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INDIAN HISTORY

S. C. SARKAR
AND
K. K. DATTA

MODERN INDIAN HISTORY

Vol. II

(THROUGHLY REVISED & ENLARGED)

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is now about nineteen years since the First Edition of this book saw light. There have been subsequently many reprints, for each of which additions and alterations, in factual details or presentation thereof, were duly considered and made, and the matter of the book has thus been kept up-to-date. In the present edition the history of the country for the last two decades has been traced, and care has been taken to avoid controversial issues,—which has been rather a difficult job, since this history is much too recent for impartial and unbiased presentation. Yet, without a basically reliable historical narrative linking up with to-day, the earlier chapters of our modern history must remain suspended in air as it were.

We have tried to make the book useful to a circle of readers much wider than the Universities, to learners as well as to maturer minds; and the Hindi version of the book is calculated to increase its utility for the public in a large part of Northern India, while for the rest of the country, as well as for the outside world, the English version will probably hold its ground. Many of the original purposes of this book, as explained in the Preface to its First Edition, still remain as objects, as we have considered these to be indispensable.

Patna,
September, 1951.

S. C. SARKAR.
K. K. DATTA.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

In this edition all the chapters have been carefully revised, and the narrative in each chapter has been brought up-to-date. The salient features of the new constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India, changes in the position of the Indian States, territorial redistribution, and recent social, economic and cultural changes have been duly incorporated.

Patna,
June, 1958

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MODERN INDIAN HISTORY

VOLUME II

CHAPTER I

ADVENT, EARLY PROGRESS AND RIVALRIES OF THE EUROPEAN TRADING NATIONS (1498—1744)

SECTION I

THE PORTUGUESE

THE geographical discoveries of the last decade of the fifteenth century produced far-reaching consequences. Columbus discovered a new world; Bartholomew Diaz doubled the Cape of Good Hope, or the Stormy Cape, as he called it, in 1488; Vasco da Gama found out a new route to an old world and reached the famous port of Calicut on the 17th May, 1498. This event had undoubtedly far-reaching repercussions on the civilized world.[1]

India had commercial relations with the Western countries throughout her ancient history. But from the seventh century the Arabs began to control the sea-borne trades in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and carried the Indian goods to the west in their own vessels, and from them these goods were purchased by the merchants of Venice and Genoa. The discovery of Vasco da Gama brought Portugal, whose merchants had been for a long time anxious to share the advantage of Eastern commerce, into direct touch with India.

The Hindu ruler of Calicut, whose hereditary title was Zamorin, offered a friendly reception to Vasco da Gama and

[2] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 1.

his party. On his return to Portugal, after an absence of two years, Vasco da Gama showed specimens of articles obtainable from the Calicut market to the merchants of Portugal and informed them about what were liked by the people of the Malabar coast. On 9th March, 1500, Padro Alvarez Cabral was sent out from Lisbon in command of a fleet of thirteen vessels. From this time the Portuguese came into direct conflict with the Muslim traders and the ruler of Calicut. They began to take part in the political intrigues of India, and entered nto alliances with Zamorin's enemies, the chief of whom was the ruler of Cochin. This change was due to the consciousness of the Portuguese that to make full use of the enormous possibilities of trade it was necessary for them "to conciliate the local Indian rulers and drive away the Arab merchantmen." But the ruler of Calicut was favourably disposed towards the Arabs, to whom Calicut owed its prosperity, and some other Muslim states as well were sympathetic towards them.

Alfonso de Albuquerque was the real founder of the Portuguese power in India. He came as the Governor of Portuguese affairs in India in 1509, and at the end of November 1510 took possession of Goa. He tried to strengthen the fortifications of Goa, and to increase its commercial importance, and with a view to securing a permanent Portuguese population, he encouraged the Portuguese to marry Indian wives. His ruthless persecution of the Muslims was a great blot on his character.

His successors gradually founded a number of important settlements near the sea. They took possession of Diu, Daman, Salsette, Bassein, Chaul and Bombay, San throme near Madras and Hugli in Bengal, and established their authority over the greater part of Ceylon. But in course of time they were deprived of most of those places, ultimately retaining only Diu, Daman and Goa. They lost Hugli during the

reign of Shahjahan and the Marathas captured Salsette and Bassein in 1739.

Through the "earliest "intruder into the East," Portugal could not establish any permanent dominion in India. The ultimate decline of the Portuguese in India was due principally to five causes : (1) discovery of Brazil by Portugal; (2) religious intolerance; (3) lack of farsightedness among the Governors; (4) bad trading methods; (5) rivalry of other European powers. The discovery of Brazil drew Portugal's colonising activities to the west. Religious intolerance of the Portuguese led them to destroy all Hindu temples in the island of Goa in 1540 under the orders of their king, and with the arrival of the Franciscan missionaries in 1517 "Goa had become the centre of an immense propaganda".

SECTIO

THE DUTCH

The object of all the European merchant companies was the same, and they appeared in the same field with a charter from their respective sovereigns; so a bitter contest among them was inevitable. These trading Companies did not confine themselves exclusively to commercial activities, but also formed designs of gaining territorial possessions, which added to the bitterness of the conflict. During the first half of the seventeenth century the contest was triangular between the Portuguese and the Dutch, between the Portuguese and the English, and between the Dutch and the English. The Anglo-French rivalry followed later,and the Dutch jsalousy of English ascendancy in India was not extinguished at least before 1759.

The first Dutch fleet to round the Cape of Good Hope and visit the Malaya Archipelago sailed from Holland in April 1595 and returned in 1597. The accomplishment of this voy-

age was a great encouragement to the Dutch, and "the pent-up enterprise of the Dutch commercial class burst forth as if a dyke had been cut". New companies for Indian trade were started in several towns of Holland and Zeeland, but all these were incorporated in the United East India Company of the Netherlands by the Charter of March 20, 1602. The Dutch States-General, by the said Charter, delegated powers of carrying on war, of concluding treaties, of possessing territories and of erecting fortresses, and thus "made the United Company a great instrument of war and conquest".

The Dutch captured Amboyna from the Portuguese in 1605 and gradually supplanted them in the Spice Islands. The Governor-General and the Council of the Indies was instituted in 1609, Pieter Both being the first Governor-General. His successor, Jan Pietersoon Coen, conquered Jacatra and founded Batavia on its ruins in 1619. They blockaded Goa in 1639, seized Malaca in 1641, and captured the last Portuguese stronghold in Ceylon in 1658. By 1664 the Portuguese were ousted from most of their early settlements on the Malabar coast. In Ceylon, it became the policy of the Dutch (at least up to 1739) to maintain friendly relations with the nominal "emperor of Ceylon", who resided at Kandy, because the Dutch rule there "rested on a native officialdom, open to many influences of race and religion over which they had no control".[2] They also tried to remove the miseries of the people, due to Portuguese misrule and protracted war, by importing slaves from southern India for irrigation and agricultural works and by encouraging new crops like cotton and indigo.

It was pepper and spices, the produce of Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, that had drawn the Dutch to these inlands, and so "the Archipelago was not only the strategic and administrative centre of their system, it was also their economic

[2] Cambridge History, Vol. V, p. 51.

centre."[3] But some interests brought them to India as well, where they established several factories on the Coromondal coast, in Gujrat and in Bengal.[4] The chief of these were Pulicat (1610), Surat (1616), Chinsura (1653), Casimbazar, Patna, Balasore, Baranagore, Nagapatam (1659), and Cochin (1661). These factories greatly helped the cause of Dutch commerce. As early as 1612, the Coromandal coast was described as "the left arm of the Moluccas and neighbouring islands, since without the cottons from thence trade is dead in the Moluccas".[5] They were now in fact the carriers of manufactures and produces between India and her former oversea colonies in the East. The port of Surat supplied them with indigo manufactured in Central India and Jamuna Valley in large quantities and they exproted Bengal, Gujrat and textiles and silk, Bihar saltpetre, rice and particularly Gangetic opium. Owing to the gradual decline of the Portuguese power and the growing superiority of the Dutch in the sea, the latter maintained a practical monopoly of spices trade in the East throughout the seventeenth century.

The peace between England and Spain, concluded in 1604, did not stop Anglo-Portuguese commercial rivalries in the East, though the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were united from 1580 to 1640. In 1611 Sir Henry Middleton was prevented from entering the mouth of the Tapti river by a Portuguese fleet. The English also made counter-attacks in the succeeding years. By an alliance with the Shah of Persia, the English deprived the Portuguese of Ormuz in the Persian

[3] Such an economic centre it had been in earlier Hindu-Buddhist periods also, when it formed part of Greater India.

[4] In Bengal they established factories even in interior villages, as we know from Gangarama's Maharastrapurana, a Bengali work of the mid-Eighteenth century, that the Marathas plundered the Dutch factories at Kagram (Murshidabad District) and Mowgram (in the Burdwan District).

[5] Quoted in Cambridge History, Vol. V, p. 35.

Gulf in 1622 and were permitted to settle in Gombroom and to receive half the customs dues. The rivalry of the Portuguese began to decline from this time and the treaty of Madrid in 1630 forbade commercial hostilities between the two nations in the East. this was followed in 1634 by a convention signed between Netswold, the English Factory President at Surat, and Viceroy of Goa, which "actually guaranteed commercial inter-relations between the English and the Portuguese in India". Portugal recovered her independence from the yoke of Spain, the traditional enemy of England, in 1640, and after this the English and the Portuguese entered into peaceful commercial relations with each other in East Indies. By a treaty of July 1654 Portugal recognized the right of the English to trade in the East and Charles II, by the treaty of 1661, which gave him Bombay as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, promised to help the Portuguese in maintaining their possessions in India against the Dutch. In fact, the Portuguese did not continue hereafter as commercial rivals of the English in India. Their subsequent degeneration into piracy and robbery brought disgrace and ruin on themselves.[6] From traders many of them turned slaverunners, kidnappers and pirates; others took to the profession of 'topasses' or mercenary gunners, and yet others settled down as expert cooks or gay fiddlers. In the eighteenth century, the name of the Portuguese had become "indelibly associated with two great crimes, piracy and the slave trade,"[7] specially in Bengal.

It was from the Dutch that the English had to face more bitter commercial rivalry in the East throughout the seven-

[6] Stewart's History of Bengal, pp. 245—249, 256—259. Mughal, British and Dutch hostility in the first half of the seventeenth century helped to bring about this degeneration, by depriving them of their trade and possessions.

[7] Long's Selections from the Unpublished Records of the Government, Vol. I, Introduction xxxvi.

teenth century. They claimed a monopoly of trade in the East by virtue of conquest from the Portuguese, and were very jealous of any competitor in the field. The Dutch policy in the East had two motives. One was revenge upon Catholic Spain and Portugal (which were united when the Dutch appeared in the East) for Spain's injustice on them in their own country (once subject to her). The other was that of establishing a monopoly in the trade of the East Indies by colonisation and settlement. By the early seventeenth century their first motive was achieved by the gradual decline of the Portuguese and their victories over them. It became too much for them to tolerate English competition in the path of realising their second motive. The Dutch drifted away from England after Elizabeth during the later Stuarts, owing to England's joining France, their oppressor, and the pro-Spanish policy of the Stuarts (and also during Cromwell), so that the presence of the English in the Eastern waters could not be tolerated by the Dutch.

The Dutch at that time had a great advantage in their naval supremacy, and the conclusion of a twelve years truce between Spain and Holland in 1609 left them more free than before to check the progress of English trade in the East Indies. Both the nations asserted priority of claim to the trade of the East Indies; and their sea-captains resorted to open reprisals or covert acts of hostility. None of the conferences in London and at the Hague (1611 and 1613-15) could effect any settlement, and the proposals for uniting the two Companies ended in failure owing to the refusal of the English to share the heavy military expenditure of the Dutch. In July 1619, due to the pressure exerted upon the English Company by James I, who wanted to be the peacemaker of Europe, the English came to terms with the Dutch. The English were rather gradually granted a share in the trade in return for their promise to give up all claims to compensation for past wrongs

and to share a part of the military expenses of the Dutch. But this union lasted only for two years. In 1621 the English were forcibly drived out of Lantor and Pulo-Run. In 1623 the massacre of Amboyna, which "marked the climax of Dutch hatred" of the English in the eastern seas, destroyed all chances of compromise. Van Speult, the Dutch Governor of Amboyna, arrested Towerson, the English agent, with eighteen Englishmen and nine Japanese soldiers, and a Portuguese, on a concocted charge of conspiracy to surprise the Dutch fort on the 17th February. The charge was a false one as the "supposed plot was a mere figment of the imagination, if it were not deliberate device to exterminate the English factory". The English and the Japanese prisoners were subjected to cruel tortures, and Towerson, with nine other Englishmen and nine Japanese, was put to death. This cruel massacre caused an outburst of indignation in England. But in spite of a great feeling of resentment and use of strong words by James I and Charles I England received no real reparations for thirty years till the time of Oliver Cromwell. By the treaty of Westminister in 1654 the question of claims and counter-claims was referred to four Commissioners, taken from both sides, sitting in London. By the decision of the Commissioners, the English got back Pulo-Run, a sum of 85,000 as indemnity for the company, ,and 3,615 for the heirs of the vicims of the Amboyna massacre. By the treaty of Breda in 1667, Pulo-Run and some other places were finally given over to the Dutch in return for the valuable colonial possesssion of New Amsterdam, renamed New York.

The English gradually turned their attention towards India leaving the Dutch secure in their dominion over the Spice Islands. The Dutch began to restrict their activities more and more to the Malaya Archipelago and the English to concentrate more and more on India. But the jealousy of English commerce and influence in India subsisted. In the

years 1672-1674 the Dutch constantly stopped communication between Surat and the new English settlement of Bombay, and captured three home-bound English ships in the Bay of Bengal.[8] When Prince Azim-us-Shan went to Burdwan in 1698 A.D., the Dutch chief of Chinsura sent an agent to his camp representing that while his nation paid a duty of 3½ per cent on all their commerce, the English paid only 3,000 per annum. He therefore prayed that the Dutch might be put on the same footing as the English.[9] Over and above the Dutch jealousy which continued even down to 1759[10] the English Company in India had presently to measure its strength with the French, whose trading and political activities had now developed considerably.

SECTION III

THE FRENCH

Three maritime powers had effected permanent settlements in India, before France entered into the race for commercial gains in the east. Yet "the desire for eastern traffic displayed itself at a very early period among the French"[11] In 1503, only five years after the Portuguese landing in India, two ships fitted out by some Rouen merchants for trading in the Eastern seas left the port of Havre, but nothing was heard of them afterwards. In July 1527 a Norman ship belonging to the Rouen merchants appeared at Diu.[12] In 1601 a company of St. Malo merchants sent two ships, which went up to the

[8] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 56.

[9] Stewart's History of Bengal, p. 385.

[10] Battle of Bedara, vide infra.

[11] Malleson, History of the French in India, p. 5.

[12] Cambridge History, Vol. V, p. 61.

Maldives and Sumatra. New prospects appeared with the peaceful reign of Henry IV, and attempts were made to found a French East India Company. In 1616 two ships were fitted out and sent to the East, and on October 2, 1619, an expedition of three ships under the command of Beaulieu sailed from Harfleur and reached Achin in island of Sumatra. But these attempts of the French sailors received a considerable check from the Dutch, who strove to maintain their monopoly of Eastern trade.[22] For more than twenty years after this, the French made no attempts in this direction. It was Richelieu who again took up the idea of commerce with the East, and under his auspices was founded the 'Society de l Orient' in 1642. The Company, however, devoted all its resources to and exhausted all its energies in the colonisation of Madagascar, under the leadership of Pronis and Flacourt.

But the exploits of some missionaries and travellers in reaching India, by a short-cut land route through Asia Minor, enhanced the desire of the French to share the profits of Eastern trade with the Dutch and the English. Colbert, the great minister of Louis XIV, "became the interpreter of the unanimous desire of the merchants and mariners of the kingdom, as well as of those who desired its economic development, and at his proposal and inspiration the "Compagnie des Indes Orientales' was formed in 1664. This company received various privileges from the state, and it began its career with a capital of about 5,500,000 livers, including the 3,000,000 advanced by the king. Nevertheless its first movements were "neither well considered nor fortunate" because the Company spent much of its energies in fruitless endeavours to revive the colonies of Madagascar. But in 1667 another expedition sailed from

[22] In 1625 Isaac de Razilly declared that "as regards Asia and the East Indies there is no hope of planting colonies, for the way is too long, and the Spaniards and Dutch are too strong to suffer it." Quoted in Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 61.

France, under the command of Francis Caron,[14] who was accompanied by Marcara, a native of Ispahan.[15] Francis Caron founded the first French factory at Surat in 1668; and another factory was established at Masulipatam in 1669 through the efforts of Marcara, under a patent obtained from the King of Golkunda. In 1672 the French occupied San Thome, but in the following year their Admiral de la Haye, was driven from Trincomali, and in 1674 the French were defeated by a combined force of the Dutch and the King of Golkonda (whose jealousy against the French had been excited by the Dutch), and had to surrender San Thome to the Dutch. In the meantime, Bellanger de Lespinay, one of the volunters who had accompanied Admiral de la Haye, obtained from Sher Khan Lodi, the governor of the King of Bijapur in Tanjore and the Carnatic, a site for a factory eighty-five miles south of Madras. Thus the foundation of Pondicherry was laid (1674) in this modest fashion, and it was Francis Martin, who by his great courage, intelligence and perseverance developed it into a place of importance," amid the clash of arms and the clamour of falling kingdoms".[16]

In Bengal the French built a Factory at Chandernagore (1690-92, about the same time as Calcutta was founded by the

[14] Francis Caron, though of French origin, was born in Holland and spent many years in the service of the Dutch Republic. But later on he became dissatisfied with the Dutch, and tendered his services to Colbert.

[15] From a recent letter of the Siamese King to the Bihar Shiah Conference, it becomes clear that the Persians in the middle of the seventeenth century were trading and settling in Siam; this period therefore saw some Persian maritime activity. Cf. also their driving out the Portuguese from Ormuz, evidently to recapture the trade between Persia and the Far East.

[16] Malleson's History of the French in India, p. 24, Bijapur ceased to be dependent in 1676, Golkonda fell a prey to the ambition of Aurangzeb, and the activities of Shivaji in the south created some troubles for the European Companies.

English Company) on a site granted to them by Nawab Shaista Khan 'about the year 1676'.[17]

The outbreak of a war in Europe between the Dutch (supported by England) and French reacted adversely on the fortune of the French in India. In 1693 the Dutch captured Pondicherry, which remained in their possession for six years, and they fortified it in various ways. But it was restored to the French by the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, with its fortifications intact, though they did not actually get back its possession til 1699. Martin, who was again appointed to the command of the place, restored by his wise measures its prosperity, so that it contained about 40,000 inhabitants at the time of his death in 1706, as compared with 22,000 of Calcutta in the same year. But French influence dwindled in other places, and factories at Bantam, Surat and Masulipatam were abandoned by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Pondicherry became the seat of the French Government in India.

The resources of the French Company were practically exhausted by the end of the seventeenth century, and from the beginning of the eighteenth century till its reorganisation in 1720, it sold its licenses to others. In 1712 the Company even gave up its rights of despatching vessels to the Indies to the merchants of St. Malo in consideration of an annual payment. No less than five governors were appointed from 1707 to 1720, but each in turn followed a line of policy different from that of Martin. At the suggestion of John Law of Lauriston, Controller of the French Finances, a royal edict was passed in May 1719, incorporating the French East India Company with the other French trading companies, viz., the Canada Company, the the Mississipi Company or Company of the west, the Senegal Company, the China Company, and the Companies of Domingo and Guinea,—and this great body known as the 'Company

[17] Stewart, op. cit., p. 241.

of the Indies' also received the right of issuing coinage, the monopoly of tobacco, and the control of its public debt. Shares poured in, and speculations by all classes of people grew immensely.[18] But by 1720 the Company's paper currency became discredited and the "rage of speculation had been superseded by the rage for realising," which led to the failure of Law's scheme. In June 1720, the East India Company was reconstituted as the 'Perpetual Company of the Indies'. From this time the French East India Company again entered upon a path of progress in the East. The island of Mauritius came into their possession in 1721, and in 1725 a small French squadron under the command of M. de Pardaillan captured Mahe on the Malabar coast, by following a plan suggested by one of its captains, La Bourdonnais, subsequently a famous name in the history of the French in India. In 1739 they took possession of Karikal on the Coromandal coast from the Raja of Tanjore. It should be noted that the two French governors, Lenoir and Dumas, who held office from 1720 to 1742, had only commercial objects in view. There was nothing in their conduct that "allows us to credit the Company with political views and still less ideas of conquest; its factories were more or less fortified, but for motives of simple security against the Dutch and the English; and although it enlisted troops, it used them only for purposes of defence".[19] Political motives appeared clearly after them, and it was left for Dupleix to think of a French Empire in India.

SECTION IV

THE ENGLISH

During the sixteenth century, the merchants of England also were anxious to share in the profits of Eastern Commerce.

[18] Cf. the speculation in England at this time: the South Sea Bubble.

[19] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 75.

Drakes' return (1580) from his voyage round the world by the Cape route and the victory over the Spanish Armada (1588) marked the birth in England of a new spirit of enterprise and advance in every field, (politics, literature, commerce, etc.). The return of Ralph Fitch (1951) from several years' travels in India and Burma, and the capture of Portuguese treasures on high seas by English privateers, encouraged some of them to undertake voyages to the East. Between 1591 and 1593 a ship under James Lancaster reached Cape Comorin and the Malaya Peninsula. Three years after Lancaster's return a fleet was sent by Sir Robert Dudley under Benjamin Wood but the enterprise ended in disaster. In 1597, Jhon Mildenhall, a merchant adventurer of London, reached India by the overland route and spent seven years in the East. The first important step was taken on the 31st December, 1600, when the East India campany was incorporated under the title of "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies," and received a charter from Queen Elizabeth granting them an exclusive right (as against others in England) to Indian trade for fifteen years.

At the beginning the Company sent 'separate voyages' in which each fleet was dispatched by a particular group of subscribers, who divided among themselves the profits arising from their enterprise. Permanent joint-stock enterprises of the modern type organised by the whole body of subscribers did not begin before half a century of trial. The Company had various difficulties to face at this early stage of its existence. "It had to explore and map out the Indian seas and coasts, it had painfully to work out a system of commerce, to experiment with commodities and merchandise, to train and discipline a staff of servants. It had to brave or conciliate the hostility of England's hereditary Catholic enemy and her new protestant rival. Further, it had to establish a position even at home...there was no active state support given to England's

first essays in the East. The East India Company was cradled in the chilly but invigorating atmosphere of individualism. It had to cope with the lingering mediaeval prejudice against the export of bullion and a fallacious theory of foreign trade:"[20]

The first (1601-1603) and second (1604-1606) voyages were made to Achin (in Sumatra), Bantam (in Java), and the Moluccas, and not to India. The third voyage (1608) under Hawkins reached Surat, the chief port of the Mughal Empire. Hawkins visited the court of Jahangir, who received him favourably and granted the English permission to settle in Surat. But owing to jealousy of the Portuguese and the opposition of the chief merchants of Surat, Jahangir revoked these privileges and ordered the exclusion of the English. Hawkins left Agra in November 1611.

Meanwhile, in May 1609, a fresh Charter had been granted to the Company extending its privileges indefinitely (subject to revocation after three years' notice). The prospects of the Company brightened up when in 1612 Captain Best defeated the Portuguese in a sea-fight off the mouth of the Tapti.[21] An English factory was permanently established at Surat under Thomas Aldworth on a firman received from Jahangir early in 1613: With the object of concluding a treaty with the Mughal Emperor for securing permanent trade relations with India, the Company sent, with the permission of James I, Sir Thomas Roe, "of pregnant understanding, well spoken, learn-

[20] Roberts, History of British India, p. 24. The reference is to the contemporary economic theory that money being wealth, export of bullion diminished national wealth, and import or purchase of manufactured goods, etc., in return for bullion is therefore a bad foreign trade; the Company did both.

[21] It will be noted that, in the absence of an efficient navy, either of the Mughal Empire of any other Indian State, such hostilities in Indian waters and on Indian coasts were carried on for about three centuries without any check.

ed, industrious, and of a comely personage" as an ambassador to the Mughal court. Roe arrived at the court of Jahangir, which was then at Ajmir, in December 1615, and spent three years in trying to fulfil his object. He could not conclude a definite commercial treaty with the Emperor, owing to the opposition of some of the Emperor's officers and of Prince Khurram (Shah Jahan), then Viceroy of Gujarat, who did not like the interference of the English in the affairs of his province. But he succeeded in securing several privileges and a permission for establishing factories in certain places within the Emperor's dominions.

By the time Roe left India (February 1619) there had been established English factories at Surat, Agra, Ahmadabad and Broach, all of which were placed under the authority of the chief of the Surat Factory, who had also to control the trade of the Company with the Red Sea ports and Persia. The Company also obtained a powerful ally in the Shah of Persia, who was jealous of Portuguese control of the trade of southern Persia—particularly as Persians in the seventeenth century took to oversea trade even as far as Siam. With his help the English obtained some advantages over the Portuguese who lost Ormuz in 1622. In 1668 the Company obtained Bombay at a rent of 10 pound a year from Charles II, who had received it from the Portuguese as part of the dowry of his wife, Catherine of Braganza. Bombay became gradually more and more prosperous and superseded Surat (after about 75 years) as the chief English settlement on the west coast in 1687. On the Eastern coast the English had started a Factory (1611) at Masulipatam (the chief port of the Kingdom of Golkonda) where they enjoyed a valuable trade, especially in exporting piece-goods to Persia and Bantam. But the Dutch and the local officers troubled the factors at Masulipatam with much opposition, and so they established in 1626 another settlement at Armagaon, a little to the north of the Dutch fortress of

Pulicat. Owing to various disadvantages in this place, they again returned to Masulipatam, where their position was improved by the grant of the '*Golden Firman*' by the king of Golkonda[22] in 1632 which gave the English liberty of trade in the ports of the kingdom of Golkonda on the payment of annual duties amounting to 500 'pagodas.'[23] Another firman of 1643 repeated the same terms. In 1639 Francis Day obtained the lease of Madras from the ruler of Chandragiri (the representative of the steadily dwindling Kingdom of Vijayanagar), and built there a fortified factory named Fort St. George. By 1641 Fort St. George superseded Masulipatam (after thirty years) as the headquarters of the English in the Coromandel coast.

By this time the English had also pushed their trade northeastwards to Orissa, and had started factories at Hariharpur in the Mahanadi Delta and at Balasore in 1633. Gabriel Boughton, a physician, who visited Agra in 1645 and appears to have made an impression at the Imperial Court and the provincial court of Bengal, was granted a firman about 1650, whereby in his name one or more ships could be cleared duty free in Bengal; but Boughton died in 1653; and it is not clear if the English Company derived any definite or continued advantage from Boughton's *firman*.[24] In 1651 a factory was established at Hugli under one Mr. Bridgeman. A trade was opened up with Bengal in sugar, silks and saltpetre, and soon other factories were built at Patna, at Kasimbazar and at Rajmahal. But for some years the Company could not derive

[22] The Muhammadan Kingdom of Golconda did not follow up the tradition of maritime activity of the Hindu States of the Coromandel whom it supplanted, just as the Mughals did not do so in Gujarat region.

[23] Cf. the grant of Shujah, Governor of Bengal, in 1651—52.

[24] Stewart, History of Bengal, pp. 284—86. Crawford, History of the Indian Medieval Service, and Roll of the I. M. S.

much profit owing to the irregular private trade of its servants, and there was a proposal to leave Bengal altogether, which was, however, altered in 1658, after Cromwell's charter. In this year all the settlements in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and on the Coromandel coast, were made subordinate to Fort St. George. But due to several causes, the position of the Company's trade at Madras and Surat was at a low ebb at the end of the first half of the seventeenth century. "The severe wars of the Indian rulers, the opposition of the Dutch, and the threatened withdrawal of the Company's privileges (owing to the Merchant Adventurer's petition for throwing the trade of India open) in England, combined to render the outlook anything but hopeful".[25]

The Company's position improved during the second half of the seventeenth century, and its policy also underwent a change. It had been hitherto a mere peaceful trading corporation, following a policy of non-interference in internal wars, but it now tried to win a position in India as a political power. Improvement of the Company's prospects was due to certain changes at home. Cromwell's charter of 1657 had given a new lease of life to the Company and enabled it to raise a permanent and effective joint stock. In the same year the rivalry between the London East India Company and the Merchant Adventurer came to an end by the union of the two bodies. During the twenty years after the Restoration several royal Charters granted to the Company the right of coining money of erecting fortifications, of exercising jurisdiction over English subjects residing in the East (and even Indians residing in or connected with English factory settlements)[26] and of making peace or war with non-Christian peoples.

[25] Hamilton, Trade Relations, etc., p. 29.

[26] Charter Acts of 1677, 1683, and 'Mayor's Court' of 1s26 and 1753.

The disturbed political condition of India made the Company, whose position was thus improving, think of its own powers of defence and led to a modification of its previous policy. The perennial warfare between the Imperial forces and the Marathas, and other Deccan states, the almost independent but inefficient rule of the Mughal Viceroy in Bengal which became a prey to all kinds of internal disorders and external dangers, and the activities of the Malabar pirates, made the Company anxious about the safety of its own trade in India. Shivaji sacked Surat twice (1664 and 1670), and in 1667 he passed close to Madras while on his way to capture the strong hold of Jinji. Gerald Aungier, who succeeded Sir George Oxenden as President at Surat, and Governor of Bombay in 1669, tried to strengthen the position of Bombay in various ways. He wrote to the Court of Directors that "the times now require you to manage your commerce with sword in your hands". In the course of a few years the Directors followed the spirit of his policy, and wrote to Madras in a letter of December 1687 "to establish such a Polity of Civil and Military power, and create and secure such a large revenue to maintain both...as may be the foundation of a large, well grounded, secure English dominion in India for all time to come".[27] This departure of policy did not originate with Sir Josiah Child as is generally supposed, but he was the dominant force in the affairs of the Company from his appointment as the Governor of Bombay in 1681 till his death in 1699.

Hostilities between the English factors and the Mughal officers had already begun. In 1651-52 the English in Bengal had obtained a '*nishan*' from Sultan Shujah granting the privilege of free trade to the members of the Company in consideration of an annual payment of Rs. 3,000. A new '*nishan*' was granted them in 1656, which laid down that "the factory

[27] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 102.

of the English Company be no more troubled with demands of custom for goods imported or exported either by land or by water, nor that their goods he opened and forced from them at under rates in any places of government by which they shall pass and repass up and down the country; but that they buy and sell freely, and without impediment".[28] The English factors became very particular in asserting these privileges, since their private trade passed free as well as the Company's. But the Mughal officers subsequently took the view that with increasing trade the English should pay the tolls levied upon other merchants, and that the 'nishan' of Shujah was not binding upon his successors.[29] The factors tried to retain their privileges by securing *firmans* from the governors and emperors. Shaista Khan's *firman* of 1672 provided that "whatsoever goods the said company shall import from Balasore and any other place near the sea-side, up to Hugly, Cassimbazar, Patna, or any other place in these two kingdoms; as also what saltpetre or any other goods that they shall export from Patna or any other place, to Balasore, or any other part to the sea; that you let them pass custom free, without any let, impediment or demands whatsoever."[30] A *firman* of 1680 granted by the Emperor Aurangzeb ordered that no one should molest the Company's people for customs and should impede their trade, and that "of the English nation, besides their usual custom of 2 per cent for their goods, more 1½ *jezia*, or poll-money, shall be taken".[31] The Company's people wrongly claimed that by virtue of this *firman*, they could on the payment of a consolidated duty of 3½ per cent at Surat, import goods and trade free of all customs and exactions at all other places in the Mughal

[28] Stewart, op. cit., Appendix No. 11.

[29] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, pp. 321—323.

[30] Stewart, op. cit., Appendix No. 111.

[31] Ibid., No. V.

Empire, even if these goods had not been imported through Surat and there not taxed at all.[32] The local officers of the Emperor continued to levy tolls and to seize the Company's goods in all places (Bombay, Bengal and Madras), which the agents of the Company could not prevent.

The English traders at last thought of protecting themselves by force. "Experience soon showed that treaties were of no avail against the lawlessness of the local officials. It was not that the Mughal Government would not protect the foreign merchants against oppression and wrong. It could not as whatever control it had, it was gradually losing".[33] The Directors also, as we have already seen, decided to exert force for the maintenance of the Company's position in India. Captain Nicholson was sent from home with orders to capture and fortify Chittagong, as the future seat of the Company in that part with the King of Siam, and to snatch off Salsette from the Portuguese. War actually broke out with the sack of Hugli by the English in October 1686, but they were repulsed from Hugli and retreated 24 miles down the river to Sutanuti (modern Calcutta). They renewed hostilities by seizing Hijli (1687), and storming the Mughal fortifications at Balasore, (1686) under a fresh naval force sent from home under Captain William Heath. He failed to conquer Chittagong in 1689 and sailed back to Madras.

On the Western coast, Sir John Child declared war against the Mughal authority (in December 1688), blockaded the mouth of the river below Surat, and captured all sorts of Mughal shipping indiscriminately, and sent his captain to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf "to arrest the pilgrimage traffic to Mecca". But Child had to submit, and he appealed for pardon, sending a mission to Aurangzeb under G. Weldon and Abraham

[32] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, p. 317.

[33] Quoted in Ibid.

Navars on the 10th December.[34] The Emperor granted his pardon on the 25th December, and peace was concluded in February 1690, by which the English obtained a licence for their trade on condition of paying one-and-a half lakh of rupees and restoring the goods captured from Mughal ships.[35] Ibrahim Khan, who had succeeded Shaista Khan, as the Governor of Bengal, was also ordered by the Emperor to allow the Company to trade in Bengal without molestation on payment of Rs. 3,000 a year in lieu of all customs and other dues.[36] Job Charnock returned from Madras to Bengal on the 24th August and the English established a factory at Sutanuti. Thus was laid the "foundation of the future capital of British India, the first step in the realization of the half-conscious prophecy of 1686".[37] In 1696-97 an alarm excited by the rebellion of Sobha Singh, a zamindar in the district of Burdwan, provided an opportunity for fortifying their new factory, and two years later Azim-us-Shan permitted the English to purchase the Zamindary of the three villages of Sutanuti, Kalikata (Kalighata-Calcutta), and Govindpur on payment of Rs. 1,300 to former holders.[38] In 1700 the fortified factory was named Fort William (in honour of King William III of England) and became the seat of a Presidency, with Sir Charles Eyre[39] as the first President and Governor of Fort William in Bengal.

But for several years after this the Company's trade in western India was under a great depression on account of

[34] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, p. 339.

[35] Ibid., p. 339.

[36] Stewart, op. cit., Appendix No. 819.

[37] Roberts, History of British India, p. 46, vide ante.

[38] Extract from the Deed of Purchase, dated 30th December, 1699 quoted in Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 31.

[39] Who had married Job Charnock's daughter by his Indian wife whom he had saved from Suttee.

"lack of capital, the intrusion of interlopers of their own race and civil discord in the Bombay Council."[40] To this was added the evil of piracy in the Indian Ocean by English pirates, who plundered the ships of the merchants of Surat and the Mughal pilgrim ships to and from Mecca. It was difficult for the native merchants and officers to distinguish between the pirates sailing under English colours and the peaceful traders of the Company, and their servants were held responsible for the atrocities of English corsairs. Aurangzeb accordingly placed the trade of all the European Companies under an embargo so long as they did not compensate the losses inflicted on Mughal shipping, and the Englishmen in the Surat Factory were imprisoned in 1699. "Finally, the English, French and Dutch agreed to act in concert to suppress piracy, and signed bonds by which they jointly engaged to make good all future losses." After this the embargo on European trade in the Mughal dominions was reversed. According to the terms of this agreement "the Dutch conveyed the Mecca pilgrims and patrolled the entrance to the Red Sea, besides paying Rs. 70,000 to the Governor of Surat; the English paid Rs. 30,000 and patrolled the South Indian seas, while the French made a similar payment and policed the Persian Gulf."[41]

The Company's Indian trade had excited the opposition of its opponents at home, and rival companies had been started for trading in the East. In 1694 four classes of English traders obtained a right of trading to the East Indies: (1) "The New English Company; (2) the Old Company, trading on their full capital until 1701, and after that, on their limited subscription of 315,000 to the General Society; (3) subscribers to the General Society, who had refused to incorporate themselves in the joint-stock of the New Company under which category the

[40] Sarkar, Aurangzeb, p. 339.

[41] Ibid., p. 354.

old Company ranked after 1701; (4) a few private adventurers who had embarked in the trade to India after the Commons Resolution in 1694 (that all the subjects of England have equal right to trade to the East Indies, unless prohibited by Act of Parliament) and before the incorporation of the General Society in 1698."

Of these, the New English Company was a really serious competitor of the Old Company and tried to thwart the activities of the Old Company in various ways. It sent Sir William Norris as an ambassador to the court of Aurangzeb (April 1701) to negotiate for privileges to the New Company's trade. But the mission ended in a fiasco. The rivalry of the two companies came to an end finally in 1708 by the award of the Earl of Godolphin. The two companies were amalgamated under the title of the "United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies".

The domestic history of the Company from 1709 to the middle of the eighteenth century was one of prosperity. A Parliamentary Act of 1711 extended the period of its exclusive trade till 1773, and another act was passed in 1730 prolonging its privileges till 1769. In India also its trade and influence increased, though there were occasional interruptions from provincial governors or local officers. It is a mistake to think that the political disorders of the time inflicted great hardships on the Company. On the other hand, it took advantage of these to better its status and fortunes step by step. The accession of Farrukhsiyar, who had been well disposed towards the English, presented an opportunity for them. An embassy under John Surman and Edward Stephenson, sent from Calcutta, reached Delhi in July 1715. Mr. William Hamilton also accompanied the embassy as surgeon, and an Armenian merchant of Calcutta, named Khwajah Sarhad, who understood both English and Persian, went with it as an interpreter. Hamilton, who became a favourite of the Emperor by curing

him of a painful disease, succeeded in converting His Majesty's ideas in favour of the Company, and the envoys submitted the Company's petitions at an opportune moment in the month of January 1716. These received a favourable response from the Emperor, who in January-February 1717 granted *firmans* conceding important privileges to the Company. Surman brought back with him three *firmans* addressed to the officials of the three provinces, Hyderabad, Gujarat, and Bengal (including Bihar and Orissa), where the English were settled. The right of the latter to trade in Bengal, free of all duties, subject to the customary payment of Rs. 3,000 per annum, was confirmed: they were to be allowed to rent additional territory round Calcutta and to settle where else they might choose: their long-standing privilege of freedom from dues throughout the province of Hyderabad[42] was continued, the only payment required being the existing rent paid for Madras;[43] certain neighbouring villages, which had long been in dispute, were added to that city; a rearrangement of the Company's lands round Vizagapatam was sanctioned; a yearly sum of Rs. 10,000 was accepted in satisfaction of all customs and dues (hitherto paid by them) at Surat; and the rupees coined by the Company at Bombay were allowed to pass throughout the imperial dominions.[44]

This embassy marks a turning-point in the history of the English East India Company in India. It secured for it important privileges for which the historian Orme afterwards rightly described it as the "Magna Charta of the Company". The concession for settling in certain villages near Madras and

[42] Lately the Kingdom of Golconda, whose rulers had conferred these privileges.

[43] Originally paid to the Rajas of Chandragiri (Vijayanagar), then to the Nawabs of the Carnatic.

[44] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 112.

Calcutta made the Company an "integral part of the empire of the Mughals," and the right of coining and issuing money from the Bombay mint was an "extra-ordinary privilege".[45] The *firman* exempting the Company's trade from duties immensely contributed towards the growth of its commerce and influence in India. Moreover, the English came to have some knowledge through their envoys about the rotten state of the Mughal Empire in India. Though hampered occasionally here and there by the evils accompanying the break-up of the Mughal Empire, the privileged trade of the Company entered upon a period of progress and prosperity. No doubt some disturbing influences appeared, but these were sufficiently overcome, and more than balanced by the favourable circumstances.

The Company's trade on the Western coast of India suffered to some extent for about eighteen years after this owing to the disputes of the Marathas and the Portuguese, who could not (in spite of English help) maintain their position and lost Bassein in 1739, and the ravages of the Maratha pirates of the Malabar coasts, notably the Angrias, who dominated the coast between Bombay and Goa. Boone, who was the Governor of Bombay from 1715 to 1722, built a wall round Bombay and constructed many fighting ships for defending the Company's factory and trade against these pirates. But after these eighteen years the commerce of Bombay increased, as the power of the pirates began to decline, though it was finally broken after the capture of Survarndrug in 1755 by Commodore James and the conquest of their capital Gheria by Clive

[45] But it may be said that Bombay was held in full territorial sovereignty so that it was not an extraordinary privilege, but a great recognition; the case was different with the Madras rupee (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and with the attempt (first half of eighteenth century) of the East India Company to have a mint or use the Mughal mint in Bengal.

and Watson in 1756. In 1744 Bombay had a population of about 70,000 and the military strength of the Company also increased. In 1739 the English concluded the first treaty with the Marathas and obtained from the Peshwa a grant of free trade throughout his dominions. At Madras also the English "plied a peaceful commerce, remaining on excellent terms with both the ruler of the Carnatic and his overlord, the Subahdar of the Deccan (Asaf Jah, Nizam-ul-Mulk, who had made himself practically independent of Delhi by this time)." In 1717 the English took possession of those 'five towns' near Madras, which had been originally obtained by Thomas Pitt (Governor of Madras from 1698—1709) from the Nawab of the Carnatic in 1708, and in 1734 they also got Vepery and four other hamlets.

The political condition of Bengal was not so disturbed as at Madras or Bombay, and the Nawabs there maintained some order and peace in the province. So the trade of the Company and the private trade of its servants prospered, and Calcutta gradually grew into importance, coming to have a population of about 100,000 by 1735. The shipping of the port, in the course of ten years after the embassy of 1715-16, amounted to ten thousand tons a year in spite of the English Company's occasional troubles with the government of Murshid Quli Jafar Khan, Nawab of Bengal, (1700 to 1727) and with the local officers of the Nawab who levied tolls and exactions on their trade.

CHAPTER II

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN INDIA

(EIGHTEENTH CENTURY)

In the eighteenth century, India witnessed on her soil not merely the rivalries of the native powers with one another or of the English East India Company with these powers, but also the bitter and repeated conflicts between the English and the French. With the gradual dismemberment of the Mughal Empire order and peace disappeared, and on every side adventurers, both native and foreign, found scope for ambitious and stormy careers. We have already seen how the French and the English Companies were each improving their positions in India step by step. By 1742 the interests of the two powers came into collision, and the echo of a war in Europe reached the distant shores of India. Henceforth the wars between the French and the English have not merely local causes or importance, but they are connected with the histories of America and Asia. Voltaire truly wrote, "the first cannon shot fired in our lands was to set the match to all the batteries in America and in Asia". The War of the Austrian Succession, which had broken out in 1740, and in which the French and the English were engaged in aid of opposite parties, thus produced hostilities between the two nations in India.

There were four stages of the Anglo-French conflict in India, the first from 1745-1748, the second from 1749-1754, the third from 1757-1763, and the fourth from 1778-1815. Except in the third stage these conflicts were mainly confined to Southern India, and we should, therefore, first of all review the political condition in that region in order to follow the history of these conflicts properly.

The whole of the Deccan (roughly the country south of the Narmada and the Mahanadi and from coast to coast) was claimed by the Nizam as his Subah. On the east coast there were three important cities, each a place of trade: Negapatam under the Dutch, Pondicherry under the French, and Madras under the English. At Arcot was the Nawab of the Carnatic,[1] formally dependent on the Nizam, but always trying to convert his official appointment into a hereditary rule. The Kingdom of Trichinopoly, at the time of its annexation to the Carnatic in 1736 or 1737, was under a Hindu princess, the widow of the last Nayak, whose family had established its power there on the breakup of the Vijayanagar Empire at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Tanjore was a little Maratha jagir, established as a result of the Maratha advance into the Carnatic in the seventeenth century. Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Subahdar of the Deccan, had for all practical purposes made himself independent of the effete Emperor of Delhi. In the Carnatic a strong Muhammadan dynasty of Nawabs soon established itself owing only a nominal submission to the Nizam, and these Nawabs tried to extend the limits of their kingdom. Nawab Dost Ali's son, Safdar Ali[2], and his son-in-law, Chanda Sahib conquered Trichonopoly in 1736 (or 1737) and Madura was occupied by Chanda Sahib's brother. But in spite of their repeated attempts, sometimes with the help of the French, they could not conquer Tanjore. The growth of a new Muslim power in the south had excited the jealousy of the Marathas,

[1] Carnatic included at this time (i) the east cost territory between the mouths of the Krishna and Kaveri, in which was situated Arcot, (ii) the east coast territory, south of the Kaveri, in which was situated Trichinopoly, and (iii) the adjacent part of the Deccan plateau, above the Eastern Ghats.

[2] Dost Ali had two sons, of whom the elder was Safdar Ali, and several daughters, one of whom was married to his nephew Murtaza Ali and another to Chanda Sahib.

who had not received the chauth from the Nawab of Arcot for many years.[3] In May 1740, a strong Maratha force (100,000 according to Orme) under Raghuji Bhonsle and Fateh Singh burst into the Carnatic. They were probably incited by their co-religionists, the Rajas of Mysore and Tanjore, who had suffered injuries at the hands of Chanda Sahib:[4] but "the common rumour was that they had been invited by Safdar Ali in jealousy of Chanda Sahib's designs, or that had been abetted by Nasir Jang, son of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, in order to get them out of his father's territories".[5] In the battle that took place on the 20th of May, Dost Ali was defeated and slain with his second son, Hasan Ali, and his principal officers, his Diwan Mir Asad being taken prisoner. At this Safdar Ali took refuge in Vellore, but returned to Arcot after the departure of the Marathas, and Chanda Sahib hurried back to Trichinopoly.[6] They reappeared about the middle of December 1740 and besieged Trichinopoly[7], and Chanda Sahib, failing to pay the ransom that was demanded of him, was carried off prisoner.

[3] Orme, History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan, Vol. I, p. 41, Shahu, on release, was virtually in the position of a dependent sub-ruler under Mughal suzerainty; Balaji Visvanath had secured, through Husain Ali, the right, on behalf of Shahu, of collecting chauth from six provinces of the Decan Subah which included Arcot.

[4] Orme op. cit., Vol. I, p. 41. In about the same time, according to on account the oppressed Hindu zamindars and subjects in Bengal invited Shahu's and Raghuji Bhonsle's help, which led to Bhaskar Pandit's invasion of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, K. K. Datta, Alivardi and His Times, pp. 57—58.

[5] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 118. So also in the case of the Maratha invasion of Bengal, the incitement of the Deccan Subahdar is alleged by contemporary historians.

[6] Orme, op. cit., p. 42. Safdar Ali had kept his family for the time being at Pondicherry.

[7] Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Trivandram Session.

Murari Rao, one of their generals, was left with 14,000 troops under his command, as a deputy at Trichinopoly.[8]

The Maratha expeditions adversely affected the economic condition of the Carnatic[9] and gave a great shock to Safdar Ali's rule.

In the autnmn of 1742 Safdar Ali went to Vellore, sending the women and children of his family and his treasures to the custody of the English at Madras. But there he fell victim to a conspiracy planned by his cousin and brother-in-law, Murtaza Ali, and some of his own courtiers, who were discontented with him for his realising heavy contributions from them in order to pay off the stipulated sum to the Marathas. Murtaza Ali stabbed Safdar Ali to death on the 2nd October, 1742, and tried to take possession of the government of Arcot by proclaiming himself as its Nawab. But he was too weak to hold it long against the hostile attitude of the people and the troops, and fled back to Vellore, disguised as a woman. On his flight being known, Safdar Ali's infant son, Seid Muhammad, who had been left with his mother at Madras, was for the time being recognised as the Nawab. In the beginning of 1743, the Nizam-ul-Mulk appeared personally in the Carnatic, compelled the Marathas to evacuate Trichinopoly, restored some order, and appointed Abdulla Khan to the government of Arcot. But the latter soon died, and Anwar-ud-din, an old officer of the Nizam, was appointed to succeed him as a temporary governor and guardian to the minor son of Safdar Ali. Seid Muhammad was soon murdered while attending a feast at Arcot, and Anwar-ud-din was confirmed in his appointment. But Anwar-ud-din's position was not quite safe. The partisans of Safdar Ali were still powerful, and, as Orme puts it, "the province, irritated by their aversion to a lord, whose sovereignty destroyed their

[8] Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 44.

[9] Ibid., p. 42.

hopes of being ruled by one of the family of the race they so much loved, complained loudly of the avarice and parsimony of Anwar-ud-din Khan's government, and contrasted it, much to his disadvantage, with that of their former Nabobs."[10]

Thus there were many conflicting political forces in the Deccan, when it became the scene of hostilities between the two European nations. There had been rumours about the outbreak of a war between them from 1740, and in 1741, when the war seemed imminent, La Bourdonnais, the French Governor of the Isles of France and Bourbon, prepared a squadron intended to intercept the English vessels, but very soon he had to send back the squadron home, as the authorities there thought that the crisis had been over; so the French had no strong ships of war left in India. Dupleix, who became Governor of Pondicherry in 1742, hoped at that time for a "neutrality in India". But war soon broke out, and an English fleet under Commodore Barnett appeared on the Coromandel coast in 1745, and threatened Pondicherry. But he died soon, and was succeeded by Commodore Peyton in the command of the fleet. Dupleix then called La Bourdonnais, who had prepared a new squadron in the Isles and received reinforcements from France, to come to his rescue. La Bourdonnais reached Pondicherry in 1746, and had an indecisive engagement with Peyton on June 25 of that year.[11] After some unsuccessful attempts Peyton left the coast and sailed to Hugli for safety. Madras was then besieged by La Bourdonnais in September,[12] and it surrendered after a feeble resistance under its governor Nicholas Morse. The English entered into a capitulation with the French by which it was agreed that the "English should surrender themselves prisoners of war; that

[10] Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 61.

[11] Ibid., pp. 62—64.

[12] Ibid., pp. 68—69.

the town should be immediately delivered up; but that it should be afterwards ransomed."[13]

But the unity of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix was not to last long: they soon entered into disputes about the disposal of Madras. The former was ready to allow the English to ransom their settlement but Dupleix refused to give his consent to this arrangement, by which, as he pointed out, the Council at Pondicherry would reap no advantage for their efforts and the interests of the French would suffer. He thought that he could not let slip this first great opportunity which had appeared. He wanted to adopt, as Malleson writes, "that policy even then consecrated by genius, the policy of Alexander, of Hannibal, of Gustavus, to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to use the means, which had been so wonderfully, so unexpectedly placed at his disposal, to crush him at once and for ever. Madras in his hands, Fort St. David could scarcely hold out, and then, secure of the Coromandel coast, it might be possible to despatch a fleet to Bengal, to destroy the colony which had rivalled, and was threatening to surpass, his own tenderly nursed settlement of Chandranagar".[14] Letters were sent to La Bourdonnais pointing out to him that he was subject to the Superior Council of Pondicherry and could not act independently in the matter. Dupleix "advised, he entreated, he menaced, he protested", but all in vain. La Bourdonnais concluded a treaty with the Madras Council, agreeing to restore Madras for 400,000. La Bourdonnais was determined "not to subordinate his will to the will of Dupleix". Duplex was not actuated by motives of personal gain; he believed that the restoration of Madras to the English would again endanger the position of the French. So when the Governor of the French

[13] Ibid.

[14] Malleson, History of the French in India, p. 156.

in India, who had strained every nerve to prevent it[15], heard of the transaction between La Bourdonnais and the English, his mind was filled with great anger and vexation, and very soon there ensued bitter personal quarrels between the two men. It was one of the misfortunes of the French in India, and it was due largely to the corrupt state of their government at home, that their governors, commanders and generals could not act in union for a long time.[16] But the rigours of the monsoon and the effects of a hurricane during the early part of October, weakened La Bourdonnais greatly. He was obliged to leave behind him a large number of his followers, who went over to the side of Dupleix and the French troops under him swelled to 3,000 men. On the departure of La Bourdonnais, Dupleix repudiated the treaty which the former had concluded with the English, seized Madras and took many of the English as prisoners to Pondicherry.

Dupleix bravely removed another difficulty. Nawab Anwar-ud-din had not been totally indifferent about these affairs. When La Bourdonnais had laid seige to Madras, he sent an urgent letter to Dupleix pressing for the withdrawal of French troops. Duplex pleaded that he was conquering Madras for the Nawab. But when after its actual siege, he received "only excuses founded upon the alleged insubordination of the French official in command, and when he saw the French flag flying over Madras and the French busy in estab-

[15] ".....in the name of God; in the name of your children of your wife, I conjure you to be persuaded of what I tell you. Finish as you have begun, and do not treat with any enemy, who has no object but to reduce us to the most dire extremity.....Let us then profit by our opportunity, for the glory of our monarch, and for the general interests of a nation which will regard you as its restorer in India." Quoted in Malleson, op. cit., p. 144.

[16] "The ways of Europeans, who used always to act in union, have apparently now become like those of natives and Muhammadans." Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai, Vol. II, p. 395.

lishing their authority there, his patience gave way. He sent a body of troops under his eldest son, Mapauhej Khan, to compel the French to transfer Madras to him." Dupleix first determined "to employ every art, to exhaust every device, to induce the Nawab to forego his claim, and to avert these hostilities" with him. But hostilities could not be prevented, and the Nawab's troops surrounded Madras. They were ultimately defeated by Peradis,[17] who was commanding the detachment against them, and had to give up the idea of gaining Madras.

Dupleix's ambition was not satisfied by the capture of Madras. He tried for the next eighteen months to capture Fort St. David, about twelve miles south of Pondicherry. But the French attack on Fort St. David was repelled by a brave English officer named Stringer Lawrence. On the other hand, a large English fleet, under the command of the Rear-Admiral Boscawen, arrived at Fort St. David on the 8th August, 1748[18] to avenge the siege of Madras. The English now laid siege to Pondicherry but it was not skilfully conducted and the French defended themselves bravely. Boscawen raised the siege in the month of October and went away to Fort St. David. It has been described as "a conspicuous success for Dupleix and conspicuous failure for the English".[19] Dupleix's prestige in the eye of the Indian powers was enhanced. He sent letters to the rulers of the south as well to the Emperor of Delhi acquainting them about his courageous defence of Pondichery against the formidable force of the English and received in reply letters of congratulation.

[17] Paradis was a Swiss (at this time parts of Switzerland were under France). He had gained the favour of Dupleix by manifesting violent hostility to La Bourdonnais and had been appointed Governor of Madras. Orme, Vol. 1, p. 78.

[18] Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, p. 28.

[19] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 124.

Both the French and the English were preparing themselves for renewing the war with the approach of a favourable opportunity, when the news of the suspension of hostilities between France and England in Europe and the conclusion of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) reached India. So they sheathed their swords and stopped their guns in India also. This treaty restored Madras to the English and Louisbourg in North America to the French. Dupleix's work was undone: the French had abandoned the sure in India for the uncertain in America, and presently lost there too.

In outward appearance the treaty restored the two powers to the position they had held before the outbreak of hostilities, but in reality a great change had come in. "The war of the Austrian Succession," writes Prof. Dodwell, "though in appearance it achieved nothing and left the political boundaries of India unaltered, yet marks an epoch in Indian history. It demonstrated the overwhelming influence of sea-power when intelligently directed, it displayed the superiority of European methods of war over those followed by Indian armies; it revealed the political decay that had eaten into the heart of the Indian state system; and its conclusion illustrated the resultant tendency of European traders to intrude into a world that had previously altogether ignored them. In short, it set the stage for the experiments of Dupleix and accomplishments of Clive."[20] From simple traders the Europeans now began to be regarded by the rulers of the South, and then of the North, as powers, whose alliance and assistance were worth gaining. "From vassals they had jumped almost to the position of liege lords".[21]

The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was not the last act in the drama of Anglo-French rivalry in India. It simply closed one

[20] Ibid., p. 115.

[21] Malleson, History of the French in India, p. 226.

act, and a second followed within a year. One would have naturally expected, and the Directors of the two Companies at home also thought, that after an exhausting war the French and the English would be disposed to live in goodwill with exclusive attention to their respective commercial pursuits. But politics does not always run a smooth course, and unexpected circumstances sometimes appear to destroy hopes of reconciliation and produce new causes of struggles. It was not long after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and even before the English had re-entered Madras, that the English Governor, Floyer, and the French Governor, Dupleix, took sides in the rivalries of the neighbouring Indian princes, which brought them soon into direct conflict with each other.

It was the English Governor who led the way by supporting the cause of Shahji, a dispossessed claimant of the throne of Tanjore, against Pratab Singh, the de facto ruler of the place.[22] The English had no concern in the affairs of Tanjore, but Shahji held out before them a prospect of gain by promising to give them Devikottai, a place at the mouth of the Coleroon and to pay all the expenses of the war if it proved successful. The first expedition of the English against Pratab Singh failed in the face of a brave resistance by the latter, but a second expedition under the command of Major Lawrence successfully besieged Devikottai, which surrendered on June 23, 1749. The ruling prince came to terms with the English, who were allowed to keep Devikottai for themselves with so much

[22] The question of succession to the throne of Tanjore was a complicated one. Tanjore, one of the conquests of Shahji, father of the great Shivaji, was conferred by the latter on his brother Venkaji, who was succeeded by his son Tukaji. Tukaji died in 1738 leaving behind him two legitimate sons, Baba Saheb and Shahji, and another named Pratab Singh, by a concubine. Baba Saheb died shortly after his accession and after a short interregnum his brother Shahji obtained the throne of Tanjore. But in 1741 Shahji was deprived of the throne for his weak administration and it went to Pratab Singh.

of the surrounding territory as would produce an annual revenue of 36,000 rupees and Shahji's object was not fulfilled. He was kept under surveillance at Madras with a life-pension of 4,000 rupees.[23] "This occupation of Devikottai", remarks Mr. Martineau "was nothing but a belated and a rather futile reply to the occupation of Karikal by Governor Dumas some ten years earlier. It restored in that part of the Carnatic the balance which had inclined in favour of the French."[24]

The policy of interfering in the politics of the country, though begun by the English, was soon followed by the French in a more daring way. With the death of the Emperor Muhammad Shah on 15th April, 1748, and of Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk, on 21st May, 1748, even the semblance of cohesion and order that had been somehow preserved in the Deccan Subah began to disappear. Of the five sons of the Nizam-ul-Mulk, his second son, Nasir Jang, and his grandson, Muzaffar Jang, came forward as rival candidates for the Subadarship of the Deccan. There was also Chanda Sahib, a man of ambition and ability, still a prisoner at Satara, but always on the lookout for an opportunity to take possession of the theoretically subordinate throne of Arcot. On proceeding to Satara with the object of winning the help of the Marathas, Muzaffar Jang met Chanda Sahib, and the two men henceforth determined to act together to realise their respective designs. Chanda Sahib opened negotiations with Dupleix, and the latter allured by the prospect of increasing French influence by establishing men so much devoted to the French in the Deccan Viceroyalty and the Carnatic

[23] Mill, History of British India, Vol. III, p. 88; Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 112.

[24] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 125. Karikal was conquered by Chanda Sahib and Francisco Pereira, a Spaniard in his service, with the consent of the then French Governor Dumas, to whom they ceded it on 14th February, 1739. Pratab Singh after his accession to the throne of Tanjore also acquiesced in the occupation of the place by the French.

Nawabship agreed to assist them. This was certainly a masterstroke of policy on the part of Dupleix, and the French would have secured great advantages in India if his plans had succeeded.

Chanda Sahib was released from Satara through the influence of Dupleix, and his forces combined with those of Muzaffar Jang and supported by the French, firstly, under the command of M. d' Auteuil and then under that of M. de Bussy, defeated and killed the Carnatic Nawab, Anwar-ud-din, at Ambur, south-east of Vellore, on August 3, 1749. A general confusion followed; Muhammad Ali, the illegitimate son of Anwar-ud-din, took refuge at Trichinopoly, and the rest of the Carnatic came into the possession of Chanda Sahib, who rewarded the French by a grant in full right of the territories of Villiyanallur and Bahur, which more than doubled the possessions of the French round Pondichery. But Admiral Boscawen had in the meanwhile taken possession of St. Thome, near Madras.

Dupleix wanted to be the real master of the Carnatic under Chanda Sahib's nominal suzerainty, but his allies vacillated and could not take prompt action. The English were now convinced that it was necessary to prevent the growth of French influence over the native powers by supporting the cause of Muhammad Ali, and from October onwards they began to send him help. Chanda Sahib wasted much time and money in an unsuccessful attack on Tanjore without directly attacking Trichinopoly, which was the objective of Dupleix and which would have given the allies a timely advantage over Muhammad Ali. In the meanwhile Nasir Jang marched into the Carnatic with a vast army[25] joined by a British contingent of 600 under Major Lawrence and compelled Chanda Sahib and the French to fall back on Pondichery after giving up the siege of Tanjore. But

[25] 300,000 men, of whom one-half were cavalry, together with 800 pieces of cannon and 1,300 elephants with 10,000 Maratha horses of Murari Rao and 600 Cavalry of Muhammad Ali.

Dupleix did not give up the attempt and encouraged his troops (again placed under the command of M. d' Auteuil) to oppose the advance of the enemy. Thus towards the end of March, 1750, the two opposing armies met each other on the banks of the Jinji river near Valudavur. Owing to the desertion of thirteen French officers on April 3, and the signs of disaffection among other French soldiers, M. d' Auteuil could not maintain the fight any longer, and retreated to Pondichery with Chanda Sahib. Muzaffar Jang surrendered himself to his uncle Nasir Jang.

But the French soon renewed their attempts and captured Masulipatam, Tiruviti, Villupuram and Jinji, which had been hitherto regarded as impregnable. Nasir Jang was surprised by the French under La Touche on 16th December, 1750, and was soon assassinated. Muzaffar Jang was at once released and recognised as the Subahdar of the Deccan at Pondichery. The French were rewarded by him with the towns of Divi and Masulipatam and also some pecuniary grants.[26] Dupleix was welcomed by the new Subahdar as the Governor of the country south of the river Krishna up to Cape Comorin (practically the same territory as the previous Vijayanagar Empire) and gifts of Rs. 200,000[27] and a jagir including the village Valudavur and worth Rs. 10,000 a year.[28] It was ordered that "no money should be current in the Carnatic, but such as was coined at Pondichery" (which meant the concession of an important sovereign right), and that revenue of the territories placed under Dupleix's control was to be remitted first to him and he would account for it to the Subadar.[29] Chanda Sahib was recog-

[26] Thus the payment of fabulous prices to foreigners for Nawabships may be said to have originated in the South, and this spread to Bengal presently.

[27] Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 166.

[28] Cf. Clive.

[29] Orme, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 165.

nised as the Nawab of Arcot under the authority of Dupleix. Dupleix's right over the territories granted to him by the Subahdar of the Deccan was not technically valid as it lacked confirmation by the Mughal Emperor; and some writers have pointed out[30] that Dupleix got merely an "honorary suzerainty" and did not "rule thirty millions with almost absolute power." But there is no doubt that the French secured great advantages by placing their own nominees on the thrones of the Deccan and the Carnatic and that Dupdeix's influence and prestige in the eyes of the native powers was highly increased.

Dupleix was now disposed to "consolidate his conquests by a definite peace" and proposals for it came from the side of Muhammad Ali, who was then at Trichinopoly. Muhammad Ali expressed his desire to recognise Chanda Sahib as the Nawab of the Carnatic if he was allowed to possess treasures left by his father and to enjoy a government in some other part of the Deccan. But it was a mistake on the part of Dupleix to think that the English would patiently allow him to arrange the affairs of the Carnatic according to his own interests. Floyer was succeeded (28th September, 1750) as the Governor of Fort St. David by Mr. Saunders, "a man of action rather than of speech," who realised that if Duplpix was allowed to act without any interference and to bring Trichinopoly under his control then the interest of the English would be greatly prejudiced. So the English decided to send active help to Muhammad Ali, who was encouraged by Mr. Saunders "not to accept the proposals then being made to him from Pondichery, and on his advice that prince conducted himself with such seeming frankness that he deceived Dupleix himself while the English were making ready their men and munitions."[31]

[30] Prosper Cultru, Dupleix, pp. 257—258; Roberts, History of British India, p. 108.

[31] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 128.

On the 15th January, 1751, Muzaffar Jang started towards the Deccan being accompanied by Bussy, the ablest of the French commanders in India at that time. But he was killed in a chance skirmish on the 14th February, 1751, at Cuddapah.[32] The death of Muzaffar Jang might have been a fatal blow to the French influence in India but for the prompt action of Bussy. He immediately proclaimed Salabat Jang, the third son of Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-Mulk, as the Subahdar of the Deccan, and the latter, besides confirming the concessions which had been granted to the French by his predecessor, made some important additions to them. Bussy conducted the new Subahdar to Hyderabad, where by his stay for a few years, he consolidated the new regime of his protege and maintained the prestige of the French by his remarkable tact and wisdom.

But in the Carnatic affairs took a different course. The year 1751 saw the zenith of Dupleix's influence, and from that year it began to wane. We have already seen how the English had realised the necessity of opposing the designs of Dupleix by rendering effectual help to Muhammad Ali. So they soon followed a "long,, fatiguing and uncommonly momentous war" for the possession of Trichinopoly between the English and the French, the former as the ally of Muhammad Ali and the latter of Chanda Sahib. The whole of the Carnatic became the scene of warfare and was subjected to terrible sufferings. The kings of Mysore and Tanjore joined the side of Muhammad Ali and the Marathas tried to "fish in the troubled waters".

Muhammad Ali was closely besieged at Trichinopoly by Chanda Sahib's troops. In the spring of 1751 the English found themselves in a desperate situation as a great part of their troops were shut up in Trichinopoly, the fall of which place appeared imminent. But at this juncture there appeared on the scene a young man endowed with a daring genius and power of original

[32] Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 167—169.

conception, whose tact and bravery saved the frotunes of the English. He was Robert Clive, who beginning his career as a writer in the civil service of the Company, and subsequently serving as a volunteer when La Bourdonnais captured Madras, had taken part in the defence of Fort St. David and in the Tanjore expedition. He was now to play the role of one of the builders of British supremacy and dominion in India. He gave the first proof of his genius by proposing, according to a suggestion of Muhammad Ali approved of by Governor Saunders, the plan of attacking Arcot, Chanda Sahib's capital, thus creating a diversion in favour of the besieged at Trichinopoly. He righly expected that this blow at the heart of the enemy's country would divide its strength and attention. Thus when he successfully besieged[88] Arcot with a small force of 200 Europeans and 300 Indian sepoys, Chanda Sahib sent half of his army under his son, Raja Sahib, to recover Arcot, though Dupleix tried to nullify and defeat the policy of Clive by urging on the French Commander Law and Chanda Sahib the absolute necessity of maintaining strongly the siege of Trichinopoly. After the successful defence of the English before Arcot for fifty-three days, Law showed feebleness and timidity, taking advantage of which the English brought into Trichinopoly a large convoy. Law fled to the island of Srirangam, where the English tried to block him up. Dupleix sent reinforcements to relieve M. Law under d' Auteuil, who was, however, compelled to surrender on June 9, 1752, at Valikondapuram and this was followed three days later by the surrender of M. Law with all his troops.

[88] "The siege which followed, not only presents one of the most glorious pictures of Anglo-Indian history, but it may be considered likewise as the turning-point in the Eastern career of the English. It was at Arcot that English officers taught their Sipahis to follow them with the implicit confidence which superior skill and energy alone can inspire .....It was at Arcot, in fine, that the Anglo-Indian army received its baptism of victory."—Malleson, History of the French in India, p. 297.

Chanda Sahib had to take refuge with the general of the king of Tanjore (an ally of Muhammad Ali and the English) only to meet a lamentable end under that general by assassination, Major Lawrence showing indifference about his fate.[34]

Thus Dupleix found himself in the midst of difficulties without a strong army and without ally, and it appeared that all his hopes would be frustrated. But his perseverance and fortitude were great, and he was at his best in the midst of adversity. So his misfortunes could not deter him from continuing the struggle. He succeeded in detaching the Mysoreans and the Marathas from Muhammad Ali's party, and the Raja of Tanjore declared his neutrality. The English, indeed, took Tirunti and Villupuram but they failed to take Jinji on August 6, and Major Kineer, who was commanding during Major Lawrence's illness, was wounded and defeated at Vikravandi by Dupleix's nephew Kerjean. The English had also lost places round Madras, and after his recovery Lawrence was defeated at Aryankuppam on 5th September. The French continued the fight; but in spite of some isolated success which they obtained, their fortunes began to wane while their adversaries were gradually gaining ground. "M. Dupleix", wrote the English at Madras in 1753, "has by repeated strokes been reduced very low."[35] His plans were being thwarted and ruined by the defeat of his generals, the discontent of his allies and want of money, and at the end of the year 1753, he opened proposals for coming to terms with the English Governor who also acceded to these. The representatives of Dupleix, M. de Kerjean, M. Bausset, and Father Lavour met the English Commissaries, Messrs. Palk and Vansittart, at Sadras, a Dutch settlement nearly equidistant from Madras and Pondichery, from 21st to 25th January, 1754. The

[34] Roberts, History of British India, p. 111: Orme, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 244—246; Lawrence, Narrative, p. 28.

[35] Quoted in Roberts, History of British India, p. 111.

conference proved abortive, because of the conflicting claims of the two parties. The French refused to recognise the claims of Muhammad Ali to the Nawabship of the Carnatic and they produced several patents from Salabat Jang and the Mughal Emperor himself, appointing Dupleix Nawab of the Carnatic. The English strongly advocated the claims of Muhammad Ali, and declared the patent from the Mughal Emperor in favour of Dupleix as a forgery.

The failure of the conference to bring about a compromise led to the renewal of hostilities. On February 15, the French troops under Mainville inflicted a defeat on the English. They also made some unsuccessful attempts to invest Trichinopoly and carried some fruitless raids into Tanjore and the Pudukottai territory. But Godehu, a Director of the French Company, arrived on August 1754, with orders from France to follow a policy of peace, now anxiously wanted under various considerations.

Dupleix was superseded by Godehu on 2nd August and Mainville was replaced by Maissin on 16th August. In October Godehu made a truce with the English which was followed by a provisional treaty in December 1754,[86] whose validity was subject to the ratification of the two Companies at home. By the first term of the treaty the two Companies agreed to renuonce for ever all Mughal dignities and offices and never to interfere in the disputes of the native princes. The second and third terms provided that the "English should possess Fort St. George, Fort St. David, and Devikota,...or that the districts of Pondichery should be made equal to those of Fort St. George and Fort St. David, the French in that case abandoning the country about Nizampatnam. The fourth clause abandoned for the French their claims on Machhlipatam (Masulipatam) and the adjoining districts, it being arranged that equal territories should

[86] Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive, p. 81.

be there assigned to the rival Companies. The fifth, sixth, and seventh clauses regulated the navigation of certain rivers, and the possession of certain other minor territories, on the same principle. The eighth provided for the prolongation of the truce till the confirmation of the treaty should arrive from Europe; the ninth, for the stoppage of reconstruction of any forts or securing any new grants of territory during the truce; the tenth, for the principle of *uti possidetis* till the treaty should be confirmed from Europe; and the eleventh, for some future plan of indemnification for the expenses of the war."[37]

The terms of the treaty have been regarded by Malleson to have been "in a French point of view disgraceful."[38] Dupleix passed some severe remarks upon these. He held that Godehu had "signed the ruin of the country and the dishonour of the nation,"[39] when the situation was turning in their favour. The French historian Cultru shares almost the same view.[40] Mill writes: "By this treaty, everything for which they had been contending was gained by the English; every advantage of which they came into possession was given up by the French. By the stipulation to withdraw effectually from interference in the affairs of the native princes, Muhammad Ali was left, by the fact, Nawab of the Carnatic or Arcot. And by the stipulation to arrange the territorial possessions of the two nations on the principle of equality, the important acquisition of the four Circars was resigned."[41] These statements would have been justified if the treaty had been made before the siege of Arcot, but they seem more or less exaggerated in view of the altered situation in 1754. The Home Government in France did not regard this treaty as

[37] Malleson, French in India, p. 429.
[38] Ibid., p. 432.
[39] Roberts, British India, p. 113.
[40] Ibid.
[41] History of British India, Vol. III, p. 140.

'disgraceful'; it was, on the contrary, anxious for peace in India, as disputes had already begun between the French and the English on the Ohio and the Mississippi, and "the preservation of that region seemed more reasonable than hypothetical conquests in India."[42] Moreover, the territories guaranteed to the French were to yield an annual revenue of 800,000, and those guaranteed to the English 100,000. Facts do not support the statement that the French had greater advantages than the English just on the eve of the conclusion of the treaty. Trichinopoly was about to surrender for want of supplies. Both in numbers and in quality the English troops were superior to those of the French and the financial position of the latter was also worse. It might be pointed out that if Watson came with a fleet, consisting of three ships and 'a sloop, having on board a King's regiment of 700 men, with 40 artillerymen and 200 recruits, Godehu had also arrived with 1,500 European troops. But the troops of the latter were not very useful for fighting purposes. The historian Orme remarks that "Mr. Godehu himself was sensible of this disparity."[43] The Pondichery Council was also aware of this for it wrote to the Directors that "the English had 2,500 men including 1,150 soldiers of a King's regiment, while the French possessed but 1,150 troops 'God knows what sort of troops'—and were almost without allies and in sore straits for gold."[44] Edward Ives, who came to India with Watson's fleet in 1754, remarks: "it was by everybody known, that at this time, exclusive of our naval force, our troops on the coast exceeded those of the French in number one thousand."[45] Moreover when Godehu arrived the treasury of the French in India was almost exhausted. But there is no doubt that Dupleix's ambitions were crushed. And Dupleix

[42] Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 134.
[43] Indostan, Vol. I, p. 373.
[44] Roberts, H. B. I., p. 114.
[45] A Voyage from England to India, etc., p. 46.

was right in emphasising the unwisdom of his country in preferring American acquisitions and opportunities to Indian,—for building a French colonial empire in America by joining Quebec and Louisiana with the Atlantic seaboard full of old English colonies, was clearly a dream, more unrealisable (as was soon shown) than that of Dupleix.

Dupleix is certainly an important figure in Indo-French history. Guided by the daring ambition of establishing a French Empire in India, he, by wholehearted efforts, succeeded for some years in improving here the position of the French, and in enhancing their prestige in the eyes of the powers to such a considerable extent that his English contemporaries regarded him as a dreadful foe of English interests in India. With a strong faith in the rightness of his cause and an earnest desire to serve the country's interests, Dupleix never allowed himself to be carried by designs of personal aggrandisement. His convictions were great, his aim was not sordid, and his diplomacy was also not always very unsound.

But certain factors doomed his policy to failure. Success in military affairs depends largely on the possession of a sound finance, and for Dupleix "finance was his stumbling-block from first to last."[46] He did not get adequate financial support from the home authorities. But it is to be noted that he "treated them in a very cavalier fashion, informing them of his victories, but concealing his defeats."[47] From 1751 he could not properly collect the revenues he had reckoned on, and in order to meet some urgent needs, he spent over 350,000 pounds of his own money and that of his friends. But this spirit was not reciprocated. The incompetence of French generals also greatly hampered his cause.

Moreover, Dupleix, perhaps over-confident of the justice of his work, did not sometimes take proper measures at the

[46] C. I. H., Vol. V, p. 133.
[47] Roberts, H. B. I., p. 117.

opportune moment to counteract English hostility. Considering it to be a certain factor he should have come to some sort of settlement[48] with Muhammad Ali before the latter received offer of help from the English.

With the outbreak of the Seven Years' War (1756-63) India again became the scene of hostilities between the French and the English. In 1754 the French Government had sent Godehu to reverse the policy of Dupleix, but now it determined to strike a blow for regaining the old position of the French in India by expelling the English. To realise this Count de Lally was appointed to the command of an expedition to India.

Though active hostilities on a large scale began only after the arrival of Lally in April, 1758, yet in the meanwhile both the parties had been far from friendly towards each other. Intelligence of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War had already reached India. De Leyrit, the successor of Godehu as the Governor of Pondichery, tried some operations against the English and sent d' Auteuil to take possession of Trichinopoly in April 1757. The "gouty octogenarian" d' Auteuil could not act as De Leyrit had desired; Trichinopoly was relieved by the arrival from Madura of Major Calliaud who had been busy in subjugating the Polygars of Madura and Tinnevelly. But the French troops had overrun the Carnatic; many of its strongholds, except Arcot, Vellore, Kanchipuram, Chingleput, and the two English seats of Government, had fallen into their hands.[49]

But in Bengal the case was otherwise. There the English attacked the French fort at Chandernagore in March 1757.[50] After a brave defence for three days (March 20-23) M. Renault, the French Chief at Chandernagore, surrendered with his party

[48] C. I. H., Vol. V, p. 140.

[49] Mill, B. I., Vol. III, pp. 197—205; Malleson, H. F. I., 456—460.

[50] Bengal: Past and Present, July—September, 1931, p. 71.

on certain terms.[51] Having a temporary sojourn in the Dutch Factory at Chinsura, M. Renault and his party were kept as close prisoners in Calcutta, and the English were so much suspicious of their helping Sirajuddaulah that they were not released before the Nawab's defeat at Plassey, when they were asked to prepare for their departure from Bengal.[52]

The capture of Chandernagore dealt the death-blow to hopes of establishing the French power in Bengal, while it was of immense importance to the future career of the English. They became comparatively free to deal with the Nawab and their immediate gain was also immense, for Dupleix had raised Chandernagore to high level of prosperity. Clive himself wrote to the Select Committee at Madras: "It was certainly a large, rich and thriving colony, and the loss of it is an inexpressible blow to the French Company.[53]

French factories in other parts of Bengal also were not left untouched by the English. The French Factory at Balasore was seized by Lieutenant Young in the month of April. In the same month M. Law, Chief of the French Factory at Cassimbazar, was compelled to leave Bengal.[54] He arrived at Bhagalpur on May 2, and after Siraj's defeats proceeded up to Patna. But he was driven out of the province by Eyre Coote,

[51] Hill, Three Frenchmen in Bengal, p. 53.

[52] Ibid., p. 61.

[53] Hill, Bengal in 1756—57, Vol. II, p. 307.

[54] The author of the Siyar-ul-mutakherin noted that the Nawab was forced by the English to ask M. Law to leave Cassimbazar, and told him at the time of his departure that "if anything new should happen he would send for him again". "Send for me again?" answered Law, "rest assured, My Lord Nawab, that this is the last time we shall see each other. Remember my words: we shall never meet again." Really they did not. After his defeat at Plassey and flight from Murshidabad the Nawab wrote to M. Law to come down to his help, but his letter did not reach him in time owing to the treachery of the Faujdar of Rajmahal, and Law's advance-guard reached Rajmahal a few hours after the Nawab had been captured there.

who marched to Patna amidst great difficulties.[55] The French Factory at Patna, where its Chief M. de la Bretesche was then lying ill, was seized by Coote. From now till 1761 M. Law remained as an adventurer under some native governments in Northern India. On hearing of the success of the English and the desire of the latter to demand the surrender of all the remaining French factories in Bengal, M. Courtin, the Chief of the French Factory at Dacca, left that place and tried to advance with his men towards the south-west probably with the hope of joining M. Law's party. But after the capture of Sirajuddaulah and the installation of Mir Jafar on the *masnad* of Bengal, he changed his route towards Dinajpur and Rangpur and even built a fort at a place about fifteen miles south of Jalpaiguri. His party had to suffer various troubles and had two skirmishes with the forces of Qasim Ali Khan,[56] the Faujdar of Rungpur, who had been asked by Clive to oppose the advance. At last, finding himself helples he solicited the permission of Robert Clive to return to Pondichery, which was granted in July, 1758. The French in Bengal were not supported by their countrymen at Pondichery, while the English, who had realized that "Bengal was the heart of India" received timely military help from Madras. This is one of the reasons why the former were so soon and so easily overwhelmed by the English in Bengal.

More acute hostilities had begun in the South, where Lally, invested with extensive powers as Commander-in-Chief and Commissary of the King for all French prossessions in the East, had reached Pondichery on 28th April, 1758. He had been charged with a double mission of reforming the French administration in India and of expelling the English out of India. The French squadron was under the command of Count D' Ache.

[55] Ives' Voyage, pp. 156—175.

[56] Mir Qasim, future Nawab of Bengal.

Lally soon besieged Fort St. David, which surrendered to him on June 2, and the fortifications were immediately razed to the ground. Thus Lally began with a successful enterprise; but henceforth he was confronted with various difficulties. He was brave, conscientious and a keen tactician, but he was too wayward to accept other's advice. Moreover, his mission of reforming the French administration at Pondichery was not taken in a good spirit by the French officers there, who remained somewhat indifferent to his plans and could not or would not render him timely pecuniary help.

After storming Ft. St. David, Lally wanted promptly to attack Madras, another stronghold of the English in India. But he met with opposition from his naval colleague, D'Ache, and the Governor at Pondichery also declared that his exchequer was in such a poor state that Lally could not expect any financial help from him.

The defection of D'Ache or the indifferent attitude of the officers at Pondichery did not, however, deter Lally from his ambitious designs. With the advice of Father Lavaur, the local chief of the Jesuits, he attacked Tanjore with a view to realising from its Raja the sum of fifty-six lakhs of rupees for which the latter had given a bond to Chanda Sahib and the French in 1749 on condition of their raising the siege. But partly due to his own hastiness and partly to want of provisions and military stores for his troops[57] Lally's object was baffled. He was compelled to raise the siege of Tanjore on August 10-11 owing to the arrival there of an English detachment and returned to the coast on the 28th August after various hardships and also with some loss of his own reputation for his "harsh and unreasoning severity" in the Tanjore territory. Meanwhile D'Ache had been beaten off Karikal by Admiral Pocock, and he went away to the Isles of France and Bourbon in spite of Lally's protests.

[57] Malleson, H. F. I., p. 527.

Lally, however, made another attempt to retrieve French fortunes, and commenced the siege of Madras in December 1759, in spite of De Leyrit's dissent. He called Bussy and Moracin to his help from Hyderabad, where in spite of some changes of fortune, the former had maintained his influence for these years. Bussy obeyed Lally's orders very unwillingly, leaving the Government of Masulipatam and the ceded east coast provinces in the charge of Marquis de Conflans, a man totally ignorant about the language and manners of the country. Clive, in spite of his difficulties in Bengal, was not unmindful of the events in Southern India, and he now thought that "it was his duty to contribute his mite towards the destruction of the French."[58] In pursuance of this policy, he, against the wishes of the whole Council, sent in October, 1758, Colonel Forde to help Raja Anandraj, the ruler of Vizianagram, who had raised the standard of revolt against French occupation, and had plundered the French Factory at Vizagapatam after Bussy's departure from the Deccan and had written to the English at Madras for help. Forde defeated the French under Conflans at Kondur in December, and captured Masulipatam in the following April. Salabat Jang concluded a treaty with Forde whereby he renounced the French alliance and ceded Masulipatam with a territory of eighty miles long and twenty miles wide to the English.[59] Thus the influence of the French at the Court of Hyderabad disappeared for ever.

At the same time, Bussy's presnce did not give a satisfactory support and strength to Lally. They could not act with a concerted plan, as they differed fundamentally in policies. "Lally, whose one great idea was the expulsion of the English, could not enter into the plan of a French Empire in the heart of the Deccan, dependent on English weakness and

[58] Quoted in Roberts, H. B. I., p. 121.
[59] Narrative of Lawrence, p. 213.

English forbearance."[60] "The King and the Company," he wrote to Bussy on the 13th June, 1758, "have sent me to India to chase the English Company out of it...It does not concern me that such and such rajas dispute for such and such a nawabship."[61]

The French had laid siege to Madras in December, 1758, but were compelled to raise it in February next for want of troops, money, and provisions and owing to the return of the English fleet under Admiral Pocock from Bombay to Madras on the 16th February.[62] Thus failed the great enterprise against Madras on which Lally had set his heart. After this about a year passed away in sundry engagements between the hostile parties, in the second of which D'Ache, who had returned to the Indian war for the last time, was defeated by Admiral Pocock. D'Ache again retreated to the Isles in October 1759, and Lally had great difficulties with his demoralised troops, who manifested a spirit of mutiny. Arcot was lost and Wandiwash (Vandivas) was also occupied by the English. But he held out desperately[63] and thought of recovering Vandivas. In the meanwhile Coote had arrived with a force, which, even after a detachment of it had been sent to Bengal, came up to 1,700 men. Lally besieged Vandivas, but was repulsed and defeated by Coote on 22nd January, 1760. Bussy, who had come forward to help Lally, was taken prisoner and the French lost many other posts in the Carnatic, being reduced to Pondichery, Jinji and Karikal. Thus the prospects of the French in India received a fatal blow at this decisive battle of Vandivas. "It shattered to the ground the

[60] Malleson, H. F. I., p. 534.

[61] Quoted in Roberts, H. B. I., p. 122.

[62] Mill, B. I., Vol. III, p. 239.

[63] "Lally had from his first arrival been struggling on the borders of despair, with wants which it was altogether out of his power to supply." Mill, B. I., Vol. III, p. 245.

mighty fabric, which Martin, Dumas and Dupleix had contributed to erect; it dissipated all the hopes of Lally; it sealed the fate of Pondichery."[64] Karikal was captured on April 5, and Lally now tried to defend Pondichery. He sought the help of Hyder Ali, the rising general of Mysore, by promising to make over to him, in case of a favourable issue of the war, Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinnevelly and all the places that he might conquer in the Carnatic. A treaty was concluded between the French and Hyder in June, 1760.[65] Hyder sent his brother-in-law with a detachment to Pondichery, but he could not render effective help to Lally. The English then laid to siege Pondichery and blockaded it for several months. The condition of the French within the place became extremely miserable for want of money and provisions and they at last surrendered on the 16th January, 1761. The town and the fortifications of Pondichery were levelled to the ground, and "not a roof was left standing in this once fair and flourishing city." The fall of Pondichery was followed by the capture of other places belonging to the French in India. Thiagur surrendered on February 4, Mahe on February 13, and Jinji on April 5, and the French were left without a single military post in India.

Lally was taken a prisoner to Madras, being insulted at the time of leaving Pondichery by many of the followers of De Leyrit and an infuriated mob. He was thence taken to England as a prisoner of war but was released on parole. But when he went to France he was charged with having berayed the interests of his country, and after a protracted trial for two years, he was most unjustly condemned to death and executed. This was certainly unmerited, for he was neither a coward nor a traitor. Among the French troops in India about 300

[64] Malleson, H. F. I., p. 368.

[65] N. K. Sinha, Haidar Ali, p. 48.

took service with Hyder Ali; 100 were taken into the English army and the rest became prisoners of war. After the conclusion of the Seven Years' War by the treaty of Paris (1763), the possessions of the French in India were restored to them, but their power was too much shattered to be easily recovered.[66]

In spite of the sad fates of Dupleix and Lally, the French "pursued their ambitions in India."[67] Many of the Frenchmen in India remained as adventurers and commanders in the different military states that arose on the ruins of the Mughal Empire,[68] and their minds were filled with designs to restore their power. Rene Madec served for some time a Jat Chief, some time Shah Alam II and some time Begun Somru.[69] Chevalier, the head of the French affairs in Bengal, offered to help the Emperor in 1772 with three thousand Frenchmen from the Isle of France. The French also tried to utilise the hostility of the Marathas and Hyder Ali against the English for their own advantage. In 1777 St. Lubin was negotiating for a treaty with Nana Fadnavis[70] with the object of stirring them up against their rival (the English) "not only in a vague and uncertain manner, but a view to obliging them (the English) to divide their forces."[71] The French also considered an alliance with Hyder Ali necessary "for regaining the ascendancy which they have lost in India, and to despoil their

[66] In America as well, the French had been expelled from Canada.

[67] Bengal: Past and Present, July—September, 1931, p. 25; The Memoirs of Gentil published with notes by Sir Evan Cotton in Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1927.

[68] C. H. I., Vol. V, p. 323.

[69] Chieftains of Sardhana (near Meerut), so called as the married the German adventurer Walter Rheinhardt surnamed the Sombre (Somru), who served Mir Qasim and carried out the famous massacre of Patna.

[70] Bengal: Past and Present, July—September, 1931, p. 25.

[71] Ibid.

rivals of it."[72] The revolt of the English American colonies gave the French the opportunity for furthering those designs. They now supported the revolted colonies in America and at the same time made a desperate attempt at regaining power in India while the English resources remained divided. They sent 3,000 men under Bussy and a powerful fleet under Admiral Suffrein to assist Hyder Ali, but these achieved nothing for French interests. Pondichery was again invested and captured by a British army, though it was restored by the peace of Versailles (1783). Even after this the Frenchmen in India continued to stir up the Indian enemies of the growing English power at the courts of Mysore, Hyderabad and Poona. During the revolutionary wars in Europe, Tipu was in communication with the French[73], who now tried to attack the English in India by establishing themselves in Egypt and making that their base of operations for Eastern ventures.[74] But Wellesley rightly realised the danger of French designs against the English and sent an expedition to the Red Sea which destroyed French hopes of establishing themselves on the overland route to India. The French lost their position in India as well as in the Spice Islands. Pondichery was again captured in 1803 and finally restored in 1814. Thus the ambitions of the French in India had been crushed by 1815, when Lord Hastings was about to establish the unquestioned supremacy of the English in India.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Tipu was so much in touch with French affairs that he was a member of the famous Jacobin party: a curious position for a despotic ruler.

[74] This was one of the many original plans of Napoleon: "To destroy England we must make ourselves master of Egypt." The French were the first to discover the importance of Egypt to a Western European power that aimed at an Eastern empire (as also the political importance of posing as a patron of Mohammedan people); the Suez Canal was projected and completed by them to be utilized by Britain later on.

The failure of French political ambition in India was due to various factors. Sometimes such factors and circumstances govern the destinies of nations, as the best of human endeavours cannot control. The French had certain disadvantages on their side, which the daring plans of Dupleix, or the sincere efforts and bravery of Lally, or the skilful negotiations of St. Lubin could not overcome. Their sea-power was comparatively inferior to that of the English. But success depended greatly on naval superiority, since between the theatre of war and the belligerent countries lay the vast expanse of two oceans. "While the English received supplies of food and money from Bengal, recruits of men from Europe and grain from their nothern settlements, the French could receive nothing but what came to them laboriously by land."

The French were also greatly embarrassed for want of money, while the English possessed a superior finance. In the midst of wars the English did not neglect their ordinary commercial affairs, while the trade of the French Company was in an inferior condition.[75] The financial success of the English East India Company evoked interest and support of the mother country in its struggles, while this backing was wanting in the case of the French East India Company which could not impress the French state or people with its commercial success or prospects. Proper support from the home government in France was also not forthcoming, as much of its money was spent in the European complications of the time and also in the luxuries of the Court. We have already noted how Lally was embarrassed, from the moment of his arrival, for want of money to pay his troops and workmen and to obtain provisions. On the other hand, the control over Bengal had given the English a great opportunity of improving their financial resources, which they very ably

[75] Roberts, H. B. I., p. 124.

utilised for furthering their interests.[76] In fact, Plassey decided the fate of the Carnatic struggles, and it was with the resources of Bengal that the English Company fought most of its wars and founded its dominion.[77] In critical moments supplies of men and money from Bengal saved and improved the position of the English in the South. Bussy had, of course, established an influence at the court of Hyderabad and had also secured for the French the Nothern Circars, a territory of some strategic importance, and the resources of which might be employed to support the French cause in the Carnatic. But his recall from the Deccan was followed by the loss of French influence there, when the tact of Clive and the gallantry of Forde succeeded in establishing English influence. In Bengal also French influence disappeared after the fall of Chandernagore.

It has also to be noted that the difference in the characters of the officers and leaders on two sides accounts partly for the difference in their ultimate achievements in India. The French cause was greatly jeopardised by the mutual jealousies of the officers and commanders which made it impossible for them to act in concert upon a single plan. It may be that Lally's "hastiness, his violent temper, his uncontrolled and cutting speech, his habit of threatening without punishing, were all strong obstacles in his way."[78] There is, however, no doubt that he was sincerely desirous to further the interests of his country and gave sufficient proofs of his personal gallantry in pursuance of his aim. But the officers at Pondicherry went so low as to exult over the reverses of Lally; partly because he had also a mission of purifying the government at

[76] Clive's letter to Pitt, dated 7th January, 1759.

[77] Even in comparatively recent times the administrations of some of the other British Indian provinces were financed by Bengal.

[78] C. H. I., Vol. V, p. 165.

Pondichery. "The daring of Lawrence, the dogged pertinacity of Saunders and his Council, the vigour and ability of Calliaud, of Forde, of Joseph Smith, of Dalton and of many others," remarks Mr. Malleson,[70] "stand out in strikng contrast to the feebleness, the incapacity, indecision, of the Laws, the d'Auteiuils, the Breniers, the Maissins and others whom Dupleix was forced to employ." Lastly, owing to the fact that the majority of the French East India Company's shares were held by the French Crown, the Company was liable to ill-advised and capricious instructions from the French Courts and Ministers, which deprived the men on the spot in the French settlements in India of the advantage they won by dint of their own policy and endeavours: the recall of Dupleix and his supresession by Godehu is an instance in point.

[70] H. F. I., p. 584.

CHAPTER III

GROWTH OF AN ENGLISH DOMINION IN BENGAL

SECTION I

FROM PLASSEY TO DIWANI, OR THE FIRST DYARCHY IN BENGAL (1756—1765)

The virtually independent Subah of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, usurped and retained against various odds by the adventurer Alivardi Khan, was lost by his favourite daughter's son, Siraj-ud-daulah, after his accession to the *masnad* in April, 1756. Siraj-ud-daulah at first wanted to secure his own position against the hostile designs of his rival and jealous relatives, like his aunt Ghasiti Begam and his cousin Shaukat Jang, Governor of Purniah. Ghasiti Begam's wealth was confiscated and she was confined to the Nawab's palace. He next proceeded against Shaukat Jang but returned from Rajmahal (May 20) on hearing that the English had not acted according to his order prohibiting additions to the fortification of Calcutta. He was soon involved into hostilities with them.

It is not correct to say that Siraj-ud-daulah contemplated expulsion of the English from Bengal even before he secured the throne, and that he acted from that motive as soon as he came to power. When in 1752 he came to Hugli after being nominated by Alivardi as his successor, the Presidents of the French, Dutch and English Companies paid him a visit, and the English President was "received with the utmost politeness and distinction far superior to one that was paid either to the Dutch or French."[1] But gradually his feelings were estranged by change of circumstances culminating in his open

[1] Long's Selections from the Unpublished Records of the Government, Vol. I, p. 33.

rupture with the English. It would not be historical to attribute his quarrel with the English to his vanity and avarice. As a matter of fact, the real causes of his conflict with them were deeply rooted in various facts of contemporary history. His apparently precipitate action was due to a conviction on his part that the English were trying to strengthen their position in Bengal against his interest as sovereign, and that he must administer a sufficient check before they had become too powerful. It was indeed natural that the English would try to safeguard their own interests and improve their prospects. On the one hand there was high ambition and on the other an attempt to oppose it, and thus was born a mutual suspicion which made the conflict inevitable. It was precipitated by the Nawab's hastiness and impatience for quick revenge on the English for certain acts on their part which he construed as affronts to his sovereignty.

The Nawab's grievances were that the English had given protection to Krishnaballabh, son of Raja Rajballabh of Dacca, against his wishes. Rajballabh, who was Diwan of Ghasiti Begam's estates and her supporter, had fallen into the Nawab's disfavour being suspected of falsifying accounts and secreting the wealth of the Begam; and he had then sent his son with his hoarded wealth and moveable property to Calcutta. The Nawab demanded the surrender of Krishnaballabh from the English, who, however, refused to place the refugee at his disposal. They were emboldened to take this step as there was a strong party advocating the succession of Ghasiti Begam, the patroness of Rajballabh.[2] As Mr. Hill writes, "whilst the accession of Siraj-ud-daulah was doubtful, they might be justified in running some risk in the case of a man to whom kindness might be a useful speculation."[3] Secondly, when the

[2] Hill, Bengal in 1756—57, Vol. III, p. 384.

[3] Hill, Ibid., Vol. I, p. iv.

English and the French began to raise fortifications in Calcutta and Chandernagore respectively in view of the impending war between them the Nawab seriously objected to this violation of his territories, whereupon the French desisted from the work but the English continued to erect new fortifications. The knowledge of Anglo-French exploits in southern India made the Nawab of Bengal suspicious about the movements of the English and the French in Bengal.[4] Thirdly, as the Nawab justly pointed out, the servants and agents of the English Company were making a great abuse of the privileges granted to it for its own trade by the Imperial *firman* of 1716-17. They used the dastaks (passports) for their own private trade to the great prejudice of the interests of the native merchants and the Nawab's government.[5] The Nawab demanded that the English Company should "promise to remove the foregoing complaints of their conduct and will agree to trade upon same terms as other merchants did in the times" of Murshid Quli Jafar Khan.[6] But the English did not comply with his demands. This highly offended the Nawab and was soon followed by the outbreak of hostilities between him and the English.

Early in June, 1756, the Nawab captured the English factory at Kassimbazar and marched towards Calcutta on the 5th of that month with a large army. On the 16th the Nawab's troops appeared before Calcutta and made an attack on the northern side of the town but were repulsed; on the 17th the defenders of the fort were driven from their outposts upon which the English women and children were put on board the ships in the river, next day. In utter despair, Governor Drake and Mr. Minchin with Captain Grant, Mr. Macket and some

[4] Hill, Ibid., Vol. III, p. 384.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 3—4.

other members of the Council joined the women and children on the ships on the next day, and all the fugitives landed at Fulta. The besieged force made a last attempt to save the fort by placing the command in the hands of Mr. J. Z. Holwell, an ex-surgeon. But with all their efforts they could not hold out for more than two days, and were at last compelled to surrender. It is said that 146 English prisoners were confined by the Nawab's officers in a dark cell in the fort, about eighteen feet long by fourteen feet ten inches wide, where in a sultry summer night 123 of them died of suffocation in the midst of horrible sufferings. This is known as the Black Hole Tragedy of 1756.

The sufferings of the English prisoners have been graphically described by Mr. Holwell who, as he says, was one of the survivors,[7] and there is a reference to this incident in some of the contemporary English, Dutch, French and Armenian[8] records, though there is some discrepancy about the numbers of prisoners and victims in these different accounts. But the contemporary Indian histories written in Persian and the proceedings of the Calcutta Council just at that time mention nothing about it. Some modern scholars[9] have doubted the truth of the accepted version of the Black Hole affairs, and have described it as a gigantic hoax.' Critics of the latter view are not wanting,[10] but all impartial writers hold that the Nawab was not personally responsible for the deed, even if it actually happened.[11]

The Nawab now returned to Murshidabad, leaving Manik-

[7] Holwell's 'Indian Tracts'.

[8] A few years back Mr. Seth published these Armenian Letters (in English translation) in "*Bengal: Past and Present.*"

[9] Mr. J. H. Little, Sj. A. K. Mitra: *Bengal: Past and Present*, July 1915, and January, 1916.

[10] Note on the Black Hole, *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 156.

[11] Prof. Martineu's article in '*Bengal: Past and Present*, 1916.

chand as Governor of Calcutta. The loss of Calcutta reduced the English to a miserable condition. The fugitives at Fulta passed their days amidst great hardship, being occasionally supplied with provisions by the Dutch at Chinsura or by some Hindu inhabitants of Calcutta.[12] But when the news of their disaster reached Madras, the authorities there in consideration of the "great importance of the settlement of Calcutta to the English" decided that "the utmost efforts should be made to recover it."[13] Fortunately they could utilise for this task the services of Admiral Watson, who had two years earlier come to India with a sqadron of the English Royal Navy, and those of Colonel Clive, who had already given proofs of his abilities at Arcot (1751). Admiral Watson was given the command of the expedition to Bengal by sea and Colonel Clive by land. The Select Committee at Fort St. George wrote to the Select Committee at Fort William on the 13th October, 1756, that "on the arrival of the present armaments hostilities should immediately commence with the utmost vigour" either "to distress" the Nawab's "dominions and estates" or "bring reprisals" into the Company's possession.[14] Starting on the 16th October, 1756, the expedition reached the mouth of the Hugli after an unfavourable voyage and relieved the fugitives at Fulta in December. Watson and Clive recovered Calcutta on the 2nd January, 1757. The English then decided to wage war against the Nawab, and plundered Hugli and its environments within a few days.

The recovery of Calcutta did not mean the cessation of hostilities between the Nawab and the English. It was, in a sense, the prelude to the great drama that was soon to be acted

[12] Raja Navakrishna was one of them. The Hindu Zamindars and businessmen were at this time very well disposed towards the English Company, for both political and economic reasons.

[13] Hill, Vol. I, p. 197.

[14] Ibid., p. 239.

on the political stage of Bengal. The English could not rest satisfied till they had provided sufficient guarantees for future safety, particularly as their plunder of Hugli had inflamed the Nawab's rage, and he had left his capital once again to punish them. With a view to preventing a second sack of Calcutta by the Nawab, the English adopted various defensive measures. "Followed by a numerous army, furnished with every thing necessary for war,"[15] the Nawab crossed the river Hugli on the 30th January, but after an indecisive engagement with the English towards the beginning of the next month, concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with them on the 9th February, 1757, on the following terms: (1) "All privileges granted by the Emperor of Delhi to the British to be confirmed; (2) All goods under the British *dustucks* to pass free through Bengal, Bihar and Orissa; (3) The Company's Factories and all goods and effects belonging to the Company, its servants or tenants, which had been taken by the Nawab, to be restored, and a sum of money to be paid for what had been plundered or pillaged by the Nawab's people; (4) Calcutta to be fortified as the British thought proper; (5) The British to have the right to coin siccas".[16] The terms of the treaty were thus very favourable to the interest of the English and greatly enhanced their influence and prestige in Bengal.

It is indeed surprising that the English and the Nawab, who were so bitterly incensed against each other, would thus settle down to peaceful terms. There were some inner motives of self-interest, which led them to seek a cessation of hostilities at this time. Already when Clive was busy in the capture of Hugli, the news of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War had reached India, and Clive rightly thought that it would not be

[15] *Siyar-ul Mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 221.

[16] Hill, Vol. I, *Introduction*, cxlviii; Stewart, *History of Bengal*, *Appendix XII*.

possible for the English to maintain themselves against a combination of the French and the Nawab. "The delay of a day or two," as he himself says, "might have ruined the Company's affairs by the junction of the French with the Nawab." The French in Bengal had a force of 800 Europeans and a train of field artillery; Bussy was in the Northern Circars within 300 miles of Calcutta, and if the Nawab were able to combine with them, then he would become an irresistible enemy of the English. Clive was also conscious of his own strained relations at that time with Admiral Watson and the Calcutta Council who brooded "over their grievance against the Madras authorities for investing Clive with independent powers."[17] As for the Nawab, difficulties within and apprehension of a danger from outside his Subah induced him to conclude the treaty. Many of his followers were unwillingly to continue the fight any longer. His father-in-law, Muhammad Irez Khan, the principal officers of his Court, and the chief commanders of his army,—all were in favour of peace. Moreover, just at that time the renewed invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali and his victory over the Imperial forces[18] made him also apprehensive of the Abdali's advance towards Bengal with the help of the Rohillas and the Oudh Nawab.[19]

In fact the treaty was not the result of any desire on the part of either to promote mutual goodwill. It lacked sincerety, without which all treaties are but scraps of paper, and so the renewal of hostilities was only a question of time. The western invasion apprehended by Siraj did not materialise, but this much is certain that the treaty gave the English the opportunity they needed to capture the French fort at Chandernagore (March 23, 1757) and thus to crush the ambitions of

[17] Hill, *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. I, *Introduction*, cxlix-cl.

[18] Vide, Vol. I.

[19] Siyar, Vol. II, p. 223; Scrafton, *Reflections on the Government of Indostan*, p. 66.

their greatest European enemy in Bengal,[20] and at the same time to deprive Siraj of a good support in case of hostilities. Siraj here lost in the diplomatic contest with Clive.

Political intrigues are sometimes more effective than open fights. On the eve of Plassey, Bengal became the scene of bitter political intrigues and conspiracies fomented by general and personal grievances against the Nawab, and it was natural that the English Company, at this stage of their affairs, should utilise these for their own advantage. As early as 1754[21] Colonel Scott had thought of "bringing about a Revolution to their advantage" in Bengal "in alliance with the discontented... (Hindu) Rajahs and inhabitants." The Select Committee at Madras wrote to the Select Committee in Calcutta on the 13th October, 1756: "We need not represent to you the great advantage which, we think, it will be to the military operations and the influence it will have in the Nawab's councils to effect a junction with any powers in the Provinces of Bengal that may be dissatisfied with the violences of the Nawab's Government or that may have pretensions to the Subahship."[22]

There was indeed a strong party in the country engaged in a conspiracy to dethrone the Nawab, and the English, who knew it for certain that the Nawab would strike against them at any favourable opportunity,[23] lent their assistance in the execution of the designs of these conspirators.[24] Some of the Hindu Zamindars (like Maharaja Krishnachandra of Nadia) and bankers (the Jagat Seths) played[25] the leading part in the conspiracy of 1757, and they were joined by some disaffected

[20] Vide, ante, the chapter on *Anglo-French Relations in India.*

[21] Hill, *Bengal in* 1756-57, Vol. III, p. 328.

[22] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 239—40.

[23] *Letter from the Select Committee in Bengal to the Secret Committee,* London, dated 14th July, 1757.

[24] "The cause of the English had become that of the Seths. Their interests the same. Can anyone be surprised to find them acting in concert?"—*Memoirs of M. Jean Law, Hill,* Vol. III, p. 186.

relatives or officers of the Nawab like Mir Jafar, Yar Latif Khan and Durlabhram. The Afghans of the Subah also, in pursuance of a traditional rebellious attitude, did not materially back up Siraj's government. Under such circumstances "discord spread itself through the Subah's (Nawab's) Court, where the only oracle that everyman consulted was his own interest."[26]

Towards the end of April, 1757, Mr. Watts, the Company's Resident at Murshidabad, informed the Select Committee in Calcutta of the conspirators' desire to combine with the English in overthrowing the Nawab and setting up Mir Jafar, the Nawab's *Bakhsi* and the arch conspirator. It was the "unanimous sense" of the Select Committee that "a revolution in the Government (whatever hands it fell into) would be advantageous to the English."[27]

A treaty was drawn up between the conspirators and the Company early in June, 1757. It stipulated, among other things, various advantages for the English Company.[28] We have it on the authority of Mr. Becher (a member of the Committee) that, by a private arrangement, the members of the Council received large presents.[29] Omichand, who threatened to divulge the plot to the Nawab unless he received about 30 lakhs of rupees and five per cent of the Nawab's treasure, was duped by Clive by the "expedient of a double treaty". One draft of the treaty which was written on a piece of white paper and was regarded as valid, did not contain anything about

[26] *Calcutta Review*, 1872, pp. 107—110; Rajib-Lochan's *Krishnachandracharit*, pp. 73—75.

[28] An Apologia for Conspiracy, "*Bengal: Past and Present*", July—September, 1928, pp. 8—10.

[27] *Letter from the Select Committee, Fort William, to the Secret Committee, London*, dated 14th July, 1757: Hill's Bengal in 1756—57, Vol. II, pp. 445—453.

[28] Hill, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 383—385; *Stewart's History of Bengal*, Appendix No. 13.

[29] Mill, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 187.

Omichand's demands, while the false one, written on a piece of red paper, contained Omichand's demands. Clive and the Secret Committee signed the fictitious treaty. Admiral Waston refused to put his signature there, but Clive got it counterfeited by Mr. Lushingon and added it to the false treaty. Clive later on defended this episode in strong terms, declaring that he "never made any secret of it; he thinks it warrantable in such a case, and would do it again, a hundred times."[30] A few modern writers have also produced a 'laboured apology' but it is hard to defend it from any point of view whatsoever. This trick "has done more harm to his reputation than any other charge that has been brought against him."[31]

The Nawab was now charged by Clive with violating the terms of the treaty of February, 1757, and before he sent any reply Clive marched towards Plassey. He arrived there in the midnight of 22nd June, and on the next day was fought between his forces and the Nawab's son one of the decisive battles of Inida in the mango-groves of Plassey (Palasi). After a desperate fight, the Nawab found himself betrayed and in a helpless situation, and left the battlefield at about 4 p.m. But at Murshidabad also he found treason and conspiracy working against him, and on hearing of Mir Jafar's and Clive's advance towards the city, he left it at 3 o'clock in the night of 24th June for Rajmahal hoping to join the small party of the French under M. Law and to obtain the help of Raja Ramnarayan, *naib nazim* of Bihar. He took with him his Begum Lutf-un-nisa and a few companions and some jewels. But a tragic turn of fortune brought him, near Rajmahal, to the notice of Mir Daud, governor of Rajmahal, who managed to send him to Murshidabad. He was not allowed to remain a prisoner for a long time. Mir Jafar's son, Miran, was bent on doing away

[30] Thornton, *History of the British Empire in India*, Vol. I, p. 256, note.

[31] Wheeler, *Early Records of British India*, p. 260.

with him and in one dark night he was most brutally murdered by a wretch named Muhammadi Beg. It is not definitely known whether Clive was in any way responsible for the deed or not.

Mir Jafar had already entered Murshidabad on the 24th June, where Clive also proceeded five days later and invested him with the Nawabship of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Siraj-ud-daulah's treasury did not, however, contain 40 million sterling as was popularly believed, and so Mir Jafar could not pay off at once the full amount of the promised sums to the English. It was therefore stipulated that one-half of the amount should be paid by the last day of October, the "remainder to be paid within the compass of three years by equal payments every six months".[32] Omichand was informed of the fictitious treaty and was not given a farthing. Mr. Orme mentions that at first Rs. 7,271,666 were received by the Company and sent to Calcutta in 700 chests. Again on the 9th of August Rs. 1,655,358, and on the 30th August, gold, jewels and cash amounting to Rs. 1,599,737, were delivered to them by Durlabhram.[33] The members of the Council in Calcutta also received large shares.[34]

An E. I. C. mint was established at Calcutta, and the first E. I. C. rupees were coined there on the 19th of August, 1757.[35] The English now sent out their agents to re-establish the subordinate factories in the interior. The Nawab passed orders for the freedom of the Company's trade throughout the Subah. The Company also received the Zamindary of the 24-Parganas, against the opposition of the tenants and renters "who were averse to the introduction of new masters, who

[32] Scrafton, *Reflections on the Government of Indostan*, pp. 96—97.

[33] *Indostan*, Vol. II, p. 188.

[34] Third Report, p. 120.

[35] There were earlier E. I. C. mints at Madras and Bombay.

being merchants might wish to appropriate"[86] the salt trade of those places to themselves.

Thus the Company secured good many advantages as a result of its victory at Plassey. Admiral Watson described it to be of "extraordinary importance not only to the Company but to British nation in general." A contemporary memoir defines exactly what the events of 1757 meant to the English: "Many of those who would have totally lost the Fruits of long Labour and various Hardships, and who must have been beggars if subject to any other power, are again easy in their fortunes, and some of them have already transported their Effects to their Native Country; the proper return for the assistance they derived from her Maternal affection; and as these Events have distinguished the present age and present administration, so their effects will probably, be felt in succeeding Times. The Company, by an accession of territory, has an opportunity of making an ample settlement; which, under proper management, may not only be extremely serviceable to her, but also to the Nation; and having a revenue from these lands, the mint at Calcutta, and the lease of saltpetre at Patna, which amounts on the whole to one hundred thousand pounds a year, there is a Provision against future dangers upon the spot, and without further expense."[87]

Besides these gains, the moral effect of the victory was great. The humiliation of the Subahdar of the province by a foreign trading company immensely increased the power and prestige of the latter. Plassey clearly demonstrated to them the utterly corrupted state of political life in Bengal and the growing discontent of the Hindu zamindars and merchants against the decaying government of Muslim adventurers, by taking ad-

[86] Orme, Vol. II, p. 188.

[87] *Bengal: Past and Present*, July—September, 1928, pp. 6—10; Hill, Vol. III, p. 395.

vantage of which the English embarked upon a new era of commercial prosperity and territorial advancement. But though the year 1757 marks a turning point in the history of Bengal, we must not exaggerate the importance of Plassey by concluding that the English thereby became a dominant influence in India. The British Empire of India was not a foregone conclusion in 1757; the half century following it was as critical as the half century preceding; and it was about a quarter of a century after Plassey that the English East India Company took a prominent place in Indian affairs as a permanent Indian power.

The new Nawab Mir Jafar was a mere figurehead in the state, while the real power passed into the hands of Clive. Mir Jafar was too weak and incompetent a man to conduct satisfactorily the machinery of the state at such a critical time in the face of a number of conflicting forces. In fact, the Nawab began to realise his difficulties soon after his accession. With scanty and precarious resources it became impossible for him to satisfy all the conspirators, who, finding their self-interests not fully served, vexed him from time to time. Moreover, his own folly in trying to crush Hindu officers like Durlabhram, to wohm he was greatly indebted for his elevation, and Ram Ram Singh, *faujdar* of Midnapore, gave birth to an opposition against his Government in different parts of the *Subah* (Patna, Purniah, Midnapore, Dacca)[38]. These were somehow suppressed with the help of the English, and Durlabhram and Raja Ramnarayan, *nab nazim* of Bihar, were pacified through the efforts of Clive. In return for this help Clive extorted from Mir Jafar the monopoly of the saltpetre trade in Bihar for the English.[39]

[38] Wheeler, *Early Records of British India*, p. 263.

[39] Mill, Vol. III, p. 274; Orme, Vol. II, p. 282; Scrafton's *Indostan*, pp. 104—114.

Besides these internal revolts, external dangers threatened Mir Jafar's government. The distracted state of Bengal attracted the attention of Ali Gauhar, entitled Shah Alam II as Emperor (the eldest son of Alamgir II), who was then subject to the "malignant hostility" of the "perfidious and selfish" *Wazir*, Imad-ul-mulk, and had for over a year "turned his face to the path of the wilderness in sole reliance on God." Muhammad Quli Khan, the first cousin of Shuja-ud-daulah of Oudh and the imperial *Subahdar* of Allahabad, assisted him in invading Bihar, but Shuja-ud-daulah's promise of help was not duly fulfilled. Shah Aam II reached Phulwari, seven miles west of Patna, on the 18th March, 1759. Raja Ramnarayan, *naib nazim* of Bihar, appealed to the Cacutta Council for help, in response to which Clive marched with an army. A body of the Nawab's troops also entered Bihar under Miran. Shah Alam II's attempt proved unsuccessful and the 'baffled' prince departed from Bihar in May. His two other attempts to establish his influence in Bengal and Bihar in 1760 and 1761 ended in total failure. "All his hopes of independence crushed, and in utter penury and lack of supporters, the sovereign of the Delhi Empire now sued for the mercy of the English."[40]

Incompetent and worthless as Mir Jafar was, he was growing restive under Clive's domination, when the Dutch led an expedition into Bengal in the year 1759. Relying on Holwell,[41] some writers hold that the Nawab, anxious to get rid of Clive's control, secretly encouraged the Dutch. This may not be true.[42] In fact, the Dutch were prompted to take this step by considerations of safeguarding their own commercial interests in Bengal, which were threatened by the new political power of their old commercial rival, the English. They had watched

[40] Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 542.

[41] *Memorial delivered by Holwell to the Select Committee upon the arrival of Vansittart to succeed him in the Government. Original Papers Relating to the Disturbances in Bengal*, Vol. I, pp. 8—13.

[42] K. K. Dutta, *The Dutch in Bengal and Bihar*, pp. 52—54.

with anxiety the incidents of the 'Anglo-Moorish' duel in Bengal, and had, except in a few instances, maintained strict neutrality. But the results of Plassey, which made the English the power behind the throne, and gave them further advantages in the field of Bengal's commerce, turned them extremely jealous of the English, and they resolved to strike a blow against the ascendancy of the latter in Bengal. "The Dutch were in fact in the same position in Bengal now, as the English would have been in, in South India, had Saunders done nothing to counteract the schemes of Dupleix. Bisdom and Vernet, the Dutch leaders, have therefore the same justification for attempting to overthrow the English supremacy as Saunders and Clive have for contesting that of the French in the South." In 1759 six or seven Dutch vessels with 300 Europeans and 600 Malayan troops appeared in the Ganges, and the English also made necessary preparations to meet them. The two forces met in an engagement, on the 25th November, 1759, on the plains of Bedara, midway between Chandernagore and Chinsura. The Dutch were defeated and entered into a treaty with the English. They "disavowed the proceedings of their ships below, acknowledged themselves the aggressors, and agreed to pay costs and damages."[43] A few days after the battle of Bedara, Miran appeared near Chinsura highly incensed against the Dutch. He at last "received their deputies; and after severe altercation, forgave them and promised ample protection in their trade and privileges on the following terms: that they shall never meditate war, introduce or enlist troops, or raise fortifications in the country; that they shall be allowed to keep up one hundred and twenty-five European soldiers, and no more, for the service of their factories of Chinsura, Kassimbazar and Patna; that they shall forthwith send their ships and remaining troops out of the

[43] *Clive's Narrative*: Malcolm, *Life of Clive*, Vol. II.

country; and that a breach of any one of these articles shall be punished with utter expulsion."[44] Thus the defeat at Bedara dealt a crushing blow to the ambition of the Dutch, and henceforth their existence in Bengal became dependent on the goodwill of the English. The battle of Bedara is another step in advance from Plassey in the growth of the British power in Bengal,—the other contemporary steps being the repulse of the Bihar and Bengal invasions of Shah Alam II in 1759, 1760 and 1761.

Clive embarked for England on the 25th February, 1760, after delivering over the charge of affairs in Bengal to Mr. Holwell as its temporary Governor. Clive had indeed done much to strengthen the position of the English in Bengal, and further successfully avoided the various dangers that arose from time to time to threaten their position. But at the same time it should be noted that the British authority had not been firmly established even by 1760. In fact the "general position was still uncertain. The English had no moral position in the province." And we shall see that their authority did not remain unchallenged. Moreover, Clive had himself set some harmful precedents which reacted on the usefulness of his work. By accepting private presents from the Nawab he not only set a bad example for his fellow-officers but at the same time impoverished the Nawab's exchequer and was thus partly responsible for the misgovernment of Bengal after 1757. The argument of defence that there was no regulation of the Company forbiding the acceptance of private presents[45] and that such presents as were not extorted from a prince but were willingly given by him were not dishonourable, does not stand the test of criticism based on facts connected with the East India Company's transactions with Mir Jafar. The Nawab

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, p. 60.

was not at all a free agent; he was placed in such a situation that he could not but conciliate Clive. The sums which Clive received were thus no voluntary gifts or presents of the Nawab; but "they were moneys bargained for the sale of a province under a transaction stained with falsehood and treachery throughout."[46] His anxiety to secure a *Jagir*, after Mir Jafar had procured for him from the shadow Emperor[47] the title of *Omrah*, is a clear proof of his desire to make a personal fortune. But he was too keen-sighted not to have realized that there would be no dearth of men after him to exploit the disturbed condition of the country, or that it was not sound policy to saddle Mir Jafar with a financial burden when the expected amount could not be found in Siraj-ud-daulah's treasury.

After Clive's departure, the helplessness of Mir Jafar's position became clear to him. His treasury was exhausted, the troops were mutinous for arrears of pay, and the Company had not received the instalments as arranged by the treaty of 1757. The Company began to press him very heavily for money, especially because it had not received any financial assistance from its authorities in England, who believed that it had acquired a vast wealth in Bengal. But if the Company did not receive the stipulated amount from Mir Jafar, its servants and agents made use of the opportunity afforded by the weak rule of the Nawab and the increased power of the English to exploit the internal trade of the country for their own advantage, by making a wholesale abuse of the *dustucks* to the great prejudice of the interests of the country merchants. Thus when the Nawab had emptied his treasury by offering repeated presents to the members of the Council in

[46] Elphinstone, *Rise of the British Power in the East*, edited by Sir E. Colebrooke, p. 315.

[47] D. N. Banerjee, *Early Administrative System of the Company*, Vol. I, pp. 641—42.

Calcutta, the country was deprived of its resources owing to the unfair and aggressive behaviour of the servants of the Company. Besides the invasions of Shah Alam from the North-West, the Marathas also continued their incursions from the South-West, and to defend Bengal Mir Jafar had to seek English help. "But every such intervention made the control of the Company over Bengal more unmistakable and the restraining of its servants more difficult; while the burden of maintaining these troops formed a heavy drain upon the Company's resources, and Mir Jafar, whose treasury was exhausted, could not defray these charges."[48]

Thus owing to the want of a strong authority at the centre and the growing rapacity of the Company's servants and agents, Bengal had "fallen into a state of utter anarchy and misery". The Council in Calcutta held Mir Jafar responsible for all these, and at the instigation of Mr. Holwell arranged for another change in the Nawabship of Bengal. Holwell levelled various charges against Mir Jafar, some of which he certainly merited, but some were concocted by Holwell to justify his own conduct in connection with the revolution of 1760.[49] Mir Qasim Ali Khan, son-in-law of Mir Jafar, who had been sent to Calcutta on a state business, entered into a treaty with the Company on the 27th September, 1760. By it he ceded to the Company the three *Chucklas* of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong to meet the cost of maintaining an

[48] Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 37.

[49] "In justice to the memory of the late Nabab Meer Jaffar we think it incumbent on us to acquaint you that the horrible massacres wherewith he is charged by Holwell in his Address to the Proprietors of the East India stock (p. 46) are cruel aspersions on the character of that Prince, which have not the least foundation in truth. The several persons there affirmed, and who were generally thought, to have been murdered by his orders, are all now living, except two, who were put to death by Meeran, without the Nabab's consent or knowledge."—*Letter to Court*, 30th September, 1766; Supplement, Long. No. 837.

army for the defence of Bengal.[50] Mir Qasim then returned to Murshidabad, where Caillaud and Vansittart also proceeded on 14th October to give effect to the treaty. Finding all resistance to the English fruitless, Mir Jafar relinquished the throne in favour of Mir Qasim and proceeded to Calcutta, where he began to live as a pensioner of Mir Qasim. Thus was Mir Jafar deposed "in breach of a treaty founded on the most solemn oaths".[51] Many members of the Council strongly protested against the resolution "to dethrone a man we were bound to support by the most solemn ties," and remarked that it would put an 'indelible stain upon our national character".[52] Mir Jafar was rightly paid back in his own coin, but the conduct of the Calcutta Council was also not above criticism. Self-interest was the key to this welter of bargains, and when Holwell and Vansittart saw that Mir Jafar's administration was not satisfactorily advancing the interests of the Company, it was but natural that they would drag him down to set up another in the hope of improving the position of the Company. The fact that the members of the Council received presents in money as the price of Mir Qasim's Nawabship "casts a sordid air over the whole business".[53]

Mir Qasim possessed a strong character and had already given some proofs of his administrative ability as the *faujdar* of Rungpur and Purniah before he became the Nawab of Bengal. He realised the necessity of having an efficient military organisation and a well-filled treasury, the two essential requisites for a strong executive, especially in those troublous

[50] Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 67.

[51] *Letter from some gentlemen of Calcutta Council.—First Report.*

[52] Roberts, H. B. I., p. 151.

[53] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 168. Mr. Vansittart received Rs. 500,000. Mr. Holwell Rs. 270,000; Mr. McGuire Rs. 180,000 and 5,000 gold mohurs; Mr. Sumner Rs. 240,000; Mr. Smith Rs. 134,000, Major Yorke, 134,000, Colonel Caillaud Rs. 200,000. *Mill*, Vol. III, pp. 368—369.

days. To strengthen his power, he suppressed the refractory Zamindars of Bengal and Bihar, who had on several occasions defied the authority of the old Nawab.[54] To improve the condition of the exchequer, he compelled the old officers to disgorge the sums they had misappropriated, and levied some *abwabs* or additional cesses. He tried to organise the military department after the European fashion, and arranged for the manufacture of fire-locks and guns at Monghyr, where he had shifted his capital. Vansittart has given the following estimate of his administration: "He discharged the Company's debt and the heavy arrears of his army, retrenched the expenses of his court, which had consumed the income of his predecessors, and secured his own authority over the country by reducing the power of the Zemindars, who were before continual disturbers of the peace of the province."[56] We have it on the authority of another contemporary writer, Ghulam Husain, that "in unravelling the intricacies of affairs of government and especially the knotty mysteries of finance; in examining and determining private differences; in establishing regular payment for his troops and for his household; in honouring and rewarding men of merit and men of learning, in conducting his expenditure exactly between the extremities of parsimony and prodigality; and in knowing intuitively where he must spend freely and where with moderation,—in all these qualifications, he was an incomparable man indeed and the most extraordinary prince of his age."[57] Mir Qasim was indeed the most efficient of all the Bengal Nawabs from 1756 onwards.

But he was not given a fair chance. His attempt to re-

[54] *Siyar*, Vol. II, pp. 423—431; *Muzaffarnamah*, pp. 163a—163b; *Khulasatut-Tawarikh*, pp. 104a—105a (*Khudabakash Library, Patna*).

[55] *Siyar*, Vol. II, p. 421.

[56] *Vansittart's Narrative*, Vol. III, p. 381.

[57] *Siyar*, Vol. II, p. 437.

move the grievances in the field of internal commerce of Bengal, and to check the oppressions of the Company's servants and agents, made his Nawabship irreconcilable with the interests of these people. We have seen that the Imperial firman of 1716—1717 had granted the privilege of free sea-borne trade to the corporate body of the Company; but taking advantage of the disturbed condition of the time, the Company's servants had extended this privilege for their own private trade of all kinds to the great detriment of the interests of the country merchants and manufacturers. In fact, by this time. "a trade was carried on without payment of duties, in the prosecution of which infinite oppressions were committed. English agents and Gomasthas, not contented with injuring the people, trampled on the authority of government, binding and punishing the Nawab's officers wherever they presumed to interfere."[58] All attempts of Mir Qasim, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hastings to settle the dispute by a compromise were foiled by the hostility on the part of the majority of the members of the Calcutta Council, who, in their behaviour towards Mir Qasim, displayed, as Macaulay says, "the strength of civilisation without its mercy."[59] To save the interests of his own subjects, Mir Qasim, on failure of the compromise, abolished (1762) trade duties altogether, thus making his *Subah* a free-trading country,—but the members of the Calcutta Council, with the exception of Vansittart and Hastings, unjustly demanded that the duties should be re-established.

The failure to arrive at an agreement regarding the internal trade of the Company and its servants made a conflict between the Nawab and the English inevitable, and it was precipitated by Mr. Ellis, Chief of the English factory at Patna, "who seems deliberately to have aimed at war, in order that

[58] Verelst, *View of Bengal*, p. 48.

[59] Roberts, *H. B. I.*, p. 152.

the obstacle to the private traffic of himself and his friends might be removed."[60]

On the 10th June, 1763, Major Adams with 1100 Europeans and 4000 Sepoys took the field against Mir Qasim's army 15000 strong. By the 5th September, the Nawab's troops were defeated in successive engagemnts at Katwah, Giria, Suti and Udaynala. The last battle practically decided the fate of Mir Qasim. Prompted by a spirit of revenge against the English, he decided to proceed to Patna; and in a desperate mood he cruelly put to death his Indian prisoners (whom he suspected of complicity with the Company), —Raja Ramnarayan, the two Seth brothers, Rayrayan Umid Ray, Raja Rajballabh with his sons, and a few others (some at Monghyr and some near Barh on his way to Patna). At Patna a number of English prisoners were massacred[61] under his orders by Walter Rheinhardt, a German adventurer in his service (who earned the appellation of 'Somru' or the Sombre). But he was ultimately defeated by the English and retreated into the country beyond the Ganges.

The pensioned Mir Jafar had been already reinstalled on the throne of Bengal (7th July) by the English, and on the 10th July he signed a treaty by which it was settled that "the English shall carry on their trade by means of their own *dustucks*, free from all duties, taxes and impositions, in all parts of the country excepting the salt on which a duty of two and a half per cent is to be levied on the 'Rowna' or Houghly market price; wherein, it is further agreed, that the late Perwannahs, issued by Cossim Ally Khan (Mir. Casim) granting to all merchants the exemption of all duties for the space of two years shall be reversed and called in, and the duties collected as before." He also promised to make compensation for

[60] Ramsay Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[61] The site of the massacre is the present Patna City cemetery.

all losses, public and private, due to the war with Mir Qasim. Nand Kumar was appointed his chief minister, but the English soon suspected him of hostile designs, as he had sent letters to the Emperor's and the Wazir's camps.[62] Mir Jafar's second Nawabship was not less troublesome to him than the first one. The abuses of the Company's servants in the internal trade of the country went on increasing,[63] and owing to disorders, revenues could not be properly collected. Mir Jafar did not live long to struggle against them. He died on the 5th February, 1765.

After being expelled from Patna, Mir Qasim had ultimately obtained shelter in the court of Nawab Shujah-ud-daulah of Oudh. The Emperor Shah Alam was also at that time with the Nawab Wazir. The Nawabs of Oudh had for the last three decades been always looking towards Bengal as a natural sphere for extension of their authority, and Shujah-ud-daulah agreed to help Mir Qasim more out of motives of personal gain than helping a brother ruler in recovering his lost throne. The exiled Mir Qasim helped the Nawab Wazir by subduing the rebels of Bundelkhand and arranged with him that "on the Vezir's crossing the Ganga, and entering the enemy's country, Mir Qasim from that day, and for so long as the expedition might last, would pay him for the expenses of his army eleven lacs of rupees per month." Joined by an adventurous party of the French, the allies proceeded towards Bihar. On the side of the English, Major Carnac, who had succeeded Major Adams, had no conspicuous military talent, and the English troops were mutinous. The first half of 1764 was spent in indecisive engagements on the borders of Oudh and Bihar. But Major Hector Munro arrived and restored the discipline of the army by blowing twenty-five mutineers from his guns and by breaking one sepoy battalion as quickly as possible.

[62] Long, No. 1738.

[63] K. K. Datta, *Bengal Subah*, Vol. I, pp. 343—352.

The two armies then met at Buxar on 23rd October, 1764, where the troops of the Nawab Wazir and Mir Qasim presented a stubborn resistance, but were ultimately defeated. After Shuja-ud-daulah's final defeat at Kara on the 3rd May, 1765, Oudh was "completely prostrated at the feet of the English." The Emperor came over to the side of the victors and Mir Qasim, stripped of all his jewels and deserted by his friends, led a wandering life making some futile attempts at regaining his power, till he died in utmost poverty near Delhi in 1777.[64] "Thus ended the famous battle of Buxar, on which depended the fate of India, and which was as gallantly disputed as was important in its results."[65]

The battle of Buxar was more decisive in results than the battle of Plassey. Plassey had enabled the Company to establish a puppet Nawab on the throne of Bengal and had no doubt immensely added to the prestige of the English. But Buxar did something more. Besides enabling them to strengthen their hold over Bengal, it afforded them an opportunity of bringing the north-west frontier of the *Subah* under their control. If Plassey saw the defeat of the Nawab of Bengal, Buxar proclaimed the defeat of the greater power of Oudh and even of the Mughal Emperor. While the rulers of Oudh thought of extending their influence eastwards, the English Company was also growing in power in that region, and so a contest between the two was only a question of time, and the Company was placed in a position of advantage when Oudh took the aggressive, and the issue was decided in 1764—65 in its favour. As Mr. Ramsay Muir remarks, "Buxar finally riveted the shackles of Company's rule upon Bengal."

After the death of Mir Jafar, the Calcutta Council placed

[64] *Last days of Mir Qasim,—Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. X, pp. 123—132.

[65] Broome, *Bengal Army*, p. 480.

his second son Najam-ud-daulah on the throne of Bengal in preference to the minor son of Miran, predeceased (by lightning stroke) The right of choice belonged unquestionably to the Emperor but to this right the servants of the Company never for a moment thought of paying any regard [66] The servants of the Company now got a splendid opportunity for strengthening their hold over the country. On the 20th February, 1765, the Select Committee entered into a treaty with the new Nawab by which it was arranged that the Nawab was henceforth to maintain troops only for the "support of his dignity, the maintenance of internal peace, and the collection of the revenues" The English obtained the right of controlling the appointment of the Nawab's officers. This new privilege was at once directed against Nand Kumar, who early in Mir Jafar's second Nawabship had been suspected of negotiating with Delhi and Oudh, and was now trying to secure an Imperial *Sanad* for the new Nawab, and he was removed from his office and kept in prison with his son-in-law "The removal of Nand Kumar," notes Prof Dodwell, "had in fact been essential to the success of the English plan from the first. His removal completed the establishment of English influence" It was also provided that the Nawab could not apply for *sanads* to the Emperor without the permission of the President of the Council in Calcutta The members of the Council compelled the new Nawab to leave their trade privileges untouched and extorted from him presents for themselves and their Governor to the total amount of £139,357 (about Rs 15 lakhs). Thus "a mere outward show of independence was left to him," and every power passed into the hands of the Company's servants, who committed various kinds of abuses and oppressions both in administrative and commercial spheres. We have a description of the wretched condition of Bengal at this time in

[66] *Mill*, Vol III, p 354.

Clive's own words: "I shall only say that such a scene of anarchy, confusion, bribery, corruption and extortion was never seen or heard of in any country but Bengal; nor such and so many fortunes acquired in so unjust and rapacious a manner. The three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, producing a clear revenue of £3,000,000 sterling, have been under the absolute management of the Company's servants, ever since Mir Jafar's restoraton to the Subahship; and they have, both civil and military, exacted and levied contributions from every man of power and consequence, from the Nawab down to the lowest Zemindar."[67] This was the natural result of weakness and inefficiency on the one side and selfishness and avarice on the other.

SECTION II

From Dewani to Sovereignty, or the Second Dyarchy in Bengal (1765—1772)

The disturbed state of affairs in India made the Court of Directors anxious for restoring order and they appointed Lord Clive Governor of Bengal and President of the Select Committee in Calcutta with Mr. Sykes, Mr. Summer, Mr. Verelst and General Carnac as members. Clive reached Calcutta on the 3rd May, 1765, and he had indeed a difficult task before him. As the Select Committee themselves observed, they beheld a "presidency divided, headstrong, and licentious, a government without nerves, a treasury without money, and service without subordination, discipline, or public spirit...amidst a general stagnation of useful industry and of licensed commerce, individuals were accumulating immense riches, which they had ravished from the insulted prince and his helpless people who groaned under the united pressure of discontent, poverty and

[67] Malcolm, *Life of Clive*, Vol. II, p. 379

oppression."[68] Lord Clive afterwards said that he "took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable." But, in fact, his point of view was not so much to provide for the good government of Bengal as to "preserve the Company's political ascendancy by playing upon the weaknesses of the Nawab and his subjects."[69]

To reform the corruptions among the Company's servants was one of the missions of Lord Clive. Soon after his arrival he compelled the Company's servants to sign covenants debarring them from receipt of presents and ordered them to refrain from private commercial engagements. But the Company's servants did not receive high salaries, and to make up their losses, the Select Committee decided on the 10th of August, 1765, that "a monopoly should be formed of the trade in salt, betelnut, and tobacco, to be carried on exclusively for the benefit of the superior servants of the Company." In spite of the arguments of Verelst[70] (which might very well be biased as he was himself interested in the matter) that the establishment of this monopoly saved the people from various inconveniences and reduced the price of salt, it is now clear that the country merchants were thus deprived of trading in important articles of common consumption. This arrangement was against the repeated instructions of the Court of Directors, and the Society for Trade organised for this monopoly was therefore abolished, according to their orders, on the 14th September, 1768.[71] Lord Clive next tried to effect a reform in the army by abolishing (1st January, 1766) the system of Double

[68] *Letters to the Court from the Select Committee in Calcutta*, dated 19th February, 1767; Verelst, *View of Bengal*, Appendix, p. 471.

[69] Ramsay, Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[70] *View of Bengal*, pp. 113—117.

[71] D. N Banerjee, *Early Administrative system of the E. I. Co.*, Vol. I, p. 424.

Batta, or extra allowance even in time of peace, which had come into vogue in Bengal since the days of Plassey, having originated in the Carnatic with Chand Sahib and Muhammad Ali. According to Clive's plan, the Company's troops were divided into three brigades, each consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of Sepoys, and one troop of 'black' cavalry and were stationed, one brigade at Monghyr, another at Bankipur, and the third at Allahabad to prevent the incursions of the Marathas.[72] Just as his reform of the covenanted service had generated a conspiracy among the civilians, so his abolition of Double Bhatta led to a combination among the military officers under the encouragement of Sir Robert Fletcher. But these were firmly put down by him.

More important than these reforms were Lord Clive's settlements with Emperor Shah Alam and Nawab Shujah-ud-daulah. According to the treaty of Allahabad, dated the 16th August, 1765, Shujah-ud-daulah was confirmed in his kingdom with the exception of the districts of Kora and Allahabad, which were ceded to Emperor Shah Alam II, Chunar, which was kept for themselves by the English and the Zamindari of Benares, including Ghazipur, which was reserved to the family of Rajah Bulwant Singh "under English protection though legally subordinate to the Nawab of Oudh." Shuja-ud-daulah agreed to pay 50 lacs of rupees in compensation for the expenses of war, and entered into a defensive alliance with the Company, by which it engaged to help him with troops for the defence of his frontiers if he required them and agreed to pay the cost for its maintenance.[73] He also agreed to allow the

[72] *Mill*, Vol. III, p. 420.

[73] This is another instance of the kind of treaty relation that later came to be called subsidiary alliance.

Company[74] to "carry on a trade duty free throughout the whole of his dominions." In short, Oudh became practically dependent on the Company, and henceforth "it was a matter of fixed policy (with the English) to maintain a close alliance with Oudh, which was useful as a bulwark against the threatening power of the Mahrattas."[75]

The fugitive Emperor Shah Alam, who had been already anxious to secure the alliance of the English after their victory at Buxar, now received from them the districts of Kora and Allahabad, taken from Oudh by the aforesaid treaty, and it was arranged that he would also receive an annual tribute of twenty-six lacs of rupees (out of which two lacs were reserved for Mirza Najaf Khan). In return for this, the helpless Emperor had to make[76] a grant of the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, over which he had no control, to the English East India Company on the 12th August, 1765[77]. Clive also took this opportunity of securing a formal grant of the Northern Circars, which had, as we have seen already, been taken by the English from the French partisans of Muzaffar Jang of Hyderabd.

The arrangement under the Diwani is highly significant. In short, it was provided that henceforth the servants of the Company were to collect the revenues and defray the expenses of the government, the Nawab of Bengal was to receive a fixed amount of sicca rupees 53,86,131-9-0, and the Emperor 26 lacs. But, in fact, the acquisition of the Diwani by the English fundamentally altered the relations between them and the Nawab and effected an important transformation in the posi-

[74] So that the same privileges of trade that were enjoyed by the Company in the Bengal Subah were now extended to Oudh, and the great economic disorders of the Bengal Subah therefore spread to Oudh also.

[75] Ramsay Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[76] *Siyar-ul-mutakherin*, Vol. III, p. 9; *Sagarf-namah* by Itsamuddin (a manuscript exhibited by us at the 13th session of the I. H. Records Commission).

[77] Atchison, *Treaties and Sanads* etc., Vol. I, p. 225.

tion of the Company. As a Viceroy of the Mughal Emperor, the Nawab of Bengal dicharged two functions: (1) the Diwani or revenue collection and civil justice and (2) the Nizamat, or military power and criminal justice. By the treaty of 20th February, 1765, the Nawab had virtually transferred the second function to the Company, and now by the Diwani the Company obtained the first one. It is clear that real power passed into the hands of the Company. It was no longer merely a "trading body" but was elevated to the position of a "ruling power" and became virtually, as the Select Committee in Calcutta observed, "the sovereign of a rich and potent kingdom." Finance is the foundation of a government and a power which can control the financial resources of a country becomes in fact its master. The Court of Directors expressed their sentiments of satisfaction on this arrangement in their letter to Bengal of the 17th May, 1766. They also wrote that they were determined to make provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa the utmost bounds of their "Political views or Possessions."

The political mastery of the Company over Bengal was an accomplished fact by this time and they were placed in such a position of advantage that it was natural for them to expect greater political power, though the Court of Directors might not have liked it at that time. The Emperor came under their control, the Nawab of Oudh became a dependent ally and the Nawab of Bengal became in fact their pensioner. But from various considerations, Clive shrank from accepting the formal responsibility for the administration of the province. The Nizamt or control of military and police functions was left in the hands of the Nawab, who was to be paid out of the revenues a fixed sum to cover expenses.[78] Thus was introduced another dyarchy in 1765, an administration carried on

[78] Atchison, *op cit*, Vol I, p 229

in name by the Nawab but in reality by the Company. This was the 'favourable policy' of Clive at that time, as is clear from his own words: 'The first point in politics which I offer to your consideration is the form of government. We are sensible that since the acquisition of the dewany, the power formerly belonging to the Subah of these provinces is totally, in fact, vested in the East India Company. Nothing remains to him but the name and shadow of authority. This name, however, this shadow, it is inlispensably necessary we should seem to venerate. Under the sanction of a Subah (Subahdar) every encroachment that may be attempted by foreign powers can be effectively crushed, without any apparent interposition of our own authority and all real grievances complained of by them can, through the same channel, be examined into and redressed. Be it therefore always remembered that there is a Subah; and that though the revenues belong to the Company, the territorial jurisdiction must still rest in the chiefs of the country, acting under him and this Presidency in conjunction"

Thus this dual system was the result of an unwillingness on the part of the Company to assume responsibilities, and it failed to realise that it was taking a risky step by possessing all powers in its hands but leaving the responsibility in the hands of others. As the Nawab of Bengal was a minor, Muhammad Raza Khan was appointed by the Company Naib Nazim or Deputy for Bengal, and Raja Dhiraj Narain and after about two years Raja Shitab Ray for Bihar, with administrative centres at Murshidabad and Patna respectively. They were also entrusted with the direct collection of revenues and the civil administration connected with it. Thus, in spite of the *de jure* Diwani of the English, the actual conduct of civil and revenue administration remained in the hands of the native functionaries, who were less able than even Mir Jafar or Mir Qasim to check the oppressions of the Company's servants. Far from abolishing the abuses in the field of internal adminis-

tration, the new system of government under which respon sibility was divorced from power produced greater evils, and for these few years the country groaned under a heavy burden of official corruption and oppressions, and the abuses of private trade by the Company's servants increased enormously.[79] Moreover, any demand by the Company for the better realization of revenues payable to it entailed great miseries on the poor ryots, who had to submit patiently to the extortions of the irresponsible revenue officers.

Clive left India in February, 1767, and under his two inefficient successors in Bengal, Verelst and Cartier, the political atmosphere of the country became more gloomy and the various other abuses grew enormously. Richard Becher, an experienced servant of the Company, gave an accurate picture of the condition in his letter to the Secret Committee of the Directors, dated the 24th May, 1769: "It must give pain to an Englishman to have Reason to think that since the accession of the Company to the Diwani the condition of the people of this country has been worse than it was before and yet I am afraid the fact is undoubted.....this fine country which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards its Ruin."[80] As a result of this Report, the Company appointed in 1769 Supervisors of revenues (afterwards called collectors) who were to watch over the working of the Indian officers. But the 'Supervisors' engaged themselves in private trade and "made confusion more confounded and corruption more corrupt." To add to these, the terrible famine of 1770 produced untold miseries for the people.[81] "The scene of

[79] Bolts *Considerations on Indian Affairs*, p. 73.

[80] Ramsay Muir, *op. cit.*, pp. 92—94.

[81] "Not a drop of water has fallen in most of the districts for six months. The famine which has ensued, the mortality, the beggary, exceed all descriptions." *Letter from the Council in Calcutta to the Court of Directors, 9th May, 1770.*

misery that intervened," wrote one of the Company's servants in 1770, and "still continues, shocks humanity too much to bear description. Certain it is, that in several parts the living have fed on the dead."[82] For famine relief the Company's revenue Councils could in one area sanction only Rs. 5 worth of rice for four lacs of sufferers and altogether less than 90 thousand rupees were spent for relief, meanwhile the resources of Bengal were being drained for various unproductive purposes.

In Southern India, conditions were not less disturbed. The Nawab of the Carnatic had no doubt placed himself under the protection of the English but there were three other Indian powers in the South-Hyder Ali of Mysore, the Maratha Confedracy and the Nizam of Hyderabad,—who were struggling for supremacy. There were frequent shiftings of alliances among them and the English could not remain idle spectators of the political events in the South. After their recovery from the blows of Panipat, the Marathas had begun actively to interfere in the politics of the South, and at the same time they had advanced even into the North.

The rise of Hyder Ali from obscure beginning to power was menacing to all those Peninsular Indian powers as well as to the English. From a very humble position in the kingdom of Mysore, Hyder had made himself the undisputed master of the kingdom by that time. Wali Muhammad, great grandfather of Hyder, had migrated to Gulbarga from Delhi, and his grand-father Muhammad Ali had migrated to Bera where he "cultivated the soil and rented fields and gardens," Hyder's father, Fateh Muhammad, was the fourth son of Muhammad Ali. By dint of his prowess and military talents Fateh Muhammad rose to the position of a military commander in the Mysore state and received Budicote as his *Jagir* or fief.

[82] Hunter, *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, p. 410.

Born at Budicote in 1721 Hyder lost his father in 1728. This threw his family into troubles and it had to pass through many vicissitudes of fortune before it could get a "secure footing" in Mysore. The kingdom of Mysore was under the virtual dictatorship of its *Sarvadhikari*, Nanjraj, the reigning monarch, Chikka Krishna Raj being "merely a shadow."[83]

The wars in the Carnatic gave opportunities to Hyder Ali, who was a man of daring and ambition, to rise into prominence, step by step, through his original employment in the Mysore military service. After the assassination of Nasir Jang and the installation of Muzaffar Jang as Nizam by the French, Hyder's Bidar peons seized a large amount of the late Nawab's treasure. Hyder also came to have an idea of French military training and tried to introduce it in the ranks of his own recruits. Impresed by these Nanjaraj went with him to Trichinopoly with a view to seizing it. Here Hyder gained much "experience in the art of warfare".[84] Soon after he captured some guns belonging to a British convoy and his military position was greatly improved. In 1755 he was appointed *Faujdar* of Dindigal, where he established "one arsenal under the superintendence of French artificers whose services he obtained from Pondicherry." He added to the number of his troops and amassed a large wealth by plundering the neighbouring chiefs. Thus he progressed from prominence to power.

The distracted government of the Subahdar of the Deccan, the humiliation of the Marathas at the third battle of Panipat and the fierce contentions between the English and the French, afforded a fair field for the rise of a man of ambition, energy and intelligence. Though unlettered, Hyder possessed a strong determination, admirable courage and keen intellect. He successfully usurped authority at Mysore by 1760. After

[83] N. K. Sinha, Haider Ali, p. 4.
[84] Ibid., p. 9.

some temporary reverses in that year owing to the machinations of the Court party who had won over to their side his assistant Khande Rao and the Maratha Chief Visaji Pandit, he triumphed by 1761 over his enemies.[85] Hyder gradually extended his conquests over Bednore, Sunda, Sera, Canara, Guti, the territory of the Maratha chieftain Morari Rao, and received the submission of the *poligars* of Chikka Ballapur, Raidrug, Harpanhalli and Chitaldrug.

All this naturally caused resentment of the Marathas, the Nizam and the English. In 1764, Peshwa Madho Rao inflicted a defeat on Hyder near Rattihalli, south of Savanur, and in March, 1765, he had to conclude a treaty with the Marathas by surrendering Guti and Savanur and paying 28 lacs as tribute to the Marathas. In the same year the Madras Council agreed to help the Nizam against Hyder in return for the cession of Northern Circars and in 1766 a triple alliance of the English, the Nizam and the Marathas was formed against Hyder. The Marathas first attacked Mysore, but Hyder "by skilful diplomacy induced the Maratha chief to withdraw his army on receiving thirty-five lacs of rupees, half of which was paid down, while the Kolar district was pledged for the remainder." The Nizam proceeded against Mysore with a party of English troops, under the command of General Joseph Smith, but the enterprise did not prove successful. Influenced by Mahfuz Khan, brother and rival of the pro-English Nawab Muhammad Ali and enemy of the English, the Nizam soon broke the compact which he had made with the Madras Council and effected an alliance early in September, 1767. The new allies, Hyder and the Nizam, attacked Smith near Changama but the engagement was an indecisive one. Smith had to run for shelter to the fort at Trinomali where he effected a junction with Colonel Wood, their united forces coming up to

[85] Ibid., Chap. III.

1,030 cavalry, 5,800 infantry and 16 guns. They were soon engaged in a hard fought contest with the confederate troops at Trinomali where the latter met with some reverses. Hyder again marched in November but was defeated at Veniyambadi in December. At this time the Nizam, who also heard that Colonel Peach had been sent with a considerable force to attack his own territory, gave up the side of Hyder. He entered into a treaty with the English on 22nd March, 1768, involving terms that drew upon the English the inveterate hostility of the Mysore State. The Nizam confirmed his previous engagements with the English, declared Hyder as a "rebel and usurper", agreed to "relinquish to the English Company all his right to the Dewany of the Carnatic Balaghat (Mysore, when that would be conquered from Hyder)" and promised to help the Company and the Nawab of the Carnatic in punishing Hyder. The Court of Directors strongly reprobated this compact with the Nizam. "It is not," they wrote to the Madras Council on 13th May, 1768, "for the Company to take the part of umpire of Indostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance among themselves. We wish to see the Indian princes remain as a check upon one another without our interfering."[86]

This move on the part of the Madras Council did not bring down Hyder, who was a "bold, an original and an enterprising commander, skilful in tactics and fertile in resources, full of energy and never desponding in defeat."[87] A completely self-made man, who found Mysore weak and divided but raised it to the position of one of the foremost powers of India in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Hyder was not a robber chief or selfish military adventurer. Besides the daring of a military genius, there was in him the stuff of constructive statesmanship.

[86] Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 475, footnote.
[87] Bowring, *Hyder Ali and Tipu*, p. 113.

"In matters of business his shrewdness and capacity were remarkable, and he had the faculty of giving his attention to several subjects at the same time, so that he could hear a letter read, dictate orders and witness a theatrical exhibition all at once without being distracted by any one of these occupations."[88] He was certainly an important figure in Indian History.[89]

Such a man was not to be daunted by the desertion of his fickly ally, the Nizam, and he continued the struggle in right earnest. He routed the Bombay forces and recovered Mangalore from their hands. In March 1769 he appeared before Madars at the head of a body of cavalry and compelled the Madras Council to sue for a peace, of which the terms were dictated by Hyder himself. This treaty, which was signed on the 4th April, 1769, contained two general conditions: mutual restitution of conquests, including the cession to Hyder of the district of Karur, an old possession of Mysore but then held by Muhammad Ali, and mutual aid in defensive wars. "Both in regards to the military operations that preceded this treaty and to the conditions which it embodied, the Mysore chief evinced high qualities as a tactician and the sagacity of a born diplomatist. On the other hand, the proceedings of the Madras Council were characterised by a mixture of rashness and irresolution and an absurd confidence in their treacherous ally, Muhammad Ali, of whose duplicity Haider had, on the contrary, formed an accurate estimate."[90] The Madras Council failed to fulfil the treaty obligations because when the Marathas invaded Mysore in 1771, the English did not help Hyder. This excited Hyder's resentment against the English and led to another rupture in the time of Hastings.

[88] Ibid., p. 110.
[89] Ibid., p. 113.
[90] Ibid., p. 58.

These southern wars entailed a heavy drain on Bengal's resources. Moreover, "the eyes of the Proprietors of the Company were dazzled by golden visions;" they thought that Bengal possessed vast resources which the Company could very well tap. In spite of the Company's debts[91] and the opposition of the Directors, the Proprietors raised the divident in 1776 from 6 to 10 per cent. and in 1767 to 12½ per cent.[92] To add to this, the fall of revenue owing to the general misgovernment of the country, "drain of specie, occasioned by the annual exportation of the precious metals, chiefly to China on account of the Company's investment, and also in other directions" and the insufficient supplies of bullion from Europe, caused a great scarcity of money, which seriously affected the Company's exchequer.[93] Thus "within five years of the great triumph of 1765 the Company seemed on the verge of ruin."[94]

This state of things and the enormous fortunes which the *Nabobs* (the servants of the Company) were taking home drew the attention of the public and the intervention of the Parliament. From 1766 to 1772 several Parliamentary Acts were passed to regulate the relations between the Crown and the Company, leading to the famous Regulating Act of 1773. Meanwhile, the Company had appointed Hastings Governor of Bengal to remedy the evils of the dual government.

[91] Letter from Select Committee to the Court of Directors, 2nd November, 1769.

[92] Ilbert, Historical Introduction, p. 38.

[93] Mill, Vol. III, p. 441. On 1st January, 1771, when the Council in Calcutta had received into their treasury Rs. 95,43,855, for which they had grant bills on the Court of Directors, the cash remaining was only Rs. 35,42,761. At the same time the amount of debt in Bengal was £612,628.

[94] Ramsay Muir, p. 81.

CHAPTER IV

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AS AN INDO-BRITISH POWER (1772—1786)

SECTION I

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER HASTINGS

Hastings was definitely appointed to put an end to the evils of the dual government. "We now arm you with our full powers," wrote the Company, "to make a complete reformation." The responsibility, therefore, was very great. Though he was given definite instructions on many points, it is to a certain extent true, as Lord Thurlow says, that he was ordered "to destroy the whole fabric of the double government, under instructions, so general, that I may fairly say the whole plan was left to his judgment and discretion." For good or ill then, the internal reforms in Bengal prior to 1774 are mainly in their details at any rate the work of Warren Hastings and bear the stamp of his personality.

He had great difficulties to confront. Something like an Indian Empire had grown up but it had no administrative framework. "The new government of the Company consists of a confused heap of undigested materials, as wild as the chaos itself." He had to attack strong vested interests, and, what was more, he had to try to strengthen an overweakened central government against a too powerful ring of provincial powers. The political centre of gravity had been seriously displaced. The government of the country, he wrote, consisted of the supervisors, the Boards of revenue at Murshidabad and Patna, and the Governor and Council at Calcutta. To remedy these evils Hastings had to begin with a series of reforms. These reforms fall under four heads, firstly, commercial reforms; secondly, all those measures which follow-

ed upon the abolition of the dual government in pursuance of the Company's proposed intention to "stand forth as the Diwan"; thirdly, revenue reforms; and fourthly, judicial reforms.

According to regulations passed by the Board of Revenue on 23rd March, 1773, Hastings abolished the fraudulent use of the *dastaks* or free passes under which the goods of the Company's servants or their agents were exempted from dues. He suppresed the custom-houses (*chowkies*) in the Zamindaries, which were a great impediment to the free circulation of goods. Only five custom-houses were henceforth maintained, at Calcutta, Hugli, Murshidabad, Patna and Dacca. Lastly, he carried out a uniform lowering of the duties by 2½ per cent. on all goods, except the monopolies on salt, betel-nut and tobacco, to be paid by all Europeans and Indians alike. These reforms, all of which were ordered by the Court of Directors, did some thing to revive the decaying internal trade of Bengal. Hastings boasted that "goods pass unmolested to the extremities of the province". He issued orders warning the *gomasthas* not to force the weavers to work against their will or to receive *dadni*. Further, Mr. George Bogle was sent on a mission to Bhutan and Tibet with a view to facilitate trade relations with those countries and at the same time "a ship laden with cargo of Indian manufactures was despatched to Jedda with letters to the Governor of Egypt and the Pasha and Sheriff of Jedda requesting them to receive and continue the trade with India and to reduce the duties to a desirable extent." He also tried to remove the currency abuses, e.g., multiplicity, lack of uniformity and evils relating to *batta* or discount, a work which was followed with some success by Cornwallis. But his novel plan of a paper currency proved abortive as it was in advance of the times.

Hastings realised that the time had come when the Company must accept the direct responsibility for the administration

of Bengal. This necessitated the removal of Muhammad Reza Khan, the Deputy Nawab of Bengal, living at Murshidabad, and of Raja Shitab Ray, Deputy Nawab of Bihar, living at Patna. Both of them were called to Calcutta to answer the respective charges against them, but after a protracted trial they were acquitted of those charges and their offices were abolished. He reorganised the household of the Nawab of Bengal by appointing Muny Begum, the widow of Nawab Mir Jafar, superintendent of the minor Nawab's household and guardian of his person, and Raja Gurudas (son of Nanda Kumar) was to assist her as her Diwan. These appointments afterwards brought much censure upon Hastings, but it should be noted that these got the approval of the Court of Directors. He tried to readjust the finances by stopping the Imperial revenue on the ground that Shah Alam had placed himself under the protection of the Marathas and by pleading that the famine of 1770 had reduced the revenues of Bengal. He reduced the Nawab's pension from 32 to 16 lacs of rupees. The *Khalsa* (treasury) was removed from Murshidabad to Calcutta in order to "rectify that displacemnt of the political gravity, which had shifted from Calcutta to the provinces."

The people were suffering from various evils at the hands of the native 'Amils', and the appointment of 'Supervisors' by the Company in 1769 could not remove these evils. To remedy them Hastings at first appointed an itnerant committee with himself as its President, and made a tour through certain parts of Bengal, such as Nadia, Murshidabad and the surrounding districts. Hastings thought of direct collection, and *supervisors* got the title of *collectors*. The Committee of Revenue joined a native officer with the Collector for revenue administration. Each *pargana* or fiscal division was let out to the highest bidder for a term of five years. Certain changes were, however, introduced in 1774. "The measures finally adopted", writes Moncton Jones, "were a compromise and an admission of the

experimental nature of the work. They comprised two distinct plans, one for immediate operation, but confessedly a temporary half measure; the other a final and permanent system, drawn up in detail but not to be promulgated until the country should be ripe for it; it was in fact published in 1781". The 'Temporary plan' or the system of Provincial Councils took effect in January, 1774. Under this plan the Collectors remained in their districts, but these "were formed into six Divisions (Calcutta, Burdwan, Dacca, Murshidabad, Dinajpur, Patna) each comprehending several inferior districts under the direction of a Chief and Council." In each division a Diwan was appointed to keep accounts in the country language with a Naib Diwan under him in each district. In the final change it was intended by Hastings to leave the revenue work in the districts to the "native subordinate executive", responsible to the Calcutta Committee through the *Khalsa*. By this he wanted to remove the abuses created by the English revenue collectors ("heavy rulers of the people"). He gave effect to his final scheme in 1781, and solved somewhat the "problem of waste and oppression in the revenue." The Provincial Councils and Collectors were removed and revenue administration was placed in charge of a Committee of four,—Messrs. Anderson, Shore, Chartres, and Crofts. These members had no fixed salaries and were sworn to receive no perquisites. They were to have commission of 10 per cent on the net monthly collections, and double on the amount sent immediately to Calcutta.

The old judicial institutions were paralysed and honeycombed with abuses. But Hastings did not want to replace the time-honoured codes of law by western laws. He wanted to organise and reform. Under his directions a digest of Hindu Law was prepared by ten learned Pandits of the province. He established a civil and a criminal court in each district, utilising the existing courts of the *Daroga Adalat Diwani* (Mofassil or provincial Diwani) for civil cases and *Faujdari Adalat* for crimi-

nal cases. He established the *Sadar Diwani Adalat* and *Sadar Nizamat Adalat* in Calcutta. In the former, appeals in civil cases were to be heard by the President and two Councillors, helped by the *Rayrayan* (Diwan of the *Khalsa*) and the chief *Kanungoes*. In the latter, investigations in criminal appeals and capital sentences were made by the Nazim's deputy, the Chief *Qazi* and *Mufti* and three *Maulavis*, and if sanctioned by them the sentences received the Nawab's formal warrant and were sent to the district courts for execution. For improving the actual working of the law, the following rules were laid down:

(1) All proceedings were to be recorded in courts of every kind. (2) A time limit was set to all litigation. (3) Chouth or "the exaction of a fourth part of all litigated property") and other heavy fines were abolished. (4) Discretionary power exercised by the creditor over the person of the debtor was inhibited. (5) Arbitration to settle all cases of disputed property (not exceeding the value of ten rupees) was encouraged.

Hastings tried to check the abuses in the administration of the Mayor's Court. His reforming zeal led him also to take serious steps for suppressing the evils of dacoity, and Sannyasi raids which had increased greatly on account of the weakness of administration in Bengal. He also expelled the Bhooteas from Kutch Behar. Thus, with these changes, as Hunter says, Hastings firmly laid "the foundations of the civil administration" on which "the superstructure was raised by Cornwallis."

Hastings' position and powers were greatly modified by the Regulating Act of Lord North. "It was by the Regulating Act of 1773 that for the first time, the British nation, as a nation assumed the actual responsibility of the government of the territories won by the servants of a trading corporation." There was a gradual growth of feeling that the British people themselvs through Parliamnt rather than through a commercial

Company should be responsible for British rule in India. The East India Company, however strong and powerful, was considered unequal to its task and there were widely prevalent reports of scandalous misrule and corruption. The servants of the Company brought back immense wealth from India and gave rise to a desire in the minds of the politicians of converting a part of the profits to the exchequer to lighten the burden of British taxpayers. The Court of Proprietors also thought that the East India Company was making large profits and, in spite of the opposition of the Court of Directors, who were aware of the bad financial state of the Company, raised the dividends on their stock in 1766 from six to ten per cent and in 1767 to twelve and a half per cent. In 1767 the Parliament also limited the rate of dividend to be declared and obliged the Directors to pay to the exchequer an annual sum of £4,00,000. In 1772 the Directors applied for a loan of one million pounds to the state. The loans of the Bank had failed to bring up its sinking credit and the disorganisation in the Company's affairs compelled the Parliament to regulate these. In 1773, the state granted to the Company a loan of £1,400,000 at 4 per cent on certain conditions, such as the obligation to submit their accounts to the Treasury. The other Act, better known as the Regulating Act, gave the Company a new constitution.

It remodelled the constitution of the Company at home. It raised the qualification for a vote in the Court of Proprietors from £500 to £1,000, and took steps to prevent the multiplication of votes. The Directors were to be elected for four years, remaining at least one year out of office. Thus the members of the court were given greater security of tenure and could follow a more consistent and continuous policy at home and abroad. Secondly, it reconstructed the constitution of the Company in India. It set up in Bengal a Governor-General who was to be assisted and controlled by four councillors. Every question was to be decided by a majority; each had equal power and

the Governor-General, who was the President, had a casting vote only in case of a tie. It also provided for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta independent of the Governor-General and Council. Lastly, it subjected the Company to the supervision of the ministry and the subordinate presidencies to the supervision of the supreme government in Calcutta. It required all information regarding the revenue to be laid before the Treasury and everything dealing with the civil or military administration to be put before a Secretary of State. The Governor-General and the Council of Bengal got a limited control over the other Presidencies so far as wars and treaties with native powers were concerned. General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Barwell and Philip Francis were named in the Act. Sir Elijah Impey was appointed Chief Justice. They were to remain in office for five years and future appointments were to be made by the Company. They received liberal salaries, but the Act prohibited the receipt of presents or the carrying on of private trade and provided penalties for breach of trust and misconduct.

"The Act was probably on thhe whole an honest attempt to deal with a difficult problem," but it was open to many criticisms. A Speaker in the House of Commons in 1781 said of it, not unfairly: "In the mode of applying a reform, Parliament was precipitate and individuals were intemperate." By abolishing the vote of £500 stockholders the Act punished the small proprietors who could not split votes and rewarded those who could. The laudable object of preventing the retired Company's servants from gaining an excessive influence in the counsels of the Company was not realised. Secondly, the Governor-General was placed at serious disadvantages. The aid and support of the ministers were indispensable for him and Warren Hastings, who was the only Governor-General to work under the Regulating Act, had to place a large share of the Indian patronage at their disposal. The Governor-General

was not given any overriding authority and, as Lyall says, it produced "divided counsels and discordant executive from the very beginning." The Council could bring about a deadlock in the executive. The control of the Supreme Government at Calcutta over the other Presidencies was limited and incomplete. It applied only to their power of making war on or concluding peace with Indian States and was qualified by two exceptions of disastrous latitude in the case of having received special orders from home or in the case of urgent necessity of which the subordinate governments themselves could be judges. The field of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the law it had to administer and its relations with the Council, were unhappily vague, and this led to calamitous consequences. The Regulating Act was "a half-measure and failed in its object to establish a self-acting balance of powers and to prevent abuses by a system of co-ordinate authorities."

Some of the particular appointments made by the Parliament were unfortunate. Francis and Clavering had no Indian experience and the former sailed with the hope that he would succeed Hastings whom he regarded as standing in his way to occupy the first situation in the world attainable by a subject. They sailed to India with the idea deep-rooted in their minds that the government was corrupt and tyrannical.

The new regime was formally inaugurated on October 20, 1774, and in the words of Roberts "there ensued a six years' struggle which is probably unique in the history of administration." First of all the Councillors quarelled about some omissions in the ceremonial in the Governor-General's reception. They next attacked his whole policy and method of government. The Rohilla War was condemned as 'carrying upon the face of it, a manifest violation of all those principles of policy which we knew have been established by the highest authority, and till now universally admited.....as the basis of the Company's Counsels in the administration of the affairs in

India." Champion was asked to withdraw from Rohilkhand and to demand at once the 40 lakhs which the Nawab had promised. "They denounced the Rohilla War as an abomination, and yet their great anxiety now was to pocket the wages of it."[1]

The next question on which Hastings came into conflict with his Council was about the Treaty of Faizabad. The Nawab Wazir died in January, 1775, and the Council decided that all the treaties with Shuja-ud-daulah were personal. In spite of the remonstrances of Hastings the liabilities of his successor Asaf-ud-daulah were increased. He had to pay a heavier subsidy for the use of British troops; the sovereignty of Benares was ceded to the Company which also received the tribute paid by the Zamindar of Ghazipur.

The quarrel between the Governor-General and the Council naturally undermined the position of Warren Hastings and several charges of defalcations were produced against him, including a letter from the Rani of Burdwan alleging that Hastings had received a gratification. More important is the case of Nanda Kumar. On March 11, 1775, Nanda Kumar accused Hastings of having received among other bribes, one of Rs. 3,54,105 from Muny Begum, the widow of Mir Jafar, for appointing her guardian to the young prince. Hastings refused to be tried by the Council and arraigned at his own Council Board, "in the presence of a wretch, whom you all know to be one of the basest of mankind." When Hastings had withdrawn from the Council, the majority resolved that there is no species of peculation from which the Governor-General has thought it reasonable to abstain. They judged him guilty and ordered him to refund the money. A few days later, on April 23, Hastings lodged a complaint against Nanda Kumar and others that they had tried to coerce one Kamal-

[1] Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, Vol. II, p. 365.

uddin to accuse Hastings of having received other bribes. Nanda Kumar was acquitted on this pending charge but while this matter was still pending he was suddenly arrested and committed for trial on a charge of forgery brought against him by Mohan Prasad, the executor of an Indian banker. He was tried, found guilty, sentenced to death and executed on August 5, 1775. The charges against Hastings could not be proceeded with but the papers were sent to England where the law officers declared that the statements could not possibly be true.

"Hastings never at any time actually denied in so many words the truth of Nanda Kumar's statement." He drew up a long minute, which, according to Burke and George Elliot, bore every sign of conscious guilt. His case would have stood him better had he faced an inquiry before the Council and denied the accusation. Moreover, Hastings had actually received Rs. 1,50,000 from the Begum, which, even his defender Sir James Stephens says, "if not positively illegal, was at least questionable." His defence was that the sum in question was not a bribe but a sumptuary allowance; it was customary as Clive and Verelst had received before him; and when he received the money, the Act prohibiting the presents was not yet passed. If it was a sumptuary allowance, there was no need for Hastings to be so mysterious about it. It is a weak defence to say that others before him had taken it and, as Roberts says, "it was really a monstrous abuse that when the Governor of Bengal, whose salary and allowances amounted to between £20,000 and £30,000, visited Murshidabad, he should receive from the Nawab an allowance amounting to £225, a day."

It seems certain, however, that Nanda Kumar did not receive a fair trial and his execution was a miscarriage of justice. Sir James Stephens admits that "if he had to depend upon the evidence called for the prosecution he would not have convicted the prisoner." Moreover, it is doubtful whe-

ther the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction over the natives, and almost certain that "the English law making forgery a capital crime was not operative in India till many years after Nanda Kumar's alleged forgery had been committed." Thirdly, the judges cross-examined the defence witnesses rather severely on the inadequate ground that the prosecution counsel was incompetent. Nanda Kumar felt at that time that he was not receiving a fair trial and requested his counsel to withdraw. Fourthly, the summing of Impey was obviously unfair to the accused as he told the Jury that if Nanda Kumar's defence witnessts were not believed, the fact condemned him.

This does not mean that there was any conspiracy between Hastings and Impey. Nanda Kumar wrote a letter to Clavering suggesting that he was a victim of conspiracy between the Governor-General and the Supreme Court but we have to remember that Impey was only one of the Judges, that he did not always see eye to eye with the Governor-General, and that there was a Jury. It is difficult to assume that they were all privy to the conspiracy. Moreover, the charge of forgery, 'developed in a natural way out of a long-standing litigation' which had begun in 1772. Beveridge in his '*Trial of Maharaja Nand Kumar*' denies that there was any real attempt at a criminal prosecution till May 1775 and Sir Alfred Lyall hints that Hastings conveyed to Mohon Prasad the intimation that it was a favourable opportunity to accuse Nanda Kumar. Hastings referred to Impey as one "to whose support I was at one time indebted for the safety of my fortune, honour and reputation," and Macaulay supposed this to refer to the trial of Nanda Kumar. It is doubtful that Hastings would be so very indiscreet as to use such words and it probably refers to the incident of his resignation in 1777 when Impey decided that Hastings' agent had executed his instructions.

The miscarriage of justice consisted in this that the punishment of death was not only severe but inopportune. Forgery

was universally regarded in India as a misdemeanour and a fine or imprisonment would have been sufficient, as Stephens says, to meet the ends of justice. Moreover, the execution of a man, who had dared to accuse the Governor-General, was liable to be misunderstood by the Indians. Impey later on declared that if this ground had been put forward he would have reprieved the prisoner, but Roberts pertinently asks, 'was it really necessary or ought it to have been necessary, to call the attention of the Chief Justice to the fact.' The character of Hastings would have stood far higher if he had tried to exert himself in the cause of mercy but he was glad that Nanda Kumar was being removed from his path. It is difficult to understand why the Council did not make any efforts to get Nanda Kumar pardoned. Francis approved of the idea of the Council appealing for the reprieve of Nanda Kumar but Clavering and Monson declined to have anything to do with it. "It casts the darkest and most sinister shadow over the reputation of the men who used him for their purpose and then callously and contemptuously flung him to the wolves."

After the loss of the American colonies, Indian affairs again attracted the attention of the politicians in England. In 1781 the Parliament appointed a Select Committee and a Secret Committee to investigate into the causes of the wars in the Carnatic (the Peninsula) and to inquire into the administration of justice in Bengal. When these committees submitted their reports, the House of Commons resolved in May 1782 to recall Hastings and the President of Bombay. But the resolution was not ratified owing to the strong opposition of the Proprietors of the East India Company and the fall of the Rockingham Ministry. With the formation of the Coalition Ministry of Fox and North, Fox introduced his India Bills, one on the 20th November and the other on the 26th November, 1783. The main features of the first Bill were that for four years all political and military powers should be vested in the

hands of seven commissioners, to be appointed at first by Parliament and afterwards by the Crown and that the management of all commercial affiairs should be left with nine 'assistant directors', to be nominated at first by Parliament but afterwards by the Court of Proprietors. Though passed by the House of Commons, the Bill, owing to the fierce opposition of Pitt and the personal pressure exerted by the King on the peers, was defeated in the House of Lords by 95 to 76 votes.

The Coalition Ministry and the Whigs were discredited, and Pitt came forward to form his famous ministry in 1784. He introduced his own Bill for the better regulation of Indian concerns.[2] This famous Act, "was the culminating point of one of the recurrent periods of state inspection into East Indian affairs" and it practically transferred the control of Indian affairs from the Company to the Crown.[3] By it the supreme authority in civil and military affairs was vested in a body of six 'Commissioners for the affairs of India', popularly known as the Board of Control, consisting of Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the principal Secretaries of State, and four Privy Councillors. In practice, however, the real power passed into the hands of the President of the Board. The supreme government of India was entrusted to the Governor-General and Council of three, possessing full control over the subordinate Presidencies in all matters relating to peace and war, finance and foreign policy. Thus an important step was taken towards the assumption of direct responsibility by the Parliament for governing the Indian possessions.

[2] The real object of the measure was stated by him in his opening speech: "The imperial dominion of our territories in the East ought to be placed under other control than that of the Company of merchants in Leadenhall Street, but the change ought to be made with as little violence as possible, it ought to be made by the conviction of the Company, and not by violece"—(Forrest, Vol. I, p. 296).

[3] The transfer to the Crown in 1858 was a formal one.

SECTION II

External Relations Under Hastings

Hastings' relations with the Indian powers may be studied broadly under the three heads: relations with the Mughal Emperor, kingdoms of Oudh and Rohilkhand, affairs in Western and Southern India. In all these his guiding principle was to establish the supremacy of the English throughout India.

After recovering from the blows of Panipat, the Marathas had crossed the Narbada again in 1769 and were interfering in the politics of Northern India. The Emperor Shah Alam soon became practically a tool in their hands. The Emperor handed over to the Marathas the districts of Kora and Allahabad in return for a promise on the part of the latter that they could establish him on the throne of Delhi. Hastings considered that to allow the Marathas to continue in possession of those districts would be prejudicial to the interests of the Company, and that the Emperor had lost his right to those districts by throwing himself into the hands of the Company's enemies. He, therefore decided to discontinue the payment of the annual tribute to the Emperor, and by the Treaty of Benares (September 1773) he restored Kora and Allahabad to the Nawab of Oudh in return for fifty lacs of rupees and an annual subsidy for maintaining a garrison of the Company's troops to be employed in the service of the Nawab. For this transaction Hastings' conduct has been variously criticised by Mill and others. Leaving aside the moral and legal aspects of the affairs it may be said that his action was justified from the point of view of practical politics to the advantage of the Company. Hastings wanted to seure two objects: to provide for the effectual protection in an important frontier of the Company's possessions in Bengal and Bihar by securing an ally in the Nawab of Oudh, and to check the active interfernce of the Marathas in the political affairs of Northern India. It should

be remembered that the "central pillars of Hastings" foreign policy was the alliance with Oudh."

But in one way, this drew the Company into the Rohilla War. In order to prevent the invasions of the Marathas into Rohilkhand, a treaty of alliance was concluded between the Nawab of Oudh and the Rohillas (Ruhelas), in the presence of the British Commander-in-Chief Sir Robert Barker, on the 17th June, 1772, by which the Rohillas promised to pay forty lacs to the Nawab on his compelling the Marathas to leave their country. In the spring of 1773 the Marathas invaded Rohilkhand; but the united forces of the Nawab of Oudh and the English kept them beyond the borders of Rohilkhand. In the month of May the main body of the Marathas returned to their capital in the Deccan on hearing of the disturbances at Poona following the death of the Peshwa Madho Rao. The Nawab Wazir then demanded the stipulated sum of forty lacs, but Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the leader of the Rohillas, evaded payment. The Nawab Wazir demanded help from the English according to the terms of the treaty of Benares, and Hastings and the Council in Calcutta acceded to his demand. The combined forces of the Nawab Wazir and of the English under Colonel Champion marched into Rohilkhand on the 17th April. Six days later, the decisive battle was fought at Miranpur Katra. Hafiz Rahamat was killed after a gallant fight, and about 20,000 Rohillas were driven out of the country, which now became a part of the Nawab Wazir's dominions.

Hastings' policy in connection with the Rohilla War has been severely condemned by Burke, Macaulay, and the older school of historians like Mill and others, who hold that "Hastings deliberately sold the lives and liberties of a free people and condoned horrible atrocities on the part of the armies of the Nawab of Oudh." On the other hand, some of the modern defenders of Hastings, chiefly Sir John Strachey, have tried to defend his policy in every point. But an im-

partial historian cannot fail to notice that the policy was unjustifiable from certain points of view. It is doubtful if it was at that time very expedient for the Company to send their forces against a native kingdom. While concluding the treaty of Benaras, Hastings thought that there would be no occasion for rendering any aid to the Nawab Wazir. He himself doubted the expediency of the whole matter, and handled it during its early stages with vacillation. "For a statesman to commit himself to a course of action while hoping that the need for it may not arise, is not the happiest or most efficient kind of political conduct." Hastings afterwards declared that he was in duty bound to help the Nawab Wazir in that matter because the treaty between the Nawab Wazir and the Rohillas had been concluded under British guarantee. But we know that Sir Robert Barker had merely witnessed the signatures. It is also unfair to contend, as Sir John Strachey has done, that the Rohillas could very well be driven out of their kingdom because they had established their rule over the Hindu population for only twenty-five years. They had not certainly misused their power by oppressing on the people, who were, on the other hand, living happily under Rohilla sway. It was rather the new rule of the Nawab of Oudh which became more oppressive on the people and inflicted various evils on them. Moreover, as Sir Alfred Lyall writes, "the expedition against the Rohillas was wrong in principle for they had not provoked us, and the Vezir could only be relied upon to abuse his advantages." It is to be admitted that Hastings' chief motive was mercenary.[4]

[4] This is clear from his own statement. "The absence of the Marathas," Hastings wrote, "and the weak state of the Rohillas promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, that saves so much of their pay and expenses."—(Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War*, p. 55).

The Company was soon involved into hostilities with the Marathas. Raghunath Rao, the uncle of the murdered Peshwa Narayan Rao, was negotiating with the Bombay Council for English help against other Maratha leaders. On the 7th of March, 1775, the Bombay Council, without any orders from the Supreme Council in Calcutta, signed the treaty of Surat with him. There were sixteen articles of the treaty, of which the most important were that the English would support Raghunath Rao's (Raghoba's) claims to the Peshwaship with a force of 2,500 men, of which the cost should be defrayed by him; that Salsette, Bassein and the adjacent islands were to be ceded to the English perpetually with a part of the revenues of the Broach and Surat districts; that Maratha raids into Bengal, and the Carnatic were to cease; and that any peace made by Raghoba with the Poona Council was to include the English. In the meanwhile, the birth of a son to Ganga Bai, the widow of the murdered Peshwa Narayan Rao, had placed a new card in the hands of the confederate Maratha leaders like Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis. But Colonel Keating had arrived at Surat with British troops on 27th February, 1775, in accordance with the orders of the Bombay Council. The allied troops of Raghunath Rao and Colonel Keating inflicted a defeat on the forces of the Maratha leaders on the 18th May, 1775, on the plain of Arras, lying between the river Mahi and the town of Anand.

The Calcutta Council, however, soon condemned this action of the Bombay Council as 'impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised, and unjust,' and sent Lt. Upton from Calcutta to Poona to negotiate for a treaty with the Maratha chiefs. Colonel Keating was ordered to withdraw his troops. Colonel Upton then concluded the treaty of Purandhar with the Marathas on 1st March, 1776, which laid down that a general peace should be established with the Marathas, and that the English should be allowed to retain Salsette, and should in

return give up the cause of Raghunath Rao, who was to retire to Kopargoan in Gujarat on a monthly pension of Rs. 25,000 from the Peshwa's government. The terms of the treaty were not liked by the Bombay authorities, who continued to give protection to Raghunath Rao, and the Maratha leaders at Poona also evaded fulfilment of its terms. Then the arrival of a French adventurer named Clevalier de St. Lubin at Poona, and Nana Phadnavis' attachment to him, created suspicions in the minds of the English about French designs in South India. Moreover, the Court of Directors in their several despatches, expressed their disapproval of the terms of the treaty of Purandhar and urged on the necessity of retaining Salsette in the hands of the Company. The Bombay Council, thereupon, renewed the alliance with Raghunath Rao, and despatched a force under Colonel Egerton (an officer of weak health and totally ignorant of Indian conditions) towards Poona in November, 1778. On account of ill-health Egerton had to make over the command to Colonel Cockburn in January 1779, but the British troops soon met with reverses, which led them to conclude a humiliating convention at Wadgaon. By this all territorial acquisitions made by the Bombay government since 1773 were to be given up; the troops advancing from Bengal were to be stopped, and the Sindhia was to receive a share of the revenues of Broach.

Hastings felt this discomfiture of the Bombay army as a disgrace to the Company, and he wrote: "We have already disavowed the convention of Wadgaon. Would to God we could as easily efface the infamy which our national character has sustained." He promptly adopted some measures, "frantic military exploits of the Governor-General," as his enemies have styled them, which restored the prestige of the English and strengthened their position in relation to the Maratha states. A strong force was despatched from Bengal under Goddard, who after a brilliant march right across Central

India, took possession of Ahmadabad on the 15th February 1780 and captured Bassein on the 11th December. While making an attempt to advance towards Poona, Goddard however sustained a defeat in April 1781, and had to fall back. But Captain Popham, who had also been sent from Bengal to create a diversion in Goddard's favour in Central India by supporting the Rana of Gohad (against his rebellious subjects incited by the Marathas), captured on the 3rd August the hill-fort of Gwalior, which had so long been regarded as impregnable. The Sindhia was also defeated on the 16th February, 1781, at Sipri (modern Sivpuri) by General Camac, who had been sent in June 1781, to help the Rana of Gohad. The moral effect of these exploits was great; they immensely added to the prestige of the English.

The Sindhia now changed his attitude and promised by a treaty with the English on the 13th October, 1781, that he would act as an intermediary in effecting a reconciliation between the Peshwa's ministers and the English. Thus the treaty of Salbai was signed on the 17th May, 1782. This treaty confirmed the possession of Salsette to the English, destroyed the pretensions of Raghoba, who was pensioned off by the Peshwa, restored to the Sindhia all the territory west of the Jumna and established the *status quo* in Bombay Deccan.

The material gains of the treaty were not "very impressive," for the English. They only retained Salsette, and the financial resources of the Company were greatly exhausted, which drove Hastings to objectionable expedients for collecting money. But it formed a turning-point in the history of English supremacy in India. It gave the Company "peace with the Marathas for twenty years," but there is no ground for overemphasising the importance of the treaty by holding that "it established beyond dispute, the dominance of the British as controlling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in

1818 to the position of the paramount power being an inevitable result of the position gained by the treaty of Salbai." Hyder and Tipu of Mysore proved no less formidable rivals of the Company.

The political affairs of Madras were no less complex and serious than those of Bombay or Bengal. The relation between the Madras Presidency and Muhammad Ali, the titular Nawab of the Carnatic, was not exactly similar to that of the Bengal Council with the Subahdar of Bengal. The titular Nawab of the Carnatic possessed a dangerous amount of responsibility as the Madras Presidency had not acquired there anything like the *Diwani* of Bengal and thus did not possess executive and financial control over the Carnatic. Moreover, the Madras Council was always "liable to interference of the home authorities, sometimes ill-informed, sometimes ill-authorised, but at this time generally incalculable." Thus in 1770 and 1771 the Home Government in England sent out Sir John Lindsay and Sir Robert Harland as plenipotentiaries at Muhammad Ali's Court, independent of the Madras Council. These two commissioners disagreed with the policy of the Madras Council and adopted the Nawab's political views. The Nawab had also no want of other supporters among the junior servants of the Company to whom he had offered private presents in money and who had become greatly demoralised and unmindful of their public duties. Thornton justly writes that the "moral atmosphere of Madras appears at this time to have been pestilential; corruption revelled unrestrained; and strong indeed must have been the power which could effectually repress it while Mahomet Ali (Muhammad Ali) had purposes to gain and either money or promises to bestow."

Thus the Madras Government very often committed itself to policies leading to serious entanglements. In 1773 the Nawab forcibly annexed the Kingdom of Tanjore and about the

same time the two great southern *poligars* of Ramnad and Sivaganga were reduced by English help. This, of course, caused much stir in England and Lord Pigot was appointed Governor with an order to restore Tanjore to its Raja. But Pigot's attempt to execute the order and to remove corruption among the officers at Madras gave birth to a conspiracy against him by his subordinates, who placed him in confinement where he died the following year. The next governor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, "displayed great corrpution in his administration" and provoked the resentment of the Nizam at such a critical time by taking possession of the district of Guntur from Basalat Jung, brother of Nizam Ali, to whom it had been granted for life after the treaty of 1768, though Hastings and the Supreme Government in Calcutta strongly disapproved of his policy. He also proposed to discontinue the payment of the annual tribute of seven lacs, which the Company had promised to pay the Nizam for holding the Northern Circars according to the treaty of 1768, by his argument that the Nizam had broken the treaty by admitting French troops into his service.

The English attempts at Guntur alienated Hyder Ali as well, who had not been well disposed towards the Company owing to its failure to renew the defensive and offensive alliance which had been concluded in 1769 but never carried out. The capture of the French factory at Mahe in 1779 by the English, in defiance of Hyder's protests that it was under his protection, greatly intensified his feelings and he now sought revenge against the Company. Thus the Nizam, Hyder and the Maratha chieftains (with the exception of the Gaikwar of Baroda) entered into a grand confederacy against the English. As Hastings said, there was a "war either actual or impending in every quarter and with every power in Hindustan." It should be noted that outside India also the English had to face a coalition of France, Spain, Holland and the

revolted American Colonies,[5] and the French were preparing themselves for another attempt to regain their old position in India by "fishing in the trobuled Deccan waters." Munitions of war were sent to Hyder from the French base at the island of Bourbon. The plan of the confederacy was that the Marathas should advance through Berar and Central India to the North Indian plains,[6] while the Nizam would subjugate the Northern Circars, and Hyder Ali should conquer Madras and the territories around it.

So in July 1780 Hyder with an army of about 83,000 men in infantry and cavalry and 100 guns suddenly swooped down upon the plains of the Carnatic through Baramahals, and the Changama Pass, "like an avalanche, carrying destruction with him." The Madras Government sent Colonel Baillie and Sir Hector Munro, the victor of Buxar, to prevent the advance of Hyder Ali's troops but Tipu, son of Hyder, prevented the junction of these two parties and Baillie was compelled to give way, after a gallant resistance, near Conjeeveram (8th—9th September). This was indeed a great achievement on the part of Hyder and revealed his "best qualities as a general."[7] Munro was seized with panic, and retreated hurriedly to Chingleput, and then to Madras. In October—November, 1780, Hyder Ali took possession of Arcot, and the Company found itself placed in a critical situation. "The fortunes of the English in India", writes Sir Alfred Lyall, "had fallen to their lowest water-mark."

[5] In 1778, France having joined the revolted American colonies, England declared war against her. The English in India therefore seized the French settlements here.

[6] Probably the objective was Oudh, the pivot of Hastings' foreign policy and finally Bihar and Bengal, excluded from Maratha raids by the treaty of Surat, 1775.

[7] N. K. Sinha, *Haider Ali*, p. 191.

The material loss of the Company at this disastrous defeat was considerable, but the "loss of morale" was greater. It became impossible for the Madras Presidency to carry on the war without speedy help from Bengal, where the news of the disaster had reached on the 23rd September. Hastings sent the sexagenarian Sir Eyre Coote, the veteran of Wandiwas, who was now the Commander-in-Chief in India and a member of the Supreme Council, "to stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honour of the British arms". Mr. Whitehall, the Governor of Madras, was suspended and Mr. Smith, the senior member of the Council, succeeded him. By skilful diplomacy Hastings succeeded in detaching the Raja of Berar and Madhaji Sindhia and the Nizam also, by return of Gumtur, from the confederacy against the Company. But Hyder did not give way to despair at this desertion of his Indian allies, and remained firm as before.

Sir Eyre Coote, after relieving Wandiwas, Permacoil and Cuddalore, defeated Hyder at Porto Novo in 1781. Hyder gave up his designs on the southern provinces; Tipu raised the siege of Wandiwas, and both of them went away with the whole of their army to the neighbourhood of Arcot. Coote next joined Colonel Pearse, who with the Bengal brigade under him had reached Pulicat, about forty miles from Madras, whither Tipu had been sent by Hyder to intercept his advance. The combined forces of Coote and Pearse fought an indecisive battle with Hyder at Polilur in the month of August. In the next month, however, Sir Eyre Coote defeated Hyder at Solinghur. The English captured Negapatam in November 1781, and Trincomali, the finest harbour in Ceylon, in January 1782, from the Dutch, who had joined the European war against the English. But after this their progress was stopped for some time. Colonel Braithwaite, who had been protecting Tanjore after the capture of Negapatam, was surrounded by Tipu's troops, and had to surrender after a desperate

resistance for twenty-eight hours. A French fleet under the command of Admiral Suffrein arrived at Madras early in 1782, and in February, Du Chemin landed with 2,000 men under his command. Several indecisive actions followed between the French and the English fleets, and the French captured Cuddalore as well as Trincomali from the English. The French, however, did not hazard any general action, as they had strict orders not to do so till the arrival of Bussy. So Hyder and the French were not ready to engage the English immediately, but they took up strong positions near Kellinoor. Towards the end of May 1782, Coote proceeded to capture Arni, which "from its central position was the chief depot which Hyder still held below the Ghats for storing his supplies and ammunition;" but Tipu rapidly advanced with a strong reinforcement, and a combined attack by him and Mr. Lally on 2nd June, 1782, frustrated Coote's design of surprising the garrison at Arni. The Bombay Government had also sent a force under Colonel Humberstone to invade the Malabar, but it had to fall back before Tipu's advance, who had been sent by Hyder to oppose the English in that quarter also.

Hostilities ceased for a time owing to the approach of monsoon. The English went back to Madras, the French retreated to Cuddalore and Hyder encamped near Arcot. But a fatal attack of cancer took him away from the midst of his ambitious wars on December 7, 1782. Coote had returned to Bengal leaving the command of the Company's troops at Madras in the hands of General Stuart, and he too died on the 26th of April, 1783.

But the death of Hyder or Coote did not put an end to the war. Tipu, as warlike and ambitious as his father, took up the contest against the English. He defeated Brigadier Mathews, who had been sent by the Bombay Government to attack Mangalore and the province of Bednore, and captured him with most of his men. Tipu was at this time deprived of

the French alliance, as the French and the English had concluded a peace in Europe, the news of which arrived in India on the June, 1783. Colonel Fullerton now attacked the southern possessions of Mysore, captured Palghat and ocupied Coimbatore in November, 1783, and was advancing towards Tipu's capital Seringapatam, when he was recalled by the Madras authorities, who had opened negotiations for a treaty with Tipu. Since his arrival as Governor of Madras in 1781, Macartney was anxious to make peace with the Mysore State, for which he had now sent commissioners to Tipu. Thus a treaty, known as that of Mangalore, was concluded on the 7th March, 1784, on the basis of mutual restitution of conquests and release of all prisoners. The terms of the treaty were not very pleasing to Hastings, but he could not amend these in any way.

Thus for eight years (1775—1783) the English had to carry on a precarious existence in the face of various odds and impediments. As England was then engaged in a war with her American colonies, helped by her old enemies France and Spain, no substantial help could be expected from home. The long wars in Western and Southern India therefore adversely affected the Company's financial resources, and Hastings had to take recourses to a "rather harsh and discreditable policy" for raisng money.

This need for funds led him to make exorbitant demands on Chait Singh, the Raja of Benares, who had been originally a feudatory of the Nawab of Oudh but had accepted the overlordship of the Company by the treaty of 1775, promising to pay thereby an annual tribute of 22½ lacs to the Company. In 1778, on the outbreak of hostilities with the French, Hastings with the approval of his Council, demanded from the Raja of Benares, five lacs as a war contribution, over and above the ordinary tribute of 22½ lacs. The Raja complied with the demand, but it was repeated in the two succeeding years.

Chait Singh made some protests and procrastinated for some time, but after a little delay paid the money. In 1780 he was asked to provide the Company with 2,000 cavalry, reduced, on his protests, to 1,000. He collected 500 cavalry and 500 infantry, and wrote to Hastings that they were ready for his service. But Hastings gave no reply, as he made up his mind to exact a fine of fifty lacs from him. "I was resolved", said Hastings, "to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distress.....In a word I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past dilinquency." To inflict this penalty, Hastings personally proceeded towards Benares. Chait Singh met him at Buxar, where he solicited and urged for his pardon, but Hastings paid no heed and after dismissing him proceeded to Benares where he put him under arrest. The Raja submitted patiently, but his troops, unable to bear this humiliation of their master in his own capital, rose to arms and massacred a number of British sepoys with their officers. Hastings had to run away for safety to Chunar, but gathering all the available forces round him he soon defeated the insurgents. Chait Singh pleaded his innocence in the matter, but was driven out of the country and fled to Gwalior. His territories were sequestrated and (the remnants?) were conferred on his nephew, who had to pay a tribute of forty lacs instead of 22½ lacs to the Company.

Hastings' behaviour towards Chait Singh is a great blot on his administration and cannot be defended from any point of view. It is immaterial to discuss in this connection the question whether Chait Singh was a Raja (ruling prince) or a mere Zamindar and thus try to justify the exaction, as some have done. Even if he were a mere Zamindar, as they regarded him to have been, "in that case the exaction ought to have taken the form of a general universal tax levied on all Zamindars, under the Company's rule. But it was directed only

against Chait Singh. It should be noted that the Company had definitely engaged on July 5, 1775, that while he paid his normal tribute "no demand shall be made upon him by the Hon'ble Company, of any kind, or on any pretence whatsoever, nor shall any person be allowed to interfere with his authority, or to disturb the peace of his country." Hastings wrongly tried to defend himself by holding that "all former sanads had become null and void by later grant of 1776. The fact is that Chait Singh objected to the wording of this later grant and it was acordingly altered. The agreement of 1775 was therefore still binding on both the Raja and the Company. The conduct of the Raja was not certainly "contumacious and refractory and deserving of punishing", as Forrest says. He had not manifested any signs of rebellion against the Company until his troops themselves broke into insurrection; on the contrary he steadily maintained a submissive and dependent attitude. Sir Alfred Lyall rightly remarks that "Hastings must bear the blame of having provoked the insurrection at Benares..... his conduct was at least impolitic and imprudent." Impartial history will say that Hastings' treatment of the Raja was "merciless and vindictive."

Some writers like Forrest and V. A. Smith try to defend Hastings' demands on the ground of expediency in consideration of the "grave necessities of the Situation". But "grave necessities' were not really served. The Raja fled with a part of his wealth and the remaining 23 lacs of rupees were plundered by the troops and divided amongst themselves. The Company simply "incurred the expense of the miliatry operations that ensued". Thus morally unjust, legally indefensible Hastings' conduct in this connection was also "unwarantable and impolitic" from the point of view of utility.

Pressing needs for money to continue the wars against the Marathas and Tipu remained, and Hastings again turned his attention towards Oudh. The Nawab Wazir of Oudh, Asaf-

ud-Daulah, owed a heavy debt to the Company owing to failure in paying for the East India Company's troops maintained for the defence of Oudh against the Marathas and for expansion of Oudh into Rohilkhand but he was not in a position to clear it off. His grandmother and his mother, the Dowager Begums, possessed extensive jagirs and immense wealth, which they had inherited from the late Nawab Shuja-ud-daulah. Asafud-daulah maintained that he had been unjustly deprived of these and always asserted his claims to them. In 1775, on the intercession of the British Resident in Oudh, the widow of the late Nawab paid him £300,000 in addition to £260,000 which had been already given to him, on the Council in Calcutta giving a guarantee, in inspite of Hastings' dissent, that he should not make any further demands in future. But in 1781 the Resident proposed that he might be allowed to take possession of the estates and treasure of the Begums in order to pay off his debt to the Company. Hastings, who was badly in need of money, did not care for the guarantee which the Council had given to the Begums, but gave his consent to the proposals. Not only this, but when the Nawab afterwards hesitated to proceed against the "uncommonly violent temper of his female relations", Hastings goaded him on. He wrote to Mr. Middleton (the Resident) in December, 1781: "you must not allow any negotiations or forbearance, but must prosecute both services until the Begums are at the entire mercy of the Nawab." The Nawab Wazir was supported by Engilsh troops, who proceeded to Fyzabad, inflicted severe punishments on the eunuchs of the Begums and compelled them to give up their wealth.

Like the Benares affair, Hastings' treatment of the Begums was also the result of his desire to replenish the exhausted treasury of the Company. "The employment of personal severities," writes Sir Alfred Lyall, "under the superintendence of British officers, in order to extract money from

women and eunuchs, is an ignoble kind of undertaking.....to cancell the guarantee and leave the Nawab to deal with the recalcitrant princesses was unjustifiable; to push him on and actively assist in measures of coercion against women and eunuchs was conduct unworthy and indefensible." In the face of some important facts, it is difficult to agree with Mr. Forrest that "for what took place Hastings at Calcutta cannot be held responsible. He ordered the Resident not to permit any negotiation or forbearance but there is a wide gulf between legitimate severity and cruelty". But in fact Hastings was the 'moving spirit' throughout the ignoble transaction. The vacillating Nawab Wazir was egged on by Hastings, who also disapproved the use of gentler methods as suggested by two successive Residents.....Mr. Middleton and Mr. Bistow. The Nawab Wazir was a "reluctant party thoughout" and Hastings wanted to give a severe rebuke to his minister for his having assumed "a very unbecoming tone of refusal, reproach, and resentment; in opposition to measures recommended by me, and even to acts done by my authority". To justify Hastings' violation of the Company's guarantee on the ground that the Begums had forfeited all claims to it for their complicity with Chait Sing is nothing but to support an error in history. The evidences for this are conflicting and are based on wrong affidavits taken by Sir Elijah Impey, Colonel Hannay, Wheeler and others. Probably the "charge of rebellion was *ex post facto*, made when it was found necessary to present a justification for the whole business." If it were a fact that the Begums were meditating a rebellion against the English, Hastings could very well produce evidence and could demand proofs of innocence from them. Making every allowance for Hastings' difficulties, impartial history will record that "it was a sordid, shabby and sorry business."

Hastings spent the next eight months at Benares for reconstructing the internal affairs and finances of Benares and Oudh,

which had suffered much from famine and misgovernment. After returning to Calcutta he received the news of the Pitt's India Act of 1784, resigned his office and left India in February, 1785.

Hastings reached England in June 1785 and was at first cordially received. But after two years he was accused of several charges, viz., violation of treaties with the Nawab of Oudh, oppression on the Raja of Benares and the Begums of Oudh, fraudulent dealings in contracts, acceptance of bribes and presents, etc., and was formally impeached by the House of Commons, by Burke, Sheridan and Fox. The trial began on February 13, 1788, and dragged on till April 23, 1795, when Hastings was acquitted of all the charges. He spent his last years in complete retirement (and comparative poverty) and died in 1818.

In spite of various defects in his politics, Hastings certainly occupies an important place among the makers of the British Empire in India. Himself of a scholarly bent he encouraged learning and scholarship. His judicial reforms were beneficial. But his revenue reforms did not prove successful; "in fact his influence on the actual conditions of the revenue was unfortunate". He had not been able to effect that "complete reformation of the administration" which was the declared aim of his office. As Sir John Malcolm writes: "His (Hastings') most strenuous advocates, while they defend his personal integrity, are forced to acknowledge, that the whole system of the government over which he presided was corrupt and full of abuses." Hastings had not in him the farsightedness of Clive or that daring political genius which Wellesley showed. But he had indefatigable industry and great courage, which enabled him to save the British power in India, when it was attacked on land by the Marathas, the Nizam and Hyder Ali, and on sea by the French under Admiral de Suffrein. As for the unscrupulousness of some of his

actions, students of history will note that hardly ever was a dominion built up but by some measure of it, so that some would praise it and others blame it. Besides, his political morals were not inferior to what generally prevailed in India or the world in that age.

CHAPTER V

FALL OF THE LEADING INDIAN POWERS—RISE OF THE NEW INDO-BRITISH POWER TO SUPREMACY (1786—1823)—THE LAST TEST OF THE MOVEMENT OF 1857-59

I NTRODUCTORY

The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth saw the fall of the leading Indian powers and the rise of the new Indo-British power to supremacy. Warren Hasting's governor-generalship formed a critical epoch in the history of the Company, and Hastings had to struggle hard for several years against the dangers created by the Marathas and Hyder Ali and Tipu. He simply patched up treaties with them; but their ambitions waited for new outlets. Both the Marathas and Tipu realised[1] that the English were "trying their utmost to encompass India" though they could not combine together.

The Marathas, in spite of their being split up into hostile groups, and their mutual jealousies, held a dominant position in Central India. Madhaji Sindhia exercised a powerful influence over Hindusthan, Malwa and the Deccan; and Nana Phadnavis, the Brahman Minister at Poona, was trying to maintain the Peshwa's hegemony over the whole Maratha confederacy. Tipu, the most relentless of the Company's foes, was busy with plans for extending his conquests and for breaking the power of the Company. The Nizam of Hyderabad was playing a vacillating game and was making shifting alliances with this power and that. The Carnatic was in a state of disorder and the relations of the Company with its Nawab were complicated. Oudh under Nawab Asaf-ud-

[1] Compare the letter from Mahadji Sindhia to Nana Phadnavis quoted in Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, p. 24—25.

'daulah was a scene of misrule and corruptions, more flagrant than those prevailing in the Carnatic. Shah Alam, "sitting crowned among the ruins of its ancient slendour, still reigned over Delhi. And although the imperial authority had lost all substance, the shadow of that great name still so far overspread the surrounding districts as to prevent their absorption under a new dominion."[2] The Rajput chiefs had lost their old valour, patriotism and strength of character, and their land was subject to foreign aggressions. Sindh was theoretically under Persia and Afghanistan since 1739 and 1757, but the tribute from this province very seldom reached the new masters. In 1783 Mir Fath Ali of the Talpura family made himself the Rais of Sindh, by overthrowing the last of the Kaloras.[3] Since the death of Ahmad Shah in 1773 at Kandahar, where he had been recalled for suppressing a revolt, the Afghan hold on the Punjab began to relax and the vacuum created by their gradual withdrawal was being filled up by the revival and organisation of the Sikhs.[4] In Nepal, the Gurkhas of the North, who had

[2] Sir Alfred Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, p. 208. By 'absorption' is meant here 'formal annexation' by a new power like the British. The Jamuna valley and the Doab under the sphere of influence of the Sindhia, and the Emperor were in hands of the Marathas; *vide infra*.

[3] For details re contending ruling families in Sindh, *vide Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 484.

[4] A similar vacuum had been created after Nadir's withdrawal, which could not then be filled by the local Sikhs, for the united Marathas were surging in full tide into the gap. Though the Sikhs had renewed their activities as early as 1738, they were then rather exhausted by their late struggle with the empire, and the Marathas were non-Moslems who had destroyed the prestige of their enemies, the Mughals, in the North; so the Sikhs acquiesced in the Maratha advance into the Punjab. But now the situation was different; the Sikhs were recovering from the effects of the Mughal wars, and the Marathas were broken up, so that the Sindhia by himself could come up only to the Upper Jamuna. Thus the time was ripe for the Sikhs to step into the place of the Afghans.

established themselves in that valley about ten years after Plassey, were gradually rising into power. In Burma, the dynasty of Alompra, which had been established there about 1750 A.D. and was expanding in various directions, had conquered Arakan in 1784, and was threatening Assam.

Such was the political condition of India when Warren Hastings left it. It is very clear that the British power in India had then to reckon with the hostility of its old foes like the Marathas and Tipu, and also to guard against the activities of the rising power in the Punjab, Nepal and Burma. Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Macpherson, who held the Company's government in India for a year and half before Lord Cornwallis' arrival, possessed neither ability and authority nor straightforwardness enough to deal satisfactorily with the problems, both domestic and foreign, with which the Company was then confronted. Again clause 34 in Pitt's India Act stated that: "And whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this nation; be it therefore further enacted, that it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General-and Council without the express command of the Court of Directors, or of the Secret Committee, in any case (except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities against the British nation in India, or against some of the princes or states whose territories the Company be engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee) either to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war, against any of the country princes or states in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country, princes or states."[5] The situation in Europe and America was then one of peace for England till the outbreak of the great revolu-

[5] Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, p. 174.

tionary wars, the influence of which was not felt in India until 1793; and this interval of ten years, which could very well have been vigorously utilised for strengthening the British position and extending the British dominion in India, remained one of comparative inactivity. Pitt's India Act had, no doubt, enforced the policy of non-interference on the Company in India, but its insecure position made its enforcement doubtful from the beginning, and the Parliamentary injunction had to be respected more often by violation than by observance.

SECTION I

The Marathas and the English

The death of Peshwa Madhav Rao was followed by dissensions among the Marathas, but even then they remained the strongest native power in India. They controlled a wide belt of territories extending from Gujrat in the west to Orissa in the east, and the limits of the Punjab in the north, and surrounding the Nizam's dominions on three sides in the south. But instead of being guided by such a common ideal of a national empire, as had been present in the time of Shivaji or Baji Rao I, the Maratha states during the last quarter of the eighteenth century were following the centrifugal tendency of independent growth. These were organised into a loose confederacy, each member owing only a nominal allegiance to it, and each being for all practical purposes an independent unit. Mr. Roberts has aptly described the constitutional position of the Maratha confederacy at this time as a "curious and baffling political puzzle."[6] The Raja of Satara, the nominal head of the confederacy, was already living virtually as a prisoner in his palace, while all real powers in Western India had

[6] *British India*, p. 239.

passed into the hands of the Peshwa. But the later members of this ministerial dynasty were also nothing more than puppets in the hands of their able minister Nana Phadnavis. Among the practically independent Maratha leaders, who were the hereditary generals of the Peshwa, was Raghuji Bhonsle II, the Raja of Berar (from 1788, after his father Mudaji's death), who possessed territories extending far eastwards from his capital Nagpur to Cuttack on the Bay of Bengal. The territories of the Gaekwad, another leader of the confederacy, roughly comprised Gujrat and the Kathiawad Peninsula, which were governed from 1771 to 1789 by Fateh Singh in the name of the titular ruler Sayaji, his imbecile elder brother. After the death of Fateh Singh, a dispute arose between his two other brothers Manaji Rao and Govind Rao for the regency. But after the death of Sayaji in 1792 and of Manaji in 1793, Govind Rao assumed the government of Baroda through the help of the British Resident against the demands of the Peshwa for the Gaekwad's territory south of the Tapti which would have meant a dismemberment of the Baroda State.[7] Govind Rao, who ruled till his death in 1800, was harassed by the hostile intrigues of his illegitimate son Kanhoji and the enmity of Aba Selukar, the deputy governor of the Peshwa's (claimed) share of Gujrat. At last Aba Selukar was imprisoned, and in October 1800 the Peshwa "granted his share of the revenue of Guzerat in farm to the Baroda government for a period of five years, at five lakhs of rupees annually."[8] Govind Rao was succeeded by his son Anand Rao, a man of weak intellect, whose rule was distracted by the rivalries of two parties, one under the aforesaid Kanhoji and the other under Raoji Appaji, a chief minister of Govind Rao. Their conflicts drew British intervention at the Baroda court and led to the establishment

[7] Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, (Cambray Edn.), p. 95.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 211—14.

there of a British subsidiary force in 1801.[9] The Holkar's territories embraced the south-western part of Malwa and these were governed after Malhar Rao Holkar's death by his daughter-in-law Ahalya Bai[10] from 1766 to 1795 with the co-operation of Tukoji Holkar,[11] "a chief of the same tribe but *in no way related* to Malhar Rao,"[12] Ahalya Bai died in 1795 and was succeeded by Tukoji, who though a good soldier was not possessed of much political ability, and whose death in 1797 was followed by chaos and confusion till 1818. These circumstances (1766 onwards) prevented the Holkar State from taking as aggressive a part in contemporary political history as the Sindhia State. Madhaji Sindhia possessed eastern Malwa, the lands west of the Jumna, and the Upper Ganges-Jumna Doab.[13] There were also some minor members of the Maratha confedearcy among the piratical chiefs of Western India, who caused frequent trouble to the Company[14] till they were finally suppressed in the year 1812.

Besides their loose allegiance to the confederacy, the different members of it were divided by "mutual distrust and selfish intrigue." But even in this period of decadence, there were among the Marathas a few outstanding personalities like Madhaji Sindhia, Nana Phadnavis, and the famous lady Ahalya Bai. Ahalya Bai was endowed with a generous heart, a lofty character and high political abilities. Sir John Malcolm,

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 214—18.

[10] Wife of Malhar Rao Holkar's son Khande Rao, who some years before the battle of Panipat (1761) was killed at the siege of Kumbher, lying between Deig and Bharatpur.

[11] For details about the Holkar family, *vide* Malcomn, *Memoir of Central India* (1824), Vol. I, Chap. VI.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[13] For details about the Sindhia family, *vide ibid.*, pp. 116—41, and Francklin's *Shah Alam*, pp. 116—30; J. N. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. IV.

[14] *Bombay Gazetteer*, p. 157 and pp. 442—49; Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 95—103.

whose knowledge of the Maratha states at this period was based on personal experience, has given a fine appreciation of her administration in the following words: "The success of Ahalya Bai in the internal administration of her domains was altogether wonderful.....[15] The undisturbed internal tranquility of the country was even more remarkable than its exemption from foreign attack..... The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her; she rejoiced, we are told, when she saw bankers, mecrhants, farmers, and cultivators, rise to affluence; and so far from deeming their increaesd wealth a ground of exaction, she considered it a legitimate claim to increased favour and protection.....she has become, by general suffrage, the model of good government in Malwa.....Her munificence was not limited to her own territories; at all the principal places of Hindu pilgrimage, including as far east and west as Cuttack, and Guzerat, as far north as Kedarnath, among the snowy mountains of Himalaya, and south as Ramiseram, near Cape Comorin, she built holy edifices, maintained establishments and sent annual sums to be distributed in charity. Her principal structures are at Gyah where a figure of herself adoring the image of Mahadeva is preserved in one of the temples***[16] She could read and understand the Puranas, or sacred books, which were her favourite study. She is represented as having been singularly quick and clear in the transaction of public business.....The facts that have been stated of Ahalya Bai rest on grounds that admit of no scepticism. It is, however, an extraordinary picture: a female without vanity, a bigot without intolerance .....her name is sainted, and she is styled an *Avatar* or incarnation of the Divinity. In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limit-

[15] Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1930.
[16] *Ibid.*

ed sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed."[17]

Madhaji Sindhia was the most powerful Maratha chief at that time. His predecessor, Ranoji Sindhia, was originally a patel or village headman of Kumerkerrah in the district of Wye, but afterwards got an employment under Balaji Biswanath and distinguished himself as a 'very enterprising active soldier', under Baji Rao I. The great dominion and sphere of influence thus built up by Ranoji suffered serious losses early in Madhaji's career as a result of the third battle of Panipat, in common with those of other Maratha Houses; but Madhaji very soon succeeded in rebuilding his power and extending his influence over Central India and Hindusthan. We have already described his activities up to 1782. The treaty of Salbai recognised him "as far as related to the British Government an independent prince," though "he continued to observe, on all other points which referred to his connexion with the Poona Government, the most scrupulous attention to forms."[18] This treaty and the dissensions at the Poona Court left him also free to extend his power and consolidate his authority in Northern India. He maintained in his service many Rajputs and Muhamadans besides Marathas; and having discarded the old Maratha system of warfare, he oganised his armaments and trained his infantry on the western scientific methods by employing Benoit de Boigne (subsequently 'Count'), a Savoyard military expert, and other soldiers of fortune.[19] Thus with an army of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, five hundred pieces of cannon and one hundred thousand horses,[20] Madhaji Sindhia stormed the Gwalior

[17] Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 179—95.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[19] Compton, *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, pp. 15, sqq. and 233 sqq. Grant Duff, Vol. II, pp. 476—80, footnote.

[20] Malcolm, Vol. I, p. 123.

Fort on the 31st July, 1783,[21] and seized Gohad and the person of its Rana Chhatra Singh on the 25th February, 1784.[22] He then helped the Mughal Emperor, in November, 1784, in crushing Muhammad Beg Hamadani, who had made himself virtually independent in the Dholpur region and had been notoriously looting one village after another.[23] The Mughal empire was again in the midst of chaos and anarchy to remove which the Emperor allowed his old ally Madhaji to assume full control of affairs. Though the Emperor Shah Alam was then a mere figurehead, yet the fiction of imperial sovereignty served Madhaji's purpose well. On the 15th December, 1784, the Emperor appointed the Peshwa his Deputy (*Naib-i-Munaib*) as well as Commander-in-chief (*Bakhsi-ul-mamalik*) on the condition that Madhaji and none else should be the Peshwa's permanent agent in discharging the actual duties of these high offices.[24] After two days he conferred on Madhaji the exalted post of Regent Plenipotentiary (*Wakil-i-Mutlaq*).[25] The Emperor became in fact a puppet in his hands. In the words of Sir John Malcolm, the Sindhia remained as "the nominal slave but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alam, emperor of Delhi."[26] Thus by a peculiar turn of political affairs, the emperor of Delhi was compelled to throw himself into the arms of a leader of the Marathas, once the inveterate foes of the Mughal Empire, and Sahu in bondage was repaid by Shah Alam II in ignoble dependence. The nominal Mughal Empire now became a sphere of influence of the Marathas, who failed, however, to recreate an empire of their own for reasons which will be stated later on.

21 Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. 3, p. 273.
22 *Ibid.*
23 *Ibid.*, pp. 284—86.
24 *Ibid.*, p. 293.
25 *Ibid.*, p. 294.
26 *Memoir*, Vol. I ,p. 122.

But Madhaji had various anxieties and pecuniary troubles during 1786, and he was confronted with a critical situation during 1787—88 due to a coalition of his enemies in the north. In his contest with the Jaipur Rajah and his allies, he was defeated at the battle of Tunga[27] near Jaipur at the end of July, 1787 with heavy casualties. His unpaid and starving soldiers of Hindusthan mutinied and he retreated from Lalsot (1—9 August, 1787) in the midst of "unspeakable terror, privation and daily alarms to the rank and file of his army."[28] His prestige was, in fact, eclipsed for some time and he lost the Regency of the Empire. Ghulam Qadir, the Ruhela Chief, with his associate Ismail Beg, took possession of Delhi city (18th July—2nd October, 1788). The Ruhelas perpetrated horrible cruelties on the members of the imperial family, heaped tortures and dishonour on the women and tender children and the Emperor himself was disposed and blinded. "It was a dance of demons for nine weeks."[29] Madhaji Sindhia was, however, able to reoccupy Delhi by removing its temporary Afghan usurpation. Ghulam Qadir was defeated (November—December, 1788) and tortured to death.[30] The Sindhia also defeated Ismail Beg in 1790 at Patan (Rajputana) and his Rajput allies at Mirta in Jodhpur territory in September, 1791.[31] With Northern India again under his influence, and his power reaching its meridian splendour,[32] Madhaji Sindhia proceeded to Poona in June, 1792, with a view to establishing his influence there against the absolute control of Nana Phadnavis. But before his real object

[27] Wrongly called the battle of Lalsot. Sarkar, *Fall*, Vol. 3, pp. 374—380.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 442.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 465—70.

[31] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 74; Malcomn, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 128.

[32] Franklin, op. cit., p. 190.

was fulfilled, Madhaji Sindhia died of fever at Poona at the age of sixty-seven on 12th February, 1794, and his possessions and military resources fell into the hands of his grand-nephew Daulat Rao Sindhia, while the control of Maratha policy and affairs passed into the hands of his rival Nana Phadnavis.

The death of Madhaji Sindhia has been justly described by "as an event of great political significance, both as it affected the Maratha Empire and the other states of India."[33] It meant the decay of Maratha influence in Northern India and left the field open for the expansion of British dominion, because judging "from the incessant perseverance with which he laboured to bring to maturity schemes once formed for his own aggrandisement, had his life been extended, he would in all probability have become a formidable antagonist to the interests of Great Britain, whose rulers were not unacquainted with his active spirit or insatiable ambition."[34] We have no definite instance to prove his hostile designs towards the English, but his growth led the English to suspect him; and "we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy."[35] This attitude was natural for the English Company as they too had for some years begun to utilise the distracted political situation of Northern India for the extension of their advantages, powers, and influence,—their Diwani and Oudh treaties being paralleled by the Maratha *Wakilship* and protectorate over the Empire; so active collision would have come sooner or later if Madhaji had time to progress further. Though Madhaji was helped by some favourable circumstances, yet it must be admitted, as Grant Duff writes, that he was "a man of great political sagacity, and of considerable genius, of deep artifice, of restless ambition and of implacable revenge."[36]

[33] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 87.
[34] Francklin, op. cit., p. 190.
[35] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 89.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

Opinions are divided as to whether Madhaji was trying to serve his own ends at the expense of the Maratha state; but this may be surmised that he was pursuing the policy laid down by Baji Rao I and successfully followed by the Peshwa Madhav Rao till 1772 which could not be given effect to owing to his sudden death and the growing internal discord among the Marathas.

While Madhaji Sindhia had been re-creating Maratha influence in the North, Nana Phadnavis was busy with Maratha politics chiefly in Peninsular India. He tried to recover those territories south of the Narmada which had once belonged to the Marathas, and open hostilities between him and Tipu broke out in 1785 with the latter's unprovoked attack on Nargund which was held by a Brahmin *desai*. The Maratha army under the command of Hari Pant Phadke left Poona on 1st December, 1785, and was assisted by Tukoji Holkar and Mudaji Bhonsle, Raja of Berar, besides the rather half-hearted support of the Nizam. After some feeble operations Tipu concluded a treaty in April, 1787. By this he agreed to pay forty five lacs of rupees (thirty of which were immediately paid and the remainder promised at the end of a year) and to make over the districts of Badami, Kittur and Nargund to the Marathas, and received back the districts reduced by them.[37] But this agreement between Mysore and the Marathas was ignored in June, 1790, when Nana Phadnavis and the Nizam entered into an offensive and defensive aliance with Cornwallis against Tipu.[38] In spite of clause 34 of Pitt's India Act, this triple alliance became "a definite factor in Indian politics for some years."[39] The Nizam "saw in it a disposition to assist

[37] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 17.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 43 Forrest, *Selections from the State Papers, etc.*, about Cornwallis, Vol. I, p. 47.

[39] Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, p. 183.

him, and he hoped to realize his meditated scheme of raising a barrier between himself and the Marathas so that he might not only resist their future encroachments but evade their present demands."[40]

But the Marathas were old foes of the Nizam and had been led to join in an alliance with him simply with the object of checking Tipu's aggression. So when the Marathas thought that the danger from Tipu was somewhat minimised all their leaders including the Peshwa, Daulat Rao Sindhia, Tukoji Holkar and the Raja of Berar, combined together, in spite of their mutual jealousies, against the Nizam. In 1794 the Peshwa renewed his claims upon the Nizam for arrears of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*. The Nizam also strengthened his military force under the Frenchman Raymond, and when negotiations failed, the two parties were drawn to "decide their differences by the sword."[41] The Nizam appealed to the English for help. but without any success. The united army of the Marathas inflicted a defeat on him at the battle of Kharda (fiftysix miles south east of Ahmadnagar) in March 1795, and he was compelled to submit to a humiliating treaty, suffering heavy pecuniary losses and ceding territories to the Marathas. English intervention might have changed the fate of the Nizam and Shore has been criticised for his observance of neutrality. His critics have pointed out that the Nizam hoped for British support and was entitled to it on the basis of the treaty of February, 1768, whereby the Company became practically the guardian of his defence. But it can very well be urged that Shore's hands were tied by the last India Act and his interference would have meant adding another violation of it to the previous one of the Triple Alliance of 1790. There is also

[40] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 198, *vide infra*, on the subject of the Nizam's policies during this period.

[41] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 110.

another side of the question. The English were then at peace with the Marathas, and they were not bound by any of the previous treaties or alliances with the Nizam to help him against a friendly power.

This victory gave to the Peshwa's government for the moment some prestige and considerably increased Nana Phadnavis' influence at Poona.[42] But "this was the last time the chiefs of the Maratha nation assembled under the authority" of their Peshwa.[43] Their temporary unity vanished shortly, and internal dissensions marked by intrigues and treachery appeared to mar the effects of their victory at Kharda. The young Peshwa Madhu Rao Narayan grew tired of the control of Nana Phadnavis, and being seized with anger, disappointment and grief after the latter's refusal to tolerate his friendship with his cousin Baji Rao, Raghoba's son, he committed suicide on 25th October, 1795. An attempt was then made by the Nana to keep this Baji Rao, his inveterate foe, out of the Peshwaship. But the opposition of Nana Phadnavis against Baji Rao II[44] vanished when the latter was about to throw himself into the hands of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and he soon recognised him as the Peshwa with himself as the head of his administration. This was opposed by Daulat Rao Sindhia and another faction, who set up, Chimanji Appa, the brother of Baji Rao, as the Peshwa towards the end of May 1796. But Nana Phadnavis made a counterplot which enabled him to restore Baji Rao II as the Peshwa and himself as his chief minister on 4th December 1796.[45] It, however, became impossible for him to recover his former influence. The Nizam profited by these dissensions, and got back the territories he had handed over to the Marathas after the battle of Kharda.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 120—21.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 126—28.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

Thus the Marathas spoiled their own game by indulging in mutual rivalries, plots and counter-plots.

At this grave moment in the history of the Maratha nation, the old statesman, Nana Phadnavis, died on 13th March, 1800. He had controlled Maratha affairs for thirty-eight years, and "with him", remarked Colonel Palmer, the British Resident at Poona, "departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Maratha government." Nana Phadnavis' attempt to establish undisputed influence at Poona and his neglect of the north have been regarded by a modern Marathi writer as shortcomings in his policy. But it has to be admitted that he was a "great statesman"* * * he is entitled to the high praise of having acted with the feelings and sincerity of a patriot." His influence over Maratha politics during his lifetime was certainly considerable and he rendered remarkable services to the Maratha nation at that critical time. To the misfortune of Maharastra, the other able leaders like, Madhaji Sindhia, Malhar Rao Holkar and Tukoji Holkar had already passed away from the world. The heroes of the tragic scene were their unworthy successors Daulat Rao Sindhia, a nephew and adopted son of Madhaji Sindhia, and Jaswant Rao Holkar, a natural son of Tukoji Holkar.

In short the whole Maratha nation was torn by bitter internal dissensions and the Maratha affairs were hopelessly confused, when the East India Company's policy of non-intervention, as laid down by the last India Act and followed more or less during Shore's administration, was reversed and was replaced by one of conquest, and expansion, after the arrival, on April 26, 1798, of Lord Mornington, subsequently Marquis Wellesley, as Governor General (1798—1805). With highly imperialistic ideas, and a knowledge of Indian affairs as a Commissioner of the Board of Control, Wellesley came as a saviour of the Indian dominion of England (when it had been challenged by the French in Europe), in the face of the hostile


INDIA ON
WELLESLEY'S ARRIVAL
1798
BRITISH POSSESSIONS.
AND PLACES UNDERLINED.
AFGHANISTAN
Kandahar
R. Indus
RAJPUTANA
Jodhpur
Ajmere
Delhi
Lasswari
Muttra
Farrukhabad
Jaipur
Gohad
Gwalior
Kotah
Allahabad
BUNDELKHAND
Bundee
Ujjain
Broach
Surat
Aseergarh
Ellichpur
Argaon
Ajanta Hills
ORISSA
Cuttack
HYDERABAD
Hyder
MYSORE
Seringapatam
Tanjore
Dindigul
CEYLON
BAY OF BENGAL
70
75
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35
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15
10

opposition of Tipu, the Marathas and the *rajas* of Malabar (with the exception of *raja* of Coorg), while an invasion of Hindusthan by Zaman Shah, the King of Kabul, was constantly apprehended, and while the finances of the Company had become unsatisfactory.[46] Moreover, the influence of European politics upon India made the situation more complicated. Besides their activities in Europe the French government, from their station of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, had formed an anti-English alliance with Tpiu, and Napoleon had taken possession of Egypt with a view to an Indian expedition. Thus from all sides the situation was menacing for British interests in India, which could hardly be saved by sticking to the policy of neutrality and non-interference. Wellesley's policy of expansion and his plan of subsidiary alliance were the inevitable products as much of his imperialistic convictions as of his desire to save British dominion in India from being endangered by a combination of several hostile elements, or by a revival of the French attempt at creating an Indian empire. He had two broad principles. One was the system of subsidiary alliances. The other, he enunciated somewhat later: "The Company with relation to its territory in India must be viewed in the capacity of a sovereign power." The former implied that the native powers "were to make no wars, and to carry on no negotiations with any other state whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The greater principalities were each to maintain a native force commanded by British officers for the preservation of the public peace; and they were each to cede certain territories in full sovereignty to meet the yearly changes of this force. The lesser principalities were to pay a tribute to the paramount power. In return the British Government was to protect them, one and all against foreign enemies of every sort or kind."[47]

[46] Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, pp. 1—6.
[47] Wheeler, *History of India*, pp. 426—27.

So far as the Marathas were concerned, Wellesley first tried to secure their alliance against Tipu. The Peshwa (Baji Rao II) promised help, but later on he carried on secret negotiations with Tipu under the influence of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and when Tipu was defeated he tried to excuse himself by attributing the failure of his engagement with the English to Nana Phadnavis.[48] The subsidiary alliance of the English with the Nizam made the Marathas extremely restless and jealous of them. But the internal divisions among themselves, especially after the death of Nana Phadnavis, prevented any concerted action on their part,—so that the obvious reply to English subsidiary alliances in the form of Maratha subsidiary alliances could not be given.

By this all the able Maratha leaders had passed away. We have already referred to the suicidal quarrel of the intriguing and selfish Maratha leaders like Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar. The frequent intrigues of the weak-minded and treacherous Peshwa and of Daulat Rao Sindhia made matters worse. The Sindhia agreed to assist the Peshwa in his policy of "implacable revenge" upon the friends of the dead Nana Phadnavis, and the Peshwa also promised his help to the Sindhia against Jaswant Rao Holkar.[49] But their union was far from being sincere; the Peshwa was always on the look-out for an opportunity to extricate himself from the thraldom of the Sindhia, and the latter also remained always suspicious of him.[50] When the Sindhia was busy in fighting against Holkar's troops in Malwa, the Peshwa "evinced a malignant spirit of revenge towards all the great families whom

[48] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 169—76; Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 370—72.

[49] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 190—92.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

he suspected of ever having been the political opponents of himself and his father"[61] and he brutally murdered Vithuji Holkar, brother of Jaswant Rao Holkar. This was too much for Jaswant Rao to bear. In spite of his defeat by the Sindhia's troops[62] at the battle of Indore on 14th October, 1801, he marched into the Deccan to avenge the murder of his brother, and inflicted a defeat on the combined forces of the Peshwa and the Sindhia at Poona on 25th October, 1802, and took possession of the city, while the Peshwa fled to Singhgarh. After fleeing from place to place, the Peshwa took refuge at Bassein; and Jaswant Rao placed Vinayak Rao, son of Amrit Rao, the adopted son of Raghoba, on the Peshwa's *masnad*.

Finding himself in a desperate and helpless position, the Peshwa now solicited British alliance and protection. On 31st December, 1802, he concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the English, which "was declaredly for the purpose of general defensive alliance, and the reciprocal protection" of the territories of the Peshwa and the English East India Company and their allies respectively. For this purpose "a subsidiary force, of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of Field-Artillery and European artillery-men were to be permanently stationed" in the Peshwa's dominions. "No European of any nation hostile to the English was to be entertained" by the Peshwa. Districts yielding 26 lakhs of rupees were assigned for the payment of the subsidiary forces; and all articles intended for the consumption of these troops were to be allowed to pass duty free. The Peshwa relinquished his claims on Surat, and submitted to British arbitration in the adjustment of his differences with and claims on the Nizam and the Gaekwad....." He likewise bound him-

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 198—99.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 201; Malcolm, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 218; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 27.

self to engage in no hostilities with other states, neither to commence nor pursue, in future, any negotiation with any power whatever without previous consultation with the British Government."[53] Thus the Peshwa "sacrificed his independence as the price of protection." British troops under General Arthur Wellesley reinstated him in his capital on 13th May, 1803, and compelled the Holkar to retire to Malwa.

The treaty of Bassein is certainly an important landmark in the history of the British dominion in India, in the sense that the Company entered into definite relations with the formal head of the Maratha confederacy, and henceforth it "had either to control the greatest Indian power, or was committed to hostilities with it."[54] But it would be overemphasising its importance if we say that "the Treaty of Bassein gave the Company the supremacy of the Deccan", and that "the Treaty by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the Empire of India."[55] The authorities in England were alarmed at turn in Deccan politics, and Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control, rightly hinted at its weak aspect by pointing out that it "tended to involve us (the English) in the endless and complicated distractions of the Maratha Empire." Wellesley hoped for peace and also thought that the English, being placed in favourable circumstances, would be able to fight their opponents even if war actually broke out.

But Wellesley's hopes for pecae were soon belied. His brother Arthur Wellesley justly characterised the treaty of Bassein as "a *Treaty with a cipher*". All the Maratha chiefs saw in the treaty of Bassein the entire annihilation of their national independence, and they tried to forget their mutual rivalries and to organise a confederacy against the British. The weak-

[53] Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 225—26; vide also Aitchison. *Treaties and Sanads*, 4th edition, Vol. VI, p. 52.

[54] Roberts, *British India*, p. 255.

[55] Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, Introduction, xlvi.

MARATHA WARS: SOUTH WEST FRONT.



minded Peshwa, now penitent for his act, encouraged them by secret messages.[56] Daulat Rao Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsle II of Berar at once joined together. They tried also to persuade Jaswant Rao Holkar to make a common cause with them. But even in this moment of extreme peril they could not completely sink their jealousies and failed to put forth united strength, for while the Sindhia and the Raja of Berar mobilised their troops, the Holkar "retired to Malwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events" and appeared on the scene of war when it was too late, while the Gaekwad remained neutral.

Hostilities commenced early in August, 1803, Lord Wellesley decided to attack at once the territories of the confederates on all points. It was planned to carry on the war in two main theatres, in the Deccan under Arthur Wellesley, and in Hindusthan under General Lake. But subsidiary operations were to be carried on simultaneously in Gujrat, Bundelkhand and Orissa. The European officers in the Sindhia's service did not prove very serviceable at this moment: Perron, the successor of de Boigne, who had to return to Europe in 1796 owing to ill-health, did not possess military enterprise and prudence like him: and he with many of his followers deserted the Sindhia. Instead of following the old harassing tactics of the Marathas, their leaders at that time proceeded to fight the English on Western methods, which they had not been able to make their own and for which they had to depend on foreigners. This was a suicidal step and was attended with disastrous consequences for them.

The Marathas met with quick reverses. In the Deccan, Arthur Wellesley captured Ahamadnagar on 12th August, 1803, and defeated on 23rd Sepetmber the combined army of the

[56] Arthur Wellesley's letter to Colonel Close, dated 23rd June, 1803; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, pp. 24547 (last para).

Sindhia and the Bhonsle at Assaye, a village situated about forty five miles north of Aurangabad. The Bhonsle Raja's troops were decisively defeated by the English at Argaon on 29th November, and the strong fortress of Gawilgarh was captured by them on 15th December, 1803. In Hindusthan, Lake achieved equally decisive success. Marching with his troops from Cawnpur, he captured Aligarh towards the end of August, while the French adventurer Perron retired at about the same time from the Sindhia's service. Lake then defeated M. Louis Bourquin (the successor of Perron in the Sindhia's army) and a party of French officers at the battle of Delhi in the month of September, and brought Shah Alam, then an unfortunate and blind old man of eighty three, under British protection. He next concluded a treaty with the Jat Raja of Bharatpur, and took possession of Agra on 18th October. The remaining forces of the Sindhia were finally vanquished at Laswaree, in Alwar state, in the month of November. This victory completed the overthrow of the brigades trained by de Boigne and Perron, and brought Agra and Delhi, together with the possessions of the Sindhia, south of the Chambal, into the hands of the English. In Orissa, the province of Cuttack was conquered by the English, and success attended their arms in Gujrat and Bundelkhand also. Thus within five months the two great leaders of the Maratha confederacy had to own decisive defeats. The Raja of Berar had to conclude the treaty of Deogaon on 17th December, 1803, by which it was arranged that he should cede to the British Government, the province of Cuttack, including Balasore, and the whole of his territory and shares of revenue to the westward of the river (Warda) and south of the hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh. Further all differences between the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Raja of Berar were to be arbitrated by the British Government; and no European or American of a nation at war with the English, or any British subject, was to be entertained with-

out the consent of the British Government.[57] He agreed to maintain a British Resident at Nagpur, and Elphinstone was sent there in that capacity. The Sindhia also concluded the treaty of Suraj-Arjan-gaon[58] on 30th December, by which he ceded to the victors his territories between the Jumna and the Ganges, and all those situated to the northward of the Rajput principalities of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Gohud. He also surrendered Ahmadnagar and Broach and his possessions between Ajanta and the Godavari. He renounced all claims on the Mughal Emperor, the British Government and its allies, the Peshwa, the Nizam, and the Gaekwad, and entered into a similar agreement in regard to European and Americans, and to Residents at his Court as had been admitted by Raghuji Bhonsle II. Major Malcolm was appointed as Resident in his court. By a separate treaty, concluded on 27th February, 1804, he entered into a defensive alliance with the English. Both the Sindhia and the Raja of Berar recognised the treaty of Bassein.

The importance of the advantages thus gained by the English was certainly great. The victory over the two great leaders of the Maratha confederacy was itself an achievement of great political significance, and it foredoomed its final dissolution. Moreover, the territorial possessions of the East India Company were expanded in all directions, and the titular Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II came under their protection. Lastly, their influence upon the 'Subedar of the Deccan' and on the Peshwa increased.[59]

But Wellesley vainly hoped that the treaties afforded the "only possible security for the permanent tranquility and

[57] Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 264; Owen *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 417—19.

[58] Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 265; Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 419—22.

[59] Owen ,*Wellesley Despatches*, p. 439.

prosperity of these (i.e., the E. I. C.'s) valuable and important possesions.' His arguments could not convince the ministry in England. Lord Castlereagh, in a letter written from London on 21st May, 1804, and received by the Governor-General in India on 14th October, expressed doubts as to whether the recent territorial gains did not "contravene too strongly the system of policy upon which the legislature has professed to act, by pushing dominion beyond what the necessity of the case may fairly appear to warrant" and whether it did not "swell so largely and so suddenly not only our own immediate possessions but our dependencies necessarily included within the dominion of our army, as to run some risk of rendering the frame of our government complicated and unwieldy in such a degree as to hazard its becoming enfeebled and embraced in ordinary hands," when Wellesley would no longer control the affairs in India.[60]

In fact, tranquility was threatened very soon. As it has been justly noted by his brother Arthur Wellesley the "Governor-General's too exacting interpretation of the Treaties of Peace" disgusted the Sindhia and the Bhonsle. But this time it was the Holkar who came forward to oppose the English when it was too late. The Sindhia also manifested a disposition to resume hostilities. War was declared against Holkar by the Company in April, 1804, after he had plundered the territory of the *raja* of Jaipur. The British Generals committed mistakes at the beginning. Colonel Monson, who according to Wellesley "advanced (too far into the plains of Rajputana) and retreated in the same manner," was defeated by the Holkar who now pursued the old tactics of the Marathas in the Mukund-dara pass (thirty miles south of Kotha), and was obliged to retreat to Agra towards the end of August 'losing five battalions and six companies.' Emboldened by this vic-

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 447.

Punjab
Cis Sutlej Sikh States
Saharanpur
Karnal
Shamli
Khakauli
Kandla
Panipat
Baraona
Meerut
Baghpath
Hapur
Delhi
Surajpur
Malagarh
Faridabad
Sikandrabad
Shikarpur
Khirja
Palwal
R. Ganges
Aligarh
Kosi
Khasganj
Aliganj
OUDH
Alwar
Laswari
Mathra
Etah
Digo
Anin
R. Jamna
Farakhabad
Mainpuri
Bharatpur
Jaopharg
Patan
Sikandra
Agra
Shikohabad
Etawah
Jaipur
Mandore
Sahenda
Biana
Nandpur
Sirmogar
Dholpur
Bithur
Ajmere
Saolia
Pipli
Bagri
Gangapur
R. Chambal
Gwalior
Cawnpore
Mawar
Char Malarna
Kerola
Didwara
Aligarh
Oniara
Rampura
Lakheri
Kapras
Patan
Kotah
Makandara
Rampura
Jaira Patan
Bhanpura
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M a l w a
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50 0 50 100
English Miles.
MARATHA WAR
Northern Front (1803-5)

tory, the Holkar proceeded towards Hindusthan at the head of 60,000 cavalry, 15,000 or 16,000 infantry and artillery-men with 192 or 180 guns, and besieged Delhi from 8th to 14th October; but his attack was successfully repulsed by Lt. Colonel Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, assisted by Lt. Colonel Burn, the commandant. A part of the Holkar's armies was routed at Dig on 13th November, and another commanded by the Holkar himself was defated by General Lake at Farrukhabad on 17th November. The English, however, suffered a reverse owing to Lake's failure (early in 1805) to capture the Jat fortress of Bharatpur, the reduction of which was thought necessary by the Company after the Holkar had received severe blows elsewhere, as its *raja* was an ally of the Holkar. But the Holkar's interests were served by this English defeat, because the Raja of Bharatpur unexpecedly concluded a treaty with the English on 10th April, by which he "paid twenty lacs of rupees, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British Government, and his claims to advantages secured by the former treaty with General Lake."[61] The Holkar was, however, saved from complete annihilation by the sudden recall of Lord Wellesley by the Directors in England. The retreat of Monson and Lake's failure before Bharatpur had given a "serious blow to British prestige," and caused grave apprehensions in the minds of the Directors in England, who were also alarmed by the rapid increase of the Company's debt from 17 millions in 1797 to 31 millions in 1806 under the pressure of Wellesley's forward policy. The ministry did not very well approve of his military operations, and there was a widespread belief that his conquests "were becoming too large for profitable managemnt." Moreover, he dealt with the authorities in England in a masterful way which offended them. So on the failure of British arms before Bharatpur, Lord Wellesley's

[61] Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 298.

"supporters waxed faint; and the vehement tide of public opinion in England condemned the rash, ambitious, and war-loving statesman." Pitt remarked that Lord Wellesley "had acted most imprudently and illegally, and that he could not be suffered to remain in the Government."[62] Lord Cornwallis, then in his sixty seventh year, was appointed to supersede Lord Wellesley, and he reached Calcutta on 30th July, 1805.

Opinions are divided about the merits of Lord Wellesley's Maratha policy and his system of subisidary alliances in general.

In the midst of the conflicting opinions, *three* points should be clearly noted. In the *first* place, it cannot be doubted that Lord Wellesley's ambitious measures immensely added to the growth of the British influence and dominion in India though his conquests involved heavy expenses and rapid increase of the public debt. The Marathas were not of course completely subdued, yet their power was considerably broken and at the same time many states had come under British influence and protection. He also succeeded in baffling Napoleon's "fixed idea of conquering England in India, together with the French faction already so powerful in Sindhia's dominions and their control over Shah Alam, whom Bounaparte would delight *more suo* to use as a political tool,"[63] and the control established by Wellesley over Shah Alam was politcally significant. Moreover, the Company's territorial possessions in India were greatly augmented and its possessions in Madras were linked up with those in Bengal as a result of his acquisitions (which will be noted in order). In the *second* place, one has to admit that there was a strong necessity for a vigorous policy on the

[62] Ross, *Cornwallis Correspondence*, Vol. III, p. 522.

[63] Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, Introduction, xxii. We have already noted how both the Marathas and the English were trying to utilise the fiction of Shah Alam's sovereignty; the French also were no exception to this. It may be noted that Napoleon was at that time at the height of his power in Europe.

part of the Company in view of the alarming situation in which it had been placed when Wellesley came to India,—a time "when the British Government was halting dubiously between two political ways (the one a policy of non-interference and the other a forward policy), before a horizon cloudy and unsettled."[64] Collisions with Tipu or the Marathas might have been delayed but could not have been avoided. But in the *third* place, there is no reason to believe that Wellesley's hopes for at once preserving tranquility in the country and improving the condition of the Indian people by bringing their rulers under British protection and influence, had any chance of being immediately fulfilled, nor were they actually fulfilled as is shown by subsequent events. One may very well conclude that though the British Empire in India was not an accomplished fact as a result of Wellesley's policy, yet during his administration in India an immense stride was taken towards the establishment of British supremacy. His goal of a grand Indian Empire for England, which, according to him, was the only logical outcome of the Company's position in India at that time, supplies the "key to his whole policy as a statesman;" he did much to realise it, and his successors carried his task to completion. While Napoleon, the arch-enemy of England, was trying for a French Empire definitely in Europe and vaguely also in the East, Wellesley thought of a British Empire definitely in India, and while the former utlimately failed against a combination of European powers, the latter succeeded in giving a tangible shape to his ideal by defeating a combination of some major Indian powers and by bringing others under control.

Jaswant Rao Holkar's power, though shattered to a great extent, was not completely broken, and Daulat Rao Sindhia, discontented with the English, was trying to form an alliance

[64] Lyall, op. cit., p. 262.

with the former against the latter,—when Lord Cornwallis assumed charge of the Company's government in India for the second time on 30th July, 1805. The old Governor-General entirely disapproved of the policy of subsidiary alliances, and evinced an earnest desire to come to a settlement with the Maratha chiefs. But his death at Ghazipur on 5th October left the charge of the British Government in India to the senior member of the Bengal Council, Sir George Barlow, who accepted the views of his predecessor of "abandoning all connexion with the petty states, and generally with the territories to the westward of the Jumna." A new treaty was accordingly concluded with the Sindhia on 22nd November, 1805, by which some of the articles of the treaty of Surji-Arjangaon were changed. The fort of Gwalior and the Gohud territory were restored to the Sindhia. The Sindhia was to lay no claims to anything north of the river Chambal and the Company to anything south of it. Further, the Company engaged not to enter into treaties with the Rana of Udaipur, the Rajas of Jodhpur, Kotah, and other chiefs, tributary to the Sindhia in Malwa, Marwar and Mewar, and not to interfere in any way with the Sindhia's internal arrangements with these states. Thus the Rajput states were again left at the mercy of the Maratha chief, and did not receive any recognition from the Company whose cause they had supported.

Meanwhile Lord Lake had pursued the Holkar up to Amritsar, whither the later had proceeded in the hope of some help from the Sikhs, who were then rising under Ranjit Singh. But the Holkar was disappointed in his expectations and opened negotiations with Lord Lake for peace which was signed on the 7th January, 1806, at Rajpurghat on the banks of the Beas, on terms favourable to the Holkar. The Holkar indeed gave up all his rights to places north of the Chambal; he renounced his claims upon Poona, Bundelkhand and on the English and their allies, and also engaged not to admit any


INDIA AT
WELLESLEY'S DEPARTURE, 1805
British Possessions
States under British Protection
English Miles.
AFGHANISTAN
Kandahar
R. Indus
RAJPUTANA
Jodhpur
Jaipur
Ajmers
Delhi
ROHILKHAND
HIMALAY MTS.
Gwalior
Bundi
Kota
BUNDELKHAND
Calcutta
Midnapur
Allahabad
Benares
Jaunpur
Ghazipur
Buxar
Patna
Rajmahal
Burdwan
Hooghly
Chinsurah
Murshidabad
Cossimbazar
Dacca
Jessore
Agra
Ahmednagar
Aurungabad
Burhanpur
Elichpur
Surat
Baroach
GUJARAT
ORISSA
WESTERN GHATS
EASTERN GHATS
Poona
Satara
Goa
Seringapatam
Bangalore
Madras
Pondicherry
Tanjore
Trichinopoly
Madura
Tinnevelly
Cape Comorin
Ceylon
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
70
75
80
85
90
95
35
30
25
20
15
10

Europeans in his service, and to return to his own dominions in Malwa by a prescribed route. But on the other hand the English also engaged not to interfere with his territories south of the Chambal, but to give him back the greater part of his possessions in the Deccan. Fearing future complications and responsibilites, Sir George Barlow, in spite of Lord Lake's strong objections, annexed declaratory articles to the treaties with the Sindhia and the Holkar, whereby he withdrew British protection from the states north of the Chambal, from Kotah to the Jumna, and restored Tonk, Rampur, and all the territory north of the Bundi hills to the Holkar. He also dissolved British connection with the Raja of Jaipur, who had rendered useful services to the English against the Sindhia and the Holkar, to whose vengeance he was now left. Thus, in the words of the Jaipur Vakil, the Company at this time made "its faith subservient to its convenience."

The policy of neutrality pursued by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow has received censure from many important writers. There is no doubt that their policy was weak as compared with the vigorous policy of their predecessor, and that, in some cases, it entailed a violation of engagements with the native states. It is also true that it meant a stop half way in the growth of the British Empire in India. But it is to be considered if the bad financial condition of the Company at that time could have permitted the further prosecution of ambitious wars. There was no surplus fund and the government was running on a huge deficit; besides the Company's export trade was at this time steadily declining. Lord Cornwallis held that the preceding years had demanded "reinforcements of men and remittances of money," which gave in return "little other profit except brilliant gazettes.....We literally have not the means of carrying on the business of government." Wars must be backed up by finances, and, in view of the empty treasury of the Company at that time, it becomes difficult to

agree with the view of Wilson that "what was done in 1817 might have been accomplished, with quite as much reason, with more ease and still less cost, in 1805."[65] It must be acknowledged that, by following a system of strict economy, Sir George Barlow was able to improve the financial condition of the Company, and to leave a surplus.[66] Moreover, it should also be noted that in their policy they were following strictly the instructions of the authorities in England, and they had no motives of personal gains.

The growth of a power presupposes the existence of inherent strength in it, and so the Marathas, utterly devoid of any real strength in the beginning of the nineteenth century, could not profit in the least by the British policy of neutrality. They moved swiftly on towards decay. The affairs within the Holkar's territories became hopelessly complex and gloomy. The Holkar committed two atrocious deeds by secretly putting to death his nephew Khande Rao and his brother Kasi Rao. But these produced a reaction very soon, and Jaswant Rao died insane on 20th October, 1811.[67] During Jaswant Rao's insanity the management of affairs was usurped by his favourite mistress Tulsi Bai, who was supported by Balaram Seth, Jaswant Rao's minister, and by Amir Khan, the leader of the Central Indian Pathans. But the administration was hopelessly mismanaged by those unworthy men. "Nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country: at the court, bribery, execution, and murders; in the provinces, violence, rapine and bloodshed."[68] The affairs of Daulat Rao Sindhia also were not very satisfactory. His military expenses far exceeded his financial resources, and his

[65] Footnote in Mill, Vol. VI, p. 769.
[66] Beveridge, Vol. II, p. 817.
[67] Malcolm, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 245—53.
[68] Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 325.

generals had to exact money on their own account from the districts. This affected the morale of his army[69] and his control over his generals was not firm. Though naturally jealous of the rising British power, the Sindhia did not at this time manifest any hostile design towards it.[70] Weakness and disorder prevailed in the territory of Raghuji Bhonsle II, who was being harassed by the Pindaris and the Pathans. The Gaekwad of Baroda did not manifest any designs of violating the treaty of general defensive alliance which he had concluded with the Company on 21st April, 1805, and by which he had undertaken to maintain a subsidiary force and to submit his foreign policy and the adjustment of his relations with the Peshwa to British control. Thus Prinsep, a contemporary writer, has remarked that "such being the feeling and disposition of the several Mahratta powers, there seemed little in their condition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm (for the British power). As far as they were individually concerned, the object of the settlement of 1805-1806 seems to have been attained; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise; at the same time the balance that had been established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second coalition were yet unextinguished."

But it should be noted that the Maratha danger was not over for the English. Another attempt was made by the Maratha power to regain its supremacy before it finally collapsed. Though apparently the attitude of the Maratha chiefs was friendly, yet they were burning within themselves with feelings of discontent, which might burst forth in revenge at any favourable opportunity. In fact, their first Maratha ally, the

[69] Malcolm, Memoir, Vol. I, p. 138.

[70] Prinsep, *Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of Marques of Hastings*, Vol. I, p. 27.

Peshwa Baji Rao II, was anything but satisfied with his position of dependence on them, and harboured designs to emancipate himself from their control, though he did not openly show any signs of hostility. Moreover, as Elphinstone has stated, the Maratha chiefs were "constantly professing their devotion to His Highness and pressing to acknowledge him for their sovereign." But in view of the distracted condition of his country Baji Rao II did not desire to throw off British alliance all of a sudden; on the other hand, he utilised it to consolidate his own position with the help of Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was appointed Resident at his court in 1810 and went there in the following year.

In a few years the Peshwa was on the whole in an apparently stronger position and his policy underwent a change under the influence of his unscrupulous favourite *Trimbakji Danglia*, who exercised complete influence over him, though Sadaseo Mankeshwar remained as his formal minister. Under Trimbakji's advice the Peshwa sent envoys to the courts of the Sindhia, Raghuji Bhonsle II and the Holkar, with the object of negotiating a "secret treaty of general confederacy and support, which was actually concluded." In 1814 he became rather serious with regard to his claims on the Gaekwad, when the decennial lease of his share of Ahmadabad, granted to the Gaekwad in June 1804, was due to expire. The negotiations regarding the adjustment of the Peshwa's claims on the Gaekwad brought Gangadhar Shastri, the able minister of Baroda, to Poona, but the latter was treacherously murdered for which Trimbakji was suspected. Trimbakji was, therefore, put under confinement by Mr. Elphinstone in the face of the Peshwa's hesitation and unwillingness to surrender him. But a year later he effected his escape from his confinement in the fortress of Thana; Baji Rao II was suspected of conniving at his escape, though there was no proof of this fact.

By the year 1817 Baji Rao II became determined to strike against British ascendancy by organising a general confederacy of the Maratha chiefs, with whom, as well as with Amir Khan and the Pindaris, he engaged himself in active negotiations. At the same time he strengthened his own army.

The British Resident, Mr. Elphinstone did not fail to see through the Peshwa's designs. Moreover, the new Governor-General, Earl of Moira, better known as the Marquess of Hastings, had given up the policy of neutrality and was working with a firm determination to establish British paramountcy in India. On the 10th May Elphinstone received instructions from him "for the purpose of circumscribing the Peshwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as would prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the Court of Poona for several years, and of obviating inconveniences found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein." The Peshwa was induced to sign the treaty of Poona on 13th June, 1817, on rigorous terms. He promised to seize and deliver up Trimbakji Danglia to the English, and until this was acomplished he agreed to hand over his family as hostages. He renounced his claims as head of the Maratha Empire, and engaged not to have any negotiations with other powers, except through the British Resident. His claims on the Gaekwad were commuted to an annual payment of four lacs of rupees, and he promised to make no further demands on the Gaekwad. He ceded some important portions of his territories to the English. A separate treaty was concluded by the English with the Gaekwad on 6th November, 1817, by which the latter agreed to discharge a part of his irregular troops, to add 1,000 regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry to his subsidiary force, and to cede some of his districts to the English for additional expenses.

Meanwhile, the Nagpur state had been in the midst of disorders and internal dissensions since the death of Raghuji

Bhonsle II on 22nd March, 1816. His son Parsoji was infirm in mind and body, and the young Raja's cousin, Appa Saheb, being the next male member in the royal family, was the heir presumptive to the throne of Nagpur. Raghuji's widow Buka Bai tried, with the help of a party of old officers, to create a regency over his son excluding Appa Saheb from it. But the latter was after some time reconciled to Parsoji, who recognised him as his regent. The English took advantage of these internal quarrels in Nagpur to conclude a treaty of subsidiary alliance with Appa Saheb, through their Resident Mr. Jenkins, on 27th May, 1816.

Thus these two treaties—the treaty of Poona and the treaty of Nagpur—immensely increased the influence of the English and severely affected the Marathas. By the former the Peshwa's dominions were dismembered, his resources were curtailed and his position as the head of the Marathas confederacy disappeared; his material interests were affected seriously, and his moral influence received a deadly blow. By the latter, the Nagpur state lost its independence, and it was brought under the subsidiary system, which had been evaded by Raghuji Bhonsle II during his lifetime, and which had been "so long and so earnestly desired by the British Government." It greatly improved 'the defensive means" of the English. Malcolm has justly observed that "in the actual condition of India, no event could be more fortunate than the subsidiary Alliance with Nagpur."[71] It dealt a serious blow at the power of the Maratha confederacy.

Besides these arrangements with the Peshwa and the Nagpur state Lord Hastings compelled Daulat Rao Sindhia to conclude the Treaty of Gwalior on 5th November, 1817. By the treaty the latter engaged to assist the English against the Pindaris, and the British Government got full liberty to

[71] Malcolm, *Political History of India*, Vol. I, p. 465.

enter into engagements with the states of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi, and other 'substantive states' on the left bank of the Chambal. Daulat Rao Sindhia, on his part, engaged "on no account or pretence, whatever, to interfere in any shape in the affairs of those states, without the concurrence of the British Government."[72]

But discontented with his lot the Peshwa had been meanwhile strengthening his army, and his discontent now burst out into open hostility. On the very day that the Sindhia had to sign the revised subsidiary treaty, the Peshwa (who disliked it very much) attacked and burnt the British Residency at Kirki, but his attack was soon repulsed by the British forces with greater losses for him. Appa Saheb of Nagpur and Malhar Rao (II) Holkar, son of Jaswant Rao, also rose in arms against the British (in spite of previous and recent treaties). The Nagpur forces were defeated, after fierce fighting, at the battle of Sitabaldi, on 27th Nvoember, 1817. The Holkar's troops were also completely routed and destroyed at Mahidpur, on 21st December. Negotiations for peace were opened by Malcolm with Tantia Jog, the Holkar's able minister, and a treaty of subsidiary alliance was concluded at Mandasor, on 6th January, 1818. By this treaty the Holkar renounced all rights to the territories of Amir Khan, to the *paraganas* in the possessions of the Kotah state, to all territories within or north of the Bundi hills, and agreed "to cede to the British Government all claims of tribute and revenues of every description which he has or may have had upon the Rajput princes," and also "all his territories and claims of every description whatever within or south of the Satpura range of hills." He further bound himself to maintain a British force within his territory for maintainting internal tranquillity, and he engaged to submit all foreign affairs to the arbitration

[72] Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. II, Appendix A.

of the British, and "to communication with any other states, except with the knowledge and consent of the British Resident." It was also provided that the Peshwa or his descendants should not exercise any sovereignty over the Holkar and his descendants.[73]

Thus the Sindhia and the Holkar were reduced to a state of dependence on the British Government. A worse fate was in store for the Peshwa. After his defeat at Kirki, he fled southwards from Poona, and got possession of the titular Raja of Satara. But being afterwards chased from place to place by the British troops, he fought two pitched battles with them at Koregaon (on 1st January, 1818) and Ashti (on 20th February 1818); he was defeated at the second place, and had to run away leaving his able general Gokhale dead on the field. The English rescued the young Raja of Satara, who was treated with much courtesy by Elphinstone, as he was convinced of the political advantage of the restoration of one of the descendants of Shivaji. The Peshwa at last surrendered himself in the camp of Sir John Malcolm on 3rd June, 1818. Lord Hastings was determined to abolish the Peshwaship for ever with the idea that the continuance, even in a decayed form, of that symbol of Maratha unity, would rally the Maratha chiefs again round it, which would certainly be incompatible with the newly-established British paramountcy. So the Peshwaship ended, and Baji Rao II was allowed to live at a place called Bithur, twelve miles north-west of Cawnpore, under the guard of a British agent, and on a pension of eight lacs a year guaranteed to him by Malcolm much against the desire of the Governor-General. Trimbakji was seized by Elphinstone and was condemned to life-long imprisonment in the fort of Chunar near Benaras. Pratap Singh, a lineal descendant of Shivaji, was set up as ruler of a small principality

[73] Malcolm, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, Appendix 'B'.

created out of Baji Rao's dominions, as a sop to Maratha sentiment. The alternative suggestion of Sir Thomas Munro, that the Company itself should stand forth as the Peshwa, was not accepted. There was no ground for apprehension that the new state of Satara would cause troubles to the English. It was much too crippled to form again the centre of a hostile Maratha confederacy; the force of Maratha nationalism had already spent itself, and India now required, and was preparing for, a differnt kind of national revival.

One by one all Maratha opposition to British arms disappeared. The designs of Appa Saheb of Nagpur, who had effected a romantic escape from British custody, and had been gathering forces in the Mahadeo hills between Nagpur and the Narmada, were frustrated. After the famous fort of Asirgarh had been conquered from its commander Jaswant Rao Lar by General Deveton in co-operation with a force from Malwa under Sir John Malcolm, Appa Saheb sought refuge among the Sikhs in the Punjab, but subsequently retired to Jodhpur, where he died in 1840. The portion of his dominions lying north of the Narmada was annexed to the British territory, and the remnant of his kingdom was given to a minor grandson of Raghuji Bhonsle II. By the second week of June, 1819, all the territories of the Peshwa, with the exception of the principality left to the Raja of Satara, came under British possession, and "British influence and authority spread over the land with magical celerity."[74] The civil administration of the Peshwa's dominions was organised by Elphinstone. He was assisted in his work by Grant Duff, the Resident at Satara. Malcolm was appointed commissioner of the territories acquired from the Raja of Nagpur, under the supervision of Jenkins. Malcolm also restored order, during the years 1818—1820, in

[74] Prinsep. op. cit., Vol. II. p. 189.

the districts of Khandesh and the parts of Malwa taken from the Holkar.

Thus ended the attempts of the Marathas to found a national Empire in India, and to rival the political supremacy, first of the Mughals, and then of the British. There were some elements in the nature of the Maratha policy which were not at all compatible with the consolidation and stability of an empire. As in almost all autocracies, the Maratha Empire was not based on an all-sided development from below. "The cohesion of the peoples in the Maratha state was not," observes Sir J. N. Sarkar, "organic but artificial, accidental and therefore precarious. It was solely dependent on the ruler's extraordinary personality and disappeared when the country ceased to produce supermen." Political development is also greatly dependent on the soundness of finances in a state. But in the Maratha kingdom trade and industry could not properly flourish and this was dangerous for a country where the soil was sterile and agriculture dependent on scanty or precarious rainfall. Occasional raids satisfied temporary needs of the Marathas but no arrangements were made for providing the state with permanent sources of revenues. Besides these, recrudescence of feudalism after the death of Shivaji greatly undid his nation-building work. The Maratha jagirdars forgot national interests, established themselves as states within state, and indulged in a shameful scramble for wealth and power.

All these characteristics became more intense among the later Marathas, though there appeared among them such eminent personalities as Madhava Rao I, Malhar Rao Holkar, Ahalya Bai, Madhaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis. They got several chances after the third battle of Panipat, and even after the treaty of Salbai, which some of them tried to utilise, and that with success, as in the case of Madhaji Sindhia, who hit the right point when he brought the Delhi Emperor under his control and established his influence in the North. By the

end of the eighteenth century all those able Maratha leaders passed away one by one, and they were succeeded by men like Baji Rao II, Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar, who could never unite at the right moment but tried to win their selfish games by base intrigues. Their aims were not purely national and their means were also ignoble. Diplomacy is needed for imperialism, but if it falls in weak hands and stoops to the low level of personal rivalries, selfish intrigues and base treacheries, then a moral canker eats into the vitality of the state and a Nemesis overtakes its destiny. Such was the case with the Marathas in the early nineteenth cenutry, when they had to face superior British politics. They also failed, even under Madhaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis, to establish a scientific military system of their own after European models when they had to fight against the English with their up-to-date military organisation, steeled through many European Wars for a century. They had to depend upon foreign mercenary adventurers like de Boigne and Perron "for a most vital means of self-protection, and since the old Maratha system of guerilla warfare could not stand against organised artillery and infantry, it went out of use and there was nothing else to take its place."

SECTION II

Final Decline of the Rajputs and Rajputana Under the British Political Influence

The spirit of rival witch awakened all the Hindu powers at the beginning of the eighteenth century disappeared much earlier among the Rajputs than among the Marathas. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Rajputana, once the land of chivalry and heroism, practically lost all her old traditions and passed through a dark period of her history. With

[75] Sardesai, op. cit., p 164.

few noteworthy exceptions, her children seem to have exhausted the stock of their virtues. Internal feuds, pseudo-chivalry, feudal strifes represented in deadly clan rivalries, were eating into her vitals, and, added to these, the encroachments of her external enemies were sucking her life-blood. The Maratha chiefs of the period like Madhaji and Daulat Rao Sindhia, or Tukoji and Jaswant Rao Holkar, frequently appeared personally on the scene, or despatched their hordes into the country. Sometimes they established their full control, or again they deprived her of her economic resources, and they always pressed their claims on tributes from the Rajput chiefs. No less troublesome and harassing were the depredations within her borders of the other plundering hordes of Central India, like the Pathans[76] and tht Pindaris.[77] The Company concluded a treaty with the Jaipur state in the time of Lord Wellesley (ratified on 15th January, 1804), but it was cancelled later on in conformity with the peace policy of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow.[78] Lord Lake's agreement of 1803 with the Jodhpur state was not ratified by the Maharaja and was not therefore carried into effect. In short, being incessantly engaged with formidable powers like Tipu and the Marathas, the Company had no opportunity to pay much attention towards Rajputana before the time of Lord Hastings.

Torn by hereditary jealousies and family feuds, and distracted by the aggressions of her foreign invaders, Rajputana was in a state of anarchy and disorder when Lord Hastings arrived in India. In pursuance of his general plan of establishing British supermacy, he was convinced of the necessity of bringing the Rajput states under control. He rightly thought that an alliance with these states would give "immense strategic advantages for the Company's military and

[76] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 321.
[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 329—30.
[78] *Ibid.*, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 311.

political position in Central India," and would also make available "the resources of the Rajput country, for defensive and offensive purposes, against internal and external enemies of the Company."[79] In 1814, the authorities in England sent orders to Bengal for bringing the Jaipur state under British protection, but the Governor-General "postponed attempting it until a more favourable season."[80]

Such a favourable turn came by the year 1817, when Mr. Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi, was instructed by the Governor-General to open negotiations with the Rajput states. The conditions prescribed for settlement with these states were "that any tribute demandable under a fixed agreement with a Maratha or a Pathan chief, was to be paid directly to the British treasury," leaving the English to account for it to the party to whom it might be due, and that British protection should be given on the usual condition of "abstaining from the contraction of any new relations with other powers," and submitting external relation to British arbitration.[81]

The state of Karauli, an acknowledged dependency of the Peshwa, entered into a treaty of subordinate alliance with the Company by submitting its right of negotiating with foreign powers to the control of the Company and by promising "to furnish troops at the requisiton of the British Government, according to its means." Among the independent Rajput

[79] Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 127. This policy of utilizing Rajputs was at the root of the early success of Mughal imperialism; the Marathas failed to learn the lesson of Akbar's days, and in their hour of greatest need (in the sixties of the eighteenth century) they were recently ruining and embittering the Rajputs instead of winning them over for a *Hindupad padshahi*, with disastrous results for themselves; the English were better successors of Akbar in this respect and it is well known today that the Rajput states (as also the Sikhs later on) became in the nineteenth century a very great support of the British Empire in India.

[80] Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 390.

[81] Princep, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 354.

states, Kotah, then under the able management of Zalim Singh, was the first to form an alliance with the English. By a treaty concluded by Metcalfe with the agent of Kotah at Delhi on 26th December, 1817, the ruler of that state acknowledged British protection and supremacy and entered into a relation of "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interest."[82] A supplementary article of the treaty, added on 20th February, 1818, guaranteed to Zalim Singh and his heirs (in recognition of his services to the British) the office of the chief minister of the state. But this caused some trouble later on because article 10 of the treaty provided that "the Maha-Rao (i.e., the rightful sovereign of Kotah), his heirs, successors, shall remain absolute rulers of the country"; the Maha-Rao could not have absolute authority if the office of his Chief Minister was permanently fixed in a particular family by an external authority. The next state, in order of time, to enter into engagements with the British was Jodhpur. The treaty concluded with that state on 6th January, 1818, contained the "usual provisions of defensive alliance, perpetual friendship, protection and subordinate co-operation."[83] The Rana of Udaipur, who "had suffered most from the usurpations of rebellious subjects, as well as from the operations" of the Marathas and the Pathans, entered into a similar arrangement with the Company on 16th January, 1818. The Raja of Bundi followed next in order, and signed a similar treaty on 10th February, 1818; the two Rathor states of Kishangarh near Ajmere, and Bikanir concluded treaties with the Company in the month of March, 1818. Jaipur was the last of the important states to enter into a treaty alliance with the Company, on 2nd April, 1818, after various negotiations since 1816. The minor states became also bound

[82] Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix No. XVI; D. Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 353—57; Tod, Vol. III, pp. 1577—90.

[83] Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Prinsep, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 134; Tod, Vol. II, pp. 1092—94.

by similar engagements. Agreements with the three principalities of Pratapgarh, Banswara and Dungarpur, branches of the Udaipur House and situated on the border of Gujrat, were concluded under the superintendence of Sir John Malcolm, on 5th October,[84] 5th December[85] and 11th December, 1818[86] respectively. The state of Jaisalmer entered into a treaty with the British on 12th December, 1818[87] and the chief of Sirohi in 1823.

Thus the historic country of Rajputana acknowledged British supremacy, and in the course of a few years order as well as British control were established there by a band of able English officers like Tod, Metcalfe, Malcolm, and some others.

This extension of political influence over the Rajput states marks an important step in the advance of British paramountcy in India. But Lord Hastings' Rajput policy has not escaped criticism. The Rajput states had never manifested any hostility towards the British and were, as Hastings himself expressed, their "natural allies." However, the treaties which they were led to accept subjected them to subordinate positions like other hostile states and entailed a loss of their independence. All proposals, which came forward later on to improve their relations with the British, were never put into force. Mr. Prinsep has strongly argued that the mutual jealousies and dissensions of the Rajput states "prevented their living together in harmony without a general sense of the necessity of submitting to the behest of a controlling power."[88] But it may

[84] Malcolm, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, *Appendix* No. XVI, 'H'.

[85] Prinsep, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369. "A treaty with Banswara was concluded at Dehlee (Delhi) on the 16th September, 1818, to the same effect precisely; but of the 5th December, having been negotiated directly with the Raja by Captain Caulfield, may be considered as that fixing the relations of the State."

[86] Malcolm, *op. cit.*, *Appendix* No. XVI, 'I'.

[87] Prinsep, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369.

[88] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 346.

very well be asked if the Rajput states could not be protected from misrule and external aggressions by being attached with the English in a tie of 'friendly co-operation' instead of 'subordinate alliance.' It should be also noted that the "good and tranquillity" of the country was not "the exclusive aim" of the Company's interference, as Prinsep holds,[89] but they were guided by considerations of political "expediency and convenience" to themselves. Lord Hastings has also been more severely criticised for continuing the tributes from the Rajput states. There was some justification for this and Mr. Prinsep's arguments is defence[90] are, firstly, that the British Government by undertaking to protect the states from external foes could legitimately realise from them the cost thereof,—secondly, that these were retained as a mark of supremacy over them,—and thirdly, that "by the immediate operation of the treaties" and by the establishment of regular government there was an increase of their revenues "of which it would have been an act of wanton profusion to make a distribution purely gratuitous." But for this retention of tributes there was another motive of Hastings arising out of contemporary political conditions. Prinsep has thus rightly hinted at it: "It will be recollected that under the original plan it was intended to make the arrangement palatable to the Maratha powers, by securing to them the benefit of any revenues their past successes had enabled them to exact from the Rajput states."[91]

SECTION III

Mysore: Its Later History and Relations

Mysore under Tipu was one of the formidable powers of India at that time. It remained for many years during the

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 349.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 347—51.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 349.

second half of the eighteenth century "a constant source of alarm and danger" to the English. Tipu was an ever active and ambitious prince. Thomas Munro wrote about him in 1799 that "a restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to have everything to originate from himself, was the predominant feature of his character."

The Anglo-Mysore Treaty of 1784 "was but a hollow truce;" neither Tipu nor the Company believed that it was the closing act in the drama of Anglo-Mysore hostility. Both parties knew that another trial of strength was inevitable. Gifted with the sagacity of an acute diplomat, Tipu tried to put on the Company in India the pressure of Anglo-French hostility in Europe, by allying himself with the French Government. With this object he sent in July 1787 envoys to France, where they reached on 9th June, 1788, and came back to Seringapatam in May, 1789, with no material help but only with assurance of friendship and "promises of future assistance." The French Government was itself in a deplorable condition at that time, and could not render any active help to Tipu. Tipu also sent in 1787 ambassadors to Constantinople, where they were ostentatiously received by the Sultan but could bring no real help from him.

Cornwallis (1786—1793) believed, from the time of his arrival as Governor-General of India, that a rupture with Tipu was imminent, and that an alliance with other Indian powers as a sort of counterpoise to it was absolutely necessary. He wrote in his letter to Malet, the Resident at Poona, in March 1788: "I look upon a rupture with Tipu as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with France, and in that event a vigorous co-operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our interests in this country." He realised the impossibility of strictly following the policy of neutrality enforced by Pitt's India Act, as is clear from his own expression that it was "attended with the unavoidable incon-

venience of our (the Company's) being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies."[92]

The settlement of the Guntoor *Sarkar* with the Nizam, and the ommission of Tipu's name in the letter written by Cornwallis to the Nizam on 7th July, 1789, with the object of laying "the foundation of permanent and powerful co-operation,"[93] confirmed Tipu's apprehension of an immediate outbreak of hostilities. But it was his own attack on the Raja of Travancore on the 29th December, 1789 that ignited the flame.

Travancore had been included in the Treaty of Mangalore as an ally of the Company; so Cornwallis "considered the Company as at war" with Tipu, and proceeded to take vigorous measures for its prosecution. The Marathas and the Nizam were not well disposed towards Tipu, and Cornwallis sent orders to the Resident at Poona and Hyderabad to negotiate an alliance with these two powers. Tipu did not receive any help from the French on this occasion, but still, in order to provide against such a contingency, Cornwallis tried to "keep a watchful eye upon all the motions of the French in those seas," and also "solicited a friendly attention to the same object of the Dutch Governor of Ceylon." A treaty of defensive and offensive alliance was formed with the Marathas and the Nizam on 1st June[94] and 4th July, 1790[95] respectively, whereby they promised to help the English with contingents in the invasion of Tipu's territory, and were given hopes of sharing in the conquests. Thus Tipu was isolated and a formidable combination was formed against him. The Marathas and the Nizam sometimes gave "useful aid"[96] to the English.

[92] Letter to Malet, dated 28th February, 1790; Forrest, *States Papers about Cornwallis*, Vol. II, p. 10.

[93] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 40.

[94] Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 58—62.

[95] *Ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 43—47.

[96] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 336.

The war against Tipu, which lasted for nearly two years, was conducted in three campaigns. The first under Major-General Medows proved indecisive. Accordingly in December 1790, Cornwallis himself assumed command of the operations. The Company also began to entertain henceforth the project of deposing Tipu in favour of the heir of the old Hindu ruling family of Mysore. Cornwallis proceeded by Vellore and Ambur towards Bangalore, which was captured on 21st March, 1791, and on 13th May the English army reached Arikera, about nine miles from Seringapatam. But Tipu exhibited brilliant generalship, and with the commencement of the rains Cornwallis had to retreat for want of equipments and provisions for his army. The contest was resumed in the summer of 1791. On 3rd November, 1791, Tipu captured Coimbatore, though it was bravely defended by Lieutenant Chalmers. But Cornwallis captured one by one the hill fortresses which obstructed his advance towards Seringapatam, arrived within sight of Tipu's capital on 5th February, 1792 and soon captured the outworks of the town, though Tipu showed such skill as a general and a diplomat in averting a disaster.

All his efforts being baffled, Tipu opened negotiations with the English for a peaceful settlement, and the treaty of Seringapatam was concluded in March 1792.[97] Half of Tipu's dominions was surrendered, and out of it the Nizam received a large portion extending from the Krishna to beyond the Penar river with the forts of Ganjdikottai and Cuddapah; the share which fell to the Marathas extended their boundary to the Tungabhadra; and the English obtained Malabar and the sovereignty over the Raja of Coorg, on the south Dindigul and the surrounding districts, and on the east the Baramahal and the famous mountain passes—, "all of them cessions of considerable importance in adding to strength and compactness of

[97] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 147—53.

the Company's territories."[98] Besides these Tipu had to pay an indemnity of more than £3,000,000 and to surrender two of his sons to the English as hostages.

Some critics have found fault with Cornwallis for his hastily concluding the treaty of Seringapatam and for not completing the destruction of Tipu which, according to them, he could then have easily brought about. But it is to be noted that Cornwallis was guided by some very reasonable considerations. The British troops were suffering from sickness; a rupture with France, when Tipu might get help from that country (now free from the first troubles of the Revolution), was apprehended, and the Court of Directors expressed a desire for peace. He did not like to take possession of the whole country of Mysore, which would have increased the difficulty of settlement with the allies, who would also have become more powerful than was convenient. When the peace negotiations were about to break down and the capture of Seringapatam was imminent, he is said to have exclaimed: "Good God! what shall I do with the place!"

About the results of the war with Tipu, Cornwallis wrote: "We have effectually crippled our enemy, without making our friends too formidable." But Tipu was not a man to put up with this humiliation calmly. "Instead of sinking under his misfortunes" he exerted all his activity to repair the ravages of war. He began to "add to the fortifications of his capital—to remount his cavalry—to recruit and discipline his infantry—to punish his refractory tributaries, and to encourage the cultivation of his country."[99] He could not forget his resentment against the English, who had vanquished him. In 1796, the *raja* of Mysore, whom the English wanted to use against Tipu by a Hindu restoration, died leaving an infant son, whom Tipu did not grant even titular status of Raja. Tipu

[98] Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 505.
[99] Quoted in Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 41.

now began preparations for resuming hostilities with the English and, in order to secure allies for himself, sent embasies to Arabia, Kabul, Constantinople and Mauritius. In Europe, France was then engaged in a deadly war against England, and Tipu thought it to be a propitious moment for himself to secure French alliance against the English in India. About 59 Frenchmen, fired by the enthusiasm for the recently established French Republic, assembled at Seringapatam and elected "citizen Ripaud," a Lieutenant in the French navy, as their President. They were assured of 'affection and support' by Tipu, and with his permission planted a 'tree of Liberty', "surmounted by the cup of Equality." Tipu also enlisted himself as a member of a Jacobin Club. In 1797 he sent envoys to the French Governor at Mauritisu, where they arrived on 19th January, 1798. The French Governor, General Malartic, received those envoys in public and heard their proposals for an alliance for expelling the English out of India. He promised to send Tipu's representations to France, but in order to show some sympathy then and there with the cause of Tipu, he publicly proclaimed that Tipu was waiting for a French alliance "to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India," and invited volunteers to come forward for helping Tipu. As a result of this some Frenchmen arrived at Mangalore in April, 1798. After Wellesley's arrival in India, another conflict of the English with Tipu became inevitable, and the latter's intrigues with the French afforded him a sufficient excuse for war. He held in his minute dated 12th August, 1798, that "the act of Tipoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither expansion, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India. To affect to misunderstand an insult and injury of

such a complexion would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear."[100]

Wellesley, therefore, began preparations for an attack on Tipu. He tried to revive and strengthen the alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas, formed in the time of Cornwallis. The former readily complied with his demands by entering into 'subsidiary alliance' on 1st September, 1798, and his French—trained troops were disbanded by Malcolm and Kirpatrick. The Marathas did not give any clear answer. But with the object to keeping the Triple Alliance intact, Wellesley promised to give the Peshwa an equal share in the conquests that might be made from Tipu.

One English army under General Harris, joined by the Nizam's troops nominally under Mir Alam but under the real command of Arthur Wellesley, marched from Vellore on 11th February, 1799, and invaded Mysore on 5th March. Another army under General Stuart marched from Cannanore, on 21st February, up the Western Ghats from the West. On 6th March, Stuart defeated Tipu at Sedaseer (45 miles west of Seringapatam), and on the 27th the Sultan was again defeated by Harris at Malvelly (30 miles east of Seringapatam). Tipu then retired within the walls of Seringapatam, where the English arrived early in April and began its siege on the 17th of that month. It was taken by assault on 4th May, 1799. Tipu died bravely in the defence of his metropolis; his sons surrendered to the English. Thus fell the new Muslim power in Mysore founded about thirty-three years ago.

Opinions are sharply divided about Tipu's character and abilities. On the one hand, he has been described by some writers, both contemporary and modern, as a cruel tyrant and a die-hard Muslim fanatic; but there are others who have expressed favourable views about his character and adminis-

[100] Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 11—57.

tration. An impartial student of history has to turn from vehemence of expression to critical examination of basic facts: he will note accordingly that Tipu was a very industrious ruler, and that his kingdom was actually well governed: his official records were voluminous and were methodically arranged; and he gave detailed instructions to his officers on every conceivable subject, civil, military and commercial.[101] Mill writes that "as a domestic ruler he sustains an advantageous comparison with the greatest princes of the East;" and that his country was accordingly, at least during the first and better part of his reign, "the best cultivated and its population the most flourishing in India." This statement, though somewhat exaggerated, is not entirely devoid of truth. Other contemporary writers have also given favourable verdicts about his administration. "When a person," remarked Lt. Moore, "travelling through a strange country, finds it it well cultivated, populous, with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and everything flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tipu's country; and this is our conclusion respecting its government."[102] "His country," wrote Dirom, "was found everywhere full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of which the soil was capable; while the discipline and fidelity of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies equally strong, of the excellent regulations which existed in his army. His government, though strict and arbitrary, was despotism of a politic and able sovereign."[103] Sir John Shore also noted that "the peasantry of his dominions are portected, and their

[101] Bowring, *Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 210; Roberts *India Under Wellesley*, p. 57.

[102] *Narative*, p. 201.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

labours encouraged and rewarded."[104] He tried to introduce vigorous innovations in different branches of administration,—in the army, trade, banking and money-lending, coinage, weights and measures, calendar and method of calculating time and in the sale of liquors. He however, lacked his father's political sagacity and was devoid of his shrewd common sense.

As a soldier, Tipu possessed great valour and occasionally exhibited strategic and tactical abilities. His private life was without any blot, and he was above the common vices of his class. His mind was deeply impressed with a sense of religion and confidence in God. He said to one of his French advisers: "I rely solely on Providence, expecting that I shall be alone unsupported; but God, and my courage, will accomplish everything."[105] He had a good education, and he was interested in foreign politics, as is clear from his embassies to different countries. It would be unfair to accuse him of systematic cruelty. Major Dirom has remarked that his "cruelties were in general inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies." Tipu has also been charged with religious intolerance, which, it is said, led him to wound the susceptibilities of his non-Muslim subjects, by forcibly converting many of the Hindus and by driving out the Christians. But Tipu's Shringeri Letters conclusively prove that "Tipu knew how to placate Hindu opinion, and religious intolerance was not the real cause of his ruin."[106] Himself a devout Mussalman, Tipu forced conversion only on those "refractory Hindus upon whose unquestioning obedience the Sultan could not count."[107] He made grants in favour of Hindu temples and employed

[104] Malcolm, *Political History of India*, Vol. II, Appendix II, pp. lxi. Cf. Buchanan's Journal: Canara.

[105] Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 152.

[106] Sen, *Studies in Indian History*, p. 169.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 166. *Vide 'New Light on Tipu Sultan'*, in *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, July, 1931.

THE PARTITION OF MYSORE



many Hindu officers. At the same time there must have been some elemnt of Hindu discontent with Tipu's rule; otherwise the victorious allies at the time of partitioning, settling and pacifying the country, would not have at once thought of restoring the Hindu dynasty and recreating a Hindu principality.

After Tipu's fall came the partition and settlement of his dominions. As a sort of diplomatic gesture, the tracts of Harponeli and Soonda lying between the northern part of Kanara and the lands ceded to the Nizam, and certain other districts, were offered to the Peshwa on certain conditions, but he refused to accept these. The Nizam got certain territories on the north-east near his own dominion, that is, the districts of Gooty and Guramkonda and part of the district of Chitaldrug without its fort. The British got Kanara on the west; Wynaad in the south-west; the districts of Coimbatore and Daraporam; two districts on the east, together with the town and island of Seringapatam. The rest of the kingdom of Mysore was restored to a minor prince of the old Hindu dynasty on the express condition "that the whole of the military force maintained for the defence of the country should be English; that for the expense of it he should annually pay seven lacs of pagodas; that in case of war, or of preparation for war, the English might exact any larger sum, which they deemed proportional to the resources of the Raja; and last of all, should they be dissatisfied with his government in any respect, they might interpose to any extent in the internal administration of the country, or even take the unlimited management of it to themselves." The members of Tipu's family were sent to Velore; and for all practical purpose, the young ruler of Mysore became dependent on the Company.

Thus fell one of the leading Indian powers whose "thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power." This was itself a great relief for the English. Moreover, the

territorial gains made by the partition of Mysore were highly valuable. The British territory now extended 'from sea to sea across the base of the Peninsula' and it encircled Mysore on all sides except on the North. When in 1800 the English also got the Nizam's possessions in Mysore, it "was entirely encircled by the Britannica."[108] "As a military, financial, and pacificatory settlement," remarks Dean Hutton, 'the conquest of Mysore was the most brilliant succes of the British power since the days of Clive." Wellesley himself wrote to Lord Grenville eight days after the fall of Seringapatam: "The event is indeed brilliant, glorious and substantially advantageous beyond my most sanguine expectations." He wrote to the Court of Directors on 3rd August, 1799: "Highly as I estimate these immediate and direct advantages of revenue, and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests in its tendency to increase your political consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependents, and of defending your possessions against any enemy, either Asiatic or European." The conquest of Mysore was highly acclaimed in England. The Governor-General was made Marquis Wellesley in the peerage of Ireland, and General Harris was elevated to the baronage.

SECTION IV

The Nizam of Hyderabad

The Nizam was the legal representative in the Deccan of the Delhi Emperor, though he had made himself practically independent of his authority during the first part of the eighteenth century. But the Nizam's authority was gradually 'overshadowed by the Marathas and the state of Mysore, and he

[108] Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 68.

was frequently subjected to attacks and harassments by those powers. His weak position made him an ally of the Company, and, except during their war with Hyder (1780), he remained formally true to this alliance. As provided by the treaty of 1768, the Company demanded the reversion of the district of Guntoor, after the death of Nizam's brother in 1782. This place was of great importance to the Nizam as being his only outlet to the sea; but to the Company also it was of strategic importance, as it separated the British possessions in the North from those in the South, being situated between Madras and the other 'Circars.' The Nizam evaded its surrender by various pretexts, and Cornwallis had to wait till the situation improved by the middle of the year 1788, when Captain Kennaway went to Hyderabad in September and obtained a peaceful surrender of the Guntoor Circar.

The Nizam now sent his confidential minister to Calcutta, with the ostensible object of settling some financial matters, but really to form a profitable defensive alliance with the Company as a sort of compensation for the loss of Guntoor. Soon afterwards the Nizam claimed the help of British troops for the recovery of some of his former districts from Tipu, on the strength of the treaty of Masulipatam of 1768. But Cornwallis found himself in a delicate position because of two subsequent treaties,—one of 1769, by which Hyder's right to those territories of which the treaty of 1768 professed to dispossess him were affirmed, and the other of 1785, by which Tipu's rights to those very territories were acknowledged by the English. There were also before him the injunctions of clause 34 of Pitt's India Act. Cornwallis at last decided to accept the Nizam's request, because he was anxious to secure the Nizam and the Marathas as allies in view of the impending war with Tipu. He took to the expedient of interpreting the Parliamentary Act in the sense that though by that Act he could not conclude new treaties, yet he could explain the treaty of 1768

"with a view to a more perfect execution of it." Accordingly he wrote to the Nizam on 7th July, 1789, giving a convenient interpretation of the treaty of 1768 and expressing his willingness to lend British troops to the Nizam. These troops could not be used against the allies of the English whose names were mentioned in an enclosed list. Tipu's name was deliberately not mentioned, and Cornwallis declared the letter to be as binding "as a treaty in due form could be."

Cornwallis' letter to and engagement with the Nizam has not escaped criticism. "The desire of not offending," says Sir John Malcolm, "against the letter of the Act of Parliament, would appear on this occasion to have led to a trespass on its spirit." In spite of his strong belief in the hostile designs of Tipu and in the wisdom of Cornwallis in general measures, he has further added that "the liberal construction of the restrictions of the Act of Parliament had, upon this occasion, the effect of making the Governor-General pursue a course, which was not only questionable in point of faith; but which must have been more offensive to Tippo Sultan and more calculated to produce a war with that Prince, than an avowed contract of defensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition."[109] It is clear that Cornwallis' action was a violation of the spirit of the Parliamentary Act, and that he was guided solely by considerations of safeguarding British interests in view of a likely rupture with Tipu.[110]

We have already seen how the Nizam joined the triple alliance with the English in 1790, and again how he was worsted by the Marathas at the battle of Khardla in 1795 when Shore refused British help in pursuance of the non-intervention policy. The Nizam resented this indifference of the British, and his relations with them were rather strained when

[109] *Sketch of the Political History of India*, pp. 68—69.

[110] Beveridge, *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 582.

Wellesley came out to India. The Nizam then entrusted the training of his troops to French officers, who were, in the words of Wellesley, "all Frenchmen of the most virulent principles of Jacobinism."

But some favourable factors soon appeared to improve the relations between the English and the Nizam. He was helped by the British during the rebellion of his son Ali Jah in 1797. Further, the Nizam began gradually to suspect the increasing French influence in his court, and the British had a supporter in the Nizam's minister Mir Alam, who urged him to enter into friendship with the English. Thus the Nizam was persuaded to conclude a subsidiary treaty with the English on 1st September, 1798[111] by which the "subsidiary force was made permanent and raised to six battalions costing Rs. 24,17,100 a year; the Nizam's French crops was to be disbanded; the British Government was to arbitrate between the Nizam and the Peshwa or, in the event of the Peshwa not consenting to that arrangement to protect the Nizam from any unjust and unreasonable demands of the Marathas." The Nizam rendered assistance to the English in their war against Tipu, for which he was given certain parts of Mysore territories. A treaty of 'perpetual and general defensive alliance' was then concluded by the British with the Nizam on 12th October, 1800,[112] by which "two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were added to the subsidiary force, and for the payment of the force the Nizam ceded all the territories he had acquired by the Mysore Treaties of 1792 and 1799, yielding about 17,58,000 Pagodas, subject to some exchanges to secure a well defined boundary. The treaty regulated the duties on which the subsidiary force was to be employed, secured the Nizam in the internal sovereignty of his domi-

[111] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 49—54.

[112] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 69—80. Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 171—77.

nions, prohibited his entering into political negotiations with other states, and made the British Government the arbiter in his disputes with other powers."

The submission of the Nizam was of importance to the British and the Nizam was also henceforward safe against his enemies; but his kingdom could not thereby be forthwith saved from the forces of disorder. Internal peace did not come hand in hand with assurances of safety from external dangers. Depending on the subsidiary troops, the government of the Nizam ceased to maintain an efficient military establishment of its own, and thus the forces of disintegration[113] worked without any check. The Duke of Wellington later on remarked: "Conceive of a country, in every village of which there are from twenty to thirty horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no means of living except by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government.....no inhabitant can, or will remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village. This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwa and the Nizam."[114] In the Nizam's state (as in the Peshwa's) the real power was now passing into the hands of the East India Company, and the native government was decaying during the transition period of inefficiency and undefined responsibility.

In 1802 a commercial treaty was concluded between the Nizam and the English for the improvement and security of the Company's trade within his dominions.[115] Nizam Ali died in 1803, and was succeeded by his son Sikandar Jah, who "went through the farce of obtaining the confirmation of Emperor of

[113] Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, XXXIX.

[114] Quoted in Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 83. It is instructive to compare this picture with that of Mysore, as drawn by Moore and Dirom, under the Indian revivalist Tipu.

[115] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 83—86.

Delhi," but confirmed all existing treaties with the English.[116] As has been already noted, the Nizam received at the close of the second Anglo-Maratha conflict, by the partition treaty of Hyderabad, dated 28th April, 1804, the Deccan territories conquered from the Sindhia and the Bhonsle Raja.[117]

In 1808 died the Nizam's minister Mir Alam, a sincere friend of the English, and henceforth there were growing disorders and troubles in his kingdom. There can not be satisfactory conditions in a country of which the ruler loses self-reliance and initiative for progressive actions by learning to depend on others, and where at the same time the protectors cannot, from some reason or other, directly intervene to root out the elements of disorder. In fact the Company was busy during this period with schemes for territorial expansion and political supremacy; the work of reconstruction and reforms, even in the British territories proper, began some years later in the time of Bentinck. Before his departure, Lord Hastings concluded a treaty with the Nizam on 12th December, 1822, "whereby the Nizam received a considerable accession of territory, was released from all arrears of tribute which he owed to the Peshwa, and some exchanges of territory were effected to secure a well-defined frontier."[118]

SECTION V

THE CARNATIC, TANJORE AND SURAT

Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the Carnatic presented a scene of woeful corruptions and the relations of the Company with its Nawab Muhammad Ali were rather complicated. The Nawab left Arcot, and built a palace in the village of Chepauk, a suburb of Madras, where he spent his

[116] *Ibid.*, pp. 86—87.
[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 88—90.
[118] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 91—97.

days in idleness and luxury by borrowing money from the Company's servants at exorbitant interest (sometimes going as high as 36 per cent per annum), and granting them assignments on the revenues of the districts of the Carnatic. The Nawab of Arcot's debt was a heavy drain upon the country and was at the same time responsible for all the administrative scandals, which the corrupt government of the Company in Madras failed to remove.

The scandal became too great to escape the notice of the British Parliament when it proceeded to deal with Indian affairs. Dundas' Bill, Fox's Bill, and Pitt's Bill considered the matter, and the Parliamentary Act of 1784 laid down that the Court of Directors should enquire into the origin of the debts, and should keep a fund for paying off such claims as will be justly due. But the Board of Control itself interfered in the matter, divided the loans into three classes,—the Consolidated Loan of 1767 amounting to £880,000, the Cavalry Loan amounting to £160,000 and the Consolidated Loan of 1777 amounting to £2,400,000 at twelve per cent,—and decided that each class should be separately treated, that "the account of the whole should be made up with interest, and that a portion of the revenues of the Carnatic should be annually set apart for the liquidation."

This was an unsound decision. The Company demonstrated against it and it was denounced in the Parliament. Burke delivered a vigorous speech attacking it in various ways; the speech remained unanswered; but clearly "a serious blow was dealt by the Board of Control at the cause of pure administration in the East."[119] By an arrangement dated 2nd December, 1781, the revenues of the Carnatic had been transferred to British control for five years, the Nawab getting one-sixth for his private expenses.[120] But his creditors clamoured

[119] Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 97.
[120] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 220—21.

for more in response to which the Board of Control "ordered the restitution of the revenues to the Nawab, and the assignment of twelve lakhs of *pagodas*[121] a year for the payment of his debts to the Company and to private creditors."

Cornwallis concluded a treaty with the Nawab of Arcot on 24th February, 1787,[122] by which it was agreed that the Nawab should pay nine lacs "for the military defences in peace besides the twelve lakhs for his debts; that in time of war the contracting parties should each pay four fifths of their revenues, the Nawab being first allowed to deduct the value of certain *jagirs;* and that in case of failure of payment by the Nawab certain districts should be assigned as security." But when war broke out between Tipu and the English, Cornwallis brought the Carnatic under the direct management of the Company. A new treaty was concluded on 12th July, 1792, by which Carnatic was restored to its Nawab but it was stipulated that the Company should maintain a force for the payment of which the Nawab agreed to pay nine lacs of *pagodas* annually; that the Carnatic should be garrisoned by the Company's troops and that the Nawab should "renounce political intercourse with other States and be included in all Treaties relating to the Carnatic."[123]

Muhammad Ali died on 13th October, 1795, and was succeeded by his son Omdut-ul-Omra who could not be persuaded by Lord Hobart, the then Governor of Madras, to change the terms of the treaty by ceding to the Company the territories that had been pledged as security for arrear dues, owing to the influence of his debt-holders, who "perplexed, plagued and intimidated him." It was Wellesley who finally brought the Nawab's administration to an end. "The method

[121] The Pagoda refers to a coin current in Southern India equal to three and a half rupee at the normal rate of exchange.

[122] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 227—34.

[123] Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 236—46.

he employed was unfortunate, and laid him open to the charge of sophistical dealing."[124]

After the capture of Seringapatam the British Government discovered there certain documents which, it is held, proved a reasonable correspondence between Muhammad Ali and his son and the ruler of Mysore. This gave Wellesley the opportunity to declare that the Nawab had broken the treaty obligations and that he had forfeited his throne by his "hostile counsels.....modelled upon the artful example, actuated by the faithless spirit, and sanctioned by the testamentary voice of his father." On the death of Omdut-ul-Omra on 15th July, 1801, Wellesley refused to recognize the claim of his son Ali Husain to the Carnatic. He made an arrangement with Azim-ud-daulah, nephew of the late Nawab, on 31st July, 1801, by which the latter made over the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the English and received a pension of one-fifth of the Carnatic revenues.

The Company's Government at that time justified its behaviour towards the Carnatic Nawab by declaring that "justice and moderation warrant that the family of Omdut-ul-Omra shall be deprived of the means of completing its systematic course of hostility; wisdom and prudence demand that the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omra shall not be permitted to retain the possession of resources dangerous to the tranquillity of the British Government in the Peninsula of India."[125] Wellesley described it to have been "perhaps the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the *dewanny* of Bengal." Wellesley's action received the sanction of the authorities in England. But it should be noted that the documents in question did not prove any charge of treason against the Nawab of the Carnatic. It is true that the corrupted state of affairs in the Carnatic made some sort

[124] Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 102.
[125] Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 187.

of settlement highly necessary, but one can very well question if a more plain course could not have been adopted by the Governor-General.

At this time the rulers of Tanjore and Surat had also to give up their kingdom to the Company in return for titles and pensions. After the death of Tulaji, the Raja of Tanjore, two candidates came forward for his throne,—one his half brother Amar Singh and the other his adopted son Serfoji. The former was a man of violent and unbalanced character but the latter had many good traits in his character. With the opinion of the Pandits of Tanjore in his favour, Amar Singh got the throne. But his rule proved injurious, and so Cornwallis referred the case to the scholars of Banaras and Calcutta, who decided in favour of Serfoji. The Court of Directors expressed their willingness to recognise him, and he concluded a treaty with Wellesley on 25th October, 1799, by which he gave up to the Company the whole civil and military administration, in return for a pension of £40,000 a year.

In Surat, the Company had undertaken its defence on behalf of the Emperor since 1759, while the civil administration remained in the hands of its Nawab. But the English soon saw that the revenues of Surat did not prove sufficient to meet the expenses of its defence. In 1790 the old Nawab of Surat died and his son ascended the *masnad*. Since the days of Cornwallis, the Bombay Council had been thinking of putting an end to this state of things, but Cornwallis did not like to interfere. The Company's authorities, however, became gradually impatient, and in 1797 the Nawab was asked to disband a great part of his own undisciplined troops and to assign funds for the maintenance of British battalions. After some negotiation, the Nawab agreed to make several concessions, but the died on 8th January, 1799, before the treaty was concluded. His only son, an infant, dying within a few weeks, his brother justly claimed the throne, but the Company im-

posed on him the conditions that a judicature should be established at Surat and that the Company should receive sufficient money for the garrison. The claimant to the throne agreed to pay a lac of rupees annually and justly expressed his inability to pay anything more. But Wellesley, guided solely by the Company's interests, ordered on 10th March, 1800, that the Nawab should be immediately displaced and the government should be taken over by the English. It is clear that Wellesley's treatment of the Surat Nawab was high-handed. Mill has described it as "the most unceremonious act of dethronement, which the English had yet performed, as the victim was the weakest and most obscure."[126] Beveridge had no hesitation in saying "that the whole proceeding was characterised by tyranny and injustice."[127]

SECTION VI

The Fate of Oudh

As we have already said, Oudh was a scene of corruptions and administrative abuses more flagrant than those prevailing in the Carnatic. Sir John Macpherson's government, which was described by Cornwallis "as a system of the dirtiest jobbing" did nothing to remove these. But the buffer state of Oudh had a strategic importance for the Company, whose interests demanded that it should be made a strong barrier of defence on the north-western boundary of Bengal. Oudh did not escape the attention of Cornwallis. He had a conference with Hyder Beg, minister of the Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah, who urgently entreated him for the withdrawal of a great part of the Company's troops stationed within the Nawab's dominions. Cornwallis agreed to reduce the tribute paid by the Nawab from 74 to 50 lacs, if this should be punctually paid, but he refused to withdraw the Company's battalions.

[126] Mill, Vol. VI, p. 296.

[127] *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 717.

With the death of Hyder Beg in 1794 all chances of reform disappeared. After the death of Asaf-ud-daulah in 1797, Sir John Shore intervened in the matter of a disputed succession between Wazir Ali, whom Asaf-ud-daulah had treated as his son and successor and the dead Nawab's eldest brother Saadat Ali. The latter was raised to the throne by Shore on 21st January, 1798, and a treaty was concluded with him by which "it was finally settled that the annual subsidy should be raised to seventy-six lacs of rupees, and the fort of Allahabad should be made over to the English.....The Nawab further agreed to pay twelve lacs of rupees to the English, as compensation money, for the expense of placing him, on the *musnud;* and not, without their consent, to hold communication with any foreign state, to employ the Europeans in his service, or to permit any to settle in his dominions. Finally he agreed to allow a lac and a half of rupees as an annual pension to the deposed Wazir Ali, who was removed to Benaras; and to afford a suitable maintenance to the rest of the reputed children of his brother the deceased Nabob." The authorities in England congratulated Shore for this settlement with the Nawab of Oudh, but it could not reform the corrupt government or remove the sufferings of the toiling peasantry of the realm. The administration remained a "by-word for inefficiency, corruption and oppression."

Thus, devoid of cohesion and torn by internal corruptions, Oudh fell a victim to Wellesley's imperialism. Soon after his arrival in India, Wellesley wrote to the Resident at Oudh on 23rd October, 1798, expressing therein his strong determination to bring Oudh under effective control of the Company. But before it could be carried into effect, Wazir Ali, who was residing near Banaras, murdered Cherry, the British Resident; there he was pursued and captured by a British force and was sent to Fort William, where he lived in confinement till 1817.

Wellesley could not charge the Nawab of Oudh with

treason or insubordination, as he had done in the case of the Carnatic. The Oudh rulers were faithful to the Company, and the instalments of the subsidy had been regularly paid. But the threat of Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan, gave Wellesley a convenient pretext for demading from the Nawab of Oudh that he should disband his own army, retaining only as many troops as might be necessary for the collection of taxes and other administrative affairs of the kingdom, and that the Company's forces be considerably augmented.

The Nawab resisted, but pressed by the Company's Resident, Mr. Scott, he expressed his intention to abdicate on 12th November, 1798. Whatever might have been the motives of the Nawab in this proposal for abdication, Wellesley informed the Court of Directors: "it is my intention to profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent; and I entertain a confident hope of being able either to establish, with the consent of the Vizier, the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oude and its dependencies, or at least to place our interests in that quarter on an improved and durable foundation." But Wellesley's attempt to provide against future embarrassments, by eliminating the Nawab's sons from the succession to the *masnad* of Oudh, led him to withdraw his abdication. Wellesley professed himself "extremely disgusted" at this, and gave "stern warning" to the Nawab. The Nawab put forward some reasonable objections by appealing to the former treaties; but these were arbitrarily rejected by Wellesley, and the Nawab was coerced to yield to his demands. This was not all. Wellesley further forced the Nawab to conclude a treaty on 10th November, 1801, by which the latter had to cede to the English half of his dominions comprising Rohilkhand and the Lower Doab, that is, the land lying between the Ganges and the Jumna. Thus Oudh, for all the practical purposes, came under British control. The Company secured immense ad-

vantages from the treaty. Owen writes: "The rectification of our military frontier, and the territorial isolation of the Nabob, were not only parts of a larger scheme, but in themselves measures of obvious importance, especially at such a crisis."[128]

But Wellesley's dealings with the Nawab-Wazir were exceedingly high-handed. Sir Alfred Lyall, a favourable critic of Wellesley, remarks that, in the case of Oudh, Wellesley "subordinated the feelings and interests of his ally to paramount considrations of British policy, in a manner that showed very little patience, forbearance, or generosity."[129] His action was criticised by the Court of Directors also. Imperial aggrandisement was key to his whole policy. It should also be noted that Oudh did not enjoy all the fruits of good and civilised government, as Wellesley professed to introdude there by supplanting the native administration. The subsidiary system rather produced harmful consequences.

SECTION VII

Last Days of Emperor Shah Alam II and the British Capture of Delhi

Shah Alam II's character was at first "one of promise. Given proper instruments and favourable circumstances he might have succeeded in restoring the Delhi monarchy. But it was the tragedy of his life that he was called upon to set right a world that was out of joint morally even more than politically. Nowhere could he find a single faithful friend or able lieutenant....."[130] Shah Alam's career is indeed a tragic one. We have already seen how he had to make over the Diwani of the Bengal Subah to the Company, and how in the time of Hastings his pension was

[128] *Wellesley Despatches*, XVIII.
[129] *British Dominion in India*, p. 246.
[130] Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 527.

stopped for his friendship with the Marathas. His last days were very bitter. Deprived of all power, he was living at Delhi as the titular head over the corpse of the once great Mughal Empire, amidst the ruins of its ancient grandeur. Though the independent provincial rulers, like the Nawabs of Oudh and Bengal and the Nizam of Hyderabad, maintained till the last moment a show of obedience to his sovereignty, by obtaining formal confirmations in their offices and grants of title, by striking coins in his name, and by reading in his name the formal prayers in the mosques, yet it was pathetic that, for all practical purposes, "in strong contrast to the observance of these forms, none thought of obeying his orders, of remitting to him the surplus revenues of the provinces, of mustering troops for his support."

On the April, 1782, died Najaf Khan, who had served the Emperor with ability from 1765, and who had "the character of an able statesman, a skilful commander, and a humane and benevolent man."[132] His death was universally mourned at the Delhi Court. With him "departed the last hope of the Mughals in India" and after his death the turbulent spirit of the other nobles broke forth with ungovernable fury into scenes of violence, anarchy and confusion,—in the midst of which the unhappy Emperor, "in the evening of life, had the mortification to perceive his authority totally annihilated, and himself became a wretched pageant in the hands of his rebellious subjects."[133]

The Supreme Council in Calcutta did nothing to help the Emperor at this crisis, and when his eldest son and heir-apparent repaired to Oudh,—as Hastings was then at Lucknow in 1784,—to solicit the help of the Governor-General and the

[131] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 602.
[132] Francklin, *Shah Alum*, p. 97.
[133] Sarkar, *Fall*, Vol. III, p. 227.
[134] Francklin, op. cit., p. 98.

Nawab-Wazir, in delivering his father from the oppression of the nobles, he got simply an advice to approach Madhaji Sindhia for it. Thus the refusal of the English to help the unfortunate Emperor, threw him into the hands of the Maratha dictator, who, as we have already seen, soon made the Emperor a puppet in his hands. Shah Alam had sought a protector but got a master.

So tortuous was the course of politics in India at that time that the English, who only a few years back, had accused the Emperor for his friendship with the Marathas, now in a way pushed him into their hands. We need not enter into any criticism on Hastings' conduct, on which opinions have differed; but this much is certain that this was a case of betrayal, whoever might be responsible for it, the Council in Calcutta or Hastings.[135]

Madhaji Sindhia's control could not save the Emperor from further ignominies and troubles. The other engagements of the Sindhia gave opportunity to a young Rohilla chief, Ghulam Qadir, to take possession of Delhi in July, 1788. He blinded the Emperor, removed him from the throne and inflicted on his family unspeakable dishonour and barbarous cruelty. There was "a dance of demons for nine weeks" (18th July to 2nd October).[136] The Emperor, however "evinced, under such accumulated misfortunes, a firmness of mind and resignation highly honourable to his character.....surviving the loss of his sight during his confinement, solaced himself in contemplative reveries, and in composing elegiac verses, descriptive of his deplorable state."[137] But Madhaji Sindhia soon recovered Delhi in 1789, and after taking revenge upon the Rohilla Chief, who was done to death, reseated the blind Emperor on the throne.

[135] For arguments, *vide* Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 16—21.
[136] Sarkar, *Fall*, Vol. III, p. 442.
[137] Francklin, *op. cit.*, p. 77 and also *Appendix* No. 4.

It was natural that at this time the English were gradually becoming more and more anxiuos to establish their own sovereignty and could see no political reasons "to employ their resources in restoring a vanished empire."[138] Falling into the hands of Ghulam Qadir, Shah Alam had appealed to Cornwallis for help, but to no effect. "I have received several melancholy (letters) from the king," Cornwallis wrote to Shore, "calling on me in the most pressing terms for assistance and support. This morning I wrote him a letter perfectly civil and respectful, but without all that jargon of allegiance and obedience, in which I state most explicitly the impossibility of our interference."[139] Such declarations of the Company's independence from any obligations to Shah Alam (who on his part naturally did not expect these) were made by Cornwallis in 1790, 1792 and 1793; a quarter century had passed since the grant of the Diwani.

Shore's government saw no change in the Company's position but a gigantic transformation took place under Wellesley. The latter realised the importance of getting possession of the Emperor's person against French intrigues : a French document had fallen into his hands stating that Shah Alam "ought to be the undisputed sovereign of the Moghul Empire.....The English Company by its ignominious treatment of the Great Mogul, has forfeited its rights as *dewan* and treasurer of the Empire.....thus the Emperor of Delhi has a real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever he may please to select, the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as the arrears due to him from the English."[140] After Lake's victories before Delhi in 1803, the capital and person of the Emperor, "reckoned among the most precious spoils of victory," passed into English hands. The Company's government in Calcutta inti-

[138] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 603.
[139] *Ibid.*
[140] Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 604.

mated to Shah Alam that it did not want to "interdict or oppose any of those outward forms of sovereignty to which his Majesty has been accustomed. His Excellency is desirous of leaving his Majesty in the unmolested exercise of all his usual privileges and prerogatives."[141] But it is clear that Shah Alam's sovereignty passed in every sense to the Company, and he remained practically a captive in his own capital till his death in 1806. Lord Hastings finally extinguished the fiction of the Mughal Raj.

SECTION VIII

THE HIMALAYAN FRONTIER: THE GURKHAS

It was in the time of Lord Hastings that Nepal, lying amidst the southern slopes of the Himalayan ranges, came under British influence.

The dynasty of the Mallas, founded at the commencement of the thirteenth century, continued to rule in the Valley till the time of Yakshamalla (1428—1476), who was the greatest of the Malla kings of Nepal. But he took the unwise step of dividing his kingdom between three sons and a daughter, which weakened Nepal and paved the way for its conquest by the Gurkhas of the Western Himalayas. In course of several generations the four branches re-formed into two branches, of Katmandu and Bhatgaon, which went on fighting against each other. During these internecine struggles Ranjit Malla of Bhatgaon (1722—54) invited the Gurkha chief Pirthvi Narayan to hlep him, and this led to the Gurkha conquest of 1768. The local Rajas whom these sturdy mountaineers displaced, were, in the words of Prinsep, "mere ignorant, selfish tyrants, on bad terms with their subjects and neighbours, but most of all with their own relations.....there was amongst them no principle of combination for mutual defence against

[141] *Ibid.*, p. 605.

a common enemy, not one of the petty principalities was sufficiently strong or united within itself to be capable of substantial resistance."[142]

Nawab Mir Casim of Bengal had sent an expedition to Nepal in 1762, but his army sustained a defeat under the walls of Makwanpur. An expedition sent, a few years later, by Mr. Golding, the English Commercial Resident of Betiah, against the Gurkhas also failed.

After the Gurkha conqueror Prithvi Narayan's death in 1771 and his son's in 1775, his infant grandson Ran Bahadur came to throne, remaining for some time under the regency of the queen mother, and subsequently of his uncle Bahadur Shah, till he himself came of age and began personally to conduct the affairs of the state in 1795. In 1792 the Gurkhas had concluded a commercial treaty with the English, and Colonel Kirpatrick was sent on a mission to Katmandu, but the mission failed to achieve any favourable result. Ran Bahadur's excessive tyranny and madness led to a conspiracy against him organised by Damodar Pande, the head of the Pande family famous in Nepalese history, and he was expelled and took refuge at Benaras in 1800. The Company's Government in Bengal made another commercial treaty with the ruling faction in Nepal, and sent Captain Knox there as Resident in 1802; but this mission also failed to gain the desired objects, whereupon Captain Knox was recalled in 1804, and Lord Wellesley declared the alliance with Nepal to have been dissolved.

Ran Bahadur again appeared in Nepal soon after Knox's recall and was received back as King, but was soon assassinated by his half-brother in 1805. Except an infant son of Ran

[142] *Political and Military Transactions in India*, p. 55. Mr. Wheeler (*A Short History of India*, 1880, p. 463) has opined that "the Gorkha conquest may have been a later wave of the great Brahmanical revival, which convulsed India in mediaeval times, and drove Buddhism out of Hindustan." This view seems to be correct, as Brahmanical revivals have very often taken the support of fresh foreign or semi-foreign ruling families.

Bahadur, the "royal family was nearly extinguished," and real power now passed into the hands of Bhim Sein Thapa (leader of the faction opposed to that of Damodar Pande).

When Lord Hastings took charge of his office in India, the dominion of the Gurkhas extended as far as river Tista to the east and the Sutlej to the west; "so that this nation was then in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindustan."[143] Since the occupation of the Gorakhpur district by the Company in 1801, the northern frontier of the British dominion came into contact with the Gurkha territories in the Tarai and the Gurkhas made frequent inroads into the border districts. The remonstrances of Sir George Barlow had no effect, and in the time of Lord Minto, the Gurkhas conquered two districts—Butwal lying north of the modern Basti district, and Sheoraj further to the east. These districts were re-occupied by the English without any open conflict.

The undefined frontiers and the rival claims of the English and the Gurkhas on the border districts made a collision between them inevitable. It came at last in the time of Lord Hastings (October, 1814), the immediate occasion being supplied by Gurkha attack on three police stations in Butwal in May, 1814. Lord Hastings "resolved to act offensively against the enemy" along the whole line of frontier from the Sutlej to the Kosi and himself planned the campaign. The main body of the Gurkha army was then engaged in an expedition on the Sutlej. Lord Hastings decided that Colonel Ochterlony from Ludhiana should operate in the hilly country near the Sutlej, that Major-General Gillespie from Meerut should help Colonel Ochterlony to fall upon Amar Singh Thapa, who was commanding the main Gurkha army, and that Major-General Marley and John Sullivan Wood should

[143] Prinsep, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 55.

advance towards the Gurkha capital from Patna and Gorakhpur respectively. Beyond the Kosi eastward, Major Latter was charged with the defence of the Purnea frontier. The English authorities also tried to engage on their side "the expelled chiefs of the ancient hill principlities reduced by the Gurkhas" and made an unsuccessful attempt to shake the allegiance of the Nepalese officers like Amar Singh Thapa and Bum Shah.

Lord Hastings had expected a quick success. But the geographical difficulties of the campaign, the bravery of the hardy Nepalese and their harassing mode of warfare contributed to the failure of the British operations of 1814. Marley and Wood retired after some feeble attempts; Gillespie, the hero of Velor, died for his 'indiscret daring' in trying to assault the mountain fortress of Kalanga, and his successor Major-General Martindell, met with a defeat before the stronghold of Jaitak. The defeat of arms meant also a loss of British prestige. But undaunted by these reverses, the English renewed their attempts. Colonel Nichollos and Gardner occupied Almora in Kumaon in April 1815, and General Ochterlony, after some successful manoeuvres, compelled the Gurkha leader Amar Singh to surrender the fort of Malaon on 15th May, 1815. Many of the Gurkha soldiers were now induced to take service with the British and they were formed into three battalions at the suggestion of General Ochterlony. Like other inland mountaineers races (e.g., the Swiss in Europe, the Turks, etc., in Central Asia) the Gurkhas were by nature inclined to mercenary military service, fighting for any side to get a good living; hence it is not surprising to find them being recruited at this stage for the British army. Thus "the campaign, which in January promised nothing but disaster, finished in May by leaving in the possession of the British the whole tract of hills from the Gogra to the Sutlej."[144]

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

The fall of Malon led the Gurkhas to open negotiations for peace. Lord Hastings at first made exorbitant demands. After some time he reduced these, and a treaty was signed at Sagauli, on 28th November, 1815.

But owing to the ascendancy of the war party in Nepal the Gurkha government refused to ratify the treaty and hostilities were resumed. Their activities were however checked by Ochterlony, who advanced into the heart of Nepal, inflicted a defeat on the Gurkhas at Makwanpur on 28th February, 1816, and thus compelled them to ratify the treaty early in March.[145] By this treaty the Nepalese government ceded to the British the districts of Garhwal and Kumaon with the great portion of the Tarai, agreed to receive a British Resident at Katmandu, and permanently withdrew from Sikkim. The Tarai boundary was defined by pillars of masonry.

Though the policy of Lord Hastings was subjected to some adverse criticism, there is no doubt that the English secured some important advantages from this treaty. The north-west frontier of their possessions was extended up to the mountains; they got the sites for the principal hill stations and local or central summer capitals of India,—like Simla, Mussoorie, Almora, Ranikhet, Landour and Naini Tal,—and facilities were obtained for communications with the remoter regions of Central Asia. The kingdom of Nepal remained all along in peace and alliance with the British Government. By a treaty with the Raja of Sikkim, dated 10th February, 1817, a considerable tract of mountainous country ceded by the Nepalese, and lying to the eastward of the Mechi river and to the westward of the Tista river, was made over to him and this created an effective barrier on the eastern frontier of Nepal.

[145] *Ibid.*, Appendix C.

SECTION IX

PACIFICATION OF CENTRAL INDIA: PINDARIS, PATHANS, AND OTHER MINOR STATES

The Pindaris were a horde of cruel marauders, with their headquarters in Central India who disturbed the peace of India by their predatory habits and plundering activities. Pindaris were heard of as early as 1689 during the Mughal-Maratha wars in the South. In fact it was the total failure of the Mughal policing in the provinces and the repeated example of reckless plundering raids of the Marathas, that taught a large number of people, for whom other occupations were gone, to lead a life of organised robbery.[146] Mr. Malcolm writes that "the Pindaris, who had risen, like masses of putrefaction in animal matter, out of the corruption of weak and expiring states, had, fortunately, none of those bonds of union which unite men in adversity. They had neither the tie of religion nor of national feelings."[147] From obscure freebooters they were utilised as auxiliaries by the different Maratha states, their great patrons being the Holkars and the Sindhias.

The Pindaris were all mounted on horses; their favourite weapons were bamboo spears from twelve to eighteen feet long; and some of them also used fire-arms. The extension of their depredations and ravages and their successes drew numerous vagabonds into their ranks and added to their numbers and strength. Their only object was plunder, and they always avoided pitched battles with regular armies.[148] "The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secrecy.

[146] The growth of widespread organised robbery in Bengal in the latter half of the eighteenth century is a close parallel both in features as well as in originating circumstances.

[147] *Memoirs of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 431; Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 417.

[148] "They avoid fighting," said Captain Sydenham in a Memorandum on the Pindaris drawn up in 1809, "for they come to plunder, not to fight."

It was scarcely possible to gain information of their movements till they had completed."[149] They perpetrated horrible cruelties on the innocent people and ran away with their property and effects. In short they were terrible pests of the society, and were destroyers of public peace and political order. Their existence and activities were bound to collide with the interests of a power which wanted to consolidate its authority in India, and thus the attention of the English fell upon them after they had subdued the decaying Indian powers.

Under their prominent leaders Hiru, Buran (1794—1800), Chittu, Wasil Muhammad and Karim Khan, the Pindaris gradually extended their raids far and wide. In 1808—09 they entered Gujarat, and again in 1812 they devastated the British districts of Mirzapur and Shahabad. During 1815—16 they ravaged the Nizam's dominions, and early in the latter year they cruelly plundered the Northern Sarkars. This strengthened Lord Hastings' determination to exirpate the evil and he received the sanction of the Court of Directors for it. But before resorting to direct offensive operations against them, Lord Hastings diplomatically improved the position of the British with regard to the other powers like the Marathas, the Rajputs and the state of Bhopal, the Muhammadan ruler of which signed a treaty of faithful alliance.

Towards the close of 1817 operations for the final extermination of the Pindaris commenced. The Governor-General's plan was that "the Pindaris were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Malwa somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbada, and between Bhopal and the dominions of Sindhia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarat—and to keep the native states in check." He collected

[149] Quoted in Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 404.

an army of 113,000 men and 300 guns; the Northern force of four divisions was commanded by himself and the Deccan force of five divisions was under Sir Thomas Hislop. With these vigorous preparations, the English were successful, by the end of 1817, in driving the Pindaris across the Chambal, and by the close of January, 1818 their organised bands were destroyed. Karim Khan surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on 18th February, 1818, and he received the estate of Gawashpur, then in the Gorakhpur District. Wasil Muhammad, who had taken refuge in the Sindhia's samp at Gwalior, was delivered by that prince to the English, and he committed suicide during his captivity at Ghazipur. Many of their followers surrendered themselves to Zalim Singh of Kotah. Chitu was hunted out from place to place till he was devoured by a tiger in the jungles near the fortress of Asirgarh. Thus Malcolm could write only after about five years, "the Pindaris are so effectually destroyed, that their name is almost forgotten." Duff also says about the same time that they "mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindharees still retain their name, though some of them have become active improving farmers."

The Pathans were also a predatory horde, who rose into power under their leaders Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan. Though actuated by the same spirit as the Pindaris, they commanded, we know from Prinsep, "forces of a different description from those of the Pindari chiefs.....Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Pathans were banded together for the purpose of preying on government and powerful chiefs: to this end their force moved about with the materials of regular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army could only impress: while the object of the Pindaris was universal plunder." Rajputana was greatly subject to depredations of the Pathans. In 1809 the Raja of Jodhpur took

Muhammad Shah Khan's army into pay for repelling an attack of the Sindhia. They often found opportunities to interfere in the "passing intrigues among the Rajputs themselves and to become partisans of the several factions, from each of which they took care to reap some personal advantage." Thus Amir Khan helped Jagat Singh of Jaipur in his contest against the Raja of Jodhpur for the hand of Krishna Kumari. About the year 1799 Amir Khan had joined Jaswant Rao Holkar and became associated with the activities of the Holkar government. After Jaswant Rao's death and during the regency of Tulsi Bai, he exercised real power in the Holkar state through his brother-in-law Ghafur Khan.

After the death of Muhammad Shah Khan in 1814, his troops passed over to Amir Khan and swelled the number of his armies, who "ranged over every part of Rajpootna that presented the slightest hopes of plunder." His movements and activities could by no means be compatible with the consolidation of British power, and the English therefore decided "to waken a little the hopes of Amir Khan with a view to detach him from the rest of the predatory bands." Negotiations were opened with him by the British Resident at Delhi, Sir Charles Metcalfe. The shrewed Pathan leader, after some hesitation, agreed to his proposals and concluded a treaty on 9th November, 1817, by which he agreed to disband his forces, his right to all territories he held from the Holkar state was confirmed, and he was recognised as the Nawab of Tonk. Thus a plundering and powerful Pathan leader, who might have been hostile to the British, was made a peaceful ally and a counterpoise against Holkar. After the treaty of Mandasore, 6th January, 1818, the Holkar also recognised his independence.

British supremacy was established and became effective also in other states besides those already enumerated. The Nawab of Bhopal finding his position insecure in the midst of conflicting forces in Central India, entered into a treaty of

"defensive and subordinate alliance" with the British on 27th February, 1818. Its wise and energetic ruler Nazar Muhammad maintained friendly relations with the English, and their influence over that state increased so much that, after Nazar Muhammad's death by an accidental pistol shot on 11th November, 1819, the question of succession was decided by the British, who placed Munir Muhammad, the dead chief's nephew, on the throne of Bhopal. British supremacy was also acknowledged by the smaller states of Malwa; the Raja of Dhar, and the *joint* Rajas of Dewas (Tukaji and Anand Rao) entered into treaties of subordinate alliance with the British Government. In 1818 a new principality was created in Malwa by the British by confirming Ghafur Khan, Amir Khan's brother-in-law, in the possession of his *jagir* which he held of the Holkar state. Ghafur Khan's independence also (like that of Amir Khan) was recognised by the Holkar's government, and he was thus made the first Nawab of Jaora. Besides these, Malcolm, who was engaged in the settlement of Malwa for four years after the close of the campaigns of 1817-18, "defined the position, powers and claims of a large number of minor chieftains and sirdars." Bundelkhand had also to accept British paramountcy. By three treaties (the first dated 5th October, 1812, the second dated 25th June, 1813, and the third dated 11th March, 1814) the state of Rewa, ruled by the Baghela Rajputs, came under British protection. The Raja of Orcha entered into an alliance with the English by a treaty, dated 23rd December, 1812, on terms similar to those of the treaty with the state of Rewa; the chiefs of Datia and Samthar, and the 'Subadar' of Jhansi also came under British protection. All the sovereign rights of the Peshwa in Bundelkhand passed to the English after the former's defeat in 1818. The state of Kutch, ruled by the Jareja Rajputs and lying in disorder for several years, was brought in this period under the sway of the East India Company.

Thus the Indian powers, who had struggled so long for political supremacy on the ruins of the Mughal Empire, fell before the pressure of British arms and diplomacy; all the principal Indian states now acknowledged the British sway and by a series of political and military transactions effective supremacy of the British became fully established from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Brahmputra to the Sutlej, across which the rising Sikh power stood in friendship and alliance. Lord Hastings completed the work which Clive had begun and Wellesley had pushed forward. British sovereignty over India became an accomplished fact in his time. Prinsep hoped at that time: "The struggle which has thus ended in the universal establishment of British influence, is particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the last we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India." As subsequent events will show, this last struggle was yet to come.

Lord Hastings left India on 1st January, 1823. George Canning, appointed Governor-General of India, could not come over, as he had to accept the office of Foreign Secretary owing to the suicide of Lord Castlereagh. Lord Amherst was then appointed Governor-General, but during the interval before his arrival in August, 1823, John Adam, senior member of the Council held the reins of government.

SECTION X

THE MOVEMENT OF 1857—59: A CRUCIAL TEST OF THE NEW BRITISH SUPREMACY

The Movement of 1857-59 during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Canning (1856—62) was indeed the most appalling ordeal to which the growing British Empire in India was subjected. Though the movement began as a military rising, its

causes were deeply rooted in the changing conditions of the times. It drew its strength from several elements of discontent against British rule, all of which were focussed into one lens and produced the fierce flare of 1857. The causes of this outbreak may be conveniently studied under several heads,—political, social and religious, and military.

With regard to the first group of causes it may be said that Dalhousie's policy of annexations, the doctrine of escheat or lapse, and his idea of removing the descendants of the Mughal Emperor from their ancestral palace to the Kutb (near Delhi), created alarm and discontent in the minds of the Indian princes. The fate of the Mughal Emperor and the annexation of Oudh irritated Muslim sentiment, while Dalhousie's refusal of pension to Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the ex-Peshwa Baji Rao II, was resented by the Hindus. So far as the "Mughal Empire" was concerned, the British in their race for dominion in India had nearly all along to deal only with its shadow, the substance having disappeared early in the eighteenth century if not earlier; but the case was otherwise with the revived Maratha power of the eighteenth century, for with it the British had, not very long ago, a serious and prolonged contest for political supremacy in India. The successors to the names of the ancient ruling families of both the communities harboured feelings of discontent against the alien British rule. The Marathas naturally "felt that they had been beaten in their bid for Empire "while the Muslims were moved by the dreams of their once great dominion in India and some among them, notably the Wahabis, by thoughts of the long past world-supremacy of Islam.

Secondly, the growing strength of the British Indian administration along with the expansion of the limits of the British Empire in India and the settlement of the acquired territories created social and economic grievances among the members of Indian aristocracy, old jagirdars, zamindars or

talukdars. Measures like Bentinck's resumption of rent-free tenures reduced many of them to poverty by depriving them of their estates, at the same time that the new administration rapidly narrowed down the "field in which men of Indian race could display their political and administrative talents." During the five years preceding the Movement the Imam Commission at Bombay enquired into a large number of titles to lands and confiscated about 20,000 estates. In Oudh especially, grievances became very acute. "The annexation of Oudh," writes Malleson, "converted a country, the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial, into a hotbed of discontent and of intrigue."[150] Sir James Outram, who had been smoothly effecting the settlement of Oudh by paying regard to the "fixed ideas and prejudices of the native mind, however little they might be consonant with the abstract political theories of the West,"[151] was compelled for reasons of health to leave Oudh in April 1856, and to the Chief Commissionership of Oudh, Lord Canning appointed Coverly Jackson, a man of unsympathetic and over-bearing disposition. Oudh was soon in a ferment, but the discontent was allayed to a great extent by the recall of Jackson and the reappointment of Sir Henry Lawrence. A great majority of the Oudh Talukdars therefore did not join the revolt until Havelock's retreat from Lucknow (after his first advance) encouraged them.

In the wake of British political supremacy, spread far and wide the new Western civilization of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While the ruling and aristocratic classes were getting discontented because of annexations and the growth of a powerful British official class at their cost, the masses were perturbed by the rapid spread of an alien civilization, which they apprehended, would destroy the sanctity of

[150] Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny of* 1857, Vol. I, p. 349.
[151] Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 304.

ancient customs and the purity of Indian religions, and the Muslim antipathy to Christians supported this attitude of the Hindus. The introduction of railways, the construction of a telegraph system connecting Calcutta with Peshawar and Bombay with Madras, the rapid expansion of European education and abolition of practices like *Sati* and infanticide, the legalisation of widow remarriage, the recognition of the claims of persons forsaking their religion to inherit the family property, and the recently manifested aggressive spirit of the Christian missionaries—all were suspected by the more conservative elements of Indian society, from whose ranks the high-caste 'Bengal' sepoys were mainly drawn, as attempts to westernise India and convert her people to Christianity.

All these created an atmosphere favouarble for a revolt, but the effective combination of all elements of discontent against the British was not possible so long as the Sepoy Army, which had so far helped them immediately in building up their Empire, remained in their hands and loyal to them. Thus, as Innes has remarked, "in the control of the Sepoy Army lay the crux of the position." Colonel Sleeman had indeed made a prophetic statement in 1853: "The native states I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not always be sufficiently under control." But for several reason, the Sepoy Army instead of being a pillar of strong support became now a source of danger to the British Raj. Campaigns in lands outside the limits of their country had sorely tried the loyalty of the sepoys; some of their regiments had already mutinied four times during the thirteen years preceding the great outburst of 1857, owing to the failure of the Company to satisfy their claims for extra allowances, the 34th N. I. in 1844, the 22nd N. I. in 1849, the 66th N. I. 1850, and the 38th N. I. in 1852. Since the days of the disenchanting Afghan War, the moral of the army, especially of the Bengal Division, had

deteriorated and discipline had become lax. The Company itself was largely responsible for this. Many able British officers were transferred from regimental duties to political employments, and both British and Indian officers were promoted by seniority alone though they had become useless (thus General Godwin commanded in the Second Burmese War at the age of seventy). The so-called "Bengal" Army was recruited for the most part from high-caste communities of Oudh and the North-West Provinces, and being very particular about their caste-prejudices and customs, were not easily amenable to the levelling army discipline of the West. There had also grown up a glaring disproportion (one to six) between the numbers of the British soldiers in India and native troops in India. When Dalhousie left India, the latter amounted to about 233,000 while the former numbered only 45,322. The troops were also not properly distributed. Strategical points like Delhi and Allahabad were left in sepoy hands; with the exception of one regiment at Dinapore, no British troops were stationed in any place between Allahabad and Calcutta. At this time again England was engaged in several wars outside India, the Crimean War ending in March, 1856 (which clouded the prestige of British efficiency as much as the Afghan War), the Persian War and the Chinese War.

An unsuitable measure intensified the prevalent discontent. Under the pressure of the activities in the new overseas acquisitions in Burma, Lord Canning issued the General Service Enlistment Act by which all recruits to the Bengal Army were henceforward to be ready for service everywhere, whether within or outside India. This affected the scruples of the Indian sepoys about crossing the sea; it was soon brought in their minds "under the category of the insidious measures aimed at caste; another of the items accumulating to form an avalanche."

Meanwhile, the gospel of revolt was being secretly preached among the army by Nana Sahib, by the Begum of Oudh and

some of the Oudh chiefs, by Lakshmi Bai, the Rani of Jhansi, and by some zamindars like Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur near Arrah. Other leaders appeared as the movement expanded.

Lastly, the introduction of the Enfield rifle, the cartridges for which were greased with animal fats equally abhorrent to orthodox Hindus and Muslims, kindled the flame the faggots for which had already been piled. This was certainly a blunder. The story of the greased cartridge spread rapidly from one end of the country to another, and the alarm of the sepoys, who were required by a regulation of 1857 to bite the ends of these cartridges in using them, was not unfounded; the objectionable animal fats had actually been used in some of the ammunition factories. "On this inflammable material," remarks Aitchison, "the true story of the catridges fell as a spark on a dry tinder." All precautions, assurances and explanations of the officers of the Government proved fruitless, and the storm brust all over the country from the Sutlej to the Narmada.

The first symptoms of unrest appeared at Barrackpore and Berhampore in Bengal early in 1857. On the 29th March the adjutant of the 34th N. I. at Barrackpore was murdered by a Brahman sepoy named Mangal Pande, none of the sepoys except a Muhammadan named Shaikh Paltu coming to the rescue. This mutiny was suppressed by the prompt intervention of General Hearvey. Next day the 19th Regiment was disbanded but a deferential treatment was meted out to the 34th regiment whose offences had been more grievous. Though Mangal Pande was executed after ten days, others who had belaboured their officers were not punished for five weeks. Cases of incendiarism soon occurred at Ambala; at Meerut troopers of the third cavalry refused to use the catridges supplied to them; and on the 3rd May at Lucknow, the 7th Oudh infantry broke into open revolt. The Lucknow rising was soon quelled; the Meerut insurgents were court-martialled and

sentenced to long-term imprisonments, their punishment being proclaimed on Saturday the 9th May in a special parade. But on the next day the rising took a serious turn with a fierce outbreak at Meerut, where the cavalry and the two infantry regiments broke open the gaols, released their imprisoned comrades, murdered their officers and burnt down their houses. The British commanding officer at Meerut, General Hewitt, an infirm old man, could do nothing to check the rising. On the morning of the 11th May, the insurgents mutineers off to Delhi and soon brought the city and the palace under their control not a single British Regiment being stationed there at that time. Two young signallers in the telegraph office outside the city warned the Punjab authorities by a message. Lieutenant Willoughly, the officer in charge of the magazine, defended it for three hours but when resistance was no longer possible, he blew it up which destroyed many mutineers. But the rest remained as furious as before, and proclaimed the titular Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah the real Emperor of Delhi. Thus Delhi, which had been won by the British half a century ago as the prize of strenuous war and astute diplomacy, simply slipped out of their hands, and a severe blow was struck at their prestige if not at their power.

The recapture of Delhi seemed to be a pressing necessity for the British. During a temporary respite of about three weeks after the Meerut outbreak, the Punjab was made secure by its Chief Commissioner Sir John Lawrence; certain sepoy regiments at Lahore were disbanded and a mobile column, organised by John Nicholson, brought the whole province under control. Forces were being collected at Ambala and Meerut for the recovery of Delhi; Henry Lawrence at Lucknow was defending against a siege and bodies of troops were advancing from Lower Bengal towards Allahabad. But by the 29th of May, the Revolt was widely spread throughout the upper Gangetic provinces and in parts of Central India as well.

Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow were the strom centres; south of the Narmada there was no outbreak of importance. The Bombay Presidency remained quiet under the able rule of Lord Elphinstone though there was naturally a great deal of excitement in sympathy with the Nana Saheb in the Maratha country, and a clear mutiny at Kolhapur. Rajputana, also remained generally loyal under the care of George Lawrence. The efforts of some of the most notable Indians of the times, like the Sindhia and his prime minister Sir Dinkar Rao, Sir Salar Jang, the minister of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal and Sir Jang Bahadur, the real ruler of Nepal, prevented the movement from spreading wider than it did. Some other Indian princes like Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Maharaja of Patiala, many zamindars and most of the Indian officials stood loyal to the British Government. General Innes considered that the Sindhia's loyalty in particular "saved India for the British". Sir Salar Jang, according to Holmes, was "a man whose name deserves to be ever mentioned by Englishmen with gratitude and admiration."

By the beginning of June the Movement had affected numerous troops in different parts of India north of the Narmada as well as in Central India; at Nasirabad in Rajputana, at Nimach in the Gwalior State, at Bareilly in Rohilkhand, at Lucknow Cawnpore and Benares in Oudh, in several parts of Bihar, and in Bundelkhand under the leadership of the Rani of Jhansi. The Bihar outbreak, which had become furious towards the end of July, at and near Arrah, under the leadership of Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur, was partially suppressed through the efforts of William Tayler, Commissioner of the Patna Division, and Major Vincent Eyre of the Bengal Artillery. At Benares there was outbreak of the Revolt on the 4th June but it was put down by Colonel Neill, of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, who had arrived there on the previous day with a British detachment. "Neill put to death all the muti-

neers who were caught; and in the surrounding country, which was placed by the Governor-General under martial law, rebels, suspects, and even disorderly boys were executed by infuriated officers and unofficial British residents who volunteered to serve as hangmen."[152] At Allahabad, Captain Brasyer with a Sikh regiment saved the fort until he was relieved by Neill's advance from Benares.

At Cawnpore, Nana Sahib placed himself at the head of the insurgents, proclaimed himself the Peshwa and attacked the English, "collected together behind very inadequate entrenchments," hastily constructed near the north-eastern corner of the town by Sir Hugh Wheeler, who commanded the station. After holding out from the 8th June to 26th the British garrison there surrendered on Nana Sahib offering assurances of a safe passage to Allahabad to every member of the garrison "who had not been connected with acts of Lord *Dalhousie*." But as this apparently favoured party were leaving the place in boats, fire was opened upon them. Many of them were shot down; some found shelter with the friendly *raja* of Oudh; and the rest were confined in a house called the Bibigarh where the mutineers killed them on the 15th July. The rebellious Gwalior contingent occupied Cawnpore or November 27 and 28. But Sir Collin Campbell relieved it on 6th December.

At Lucknow, in spite of certain precautionary and defensive measures taken by Sir Henry Lawrence (who had succeeded the much disliked Mr. Jackson as Chief Commissioner), the Mutiny broke out on 30th May and he had to take shelter in the Residency with all the Europeans and Christians and about 700 loyal seopys. The mutineers besieged the Residency, and the garrison suffered a severe blow when at the outset Lawrence was killed on the 4th July by the bursting of a shell.

[152] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 182.

The command of the garrison then devolved upon Brigadier Inglis, who maintained the defence against several assaults and amidst various odds in expectation of reinforcements. On the 25th July Havelock with a force of 1,500 men marched towards Lucknow. After winning two victories, he had advanced half the way, when, considering that his army had been much weakened and thinned by cholera and the enemy's fire, and that he had no hope of getting speedy reinforcements owing to the recent mutiny at Dinapore, he decided to retrace his steps, and fell back upon Cawnpore. Once again, reinforced by only one Company of British infantry and half a battery, Havelock set out for Lucknow, and reached the point up to which he had come before, but was obliged to retreat again owing to similar reasons. At the same time Neill, who had been trying to avenge the massacre of Bibigarh (Cawnpore) with horrible cruelties, was hard-pressed by a large party of the mutineers but was luckily relieved by Havelock. Sir James Outram had now arrived to supersede Havelock, but considering the gravity of the situation he decided to serve as a volunteer under Havelock till Lucknow was relieved.

Thus, along with Outram, and with his force raised to about 3,200 men, Havelock again crossed the Ganges on the 19th September, and after winning three successes against the enemy he forced his way into Lucknow on the 25th September with valuable supplies. General Neill, who in the words of Malleson, had the " energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man"[153] died at this time. The entry of Outram and Havelock with reinforcements into Lucknow did not, however, result in the mutineers raising the siege. It only afforded the besieged garrison some relief. It remained reserved for Sir Collin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who had arrived from England to take the chief com-

[153] *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 497.

mand, to effect the final relief on the 17th November. With a powerful force, joined by a Gurkha contingent under Jang Bahadur, the able minister of Nepal, Sir Collin brought the city under the British control on the 21st March, 1858, after three weeks of incessant fighting. But the reconquest of the province was delayed because of the opposition of the Oudh Talukdars, who were incensed by Canning's injudicious proclamation at the end of March, 1856, declaring "the lands of all Talukdars forfeit to Government except those of six specifically mentioned and of others who could prove their loyalty." Campbell captured Bareilly in the month of May and it was not till the end of December that the Talukdars were overpowered and the rebel regiments were driven across the frontier into Nepal.

Delhi, the rallying centre of the fighters, had already been recovered by the English. The story of the recapture is an extremely stirring one, and illustrates, along with other incidents of the movement, the selfless devotion of the British officers to the cause of the British Empire in India and their untiring energy and perseverance. Anson started with a British force from Ambela for relieving Delhi and proceeded down to Karnal, where he died of cholera on the 17th May, 1857. The command of his army then fell upon Sir Henry Bernard, who continued the march to Delhi and was joined on the 7th June by Brigadier Wilson from Meerut. The combined forces inflicted a defeat on a rebel army at Badli Sarai on the 8th June, and encamped on the famous Ridge overlooking the city of Delhi, where they had to spend many weary weeks in the face of fierce attacks from the enemy. On the 9th July, Barnard died and was succeeded by General Reed, who again from illness had soon to give place to Sir Archdale Wilson. It seemed clear that without further reinforcements Delhi could not be relieved. This additional help came from the Punjab, where mutinous tendencies had been successfully

checked by a band of able officers. Sir John Lawrence with the advice of his co-adjutors, Herbert Edwards (the Commissioner at Peshawar), John Nicholson (the Deputy Commissioner), Sydney Cotton (the Brigadier) and Neville Chamberlain (the Commander of the Punjabi Irregulars), decided at the end of July to denude the Punjab of its troops for the greater need of recovering Delhi, and to send a reinforcing and relieving army to that vital point under Nicholson. On the 6th September all the relieving troops, together with the siege train, arrived in camp, after foiling an attempt of the mutineers to intercept their advance (towards the end of August). Nicholson, helped by Wilson, Baird Smith and Neville Chamberlain, now delivered a vigorous attack against the Delhi insurgents; the Kashmir gate was blown on the 27th September and four columns advanced to storm the city. By the 21st of the next month the whole city, with the person of the "Mughal Emperor," fell into British hands, and the insurgents fled towards Oudh to join their comrades there. Wilson followed up the capture of Delhi by sending a force towards Agra, which later on joined Sir Collin Campbell's relieving force at Cawnpore; Nicholson had fallen in the fight. In recognition of the services of Sir John Lawrence towards the recovery of Delhi, the imperial city with the surrounding territory was transferred in February, 1858, from the control of the Government of North-Western Provinces to that of the Punjab. Bahadur Shah II, the old Mughal Emperor, was captured at the tomb of Humayun by L. Hodson, a dashing cavalry officer, with the promise that his life would be spared; he was condemned to exile and was deported overseas to Rangoon, where he died in 1862 at the age of eighty-seven. The old man's sons and a grandson surrendered to Hodson, who butchered them with his own hands, as in his opinion they were guilty of massacring English men and women, and also as he thought his royal prisoners would be rescued by

the mob before they could be removed to a place of safe custody. Thus disappeared the last representatives of the Mughal Imperial dynasty. This act of Hodson has been the subject of a bitter controversy. Hope Grant considers that it "was most uncalled for."[154] Malleson comments: "A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed. It was a blunder as well as crime. It is true that the gossip of the camp had accused the princes of the imperial house of having instigated the massacre of our countrymen and countrywomen in the month of May, but not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge."[155] In the history of this movement there is no more painful episode than that connected with his (Hodson's) name on this occasion.

Central India and Bundelkhand were also greatly agitated by the movement. In the Indore district, Colonel Durand, who had been supervising the affairs of the Holkar's state in the absence of the agent Sir Robert Hamilton, overpowered the Holkar's mutinous troops between October and December. While Sir Collin Campbell had been engaged in relieving Lucknow, the mutinous Gwalior army, 20,000 strong, "dropped its role of being merely threatening, and became for the first time actively aggressive" under the able leadership of the Maratha Brahman Tantia Topi. They crossed the Jamuna at Kalpi, joined Nana Sahib's forces and defeated General Winham, who had been left in charge of Cawnpore. But Sir Collin Campbell drove them out on the 6th December; some across the Ganges and others across the Jamuna. Tantia Topi then joined the Rani of Jhansi and carried on a harassing warfare throughout Central India. But Sir Hugh Rose, leaving his base of operations at Mhow on the 6th January, 1858,

[154] Holmes, *Indian Muting*, pp. 384—87.
[155] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 80—81.

advanced to Sagar, relieved it on the 3rd February and after capturing the fort of Garra-Kota, reached Jhansi on the 21st March. While besieging Jhansi Sir Hugh came to know that Tantia Topi was advancing with a relieving force to make him raise the siege. He thereupon marched forth against Tantia Topi whom he defeated at the battle of the Betwa, and then returning to Jhansi he captured it on the 3rd April; the Rani left the fort during the night of the 4th and rode off with a few followers to Kalpi, which however fell into British hands of the 22nd May. The Rani and Tantia then marched with the remnant of their forces to Gwalior, occupied the fortress, drove out the Sindhia, who had remained loyal to the English, to Agra, and proclaimed the Nana as the Peshwa. Sir Hugh immediately took the field again and recovered Gwalior after defeating the rebels in two battles in one of which (17th June, 1858) the Rani (whom Sir Hugh esteemed as "the best and bravest military leader of the rebels") fell fighting heroically in male attire. Tantia, after being hunted from place to place, was betrayed early in April 1859 into the hands of the British by a feudatory of the Sindhia, and was executed on the 18th April at Sipri in the Gwalior state, on charges of rebellion and murder. Nana Sahib fled into the jungles of Nepal never to return again. Amar Singh, brother of Kunwar Singh and leader of the movement in Bihar after the latter's death, was captured in the Nepal Tarai in December 1859 and died in the Gorakhpur Jail on the 5th February 1860.

Thus, one by one all the Indian leaders passed away, and the movement was suppressed at all its centres. On the 8th July, 1859, Canning proclaimed peace throughout India and during that year the country was gradually restored to something like its normal state.

There was a loud outcry among the British people both in England and India for "a ruthless and indiscriminate policy of vengeance." Even Nicholson spoke for legalising "the


INDIA IN 1858
English. 0 50 100 200 300 Miles.
British Territory in 1805
Acquisitions before 1837
" " 1858
Dependent States in 1858
Acquired Since 1858
Boundaries of Br. Territory
" " dependent States
" " modern provinces
Dates of Acquisition and of
" " Principal battles.
KASHMIR
AFGHANISTAN
PUNJAB
RAJPUTANA
(Protectorate 1818)
NEPAL
GURKAS
BHUTAN
SIKKIM
ASSAM
BENGAL
BIHAR
CHOTA NAGPUR
NIZAM'S DOMINIONS
BERAR
KANDEISH
GUJRAT
KATHIAWAR
CUTCH
SINDH
MALWA
BUNDELKUND
DELHI
OUDH
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
G. OF MARTABAN
G. OF CAMBAY
MYSORE
CEYLON
MANAR
C. COMORIN
Madras
Bombay
Calcutta
Manasarowar
R. Brahmaputra or Tsanso
R. Indus
R. Ganges
R. Godavari
R. Kistna
R. Nerbudda
R. Tapty
R. Mahanuddy
Hyderabad
Pondicherry (Fr)
Karikal (Fr)
Mergui
Tavoy
Moulmein
Bassein
Pegan
Ava
Amarpura
Chiengmai
Siam
Kachin
Burmah
Pegu
Arracan
Tenasserim
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flaying alive, impalement, or burning of the murderers of the women and children at Delhi."[156] But unmoved by such clamour, Canning considered the question with cool judgement and held that "sheer undistinguishing vengeance on the entire population was not to be permitted."[157] For this he was called 'Clemency Canning' in derision. But it must be admitted that his policy was statesmanlike. In fact the atrocities of the movement left a legacy of mutual hostility which was never completely eradicated, and continued ever since to affect Indo-British political thought and attitude. It is possible, for example, to trace a continuity in the history of Indian Extremism from the Mutiny to the present day, or to realise that the isolation of British social and political life from the Indian began to grow steadily from that time.

Opinions have been divided as to the nature of the movement, whether it was in meaning and origin, a mere military revolt, or was the outburst of an organised conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of the British Empire. Even persons directly connected with the movement expressed diametrically opposite views in this matter. According to Sir John Lawrence it was nothing more than a military rising, the proximate cause of which was supplied by the cartridge incident,[158] while Sir James Outram declared that it was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy which utilised Hindu grievances to its own advantage. The cartridge incident, according to the latter opinion "precipitated the Mutiny before it had been thoroughly organised and before adequate arrangements had been made for making Mutiny a first step to a popular insurrection." The movement should not be characterised as a definitely planned war of independence' with

[156] Kaye and Malleson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, p. 301.

[157] Innes, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

[158] *Ibid.*, pp. 328—29.

a recognised head, clearly defined policy, and concerted plan among the different groups. But it would not be correct to describe it as a mere military rising. There is no doubt that in certain parts, particularly in Bihar and eastern U. P., it assumed the character of a national revolt with the support of the people behind it. A contemporary British Military officer in India wrote in his *Narrative*, "The crisis came. At first apparently, a mere military mutiny, it speedily changed its character, and became a national insurrection."

We have already incidentally dwelt on some of the causes of the failure of the movement; other causes mainly military, can thus be summed up. Firstly, the sepoys were weaker in equipment; thus the newly invented breech—loaders of the English troops outraged the old muzzle-leaders in their hands. Secondly, the possession of a wide-spread telegraph system and the control of postal communications was of immense help to the British, in the way of conveying information or instruction from one part of the country to the other for proper military action; the mutineers understood nothing about these, and made no attempt to possess and control them. Thirdly, as we have already pointed out, the English had the advantage of superior generalship, and of recent experience of a strenuous European War on their side, and they had a plethora of talented men as their leaders; as opposed to those, there were very few able generals among the insurgents. Fourthly, ignorance of the latter about some important changes was also partly responsible for their ineffectiveness. The English had utilised the advantages of modern scientific improvements while the mutineers remained in the dark about them and shrank away from innovations.

The movement sounded the deathknell of the East India

[159] Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, p. 74.

Company's rule in India. The British statesmen at home realised the unwisdom of leaving any longer the government of so vast and populous a country as India in the hands of a private corporation. The Company protested loudly against the change, which could not, however, be averted. Accordingly an Act for the better government of India was passed on the 2nd August, 1858, which directed that "India shall be governed by and in the name of the sovereign through one of the principal Secretaries of State, assisted by a Council of fifteen members. At the same time the Governor-General received the new title of the Vicerory. All important points of this Parliamentary Act will be discussed in another connection; it may be noted here in passing that the "transfer of the Indian Empire to the Crown involved far less change than might at first sight appear; for the Crown had been steadily increasing its control over the Company's affairs almost since the beginning of its (the E. I. C.'s) territorial sovereignty." Thus, all real power had been exercised under the Company by the President of the Board of Control who was also a minister of the Crown.

The assumption of the government of India by the British Crown was formally announced to the Princes and Peoples of India in a Proclamation issued on November 1, 1858, in the name of the Queen. The Queen's Proclamation is an important document in the history of Modern India. It declared:

"We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained and we look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect

the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own and we desire that they as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity, and social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

"We hold ourselves bound to the native of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge.

"We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from our ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith subject to the equitable demands of the States; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India.

"We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have

deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled but who desire to return to the path of duty.

Already, in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacifiction of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness.

"We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:

"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been and shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such the demads of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

'To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in apportioning the penalty to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in the credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.'

'To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.'

'It is our royal pleasure, that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next!'

"When by the blessing of providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

CHAPTER VI

CLASH WITH EASTERN AND WESTERN INDIAN POWERS: COMPLETION OF INDO-BRITISH TERRITORIAL EXPANSION: AND GROWTH OF AN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY—(FROM 1824)

INTRODUCTORY

By 1823, British supremacy and control were established over the whole area stretching from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Sutlej to the Upper Brahmaputra and the Karnaphuli. But still there were some powers on the North-West (the Sikhs, the Sindhis, the Pathans and Baloch tribes of the Frontier, and the Afghans), and on the North-East (the Assamese and the Burmese), whose absorption or reduction was necessary before the British dominion in India could become a safe and sound unit.

The hopes of the early twenties that absolute peace and equilibrium would follow the epoch ending with 1823, were not, as already noted, fully realised. "The First Burmese War, the disastrous Afghan War, the short and sharp campaigns of Sindh and Gwalior, the two fierce conflicts with the Sikhs involving at least three desperate battles, the Second Burmese War, and finally the grim struggle in which month after month the European garrisons of Hindostan supported by a few loyal native regiments fought with their backs to the wall till the longed-for succour came and the great Mutiny was crushed: these followed on each other in steady succession."[1]

The foreign policy of the period after 1823 also received a new colour. Sir Alfred Lyall has remarked: "As the expansion of our dominion carried us so much nearer to foreign

[1] A. D. Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 219.

Asiatic counries, our rapid approach to the geographical limits of India proper discovered for us fresh complications, and we were now on the brink of collision with new races."[2] Hitherto the ambitious projects of the French in the Near and the Middle East, and the fear of a French conquest of India had greatly engaged the attention of the British. The policy of Marquess of Welesley was considerably influenced by the French menace. After the treaty of Tilsit, the world seemed partitioned between France and her new ally Russia, and Lord Minto sent diplomatic missions to Persia and Afghanistan to prepare them against a possible extension of the influence of Russia over and through them in the direction of India; but the mission met with no great success.[3] The French menace to England's Eastern Empire, however, disappeared after Waterloo, and Russia then definitely took the place of France in the political horizon of British India. So its foreign policy was henceforth influenced by the Asiatic expansion of Russia and her various enterprises in the East till some other new failures appeared since the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

SECTION I

Rise of the Sikh Power : The Sikh Wars and British Annexation of the Punjab

In spite of their being exhausted by struggles with the Mughals, the Sikhs did not entirely lose their military spirit after the death of Banda, but they caused frequent troubles and harassment to the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, though they could not successfully check his advance. Some of the Sikh chiefs created forts in conveninent places, overran

[2] *British Dominion in India*, p. 297.

[3] *Lord Minto's Letter to the Court of Directors*, 2nd February, 1808. Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, pp. 252—55.

the plains of the Punjab, shut up the Muslim governors in their forts at Sirhind, Dinanager and Lahore, and they twice seized Lahore itself and retained it for some time.[4] When the Afghan invader appeared year after year, the Sikh chiefs temporarily retreated, but soon after his departure, they came out to re-occupy their lost possessions. During the years following Ahmad Shah's speedy retirement in 1764, the Sikhs became master of Lahore, partitioned among themselves the whole country from the Jhelum to the Sutlej, and assembling at Amritsar, they proclaimed their new sway by striking coins with a legend to the effect that Guru Govind "'had received from Nanuk 'Deg, Tegh, and Futteh,' or grace, power and rapid victory."[5] After Ahmad Shah Abdali had finally left India in 1767, the Sikhs captured his Indian conquests from his son Timur Shah and within a few years became masters of an area extending from Shahranpur in the east to Attock on the west and from Kangra and Jammu in the north on the south.

The Sikhs divided themselves into fraternities or associations called 'misls' (meaning 'alike' or 'equal'), usually recorded as twelve in number—(1) Phulkian, (2) Ahlulwalia, (3) Bhangi, (4) Kenheya, (5) Ramgarhia, (6) Singhpuria, (7) Krora Singhia, (8) Nishania, (9) Sukarchakia, (10) Dublwala, (11) Nakkais, (12) Shahids. Of these Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 11 possessed lands north of the Sutlej and the remaining six south of that river. Each *misl* was under a *Sardar* or chief but their "composition was always changing, and their possessions passed from one hand to another rapidly."[6] These different confederacies very often fought with one another and could not therefore stand as nation during that period of struggle for supremacy in India. Besides these regular bands, there

[4] Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, Chap. IV.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[6] Griffin, *Ranjit Singh*. p. 83.

were the Akhalis, "a body of men who threw off all subjection to earthly governors and who peculiarly represented the religious element of Sikhism."[7]

A military adventurer with ambition and a personality can sometimes, by successfully asserting his authority over the several independent bands of soldiers of a country in anarchy, organise them into a strong military force and thereby create out of fragments, a nation able to leave a mark on the page of history. Such a turn came in the career of the Sikhs with the advent of Ranjit Singh, born in 1780. He was the son of Sardar Maha Singh,[8] the enterprising leader of the Sukarchakia confederacy, who died in 1792 at Gujranwala. Ranjit got an opportunity for distinction during Zaman Shah's invasion of India. Zaman Shah, who had succeeded Timur Shah on the throne of Kabul in 1793, always cherished hopes of an Indian Empire. He led two or three invasions into the Punjab during 1795—98, and in the last he received valuable services from Ranjit for which the Afghan King appointed him governor of Lahore with the title of Raja when he was only nineteen. He soon established himself at Lahore by rooting out all the elements hostile to him.

In 1802 Ranjit took possession of Amritsar from the Bhangis; he soon threw off the Afghan yoke and gradually brought under his authority all the Sikh *misls* west of the Sutlej. When in 1805, the Holkar, pursued by Lord Lake, solicited Sikh help, Ranjit Singh refused it: like the Rajputs, the Sikhs also had no love for the Marathas, and another chance of a combination of Hindu powers was lost. The treaty of Lahore, concluded on 1st January, 1806, excluded the Holkar from the Punjab and left Ranjit Singh free from English interference in his plans of conquest north of the Sutlej.

[7] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[8] Ranjit's mother was Raj Kour, who was the daughter of Raja Gajpat Singh of Jhind and was married to Maha Singh in 1774 A.D.

Ranjit Singh "laboured", writes Cunningham, "with more or less of intelligent design, to give unity and coherence to diverse atoms and scattered elements to mould the increasing Sikh nation into a well-ordered state, or commonwealth, as Govind had developed a sect into a people, and had given application and purpose to the general institutions of Nanuk."[9] It was this desire for mastery over all the Sikhs that led Ranjit to think of extending his influence over the Sikhs lying east of the Sutlej in the tract between that river and the Jamuna, sometimes known as Sirhind. After the defeat of the Sindhia the Cis-Sutlej states had come, though without any formal arrangement, under British protection. A quarrel between the chiefs of Nabha and Patiala gave Ranjit Singh the opportunity for interfering in the affairs of the Cis-Sutlej states. On 26th July, 1806, he crossed the Sutlej, and captured Ludhiana, though he made it over to his uncle Bhag Singh of Jind. He crossed the Sutlej for the second time in the following year with a large army and arbitrated in a dispute between Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala and his queen, much to the advantage of the latter, from whom, it is said, he had accepted some presents. Some of the Sikh chiefs alarmed at Ranjit Singh's aggressions, and not in sympathy with his Pan-Sikhism, sent a deputation for help to Mr. Seton, the British Resident at Delhi, in the month of March, 1808.

This became a matter of serious consideration for the English. For strategic and diplomatic reasons, it was necessary for them to check the advance of Ranjit Singh to the Jamuna. But to resist the Lord of Lahore by force would have led to an open rupture with him, which the English could hardly hazard at that time in view of the possibility of a French invasion of India. In fact, the fear of this invasion made it imperative for the Company "to seek alliances, not only beyond the Jamuna

[9] *History of the Sikhs* (1903 Ed.), p. 156.

but beyond the Indus." Lord Minto thought of securing two objects, that is preventing Ranjit Singh's advance, and at the same time persuading them to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the British against the French if they should ever invade India. To give effect to this, he sent Metcalfe on a mission to Ranjit Singh. But in return for the proposed alliance, Ranjit Singh demanded an acknowledgment of his sovereignty over all the Sikh people. He appeared for the third time south of Sutlej and conquered some of the Sikh states; it appeared that the negotiations would break down.

But the chances of a French invasion soon disappeared with Napoleon's engagement in the Peninsular War and with the improved relations between England and Mahmud II, the new Sultan of Turkey. The British envoy now strongly pressed his points. Ranjit Singh evaded compliance with his proposals and war seemed imminent. In the month of January, 1809, Lord Minto sent a body of troops under Sir David Ochterlony "to support the British envoy in his relations with the Lahore ruler, and effectually confine Ranjit Singh to the north of that river." On the 9th February, 1809, Ochterlony issued a proclamation "declaring the Cis-Sutlej states to be under British protection, and that any aggressions of the chief of Lahore would be resisted with arms." As Cunningham suggests, this note of warning and Ranjit's apprehension that some of the jealous Punjab chiefs might tender their allegiance to the British, brought him down to accept the terms proposed by the English. He concluded a treaty of "perpetual friendship" with the English at Amritsar on the 25th April, 1809.[10] This treaty brought the Cis-Sutlej states under British protection, and limited Ranjit Singh's activities to the right side of Sutlej. *The British frontier was now pushed from the Jamuna to the Sutlej, and British troops were posted at Ludhiana.*

[10] Aitchinson, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 144; Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Appendix IX; Latiff, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

The treaty of Amritsar substantially checked one of the favourite dreams of Ranjit Singh, that is, universal supremacy over the Sikhs to the north as well as to the south of the Sutlej. But this failure did not force him into a life of idleness and inactivity; on the other hand, his activities were henceforth directed towards the north, the north-west and the west,—a more difficult regions to manage, up to which not many native powers of the plains had expanded in the past. He acquired Kangra and got the better of the Gurkhas (1809—1811), inflicted a terrible defeat on the Afghans at Haidaru on 13th July, 1813, and secured Attock, the great key to the Frontier. The fugitive Afghan King, Shah Shuja, became in 1814 practically a prisoner in the hands of Ranjit Singh, who secured from him the famous diamond Koh-i-noor. But Shah Shuja soon effected his escape and retired to Ludhiana (within the British sphere) in 1816. After some futile attempts for several years Ranjit Singh captured Multan in 1818, and Kashmir also passed into his hands in 1819. He took Peshawar in 1823, but left it as a dependency to Yar Muhammad Khan, brother of Muhammad Azir, governor of Peshawar, after the death of Fateh Khan. Thus by the year 1824 the three Muhammadan kingdoms of Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar were added to Ranjit's dominions; and in about the same time that in the Gangetic regions the British power had become supreme, in the Indus basin the Sikhs rose to supremacy. Ranjit's power went on increasing, and with the object of creating strong buffer states in order to check Russian influence, Lord William Bentinck met Ranjit Singh at Rupar on the Sutlej in October, 1831, and got the treaty of alliance with him renewed. On 6th May, 1834, the citadel of Peshawar was captured by the Sikh general Hari Singh Nawla and Peshawar, after having been for ten years a dependency, passed formally under Sikh rule. The impact of Sikh advance was also felt on Sindh, but it was checked by the English out of political and commercial motives, as we shall see

later on. Nevertheless, Ranjit Singh left a mighty empire when he died on 27th June, 1839, at the age of fifty-nine.

Ranjit Singh is one of the most arresting personalities in Indian history. Cunningham writes: "Ranjit Singh found the Punjab a warring confederacy, a prey to the factions of its chiefs, presented by the Afghans and the Marathas, and ready to submit to English supremacy. He consolidated the numerous petty states into a kingdom, he wrested from Kabul the fairest of its provinces, and he gave the potent English no cause for interference. He found the military array of his country a mass of horsemen, brave indeed, but ignorant of war as an art, and he left it mustering fifty thousand disciplined soldiers, fifty thousand well-armed yeomanry and militia, and more than three hundred pieces of cannon for the field." Ranjit was short in stature; he was devoid of any beauty of features and was deprived of the left eye by small-pox; "yet his appearance was prepossessing, his manner and address were delightful and his features were full of animation and expression." He himself received no education; nevertheless he encouraged learning. He has been charged with the vices of drinking and intemperance in his private life; but he was never unmindful of his public duties. Mr. Cunningham writes that Ranjit was "assiduous in his devotions; he honoured men of reputed sanctity, and enabled them to practise an enlarged charity; he attributed every success to the favour of God, and he styled himself and people collectively the "Khalsa", or Commonwealth of Govind." Possessed of indefatigable energy, firm determination and untiring perseverance, Ranjit was a born ruler of men. Sir Lepel Griffin has admitted it in following sentences: "We only succeed in establishing him as a hero, as a ruler of men and as worthy of a pedestal in that innermost shrine where history honours the few human beings to whom may be indisputably assigned the palm of greatness, if we free our minds of prejudice and, discounting conventional virtue,

only regard those rare qualities which raise a man supreme above his fellows. Then we shall at once allow that, although sharing in full measure the commonplace and coarse vices of his time and education, he yet ruled the country which his military genius had conquered with a vigour of will and an ability which placed him in the front rank of the statesmen of the century."[11] Victor Jacquemont, a French traveller, who visited Ranjit Singh's Court at Lahore, remarked: "Ranjit Singh is an extraordinary man—a Bonaparte in miniature."[12]

Though fond of military conquests, he was not cruel or bloodthirsty but he treated the vanquished with kindness and consideration. He might have used frauds and trickery in his political methods; but one can very well say that hardly has the game of politics been ever fought or won without these means. Machiavellian statecraft and Bismarckian policy of 'blood and iron' have been resorted to, more or less, in every age and clime by political rulers of men and by military despots. Baron Carl Von Hugel, a German traveller, who visited Ranjit Singh's Court in 1835, thus remarks: "The sole aim of Ranjit Singh is the preservation and extension of his unlimited power: and though his ambitious mind considered all means perfectly allowable to this end he has never wantonly imbued his hands in blood. *Never perhaps was so large an empire founded by one man with so little criminality.*"[13]

Ranjit Singh's civil administration was not oppressive, though it did not posses the features of very well organised system such as a fixed judiciary, elaborate laws and a vigilant police.

Ranjit's genius was, of course, better displayed in his reorganisation of the Sikh military system. He converted the Sikh army into an engine of terrible efficiency,—a strong mili-

[11] *Ranjit Singh*, p. 95.
[12] *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926.
[13] *Ibid.*

tary body "which", according to Hunter, "for steadiness and religious fervour has had no parallel since the 'Ironsides' of Oliver Cromwell." He rightly realised that the old cavalry force of the Sikhs and guerilla mode of warfare would not be of much value at a time when European infantry and artillery were winning brilliant victories in India, and with this idea he tactfully changed the entire organisation of the Khalsa army in order to make it as formidable as possible. The incentive for the army reform was due to Ranjit himself but he was much assisted in this work by European military adventures like Allard, Ventura, Count Avitable, and a few others some of them having experience in Napoleonic wars.

Ranjit Singh showed weakness in his relations with the English. His modern biographer has significantly observed: "But in almost all cases, as Bismarck has put it, a political alliance means a rider and a horse. In this Anglo-Sikh alliance, the British Government was the rider and Ranjit Singh was the horse..... In his relations with the British Government Ranjit Singh is seen at his worst. He never grandly dared. He was all hesitancy and indecision."[13a]

The rise of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh was like the flash of a meteor destined to disappear quickly. At the time of Ranjit's death the Sikhs were at the zenith of their power, and "then it exploded", remarks General Sir J. H. Gordon, "disappearing in fierce but fading flames." As is always the case with a military despotism, which owes its growth to the abilities of a single powerful ruler but follows soon after his removal a downward course of degeneration and decay. Ranjit's death in 1839 was the signal for the appearance of disorders and confusion among the Sikhs, which discredited them in the course of a few years and made them prostrate before the British power.

[13a] N. K. Sinha, Ranjit Singh, p. 186.

Ranjit was succeeded by his almost imbecile son Kharak Singh, but the government soon fell into the hands of the latter's able and youthful son Nao Nehal Singh, who though at heart opposed to the *wazir* Dhian Singh and the Jammu chiefs, temporarily allied with them against his father's favourite Chet Singh, who was murdered on 8th October, 1839. But Kharak Singh died on 5th November, 1840, and his promising son also met with a fatal accident on the same day, while returning home from the funeral rites, by the fall of the gateway in the Lahore fort. It is not certain whether the latter was the victim of a plot organised by the Jammu chiefs, as some writers say; but this may be presumed that the Jammu Rajas had every reason to wish him death. Sher Singh (reputed to be a son of Ranjit Singh but whose legitimacy was doubtful), with the help of the Khalsa army succeeded in proclaiming himself as the Maharaja on 18th January, 1841. But he was assassinated by Ajit Singh, one of the Sindhianwala chiefs, on 15th September, 1843. Dalip Singh, a minor, was then raised to the throne with his mother Rani Jhindan, an able but unscrupulous woman, as the Queen Regent. The army now became the virtual ruler of the state. It failed to utilise its power for the good of the Sikh nation; it had become ungovernable and was responsible for "much of the bloodshed and mischief which ravaged the country." The Lahore darbar became anxious to be free from its control but was not able to defy it openly. So the incapable members of the *darbar* considered that the only chance of retaining their own position and power would be by removing the army by inducing it to engage in a contest with the English in the course of which its 'superabundant energy' would be exhausted and its power would be broken making room thereby for the darbar-officers to make peace with the English. "This—the main feature of the first Sikh War," remarks Mr. Roberts, "must constantly be borne in mind. The leaders were half-hearted or even trea-

cherous fearing victory almost as much as defeat. We were fighting against a fine army without a general, or, at any rate, without one supreme controlling mind."[14]

But this persuasion would not have by itself been sufficient to goad the army into a war with the English, if its own members had not been convinced that 'their colossal neighbour' (the English) were meditating an invasion of their country. This convinction was not wholly unfounded or unreasonable;[15] and some acts on the part of the English certainly strengthened it. As Cunningham points out, the English advanced "bodies of troops towards the Sutlej country to their policy of 1809"; during 1844 and 1845 the English were preparing boats at Bombay for making pontoon bridges across the Sutlej, and they were also equipping troops in the newly acquired territories of Sindh for a march upon Multan; and "various garrisons of the north-west provinces were being gradually reinforced, while some of them were being abundantly supplied with the munitions of war as well as with troops." To the Sikh army, all these things were "held to denote a campaign, not of defence, but of aggression."[16] Thus, when the officers of the Lahore darbar incited the Sikh soldiery to prevent the prospective invasion of their country by the English, they at once responded to it and decided to take the initiative and advance against them.

The Sikh army crossed the Sultej unopposed on 11th December, 1845, because of some personal misconceptions and negligence on the part of Major Broadfoot, the British commander at Ferozepore, and reached within a few miles of Ferozepore. The Governor-General Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge (1844—48), who had gained some experience in the

[14] *History of British India*, p. 334.

[15] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

Napoleonic wars, issued his declaration of war on 13th December, 1845, and also proclaimed the possessions of Maharajah Dhalip on the left of British bank of the Sutlej, "confiscated and annexed to the British territories."[17] The first battle was fought at Mudki, twenty miles to the south-east of Ferozepore, on 18th December, 1845, between the united Ambala and Ludhiana divisions of British troops under the command of Sir Hugh Gough and the Sikh army under Lal Singh. The engagement was bloody and sharp. The British soldiers first reeled before the Khalsa battalions; but Lal Singh treacherously left the field at a critical moment "leaving the Sikhs to fight as their valour might prompt." They were at last defeated with the loss of seventeen guns; but for the English "the victory was dearly purchased, and by it the British learnt the true character of their foe." On their side 657 men were wounded and 215 were killed, including Major-General Sir Robert Sale, known for his gallant defence of Jalalabad, and Major-General Sir John M'Caskill. Two days after the battle of Mudki, the British army marched against the Sikh entrenchments of 'Feroze Shah' (Phirushahr or 'Phirus town') about twelve miles from the Sutlej, and was joined by Sir John Littler's division. At the beginning of the contest on 21st December, the Sikhs fought stubbornly and with terrific force; the "position of the English was one of real danger and great perplexity." The Commander-in-Chief himself took that view: "During the night of horrors, we were in a critical and perilous state." The treachery of the Sikh generals ultimately helped the English cause and the Sikh entrenchments were finally captured on 22nd December. But for this failure of Sikh leaderhip the result of the battle might have been otherwise. Yet such hard contests could not but cause heavy losses on both sides; on the English side 694 men were killed includ-

[17] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Appendix XVII.

ing 103 officers and 1,721 were wounded; the Sikhs' causalties were estimated to come up to about 8,000 men in killed and wounded and they lost 73 fine guns.

The victors of 'Firoze Shah' were for some time "paralyzed after their prodigious exertions and intense excitement," and remained inactive for the time being for want of heavy guns, ammunition and stores, which they daily expected from Delhi. Before their army was properly reinforced, a strong body of the Sikhs under Ranjur Singh Majhithia again crossed the Sutlej in January and made a dash on the frontier station of Ludhiana. Sir Harry Smith (afterwards Governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to intercept the Sikh advance, suffered a defeat in a skirmish with the Sikhs at Buddewal on 21st January. But reinforced by a brigade under Wheeler and effecting a junction with the Ludhiana troops, he raised the forces under his command to 11,000 men with 32 guns, and inflicted a defeat on the Sikhs, in spite of their strong resistance, at Aliwal, on 28th January, 1846. The Sikhs fled across the Sutlej, many of them being drowned in the river. The final battle was fought on 10th February, 1846, at Sobraon (more correctly Subrahan, named after the tribe inhabiting the village), where the Sikhs had constructed strong entrenchments. "Sobraon," remarks Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler, "proved to be the hardest fought battle in the history of British India. The Sikh soldiers unlike their treacherous commander Tej Singh, were prepared to conquer or die for the glory of the Khalsa."[18] But while the soldiers did everything, the Sikh commanders, with the honourable exception of Sham Singh Atriwala, remained inactive or proved traitors. As Cunningham has observed: "Hearts to dare and hands to execute were numerous, but there was no mind to guide and animate the whole." Treachery and disunion always ruin a nation; the courage and resoluteness of

[18] *History of British India*, p. 597.

SIKH KINGDOM AND SIKH WARS, 1839-49.



the Sikhs soldiers were thus of no avail against the united and purposive organization of the British. Though the brethren of the Khalsa "fought with the valour of heroes, the enthusiasm of crusaders, and the desperation of zealots sworn to conquer the enemy or die sword in hand,"[19] since the early dawn of 10th February, they at last gave way by the midday. "The Sikhs lost in killed, wounded, and fled, about eight or ten thousand men; many of their run-away soldiers were killed while crossing the Sutlej, which was crimsoned with the blood of a fugitive multitude."[20] No mercy, no quarter was granted. The casualties on the English side were 320 killed and 2,083 wounded.

The victory at Sobraon was decisive; it saved the British power in India from humiliation in a critical struggle with "the bravest and steadiest enemy ever encountered in India by a British army."[21] On 13th February, 1846, the whole British army crossed the Sutlej and on the 20th occupied Lahore. A treaty was concluded on 9th March, 1846 the terms of which were dictated by the English to the vanquished Sikhs in the old capital of Ranjit Singh.[22] By these terms the Maharaja of Lahore renounced "for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej" and engaged "never to have any concern with those territories, or the inhabitants thereof;" he ceded to the Company "in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights in the Doab, or country, hill and plain situate between the rivers Beas and Sutlej." The Lahore darbar being unable to pay the one and a half crores of rupees, demanded as

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Cunningham, *op. cit.*

[21] Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 695.

[22] Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII; Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Appendix XVIII.

war indemnity by the English, or failing to give satisfactory security for its eventual payment, the Maharaja transferred to the Company "in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees all his forts, territories, rights and interests, in the hill countries, which are situated between the river Beas and Indus including the provinces of Cashmere (Kashmir) and Hazarah," promising to pay the remaining fifty lacs on or before the ratification of this treaty. The Maharaja agreed to "disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms;" the regular army of the Lahore State was henceforth limited to 25 battalions of infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and 34 guns which had been captured at the battle of Sobraon were surrendered to the English. The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuation of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Panjnad, as far as the confluence of the Indus at Mithankot, and from Mithankot to the borders of Baluchistan was, with respect to tolls, to remain with the British Government. Free passes were to be allowed to the British troops through Lahore territories, and the Maharaja engaged "never to take or retain, in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state without the consent of the British Government." Kashmir and the hill states from the Beas to the Indus were cut off from the Punjab proper, and by a separate treaty concluded on 16th March with Golab Singh, a sardar serving the Lahore darbar, these were transferred to him for one million sterling.[23] Referring to this arrangement with Golab Singh, Mr. Cunnigham has observed that it was "a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the power of the Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness, and the objections become stronger when it is considered that Golab Singh had agreed to pay sixty-eight lacs of rupees (6,800,000) as a fine

[23] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Appendix XX.

to his paramount before the war broke out, and that the custom of the East as well as of the West requires the feudatory to aid his lord in foreign war and domestic strife. Golab Singh ought thus to have paid the deficient million of money as a Lahore subject, instead of being put in possession of Lahore provinces as an independent prince."[24] The minor Dalip Singh was recognised as the Maharaja with Rani Jhindan as regent of the state and Lal Singh as the executive minister. It was stated that the Governor-General would not "exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State"; but a British force "adequate for the purpose of protecting the person" of the Maharaja was left at Lahore, which was to be withdrawn after the close of the year 1846, and Sir Henry Lawrence was placed there as the British Resident.

Some events following quickly made an alternation of this arrangement necessary. The transfer of Kashmir to Golab Singh was resented by some. In the month of October Shaikh Immamud-Din, the Sikh Governor of Kashmir, rose in an insurrection against Golab Singh, at the intigation of Lal Singh; it was put down by a considerable British force. Lal Singh was tried by a formal Court of Enquiry and his guilt being proved, he was dismissed from the ministership and was deported to Benares. Thinking that anarchy would revive without the presence of the British troops, the friendly sardars asked for a revision of the treaty. So a new treaty was signed on 16th December, 1846[25] which made the British the real masters of the Punjab. Its administration was placed in the hands of a Council of Regency of eight Sikh sardars acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident. The Lahore Government agreed to pay to the British twenty two lacs of rupees for the maintenance of a British force. It was stated

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 1380.

[25] Cunningham, *op. cit.*, Appendix XXI.

that this arrangement would last till 4th September, 1854, when the minority of Dalip Singh would terminate and the Government be handed over to him. Henry Lawrence was appointed British Resident at Lahore, and he tried with the help of a band of officers, his brother George and John Lawrence, Abbot, Edwards, Hodson, Nicholson, and Lumsden, to introduce various reforms in the country. Henry Lawrence sailed for England with Lord Hardinge on 18th January, 1848; his office was held for some time by his brother Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence and it was ultimately conferred on Sir Fredierick Curie on 6th April, 1848.

Lord Hardinge shrank from annexation of the Punjab which would have required a greater force than what he had at his disposal, and the plan of 'subsidiary alliance' did not commend itself to him as he apprehended future complications thereby. But the arrangements that he effected were 'lacking in prospects of permanence." The Sikhs were far from feeling themselves subdued though their army had been defeated. They attributed their defeats and humiliation to the perfidy of their leaders who, they believed, were now reaping the consequences of their action. The Queen-mother Rani Jhindan was accused of hostile plots against the British Resident and she was removed from Lahore. This added to the bitterness of Sikh feelings and of discontent against British ascendancy, which waited only for a suitable opportunity for a gigantic outburst. In fact, a Second Sikh War was inevitable. The Sikh nationalists, who had given proofs of their strong determination and bravery and had a tradition of brilliant achievement behind them, were not likely to submit without another attempt. The next Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie (1848—1856), was to see the Punjab aflame with rebellion within three months of his arrival. "It needed but an event of sufficient general interest to excite a national rising, and that event was supplied by the city of Multan, long a storm centre."

Mulraj, a man of some strength and ability, who had succeeded his father Sawant Mal as Governor of Multan in 1844, was in some troubles owing to deficient revenue-collection in his district, and consequent failure in paying off the sum for which he had contracted with the Lahore darbar as the price of his governorship. In March 1848 he expressed his desire to give up his charge and the state thereupon appointed Sardar Khan Singh Man in his place, "on a fixed salary of 30,000 rupees a year in lieu of the contract system."[26] The Sardar went to Multan with 500 state troops and two British officers, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European regiment. On 19th April these two officers took formal charge of the fort of Multan, but they were soon murdered while coming out of it. Mulraj was probably implicated in this murder. Some soldiers of the escort joined Mulraj, who declared a war against the British on 20th April, 1848, summoning 'people of every creed' to join his standard.

This was indeed a critical moment for the British power in India; the revolt of Mulraj affected their prestige and challenged their authority in the Punjab. The British Resident, Sir Frederick Curie, wrote to Lord Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, for permission to send a body of troops to suppress the Multan revolt. But the latter decided not to send any troops and to defer the operations till the beginning of the cold weather. This decision though approved of by the home authorities evoked much criticism, but it has been rightly pointed out by certain writers that there was a good political reason behind it. They point out that "technically speaking it was the business of the Sikh authorities to suppress the rebellion," and the Commander-in-Chief wanted by this delay to sound the strength of the Punjab Government to suppress it as well as its sincerity towards the British Government. He apprehended

[26] Lee-Warner, *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie* (1904), Vol. I.

also a general rising of the Sikhs and therefore preferred the chance of a big revolt with the certainty of throwing a powerful conquering army into the Punjab in proper season late in the year, to the hazard of at once sending a small force when failure might precipitate disaster.

In spite of this decision on the part of the supreme government to delay activities, a young lieutenant named Herbert Spencer, serving under the Sikh Council of Regency, and the Resident Curie made "heroic but mistaken efforts to deal with the rising on a small scale." Though they began in right earnest they had at last to abandon the siege of Multan and the revolt of Mulraj soon developed into a Sikh national rising. Early in August, Chatter Singh, the Sikh governor of the Hazra district, has risen in revolt and had murdered Colonel Canora, an American in the service of the Sikh government, and on 14th September, 1848, his son Sher Singh, who had been unwisely sent by the Lahore Resident to join the British besieging force at Multan, went over to the side of Mulraj with all his troops. Owing to the intrigues and activities of Rani Jhindan, the whole of the Punjab had become a "scene of convert disaffection" and all the old Sikh leaders gathered round Sher Singh. They purchased the friendship and help of their old enemies the Afghans by the surrender of Peshawar.

All these strengthened Lord Dalhousie's determination for a final tussle with the Sikhs and in a letter to the Secret Committee, dated 7th October, 1848, he "spoke of a general Punjab war and the occupation of the country." He declared on 10th October, 1848: "Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war and on my word, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance." But it was not before the second week of November next that the English could begin offensive operations. On 16th November Lord Gough crossed the Ravi, and on 22nd November he fought an

indecisive battle with Sher Singh at Ramnagar on the Chenab. The Sikhs then entrenched themselves strongly at Chilianwala, where a bloody but indecisive battle was fought on 13th January, 1849. By this battle the Sikhs lost some brave men and only twelve guns, while the losses of the English were great,—602 killed and 1,651 wounded; three regiments lost their colours and four horse-artillery guns were captured. But the English were more successful at Multan, which was stormed by them on 22nd January, 1849, after a gallant defence by the Sikhs. Mulraj was compelled to surrender at *discretion*.

The disaster and carnage at Chilianwala had roused criticism both in India and in England, and Sir Charles Napier was appointed by the Directors to supersede Lord Gough as Commander-in-Chief. But before he arrived, Lord Gough had been able to inflict a deadly blow on the Sikhs. After Chilianwala, the Sikhs had moved on towards Gujarat, a town near the Chenab, Lord Gough slowly pursuing them by way of Sadullapur. Sher Singh was now joined by his father Chatter Singh at the head of all his forces and by Akram Khan, a son of Dost Muhammad Khan, with some Afghan soldiers. The Sikh forces, in Lord Gough's estimate, numbered 61,500 men with 61 guns. Lord Gough commanding 250,000 men with 100 guns was also joined by the Multan army under General Whish on 20th February. On 21st February the two armies met in a battle near Gujarat. "It was essentially an artillery action, and is known as the battle of the guns." After three hours' sustained cannonade Lord Gough compelled the Sikhs and the Afghans to leave the position which they had defended with resolute hardihood, and put them to flight. The victory at Gujarat, gained by the English at the comparatively small loss of 69 killed and 670 wounded, was decisive. The Governor-General remarked that the action at Gujarat "must ever be regarded as one of the most memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the greatness

of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter." On 13th March, Sher Singh, Chatter Singh and all the Sikh sardars and soldiers laid down their arms; and the Afghans were hotly pursued by Sir Walter Gilbert, who recovered Attock and drove them towards the Khyber Pass and Kabul. Tried by a military court Mulraj was sentenced to life-long imprisonment and banishment beyond the seas, where he died soon.

The complete defeat of the Sikhs sealed the fate of their country. Their prospects of maintaining independence disappeared, and on 29th March, 1849, Lord Dalhousie on his own responsibility issued a proclamation announcing "that the Kingdom of the Punjab is at an end, and that all the territories of the Maharaja Dalip Singh are now, and henceforth, a portion of the British Empire in India." Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Lawrence were opposed to this annexation, and the Cabinet also thought in their way. But Lord Dalhousie felt that circumstances had created the "necessity for an immediate action." He remarked: "however contrary it may be to our past views and to our present views, annexation of the Punjab is the most advantageous policy for us to pursue. I firmly believe we shall not succeed in establishing a friendly Sikh power."

The young Maharaja Dalip Singh was granted a pension of £50,000 a year. He was sent to England with his mother Rani Jhindan, and placed under the guardianship of the physician Sir John Logan of the Bengal Army. He subsequently embraced Christianity and lived the life of an English landlord with an estate in Norfolk. Lather on he returned to the Punjab and reembraced his old faith, but he could not regain any authority. His mother (the first Indian princess to make a prolonged stay in England) died in London in 1853.

Various opinions have been expressed about Dalhousie's annexation of the Punjab. Two points are however clear.

Firstly, it is to be admitted that Dalip Singh had to suffer for the faults of others; and, secondly, it should be noted that British interests and influence in India became safer and unquestioned. Mr. Roberts has described it as a "momentous step which finally carried the frontiers of British to their natural limits, the base of the mountains of Afghanisthan." After annexation, the settlement of the province engaged the Governor-General's attention. He constituted a Board of three commissioners, consisting of Henry Lawrence as President, his brother John Lawrence and Charles Mansel. The functions of the Board were divided into Political, Revenue and Judicial, and the members had each special charge of one of those departments, "though all worked jointly when any question of more than an ordinary importance arose." The old Sikh armies were disbanded, a general forces disarmament was effected; civil and military police were organised; and a new army called the Punjab Frontier Force, was raised under the immediate control of the Board. Changes were introduced in the spheres of industry, commerce, agriculture and land revenue. Fortified posts were established along the north-west frontier; roads were laid out in all directions, the most important one connecting Lahore with Peshawar; and canal works, like those in the Bari Doab, were undertaken. In 1853, Henry Lawrence went to serve in Rajputana, the board was abolished and Sir John Lawrence was appointed the first Chief Commissioner of the Punjab with a Judicial Commissioner and a Fiancial Commissioner under him. The name of Sir John Lawrence is associated with important reforms in different spheres. The Punjab chiefs rendered valuable services to the British Government during the Mutiny and received rewards in return. From 1st January, 1859, the Punjab and its dependencies were constituted into Lieutenant-Governorship. The first Lieutenant-Governor, the same Sir John Lawrence, had to retire on account of ill-health towards the end of February and was succeeded

by Sir Robert Montgomery, whose administration was notable for the opening of the Bari Doab canal on 11th April, 1859.

SECTION II

British Annexation of Sindh

As we have already seen, during the latter part of the eighteenth century Sindh was being governed by the Amirs or Mirs of the Talpura family with their three branches stationed at Hyderabad, Khairpur and Mirpur. They were theoretically under the supremacy of Afghanistan, though the "connection was seldom more than nominal." After the death of Fateh Ali in 1809, a treaty of friendship was concluded by the British Government with his three brothers Ghulam Ali, Khurram Ali and Murad Ali by which it was provided that the "English Government will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French" in Sindh. This treaty was renewed in 1820 with the addition of an article "binding the contracting parties to take vigorous measures to suppress the predatory hordes who were continually disturbing the peace of the frontier." The journey of Alexander Burnes up the Indus en route to Lahore disclosed the importance of the control of Sindh to the British.

In 1831 Ranjit Singh suggested to Lord William Bentinck a partition of Sindh, but the latter did not support the idea, and proceeded to deal independently with the Amir of Hyderabad, who rather reluctantly concluded a treaty with the British on 20th April, 1832, on the following terms:

(1) "That the two contracting Powers, bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

(2) That the British Government has requested a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindoostan by the rivers and roads of Sinde by which they may transport their goods and merchandise from one

country to another and the said Government of Hyderabad hereby acquiesces in the same request on the following conditions:

(a) That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads. (b) That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.

(3) That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle on Sinde, but shall come as occasion requires and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India."

This treaty was renewed in 1834.

Till 1838 Ranjit Singh frequently expressed his ambitious desire of annexing Sindh, which was steadily opposed by the English Government, apprehensive of a further strengthening of the Sikh power. As a price for this protection against Sikh ambition, Sindh had to come under the net of British imperialism. By a treaty concluded on 20th April, 1838, Lord Auckland extorted a consent from the Amirs of Sindh to receive at Hyderabad an accredited British Resident. This was not all. On the outbreak of the Afghan war, which made control of the Indus highly necessary for the English for transporting Bombay troops to Afghanistan, they felt no scruple in violating the treaty of 1832 and "acted in a very high-handed manner towards the Amirs in taking an armed force through their country." It was intimated to the Amirs that "while the present exigency lasts.....the article of the treaty prohibiting the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores must necessarily be suspended."

By the Tripartite Treaty of 26th June, 1838, between Shah Shuja, the English and Ranjit Singh, Shah Shuja agreed to "relinquish, for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears of tribute, over the country held by the Ameers of Sinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers

and their successors in perpetuity) on condition of the payment to him by the Ameers of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of the British Government, 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maharaja Ranjeet Singh." But as the price of this mediation, Lord Auckland exacted a large sum from the Amirs of Sindh, though the latter produced reasonable arguments to the effect that they had ceased paying any tribute to Shah Shuja during his thirty years' exile from Kabul and that the Shah himself had exempted them from all claims in 1833. To add to the humiliation of the Sindh chiefs, they received a strong warning from the English in the following terms: ".....we have the ready power to crush and annihilate them, and we will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely for either the integrity or safety of our Empire, or its frontiers." Under the threat of Sir John Keane's advance on their capital, the Amirs of Sindh were compelled to accept a treaty in February 1839, the effects of which have been described by Lord Auckland in the following terms: ".....the confederacy of the Amirs is virtually dissolved, each chief being placed in his own possessions, and bound to refer his differences with the other chiefs, to our arbitration; that Sinde is formally placed under British protection and brought within the circle of our Indian relations; that a British force is to be fixed in Lower Scinde, at Tatta, or such other point to the westward of the Indus as the British Government may determine; a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum, in aid of the cost of this force, being paid in equal proportions by the three Amirs." There is no doubt that these arrangements were highly unjust. Lord Auckland went further; after the treaty had been very reluctantly accepted by the Amirs, he revised it to suit his own advantage and returned it to the Amirs for final signature, "who objected, implored and finally gave way, by affixing their seals to the revised documents."

During the terrible crisis of the Afghan war, when the Amirs of Sindh might have caused considerable embarrassments to the English, they faithfully observed all their engagements with them, and their country was used as a base of operations against the Afghans. But instead of rewards for their fidelity the Amirs were wrongly charged with disaffection and hostility against the British Government. Major James Outram the Resident at Hyderabad, who was conversant with the Sindh affairs, was not entrusted with the settlement of Sindh, but in the autumn of 1842, he was superseded by Sir Charles Napier, who was placed by the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough (1842—44), in supreme control, both military and political,—"a step," as pronounced by a writer generally favourable to Lord Ellenborough," at such a crisis, of very questionable policy." Napier, remarks Innes, "conducted his operations on the theory that the annexation of Sindh would be a very beneficent piece of rascality for which it was his business to find an excuse—a robbery to be plausibly effected." Opportunity for this was supplied to him by a succession dispute at Khairpur. He arbitrarily decided this question in favour of Ali Murad, brother of Mir Rustam, the old Rais of Khairpur, by neglecting the claims of the latter's son Mir Muhammad Hussain.

Napier at once declared that the charges against the Amirs were proved. He laboured hard to impose a fresh treaty on the Amirs, by which they were required to cede certain important territories in lieu of tribute, to provide fuel to the steamers of the English navigating the Indus, and to relinquish to the British Government the right of coining money. The right of coining money is one of the most important attributes of sovereignty and its assumption meant that the Amirs were going to be reduced to the position of dependents of a foreign power, —a situation highly offensive to them. But they did not resort to open hostilities without further provocations caused by

Napier himself. Even before the Amirs had accepted the treaty he sequestered the territories in question, and issued such a strongly worded proclamation that it seemed as if Sindh had already passed under British control. Sindh was thus dealt with by Napier, remarks Thornton, "as though the rights of the Governor-General of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure were unquestioned and unquestionable; and, moreover, as if it were desired to exercise this right in a manner as offensive as possible to those who were to suffer privation from the exercise." In order to excite awe in the minds of the Amirs, Napier marched upon Imamgarh ('the Sindh Gibraltar'), a desert fortress lying half way between Khairpur and Hyderabad, when all were professedly in a state of peace, and attacked and destroyed that fortress early in January, 1843. Outram, who had been recalled to Sindh as the British Commissioner, was able, by personal influence, to presuade the Amirs (with the exception of one of the Amirs of Khairpur who said that his seal was with his brother and promised to ratify the treaty at a future date) to sign the treaties of 12th February, 1843.

But aggression seldom goes without resistance whether it becomes succesful or futile, immediate or belated. Napier's high-handed acts had excited the warlike Beluchis to an intense pitch of animosity, and on 15th February they attacked the residence of Outram, who was compelled to take refuge in a steamer. Open war now became inevitable. On 17th February, Napier with a force numbering about 2,800 men and 12 guns inflicted a defeat on a Beluchi army of about 22,000 men at Miani, a few miles from Hyderabad. Six of the Amirs (three of Khairpur and three of Hyderabad) at once submitted to the British and Hyderabad was immediately occupied by the latter. This did not however bring the contest to an end, Sher Muhammad, 'the Lion of Mirpur,' remained in possession of considerable forces with which he made an attempt to

retain his independence. But he was completely routed, on 24th March, at Dabo, six miles from Hyderabad. Napier occupied Mirpur on 27th March, Amarkot on 4th April, and announced his victory to Ellenborough in the now well-known phrase, "*peccavi*, I have Sindh." Sher Muhammad made yet another attempt, but he was finally defeated by Jacob on 14th June and was driven out of Sindh, with which the war came to an end.

British arms having thus vanquished the Beluchis, Sindh was annexed in August, 1843, the Amirs were exiled, and Sindh became henceforth a British province. Napier accepted £70,000 as share of the prize money, but Outram instead of pocketing his own share amounting to £3,000 distributed the sum for charitable institutions. He disagreed with his chief's policy and wrote to him: "I am sick of policy; I will not say yours is the best, but it is undoubtedly the shortest—that of the sword. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause." Napier became the first governor of Sindh and the next four years were devoted to its reorganisation and to the consolidation of British authority there.

Lord Ellenborough's policy and Sir Charles Napier's conduct towards the Sindhis received almost universal condemnation. The Court of Directors disapproved of it though they did not care to restore Sindh to its real owners. A critical examination of the facts of this transaction establishes beyond doubt that the Amirs had given no provocation, that their conduct was not all along hostile, but they had to some extent helped the British in their Afghan wars, and that the Governor-General's policy was purely aggressive. Mr. Innes has aptly remarked: "If the Afghan episode is the most disastrous in our Indian annals, that of Sindh is morally even less excusable." Sir Charles Napier himself admitted in his Diary: "We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be."

SECTION III

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

The North-West Frontier represented by the mountainous tracts lying between Afghanistan and the Indus has ever presented "both an international and a local problem of enormous complexity and difficulty." The valleys and defiles of these intersecting rugged and barren mountain ranges have since the middle ages been inhabited by hardy and fanatical tribesmen who have often taxed the energies of successive Indian governments. Besides, for centuries invaders from outside India have pushed their way through north-western and western passes into the Indo-Gangetic plains; and it has been the traditional policy of Imperial powers within India since the days of the Mauryas, to try to control this tract (more or less effectively) and to reach a scientific frontier towards the North-West.

The annexation of Sindh in 1843 and the conquest of the Punjab in the course of the next few years carried the British boundaries beyond the Indus and made them co-terminous with the territories of the frontier tribes, bordering on Sindh and the Punjab. Sir Charles Napier did not take measures to guard the most exposed part of the Sindh frontier extending for about 150 miles from Kashmir to the northern spurs of the Hala mountains. This left Sindh open to the terrible incursions of the Bugtis from the Kachhi hills and of the Domokis and Jakranis from the Kachhi plain; they could not be subdued by Napier even after regular expedition against them in 1845. It was Major (afterwards General) Jacob who, on being appointed the sole political Agent on the upper Sindh in 1848, "completely revolutionised Napier's system" and relieved Sindh from the dread of Baluch inroads.

Towards the Punjab, the frontier problem was more complex and formidable due to geographical as well as political

reasons. There the frontier was too long and too rugged to be easily defended, and the British had succeeded to a "heritage of anarchy," due to the weakness of the later Sikh administrators (since 1839). During the administration of Lord Elgin I (1862-63), a band of Muhammadans known as the Wahabis, chiefly inhabiting the frontier regions but having an agency at Patna in Bihar, and with their influence spreading far and wide through secret channels, created troubles in the Punjab. But they were suppressed in the month of December 1863, and their stronghold of Malka was destroyed.

From 1849 to 1901 the trans-Indus districts remained with the Punjab. In 1876 the three northern districts of Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat were formed under the commissionership of Peshawar and the three southern ones, Banu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan under that of the Derajat. In 1878 the system of political agencies was introduced; Kurram was formed into an agency in 1892, and the three other agencies of Malakand, Tochi, and Wana came into being between 1895 and 1896,—Malakand being placed under the direct control of the Government of India from the beginning.

British attention was directed more and more towards Quetta lying between the Bolan and the Kohjak passes, as the Afghan situation became more tense. It was in the possession of the Khan of Khelat, who by the treaty of 1854 promised "to abstain from negotiations with any other power, without first consulting the British; to receive British troops in Kalat (Khelat) whenever such a step should be thought necessary; to protect merchants pasing through his territories; and to prevent his subjects from harassing the British border. In return for this he received an annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000." But the Khan failed to comply with these terms, and by 1873 his territory fell into anarchy leading to raids on the British borders. This led to the mission of Major (afterwards Sir) Robert Sanderman to the Khan's territory, and he concluded the treaty of Jacoba-

bad on 8th December, 1876, by which the long-coveted fort of Quetta came under British occupation. This was followed by the creation of the Beluchistan Agency, Major Sandeman being appointed (on 21st February, 1877) Agent to the Governor-General with his headquarters at Quetta.

From 1876 the frontier policy of "masterly inactivity" of the Lawrence or "non-intervention" school was thought to be unsuitable. Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, which was marked by vigorous attempts to further the cause of British Imperialism, saw the growth of a consciousness, among some English statesmen, of the necessity for a scientific frontier.[27] This forward policy both to the north-west and the north-east was further defined by Lord Lansdowne, a courageous conservative, who remained as the Governor-General of India from 1888 to 1893, and Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army during that period. The former was a strong believer in the doctrine of "the sphere of influence" within which, he said, "we shall not attempt to administer the country ourselves but within which we shall not allow any aggression from without."

The forward policy on the frontier required that the Afghan boundaries on the side of India should be definitely settled, the tribal lands should be reduced to order and strategic railways should be constructed. In 1889, Lord Lansdowne, "acting on certain vague and indeterminate charges, which were newer properly substantiated," displaced the Maharaja of Kashmir from his government and placed it with a council under the authority of a British Resident. But the Maharaja was restored in 1905, also for reasons not fully known. But the year 1888 British control was established over the Bori and Zhob valleys lying to the south of the Gomal Pass, and in 1899 the British Government declared the Gomal river from Domandi to its junction with Dhob streams, to be boundary

[27] In England, during this period, the mind of the Prime Minister Lord Beaconsfield was filled with grandoise schemes of imperialism.

between Baluchistan and the Punjab frontier zone. This was followed by the British occupation, during 1891 and 1892, of Hunza and Nagar in the Gilgit Valley, two places commanding the communications with Chitral. The Khan of Khelat was also required to abdicate in 1892.

These British activities on the frontier naturally created apprehensions in the minds of Abdurrahman, the Amir of Afghanistan. A war between the Amir and the British Government appeared to be imminent. Conflict was, however, in the end averted by the British policy of compromise at this time. The mission of Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul (2nd October—16th November, 1893) resulted in an agreement by which the boundary lines were demarcated by Afghan and British commissioners. The Amir received certain districts, and agreed not to interfere with the frontier tribes like the Afridis in the Khyber, the Waziris, and the tribes in the regions of Swat, Bajaur, Dir and Chitral. The Amir's subsidy paid by the Indian Government was raised from twelve to eighteen lakhs and he was permitted to purchase and import munitions of war. As a sort of check against Russian advance the British Government declared in the same year a formal portectorate over Gilgit and Chitral.

The Durand Agreement, no doubt, restored cordial relations between the two governments, but it did not remove all risks of wars and frictions on the frontier, as is proved by the facts of frontier history since 1893.

In fact, disturbances soon appeared on the north-west frontier in the time of Lord Landsdowne's successor, Lord Elgin (1894—99), the son of the second Viceroy. In 1895, the Mehtar or chief of Chitral was murdered at the instigation of Sher Afzal, an ex-Mehtar, and Umra Khan, the ruler of Jhandol, proclaimed a 'jihad' throughout Dir, Swat, Bajaur. The British Agent at Gilgit, Dr. (afterwards Sir) George Roberston, who had proceeded to Chitral, was besieged in Fort Chitral by a

combined force of Chitralis, and Pathans. The British Government sent Sir R. Low with a force of 15,000 men to their relief; but Chitral was ultimately relieved by Colonel Kelly with a handful of men from Gilgit. Though the retention of Chitral was urged by Lord Elgin who also proposed the construction of a road from Peshawar through Swat, the Liberal Government of Lord Rosebery thought of evacuating it. On 14th March, 1895, a proclamation was issued by the Government of India to the people of Swat and Bajaur declaring that their territory would not be occupied if they allowed British forces to pass unmolested through their territories. The Liberal opposition could not prevent the retention of Chitral, as the Unionist regime of Lord Salisbury reversed the decision of Lord Rosebery's government and authorised Lord Elgin's government to construct a military road from Chitral to the British frontier. The Chitral affair raised fierce party strifes in England; the Unionists urged its retention on grounds of strategic necessity while the Liberals advocated its evacuation and opposed the construction of a road on the argument that it would mean a violation of the proclamation of March 1895, and thus a breach of faith with the frontier people.

Meanwhile, the frontier tribes grew restive owing to the British advance and activities, and in 1897 the whole frontier was ablaze with violent risings. The active forward policy pursued by the British Government during the nineties was by itself sufficient to excite anti-British feelings in the minds of the fierce and freedom-loving frontier tribe; to this was added the influence of religious fanaticism fanned by the Muslim priests. Religious fanaticism only served to intensify the feelings of discontent and resentment which had already been awakened in the minds of the frontier people for other reasons.

On 10th June, 1897, the British political agent and his escort at Maizar in the Tochi Volley were treacherously attacked. In July, the tribesmen of Swat, under Sadullah Khan,

attacked the British fortified posts at Chakadarra and Malakand. In August the Mohmands, dwelling north of the Kabul river, rose under Najm-ud-din and attacked the village of Shankargarh in the Peshwar district. Lastly, the Orakzais and Afridis, being instigated by Mulla Sayyid Akbar, laid siege to the fortified posts on the Samna Ridge and captured the Khyber forts. It was after severe fighting in two regular campaigns that the situation became gradually quiet by 1898.

Lord Curzon's viceroyalty (1899—1905) saw important changes in the North-West Frontier. Though the Tirah campaign had been concluded by the spring of 1898, yet when Lord Curzon arrived in India in January 1899, about 10,000 British troops were quartered across the British administrative border, in the Khyber, on the Samna Range, in Waziristan, and in the Malakand area. With regard to the frontier question, the new Viceroy followed a middle course between an extreme forward policy, though he retained Chitral, and a policy of definite retreat ("back to the Indus"), and thus he may be said "to have founded a new school of frontier politician." His frontier policy has been described as "one of withdrawal and concentration." This was summed up by him as consisting of the principles of "withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal forces in the defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces in British territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, and improvement of communications in the rear." He gradually withdrew large numbers of regular British troops from the Khyber pass, the Khurram valley, Waziristan, and the tribal country generally, and filled in their places by a tribal militia trained and commanded by British officers. The Viceroy also adopted the principle of "establishing moveable columns of regular troops as convenient centres on the edge of the plains, ready always to march at a moment's notice to the relief of the tribal forces." A small garrison was, however, kept at Kila

Drosh, at some distance to the south of the Mehtar's capital in Chitral and in 1902 regulars were stationed at Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. Forces were increased and concentrated within British lines and important strategic railways were constructed to Dargai at the base of the Malakand, Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber and to Thal at the mouth of the Khurram valley. Another aspect of Lord Curzon's frontier policy appears in his granting allowances at regular intervals to the important frontier tribes 'for keeping open the roads and passes, for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity and for the punishment of crime.' The British Government also made attempts to regulate and limit the importation of arms to the tribesmen.

Curzon's policy has been generally defended on the argument that for several years after the rising of 1894 it secured peace on the frontier with the exception of the outrages committed by the Mahsud Waziris in 1901, against whom "he refused to sanction an expedition but restored to the expedient of a blockade coupled with a series of swift blows at Mahsud villages." It has also been pointed out that his system made a great saving in expenditure; during seven years he spent only £248,000 on military activities on the North-West Frontier as against £4,584,000 during the years 1894—98.

Besides these military and police measures, another more important item of his reforms was the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901, with an area of 40,000 square miles under a Chief Commissioner directly responsible to the Government of India. For about a quarter of a century proposal had been made by Viceroys and frontier officers for the creation of a new administrative unit in the North-West. For one reason or another these proposals were not carried into effect before Lord Curzon. Politically the new province was formed into two parts: (1) the settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and (2) the

trans-border tracts lying between the administrative and Durand, boundaries. The latter comprised, besides the five political agencies of the Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana, also the tribal areas, the political control of which remained vested in the Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining settled districts. The Punjab Government ceased to exercise any authority west of the Indus except in the settled district of Dera Ghazi Khan. In order to avoid confusion, the old "North-West Provinces" was renamed "The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh."

Lord Curzon's plan, though commendable in many respects, did not offer the final solution of the Frontier problem. The spirit of unrest and independence which characterised the tribes could not be thoroughly subdued, and administrative difficulties in the spheres of justice and revenue remained both in the settled districts and in the tribal areas. In the year 1908 there was a rising in the Afridi and Mohmand valleys, partly due to instigation from Afghanistan and partly to resentment at the construction of the Loi-Shilman Railway. Except minor operations, no large punitive expeditions were undertaken till the first Great War. But this period was "marked by the growth of the arms traffic, which entirely revolutionised the nature of border warfare; by the increase of raiding by well-organised gangs of outlaws from Afghanistan; and by the development of the Mahsud probelm" which long awaited solution. All these factors, combined with the weakness and inefficiency of the Border Military Police or the Militia, increased the complexity of the frontier problem in spite of some efforts on the part of the Afghan as well as the British Government. After the outbreak of the first Great War, the British Government tried to avert the danger of an Afridi rising by deciding, on 1 February, 1915, to grant them double their allowance. The Amir Habibullah remained friendly to the British cause, but a spirit of unrest was manifest among the Mohmands and

the Mahsuds for which punitive expeditions were sent against them.

The system of Lord Curzon worked till 1914, but it collapsed amidst the general unrest created by the first Great War. After the restoration of peace, the Government of India realised the necessity of settling the 'political' part of the Frontier problem permanently. Grave disturbances subsequently took place on the Frontier, and their suppression necessitated some extraordinary measures on the part of the Government of India. In 1922 a committee presided over by Sir Denys Bray recommended constitutional reform in the North-West Frontier Province though it emphasised the need of control of the Central Government; but nothing was done to give effect to it. In January 1932, it was announced that the province would be constituted as a Governor's Province, and the provisions of the Government of India Act, with certain exceptions, should be applied there. His Excellency the Governor and Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Ralph Griffith, assumed charge of the province on 18th April, 1832. After 1947 this province forms a part of Pakistan.

SECTION IV

Relations With Afghanistan

The importance of Afghanistan in Indian history, during the two and a half centuries closing with the collapse of the decaying Mughal Empire, has already been shown. Here we have to survey the relations of the sucessors of Ahmad Shah Abdali with the new rulers of India. Ahmad Shah left behind him eight sons, but his second son Timur Mirza, named by his father as his successor, seized the throne and transferred his capital from Kandahar to Kabul. He was not a very vigorous and successful ruler.

At his death in 1793 the kingdom of Afghanistan compre-

hended Kashmir, Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul, Balkh, Kulu, Kandahar, Multan and Herat. Khelat, Baluchistan as well as Persian Khorasan acknowledged its suzerainty, and Sindh was theoretically a dependency. His fifth son, Zaman Shah succeeded him. Zaman Shah encountered many difficulties in the Punjab, east of the Indus, and so he placed Lahore formally under Ranjit Singh as a subordinate chief in 1799. Whenever Zaman Shah came down towards Peshawar to settle his affairs, his brothers dispersed over the different districts behind him, and fomented plots and insurrections against him. He put his eldest brother, who had proclaimed himself Shah at Kandahar, into prison depriving him of his eyesight; and satisfied another brother, Mahmud Mirza, by appointing him to the Governorship of Herat.

From 1798 Zaman Shah was at the height of his power and while at Lahore, he meditated an invasion of interior Hindustan like his predecessors Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah. Though it may now appear to us that an invasion by Zaman Shah had not much chance of success at the close of the 18th or beginning of the 19th century owing to altered conditions of the country, yet that time the prospect of it "kept British Indian Empire in a chronic state of unrest"[28], especially in the days of Sir John Shore and Lord Wellesley. It is said that all the disaffected elements in India sought his invasion, and "from northern Oude and from southern Mysore had gone forth invitations to the Afghan monarch."[29] Dundas, President of the Board of Control, who was confirmed in the "belief of his (Zaman Shah's) hostile designs," wrote to Lord Wellesley that the "ought to keep a very watchful eye upon the motions of that Prince, whose talents, military force, and pecuniary resources, afford to him the means of being a formi-

[28] Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanisthan*, Vol. I, p. 2.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 2—3.

dable opponent."[30] Lord Wellesley assembled a large British army in Oudh under the command of Sir J. Craig to protect the Nawab's dominions against this apprehended invasion. He also utilised Persian friendship by sending two missions to Persia, one under Mehdi Ali Khan 31, a naturalised Persian who was acting as the Company's Resident at Bushira, and the other under Captain John Malcolm. The relations between Afghanistan and Persia, where two of Zaman Shah's brother, Mahmud and Firuz, had taken refuge, were strained at the time, and the Shah of Persia ordered and also personally conducted military operations against Zaman Shah. "The actual result of the Persian military operations was slight, but the consequent retirement of Zaman Shah from Lahore to Peshawar, in order that he might be ready to fight if necessary, relieved the Afghan pressure on India."[32] Zaman Shah's last days were very much embittered due to conspiracies and strifes between the Badozis, that is, members of the royal family and the Barakzais under Payendah Khan. The sons of Payendah Khan, led by the eldest Fateh Khan went to Khorasan, where they joined Prince Mahmud Mirza to organise an open revolt. Zaman Shah, who was at that time also troubled with revolts in Peshawar, the Punjab and Kashmir, was overthrown, captured and blinded. His minister Wafadar Khan was publicly executed at Kabul. Thus Mahmud became the Shah of Afghanistan, whilst Zaman Shah fled to Bokhara, to Herat and finally to India. Here at Ludhiana, the once "dreaded Afghan monarch whose threatened invasion of Hindostan had for many years been a ghastly phantom haunting the Council Chamber of the British Indian Government," survived his blindness for half a century as a pensioner of that Government.

[30] Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 638.
[31] Sykes, *History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 299.
[32] *Ibid.*

and as a witness of the greatness of his former vassal Ranjit Singh and his successors' vicissitudes.

Mahmud (1800—1803) was however a Shah only in name and remained a puppet in the hands of Fateh Khan, who had succeeded his father as chief of the Barakzais. Soon the city of Kabul became the scene of sanguinary disorders, which the incompetent ruler failed to suppress. In 1803 the throne of Kabul was seized by Shah Shuja.

Though begun with clemency, Shah Shuja's reign was not destined to be peaceful, and his end was tragic. "His resources were limited, and his qualities were of too negative a character to render him equal to the demands of such stirring times. He wanted vigour; he wanted activity; he wanted judgment; and above all, he wanted money."[33] As with every Afghan king, it was absolutely necessary for him to bring the powerful chiefs under control. But he made a great mistake in alienating Fateh Khan and other sardars, who stirred to revolt Prince Kaysar, son of Zaman Shah, who had been made governor of Kandahar by Shah Shuja. The revolt was suppressed with great difficulty; Prince Kaysar was pardoned and restored to the government of Kandahar, and Fateh Khan fled to Herat to offer his services to Kamran Mirza, son of his old master Mahmud.

Shah Shuja next reduced Sindh to obedience in 1805. He then proceeded to Peshawar to receive the British Ambassador Mr. Elphinstone, who concluded a treaty with the Shah on 17th June, 1809. But meanwhile Fateh Khan leagued himself with the Qizilbashes, released his old master Mahmud Shah from prison, and occupied Kandahar. Shah Shuja was defeated at Nimula near Gandamak. Mahmud Shah was restored to the throne of Kabul. Shah Shuja then took to a life of wandering intrigue making "new efforts to splinter up his broken for-

[33] Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 28.

tune." In 1812 he was a prisoner at Kashmir, where he remained for about a year, and after his release went to Lahore. "Powerless rather than discouraged," Shah Shuja retired in 1816 to Ludhiana, where he became a pensioner of the Company like his brother Zaman Shah.

Mahmud Shah, thus restored (1809—16) to the throne of Afghanistan, was a man of feeble and effeminate character. He "wished for power with reference only to the sweets of life and the pleasures which it procured, leaving to others the cares of government," and he thus became a tool in the hands of his Barakzai minister Fateh Khan. Fateh Khan did not, however, abuse his power, but restored prosperity in Afghanistan. His brother Dost Muhammad (born of a Qizilbash mother) was now his great helper. But his influence proved to be galling to Mahmud Shah and so in 1818 the latter got him arrested, blinded and literally hacked to pieces. The ignoble death of this once wise and brave Barakzai minister was a great disaster for the ruling family of Afghanistan. The whole country was soon in Barakzai hands except Herat, where Mahmud Shah and Prince Kamran found refuge and commended themselves to the overlordship of Persia. Mahmud died in 1829 and was succeeded by Kamran at Herat.

For a few years (1818—1826) Afghanistan remained without a strong ruler, as the Barakzai brothers were divided among themselves, each of them trying to set up one or other Durrani puppet on the throne. At length in 1826 Dost Muhammad Khan made himself master of Kabul. He was afterwards formally elected king by an assembly of the chiefs and was proclaimed Amir by the chief Mulla with all the necessary ceremonies. A man of better character than his contemporaries, Dost Muhammad was endowed with courage, enterprise and activity, and he ruled for twelve years with vigour and ability. He foiled an attempt of Shah Shuja in 1834 to recover his throne, but owing to the treachery of his brother Sultan Muh-

ammad Khan, Peshawar was lost to the Afghans for ever in the same year and it could not be retaken in spite of their successful expedition of 1837 and the victory of Dost Muhammad's son at the battle of Jamrud on 1st May in that year. Thus Dost Muhammad remained surrounded by dangers on all sides. "On the north there were revolts in Balkh; on the south one of his brothers was holding out against him at Kandahar; on the east he was harassed by Ranjit Singh at Peshawar with Shah Shuja and the British Government in the background; on the west there was Mahmud Shah and Kamran at Herat, with Persia plotting behind and Russia looking in the distance." In these circumstances he naturally sought to conclude an alliance with the English, provided the latter did not help Shah Shuja in plots to regain the throne of Afghanistan, and provided they helped him to recover Peshawar from Ranjit Singh.

Just at this time the course of European politics exercised a decided influence in reshuffling the political relations among the powers in Asia. The central facts which determined these relations were the Eastern ambitions of Russia and her designs in Asia especially since the treaty of Gulistan, concluded between Russia and Persia in 1813, and the anti-Russian policy of the British ministry, chiefly of Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs in England. According to the treaty of Teheran, signed on 25th November, 1814 between England and Persia, "all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain." After the death of Abbas Mirza in the autumn of 1833 and of Fateh Ali Shah in the autumn of 1834, Muhammad Mirza, son of the former, became the Shah of Persia. He was a close friend of Russia and the Muscovite influence now became paramount at the Persian court. Russia was now "making a cat's paw of Persia and

urging the Shah to seize Herat." The ambitions of Russia caused great anxiety to British statesmen. At Russian instigation, the Shah of Persia actually laid siege to Herat (November 1837 to September 1838) which was, however, relieved due to the brave defence of the Afghans and the heroic exertions of a young British lieutenant, Eldered Pottinger, who was then travelling in Afghanistan. But British suspicious had now been deepened into alarm.

In 1836, Lord Auckland, the nominee of the Government of Melbourne in England, came out as the Governor-General of India. In May 1836, Muhammad sent a congratulatory letter to Lord Auckland on his arrival and solicited his help against the Sikhs; the Governor-General pleaded that it was "not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states." Dost Muhammad, thereupon, made overtures to Persia and Russia, "not because he wanted a Russian alliance, but to facilitate diplomatic pressure on the British." But the Governor-General, whose mind, in common with those of the other Whigs in England, was deeply perturbed by the prevalent 'Russophobia,' could not allow things to take their own way. Lord Palmerston, who saw in Russian designs "imminent peril to the security and internal tranquillity" of the Indian Empire, urged on the Government of India to take necessary steps for counteracting the ambitions of Russia. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors through its letter dated 25th June, 1836, instructed the Governor-General to "judge as to what steps it may be proper and desirable for you to take to watch more closely, than has hitherto been attempted, the progress of events in Afghanistan, and to counteract the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory.

The mode of dealing with this very important question, whether by despatching a confidential agent to Dost Muhammad of Kabul merely to watch the progress of events, or to enter into relations with this chief, either of a political or merely, in the first instance, of a commercial character, we confide to your discretion, as well as the adoption of any other measures that may appear to you desirable in order to counteract Russian advances in that quarter, should you be satisfied from the information received from your agents on the frontier, or hereafter from Mc Neill, on his arrival in Persia, that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan. Such an interference would doubtless be requisite, either to prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that quarter, or to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence."

Alexander Burnes was sent by Lord Aukland to the Amir ostensibly on a commercial mission but in reality to judge political matters. Dost Muhammad, who preferred an alliance with the English to one with the Russians, agreed to accept the overtures of the British Government if the latter helped him in the matter of reoccupying Peshawar from Ranjit Singh. Burnes also recommended an alliance with him. But Lord Auckland and his advisers, like his two secretaries, Willam Macnaghten and John Colvin, who were possessed with an entire distrust of Dost Muhammad, refused to put any pressure on Ranjit Singh and to accept Burnes' suggestions. The Amir, therefore, naturally drifted into a Russian alliance, and Viktevitch, the Russian agent, who had already arrived at his court, but had been before received "in a scurvy and discouraging manner," was now received with more favour when his last efforts for securing the friendship of the British Government failed. Thus after a fruitless mission Burnes left Kabul on 26th April, 1838.

Lord Auckland failing, through his own fault, to utilise

Afghan friendship for checking Russian designs now resorted to an unfortunate step leading to ruinous consequences. He had pleaded the doctrine of non-interference in the private affairs of neighbouring states; but now he formed a resolution that the *de facto* government of Afghanistan should be upset and the exiled Shah Shuja should be restored to the throne of Kabul with the help of the Sikhs. Macnaghten, Secretary to the government, was sent to Lahore and a tripartite treaty was accordingly arranged between Shah Shuja, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the British Government on 26th June, 1838. Lord Auckland did not at first intend to send British troops beyond the Indus. His idea was to make a demonstration of force at Shikarpur, while Shuja would regain the throne with his own followers and the help of his Sikh allies. But he was soon convinced that this would not be possible without more effective military actions. On 1st October, 1838, he issued a manifesto from Simla, which contained an official justificaton of the proposed Afghan War and in which, in the words of Sir Herbert Edwardes, "the views and conduct of Dost Muhammad were misrepresented with a hardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied." "The welfare of our possessions in the East," remarked the Governor-General in that manifesto, "requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement." After the withdrawal of the Persian from the siege of Herat (9th September, 1838), the news of which reached Lord Auckland sometime in October, the danger of Russo-Persian aggression was removed for the time being, and "the legitimate object of the expedition across the Indus was gone. All that remained was usurpation and aggression." But the Governor-General announced to the world by the General Order of 8th November that the intend-

ed expedition should still be carried on "with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier."

Lord Auckland's Simla Manifesto, his plan to dethrone Dost Muhammad and his policy of war against Afghanistan have been justly censured from different points of view. In the Simla Manifesto "lies were heaped upon lies." Lord Auckland's note about Dost Muhammad's "unprovoked attack upon our ancient ally" has been compared by Trotter "for truthfulness with the wolf's complaint in the fable against the lamb." It was issued by the Governor-General without the concurrence of the Supreme Council of India, against the advice of his Commander-in-Chief and in opposition to the wishes of the Court of Directors. All impartial writers have held that the plan of reinstating Shah Shuja by deposing Dost Muhammad was morally indefensible. As an independent sovereign of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad had every right to form an alliance with Russia however opposed it might be to the interests of the British. Moreover, it is also to be noted that he drifted into an alliance with Russia and Persia after he had been refused British help, which he so earnestly desired, by Lord Aukland and his advisers. This step was also politically inexpedient. Dost Muhammad was a capable ruler and he had been able to secure obedience of the Afghan tribesmen. Shah Shuja, though possessed of some capacity, had been an unlucky victim of failures. His cause was not supported in Afghanistan and he had no chance of becoming popular there by being reinstated with the help of an alien Christian power and a Hindu (Sikh) power that had grown at the expense of several Muslim states. Thus the expedition was commenced, observes Kaye, "in defiance of every consideration of political and military expediency; and there were those who, arguing

the matter on higher grounds than those of mere expediency, pronounced the certainty of its failure, because there was a canker of injustice at the core. It was, indeed, an experiment on the forbearance alike of God and of man; and therefore, though it might dawn in success it was sure to set in failure and disgrace." Among those who disapproved of it and predicted its failure were the Duke of Wellington, Lord Wellesley, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr. Edmonstone, Mountstuast Elphinstone, Sir Henry Willcock and Mr. Tucker. The Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Tucker that "the consequence of crossing the Indus, once to settle a government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial march into that country." Lastly, as already noted elsewhere, the poor excuse of the Russian menace which the Auckland government pleaded had disappeared before the operations actually commenced, and it would have been a wise piece of statesmanship to retire at that time from 'an untenable position.' Under pressure from London, the Russian Government recalled its agents; the Shah of Persia withdrew from the siege of Herat (9th September, 1838); and this "cut from under the feet of Lord Auckland all ground of justification, and renderd the expedition across the Indus at once a folly and a crime." But no consideration could prevent Lord Auckland and his advisers from launching into a war, which has been pronounced by Innes, as probably "the most unqualified blunder committed in the whole history of the British in India."

The 'Army of the Indus', intended for the occupation of Afghanistan, assembled at Ferozepur, towards the close of November, 1838, under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane. But he had to resign his command owing to ill-health before the Army of the Indus began its march, his place being taken by Sir John Keane from Bombay. On account of Ranjit Singh's objection to the passage of British troops through his dominions, it was arranged that Shah Shuja, with the main army

under Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton should march on Kandahar by way of Bhawalpur, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the Bolan and Khojak Passes (i.e., via Quetta to Kandahar), thus traversing a distance of a thousand miles between Ferozepur and Kabul, while the Sikh expedition, accompanied by Colonel Wade and Shah Shuja's son Timur, should invade Afghanistan by way of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. "The plan." remarks Dr. Smith, "violated all the conditions of sound strategy, and was that of a lunatic rather than of a same statesman." Sir W. Macnaghten, envoy and adviser at Shah Shuja's court, proceeded with the expedition in charge of its political implications, Sir Alexander Burnes acting as his chief lieutenant. The march through Sindh involved a flagrant violation of the treaty of 1832 with the Amirs of Sindh, whose consent was extorted by the Governor-General through intimidation. Both the Bengal and the Bombay forces were very much thinned in numbers before they reached Kandahar after undergoing great sufferings for lack of water supply and provisions. However success at first attended the British arm, Kandahar was occupied in April, and Ghazni was stormed in July. Dost Muhammad evacuated Kabul on 3rd August 1839; and on the 7th Shah Shuja entered there triumphantly without any popular welcome or even a 'common salaam'. "It was," says Kaye, "more like a funeral procession than the entry of a king into the capital of his restored dominions." On 2nd November, Dost Muhammad surrendered himself to Macnaghten; he was sent down as a prisoner to Calcutta where be was well treated. For a little while it appeared that the Brithish arms had received a fresh lustre. But as we shall see, by the end of 1841, " that lustre, such as it was, had been lamentably besmirched."

Lord Auckland decided to keep in Afghanistan 10,000 Bengal troops under General Cotton and General Nott was summoned from Quetta to command at Kandahar. The rest

of the troops were sent back in the interior of India. The Governor-General committed two fatal mistakes at this time. Firstly, he appointed General Elphinstone, an old incompetent officer in bad health, to the command of the army in Kabul against the advice of his Commander-in-Chief, who preferred General Nott. Secondly, by an extraordinary folly, which prepared the way for the ultimate disaster, the citadel of Kabul, known as the Bala Hisar, was in deference to Shah Shuja's request made over to him for housing his seraglio, and the troops were cantoned in indefensible plains exposed to attacks on every side while the commissariat stores were placed in a separate quarter.

The difficulties of the Afghan position were increased by the death of Ranjit Singh (27th June, 1839) and the confusion at Lahore, which followed it. In Afghanistan itself the situation was full of dangers and difficulties, and these now quickly appeared. Shah Shuja could never secure a national support; he could be maintained only with British arms and Sikh backing, which latter had now failed. "The palace of his fathers had received him again; but it was necessary still to hedge in the throne with a quickset of British bayonets." The Governor-General now saw that it was not advisable to withdraw the British army of occupaton if Shah Shuja was to remain as the ruler of Afghanistan; the feeling against him was so strong among the people there that an evacuation of the country was thought impossible even when the surrender of Dost Muhammad "seemed to offer a legitimate opportunity" for it. But the cost of maintaining the English army of occupation was heavy (a million and a quarter a year at the lowest estimate) and this meant a heavy drain upon the resources of India, for which she could expect nothing in return. The presence of the English in Afghanistan also increased the prices of all the necessaries of life, which affected the chiefs as well as the poor. Further, the political system established by

the English in Afghanistan contained elements of decay. The Shah remained a puppet in the hands of the British officers, who for various reasons became unpopular. "The double government," says Kaye, "which had been established was becoming a curse to the whole nation."

In these circumstances, the course of safety probably lay in the British withdrawing with Shah Shuja, when his position seemed to be untenable in Afghanistan. But Macnaghten, who saw that "everything was quiet from dan to Beersheba," that their prospects were "brightening in every direction," that everything was "*couleur de rose*," scouted the very idea of withdrawal as "an unparalleled political actrocity." Lord Auckland thought that this sort of withdrawal would mean a confession of the failure of his policy, and he did not want to "purchase the advantages of their withdrawal at the price of the failure of the Afghan expedition." He decided to retain the English army of occupation and to follow a policy of economy by withdrawing from the tribal chiefs the subsidies for which alone they had so for adhered to the British. "This misplaced economy produced its natural results" in the shape of outbreaks in different parts by the autumn of 1841.

In Kabul the danger was "aggravated by the habitual and flagrant misconduct of some of the English there." On 2nd November, violence and alarm reigned in the city; a mob attacked the house of Alexander Burnes, and murdered him, his brother Charles and Lieutenant William Broadfoot. The insurgents also sacked the house of Captain Johnson, the Shah's Paymaster. The mob did not at the beginning exceed 100 men; but all this took place when 5000 troops remained idle within easy reach of the insurgent city. A timely relief would have saved the life of three English officers, and "stamped out the little fire which grew by sufferance into a wide conflagration." The English officers betrayed on this occasion a sad want of promptness, energy and ability. Their indecision, in-

activity and differences of opinion with one another were responsible for these disastrous results. "Burnes did not believe the outbreak to be a formidable one; Macnaghten did not believe it to be a formidable one; and Elphinstone was entirely swayed by the opinion of his political associates." On the other side, Muhammad Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad, a young man of daring and energy, appeared in Kabul as the leader of the Afghans. On 23rd November, the Afghans won a victory, which in the opinion of Eyre, was decisive, over an English force in the Bemaru hills, and the English troops began to lose heart. In reply to certain overtures from Kabul, Macnaghten opened negotiations, but nothing came out of it as the Afghans demanded unconditional surrender.

The news of these disastrous events, which began to reach Lord Auckland from 25th November, 1841, disconcerted him. The situation became, day by day, more critical for the English; and Macnaghten, apprehending starvation, concluded a humiliating treaty on 11th December, by which it was provided that the British forces should evacuate the country as soon as possible (within three days), that Dost Muhammad and all other Afghans detained in India should return to Kabul, and that Shuja should either remain on a pension in Afghanistan or should go to India with the British troops. But there was mutual distrust between the contracting parties; Macnaghten added irresolution to weakness by entering into negotiations with the Ghilzai and the Kazilbashi chiefs. "His mind," remarks Kaye, "was by this time unhinged; his intellect was clouded; his moral perception were dead." This attempt to divide the enemy was a suicidal step on his part. He was soon betrayed by them, was drawn into a conference with Akbar Khan on 23rd December and was murdered there with one of his companions Mr. Trevor; Lawrence and Mackenzie escaped with their lives through great perils.

Thus the British envoy was murdered and his companions

were seized within a few hundred yards of an entrenchment occupied by 4500 troops. But "not a hand was raised to rescue the supposed captives or to avenge their fate." Major Eldred Pottinger, who received the office held before him by Macnaghten, wanted to reject all terms with the Afghans, and to occupy Bala Hissar to the last or to cut their way to Jalalabad. But he was overruled by Elphinstone and other military officers, to whom adversity had offered no lesson and who remained quite apathetic towards the vindication of national honour and thus stood for evacuation. The treaty was ratified on 1st January, 1842, the guns, muskets and ordnance stores having been previously surrendered. On 6th January the retreat from Kabul began, the sick and the wounded being lodged in the Bala Hissar; "the British troops," a crouching, drooping, dispirited army," and camp-followers 16,000 men in all, proceeded through storm and snow and heavy shower of bullets from the Afghans, Akbar and his fellow chiefs having lost all control over them. In the course of two or three days several women and children, and many officers, including Pottinger, George Lawrence and Elphinstone himself were handed over to Akbar Khan as hostages. Many lives were sacrificed; "the retreat became a rout, the rout a massacre." The last desperate attempt was made by the English, on 11th January, at the Jagdalak Pass, when twelve officers lost their lives. Of the 16,000 men that had started from Kabul, all perished with the exception of 120, who remained as prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan, and one Dr. Brydon, "sorely wounded, and barely able from exhaustion to sit upon the emaciated best that bore him, "reached Jalalabad on 13th January, to relate the story of this terrible catastrophe.[33]

[33] Macdonald, however, in his letter of 17th June, 1842, refers to "the Journal of the Serjeant Major of the 37th Native Infantry, containing his account, as an eye-witness, of the occurrences from the date of General Elphinstone's force quitting Kabul, until its final destruction, and his (the

There was, however, one relief for British honour amidst these ignoble reverses; Nott and Rawlinson gallantly defended Khandahar, and Sale and Broadfoot held Jalalabad against the attacks of the Afghan tribesmen.

When the news of these cumulating disasters reached Lord Auckland, he became despondent and unnerved. But he tried to cover his folly by issuing on 31st January, a General Order, in which he described the great disaster as "a partial reverse" and "a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British Indian army." He and his colleagues tried to take measures "for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British Government." The first relieving force under Brigadier Wild passed through the Khyber and captured the fort of Ali Masjid, but was compelled to fall back. Colonel George Pollock, an able officer of the Bengal artillery, proceeded to Peshawar, but before he could start for relieving Jalalabad, Lord Auckland had to leave his office.

Mr. Kaye throws the responsibility for the failure and disasters of the Afghan expedition on the military commander Mr. Elphinstone, though there were also other causes.[84] He believes justly that England's policy in Afghanistan was unrighteous, and remarks "that the wisdom of our statesmen is but foolishnes, and the might of our armies is but weakness, when the curse of God is sitting heavily upon an unholy cause."[85] Captain Trotter gives a critical explanation for this "tremendous Nemesis". He observes: "the utter collapse of that (Lord Auckland's) policy baleful, lawless, and clundering as it was, sprang mainly from the choice of agents ill-fitted for

narrator's) making his escape to Jellalabad. It is a far better account than Dr. Brydon's who seems scarcely yet to have recovered his reason, which in his fright he certainly lost for the time."

[84] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 330.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

their work. Macnaghten's cheery trustfulness, Elphinstone's bodily and mental decay, Shelton's stupid wilfulness, chronic dissensions between the civil and military powers, Sale's withholding of timely succour, all conspired with Lord Auckland's half-measures and ill-timed economies, to work out the dramatic Nemesis of an enterprise begun in folly and wrong-doing."

Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta and took the oaths of office on 28th February, 1842. He stated his policy with regard to Afghanistan in a letter, written on 15th March, to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir J. Nicolls. He declared that the British Government would no longer "peril its armies and with its armies the Indian Empire" for supporting the Tripartite Treaty. Therefore, he said that whatever course was hereafter adopted "must rest solely upon military considerations, and that British military reputation should be reestablished by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans....." But the news of the defeat of General England at Hakalzai on 28th February, and Palmer's surrender of Ghazni led him to alter his resolution, and he issued orders for the evacuation of Kabul and Kandahar without any thought of reprisals or for the rescue of the prisoners, about a hundred and twenty of them being still in the hands of the Afghans. Neither Pollock nor Nott however moved immediately, but pleaded want of carriage and the dangers of a hasty retreat as reasons for their standing fast. The situation in Afghanistan had in fact greatly improved in the meantime; on 5th April Pollock had passed through the Khyber by a masterly manoeuvring and had joined hands, ten days later, with Sale at Jalalabad, where the garrison had raised the seige by defeating the besieging army in a pitched battle, and at Kandahar. Nott had held his own position by defeating the insurgents. Shah Shuja, the nominal king shut up within the Bala Hissar, was murdered by the son of the Barakzai Nawab, Zaman Khan. The cause of the murder is not definitely known; but "it was doubtless

the inevitable outcome of Barakzai feeling whatever the immediate occasion."[38] Lord Ellenborough's orders for immediate evacuation raised an explosion of indignation among the military officers; but just in time, he "discovered a way to maintain a particularly empty show of consistency, and at the same to satisfy the universal demand for the decisive reconquest of Kabul and recovery of the prisoners as a preliminary to withdrawal." On 4th July he wrote letters to Nott and Pollock repeating the orders for withdrawal, but suggesting to the former that he might, if he did not think it to be too risky, retire from Jalalabad via Ghazni and Kabul and also permitting the latter to co-operate with Nott should that officer "decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghazni and Kabul."

By the middle of August, Pollock knew of Nott's intention to "retire to India via Kabul and Jalalabad," and on 20th August he marched out of Jalalabad with 8,000 of his best troops. On 23rd he reached Gandamak and drove a body of the Afghans from the neighbouring fort and village of Mamu Khel. Having heard that Nott had started, he left the place on 7th September, defeated the Ghilais at Jagdallak on the 8th, and on the 13th won a decisive victory over Akbar Khan at Tezin near the pass of Khurd Kabul; on 15th September he was in Kabul and hoisted the British flag once again at Bala Hissar on the next day. On the 17th he was joined by Nott. Nott had marched out of Kandahar on 7th August at the head of 8,000 choice troops, "confident alike in their leader and in themselves." He occupied Ghazni on 6th September, destroyed the fortifications and carried away the gates of the tomb of the Ghazi, which Mahmud Ghaznavi had, it was believed, taken there eight centuries ago from the Hindu temple of Somnath in Gujrat. The English prisoners, who had been during these months shifted from place to place, were rescued.

[38] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 515.

But Colonel Stoddard and Captain Conolly, who had been sent to form friendly relations with the Amir of Bokhara, were beheaded there publicly in a market place. "The glory of the avenging army at Kabul was marred by acts of barbarity" when the great bazar at Kabul, which Pollock himself called "the grand emporium of trade in this part of Central Asia", was blown up by gunpowder and many unoffending men had to suffer before the city was evacuated on 12th October.

Lord Ellenborough in a proclamation from Simla, which was issued on 10th October but was dated 1st October, demonstrated the utter failure of Lord Auckland's Afghan policy and declared:

"The Governor-General will willingly recognise any government approved by the Afghans themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states.

"Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace, to the protection of the Sovereigns and chiefs, its allies, and to the prosperity and happiness of its own faithful subjects."

In another bombastic proclamation addressed to "All the princes and chiefs, and people of India," he announced: "Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of eight hundred years is at last avenged." He wanted to commit this "glorious trophy of successful war," as he called it, to the princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwara, of Malwa and of Gujrat, who were to "transmit the gates of sandalwood through your respective territories to the restored temple of Somnath." The proclamation was at once farcical and full of mischief. "The folly of the thing," remarks Kaye, "was past all denial. It was a folly, too, of the most sense-

less kind, for it was calculated to please none and to offend many. It offended the feelings of the Muslims, the Hindus did not care about it, while it was pointed out by antiquarians that the gates were made much later than the eleventh century, 'of no wood more precious than deal or deodar.' It simply subjected the Governor-General to ridicule and censure; the rest of the world remained completely unaffected by it. Lord Ellenborough met the returning troops in a grand review at Ferozepur amidst a great display of pomp. Dost Muhammad was released and returned to Kabul, where he regained his power and ruled till his death in 1863; his subsequent career, especially his successful opposition to Persia in 1856, showed "how entirely superfluous the whole disastrous episode had been."

Commenting in conclusion on the policy of the Afghan war, M. Kaye[87] has remarked that "no failure so total and so overwhelming as this is recorded in the pages of history. No lesson so grand and impressive is to be found in all the annals of the World.....It is upon record that this calamitous war cost the natives of India, whose stewards we are, some fifteen millions of money. All this enormous burden fell upon the revenue of India, and the country for long years afterwards groaned under the weight." The gains were nothing but the losses were many. The main object of the expedition was to erect a friendly power in Afghanistan as a barrier against encroachment from the West. But "after an enormous waste of blood and treasure" the British only left "every town and village of Afghanistan bristling" with enemies of the English, while the British disasters in that country "encouraged anew the aggressions of the Persian and the intrigues of his Muscovite ally."

For ten years after the restoration of Dost Muhammad as

[87] *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 398—402.

the Amir of Afghanistan, British relations with Afghanistan were "undefined but sullen. They were modified under the pressure of Persian eagerness to expand eastwards and re-conquer Herat and Kandahar." When the Persians attacked Herat in 1855, a treaty was concluded between the British Government and Dost Muhammad by which the former agreed not to interfere with the Amir's territories and the latter promised in return to be "the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company."[88] They fought together against the Persians when they seized Herat in 1856.

Sir John Lawrence, who succeeded Lord Elgin as Viceroy in 1864, advocated a policy of "friendship towards the actual rulers combined with rigid abstention from interference in domestic feuds." He did not interfere in the fierce civil war that broke out in Afghanistan among the relations of Dost Muhammad after his death in 1863. During this period, Lawrence, in pursuance of his policy of "assenting peaceably to the visible facts resultant from a neighbour's settlement of his own affairs after his own fashion,"[89] recognised each combatant in turn as he succeeded in asserting his authority. But when Sher Ali, the third son and heir designate of Dost Muhammad, made himself the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan, Sir John Lawrence sent him a present of £60,000 and 3,500 stands of arms. He said; "while strictly refusing to enter into anything like a defensive alliance with the Amir of Kabul, I think it should be carefully explained to him that we are interested in the security of his dominions from foreign invasion, and that provided he remains strictly faithful to his engagements we are prepared to support his independence; but that the manner of doing so must rest with ourselves."

[88] Atchison, Vol. XI, p. 340.

[89] *Essays on the External Policy of India, by* J.W.S. Wyllie, edited by Sir W. W. Hunter (1875), p. 119.

This policy of Lawrence, described as the "Policy of Masterly Inactivity," has been bitterly attacked by some as well as strongly defended by others. The grounds of defence are that British interference was forbidden by the clauses of the existing treaties, that every reasonable advantage was secured by remaining passive, and that interference would have thrown the Afghans into the arms of Persia or Russia. The critics of the policy have pointed out that non-interference was impracticable. When in 1867 the chief rivals sought Russian help, Lawrence declared that if there were any chance of the Persian occupation of Herat then the British Government should "openly assist the party at Kabul, if at the time being that party should appear to be in a condition likely, with such assistance, to hold its position." He did not strictly conform to it when he sent material aid to Sher Ali in 1868. Moreover, the real object of establishing a strong and friendly power in Afghanistan was not secured; on the other hand, the policy "seemed to the Afghan chiefs rather cold-blooded and selfish, and made it difficult to establish really friendly relations between the Governor-General and the Amir." Sher Ali himself said that the "English look to nothing but their own interests and bide their time." Lawrence has also been charged with lack of insight into and want of information about the facts of Central Asian and Frontier history. This is, however, true that his policy was 'cheap and cautious.' It prevented international conflicts.

Russia, thwarted in her push towards the Straits after the Crimean War, had been meanwhile advancing steadily through Central Asia towards the northern Afghan frontier. In 1864 the Russians touched the borders of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva, the three great Muslim Khanates, which had then lost their old greatness and whose absorption, therefore, by the Russian Empire "was as nearly a natural process as anything political can be." In 1865 the Russians annexed Tashkand;

in 1867 the new province of Russian Turkestan was constituted with General Kaufmann as its first Governor-General and in 1868 Bokhara fell after sending a desperate appeal to Lawrence. One principal motive for this Russian advance towards Afghanistan was the strengthening of the Muscovite political influence in Europe. Thus, the expansion of Russia was bound to be a menace to British interests in India and to influence the policy of the British Government.

Lawrence was not entirely blind to the Russian question. He tried to solve it by pressing the Home Government for coming to some definite agreement with Russia in Europe instead of occupying some advanced positions in Asia. If that were done, England, according to him, could have no legitimate objection to Russian advance but could rather welcome it as a means of a European power civilising the Central Asian people. This view, though enunciating a grand Utopain principle, was rather unpolitical; Russian advance in Central Asia could hardly be compatible with the position of the British in the East. Lawrence thus "seems wholly to have ignored the point that unless England could entrench herself so strongly in Central Asia as to convince Russia of the futility of movements in that direction, an agreement in Europe could only be reached by subordinating English to Russian interests on the continent."

Lawrence was succeeded by Lord Mayo, a member of the Conservative party in England, who was selected by the British Premier Disraeli. With regard to Afghanistan his "policy was no reversal, but a continuation and development" of that followed by his predecessor. In pursuance of this policy, the Viceroy gave to Sher Ali the second amount of £60,000 which Lord Lawrence had promised and met him in a conference at Ambala in March 1869. The Amir came with five distinct objects in view; he hoped for a definite treaty, a fixed annual subsidy, assistance in arms or in men to be given 'when he

might think it needful to solicit it for a clear engagement "laying the British Government under an obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency; and not only that Government generally but that Government as vested in himself and direct descendants, and in no others," and lastly for a recognition by the British Government of his younger son Abdullah Jan as his heir to the exclusion of the elder son Yakub Khan, who had helped him much in securing the throne but had since incurred his displeasure. But the British Government was not prepared to agree to those terms. The Viceroy succeeded in defeating the Amir's objects by his diplomacy and was able by his personal charm and winning manners to impress him. The Amir was further informed by Lord Mayo that the Government of India would "view with severe displeasure" any attempts on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. Some English writers have tried to represent the Ambala Conference as a grand success; but it is doubtful if the non-commital policy of the British Government was very much pleasing to the Amir and "it is possible that he was less pleased than he was believed to be." Alarmed by Russian advance the Amir had no help but to be satisfied with these hollow promises of the British Government, and on his return to his capital he tried to carry out some reforms according to the suggestions of Lord Mayo.

But the absorption of the Khanates on the Oxus by Russia and her steady advance towards the northern frontier of Afghanistan rekindled the Amir's anxiety and alarm. So, though his belief in the support of the British Government had been gradually waxing, in July he sent an envoy to meet the Viceroy in a conference at Simla for securing 'an unequivocal guarantee against Russian attack.' Lord Northbrook (1872—1876) was prepared to comply with the Amir's requests. But his proposal was not supported by the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India in the first Gladstone Ministry.

The Cabinet, influenced by the ideas of Lawrence, thought that there was no necessity for any such formal guarantee, and asked Northbrook to limit his assurances to a simple declaration that "they will maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan." Being thus disappointed in his hope of an alliance with the British Government, the Amir now turned towards Russia for support. It would be wrong to accuse the Amir of insincerity towards England. Placed between two forces, one of Russian expansion and the other of British advance towards his kingdom, the Amir realised that it would be eventually necessary for him to form an alliance with the one or the other. We have seen that for long he preferred Great Britain to Russia; but the former's cold and unsympathetic attitude led him to seek the latter's help. The British Government might very well have effected a slow and tactful modification of Lawrence's policy to suit the changed circumstances of the case.

British indifference thus eventually evoked Afghan hostility; two other circumstances widened the breach. The Government of India was at this time ill-advised enough to arbitrate on the boundary claims of the Persians and Afghans in Seistan. Instead of bringing about peace between the two neighbouring powers, the British decision simply irritated the Amir, who regarded it "as a substantial measure of injustice." Another cause of offence was that when Sher Ali declared his son Abdullah Jan as heir apparent, the Viceroy did not express his willingness to recognise him as such.

The Amir was coming more and more under Russian influence. The exchange of letters between Afghanistan and Russia, which had been started in 1870 by General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, became frequent from 1875, and the Russian agents also began to appear in Kabul. Events were gradually drifting towards a crisis. The Amir ceased to consult the British Government about replies

to Kaufmann's letters and was suspected of holding secret conferences with the Russian agents. Lord Salisbury asked for absolute discontinuance of correspondence between Russia and Afghanistan but the Russian Government refused to comply with this.

From 1874 the Government in England had been watching these events with more jealousy and attention than before. In the month of March, Disraeli succeeded Gladstone as the Premier of England with Lord Salisbury as the Secretary of State for India. The advent of these men marked "a sharp swing of foreign policy both in Europe and in Asia." Disraeli, an imperialist to the very finger-tips, naturally looked with distrust upon the Russian policy in Asia and became anxious to counteract her motives. So the old policy of the Lawrence school, which had been one of "general inaction, of subsidies, smooth words, and an amiable acceptance of Russian assurances," had to give way before the spirited foreign policy of the Disraeli Cabinet, which aimed at expanding the limits and enhancing the prestige of the British Empire throughout the world. The new British Cabinet became convinced that the designs of the Russians in Asia must be checked by constant watchfulness, prompt action and tactful diplomacy.

Lord Lytton was now sent out as the Viceroy of India to carry out the vigorous policy of the Disraeli Cabinet. He came, in his own words, with instructions for "a more definite, equilateral and practical alliance" with the Afghan Amir and to obtain his consent for the establishment of a permanent mission. To the Amir might be conceded all the terms that he had asked for in 1873, that is, his subsidy was to be increased, Abdullah Jan was to be recognised as heir to the throne of Afghanistan, and he was to be given a definite promise 'by treaty or otherwise' of British help against foreign attack. But Sher Ali refused to receive the English envoy by pointing out that the British Government was already bound to protect

AFGHANISTAN and N.W. FRONTIER (FROM 1870)



him against Russia and that if he permitted the establishment of a British Resident within his territory, he could not deny the same thing to the Russians. Lord Lytton held that the Amir's reply contained terms of "contemptuous disregard" of British interests and gave him a warning that he "was isolating Afghanistan from the alliance and support of the British Government." Both Lord Salisbury and Lytton insisted on the Amir's accepting a British Resident. "A tool in the hands of Russia," said Lytton, "I will never allow him to become. Such a tool it would be my duty to break before it could be used." They thought that British interests, which had every chance of being jeopardised by unsatisfactory relations with Afghanistan and by the machinations and advance of the Russians, could be safeguarded. But there was something to be said for the Amir as well. As an independent ruler of Afghanistan, it was perfectly within his rights to refuse to accept a British Resident or to enter into relations with Russia, however sharply these might have collided with British interests. The British Government had no moral justification for preventing him from following these courses. "The old Lawrence policy," remarks Mr. Roberts, "was in truth based upon a generous recognition of the rights of small and weak states; the school of Lytton and his followers relied upon a cynical doctrine of political expediency." The view that Britain had every right to treat Afghanistan as a dependency, being in a much weaker and inferior position, does not carry much weight now a days, for the so-called right and privilege of a 'powerful and highly civilised' nation to extend its influence over a country which is 'comparatively weak and barbarous,' against the latter's wishes, honour and sentiments, is only a convenient pretext for the working of subtle diplomacy or aggressive imperialism.

Besides trying to place a British Resident within the Amir's territory, Salisbury and Lytton were anxious to obtain

a position of advantage on the Afghan frontier, for political and military convenience. They accordingly secured the occupation of Quetta, a place of great strategic importance in 1877 by virtue of a treaty concluded with the Khan of Khelat towards the close of 1876. Lord Salisbury also indulged in plans for the extension of British outposts nearer to Afghanistan through the territory of the frontier tribes. According to some this was opposed by the old frontier officials "who looked with suspicion upon any system of diplomacy which required secrecy and dexterity." But, on the other hand, the Viceroy was now, as he himself admitted, bent upon effecting the "gradual disintegration and weakening of the Afghan power."

The destiny of an Eastern potentate was however in these days linked up with the forces of world history, as Asiatic politics had long ago come largely under the influence of the European powers. So Lytton's plans had no chance of success unless the designs of the Russians, who had been as keenly interested in Afghan affairs as England, could be effectively combated. In Europe events tending to intensify Anglo-Russian antagonism were developing quickly. In 1875 Bosnia and Herzagovina rebelled against Turkey, and this led in May 1877 to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war. Any storm in the Near East was bound to move the cabinets of Europe. It was rightly held that England's interests were sure to be hampered by the establishment of Russian influence over Constantinople, which would give her the supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and thus the control over the shortest sea route to India, Australia and the Far East. Bismarck truly said that "the Suez Canal was the neck of the British Empire;" and it had been the policy of British statesmen like Canning and Palmerston to prevent Russia from fishing in the troubled waters of the Black Sea. Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield) took a similar view of the affairs in the East, and after obtaining from Parliament a grant of £ 6,000,000 for

naval and military purposes, he despatched a fleet to Constantinople, and Indian troops were sent overseas to Malta. In March, 1878, Russia concluded with the Sultan the treaty of San Stefano, "well-calculated to offend Europe." Its terms "could not be accepted either by Great Britain, who saw all her worst nightmares of Russians in India realized, or by Austria, who saw her cherished dreams of a port on the Aegean for ever falsified." The Beaconsfield Cabinet denounced it, prepared for war, secured the Sultan's permission for the occupation of Cyprus and sent reinforcements to Mediterranean squadron. War between England and Russia seemed inevitable; but it was averted by the mediation of Bismarck. The question was referred to a Congress of the European powers, which sat in Berlin from 13th June to 13th July and offered only a temporary solution of the problem. The decision of the Berlin Congress being rather unfavourable to Russia influenced in a way the course of Asiatic politics. Russia's designs in the Near East being foiled by the action of Great Britain, she sought recompense in Asia by opposing there the march of British imperialism.

As a sort of counterpoise to the concentration of English fleets and Indian troops in the Mediterranean, the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan "sought a specific alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan and initiated a military movement" in the direction of Afghanistan and India. From Tashkhend a body of 20,000 men marched towards the Afghan border, and another body towards the Pamirs and Kashmir. On 13th June, the opening day of the Berlin Congress, Colonel Stolietoff proceeded from Tashkhend to Kabul carrying a letter from Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General, to the Amir with a draft treaty. The Amir made "desperate attempts" to oppose the enemy's advance. But the latter ignored them, reached Kabul on 22nd July, 1878 and negotiated a treaty. The Amir probably received a guarantee against external

attack, and even on the strength of the very moderate promises of the Russians, he now defied the overtures of the Government of India.

Lytton, with the approval of the Home Government, now insisted that Sher Ali should receive a British envoy in his letter, which reached Kabul on 17th August, the day on which the Amir's favourite son, Abdullah Jan, died. The answer to Lytton's letter was so delayed. The Amir consulted the Russian envoy who was still at Kabul and who asked the Amir to postpone the reply as long as possible while he himself went to Tashkhend to seek the official help of the Russian Cabinet for the Amir. This encouraged the Amir to turn a deaf ear to English negotiations.

Lord Lytton thought that the treaty of Berlin had "freed our hands and destroyed, at the same time, all hopes on his (Sher Ali's) part of complications to us or active assistance to himself, from Russia." He sent Sir Neville Chamberlain, with a small escort, on a mission to Peshawar but the latter was prevented from passing beyond Ali Masjid, a post at the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The British Government regarded this as a direct affront on itself. On 2nd November the British Government sent an ultimatum, which was to expire on the 20th, to the Amir demanding from him a "full and suitable apology" and his consent to the acceptance of the proposed mission. But no reply came from Sher Ali before 30th November, and British troops had already begun to move on the day after the ultimatum expired. All this while the Amir solicited help from the Russians but the latter found themselves unable to afford it because of the Berlin treaty and Kaufmann asked him to make peace with the English if he could get an opportunity. Thus was Sher Ali duped at a moment when he required Russian help most for meeting a situation which had arisen by his acceptance of the Russian mission.

War being declared on 21st November, the British armies advanced by the three great passes of Afghanistan, —one under Sir Samuel Browne through the Khyber, another under Major-General Roberts through the Kurram valley and a third under General Stewart marched from Quetta through the Bolan Pass. Kandahar was occupied almost without any opposition; Sher Ali fled into Russian Turkestan and died on 21st February, 1879, at Masar-i-Sharif. His son Yakub Khan opened negotiations and concluded the treaty of Gandamak on 26th May, 1879. By this agreement the foreign affairs of Afghanistan passed under British control; the Amir handed over to the English the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi and agreed to receive a permanent Resident at Kabul with agents at Herat and other places on the frontier; he was promised an annual subsidy of six lacs and was assured of help in men, money and arms against foreign attack at the discretion of the English.

The treaty of Gandamak "marked the apogee of Lord Lytton's Afghan policy. It seemed to have secured for the English all that they had desired. Lord Beaconsfield said that the English had obtained "a scientific and adequate frontier" for their Indian Empire. But their hopes were belied before long. The very fact that Yakub Khan was now supported and guaranteed by a foreign power wounded the feelings of the Afghans; the selection of Kabul as the residence of the British agent was 'dubious and ill-omened,' and lastly neither the new Amir nor the British agent, Major Cavagnari, was fitted by his character and abilities to ensure the success of the settlement. The former was, in the opinion of those who met him, 'shifting, unstable, lacking in character,' while the latter though 'resolute and forceful,' was not "suited for a position of delicacy."

Major Cavagnari was at first well received when he reached Kabul on 24th July, 1879, but he was murdered on 3rd September with the whole of escort by a body of mutinous Afghan troops, Yakub Khan making no effort to save him.

"The degree of Yakub's complicity was never ascertained..." This affair sounded the death-knell of the Gandamak settlement. Measures of retribution were promptly adopted by the British Government. Sir Donald Stewart immediately re-occupied Kandahar; Yakub Khan appeared in the British camp on 27th September and threw himself upon British protection, and General Roberts marched through the Khyber to Kabul which he entered on 12th October after inflicting a defeat on the rebels at Charasiab and punishing those who had taken part in the murder of the British agent. Yakub Khan was deported to India as a state prisoner, and he lived at Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. Lytton and the Government in England thought of disintegrating Afghanistan by placing a chief at Kandahar, a region in which the English were most interested, and by establishing a cantonment at Pishin. But the affairs suddenly took an unexpected turn by the appearance of Abdur Rahman, son of Afzal Khan, the eldest son of Dost Muhammad, as a claimant for the throne of Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman had been living as a pensioner in Russian territory since 1870; in 1878 Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General, had thought of installing him as Amir in place of Sher Ali if the latter proved intractable; now in 1880 he took leave of the Russian Governor-General to start for Afghanistan to try his luck. He was an able man and had "inherited his grandfather Dost Muhammad's vigour, judgment and ferocity." Soon after his arrival, Lord Lytton decided to recognise him as Amir, but his plan could not be carried out immediately because of the change in the ministry in England and in the office of the Governor-Generalship of India.

The foreign and Indian policies of the Beaconsfield Government had excited strong criticism and bitter condemnation among the Liberals in England. Lord Hartington described Lytton as "the incarnation and embodiment of an Indian policy which is everything an Indian policy should not be."

The Beaconsfield Government was defeated in the election of 28th April, 1880; Gladstone became Prime Minister of England for the second time and Cranbrook and Lytton were replaced respectively by Hartington as Secretary of State and Ripon as Viceroy. But on reaching India, Ripon recognised Abdur Rahman as Amir on the conditions that he was to "have no political relations with any foreign power except the English, and that the districts of Pishin and Sibi were to be retained by them." The Amir was promised an annual subsidy; by obtaining a control of the foreign relations of Afghanistan, the Viceroy now dispensed with the demand for the maintenance of a British Resident in Afghanistan. A rival to the new Amir soon appeared in the person of Ayub Khan, a son of Sher Ali, who then held Herat under his control. On 27th July, 1880, he defeated a British force under General Barrows at Maiwand between Kandahar and the Helmand river, and compelled the rest of the vanquished to take shelter within the walls of Kandahar. But they were soon relieved by Sir Fredrick (afterwards Lord) Roberts (destined to be one of the greatest British military leaders during the next 35 years), who effected a brilliant march from Kabul to Kandahar and routed the army of Ayub Khan at the battle of Kandahar. Ayub Khan was finally overpowered in the month of September by Abdurrahaman who now established his undisputed authority over Afghanistan. Lytton's plan of partitioning the kingdom of Afghanistan was abandoned, and Ripon withdrew all British troops from that country.

Opinions are divided about the desirability and usefulness of the Second Afghan War. It has been "condemned as a war of aggression and as a war that failed of its object." It is indeed true that imperialistic expansion necessitates a resort to questionable aggression, and there is no doubt that Afghanistan had become subject to it. But in this case, the British aggression on Afghanistan was chiefly meant to check Russian

designs in Central Asia about which there could be no doubt, as the events of 1878 clearly showed. Thus it cannot be said that the Second Afghan War was wholly unnecessary in the interests of the British Empire in India. Neither was it altogether fruitless, though it cost so much in men and money. "The Russianised Amir was expelled" and one friendly to the English took his place; the designs of Russia received a check. The Khan of Khelat passed under British control, the province of British Baluchistan was formed with the addition of two new and important districts of Sibi and Pishin and Quetta was definitely occupied by the British, who also secured the uninterrupted use of the Bolan Pass.

Russian ambitions, which received a temporary setback, sought outlets for expansion as soon as opportunities appeared due to the external difficulties of the Gladstone ministry. "Fortified by a secret treaty with Germany," the Russians tried to encroach on what was in those days regarded as Afghan territory, though they occasionally proclaimed that their intentions were protection and peaceful development of trade. Their occupation of Merv in 1884 gave rise to much popular excitement in England and made some action on the part of the Liberal Government absolutely necessary. Lord Ripon's Government had agreed to a Russian proposal for a joint commission with the object of delimiting the Russo-Afghan boundary lines in dispute lying between the rivers Hari Rud and Oxus. A British Indian official, Sir Peter Lumsden, and General Zelenoi were appointed heads respectively of the English and Russian commissions; they met for the first time after much delay caused by Russia, on 1st October, 1884, a month before Lord Dufferin arrived as the Viceroy of India (1884—1888). But a peaceful settlement was delayed by Russo-Afghan disputes about their respective territorial rights and by April 1885 discussions reached a deadlock. While Lumsden had been waiting in North-Western Afghanistan, the Russians

occupied the Zulfiqar Pass and came into collision with the Afghan troops at Panjdeh situated a hundred miles due south of Merv, on 30th March, 1885. They drove a body of Afghan troops out of Panjdeh and interrupted the telegraph line from Meshed to Teheran.

These events nearly precipitated a war. Public opinion in England was deeply incensed against Russia and the Conservatives clamoured for strong action; in Russia also the war party had influenced over the Emperor. Gladstone's position thus became critical. But a risky and calamitous war was prevented by the tact of Lord Dufferin, the diplomacy of the home Government and the good sense of the Amir. The Amir, who had already arrived at Rawalpindi for an interview with the Viceroy, did not lose himself in the excitement but considered the whole thing in a calm way and became determined to avoid war at all costs. The Viceroy, who was wise enough to refrain from wounding the national sentiments of the Amir and his people, acceded to his suggestions and he returned home with satisfaction. Meanwhile, Gladstone, who, in the first flush of resentment, had characterised the Russian attack on Panjdeh as "an unprovoked aggression," sought to satisfy the clamours of the British war party by calling up the reserves and asking for a vote of eleven million pounds for extra military preparations. The Russian government was placated by Gladstone's consent to refer the question to the arbitration of the King of Denmark and the Russians retained Panjdeh but the Zulfaqir Pass was given to Amir.

Gladstone's dexterity could not however lead to any successful issue and the proposed arbitration did not turn up. His ministry fell in June and his successor, Lord Salisbury, took over the negotiations. The Boundary Commission resumed its work, Sir West Ridgeway continuing the work of Sir Peter Lumsden, who had been recalled. After a good deal of negotiations between Kabul, Simla, London and St. Petersburg,

the line of demarcation between Russian and Afghan territory was finally settled by a protocol signed at St. Petersburg in July 1887.

Six years of comparative quiet followed but the feelings of mutual distrust were not completely extinguished. Disputes were received by the Russian advance towards the Pamirs and no settlement was reached till by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1895. Afghanistan surrendered the territory north of the Panjdeh while the Russian protectorate of Bokhara gave up that portion of Darwar lying south of the Oxus. The southern boundary of the Russian Empire was fixed at the Oxus. There was temporary cessation of Anglo-Russian hostilities.

The period after 1884—85 saw a great expansion of Russian railway policy, uniting finally the Trans-Caspian and the Orenburg Taskhend lines at Kush on the Afghan frontier. In 1900 the Russians sought to place the Governor-General of Turkestan in direct communication with the Kabul government, and they repeated this demand in 1903 in terms which the Government "deeply resented." On 21st March, 1905, a treaty was concluded between the Government of India and Amir Habibullah, who had succeeded his father Abdur Rahman in 1901, whereby the engagements between the former and the latter's father were renewed. But both in the time of Curzon and Minto, he was suspected of leanings towards Russia. All these made an understanding between England and Russia necessary but it was prevented firstly by the influence of German diplomacy and secondly by the strong differences of opinions between the Viceroy, Lord Minto II (1905—1910), and the Secretary of State, Sir John Morley, who was a man of strong personality, anxious to take a more active and direct part in the administration of India than the former Secretaries had done. In 1906, when the negotiations for a settlement had been formally opened, Lord Minto pointed out that it would not be proper to enter into any definite agreement with Russia

without a previous discussion on this matter with the Amir Habib-ul-lah. But this view was wholly rejected by Morley, who insisted that "the terms should only be communicated to the Amir as a settled thing." The India Office further proposed to allow direct communication between Russia and Afghanistan. The Viceroy was strongly opposed to this concession, and so the proposal was abandoned after long discussions. There was another proposal of the Secretary of State to the effect that England and Russia should suspend the construction of strategic railways for a period of ten years. This also was justly opposed by the Viceroy, who pointed out that England would be loser by it because while the "Russian scheme was practically complete, the English one was not," and this proposal also was therefore dropped.

An understanding was at first reached by the Anglo-Russian Convention signed on 31st August, 1907. So far as 'Afghanistan was concerned, the Convention left her political status unchanged. Russia definitely acknowledged that this country lay outside her sphere of influence and she also agreed to conduct her relations with the Amir through the British Government, and equal commercial privileges were provided for English and Russian traders. It was stipulated that these clauses were to take effect after the Amir had formally signified his assent. But this formal assent was refused by the Amir, who "regarded this union of the two great neighbours with natural suspicion." Russia, however, followed the agreement.

The Pan-Islamic forces received an additional stimulus for uniting against the combination of the European powers. The orthodox sections in the Muslim countries did not like very much the attempts of the European powers towards westernisation of Islamic peoples, and they now tried to utilise religion as a bond of union among themselves. Russia and Turkey were at loggerheads with each other; German agents at Kabul

were engaged in exciting Afghan hostility against England; and the differences between the old allies, England and Turkey, went on increasing. Pan-Islamism could not work ahead so long as Russia and England remained allied. But matters took a serious turn after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the consequent disappearance of the recently formed Anglo-Russian alliance, when the aggressive Islamic parties got a favourable opportunity.

The ill-advised attempts of the Amir Habib-ul-lah to introduce Western manners and customs into his country, even to the extent of changing the dress of the ladies of his zenana, made him unpopular with the orthodox and anti-British party, and he was assassinated on 20th February, 1910. His son, Aman-ul-lah, the new ruler of Afghanistan, discarded the policy of his father and grandfather, and manifested designs of hostility against the English. This led to the third Afghan War, one of the many episodes in the Epic of the first Great War. Aman-ul-lah crossed the frontier and commenced ravaging British territories. After meeting with some reverses, the British Indian Army succeeded in finally repulsing the Afghan attacks. The war came to an end by the treaty of Rawalpindi signed on 8th August, 1919, which was confirmed by another treaty concluded on 22nd November, 1921. By these treaties Afghanistan secured her freedom from British control in external affairs. The British subsidies to the Afghan Government were confiscated; but the British Government agreed to sanction the residence of an Afghan minister at London and the Afghans got the privilege of importing goods into Afghanistan through Indian ports duty free. The close of the year 1921 saw friendly relations established between the British Government and Amir Aman-ul-lah, whose accession had been marked with open hostility. In 1922 an Afghan minister was appointed at the Court of St. James and a British minister at the Court of Kabul. In June 1923, an Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention

"put into formal shape the obligations accepted by the British Government under the Treaty of 1921 in respect of goods in transit, through India to Afghanistan." Afghanistan had also recently concluded a treaty of alliance with the National Government of Angora. Thus "buttressed in her foreign relations with her neighbours," she "embarked upon a new era of internal development" in administration, education and commerce. Certain incidents almost caused another Anglo-Afghan friction during the year 1923-24, but the danger was averted by British representations and friendly action on the part of the Afghan Government.

The far-reaching and rather hasty internal reforms of the Amir Aman-ul-lah (who refused to take a lesson from his father's life) were not liked by the conservative sections of his people, and soon produced a civil war, which was watched by the Government of India with grave anxiety. Aman-ul-lah had ultimately to abdicate the throne, which was usurped by Bachai-i-Saqqa, a remarkable adventurer, and the country remained in a state of strife and confusion during 1929. During this civil war, the Government of India withdrew its representative from Kabul and maintained neutrality. Order was, however, restored during the subsequent year by an officer of the late Amir, Muhammad Nadir Shah, who became the next king by general choice and Indo-Afghan relations were again satisfactorily re-established. Nadir Shah was slowly working out almost all the modernising schemes of Aman-ul-lah, but with great caution and tact, and the foreign relations of Afghanistan were also developing rapidly, both in the diplomatic and commercial spheres, but he was soon assassinated by a partisan of the pro-Aman-ul-lah faction.

SECTION V
BRITISH INDIAN RELATIONS WITH PERSIA, TIBET AND BHUTAN

A. PERSIA

During the closing years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the British dominion in India was threatened by perils from beyond the Indus. At the same time Lord Wellesley was effecting a marvellous transformation of the Company's position in India, he also paid due attention towards safeguarding it against external dangers. In 1799 he sent Mehdi Ali Khan, a naturalised Persian who had been acting as the Company's Resident at Bushire, on a mission to the Shah of Persia, with the object of putting pressure on Zaman Shah of Kabul, who aspired to play the aggressive role of his predecessor Ahmad Shah Abdali.

But more dangerous than the designs of Zaman Shah would have been the success of the intrigues of the French in interior Asia or the materialization of plans of advance of Russia through it. The British Government, therefore, sought to secure the friendship of Persia, and despatched in 1799 Captain John Malcolm on a mission to the court of the Persian Shah. It was partly a commercial and partly a political mission, and resulted in success. Malcolm had negotiated a commercial and a political treaty with Haji Ibrahim, the Shah's Wazir, and these were formally signed on 28th January, 1801. By the commercial treaty it was provided that the English and Indian merchants should be permitted to settle free of taxes at the ports, and that English broadcloth, iron, steel and lead should be admitted free of duty. The political treaty was meant to put pressure on the Afghans and to check the extension of French influence in Persia.

For six or seven years after the treaties had been signed, "profound indifference concerning Persia prevailed in Calcutta," and in the meanwhile chances of Russian advance and of growth of French influence re-appeared. In 1801 Russia

annexed Georgia and planned further advances. The Persians suffered heavily in Armenia in 1804, and disgusted with the procrastination of England, who was then in temporary alliance with Russia, the Shah sought French help. This led to the growth of French influence in Teheran, but nothing positive took shape as the convention of Tilsit (1807), by bringing France and Russia into alliance, changed the whole situation.

The British Governments in London and Calcutta now awoke to the need of "doing something" to counteract the designs of Napoleon in the East. In 1808 Minto sent Captain Malcolm on his second mission to the court of Persia, whilst a similar mission under Sir Harford Jones (afterwards Jones Bridges) had at the same time been despatched thither by the British Cabinet. Malcolm reached the Persian Gulf in May 1808, when French influence was dominant at Teheran; he met with an uncourteous reception and returned completely unsuccessful to Calcutta, where he urged that an expedition should be sent to take possession of Karrak, an island in the Persian Gulf. Sir Harford Jones appeared in the scene after Malcolm's departure, when a reaction against the French influence had set in at Teheran, and he met with better luck. He concluded a preliminary treaty with Persia on the 12th March, 1809.[40] The projected invasion to Karrak was disowned. The proceedings of Sir Harford caused a good deal of friction with the Government of India, but Lord Minto soon accepted the arrangements he had made by insisting that "the execution of the treaty, should be entrusted to an officer nominated by himself." Accordingly Malcolm was sent on a third mission to Persia. "It was indeed a mere pageant, and a very costly, but not wholly a profitless one."[41] It yielded excellent

[40] Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII, p. 46.

[41] Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 72, footnote.

literary fruits in the shape of Malcolm's valuable *History of Persia*, Pottinger's *Travels in Beluchistan*, and Kinner's *Geographical Memoir*. Henceforth the control of diplomatic relations with Persia remained in the hands of the British Cabinet, though from 1826—35 the nomination of the Persian envoy was entrusted to the Government of India. A definitive treaty, based on Sir Harford Jone's preliminary agreement, was signed between England and Persia on 24th November, 1814.[42] By the terms of this treaty "which was specially declared to be defensive, all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void ,and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain,.....As regards Afghanistan the British Government was not to interfere in case of war breaking out between Persia and the Amir, whereas Persia, on her part, agreed to attack Afghanistan if it went to war with Great Britain."

From the treaty of Gulistan (1813—14) up to the year 1826 there was at least an outward observance of peace between Russia and Persia. But hostilities broke out again in the latter year. On the strength of the Treaty of Teheran by which England had promised to help Persia against any European invader if she herself was not the aggressor, the Shah of Persia appealed to his ally for help; but the British excused themselves from affording it on the plea that Persia was the aggressor, though "it is certain that the real provocation came not from the Mahomedan but from the Christian state."[43] Persia was defeated and had to conclude the humiliating treaty of Turkomanchi in February 1828. 'After the defeat of

[42] Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 336. Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 103—107; Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I.

[43] Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 152.

Persia, the British Government tried to 'salve their political conscience' by taking advantage of the embarrassments of Persia to cancel that article of the definite treaty by which they were bound to afford her military or pecuniary aid and by paying a large idemnity to their stricken ally. But English influence henceforward steadily declined at the Persian Court, while that of Russia became predominant.

During the period 1832—57, Persia, 'facile tool' in the hands of Russia, was goaded by her to make "persistent though unsuccessful efforts.....to recover provinces on the eastern confines of the Europe in order to balance heavy losses on the west." Besides expeditions to Khiva and Khorasan, the main Persian objective was Herat, which was besieged several times and was once (1856) actually occupied for a short period; Persia also intended to advance further into Afghanistan, which would threaten the British Indian Empire and thus serve Russian interests. The "game of quiet intimidation" which Russia was now trying against the British Empire in India through the agency of Persia caused apprehensions in the minds of the British statesmen. The Government of India, therefore, made "strenuous efforts to keep Afghanistan outside the spheres of influence of both Russia and Persia, not shrinking from an Afghan campaign, from costly missions, or even from war with her old ally Persia (1856)."[44] Peace was concluded with Persia in 1857, after which relations with Persia improved from the British point of view.

British policy towards Russia was intimately connected with England's position in the Persian Gulf. Her interests in the Gulf were vital and it was necessary on her part, for commercial as well as political reasons, to maintain a general control over all the coastline eastwards from Aden to Baluchistan. For her, as she thought, it was highly important to keep

[44] Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

open and safe the trade route to India over the sea-washing Arabia and Persia and to prevent other powers from creating a fortified base or making territorial acquisition on either seaboard of the Persian Gulf. In short, for her eastern supremacy, her control of the Gulf was to remain inviolate. But this attitude of England provoked the resentment of the Continental powers, France, Russia, Germany and also Turkey, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and led them to challenge British paramount influence in the Gulf. But the attempts of the European powers to sap the supremacy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf led England to formulate her claims openly. Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, made the following declaration in the House of Lords on 5th May, 1903 :—"I say it without hesitation, that we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." Britain thus asserted her "Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East" and has tried to maintain it ever since.

Such a strong policy on the part of England was also meant to safeguard her interests in Persian waters against the growth of Russian influence in Northern Persia and her attempts to spread it southwards. Lord Curzon, long before he became Viceroy, urged the extension of British influence by excluding that of the other Powers. As Viceroy he visited the Gulf in 1903 and enforced his policy by several other measures, such as the Sistan Mission of 1903—05 under Sir Henry McMahon, the establishment of consulates in the ports and the internal trading centres, the projection of a railway from Quetta westwards to Nushki, a distance of 93 miles, the construction of a road from Nushki to the frontier post at Robat Kila, a distance of 327 miles; and opening of a postal service along the route with frequent telegraph offices and stores and reorganisation of

the Indo-Persian customs and tariff. Thus Lord Curzon was markedly successful in his Persian policy.

From 1905—10 Persia passed through internal disorders and troubles, and attempts to establish democratic institutions in that stronghold of despotism produced disastrous consequences. Russia and England, however, tried to settle the nature of their respective interests in Persia by peaceful negotiations, and this resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention, signed on 31st August, 1907. Under it the contracting parties bound themselves to respect the integrity and political independence of Persia, and Persia was divided into three spheres of influence. "Great Britain obtained the south-east corner, including all the territory within a line drawn from the Afghan frontier through Gazik, Birjand and Kermand to the sea at Bunder Abbas. Russia secured the whole of Nothern Persia. Her sphere extended through all the territory north of a line drawn from Kasr-i-shirin on the Turkish frontier, through Isfahan, Tezd and Kahk to the point where Russian and Afghan frontiers intersect.....The intervening regions, including the greater part of Southern Persia and the whole of the Gulf coast on the Persian side, constitute the third or neutral sphere." Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, declared that the Persian Gulf was not included within the scope of the convention but that Russia had expressed during the negotiations that she would not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Gulf. Each country declared that she would not "seek for herself or her own subjects or those of any other country any political or commercial concessions such as railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport or insurance" within the other's sphere or should not prevent the other party from obtaining those concessions there.

The Convention, of course, averted Anglo-Russian conflict in Persia between the years 1907—10. But it evoked criticism for certain features. As Sykes observes, it gave "grave

offence to the Persians" as Persia was not consulted about the new arrangement.[45] It is true that "there is something amazingly cynical in the spirit in which Western powers dispose of the heritage of their races."[46] It has been characterised as an "imperfect instrument," and many politicians held that the British gains were meagre as compared with those of Russia, as the Russian sphere of influence included half the country while that of England was too small. But one should remember in this connection that Russian influence had already extended very much over Northern Persia, and, therefore, in this respect Great Britain, in the words of Sir J. D. Rees, "had not so much given away advantages as accepted a position that had grown up."

Persia continued in a miserable plight before the first Great War and during it. At the outbreak of the war, she declared strict neutrality. But the central European powers tried to "embarrass Great Britain and Russia by creating disturbances in Persia, in Afghanistan and on the frontier of India, and to force Persia into the world war on their side."[47] Great Britain took strong steps to counteract these hostile moves. Her position became better by 1914, and by the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August, 1919, she reiterated her old promise to "respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia," and further agreed to help her in the preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers, in the improvement of her communications and in a fair revision of the customs tariff. This agreement was, however, annulled by the Persian Government in February 1921. There was rapidly developing in these years a national renaissance in the three Islamic states of Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia, who tried together to 'westernise their subjects.'

[45] Sykes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 414.
[46] Lovat Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
[47] Sykes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 442.

B. TIBET

While the British Government had been trying to secure the North-West Frontier, attention was also drawn further to the North-East where the territory of Tibet touched the Indian borders in the mountains. Being nominally subject to China, Tibet was in reality an independent theocracy, the chief authority in the state being vested in the Dalai Lama of Lhasa but for many years no Dalai Lama had grown up to maturity, each in turn expiring at such age as left powers with Councils of Regency.

The East India Company's relations with Tibet, which had begun in a friendly manner in the time of Warren Hastings, turned, however, to be gradually unsatisfactory. In 1887 the Tibetans made an "inexplicable invasion" into the little protected state of Sikkim but they were expelled with losses by General Graham in the next year. This was followed by British negotiations with China, and in 1890 a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and China, which settled the appointment of joint commissioners for considering "the questions of facilities for trade, pasturage for Tibetan cattle in Sikkim, and mutual methods of communication." In 1893 the joint commissioners entered into a further agreement and a trade mart was established at Yatung just over the Tibet-Sikkim frontier. But being determined to keep their country free from the influence of the British Indian Government, the Tibetans paid no heed to those conventions.

Thus, Lord Cruzon, on coming to India, 'found relations with Tibet at an absolute deadlock.' Two new factors had just then appeared in the political situation of Tibet; in the first place, the Chinese showed a strong desire to throw off Turkish (Manchu) imperial domination, and, secondly, after many decades, a Dalai Lama had grown to manhood, and had succeeded in overthrowing the Regency Government by a *coup d'etat*. This was due to the influence of Dorjieff, his

tutor during his minority and a Russian Buddhist, who had acquired great influence by his residence in Lhasa for twenty years.

Dorjieff conducted several religious missions to Russia (which had many Buddhist subjects) in 1898, 1900 and 1901. The Russian Foreign Minister assured the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that the object of these missions was religious. But rumours rapidly spread that Russia had entered into a secret treaty with China, by which the latter ceded at least some of her rights in Tibet to the former. The British Government, which had no means of testing the validity of these stories, believed that the missions sought to serve political purposes under a religious garb, and naturally suspected the Grand Lama of leanings towards Russia. Lord Curzon thought of meeting the situation by sending a mission, and in November, 1903, he persuaded the Home Government, which was not at first in favour of any advance into Tibet, to sanction his proposal after a good deal of argumentation. The mission started in 1904 under Colonel Younghusband, and after baffling the attempts of the Tibetans to check its advance, reached Lhasa on 3rd August. Finally, a treaty was concluded by which "marts for the exchange of goods were to be opened, an indemnity (greatly reduced by the Home Government) to be paid, and the Chumbi Valley occupied for three years as a temporary pledge." China's suzerainty over Tibet was confirmed by the action of the British Foreign office in taking her into confidence.

According to one school of writers, Lord Curzon "by his policy of persistence crushed a cleverly-veiled design" hostile to the imperial interests of England, while in the opinion of another school he "seemed to have embarked upon a course of unwarranted and disastrous interference with a weak and independent state." This much is certain that politically the mission had very little or no importance, though it might have

a grand spectacular effect in 'unveiling Lhasa'. It should be noted in this connection that a great Bengali explorer, Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., having no dread of the unknown, had entered the forbidden country of the Dalai Lama long before Colonel Francis Younghusband led the expedition across the Himalayas, and therein he was following the ancient and medieval tradition of Bengal missionaries who found wide scope for their civilizing activities in the Trans-Himalayas. In the opinion of Dr. Smith "the expedition of Younghusband was unneccessary and all but fruitless."

The Home Government did not like to offend Russia by the establishment of British supremacy at Lhasa at a time when the two powers were disposed to settle their differences in Central Asia, and preferred, therefore, a conciliatory policy. On 2nd June, 1904, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, assured the Russian ambassador that "so long as no other power intervened, Great Britain would neither annex Tibet, nor establish a protectorate over it, nor attempt to control its internal affairs." By the Anglo-Russian convention of August, 1907, both Russia and England agreed to carry on their political relations with Tibet through China, not to send direct emissaries to Lhasa and to interfere in its internal administration and not to acquire any part of Tibetan territory. During the next four decades, however, trade relations between British India and Tibet increased, and communications and mutual knowledge considerably improved, so that indirectly British Indian influence in Tibet became a tangible force.

C. BHUTAN

British relations with the Bhutanese, a large group of hill tribes in the Eastern Himalayas, began since 1772 when in helping the local chief of Cooch-Behar, they expelled them from that principality. Bhutan was a dependency of Tibet; and after the conclusion of a treaty of peace with the Teshu

Lama in 1774, Warren Hastings sent George Bogle to Lhasa for trying to open up commercial relations. But this led to no result owing to the untimely death of the Teshu Lama. A commercial mission under Turner followed in 1783 but it proved a failure. The British acquisition of Assam in 1826 brought them into closer contact with the Bhutanese, who carried on depredations into the Duars (doors) or passes leading into Assam. Several unsuccessful negotiations, *e.g.*, Pemberton's mission in 1838, followed; and the affairs on this frontier remained unsatisfactory, while Bhutan itself was frequently in the throes of revolutions. A mission was sent by Lord Elgin under Hon. Ashley Eden (4th December, 1863—12th April, 1864). But the envoy was insulted by the Bhutanese who compelled him to sign a humiliating treaty surrendering to them the Duars leading into Assam. This treaty was repudiated by the Government of India, and war followed. At first the British frontier officials conducted the war inefficiently and in January 1865 the Bhutanese drove out a British garrison at Dewangiri with the loss of two guns. Peace was, however, concluded in the month of November. The Bhutanese ceded the eighteen Duars in return for an annual subsidy of £ 5,000. A strip of territory, about 180 miles long and from twenty to thirty miles broad, was added to British dominions. Lord Lawrence acted wisely in not further prosecuting the war, and British relations with Bhutan became since then cordial.

SECTION VI

The Eastern Frontier : Conquest of Burma and Assam

A government of India has to take into account the political importance of the North-Eastern frontier as well. Mughal imperialism, especially in the time of Aurangzeb, tried to push its limits towards this eastern frontier; and the British Empire in India was, in course of its territorial expansion, also drawn

towards it. The English had commercial relations with Burma since 1587. The eastern boundary of Bengal, in which was included the district of Chittagong, for long remained 'very ill-defined and variable'. Immediately south of Chittagong lay the Kingdom of Arakan, south of that Pegu, and south of that again the coastland of Tenasserim. In the latter half of the eighteenth century while in the north of India a kindred people, the Gurkhas, were conquering Nepal, a Tibeto-Chinese race rapidly brought Arakan, Pegu, Tenasserim and the whole basin of the Irrawaddy under the sway of a new kingdom of Burma with its capital at Ava.

The region of Pegu was conquered by a Burman chief named Alampora from the Talaings in the delta of the Irrawaddy (Trikalingas, old colonists from the three Kalingas or East Coast of India), and thus was established a strong expansive monarchy in Further India about 1750 A.D. Under his successors, chiefly under his third son Bodoaphra who as the sixth sovereign of the dynasty reigned from 1779—1819, the Burmese kept on expanding in all directions. Bodoaphra was succeeded by his grandson Hpagyidoa, who was greatly responsible for the Burmese War of 1824. The Burmese conquered Arakan in 1784, established their control equally over Upper and Lower Burma by 1793, and next pushed on close to Surma Valley in 1813. These Burmese conquests made it necessary for the English to open political intercourse with the Burmese; and their Government in Calcutta accordingly sent envoys to Burma,—Captain Symes in 1795 and 1802; Captain Cox 1797; Captain Canning, 1803, 1809, 1811. But the envoys were not favourably treated and the missions proved unsuccessful, while the contemporary political missions to the North-Western Asiatic States produced better results.

The advance of the Burmese on the Chittagong frontier made an ultimate collision with the British inevitable. Fugitives flying from the territories conquerd by the Burmese

took shelter over the British border and used their new quarters as a base of inroads into the conquered provinces. The British Government steadily declined to surrender them to the Burmese in spite of repeated demands to this effect on the part of the latter. So, when the British were engaged in the large-scale campaign against the Pindaris, the King of Ava in 1818 sent a letter to Lord Hastings demanding the surrender of Chittagong, Dacca, Murshidabad and Kassimbazar on the ground of their being ancient dependencies of Arakan, part of the Burmese dominions (possibly referring to the Magor-Arakanese practical domination of the riparian tracts of E. & S. Bengal in 17th and 18th centuries). But before the letter reached Calcutta, the British had been relieved of pressures from other quarters, and the Governor-General returned the communication to the King of Burma with the remark that it was perhaps a forgery. After a temporary respite, the Burmese resumed their role of conquest and annexed the Hinduised Ahom Kingdom of Assam in 1821-22, which brought them into contact with the whole north-eastern frontier of British India. They were now prepared to invade British territories; in September 1823 they occupied Shahpuri island, near Chittagong, and soon the British outposts from that island to Dudpatti were driven in by Burmese commanders who also threatened an invasion of interior Bengal.

The Burmese Government paid no heed to the British demands for satisfaction, and war could no longer be averted. It was declared by Lord Amherst on 24th February, 1824. The physical features of Burma, "which was one vast expanse of forest and morass, laced longitudinally by mountain ranges and the valleys of the Irrawaddy, Sittang and Salween," afforded the best defence to the Burmese. As a military force in open fighting the Burmese could not be certainly compared with the British troops of that time, but the former possessed considerable skill in building stockades of timber

with great rapidity, or in throwing up earthworks and sinking rifle-pits.

In considering the plan of operations against the Burmese, the British Government decided that on the frontier, "operations should be in a great measure defensive; but not so exclusively as to preclude the expulsion of the Burmese from territories in which they had recently established themselves by usurpation." The main blow was to be struck through an expedition by sea to Rangoon with the idea that it could then proceed up the Irrawaddy. Bengal Presidency supplied a part of the force required for the expedition; the remainder, forming by far the large portion, was recruited chiefly from Madras (the people of that region being better acquainted with the Burmese). The British armada under the chief command of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell occupied Rangoon on 11th May, 1824. But the entire population had disappeared into the jungles of Pegu leaving Rangoon denuded of every kind of supplies. The expedition had been undertaken in a wrong season and without any satisfactory arrangement for securing supplies. Soon after the occupation of Rangoon by the British, the rains set in, and with them fever and dysentery; while their troops had to depend on the provisions supplied irregularly by the Calcutta contractors. The efforts of Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, gave some relief, but till the end of the rains the English had to remain almost inactive.

Bandula, the ablest of the Burmese generals, had proceeded north to invade Bengal in the same month of May and had repelled a British detachment at Ramu on the Chittagong frontier; but now he was recalled for meeting the counter-invasion of Pegu. On 1st December, the Burmese army, 60,000 in numbers, appeared in front of the British position at Rangoon and threw up entrenchments with great rapidity. After several skirmishes, the Burmese were signally defeated on

15th December, and fell back upon Donabew, forty miles up the river.

Sir Archibald Campbell then decided to advance upon Prome, the second city of the Burmese Empire, and after whiling away some time in dilatory preparations, he commenced his march on 13th February, 1825. But Bandula held out bravely for a month before the column sent against him, and the general advance was delayed till 1st April, when Bandula was killed by a rocket and his troops consequently demoralised beat a hasty retreat during the night abandoning everything, including a store of grain. Three weeks later Campbell occupied Prome, the capital of lower Burma, on 25th April without any resistance, but the rains having set in further offensive operations were again stopped.

After some abortive negotiations, hostilities were resumed. But all the attempts of the Burmese proved unsuccessful against the British troops, and towards the end of December, they opened negotiations for peace, which were entertained by the English, though their army continued its march. The last desperate attempt of the Burmese Government, with an army of 10,000 men, was frustrated by the British forces, who inflicted a defeat on it at Pagan and advanced to Yandaboo within sixty miles of their capital. There on 24th February, 1826, peace was concluded. The King of Ava had to accept British terms by agreeing to surrender absolutely the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim, to interfere in no way in Assam, Cachar and Jaintia, and to recognise Manipur as an independent state, and to pay a heavy war indemnity amounting to a million sterling. Provision was made for the residence of an accredited Minister from each state at the court of the other and for the conclusion of a commercial treaty 'upon principles of reciprocal advantage.' A commercial treaty, "not of nature calculated to place to trade between the two countries on a satisfactory footing," was concluded on 23rd November; but


BURMA
AND
BURMESE WARS
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105
25
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DARRANG
Sadiya
GOALPARA
KAMRUP
NOWGONG
R. Brahmaputra
JAINTIA
CACHAR
Sylhet
R. Ganges
Murshidabad
Cossimbazar
Calcutta
Dacca
Chittagong
UPPER
R. Irrawaddy
Mandalay
Ava
Yandaboo
Pagan
BURMA
Myade
Prome
Pegu
R. Meh-ping
SIAM
Mergui

a British Resident was not admitted before 1830 A.D. From that date Colonel Burney held that office for seven years and discharged his duties successfully. King Hpagyidoa fell a victim to fits of melancholy and had to be kept in strict seclusion. He was deposed by his brother Tharrawaddy in May 1837 and "lived as a prisoner but well-treated, for several years."

The first Burmese war has received much censure for the manner in which it was conducted. "The war had been", remarks Mr. Innes, "in many respects a disastrous one."[48] The expedition had been dispatched "in almost entire ignorance of the circumstances of the country to which it was to proceed, and without any adequate preparation for securing supplies;"[49] it meant a grossly needless waste of life and wealth. Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, observed in April, 1826; "There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated and its success rendered more certain."[50] But for the help that he sent in the shape of reinforcement and supplies, the British troops in Burma would have experienced greater troubles.

Justice should be done to the Burmese soldier who, says Phayre, "fought under conditions which rendered victory for him impossible." The soldiers were recruited from amongst the untrained peasants fighting with crude instruments. But they were experts in the construction of stockades and fought bravely to the best of their ability. It has been observed that "the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer."

[48] *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 182.
[49] Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 91
[50] Gleig, *Life of Munro*, Vol. II, p. 279.

The treaty of 1826 did not, however, close the story of Anglo-Burmese hostilities. The monarch of Burma had no disposition to observe its spirit. The British Residents sent to the Court of Ava were not courteously treated. King Tharrawaddy (1837—45) said; "The English beat my brother, not me. The treaty of Yandaboo is not binding on me, for I did not make it, I will meet the Resident as a private individual, but as Resident, never. When will they understand that I can receive only a royal ambassador from England?" Now this was nothing but a repudiation of the treaty of Yandaboo by the King of Burma, who was, in this matter, "within the Burmese constitution, whereby all existing rights lapsed at a new King's accession until he chose to confirm them." British Residents were now finally withdrawn from Burma. Soon after Tharrawaddy, like his predecessor, was seized with insanity, and was placed under restraint by his son King Pagan (1846—52). The merchants, settled at the coast, complained of ill-usage and harassments at the hands of the Governor of Rangoon. By the summer of 1852, this matter beccame so serious that in the month of September the European merchants at Rangoon sent a memorial to the British Government in Calcutta requesting it to intervene in the matter, and declaring that otherwise they would be compelled to abandon their property and leave Burmese territory.

In response to this appeal Lord Dalhousie sent, two months later, Commodore Lambert to Rangoon in Her Majesty's frigate the Fox to investigate into the complaints of the merchants and to demand compensation from the King of Burma, along with the removal of the Governor of Rangoon. Many have considered this action as being unnecessarily provocative; even John Lawrence, who wished to help and not merely to criticise, wrote, "Why did you send a Commodore to Burma if you wanted peace?" Dalhousie himself later on admitted, "these commodores are too combustible for negotiations."

The British Commodore received a courteous reply from the King of Burma, who sent a new governor to settle the matters; the old governor was recalled but with every mark of honour and in triumph. Lambert sent to the new governor a deputation of senior naval officers, but when the officers reached the palace at the appointed hour they were refused audience and were informed by the servants of the governor that he was asleep. The officers in great indignation returned to the frigate. At this the Commodore demanded the immediate payment of the compensation to the amount of £1,000 sterling and an apology from the governor. As a security for these, he declared a blockade and seized a royal ship. The Burmese Governor replied that the naval officers who had been turned away were drunken; the Burmese batteries opened fire on the Fox and the British Commodore also returned it.

Lord Dalhousie accepted responsibility for Lambert's action and sent an ultimatum to the Burmese Government making a demand for compensation and an indemnity of £ 100,000 to be paid by 1st April, 1852. But in the meanwhile he set himself to make immediate preparations for war, as his plan was to begin the operations before the heavy rains set in. The commissariat, the transport and the medical arrangements were this time well organised, and under the Governor-General's personal superintendence, precautions were taken to avoid the errors of the First Burmese War. The annexation of the Punjab had placed at his disposal the Sikh soldiers, who could be persuaded to take service across the sea without any prejudice to their caste rules. Lord Dalhousie's ultimatum remained unresponded, and on the day it expired (1st April, 1852) a land force of 5,800 men under the Commander-in-Chief, General Godwin, a veteran of the First Burmese War, together with 19 sailors and marines, reached Rangoon. Martaban fell quickly before the British soldiers, and the Great Pagoda of Rangoon was stormed on 14th April, the British

flag being hoisted on its golden dome. This was followed by the capture of Bassein, situated on the north-west corner of the delta of the Irrawaddy. Lord Dalhousie himself appeared on the scene in September. Prome was captured in October and Pegu was finally secured in November. Thus the main military operations came to an end. Dalhousie wanted to stop now, by annexing the occupied portion of Burma; the Court of Directors supported him, but suggested that either Pegu should be voluntarily ceded by a formal treaty or else the British shall advance upon Ava to compel that cession. An advance on Ava would have, however, eventually led to the annexation of all Burma, which Dalhousie wanted at that time to avoid, and the Burmese sovereign also did not come down from Ava to conclude a treaty. Pegu or Lower Burma was, therefore, annexed by a Proclamation on 20th December, 1852.

By the annexation of Lower Burma, the eastern limits of the British Indian Empire were carried up to the river Salween, and the eastern frontier of India was protected against incursions from outside. The entire coast of the Bay of Bengal from Chittagong to Singapore passed under British control, and the independent kingdom of Upper Burma was shut off from access to the sea except through British territory. Major (afterwards Sir) Arthur Phayre was appointed commissioner of Pegu; with the help of Captain (afterwards General) Fytche he introduced various administrative changes for the establishment of law and order within the new province extending as far north as Myede, fifty miles beyond Prome.

Meanwhile a change occurred in the internal history of Burma; Mindon (1853—78), brother of King Pagan, deposed the latter and kept him in imprisonment for the rest of his life. In many respects Mindon was a better man than his four predecessors. He tried, through various friendly means, to get

back Pegu from the British, but his efforts ended in smoke. Upper Burma was opened to trade by treaties concluded in 1862 and 1867 between the Governments of India and Burma. But the relations between Mindon and the British were not quite cordial. The English Resident at Mandalay had always to remove his shoes and to take his seat before the King, with his feet behind him. In 1876 the Viceroy tried to stop this inconvenient practice with the result that thereafter no Resident was allowed into the Palace, and all British Indian business had to be transacted through the ministers outside.

Mindon's death became the signal for disorder in the Burmese kingdom. The rule of his son and successor Thibaw did not prove to be vigorous, but it fell into confusion. For various reasons, the British Government was soon involved in action against (Upper) Burma. King Thibaw's policy in negotiating commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and especially with France was regarded by the English as opposed to their interests. The relations between England and France were at this time embittered over colonial disputes in northern, north-western and central Africa. France, having gained an empire in Indo-China, was trying to establish her influence in Upper Burma. Burmese missions visited that country in 1878 and 1883, and when in January 1886, Ferry, the French foreign minister, concluded a public treaty for trade, "he gave the Burmese envoys at Paris a secret letter promising to permit the import of arms through Tonkin when order was restored." A French Consul, Haas, proceeded to Mandalay; and through him and a Burmese envoy in Paris, negotiations were carried on for the "establishment of a bank at Mandalay; construction of a railway from Mandalay to the new rail head in British Burma, and the management of the royal monopolies, capital and interest to be secured on the revenues of the Kingdom." On the protest of the British Cabinet, the French Government disclaimed all knowledge of the proceedings of their envoy and

recalled him. But this could not remove the suspicions of the British Government regarding French motives.

The immediate occasion for the outbreak of war was supplied by Thibaw's behaviour towards an English firm, the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation. He imposed a fine of ten lacs on the said Corporation on hearing that a French syndicate was ready to take over the Corporation lease of the teak forests. Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy, demanded an enquiry into the case, but Thibaw refused to comply with it. The Viceroy then, with the permission of the Government in England, dispatched to him an ultimatum demanding the admission of a British envoy at Mandalay, suspension of all actions against the Company till the envoy's arrival, subordination of Burma's foreign policy to the advice of the British Government, and acknowledgement of the right of the British to trade with the Chinese through Thibaw's dominions. The King of Burma refused to accept these terms, whereupon the British troops already collected at Rangoon were ordered to advance. General Pendergast moved up the Irrawaddy and took Mandalay without any strong resistance. On 28th November, 1885, Thibaw surrendered himself to the British troops, and he was deported with his family to Ratnagiri in the Bombay Presidency. Upper Burma was annexed to the British Empire by a formal proclamation issued on 1st January, 1886. But operations had to be continued for several years against irregular armed bands before order could be completely restored in Burma. In the meanwhile the process of settlement was carried on. The conquest of Burma brought about some change in the Government of India's diplomatic relations with the Chinese Empire (now its next neighbour) which still maintained vague and formal claims of suzerainty over Burma and Tibet. China's consent to the British annexation of Burma had to be purchased at the cost of abandoning a projected British commercial mission to Lhasa. During the

year 1923-24 the peace of the frontier of Burma marching for some thousand miles with that of China "was threatened by nothing worse than occasional rumours of impending incursions from the borders of Mangmao and Chefang." A Burma Frontier Service was accordingly created for the protection of the tracts adjoining China.

The conquest of Upper Burma is an instance of 'high-handed and rather relentless' procedure for the sake of imperial interests. Lord Dufferin was, from the very beginning, determined on conquering it for protecting the eastern frontier of the Indian Empire against external aggressions, and for checking the growth of French influence in that quarter. Thibaw might have been a cruel and uncompromising king and he might have inflicted some sufferings on the British merchants, "but it would be hypocrisy," says Mr. Roberts, "to maintain that the tyranny of the king or even the impediments he put in the way of British commerce would by themselves have brought his downfall." Then, as an independent sovereign of Upper Burma, which formed no part of the British Empire, Thibaw had every right to negotiate treaties with any power, and it is also to be admitted that the French from Indo-China having entered into Upper Burma at the request of its independent sovereign,' had at least as much right as the British from (Lower) Burma to extend their influence over (Upper) Burma, or even more.' But the history of imperialism, in different parts of the world, shows that all such considerations are swept away before its march, and the conquest of Burma formed no exception to this.

In 1862, Lower Burma, consisting of three commissionerships of Pegu, Tenasserim and Arakan was constituted into a single province of British Burma with headquarters at Rangoon. In 1885, the province of Burma was formed with the combination of Upper and Lower Burma, with headquarters at Rangoon. It was governed by a chief comis-

sioner up to 1897 when it was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor. Legislative power was in the hands of the Government of India until 1897, when the Burma Legislative Council, a small body with limited powers and an official majority, was formed. A special committee, with Sir Frederick Whyte as its President, visited Burma in 1921; its recommendations were in the main approved, and Burma was constituted as a Governor's province at the beginning of 1923. Under the Act of 1935 Burma was separated from India with a distinctive constitution. Burma is now a separate dominion.

The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth saw the decay and fall of the Ahom Kingdom of Assam, and it was conquered by the Burmese in 1821-22. But it soon fell under British control after the treaty of Yandaboo in 1826. The Rajas of Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia were restored to their respective possessions, but the Brahmaputra Valley with the exception of two tracts in Upper Burma, viz., Sadiya and Matak, was placed in November, 1828, under direct British administration, and David Scott was appointed Agent to the Governor-General for the whole eastern frontier from Cachar and Sylhet in the south to the Sikkim country in the north and early in 1833, Purandar Singh was formally made Raja of Upper Assam, except Sadiya and Matak, under British protection on condition of his paying an annual tribute of half a lac of rupees. The other part of the country was retained by the Company and in 1834, when Mr. Robertson had been succeeded by Captain (afterwards General) Jenkins, the British portion was divided into four districts, viz., Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang and Nowgong. The territories left under native rulers were, in course of time, annexed by the British, and the hills tribes were also subdued, e.g., Cachar in August 1832, Jaintia in March 1835, Purandar Singh's dominions in October 1838, Matak and Sadiya in 1842.

In 1874 Assam was placed under a separate Chief Com-

missioner, Lt. Col. R. H. Keating, being the first incumbent of this office. In 1890 an attempt to remove the Senapati or Commander-in-Chief of the Manipur state on the south-eastern border of Assam created some troubles. Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, was sent to settle the affairs, but he was murdered. Mainpur was thereupon occupied by the British troops and it was placed under the control of a British Political Agent, acting on behalf of a minor Raja. On the partition of Bengal in 1905 Assam and Surma Valley were amalgamated with fifteen districts of old Bengal to form a new province, Eastern Bengal and Assam. But when this agreement was changed in 1912, Assam again became a separate unit.

SECTION VII

GROWTH OF AN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

We may now briefly review the main outlines of Indian foreign policy, the details about which have already been noted in the course of our narrative. During the last decade of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, the English dominions were exposed to the invasions by land and by sea, of the French, then engaged in a deadly conflict with England in Europe and elsewhere,—and to those of the Afghans (and, it was believed, of other adjacent powers) from the North-West. The foreign policy of the Company during this period was, therefore, concerned with defeating the designs of those powers. Lord Wellesley was fully alive to the danger of a French invasion of India. We have already noticed how he secured the friendship of Persia by the first mission of Malcolm to the court of Teheran leading to the Anglo-Persian commerical and political treaty of 1800, how his expedition to the Red Sea together with the downfall of Napoleon, destroyed the hopes of the French for a dominion or sphere of influence in the Near and Middle East, and how his Oudh policy con-

tributed to the security of the North-West of the Gangetic possessions of the Company. The defeat and death of Tipu followed by the annexation of the Carnatic Payen Ghat, together with the fall of Tanjore, gave the Company "the full command of the Coromandel seaboard, and so diminished the danger of a hostile landing on that coast." Further, the destruction of the military power of the Northern Maratha states and the alliance of the English with the Peshwa enabled them to acquire the control over the Western seaboard from Goa to the Narmada, to strengthen their position in Gujrat and to occupy Bundelkhand. They also occupied Cuttack as result of a Maratha war, so that the Bengal and Madras seaboards were linked.

Students of Indian History should note that European wars have influenced the course of Indian politics noticeably since the middle of the eighteenth century. This influence became more marked during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The battle of Waterloo dug the grave of Napoleon's ambitions and relieved the East like the West from the spreading pressure of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. But this did not eliminate the influence of European affairs upon Eastern politics. The place of France was now taken by Russia.

Lord Minto took precautionary measures against Russian designs in the East by embassies to the Persians, the Afghans and the Sikhs and a generation later apprehensions of Russian advance led to the First Anglo-Afghan War. For some time after this the Government of India was free from these anxieties because of the visit of Tsar Nicholas to Queen Victoria in 1844 and the formation of an Anglo-Russian *entente* by which the powers agreed to leave the Khanates of Central Asia as a zone of neutrality between the two empires. But the events leading to the Crimean War in 1854 and its results reawakened Anglo-Russian jealousy. Being baffled in the direction of

Constantinople, Russia sought to make amends by an advance through Central Asia, which she steadily carried on, approaching gradually the Northern Afghan frontier.

This Russian advance appeared as a serious menace to the safety of the British Empire in India while Sir John Lawrence had been following his policy of "masterly inactivity" with regard to the North-West. All attempts, made about 1870 to create a netural zone in Asia, failed.

Meanwhile Russian influence went on expanding in Central Asia, and Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, being dissatisfied with the cold behaviour of Lord Northbrook and British arbitration between Afghanistan and Persia in the matter of their boundaries in Siestan, was gradually drifting towards an alliance with Russia. The Balkan Wars (1876—78) complicated the situation, and the decision of the Berlin Congress, by dissatisfying Russia, added to the intensity of Anglo-Russian hostility. Lord Lytton was specially selected as the Viceroy of India for counteracting the Russian danger. He occupied Quetta in 1878, but Sher Ali now welcomed a Russian envoy, refused admittance to an English one and rejected British overtures. Lytton declared war against the Amir and victory remained with the British. But a change of ministry in England resulting in the formation of the second Gladstone administration, which was against the Conservative imperialistic policy towards Afghanistan, compelled Lytton to resign this post. His successor, Lord Ripon, ended the Afghan War but took measures to check Russian designs in Afghanistan.

From 1880 the foreign policy of the Government of India received a new orientation. Besides Russia, "in the eightees, France, under the restless guidance of Jules Ferry, resumed for a while her ancient role of a rival in the colonial world, while German ambitions too, made themselves felt, though so far as India was concerned, rather through their influence on Russian and French and Turkish policy than as a direct force."

The Government of India had thus to be careful to guard not only the north-west frontier towards Afghanistan but also that of the south-east towards Burma and Indo-China, and that of the north towards Tibet. It was not till in the early years of the 20th century that England, France and Russia agreed to sink their disputes in distant lands in view of the stupendous growth of German militarism, against which they subsequently combined in 1914. But the outbreak of the first World War brought into being a more complicated foreign situation for the Government of India. Many German agents tried to provoke the Afghan Amir against the Government of India; the Russian Revolution of 1917 deprived England of Russia's alliance; and the open war with Turkey embittered Muslim feelings against the British Empire, and these were accentuated by the rise of a new Pan-Islamic favour. The termination of the first World War did not bring complete safety to the North-West Frontier of India. "To the menace of German arms there succeeded the more formidable menace of Bolshevik ideas."[61] During 1920 Bolshevik influence increased in Central Asia and the forces of Bolshevism now tried to enter India by gaining footholds in Persia and Afghanistan. Towards the end of that year the Soviet Government in Central Asia underwent some reverses, when the Amir of Afghanistan "invited a British delegation to Kabul, for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of an Anglo-Afghan treaty." But the Soviet agents did not stop their attempts to penetrate India. In the summer of 1921 a Russo-Afghan treaty was ratified, which permitted the establishment of Russian consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni. From the Indian standpoint this was menacing. But the Amir of Afghanistan refused to grant "free transit through his country to the Bolshevik agents; and Russian intrigue was powerless to prevent the conclusion

[61] *India in* 1919, p. 6.

of a treaty between Afghanistan and Great Britain, which implied, if not close friendship, at any rate neighbourly relations."[52] The Amir also gave a written assurance that Russian consulates should be excluded from the neighbourhood of Indo-Afghan frontier."[53] The resumption of Anglo-Russian relations within the next few years "brought about some relaxation of the tension which had previously existed."[54]

India actively participated in the Second World War and its influence upon this country was tremendous in all respects. She has been now taking a prominent part in the organizations which are functioning with a view to securing international co-operation and peace. India has not aligned herself with either of the two powers blocs, but has been marvellously trying to fulfil her historic mission of promoting universal fellowship. The true ideals of India to promote world peace and harmony were splendidly expressed by our President in his speech at the inaugural joint sitting of the two chambers of Parliament on the 21st February, 1955, in the following words, "These five principles which are sometimes referred to as the *Panch Shila*, are, mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. I commend these principles to you and earnestly trust that they will increasingly form the basis of international relations, thus ensuring peace and security all over the world."

[52] *India in* 1922—23, p. 29.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *India in* 1930—31, p. 10.

CHAPTER VII
THE INDIAN STATES

The past history of the Indian States, the policy of the British Government towards them, their present status, rights, duties and obligations and their position in the new India of today, are, for various reasons, topics of immense interest and importance to a student of Modern Indian History. Many of those states rose into independence and prominence during the decadence of Mughal imperialism; but even as independent units owing only a nominal allegiance to the Mughal Emperor they came into contract with a new foreign power, the English, who proceeded to fill in the vacuum created by the subsidence of the former.

Two important points should be remembered at the very outset. Firstly, all the Indian states cannot be placed under one category. Mr. Pannikar thinks that they fall into three distinct classes: "(a) those whose treaties entitle them to full and absolute sovereignty within the state, (b) those who, though treaty states, enjoy criminal and civil jurisdiction and legislative powers only under supervision and (c) those whose rights are based on grants and *sanads*."[1] Secondly, "the transformation of Indian States was partly by force of circumstances and partly by the pressure of irresistible currents of history; and the policy towards them was evolved partly by the official character of the East India Company, partly by the views and ambitions of Governors-General, but mainly by the conviction which developed with Wellesley and continued up to our own time, that the Government of the whole of India directly or indirectly by the British is part of a preordained system."[2]

[1] *Relations of Indian States with the Government of India, Introduction*, xx.

[2] Pannikar, *The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States*, 1774—1858. (*The Calcutta University Readership Lectures*, 1929), Introduction, xi.

Mr. Lee-Warner, in his well-known work, *The Native States of India*, has noticed three epochs in British relations with the Indian States till the introduction of the Reforms; the first, that of the 'Policy of the Ring Fence'; the second, that of 'Subordinate Isolation' from 1813 to 1857; and, the third, that of 'Subordinate Union' from 1857 (to the First Great War and the Reforms). Now a new order has come into existence in free India. According to Lee-Warner, the Company during the first period treated the Indian princes as independent rulers and did not interfere in their affairs. But certain events of history, such as the Oudh affairs during the times of Warren Hastings and Lord Wellesley, the treaty of Banaras of 7th September, 1733, the Rohilla War, Lord Wellesley's policy towards Mysore, and the treaty of the English with Ranjit Singh in 1809,—show that there were a number of important exceptions to this postulated principle, and that the Company intervened in the affairs of some states when it became necessary for self-defence or strengthening of their position. The fundamental idea of the Company's system in the time of Warren Hastings was the defence of their neighbours' frontiers for safeguarding their own territories[3] against the advance and attacks of the Marathas, the Afghans and the Muslim chiefs of Mysore. Lord Wellesley effected a transformation in the position of the Company and left it as almost the predominant power in India. Two points should be, however, carefully noted in the relations of the Company with the Indian powers at that time:—(i) "All the treaties, except that with Mysore, are negotiated on a basis of equality. The Company did not claim any paramountcy or imperial authority, and the treaties themselves clearly show that at least in the case of those States which were not conquered there was a spirit of reciprocity." (2) "Each of these treaties guarantees

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

in a most absolute manner the absolute authority of the Ruler over his subjects and most unequivocally repudiate any claim to intervene in the affairs of the state."[4] Wellesley did not like these features and tried to omit them when possible. Indeed from one point of view, the native states of the earlier half of the nineteenth century afforded examples of the same transitional type of 'double government' which was initiated in Bengal in the middle of the eighteenth century, and gradually spread to Oudh, and South India, and then to the rest of India,—the earlier (and a few later) double governments developing into full British administrative units,—the other double governments getting stereotyped into "Native States", where the evils of double government were minimised partly by the efficiency and policy of the steadily strengthening Central Government, and partly by the growing influence of British India over 'Native' India in many ways.

With the establishment of the Company as a paramount power after 1818 the treaties of reciprocity and mutual amity gave place to those of 'subordinate co-operation.' In the new treaties concluded by Lord Hastings, the Indian states surrendered all forms of external sovereignty, as they could not "make war or peace, nor could they negotiate agreements with other Princes." As regards internal sovereignty, the States retained it in full" so far as the terms of the treaties, and the declared policy of the British Government go."[5] But in actual practice, as is natural in a connection between unequal powers, there was a great deal of interference by the Company in the internal affairs of the Indian states (in Oudh, Mysore, Nagpur, Udaipur, Jaipur, etc.). The nature and degree

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[5] Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 288. Cf. *Hastings' letter to Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad, and his note in his private journal*, dated 6th February, 1916, both quoted in Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, etc., pp. 52—57.

of interference varied in different states according to the 'personality and temperament' of the agent.[6] About Lord Hastings' relations with the Indian States it should be noted that, though an "aggressive champion" of British paramountcy, he was "not an annexationist."[7] Lord Amherst (1823—28), who was mostly occupied by the war with Burma, had no time to initiate a new policy. But the initial reverses of British arms in Burma led some of the States to think of a speedy downfall of the Company's power, and so some disturbances took place in Alwar, in the Sondhwada tract of Central India, and at Bharatpur.[8] In 1823, David Ochterlony sought to place on the throne of Bharatpur its rightful heir Raja Baldeo Singh, a minor. But this was opposed by his cousin Durjan Sal, whereupon Ochterlony ordered troops to march from Delhi in support of his nominee. But his orders were countermanded; he was promptly recalled by the Governor-General, and he died soon afterwards. His successor Sir Charles Metcalfe soon complained that Durjan Sal was fomenting plots against the English amongst the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha States, and declared that British influence was "too prevading to admit of neutrality." Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, marched up with his troops and captured the famous Bharatpur fort on 18th January, 1826. Durjan Sal was deported and British influence was asserted.

In the period from Lord Hastings' retirement to the Mutiny, the relations between the British Government and the Indian States were marked by two features:—(1) the power of the Company's Residents in the internal administration of the States gradually increased; and (2) the Governor-Generals

[6] Mehta, *op. cit.*, *pp.* 238—49.

[7] Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, etc., p. 51.

[8] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 577.

of this generation were "frankly annexationists in their policy."[9]

The Government of India's policy of annexation with regard to the States had political as well as economic backgrounds.[10] The former consisted in the Governor-Generals' desire of bringing territories directly under British rule when opportunities appeared and of gradually ignoring the titular Mughal Emperor. The economic background lay in the Company's necessity to secure more revenues and greater commercial facilities through uninterrupted cross-country communications and abolition of economic barriers. The misgovernment in the native states and the desire to extend the blessings of British rule in them were put forward as two main grounds for annexation. But it should not be forgotten that the policy of subsidiary alliance, by guaranteeing the rulers in their possessions against rebellion, revolution or deposition, or even opposition of subjects, and thus removing all incentive for good government, was greatly responsible for the maladministration of the states.[11] Sir Henry Lawrence remarked in 1848: "If ever there was a device for insuring malgovernment, it is that of a Native Ruler and Minister both relying on foreign bayonets and directed by a British Resident. Even when all three are able, virtuous and considerate, still the wheels of government could hardly move smoothly. Each of the three may work incalculable mischief, but no one of them can do good if thwarted by others."[12]

The policy of annexation, being applied since the time of Bentinck, was more definitely emphasised during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Auckland. The Court of Directors formally enunciated in 1841 the policy "of abandoning no

[9] Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, p. 57.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Pannikar, *Relations of Indian States*, pp. 28—32.
[12] *Caclutta Review*, 1848.

"just and honourable accession of territory or revenue." This policy reached its culmination under Lord Dalhousie, who in pursuance of what is known as the 'doctrine of lapse, brought the British dominion in India on the verge of a catastrophe. This doctrine meant that, on the failure of natural heirs, the sovereignty of dependent states, or of states created by the British power, lapsed to the paramount power; it did not also recognise the right of the ruling families of those states to adopt heirs. Besides conquest and lapse Dalhousie sometimes applied the maxim of "the good of the governed" for acquiring territories. It is of course true that Dalhousie did not invent the policy of annexation; the principle had been asserted as early as 1834, being laid down in the instructions of that year of the Court of Directors (whose clearer formulation of it in 1841 has already been noted). But there was certainly a more vigorous application of the principle in the hands of Dalhousie. "There was," writes Mr. Innes, "fully adequate precedent for every one of his annexations. But his predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of annexing if he could do so legitimately."[13] It has been held that the British Government as the successor of the Mughal Empire in the position of the Paramount Power in India was "entitled to refuse their sanction of an adoption" and to absorb territories. But justified or not, the actual result of the annexations of Dalhousie was that they created a suspicion in the minds of the Indian rulers that their states were in danger of complete absorption by British Imperialism, and this feeling had its outburst in the Movement of 1857—59.[14] An impartial student of history "will not deny that there was abundant reason for uneasiness in the minds of native rulers, and there is much evidence to show that such uneasiness did, as a

[13] *Short History of the British in India*, p. 279.

[14] Vide ante.

matter of fact, exist."[15] Every case of Dalhousie's annexation with the exception of Karauli in Rajputana received the approval of the Government in England. The reason given for that exception was that Karauli was "a protected ally," and not a "dependent" state, and the Governor-General declared himself to be "very well content" with this decision.[16]

We have already described the annexation of the states of Sindh, the Punjab and Burma (with Assam). A brief review of the fate of other important States may now be attempted. Owing to the misgovernment of Raja Krishna Udaiyar and the consequent disorders in Mysore, Bentinck in 1831 pensioned off the Raja and took over its administration, which remained in the hands of the British till 1881. For the same reason was annexed the principality of Cachar on the borders of Assam, and so was Manipur in 1832 at its request after the death of its ruler without an heir; and the territories of the *raja* of Jaintia to the north-east of Sylhet were absorbed in 1835 within the British Empire. The country of Virarajendra Wodiar, *raja* of Coorg, was annexed to the British Empire by a formal proclamation, dated 7th May, 1834, which after reciting "the unanimous wish of the inhabitants of Coorg to be taken under British protection," assured them "that they shall not again be subjected to Native rule." The *raja* was deported first to Vellore, and then to Banaras; in 1852 Lord Dalhousie permitted him to visit England with his ten-year old daughter, and he died in London about 1863.[17] In 1842 Lord Auckland annexed the territory of Nawab of Karnul on suspicion of his disaffection towards the British Government. In 1843 there were troubles in the Maratha State of Gwalior. After the Maratha wars of 1818 Gwalior had been left under Daulat Rao

[15] Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

[16] Lee-Warner, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 173.

[17] Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 660. Another and a more famous Indian princess, Rani Jhindan, was already in England at this time.

Sindhia as the most powerful military state on the left of the Sutlej. Daulat Rao died in 1827, when his ambitious queen, Maharani Baiza Bai, had to adopt his kinsman Jankoji, though she herself controlled the government for about six years. The dowager queen's regency became intolerable to the young Raja, who drove her out from his dominions in 1833. These incidents naturally gave birth to various intrigues and counter-intrigues within the kingdom, which continued for several years and became more intense after Jankoji's death in February 1843. He left behind him a girl-widow of thirteen years named Tara Bai, who, with the concurrence of supporting chiefs and of Lord Ellenborough, adopted Jayaji Rao a boy of eight. But intrigues quickly multiplied, and a dispute arose between two rival parties over the selection of a regent for the boy *raja*. The Gwalior *darbar* was for carrying on the administration as before by a council of ministers; but Lord Ellenborough insisted on the appointment of one individual as regent. The Rani's choice for the post fell upon Dada Khasgiwala, while Lord Ellenborough was in favour of Krishna Rao Kadam, the Mama Sahib or the maternal-uncle of the later ruler. Mama Sahib was duly appointed regent of Gwalior much against the expectation of the queen and her advisers, who contrived to bring about his downfall in favour of Dada. Lord Ellenborough broke off diplomatic relations by withdrawing the British Resident from Gwalior. But there was another factor in the situation, which caused British anxiety and led to their armed intervention. It is generally found that during civil strifes in a kingdom which has a strong army, the control of affairs soon passes into its hands enabling it to dictate terms to the rival factions. The Gwalior army, 40,000 strong possessed of 200 guns, became the leading factor in the situation. The Governor-General calculated that a combination between the Gwalior troops and the Sikh army, which after the assassination of Sher Singh had assumed a threaten-

ing attitude, would prove to be a serious danger for the British Empire in India. He, therefore, made up his mind to avert the crisis by armed intervention in time. He came to Agra on 11th December, 1843, and a British force under the command of Sir Hugh Gough advanced to Gwalior. This was regarded by the Gwalior troops as tantamount to a declaration of war and they became determined to fight the interveners. But they were defeated in two engagements, viz., at Maharajpur by a contingent under Sir Hugh Gough and at Panniar by a corps under General Grey. A new arrangement was now made with the Gwalior State. It was not of course annexed, but its independence practically disappeared, and it became definitely a protected state. A council of regency was appointed to govern the kingdom during the *maharaja's* minority, and it had to act according to the advice of the British Resident. The army was reduced from 40,000 to 9,000 men, and a British contingent of 10,000 was subsidized. It should be noted that during the Movement of 1857—59, the Sindhia and the native army under his able minister Dinkar Rao remained loyal to the British cause, while the British Indian contingent joined the revolt and murdered its English officers.

So early as 1834 the Court of Directors had remarked about certain princely adoptions: "Wherever it is optional with you to give or to withhold your consent to adoptions, the indulgence should be the exception and not the rule, and should never be granted but as a special mark of approbation." The doctrine of lapse had been applied to certain states before Dalhousie, e.g., to Mandavi in 1839, to Kolaba and Jalaun in 1840, and to Surat in 1842. The states that passed under British sway in Dalhousie's time by this doctrine were,—Satara in 1848, Jaitpur and Sambalpur in 1850, Baghat in 1850, Udaipur in 1852, Jhansi in 1853 and Nagpur in 1854. Dalhousie stated his position thus: "In states owing their origin to our grant or gift, if heirs fail, according to the terms of our

grant we annex." So far as the state of Satara was concerned, it had been bestowed by Lord Hastings on a representative of the House of Shivaji after the fall of the Peshwa in 1819. The kingdom of Satara was in this sense created by the British Government. In 1839 the Raja was deposed on a charge of misgovernment and was replaced by his brother. The latter had no son and just before his death in 1848 he adopted a son without the knowledge of the Governor-General or the British Resident. Lord Dalhousie and almost all the leading British officials in India held that the adoption by the late *raja* of Satara, in the absence of any sanction of the British Government, could not be held to be valid, and that the state therefore lapsed to the sovereign power. The Court of Directors also supported his action. Like Satara, Nagpur had fallen into the hands of the British in 1818. But Lord Hastings reinstated a member of the royal house as Raja over a shorn principality. The Raja died in 1853; no lineal descendant in the male line survived, nor had he adopted any heir. It was therefore annexed, though many of Dalhousie's advisers, especially Colonel Lowe, were against him. In a long Minute, dated 28th January, 1854, Dalhousie justified the annexation of Nagpur state as being of British creation. But even Lee-Warner, an avowed apologist of Dalhousie, had expressed the opinion that in the case of Satara and Nagpur, "imperial considerations weighed with him.....they were placed right across the main lines of communication between Bombay and Madras, and Bombay and Calcutta. Consolidation was therefore to be secured by their annexation."[18] There is no doubt that the annexation of Nagpur gave solid political and economic advantages to the British power. A tableland, 80,000 square miles in area with a population of 4,000,000, gave the English, along with other obvious resourses, some of the finest cotton

[18] *The Native States of India*, p. 152

lands and the control of the land route from Calcutta to Bombay. Different opinions have been expressed about Dalhousie's disposal of the Nagpur State funds and treasures. Kaye, in his *Sepoy War*, speaks of the "spoliation of the palace" and remarks that the "gain of money is not worth the loss of character." This at least is true that it "was a tactless blunder and that it might well have been avoided."[19]

Jhansi was a district of Bundelkhand ceded to the English by the Peshwa in 1817, when Lord Hastings placed Rao Ramchand as hereditary ruler of the state on terms of "subordinate co-operation." He died childless in 1835, when a son adopted by him on death-bed without sanction of the British Government was set aside, and his uncle Raghunath Rao was given the succession. The new *raja* died in 1838, when the British placed his brother Gangadhar Rao on the throne. The last king died in November 1853 leaving no issue but an unrecognised adopted son. This gave Lord Dalhousie the opportunity to annex it. "The dependent nature of Jhansi," he declared "does not admit of dispute." Dalhousie's similar action with regard to Baghat and Udaipur was reversed by Lord Canning. Sambalpur (in Orissa), the suzerainty over which passed from the Bhonsles to the British between 1818—20, was annexed to the British dominions in 1850 on the death of its ruler Narayan Singh without any heir, since the state was created or restored by the British. A part of Sikkim, about 1676 square miles (forming the Darjeeling District), was taken over in 1850 as a penalty for its raja's seizing the representative of the British Government and ill-treating two British subjects. The Nizam of Hyderabad stood heavily indebted to the Company for his failure to pay regularly the stipulated sum for the maintenance of a British contingent in his state. An agreement was concluded with him in May 1853, by which the British

[19] Roberts, *British India*, p. 353.

Government obtained the cotton-growing province of Berar in lieu of the subsidy.[20]

As a corollary to his principle of lapse to the paramount power, Dalhousie swept away the titles and pensions of some of the native rulers on the ground that "appearances without the reality of authority were sure to shake Native confidence in our good faith."[21] On the death of the Nawab of the Carnatic in 1853, Lord Dalhousie agreed with Lord Harris, Governor of Madras from 1854—59, not to recognise any successor to the Carnatic Nawab. However, in 1867 a pension and the title of Prince of Arcot was granted to Azam Jah, the claimant to the Nawabship. Shivaji, the raja of Tanjore, died in October 1855, leaving behind him only two daughters and sixteen widows but no son or collateral male heir. On this Dalhousie decided that the rajaship in Tanjore had "come to a natural end" and abolished it. His proposal to establish the title of the Mughal Emperor at Delhi was thwarted by the Court of Directors, and so the shadow lingered for a little while more. On the death of Baji Rao II, the Ex-Peshwa, Dalhousie refused to continue the pension of eight hundred thousand rupees (which Sir John Malcolmn had granted) to his adopted son Dundu Pant, better known as Nana Saheb. Kaye has regarded this action as "harsh", and Arnold has described it as "grasping." Dalhousie's argument was that the pension granted to Baji Rao II was personal one and could not pass on to his successor.

Oudh was annexed not on the ground of lapse or escheat but misgovernment. Since the treaty of 1801 the administration of the country had gone from bad to worse to the great suffering of the people. Several Governors-General had warned the rulers of Oudh but did not try to remove the funda-

[20] Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 93.

[21] Lee-Warner, *Lord Dalhousie*, Vol. II, p. 134.

mental defect in the administration created by the subsidiary system which allowed the King to do anything and everything under the guarantee of British protection. Lord William Bentinck wrote to the King of Oudh in April 1831, that if there was no improvement he would be "transmuted into a pensioner of state." In 1837 Lord Auckland concluded a treaty with the ruler of Oudh, by which, among other terms, it was provided that he must introduce reforms in the administration or hand it over to the British officers while nominally retaining the sovereignty. The Court of Dierctors abrogated this treaty, but Lord Auckland informed the King of Oudh of the disallowance of one clause only and not of the other provisions of the treaty, and somehow or other "the treaty was actually included in a subsequent government publication and was referred to as still in force by succeeding Governors-General." In 1847 Lord Hardinge warned him that if he delayed in introducing reforms then he would "incur the risk of forcing the British to assume the government of Oudh." Colonel Sleeman, Resident in Oudh from 1848—54, and his successor Colonel Outram, both of whom were opposed to unnecessary interference with Indian rulers, reported about the deplorable condition of Oudh. Some solution had, of course, become necessary. Lord Dalhousie wanted to take over the administration of the country by allowing the king to retain a nominal sovereignty, and he was not personally in favour of complete annexation. But he was overruled by the Court of Directors, who decided on annexation. Outram tried to induce the King of Oudh to abdicate; but the King, with tears in his eyes, refused, on 7th February, 1856, to sign the treaty of abdication. At this Outram published the proclamation of annexation on 13th February, 1856. Wajid Ali Shah, the last Nawab of Oudh, was then deported to Calcutta and was allowed a pension of twelve lacs a year.

The annexation of Oudh was certainly an unpleasant epi-

sode, and it was "frankly a question of territorial aggrandisement."[22] Lord Dalhousie himself wrote to Sir George Couper on 15th December, 1855: "The course proposed by the Court (of Directors) is not warranted by international law. It would be either conquest or usurpation of the power of government by force of arms." There was of course misgovernment in Oudh, but the Company itself was greatly responsible for this. Sir Henry Lawrence remarked: "The facts furnished by every writer on Oudh affairs, all testify to the same point, that British interference with that province has been as prejudicial to its court and people as it has been disgraceful to British name." To quote the words of Col. Sutherland, an able and temperate writer, "there is no state in India with whose government we (the East India Company) have interfered so systematically and so uselessly as with that of Oude."[23] The Court of Directors ought to have considered that the ruling family of Oudh with all its vices had remained loyal to the British Government and had "always done their best to help in the hour of need." Moreover, the Nawab of Oudh could very well say that the annexation was a violation of an old treaty because he had never been informed that the Court of Directors had disallowed Auckland's treaty of 1837. There is no wonder, therefore, that the annexation of Oudh was regarded as a "gross breach of national faith." Sleeman, who thought it to be a political blunder, said that it would "cause our good name to suffer," and that "good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes."

On the other hand, some states like Khairpur in 1832, Bhawalpur in 1833, Kashmir in 1846, and Jind just before Dalhousie's appointment, received assurances that the internal administration of their countries should be left to their rulers. It is to be noted in this connection that the policy of the

[22] Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, p. 66.
[23] Quoted in *Ibid.*

Company towards the Indian states from the time of Lord Hastings till the arrival of Canning was "chaotic, indefinite and contradictory." "The authorities of the Company were wavering with every passing fancy as to whether the rulers were *zamindars*, feudatories, tributaries or independent sovereigns; and each Governor-General and each Resident held and enforced his own views." At one time they interfered in minute affairs of administration and at another allowed the ruler to act as he liked. "The position in 1858," remarks Prof. Dodwell, "was therefore exceedingly indefinite."

Many of the Indian states, as we have already noted, rendered valuable services to the Company during the Movement of 1857—59, for which they were rewarded with honorary titles and pecuniary or territorial concessions. But even after the change of government in 1858 the old treaties "were confirmed *en bloc*" : and so the ambiguities in the position of these states were not removed. Nevertheless the direct assumption of sovereignty by the Crown ushered in a new policy of the Government of India towards the Indian States. The Company's policy of annexation was reversed. "We desire," said the Queen's proclamation of 1858, "no extension of our present territorial possessions, and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others." Lord Canning issued a number of *sanads*, commonly known as "adoption sanads," about 140 in all, in two forms, one for the Hindu and the other for the Muhammadan states. The first recognised the right of the Hindu chiefs of adoption on failure of natural heirs, and the second recognised any succession that may be "legitimate according to Muhammadan law." But this did not mean that the States became entirely free in the matter of succession; every succession still required the consent of the Government of India.

From foreign and independent units of undefined status

the States became transformed after 1858 into protected feudatories of the Crown of England, and they were to be regarded henceforth as parts of a single charge, "as partners with the Government of India, not only in the defence of the Empire and its international activity, but also in the material and moral progress of the united country."[24] The freedom from annexation was not purchased without a price; it was followed by 'ever-growing closeness of control' (from Canning to Curzon) of the Government of India as the paramount power. Certain obligations also devolved on the States through the exercise of the Crown's prerogatives in the matter settling precedure and granting honours, in recognising successions, assuming the guardianship of minor princes, in sanctioning the acceptance of foreign orders, and in granting passports and recognising or appointing consular officers.

The paramountcy of the Crown over the Indian States began to be asserted in clear terms soon after the Movement of 1857—59. This dependent character of the States was emphasised by different viceroys. The visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (afterwards King Edward VII) to India in 1875, which was welcomed with eager demonstrations by the States, was followed by the great Delhi Durbar arranged by Lytton in 1876, when Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India. Students of history will note that this was the age of Disraelian imperialism and the two events noted above marked the extension of its spirit over India. Later on Lord Curzon and Hardinge II continued this policy of strengthening the Imperial idea by holding magnificent Durbars.

In some cases, the Paramount Power had "to make decisions and exercise the functions of paramountcy beyond the terms of the treaties in accordance with changing political, social and economic conditions."[25] Its interference in the

[24] Lee-Warner, *Native States of India*, p. 160.
[25] *Butler Committee's Report*, p. 14.

internal affairs of the States also increased through various new developments, such as the construction of railways and telegraph lines (and latterly telephone, radio and aerial services), and growth of the public press, extension of free trade, etc. The necessity of ensuring good government to the people also served as a ground for interference. This is well illustrated by Lord Ripon's 'Instrument of Transfer,'—a document of considerable importance in the history of the States, in which Ripon laid down the conditions under which he restored Mysore to its Maharaja in 1881.

Among several cases, three may be noted here as examples of the Paramount Power's right to intervene; the Baroda case (1873—75), the Manipur case (1891—92) and the Hyderabad case (1926). In 1873, Malhar Rao, the Gaekwar of Baroda, was charged with misgovernment of his kingdom, and a commission of enquiry was appointed by the Government of India to enquire into the facts. He was required to improve the state of his administration. In the following year he was charged with an attempt to poison the British Resident at Baroda, who was himself "a man wanting in acuteness and in tact, who certainly made matters much more difficult for the Geakwar than he need have done."[26] The Gaekwar was arrested on 13th January, 1875, and was placed for trial before a new commission consisting of the Chief Justice of Bengal, another judge, one high political officer, two ruling princes, Sindhia and Jaipur, and Sir Dinkar Rao. The Indian section of the Commission found the Gaekwar 'not guilty.' But the Government of India deposed him on the charge of misgovernment, and declared his heirs precluded from succession. A child member of the family named Sayaji Rao, was installed in his place, and the administration of the State was placed under a council of regency with Sir T. Madhava Rao at its head.

[26] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 499.

The arrest and trial of an Indian Prince was certainly an unprecedented procedure, and the question as to how far such interference was justified by treaties has been very much disputed.

The Manipur rebellion of 1891 drew the intervention of the Government of India. The State was not annexed. The old ruler, Sur Chandra Singh was deposed as unfit to rule; the Senapati, the younger brother of the king, was hanged for murdering the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and the State was given to a boy Raja, who was placed under a British Political Agent. The Manipur case led to the enunciation of certain important principles, such as (1) "the assertion of the Government of India's right to settle successions, and to intervene in case of rebellion against a chief"; (2) "the doctrine that resistance (in a native state) to Imperial orders constitutes rebellion"; (3) "the right of the Paramount Power to inflict capital punishment on those who had put to death its agents while discharging the lawful duty imposed upon them," (4) "the repudiation by the Government of India of the application of International Law to the protected States" (*India Gazette*, 21st August, 1891). In fact, the States had no real international status. Prof. Westlake points out that their position was "imperceptibly shifted from an International to an Imperial basis."

The Hyderabad case (1926) also led to an authoritative pronouncement by the Government of India about its right to intervene in the internal affairs of the States. His Excellency Lord Reading pointed out to His Exalted Highness the Nizam that "the right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown. The British Government have indeed shown again and again that they have no desire to exercise this right without grave reason. But the internal, no less than

the external, security which the Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the protecting power of the British Government, and where imperial interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the people of a State is seriously and grievously affected by the action of its government, it is with the Paramount Power that the ultimate responsibility of taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy are all subject to the due exercise by the Paramount Power of this responsibility."[27]

During Lord Curzon's viceroyalty we find a great insistence by the Foreign Department of the Government of India on the maintenance of administrative efficiency in the States. There was also a marked desire to tighten Imperial control, and to "ignore treaty stipulations where important considerations were deemed to be at stake." Lord Curzon established the Imperial Cadet Corps for giving military training to the sons of the Indian Princes. In 1902 he obtained from the Nizam a lease of the Assigned Districts of Berar in perpetuity at an annual rent of £ 168,000.

Towards the end of Lord Curzon's administration, his somewhat "exacting demands" and his regulations restricting the Princes' visit to Europe began to be opposed by them. But this was also a time when the Viceroy's plan of partitioning Bengal had created political unrest in India, for combating which the Government of India "looked round naturally for allies and helpers," and it was now thought that "they were therefore to be cultivated rather than coerced." This consideration brought a change in the policy and attitude of the Government of India towards the Indian States during the administration of Lord Minto II. But he did not forget to emphasise the paramountcy of the Crown, as

[27] Quoted *in extenso* in *Butler Committee's Report*, Appendix II.

he also said that the "imperial government has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for the general soundness of the Princes' administration and would not consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of misrule." On the occasion of investing the Maharaja of Jodhpur with ruling power, on 26th February, 1916, Lord Hardinge described the Indian Princes as "helpers and colleagues in the great task of *Imperial rule.*"

This new policy was manifested in two measures, which had, however, their beginnings in the pre-Curzon era. One was the further development of the Imperial service troops, the formation of which dates from the administration of Lord Dufferin (1884—88). These troops, maintained and controlled by the Indian States, were trained by British officials lent for the purpose, and they were not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief except when on active service.

The other measure meant the "abandonment of the century-old policy of the isolation of individual states." It was Lord Lytton who first thought of constituting an Indian Privy Council comprising some of the great Princes of India, who were to consult with the Governor-General on questions of common interest. But the proposal bore no fruit owing to the opposition of the authorities in England, and only some of the leading Princes received the empty title, 'Councillors of the Empress.' Lord Curzon's plan for a Council of Ruling Princes and Lord Minto's schemes first for an Imperial Advisory Council and then for an Imperial Council of Ruling Princes also led to no tangible results. But the utility of this policy was generally realised during and after the first Great War, and Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the Ruling Princes on matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a whole." Lord Chelmsford "carried the system of conferences further by utilising them for the purpose of discussing general questions affecting the states, as a whole."

The Montague-Chelmsford Report recommended "that all important states should be placed in direct political relations with the Government of India; and that machinery should be set up for joint deliberation on matters of common interest to British India and the Indian States." The Chamber of Princes was accordingly set up by the Crown by Royal Proclamation on 8th February, 1921. The Chamber of Princes was "a deliberative, consultative and advisory body, but not an executive body."[28]

The proposals for further constitutional reforms in India led the Crown, the States and the people of British India to study the position and rights of the Indian States with a view to fitting them in the new form of government. The Indian States Committee, usually known as the Butler Committee from the name of its Chairman Sir Harcourt Butler, was appointed in December 1927, to enquire into the relationship between the Government of India and the Indian States and it made recommendations for adjustment of the "financial and economic relations between British India and the States."[29]

The main recommendations of the Report were :—(1) the Viceroy, and not the Governor-General-in Council as at present, is to be the Crown's agent in dealing with the States, (2) the relationship between the Crown and the Princes is not to be transferred, without the agreement of the Princes, to a new Government in British India responsible to a Legislature, (3) the scheme for the constitution of a States Council of six including three Princes is to be rejected, (4) intervention in the administration of a state is to be left to the Viceroy's decision, (5) special committees are to be appointed to enquire into disputes that may arise between the States and British India, (6) a committee is to be appointed to enquire into the financial relations between British India and the States, (7)

[28] *Simon Commission's Report*, Vol. I, p. 90.
[29] *Butler Committee's Report*, p. 5.

there should be separate recruitment and training of political officers, forming a special service of their own, drawn from the universities in England.

The Committee's recommendations were criticised in various ways. The direct relation theory was pointed out to be historically unsound, as the relations of the States were first established with the East India Company, its Governor-General, its Governor-General-in Council and even with its military or political officers, and not with the sovereign of England; later on the Crown roundly assumed the sovereignty of British India from the Company and also the widely differing relations and obligations of the Company with the several States. There were no fresh defining treaties entered into by the Crown with them, but only their non-absorption and *status quo ante* was guranteed for the time being. This theory was also considered as a positive permanent barrier to the possible union of the Indian States and British India. Sir M. Visvesvaraya, a former Dewan of Mysore and a strong believer in a federal constitution evolved through a coalition of the Indian States with British India, remarked that in the Butler Committee's Report "there is no hint of a future for the Indian States' people. Their proposals are unsympathetic, unhistorical, hardly constitutional or legal.....There is no modern conception in their outlook, certainly nothing to inspire trust or hope." In presiding over the Indian States' Subjects Conference held at Bombay in May 1929, Mr. C. Y. Chintamani said that "the Butler Committee was bad in origin, bad in the time chosen for its appointment, bad in its terms of reference, bad in its personnel and bad in its line of enquiry while its report is bad in its reasoning and bad in its conclusions."

The Nehru Committee and the Indian Statutory Commission rightly held that the proposed federal constitution of India would not be evolved by ignoring the Indian States, who would be also influenced by the new constitution. The Princes

and the representatives of Indian States attended the Round Table Conferences and made speeches sympathetic to the Idea of a Federation for all India, but the problem of creating a Federal Constitution comprising British India and the Indian States proved to be a very intricate one. The Government of India Act, 1935 provided that the accession of the States to the proposed federation for India would be voluntary. This accession was to be "effected by the King's acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by the ruler personally whereby he for himself, his heirs and successors, declares that he accedes to the federation with the intent that the King, the Governor-General, the federal legislature, the federal court, and any other federal authority shall, by virtue of his instrument of accession, but subject always to the terms thereof and for the purposes of the federation, exercise in relation to his state such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Act, and assumes the obligation that due effect is given within his state to the provisions of the Act, so far as applicable under the instrument". According to this Act the Crown Representative, not the Governor-General or the Government of India, was to deal with the claims of Paramountcy.

But the Cabinet Mission plan recommended that "His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the power of paramountcy" as a logical sequence of India's independence. When the plan of India's partition had been announced, some of the bigger States, like Hyderabad and Travancore began to declare independence. But the Indian National Congress expressed strong disapproval of this action on their part and urged for accession of all States to the Indian Union. In free India after August 1947, the Government of the Indian Union have achieved miraculous success, very much due to the efforts of late Sardar Patel, in its policy with regard to the States through the operation of two processes, such as the merger of the smaller States into the neighbouring provincial

administrations and the integration of a number of States into bigger administrative units. Promotion of popular interests and introduction of progressive reforms are now being earnestly attempted.

Hyderabad and Kashmir, however, still continued to be thorns on the path of a complete and happy solution of the States' problem. On the 29th November, 1947, Hyderabad entered into a year's Standstill Agreement with the Indian Union to maintain the *status quo* as had existed before 15th August, 1947. But shortly the relations between the two became very much strained. The Government of the Indian Union felt justly that Hyderabad, as it was then, would prove to be a source of growing menace for them on grounds of defence, internal security and economy. In fact, law and order in Hyderabad and on the borders of the Indian Dominion were seriously threatened by the reactionary and terrorising activities of the Majlis Ittehadul-Muslimin and of the Razakars, who were encouraged by the Muslim League and the Churchillian Tories. At this, Indian troops marched into Hyderabad territory on the 13th September, 1948, not as an "act of war" but a mere "police action" for restoration of "peace and security inside the State and a sense of security in the adjoining territory", and soon obtained a "tremendous victory." The Nizam, finding himself relieved of the undue control of the reactionaries, affirmed friendship with the Indian Union and withdrew the Hyderabad case from the Security Council where the old Government had previously referred it.

The situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir became terribly disturbed through raids of the Frontier tribes of her territory at the instigation of Pakistan. Placed in a critical situation the Maharaja of Kashmir legally acceded to the Indian Union on the 26th October, 1948, with the full concurrence of Kashmir's national leader, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, who became the head of an interim administration.

In defence of a right cause the Indian Government sent troops to Kashmir which maintained a heroic fight all through even after Pakistan soldiers had actively joined the raiders. Prompted by considerations of peace and harmony, the Indian Union referred the Kashmir issue to the U.N.O. which sent a Commission of five men to study it on the spot. The Commission's cease-fire resolution of the 13th August, 1948, was accepted by the Indian Union but rejected by Pakistan. However, both the Indian Union and Pakistan accepted the U. N. proposal of cease-fire with effect from one minute before mid-night of January 1, 1949, and Pakistan agreed to call back raiders. With all this, Kashmir still presents an extremely complicated problem. The Kashmir problem has been before the Security Council for the last ten years, but it has not been able to solve it. In view of the fact that Pakistan has not stopped her aggression, the question of plebiscite is dead now so far as the Government of India is concerned. In 1951 a Constituent Assembly met in Jammu and Kashmir to frame a constitution for the State. In February, 1954, the accession of the State to India was ratified by the Constituent Assembly and in November, 1956, it adopted a constitution legalising the status of Jammu and Kashmir as a unit of the Indian Union.

According to the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 and the Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Act, 1956, the States and the territories of the Indian Union have been re-organised from the 1st of November, 1956. After this re-organisation, there are fourteen States and six Union Territories. The six Union Territories are, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, The Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindive Islands. The fourteen States are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Orrisa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Jammu and Kashmir.

CHAPTER VIII

INDO-BRITISH INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION
(From 1786)

SECTION I

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

The reforms of Warren Hastings could not produce any satisfactory settlement of the revenue system. The system of farming revenues to the highest bidders for a short term produced serious evils. Having no permanent interest in the soil, the new landholders tried to screw out of the cultivators as much as they could within the specified time, and thus committed various oppressions on them. This affected agriculture and diminished the value of the land, the area under cultivation and the field. The Government had to depend mainly on the land revenue, but the irresponsible speculators who, out of temptation, often made high bids could not make good their contracts at the time of payment. Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Government in England: "I am sorry to be obliged to say that agriculture and internal commerce have, for many years, been gradually declining; and that at present, excepting the class of shroffs and banyans who reside almost entirely in great towns, the inhabitants of these provinces are advancing hastily to a general state of poverty and wretchedness."[1]

The adjustment of the land revenue had, of course, proved to be a difficult affair since 1765. Pitt's India Act of 1784 directed that the Court of Directors shall forthwith "give orders to the several Governments and Presidencies in India, for effectually redressing, in such a manner as shall be consistent with justice and the laws and customs of the country, all injuries and wrongs which the rajas, zamindars and other

[1] Quoted in Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 473.

native landholders may have sustained, and for the settling upon principles of moderation and justice, according to the laws and constitution of India, the permanent rules by which their tributes, rents and services shall be in future rendered and paid to the Company." Two years later, on 12th April, 1786, the Court of Directors wrote to Cornwallis for giving effect to what it termed 'the true spirit' and 'the humane intentions of the Act.' The Court recommended a settlement with the zamindars, at first for ten years, to be made permanent if it proved satisfactory. Regarding the amount of assessment, the Directors were of opinion that the information already obtained might be sufficient to enable their government in Bengal to fix it, without having recourse to minute local scrutinies; and they suggested "the average of former years' collections to be the guide on the present occasion."[2] Thus the Permanent Settlement was "no product of any preconception of Lord Cornwallis in favour of the landlord system of England."

Cornwallis did not, however, proceed hurriedly to effect "so important a step as the conclusion of a settlement of land revenue, for a period of ten years, with a view to prepetuity; constituting as it did the principal financial resources of government."[3] He continued the annual settlements of the revenues by the collectors during the years 1787 and 1788, while John Shore (afterwards Sir John Shore and Lord Teignmouth), an experienced member of the Bengal administration since 1769, engaged himself in making enquiries into the question of usages, tenures and rents. On 8th June, 1789, Shore issued his famous Minute regarding the permanent settlement of the lands in the Bengal Provinces, wherein he held that the settlement was "to be made for a period of ten years certain, but with a view to permanency."[4] Cornwallis gave his reply

[2] *Fifth Report.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] R. C. Dutt, *India Under Early British Rule*, pp. 89-90.

in a Minute dated 18th September, 1789, wherein he affirmed that the Court of Directors would never have held out "the flattering hopes of a permanent settlement, which alone, in my judgement can make the country flourish, and secure happiness to the body of inhabitants, unless they had been predetermined to confirm the perpetuity, if they found that their servants here had not failed in their duty, or betrayed the important trust that had been reposed on them."[5] In another Minute of 21st December, 1789, Shore again expressed his opinion against giving any definite undertaking to make the settlement permanent. Cornwallis put in a strong reply in his Minute, dated 3rd February, 1790, which he concluded by recommending that "the Board of Revenue be directed to notify to the landholders that the settlement, if approved by the Court of Directors, will become permanent and no alteration take place at the expiration of the ten years."[6] Rules for the Decennial Settlement of Bengal were issued on 10th February, 1790, but it was not until November, 1791, that a complete code of regulations for it was promulgated by the Bengal Government.[7] When the question of permanent settlement came up before the Court of Directors, some members objected to it; but the measure was strongly supported by Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, and by Pitt, the Prime Minister, and the Court of Directors finally decided in its favour.[8] They sent their orders to Bengal through their letter, dated 19th September, 1792, on the basis of which a proclamation was issued on 22nd March, 1793, which declared the decennial settlement of Bengal and Bihar to be permanent.[9]

[5] Forrest, *Cornwallis*, Vol. II, pp. 72—80. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[7] Land revenue realised in 1791 from Bengal and Bihar, together with Benaras, amounted to 3,02,563 *sicca* rupees. Mill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 493.

[8] *Vide* letter of Dundas to Lord Cornwallis, dated 17th September, 1792, quoted in Forrest, *Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 204.

[9] For terms of the proclamation, *vide Ibid.*, p. 206 and *Fifth Report*, edited by Firminger, Vol. I, pp. 35-36.

Writers on Indian History have passed diametrically opposite opinions on the merits and demerits of the Permanent Settlement.[10] According to Marshman, "it was a bold, brave and wise measure. Under the influence of this territorial charter which for the first time created indefeasible rights and interest in the soil, population has increased, cultivation has extended, and a gradual improvement has become visible in the habits and comfort of the people."[11] The *Fifth Report*, after pointing out certain defects in the revenue administration after the Permanent Settlement, holds that "the measure was a success and that the Government had taken every step in its power to remove the minor defects, which are not infrequent in all important legislation of a revolutionary nature." On the other hand, Holmes has written that "the Permanent Settlement was a sad blunder. The inferior tenants derived from it no benefit whatever. The Zamindars again and again failed to pay their rent charges, and their estates were sold for the benefit of the Government."[12] Mill has also used strong strictures against the settlement.[13] Thornton has remarked that the "permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis was concluded under the influence of an extraordinary degree of ignorance. Little was known of the tenure by which the lands were held; little of the various rights connected with them; little of their value or capability of improvement. The effects were in many cases such as might have reasonably been expected, though widely different from those which Lord Cornwallis contemplated."[14]

One has to admit that the latter view is nearer the truth and that the Permanent Settlement was not an unmixed bless-

[10] For details, *vide* Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 526—37, footnote.
[11] *History of India* (1871), Vol. II, p. 35.
[12] *History of the Indian Mutiny*, p. 12.
[13] *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 517—32.
[14] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 526.

ing. It is of course true[15] that the settlement ultimately gave fixity of tenure to the Zamindars (a class hitherto in a state of continuous flux and change in composition) so long as they paid the fixed dues to the state, and that some members of this class (not all) have also done much for the moral and material improvement of the province. But the Permanent Settlement by recognising the proprietary rights of the Zamindars in the lands introduced new "rights hitherto unknown and unenjoyed in that country."[16] The Zamindars or the Talukdars had been formerly mere revenue-farmers, who paid to the government nine-tenths of the whole collection and took the rest as remuneration. They had never any proprietary or even really hereditary rights in the soil, but during the decay of Mughal central authority they had considerably increased their power[17] and stability—which, however, again became seriously affected by the land-revenue administrations and policies under the Bengal Nawabs and their successors the East India Company (Murshid Quli to Hastings). As Mr. Roberts has remarked, the "Zamindari system which was originally a hereditary contract agency for the collection of revenue became something resembling a landlord state." But Cornwallis recognised these contractors and agents as "lords of the soil" and "owners of the land," and his measure was intended to improve the status of the Zamindars according

[15] Within about two decades the province of Bengal gradually returned to normal state of agriculture after the economic confusion, uncertainties and calamities of the latter half of the eighteenth century (on the eve of the Permanent Settlement enquiry showed that one-third of the cultivable land of Bengal was abandoned); so that though at first the Zamindars found it difficult to pay according to the new rates of settlement, ultimately their profits from land grew to be so much in excess of the state demand that they did not take the expected interest in agricultural development, and gradually became absentee landlords.

[16] *Fifth Report.*

[17] Baden Powell, *Land System of British India,* Vol. I, pp. 283-84.

to the contemporary British conception of the landed aristocracy.

Strangely enough, the immediate effects of the Permanent Settlement upon the Zamindars were disastrous. The revenues, though permanently fixed, were not at that stage very light,[18] and many of the Zamindars being unable to pay the stipulated revenues were deprived of their properties by the sale laws, ordinarily spoken of as the 'Sunset law.'[19] The rigours of the sale laws[20] gave the last blow to the old aristocracy of Bengal,[21] that is, to the remnants of it.

The rights and interests of the *raiyats* were ignored. Firstly, they had to sacrifice their proprietary rights, and secondly, nothing was done to safeguard their customary rights but they were left entirely at the mercy of the landlords.[22] Rightly did Sir Charles Metcalfe remark: 'We destroyed all the existing property in land, by creating a class of proprietors to whom we recklessly made over the property of others.''[23] "A very great blunder as well as gross injustice was committed," writes Mr. Beveridge, "when a settlement was made with the Zamindars alone, and rights of property every whit as good as theirs were completely ignored."[24] Sir Edward Colebroke, an advocate for some sort of permanent settlement, remarked in a minute recorded in the Bengal Consultations, July, 1820: "The errors of the Permanent Settlement were twofold; first, in the sacrifice of what may be denominated

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 289. (*Vide* note 15 ante.).

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] "At first the *zamindaries* were sold not in the districts to which they belonged but in Calcutta at the office of the Board of Revenue." J. C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal*, p. 272.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Minute of Lord Hastings* in the Revenue Appendix to the Report of the House of Commons, 1832.

[23] *Calcutta Review*, August, 1929.

[24] *Comprehensive History of India*, Vol. II, p. 631.

the *yeomanry*, by merging all village rights, whether of property or of occupancy in the all-devouring recognition of the Zamindar's permanent property in the soil; and secondly, in the sacrifice of the peasantry by one sweeping enactment, which left the Zamindar to make his settlement with them on such terms as he might choose to require. Government indeed reserved to itself the power of legislating in favour of the tenants, but no such regulation has ever taken place; on the contrary, every subsequent enactment has been founded on the declared object of strengthening the Zamindar's hands."[25] Regulation VII of 1799 empowered the Zamindars to distrain the property of their tenants for rent without sending notice to any court of justice. The village record of rights ceased to be kept and the office of the Kanungo was abolished throughout Bengal and Bihar. Cornwallis' hope that the new landlord would "be known as the benevolent landlord of a covenanted tenantry" was disappointed. "The Zamindars, as a class, did nothing for the tenants but rackrented them, or hand them over to 'patnidars' or rent-farmers, who did so still more."[26] The tenants could get protection at the British Courts. But "the Courts of Justice could proceed only by regular suit on the complaint of the injured party. The poverty of the people, their passive character, and the extreme difficulty of proving by legal evidence before a distant tribunal what was customary have rendered this protection illusory; the rights of the Bengal ryot have passed away *sub silentio*, and they have become, to all intents and purposes, tenants at will."[27]

It may be mentioned in this connection that later on, for two generations, some, finding merits in the Permanent Settlement, urged for its extension in other provinces. But the ques-

[25] Quoted in Thornton, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 533.
[26] Baden-Powell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 290.
[27] Forrest, *Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 207.

tion was closed by the Secretary of State's declaration, dated 28th March, 1883,—though the late Mr. R. C. Dutt revived the plea for this extension.

Usually two bases of differentiating land revenue settlements grew in India,—(1) the position of the person or persons responsible for the payment of the land revenue, (2) the duration of the settlement. On the first basis arose three main types of land tenure—(a) *Zamindari*; when the revenue was "assessed on an individual or a community owning an estate and occupying a position, identical with or analogous to that of a landlord," (b) *Joint village* or *Mahalwari*: where there were "village estates which are held by cosharing bodies or village communities the members of which are treated as jointly and severally liable for the land revenue," (c) *Rayatwari*: where the actual occupants and cultivators of smaller holdings paid the revenues directly to the officers of the State.[28] On the second basis the settlements were (A) *permanent*: that is, the amount of the share demanded by the State might be fixed for ever (e.g., in Bengal), and (B) *temporary*: when the State demand was fixed for a short or fairly long definite period and not in perpetuity, the ordinary period being thirty years in Bombay, Madras and the United Provinces and twenty years in the Central Provinces and the Punjab. A Zamindari settlement might not always be permanent nor is it true to say that all Rayatwari settlements were temporary and unstable. The Zamindari settlements in Agra, the Punjab or the Central Provinces, for instance, were not permanent.

With the gradual expansion of the British dominion in India, different systems of land tenure and revenue assessments were established throughout the country according to

[28] These, however, do not exhaust the types of land settlements in India. There are some other varieties in different interior parts of India.

the varying circumstances in different areas. Benaras in 1795, and some of the northern districts of the Madras Presidency in 1802 were permanently settled.[29] But the permanent settlements in these Madras districts became unpopular and were not supported for other parts of the Presidency, and so the Rayatwari system was introduced there through the exertions of Sir Thomas Munro,—who having been connected with the affairs of Southern India for many years before 1820, was ultimately appointed Governor of Madras (1820—1827).[30] The modern system in Madras dates from 1855.[31] During the years 1855—1862 the Madras Government made declarations that the Madras raiyats could not be ejected by Government so long as they paid the fixed assessment and that "the Government demand on the land is fixed for ever."[32] But the late Mr. R. C. Dutt has pointed out that "these repeated assurances" have been in actual practice "ignored and set aside" and Madras raiyats continued to suffer from the evils of an "uncertain State demand." Lord Ripon (1880—1884) suggested that in districts, which had once been surveyed and settled, the land tax should not be enhanced except on the ground of a rise in prices. "This compromise," remarks Mr. Roberts, "would have happily combined the ideal of comparative permanency with that of a certain incidence, while leaving to the Government an open door for an increase of revenue if there

[29] Dutt, *India Under Early British Rule*, pp. 129—34; Baden-Powell, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part I.

[30] Sir Thomas Munro's name is as famous for the land settlements of Madras as that of Cornwallis for Bengal. "Perhaps there never lived a European more intimately acquainted," says his biographer, "with the character, habits, manners and institutions of the natives of India, because there never lived a European who at once possessed better opportunities of acquiring such knowledge and made better use of them."

[31] Baden-Powell, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 51—83.

[32] R. C. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

was a general rise in prosperity.[38] But this rule was unfortunately cancelled by the Secretary of State.

The Bombay Presidency also developed the Rayatwari Settlement. The results of the settlement operations there, which commenced from 1835, were gathered up and formulated as rules for future guidance in what is known as the Joint Report dated 2nd August, 1847, signed by H. E. Goldsmid, Capt. Wingate, and Capt. Davidson. The Report laid down the following principles of the Bombay settlement: (1) 'it was based on the assessment of each field separately,' (2) 'it granted long leases of thirty years,' and (3) 'it abandoned the basis of (actual) produce estimates, and substituted the basis of the (potential) value of lands for distributing the assessment. In Oudh, the Talukdars got full proprietary rights. Mahalwari settlements or settlements with village proprietors were adopted in the North-Western Provinces (Agra, etc.) between the years 1833—1849, and in the Punjab after its annexation. After the formation of the Central Provinces in 1861, the Malguzari settlement was adopted there, by which the revenues were framed to the Malguzars or the old revenue collectors and payers, and their proprietary rights were also recognised.

Thus these settlements created, except in Madras and Bombay Presidencies, a class of intermediaries such as the Zamindars, Talukdars, Malguzars, Khots, Inamdars, or other tenure-holders, between the State on the one hand and the actual peasants and cultivators on the other. The question of tenant rights, especially in Bengal, the United Provinces and the Central Provinces, proved to be a very vexed one. The Government passed during the subsequent years various Tenancy Acts, for protecting the interests of the tenants by limiting the demands of the Zamindars and protecting the

[38] *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

tenants from vexatious evictions. It became an established rule in Bengal and the Agra Province that "any one who can prove that he has been tilling land in the village for twelve years without a break acquires the status of an occupancy tenant and cannot be evicted as long as he pays the rent." This twelve years' rule is not in force in the Punjab and Oudh, and is applicable to a limited extent in the Central Provinces. But the interest of the tennants in those parts were safeguarded there in other ways by local Tenancy Acts. The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1901 was passed to prevent unnecessary and frequent alienations of land from the hands of the old agricultural classes to those of the moneyed and speculating classes.

The terrible distresses and sufferings due to the famines which visited India during the close of the nineteenth century drew attention of some old and experienced officers of the Government to its Land Revenue policy. The late Mr. R. C. Dutt, along with several other retired European members of the Indian Civil Service, presented (in 1900) a memorial on the subject to the Secretary of State for India. Shortly before this Mr. Dutt had addressed his Open Letters to Lord Curzon; and the Government Resolution of 1902 declared by way of reply that the "Legislature has created a strong body of occupancy tenants in Bengal, has secured the tenantry of Oudh against enhancement at over-frequent intervals and in immoderate proportions, and has practically given to every tenant in the Central Provinces fixity of tenure at a fair rent."

After the reforms of 1919, land revenue became a provincial subject and one of the main sources of income for the Provincial Government. But it was not made a transferred subject, and the Government of India still retained a large control over its administration. But subsequently there were movements in different provinces for freeing the land revenue administration from 'executive arbitrariness' and for placing

it under the control of the Legislature by special statutes like the Bombay Land Revenue Code.

After the introduction of Provincial Autonomy on 1st April, 1937, important measures of tenancy reform were initiated in different provinces, somewhere with success, as for example, the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1938, the Central Provinces Tenancy Act of 1939, the United Provinces Tenancy Act of 1939 and the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1939.

Various forces in the new India of today began to demand insistently the abolition of the Zamindari System and the Permanent Settlement. In November, 1938, the Bengal Government appointed a Commission with Sir Francis Floud as its President, to examine the prevailing land revenue system in the province with special reference to the Permanent Settlement and to point out its merits and demerits. The Commission submitted their Report in March, 1940. Majority of its members expressed the opinion that the Permanent Settlement was unsuited to present conditions and the Zamindari System is full of defects. They advocated replacement of the Permanent Settlement by a Ryotwari system in which the State would come into direcct relation with the actual cultivators. The new national governments in the diffenent States have almost entirely brought the Zamindari System and other intermediaries to an end by special legislation.

SECTION II

LAW AND JUSTICE

We have already noted the paralysed state of Bengal judicial administration during the period of confusion following the battle of Plassey, and also the judicial reforms of Warren Hastings. Further efforts to reform the judicial system were made by Lord Cornwallis. For convenience of administration he divided the country into districts each of

which as a separate unit was placed under the charge of a Collector who was a member of the Company's civil service. He overhauled the machinery of justice and laid the main foundations of the existing system. One of his most important changes in this direction was that he took away from "the Board of Revenue and the Collectors all judicial powers, thereby confining their duties and functions to the mere collection of the public dues, and to transfer the cognisance of the causes hitherto tried in these courts to the Courts of Justice." For the administration of civil justice a regular heirarchy of courts was constituted. At the top was the Sadar Dewani Adalat or the Chief Civil Court, consisting of the Governor-General and Members of his Council in Calcutta and assisted by the Qazi-ul-Qazat or the Chief Qazi of the State, two Muftis and two Pandits. Below this court were provincial courts, established at the chief cities of Patna, Dacca, Murshidabad and Calcutta. They were "courts of revision and appeal with relation to courts below; but they were also to a certain extent, courts of primary jurisdiction. Each of these courts was placed under three European judges, all covenanted servants of the Company, and three assessors, a Qazi and a Mufti for Muhammadan Law and a Pandit for Hindu Law. In the next grade were the *zila* or district courts, established in each of the newly-formed districts and City Courts in 'considerable towns or cities' under a British judge, who was to be a servant of the Company higher in rank than a Collector and who was assisted by native assessors. All classes of persons within these district or city areas were amenable to the jurisdiction of these courts, except the 'European and British subjects' who were under the control of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Calcutta. At the bottom of the organisation stood the petty courts, in the interior of the country presided over by *native commissioners*, who were authorised to "hear and decide, in the first instance, on suits

of personal property not exceeding the value of fifty rupees." These commissioners were of three descriptions: *amins* or referees, *salises* or arbitrators and *munsiffs* or native judges. Another change of importance in the administration of civil justice was that Cornwallis placed the appointment of *vakils*, or agents employed in cases, in the hands of the Sadar Dewani Adalat. This was intended to "introduce a better class of vakeels by ensuring the possession of some measure of qualification for the office which they undertook, and by subjecting them to due control."

A parallel organisation of courts was set up for the administration of Criminal Justice with the Sadar Nizamat Adalat in Calcutta as the highest Court of Appeal. The judges of the Provincial Courts were made judges of circuit in their respective divisions. The Deputy Nawab of the old order was deprived of his criminal jurisdiction, and the Nizamat Adalat was transferred from Murshidabad to Calcutta. It was to meet at least once a week and was to "take cognisance of all matters relating to the administration of justice in criminal cases, and submit such propositions as may appear to them calculated for the better regulation of the same, for the consideration and sanction of the Governor-General-in Council." Besides changing the instruments of judicature Cornwallis made a few alterations in the criminal law administered, and an elaborate Code of better regulation of the same, for the consideration and sancin the criminal law administered, and an elaborate Code of Regulations known as the *Cornwallis Code* of 1793 was published for the guidance of the officers of the new judicial system. Cornwallis held a favourable opinion of the working of the new Courts of Justice. He declared in February, 1793, that the "most happy effects have already been felt from this system." But this was clearly an exaggerated estimate about the working of the new system; it might have removed some abuses of the old order but it "was yet by no

means perfect." Justice did not at once become cheap and easy; on the other hand, the immediate effects were visible in the multiplication of suits and in the growth of huge files of pending cases. The courts were greatly infected with technicalities of procedure calculated both to defeat justice and obstruct the access to it by needless delay and expense. Experience soon revealed many defects of the new system.

Certain minor changes were indeed introduced within a few years of Cornwallis' departure, before we come to the time of Bentinck, which forms another landmark in the history of modern judicial administration.

Lord William Bentinck abolished the Provincial Courts of Appeal in civil cases, conferred full criminal jurisdiction upon District Civil Judges, newly designated District and Sessions Judges, and transferred to the Collectors the magisterial powers formerly exercised by the civil judges. This has been regarded as a reactionary measure as it was opposed to the principle of separation of executive and judicial functions. Lord Cornwallis had created Courts of Native Commissioners outside the Presidency towns; Lord William Bentinck formed in 1831 a new grade known as Principal Sadar Amins, whose jurisdiction afterwards became unlimited in respect of values. In 1868 these were transformed into Subordinate Judges under the District and Session Judges.

It was about this time that we find the beginning of attempts for codification. Hitherto nothing except certain Regulations, with which the names of Munro in Madras and of Elphinstone in Bombay are associated, had been achieved in this direction. By the Parliamentary Act of 1833 a Law Member was added to the Governor-General's Council and a Law Commission was appointed to sit in Calcutta for preparing a law code and for standardising judicial procedure. Lord Macaulay took a large part in the labours of this Commission, and a Penal Code was prepared which became law

in 1860. The laws made since 1833 are known as Acts, not Regulations. In 1853 a new Commission was appointed in England which was followed by another in 1861, "for the purpose of preparing a body of substantive law for India." The jurisdictions and nature of the law were greatly simplified by the passing of the Civil Procedure and the Criminal Procedure Codes, as also by the aforesaid Penal Code. It is to be noted that the process of simplification of the law has not been carried much further since then; at the present time there is a general public opinion in favour of considerable simplification of procedure and cheapening of justice.

Within a few years of the direct assumption of sovereignty by the Crown, an important change was effected in the judicial organisation of India. By the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 the Crown of England was empowered by Letters Patent to establish High Courts in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, in which the Supreme Court and the Sadar Adalat Courts were merged. Power was given by the Act to establish subsequently another similar High Court for the North-Western Provinces, and this was done in the year 1886. The Indian High Courts Act of 1911 raised the maximum number of judges of an Indian High Court to twenty, gave power to establish new High Courts from time to time as occasion may require, and to make consequential changes in the jurisdiction of the courts and made it lawful for the Governor-General-in-Council to appoint from time to time persons to act as additional judges of any High Court for such period not exceeding two years as may be required. On the basis of the powers under this Act High Courts were established at Patna, Lahore and Rangoon.

The Government of India Act, 1935, provided that there shall be a Federal Court consisting of a Chief Justice and not more than six puisne judges having both original and appellate jurisdiction. The Act conferred the status of High Court on the existing courts at Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Lahore,

Madras, Patna, as well as on the Chief Court in Oudh, the Judicial Commissioner's Courts in the Central Provinces and Berar, the North-West Frontier Province and Sindh, and "any other court constituted or reconstituted as a high court, or any comparable court which may be declared a High Court for purposes of the Act by the Crown in Council." Delhi became the seat of this new Federal Court, with Sir Maurice Gwyer as the first Chief Justice of India and Sir B. L. Mitter as the first Advocate-General of India.

Below the High Courts were kept subordinate courts, both civil and criminal, with some differences in nomenclature, but in other respects the essentials of the inferior courts in different provinces were almost the same. For the administration of criminal justice, a province was divided into sessions divisions each of which became usually equal to the area of a district and came to have a Court of Sessions presided over by a Sessions Judge who is generally the District Judge himself exercising his criminal jurisdiction and who may be assisted by additional, joint or assistant Sessions Judges. The new Constitution of India has provided for a Supreme Court of India, consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by Law prescribes a larger number of not more than seven other judges. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in certain matters and appellate jurisdiction in appeals from High Courts in some cases.

The State Judiciary continues as before consisting of a High Court in each State and subordinate Courts.

Trial by Jury is one of the important privileges gradually secured by the people of England. In pursuance of the principles of English Law, in India also criminal cases, of certain classes and in certain areas, are tried with the help of jurors or assessors. In trials before High Courts the jury consists of nine persons, and in those before a Court of Sessions, there are jurors or assessors of an uneven number prescribed by the

local government, who assist and give advice but whose opinions are not binding on the judges, cases of disagreement being referred to High Court. Appeals are allowed both in civil and criminal cases, first, from a subordinate court to the next higher court, secondly, to a High Court, and, lastly, to the supreme court of India as provided in the new Constitution.

Racial distinction in the administration of criminal justice has been one of the most burning topics in the modern history of India. Until 1836 'European British subjects'[34] were in civil and criminal matters under the control of the Supreme Courts alone. But by Act XI of 1836, commonly known as Macaulay's Black Act, they were brought under the jurisdiction of the Company's civil courts and thus distinctions of race were abolished in the civil courts throughout India.[35] But so far as the administration of criminal justice was concerned, the European British subjects could be tried only by European magistrates and judges. This was at once an injustice and a disgrace, and it was thus that the Indigo planters, in spite of their oppressions on the ryots, escaped from proper punishment. In 1884 Lord Ripon's Government sought to remove this discrimination by investing Indian magistrates and judges with the power of trying European British subjects. Mr. (afterwards Sir) C. P. Ilbert prepared a Bill to this effect; but it encountered a storm of opposition from the members of the European community before which the Government had to bend. The result was a compromise which practically meant

[34] The Code of Criminal Procedure defined a "European British subject" thus :—"(1) Any subject of Her Majesty born or naturalized, or domiciled in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or in any of the European, American, Australian Colonies or possessions of Her Majesty, or in the colony of New Zealand or in the colony of Cape of Good Hope or Natal; (2) Any child or grandchild of such person by legitimate descent."

[35] Strachey, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-09; Trevelyan, *Life and Letters of Macaulay*, Chap. II, pp. 287—89.

a "virtual though not avowed abandonment of the measure that European subjects might be tried by District Magistrates or Sessions Judges, whether European or Indian, but they could in every case, however trivial, claim to be tried by a jury of which not less than half the number shall be Europeans or Americans. As the Indians could make no such claim, the Act did not diminish "the privileges of European British subjects charged with offences, and it left their position as exceptional as before."[37] Eminent Indians, like Mr. Kristo Das Pal, Syed Amir Ali and Raja Shiva Prasad, pointed out, in course of their debates, that this would result in nothing but a failure of justice. Sir John Strachey remarked in 1903: "It may be feared that the result of all this has been that we must leave to a distant future the hope that the Government of India will be able to place the law regarding jurisdiction over European British subjects on a satisfactory footing."[38]

The attention of the reformed Central Legislature was drawn towards this question in 1921 and the Government of India appointed the Racial Distinctions Committee to enquire into the whole matter. The Committee recommended the removal of some of those distinctions. The Act, which embodied its proposals, with certain modifications, gave all first class magistrates authority to try European British subjects. All restrictions about the jurisdiction of Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges over them were abolished, Indians and Europeans being placed on a footing of equality in the matter of trial by jury, and a similar measure of equality being allowed in the exercise of the right of appeal. But the privilege of being tried by a European jury could still be claimed.

The proper articulation of governmental powers through the three organs of a state, the Executive, the Legislature and

[36] Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

the Judiciary is an essential condition for civil liberty. No fair justice is possible if the Judiciary is subject to interference from the Executive or if the executive and judicial powers are combined in the same hands. In India, however, some officers, like the Collector-Magistrates of Districts or Deputy Commissioners, were invested with the two functions. Public opinion in India as well as some British officials and high judicial authorities raised their voice against this anomaly; its defects were ably pointed out in a memorial submitted to the Secretary of State for India in 1899 by such eminent persons as Lord Hobhouse, Sir Richard Garth, Sir Charles Sargeant and seven others. But various arguments were advanced from the other side and no sufficient steps were taken to effect this separation completely, which is indispensable for civic liberty.

SECTION III

POLICE AND PRISON REFORM

Law and order are the two most essential elements of a happy civic life. During the period of confusion in the latter half of the eighteenth century, like every other branch of administration the indigenous police system, consisting of village watch and ward for the countryside[39] and Kotwalis for the large towns,[40] had become paralysed. While the nominal native rulers' corrupt and inefficient executive gradually dropped its policing functions, the *zamindars*, who were the deputies of the State in the matter of maintaining order within their

[39] D. J. McNeile's *Report on the Village Watch in the Lower Provinces of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1866.

[40] For functions of the Kotwals, *vide* Sir J. N. Sarkar's *Mughal Administration*; we find also descriptions in Bengali Literature of mid-eighteenth century, e.g., in Ramaprasad's *Vidyasundara*, pp. 27-28 (B. E.); Bharatacandra's *Annadamangala*, pp. 90—92; Jayanarayan Sen's *Harilila*, pp. 83—92.

zamindaries, did not also discharge their responsibility;[41] on the other hand, their pykes and bands of followers, like the retainers of the feudal barons of Europe in later Medieval period, oppressed the people, sometimes even by joining with the robbers and marauders.[42]

For administrative as well as commercial considerations, the East India Company's officers tried to re-establish law and order in the land. Warren Hastings tried a new state police system consisting of the *faujdars* and *thanadars*, but it proved unsatisfactory and was abolished in 1781. Thus the police duties remained practically in the hands of the Zamindars, who "misapplied the authority confided to them as officers of police."[43] Lord Cornwallis took strong measures to reform the police system in Calcutta[44] as well as in the mofussil. He introduced a new system by the Police Regulations of 7th December, 1792, confirmed in the Code of May, 1793. The Zamindars were compelled to disband their pykes or armed constabulary, and a police force was established in each *thana* under a *daroga* or superintendent, who was to be appointed and controlled by the District Magistrate and was to receive a commission of ten per cent on the value of all stolen property recovered by him and ten rupees from the Government on the conviction of every dacoit or gang robber.[45] The cost of maintaining the police, amounting to Rs. 3,19,440, "was to be met by a small tax on the warehouses and shops in the Chief towns and markets."[46]

[41] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 20th June, 1782.

[42] Aspinall, *Cornwallis in Bengal*, p. 107.

[43] J. C. Sinha, *Economic Annals of Bengal*, p. 202.

[44] Aspinall, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

[45] *Fifth Report*, Vol. I, p. 79. It is well known how even almost a century after this, old women in villages knew of no position of higher emoluments and power than that of the *daroga*, and their blessings took the form "child, be a *daroga*."

[46] Aspinall, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

The system established by Cornwallis "proved to be an expensive failure,"[47] and could not ensure order and peace. When one *daroga* with fifteen to twenty constables was expected to look after an area of four hundred square miles,[48] dacoities and disorders could not be effectively dealt with, and in fact increased. Further the *darogas* of the new system were "not less currupt than the *thanadars*, their predecessors."[49] An attempt was made in Bengal by Regulation XII of the year 1807 to restore the police functions of the Zamindars who were asked to act as *amins* or commissioners of police.[50] But owing to the general dissolution of the old order of things, the scheme of 1807 did not meet with great success. According to the orders of the Court of Directors issued in 1814, the establishment of *darogas* and their subordinates was abolished in all other possessions of the Company (Madras, 1816; Bombay, 1827) except in Bengal, and there the decayed indigenous system of the village watchmen was suffered to continue.

In 1808 a Superintendent of Police with criminal jurisdiction was appointed for Calcutta, his jurisdiction, up to 1829, extending over a large part of the surrounding country. He was to work with *goyendas* or spies who were to trace out the criminals and *girdawars* or overseers who were to apprehend them. This measure had some early success but soon the *goyendas*, in concert with the *girdawars*, actually committed "depredations on the peaceable inhabitants, of the same nature as those practised by the dacoits whom they were employed to suppress."[51] The spirit of lawlessness had continued to be fed for several decades by unemployment and the inefficiency and corruption of the custodians of order went on increasing.

[47] *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, p. 386.
[48] *Fifth Report*, Vol. I, p. 130.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

The principal defects of the existing system were that the police force was "imperfectly organised," and the Magistrate-Collector, who was also the head of the Police, became overburdened with duties. Though Committees were appointed to make enquiries yet no definite steps were taken for many years. It was first in the Presidency towns that the duties of the Magistrate and the Police Superintendent were separated. In the countryside, Sir Charles Napier in 1843 made an attempt at improvement in Sindh, by drawing up a plan, the "main characteristics of which were separate organisation, severance of police and judicial functions and a reasonable degree of discripline." This system was copied in Bombay in 1855, in the Punjab after the Mutiny, and in Madras in 1859.

In 1860 the Government of India appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole subject of police administration. It recommended the "establishment of a well-organised and purely civil constabulary, supervised by European officers, and capable of carrying out all ordinary civil duties, including the provision of guards and escorts. The village police should be retained on their existing footing, being brought, however, into direct relationship with the General Constabulary."[52] These recommendations were embodied in the Police Act of 1861. The provisions of this Act were followed in organising the Police system in different parts of India excepting Bombay, where under the local District Police Act, the District Superintendent and his staff were placed under the control of the District Magistrate. Besides this general organisation there had also grown a special department for the suppression of *Thugee* (1830), which was also entrusted with the function of suppressing dacoity in 1839. This branch was abolished in 1904, when under the recommendation of the Police Commission of 1902, a new branch, known as the Criminal Investigation Department

[52] *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, p. 388.

(C. I. D.), was started. Many of the other recommendations of this Commission were given effect to resulting in the improvement of pay and prospects of the police officers and in the growth of their numbers. For many years the officers in the Indian Police Service were recruited from the commissioned ranks of the Native Army, and were afterwards appointed by nomination alone. The system of appointment by open competition was introduced in England and in India in 1893.

But in spite of all these, the police system remained honeycombed with abuses, chiefly because the responsibility for law and order was entrusted to rather untrained and uneducated, and consequently irresponsible, people and officers, who were "allowed from various causes to get out of acquaintance and sympathy with the people and out of touch even with their subordinates." There has been, for some time, growth of literacy among the police constables, largely owing to unemployment among semi-educated middle classes. "Between 1920 and 1928 the percentage of literate constables rose from 27 to 48 per cent. and in 1929, for the first time in history, more than half the constables,—indeed as many as 57 per cent, were literate."[53] But the system requires more wholesome reforms to make it really efficient and conducive to the interests of the people.

Under the existing police organisation in India the administrative head of the police in each province is the Inspector-General, who has under him a number of Deputy Inspector-Generals, one for each division or circle. Each district police force is under a Superintendent of Police. Every district is divided into several charges or *thanas*, each under an Inspector of Police, assisted by Sub-Inspectors and Constables. The institution of the village watchmen has survived almost everywhere throughout India.

[53] *India in* 1929-30, p. 388.

JAILS

"The early Indian jail system was, like its English prototype, insanitary, demoralising and non-deterrent."[54] The earliest attempt towards reform was inaugurated at the suggestion of Lord Macaulay during the years 1836—38. The Report of the First Prison Commission submitted to the Government of India in 1838 did not recommend any advanced methods. The two other Commissions of 1864 and 1867 were both infructuous. In 1889 the Government of India appointed a Committee consisting of two officers whose report dealt with prison administration in all aspects. Its work was supplemented by a conference of experts on the subject of prison reform in 1892. A General Prison Act was then passed in 1894 for British India, and rules were issued under it by the Government of India and the Local Governments, according to which the jail administration in India came to be regulated.

Since the introduction of the Reforms in 1921, the "maintenance of the India Prisons" came "within the sphere of provincial governments," subject, however, to all-India legislation. The advisability of having general principles governing the treatment of criminals led to the appointment of a Jails Committee in 1919. Besides other recommendations, this Committee laid stress upon the "reformative side of the prison work." Various attempts have been made during the recent years to reform jail administration.

SECTION IV

DIVISION, DISTRICT AND VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION

A district is the principal unit of administration in British India. Though there are differences in the details of district

[54] *Imperial Gazetter*, Vol. IV, p. 398.

organisation,[55] the general principles on which the administrative system is based are much the same everywhere.

Each district is placed in charge of an officer called Collector-Magistrate or simply Collector, or Deputy Commissioner in Non-Regulation areas. As his title implies, this officer has two-fold functions. As a Collector he is the principal revenue officer of the district and as a Magistrate he supervises the criminal courts (also civil courts in some non-regulated areas) and the police work, and also maintains peace and order in the district area. The efficiency of administration in a district depends much on the strength of his personality. Sir W. Hunter describes him as the "representative of a paternal and not a constitutional government. Police, jails, education, municipalities, roads, sanitation, dispensaries, the local taxation and the imperial revenues of his district are to him matters of daily concern. He is expected to make himself acquainted with every phase of the social life of the natives, and with each natural aspect of the country. He should be a lawyer, an accountant and financier, and a ready writer of state papers. He ought also to possess no mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy and engineering."[56]

At the bottom of the system of district administration lies the Indian village,—an old institution, which has in a way survived the changes of many centuries in many parts of the country. Mr. Elphinstone in his "Report on the territories conquered from the Peshwa" submitted to the Governor-General in 1819 stated that the most striking feature of the Deccan was its division into villages or townships and that these communities contained "in miniature all the materials of a state

[55] For details about administration of the different districts, *vide Cambridge History*, Vol. VI; (Bengal) Chaps. II and XIII, (Bombay) Chaps. IV and XIV, (Madras) Chaps. III and XV, (U.P., C.P., and the Punjab) Chaps. V and XVI.

[56] Hunter, *The Indian Empire*, p. 113.

within themselves." Referring to the village communities in 1830, Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe wrote: "They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same.....This union of the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the people of India through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered, and in a high degree conducive to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence."[57] Whenever there has been a period of political flux and transition, involving successive collapses and struggles of states in India, the protective mechanism of the village community has become prominent (negatively) giving some stability to society, to civil and economic life. Efforts are now being made to rehabilitate Indian villages and to adjust village administration to changed conditions.

SECTION V

PUBLIC SERVICES

During the early days of the East India Company, merchants, factors and writers of the Company discharged commercial as well as administrative duties; but they were hopelessly corrupt and inefficient. It was Lord Cornwallis who for the first time tried to organise the different branches of public service, and the Company's Charter Act of 1793 provided that "all vacancies happening in any of the offices, places or employments in the civil line of the Company's service in India should, subject to certain specified restrictions, be filled from among the Company's civil servants." The civil servants were

[57] Elphinstone, *History of India*, Book II, Chap. 2.

required to sign a covenant not to carry on private trade, and not to receive presents; provision was made for paying them liberal salaries, and to reserve for them the superior grades and offices. In 1800 Wellesley founded the Fort William College in Calcutta for instructing the young civil servants in literature, science and oriental languages; and this institution survived as a language school for Bengal civil servants till 1854. In 1806 the Company established an "East India College" at Haileybury for imparting two years' training to young officers nominated for service in the East. Up to the year 1853 appointments were made by the Court of Directors. In the Charter Act of that year, Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, proposed the introduction of the principle of open competition. Strongly supported by Macaulay, this proposal of Sir Charles Wood received the sanction of the Parliament; it was reaffirmed after the formal transference of the Government from the Company to the Crown, and by Section 32 of the Government of India Act of 1858 the Secretary of State in Council received the power of making appointments to the Indian Civil Service with the advice and help of Her Majesty's Civil Service Commissioners.

In spite of the introduction of the principle of open competition, the Indians remained handicapped by various disadvantages and the British competitors greatly outnumbered them. In 1869 three Bengalis, Sir Surendranath Banerjee, Mr. Ramesh Chandra Dutt and Mr. Biharilal Gupta became successful;[58] but in 1870 out of seven Indian competitors only one was successful. Section 6 of the Government of India Act of 1870, however, provided for the appointment of Indians to offices, places and employments in the covenanted civil service. But the rules of giving effect to this Act were not passed till nine years later, when in a resolution, dated 24th

[58] Banerjee, *A Nation in the Making*, p. 10.

December, 1879, the Government of India declared that appointments under the rules would be limited to "youngmen of good family and social position, possessed of fair abilities and education, to whom the offices which were open to them in the uncovenanted service had not proved sufficient inducement to come forward for employment." It was also laid down that one-sixth of the posts reserved for the members of the Covenanted Civil Service should be filled by Indians through nominations by the Local Governments subject to the sanction of the Government of India and the Secretary of State. Thus came into existence what was called the 'Statutory Civil Service.' But this system did not produce satisfactory results; during the seven years after its introduction sixty appointments were made under it. In the face of persistent agitation in the country for greater Indianisation of the services and the demand made by the first Indian National Congress meeting at Bombay, in December 1885, for holding simultaneous examinations in India and England, the whole question was reconsidered by Lord Dufferin's Government. The scheme of 1879 was given up in favour of one brought forward by the Public Service Commission which sat in 1886-87 under the presidency of Sir Charles Aitchison, the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Under the recommendations of this Commission the general Civil Service was divided into three classes: (1) the Indian Civil Service, recruited in England, (2) Provincial Civil Service and (3) the Subordinate Service; the two later being recruited from among the Indians according to the rules framed by the Provincial Governments and approved by the Government of India, either by nomination or examination.

Owing to the growth of complexity in administration, new services had by this time gradually developed to manage the numerous specialised departments, such as those of the Public Works, Survey of India, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs,

Education, Police, Salt, Public Health, Jails and Civil Hospitals. These services were also divided on the analogy of the Civil Services, into three grades, Imperial, Provincial and Subordinate.

The reforms recommended by the Aitchison Commission failed, however, to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the politically-minded and educated Indians. The resolution of the House of Commons for the holding of simultaneous examinations in England and India for admission to the Indian Civil Service, passed on 2nd June, 1893, was not given effect to, and the agitation of the Indians for a greater share in the public services came to a head in a debate introduced by a non-official member on 17th March, 1911, in the Imperial Legislative Council. Lord Hardinge's Government thereupon secured the appointment of a Royal Commission on Public Services under the presidency of Lord Islington, on 5th September, 1912. The British members of the Commission were Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Lord Ronaldshay and Sir Valentine Chirol; the Indian members were Mr. Gokhale and Mr. Justice (afterwards Sir) Abdur Rahim. The report of the Commission was ready in 1915 but its publication was deferred because of the Great War till 1917 when it "was criticised as wholly disappointing." "In view of the altered circumstances," the framers of the Reform Scheme of 1919, Mr. Montague and Lord Chelmsford, thought it necessary to proceed in the direction of Indianisation of the Services far beyond the proposals of the Islington Commission. They were convinced "that recruitment of a largely increased proportion of Indians should be begun at once." In order to give effect to this policy, they definitely recommended that (1) all racial distinctions in the matter of appointments should be removed, (2) that "for all the public services, for which there is recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there must be a system of appointment in India," (3) that "33 per cent of the super-

ior posts should be recruited for in India, and that this percentage should be increased by 1½ per cent annually" until the situation is again revised by a Commission, (4) that improvements in the rates of pay and incremental time-scale and greater elasticity in leave and pension rules should be effected, and lastly (5) that "any public servant, whatever the Government under which he is employed, shall be properly supported and protected in the legitimate exercise of his functions; and that any rights and privileges guaranteed or implied in the conditions of his appointment shall be secured to him. No changes that will occur can be allowed to impair the power of the Government of India or of the Governor-in-Council to secure these essential requirements." The authors of the Reform Scheme, however, believed that "to make the Indian people self-governing," the "continued presence of the English official is vital."

The Government of India Act of 1919 considered separately the question of the Civil Service in India. According to Section 96D of it, "subject to the provisions made by statute or statutory rule, any person in the Civil Service of the Crown in India is declared to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure, and may be employed in any manner required by a proper authority within the scope of his duty. But he may not be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and may, if dismissed, be reinstated by the Secretary of State in Council. If a person appointed by the Secretary of State in Council thinks himself wronged by an order of an officer superior to him in a Governor's province, he has a statutory right to complain to the Governor, who is directed to examine the complaint and require such action to be taken therein as may appear to him to be just and equitable. By the same section the Secretary of State in Council is empowered to make rules for regulating the classification of the civil services in India, the methods of their recruitment, their

conditions of service, pay and allowances, and discipline and conduct."[59]

The principle of progressive Indianisation caused dissatisfaction among the vested interests in the services; on some occasions frictions naturally arose between the Indian ministers on the one hand and the officers of the All-India Services working in the transferred departments.

These difficulties led to the appointment, in June 1923, of the Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in India under the chairmanship of Lord Lee of Fareham, in the teeth of a violent opposition from the Legislative Assembly. The Lee Commission made detailed recommendations in 1924, most of which were put into force. As contemplated in the Government of India Act, 1919, the Commission recommended the immediate establishment of a Public Service Commission in India consisting of five members for regulating and exercising disciplinary control over the services. It was provided that the Secretary of State in Council should continue to appoint and control the All-India Officers operating in the reserved part of the provincial administrations (the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, the Irrigation Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers and the Indian Forest Service outside Bombay and Burma), while as regards services like the Indian Educational Agricultural, Veterinary, Forest and Engineering (Road and Buildings Branch), the control of the Ministers "should be made more complete by closing the recruitment for them on an All-India basis." But about the Indian Medical Service, which was in the field transferred to the Ministers, the Commission, for special reasons, recommended that every province should appoint in its civil medical department a certain number of officers lent from the medical department of the Army in India. It fixed the rate of Indianisation of services and made several important recommendations regulating leave,

[59] Ilbert, *Historical Introduction*, p. 139.

pensions, and other privileges and providing safeguards for an official career in India. The Government of India Act, 1935 elucidated and defined the rights of the Civil and Military Services in the Indian Federation and also in the provinces. Their existing privileges in the matter of pay, promotion, leave, pension, etc., were guaranteed by it. The Secretary of State was to continue to make appointments to the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Medical Service (Civil) and the Indian Police. These were placed beyond the purview of the legislature, and their interests were to be safeguarded by the Governor-General and the Governors. This act also provided for the establishment of a Federal Public Services Commission and provincial commissions, but two or more provinces might "agree that one commission shall serve a group or that all the provinces shall use one commission." In independent India All-India services of the old type have practically disappeared. Indianization has been almost complete; and appointments to All-India services are being made on the merit of successful candidates in open competitive examinations held in India. There is a Public Service Commission for the Union and Public Service Commission for each State.

SECTION VI

GROWTH OF INDIAN ARMY AND ARMY ADMINISTRATION

During the first half of the seventeenth century the East India Company employed guards for the protection of its factories, but as time went on 'their military character became slightly more marked."[60] However, the first establishment of the Company's Indian Army may be accurately dated from the year 1748, when Major Stringer Lawrence, 'father of the (British) Indian army,' organised a body of Sepoys at Madras

[60] *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, p. 326.

after the example set by the French Governors, Martin and Dumas.

The gradual extension of the East India Company's possessions in India and the numerous political complications of the time led to the development of an army consisting of Indian recruits, European recruits and Royal regiments,——the 39th Foot being the first to arrive at Madras in 1754 A. D., so that in the year 1794, in the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, 'the total strength of the Indian armies, including (British) royal troops, was 70,000 of which 13,500 were Europeans.'[61] The nucleus of the European army in India lay in detachments of soldiers coming from England and being reinforced by European 'mercenaries, deserters and prisoners of war from other foreign settlements and sailors from the Company's ships.'[62] The Indian section of the Army consisted of Pakistan, Rohilla, Rajput, Arab and Abysinian advanturers. The Madras and Bombay armies were recruited locally and the Bengal Presidency was supplied with soldiers from Oudh and the country between the Ganges and the Gogra in Behar.[63] The three Presidency armies were under three separate Commanders-in-Chief. In course of time, though the Madras and the Bombay armies remained under the management of their local Governments, the Bengal Army became the army of the Central Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army became the head of the military establishments in British India.

Though often manifesting courage and military skill, the general discipline and morale of the Indian army remained for a long time utterly deplorable in spite of Lord Clive's reforms

[61] Chesney, *Indian Polity*, Second edition, p. 286.

[62] *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, p. 327.

[63] *Baksariyas*, who served as matchlockmen during the Mughal period and also in the native regiments of the East India Company. Many of them served the Bengal Zamindars during the eighteenth century.

in 1765 and the reorganisations of 1796 and 1824.[64] With the further expansion of the East India Company's dominions a force of eighteen regiments termed the 'irregular infantry' was attached to the Bengal Army, and local corps were raised in the different regions (*e.g.*, 'the Punjab Irregular Force' on annexation of the Punjab in 1849; one raised after the annexation of Nagpur in 1854; and the 'Oudh Irregular Force' after the annexation of Oudh, 1856). Besides these many of the Native States, in accordance with treaties, maintained contingents which were practically at the disposal of the British Government (*e.g.*, the Hyderabad Contingent). But various causes combined gradually to impair more and more the efficiency and discipline of the army. The Indian Movement of 1857—59, which clearly revealed the defects of the system, was followed by a reorganisation of it. The Company's European troops then numbering above 15,000 were transferred to the service of the Crown and they "became liable to serve wherever ordered." These local European troops strongly protested against this order, and their action was at that time aptly called the 'White Mutiny,' much discontent, a good deal of open insubordination, and even more covert disaffection, were manifested, and 1,000 men took their discharge." The native armies were reorganised and the British element was increased, so that in the year 1864 in the aggregate strength of 205,000 men, 65,000 were British. A Royal Commission, appointed to consider the question of Army reorganisation, recommended that "native regiments should be formed by a general mixture of all classes and castes;" but this salutary and progressive suggestion was not adopted, and the native army remained a loose heterogeneous body. It was arranged in 1861 that the British officers in the native regiments should be regarded as holding a 'staff' appointment and should draw allowances

[64] For details on this point reference may be made to Captain Arthur Broome's *Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army*, Vol. I, pp. 533—622.

as well as pay of rank. They were henceforth "graded in a Staff Corps, recruited from the Company's and the Queen's services."[65] During the Indian Movement of 1857—59, and the few years after it, many changes occurred in dress, equipment and armament, in common with the changing British army organisation in Europe after the Crimean War.

The fear of Russian advance in Central Asia and the troubles in Afghanistan brought the question of army reform to the forefront. The Afghan War of 1878—80 "involving the employment of a considerable army and a strain upon the military resources, was fruitful of lessons in every branch of the art of war and of army organisation." It revealed many defects, and several reforms were carried out according to the Army Organisation Commission of 1879. Then, the Panjdeh crisis, the troubles in the North-West-Frontier and the third Burmese War created grave anxieties for the Government of India and led to the increase in the number of both British and native troops bringing the strength of the former to 73,500 and of the latter to 145,000.

The pressure of external dangers henceforward made the British Government particularly careful about army organisation and efficiency. The composition of the army was considerably modified. Since 1873 the more warlike races of the outer circle, like the Gurkhas, the Pathans and the Sikhs, took the place of the old interior Hindustanis and Southerners. After the third Burmese War eight Madras regiments were converted into Burma regiments being recruited from more warlike races of North-West India and stationed permanently in Burma. Recruitment of Telingas was stopped in 1895; and between 1902 and 1904 two of the Madras regiments were converted into battalions of Moplahs, one into a Gurkha corps, and nine

[65] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 396; *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IV, pp. 344—46; Chesney, *op. cit.*, pp. 299—338.

into battalions of the Panjabis.' Various reforms were also introduced for improving the organisation, the most important ones of which may be mentioned here. In 1891 the Staff Corps of three Presidencies were amalgamated into the Indian Staff Corps, which was renamed the Indian Army in 1903. By an Act of the year 1893, which came into force since April 1895, the offices of the Commander-in-Chief in Madras and Bombay were abolished and the control of the local governments there over the two armies was withdrawn. In 1895 the old presidency armies were organised into four territorial commands, each under a lieutenant-general. This measure removed, no doubt, the anachronism of the absence of the Commander-in-Chief's direct control over great bodies of troops in India and dissolved the Bengal Army, which "had become unwieldy for a single command and was in danger of becoming homogeneous," but it "still left the organisation in time of peace unrelated to the organisation in time of war." A further reorganisation took place under Lord Kitchener when the Indian troops were formed into three army corps, northern, western, eastern (corresponding to the Punjab, Bombay and Bengal commands) and ten divisional commands including Burma. But the command system was abolished in 1907 and India was divided into spheres of two Armies—the Northern and Southern. The first Great War revealed the defects of this system and a radical reorganisation of the army took place after the War was over. The whole of India was divided into fourteen districts grouped into four commands, each district containing a certain number of brigade commands.

Lord Curzon's viceroyalty witnessed many reforms in "armament, equipment, mobilisation and defences." An important change also took place in the sphere of army administration. Since 1861 the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council was the officer through whom the supreme control

of the Government of India over the troops was exercised. He was an officer of the British or Indian Army, presided over the Military Department, and "was the constitutional adviser of the Viceory on questions relating to the Army."[66] But the Commander-in-Chief, who was "responsible for promotion and discipline, and for all movements of troops, was appointed as an Extraordinary Member of Council and occupied a rank next to that of the Viceroy and thus superior to that of the Military Member." Under this somewhat anomalous system, the works of the Military Secretariat and the Army Headquarters often collided; and besides that the Commander-in-Chief had to bring his proposals and schemes to the notice of the Viceroy in Council through the Military Member, an officer of lower rank than him. Lord Kitchener, after his arrival in India as the Commander-in-Chief in November 1902, strongly attacked this "system as a military solecism involving, moreover, great expense and delay." But Lord Curzon, being supported by the ordinary members of his Council, refused to accept it on the ground that the 'tendency of the scheme was to concentrate military authority in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and to subvert the supremacy of the civil power by depriving it of independent military advice," and that it would produce too much centralization and would overburden the Commander-in-Chief with too many duties. The Secretary of State made an amendment by which certain branches of Army administration, such as the supply and storage of provisions, clothing, ordnance, medical stores and horses, together with matters connected with important army contracts, were made over to the Department of Military Supply especially constituted for the purpose and placed under the control of a military officer who was to be an ordinary member of Council. Lord Curzon agreed to this but the

[66] Sir Thomas Raleigh, *Lord Curzon in India*, Introduction, xlix.

appointment of the officer created difficulties which led him to tender resignation in August, 1905; he left India in the following November.

During the two Great Wars Indian troops of all classes rendered valuable services in different theatres. During the first World War over 680,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants were raised by the Government of India on a voluntary basis, more than 1,215,000, combatants and men served overseas and the Indian casualties amounted to 101,000. Before the second World War the strength of the Indian Army was 1,82,000. By 1945 its strength rose to above 2,00,000 although recruitment had been all along voluntary.

Of the two main categories of officers in the Indian Army, holding the King's Commission and the Viceroy's Commission respectively, since 1918 the Indians became eligible to hold the King's Commission in the army. Until 1931 three vacancies at Woolwich and ten at Sandhurst were reserved annually for Indian cadets. To enable the Indians to obtain a preliminary training for admission into the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, or the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, the Government of India established the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun. Besides these, the Government of India, at the suggestion of Lord Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief in India, decided in February, 1923, for the Indianisation of eight units of the Indian Army; and a further step in this direction was marked by the announcement of 1932 for Indianising a Division of all Arms and a Cavalry Brigade. In the month of October, 1932 was opened the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun with the object of training officers of the Indian Army of the future.

The Indian national leaders became very much concerned in the problem of national defence. Since the inauguration of the Indian Nationalist Movement in India, there was expressed a genuine aspiration for bringing the defence of the country

in the hands of her people. This took a more intense form in the period after the first World War in two concrete forms,—firstly, "for the rapid Indianisation of the commissioned ranks of the regular Army" and, secondly, for the "extension of the facilities which already exist for training Indians in the Territorial Force." There was also an insistent complaint that the army expenditure was a heavy burden on the revenues of India and the greater portion of the revenues should be spent for 'nation-building' purposes.

The Montague-Chelmsford Report, after admiring the "brilliant and devoted services of the Indian Army in the various theatres of war", emphasised the "necessity of grappling with the problem." The Skeen Committee, which was appointed in June 1921 under the presidency of Major-General (afterwards General) Sir Andrew Skeen, then chief of staff of the army in India, and which is commonly known as the "Indian Sandhurst Committee," recommended the abolition of the "eight units scheme" of 1923 and the establishment of an Indian 'Sandhurst' by 1933. The rejection of these recommendations by the Government of India was "widely represented in India as a refusal to adopt a more liberal treatment of the problem of Indianisation." The problem of Indian defence did not escape the attention of the Indian Satutory Commission. But it urged the necessity of a British element in Indian Army for three reasons—(1) frontier defence, (2) internal security, (3) obligation to the Indian States. The Government of India Act, 1935 made no 'substantial change' in the question of defence. The National Government is fully alert on the question of defence.

SECTION VII

PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The promotion of Public Works has formed a traditional activity of the State in the country of Asoka and Sher Shah.

The tradition did not die out altogether, though its force was greatly lost, owing to numerous political convulsions, when the East India Company began building up again an administrative system in India. A study of the East India Company's early surveys undertaken by Martin in 1750 or by Rennell in 1763—66 and of some old accounts and gazetteers like those of Buchanan and others clearly shows that the country had not even in the latter half of the eighteenth century totally lost what had been built up in the past in the shape of communications, and facilities for travel and transport. Indeed it was in the nineteenth century that communications in the major part of India were at their worst. Political or more properly strategic, administrative and economic conditions of a country are very intimately related to the organisation of Public Works and Communications. Thus during the first decades of the nineteenth century, the East India Company's attention was mainly occupied with the construction and repair of barracks and other military buildings and of some military roads. Lord William Bentinck is given the credit of having perceived the importance of a new trunk road connecting Calcutta with the Upper Provinces and this project was carried out vigorously by Mr. Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces from 1843—53, and by Lord Dalhousie.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, a Military Board in each Presidency was the recognised authority for construction of Roads and Buildings. But in 1854, during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie, a special department of public works in the Government of India was constituted with subordinate departments for Madras and Bombay. Irrigation works, "which paid, and more than paid, from the very commencement,"[67] had attracted the East India Company's attention during the early years of the ninteenth century. But

[67] Dutt, *India in the Victorian Age*, p. 173.

work in this branch was pushed on vigorously in the time of Lord Dalhousie. The Ganges Canal, designed and completed by Sir Proby Cautley, was opened by Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, in March 1854. The Bari Doab Canal followed, and in Madras the great anicut across the Godawari was executed by Sir Arthur Cotton and his successors. Railways were first constructed during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie, and soon Railway companies, like the East Indian, the Great Indian Peninsular, the Bombay Baroda and Central Indian and the South Indian, were started. This period was also marked by the opening of electric telegraph due to the enterprise of Mr. (afterwards Sir) William O'Shaughnessy.

Subsequently, growing decentralisation and gradual development of local self-government have led to changes in the organisation of Public Works. As regards Buildings and Roads powers were delegated to the provincial governments and local bodies even before 1920. The Montague-Chelmsford Reforms made the construction and upkeep of roads a provincial and, except in Assam, a 'transferred' subject. But owing to the growth of motor transport, the "maintenance and construction" of the most important roads became a matter of national or "All-India" concern.

The importance of Irrigation Works in an agricultural country like India, where rainfall is characterised by "its unequal distribution throughout the seasons and its liability to failure or serious deficiency," can hardly be exaggerated. We have already noted the earlier attempts of the Company which were more or less successful and paying; but during the middle of the nineteenth century, when railway construction was pushed on vigorously, "irrigation works suffered from comparative neglect." The frequent visitations of famines during the last few decades of the nineteenth century roused public opinion to the importance of sounder irrigation works

in India. "Among the means," remarked the Famine Commission of 1880, "that may be adopted for giving India direct protection from famine arising from drought, the first place most unquestionably be assigned to works of irrigation." An Irrigation Commission was appointed by Lord Curzon in 1901 which submitted its report in 1903. The Commission revived all the irrigation works of importance in every province of India, pointed to a great number of suggested projects and recommended a thorough investigation of the irrigation capabilities of every part of India. It sketched out a rough programme of works for the next twenty years, and added 6½ million acres to be irrigated at an estimated cost of nearly £30,000,000. The report of the Commission formed the basis of the Government of India's irrigation policy and since 1908 irrigation statistics began to be systematically recorded, though all the schemes recommended by the Commission could not be implemented.

Irrigation became a provincial subject after the Reforms of 1919, and the local governments were made responsible for constructing and maintaining irrigation works. But recently the growth of new provinces by provincial redistribution or otherwise, made it necessary for either the Central Government or two or more local governments jointly, to manage certain irrigation works extending over or benefiting more than one such province.

The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India also considered the question of Irrigation Works and made certain important recommendations. It recommended the maintenance of closest relations between the agricultural and irrigation departments. The Commission further pointed out the necessity for research on irrigation problems. Some important irrigation schemes have been launched by our national government.

The history of railway construction in India may be studied under four periods. During the first period coming up to

1869 the lines were constructed by joint-stock companies on a Government guarantee of five per cent annual interest on all share capital raised by them together with a free grant of lands required. In return the companies were required to pay to the State, when they earned more than five per cent, half the surplus in every half year; the Government were to exercise control over the construction, working and management of the lines and it retained the right to purchase the railways at a fixed rate after twenty-five years. But the guarantee system produced evils rather than any benefit to the country or the Government. The companies being assured of five per cent on every farthing spent had no motive for economy or incentive for speedy or convenient work. The system therefore entailed a heavy drain upon Indian revenues; by 1869 the deficit on railway budget amounted to Rs. 166½ lakhs. As a witness before the Parliamentary Committee of 1873, Lord Lawrence condemned railway extravagance in India in the following terms: "I think it is notorious in India among almost every class that ever heard talk on the subject, that the railways have been extravagantly made; that they have cost a great deal more than they are worth, or ought to have cost."[68] The guarantee system was, therefore, abandoned and the State decided to construct railways through its own agency with borrowed capital. The Indus Valley, Punjab Northern, Rajputana, Malwa, North Bengal, were the lines directly constructed by State agency between 1869—80. But the outbreak of terrible famines between 1874—79 and the Afghan War of 1878—1889 by upsetting Indian Finance "dealt the *coup-de-grace* to the policy of pure State construction and management." In England also "a feeling of hostility towards State enterprise was again surging up." The Government therefore took recourse to the old guarantee system on easier terms than before and under a new name—the State lines worked by

[68] Quoted in R. C. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

Companies. Railway lines of the total strength of over 4,000 miles were opened under this system. At the same time the State also remained concerned with the construction of some lines chiefly from strategic considerations. Being financially embarrassed, the Government further tried to enlist 'unaided private enterprise.' Four companies were thus started: the Nilgiri, the Delhi-Ambala-Kalka, the Bengal Central, and the Bengal North-Western. This experiment did not, however, prove successful. The Native States were also now invited to undertake railway construction in their own territories. In 1908 the Mackay Committee laid down a vast programme for railway extension, but the changed conditions during and after the first World War accentuated the problem of railway construction. The Acworth Commission in 1921 considered a suitable policy for further development in future. But its members were not unanimous; the majority, including the President himself, were in favour of abolishing the system of Company management. They recommended that the State should undertake the direct management of railways after the expiry of the contracts with the companies. The Majority Report was not accepted by the Government of India as final, but a great deal of public dissatisfaction and clamour began to appear against the system of management by the Companies, who carried away profits to the amount of one crore a year out of India and whose Boards in London did not sympathetically consider the grievances of the poor passengers or struggling producers, manufacturers and traders who paid for the railways, and their profits. Under the pressure of this national demand, the Government took over under its direct management the East Indian Railway (1st January, 1925), the Great Indian Peninsula Railway (30th June, 1925), the Burma Railways (1st January, 1929) and the Southern Punjab Railway (1st January, 1930).

The Posts and Telegraphs Department renders numerous

services to the State as well as to the people. Up to 1912 the telegraph service in India was a separate department administered by an officer named Director-General of Telegraphs, working in subordination to the Government of India in the Department of Commerce and Industry. In 1914 the Secretary of State sanctioned the amalgamation of the Posts and Telegraphs Departments. The new arrangement being introduced from 1st April, 1914, was completed in March, 1930. A special feature of the Department's work in recent times has been the "extension of postal and telegraphic facilities in rural areas." 'Apart from purely postal activities and telegraph department, other activities of the department, like telephones, wireless, radio and aerial post, are also making rapid progress, thus bringing India abreast of the times.

CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

A—INDIAN CONSTITUTION

SECTION I

GROWTH OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL; AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

The administrative scandals in Bengal during the second dyarchy instituted by Lord Clive and the greed of the Directors in England (who regarded the Dewani as marking "the beginning of a golden millennium" and thus raised the rate of dividend to 10 and 12 per cent) drew the attention and intervention of the British Parliament to and in Indian affairs even from 1766, when Parliamentary Committees were appointed to enquire into these; next year the Parliament required the Company to pay an annual tribute to the Home Government for their new and considerable acquisitions. Parliamentary control of a more effective nature is however to be traced from the year 1773. The Company's servants were arrogant and opulent, but the Company itself was struggling with impending bankruptcy. So when the Company approached the Parliament in 1773 for financial assistance, Lord North's Government took this opportunity to make alterations in the system of administration of the Company's Indian possessions by passing two Acts. By the first the Company was granted a loan of £ 1,40,000 at 4 per cent and its power of declaring large dividends was somewhat restricted. The second Act was the famous Regulating Act of 1773, the provisions of which have been already noted. But this Act did not remove the evils

and it has been justly condemned "as violating the first principles of administrative mechanics. It created a Governor-General who was powerless before his Council, and an executive that was powerless before a supreme court, itself immune from all responsibility for the peace and welfare of the country."[1] The Amending Act of 1780-81 removed some of its anomalies and settled the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. But the whole question was re-opened in 1783 when, in the month of March, the East India Company was again obliged to petition for financial help. "The relief and reformation of the Company", remarked Burke, "must go together. The Company had flown in the face of Parliament."[2] Three proposals came forward, those, namely, of Dundas, Fox and Younger Pitt. The first two were rejected after bitter and vehement criticism, but the third was carried through the Parliament in August 1784. Pitt's India Act set up six "Commissioners for the Affairs of India," known more generally as the Board of Control, consisting of the Chancellor of Exchequer, a Secretary of State and four (five as modified by a subsequent Act) Privy Councillors and appointed by the King and holding office during his pleasure. The Commissioners were unpaid and had no patronage. They were invested with the "Superintendence and Control over all the British Territorial Possessions in the East Indies and over the Affairs of the United Company of Merchants." Members of the Board were to have access to and to be furnished with all papers belonging to the Company. The Directors of the Company had "to pay obedience to, and had to be bound by the orders of the Board, which might modify any communications or despatches issued by them." The secret or urgent orders of the Board might be sent to India through a Committee of Secrecy of the Directors consisting

[1] *M. C. Report*, para 30.
[2] *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 193.
[3] P. Mukherjee, *Indian Constitutional Documents*, Vol. I, pp. 28—58.

of the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, and the Senior Director; and the Court of Proprietors was deprived of any power to suspend or annul resolutions of the Directors approved by the Board. Thus the Court of Proprietors was reduced to an insignificant position and the Board became practically the master of the Company. The Secretary of State, in his absence the Chancellor of the Exchequer or in the absence of both of them, the most senior of the other Commissioners was to be the President of the Board, having a casting vote in matters of difference. The Council of the Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal and of the Governors of Fort St. George and Fort St. David were to consist of three instead of four members, the Commander-in-Chief being one of them; the Governor-General or Governors were to have casting votes. The Governor-General and Council were to exercise control in certain matters over all the other Governments belonging to the Company. It was also provided that the Governor-General and Council should not declare war against any Indian Power without the permission of the Court of Directors. Thus was "instituted the dual system of government by the Company and by a Parliamentary Board which endured till after the Mutiny."

The constitution of the Board was remodelled by an Act of 1793 which provided that two Commissioners might be appointed from outside the Privy Council and that the members and staff of the Board were to be paid out of the Indian revenues. From this time the First Commissioner was called the President of the Board of Control, and "under this change the collective action of the Board became a mere fiction, and all power came to reside in the hands of the President who derived additional importance from his being a member of the Cabinet." Very few enactments of constitutional importance

[4] *M. C. Report*, para 31.

were passed during the period from 1793 to 1813.[5] But various considerations, political as well as financial, led to the appointment of a committee of the House of Commons, which made a searching enquiry into the affairs of the Company in India and submitted the famous *Fifth Report*, which was published in July 1812. The Parliament then passed the Charter Act of 1813 in the teeth of vigorous opposition from the Company, and this Act granted the Indian possessions and revenues to the Company for a further term of twenty years, reserved to them for the same time the China trade and the tea trade, but threw open the general Indian trade subject to certain conditions. The constitutional significance of the Act was that "it asserted the sovereignty of the Crown over"[6] the territories of the Company. A further step in this direction was marked by the Charter Act of 1833, which in several ways introduced "important changes into the constitution of the East India Company and the system of Indian administration."[7] The Company was allowed to retain its territorial possessions for another term of twenty years, but it was to hold these "in trust for his majesty, his heirs and successors, for the service of the Government of India." The Company had to close its commercial business, and its administrative affairs were henceforth to be conducted by the Court of Directors under the control of the Board as representing the Parliament. By the Charter Act of 1853 the Charter of the Company was renewed but not for any definite number of years. It was provided that the "Indian territories should remain under the government of the Company, in trust for the Crown, until Parliament should otherwise direct." The Act further reduced the number of Directors from twenty-four to eighteen, out of whom six were to be appointed by the Crown. In the same year the "right

[5] Ilbert, *Historical Introduction*, p. 73.
[6] *M. C. Report*, para 31.
[7] Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

of patronage was taken from the Directors and exercised under rules made by the parliamentary Board of Control."[8] The Directors still possessed some powers; but in reality the Government was already in the hands of the Crown, through the President of the Board of Control, even before the Indian Movement of 1857—59, and the transfer of 1858 marked a formal rather than any substantial change.

The double government of the Court and the Board "with its division of powers and responsibilities" gradually proved to be cumbrous, anomalous and unsuited to the changed conditions, and the Indian Movement of 1857—59 gave it the deathblow. The Act of 1858 for the better government of India[9] provided that India should be governed "directly by and in the name of the Crown, acting through a Secretary of State, to whom were to be transferred the powers formerly exercised either by the Court of Directors or by the Board of Control." The Secretary of State was to be assisted by a Council of fifteen members, of whom eight were to be appointed by the Crown and seven were to be elected by the Court of Directors from among themselves.

Eighteen years after the transference of the Indian Government to the Crown, Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India by the Royal Titles Act of 1876. Her successor, Edward VII, was proclaimed King-Emperor at the Second Delhi Durbar on January 1, 1903; and after him George V succeeded in 1911 to the title, which came to be regarded as "the symbol of unity, of the British Empire," and which represented "in a special way the sovereignty of the British nation" in this country. After August 1947, the Dominion of India and Pakistan still retained links with the British Crown as Dominions. The new constitution of India, however, constitutes India into "Sovereign Democratic Republic."

[8] *M. C. Report*, para 31.

[9] P. Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 134—48.

The status and function of the Secretary of State may be discussed from different points of view, such as, (a) his relations with the Parliament, (b) his relations with the India Council, and (c) his relations with the Government of India.

(a) The Secretary of State for India was one of the principal Secretaries of State of His Majesty, and as such he was one of the Ministers of Cabinet rank, a member of one or the other House of the Parliament and also a party leader with some influence. His tenure of office was linked with the rise and fall of the party to which he belonged and like other members of the Cabinet he was responsible to the Parliament for his policy and actions. Thus the Secretary of State for India was thoroughly subordinate to the Parliament. Before the Reforms of 1919 his salary was not voted from the British Exchequer and as such the Parliament had no opportunity of criticising the policy of the India Office and the Secretary of State at the time of voting their expenditure. But this was changed by the Government of India Act, 1919, which laid down that "the salary of the Secretary of State shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament, and the salaries of his Under Secretaries and any other expenses of his department may be paid out of the revenues of India or out of moneys provided by Parliament." As a member of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for India was primarily responsible to this body, and in cases of disagreement with the Prime Minister and his colleagues, he had no alternative but to resign. Though such contingencies were rare, a notable case occurred some years back when Mr. Montague, the Secretary of State for India and a member of the Cabinet, had to resign owing to differences with his chief Llyod George and his colleagues in the Cabinet.

(b) The Council of India was originally instituted by the India Act of 1858 to restrain and limit the action of one man, the Secretary of State. As provided by the Act, the Council

was to consist of fifteen members, of whom eight were to be appointed by the Crown and seven were to be elected by the Directors of the East India Company. The majority of the councillors were to be men who had served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the country more than ten years before their appointment. Thus, it was thought that the Council would exercise "moral control." Among other clauses of the Act was one which provided that "orders of the Secretary of State relating to expenditure and loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India." But gradually the Council was reduced to a subordinate position in three ways :—(a) in its composition; (b) in its powers; and (c) in the method of transacting business. In short, instead of being a check on the powers of Secretary of State (as intended by the statesmen of 1858), the Counccil was reduced to the position of his dependent tool.

(c) In studying the relations of the Secretary of State with the Governor-General and the Government of India we should note that so far as statutory positions are concerned the former was authorised by the Act of 1858 to "direct and control the latter." But great controversies have raged round the question of their mutual relations. All believed in 1858 that the executive power lay with the Government of India. Even later on Northcote described the Government as set up in 1858 as "an executive machinery in India subject to a controlling machinery in England." In the early sixties Bartle Frere pointed out that the Secretary of State should act as the "representative and colleague of the Viceroy in the Cabinet and Parliament, and as the exponent of the Viceroy's measures to the English Parliament and people." Various causes increased the importance of the Government in England and contributed 'to fortify the position of the Secretary of State *vis-a-vis* the Government of India.' Even the impediment of geographical isolation and distance was annihilated in 1870 by the comple-

tion of a direct telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through the Red Sea. The Secretary of State "could thus less than ever be confronted with accomplished fact." He wanted to exercise greater control over the Government of India by issuing detailed and positive orders, and frictions naturally arose between the two.

The tension came to a head during the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, and the Secretaryship of Lord Salisbury in the Disraeli administration. Lord Northbook "recognised the subordinate position of the Viceroy, but he held that Parliament had conferred certain rights, not only on the Viceroy, but on his Council, which differentiated them in a very notable degree from subordinate officials."[10] He tried to assert the independence of his Government in fiscal matters, but Mr. Disraeli's Government were equally decided in affirming their constitutional rights:—"It is not open to question that Her Majesty's Government are as much responsible to Parliament for the Government of India as they are for any of the Crown Colonies of the Empire.....It necessarily follows that the control exercised by Her Majesty's Government over financial policy must be effective also."[11] Lord Ripon, as the Viceroy of India, protested against the "undue control" of the India Office. "I am not sure," he said, "that if I had known exactly how matters stood I would have come out here (India)." A strong assertion of the theory of Parliamentary supremacy over the Government of India was made in 1894 by Sir Henry Fowler, the Secretary of State, on the occasion of the Cotton Duties Bill.

Of course the intensity of control varied "with the interest shown by Parliament on whose behalf the Secretary of State exercises his powers." Further, the relations between Simla

[10] Mallet, *Life of Northbrook*, p. 91.

[11] *M. C. Report*, para. 34.

and Whitehall "varied also with the personal equation."[12] A strong Viceroy like Lord Curzon thus ascribed to the members of the Council of India "a desire to thwart and hinder his work" and felt himself compelled to resign because he was overruled by the Home Government.[13] The issue was raised again when Lord Morley was the Secretary of State for India.[14] General J. H. Morgan has rightly noted about Morley that "no more autocratic Secretary for India ever reigned at Whitehall, none ever consulted his Council less and none ever admonished a Viceroy more."[15] Lord Morley claimed the liberty to correspond directly with any official and asserted a predominant claim in the matter of appointing Lieutenant-Governors. Lord Minto, the Viceroy of India, bitterly resented.

According to Section 33 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the Governor-General in Council was "required to pay due obedience to all such orders as he may receive from the Secretary of State, and thus, by the exercise of the powers of control over Indian finance, legislation and administration inherent in the Secretary of State, the supervision of the British Parliament over Indian affairs is secured."[16] But though the legal and constitutional powers of the Secretary of State over the Government of India were so great and enormous, yet in the practical working of the machinery, the Governor-General being the man on the spot, his "old discretionary power" did not altogether cease. "The authority and position of the Secretary of State," said Lord Birkenhead on the 5th day of November, 1929, "are complementary of the authority and

[12] *Ibid.*, para 35.

[13] Ronaldshay, *Curzon*, Vol. II, p. 237.

[14] *Indian Unrest*, by Sir V. Chirol.

[15] Quoted in *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 217. Reference may be made to Lord Morley's article entitled *'British Democracy and Indian Government' in Nineteenth Century and After, February* 1911.

[16] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 179.

position of the Viceroy. Sometimes the special atmosphere in which the Viceroy lives, or the wholly different atmosphere in which the Secretary of State lives, may be the corrective of a rash impulse, whether that be formed in Delhi or in Whitehall." Under rules which dating from 1921 the Bills to be introduced in the Central Legislature in India were not to be "referred for the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, unless they relate to a limited number of subjects, as, for exomple, Imperial or military affairs, foreign relations, the rights of European British subjects, the law of naturalisation, the public debt, customs, currency and shipping."

We have already reviewed the history of the India Council up to 1907 and its subsequent history may now be briefly narrated. Many Indian politicians including the late Mr. Gokhale had been of opinion that the India Council served no useful purpose and demanded its total abolition. The Crewe Committee of 1919, appointed to consider plans for the re-organisation of the India Office, also shared the same opinion. But the writers of the Montagu-Chlmsford Report and the Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended its retention with certain changes in composition and functions. The Act of 1919 introduced the following changes on the basis of those recommendations:—The Council of India was to consist of such number of persons, not less than eight and not more than twelve, as the Secretary of State would determine. The right of filling any vacancy in the Council remained as before with the Secretary of State. Half the number of the members were to be persons who had served or resided in India at least for ten years and had not last left India more than five years before the appointment. The term of office was reduced to five years instead of seven as before. The Secretary of State retained the power of reappointing a member of the Council for a further term of five years, the reasons for which he was to place before the Parliament. Each member was to receive an annual salary

of £1,200 and the salaries and allowances might be paid either out of the revenues of India or out of money voted by Parliament. The Indian element in the Council was increased from two to three members. Section 29A of the Government of India Act of 1919 created the office of the High Commissioner for India. He was to remain as a servant and an agent of the Government of India and controllable by them, his salary and that of his establishment being paid out of Indian revenues. He was charged with all agency and commercial business which had been hitherto transacted by the Secretary of State in Council for the Government of India. Purchase of all stores for the Government of India, other than military stores, the Indian Students' Department, the training of probationers to the Civil Services, passages, purchase of quinine, etc., were made over to him. Under the constitution of 1935 the High Commissioner was to be controlled by the Governor-General exercising his individual judgement, and might be authorised to act for a federated state, a province, or Burma.

Even after the Reforms of 1919 there was a strong body of opinion in India regarding the Secretary of State's Council "as a reactionary body which has stood in the way of constitutional advance." The Government of India Act, 1935 provided for the dissolution of the India Council as it existed but the Secretary of State was to be aided by a body of advisers whose number would be not less than three and not more than six and who would be appointed by him. All these have disappeared in the new setup of things in our country.

SECTION. II

The Central Government in India

The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed the gradual transformation of the East India Company from a mere trading corporation to an Indo-British power, and new responsibilities consequently devolved upon it. The need of greater

solidarity and coordination among the three Presidencies began to be felt, and the Parliament also felt the necessity of interfering in its affairs. The Regulating Act of 1773 marks the first important step in this direction. By it the Governor of Bengal became the Governor-General of Bengal, and he was empowered along with his Council to superintend and control the "government and management of the presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen (in Sumatra), so far as and in so much as that it should not be lawful for any Government of the minor presidencies to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against any Indian princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty with any such prince or power without the previous consent of the Governor-General and Council, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the arrival of their orders, and except also in cases where special orders had been received from the Company."[17] The Governor-General and Council were required to obey the orders of the Court of Directors and to inform them constantly of all matters concerning the interest of the Company. The Amending Act of 1781 tried to remove some of the difficulties connected with the operation of the Regulating Act and it empowered the Governor-General and Council "from time to time to frame regulations for the provincial courts and councils."[18] Pitt's India Act of 1784 extended the control of the Governor-General and Council over the government of the minor presidencies to "all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war or to peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of such presidencies in time of war." The Charter Act of 1793 distinctly enunciated the powers of the Governor-General over

[17] Ilbert, *Historical Introduction*, p. 46.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

the whole of British India. After the vigorous march of British imperialism under Lord Wellesley and Lord Hastings, the title of the Governor-General of Bengal was changed into the Governor-General of India by the Charter Act of 1833. Now "the superintendence, direction and control of the whole civil and military Government in India as expressly vested in the Governor-General of India in Council." The Act of 1854, as already noted, empowered the Governor-General of India in Council, with the permission of the Home authorities, "to take by proclamation under his immediate authority and management any part of the territories for the time being in the possession or under the government of the East India Company and thereupon to give all necessary orders and directions respecting the administration of that part, or otherwise provide for its administration." This power was exercised by the creation of Chief Commissioners like those of Assam, Central Provinces and Burma to whom the Governor-General in Council delegated such "powers as need not be reserved to the Central Government." The Government of India was also empowered, with the sanction of the Home authorities, "to define the limits of the several provinces of India." At the time of the formal and direct assumption of the Government of India by the British Crown in 1858, Queen Victoria referred to Lord Canning, the Governor-General designate, as the "First Viceroy and Governor-General." This new term 'Viceroy', unknown to any law but since then freely used in practice, meant that besides being the head of the Indian administration, he stood also as the representative of the British Crown in its relation to the Princes and peoples of India.

"Appointed from among the most prominent public men in Great Britain, and usually discharging his task for a period of five years (which was not fixed by any statute), the Governor-General" occupied "the most responsible," as it was "the most picturesque and distinguished office in the overseas service of

the British Crown,"[19] before 1947. Lord Lansdowne wrote to his mother on February 8, 1888: "I am offered a magnificent post, the most responsible and honourable in the service outside England."[20] He was a non-party official and held his post irrespective of ministerial changes in England.[21] So long he had to work with the concurrence of the members of his Executive Council and with a popularly elected Legislature, he could override the opinions of both if he liked, "in cases of emergency and stress." He presided over the Executive Council, and could nominate a Vice-President from among the members for presiding during his absence. He had power to make rules for "the transaction of Council business, the allocation of portfolios among its Members, and the limitation of their scope." He could exercise his casting vote if there be an equality of votes in the Council on any particular question. In the Indian Legislature he could dissolve either chamber or could extend its life if he thought it necessary. He might assent to, certify and veto bills and authorise such expenditure on his sole initiative as he thought to be "necessary for the safety or tranquillity of British India or any part thereof." His previous assent was indispensably necessary for introducing measures on matters like the public debt or public revenues of India, religious rights and usages of British subjects, discipline of the army, foreign relations, provincial subjects and provincial laws. Besides these, the Governor-General had been given the power since 1861 to promulgate in an emergency, without consulting the Legislature, ordinances having force of law for six months (e.g., Lord Irwin's ordinance embodying the Public Safety Bill). No new measure of importance could be initiated by the Governors of Provinces without consultation with or the general concurrence of the Governor-General. Lastly, we

[19] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 177.
[20] Quoted in *Ibid.*
[21] Lord Reading served under three different ministries.

should note that he stood as the representative and symbol of the King-Emperor and had the "direct personal charge of the relations of India with foreign countries, and of British India with the various Indian States." All matters of importance concerning the Indian States, though issued in the name of the Government of India, was "a special concern of the Viceroy." The Viceroy was the link between British India and the Indian Princes. The Governor-General and Viceroy of India thus enjoying these large powers held a pre-eminent position. The Government of India Act 1935 provided that the unitary state of India will be transformed into the Federation of India comprising Governor's provinces, Chief Commissioners' provinces, and federated states. But it would not be given effect to.

A brief account of the Central Executive Council and the Central Legislature may be attempted here. In tracing the history of the Central Executive Council we find that before the Regulating Act of 1773 the Government of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal consisted of a Governor (who was entirely independent of those at Madras and Bombay) and ten councillors. The Act of 1773 placed the control over the Company's affairs in India in the hands of the Governor-General and a Council of four members. But the quarrels between Hastings and his hostile colleagues rendered a reform necessary. By the Act of 1784 'the number of the members of the Governor-General's Council was reduced to three, of whom the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in India was to be one and to have precedence next to the Governor-General.' This Act left the Government in India "vested in the majority of a constantly-changing Council."[22] Consequently an Act was passed in 1786, when Lord Cornwallis accepted the office of the Governor-General, which empowered the Governor-General to overrule the Council and to act on his

[22] Chesney, *Indian Polity*, p. 19.

own responsibility in matters of grave importance in extraordinary cases. This power, reaffirmed and slightly expanded by an Act of 1870, was seldom exercised, though Lord Lytton used it in 1879 to exempt imported cotton goods from duty. The Act of 1833 added to the Council a fourth ordinary member, the Law Member, "who was not to be one of the Company's servants and was not to be entitled to act as member of Council except for legislative purposes." By the Act of 1853 the Law Member of the Council of the Governor-General was made a full member of the Council and was given the right to sit and vote at its executive meetings as well. In 1860, a project was formed for abolishing the Council altogether, but instead of that the Indian Councils Act of 1861 increased the number of the ordinary members of the Council from four to five, "three of whom shall.....be from among such persons as shall have been at the time of such appointment in the service in India.....for at least ten years," and of the remaining two "one shall be a barrister, or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, of not less than five years' standing." The Secretary of State's power of appointing the Commander-in-Chief as an extraordinary member was retained. At this time Lord Canning introduced the portfolio system in the Government of India by which the ordinary work of the Departments was distributed among the Members, the Governor-General himself holding charge of the Foreign Department, and matters of greater importance were referred to the Governor-General or dealt with collectively. These rules, remarks Prof. Dodwell, "whether or not designed to replace the scheme for abolishing the Council altogether.....undoubtedly reduced the importance of the Council, and increased the effective influence of the Viceroy over it."[28] But it should be noted that the comparative influence of the Viceroy and his Council

[28] *Sketch of the History of India*, p. 48.

depended on the personal equation. Further modifications were introduced by the Government of India Act, 1869, which transferred from the Secretary of State in Council to the Crown the power of filling in vacancies among the members of the Council, and also by the Indian Councils Act of 1874, which made provision for the appointment of a sixth member for public works. In 1904 the clause specifically appointing him for that particular department was replaced. The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 provided for the appointment of qualified Indians to the Council, Mr. S. P. (afterwards Lord) Sinha being then (March, 1909) appointed Law Member by the Crown; he was succeeded by a Muhammadan barrister on whose retirement, a Hindu High Court Judge was appointed Education Member of the Council. The Act of 1919 introduced a few important changes in this sphere also. It removed the statutory restriction on the number of the members of the Council, allowed the Indian High Court Pleaders of ten years' standing to become members, provided that Governors of Provinces should cease to sit as extraordinary members when meetings of the Council were held in their territory, and it also gave powers to the Viceroy to appoint Council Secretaries from among the non-official members of the Legislative Assembly or the Council of State. No statutory provision was made for including a fixed number of Indians in the Council, but three were appointed on the recommendation of the Joint Select Committee. Inspite of some attempts at reshuffling the portfolios after the Reforms, these remained substantially unaltered, and were allocated, apart from the Viceroy holding the portfolio of the Foreign and Political Departments, in the following manner; a Member each for the Army (the Commander-in-Chief), Home Affairs, Finance, Law, Commerce, Education (with Health and Lands), Industries and Labour.

Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Government of India Act, 1935 divided Federal subjects into two groups—Reserved and Trans-

ferred. The Governor-General was to administer the Reserved Group, which included Defence, External Affairs, Ecclesiastical Affairs and Tribal Areas, with the advice of Counsellors not exceeding three in number appointed by himself and not responsible to the Federal Legislature. The Transferred Group including the rest of the federal subjects was to be administered by the Governor-General with the advice of a Council of Ministers, who as members of the Federal Legislature would be responsible to it. The Governor-General was invested with Special Responsibilities in certain matters. These were: (a) "Prevention of grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of India; (b) the safeguarding of the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government; (c) the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of minorities; (d) safeguarding the rights and legitimate interests of the services; (e) the securing in the sphere of executive action of the purposes which the provisions of Chapter III of part V of the Act (dealing with the prevention of commercial discrimination) are designed to secure in relation to legislation; (f) the prevention of action which would subject goods of United Kingdom or Burmese origin imported into India to discriminatory or penal treatment; (g) the protection of the rights of any Indian States and the rights and dignity of the ruler thereof; and (h) the securing of the due discharge of his functions which have to be exercised at discretion or in individual judgment." Thus enormous powers were concentrated in the hands of the Governor-General.

According to the new Constitution of India, which came into force from the 26th January, 1950, India has been constituted into a sovereign Democratic Republic. As it has been stated in the Preamble to this Constitution, it aims at securing to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity and also promoting among them all

"fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation." The Constitution contains an elaborate declaration of Fundamental Rights grouped under seven categories, right to equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, right to property and right to constitutional remedies. The Constitution also provides certain Directive Principles of State Policy, which "shall not be enforceable by any Court" but "are nevertheless fundamental in the government of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws".

As regards the Central Government, the executive power of the Union has been vested in the President and "shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with this Constitution." The President, who must be a citizen of India, shall be elected for a term of five years by the members of an electoral college consisting of—(a) the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and (b) the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States. There shall be a Vice-President of India, who also must be a citizen of India and shall be elected by the members of both Houses of Parliament at a joint meeting for a term of five years.

The President is the constitutional head of the Executive. But the *de facto* executive is the Council of Ministers. It is provided in Article 74 of the Constitution that "there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions."

Elizabeth's Charter (of 1600) authorised the East India Company to make reasonable "laws, constitutions, orders and ordinances not repugnant to English law, for the good government of the Company and its affairs." The subsequent Charters of the East India Company increased these powers given by the original charter as circumstances changed; George I's

Charter of 1726 empowered the Governors-in-Council of the three Presidencies to make "laws, ordinances and regulations" in their respective jurisdictions. The Regulating Act of 1773 by subordinating the Presidencies and Councils of Bombay and Madras to the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, required the Madras and Bombay Governments to send copies of all their Acts and orders to Bengal. But we do not find that the Bengal Government "had any power of modifying them," and the Act of 1807 gave to the Governors-in-Council in Madras and Bombay similar powers of making regulations as were possessed by the Governor-in-Council in Bengal. Thus during this period the legislative powers were lodged in and were exercised by the Executive governments in the three Presidencies.

But the gradual growth of the Company's power and territorial dominion in India made more systematic legislation necessary. The Charter Act of 1833 marks an important step in the direction of "simplifying the legislative machinery" and also at correcting the errors of the past. It deprived the governments of Bombay and Madras of their power of legislation and empowered the Governor-General in Council "to make laws and regulations of all persons (British, Foreigners or Natives), and for all Courts (i.e., the Courts of the Company and the Supreme Court)." As we have already noted, Macaulay was appointed Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, and his "duties were to be confined to legislation. Law-giving by purely executive orders, such as had produced the three presidency codes of regulations, was thenceforth to cease." But this reform proved inadequate, and so the Charter Act of 1853 made the legislative member of the Executive Council an ordinary member, and the Executive Council was enlarged for legislative purposes by the addition of six new members called legislative members—the Chief Justice and another judge of the Bengal Supreme Court, and four officials

appointed by the provincial Governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Agra. The Governor-General as president retained his veto over legislative proposals; the proceedings of the legislative sessions were made public. "This was the first recognition of the principle of local representation in the Indian legislature.....We find legislation for the first time treated as a special function of government requiring special machinery and special processes."[24]

But the Council as constituted by the Act of 1853 "evinced an inconvenient tendency to interfere with the Executive." Sir Charles Wood complained in the House of Commons that the "council had become a sort of debating society or petty parliament."[25] Bombay and Madras continued to complain about the preponderance of Bengal, and the Indian Movement of 1857—59 showed the necessity of associating the Indians in the legislation of their country. So the Central Legislative Council was reconstituted by the Indian Councils Act of 1861. This Act raised the number of the additional members from six to twelve; half of these were to be non-officials, who were of course to be nominated, and some seats were given to the Indians. The Act restored to the Governments of Madras and Bombay the legislative powers which the Act of 1833 had withdrawn, but this important distinction that the "previous sanction of the Governor-General was made requisite for legislation by the local Councils in certain cases, and all Acts of the local Councils required the subsequent assent of the Governor-General in addition to that of the Governor." Again, the "power of local legislation bestowed by the Act of 1861 was not, as previously, exclusive: it was concurrent, so that, while a provincial council might, with the Governor-General's approval legislate for its own area, the legislative power of the Governor-General in Council was unimpaired and extended

[24] *M. C. Report*, para 58.
[25] *M. C. Report*, p. 62.

for all purposes over the whole of the Indian territories under the British Crown. The concentration of authority at the Centre thus persisted." It should not be thought that the Legislative Councils, as established under the Act of 1861, contained germs of responsible Government. Their functions were "strictly limited to legislation. They were expressly forbidden to transact any business except the consideration and enactment of legislative measures, or to entertain any motion except a motion for leave to introduce a Bill or having reference to a Bill actually introduced."[26] But there was an advance in the direction of representation in the next stage, which was reached in 1892. The Indian Councils Act of that year provided that the Legislative Council of the Governor-General was to consist of not less than ten and no more than sixteen additional nominated members. The minimum number of non-official members was brought up to ten, of whom five were to be brought in, one, on the recommendation of the non-official members of each of the four provincial councils, and one, on that of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. "A species of indirect election was thus inaugurated." This Act also enlarged the functions of the Council to the extent of holding discussions (though not voting) on the annual statement of revenues and expenditure, and also to put questions to the Executive under prescribed conditions and restrictions. The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 took another step of advance in representation. It raised the maximum number of the additional members of the Indian Legislative Council from 16 to 60, of whom not more than 28 could be officials, while 27 of the remainder were not only non-officials but were elected. There were now three classes of additional members,—nominated official members, nominated non-official members,

[26] *M. C. Report, paras* 63 and 65.
[27] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 116.

elected members. The electorates created by the Regulations under the Act of 1909 were of three classes :—(1) *General* Electorates, consisting of the non-official members either of the Provincial Legislative Councils or of the Municipal and District Boards, (2) *Class* Electorates, comprising of (a) Muhammadan (i.e., Communal) electorates, (b) landholders' constituencies, and (3) *Special* Electorates, consisting of Corporations, the Chambers of Commerce, Universities, etc. Under the new regulations, of the 27 elected members of the Indian Legislative Council, 13 were to be elected by the non-official members of the Provincial Legislative Councils; one member from the special landholders' constituencies in each of the six provinces, Bengal, Bombay, Madras, U.P., Bihar and Orissa, and the C.P.; six members by special Muhammadan constituencies,—two from Bengal and one each from Bombay, Madras, Bihar and Orissa and the U.P.,[28] and two by the Chambers of Commerce of Calcutta and Bombay. It should be noted that seats were distributed in the Central Legislative Council in such a way as in effect to maintain an official majority, and Lord Morley justified it by declaring that the Governor-General's Council "in its legislative as well as executive character, should continue to be so constituted as to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it owes, and must always owe, to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament." The Executive control over Legislative functions remained. Lord Morley plainly declared on 17th December, 1908: "If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a *parliamentary* system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it." The functions of the Central Legislature were enlarged by this Act, for it was now given the power of moving resolutions and asking

[28] Thus was introduced the principle of communal representation which since then agitated Indian political opinion so much.

supplementary questions, subject to disallowance by the Governor-General as the ex-officio President. But no further advance in the direction of responsible or parliamentary Government was contemplated.

The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report pointed out the defects in the arrangements of 1909[29] and recommended an overhauling of the whole system in view of the changed conditions after the Great War. The Government of India Act of 1919 introduced a bicameral system in the Central Legislature, and the old Legislative Council of India was replaced by two chambers, the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State, each chamber having its own President. The President of the Council of State was appointed by the Governor-General from among the members of the Council; he could also appoint other persons to preside "in such circumstances as he may desire." The President of the Legislative Assembly was for the first four years appointed by the Governor-General[30] and then elected by the Assembly and the approval of the Governor-General.[31] There was also a Deputy President of the Assembly from the beginning, who was elected by the Assembly and approved by the Governor-General. The Council of State continued for five years, and the Assembly for three years. But the Governor-General had the power of dissolving either chamber, or, in special circumstances, extending its life.

The Council of State was to consist of 60 members, of whom 34 were to be elected, the rest were to be nominated, not more than twenty being "official members." The Council of State roughly corresponded to the Upper House or Second

[29] *M. C. Report*, Chapter IV.

[30] The First President was Mr. (afterwards Sir) A. H. Whyte, formerly an M.P.

[31] The late Mr. V. J. Patel was its most distinguished elected President.

Chamber of other countries, and was intended to serve as a sobering and revising agency against the hasty legislation or the "radical freaks of a demos." Its franchise was therefore extremely restricted. Property qualifications were "pitched so high as to secure the representation of wealthy landowners and merchants; previous experience in a central and provincial legislature, service in the chair of a municipal council, membership of a University Senate and similar tests of personal standing and experience in affairs" qualified one for a vote. Electors were for the most part grouped in communal constituencies; thus there was one member of the Council of State who was elected by the Muhammadans of the Madras Presidency, and four who were elected by the non-Muhammadans of that province. The Sikhs of the Punjab had a member. There was one member elected by the general constituency of Burma, and another by the Chamber of Commerce. Representing mostly the vested interests in the country, the Council of State had an oligarchical character and outlook. All Bills which had to be passed into an Act must receive its assent. So far as its financial powers were concerned, the annual budget was presented before it at the same time as before the Assembly; it could open a general discussion on the budget and on the financial policy of the State, and the Finance Bill containing all proposals of taxation was sent up to it for its assent and could be accepted, amended or even rejected by it. But the Council of State could not vote particular grants demanded by the heads of various departments; this power belonged exclusively to the Assembly.

The Legislative Assembly was the more democratic Chamber in the Indian Legislature, having a clear elected majority. It consisted of elected official and nominated non-official members. In the last group were the sole representative of the 'Depressed' classes, the sole representative of the Indian Christians, and the sole representative of the Anglo-Indian

community, one nominated non-official from the North-West Frontier Province; another representing Labour interests, and another the Associated Chambers of Commerce. The official members constituting the "official bloc" included most of the members of the Governor-General's Council, important members of the Government of India's Secretariat (such as the Military Secretary and the Foreign Secretary) or nominated representatives of the Provincial Governments. The Legislative Assembly represented different communities, classes and interests in India. The franchise for it was based on high electoral qualifications, which varied in different provinces. All central legislation were to be presented before it as before the Council of State. But if the Governor-General *certified* that any Bill was "essential for the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India, or any part thereof," then it became law on his signature and approval of the Houses of Parliament, even if it was subsequently passed by either of the Chambers, or rejected by both. Another limitation on the legislative powers of the Central Legislature was contained in Section 67 of the Government of India Act of 1919, according to which the previous sanction of the Governor-General was required for the introduction of any measure affecting,—(a) the public debt or public revenues of India, or imposing any fresh charge on the revenues of India; (b) the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India; (c) the discipline or maintenance of any part of His Majesty's Military, Naval or Air forces; (d) the relations of the Government with foreign powers or Native States; (e) any measure—(1) regulating any provincial subject, or any part of a provincial subject, which was not declared by rules under the 1919 Act to be subject to legislation by the Indian Legislature, (2) repealing or amending any Act of a local legislature, (3) repealing or amending any Act or Ordinance made by the Governor-General.

Though Section 25 of the Act of 1919 defined the financial powers of the Indian Legislature, the Governor-General still had the "power in cases of emergency, to authorise such expenditure as may, in his opinion, be necessary for the safety or tranquillity of British India or any part thereof."

In studying the relations between the two chambers of the Indian Legislature, we should note that in all bicameral systems of legislature, conflicts between the two chambers have been very common, and means have also been provided for getting over consequent deadlock. In India also there were chances of conflicts between the two chambers, "so different in complexion" but having equal status and almost equal powers. So the Government of India Act, 1919, provided three "methods for avoiding or composing such differences"—(1) *Joint Committees*, (2) *Joint Conferences and* (3) *Joint Sittings*. The first means required a formal resolution in each chamber; and each nominated an equal number of members, and it was intended to forestall differences and to expedite the passage of a particular Bill; the second measure was adopted when a difference of opinion had already arisen, and in the Joint Conference each chamber was represented by an equal number of members, but no decision was taken; thirdly, when the originating and the revising chambers "failed to reach agreement within six months of the passing of the Bill by the originating chamber," it rested with the Governor-General, in his discretion, "to convene a Joint Sitting of both chambers," at which those present deliberated and voted upon the Bill in the shape given to it by the originating House, and on the outstanding amendments. The decision there taken was considered to be the decision of both chambers. Lastly, we should note that when there was a case of conflict between the chambers which was complicated by the disagreement of the Governor-General with either chamber, the Governor-General might prevent the deadlock by using his extraordinary power of certification.

The relations of the Executive to the Legislature may now be briefly stated. The proper articulation of governmental powers is essential in a democratic state; in England, for example, the battle of liberty has all along been fought with the motto of subordinating the Executive to the Legislature, though in recent times the Cabinet has wielded almost dictatorial powers. As the final goal of British policy in India was announced to be the progressive realization of responsible government and the development of Parliamentary institutions, one may very well enquire how far the Executive in the Indian Constitution became subordinate to the Legislature. As we have already noted, there was no question of introducing Parliamentary government or of subordinating the Legislature to the Executive in the Councils Act of 1909. The Legislature as created by that Act could only use declamatory rhetoric, which, as late Sir Surendranath Banerjee remarked, "fell on deaf ears, and beat its head against stone walls." Though the Act of 1919 introduced many changes, yet from strictly legal and constitutional point of view the Governor-General in Council remained responsible only to the British Parliament, and retained its old autocratic powers. But in actual practice, the Legislature after 1919 with democratised composition and enlarged powers often exerted an indirect influence on the Executive. The contact of the members with the elected representatives influenced the Government to some extent. Sir William Harcourt once remarked that "the value of political heads of departments is to tell the officials what the public will not stand."[82] Sir Malcolm Hailey, speaking a few years back in the Legislative Assembly, described the Government of India "as having become, after the Reforms, responsive if not responsible to popular opinion, and its viewpoint." But it did become really responsible to

[82] G. Gardiner, *Life of Sir William Harcourt*, Vol. II, p. 897, quoted in *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 231.

the Legislature as it is expected to be a democratic constitution.

The Government of India Act, 1935 provided for a bicameral system in the central legislature, the upper chamber being "known as the Council of State and the lower house as the House of Assembly or Federal Assembly." The Federal Assembly was to have a maximum tenure of five years but it might be dissolved earlier. The Council of State was to be a permanent body, one-third of the members retiring every three years. The Council of State was to consist of 156 members for British India elected by the people, of whom six would be selected by the Governor-General at his discretion and up to 104 members for the States. The representatives of British India were to be chosen on a communal basis, and the representatives of the States were to be appointed by the Rulers of the States concerned. Elections to the Council of State would be direct. The Federal Assembly was to consist of 250 representatives of British India and not more than 125 representatives of the federating Indian States. Elections to the Federal Assembly were to be indirect, that is, the representatives of British India were to be mostly elected by the Legislative Assemly of the province whenever there were two houses. Both the chambers were to have co-ordinate powers almost in all restriction.

The new Constitution of India provides for a bicameral legislature at the centre. According to Article 79 of it, there "shall be a Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as the Council of States and the House of the People." The Council of States shall consist of two hundred and fifty members—twelve nominated by the President in the manner prescribed and the remaining two hundred and thirty-eight are representatives of the States and the Union territories. The House of the People shall consist of "not more than five hundred members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the States"

and "not more than twenty members to represent the Union territories, chosen in such manner as Parliament may by law provide."

A Bill, other than a Money Bill or a Financial Bill, may originate in either House of Parliament. No Money Bill shall be introduced in the Council of States. When a Bill has been passed by the Houses of Parliament, it shall be presented to the President, and the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill, or that he withholds assent therefrom. The President "may, as soon as possible after the presentation of a Bill for assent, return the Bill, if it is not a Money Bill, to the Houses with a message requesting that they will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message, ,and when a Bill is so returned, the Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the Houses with or without amendment and presented to the President for assent, the President shall not withhold assent therefrom."

SECTION III

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The first petty possessions of the East India Company grew into the full-fledged British Indian Empire in the course of a century and a half, through a long process of acquisitions and conquests, under varied circumstances. Administrative arrangements for consolidating them therefore followed in successive stages, and division of British India into provinces could never be made on purely scientific or political principles; considerations of ethnic, linguistic or cultural groupings, of economic or political units, have subsequently cropped up, and the distribution of the Provinces has many critics now-a-days.

The Bombay and Madras Presidencies remained under a Governor in Council. The Charter Act of 1853 gave authority to the Directors either to constitute a new province with a Governor and Council, or to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor. In 1854 Bengal was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor, and this arrangement lasted in that Presidency till 1912 when it was again raised to the status of a full-fledged Governorship. A Lieutenant-Governor was appointed for the Punjab in 1859. Agra was part of Bengal till 1834 when it was placed under a separate administration under a Lieutenant-Governor as the North-West Province. Oudh was annexed in 1856, and remained under a Chief Commissioner till 1877, when it was merged in the North-Western Province. In 1902 it was renamed the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh under a Lieutenant-Governor, and in 1921 it was constituted a Governor's Province. An Act of 1854 empowered the Governor-General in Council, with the sanction of the Director and the Board, to appoint Chief Commissionerships for newly-acquired territories. Accordingly in 1861 the Central Provinces were formed by combining the Sagar and Narmada districts with the Nagpur territories in one charge under a Chief Commissioner. Berar being leased in perpetuity to the British by the Nizam of Hyderabad, was, in 1903, linked with the Central Provinces, and in 1920 these became a Governor's Province. Conquests in Lower Burma were placed under a Chief Commissioner in 1862. Upper Burma was annexed in 1886 and was joined to British Burma to form the Chief Commissionership of Burma; it was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor in 1897, and became a Governor's Province in 1923. Assam was separated from Bengal and was placed under a Chief Commissioner in 1874. In 1905, by the ill-fated partition scheme of Lord Curzon, Assam with the eastern half of Bengal was converted into a separate province under a Lieutenant-Governor. But when the partition of Bengal was annulled by the King in 1911, Assam was again converted into a Chief

Commissionership, but subsequently became a Governor's Province as well. Bihar and Orissa were also, along with Assam, separated from Bengal and constituted as a province early in 1912 and was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor, and subsequently under a Governor. The North-West Frontier Province was created in 1901 by Lord Curzon from districts transferred from the Punjab and British Baluchistan, and was placed under a Chief Commissioner; it received the status of a Governor's Province in April, 1932. British Baluchistan was constituted into Chief Commissionership in 1889. The small province of Delhi, which came into existence on 1st October, 1912, Ajmere-Marwara in Rajputana, Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands came to be administered by Chief Commissioners. Subsequently Sindh and Orissa were created Governor's provinces.

The Governor of a province with plentitude of powers and privileges was really the chief authority there. He was for long the ex-officio President of the Executive Council and could nominate a Vice-President to preside during his absence. Before the Reforms of 1919 he was the ex-officio President of the Provincial Legislature, and though the Reforms abolished this anomaly, his powers over the Provincial Legislature were still great. He had the power to summon, prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Council and to order fresh elections. His permission was necessary for the introduction of private members' resolutions for discussion in the Council. All Bills passed by the Legislature required his assent, and he possessed the extraordinary powers of "certification against the Legislature with regard to all Bills including money grants (*e.g.*, certification of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act) and of veto (*e.g.*, Malabar Tenancy Bill and Calcutta Municipal Amendment Bill)." It was also expressly laid down by the Government of India Act of 1919 that no proposal for the appropriation of revenues or other moneys for any purpose

could be made except on the recommendation of the Governor.

The Reforms of 1919 introduced the system of dyarchy or dual government in the Provincial Executive, into two parts,—(1) the Governor with his Executive Council dealing with *'Reserved subjects,'* (2) the Governor acting with most important of the transferred subjects were:—(a) Local Self-Government, *e.g.*, matters relating to the constitution and powers of municipal corporations and district boards, (b) Public Health, Sanitation and Medical Administration, (c) Public Works, including Roads, Bridges and Municipal Tramways (except in Assam), (d) Education of Indians excepting certain universities and similar institutions, (e) Agriculture and Fisheries, (f) Co-operative Societies, (g) Excise, excluding cultivation, manufacture and sale or export of opium (which was a Central subject), (h) Forests, in Bombay and Burma only, (i) Development of Industries, including Industrial Research and Technical Education. The principal Reserved subjects were,—(a) Irrigation and Canals, Drainage and Embankments, Water Storage and Water Power, (b) Land Revenue Administration, including assessment and collection of Land Revenue, Land Improvement and Agriculture Loans, (c) Famine Relief, (d) Administration of Justice, (e) Police, (f) Control of Newspapers, Books and Printing Presses, (g) Prisons and Reformatories, (h) Borrowing money on the credit of the Province, (i) Forests, except in Bombay and Burma, (j) Factory inspection, Settlement of Labour Disputes, Industrial Insurance and Housing.

In tracing the history of the Provincial Executive Councils, we find that Pitt's India Act of 1784 provided for the creation in each province of a council of three members including the Commander-in-Chief of the Province, and since then the old Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were ruled by the Governor in Council; the Bengal Lieutenant-Governorship

remained till 1909 without a Council.[83] In 1833 the number of members of the Madras and Bombay Councils was reduced to two, but the maximum number was raised to four in 1909 though the actual number of the members of each of those Councils and also of that then created in Bengal remained three till the Reforms of 1919. The provinces under the charge either of Lieutenant-Governors or Chief Commissioners had no Executive Councils except in the province of Bihar and Orissa created in 1912 after the Partition.

After the Reforms of 1919, there was an Executive Council of Executive Councillors remained four, but it was laid in each of the Governor's Provinces. The maximum number down in the Act that one of the Councillors must be a man who at the time of appointment had at least twelve years' previous service under the Crown in India. All Executive Councillors were ex-officio members of the Legislative Council, but their tenure of office or emoluments did not depend on that body. The Governor presided over the Executive Council, or a Vice-President nominated by him from among the members of the Council. The decision of the majority prevailed, the President having a casting vote in case of a tie. But this rule was limited by the provision regarding the Governor's special powers in exceptional circumstances threatening in his opinion, 'safety, tranquillity or interests of his province.'

As to the Transferred subjects, the Governor was to be "guided by the advice of his ministers, unless he saw sufficient cause of dissent from their opinion, in which case he must require action to be taken in accordance with his advice." The Ministers were normally selected by the Governor from among the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council and they held "office during his pleasure." As appears from sub-

[83] Strachey, *India: Its Administration and Progress*, p. 61. Arguments for and against the introduction of a Council in Bengal may be studied in Chesney, *Indian Polity*, pp. 107—17.

section 2 of Section 4 of the Act of 1919, the Governor might, in exceptional cases, choose a nominated member or even a non-member, especially when the Council was not sitting. It was also provided that if Ministerial Government could not work, the Governor-General in Council, with the previous sanction of the Secretary of State in Council, might "revoke or suspend the transfer of all or any subjects in the province," and thereupon any subjects relapsed "for the time being into the position of reserved subjects administered by the Governor in Council." But in ordinary practice the Ministers were primarily responsible to the Local Legislature for their administration; their pay and the funds required for their departments were voted by that body; they were expected to enjoy its confidence and on an adverse vote of that body they had to tender their resignation. Thus we find here an application of the theory of the supremacy of the Legislature over the Executive part of the Government. But the presence in the Legislative Council of a proportion of thirty per cent of nominated members, official and non-official, and of representatives of special constituencies like those of landholders or of communal constituencies like that of the Europeans, was a "solid asset in the hands of the executive." The Ministers were very often more anxious to satisfy this *bloc* than the elected members whose chosen man he was supposed to be. Responsibility to the Legislature thus tended "to be demoralised into subservience to an irremovable executive." The Governor's interference in transferred subjects was also potent; and the Secretaries, who were theoretically under the Ministers, had direct access to the Governor independently of the Ministers, and they had to keep the Governor informed of every important matter in their respective departments. The Ministers did not form a corporate body like the Cabinet in England, and there was really no joint responsibility, though something like it was sought to be established by way of a convention in a few provinces, notably

in Madras; each minister was ordinarily responsible for his own department, and there was no provision in the law for mutual consultation of the Ministers.

Legally speaking, each half of the Provincial Executive was independent of the other, but in actual practice it was not possible to avoid mutual overlapping of Transferred and Reserved subjects. As a matter of fact, the division of subjects into Transferred and Reserved "was, in the nature of things, arbitrary" and did not give "the Transferred Departments autonomy within their own sphere."

It should be remembered that the dyarchy was declared to be an experiment before the establishment of full responsible government in the provinces. It was something like a bait of compromise, and its inherent defects, combined with changes in the feelings and political ideas of the Indians, made its successful working impossible from the very beginning.[84] The Reforms Enquiry Committee was instituted in May 1924 with ten members under the Chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman, the then Home Member of the Government of India and Leader of the Legislative Assembly, to enquire into the difficulties arising from, or the defects inherent in the working of the Act of 1919 and to suggest future remedies. All things considered, the Muddiman Committee did not condemn the dyarchy as completely unsuccessful or unworkable. As the Governor of the United Provinces declared, it was "a complex, confused system having no logical basis, rooted in compromise, and defensible only as a transitional expedient." There is no doubt that Dyarchy in the provinces did not prove to be a satisfactory system in actual working. The Government of India Act, 1935 abolished the system of dyarchy in the provinces and the dual character of the provincial government. There remained no reserved subjects and no Execu-

[84] Chirol, *India*, p. 258.

tive Council of the Governor. The Governor was to administer the provincial matters with the advice of a Council of Ministers, who were to be members of the Legislature and responsible to it. The Legislature was to fix their salaries and they were to act on the principle of collective responsibility. But the Governor had special powers in matters of law and order, and he had special responsibilities almost similar to those of the Governor-General.

According to Articles 153 and 154 of the new Constitution of India, there is a Governor for each State and executive power of the State is vested in the Governor who is to exercise it either directly or through officers subordinate to him. The Governor, who must be a citizen of India, is appointed by the President of India. He shall hold office during his pleasure. The executive power of a State extends to matters with respect to which the State Legislature has power to make laws. But with respect to the matters in the Concurrent List the executive power of the State is "subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof."

Article 163 of the Constitution provides that there shall be Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the Head "to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion." The Governor of each State is its Constitutional head. But the *de facto* executive is the Council of Ministers, and in practice the Governor has to accept its advice. The Council of Ministers of a State is collectively responsible to its Legislative Assembly.

The history of the growth and the present position of the Provincial Legislature is an interesting and instructive study. In tracing the origin of the legislative power of the provinces

we find that in 1797 the Presidency of Bengal and in 1807 the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were authorised to issue independent regulations for their respective jurisdictions. The Act of 1833, however, took away from the Government of Madras and Bombay the power of independent legislation. But this centralisation of all legislative powers was fraught with defects. Madras and Bombay "complained of the preponderance of authority which Bengal exercised. The huge extent of territory for which a single council legislated made it impossible for matters to be handled with adequate information and experience."[85] Lord Canning thought that a partial return to the system which existed before 1834 "was advisable" and the Indian Councils Act of 1861 restored the powers of legislation to the Madras and Bombay Councils, which were also expanded by the addition of the Advocate-General of each Presidency and other nominated members, not less than four and more than eight, at least half of whom were to be non-officials as was the case with the Governor-General's Council. No demarcation was made between the jurisdiction of the Central and the Local Legislatures respectively; the "previous sanction of the Governor-General was made requisite for legislation by the local councils in certain cases, and all Acts of the Local Councils required the subsequent assent of the Governor-General in addition to that of the Governor," and were made subject to disallowance by the Crown.

But the legislative councils created by the Act of 1861 had none of the features of a legislature in a modern democratic constitution. These have been described by Lord MacDonnel and Mr. Cowell as "committees by means of which the executive government obtains advice and assistance in their legislation, and the public derive the advantage of full publicity being ensured at every stage of the law-making process." The

[85] *M. C. Report*, para 59.

"laws made in the legislative councils" were "in reality the orders of Government." Public opinion, exercised in the Indian National Congress, exposed the inadequacy of the Act of 1861, and the Government thought it necessary to make a move. Hence came the Councils Act of 1892 by which the Legislative Councils were enlarged, an elective element was introduced, and the Councils were given the limited rights of questioning the Executive and of discussing budgets. The "functions of the councils were thenceforward to be more than merely legislative, or merely advisory," and this marked an advance over the earlier measure of 1861.

But events were moving quickly in India marked by the growth of political consciousness, and the Indain politicians demanded greater administrative reforms. So another step of advance came with the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, which effected important changes in the composition and functions of the Provincial Legislature. These "were enlarged up to a maximum limit of 50 additional members in the larger provinces and 30 in the smaller; and the composition was so generally arranged as to give a combination of officials and nominated non-officials a small majority over the elected members except in Bengal where there was a clear elected majority."[86] The greater part of these additional non-official members were elected either by groups of local authorities, landholders, trade associations or universities. The Muhammadan community was given a special representation (except in the Punjab, Burma and the Central Provinces) by the addition from two to five members to each council, chosen by the vote of a separate Moslem electorate. Thus was introduced the principle of "communual representation based upon the vote of a separate electoral roll," which become later on a "cardinal problem and ground of controversy at every revision of the

[86] *Ibid.*, para 76.

Indian electoral system."[37] No less important were the changes in the functions of the Councils, which were now empowered by this Act to "discuss the budget at length before it was finally settled, to propose resolutions on it, and to divide upon them. Not only on the budget, however, but on all matters of general public importance, resolutions might henceforth be proposed and divisions taken. The resolutions were to be expressed and to operate as recommendations to the executive government."[38] But there were certain matters, like the army, foreign relations, Native States, on which no resolutions could be moved, and the right was thus limited.

As we have already noted, Lord Morley had no desire to establish parliamentary and responsible government in India, and the 1909 Act left the Legislatures as "essentially Consultative Committees attached to the Executive."[39] The authors of the Reforms Scheme of 1919 justly held that "the reforms of 1909 afforded no answer, and could afford no answer, to Indian political problems." They therefore declared that their first object would be to invest the Legislative Councils with real powers.

This was in tune with Indian national aspirations; public opinion for a decade had demanded removal of the defects of that imperfect measure, and the Great War had come unexpectedly to change the "philosophy of politics and of life and to prepare the ground for a change of policy and its declaration (1917)." Imperialism had been subjected to severe strain and tests between 1914 and 1919, and statesmen thought it wise to strengthen the confidence of the colonies and dependencies. The Act of 1919 was thus able to make

[37] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I. p. 118.

[38] *M. C. Report.*

[39] Ramsay MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 89.

[40] *M C. Report*, para 81.

important changes in the composition and function of the provincial legislatures. The Legislative Council for each Province was to consist of members of the executive councils and of members either elected or nominated; 70 per cent of the members being elected members (60 per cent in the case of Burma) and not more than 20 per cent "official members." The number of members of each council became much greater than that of the old legislative councils.[41] The constituencies were divided into two categories, general and special; the former including non-Muhammadan, Muhammadan, Indian Christian, European or Anglo-Indian or Sikh (in the Punjab), and the latter including Landholders, Universities, Planters, Mining (Planters or Mining in Bihar and Orissa and the Central Provinces) and Commerce and Industries. The question of communal electorates was carefully discussed by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report[42] and it declared that they "were opposed to the teaching of history; that they perpetuated class division; that they stereotyped existing relations; and that they constituted a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle." Nevertheless, the Joint Authors of the Report had to admit the principle of special electorates to the constitution they were framing and to extend it in the case of Muhammadans and Sikhs of the Punjab. Separate elctorates were eventually also provided (although not contemplated by the M. C. Report) for Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. Certain seats were reserved for other minorities; for example, in Madras out of 65 seats allotted to non-Muhammadans, 28 were reserved for non-Brah-

[41] As provided by the Act of 1909, these were for Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the United Provinces respectively, 50 members, exclusive of the members of executive councils; under the schedule to the Act of 1919 the total number for Bengal was 125, for Madras and the United Provinces 118 and for Bombay 111.

[42] Paras 227—232.

mins and in Bombay 7 out of 46 non-Muhammadan seats were reserved for "Marathas and allied castes."[48] The Governor was authorised to nominate the representatives of the backward classes and also of 'organised industry.' Besides 'general' and 'special' constituencies, there was another division between 'urban' and 'rural' constituencies. The franchise for the Councils was lowered and the normal qualifications of a voter were based on (1) community, (2) residence, (3) occupation of a house, (4) assessment of income-tax, (5) receipt of a military pension, and (6) the holding of a land. Women suffrage was not directly established by the Electoral Rules; but the legislative councils were given the power to remove the sex barriers, and this was done in every province, though the number of women voters remained very small.

The functions (legislative, administrative and financial) of the Legislative Councils were enlarged, and these can be studied under three heads, legislative, administrative and financial. Bills intended to be legally applied within a province were to be passed by the Legislative Council, whether it concerned the Reserved or the Transferred half of the Government. The Council could exercise administrative control in three ways—(a) by moving resolutions, (b) by putting questions and supplementary questions, (c) by moving votes of censure against the policy of the Government, and (d) by demanding adjournments of the House "when the House is in session, or a discussion on an important matter of recent occurrence." With regard to the Legislative Council's financial powers it was provided that the budget for the administration of the whole province must be considered and passed by the Council. So far as the Transferred subjects were concerned, the Council could cut down or refuse any demand made on

[48] Vide *Appendix III and Appendix IV of Indian Statutory Commission's Report*, Vol. I.

behalf of these. In the matter of Reserved subjects, the Governor was given the right of certifying that the expenditure provided for by the demand was essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the subjects. There were also four items on which the Legislative Council's vote was not required:— (a) the provincial contributions to the Central Government, (b) interest and sinking fund charges on loans, (c) expenditure of which the "amount is prescribed by law," (d) the salaries and pensions of High Court Judges and the Advocate-General of the Province. The power of voting supplies could be exercised by the Council only once a year, and so the check of the Legislature on the Executive through the control of the purse-strings was not operative continuously.

The general powers of legislation of the Council were limited in two ways—(1) it had to take the previous sanction of the Home Government and the Government of India through the Governor for introducing certain Bills, and (2) the laws passed by it were of provincial character. Further, the Governor could certify, veto or reserve for the consideration of the Governor-General, any Bill passed by a Provincial Legislature, if he thought it necessary for the safety and tranquillity of his Province. The control of the Council over the Transferred Departments was or might be real, but it was only indirectly exerted over the Reserved Departments by resolutions, questions and the reduction of demands or token cuts. In fine, it may be said that though the reforms of 1919 marked an important step in the growth of responsible Government in the provinces, the Legislature's control over the Executive, which is the most indispensable element in a democratic constitution, remained imperfect.

Under the constitution of 1935, the provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam came to have two chambers, Upper and Lower, namely, the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly, while the others

only one chamber, the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Council became a permanent body, one-third of its members retiring every three years. The Legislative Assembly's tenure was final for five years but it might be dissolved earlier. Representation in the Legislative Assembly was settled by the Communal Award of 4th August, 1932, as modified by the Poona Pact of 25th September, 1932. Representatives to it were to be elected by separate electorates for each community and a number of seats out of the general seats were assigned to the so-called depressed classes,—officially the scheduled castes. About 10 per cent of the total population of India was enfranchised, and women got a much wider franchise so that six million women (against 315,000 under the Act of 1919) received the right to vote, compared to 29 million men. In most respects the powers of the two chambers became equal but the Legislative Council was not entitled to vote expenditure in the provincial budget. There were votable and non-votable items in the provincial budget, the legislature having no control over the latter.

According to Article 168 of the new Constitution, for every State there is a Legislature consisting of the Governor and in the States of Bihar, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, two Houses, in other States, one house. In a State having two Houses of the Legislature, one is known as the Legislative Council and the other as the Legislative Assembly, and when there is only one House, it is known as Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly of each State shall consist of "not more than five hundred, and not less than sixty, members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the State." The total number of the Legislative Council of a State shall not exceed one-third of the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly of that State; but this total number shall in no case be less than forty. Every Legislative Assembly of

a State, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. The Legislative Council of a State is not subject to dissolution, but "as nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as may be on the expiration of every second year in accordance with the provisions made in that behalf by Parliament by law."

With certain restrictions the Governor has the power to promulgate ordinances during recess of Legislature.

The relations between the Government of India and the Provincial Governments should also be considered in this connection. The Government of India, prior to the inauguration of the new Constitution, continued to be a unitary Government, with entire responsibility to the Parliament of England for its works, and the provinces being created to serve administrative efficiency continued to be dependent on the Government of India. As has been noted in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, "the local governments are 'literally' the 'agents' of the Government of India. Great powers have been delegated to them because no single head could support the Atlantean load."[44]

The bonds connecting the Government of India with the Provincial Governments were (1) Finance, (2) Legislation, (3) Administration.

(1) Even after the Acts of 1853 and 1858, finance was centralised in the hands of the Government of India, "which treated the revenues of India as one and applied them to the purposes of the Government of India as a whole."[45]

This system was full of various defects. The Government of India had a heavy financial burden, and there was no fair distribution of funds among the provinces. Sir Richard Strachey made definite proposals for the reform of the

[44] Para 120.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

system in 1867. The system of financial decentralization was inaugurated by Lord Mayo's Government in 1870. Each provincial government was henceforth allowed a fixed grant for the maintenance of certain departments, like police, jails, education and the medical services, "with power, subject to certain conditions, to allocate it as seemed best, and also to provide for additional expenditure by the exercise of economy and, if necessary, by raising local taxes. All the residuary revenues the Government of India retained for its own needs." The next step in this direction was taken in 1877 in the time of Lord Lytton by transferring to the provincial governments the management of certain other new departments, like Excise, Stamps, Law and Justice and some others varying from province to province, and by handing over to them the revenues from those specified departments for meeting the expenditure instead of making fixed grants as before. But the new system did not prove financially successful. "The difficulty of exactly adjusting means to needs remained; and as the revenue from the transferred heads was not ordinarily sufficient for provincial requirements, it was supplemented by a percentage of the important head of land revenue, which otherwise remained an all-India receipt.

In 1904 there was a new departure. In order "to give the local Governments a more independent position and a more substantial and enduring interest in the management of their resources than had previously been possible," the amount of revenues granted to a province was definitely fixed. Thus the settlements were made quasi-permanent subject to revision only under cases of extreme necessity and "when the assignment was made disproportionate to normal provincial needs." Thus the provincial governments, being relieved from the old uncertain financial policy and from the fear of resumption of the provincial resources by the Government of India, were placed in a better position of freedom in financial matters.

This comparative independence naturally created among them an incentive for economy. The Royal Commission of Decentralisation appointed in 1907 enquired into the relations between the Central and the Provincial governments; it submitted its report in the following year but no radical change took place. It was Lord Hardinge's Government which in 1912 made the settlements premanent, reduced the "fixed assignments" and increased the "provincial share of growing revenues" and curtailed intervention of the central government in provincial budgets.

But in spite of all these measures, the Government of India exercised a very real control over the finances of the provincial governments. Having a share in the revenues, the Government of India had a "strong motive for interfering in details of administration." Further, the Government of India completely controlled all taxation imposed in British India and the provincial governments were not granted the power of borrowing on their own credit. Lastly, the Government of India "exercised control over expenditure in the provinces in the series of the codes of instructions, such as the Civil Service Regulations, the Civil Accounts Code, the Public Works Code and the like.

(2) In tracing the history of the Provincial Legislatures we have noticed that, subject to certain restrictions, powers had been delegated to the local legislature of each province to make laws "for the peace and good government of the province." A local council was not competent to "affect any Act of Parliament nor as a general rule to repeal or alter without previous sanction any Act of the Governor-General's legislative council or indeed of any legislature but itself." Further, a provincial council could not consider any law affecting religious usages of any class of British subjects in India, or the regulation of patents and copyrights, or the relations of the Government of India with the foreign powers and the Indian States. Even in other

matters, the law-making powers of the provincial councils, though legally unfettered, were limited in actual practice. The Governor-General's Council also "retained a concurrent power of legislation for the country at large," on matters like Penal and Criminal Codes, laws for prisons and police, for forests, mines, factories and preservation of the public health. The subsequent assent of the Governor-General was required for every Act of the local legislatures, and all projects for legislation had to be submitted by the local government to the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for approval. Provincial Legislatures were still in theory only 'enlargements of the executive government for the purpose of law-making.'

(3) Section 45 of Government of India Act, 1915 distinctly provided for the supreme control of the Government of India over the proceedings of the provincial governments.

The Government of India, being responsible for the administration of the whole country to the Parliament through the Secretary of State, kept administrative functions with regard to defence, diplomatic relations with the frontier states and the foreign nations, political relations with the Native States, tariff, currency and exchange, the post office, railways and other heads of all-India concern, in its own hands. On other heads, authority and responsibility were shared by the Government of India with the provincial governments in a varying degree. But there was a strong body of public opinion pressing for decentralisation, and the authors of the Joint Report laid stress upon it. With the introduction of the principle of 'responsible' government in the provinces by the Reforms of 1919, the old state of things was considerably modified.

After the Act of 1919 devolution to the provinces was effected by rules made under the Act known as the Devolution Rules and approved of by both Houses of Parliament. This devolution was to take place in the "Governors' Provinces,"

and the other parts of British India remained, so far as the devolution of authority from the Central Government was concerned, essentially in the same position as before the Act of 1919.[46] The old divided heads, like land-revenue, stamps, excise, income-tax and irrigation, were abolished, and as provided in the Schedule to Rule 3 of the Devolution Rules[47] a distribution was made between "Central Subjects" and "Provincial Subjects." In case of any doubt as to whether a particular matter did or did not belong to a provincial subject, the final decision rested with the Governor-General in Council.

This classification was made both for purposes of administration and legislation. So far as administrative control was concerned, it was restricted only in the transferred sphere, but in the reserved subjects it remained complete. The control of the Central Government over the "official part" of the provincial governments was exercised very often and fully in the sphere of "Law and Order." But it was understood that in consonance with the growth of responsible government in the provinces, the interference of the Government of India, even in the Reserved half of provincial administration, should be "restricted only to cases of unimpeachable necessity." In the transferred half, there was no legal restraint upon the Central Government's power of intervention. It could further co-ordinate with the provincial governments and could give its advice in certain matters. Thus conferences were arranged at Simla and Delhi where Education Ministers and Directors of Public Instruction, Provincial Excise and Agricultural Ministers, Inspectors-General of Police and Jails, and Finance Members were summoned. Certain provincial matters, like the borrowing and taxing powers of the local self-governing bodies, factories,

[46] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, pp. 124 and 175.

[47] Quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 126—131.

labour questions, infectious and contagious diseases of men, cattle and plants, and standards of weights and measures were "subject to central legislation."

So far as legislative devolution was concerned, the Provincial Legislatures could legislate without the previous consent of the Governor-General in a small category of provincial matters. But on a specified list of subjects, for example, a provincial bill regulating any Central subject,—it could not legislate even for its own territorial jurisdiction without the previous consent of the Governor-General.

In the matter of finance also, the control of the Central Government over the provincial administrations was comparatively relaxed. The Central and Provincial budgets were separated and certain sources of income were allocated to the provincial administrations. The provincial governments were given the power of imposing taxation without the previous sanction of the Governor-General on certain heads. They were also given the power of borrowing for certain specified purposes. The loans were raised "on behalf and in the name of the Secretary of State in Council and on the security of the revenues allocated to the provinces." But restrictions still remained. The Government of India was faced with a large deficit at the beginning of the Reforms and it was decided that the provinces should pay contributions in proportion to their increased revenue so that the budget of the Central Government might be balanced. A Committee, known as the Financial Relations Committee, was appointed with Lord Meston as its President, and it settled the share of each province. Though the Act of 1935 provided for provincial autonomy, control of the centre over the provinces remained in essence considerable.

In studying the relations between the Union and the States under the present Constitution of India, it has to be noted that the Parliament has the authority to make laws for the

whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. No law made by Parliament "shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation". The Parliament has exclusive power to legislate on any of the matters enumerated in the Union list, and the Legislature of any State has the exclusive power to make laws for matters mentioned in the State list. The Parliament and the Legislature of any State also have power to make laws with regard to any matter contained in the Concurrent list. There are certain special circumstances in which the Parliament can, in the national interest, legislate on the State List for a limited period. The Parliament has also the power "to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body".

Though the States are autonomous, ,the ultimate and residuary responsibility for the peace and safety of the whole of India is vested in the Government of India. So it has been provided that the "executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose". The Union has control over the States in certain cases.

Financial relations between the Union and the State are mainly on the lines adopted by the Government of India Act, 1935. Some are Union sources of revenue and others are State sources. Some revenues are distributed between the Union and the States. There are others, collected by the Union, and are allotted entirely to the States.

Having thus briefly reviewed the question of decentralization, we may next study the development of Local Self-Government in India which is but another form of decentralization.

Modern researches have established beyond doubt the fact of the existence of village and town governments in India from time immemorial. But these disappeared gradually under the pressure of repeated foreign invasions and political and economic disorders, between the sixth and the nineteenth centuries, so that Local Self-Government, in modern India, became "essentially a product of British rule." Ignoring, and thus helping on to decay, the traces of local self-governing institutions and traditions of ancient India, that had survived the uncongenial medieval ages even down to the nineteenth century in British, and more specially Indian, India, has been one of the failures of the British Indian administration.

Dealing first with the municipalities, we find that the earliest attempts in municipal government were made in the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. An order of the Court of Directors in 1687 conferred on the East India Company the power of forming a corporation composed of European and Indian members of the city of Madras for purposes of local self-government. A royal charter of 1727 permitted the establishment of Major's Court with aldermen but no burgesses in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta; the functions of these bodies were judicial rather than administrative. The Charter Act of 1793 empowered the Governor-General to appoint justices of the peace in the Presidency towns from among the Company's servants and other British inhabitants. Besides their judicial duties, the justices of the peace were "expressly authorised to provide for scavenging, watching and reparing the streets," the expenditure on which was to be defrayed 'by an assessment on houses and lands." After the passing of the Councils Act of 1861 the system of municipal

government was changed by the local legislatures by a series of statutes and henceforth its history was different in each Presidency.

Before 1842 there was no attempt at municipal organisation and legislation outside the Presidency towns. An Act passed in that year for Bengal proved practically inoperative, and eight years later another Act was passed applying to the whole of India. Under this Act of 1850 and many subsequent provincial Acts, municipal institutions were established in other parts of India. These Acts "provided for the appointment of commissioners to manage municipal affairs, and authorised the levy of various taxes, but in most Provinces, the commissioners were all nominated, and from the point of view of self-government these Acts did not proceed far enough." A step forward was taken in 1870 by Lord Mayo's Government in connection with its decentralization scheme. It was declared that "local interest, supervision, and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical charity and local public works. The operation of this Resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institution, and for the association of Natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore in the administration of affairs." New municipal Acts were passed in various provinces between 1871 and 1874, a considerable increase took place in the number of municipal bodies in urban areas "with well-marked fields of activity," and the elective principle was extended; but "only in the Central Provinces was popular representation generally and successfully introduced." It was Lord Ripon, who in his Resolution of 1882, announced a new policy and established Local Self-Government on a liberal basis. He declared the main object of his reform to be "to advance and promote the political and popular education of the people and to induce the best and the most intelligent men

in the community to come forward and take a share in the management of their own local affairs and to guide and train them in the attainment of that important object." In pursuance of this policy, Acts were passed in 1883-1884 which greatly altered the nature of Local Self-Government. The election of members of municipal bodies was extended to the number of half or more in each case, and many towns were granted the privilege of electing a private citizen as Chairman or Vice-Chairman. The administration of the Municipalities continued on the general principles laid down then, till 1915, when Lord Hardinge's Government issued another important Resolution declaring their future policy towards Local Self-Government.

The establishment of the Local Boards dealing with local affairs in rural areas is of recent date. These came into existence after the Resolutions of 1870 and 1882 referred to already. The main outlines of Lord Ripon's plan were:—— "Firstly, that a network of Local Boards should be formed in country areas, in addition to the Municipal Committees, the area included under each board being so small as to ensure local knowledge and interest on the part of each of the members; secondly, that all the Local Boards, urban or rural, should, everywhere, have a preponderance of non-official members; thirdly, that the members should be chosen by election whenever it was, in the opinion of the Local Government, practicable to adopt such a plan; fourthly, that there should be a District Board of some kind which should meet periodically to settle matters such as the rate of the land cess, in which the smaller boards have a common interest; fifthly, as to the necessary Government control they considered that it should be exercised rather from without than from within, and that the Chairmen of the Local Boards should, as a rule, and whenever practicable, be non-official persons." As conditions were not uniform throughout the country, one general system could

not be introduced in all the Provinces; so a large discretion in this matter was allowed to the Local Governments, and the system introduced by the Acts of 1883—85 in the different provinces differed from one another.

The Decentralization Commission of 1909 recommended certain changes in Local Self-Government, and the Government of India in 1915 laid down certain guiding principles, but these did not lead to any practical development in the field. In view of the changed circumstances during World War I and the criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of the then existing system of Local Self-Government,[49] the Government of India issued a Resolution on the 16th of May, 1918, declaring the "policy of the gradual removal of unnecessary Government control and of differentiating the spheres of action appropriate for Government and for Local bodies respectively." It was proposed to make Local bodies as representative as possible and to remove unnecessary restrictions in connection with taxation, budget and the sanction of works and to have elected instead of nominated Chairmen of the Boards.

Under the Reforms of 1919 local self-government became a transferred subject and the Ministers became responsible for the practical application of the policy. In almost every province the Legislative Councils evinced zeal and interest for the progress of local institutions, and the result was, broadly speaking, "to make the boards, both municipal and rural, predominantly non-official in all the Governor's provinces and to reduce the control of Government to external supervision by the elimination of the officers of Government from the position of Chairmen."[50] The Local bodies did not of course in all cases show satisfactory work and progress, and their workings were subjected to adverse criticism. But the defects in their work-

[48] *Moral and Material Progress Report*, 1901-1902.
[49] Paras 13 and 192.
[50] *Report of the Indian Central Committee*, p. 23.

ing were due not so much to the incapacity of the people to govern themselves as to other obstacles, "some having origin in the change to a new system, others from the nature of the new organisation, and others again from local or temporary conditions."[51] The Indian Central Committee rightly remarked that many of the defects "were the inevitable result of the suddenness with which the transition from official tutelage to complete freedom was made."[52] One highly interesting feature of rural uplift work in free India is revival of village panchayets.

B. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA AND INDIAN NATIONALISM (1821 ONWARDS)

The political development of Modern India is but an aspect of the Indian Renaissance of the 19th century. Indian nationalism has been "much more than the agitation of political coteries. It is the revival of historical tradition, the liberation of the soul of a people."[53] "No reformation," remarks Hegel very rightly, "is possible without renaissance," and it may be added that no revolution in policy can be effected except on the basis of a socio-religious reformation and a wide cultural renaissance. The different phases of Indian life were during the 19th century permeated with the spirit of a renaissance, a great awakening; the efforts of men began consciously to be directed towards the redemption of India from the state of all-round degradation to which she had been reduced during a long process of decline and fall the depth of which had been reached in the 18th century. This spirit of revival and recreation spread from sphere to sphere of the national life, and while deeply affecting society, religion and literature, it

[51] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. I, p. 308.
[52] *Report*, p. 25.
[53] MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 27.

passed on into the field of politics and produced a commotion there as well.

The earlier renaissances of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, though rich in cultural and religious achievements, had on the political side led only to the rise of independent nation-states like those of the Sikhs and the Marathas, and could not, for various reasons, evolve one national movement embracing the whole of India, Hindu as well as Moslem, orthodox as well as the reformed. The Marathas and the Rajputs, for long the ever disappointing hopes of undeveloped Indian nationalism, ceased to make history after 1818, and the belated sprouting of the Sikhs failed to take root after 1839. The last fancies of political revival round the phantoms of the Peshwa or the Padishah perished in 1858. A blank was thus created in the first half of the 19th century, and the frustrated urge of Indian nationalism sought to realise itself in a novel way, turning away from the barren political results of the earlier Renaissance. The stained pale moon of Indian political life set in the Western lands of India, while in the East of it dawned a new political consciousness: Maharastra went out of the stage, and almost immediately Bengal stepped in to give a new lead.

In the 19th century certain factors combined to produce a real Indian National Movement. The first important factor was the strong British imperialism in India, which gave her political unity under a 'third party' in the midst of various other discordant elements. Secondly, the intimate contact with the West, effected through the exertions of educationists like David Hare, missonaries like Carey, and administrators like Macaulay, brought about a change in the political outlook of the Indians. Western education brought them in touch with the historical and political works of men like Burke, Mill, Macaulay, Herbert Spencer and others, and saturated their minds with the ideas of nationality, liberalism and freedom. Of course, at first 'the new wine of Western learning went

into the heads of young Indians"[84] and produced disastrous social effects, but the evils proved to be temporary, thanks to the early religious and social reform movements. On minds chastened by reborn religion and literature, the growing acquaintance, through the medium of Western education, with developing political ideas of the West and the stirring history of Western nationalistic movements, impressed the love of civic liberty and national freedom. Moreover, English education furnished India with one of the best aids to national growth, a *Lingua Franca*, which made it possible for representative men from distant and different provinces to know and understand one another better, to interchange views and form common programmes of action. Western Science, in changing and improving transport and communications, has quickened the pace of national movements, by enabling the leaders of the country to carry on national propaganda with promptness and on a large scale and to come into contact with public men and opinions in other countries of the modern world.

Scholars, poets and religious reformers have also had their share in generating in the minds of the Indians a feeling of regard for and pride in their motherland. Just as the European Renaissance from the 13th to the 15th centuries unfolded before the benighted people of Europe the classical treasures of ancient Rome and Greece, so the study and republication of Ancient Indian lore by the Asiatic Societies and by an unbroken chain of European scholars like Jones, Colebrooke, Max-Muller, Monier-Williams and others and Indian scholars like Rajendralal Mitra, Mahadeo Govind Ranade, Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar, Haraprasad (Banerjee) Shastri and others, "revealed to India herself scarcely less than to the Western world, the majesty and wealth of the Sanskrit language and the historical as well as literary value of the great body of Hindu

[84] Lord Ronaldshay, *The Heart of Aryavarta*, p. 45.

Literature which is the key to India's civilisation."[55] The religious and social reformers of 19th century India, like Rammohan Roy, Devendranath Tagore, Kesav Chandra Sen, Pratap Chandra Mazumdar, Peary Charan Sarkar, Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar,[56] Dayananda Saraswati, Ramkrishna Paramhansa and his great disciple Vivekananda (Narendra Nath Dutta impressed on the minds of the people the greatness and universality of much of the ancient though of their country, and thus served to awaken in them a keen desire for national regeneration on the basis of the best in the past. As it has been remarked by Colonel Olcott, Dayananda exercised "great nationalising influence.....upon his followers."[57] Mrs. Annie Besant also has pointed out that "it was Dayananda Saraswati who first proclaimed: 'India for the Indians." The writings and speeches of Vivekananda exerted a considerable influence upon young minds in India. "The queen of his adoration," says Sister Nivedita, "was his motherland." "Like Swami Dayananda," writes Hans Kohn, "Vivekananda taught Young India self-confidence and trust in her own strength."[58] The theosophists (much of whose inspiration came from India) like Blavatsky, Colonel Olcott and Mrs. Annie Besant, helped the cause of Indian Nationalism considerably by their writings and life's work. The Indian Press and Literature also acted as powerful stimulants in arousing national consciousness in the country. We should note here the political influence exerted by papers like *the Indian Mirror, the Hindu Patriot, the Amrit Bazar Patrika, the Bengalee, the Bomboy Samachar, the Soma Prakash, the Sulabha Samachar, the Sakklya Prakash, the Marathi Sabodhka Patrika, the Gujrati Daftaram, the Com-*

[55] Sir Valentine Chirol, *India*, p. 80.
[56] Sir Surendranath Banerjee, *A Nation in Making*, pp. 6—9.
[57] A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution*, p. 23.
[58] *A History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 72.

rade, the New India, the Hindu, the Keshari, the Bangadarshana, the Arya Darshana, the Bandhava and others. Equally important in this matter are the works of writers like Dinabandhu Mitra, Hem Chandra Banerjee, Nabin Chandra Sen, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Ramesh Chandra Dutt, Rajanikanta Sen, Dvijendra Lal Roy, Rabindranath Tagore, Srimati Sarojini Naidu, Srimati Sarala Devi-Chaudhurani, and others. Bankim's *Ananda Math,* which gave to Bengal and thus to India the famous song '*Bande Mataram,*' has been justly regarded as "The Bible of Modern Bengali Patriotism;" while more than three-fourths of the abundant poetry, songs and music associated with Indian nationalism has been supplied by Tagore and D. L. Roy. Students of history will carefully note that Literature of a creative character has in every country profoundly influenced the course of politics and nationalism,[59] and India was not an exception to this.

The origins of nationalism, however, are not only positive in character, but also negative, and oftener than not nationalism grows on rightly or wrongly based national discontent, and in the process of grow destroys and spoils much. Various economic troubles among the masses and growing unemployment among the middle classes have played their parts in fanning the flame of Indian national discontent. The Indian politicians also came to believe in an exploitation of India by foreigners, and in a consequent economic slavery of India. The administrative apparatus in India, again, became excessively top-heavy and costly. Further, the growing differences between the Indians and the Englishmen in India on all vital questions and the increase in the feelings of racial bitterness between them since the Indian Movement of 1857—59, have intensified the national discontent.

The history of the National Movement in modern India

[59] Compare the influence of Literature on Europe before the French Revolution, or before the development of Socialism.

may be conveniently studied under several periods :—(a) 1821—1833, (b) 1833—1859, (c) 1859—1885, (d) 1885—1905, (e) 1905—1914, (f) 1914—1930, and (g) since 1930. Raja Rammohan Roy was not only a great religious and social reformer but he may be justly regarded as the father of the modern Political Movement in India. Being a strong lover of freedom, he helped progressive political ideas and he believed that the people of India "have the same capacity of improvement as any other civilised people." Mr. William Adam, a Baptist Missionary associated for some time with the Raja, remarked :—"He would be free or not be at all.....Love of freedom was perhaps the strongest passion of his soul." He fought hard for a Free Press in India and demanded various advanced political rights for his countrymen. A batch of politically-minded students of the Hindu College, like Tarachand Chakravarty, Dakshina Ranjan Mukhopadhyaya, Rasik Krishna Malik, Ramgopal Ghosh and Pearychand Mitra, being influenced by the Revolutionary doctrines of "natural rights" and "equality," before Rammohan's departure from India, demanded "radical reforms like abolition of the political power of the East India Company and provision for free and compulsory education." These youngmen and some of the Raja's prominent political disciples like Prasanna Kumar Tagore (1801—1868), Dwarkanath Tagore (1794—1846), Kishorichand Mitra, Govinda Chandra Datta, and Harish Chandra Mukerjee, who however sought to remove specific grievances through constitutional agitation,—did much to awaken the political consciousness of the people of Bengal during the period from November 1830, when Rammohan sailed for England, to June 1861, when Harish Chandra Mukerjee died. During the fifties and the latter half of the 19th century a number of prominent Bengalis, like Dwarkanath Vidyabhusan (1820—1886), a notable journalist who edited the *Soma Prakash* since 1858, Kristodas Pal (1838—1884), Rev. Lal Behari De, Bholanath Chandra (1822—1910).

Sisir Kumar Ghosh (1840—1911), Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, and Sir Asutosh Mukerjee and others helped in various ways the evolution of Indian Nationalism. Bankim's novel, *Anandamath*, gave to the people the well-known patriotic song *Bande Mataram*. Bankim through his writings[60] developed the idea of nationalism as part and parcel of religion, and deeply stirred the young minds of Bengal.

The Indian Movement of 1857—59 marks a turning-point in the history of the National Movement of India as a whole. It served to engender a feeling of distrust of Indians in the minds of Englishmen in India. Before this movement the British administrators, like Meadows Taylor and Munro (as we know from their autobiography and letters respectively), lived in cordial relations with the Indians; but in the years following it, wrote Frere, a contemporary observer, to Sir Charles Wood, "the old sympathy with India changed to a feeling of repugnance; the old spirit of content with life and work in India, the old inclination to regard things in an Indian rather than an English light, gave place to a reluctance to stay in India longer than one needs most and a disposition to judge things by an emphatically English standard." Referring to this change, Sir Henry J. S. Cotton remarked: "It is a grave position to which we have drifted, for the change is complete and the tension is acute."[61] The undercurrents of discontent already generated by Dalhousie's annexations began to spread to wider Muslim as well as Hindu circles after the

[60] Bankim's political ideas are found in the following works:—(a) A popular literature for Bengal, 1870; (b) Bangadarśaner Pratham Suchanā, 1279 B.S.; (c) Bhāratavarṣa Parādhīn Kena, 1279; (d) Baṅgadeśar Kṛiṣak, 1279; (e) Svādhīnatā-o-Parādhīnatā, 1280; (f) Sāmya, 1280; (g) Kamalakanter daftar, 1280—93; (h) Bānglār Itihās, 1281; (i) Bāngala Sāsaner Kal, 1281; (j) Bahubala-o-Bākyabala, 1284; (k) Manuṣyatva ki, 1294; (l) Lokaśikṣā, 1285; (m) Bāṅgalār Itihāser Bhagnāṁśa, 1289; (n) Ānandamath, 1989; (o) Devichaudhuraṇi, 1290; (p) Dharmatatva, 1291; (q) Kṛṣṇacharitra, 1923.

[61] *New India*, London, 1885, p. 51.

failure and the suppression of the Movement of 1857—59, and in fact we may trace the birth of extremism in India from this time. The Muslim stream of underground discontent emerged to view in several geysers, chiefly the Wahabi movement, the followers of which "resented the loss of the supremacy which their forefathers had enjoyed, and hoped to destroy as enemies of Islam the aliens who had seized it."[62] In 1863 the Ambela expedition under Sir Neville-Chamberlain proceeded to suppress a band of Muslims (who had been receiving help from interior Hindustan) at Sittana, some fifty miles above Attock on the right bank of the Indus.

Racial antagonism and national discontent thus engendered continued to be fed up by a number of events during the administration of Lord Lytton,—like "the wanton invasion of Cabul, followed by the Second Afghan War; the large increase of the army under the hallucination of the Russian bugbear, the costly establishment of a 'scientific frontier,' the complete disarming of an inoffensive and helpless population, although the Eurasians were untouched; the gagging of the Vernacular Press (1878); the sacrifice of the import cotton duties as a Conservative sop to Lancashire; and the unmerited and undignified rebuff administered by the Viceroy personally to a leading association in the country....." All these combined to stir national sentiment in India to a considerable degree. Sir William Wedderburn told Blunt that "the state of things at the end of Lord Lytton's 'reign' was bordering upon revolution."

Local Associations for representing and advancing Indian views and interests had for some years been coming into existence, such as the *Anjuman* at Lahore, the *Sārva-Janik-Sabhā* founded at Poona in 1870 working under the able guidance of

[62] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 169.

Ranade and Joshi and the British Indian Association in Calcutta, which held pretty advanced and admirably reasoned political views as early as 1852 when it petitioned the British Parliament on the subject of administrative and constitutional Reforms.[63] The British Indian Association was, however, "essentially and by its creed an Association of landholders,"[64] and the need was soon felt of a more democratic body. Mr. (afterwards Sir) Surendranath Banerjee, one of the greatest political leaders of modern India, who had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1871 but had to give it up a year later and had taken up educational work, was then trying, as he has himself explained, through his teachings and utterances, "to kindle in the young the beginnings of public spirit, and to inspire them with a patriotic ardour, fruitful of good to them and to the motherland."[65] After a year's efforts Surendranath, with the assistance of Ananda Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath Ganguli, succeeded in establishing the Indian Association on 26th July, 1876. A few months before this had been started another association called the Indian League, of which the moving spirits were Sisir Kumar Ghose (of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*), Sambhoo Chunder Mookerjee (of the *Rais and Rayyet*) and Motilal Ghose, but it soon ceased to function and its leading members joined the Indian Association, which 'soon focussed the public spirit of the middle class, and became the centre of the leading representatives of the educated

[63] *Vide* the reprint of this rare document in B. B. Mazumdar's P. R. S. Thesis on Growth of Political Thought in India from Rammohan published by the Calcutta University.

[64] Sir S. N. Banerjea, *A Nation in Making*, p. 40.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 35. He remarked in one of his speeches: "Political work is more or less ephemeral, though none the less highly useful. Educational work has in it the elements of permanent utility. The empire of the teacher is an ever-enduring empire, which extends over the future. The teachers are the masters of the future. I cannot think of a nobler calling than theirs. Theirs is a heaven-appointed task, a sacred vocation."

community of Bengal."[66] Within a year of the foundation of this Association an opportunity presented itself for greater political agitation. The reduction of the age-limit for entrance to the Indian Civil Service from 21 to 19, by orders of the Marquis of Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, was regarded as a "deliberate attempt to blast the prospects of Indian candidates" for the highest public service, and it was decided at a meeting of the Indian Association held on 24th March, 1877, in the Town Hall of Calcutta under the presidency of Maharaja Sir Narendra Krishna Bahadur to organise an all-India national protest against it by uniting all the provinces "through a sense of common grievance and the inspiration of a common resolve."[67] With this object Surendranath undertook two tours, one (1877) in Northern India and the other (1878) in Western and Southern India. As a result of this campaign an all-India memorial praying for raising the age for the open competitive examination to twenty-two years and for holding simultaneous examinations in India as well as in England was sent to the House of Commons through Lal Mohan Ghose, as the representative of the Indian Association,[68] and was attended with considerable success. Thus the efforts of the educated Indians had been creating new hopes and aspirations among them during the reactionary government of Lord Lytton. As Sir S. N. Banerjea has remarked, "In the evolution of political progress, bad rulers are often a blessing in disguise."[69]

The administration of his successor Lord Ripon, who was the nominee of Mr. Gladstone and a friend of Indian Nation-

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 52—55. Maharani Svarnamayi, the 'Lady Bountiful' of Cassimbazar, contributed a substantial sum towards the expense of this mission.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

alism, was marked by a distinct development of the Indian Political Movement. Gladstone had thus declared the Liberal creed with regard to Indo-British relations: "Our title to be in India depends on a first condition, that our being there is profitable to the Indian nation; and on a second condition that we can make them see and understand it to be profitable." Ripon, "a transparently honest man"[70] and possessed of moral earnestness, believed in the capacity of the educated Indians for self-government, and also in the necessity of imparting them further political training, as is clear from his Local Self-Government Bill. As Chancellor of the Calcutta University he declared before the students that "the time was fast approaching when popular opinion even in India would become the irresistible and unresisted Master of the Government." He repealed the Vernacular Press Act of Lytton and earned the gratitude of the Indian Journalists. But Indian hopes soon received a check through "the astonishing blunder of the Ilbert Bill."[72] This Bill drafted by Sir C. P. Ilbert, the Law Member of the Viceroy's Council (1883), provided that Indian magistrates and judges should have jurisdiction over Englishmen in the country districts. Lord Ripon sought thus to take an important step towards abolishing "judicial disqualifications based on race distinctions." But the Europeans in India raised a furious protest against this change which was on the other hand enthusiastically supported by Indian opinion. The Viceroy was almost boycotted by his countrymen; they formed a European Defence Association with its branches in different parts of the country and raised a fund of Rs. 150,000 "to protect the caste privileges of the White Race."[73] The Government

[70] Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[71] *A Nation in Making*, p. 66.

[72] Sir S. N. Banerjea writes that a note submitted by Mr. B. L. Gupta, I.C.S., who was then Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, "became the genesis of the Ilbert Bill Controversy," *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[73] Zacharias, Renascent *India* p. 110.

had at last to submit to a compromise which provided that Europeans brought before District Magistrates or Session Judges (whether Indians or Europeans) could claim to be tried by a jury, half of whom were to be Europeans. As this privilege was denied to the Indians, the compromise means an abandonment of the principle of the bill. The Ilbert Bill proved to be a blessing in disguise for the cause of Indian Nationalism. The fight over it, the attitude of the Europeans, and its defeat left "a rankling sense of humiliation in the mind of educated India; "[74] it increased racial bitterness, led to the growth of national discontent and convinced the politically-minded Indians of the necessity of having a more powerful organisation for national work.

Already in 1881 in the Mysore State,[75] Dewan Rangacharlu (1831—1883) had held a Representative Assembly,—"a popular machinery devised deliberately to bring the masses into co-operation with administrative machinery." The Bengal group of political workers under the leadership of Surendranath Banerjea launched an agitation for the creation of a National Fund, and a National Conference was held in Calcutta for three days, from December 28 to 30, 1883. On the 1st of March of that year Allan Octavian Hume, a distinguished British officer, who had resigned his service in 1882, had addressed an open letter to the graduates of the Calcutta University urging them to form an association "for the mental, moral, social and political regeneration of the people of India —a little army *sui generis* in discipline and equipment."[76] This letter produced a deep impression on educated Indians, and in the month of December 1884, representatives from all parts of India, who had come to attend the annual convention

[74] Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[75] K. T. Paul, *The British Connection with India*, p. 775.

[76] *Allan Octavian Hume, C. B., Father of the Indian National Congress* by Sir William Wedderburn, London, 1913, p. 52.

of the Theosophical Society at Adyar in Madras, resolved to "form themselves into a group of provisional committees, men from different towns to win others, each in his place, and to meet later for further consultation."[77] These forces brought into existence the Indian National Congress. While on December 25, 26 and 27, 1885, the National Conference met again in Calcutta, simultaneously the Indian National Congress consisting of a smaller group of seventy delegates held its first sitting in Bombay on 27th December under the presidency of Umesh Chandra Banerjee (better known as W. C. Bonnerjee). It should be noted here that besides conducting the Indian National Congress the Bengal political workers held the first Provincial Conference for Bengal in 1886, and this example was followed by the other provinces as well.[78] The efforts and motives of Hume, who has been justly styled as the "Father of the Indian National Congress," were sincere and admirable; he was perhaps guided by a conviction that there cannot be a great abiding empire without a great people, and that the people cannot be great by being always kept under a state of tutelage. Besides preparing the ground in India before the opening of the Congress, he also went to England to secure the sympathy of friendly public men there for the proposed political institution and tried his best to guard "the British public against all possible misrepresentation, suspicion and distrust to which the new organisation was naturally exposed."[79] He returned to India just in time to attend the Congress as one of the Bengal representatives. The names of some of the talented and eminent Indians who took part in Congress work during its early days may be mentioned here: Surendranath Banerjea, W. C. Bonnerjee, Dadabhai Naroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, Dinshaw Wacha, Badruddin Tyabji, K. T. Telang,

[77] Mrs. Besant, *How India Wrought Her Freedom*, p. 1.
[78] S. N. Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[79] Mazumdar, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

M. G. Ranade, B. G. Tilak, G. K. Gokhale, A. M. Bose, Rash Behari Ghose, Motilal Ghose, B. G. Pal, Arabinda Ghose, Ayodhyanath, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Lajpat Rai, Subrahmanya Iyer Sankaran Nair, Ananda Charlu and some others.

Space will not allow a detailed narrative of the history of the Congress, but a very brief review will not be out of place. The early relations between the Indian National Congress and the Government were cordial. But this attitude of friendliness was vitiated very soon. In 1888 Sir Auckland Colvin assailed the Congress, and Lord Dufferin, hitherto well-disposed, criticised its programme in his speech at the St. Andrew's Dinner in Calcutta in 1887, and referred lightly to the educated community as a "microscopic minority." In 1890 the Government officially declared that the Congress belonged to that class of conferences which private individuals might attend, but from which "Government officials are necessarily debarred." The Congress thus developed into an "Opposition to the Government,—not a friendly consultative Opposition but an Opposition which challenged the status and the authority of the Government."

Muslim attitude towards the Congress is an important point for study. Sir Saiyad Ahmad (1817—1898), an eminent leader and reformer of the Muslim community in India, and a strong believer in the "catholic nationality of India,"[80] was yet of opinion that in the then state of Indian politics the changes proposed by the Congress would be opposed to the interest of the Muslims who formed a minority. He therefore decided (1885) to keep his community aloof from the Congress, and three years after stood in definite opposition to that body: in 1888 he started the Patriotic Association "as a

[80] He wrote in 1884: "In the word Nation I include both Hindus and Mohammedans because that is the only meaning which I can attach to it."

counterblast to the Congress,"[81] and followed it up by founding in 1893 the Upper India Muhammadan Association. It cannot be said, however, that the whole Muslim community was opposed to the Congress; there were from the very beginning some who associated themselves with it. Out of 702 delegates attending the sixth conference held in Calcutta in 1890, 154 or 22 p.c. were Muhammadans.[82] Justice Badr-ud-din Tyabji of Bombay was Congress President in 1887, and Rahamatulla Mohammad Sayani (1847—1902), another prominent Moslem of Bombay, presided over the Twelfth Congress held in Calcutta in 1896. In that capacity he declared: "It is imagined by some persons that all, or almost all, the Moslems of India are against the Congress movement: this is not true. Indeed by far the largest part do not know what the Congress movement is." The Congress, however, pursued its course. A British Committee of the Indian National Congress was founded in London; in 1890 it published a journal of its own (*India*) which in 1892 became a monthly, and in 1896 a weekly paper.

From the very beginning the Congress agitated for constitutional and representative Government. Its first meeting passed resolutions demanding "the reform and expansion of the supreme and the existing local legislative councils by the admission of a considerable proportion of elected members," "the creation of similar councils for the N.-W. Provinces and Oudh, and also for the Punjab," and the right of discussing the budget and questioning "the Executive in regard to all branches of the administration." It demanded, besides other things, the abolition of the Council of India as being the "necessary preliminary to all other reforms," and the holding of simultaneous examinations in England and India for admission into the

[81] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[82] Sir Verney Lovett, *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement*, p. 43.

Indian Civil Service. Indian Councils Act of 1892 reformed and expanded the Councils to some little extent.

The year 1892 marks a turning-point in the history of the Indian National Movement. We shall notice henceforward the rise of Religious Nationalism or Extremism and Revolutionary Nationalism or Terrorism. The leaders of each school were at first[83] opposed to the Westernisation of India, and aimed at securing her complete independence and at restoring her 'pristine purity and ancient glory and prosperity.'

The instalment of reforms released by the Act of 1892 did not satisfy the hopes of the younger members of the Congress, and they soon thought the mild methods of the Congress,—its "moderation and loyalty,"—to be insufficient for securing the political freedom of their motherland. It was at Poona that this extreme section of the political workers first found a field for work; later on it spread to Bengal and the Punjab. The Deccan, which had in the days of Mughal Imperialism, produced a national hero in the person of Shivaji the Great, now also supplied the first leader of the Extremists,—both by way of a Hindu reaction. Bal Gangadhar Tilak was a man of remarkable intelligence and culture, belonging to that section of the Deccani Brahmans called the Chitpavans to which belonged the Peshwas of the eighteenth century. An eminent scholar with mastery over Sanskrit, Marathi and English, of versatile talents, a powerful journalist, and above all a man of high moral character, Tilak proceeded to utilise "the Hindu gods and heroes to instil a new life and a new spirit in the people," and so inaugurated the celebration of the Ganapati festival in 1893 and of the Shivaji festival in 1895. He bitterly opposed (apparently from the points of view of religious nationalism and political expediency) Lord Lansdowne's Age of Consent Bill of 1890 introduced for raising the age of consummation of

[83] Later Extremists and Revolutionaries have mostly made friends with the West.

Hindu marriages from ten to twelve, though it had been supported by such patriotic and learned men as Telang and Bhandarkar. While it was clear that the nationalism of Tilak's school was much too narrow in basis and outlook to finally suit modern India, for the time being it proved a force to reckon with. One important feature of Tilak's work was that he tried to initiate the students into the virtues of disciplined action and physical training so that they might develop the necessary grit for organised political struggles. Two dire natural calamities—famine and plague,—"seemed to help his designs." Blunt had remarked ten years ago: "Agricultural distress is the major premise of revolution in India, and political education, unaccompanied by political power, its minor premise." When a famine broke out in 1896, Tilak, with his knowledge of the Irish Land League, started something like a no-rent campaign amongst the Deccan peasantry.[84] The famine was followed quickly by an outbreak of bubonic plague, which produced a havoc in the western parts of the Bombay Presidency. The Bombay Government, in spite of its sincere desire to save the people from this terrible disaster, hurriedly took recourse to measures which proved to be 'ineffectual' and 'unpopular'. All these keenly stirred popular opinion, and Tilak, who had so long co-operated with the Government in relief works, now charged the "British soldiers with every sort of excess" and imputed "not merely to subordinate officials but to the whole Government itself deliberate direction to oppress the people." On 22nd June, 1897, the date of the Jubilee Celebration of Queen Victoria, Mr. Rand, the Plague Officer of Poona, and his associate Lt. Ayerst of the British Regiment on duty, were murdered by two Chitpavan Brahman brothers, Damodar and Balkrishna Chaplekar, who were subsequently tried and executed. They had founded in 1895 a society in

[84] Athalye: *The Life of Lokamanya Tilak*, pp. 84-85.

Poona for physical and military training called the "*Society for the removal of obstacle to the Hindu Religion.*" The Government came forward to suppress the growth of the Revolutionary Movement by repression. Tilak was arrested for sedition on 27th July, 1897, and imprisoned for eighteen months, six months of his sentence being subsequently remitted. The printer of the *Kesari* and the editors of the *Poona Vaibhav*, the *Modavritta* and the *Pratod* were also arrested, and two *sardars* or landlords (the Natu brothers) were, on suspicion of being in touch with the political movement, deported under Regulation XXV of the Bombay Regulations corresponding to Bengal Regulation III of 1818. The Poona murders of 1897 "inevitably exacerbated feelings, both on the Indian and on the English side."[85]

Revolutionary ideas and activities soon appeared in other parts of India. Tilak "through his imprisonment became a martyr in the eyes of his people"[86] and his *Kesari* continued to exercise a great influence as before. Bengal was the first to be moved by his ideas and methods. In the Congress of 1897 Surendranath Banerjea expressed these sentiments: "For Mr. Tilak my heart is full of sympathy. My feelings go forth to him in his prison-house. A nation is in tears." Lord Curzon came out as the Viceroy of India (1898—1905) at a time when the political temper of the country was thus disturbed. Under him, remarks Sir Valentine Chirol,[87] who is by no means an unfriendly critic, "a system of Government by efficiency reached its apogee." But administrative efficiency does not always bring national and political contentment, and the means which he adopted for securing this efficiency were regarded by the Indian nationalists as strong measures for tightening the hold of British imperialism on the country. Lord

[85] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-31.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *India, Old and New* London, 1921, p. 103.

Curzon failed to realise that "India presents not only political but psychological problems of the first magnitude, and with all his intellectual gifts, Lord Curzon, seldom, if ever, showed himself possessed of the spiritual vision which is of the essence of real statesmanship."[88] It was on grounds of administrative efficiency that he tried the Partition of Bengal in 1905 which greatly intensified the discontent of the Hindu politicians of Bengal and was largely responsible for the spread of the Revolutionary Movement. It was introduced at an ominous time "when a little Asiatic Power, Japan, had vanquished the giant Russia about whose movements England herself had for a generation shown such undoubted nervousness. Japan's smashing victory could not fail to thrill India from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya, nor to be taken by her as a turning-point in the political relationship between East and West."[89] The teachings of Swami Vivekananda were also influencing young minds in Bengal at this time by creating in them a feeling of adoration for their motherland, and of confidence in her future political destiny.

In spite of protests from the leaders of public opinion from differents parts of the country, the partition scheme was promulgated in a Government Resolution, dated 19th July, 1905, and it became a "settled fact" on the 16th of October, 1905, when the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam came into existence with Dacca as its capital and Sir Bampfylde Fuller as the Lieutenant-Governor. This partition was regarded by the politicians of Bengal as an open application of the policy of 'divide and rule, intended to prejudice their national solidarity and strength by dividing them into two administrations, "to drive a wedge between the two communities and to create a new Muhammadan province in which the government was to be conducted on the basis of credal differences." Protest

[88] Chirol, *India*, p. 115.
[89] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

meetings were held in different parts of Bengal and a great demonstration at the Calcutta Town Hall on 7th August, 1905, a boycott campaign was launched "as a protest against the indifference of the British public in regard to Indian affairs and the consequent disregard of Indian public opinion by the present Government," and it was decided "to abstain from the purchase of British manufactures so long as the Partition Resolution is not withdrawn."[90] As we have already noticed, the partition actually came into force on the 16th October, 1905, and the negative Boycott and the positive Swadeshi programmes were soon accepted with religious vows by the youths of Bengal.[91] Vigorous propaganda was carried on by leaders like Surendranath Banerjea and Bipin Chandra Pal, and the Boycott and Swadeshi movements soon extended from Bengal to the other provinces of India. The Congress of 1905 and 1906 sanctioned both the movements as all-India political weapons of great economic value.

These years are important in the history of the Indian National Movement also for other reasons. In the Congress held at Banaras in December 1905 under the presidency of the veteran and sober politician, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the younger men raised the standard of revolt under the leadership of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal ("Bal-Lal-Pal"). "A new turn was given to Indian politics; the policy of 'mendicancy,' as the Congress method was derisively called, was henceforth even more seriously assailed."[92] In the next Congress held in Calcutta in 1906 an open rupture between the party of the Moderates and the party of the Extremists was prevented by the tact and influence

[90] S. N. Banerjea, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[91] "Invoking God Almighty to be our Witness, and standing in the presence of after-generations, we take this solemn vow that so far as practicable we shall use home-made articles and abstain from the use of foreign articles. So help us God."—*Ibid.*, p. 228.

[92] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

of the President, Dadabhai Naroji, 'India's Grand Old Man, then 82 years old, who proclaimed in that meeting the ideal of 'Swaraj' (Self-rule) for the people of India. But while to the Moderates this *Swaraj* meant the establishment of a parliamentary form of responsible Government, the Extremists understood it as an ideal of complete independence. Aravinda Ghose entered the Congress arena in this year, and as Editor of a new nationalist paper, *Bande Mataram*, preached the "only two modes to effect the fulfilment of national desires; self-help and passive resistance," thus furthering the idea of Bipin Pal who was working through his paper *New India*. *Bande Mataram*, the remarkable song taken from the *Anandamath* of Bankim Chatterjee, had by this time become the "National Anthem of Renascent India." But gradually the differences between the Right and Left Wings of the Congress, that is, between the Moderates (like Gokhale, Pherozeshah Mehta, Surendranath Banerjea, Rash Behari Ghosh, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Dinshaw Wacha) on the one hand, and the Extremist leaders (like Tilak, Lajpat Rai, Bipin Pal, etc.) on the other, became irreconcilable, and these resulted in rowdyism and scenes of disorder in the Congress (of 1600 delegates) held at Surat on 27th December, 1907, leading to the intervention of the police. On the next day 900 of the 1600 delegates, the moderates forming the majority among them, met as a Convention, and appointed a Committee of a hundred out of those present for drawing up a constitution of the Congress. This Committee met at Allahabad on the 18th and 19th of April, 1908, and drew up a constitution the first article of which came to form subsequently the Creed of the Congress. It runs: "The objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire, and a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on

equal terms with those members. These objects are to be achieved by constitutional means, by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration, and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organising intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country." Henceforth it was made obligatory on all who wanted to become members of the Congress to sign this creed.

Besides the Extremists of Bombay and Bengal, who as a new party fought from within the Congress, Revolutionary party was organised in Bengal under the leadership of Barindra Kumar Ghose, younger brother of Aravinda Ghose, and Bhupendra Nath Dutt, the only brother of Vivekananda. They carried on an extreme and vigorous propaganda through papers like the *Yugantar* (*the Transition of Ages*) and the *Sandhya* (*the Twilight*). Terrorism and revolutionary activities, like intimidation and murder of Government officers by working through secret societies, bomb outrages, etc., became rampant after the break-up of the Barisal Conference in April 1906.[93] Anarchism and revolutionary activities soon spread to other provinces of India, and centres of work were started even in other countries, as in London under Shyamji Krishnavarma, son of Kathaiwar merchant, who published a paper called the *Indian Sociologist*, Vinayak Savarkar and Madan Lal Dhingra.

The Government naturally all along tried to stamp out terrorism by strong and repressive measures, like the deportation, on 9th May, 1907, of Sardar Ajit Singh and Lala Lajpat Rai, under Regulation III of 1818, to Mandalay (Burma), promulgation by the Viceroy on 11th May, 1907, of an ordinance called the Regulation of Meetings Ordinance, passing of the Seditious Meetings Act on 1st November, 1907, the Explosive Substances Act and the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences)

[93] S. N. Banerjea, *op. cit.*, pp. 228—36.

Act of 8th June, 1908, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 11th December, 1908, imprisonment of Tilak at Mandalay for publishing two articles in his *Kesari* on 12th May and 9th June, 1908, and further deportations under Regulation III of 1818 of several Bengal leaders, like Asvini Kumar Dutta and Krishna Kumar Mitra, whose influence was based on things nobler than politics, and "who were the leading spirits of the Swadeshi movement." But anarchism could not be killed: "the revolutionary movement reached the crest of the wave during 1913 both in Bengal and the Punjab" and "Indian revolutionaries abroad tried to take advantage of the outbreak of the Great War to get help from Germany to push forward their schemes of work in India."

The leaders of the Muslim community got a new body for the expression of their political ideas in the All-India Muslim League founded in December 1906. H. H. the Aga Khan remained as the permanent President of the League till 1913. The League was an association of the loyalist members of the Muslim community who wanted special reforms for it. It had branches in India known as Provincial Muslim Leagues and also a London Branch, with Sir Syed Amir Ali as the first President.

Thus as against the activities of the Extremists and the Anarchists, there were the Moderates in both the communities whom the Government tried to satisfy by conciliatory measures. In the midst of this political stage came the Morley-Minto Reforms, which were at first welcomed by the Moderate leaders of the Congress as "an instalment of what India was entitled to claim."[94] But in actual working the Reforms were found to be unsatisfactory and in August, 1910, the moderate leader Gokhale himself declared in the Imperial Legislative Council:—"Now, my Lord, we well know that once the Government have

[94] Chirol, *India*, p. 156.

made up their mind to adopt a particular course, nothing that the non-official members may say in the Council is practically of any avail in bringing about a change in that course."

From this time other factors also began to influence Indian politics. The treatment meted out by the Union Government of South Africa to the Indians there, against which Gandhiji had started the Satyagraha movement, the humiliating position of the Indians in the other British colonies, and the question of Indian emigration to the Crown Colonies which had come into existence after the abolition of slavery in 1833, aroused strong feelings of discontent and indignation.

The World War of 1914 also considerably influenced the course of Indian politics. After its outbreak, India rendered splendid assistance to the Allies through men, money and munitions. At the same time the War "induced in India a new psychology. It brought to her a new sense of self-respect and self-reliance, and hastened enormously the development of consciousness amongst her peoples."[95] This led the Hindus and the Muhammadans to think and act oftener in terms of one India, and the Moderates and the Extremists to merge their differences in more or less a common political programme. A new generation of educated Muslims had now grown up, and being profoundly influenced by the nationalist movements in Turkey and Persia, the war between Italy and Turkey, the agreement between Russia and England regarding Persia, and still more by the Balkan Wars, they came to realise that their true interests were identical with those of the Hindus. The bid for Hindu-Muslim unity made in 1911 by Sir W. Wedderburn, who had come from England to preside over the Congress at Allahabad in 1910, Sir Surendranath Banerjee, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sir Ibrahim Rahimatullah and Messrs. Hasan Imam, Mazharul-Huq and M. A. Jinnah had indeed failed; but at

[95] Graham Pole, *India in Transition*, p. 22. Compare also paras 23. and 24 of the *M. C. Report*.

the annual session of the All-India Muslim League held at Lucknow on 22nd March, 1913, under the presidency of Sir Ibrahim Rahimatullah, its "creed" was changed and henceforth the aim of the League was declared to be "the attainment of self-government for India along with the other communities." The Karachi Congress of December 1913 under the presidency of Nawab Syed Muhammad Bahadur welcomed this change in the constitution and ideal of the Muslim League, and ultimately in 1916 the Congress and the League formulated a joint scheme of reforms and the two communities thus united themselves together in their political demands.

From 1908 to 1916 the Congress was under the control of the Moderates, but their leadership passed away after the death of Gokhale on 19th February, 1915, and of Pherozeshah Mehta nine months later. The Extremists now re-entered the Congress in large numbers at the Lucknow session of the Congress in December 1916, which still "represented all shades and schools of political thought;" Tilak (released in June 1914) for the first time after the Surat Session received an enthusiastic welcome. Mrs. Annie Besant was also "almost unanimously accepted as one of the most influential leaders of the new political life and thought in the country." In order to give effect to the political part of her comprehensive scheme for the regeneration of India, Mrs, Besant had joined the Indian National Congress early in 1914 and had started two papers,—the *Commonweal*, a weekly, on 14th January, 1914, and the *New India*, a daily, on 14th July of the same year. She started the Home Rule League by a formal meeting in Madras in September 1916, and this organisation co-operated with another Home Rule League which had been inaugurated at Poona by Mr. Tilak in April 1916, and together carried on vigorous propaganda throughout India in support of the 'Congress-League Scheme.' The minds of the Muslims in India were also deeply stirred by the war of the Allies against Turkey.

especially since 1916 when the Sharif of Mecca had rebelled against his overlord, the Sultan of Turkey, who was the Khalif of all the Faithful, and had in "Moslem eyes become England's tool." Thus there was discontent and agitation on all sides, and "the situation demanded new handling."[96] Mr. D. Graham Pole, while travelling through India in the cold weather of 1916-17, had "an opportunity of realising how much unrest and dissatisfaction there was in India and how necessary it was for some declaration to be made by the British Government indicating a generous policy of self-determination for India."[97] At such time came the Report of the Mesopotamian Commission, which had been appointed by the Parliament in 1916 to enquire into the reasons leading to the disasters of the Mesopotamian campaign (from 5th November, 1914 to 29th April, 1915), which had been undertaken by the Government of India and its army. The Report of the Commission strongly condemned the conduct of the Mesopotamian campaign as carried on by the Government of Lord Hardinge and by Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, and in July 1917 the latter had to resign. He was succeeded by Mr. E. S. Montagu, who on 20th August, 1917, made the following historic declaration in the House of Commons :— "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in full accord, is that the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The Montagu Mission arrived in India on 10th November, 1917. After various consultations and enquiries the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, formulated a joint scheme of reforms which were approved by the other members of the

[96] *India in Transition*, p. 23.
[97] *M. C. Report*, para 28.

Montagu Mission, Lord Donoughmore, Mr. Charles Roberts, M. P., Mr. (afterwards Sir) Bhupendranath Basu and Sir William Duke, from the India Office. This scheme of reforms was embodied in a report to which both Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford affixed their signatures and which was published on 8th July, 1918, after Mr. Montagu had returned to England in May. Its publication however raised "an angry outcry from the Extremist organs." Mrs. Besant denounced the scheme as being "unworthy to be offered by England or to be accepted by India." "The Montagu Scheme," observed Tilak, "is entirely unacceptable," and he started a violent agitation calling upon the people to "stand firm by the Congress-League Scheme as an irreducible minimum." The Moderates, however, welcomed the reforms proposed. They did not attend the special session of the Congress held at Bombay at the end of August 1918; on the contrary, they met in a party Conference in November 1918 at Bombay in order to express the views of the Moderates on the 'Montford' Reforms, and formed an organisation distinct from the Congress, known as the Indian National Liberal Federation. The Muslim organization also supported the Reforms on the whole, while putting forward criticisms from the standpoint of their special interests. Thus on the Reforms question was broken up the union of the political parties in India which had been secured during the first years of the War.

The Government of India Act, 1919 releived royal assent on 23rd December of that year, and the Reforms were actually introduced in India on 1st January, 1921. But certain factors, 'economic, natural and political,' created an "unfortunate situation" in India at that time which made the success of the Reforms doubtful from the date of their inauguration. There was certainly a dangerous atmosphere in the country in 1919, especially in the province of the Punjab. The influence of economic factors in the growth of political move-

ments can hardly be overstated. In fact the great political movements in history like the French Revolution of 1789 and others had many economic causes as well at their root. Similarly in Post-War India, economic troubles accentuated political discontent. Additional taxation to meet war expenses proved to be a hardship on the people, and rise in prices, especially of such commodities as cotton goods, kerosine, salt, oil and spices, produced distress throughout the country; this was accompanied by agrarian unrest, notable in Champaran in Bihar, where the tenants protested against the oppressions of the Indigo Planters, and in the Kaira (Kheda) district of Gujarat where the tenants demanded reduction of revenue in view of the bad harvest of 1917 caused by heavy rains. Nature also became cruel, and the sufferings of the needy people were highly aggravated by epidemics of plague and influenza in 1917 and 1918. To these were added certain political factors together to produce an acute general discontent. The Rowlatt Act and the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act of March 1919, the tragedy at Jallianwalla Bagh, Amritsar, and the proclamation of martial law in the Punjab by its Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer,—all aroused a "vehement opposition" against the Government. The Khilafat question, or the fate of Turkey during and after the War, agitated the minds of the Muslims in India and once again brought about a temporary Hindu-Muslim unity fostered by Gandhiji on the one hand and the Ali Brothers (Maulanas Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali) on the other, as much for the sake of unity as for political expediency. The attitude of the all-India services towards the Reforms led the Indian public to apprehend that they would not work the Reforms or would try to render them futile. So, instead of being content with the Reforms, Post-War India was ruffled by a great unrest, in the midst of which Gandhiji started the Non-coperation Movement, which was supported by a majority of votes at a special

session of the Congress held in Calcutta in September 1920 under the presidency of Lala Lajpat Rai, with a view to secure India's independence by "bringing moral pressure to bear on government." This movement remained vigorous till 1924.

Unity among the political leaders of India did not last long. A batch of nationalists formed themselves into the 'Swarajist' party in 1923 under the guidance of Mr. C. R. Das in Bengal, Pandit Motilal Nehru in Upper India and Mr. N. C. Kelkar in the Deccan. They followed the Parnellite tactics of obstruction for "mending or ending" the new constitution by entering the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils. The Swarajists exercised a dominating influence in Indian politics till the untimely death of Mr. C. R. Das in June 1925.

Another distintegrating factor in Indian nationalism during the few succeeding years was the re-emphasising of Hindu-Muslim divergences and the growth of communalism which hindered considerably all subsequent attempts towards the solution of Indian problems. The Muslim League was revived by Mr. Jinnah in 1924 and Hindu-Muslim unity disappeared, leading to serious communal riots in different parts of the country (e.g., Calcutta riots of April 1926). After the abolition of the Khilafat by the Ghazi in March 1927, "Khilafatism "lost all raison d'etre,"[98] and the common platform of Gandhi-ites and Ali-ites gave way.

When Lord Irwin took up the viceroyalty of India in 1926 it was "an India of despair. All efforts in India to exercise the evil spirit of communalism had met with only partial success, and all the efforts which had been made by political India to drive home to the Government the necessity of constitutional revision had met with even less success. Neither the friendly reasoning of the first Assembly, nor the gesture of co-operation

[98] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

implied by the entry of the Swarajist or Congress Party into the second Legislative Assembly, nor the unanimous request of all shades of opinion which was embodied in the National Demand (made by the Indian Legislative Assembly in September 1925), had induced any change"[99] of the Act of 1919. Following upon such a state of affairs, the year 1927 came with certain new factors to influence the course of politics. Firstly, the breach in Anglo-Russian relations was followed from 1927 by Communist agitation in India, where the Government had already apprehended the entrance of Bolshevik influences. Secondly, the Cape Town Pact, concluded between the Union of South Africa and India, through the statesmanship of the Right Honourable V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, guaranteeing favourable terms for the Indians in South Africa, "threw a first bridge again between Indian political parties, and Mr. Sastri had the exceptional distinction, when in June 1927 he sailed as first Indian Agent to South Africa, that he went at the joint request of Lord Irwin and Mahatma Gandhi." Thirdly, Sir Basil Blackett's meosure stablising the rupee at 1s. 6d., two pence higher than the traditional exchange ratio, evoked opposition in the politically-minded Indian business circles. Fourthly, the Government decision on the Skeen Committee's Report, published in April 1927, providing a plan for completely Indianizing one-half of the cadre of the Indian Army in twenty-five years, was represented by some as really an anti-national scheme. Lastly came the announcement of the Simon Commission's appointment excluding Indians from its personnel,[100] for which a campaign of boycott was launched

[99] Graham Pole, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[100] The Conservative Party was represented by two members of the House of Lords, Viscount Burnham and Lord Strathcona and two members of the House of Commons, the Hon. E. C. G. Cadogan and Colonel G. R. Lane-Fox. The Labour Party, then His Majesty's Opposition, was represented by Major C. R. Attlee and Mr. Stephen Walsh, who being unable

against it by the Extremists and by most of the Liberals. A public meeting convened by Sir T. B. Sapru on 11th December, 1927, at Allahabad, considered "the exclusion of Indians a deliberate insult to the people of India, as not only does it definitely assign to them a position of inferiority, but what is worse, it denies them the right to participate in the determination of the constitution of their country." The Legislative Assembly passed a resolution on 18th February, 1928, "that the present constitution and scheme of the Statutory Commission are wholly unacceptable to this House and that this House will therefore have nothing to do with the Commission at any state or in any form." The Indian Central Committee was thereafter formed for co-operating with the Statutory Commission. An all-India all-Parties Conference met at Delhi in February 1928 and appointed a small Committee, of which Sir T. B. Sapru and Pandit Motilal Nehru were the most prominent members, charging them with the drafting of a Constitution. The result of their labours produced a document known as the Nehru Report. This Report recommended 'Dominion Status' for India "and was accepted with certain amendments by the next all-Parties Conference held at Lucknow in August 1928. But opposition cropped up against its recommendations with regard to the claims of the Muslim and Sikh communities. It was therefore repudiated by the Muslim League, and also by the Independence League, which had come into being in November 1928 within the Congress itself under the presidency of Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar with Messrs. Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru as secretaries, and which favoured 'complete independence' as against the 'dominion status' of the Nehru Report. The growing strength of those, who supported the goal of independence, was manifest at the

to act was replaced by Mr. Veron Hartshorn. The Commission paid two visits to India, the first from 3rd February, 1928 to 31st March, 1928 and the second from 11th October, 1928 to 13th April, 1929.

annual session of the Congress held in Calcutta in December 1928. Under the temporizing influence of Gandhiji, who had reentered the field of politics, the Congress passed a resolution, which, "while adhering to the resolution relating to complete independence passed at the Madras Congress (1927), approved of the Constitution drawn up by the Nehru Committee," but which added that "subject to the exigencies of the political situation, this Congress will adopt the Constitution in its entirety, if it is accepted by the British Parliament on or before December 21, 1929, but in the event of its non-acceptance by that date, or its earlier rejection, the Congress will organise non-violent non-cooperation by advising the country to refuse taxation and in such other manner, as may be decided upon."

Things were thus taking a serious turn from all sides. Gandhiji and Sardar Vallabbhai J. Patel had started Stayagraha and a no-rent campaign at Bardoli in Surat district; Jawahar Lal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose were agitating for "Purna Swaraj" or complete independence, and Communist Workers' and Peasants' Associations had sprung up everywhere and all industrial centres were disturbed by strikes throughout 1928. Moderation of Lord Irwin, the then Viceroy of India, and of the Labour Cabinet of Mr. MacDonald formed for the second time in June 1929, exercised a restraining influence. Lord Irwin visited England in June, and there he remained in close consultation with the Cabinet till October 1929, and within a week after his return to India made his famous declaration of 31st October, 1929, that he was "authorised by His Majesty's Government to state clearly that, in their judgement, it is implicit in the Declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status." It was also made clear, through the publication of the correspondence between the Statutory Commission and His Majesty's Government, that after the

publication of that Commission's Report a Round Table Conference of British and Indian delegates would be convened in London for the elaboration of a new constitution for India. The Viceroy's pronouncements "produced a very generous response in India."

But all these bright hopes were frustrated by the force of opposition which was launched in England against the Benn-Irwin policy. A campaign started there, against the Viceroy's pronouncement and against the use of the term 'Dominion Status' by a "considerable section of the Press and a number of prominent politicians" (Conservatives as well as Liberals), "revived doubts in India as to the sincere intention of Britain to fulfil her repeated pledges." This scepticism led to the re-emergence of a militant spirit in the Lahore Session of the Indian National Congress held in December 1929 under the presidency of Jawaharlal Nehru. This Congress declared that the goal of the Congress "is the attainment of complete independence for India" and that therefore "nothing is to be gained in existing circumstances by the Congress being represented at the proposed Round Table Conference." It also authorised the All-India Congress Committee, "whenever it deemed fit, to launch a programme of Civil Disobedience, including the non-payment of taxes, under such safeguards as might be rendered necessary." The Indian Liberals, the Indian States, and the Indian Muslims under the leadership of the Ali brothers with their Khilafat organisations, co-operated with the Government and stood against the Civil Disobedience movement, which was formally launched by Gandhiji on 6th April, 1930, by starting the illegal preparation of salt on the Dandi beach. This movement led to riots and disorders; the Indian leaders like Gandhiji, Jawaharlal Nehru, Motilal Nehru, Abbas Tyabji, (Mrs.) Sarojini Naidu, J. M. Sen-Gupta and others were imprisoned, and the Government promulgated special Ordinances to cope with particular aspects of the

movement. The peace negotiations between Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Mr. Jayakar, on the one hand, and the Viceroy, on the other, could lead to no compromise.

Meanwhile, the first Round Table Conference was ceremonially opened on 12th November, 1930, and was adjourned *sine die* on 19th January, 1931. On that day the Prime Minister made a striking statement, declaring that a "mutual understanding of intention and difficulty, gained under such conditions as have prevailed here, is by far the best way for discovering ways and means of settling differences and satisfying claims. His Majesty's Government will strive to secure such an amount of agreement as will enable the new Constitution to be passed through the British Parliament and to be put into operation with the active goodwill of people of both countries." A change of policy was accordingly inaugurated in India; on 25th January, 1931, Lord Irwin released Gandhiji unconditionally as well as all members of the Congress Executive in order to "give an opportunity for them to consider the Premier's statement at the Round Table Conference." Through the efforts of Sir T. B. Sapru, Mr. Jayakar and the Rt. Hon. V. S. S. Sastri, an interview was arranged between the Viceroy and Gandhiji and on 18th February "the half-naked fakir," to use Mr. Churchill's phrase, "strode up the steps of the Viceroy's palace," and on 5th March, 1931, Irwin and Mahatma Gandhi signed the Delhi Pact, on the terms that Civil Disobedience will be discontinued, that boycotting of British goods "as a political weapon" will cease, though 'swadeshi' propaganda and peaceful and unaggressive picketting will be permitted, that there would be no organised defiance of laws, and the question of police excesses will not be pressed,—while, on the other hand, all Ordinances will be withdrawn, and the Government will declare a general amnesty. About the Round Table Conference it was agreed that "steps will be taken for the participation of the representatives of the Congress in the

further discussions that are to take place on the scheme of constitutional reform." The Pact was not well received by the Extremists on either side, but Gandhiji was able through the force of his magnetic personality to secure for it the support of the Congress at its annual session held at Karachi on 29th March, 1931. According to the decision of the Congress Working Committee dated 2nd April, 1931, Gandhiji went as the sole delegate of the Congress to attend the second session of the Round Table Conference (September 7th—December 1st, 1931) which after various discussions formulated a draft constitution for India. Gandhiji could not gain anything impressive in London; he was again detained as a state prisoner on return to India on 4th January, 1932, for expressing his intention of resuming civil disobedience. Thus the country was again in the midst of disorders and turmoil for the greater part of 1932. The question of communal representation and of the place to be given to the Depressed Classes in the new constitution aggravated the agitation, especially after the publication of the Prime Minister's (Mr. MacDonald's) Communal Award in August 1932. The situation improved after the formal acceptance of the Poona Pact, an agreement under Gandhiji's influence between the Caste Hindus and the Depressed Classes, by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Government. The third session of the Round Table Conference convened in London (November 17th—December 24th, 1934) made its own recommendations. The year 1933 was one of comparative tranquillity, though disturbed by an almost universal protest against the 'White Paper' proposals, and by a growing dissatisfaction with the Poona Pact, especially in Bengal. Owing to a presistent 'diehard' campaign in England and India against the White Paper and further political advance, and the delay in the coming of the expected new constitution, there grew a general sense of uneasiness in the country. Vigorous activities of the Congress since January 1932 led

to a series of Government measures directed against various Congress bodies and funds, and the Congress could not function as before.

By the middle of 1934 the Civil Disobedience Movement was formally withdrawn. The Congress became once more a constitutional organisation, most of its activities being regarded as legitimate and lawful. Though Gandhiji retired from the Congress and active politics, he remained the real moving force, his advice being sought, obtained and followed at every step. Meanwhile, the creed of socialism had mode some progress.

In spite of hostility to the reforms embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Congress contested elections and secured signal success at the polls, with clear majorities in six of the eleven provinces. But the party in power declined to form ministries unless the Governors of the Provinces undertook not to exercise their discretionary powers of interference with the ministers in their constitutional activities. This the Governors could not agree to do as being contrary to the provisions of the Act and their Instrument of Instructions. The Congress did not accept any other kind of assurances, and the Governors therefore called upon the leaders of minority groups to form ministries, and as a result what has been termed 'Interim Ministers' came into being. The steps taken by the Congress and the Local Governments were criticised in detail from many points of view by some Indian and British statesmen, and ultimately the Congress directorate decided to end the deadlock and give the new system a trial. Thus from July 1937 the Congress ministers began to carry on the government in six provinces, and subsequently in two more.

But these ministries proved to be shortlived. The emergence of vaiious complicated issues in Indian politics after England's declaration of war against Nazi Germany on the 3rd September, 1939, made it impossible for the Congress leaders

to continue in charge of administration under conditions dictated by the British Government. So they resigned in the month of November of that year, and after immediate enforcement of section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in the respective provinces of which they had been in charge, the Governors suspended the Legislatures and began to exercise all the powers of the Provincial Governments and Legislature. Thus ensued a constitutional deadlock, which lasted during the course of the Second World War. The war menace, particularly the rapid success of Japan, caused great alarm and excitement throughout the country. Though all realized the indispensable necessity of immediate and full mobilisation of the national resources to ward off the impending calamity, yet a number of disintegrating forces prevented united action. The British plans for immediate as well as ultimate constitutional changes in India, such as the August Offer (8th August, 1940) of the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the 1942 proposals of Sir Stafford Cripps could not solve the deadlock as they fell far short of legitimate demands of the Indian National Congress. The Congress passed the Quit India resolution on the 8th August, 1942, emphasising the demands for the withdrawal of the British power from India, on the conviction that "only the glow of freedom can now release that energy and enthusiasm of millions which will immediately transform the nature of the war" for "the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations." This led the British Government to arrest immediately Mahatma Gandhi, the members of the Congress and also to ban the Congress organisations. Government repression, however, aggravated national discontent, which soon found expression in widespread mass upheavals, those in Bihar and U. P. assuming the most serious shape. Even after the ruthless suppression of the August 1942 movement, the country's political situation remained much disturbed.

Besides other factors, communal separatism had rapidly developed as a deadly canker gnawing at India's national integrity. At its session held at Lahore in March, 1940, the Muslim League proclaimed the theory that "the Muslims are not a minority" but "are a nation.....and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state (Pakistan)", that is the "areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous." This attitude of the Muslim League baffled all attempts for preservation of communal harmony including even those of Mahatma Gandhi and growing communal frenzy ultimately plunged the country in 1946-47 into a horrible civil war causing loss of numerous innocent lives and dishonouring of womanhood, loot and arson.

In the meanwhile, Lord Wavel, succeeding Lord Linlithgow as Governor-General of India since October 1943, had made an offer in June, 1945, to end the deadlock in India by some interim arrangement. For discussion of his proposals he convened a conference of Indian Leaders at Simla in June and July, 1945. But it failed to achieve anything in the absence of agreement about the interim arrangement. According to an announcement of Indian policy, made by the British Government on the 19th February, 1946, a mission of three Cabinet members, Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Strafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, came to India in the month of March. In its statement of the 16th May, 1946, the Cabinet Mission rejected the proposal for the formation of a separate State of Pakistan and formulated instead the plan of an Indian Union including British India and the Indian States with powers only over foreign affairs, defence and communications and also to raise money required for such subjects. All other subjects were to be vested in the

different provinces and in the Indian States. But the Provinces were to remain free to form groups for common action. As planned by the Mission, British India was to be divided into three groups of Provinces,—A Group—consisting of the six Hindu-majority Provinces of Madras, Bombay, C. P., U. P., Bihar and Orissa; B Group with the Muslim-majority Provinces in the North-West, the Punjab, the N.-W.F.P., Sindh; and C Group embracing Bengal and Assam. The Missinon further recommended a machinery for the framing of the new constitution.

Both the Congress and the Muslim League at first agreed to accept the long-term proposals. But there was no agreement between the two regarding the British proposals for the immediate formation of an interim coalition Government comprising representatives of different interests. When in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, held in the month of July, 1946, an overwhelming majority of Congress members was returned, the Muslim League withdrew its assent to the long-termed proposals of the Cabinet Mission and announced its intention to resort to 'direct action' to achieve Pakistan. Its immediate effect was the beginning of serious communal riots first in Calcutta and subsequently in eastern Bengal and Bihar and the Punjab. The Constituent Assembly's first session met at New Delhi on the 9th December, 1946. The Muslim League members not only absented themselves from attending the meetings of the Constituent Assembly, but also declared that its proceedings were "*ultra vires, invalid and illegal*" and so demanded that it "should be forthwith dissolved."

At this critical moment the British Government made a momentous declaration on the 20th February, 1947, announcing therein their intention "to take necessary steps to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands by a date, not later than June 1948." Lord Wavel was succeeded by Lord Mountbatten as Viceroy and Governor-General of

India in March, 1947. He issued a plan on 3rd June, 1947, which suggested India's partition and contained an expression of desire on the part of the British Government to anticipate the date of June, 1948, for "transference of power" that year "on a Dominion status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement." The Mountbatten Plan was accepted by leaders of Indian Nationalism out of some practical considerations, and by the Muslim League as it satisfied its demand for Pakistan.

According to the Indian Independence Act, passed by the British Parliament in July, 1947, the two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan came into existence their boundaries being determined by the awards of the respective Boundary Commissions. Lord Mountbatten continued as Governor-General of India and Mr. Jinnah became the first Governor-General of Pakistan. In free India the first Indian Governor-General was Raja Chakarvarty Sri Rajgopalachari. According to the new constitution of India, which came into force on 26th January, 1950, India became a "Sovereign Democratic Republic" with Dr. Rajendra Prasad as its first President.

CHAPTER X

RELIGION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The Indian Renaissance of the 19th century has been essentially a matter of the spirit, producing striking changes in Religion, Society and Culture along with a demand for national growth. The earlier reformation movements covering three centuries from the 14th to the 17th, which had stirred Indian minds in different parts of the country, had spent up their force to a considerable extent in the struggle against medievalism and under the pressure of adverse political circumstances, so that the 18th century had become from different standpoints one of the darkest periods of Indian History. "In social usage, in politics, in the realm of religion and art, we had entered the zone of uncreative habit, of decadent tradition, and ceased to exercise our humanity."[1] But it was during the closing years of that century and the beginning of the next that various factors, which have been already discussed, appeared, making a second renaissance and reformation inevitable.

The spiritual parentage of religious and social reformation, as of political awakening, in Modern India is to be traced to Raja Rammohan Roy (b. 22nd May, 1772), who appeared as "the herald of a new age," to save Indian religion and civilisation from the deadening influence of superstitions and spiritual blindness on the one hand and the intrusion of Christianity and Western modes on the other, at a time "when our country, having lost its link with the inmost truths of its being, struggled under a crushing load of unreason, in abject slavery to circumstance."[2] With profound learning, ecumenical culture (marked by acquaintance with so many classical languages

[1] *Rammohan Roy Centenary Publicity Booklet*, No. 1.
[2] *Ibid.*

as Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, Latin, Greek and Hebrew) and high philosophical acumen, Rammohan, a true son of India where religion has ever formed the backbone of national life, was, in the words of Mr. Monier-Williams, "perhaps the first earnest-minded investigator of the science of comparative religion that the world has produced." "He was," remarks Sir Brajendranath Seal, "the harbinger of the idea of Universal Humanism.....the humanist, pure and simple, watching from his conning tower the procession of Universal Humanity in Universal History."

Rammohan tried to revive in the Hindu world the doctrine of the unity of Godhead,[3] and devoted himself to this task after retiring from the East India Company's service, and settling down in Calcutta in 1815. His earliest attempt was the foundation of the Atmiya Sabha, "an association of free dissemination of religious truth and the promotion of free discussions of theological subjects,"[4] which lasted from 1815 to 1819. The next important step was his foundation of another organisation, which later on became famous as the Brahma Samaj, on 20th August, 1828, with Tarachand Chakravarty as its secretary.[5] But its new theistic service soon excited the hostility of the orthodox citizens of Calcutta, who started a rival organisation named the Dharma Sabha, with Bhavani-charan Banerji as its Secretary, and with its organ, the *Samachar Chandrika*, which opposed Raja Rammohan Roy's Bengali Weekly, *Samvada Kaumudi*.[6] The Trust-Deed of the Brahma Samaj[7] was drawn up on the 8th January, 1830.

[3] *The Modern Review*, March 1934.

[4] Sivanath Sastri, *History of the Brahma Samaj*, Vol. I, p. 24.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 38—40. The Samaj was first located in the premises No. 48, Chitpore Road, then owned by Ram Kamal Basu, well-known in Calcutta as "Firingi Kamal Basu," a resident of Chandernagore.

[6] Shastri, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 40, Brajendra Nath Banerji, *Samvad-Patre Sekaler Katha*, Vol. I, pp. 149—52.

[7] Shastri, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Appendix 'A'.

The Raja rejected the barriers of caste-divisions, worship of idols and sacrificial rituals, and stood forth as the high-priest of Universalism and Love. He started his reformed church on 23rd January, 1830, and sailed for Europe on 15th November of the same year as a private individual,[8] though while in England he declared himself to be the accredited agent of the Emperor of Delhi before the authorities of the East India Company. He did not return, passing away at Bristol on 27th September, 1833. His biographer, Miss Colet, has left the following estimate of his life's work :—"Rammohan stands in history as the living bridge, over which India marches from her unmeasured past to her incalculable future. He was the arch which spanned the gulf between ancient caste and modern humanity, between superstition and science, between despotism and democracy, between immobile custom and a conservative progress, between a bewildering polytheism and a pure, if vague, theism." The Raja never thought of establishing the Brahma Samaj in opposition to the sublime ideas and principles of Hinduism,—his aim was to purge it of some of the grosser practices, prejudices and superstitions which had overwhelmed it by an appeal to rationalism and by adapting it to the changed conditions of his age. In thus liberalising Hinduism and making it responsive to all the forces of the modern world, Rammohan enabled India once again after Buddha to give a spiritual message to all mankind, and to embark on a course of creative national history.

After Rammohan's death, his infant church was left almost entirely under Pandit Ramachandra Vidya-vagisa but it was passing through "a period of depression," and according to Pandit 'Shivanath Shastri, the Brahma Samaj during the years 1833—1941 "had no organisation, no constitution, no member-

[8] Miss Colet, Life and Letters of Raja Rammohan (2nd edition), p. 168.

ship, no covenant, no pledge."[9] But it was soon raised from this "moribund condition" by the genius and efforts of Maharsi Devendranath Thakur (Tagore) (1817—1905). He formally entered the Samaj in 1843 and within five years gave it a new life, and "introduced a regular form of church service, including thanks-giving, praise and prayer, in the place of the old practice of mere expositions of passages from the Upanishads, attended with sermon and hymn." Mr. Keshav Chandra Sen was another important member of the Brahma Samaj and imbued it with devotional fervour through his message of Love and Faith. His emphasis on Christian and Vaisnava teachings and forms, and the rapidity with which social reform was proceeding under his leadership, led to a breach with the more conservative section of the Brahmas, and the Samaj now practically divided into two bodies. A man of wide culture and manifold experiences, an ardent aspirant after a Universal Religion, Keshav holds a high place among the reformers of Modern India. He took a leading part in the passing of the Marriage Act of 1872, which among other things wanted to discourage child-marriage, and fix the minimum age of men and women marrying under that Act at eighteen and fourteen years complete respectively. The famous Cooch-Behar marriage case of 1878 "formed the great turning-point of Keshav Chandra Sen's career."[10] His own daughter under fourteen he married to the young enlightened Maharaja of Cooch-Behar who was not yet sixteen. This inconsistency raised a storm of controversy and protest among many of the members of the Brahma Samaj,[11] "who called for public meetings to expel Keshav from his position as Secretary to the Brahma Samaj of India

[9] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 89.

[10] P. C. Mozoomdar, *The Life and Teachings of Keshub Chunder Sen*, p. 204.

[11] Shastri, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 276—94.

and as Minister to the Brahma Mandir."[12] A schism occurred and the 'protestant' Brahmas under the leadership of Anandamohan Bose, Shivanath Shastri and Bijay Krishna Goswami established what has since then been known as the Sadharan (Universal) Brahma Samaj, as distinguished from the Adi (Original) Brahma Samaj, with a democratic composition,—and with a continuous brilliant record of social and cultural activities on liberal and progressive lines.[13] After this secession Keshav also organised a new church known as the Navavidhan (New Dispensation) Samaj,—whose distinguishing feature is formalism in worship and regard for Keshav as a prophet.

In Maharastra a theistic Samaj called the Paramahamsa Sabha was started in 1849; but its influence was limited and it soon broke up. A more important organisation was a theistic society called the Prarthana Samaj formed under the leadership of Dr. Atmaram Pandurang (1823—1898) "with aims of rational worship and social reform,"[14] and developed under the influence of the Brahma Samaj. The Samaj maintained night-schools for working people, a Depressed Classes Mission for elevating the social as well as spiritual condition of the depressed classes, a Ladies' Association for education of girls, and an Orphanage and Foundling Asylum at Pandharpur. It saved itself from the influence of "Western Rationalism and Secularism"[15] under the guidance of two leaders, Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (1837—1927), one of the greatest Sanskrit scholars of Modern India, and Justice M. G. Ranade (1842—1901), who was undoubtedly the central figure of the Renaissance in Western India. It was Mr. Ranade who inaugurated the practice of

[12] P. C. Mozoomdar, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

[13] "In reply to the Adi Brahmo Samaj cry of 'Brahmoism is Hinduism. The young reformers cried 'Brahmoism is catholic and universal'. —Shastri, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

[14] Shastri, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 411—56.

[15] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

holding Social Conferences along with the annual session of the Congress. Mr. Andrews remarks that "the last and the most enduring aspect of the new reformation in India is linked up most closely with the name of Justice Ranade, who," according to him, "comes nearest to Ram Mohan Roy and Syed Ahmad Khan in the largeness of vision and the magnanimity of character; but he was more advanced than either in the width of his constructive aim, and his grasp of principles underlying Western civilisation and his application of them to Indian conditions."[16] It was under his inspiration and 'spiritual leadership' that the Deccan Education Society, the members of which like Gokhale, Tilak and Ganesh Agarkar have played important parts in the history of Modern India, was founded in 1884. The members of this society, with the motto of 'plain living and high thinking,' took upon themselves the task of educating the youths of their country through simple means, accepting in return a small remuneration of Rs. 75 per mensem for bare subsistence. The Society started with a small school which ultimately developed into an important educational centre in Maharastra (the Fergusson College) and it organised another institution at Sangli named the Willingdon College.

Gokhale, who had joined the Society in 1885, just after completing his university education, could not agree to work with Tilak's Extremism, and founded in 1905 the famous Servants of India Society, which also has a brilliant record of social and educational works to its credit. The 'basic principle' of his Society was that "public life must be spiritualised". As defined by the rules of the Society, its object was to train "national missionaries for the service of India, and to promote, by all means, the true interests of the Indian people." The members of this society have acted up to this ideal in

[16] Andrews, *Indian Renaissance*, pp. 135-36.

different spheres, and after Gokhale's death in 1915, the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri became its second President.

Narayan Malhar Joshi, who joined the Society in 1909, founded two years later in Bombay, the Social Service League "to collect and study social facts and discuss social problems with a view to forming public opinion on questions of social service" and to make endeavours "to secure for the masses of the people better and reasonable conditions of life and work." The League made successful attempts to secure its objects and its founder, Mr. Joshi, established in 1920 the All-India Trade Union Congress which could affiliate to itself within five years forty trade unions with 100,000 members.[17] Mr. Joshi continued his work unhampered for the welfare of the masses as the acknowledged leader of the Indian Labour Movement till an attempt was made by the Communists at the Annual Trade Union, Congress of 1929 to affiliate the All-India Federation to Moscow.

Mr. Hirdayanath Kunzru, Vice-President of the Servants of India Society for some years since 1927, started at Allahabad in 1914 an organisation called the Seva Samiti which devoted itself "to organise social service during fairs (e.g., during the great Kumbha Mela of 1927), famines, floods, epidemics, etc; to promote the spread of education, co-operation, sanitation and physical culture; to uplift the depressed classes, reclaim the criminal and rescue the fallen."[18] A Scouts Association grew out of this Samiti under the leadership of another member of the Servants of India Society, Mr. Shri Ram Bajpai. This Scouts Association has rendered useful services and an English Scouter, visiting the Kumbha Mela in 1930, remarked that "he would like his own boys in England to see how they are working and capture some of the spirit which he saw

[17] *Report of the Royal Commission on Labour*, pp. 316—32.
[18] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

everywhere."[19] The Madras Branch of the Servants of India Society has of late years paid special attention to village revival and reconstruction work. An organisation named Bhil Seva Mandal was started in 1922 by Mr. Amritlal Vithaldas Thakkar for the uplift of the Bhils and other aboriginals of India by imparting religious and any vocational training, and it has done excellent work.

Admirable work has been done for the uplift of women by Mr. Gopal Krishna Devadhar and by Mr. Dhondo Keshav Karve, who though not a member of the Society, was however for some time a Professor at Fergusson College. The Indian Women's University founded and conducted by Karve, and the Poona Seva Sadan working under the inspiration and guidance of Devadhar, have rendered great help to the women's movement in modern India by equipping them with literary, medical, industrial and social service training through its branches at Bombay, Madras, Nagpur and other places.

The Theosophical Society has also exercised a considerable influence on Indian social and religious life in modern times. The "Mysterious Madame," H. P. Blavatsky, had established this Society in 1875 in the United States along with Col. H. S. Olcott. They came to India in 1879, and since 1886 Adyar near Madras became the headquarters of the Society. The growth of the Theosophist Movement as a force in Indian history has been to a great extent due to Mrs. Annie Besant, who formally entered the Theosophical Society in 1889, and four years later came out to India, where she dedicated herself to her life's work, which she has thus defined in her Autobiography: "The Indian work is, first of all the revival, strength-

[19] Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 60. Some years back, under the guidance of Mr. Gurusadaya Dutta, I.C.S., a Bengali national 'scouts' movement more suited to the genius of the people and known as the Vrata-chari movement, developed along with the founder's other movement for revival of folk dances and indigenous games.

ening and uplifting of the ancient religions,—Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and in Ceylon and Burma, Buddhism.[20] This brought with it a new self-respect, a pride in the past, a belief in the future, and, as an inevitable result, a great wave of patriotic life, the beginning of the rebuilding of a nation." One of her most notable achievements was the establishment at Banaras in 1898 of the Central Hindu School which developed later on into a College and ultimately into the Hindu University at Banaras.

Reformation in Modern India owes a great deal to the Ramkrishna Mission and the Arya Samaj. The former named after Ramkrishna Paramahamsa (1834—1886), the Saint of Daksineswar near Calcutta, was founded ten years after his death by his ardent disciple Narendranath Dutta or Swami Vivekanand (1863—1902). He attended the "Parliament of Religions" in 1893 at Chicago, where he "proclaimed the Vedanta as the grand, universal, super-religion of the world, and he has certainly never lacked successors in the United States, where the preachments of *yogis and swamis* have ever since found ready audiences."[21] Vivekananda attended another Congress of Religions held in Paris in 1900, and he was, remarks Sir Valentine Chirol, "the first Hindu whose personality won demonstrative recognition abroad for India's ancient civilization and for her new-born claim to nationhood."[22] The

[20] During the last few years the work of 'revising, strengthening and uplifting' Buddhism in India and the wide world,—not only in Ceylon and Burma,—has progressed appreciably through other agencies; Sarnath-Benares bids once again to develop into an Indian Buddhist Renaissance centre with a monastery and cosmopolitan university which would reinterpret and adapt Buddhism to Modern India and Modern World. It is to be noted that Bengal, Bihar and Ceylon are the most interested in this movement. When Buddhism is revitalised and reformed in India, the age of Reformation begun in early nineteenth century will have neared its completion.

[21] Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[22] *India*, p. 97.

Ramkrishna Mission with branches in different parts of India has been doing splendid humanitarian and social service by opening dispensaries, orphanages, schools, etc.

The Arya Samaj was formally started in Kathiawar in 1875 by Swami Dayananda Saraswati (1824—1883). It was also in Bombay that he published his admirable treatise, *Satyartha Prakash*, "which expounded his doctrine and formulated it as a doctrine *sui generis*." But his preachings took the strongest root in the Punjab and in the United Provinces.[23] Swami Dayananda had no English education, but he was a good Sanskritist, and was deeply inspired by a comprehensive study of the Vedas; he therefore aimed at reconstructing modern Indian life on the model of the ancient Vedic Society as he conceived it to have been, "by a pruning of all the engrafted shoots upon the Vedas."[24] He had no faith in the religious system of the Puranas which he attacked as the "work of the selfish, ignorant and malevolent men," and he was hostile to image-worship. He was an enemy of the caste restrictions, and of sacrifices, and wanted to remove superstitions from the minds of the people. He opposed child-marriage, advocated travels in foreign lands, and also re-marriage of widows and female education. One important item in the programme of the Samaj has been the *Suddhi* work of re-Hinduising the fallen, the outcastes, the converts and other externals. The Samaj has in certain respects done splendid

[23] It may be mentioned here that while many of the Brahmas in the Punjab fell back from progressive liberalism and became Arya-samajists, Satyananda Agnihotri, a prominent member of the Lahore Brahma Samaj, seceded from it to found on 16th February, 1887, a Samaj of his own called the *Deva Samaj*, which combines "with the other usual features of Indian Reform Movements, i.e., social reform and service, educational and charitable enterprises, etc., the very unusual one of being militantly atheistic." Zacharias, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[24] MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 236.

social and educational work, and has remained "a great and powerful factor to this day in the national life of India and one seriously to be reckoned with in future." The success of this Samaj has been greatly due to the efforts of three able successors of Dayananda,—Lala Hansraj, Pandit Guru Dutta and Lala Lajpat Rai. It was due to these men that a school was founded to commemorate the memory of Dayananda after his death, and this institution has later on developed into the well-known Dayananda Anglo-Vedic (D. A. V.) College of Lahore. In 1892 Arya Samaj was split up into two parties,—one led by Lala Hansraj, which controlled the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, advocated meat diet, and worked for a liberal education and programme, while the other under Munshi Ram (later on famous as Swami Sraddhananda) "endeavoured to be not modern but Vedic, and harkened back to the traditional Brahman ideal of ascetic sannyasis." The latter party founded in the year 1902 a remarkable educational institution, the Gurukul, near Hardwar. The students there are taken from their parents at the age of seven or eight for a residence of sixteen years, under the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, and placed under the control and influence of their *gurus*.

It may be noted in this connection that the Revolutionary Movement in Bengal, like other extremist political movements in other parts of India, was "based upon a return to Hinduism."[25] "All these old and traditional gods and goddesses," writes Mr. Bipin Chandra Pal,[26] "who had lost their hold upon the modern mind, have been reinstalled with a new historic and nationalist interpretation in the mind and soul of the people. Hundreds of thousands of our people have commenced to hail their mother-land today as Durga, Kali, Jagaddhatri. These are no longer mere mythological conceptions or legend-

[25] MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 243.
[26] The *Soul of India*, pp. 187—89.

ary persons or even poetic symbols. They are different manifestations of the Mother." Even the map of India came to be represented as the Mother goddess.

The Parsi community in India have also been considerably influenced by the 19th century Indian Reformation. A number of young men, a band of able workers, the most notable of whom were Dadabhai Naoroji, J. B. Wacha, S. S. Bangali and Naoroji Furdonji, started in 1851 the Rahnumai Mazdayasnan Sabha or Religious Reform Association for "the regeneration of the social condition of the Parsees and the restoration of the Zoroastrian religion to its pristine purity." Karshedji Rustamji Cama, after his return from Europe in 1859, tried hard for the spread of education among the members of his community. Behramji M. Malabari (born at Baroda in 1853 or 1854 A.D.), a prominent member of the Parsi community, is entitled to be ranked as one of the greatest social reformers of modern India for his brilliant services in the cause of Indian women and children, journalism and education.[27] In 1910 was inaugurated a Zoroastrian Conference under the inspiration of a Parsi priest named Dhala who had visited America and had studied in the University of Colombo under the famous Zoroastrian scholar Professor Jackson, and this organisation has rendered useful services for the community.

The Sikhs with a glorious tradition in the past were also roused by the renaissance spirit to make an attempt for the purification of their religious and social life. The progressive among them established the famous Khalsa College at Amritsar and started a central association called the Chief Khalsa Diwan with its office at Amritsar and branches throughout the country, pressing for liberal reforms in society and education.

Islam in India has also been stirred into a new life during the last century and a quarter. At the beginning of the 19th

[27] A sketch of his life and times has been given by Mr. R. P. Karkaria *In India: Forty Years of Progress and Reform*, London, 1896.

century a "puritanical reform, not unlike that carried on by the followers of Muhammad Abd-ul-Wahhab in Arabia," was inaugurated by and carried on under some 'ardent souls,' like Haji Sharait Allah of Eastern Bengal, Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli (1782—1831), Karamat Ali (b. at Jaunpur, U.P., in the early part of the 19th century and d. 1873 A.D.), his son Maulvi Hafiz Ahmad (d. 1898) and his nephew Muhsin. This movement while attempting the purification of Islam, was rather reactionary in character, and opposed the introduction of English education and western institutions; but it was not entirely barren of good results to the Muslim community.

But far more important than this movement was another which was destined to come and was the reply and the complement to the rapid advance of the Hindus through the new path they had struck out much earlier of assimilating Western civilisation and adapting themselves to the new world. This was started by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817—1898), who brought a new message for the members of his community; as an 'apostle of reconciliation' he advocated changes in the political, religious, educational and social ideas of the Muslims in India by effecting a harmony between the old faith and the modern rationalism, oriental learning and modern science, in short by establishing a "working harmony between East and West."[28] He visited England in 1869, and after his return established with the help of some of his friends the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh in 1875, in the face of a vehement orthodox opposition. The college that was thus founded was raised to the status of the Muslim University of Aligarh in 1920, and now forms an important centre of education in India. He also tried to have large-scale translations made of English literature and scientific works into the chief vernacular of the Muslims, and thus cleared the way for

[28] MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 9.

the experiment in higher education through the medium of Urdu, which began to be successfully carried on in Hyderabad under the patronage of His Exalted Highness the Nizam by the Osmania University since its creation in 1917.

Sir Syed was an advocate of social reforms like the abolition of *purdah*, education of women, etc., and carried on vigorous propaganda for these through his magazine *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq* (Reforms of Morals). His activities and the Aligarh movement succeeded in "rousing to new life the whole of Indian Islam" and gave birth to a New Islam with exponents like Maulvi Chirag Ali, Right Hon. Syed Amir Ali, Sir Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, Prof. S. Khuda Bakhsh and Prof. A. M. Maulvi. A number of anjumans or societies came into existence for the service of the community, and a powerful Muslim press grew up. The spirit of reform was noticeable among the Indian Muslim women as well, as is clear from the sessions of the All-India Muslim Ladies' Conference since 1914. Her Highness the Dowager Begum of Bhopal, who presided over the All-India Women's Conference in 1928, introduced many social and educational reforms for women in her State. Prominent Muslim ladies of aristocratic and intellectual circles have laid aside the *purdah*, have received higher education, and taken part in politics,—and educational and social welfare works.

Along with these should be noted the influence exerted by the Ahmadiya Movement inaugurated by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, born in 1839 A.D. at Qadian, a small town in the Gurdaspur district of the Punjab. Through its vigorous organisation and propaganda the Ahmadiya community gained a large number of followers in different parts of the world. After the death of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in 1908, the affairs of the community came to be managed by a Khalifah with headquarters at Qadian. A split occurred in the community in 1914 when a group headed by Khwajah Kamal-ud-din and

Maulvi Muhammad Ali formed the Lahori party, the original group being named the Qadiani party. The Qadiani party emphasised the fact that the founder of the community "must be regarded as a prophet (*Nabi*) while the Lahori party insist that he was only a reformer (*mujaddid*) in Islam."

The influence of Christianity as a factor in the cultural history of India during the modern age should be carefully studied in this connection. Christianity in India has had a long history beginning probably from the days of St. Thomas and Gondophares (1st century) and certainly from the sixth century when a Syrian Church established in the Malabar with the Patriarch of Babylon as its spiritual head. While the rise and growth of Christianity was in many ways indebted to early Buddhism working in Western Asia and Egypt, later Buddhism also in turn came to be influenced by Christianity. So it is an old factor in Indian History. The early Christian Churches and the Catholics had already long worked in India for their faith, when the first Protestant Mission was established at the Danish Settlement of Tranquebar. The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid progress of Christianity largely through the Protestant missionaries. The Charter Act of 1813 laid down: "It is the duty of this country to promote the introduction of useful knowledge and of religion and moral improvement in India and that facilities be offered by law to persons desirous of going to and remaining in India to accomplish this benevolent design." In 1820 an Anglican Bishop was appointed in the E. I. C.'s dominions for the first time, and Bishop Middleton came out to Calcutta as the first Metropolitan of India. Most of the Protestant Missions were founded in India between 1815 and 1830 and the Bishoprics of Madras and Bombay were established in 1833. Many high-caste and educated Hindus in Bombay, Bengal and Madras were converted to Christianity. In Bengal conversion was effected through the systematic efforts of missonaries like William Carey, Joshua

Marshman, William Ward, Daniel Brunsdon, William Grant and Rev. Alexander Duff; similar work was carried on in Bombay by Dr. John Wilson, in Madras by Robert Noble and in the Punjab by Dr. Forman (after whom the Forman Christian College of Lahore was named). These missionaries, besides carrying on the work of conversion, also helped directly and indirectly the cause of Indian Education and Literature, which will be noted later on. In the post-1859 period owing to the unfortunate breach between Europeans and upper class Indians, the attention of the missonaries of both the Protestant and the Catholic Churches was directed more towards the conversion of low caste people and backward aboriginal hill-tribes, like the Santhals, Oraons, Mundas, Nagas, Khasias, Garos, etc. This line of activity has later on been followed by Hindu and Moslem workers, resulting in the acceptance in either fold of various depressed or animistic groups. So far as the direct effect of Christianity in India is concerned, it will be noted that a fairly numerous Indian Christian community has grown up, led by a small class comparable to the Hindu intelligentsia, but consisting of a majority of converts from depressed and aboriginal classes reclaimed to democracy and civilization. Its indirect influence is, however, more important to India in general. The efforts of the Christian missionaries to propagate their own faith at the cost of Indian religions made the natives of the country watchful about the preservation and betterment of their own faiths by removing their evils, or, in other words, the need for protection against the onrush of an external force led to rearrangement and reformation of faiths within the country. Further, the activities and success of the Christian missionaries among the depressed classes have led the 'caste' Indians to change their attitude towards the latter from one of neglect and indifference to that of sympathy and fellow-feeling, and today we find even political leaders trying seriously to remove the problem of untouchability. Lastly, the Christian

missionaries, whatever might have been their objectives, greatly furthered the cause of education of all grades in Modern India, and showed to Indian workers the modern way to effective social service through various types of institutions connected with their missions,—a curious irony of history,—for this way of social service and these types of institutions originated in Buddhist India and through West Asiatic Buddhist missions passed into early Christianity; and once again have come back to their first home as a so-called 'foreign product'.

SECTION II

SOCIAL PROGRESS

The connection between Religion and Society has been nowhere more intimate than in India, and so Indian reformations have involved as much of doctrinal changes as of social modifications. Here we shall attempt a brief survey of the manner in which the different spheres of Indian society have been influenced by the general awakening of the modern times.

All the reform movements of Modern India have advocated the uplift of women and have succeeded, more or less, in this attempt. The first measure of importance in this respect was the abolition of *Sati* or the practice of a wife burning herself on the funeral pyre of her husband, which had survived in its worst forms in spite of some attempts on the part of the Company's Government to check it since 1789.[29] But an Indian opinion against the practice grew up in the generation of Raja Rammohan Roy, who joined hands with the Government for the suppression of *Sati*. Nothing daunted with orthodox opposition under the leadership of Raja Radhakanta Deb, Rammohan, with the usual zeal of a reformer, carried

[29] *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, pp. 132—40; Sivanath Shastri, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 47—53.

on a vigorous anti-*Sati* agitation with the help of some of his friends and his Bengali journal, the *Kaumudi*, till the practice was declared illegal by Lord William Bentinck's Regulation XVII of 1829. The opponents of this measure, like Radhakanta Deb, Nilmoni De, Bhavani Charan Mitra and others, tried for its repeal through petitions to the Government and by organising meetings under the auspices of the Dharma Sabha, but to no effect. When in 1830 eight hundred Hindus of Bengal made an appeal to the Privy Council against Bentinck's measure, Rammohan Roy, who was then in England, "obtained access to Members of Parliament and was consulted by the Privy Council. With all the emphasis and power of his amazing intellect and personality, he begged them to reject the appeal of the pro-*suttee* party (which they did in 1832), and he procured a petition from progressive and humane Hindus, thanking Lord Bentinck for what he had done."

Stray cases of attempted or accomplished *Sati* were, however, reported occasionally during the last century[30] and it would appear that the tendency of justifying everything medieval or ancient encouraged the suppressed practice to some extent; thus in the Patna district of Bihar, there was an abetted *Sati* case in November, 1927; in 1930 again a widow in the Hazaribagh district of the same province "attempted to commit *Sati*."[31]

Evils like polygamy, Kulinism and child-marriage were attacked by all the notable reformers of Modern India and have now almost disappeared from the better classes of Hindu Society. It appears from a study of Rammohan's *'Brief Remarks Regarding the Ancient Rights of Women'* that it was he who first raised a voice against polygamy and Kulinism; and his

[30] Chailley, *Administrative Problems of British India*, p. 145; K. K. Datta, *Education and Social Amelioration of Women in Pre-Mutiny India.*

[31] *India in* 1930-31, p. 543.

work was carried on by a number of ardent reformers who succeeded him. The Native Marriage Act of 1872, passed through the exertions of Keshav Chandra Sen, "abolished early marriage, made polygamy penal, sanctioned widow marriages and intercaste marriages" for those who chose to come under that Act. The Arya Samaj also tried hard to abolish early marriages. Besides these attempts, Mr. B. M. Malabari, the great Parsi reformer of modern times, started from 1884 an agitation against 'Infant Marriage' and through severe exertions stimulated public opinion. The Government of Lord Lansdowne also came forward to help the reformers in this matter and passed the Age of Consent Act of 1891 which raised the age of consummation from ten to twelve in the teeth of violent opposition from the orthodox Hindus who held that the "Bill was an infringement of the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, by which she pledged her Government to a policy of non-interference with the religions of her Indian subjects." But in 1901 the Gaekwar of Baroda passed the Infant Marriage Prevention Act by which the minimum age for marriage in the State was fixed for girls at twelve and for boys at sixteen.[32] During recent years the Age of Consent Committee, which first assembled at Simla in June 1928 for enquiring into the problem of marriage reform,[33] estimated that "something like half the girls of India are married before the completion of the fifteenth year." After the issue of its report Rai Saheb Harbilas Sarda's Child Marriage Bill was passed on 23rd and 28th September, 1930, by the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State respectively.[34] The object of this Act was to "discourage the solemnization of marriages between boys of under 18 or girls

[32] J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, p. 399. Since then Baroda has progressed much further in legislation on the subject of marriage and position of women.

[33] *India in* 1929-30, p. 7.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

of under 14 years."[35] Orthodox opinion among all the communities have protested vigorously against this Act, but it remains binding. It should be noted however that other factors, chiefly economic and educational, have automatically raised the marriageable age of girls (as well as of boys) almost beyond the expectations of reformers and legislators, though this advance is not uniform to all parts of the society.

Coming to the history of the Widow Remarriage Movement, we find that so early as the middle of the eighteenth century, Raja Rajballabh of Dacca made an attempt to reintroduce Widow Remarriages in Hindu Society but could not succeed owing to the opposition of the Maharaja of Krishnanagar and of the Pandits of that place.[36] Babu Nilakamal Bandopadhyaya of Bowbazar in Calcutta, Maharaja Srischandra of (the same) Krishnanagar,[37] and a few others tried for widow remarriage during the years following the abolition of *Sati* (1829) but their efforts ended in smoke because of orthodox opposition.[38] Babu Shyamacharan Das, mortified at the sight of his tender-aged widowed daughter in his house, circulated among the Pandits of the country the question "Whether the widowed daughter of a Sudra who had not known her husband and who was unable to practise the higher virtue of concremation with her husband's corpse, or endurance of the hardships of a life of widowhood, could be remarried agreebly to the Shastras."[39] The Pandits assembled in a meeting to discuss the point raised in the house of (the orthodox leader) Raja Radhakanta Dev and 'gave a certificate of permission'. "It applied to the case

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 90. In actual working however the Sarda Act has been found to be useless.

[36] *Kaitisavamsavalicarita*, p. 145.

[37] Chandicharan Bandopadhya, *Vidyasagarer Jibancharit*, pp. 226-27.

[38] B. N. Banerjee, *Sambad Patre Sekaler Katha*, Part II, pp. 71 and 192.

[39] Sitanath Tattvabhushan, *Social Reform in Bengal*, pp. 73-74.

of Sudra girls only, and even as such, it was disowned and practically laid aside by "the promulgators".[40]

It was Pandit Isvarchandra Vidyasagar, the great Sanskrit scholar, social reformer and philanthropist of modern Bengal, who devoted himself with extraordinary courage and zeal for furthering the cause of widow remarriage in the teeth of violent orthodox opposition under the leadership of Raja Radhakanta Deb. Pandit Isvarchandra tried through his writings and speeches to prove that the marriage of widows was sanctioned by the Sastras and soon gained a large number of followers. He next endeavoured to remove the legal bar to the legitimacy of the issue of the remarried widows, and accordingly presented a petition[41] bearing about 984 signatures to the Government of India; other petitions from notable individuals of Bengal also followed. These efforts bore fruit in the passing of Act XV, dated 26th July, 1856, which legalised widow remarriage and declared the legitimacy of the issue of remarried widows.[42] "The advocates of widow-marriage were not slow to prove that their application for legislation was not an idle demonstration of hollow liberalism, and that the law was not to remain a dead letter,"[43] within a few months of the passing of this Act widow marriages began to be celebrated, the first (on 23rd Agrahayana, 1263 B.S.) being that of Pandit Srischandra Vidyaratna, son of the well-known Pandit Ramdhan Tarkabagis, with a widowed daughter of the respected family of Brahmananda Mukhopadhyaya connected with the *gurus* of the Rajas of Nadiya.[44]

The Brahma Samaj was also making efforts at about the same time for the spread of widow remarriage; the cause was

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Chandicharan, *op. cit.*, pp. 252—55 and Appendix 'C'.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 255—61; Sitanath, op. cit., pp. 76-77; Joseph Chailley. *Administrative Poblems of British India* (London, 1910), p. 151.

[43] Sitanath, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[44] *Ibid.*; Chandicharan, *op. cit.*, pp. 265—68.

taken up earnestly by Keshav Chandra Sen since 1859, and the first remarriage under the auspices of this Samaj took place in the year 1864.[45] Babu Sasipada Bannerji of Baranagar[46] soon came forward as a prominent worker in the field, and his labours produced striking results.[47] He established in 1887 the Hindu Widow's Home which did excellent work in educating widows so long as it lasted.[48]

The Widow Remarriage Movement had advocates in other provinces of India as well. The attention of the Maratha Brahmans was first drawn to this subject through a pamphlet published in 1837 at Bombay; this was followed by another 'book' which was not printed, and the Rev. Baba Padmanji wrote two works on remarriages entitled '*Kutumbasadharana*' and '*Yamunaparyatana*'. But it was Pandit Vishnu Shastri who came forward as the effective champion of this cause in the Maratha country, and a Widow Marriage Association was started at Bombay in the year 1866, many educated citizens enlisting themselves as its members. In antagonism to this association, the orthodox party set up another called the Hindu Dharma Vyavasthapaka Mandali, but the party of the reformers under the guidance of Pandit Vishnu Shastri and assisted by M. G. Ranade obtained victory for their cause, and from 1869 onwards widow marriages began to take place in Maharashtra. In Gujrat also a Remarriage Association was started at Ahmadabad, and since 1884 the subject acquired fresh importance through the writings of Mr. Malabari. Men like Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, G. G. Agarkar and D. K. Karve also did much for the amelioration of the widows' lot and condition. Having

[45] Sitanath, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[46] Father of Dewan A. R. Bannerjee, I.C.S., a prominent official of later days.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 78—89. The first widow marriage that he promoted was that of his niece Kusumkumari on 28th November, 1868.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 13—17.

become a widower, Mr. Karve remarried a Brahman widow in 1893 and revived the Widow Marriage Association of which he remained the Secretary for seven years till 1900. In 1899 he opened a Hindu Widows' Home in Poona City which formed the nucleus for a women's university. The movement for the general unlift of Hindu widows has made steady progress. Maharaja Sir Jatindra Mohan Tagore Bahadur was amongst the earliest benefactors to make a generous endowment (1 lakh) for helping Hindu widows,[49] and amongst local governments Bengal and Madras showed the way by providing stipends and scholarships to encourage the education and training of widows.[50] Pandita Ramarai's[51] *Sarada Sadan* (1889—1893) at Bombay, the Maharani's School at Mysore, the Arya Samaj and the Purity Society in the Punjab and the Hindu Widow Reform League of Lucknow, have done excellent work in this direction.

There has been a steady growth of education among women in modern times;[52] they are coming more and more out of *purdah*, and are displaying growing interest in social and political matters. The All-India Women's Conference, which met for the first time in 1926, is being utilised by women for expressing their opinions about educational and social reforms and for co-ordinating their attempts to effect these.

Increasing interest is being taken in the medical training of women. The days when ladies of the Brahma Samaj, like Mrs. Ganguli and Miss Sen, had to suffer adverse criticism for going in for medical training are long over. Generous ladies, like the wives of several Viceroys following the lead of the Countess of Dufferin, started and helped important insti-

[49] Buckland, *Bengal Under the Lieutenant-Governors*, Vol. II, p. 1054.

[50] Sitanath, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[51] Rambai Sarasvati (1838—1922),—a Protestant convert from Hinduism and a good Sanskrit Scholar.

[52] *Vide* Section on 'Education'.

tutions. The object of the Lady Dufferin Fund or more properly the "National Association for Supplying Medical Aid by Women to the Women of India," was "the training of women as doctors, hospital assistants, nurses and midwives, as well as the provision of dispensaries, wards and hospitals." As a branch of this organisation a special Women's Medical Service was constituted in 1914. The Lady Hardinge Medical College at Delhi trains Indian women for the degree of M.B., B.S. Semi-official organisations, like the Victoria Memorial Scholarships Fund and the Lady Chelmsford League as well as the Indian Red Cross Society, a purely voluntary organisation, have also done useful work in this direction; the two former organisations were amalgamated with the Special Maternity and Child Welfare Bureau of the Indian Red Cross Society on the 1st of January, 1931. At Calcutta the recently started Hospital, called Chittaranjan Seva Sadan, has shown what Indian ladies can do for Indian women when they have received up-to-date medical education in India and abroad.

The Women Suffrage Movement has achieved much success since the All-India Women's Deputation waited upon Mr. Montagu in Madras and presented an address to him on 18th December, 1917. The next three decades have seen the steady entry of women into the political field, and in the various councils and corporations women members are now taking prominent parts. The Government of India Act, 1935 allotted them seats in the Central as well as provincial legislatures and their franchise qualifications were liberalized. The example shown by Swarnakumari Devi of Calcutta and a few other ladies in the eighties in taking part in the Indian National Congress has borne fruit, and the Congress has had many prominent women leaders and workers.

The spirit of reformation has awakened the public conscience in India to the necessity of elevating the condition of those who have been described as the Depressed Classes.

While all the Samajas, the Ramkrishna Mission and the Christian Societies have done much valuable work for the uplift of the depressed classes, the Arya Samaj has been strikingly active in raising the social status of the 'untouchables' and in the work of "Suddhi" or re-Hinduising individuals and castes that had been converted to other religions, like Islam or Christianity, or Hinduising non-Hindus.[53] Useful services have also been rendered by the Depressed Classes Mission Society of India founded in 1906 in Bombay with the object of elevating "the social as well as the spiritual conditions of the depressed classes, *viz.*, the Mahars, Chambhars, Pariahs, Namasudras, Dheds and all other classes treated as untouchable in India, by (1) promoting education, (2) providing work, (3) remedying their social disabilities, (4) preaching to them principles of Liberal Religion, personal character and good citizenship.[54] The Hindu Mahasabha, at its seventh annual session held at Banaras in August 1923, passed a resolution for "admitting untouchables to ordinary Hindu privileges." Gandhiji in recent years devoted himself heart and soul to the work of removing untouchability and improving the lot of the 'Harijans' as he call-

[53] *Suddhi* is not a new thing in India. A writer in the *Calcutta Review*, February and March, 1934, has proved with instances from the study of original sources that "from Sindh to Madura, from Gujarat to Kashmir, from Benares to Thatta, everywhere an almost continuous stream of conversions and reconversions seems to have been running all through the first ten centuries of Muslim rule in India. Hindus not only welcomed their brethren back to their fold from Islam but were prepared to admit Muslims into their faith and did admit them as a matter of fact." Before the advent of Muslims, the doctrine of *Suddhi* was applied by the revived Brahmanism of the Early Middle Ages to the Huns and Gurjaras (being foreign conquerors and settlers) and to Gonds, Bhars, etc. (being aboriginals), and thus arose the purified 'Agnikula' and other Rajput clans. In fact, it was through *Suddhi* that various external elements have been absorbed in India at least from the 2nd century B.C., if not earlier than the 6th, or from pre-historic ages.

[54] Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, pp. 372-73.

ed the depressed classes. The Government also has been making systematic efforts for the spread of co-operation and education among them by granting special scholarships, allowances and other educational requirements, by making special provisions for appointments of members of their community in the services, and dealing favourably with the question of their special representation in the legislatures and public bodies. One of the most revolutionary changes in India's Social history in our days has been the removal of untouchability. According to Article 17 of the new Constitution of India "untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of 'untouchability' shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law".

It may be mentioned here that the rigours of the caste system have slackened considerably in the last half century; interdining and intermarriages have often taken place and been encouraged in different parts of the country, and sojourners to foreign lands have long ceased to be punished by social ostracism. Civil Marriage provisions, supplementary to the Act of 1872, have in recent years made intercaste and intercommunal marriages easier in the country.

The evils of slavery and infanticide have also been removed. It is known from various sources that a pitiable type of slavery was in the 18th century a long-standing institution in the country. But the spirit of reform did not leave this evil untouched. In 1807 the British Parliament abolished *slave trade*; in 1811 the East India Company's Government forbade the importation of slaves from any other country into India, and in 1832 "the purchase and sale of slaves brought from one district to another was made a *penal* offence". By the Charter Act of 1833 the Governor-General was required to take steps for the *abolition* of slavery "as soon as emancipation should be safe and practicable". By Act V of 1843 slavery in India was rendered illegal; and maintenance of or trade in

slaves became a criminal offence under the Indian Penal Code of 1860.[55] But slavery existed to our own days in places like Ceylon and North-Eastern Frontiers of Burma, to abolish which the Government of India conducted several anti-slavery operations.[56] The evil of infanticide in different parts of Western and Central India was also removed through the activities of Lord William Bentinck and other British officers, such as Wilkinson, Willoughby, Erskine, Jacob, Pottinger and Melville.

SECTION III

EDUCATION: LITERATURE AND ART

The education that men receive always exercises a potent influence in moulding the course of history of a country. Modern Indian Reformation, as we have already noted, has been intimately connected with the changes in educational ideas and institutions, the history of which may now be briefly attempted.

It is clear from a study of facts preserved in works like Buchanan's Journals, Bishop Heber's Journals, Adams' Report and Correspondence, etc., in vernacular literature and periodicals of the early nineteenth century and in accounts of the early missionaries like Ward's *History of the Hindus*, that the whole country was covered with institutions for primary and higher education when the English were trying to build up their political dominion in India during the second half of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century. "The English found in India," writes F. W. Thomas, "a widespread system of elementary and higher education, of which the former was mainly practical, the latter mainly literary, philosophical and religious."[57]

[55] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 128.

[56] *India in* 1930-31, pp. 23—25.

[57] *History and Prospects of British Education in India*, London, 1891. p. 148.

During the early period of its administration in India at least till 1813, the East India Company "did not recognise the promotion of education among the natives of India as part of its duty or concern."[58] But while this was generally true, there were, even during this period, three forces that were working for the cause of a New Education in India :—(a) the efforts of some of the civil officers of the East India Company, (b) the activities of the missionaries and (c) the attempts of some benevolent and public-spirited Indians. Among the early efforts of English officials for the cause of education in India we may mention here that Warren Hastings founded in 1781 the Calcutta Madrassa[58] to fit Indians for "the numerous offices of the British Government,"[59] and in 1791 Jonathan Duncan, Resident at Banaras, opened in that holy city a Sanskrit College "designed to cultivate the laws, literature, and religion of the Hindus, and specially to supply qualified Hindu assistants to European judges." In 1784 Sir Willam Jones of the Calcutta Supreme Court established, with the help of Warren Hastings, the Bengal Asiatic Society, which has, through its literary collections and publications, played an important part in the cultural history of Modern India, and of the Modern World as well, by making Ancient Indian thought available to Europe and European scientific scholarship to India. Sir Charles Grant, who served in the commercial branch of the Company in Bengal from 1773—1790 and ultimately became a Director of the Company, presented to the Court of Directors in 1797 a treatise written in 1792, in which he advocated the introduction of English education among the Indians.[60]

About the working of the other forces it should also be carefully noted in this connection that the missionaries in

[58] Syed Mahmood, *A History of English Education in India*, p. 2.

[59] For details, reference may be made to *Bengal : Past and Present*, January—June, 1914.

[60] Sharp, *Selections from Educational Records*, Vol. I, p. 8.

India, especially the Baptist missonaries like Carey and his co-adjutors, Thomas, Marshman and Ward, from their safe refuge at Serampore, a Danish settlement sixteen miles north of Calcutta, made strong endeavours for the conversion and education of the Indians in spite of the Despatch of the Court of Directors, dated 7th December, 1808, "declaring their policy of strict neutrality in all matters religious, and in spite of the contempts thrown on their efforts at home."[61] They started there a paper manufactory and a printing press, from which they brought out translations of the Bible in twenty-six vernaculars including Bengali, Marathi and Tamil; in 1801 Carey was appointed a Professor of Bengali in the newly-established institution in Calcutta for the training of young civil servants of the Company called the College of Fort William. Another pioneer in education was David Hare, who "spared no personal trouble, money or influence" for the cause of education in Bengal. The Bishops' College, an important missionary institution, was founded in Calcutta in 1820. Among the philanthropic Indians working for the cause of education in India about that time were Raja Rammohan Roy, Raja Radhakanta Deb, Maharaja Tejchandra Rai Bahadur of Burdwan,[63] and Jayanarain Ghosal who established a school at Banaras for the teaching of Engilsh, Persian, Hindi and Bengali.[64] The

[61] It should not be concluded from the comparatively late introduction of an English *system* of education that there was no knowledge of English language and Western civilization amongst Indians in the eighteenth century. Itsam-ud-din, a Bengali of Nadia district, was well-versed in English, and as such found high employment in E. I. C. and native Indian courts; and he went to England in 1766 as an envoy of Shah Alam to the English court, and has left an interesting account of his European experiences. There were some others like him, who acquired European education and experience, ever since the Portuguese settled in India (*vide* Winternitz: *History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vol. I, Introduction).

[62] R. W. Frazer: *A Literary History of India*, p. 390.

[63] B. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 23.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 22; Frazer, *op. cit.*, p 394.

exertions of Raja Rammohan, Mr. David Hare and Sir Hyde East, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, led to the establishment in 1816 of the Hindu Mahavidyalaya or Hindu College of Calcutta, which later on developed into the Presidency College of Calcutta.[65] It is clear from the letter which Sir Hyde East addressed on 18th May, 1816, to his friend Mr. J. Harington, a brother judge then absent in England, that Rammohan played a "leading part in founding the Hindu College. The leading Hindus of Calcutta disliked his association with it, as he was regarded by them as a heretic and more of a Musalman than a Hindu. Rammohan, therefore, very wisely withdrew from the movement, lest the objects of the institution should be frustrated in consequence of his name appearing on the Committee of Management."[66] About the same time (1816-17 A.D.) Rammohan established an English school at Suripara in Calcutta for the *free* instruction of Hindu boys, and he continued to patronage modern *as well as* classical education in a number of ways.

In England, Grant and Wilberforce were urging the necessity of introducing English education in India; and in India, Lord Minto with his colleagues, T. Lumsden, G. Hewett and the famous orientalist H. T. Colebrooke, issued a minute on the subject of education on the 6th of March, 1811, deploring the 'lamentable decay of learning' in the country and suggesting means for its improvement.[67] Two years later, at the time of the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, a clause was inserted in the East India Company Act of 1813 which is famous "as containing the first legislative admission of the

[65] It is interesting to compare the Hindu Mahavidyalaya of early nineteenth century and the Hindu Visvavidyalaya of the early twentieth century in origin, characteristics and results.

[66] It is difficult to parallel this act of self-abnegation in national service in the last century of Indian social and political history.

[67] Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
Past and Present, 1914.

right of education in India to participate in the public revenues," as it authorised the Governor-General in Council "to direct the application to education of an annual sum not less than one lakh of rupees." Lord Hastings in his Minute of 1815 recognised the pressing need for education; before his retirement in 1823 the Government distributed grants to two educational societies, the Calcutta School Book Society and the Calcutta School Society[68] and a Committee of Public Instruction was appointed by Adam, Hastings' temporary successor, from among the civil servants, with Horace Hayman Wilson, the famous Orientalist, as secretary, to superintend the expenditure of the sum granted in 1813.

But a new difficulty arose regarding the medium of instruction (vernacular or English) and the type of education (classical oriental or modern western in contents). Rammohan advocated English education[69] and protested against "the introduction of the *unmixed* Sanskrit system of education," in his letter to Lord Amherst, dated 11th December, 1823.[70] Rammohan's protest bore no *immediate* fruit; the Committee opened a Sanskrit College in Calcutta in 1824, and another College at Delhi in 1825 "for instruction in the three classical languages of India." For several years a fierce controversy continued between the 'Orientalists' and the 'Anglicists Lord Macaulay' who had been appointed Law Member of the Council of the Governor-General of India, arrived in India on 8th June, 1834, and was appointed President of the Committee of Public Instruction. He issued his well-known Minute of 2nd February, 1835, in which "he adopted and defended the views of the

[68] Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 104; Bengal: Past and Present, 1914.

[69] *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, June 1930, pp. 166—70; Syed Mahmood, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

[70] Sharp, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI.

English section in the Committee,"[71] and vehemently denounced Oriental Literature of which he knew nothing. He favoured introduction of the Western system and subjects of education from a point of view very different from that of the wise Rammohan. While Lord Macaulay's championship of English education has been of profound significance in the intellectual history of Modern India, his unjust denunciation of Eastern literature, culture and knowledge produced undesirable results.[72] Lord William Bentick had already in the month of January, 1835 appointed William Adam, the well-known ex-missionary, to make enquiries into the state of indigenous education in Bengal; but after the issue of Macaulay's Minute he and his Council expressed "entire" concurrence with Macaulay's views and passed the famous Resolution of 7th Marih, 1835, which declared that "the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science amongst the natives of India," that "all the funds appropriated for the purposes of education would be best employed on English education alone," and that "for the future all funds set apart for education should be devoted to that purpose, and no portion of them be expended on the printing of Oriental works."

Lord Auckland modified[73] to some extent Lord William Bentick's resolution and a grant of 500 rupees a month was sanctioned to the Asiatic Society of Bengal with which it carried on the valuable *Bibiliotheca Indica* series of Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian texts.[74]

In 1842 a Council of Education superseded the Committee of Public Instruction, but its activities were limited to Bengal.

[71] Trevelyan, *Life of Macaulay* (1881), p. 290.

[72] Macdonald, *Government of India*, p. 165.

[73] For details *vide* his Minute dated 24th November, 1839, printed in Sharp, *op. cit.*, pp. 147—70.

[74] *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 114.

James Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces from 1843—1853, started a new experiment in the field of education by devising a *halqabandi* (circle) school system "whereby villages were grouped in circles of five, the landholders of each group undertaking to pay for a school by a voluntary cess of 1 per cent on the land revenue. This system was in 1852-53 introduced into eight districts and was afterwards extended as other districts came under land-revenue settlement. The scheme, as sanctioned by the Directors, involved the levy of a cess of 1 per cent on the rent, which was deducted before the revenue was calculated, so that payment was shared by the government and the landholder."[75] Some efforts were made by the Government also in Bombay and Madras, but "uniformity and constancy of aim were lacking in the education policies of the various provincial governments.[76] The most important Government institutions at that time were the Medical College started in Calcutta in 1835, the Thomason Engineering College at Rurki in the North-Western Provinces and an institution in Madras bearing in 1852 the title of the 'Madras University High School.' The years following 1835 were so far as education was concerned "years of verying opinion, uneven direction, and scanty expenditure."[77]

The educational despatch of 19th July, 1854, drafted by Sir Charles Wood, President of Board of Control, and forwarded to India through the Court of Directors, forms a landmark in the history of education in Modern India by supplying the basis for the present system. It commended to the special attention of the Government of India, "the improvement and far wider extension of education, both English and vernacular," and prescribed "as the means for the attainment of these objects :—(1) the constitution of a separate department of

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

the administration for education, (2) the institution of Universities at the Presidency towns, (3) the establishment of institutions for training teachers for all classes of schools, (4) the maintenance of the existing Government Colleges and High Schools, and the increase of their number when necessary, (5) the establishment of new Middle Schools, (6) increased attention to Vernacular Schools, indigenous or other, for elementary education, (7) the introduction of a system of grants-in-aid on the principle of perfect religious neutrality, (8) a comprehensive system of scholarships to be instituted, so as to connect Lower Schools with higher, and Higher Schools with Colleges and (9) female education which was to receive the frank and cordial support of Government."[78]

In pursuance of the despatch of 1854 Educational Departments were established in each of the Presidencies and "before the end of 1856 the new system was fairly at work."[79] A Director of Public Instruction was appointed for each province with a staff of Inspectors and Assistant or Deputy Inspectors under him. Prof. Dodwell has noted the 'officialised' character of the new Educational Departments thus created and has pointed out that the men in charge of these departments being 'primarily administrators' education "tended to become a matter of administration and routine."[80]

It was during the stormy days of the Movement of 1857—59, that Universities were significantly founded in Calcutta Madras and Bombay, on the model of the newly developed University of London, that is, as examining bodies and not as teaching and residential institutions; subsequently one University was established for the Punjab at Lahore in 1882 and one for the North-West Provinces (modern U.P.) at Allahabad in

[78] *Calcutta Review*, 1860, pp. 401—26.

[79] *Report of the Indian Education Commission* (1882), p. 25.

[80] *A Sketch of the History of India*, p. 203.

1887. These Universities had a Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor and a Senate with a governing body, and controlled by their examinations the courses of study in the colleges affiliated to them. The candidates were admitted into colleges after they had passed their Entrance examinations. Colleges and Schools rapidly multiplied, and by 1882 more than two and a quarter million pupils received instruction in public institutions.

In Februray 1882 Lord Ripon's Government appointed an Education Commission consisting of twenty-two members (English and Indian) with Sir W. W. Hunter as President, and the Commission was charged with the duty of enquiring into "the manner in which effect had been given to the principles of the despatch of 1854, and of suggesting such measures as might seem desirable in order to further carrying out of the policy therein laid down."[81] The chief object of enquiry was to be the "present state of elementary education and the means by which this can everywhere be extended and improved." The Commission collected various information on the subject of Indian education and made useful recommendations advising increased reliance upon private enterprise and management. With the growth of Local Self-Government after 1882, the Municipalities and the Local Boards were entrusted with powers for managing schools.

Lord Curzon's viceroyalty witnessed an important change in the sphere of education as in other spheres of administration. Possessed of great energy and considerable insight into the details of administration, Lord Curzon realised the importance of reorganising and of effectively controlling the educational institutions of the country. After a preliminary enquiry the Viceroy summoned in September 1901 a conference at Simla, consisting of the principal education officers of the

[81] Quoted in Syed Mahmud, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

country "to consider the system of education in India." In January 1902 he appointed a Universities Commission "to enquire into the conditions and prospects of the Indian Universities, to report upon proposals which might improve their constitution and working, and to recommend such measures as might tend to elevate the standard of University teaching and to promote the advancement of learning."[82] The Commission was presided over by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Thomas Raleigh, legal member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and included Mr. Syed Hossain Bilgrami, a distinguished Muhammadan who was Director of Public Instruction in the Nizam's dominions and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Gurudas Banerjee, a judge of the Calcutta High Court. In June 1902 it presented its report and upon its reccommendations was based the Universities Act of 1904. "As was to be expected under a Viceroy who was a great autocrat with an overwhelming faith in the efficiency of Government machinery, the chief pupose of the Act of 1904 was to tighten the hold of the Government on the Universities, and in the first place on their Senates, which were still retained as the ruling bodies, by reducing their total numbers whilst increasing to an overwhelming majority the proportion of those nominated by the Chancellor and giving ex-officio seats on them to Provincial Directors of Public Instruction. In the Syndicates, which were the executive bodies, provision, at first sight effective, was made for a large number of college teachers, but none was eligible who was not already a member of the Senate. Increased powers of supervision over existing colleges and the imposition of more stringent conditions for the affiliation of new ones, were steps in the right direction, but they came too late and made no attempt to deal with the fungus-growths which, in so many schools, were rotting the foundations on which a sound college education could be built up.

[82] Lovat Fraser, *India Under Curzon and After*, p. 189.

New faculties were created to deal with the university curricula and with the methods of university examinations, but these were also to be mere emanations from the Senate. Practically nothing was henceforth to be done without the approval of Government."[83] Protests from different quarters were raised "against such a comprehensive scheme of officialization."[84] But the Act was not entirely barren of good results. Though Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, the greatest Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta Unversity and one of the noblest sons of Bengal, opposed it vigorously, he took advantage of it to create the present teaching branch of the University of Calcutta.

In 1910 control of education was transferred from the Home Department of the Government of India to the newly created Department of Education with an office of its own, and Resolution dated 21st February, 1913, of Sir Harcourt Butler, a Member to represent it in the Executive Council, the first education member of the Governor-General's Council, laid down certain lines for advance and recommended the establishment of teaching and residential Universities. The Dacca and Patna University Commissions were accordingly appointed, but their reports were not acted upon or entirely deviated from owing to the war and other causes. The growth of local and communal patriotism led to the establishment of Universities at different centres, viz., Patna, Lucknow, Rangoon, Dacca, Delhi, Nagpur, Waltair (Vizagapatam), Chidambaram, Banaras Aligarh, Hyderabad. We have alredy referred to the Indian Women's University at Poona; the Visvabharati (The 'World and India' University) of Dr. R. N. Tagore at Shantiniketan, Bolpur, is known for its cosmopolitan cultural outlook. Lord Chelmsford (1916—21) appointed the Calcutta University Commission for enquiring into working and needs

[83] Chirol, *India*, p. 141.

[84] *Ibid.*

of that university with Dr. (afterwards Sir) Michael Sadler as President, though Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee was its moving spirit. The report of the Commission was published in August 1919, and in the following January the Government of India issued a Resolution drawing special attention to the following points:—"High Schools fail to give that breadth of training which the developments of the country and new avenues of employment demand, (2) the Intermediate Section of University education should be recognised as part of School education and should be separated from the University organisation, (3) the defects of the present system of affiliated colleges may be mitigated by the establishment of a strong central teaching body, the incorporation of unitary universities (as occasion arises), a modification of the administrative machinery which will admit of fuller representation of local interests, and supervision of different classes of institutions by several appropriately constituted bodies." The recommendations of the Commission were given effect to in some of the provinces in harmony with local conditions, but the Calcutta University itself remained unaffected and thus derived no benefit from the labours of the Commission. In May 1924, the Government of India summoned a Universities Conference at Simla where representatives from all the Indian Universities were invited. The most important resolution of the Conference was one relating to the establishment of an Inter-University Board for India, which has now been functioning for some years.

Since the Reforms of 1919 Education became a transferred subject in each province under the responsibility of a Minister. A review of the state of education in India was made by an Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission in 1928. This Committee was presided over by Sir Philip Hartog and included other prominent educationists, British and Indian. In the opinion of the Hartog Committee, "so far as mere

quantitative increase in the numbers under instruction is concerned, there has been a phenomenal advance since the inception of the Reforms." In short, education spread but deteriorated, more money was spent on it but less thought, so that while some political advantage was gained, academic advance and national profit did not come upto the expectations raised by the formation of education ministries.

Reorientation of our culture and reorganisation of the educational system on right lines, contributing to the fullest development of our new-form democracy in free India, have engaged due attention of the Centre and the States. Earnest attempts are being made towards the spread of Basic Education and the introduction of vernacular medium in different stages. Experts, however, consider it advisable to retain English medium in the University stage for some time more. A Commission under the chairmanship of Sir S. Radhakrishnan reviewed the state of education in this country, and it brought out a comprehensive report containing highly valuable suggestions for constructive educational reform.

Female education in modern India has been an interesting and important topic. Education of women was a characteristic feature of ancient India, and even in medieval India it was not unknown; in spite of the political changes and disorders of several centuries, the tradition survived in the early part of the nineteenth century.[85] Instances were many of women educating themselves out of religious considerations; secular motives were also not entirely absent. But the subject of female education received a new impetus from the spirit of renaissance which characterised the nineteenth century, and we find that long before the Government paid any attention to this subject, a few enterprising missionaries and some philan-

[85] B. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 7—9; K. K. Dutta, *Dawn of Renascent India*, pp. 73—91.

thropic individuals like Raja Radhakanta Deb, Raja Baidyanath Ray of Calcutta and others took it up.[86] Missionary efforts however could not influence the members of the higher classes who often suspected these, and pupils were thus recruited mostly from the lower ranks of the society. Their efforts were attended with partial success in other parts of India as well, notably in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies.

These early endeavours received no encouragement from the Government and it was so late as in May, 1849, that the first school for the education of the girls of high class Hindu families was established in Calcutta under the name of the Hindu Balika Vidyalaya through the efforts of Mr. Drinkwater Bethune, Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, and of Pandit Iswarchandra Vidyasagar. The Hon'ble Justice Sambhunath Pandit (the first Indian Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William), Babu Ram Gopal Ghose (a leading merchant of the time and the first Indian public man to make his orations in English of literary merit), and Pandit Madanmohan Tarkalankar (a well-known Bengali author of these times), were the chief supporters of the school. The Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, also recorded in his Minute dated 1st April, 1850, that Mr. Bethune, for doing "a great work in the successful introduction of Native Female Education in India," has "earned a right not only to the gratitude of the Government but to its frank and cordial support."[87] He also made grants of money for "aiding existing girls schools."[88] But Sir Charles Wood's Despatch of 1854,—though it expressed concurrence with Lord Dal-

[86] Sitanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 33—40; Monier-Williams, *Modern India and the Indians* (Third Edition, London, 1879), pp. 322—24; B. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 9—12; *Selections from Educational Records*, Part II, pp. 32—51.

[87] Monier-Williams, *Modern India and the Indians*, P. 325.

[88] Sitanath Tattvabhusan, *Philosophy of Brahmanism*, pp. 360—68

housie's declaration,—devoted only one paragraph out of one hundred to the subject of female education. Paragraph 83 of it runs thus :—"This importance of female education in India cannot be overrated, and we have observed with pleasure the evidence which is now afforded of an increased desire on the part of many of the natives of India to give a good education to their daughters. By this means a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and moral tone of the people than by the education of men. We have already observed that schools for females are included among those to which grants-in-aid may be given, and we cannot refrain from expressing our cordial sympathy with the efforts which are being made in this direction." But Lord Canning's Government, anxious to avoid giving any impression of trying to revolutionise Indian Society, declared that girls' schools should be really supported by voluntary aid. In 1867 a circular was issued to the effect that the Government could take no initiative in the case of girls' schools as it had done in the case of schools for boys, but could encourage the then existing schools by grants-in-aid. Nevertheless some action was taken. In 1870 out of £316,509 expended on education in the Bengal Presidency, £1,173 was given to Government girls' schools and £4,462 to aided girls' schools, chiefly in the North-West and the Punjab; out of £198,182 spent in Bombay £4,000 was assigned to Government female schools; in Madras the Government did not maintain a single girls' school. In 1875 there was about 1,000 Government female schools, with about 34,000 pupils, in all the eight provinces under Governors, Lieutenant-Governors and Commissioners.

With the revival of Liberalism in the time of Ripon the Education Commission of 1882 advised that "female education should receive special encouragement and be treated with special liberality. Government grants thereafter began to be

more freely used and Government management more freely resorted to than before, and this led to a substantial growth of female education in the succeeding decades.

Besides missionary and state efforts, the activities of the various reformed social groups and other associations, such as the Brahma Samaj, the Arya Samaj, or the Servants of India Society, have considerably furthered the cause of women's education. Every important branch of the Arya Samaj has a girls' school under its control. In the Brahma Samaj, men like Messrs Keshav Chandra Sen and Sasipada Banerji,[89] *and* women like Lady J. C. Bose and Mrs. P. K. Ray have rendered conspicuous services to this cause. Some members of this Samaj have also from time to time started journals for the promotion of education and culture amongst women, such as (a) the *Bamabodhini*, started in 1863 and edited by the late Umeshchandra Dutta, (b) the *Abalabandhava*, started about 1869 by the late Dwarkanath Ganguli, (c) the *Mahila* edited by the late Girishchandra Sen, (d) the *Antahpura* started by Sasipada Bennerji, (e) the *Bharati*, started by Dvijendranath Tagore and long edited by his accomplished sister, the novelist Srimati Svarnakumari Ghosal and her talented daughters, (f) the *Bharatamahila*, (g) the *Suprabhata*, started by two graduate sisters, Srimatis Kumudini and Basanti Mitra. Dr. Mrs. Ganguli of the same Samaj, the first Indian lady to become a professional physician no western lines, was also, jointly with Miss Chandramukhi Bose (a Bengali Christian, later on well-known as for long the Principal of the Bethune College for Women), the first Indian girl, to enter the University at Calcutta in 1876. The Deccan Education Society has also made important contributions to the cause of female education, and Karve's Women's University, having in 1931 twenty-four institutions, mainly in Gujarat and Maharashtra, affiliated to it, is

[89] Sitanath Tattvabhusan, *Philosophy of Brahmanism*, pp. 360—68.

the brilliant result of the sincere exertions of Dhondo Keshav Karve and Sir R. C. Bhandarkar, both connected with the Fergusson College of Poona.

Thus female edcuation has progressed in modern times through the agency of various forces, and we have now women teachers, professors, poets and novelists, doctors and scientists, legislators and statesmen of repute. Among the famous women poets of the period under review the names of Toru Dutt, the "marvellous girl that perished before her prime,"[90] Mrs. Svarnakumari Ghosal, Mrs. Sarala Devi Chaudhuri, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu (*nee* Chatterjee) and Mrs. Kamini Ray, deserve special mention, though there are many others in the field. Number of women are now forging ahead in different walks of life. But with all these India has as yet achieved little as compared with other countries in this essential matter of national importance.

Increasing contacts with the outside world, a revived and finer appreciation of the national culture of past ages, the urge of thorough reformation in all aspects of life and society, and the development of new situations and problems in the country, have all stimulated deep and creative thought and have inspired Literature and Art with stirring ideals and set up fresh and higher standards. The Indian genius has unfolded and is unfolding itself superbly in manifold petals, in different branches of thought and knowledge. This Literature has expanded in all possible channels,—prose or poetry, fiction or eassy, drama or epic, lyric or ballad. All the vernaculars have been, more or less, earlier or later, on the path of progress. We may here review briefly the advance of the more important ones: Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Marathi and Gujarati in the North, and Tamil, Malayalam and Telugu in the South.

[90] Macnicol, *The Making of Modern India*, p. 170.

As during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the impetus for the development of vernacular literatures was supplied by the religious reformation movements of the time, so also in the nineteenth century the inspiration came first from the movements for social and religious reformation and as such the literary progress in Modern India is also an aspect of the general awakening of the age. At the same time the influence of the British connection and of Western Education on the growth of Indian literatures has also been considerable.[91] British rule made it possible for India once more to think of literature and art in an atmosphere of peace and order after the troubled years of the eighteenth century; English education placed before her writers new ideas and models,[92] and the rapid expansion of the Press helped the multiplication and circulation of books. "The Hindu intellect" remarks Mr. R. C. Dutt, "came in contact with all that is noblest and most healthy in European history and literature, and profited by it."[93]

During the closing years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth the Serampore Missionaries, notably Carey, Marshman and Ward, and the *pandits* and *munshis* of the Fort William College were trying to create something like a prose literature in Bengal. Whatever might have been their objects, their efforts produced good literary results.[94] But it was Raja Rammohan Roy who during the tens and twenties of the nineteenth century devised and used effectively a powerful prose style for his work of reformation, and has thus been justly regarded as being "practically the father of

[91] Western Influence on Bengali Literature, *Calcutta Review*, November-December, 1931.

[92] Sushil Kumar De, *History of Bengali Literature in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 62-63.

[93] *Literature of Bengal*, p. 136.

[94] S. K. De, *op. cit.*, Chapters III-VI.

the modern Bengali literary prose." He was also a poet and was the first to compose theistic hymns in Bengali. During the thirties Isvarchandra Gupta (1809—58) enriched Bengali poetry with his easy-flowing "witty and interminable, verse, displaying a copious power of the language unsuspected before."[95] He was succeeded in the forties by two prose-writers and essayists writing with considerable force and grace on topics of social and educational reforms, Srijut Akshay Kumar Datta (1820—86) and Pandit Isvarchandra Vidyasagar (1820—91). A number of talented writers belonging to the Brahma Samaj, like Maharsi Devendranath Tagore, Raj Narayan Basu, Kesavachandra Sen, Dvijendranath Tagore, and Pandit Shivnath Shastri continued the work of Akshay Kumar after his retirement from the field, and also produced a religious and philosophical literature of high merit. Vidyasagar was similarly followed by another group of literary men like Bhudev Chandra Mukherjee (1825—94), Peary Chandra Mitra, Pratap Chandra Ghosh, Kaliprasana Sinha and others.[96] Ram Narayan Tarkaratna produced in 1854 the first original dramatic work in Bengali named *Kulina Kulasarvasva*, holding up therein the custom of Kulinism and polygamy "to deserved ridicule and contempt." After him Michael Madhusudhan Datta, whose Christian education had yet enabled him to appreciate the best in ancient Indian literary tradition, produced his 'renaissance' plays the *Sarmistha* in 1858 and the *Tillottama* in 1860, on Sanskritic models, and in the next year brought out his monumental epic in blank verse (a new instrument in Bengali prosody), the *Meghnada-vadha-Kavya*, which has immortalised his name. The tradition thus created in the field of Bengali Literature

[95] R. C. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[96] Mitra wrote a delightful social tale of Bengal '*Alaler gharer dulal*'; Ghosh wrote '*Bangadhipaparajaya*'; and Sinha translated the *Mahabharat* in classic prose.

was ably maintained by writers like Hemchandra Banerjee and Nabinchandra Sen flourishing the eighties of the nineteenth century. The line of dramatic composition, given up by Madhusudhan Datta for epic poetry, was resumed by others, the most prominent being Dinabandhu Mitra, who in 1860 brought out his *Nila Darpan*, a vigorous satire on the indigo planters of Jessore and Nadiya. In subsequent years the writings of Girish Chandra Ghosh, Amrita Lal Bose and D. L. Roy have added to the richness, variety and power of Bengali dramatic literature. The influence of the Bengali historical, social and psychological dramas on the formation of the national and social life of not only Bengal but of all India cannot be over-estimated; from the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, this stream has been broadening considerably.

The mingling of the old with the new, a characteristic feature of nineteenth century history, is nicely illustrated in the works (1864—1894) of Bankimchandra Chatterjee, the first great novelist, and of Madhusudhan Datta (1861) the first great epic writer of modern Bengal. Both of them learnt their art and manner from master writers of the West, but made the new thing their own and enriched the native literature and style thereby. "Bankimchandra is in prose what Madhusudhan is in verse,—the founder of a new style, the exponent of a new idea. In creative imagination, in gorgeous description....., Madhusudhan and Bankimchandra stand apart from the other writers of the century." Bankim's earliest historical novel Durgeshnandini appeared in 1864, and was followed by other subsequently famous romances and social and political novels like *'Kapalkundala,' 'Mrinalini,' 'Visa-vriksha', 'Devi Chaudhurani, 'Ananda Math'* and *'Krishnakanter Will.'* In his later years he began to write on religious subjects and published his *'Krishna Charitra'* in 1886. "Bankimchandra Chatterjee," in the opinion of Mr. R. W. Frazer, "is the first

great creative genius modern India has produced. For the western reader his novels are a revelation of the inward spirit of India life and thought."[97] Bankim had a worthy successor in Ramesh Chandra Dutt, who produced the following well-known novels in quick succession,—*Banga-Vijeta'* (1874) 'Rajput *Jivana-Sandhya'* (1878) *Madhavi-Hankan* (1876), *'Maharashtra Jivana-Probhata'* (1877), 'Samasara' (1885) and *'Samaja'* (1895). Many other novelists of merit (including women) have since appeared in modern Bengal, and amongst their oustanding literary productions are *'Dipanirvana* by Srimati Svarnakumari Ghosal, *'Svarnalata'* by Tarak Chandra Ganguli, and *'Meja Bau'* by Pandit Shivnath Shastri. In subsequent years, the field of fiction has been dominated by Rabindranath Tagore and Sarat Chandra Chatterjee and their numerous followers, and quite recently a bold realistic school of fiction writers have appeared. Essayists like Kali Prasanna Ghosh of Dacca, the author of *'Prabhata-chinta* and *Nibhritachinta,* Rajkumar Mukherjee, Chandra Nath Basu and others, have also added to the variety of Bengali literature; some notable biographical works of this period are, *Life of Rammohan Roy* by Nagendranath Chatterjee, *Life of Akshaya Kumar Datta* by Mahendranath Vidyanidhi, *Life of Madhusudhan Dutta* by Jogendra Chandra Basu, *Life of Vidyasagar* by Chandi Charan Banerjee, *Life of Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandi* by Savitriprasanna Chattopadhyaya, etc. High class autobiographies began with Maharsi Devendranath Tagore and his son the great poet, and this class literature has grown after them. Some Bengali writers have produced striking literary works in English also, in prose as well as in poetry. The names of Raja Rammohan Roy, of Madhusudhan Datta, and of several members of the Dutta family of Rambagan including the famous Toru Dutta, and of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and her

[97] *Literary History of India,* p. 420.

brother H. N. Chatterjee deserve mention in this connection.[98]

For more than half a century, Rabindranath Tagore was mainly instrumental in shaping the literature of Bengal. He further exercised through his numerous writing in poetry and prose, his dramas, novels and stories, his lyrics and sonnets and songs, all-India and an international influence of profound significance. Through his writings and the artistic activities of his pupils and followers of the Santiniketan (Bolpur), the outside world is getting an insight into the spirit of Indian civilization, of which in its manifold aspects, he was a great revivalist and re-interpreter. "Tagore's poetry," remarks Mr. Ramsay MacDonald justly, "is India. It is the product of his devotion to Indian culture.....It is of the soul of a people, not merely the emotion of a man; a systematic view of life, not merely a poetic mood; a culture, not merely a tune."[99]

In Hindu Literature, Lalluji Lal, the author of *Prem Sagar* (1803) and Sadal Misra, the author of *Nasketopakhyan*, began the transformation of common Hindi into a literary dialect ("High Hindi)", under the guidance of Dr. John Gilchrist at the Fort William College in Calcutta at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[100] The work of the Serampore missionaries who translated the Christian scriptures in the dialects of Northern India, should be noted here; the first portions of Carey's Hindu New Testament were published in 1809 and the Hindi translation of the whole Bible was completed in 1818 A.D. Printing of Hindi books first began at the College Press at Fort William (Calcutta), but all kind of books in Hindi began to come out since the opening of a lithographic press at Delhi in 1837, though most of these works were of little literary merit. Hindi writers continued to

[98] *Ibid.*, pp. 430—34.
[99] *The Government of India*, p. 245.
[100] F. E. Keay, *A History of Hindi Literature*, p. 88.

enjoy as in the past, patronage of native courts, such as at Patna and Charkhari in Bundelkhand, at Rewah in Baghel khand, at Nagpur, Banaras, Ayodhya, Darbhanga and other places.[101]

Hindi Literature has been enriched during this period by a fairly large number of works in prose and poetry. There is a considerable output in the subject of poetics and anthologies, but on traditional Sanskrit lines. Fiction and drama or periodical literature, have long been mainly translations and adaptations from the neighbouring Bengali literature. But signs are not wanting in the present generation of a tendency towards striking out a line of development free from medieval tradition and imitation. Among the writers who flourished in the nineteenth century the names of the following deserve mention :—Padmakar Bhatt (1753—1833), the author of *Jagad-vinod*, Gokul Nath, who completed in 1829 the translation of the *Mahabharata* into Hindi and wrote other works as well, Chandra Sekhar Bajpeyi (1798—1875), the author of *Hamir Hath* and other works, Raja Shiv Prasad (1832—95), and Babu Harishchandra of Banaras (1850—85) who, for his varied writings, has been often called 'Bhartendu' ('The Moon of India'). Among the Bihari poets, all writing in the Maithili dialect, the names of Bhanu Nath Jha (c. 1850 A.D.) and Harsha Nath Jha (b. 1847) deserve mention; both of them were attached to the court of the Maharaja of Darbhanga. In the list of anthologies the most important of all in size and contents is the *Raga Sagarodbhava, Raga-Kalpadruma*, compiled by Krishnananda Vyasa-deva and published in 1843.

The nineteenth century saw Urdu Poetry at the height of its popularity and also the growth of Urdu Prose. Some of the most famous Urdu poets flourished during this period at Lucknow, Delhi, Patna, Rampur, and Hyderabad; amongst

[101] Keay, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95; Grierson, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-08.

them may be specially mentioned Ghalib, a poet and philosopher having "originality in thought, expression, similes; metaphors, imageries, vocabulary and constructions"; Ghalib's worthy pupil Zaki (1839—1903 A.D.); Annis (1802—74 A.D.) "who was a born poet and had received poetry as inheritance" and whose marsia or elegies are brilliant specimens of Urdu Literature; Altaf Hussain Ali (1837—1914), whose *Musuddus* Hali or the Ebb and Flow of Islam is one of its landmarks. A new turn to Urdu (and Persian) poetry has been given in the twentieth century by the celebrated poet Muhammad Iqbal of Lahore, whose poems are read and appreciated both in and out of India. Urdu prose for practical purposes came into existence at the Fort William College in Calcutta under the care of Dr. John Gilchrist, who has been "fitly called the father of Urdu Prose." The Christian missionaries thus conferred an inestimable benefit on Urdu Literature; but the "halcyon days of Urdu prose were in the latter half of the nineteenth century," when Sir Syed Ahmad and a distinguished band of scholars (Hali, Shibili, Zakaullah, Cherag Ali, Mohsinul-mulk, Nazir Ahmad, Azad, Soshar and others) "gave a great impetus to the development of Urdu." Western education and contact with English literature liberalised thought and style in Urdu literature, and books on history, travels fiction or science, and journalis began to appear.

Western and Southern India also have showed examples of the modern literary renaissance. In Maharashtra, Vishnu Shastri laid the foundations of Marathi prose literature and Annasahib Kirloskar of the Marathi drama. In Gujarat, Dayaram (1767—1852) produced love lyrics of excellent quality, and Behramji Malabari, the great Parsi reformer, was also an author of note having equal command over Gujarati and English. Justice Kashinath Trimbak Telang (b. 1850 A.D.), with his profound scholarship in Sanskrit and Marathi, exercised a stimulating influence on the Marathi literary circles. Both

Gujarati and Marathi have profited appreciably by the models set up by the Bengal literary revival, and many standard Bengali works were translated into these West Indian vernaculars. In South India, Mr. Chandu Menon wrote in 1889 a novel of great interest entitled *'Indulekha'* in the vernacular language of the Malabar coast, Travancore and Cochin,[102] in Madras, Mrs. S. Sathianadhan wrote her two well-known novels, *'Saguna'* and *'Kamala.'*[103] Orissan life also has revived and grown in the period under review very largely under the influence of the Bengal renaissance. The new Oriya literature began with the writings of there notable authors,—Radhanath Ray, Madhusudhan Rao, and Fakir Mohan Senapati,[104] and gradually this literature has asserted its own position.

Thus there has been an almost general awakening of the Indian mind leading in most cases to a revival and adaptation of the past literary traditions of India, which have been and are being harmonised with all that the West and the wide world has brought and is still bringing to the doors of India. As Mr R. W. Frazer has remarked: "Men such as Ram Mohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Michael Madhusudhan Datta, Bankimchandra Chatterji, Kashinath Trimbak Telang, are no bastard bantlings of a Western civilisation; they were creative geniuses worthy to be reckoned in the history of India with such men of old as Kalidasa, Chaitanya, Jayadeva, Tulsidas, and Sankar-acharya, and destined in the future to shine clear as the first glowing sparks sent out in the fiery furnace where new and old were fusing."[105]

This cultural renaissance has also necessarily created in Modern India a sprit of enquiry into the past history and anti-

[102] Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 434.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 439.

[104] B. C. Mazumdar, *Typical Selections from Oriya Literature*, Vol. III, Introduction, p. xxi.

[105] *Op. cit.*, pp. 446-47.

quities of the country. The foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784 was a landmark in the history of India from this standpoint (marking as it does the beginning of the cultural fusion of East and West in world history as well), and since then the researches of a number of prominent European scholars (like Sir Charles Wilkins, Sir William Jones. Henry Thomas Colebrooke, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich Schlegel, Franz Bopp, F. Rosen, Rudolf Roth, F. MaxMuller, Theodor Aufrecht, Burnouf, Lassen, T. W. Rhys Davids, George Buhler, A. A. MacDonell, Keith, Jolly, M. Winternitz, and Tucci) have unfolded India's intellectual past in its manifold aspects.[100] No less important work in this field has been done by a galaxy of prominent Indian scholars—Raja Rammohan Roy, Dr. K. M. Banerjea, Rajendra Lal Mitra, Bhagvan Lal Indraji, R. G. Bhandarkar, Mr. R. C. Dutta, M. G. Ranade, Mahamahopadhyaya Harprasad Shastri, U. C. Batavyal, Rakhaldas Banerjee, and many others down to our own day. The University of Calcutta, the Visvabharati of Rabindranath Tagore, the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute at Poona and the Asiatic Society of Bengal are giving considerable impetus towards the study of Indian antiquities. The Government of India Archaeological Department has also been rendering highly useful services in this matter by exploration and preservation, as is clear from the valuable annual "Reports" and specially from the recent excavations at Mahenjodaro, Harappa, Taxila, Kausambi, Kumrahar (Patna), Nalanda, Paharpur and Mahsthan (in Bengal), and Nagarjunikonda (in the Madras Presidency), which have disclosed immensely important facts about the past history of India and have revolutionised current notions about things Indian. The Ancient Monuments Preservation Act passed

[100] A. MacDonell, *India's Past*, pp. 236—45; M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 8—25.

during the administration of Lord Curzon has safeguarded and preserved many of the past relics of India's history and culture, and most of the States are now enthusiastically preserving and studying antiquities within their limits, through their own archaeological departments.

In the study of philosophy and science also Indian intellect has made considerable progress in modern times. Eminent philosophers like Sir Brajendra Nath Seal, Dr. Rabindranath Tagore, Dvijendranath Tagore, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S. N. Das Gupta and others have produced works of everlasting value, re-interpreting and re-creating Indian philosophy; while in scientific studies and discoveries scholars like Sir J. C. Bose, Sir P. C. Ray, Sir C. V. Raman, and Dr. Meghnad Saha have gained international fame; even in the domain of the younger sciences, the patient researches of Rai Bahadur Saratchandra Ray among Chota Nagpur tribes have immensely added to the knowledge of anthropology in India. The various scientific surveys, like the Geological Survey, the Zoological Survey, the Botanical Survey, etc., conducted under Government guidance, have trained up a fair number of Indian practical scientists and brought out valuable materials for study and economic utilization. The scientists of India have for many years been meeting annually in a Science Congress.

Indian art has also revived in comparatively recent times from the decadence which had overtaken it during the period of political disorders following the gradual dismemberment of the Mughal Empire from the latter half of the seventeenth century. Real art must be nourished by high inspirations and sentiments under conditions of peace and order, cultural progress and national regeneration; but the eighteenth century in India being a period of transition, saw a regrettable deterioration of creative genius and artistic standards, and a decline in the capacity of producing and appreciating true art. Artists

in the real sense of the term ceased to appear and the old styles remained for sometime in enfeebled condition in the old cities like Delhi, Jaipur, Lucknow, Hyderabad and Mysore. The descendants of the old architects, craftsmen and painters displayed a vitiated taste during the first half of the nineteenth century and became bad imitators of Western styles. The Qaisar Bag of Wajid Ali Shah at Lucknow and the Chattar Manzil of Nasiruddin Haidar, constructed of brick and plaster, and the huge styleless buildings set up by the rich men of our country and also the Public Works Department of the British Indian Government are examples of this meaningless imitation. Gradually, however, there has been a desire to give up this imitation and jumble of things foreign, and to introduce a new style, which though not exactly a revival of the traditional Rajput and Mughal styles, is however marked by a mingling of Western and Eastern ideas and models of buildings, and based upon the adaptation of modern science and examples to the Indian conditions and needs. In this new architecture a clear lead has been given by the New Delhi and the London India House workers including Rajput and Moghul, Bombay and Bengali talent, and by Calcutta civil engineers, who in the course of the last few years have turned out building plans and architectural motifs of a distinctly Indian type while they are not slavish revivals.

Painting has been rescued from the same deplorable condition, and has manifested a return to Indian inspiration and ideals, through the genius and efforts of a group of Bengali artists, chiefly the Tagores and the Gangulis and their disciples. "The revival of Persian, Mogul and Hindu art, though in inferior hands it is copying, in others, like the Tagores and Gangulis, it is a spirt and a genius."[107] Dr. Abanindra Nath Tagore was the *guru* of this group of artists who have been

[107] MacDonald, *The Government of India*, p. 24.

working with vigour and faith; among the younger artists the names of Mr. Nandalal Bose of Bengal and of Abdur Rahman Chaghtai of the Punjab deserve special mention; and in Bombay the pupils of Dr. Solomon helped the evolution of a new school of painting seeking to apply Western methods to actual modern Indian conditions and to free artists from the leading strings of medieval and ancient tradition. Mr. E. B. Havell, who was for several years Principal of the Government School of Art in Calcutta, was a genuine worker of this art renaissance in Bengal, and Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy has done much to convince the outside world of the majesty and spiritual qualities of Indian art. Like painting, sculpture has also revived on similar lines, the centres of renaissance being the Calcutta and Bombay Art Schools. The growth of new art schools in the other provinces, as at Lahore, Jaipur, Lucknow, etc., has helped and been helped by the Bengal and Bombay Art Renaissances a good deal, and promises to produce an India-wide Art Movement in the near future.

Indian Music again has been similarly rescued from neglect and the mire of medieval social stigma by Bengal in the nineteenth century, and the study and cultivation of it grew rapidly with the rise of the modern Bengali drama and the stage,—in which connection the services of three Tagores, Raja Saurindra Mohan, Maharaja Jatindra Mohan and Jyotirindranath (a brother of the great poet), are to be noted. Music was given its proper place in even austere religious exercises by the Brahma Samaj under Rammohan Roy and Devendranath Tagore. In fact the Tagores have performed the 'Suddhi' of Indian Music, restored it to respectable men and women alike, and ushered it into the stage of the modern world of culture, for appreciation in India as well as abroad. Subsequently, in Calcutta, Bombay, Poona, Baroda, Patna and some other places, schools and academies of music for scientific study and practice of Indian music and musical instruments

and its application in cultured society, have grown up. One of the latest and most important developments in Indian music is the application by Bengali artists of Western musical science and methods in a subtle way to the traditional Indian forms, so as to enrich its 'melody' with 'harmony' without departing from its essential characteristics. Another important allied development is the rapid growth of a revived school of Indian dancing based on classical and folk traditions and polished by Western technique, which is enthusiastically supported by the cultured sections of Indian Society following the lead of Calcutta, and which has already evoked critical appreciation even in foreign countries. Progress and new creations in these fine arts has enabled India to take cinema production with considerable success in the course of the last few years; and a number of educated men and women of the upper classes have begun to enter this new field of activity.

APPENDIX

DYNASTIC TABLES

(1)

THE NIZAM FAMILY



(2)

ARCOT NAWAB



(3)

FAMILY OF HYDER AND TIPU



(4)

PESHWA DYNASTY



(5)

INDEPENDENT NAWABS OF BENGAL



(6)

THE OUDH FAMILY



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THE HOLKAR FAMILY



(8)

THE SINDHIA FAMILY



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RANJIT'S FAMILY



(10)
DURRANI SHAH

AHMAD SHAH, DURRANI (1747—73)
|
Timur Shah (1773—93)
|
Zaman Shah (1793—1800)
|
Mahmud Shah (1800—1803)
|
Shah Shuja (1803—1809)
|
Mahmud Shah restored (1809)

(11)
BARAKZAI WAZIRS

JAMAL KHAN BARAKZAI (1747—73)
|
Payenda Khan (1773—1800)
|
Fateh Khan (1800—1803)
|
Dost Muhammad Khan (Amir of Kabul, 1826)

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10. Sayyid Ahmad Khan : The Causes of the Indian Revolt. Benares 1873.
11. Punjab Government Records : Mutiny correspondence. Two volumes. Lahore, 1911 : The Mutiny Reports, Two volumes. Lahore, 1911.
12. Forrest Selections from the Letters, Despatches, and Other State Papers in the Military Department of the Government of India, 1857-58. Four volumes. Calcutta, 1893—1912.
13. Sir William Muir Records of the Intelligence Department, North-Western Provinces. Two volumes, 1902.
14. Hall : Two Months at Arrah.
15. William Tayler : Thirty Eight Years in India.
16. Holmes : Indian Mutiny :.
17. Buckland : Bengal Under the Lieutenant Governors.
18. K. K. Datta, (*a*) History of Freedom Movement in Bihar, Vol. I. (b) Kunwar Singh and Amar Singh.
19. R. C. Mazumdar, Sepoy Mutiny and Revolt of 1857.
20. S. N. Sen, Eighteen—Fiftyseven.

CHAPTER VI

All works as noted for general study in connection with Chapter V.

A. General :—

1. Dodwell: Sketch of the History of India, 1858—1918.
2. Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
3. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vols. I and II.
4. India from Year to Year (1918—1930).

B. Advanced :—

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2. Sir Lepel Griffin: Ranjit Singh.
3. Latiff: History of the Punjab, 1891.
4. Narang: Transformation of Sikkism.
5. Bengal: Past and Present, 1926.
6. Journal of Indian History, 1921-22.
7. Journal of the Department of Letters, Vol. X (Calcutta University).
8. Lee-Warner: The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie (1904). Two volumes.
9. Macfarlane: History of British India (1862).
10. The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, by Sir Charles Gough and A. D. Innes. 1897.
11. N. K. Sinha: Ranjit Singh.
12. N. K. Sinha: Rise of the Sikh Power.

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1. Colonel Keith Young: Sinde in the Forties, edited by Arthur Scott.
2. Thornton: Op. cit., Vol. VI.
3. Macfarlane: Op. cit.

4. Murray: History of British India (1857).
5. The Conquest of Sindh, by Sir William Napier, 1845.
6. History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde, by Sir William Napier. 1851.
7. The History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, by Lord Colchester, London, 1874.

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2. Frazer: India Under Curzon and After.
3. Lord Curzon in India, Ed. Sir T. Raleigh, 1906.
4. J. M. Adye: Indian Frontier Policy. 1897.
5. R. Bosworth Smith: Life of Lord Lawrence. Two volumes. 1885.
6. Aitchison: Lord Lawrence. 1916.
7. W. P. Andrew: Our Scientific Frontier. 1880.
8. B. Balfour: Lord Lytton's Indian Administration.
9. H. W. Bellow: North-West Frontier and Afghanisthan. 1899.
10. R. I. Bruge: The Forward Policy and Its Results. 1900.
11. J. Buchan: Lord Minto. 1925.
12. E. Collen: The Defence of India. 1906.
13. Col. G. M. Maggregor: The Defence of India. 1884.
14. H. L. Nevill: Campaigns on North-West Frontier, 1849—1908. 1912.
15. W. R. Robertson: Official Account of the Chitral Expedition, 1895. 1898.
16. P. Sykes: Sir Mortimer Durand. 1926.
17. Thorburn: Banu on Our Afghan Frontier. 1876.
18. H. D. Watson: Hazara Gazetteer. 1907.
19. Davies: The Problem of the North-West Frontier. Cambridge, 1932.
20. R. H. Davies: Report Showing the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes on the North-West Frontier of the Punjab. 1864.

21. R. G. Temple: Report Showing the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes on the North-West Frontier. 1856.
22. Report of the North-West Frontier Committee (Bray Committee). 1921.
23. R. Warburton: Report on Certain Frontier Tribes. 1877.

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1. J. P. Ferrier: History of the Afghans. 1858.
2. Owen: Wellesley Despatches.
3 Owen: Wellington Despatches.
4. Kaye: History of the War in Afghanisthan. Three volumes. Fourth Edition. 1878.
5. Sir Henry Marion Durand: The First Afghan War and Its Causes. 1879.
6. H. Havelock: Narrative of the War in Afghanisthan. Two volumes. 1840.
7. L. J. Trotter: The Earl of Auckland. (R. J. 1905.)
8. Sir A. Colvin: John Russel Colvin. (R. J. 1911.)
9. W. P. Andrew: India and Her Neighbours. 1878.
10. Major Evans Bell: The Oxus and The Inn.
11. Percival Landon: Lhasa. Two volumes. 1905.
12. Indian Historical Quarterly, June 1933.

For Section V.

1. Sykes: History of Persia, Vol. II.
2. Kaye: Op. cit., Vol.
3. Thornton: Op. cit., Vol. VI.
4. Lovat Frazer: Op. cit.
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6. Sir Arnold Wilson: The Persian Gulf. 1928.
7. M. S. Bell: Account of the British Wars with Persia from the occupation of Kharak in 1838, 1889.
8. E. Candler: The Unveiling of Lhasa. 1905.

9. Sarat Chandra Das : Narrative of a Journey to Lhasa. 1902 Edition.
10. Sir Thomas Holdich, Tibet the Mysterious.
11. Lord Curzon : Russian in Central Asia in 1899, 1899.
12. Howard Hensman : The Afghan War. 1881.
13. J. Long : Russia, Central Asia and British India. 1865.
14. S. Wheeler : The Ameer Abdur Rahman. 1895.
15. G. E. Yate : Northern Afghanistan, 1888.
16. Dr. Abd-ul-Ghani : Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia. 1922.
17. Amir Abdur Rahman : Autobiography. Two volumes. 1900.
18. J. W. S. Wyllie : Essays on the External Policy of India. 1875.

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2. Thornton : Op. cit., Vol. V.
3. Calcutta Review, 1852.
4. Sir Arthur Phayre : History of Burma. 1883.
5. Gleig : Life of Munro, Vol. II.
6. Lee-Warner : Op. cit., Vol. I.
7. Sir Alfred Lyall : Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava.
8. Major Snodgrass : Narrative of the Burmese Wars. London, 1827.
9. Colonel W. F. B. Laurie : Our Burmese Wars and Relations with Burma. 1880.
10. G. E. Harvey : History of Burma. London, 1925.
11. J. Nisbet : Burma Under British Rule and Before. Two volumes. London, 1901.
12. A. Fytche : Burma, Past and Present. Two volumes. London, 1878.
13. British Burma Gazetteer. Two volumes. Rangoon, 1880.

14. Gazetteer of the Upper Burma and the Shan States, by J. G. Scott and J. P. Hardiman. Five volumes. Rangoon, 1900.
15. Sir Ed. Gait: History of Assam.
16. Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1927.
17. Modern Review, 1925.

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A. General :—

1. Roberts: Op. cit.
2. V. A. Smith: Op. cit.
3. Innes: Op. cit.
4. Cambridge History of India, Vols. V and VI.
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6. K. M. Pannikar: Introduction to the Study of the Relations of Indian States with the Government of India. 1927.
7. K. M. Pannikar: The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States, 1774—1858. (The Calcutta University Readership Lectures, 1929.)
8. Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
9. Indian Statutory Commission's Report, Vols. I, II, III.
10. Proceedings of the Round Table Conferences.
11. Mehta: Lord Hastings and the Indian States.
12. A. B. Keith: A Constitutional History of India.
13. K. K. Datta, India's March to Freedom.

B. Advanced :—

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2. Prinsep: Political and Military Transactions of the British in India. Two volumes.
3. Todd: Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan. Three volumes. (Crooke's Edition.)
4. Grant Duff: History of the Marathas. Three volumes.
5. Lee-Warner: Life of Dalhousie, Vol. II.

6. Lord Ronaldshay: Life of Lord Curzon, Vol. II. 1928.
7. Louis Rousselet: Indian and Its Native Princes. Revised by Lt-Col. Buckle. 1878.
8. Mirza Mehdy Khan: Hyderabad State. 1910.
9. Sir Richard Temple: Journals in Hydrabad and Kashmir. Two volumes. 1887.
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11. British Crown and the Indian States .....drawn up on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes, 1929.
12. P. Mukherjee: Indian Constitutional Documents. 1909.
13. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads. Nine volumes.
14. Butler Committee's Report.
15. India From Year to Year (1918—1934).
16. Papers relating to the Cabinet Mission, 1946.
17. White Paper on the Indian States issued by the Government of India.
18. K. K. Datta, India's March to Freedom.
19. Menon, Integration of States.

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2. Palande: Indian Administration.
3. Spare: Indian Administration.
4. Ilbert: Historical Introduction.
5. Thakore: Indian Administration.
6. J. Ramsay MacDonald: The Government of India.
7. D. N. Banerjee: The Indian Constitution and Its Actual Working.
8. Cambridge History of India, Vols. V and VI.
9. Kerala Putra: The Working of Dyarchy in India.
10. B. P. Singh Roy, Democratic Government in India.

Advanced:

1. Montagu-Chelmsford Report.
2. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vols. I and II.
3. Report of the Reforms Enquiry Committee.
4. The Indian Year Book, from Year to Year (till 1933).
5. Report of the Indian Central Committee.
6. India in 1917-18 to 1931—34.
7. Reports of the Round Table Conferences.
8. Moral and Material Progress Reports from Year to Year.
9. The White Paper.
10. The Government of India Act, 1935.
11. The New Constitution of India.

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2. Aspinall: Cornwallis in Bengal.
3. 'Fifth Report,' edited by Firminger.
4. R. C. Dutt: India Under Early British Rule.
5. Forrest: Selections from State Papers, etc., relating to Cornwallis, Vols. I and II.
6. J. C. Sinha: Economic Annals of Bengal.
7. Baden-Powell: Land Systems of British India, Vols. I and II.
8. R. C. Dutt: India in the Victorian Age.
9. S. C. Ray: Land Revenue Administration.
10. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter VII.
11. Flould Commission's Report.

For Section II.

1. 'Fifth Report,' edited by Firminger.
2. Forrest: Op. cit.
3. Aspinall: Op. cit.

4. Sir John Strachy: India: Its Administration and Progress (1903), Chapter VII.
5. P. Mukherjee: Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol. I.
6. Trevelyan: Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay, Chapter II.
7. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter V.

For Section III.

1. Aspinall: Op. cit.
2. Fifth Report.
3. J. C. Sinha: Op. cit.
4. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter XII.
5. D. J. McNeile: Report on the Village Watch in the Lower Provinces of Bengal.

For Section IV.

1. Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16.
2. Sir W. Hunter: The Indian Empire.
3. Kaye: Indian Administration, Chapter XI.
4. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter II.
5. Montgomery Martin: Eastern India, Vols. I—III. 1838.
6. Buckland: Bengal Under the Lieutenant Governors, Vols. I and II. 1901.
7. Sir John Kaye: The Administration of the East India Company. 1853.
8. L. S. S. O' Malley: History of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa Under British Rule. 1925.
9. District Gazetteers.
10. District Records (Midnapur, Chittagong, Rungpur).
11. J. Matthai: Village Government in British India.

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1. Sir S. N. Banerjea: A Nation in the Making.
2. Strachey: Op. cit., Chapter VI.

3. George Chesney: Indian Polity, Chapter IX. 1868.
4. Sir Valentine Chirol: Indian Unrest. 1910.
5. T. Raleigh: Lord Curzon in India. 1906.
6. Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After. 1911.
7. L. S. S. O'Malley: The Indian Civil Service, 1601—1930-31.

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1. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter XI.
2. T. Raleigh: Op. cit., Introduction.
3. Captain Arthur Broome: History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army, 1850.
4. Sir P. C. Sivaswami Aiyer: Indian Constitutional Problems, Chapter II.
5. Sir George Chesney: Indian Polity, Chapter XII—XVI.

For Section VII.

1. V. G. Kale: Indian Administration, Chapter XXI.
2. Hunter: The Indian Empire, pp. 628—643.
3. Sir George Chesney: Indian Polity, Chapter XVII.
4. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter X.
5. Sir John and Sir Richard Strachey: Finances and Public Works of India.
6. G. W. MacGeorge: Ways and Works in India.
7. N. B. Mehta: Indian Railways.
8. Rai Saheb Chandra Prasad Tewari: The Indian Railway.

CHAPTER IX

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(For portion marked 'A')

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1. R. Coupland: Britain and India, 1600—1941.
2. R. Coupland: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India. Part I, The Indian Problem, 1833—1935.

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3. R. Coupland: India: A Restatement.
4. Government of India Act, 1939.
5. Papers Relating to the Cabinet Mission to India, 1946
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2. Sir John Strachey: Op. cit., Chapter V.
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5. L. J. Trotter: History of India under Queen Victoria Two volumes. 1866.
6. Sir William Lee-Warner: Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie. Two volumes. 1904.
7. Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon.
8. Lord Morley: Recollections. Two volumes. 1917.
9. Sir A. Lyall: Life of Lord Dufferin. Two volumes. 1895.
10. Lord Curzon: A Selection from his Speeches as Viceroy. 1906.
11. A. C. Banerjee: Indian Constitutional Documents, vols. I—III.
12. A. C. Banerjee: The Making of the Indian constitution.

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For Section III.

1. Sir John Strachey: Op. cit., Chapter IV.
2. Sir George Chesney: Op. cit., Chapters II—IV.
3. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapters II and IX.

4. Sir Valentine Chirol: India, Chapters XIII, XVIII, XIX.
5. P. Mukherjee: Indian Constitutional Documents.

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2. Mahatma Gandhi: My Experiments with Truth.
3. Jawaharlal Nehru: Autobiography.
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2. Sir Valentine Chirol: India. 1925.
3. Sir Valentine Chirol: Indian Unrest, 1910.
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5. G. M. Chesney: India under Experiment, 1918.
6. J. Chailley: Administrative Problems of British India. Tr. Meyer. 1910.
7. Sir Surendranath Banerjee: A Nation in Making. 1925.
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9. Sayyid Ahmad Khan: The Present State of Indian Politics, Allahabad, 1888.
10. The Aga Khan: India in Transition. 1918.
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12. B. G. Tilak: Writings and Speeches, Madras, 1922.
13. A. C. Mazumdar: Indian National Evolution.
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18. W. S. Blunt: Ideas About India. 1885.
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20. Morley: Speeches on Indian Affairs. 1909.
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25. Sir Michael O'Dwyer: India As I knew It. 1925.
26. Lord Ronaldshay: Life of Lord Curzon. 1928.
27. E. S. Montagu: An Indian Diary. 1930.
28. H. C. Zacharias: Renascent India. 1933.
29. Political India edited by Sir John Cumming. 1932.
30. Graham Pole: India in Transiation.
31. Horace Alexander: India since Cripps.
32. K. K. Datta, India's March to Freedom.

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2. Ramsay MacDonald: The Government of India, 1—27 and 234—263.
3. R. W. Frazer: Literary History of India, Chapter XV.
4. J. N. Farquhar: Modern Religious Movements in India, Pp. 387—430.
5. Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, Chapters VI, VII and XIX.
6. Sir Valentine Chirol: India.
7. Macnicol: The Making of Modern India.
8. Dodwell: A Sketch of the History of India, Book III.
9. Imperial Gazetteer, Vol. IV, Chapter XIII.
10. Syed Mahmood: A History of English Education in India. 1895.

11. Sir Philip Hartog: Indian Educations. Past and Present.
12. K. K. Datta, Dawn of Renascent India.

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2. J. Chailley: Administrative Problems of British India. Translated by Sir William Meyer. 1910.
3. Sir Raleigh: Lord Curzon in India. 1906.
4. Lovat Fraser: India Under Curzon and After.
5. Sir John Strachey: India: Its Administration and Progress.
6. Sir John Kaye: Administration of the East India Company. 1853.
7. Sir John Kaye: Memorials of Indian Government 1853.
8. Monier-Williams: Modern India and the Indians.
9. Sir John Kaye: Christianity in India. 1859.
10. A. Mayhew: Christianity and the Government of India. 1929.
11. J. C. Marshman: Carey, Marshman and Ward. 1864.
12. Martin: Eastern India.
13. Martin: The Indian Empire.
14. Ward: History of the Hindoos. 1818.
15. Alexander Duff: India and Indian Missions.
16. M. A. Sherring: History of Protestant Missions in India. 1875.
17. Hebber: Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India. Three volumes.
18. G. R. Gleig: Life of Sir Thomas Munro.
19. Sir T. E. Colebrooke: Life of Henry Thomas Colebrooke. 1873.
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21. Mary Carpenter: The Last Days in England of Rammohan Ray. London. 1866 (reprinted by the Rammohan Library, Calcutta, 1915).

22 English Works of Raja Rammohan Ray, edited by J C. Ghose. Two volumes Calcutta, 1887

23 A Lecture on the Life and Labours of Raja Rammohan Ray (delivered in Boston, U S A , 1845), by William Adam; edited by Rakhaldas Haldar, Calcutta, 1879.

24 Rev. K S. MacDonald : Rammohan Ray, the Bengali Religious Reformer, Calcutta, 1879.

25 Nagendranath Chatterjee · Life of Rammohan Ray (in Bengali). Calcutta, 1881

26 Sophia Dobson Collect Life and Letters of Raja Rammohan Ray London. 1900. Edited by Hemchandra Sarkar with an Introduction, Calcutta, 1913

27. Titus · Indian Islam. 1930.

28. H. A. Watter : The Ahmadiya Movement 1918

29 Ramananda Chatterjee : Rammohan Ray and Modern India. Calcutta, 1918.

30. Samvad Patre Sekaler Katha (A History of Old Days from Bengali Newspapers). Compiled and edited in Bengali by Brajendra Nath Banerji, published by the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad. 1933.

31 Sitanath Tattvabhusan · Social Reform in Bengal

32 B. M. Malabari : Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood in India, Bombay, 1877.

33 M G. Ranade : Religious and Social Reform Bombay, 1902.

34 The Speeches and Writings of Sri N. G Chandavarkar Bombay, 1911.

35 R P. Karkaria : India—Forty Years of Progress and Reform 1896.

36 Chandicharan Bandopadhyaya : Life of Vidyasagar (in Bengali). 1909.

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41. Meadows Taylor: Confessions of a Thug.
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43. C. F. Andrews: Indian Renaissance.
44. Manilal C. Parekh: The Bramho Samaj. 1929.
45. Bipin Chandra Pal: Mrs. Besant—A Psychological Study, Madras, 1913.
46. Dhondo Keshav Karve: My Twenty Years in the Cause of Indian Women. Poona, second edition. 1915.
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48. Alexander Duff: State of Indigenous Education in Bengal and Bihar,—published in Calcutta Review, 1844.
49. F. W. Thomas: The History and Prospects of British Education in India. 1891.
50. C. F. Trevelyan: On the Education of the People of India. 1838.
51. Arthur Mayhew: The Education of India. 1926.
52. Post-War Educational Development in India (Bureau of Education, Government of India).
53. R. C. Dutt: The Literature of Bengal, 1895.
54. D. C. Sen: History of Bengali Language and Literature.
55. S. K. De: History of Bengali Literature in the Nineteenth Century. 1919.
56. Haranchandra Rakshit: Victoria Yuge Bangala Sahitya.
57. A. A. MacDonell: India's Past. 1927.
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60. F. E. Keay: A History of Hindi Literature. 1920.
61. Babu Ram Saksena: A History of Urdu Literature. Allahabad, 1927.
62. Grierson: Modern Vernacular Literature of Hindusthan.

*63. E. B. Havell : Indian Sculpture and Painting.
64. E. B. Havell : Essays on Indian Art, Industry and Education.
65. A. K. Coomaraswamy : Essays on Indian Idealism.
66. Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art.
67. Moral and Material Progress Reports.
68. India Year by Year, from 1917—34.
69. Indian Social Reformer, containing Proceedings of the National Social Conferences.
70. K. M. Munshi : The Theory and Practice of Social Service in India.
71. Speeches of Swami Vivekananda.
72. Works of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee.
73. Works of Dr. Rabindranath Tagore.
74. Report of the Hartog Committee on Education in India.
75. Report of the Radhakrishnan Commission of Education in India.
76. Report of the Secondary Education Commission.