worthy that contemplation which is nothing but "escape from reality?" Does not the whole concept of "escape from reality" sometimes mistake the most arduous achievements of prophets, artists, and thinkers for idleness and daydreaming, because those who use this concept of "escape" are themselves incapable of appreciating great spiritual values? What will happen to civilization if it becomes gradually convinced that it has no mooring in a deeper dimension and no relation to anything by which it may judge itself?

But there is in all "absolutists"—so the instrumentalists would reply—the tendency to cause life to stagnate by dint of their rigid and "fixed" ideals. Yet does not a real ideal always point beyond all possibilities of definite realization?

The deepest reason for all idealistic and dialectical systems of

¹See Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy, Democracy and Education, and Experience and Nature, passim*.

²See the sections on Plato and Aristotle, pp. 1-43.

thought is the very acknowledgment of an infinite movement in all things existing; not, as Dewey says, a tendency to split the wholeness of reality into two incompatible realms of spirit and matter, perfection and sin, order and confusion. And did not Emerson, the "transcendentalist," use the concept of the Absolute as a lever for raising complacency, dogmatism, and institutionalism from the souls of men? Dewey himself praises Emerson, the transcendentalist and reverent admirer of the Absolute, as the philosopher of democracy and as:

. . . the one citizen of the New World fit to have his name uttered in the same breath with that of Plato.¹

There is a passage in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* which shows Dewey's disinclination for any kind of *a priori* reasoning.

. When Kant taught that some conceptions, and these the important ones, are *a priori*, that they do not arise in experience and cannot be verified and tested in experience, that without such ready-made injections into experience the latter is anarchic and chaotic, he fostered the spirit of absolutism, even though technically he denied the possibility of absolutes.²

We shall not discuss here to what extent Dewey's interpretation of Kant is correct. Those who know Kant would say that it is both incorrect and self-contradictory. We wish only to remark that conceptions *a priori* are not an invention of Kant's but are to be found in French and English philosophy before him. "Idealism" in philosophy, generally speaking, is not a German monopoly, as the inexperienced reader of Dewey's early works might be led to think. Germany has been, particularly since the middle of the nineteenth century, the playground of the most diverse schools of thought: materialism, skepticism, pessimism, nihilism, monism, Marxism, Thomism, solidarism, vitalism, phenomenology, existential philosophy, and so on.

¹John Dewey, "Emerson—The Philosopher of Democracy," in *International Journal of Ethics* for July, 1903, p. 412.

²John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 99. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920.

✓ Kant himself, in any history of philosophy, is primarily described as a "critical" thinker, and in popular Catholic pamphleteering he is often called "the philosopher of nihilism" for his refutation of the rational demonstrations of God. ✓ Even the liberals among his contemporaries called him, after publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the "great destroyer" (*der alles Zermalmende*). Does all this smack of fixity and dogmatism and absolutism? ✓ Dewey could have remembered, in his criticism of Kant's philosophy, that Kant is the author not only of the three Critiques but also of *The Eternal Peace*. ✓ In the latter he sets forth three principles from the realization of which our age of science and pragmatism appears to be still as far away as the age of Kant was. These principles are: that the civil constitution of every state shall be republican, that international rights ought to be guaranteed by a federation of free states, and that right between nations ought to be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality. ✓ Kant wrote also a treatise on *Religion within the Bound of Pure Reason* which brought him a reprimand on the part of his government, that is, of exactly the same bureaucrats and absolutists whom Dewey supposes to have been Kant's disciples.¹ ✓ The potentates in Germany and all over the world are generally not deeply influenced by such abstract and difficult treatises as the "Transcendental Analytic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. What influences and always has influenced the enemies of peace and progress is much more materialism, greed, and cynicism than any *a priori* metaphysics.

What would be Dewey's reply to the reproach that it is the very philosophy of pragmatism, with its glorification of growth and effect, which has helped to bring modern civilization so close to ruin? ✓ What would he say if somebody were to assert that this philosophy has argued away ideals, principles, and faith and explained them as merely the "experimental methods" of society? Or if one were to allege that the persistent denial of spiritual values has created a vacuum into which could creep reckless nationalism and a host of

¹In this connection see also Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1915.

false naturalistic concepts? Or if one were to accuse pragmatism of its glorification of the sciences, because many scientists entered the laboratories of tyrants without so much as a bad conscience, and thus indirectly assisted in the killing of more peaceful and innocent people than ever the Inquisition was capable of killing? Cannot the pragmatic concepts of "efficiency," "adjustment," and "experimentalism" be used as well for evil purposes as for good ones, the moment permanent ethical criteria are denied?

✓ Dewey and his adherents would reject such accusations violently, and would explain them as a sign of a stupid and perhaps malicious identification of the faults of mankind with the philosophy of pragmatism, which wishes to explain the methods of progress and not the methods of destruction. ✓ In this rejection the pragmatists would be perfectly correct; but they would suffer no more injustice than did the advocates of serious philosophical transcendentalism when placed in the neighborhood of reaction, superstition, and despotism.

✓ All writers who attack one particular system of thought as the cause of the evils of the world isolate a single factor from the whole of reality. ✓ History is a continuous confluence of many streams—political, economic, institutional, intellectual, and spiritual. Unless one sees individual things and forces as working within a system of co-ordinates, he will always be wrong. ✓ And it can be said in all justice that the so-called exact sciences, as well as the pragmatic and experimental philosophies, have still to prove whether they can create as many prophets and productive revolutionaries as did the religious and idealist movements; whether they can give as much courage to the brave and as much comfort to the weak; and whether they will be able to lead us, at least from time to time, up to the heights where man can converse with eternity.

✓ It may almost seem as if we now contradicted ourselves and retracted what we have already said about the merits of the pragmatic attitude, but this is not the fact. To repeat, we cannot go too deeply into the analysis of reality as it appears to us concretely, actually, and in all its change and disillusioning cruelty. Nor can

we do better than rely on experiences for better experiences. But it is difficult to understand why faith in a *logos* within and behind the transient impressions of life should impede us from ever-new activity and from judging human actions and ideas according to the benefit they bring to mankind. Through the narrowness of his instrumentalism, Dewey prevents many of his own ideas from maturing into their own productive consequences. He shows exciting problems and sets up challenging demands, but often he only removes the barriers which block our ways without going the whole distance. The future will be indebted to him for throwing up new questions as to the relationship between science and ethics, world immanence and faith, the individual and society, and theory and application. But with respect to all these questions he remains ambiguous.

✓ At one place in his writings Dewey says that radical idealism, which explains our environment merely as a product of ideas, can never be really lived. He is right. But the same can be asserted with respect to merely functionalist or instrumentalist pragmatism. It, too, cannot be really lived, because sooner or later man wishes to know for what ends he uses his instruments. This statement can, strangely enough, be verified with respect to Dewey himself.

Even in his early works, particularly in *Democracy and Education*, we discover a strange contradiction between Dewey's instrumentalism and his ethical viewpoints. It is as if Dewey the moral philosopher were afraid of the disapproving eyes of Dewey the instrumentalist. But a definite change occurs around 1930. Dewey then modifies his standpoint about "ends" and "ideals." It is difficult to decide whether he does so because of the menacing breakdown of democracy on the European continent or in a state of defense against his one-sided American disciples or in consequence of personal experiences. In any case, he no longer takes democracy "for granted" or describes it as the society based on the idea of experimenting with everything and anything and believing in values only in so far as they serve as "functions" and "methods."

It has become clear to Dewey that democracy, understood in this merely pragmatic sense, may degenerate into a political organization which has much activity but no directions, and little room for the ideas of fellowship, dignity, and human brotherhood as principles of human progress.¹ In this second period of his thought, Dewey's whole conception of values received a character of definiteness which lifts it out of the realm of mere experimentation into a sphere of persistent validity. How otherwise could we understand such terms as "moral foundation" and "law of life," the elevation of "friendship, beauty, and knowledge" as the indispensable conditions of civilization, "the identification of the divine with ideal ends," and sentences such as the following?

Whether one gives the name of "God" to this union, operative in thought and action, is a matter for individual decision. But the *function* of such a working union of the ideal and actual seems to me to be identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a spiritual content; and a clear idea of that function seems to me urgently needed at the present time.²

The reality of ideal ends and values in their authority over us is an undoubted fact. The validity of justice, affection, and that intellectual correspondence of our ideas with realities that we call truth, is so assured in its hold upon humanity that it is unnecessary for the religious attitude to encumber itself with the apparatus of dogma and doctrine.³

With these ideas accepted, the merely instrumentalist or experimentalist conception of values is clearly abandoned. We have an intrinsic moral teleology; we are allowed to attach "faith" to "ideal ends" which are not "shadowy and wavering"; and, finally, we have a universe described in the following terms:

The community of causes and consequences in which we, together with those not born, are enmeshed is the widest and deepest

¹See "Education and Social Change," in *Social Frontier* for May, 1917.

²From Dewey's *A Common Faith*, pp. 47 and 52. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1934.

³*Ibid.*, p. 44.

symbol of the mysterious totality of being the imagination calls the universe. It is the embodiment for sense and thought of that encompassing scope of existence the intellect cannot grasp. It is the matrix within which our ideal aspirations are born and bred. It is the source of the values that the moral imagination projects as directive criteria and as shaping purposes.¹

✓Furthermore, we have Dewey's expressed opposition to agnostics, "aggressive atheism,"² and "agnosticism";³ we even have Dewey's opinion that "the transfer of idealizing imagination, thought, and emotion to natural human relations would not signify the destruction of churches that now exist."⁴

• All these ideas force on the believer the quest for an explanation of their genesis. But this is exactly the boundary before which Dewey would like the philosophical mind to stop, and it will not. It insists that even empiricism should examine its own metaphysical assumptions.

~ Certain ideas expressed by Dewey in his later writings, and even in his earlier ones—as, his ideas of growth and experience—are either self-contradictory or incomplete or else they involve the acknowledgment of something like a *logos* or *kosmos*, without which growth would lead to chaos and all experiences would be nothing but atomistic impressions. The mere fact that we cannot define the idea of *logos*, as we do with an object in a laboratory, is no sufficient reason for denying it.

¹*A Common Faith*, pp. 87 and 85. These sentences show a combination of natural and moral teleology which, if more thoroughly analyzed, would reach deeply into metaphysical and ontological problems. A certain sympathy for Aristotelian teleology shows already in Dewey's earlier writings. See the following sentences in *Experience and Nature*: "The modern mind has formally abjured belief in natural teleology because it found Greek and medieval teleology juvenile and superstitious. Yet facts have a way of compelling recognition of themselves. There is little scientific writing which does not introduce at some point or other the idea of tendency. The idea of tendency unites in itself exclusion of prior design and inclusion of movement in a particular direction, a direction that may be either furthered or counteracted or frustrated, but which is intrinsic." (*Experience and Nature*, p. 373. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1925.)

²*A Common Faith*, p. 52.

³*Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 82.

As a matter of fact, if carried to its own inherent consequences, Dewey's pragmatism is much closer to the thought of Kant, Hegel, Emerson, or Bergson than he and his followers would like to admit. To Dewey, as to all great philosophers, later generations will unhesitatingly apply the verses of William Blake:

Five windows light the cavern'd Man:
through one he breathes the air;
Through one hears music of the spheres;
through one the Eternal Vine
Flourishes, that he may receive the
grapes; through one can look,
And see small portions of the eternal
World that ever groweth;
Through one himself pass out what time
he please, but he will not:
For stolen joys are sweet, and bread
eaten in secret pleasant.¹

CRITIQUE OF DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

This evidence of the abandonment of radical instrumentalism in Dewey's general philosophy must have its effect on our interpretation of his educational principles. Examined in the light of his total system of thought, as it is now before us, Dewey's philosophy of education is no longer sufficiently characterized by his *Pedagogic Creed* or his main educational work, *Democracy and Education*. There the emphasis is on experience for its own sake, and education is all one with an essentially undefined concept of growth. No doubt the lack of direction and discipline, characteristic of many of the initial experiments in progressive education, is partly due to a one-sided interpretation of these concepts on the part of Dewey's followers. Had he from the beginning expressed himself so unambiguously about the necessity of regulative and persistent values as he did after 1930, when the crisis of our modern society had become apparent, then he would not have needed to remind his own followers that they had misunderstood his philosophy.² Then also

¹From *Europe: A Prophecy*, published in 1794.

²See particularly Dewey's *Experience and Education*.

much heated controversy and the break between the older and the younger tradition in education could have been avoided; the line from Franklin, Pestalozzi, and Froebel to Emerson, and from Emerson to Francis Parker and Dewey himself, would have been much more evident. Many modern American teachers would have enriched their thought with the great ideas of the past, instead of looking down on the past as a time of mere "traditionalism" with lifeless cramming, fixed ideas, and outmoded methods. The critical note in respect to all idealistic thought which prevailed in the writings of Dewey's first period made many of his followers unaware of his profound contact with two of the greatest idealists, Plato and Hegel.

Dewey writes in his intellectual autobiography of the year 1930:

Nevertheless, I should never think of ignoring, much less denying, what an astute critic occasionally refers to as a novel discovery—that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking. The form, the schematism, of his system now seems to me artificial to the last degree. But in the content of his ideas there is often an extraordinary depth; in many of his analyses, taken out of their mechanical dialectical setting, an extraordinary acuteness. Were it possible for me to be the devotee of any system, I still should believe that there is greater richness and greater variety of insight in Hegel than in any other single systematic philosopher—though when I say this I exclude Plato, who still provides my favorite philosophical reading. . . . Nothing could be more helpful to present philosophizing than a "Back to Plato" movement; but it would have to be back to the dramatic, restless, co-operatively inquiring Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see what it might yield; back to the Plato whose highest flight of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn, and not to the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commentators who treat him as the original university professor.¹

¹From Dewey's "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, edited by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers, New York, 1930.

Concluding Remarks

After following the path of educational thought through more than two thousand years, we may now ask where we stand, what our present problems are, and what tasks we will have to face in the future.

WHERE DO WE STAND?

There occur periods in the history of man when his cultural productivity seems to be exhausted. With much evidence to support his view, a citizen of the Roman Empire in the time of Constantine the Great could contend that the most diverse efforts had been made to explain the character of human values and to instill them into the souls of men. But what had been the fruit of all this? Were there not still wars, even more destruction than ever? quarreling philosophers and theologians? tyrants and dictators? and a host of orators and pedagogues who talked about the virtues of the past, but had lost the confidence of youth and the faith in their own calling?

In a sense, our own feelings about the present are not so far away from those of the thinking men who lived at the end of the Roman Empire.

However, have not the fifteen centuries which lie between us and the collapse of Rome added an immense amount of wisdom and knowledge to the cultural fund of humanity? The medieval church developed the great systems of Christian philosophy; the humanists created new concepts of art and of the art of living; and the great scientific revolution emerging from the Renaissance taught the art of systematic observation and experimentation, thus bringing about an immense modification of the relation of man to nature. Instead of being its slave, seeing himself surrounded by magic forces, has not man become the master of his physical environment? And has not the same trend away from authority toward a

systematic understanding of man and his environment brought about entirely new concepts of education?

Like the scientists of his time, who began to reveal the secrets of the physical universe, John Amos Comenius attempted to find out the inner laws in the nature of man and to change his upbringing from a random procedure into a systematic process. After Comenius there came men such as Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Herbart, who partly in more intuitive fashion, partly in more scientific fashion, laid the psychological or sociological basis for the modern study of education. Finally, John Dewey's instrumentalism represents, at least in its earlier Darwinistic phase, the most radical attempt at subordinating philosophy and education to the rule of science. Dewey wished to eliminate all concepts which could be suspected of being aprioristic and likely to disturb the strictly inductive and functional method of the modern empiricist.

Parallel to the scientific revolution, with its impact on education, has gone another development of at least equal significance for modern civilization—the relation of education to the interests of the state. We find the concept of education as a part of statecraft most striking in the first great treatise on education—Plato's *Republic*. In the Middle Ages education and secular government abandoned their alliance for different reasons, political and religious. But later the early Protestants wanted the community to assume responsibility for the schools, because they did not see any other way of rendering Christian youth sufficiently literate to read and interpret the Bible; and the absolutist princes wanted their subjects to be educated so that they could understand the orders of the government and contribute to the welfare of the country; and, finally, democracy fostered a better education because without public enlightenment such basic democratic concepts as co-operation, freedom, and human dignity would be meaningless.

Yet all the blessings of modern culture and science, of democracy and self-determination, have not been able to prevent one of the most terrific crises in the history of mankind. A global war is raging, the social order is menaced by revolutions, minorities or colo-

nial peoples are badly treated on every continent; and, except in times of war, the curse of unemployment threatens most severely the countries that are most advanced technically. To be sure, the noble human power of reason became clouded with hatred and superstition in earlier times also, and success won fame, even though it was built on crime and the misery of fellow men. But then standards and principles derived from a great cultural heritage still stood as the voice of conscience behind all vice and error; whereas now, in certain parts of this earth, force alone has been proclaimed the guiding principle of man's action.

In such a situation education has overwhelming responsibilities. For civilization, in order to survive, needs not only knowledge of facts and methods; it needs also rational concepts about the principles which govern, or ought to govern, society. It is education which has to transmit this wisdom from one generation to the other and to help youth take its place in the great workshop of history. This is the reason why every great educational philosopher is interested not only in schools, children, and methods of teaching but also in broad philosophical and social problems. This is also the reason why a free and wise society must expect the educator to point courageously at the faults from which it suffers, and to seek remedies for them.

OUR PRESENT PROBLEMS

1. *The Problem of Science*

What are those elements in the contemporary crisis of which education must become aware in order to understand its specific obligations? The answer is that exactly the two modern developments at which we have pointed—namely, the scientific revolution and the alliance between the state and education—have not yet been fully harmonized with other conditions essential for a full and healthy civilization.

When Comenius welcomed Francis Bacon's philosophy as a scientific instrument for the education of mankind, he conceived of

science as being part of a fundamentally religious view of the universe, not as an isolated and autonomous mental pursuit. For Comenius, God and the scientist were not yet in conflict; rather, the scientist was supposed to reveal the wonders of God more effectively than the scholars before him had. So thought Bacon himself, as well as Galileo, and after them Newton and many other great explorers of nature. But in the course of time the ideal of scientific exactness and the traditional concepts of religion and philosophy contradicted one another; the experimental method and the philosophical trend toward synthesis became difficult to reconcile; furthermore, progressive social forces, mostly united with scientific thinking, often met their most powerful obstacle in a coalition of theologians and political reactionaries. Thus the scientists became alienated from the spiritual tradition of the western nations just when our civilization became increasingly dependent on scientific research and technology. The result is a split mentality in modern man because of a split concept of life and the universe.

Another result is a program of teaching in which the different parts of subject matter are no longer related to a common cultural denominator. As a consequence of this lack of an embracing criterion of what constitutes a true civilization, many scholars and educators have lost the sense of what is significant and what is not. They lead their students to more and more knowledge and less and less wisdom. The embarrassment does not decrease, but rather increases, on the higher levels of education. The modern university is no longer a *universitas litterarum*, but an aggregate of departments which more often misunderstand than understand one another, or actually ignore one another without any attempt at understanding.

The defect cannot be rectified simply by organization, or by meetings of teachers and professors. Nor is it any use to blame the scientist for his refusal to indulge in philosophical generalities, since his empirical method requires the utmost degree of self-restriction. It would show a similar lack of judgment if one blamed

the representatives of the humanities for their trend toward specialization and rigid analysis of social trends, and their tendency to avail themselves of scientific methods. To undo the right of free reasoning and to cast aspersions on research because it may destroy cherished illusions can only result in new romanticism and final disillusion.

There remains, nevertheless, the fact that no civilization can survive without a deeper and uniting definition of truths and values. Coleridge rightly says that "Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics." Only the mediocre person is satisfied with a mass of incoherent and isolated knowledge; the educated person wants knowledge not for quantitative reasons, but in order to understand himself, his society, the role he plays in it, and his relation to the universe.

How can we provide men with such a life of coherence? For this purpose we need creative thinkers who, conscious of all their limitations, nevertheless dare to produce the unity of thought which their fellow men need for their orientation. Insistence on exactness is a praiseworthy attitude; but if the specialists accuse of lack of exactness everybody who ventures to bring order and direction into the multiplicity of knowledge, they forget that they advocate narrowness, not exactness in its deeper sense. For true exactness requires interconnection as much as it requires specification. And all our knowledge and thinking being tentative, the comprehensive thinker has the same right as the scientist to fall short of the ultimate ideal of truth.

Only if modern thought dares connect the world of facts with ordering principles and ideas can we read without blushing Dostoevski's words in *The Brothers Karamazov* about modern scholars:

But they have only analyzed the parts and overlooked the whole, and, indeed, their blindness is marvelous.

But here emerges a great difficulty. For a century the philosophical tradition has been neglected, and once the continuity and

generality of thought is interrupted, it takes a long time to restore it.

Yet we must hope that an increase in our awareness of a great defect in civilization is the first step toward a remedy of it. And it seems as if modern scholarship had already entered the path which may lead modern man toward a more integrated view of life. Why should not the universe—so we hear today from leading scientists—combine within its wide orb a material order, accessible to weighing and measuring research, with an element manifesting itself in creativeness and freedom? Does not every man who lives, eats, works, and thinks and, in addition, ponders about his thinking experience in himself this miracle of physical and spiritual interaction? That is to say, the crisis of the modern mind does not spring from scientific experimentation as such, but from its association with philosophies which declare that the rule of determinism, valid in the life of matter, applies to all existence. Nor does our crisis spring from religion and metaphysics as such, as some empiricists believe, but from the fear of some theologians and humanists that the spiritual character of man is in jeopardy if free intelligence exercises its right of investigation. A new integrated civilization will depend on bringing the parts together, instead of insisting on their separation.

2. The Problem of Political Government

Besides the conflict between science and our spiritual tradition, we mentioned as the other conflicting element in our civilization the lack of harmony between education and the modern tendencies toward centralization of government.

Nobody, we suppose, will be so much a lover of the past as to deny the merits of modern governments in the promotion of public education, or to wish back the times when the education of the masses was left to charitable organizations. On the other hand, our civilization is on the way to delivering one of its noblest responsibilities, the education of men, almost completely into the hands of a supreme secular authority, the "State." This state, however

human and liberal its leader may be, is by its very character involved in conflicts of power. And under the pressure of circumstances, the more it must count on the co-operation of all its citizens and centralize their activities, the more it will be inclined to use education as an instrument of politics.

Of this temptation democratic nations must be aware, though there is a fundamental difference between democracy and modern despotism. This difference lies in the claim of the democratic state to the use of its power in such a way as to produce the greatest possible harmony between the rights of the citizen and the needs of national welfare and self-preservation. In the language of the makers of the American Constitution, the democratic state considers itself an instrument of the people "in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

Thus the democratic state submits itself to the hierarchy of values which moral men acknowledge as being above their own arbitrariness, whereas the despotic government attributes the right of the lawgiver only to itself. Yet even in the democratic states we observe the increasing trend toward centralization.

Here is now the great responsibility incumbent upon education. The more the state will have to expand its influence upon all the various ways of life, even upon education itself, the more will be needed a type of education which, in spite of all the compromises of political life, never loses sight of the persistent aspects of humanity. Otherwise, all modern nations will become more and more mechanized "collectives," but not real communities, even though they grow in external power. This fear is not to be interpreted as a sign of remote and impractical idealism. Certainly there is a kind of "idealism"—vague, individualistic, escapist—which does not want to recognize the power of reality and has rightly fallen into disrepute. But there is another kind of idealism without which man cannot master reality but becomes its slave. Only a civilization in

which this latter productive kind of idealism asserts itself against cheap forms of realism is realistic in a deep sense and has hope of surviving. Applying this principle to our problem of the relationship of education and the state, we may say that only those men and women are good patriots who insist that their country combine its national conscience with a universal human conscience. Those who forget the obligations of their political group to such a universal conscience will see patriotism soon decay into materialistic chauvinism and imperialism.

Nobody can foresee the future of mankind. The only fact we know as certain is that we live in the midst of a gigantic world revolution. To save the world from chaos, planning will be needed. Of what kind will it be? Will it be of a sort that changes the nineteenth century concept of *laissez faire* democracy—which will never be restored—into a democratic society capable of combining the new planning with the “natural rights of man,” with the freedom of individual conscience, and with justice and initiative? Or will the new order be but a transfer of mechanical engineering into the human and social sphere, degrading man toward the role of a particle of a machine? Will the new “planners” respect the depth and dignity of man, or will they move families around like cattle, send youth to battles the meaning of which they do not understand, and thus build the edifice of a rigidly controlled society on a foundation of distorted human relations? Then the time must come when the despairing souls of men again seek shelter in fantastic substitute religions and cry to heaven in new and still more violent revolutions.

Should these considerations of the danger which lies in the increasing omnipotence of the modern state discourage us from following the way of the last centuries, which increasingly allied education with the state? No; for just as education cannot build the future without the help of science, so it cannot work for progress without the assistance of the state. Only through such co-operation can society arrive at a unity between human culture and large-scale organization. But education can wish this co-operation only

if it is recognized by the state as an ally, not a handy-man. Herein lies the responsibility as well as the dignity of the modern teacher.

THE TASKS OF THE FUTURE

We have tried to prove that the future of education will depend on its capacity to bring about two closely interrelated syntheses, the one being that of science and our spiritual tradition, and the other that of the demands of the state and the individual conscience of man. These two problems are but reflections of a still deeper concern of the human race.

So far, man's reason and social planning have not been able to comprehend the wholeness of the human person and the totality of the conditions under which he can develop fully. Our governments, our social planners, so far as there were any, and our schools have always regarded one condition or some special set of conditions of wholesome human life at the expense of others. But man is not the *homo economicus* who can be explained and satisfied exclusively with respect to his material needs; nor is he the *homo politicus*, dependent on nothing but the external organization of his society; nor is he the *homo sapiens*, hearing and obeying the voice of reason; nor is he the *homo contemplativus* whose delight is to feel the nearness of God and reflect upon "first principles"; nor is he the *homo practicus* who enjoys himself only in business and adventure. He is all these together. He wishes to have his bread and some security; he wishes to be a decent citizen in a decent state; he wishes to think and argue; he needs faith in a deeper meaning of his life; he needs time for withdrawal from the hustle and bustle lest he lose the inner peace and the strength which come from perspective; yet he wishes also to breathe from time to time the exciting air of action. According to his specific temperament, each of us tends toward one way more than toward another and organizes his life and values accordingly. Yet some desire for totality lives in every sound person, and a wholesome civilization must give sufficient scope to all the different talents and aspirations of its members.

Our period deserves more blame than the past for disregarding

the symphonic character of human life, because we could utilize a long cultural heritage and an unheard-of wealth of material and technological knowledge. But how can people lead themselves and others toward a total life if they do not understand themselves and their fellow men? No doubt we have rectified and added many details in educational theory and practice; but in spite of all our quantitative achievements, we still have to ask Pestalozzi's question:

Man who is the same whether on the throne or in a hut, what is he in his innermost nature? Why do not the wise tell us? . . . Does your wisdom help you to understand truly your race and is your goodness the goodness of enlightened guardians of the people?

We lack both a comprehensive psychology of the nature of man and comprehensive social ethics. Therefore education has not been able to cope with the rapid modifications in all aspects of civilization. Can we simply preach the gospel of "adapting youth to the changing needs of society"? Must we not have principles to determine which challenges in the welter of opportunities we wish youth to accept and which to refuse?

Only with such a comprehensive knowledge of the fundamental conditions of man and his civilization can we distinguish means and ends and dare be revolutionary with respect to the instruments of society, without being destructive of the deeper and permanent interests of man.

Of course, teachers and philosophers alone are not capable of creating a new ethics—personal, national, and international—and through it a new interpretation of education and nature and the role of man in his society. For producing such an ethics mankind needs statesmen with a vision comprehensive enough to inspire nations with great purposes and ideals. It is wrong to think that man can learn to understand himself and his race through psychology and theory alone; rather, he can have the right psychology only if he knows for what he exists and is, eventually, willing to die.

We live in these days at a juncture of history in which the future of nations all over the world will be determined for many genera-

tions. But to do this wisely and to have their plans carried over into lasting effort, the statesmen need their people; and to have the people ready, teachers are needed. Theirs is the task of preparing the citizen to understand what his statesmen deem necessary; nay, even more, theirs is the task to educate a nation so that it selects the right statesmen, endowed with great courage and great vision. In other words, the relation between the political leaders and their peoples is of a reciprocal nature.

But how can teachers help the citizens of a nation to work understandingly for a larger and better world? Certainly not so much through adding a host of new subjects to an already overcrowded curriculum as through first of all placing the young student in an environment which he is able to master through consistent use of his abilities and from which he may expand the circle of his experiences gradually through more courageous acting and thinking. Thus he will form his life so that the different parts blend together and receive character from belonging to a meaningful whole. Such is the real meaning of a liberal education.

In order to fulfill this task, we need particularly a new conception of secondary education, because it covers the years when the majority of our youth must fit themselves for life. We can no longer be satisfied with diluting the older selective intellectual program of the secondary school of the nineteenth century in order to fit it to even the most modest grade of intelligence. In this way the school will finally disappoint all: the intellectually gifted, who feel their talent wasted; the practical minded, who are impatient to prove their strength in action; and the young without particular talent, who are discouraged because—in spite of all leveling—they cannot compete with their comrades.

Thus there arise three great tasks, especially for modern secondary education, but *mutatis mutandis* also for the other levels of schooling.

First, we must use constructively the different human talents, but do this in such a way that the democratic unity of the nation is not imperiled. To succeed in this enterprise we must use, as a com-

mon basis of education, useful practical work, sport, and all those activities which appeal to the emotions. For in their emotions men are united, whereas the inevitable differences of intellect separate men from one another. Therefore there is no profit in the customary attempt to use mediocre textbooks adapted to the capacities of the lower average as the common element of instruction. Such textbooks bore the intelligent as well as the less gifted, and allow ignorant and uncreative teachers to degrade a difficult and responsible profession.

The second task incumbent on modern education is to find a more constructive relation between the school and the future vocation of the students.

The third task is to combine respect for future vocational life with a liberal education which prepares man to enrich himself through contact with the cultural values of human life.

Only if we combine a new and total understanding of the growth of man with the art of applying this insight to reality can we hope to build up a better society. Future generations will acknowledge only that civilization which helps them combine their feeling and thinking with their living and acting. For decades we have heard the cry in this and other countries for a new philosophy, especially for a new philosophy of education—as if any kind of philosophy could help people live in a wholesome civilization if they live only in segments of life! What else does the demand for a new total philosophy reflect but the desire of people to subordinate the bewildering amount of unco-ordinated experiences and responsibilities—local, national, and international—to an ordering principle of thought and practice which tells them what to put first and what to put last, and how to differentiate between mere means and true ends in the process of human history?

Thus we discover everywhere the need for a new and total conception of man: in his relation to science and faith, in his relation to state and government, and finally in his relation to self and society. If we do not succeed in creating such a new conception and applying it to reality, our time may not be different from the end of

Antiquity, with all its melancholy, chaos, and final decay. If, on the other hand, we succeed—and we can succeed if we are really determined and ready to submit to sacrifices—then we may hope that this greatest crisis of western civilization is but the stormy overture of a new era of humanity, greater than any seen before.

For this effort to turn chaos into progress we need as companions the great educational prophets who, in earlier crises of civilization, helped their fellow men to strive for new horizons. It is not because these leaders of humanity belong to the past that we have to acquaint ourselves with their ideas. We need their advice because they were the men with the courage and the vision to protest against false traditions and complacencies. They show the brave what mankind can achieve if it realizes the strength that comes from devotion to great purposes.

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Index

- Abelard, 93, 311
 Absolute (Emerson), 304, 309, 327f.
 Absolutism, 103, 127, 186, 202,
 213f., 222, 244, 329f., 338
 Academy, 238f.
Adhaerere Deo, 99
 Adler, Alfred, 316
 Aenea Sylvio (Pope Pius II), 108, 112
Agáre, 221
 Agnosticism, 156, 334
 Alberti, Leone Battista, 108, 243
 Albertus Magnus, 42, 93, 118
 Albigeneses, 118
 Alcott, Bronson, 221, 310
 Aleuin, 92
 Alexander Gallus de Villa Dei, 110
 Alexandria, 47, 72, 78, 81, 311
 American Philosophical Society, 237
Amor intellectus dei, 30
 Anatomy, 163
 Ancient Church, 72-88
 Andreae, Johann Valentin, 184
Anér kalós k'agathós, 4, 6, 201
 Anthologies, Latin, 125
 Antiquity, 104, 106, 111, 132, 165,
 179, 242
 Aquinas, Thomas, 26, 42, 93, 94ff.,
 118, 161, 173
 Arabs, 109
 Areté, 5, 128, 328
Aristoi, 6f.
 Aristotle, Aristotelianism, 2, 23,
 25-43, 45f., 90, 92f., 96f., 103,
 118, 132, 144, 147, 156, 161, 165,
 188f., 283, 328, 334 note
Artes liberales, 42, 83f., 92, 108,
 111, 123
 Astrology, 174
 Astronomy, 34, 171, 174, 175, 208
 Atheism, 206, 217, 262, 334
 Athens, Athenians, 3, 8, 26, 47, 311,
 327
 Authoritarianism, 20, 86, 152, 337
 Bacon, Francis, 107, 153, 162-168,
 169, 179, 182ff., 188f., 192f., 198,
 310, 339f.
 Basedow, 209
 Basil the Great, 82, 84
 Beda, Venerable, 92
 Behaviorism, 275
 Belgium, 203
 Bergson, 32 note, 335
 Bill of Rights, 187
 Binet, 316
 Blake, William, 335
 Bodin, Jean, 174
 Boethius, 92
 Bohemia, 112, 188, 190
 Bologna, 31
 Bolshevism, 9
 Bonaventura, 64, 93
 Book learning, bookishness, 207f.,
 310
 Boston Latin School, 225
 Bourgeois class, 183
 Brethren of the Common Life, 152
 Bruni, Leonardo, 108
 Bruno, Giordano, 173, 294
 Buridan of Bethune, John, 164
 Byzantium, 50, 109
 Calcar, Jan Stephan, 163
 Calvin, John, 64, 104, 119, 134, 173, 178
 Calvinists, 184, 188, 189
 Cambridge, England, 203

Cardinal virtues, 4
 Carolingians, 75
 Carr, Peter, 254
 Carroll, Charles, 229
 Cassianus, Joannes, 92
 Cassiodorus, 92
 Catechetical schools, 78, 81
 Catharine, Empress of Russia, 155
 Catherine of Medici, 156
 Catholic Church, 9, 26, 97, 114-129, 173
 Cato, 56
 Centralization of government, 342f.
 Charity, 221
 Civilization, application of, 219
 Charles I of England, 186
 Charles V, Emperor, 140, 149
 Charles the Great, 87
 Chivalry, 109, 201
 Christianity, 2 note, 41, 49, 61ff.
 Christology, 133
 Chrysostom, John, 82, 84
 Church history, 25, 72-93, 103, 114-129
 Cicero, 51, 60, 92, 111, 124, 132, 143, 162, 188, 192
 Clarke, Edward, 200
 Classicism, 108-113
 Clemens of Alexandria, 78
 Coleridge, 294f.
 Colet, John, 142, 225
 Collinson, Peter, 230
 Comenius, John Amos, 70, 86, 168, 174, 179, 186, 188-199, 200, 205, 267, 338, 339f.
 Commonwealth educators, 178-187, 200, 207, 225, 228
 Comte, Auguste, 322
 Conformity (Emerson), 299
 Consciousness, 275f., 279, 316
 Conservatism, 12, 203
 Constantine the Great, 72, 337
 Constitution, American, 229, 343
Contrat Social (Rousseau), 211f.
 Co-operative education, 290, 338
 Copernicus, 104, 162, 164, 167, 173, 175
 Cosmic order, 6, 334
 Council of Constance, 100
 Council of Pisa, 100
 Council of Trent, 147
 Cranach, Lucas, 130
 Cromwell, 120, 178, 186
 Crusades, 102, 109
 Culture-epoch theory, 279
 Cusanus, Nicolaus, 189
 Cyclopedias, 92
 Dante, 90
 Darwin, Charles, 191, 322, 338
 Declaration of Independence, 187, 246
 Deism, 232
 D  mia of Lyon, 183
 Democracy, 27, 65, 120, 140, 152, 189, 203, 262, 314, 322, 332ff., 338, 343f., 347
 Democritus, 35
 Descartes, Ren  , 107, 164, 169-172, 173, 177, 195, 272
 Determinism, 342
 Dewey, John, 298, 315-336, 338
 Dialectics, 19-21, 31, 34, 53f., 73, 327
 Diet of Augsburg, 147
 Differentiation, 261f.
 Dignity of man, 145, 338, 344
 Diotima of Mantinea, 4
 Dogmatism, 26, 64, 75, 86, 177, 232, 302, 329f.
 Domitian, Emperor, 53
 Donatus, 110 note
 Dostoevski, 313, 341
 Driesch, Hans, 32 note

- Dualism, 170, 172
 Dürer, Albrecht, 130f.
 Durie, John, 180, 183, 186
- Eckart, Master, 64, 188, 189, 294
 Edwards, Jonathan, 64, 317
 Elementary schools, 181, 210
 Elite, 10, 66, 247
 Eloquence (oratory), 52ff., 59, 112, 124, 183
 Elyot, Sir Thomas, 49, 184, 200
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 156f., 221, 292-314, 315, 317, 329, 335f.
 Emotional impulses, 319, 348
 Empirical liberalism, 325
 Empiricism, *if.*, 25f., 35, 148, 155, 163ff., 176, 179, 183, 193, 272, 274, 301, 316f., 323, 327, 338, 340, 342
 Encyclopedias, 42, 180, 195
 England, 203f., 244
 English School (Franklin), 238
 Enlightenment, 222, 338
 Entelechy, 32 note, 36 note, 98
 Epicurus, 49, 161
 Erasmus of Rotterdam, 104ff., 130-148, 182, 188, 190, 225
 Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Gotha, 183
 Eros, 3, 4
 Eschatology, 68
Esse cum deo, 99
 Estienne de la Boétie, 159
 Ethics, 269, 346
 Eton, 203
Eudaimonia, 28, 38, 41
 Eugenics, 108
 "Exact" methods, 316, 331, 340, 341
 Existential philosophy, 329
 Experimental logic, 324
 Experimentalism, 322, 325
- Fathers of the Church, 118, 188
 Fechner, Gustav, 316
Felicitas, 99
 Fellenberg, Philipp, 263f.
 Fénélon, Francois, 223
 Feudalism, 91, 102f., 121, 201
 Fichte, Johann, 272, 311
 Fleury, André, 223
 France, 203, 223. *See also* Paris.
 Francis of Assisi, 100
 Francke, August Hermann, 183
 Franklin, Benjamin, 209, 225-241, 245, 292, 317, 336
 Frederic II, King of Prussia, 155
 Frederick II of Hohenstauffen, 97
 Freethinkers, 205, 232
 French Revolution, 246, 259, 292
 Freud, 277, 316
 Froebel, Friedrich, 17, 86, 99, 179, 267, 284-291, 305, 315, 336, 338
 Functionalism, 322
- Galileo, 18, 104, 147, 163, 173-177, 303, 340
 Genius and Drill (Emerson), 308
 Gentleman ideal, 200, 201
 Geography, 208, 248
 George, Duke of Saxony, 137
 George, Margrave of Brandenburg, 122
 Germinal capacities (Thomas Aquinas), 95
 Gerson, John, 100f.
 Gilbert, William, 167
 Gnostic movement, 68
 Goethe, 17, 71, 152, 196, 263, 283, 294, 296, 308, 311
 Government, 216, 236, 338, 342, 345, 348
 Grammars, 125
 Greek language, 110, 115, 208, 248

Greeks, 45f., 61, 165, 253, 311
 Growth (Dewey), 319-324
 Guarino, Battista, 108
 Guidance, 181, 288, 319
 Gymnasium (Germany), 279
 Gymnastics, 16f., 23, 37

 Habit, 28, 38, 49, 308
 Hall, Stanley, 316
 Harrington, James, 184
 Harrow, England, 203
 Hartlib, Samuel, 181, 183f., 186, 190
 Harvard College, 225, 237, 299
 Harvey, William, 167
 Hawthorne, Julian, 305
 Hebrew language, 115, 173, 181
 Hedonism, 207
 Hegel, 99, 191, 272, 297, 327, 335f.
 Heine, Heinrich, 25
 Henry VIII of England, 120
 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 146,
 179, 194, 271-283, 284, 287, 288,
 315, 316, 319, 338
 Heretics, 74, 118
 Hesus, Eobanus, 114, 124
 Hierarchy of sciences, 35
 History, 109f., 112, 125, 209, 210, 220
 Holbein, Hans, 130
 Holy Roman Empire, 90, 104, 136
 Homer, 111, 279
 Horace, 116
 Hrabanus Maurus, 91f.
 Hugh of St. Victor, 103 note
 Humanism, humanists, 23, 43, 49, 59,
 61, 91, 102-107, 109f., 114-119, 138,
 143, 178, 189, 225, 253, 337, 341f.
 Hungary, 108, 112
 Huss, John, 104, 118, 188
 Hussites, 184
 Hutchinson, John, 239
 Huxley, Thomas H., 209f.

Hygienics, 108, 146
 Hypatia, 72

 Iconoclasm, 134
 Idealism, 1, 26, 294, 317, 329, 343f.
 Ignatius of Loyola, *see* Loyola
 Immanence, 32, 324, 326
 Indian thought, 311
 Individualism, 66, 202, 213, 224, 259
 Indulgences, 117
 Inner relatedness of education, 288
 Inquisition, 135, 173, 175, 331
 Institutionalism, 75f., 115, 128,
 138, 179, 329
 Instrumentalism, 322, 332, 335, 338
 Intellectualism, 35, 275
 Interest (Herbart), 276-278, 279,
 319-320
 Intuitionism, 327

 Ireland, 203
 Irrationalism, 134
 Isaiah, 63, 98
 Isidorus of Sevilla, 92

 Jackson, Andrew, 292
 James, William, 233, 298, 316f.
 Janet, Pierre, 316
 Jansenism, 223
 Jefferson, Thomas, 209, 242-257,
 292, 317
 Jesuits, 149-155, 190
 Jesus of Nazareth, 61-71
 Jews, 48, 63, 72f., 78, 80, 136
 Judd, C. H., 316
 Justin the Martyr, 77, 78

 Kant, 128, 164, 177, 207, 218, 271f.,
 295, 297, 329f., 335
 Kelvin, Lord, 313
 Kepler, Johann, 18, 167

Kierkegaard, Soeren, 296f.
 Kindergarten, 267, 284, 288
 Krüsi, 263

 Ladislaus of Hungary, 108, 112
 Lacta, 85
 Languages, 115, 124, 147, 196, 208, 238
 La Salle, Jean Baptiste de, 86, 183, 223
 Latin, 110ff., 115, 143, 208, 248
 Laud, Archbishop, 186
 League of nations, 198
 Lefèvre d'Étaples, 132f.
 Leibnitz, Gottfried von, 32 note, 164, 177, 191, 294
 Leonardo da Vinci, 106, 162f.
 Liberal arts, see *Artes liberales*
 Liberal education, 278f., 347
 Liberal theology, 134
 Liberalism, 201f., 262, 292
 Libraries, 125, 237, 247
 Locke, John, 49, 128, 160, 179, 200-210, 214, 225, 239, 295, 338
 Logos, 2, 6, 7, 29f., 39, 64, 66, 73, 99, 128, 332, 334
 Ludolf of Saxony, 149
 Louis XIV of France, 127
 Loyola, Ignatius of, 107, 149-155
 Luther, 32, 104ff., 114-129, 130-136, 149, 162f., 178, 182
 Lutherans, 184, 188
 Lycée (French), 279

 Machiavelli, 139f.
 Machiavellism, 14
 Mackintosh, Sir James, 295
 Magic, 174, 337
 Mann, Horace, 203
 Manual training, 208, 290
 Marcus Aurelius, 48, 56, 297
 Marx, Karl, 322

Marxism, 329
 Materialism, 329
 Mathematics, 18-20, 31, 34, 163, 164f., 170, 208, 274, 285, 316
 Matsys, Quentin, 130f.
 Medicine, 163, 171, 316
 Medieval Church, 89-101, 337
 Melanchthon, Philipp, 178
 Merovingians, 75
 Metaphysics, 177, 195, 234, 261, 319, 322, 327, 341f.
 Methodology, 35, 142, 164, 165, 191, 194, 197, 238, 273-281, 316f.
 Michelangelo, 106
 Middle Ages, 22f., 25, 42, 86f., 89, 101, 102, 109, 112, 163, 178, 338
 Middle class spirit, 178-187
 Millennium, 68, 90
 Milton, 184f., 239, 311f.
 Minerva, 53
 Monism, 64, 329
 Monotheism, 63
 Montaigne, 107, 156-161, 207
 Montesquieu, 214
 Monticello, 244, 252
 Moravian Brethren, 189, 190
 More, Sir Thomas, 141, 184
 Motivation, 319, 323
 Music, 16f., 23, 34, 123f.
 Mysticism, 22, 25f., 34, 75, 99f., 119, 128, 188, 191, 195, 212, 267, 287

 Napoleon, 263, 285, 292
 Nationalism, 44f., 103, 176, 330
 Natural rights, 212, 344
 Natural theology, 206, 220
 Nature, 145f., 162, 166, 192f., 209f., 219, 221, 258ff., 266, 269f., 285, 290, 337
 Neo-Humanism, 23
 Neo-Kantianism, 327

- Neoplatonism, 2 note, 21, 74, 191
 Neo-vitalism, 32 note
 New England, 120, 186, 225
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 18, 177, 303, 340
 Niebuhr, Georg, 311
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 211, 300
 Nihilism, 329, 330
Nous, 40 note

 Oligarchy, 27
 Omnipotence of reason, 254
 Operationalism, 322
 Origen, 74
 Over-Soul, 294f.
 Oxford, England, 31, 203

 Pace, Richard, 136
 Paganism, 104, 118, 134f.
Paideia, 6
 Paine, Thomas, 233
 Paley, William, 295
 Pantheism, 64, 189, 221, 285
 Parables, 70
 Paris, 31, 94, 100, 150, 164, 243, 245, 311
 Parker, Francis, 336
 Parsifal, 89
 Pasteur, Louis, 302
 Paulsen, Friedrich, 114
 Pavlov, 316
Pax Romana, 45
 Pedagogy, 57
 Pericles, 13, 56
 Persia, 48, 285
 Pessimism, 329
 Pestalozzi, 86, 99, 179, 194, 218, 221, 258-270, 271, 273, 284, 287, 288-291, 305, 310, 315, 336, 338, 346
 Petrarch, 106, 242
 Petty, Sir William, 181, 183, 200
 Pfefferkorn, 136
 Phenomenology, 329
 Philadelphia, 228, 236, 237
 Philanthropist movement, 223
 Philip II of Spain, 173
 Physical training, 145, 153, 182, 193
 Physics, 54, 170, 177
 Pico della Mirandola, 132
 Pietism, 25, 99, 120, 188
 Pirckheimer, Willibald, 141
 Planning, need for, 344
 Plato, 1-24, 45, 60, 62, 66f., 73, 82f., 92, 110, 123, 132, 153, 177, 188, 253, 293f., 295, 308, 314, 326, 328f., 336, 338
 See also Aristotle, 25-43.
 Play, 146, 290f.
 Plotinus, 21, 48, 100, 294, 311, 314
 Plutarch, 44-50, 145f., 162, 188
 Poetry, 124f.
 Poggio, Andrea, 57, 111
Polis, 3, 6, 26, 56
 Political leadership, 4, 6, 10
 Political science, 250
Polymathia, 34
 Polytheism, 61
 Pope, 87, 93, 116, 129
 Pope, Alexander, 239, 295
 Pope Clement XIV, 154
 Pope Julius III, 151
 Pope Leo X, 128, 135, 140
 Pope Paul III, 151, 162
 Pope Paul V, 190
 Pope Pius II (Aenea Sylvio), 108, 112
 Potentialities (Thomas Aquinas), 95
 Pragmatism, 30, 232, 317ff., 322ff.
 Predestination, 133
 Presentation of ideas (Herbart), 275-277, 287
 Priestley, Joseph, 230
 Primitive man, 269

- Protestantism and Protestants, 25,
 91, 105, 114-129, 153, 173, 188,
 190, 296, 338
 Prussia, 203, 262
 Psychoanalysis, 275
 Psychology, 35f., 96, 191f., 261,
 273-279, 316-319, 338, 346
 Ptolemaic-Christian cosmology,
 147, 162, 175
 Public Schools of England, 203,
 207, 209, 279
 Punishment, 220f.
 Puritans, 186, 225, 226
 Pythagoreans, 18, 21, 82ff.

 Quintilian, 51-60, 92, 111f., 124,
 145, 188

 Race, 37, 176, 269, 279, 346
 Raimond de Sebonde, 161
Ratio, 82
 Rationalism, 120, 155, 192, 195,
 222, 297
 Ratke, Wolfgang, 179
 Realism, 1, 14, 183, 192, 230, 344
 Relativism, 161, 324
 Religious festivals, 17
 Renaissance, 23, 43, 49, 58, 61, 76,
 91, 99, 104, 106, 108f., 120, 134f.,
 161ff., 242, 243, 337
 Reuchlin, Johann, 135, 142, 173
 Ritualism, 87
 Rollin, 239
 Roman law, 87
 Romans, Roman Empire, 43ff., 57,
 61, 87, 90, 104, 253, 327, 337
 Romanticism, 155, 341
 Rosenkranz, Karl, 327
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 160, 179, 209,
 211-224, 258f., 268, 289, 300, 338
 Royce, Josiah, 317

 Saint Augustine, 64, 79, 82, 83, 92,
 99, 115, 118, 132, 161, 314, 327
 Saint Jerome, 82, 85, 92, 135
 Saint Mary, 74, 89
 Saint Paul, 64, 69, 76f., 116
 Savonarola, 104, 118
 Saxony, 203
 Schelling, Friedrich, 191, 272, 285,
 297, 303
 Scholasticism, 42, 91, 93, 96, 98,
 103, 105, 109, 118, 163
 Sciences, 147, 164, 173, 176, 208,
 210, 253, 316, 338, 339f., 348
 Secondary education, 153, 210, 237,
 347
 Secularism, 102, 107
 Seneca, 48, 52, 101, 192
 Sensualism, 35f., 221
 Sermon on the Mount, 65
 Serveto, Michael, 173
 Shakespeare, 311, 312
 Skepticism, 329
 Slavery, 65, 144, 256
 Social man, 269
 Sociology, 261, 319, 322, 326, 338
 Socrates, 1, 3, 4, 35, 52, 67, 153,
 161, 311
 Solidarism, 329
 Sophists, 35, 317, 327
 Sovereignty, 215f.
 Sparta, 13
 Specialization, 301, 315
 Spencer, Herbert, 209f.
 Spinoza, 18, 30, 295
 Sport, 146
 State, 7, 12, 65, 97, 103, 126f., 139,
 145, 330, 338, 339, 342, 344f., 348
 Steps of instruction (Herbart),
 279f., 319
 Stewart, Dugald, 295
 Stoicism, 2 note, 49, 56, 68, 193, 300

- Strahan, William, 235
 Sturm, Johannes, 152, 225
 Subjectivism, 64
 Superstition, 80

 Tabooism, 87, 324
 Tao, 221
 Tatian, 77ff.
 Tauler, Johannes, 119
 Teachers' colleges, 183, 273
 Techné, 5
 Tertullian, 78f., 85
 Textbooks, 195ff., 209, 348
 Thirty Years' War, 190, 199
 Thomism, 119, 329. *See also* Aquinas, Thomas.
 Thoreau, Henry, 221
 Thorndike, Edward Lee, 316
 Tiberius, 72
 Titian, 163
 Totalitarianism, 13, 127
 Transcendentalism, 68, 86f., 149, 179, 286, 293f., 324, 327f., 329, 331
 Tully, 226
 Turnbull, 239

 Ubertino of Carrara, 108
Unio mystica, 100
 Universal language, 199
 Universal Unity (Froebel), 286f.
 Universities, 93, 104f., 114, 121, 123, 147, 153, 250, 340
Uomo universale, 57, 109, 201
 Utilitarianism, 128, 210, 239f.

 Vagantes, 105
 Valla, Lorenzo, 242

 Vegio, Maffeo, 108, 112, 146
 Vergerio, Pietro Paolo, The Elder, 108
 Vergil, 53, 90, 111
 Vesalius, Andreas, 163, 167, 173
 Vespasian, Emperor, 56
 Vincent of Beauvais, 103 note
 Visual education, 196
Vita contemplativa, 21, 29-33, 94f., 98f., 322, 328
 Vitalism, 329
 Vittorino da Feltre, 110
 Vives, Juan Luis, 104, 152. 188f., 192, 199, 205
 Vocational education, 121, 315, 348
Volonté de tous, 215-217, 224
Volonté générale, 215-217, 224
 Voltaire, 62, 205, 218, 219
 Voltairians, 194

 Waldenses, 118
 Walker, 239
 Washington, George, 243
 Weightman, Roger C., 255
 Whitefield, George, 232
 William and Mary, 202f.
 William and Mary College, 225, 248
 William of Occam, 163
 Wimpfeling, Jakob, 110f.
 Winchester, England, 203
 Wolfram von Eschenbach, 89
 Working schools, 204
 Wundt, Wilhelm, 316
 Wycliffe, John, 104

Zendavesta, 285
 Zeus, 61
 Zwingli, Huldreich, 119

