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DISORGANIZATION

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL

By

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LIPPINCOTT SOCIOLOGY TEXTS—Floyd N. House, *Editor*

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To

H. R. M.

Preface

THE PURPOSE of this book is to present a systematic analysis of some of the major problems of personal and social disorganization. The point of view is that of social psychology, which the author believes holds more promise for an understanding of the genesis of social disorganization than any alternative approach.

In the presentation of the statistical findings which have provided a basis for much of the analysis, graphic methods have been utilized in the belief that this procedure facilitates an understanding of the data. For those who wish the data from which the charts have been made, corresponding tables bearing the same numbers have been included in an appendix.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the many persons who have at one time or another assisted him in the prosecution of the research project out of which the original statistical materials have come.

The Work Projects Administration of Illinois provided the personnel for the collection of statistical data upon social disorganization in Chicago. Grants-in-aid of research from the Social Science Research Council of Northwestern University have provided the assistance for the preparation of the statistical materials for interpretation and publication.

The author is indebted to Professor Floyd N. House for reading the manuscript and offering valuable suggestions. Particularly is he indebted to Harriet R. Mowrer who has given un-

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ERNEST R. MOWRER

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Disorganization

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL

I

Social Organization and Social Change

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION implies some breakdown in the organization of society, the nature of which can be understood only upon the basis of an analysis of what social *organization* consists. But social organization itself is not something static, which, once established, will forever remain without change. In one sense, social organization is a hypothesis, an ideal-construct, emphasizing the relatively unchanging patterns of culture as over against the changing aspects which are always present in every society.

Because the rate of change is not constant in all societies, social organization is more stable in some than in others. This implies that the diversity and extent of social disorganization is inversely a function of the stability and permanence of social organization. Yet, one should not overlook the fundamentally dynamic character of every culture and its resulting social organization. Neither should one view with alarm the fact of social change, since to have a culture is to have social change.

Before discussing social change, we must examine the notion of culture itself. What is culture? What are its essential characteristics? Where is it? How can one recognize it when he sees it? Is it something which transcends individual behavior? How does culture operate in patterning social relations? All these and many more related questions need to be answered before one is

ready to discuss either social organization or social disorganization.

THE NATURE OF CULTURE[1]

Culture consists of those instrumentalities by which the direct influence of the natural environment is mediated. These instrumentalities can conveniently be classified into artifacts, techniques, and beliefs. The artifacts are the physical objects of everyday life which represent the molding of the materials of both inanimate and animate nature to the purposes of man. The tools which the workman uses, the automobiles in which one rides, and the dog upon which one depends to guard his possessions—these all belong to the realm of the artifact. On the other hand, the action patterns by which one gets things done, whether with or without the use of artifacts, constitute the techniques. Thus the processes by which an automobile is manufactured from the time the ore is mined and the plans conceived until completion represent techniques. But so also is there a technique of playing the piano, of painting a picture, or composing a poem. Beliefs in turn are quite as varied so far as their concrete manifestations are concerned, ranging all the way from a society's moral and ethical notions to the principles of science and the philosophies by which man attempts to understand his relationship to the multiverse in which he lives and to his fellows.

An important part of the instrumentalities which make up culture is the formalized patterns of co-operative activity organized about the performance of certain essential functions, which have often been called institutions. Thus the institutions of the church, the school, the family, the market place, and the government—to mention but a few of the many in modern society—represent the social patterning of human response along co-operative lines in the satisfaction of widespread and deep-seated, if not universal, wants of man. This is not to say that only through these instrumentalities, the institutions, can man's

[1] Cf. Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, pp. 73-108.

wants be satisfied, but that the institution facilitates such satisfaction at least for those who participate in it. Thus one may be religious without going to church or may obtain an education without going to school, but the great masses find it easier to satisfy their basic needs through these instrumentalities than through individualized activity.

The institutions also have their structural aspect, in that they represent patternings of cultural elements in the form of artifacts, techniques, and beliefs. Thus the school utilizes in its satisfaction of human needs through co-operative activity, certain specialized artifacts such as blackboards and desks; certain specialized techniques such as the grading system, lecturing and teaching practices; certain specialized beliefs such as belief in the rightness of the compulsory school-attendance law and faith in the educational process. There are, however, other cultural elements which are not so exclusively a part of the structure of a single institution. The automobile, for example, may be used as a recreational device, a vehicle in which to go about one's business, and as a means of transporting oneself to church. Thus the same artifact is related to a number of institutions and may become an essential part of each of the patterns. It may be objected that the automobile in this connection is only a means to an end and is not an essential part of the institutional pattern, since it is only one of the ways by which one may transport himself to the locale within which the institutional patterns operate. According to this argument, the automobile is a part of a larger complex or institution of transportation. In part this is true, but not necessarily, since so far at least as recreation is concerned, riding in an automobile may become a recreational end in itself.

Some culture traits are thus more intimately related to the institutions than others because of their specialized character. Some culture traits, whether in the form of artifacts, techniques, or beliefs, are so highly specialized in character that they have no meaning outside the institution in which they have developed. Others are more general in character, and not only may they find

their places in relationship to several institutions at the same time, but these connections may change from time to time. For example, the organ was found at one time in the home and the church and a little later in the motion-picture theater and the church; now it is found almost exclusively in church.

The culture traits which are outside the institutional pattern, then, are not a part of social organization, since this term refers to the patterning of social institutions. Thus the various social institutions in their inter-relatedness constitute the pattern of social organization. Accordingly, anything which changes the character of the institutions disturbs this equilibrium and leads to social disorganization. But since the processes which bring about transformations in the institutions and, in turn, in the pattern of relationship between them are essentially of the same basic character as those processes through which the noninstitutional culture traits are changed, it is necessary to examine this larger process of social change.

THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Prior to the discussion of the processes of social change, it is necessary to come to some understanding about the objective character of culture itself. Many writers talk about culture as if it were something which exists "out there." And while these writers may not mean to imply some objective existence of culture apart from the responses of human beings, they adopt such terminology as to suggest such an implication. In fact, it is typical of the cultural school of sociology to reify the conventional practices of mankind until they become veritable entities in and of themselves.

Now, it is of course true that one cannot overlook the common elements in the responses of human beings. Human beings may respond in like manner because of instincts or inborn patterns or because of common attributes in the natural environment. But while these two explanations would take care of the commonness of response between individuals living in isolation, for men living

in society such explanations are of little value, owing to the tendency of man to reproduce in his own behavior the responses of those around him. The consequence is that the learning process becomes socialized; trial-and-error learning becomes directed toward socially approved, rather than biologically defined, goals; imitation shortens the trial-and-error process by presenting the solution of the problem, leaving only the incorporation of the response into the muscular functioning of the organism.

In the process of learning the responses of others, there is always the introduction of variation into the responses of men. Though the pattern may be common, the reproduction is always varied, even though by minute degrees. Take for example the stereotyped practice of a man's tipping his hat to a woman of his acquaintance. While no two men tip their hats exactly alike, no woman would make the mistake of recognizing the behavior for what it is in one case and not recognizing it in the other. Each person is conforming to the conventional code which requires the tipping of the hat. Yet tipping the hat does not exist except in the tipping of the hat in each of the concrete instances, each of which is different from every other, and still the cultural sociologist speaks of tipping the hat as a folkway rather than an "individual-way." However, all that is implied in this statement is that the behavior pattern is not individual in origin even though individual in expression.

One of the sources of social change, accordingly, lies in the spontaneous and unconscious introduction of variations in human behavior in the imitative process. Because his social status is in part determined by conformity, the individual does not want to behave differently from those around him, but he nevertheless does frequently introduce minute variations, which in time may lead to radical modification in the folkway. Some of these variations find acceptance because of their novelty, if they do not conflict with the mores of the group. Thus in telling the folktale, the individual often introduces variations in the form of spontaneous embellishments or because of lapse of memory,

which eventually may completely transform the pattern of the folktale. All elements of culture are subject to such change from time to time.

However, social change growing out of spontaneous and unconscious variations arising in the imitative process is very slow indeed. But this is never the only source of variation and, in modern societies, is perhaps of minor importance. Much more important are the variations introduced through invention and borrowing.

It is not necessary to enter here into the classic controversy among anthropologists as to whether identical or similar traits can originate in different places at different times, or whether such identity or similarity of itself indicates common origin, since it has been amply demonstrated that in some instances the same trait has originated in two or more places, and the influence of borrowing is apparent to everyone. Accordingly, invention, no less than borrowing, constitutes a very potent source of change in any culture.

Inventions represent both the introduction of new culture traits and the modification of old. The essential character of the inventive process is that someone sets about consciously to introduce changes into the cultural medium. And though the particular attributes of the new trait or the modifications made in the old may be discovered by accident as a phase of the trial-and-error process, its presentation to the group is always a conscious attempt to change the contemporary culture in some way, however minutely. When the innovator acts simply as a carrier, bringing the variations from another culture, the process is conveniently called borrowing.

But whether the source of change is invention or borrowing, not all invented or borrowed traits become a part of the culture of a particular group. What determines the acceptance or rejection of a new culture trait or a modification in an old one? History is replete with selection of some innovations, whether invented or borrowed, and the refusal to have anything to do with

others. And while the complete explanation is not always available, a number of answers to the problem are reasonably clear. In the first place it is quite clear that innovations which have to do with the artifacts are readily accepted if they promise greater utility and do not disturb the larger social complex of which the trait would have to become a part. If, on the other hand, the acceptance of the new trait would necessitate a radical reorganization of the culture complex into which it must fit in order to be of use, the trait tends to be rejected. The classic illustration of borrowing is to be found in the contacts between the early Spaniard and the plains Indian of North America. The Spaniard brought to the new continent two closely related traits, the horse and the wheel. The plains Indian readily took over the horse but rejected the Spaniard's cart. The customary explanation is that being accustomed to transporting his belongings by the use of the *travois* pulled by a dog, it was a simple matter to substitute the horse for the dog, this necessitating no further adjustment than lengthening the poles of the *travois*. The acceptance of the cart, however, in the place of the *travois* would have completely revolutionized the whole transportation complex.[2]

In addition it is often argued that the usefulness of one artifact as over against another is readily tested and demonstrated. No one, for example, would question the superior utility of an automobile as compared to a horse and buggy. In the same way the superiority of electric lights over gas lights can be easily demonstrated to the satisfaction of everyone. Furthermore, anyone can use either the automobile or the electric light without understanding how it operates. In fact there is no necessary relationship between the understanding of the mechanism of many of the most widely used artifacts and their use by the great masses. In contrast with the artifacts, determining the utility of one belief as compared with another is a difficult task indeed. To utilize a belief means to understand it. It is only natural, therefore, that there would be much more resistance to innovations in beliefs

[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-121.

than in artifacts. Part of the resistance is caused by the difficulty of setting up any objective criteria in terms of which to test the utility of one belief as opposed to another. Which, for example, leads to the greater happiness, the belief in evolution or in divine creation? But how can we know until we know what happiness consists of? Happiness is a matter of belief also, and one belief is inextricably tied up with other beliefs so that, even though there were any hope of arriving at objective criteria, it would be difficult to know where to begin. And so it turns out that whether or not one belief is accepted as opposed to another is largely a matter of faith, but why some persons have faith and others do not is still an unsolved problem.

Closely related to the fact that beliefs cannot be tested for their usefulness so readily as artifacts, is the fact that there is a marked difference in society's conception of the world of artifacts and that of beliefs. This goes back to a differentiation between the sacred and the secular. Some aspects of culture belong to the secular realm and are therefore to be treated as means, tools, and devices for the satisfaction of human desires. Other aspects belong to the sacred, to be zealously guarded because, if not the ends of human endeavor itself, they are intimately essential to these ends. From this standpoint the whole panorama of cultural development from the beginning to the present represents a continual expansion of the secular and a corresponding contraction of the sacred. In this process the artifacts have not always been outside the sacred realm, though they have become so in contemporary Western civilization.

Resistance to innovations in the sacred realm goes back to the emotional attitudes generated in the primary group, particularly in the family. The beliefs acquired in the family become enmeshed in the core of the personality, so that to question them seems to threaten the integrity of the personality itself. Any suggestion of replacing the old beliefs with new ones is looked upon with misgiving or with outright hostility. To question a

man's beliefs is equivalent to questioning his intelligence, his reason, his virtues.

Innovations in the techniques of culture are accepted more readily, on the whole, than those in the realm of beliefs, and less readily than those in the realm of artifacts. Techniques in the form of manufacturing processes change readily as they seem to promise greater profits to the manufacturer. Radically new techniques in painting pictures, however, are resisted by the well-established artists. The techniques of contraception are held by many individuals to be in contravention to their basic beliefs. The amount of resistance to the techniques depends upon how closely these are allied to either the realm of the artifacts or that of the beliefs, except that much of natural science has been able to escape the sacred. In fact it is just this secularization of belief which characterizes science and demonstrates the utility of the secular approach to the realm of belief.

Another factor which has to be taken into account in explaining the selection of cultural innovations is that of prestige. Traits are more readily borrowed from peoples who are looked upon as superior, although there are exceptions. American whites borrowed the spiritual from the Negro, whom they consider inferior; and the Japanese have borrowed heavily from Western civilization without in any sense lowering their conception of themselves as a superior people. When it comes to inventions, the operation of prestige seems a little more uniform. Innovations in the business world are more readily accepted when made by business men; innovations in teaching technique move from the college classroom to the high school, but not the other way about.

Explanation of the process of cultural selection does not complete the understanding of social change. It is necessary also to look into the sources out of which innovations develop. What are the forces which cause some individuals and not others to work out new cultural traits or modifications of old ones or to

identify themselves with certain cultural traits of other societies and to introduce them into their own culture?

THE SOURCE OF SOCIAL VARIANTS

Heredity is one of the sources of variants in behavior which may result in a change in culture. While this factor has often been overemphasized, there can be but little doubt that it plays a role in the development of innovations. The constant shifting of genes into an infinite variety of patterns leads inevitably to the appearance of variants of behavior from the established pattern. Such variations are likely to find expression most commonly in the spontaneous, unconscious changes which are introduced in the learning process. It is doubtful if heredity is particularly important in the more conscious process of introducing variations in culture.

Of prime importance in the creation of conscious innovations are the influences of family life which determine the personality pattern of the individual. Important here are the relations between siblings, the relationship between the father and mother, and the relations between the child and his parents. Here the patterns of conformity and nonconformity and the traits of personality which will later act as selective factors in determining the individual's response to his social relationships are developed. The meaning of cultural forms, as translated to the individual through the mechanism of the family, is varied indeed when compared to the standardized interpretations encountered in the play group and the community. Nevertheless, the social groupings outside the family play an important part in the development of innovations.

Social relationships outside the family, particularly those which are educational in character, provide the basic materials out of which the social variants are constructed, though the impulse to make such reorganizations usually comes from the family relationship. There are, of course, the exceptional cases in which the role of the individual in nonfamily contacts is so different and

contradictory to that in the family that radical transformations take place in the personality pattern, which in turn becomes the source of innovations.

Social contacts provide the raw materials upon which the personality operates selectively. For this reason the cultural environment is never quite the same to two individuals. Innovations develop out of the process of combining the elements given in culture into new patterns, the guiding hand in this process being the personality make-up of the individual. Innovations are more numerous in complex cultures because of the wider variety of elements to select from, but they appear in every culture, however simple.

It is of course true that the social organization itself and the leisure which it provides have something to do with the appearance of innovations, particularly to the extent to which these are consciously developed. A society organized along military lines will produce more innovations in the military field than another not so organized. The development of modern industrialism has stimulated a greater number of innovations in trade and manufacturing than in philosophy and religion. Likewise, a society in which many individuals have opportunities to escape at times from the routine of highly mechanized behavior produces more innovations than does one in which there is little opportunity for such escape.

The role of the social order in the appearance of social variants should not, however, mislead one into placing too much importance upon this factor in the production of variant behavior, as has so commonly been done in the discussions of invention. Not infrequently variants appear, but society discourages their development. The social order operates as a selective or limiting, rather than a determining, factor. This is not to deny that the number of variants can be enlarged by offering rewards, either in the form of economic advantage or in prizes, honors, etc. Such encouragement, however, will have more to do with the stimulation of consistent and careful elaboration upon the initial

variant than upon the appearance of the variant behavior itself. This brings one to the question, then, of how these innovations out of which social change develops result in the disorganization of the social order. Are all innovations disorganizing, and if so in what way? What is the role of social disorganization itself in the production of social variants? What is the relationship between social disorganization and personal disorganization?

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III

Social Disorganization and Social Change

CHANGES in the cultural elements which make up the social institutions, as has already been pointed out, produce in obvious and dramatic form some disorganization in the institutional pattern, which in turn disturbs the relationship among institutions that constitute the social order. Nevertheless, it is also true that changes in the culture traits which do not belong essentially to any one institutional pattern operate indirectly to produce change in the social order. Social disorganization is therefore the normal consequence of social change as well as the natural condition to social change. This dual role of social disorganization in relation to social change becomes more clear with an understanding of the varied approaches which have been made to the study of social disorganization.

The earliest and least theoretical approach to the study of social disorganization is that of the social problems. Books written from this point of view might well have been entitled: "What Is Wrong with Society and How to Remedy It." The earliest treatises of this sort were hodgepodges of reformative notions and of problems from the various fields of economics, medicine, psychology, history, politics, and sociology. These problems were discussed without any particular sociological frame of reference, both the facts and the suggested reform programs being taken from the fields in which the problems were found.

The analysis of the various problems was, therefore, essentially commonsense, enmeshed in a plethora of concrete and technical details. Each problem was considered in complete isolation from every other, and if the reformative programs presented chanced to be contradictory to one another, that did not in any way disturb the writer.

Basic to the social-problems approach was the assumption that society could and should progress if it would but attack the maladjustments which were impeding or delaying human advancement. Thus the social problems were the diseases of society which threatened the welfare of the group. Social problems exist in those areas of human relationship in which there is an awareness that individual and collective behavior deviates from what is considered socially desirable and that treatment calls for some sort of collective action.

The care of the aged is, accordingly, a social problem if there are some who are in danger of dying from exposure and starvation in a society which looks upon death from these causes as undesirable. Divorce is a social problem in that society in which the ideal of marriage until terminated by death is considered basic to social welfare. Feeble-mindedness constitutes a social problem to that society which believes that interbreeding with the feeble-minded deteriorates the stock, physically, mentally, or morally, and that to permit them to die in consequence of an unmitigated struggle for existence is contrary to humanitarian ideals. Unemployment is a social problem because it threatens to make the unemployed depend upon others for support or die from starvation. Crime is a social problem because it threatens the collective security of a society from within. Modern recreation is a social problem because it has become so commercialized that the primary motive of satisfying the genuine needs of man is felt to be sacrificed in the interest of commercial gain and exploitation.

But why multiply illustrations further? It is quite clear that what are considered social problems in one period of history are

not so considered in another. Also, some of the so-called social problems are not generally accepted as such. Furthermore, the approach is largely an evangelistic one. The present is represented as a crisis in which something drastic must be done collectively, otherwise dire calamity is bound to befall the group which refuses to act upon the problem.

The social-problems approach is little concerned in the final analysis with an understanding of the problem, for it assumes that the nature of the problem is readily apparent and that what is needed is the mobilization of collective behavior in the direction of remedial activity. A great reliance is placed upon statistical findings in the form of enumerations which provide a measure of the magnitude of the condition and therefore signalize the imperativeness of doing something about it.

For all its fallacies and imperfections, the social-problems approach contributed to the understanding of social disorganization by paving the way for a more scientific analysis. As a part of the great humanitarian movement of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, it called attention to, and got acceptance for, the point of view that social maladjustments were not decreed by divine providence for the sins of mankind but had naturalistic origins.

The second approach to the study of social disorganization is the biopsychological. This approach is the direct outgrowth of the development of the sciences of biology and psychology which dominated the intellectual world for a period, beginning with Darwin's *The Origin of Species* to well into the twentieth century. The beginnings of this approach lie in the formulation of the racial theories of Gobineau and his followers, refined by the development of modern notions of eugenics, and buttressed by the doctrine of mental differences and its corollary, mental testing.

Gobineau and his followers promulgated the theory that the decay of all societies is the result of racial intermixture. This is due to the fact that the races are not equal in capability. From

the beginning of time, according to Gobineau, there have been three races: the white, the yellow, and the black. The white is superior in capability and has been responsible for the production of all the civilizations in the history of mankind. But as the white race has conquered the inferior races, it has interbred with them, bringing about a decadence in each civilization.

The eugenists carried the doctrine further by showing that there are biological differences not only between races but between individuals within the same race. Thus the mental capabilities of the members of the same race follow the normal distribution curve. The social problems arise out of the lack of capabilities of the members of the inferior classes who are represented by the lower end of the distribution curve. Any amelioration of the working of natural selection through education and philanthropy only encourages the production of more progeny. Society should therefore take drastic measures to prevent conception among the mentally unfit by programs either of segregation of the sexes or of sterilization. Only in this way can the social problems be solved and the disorganization of society be prevented.

The doctrine of eugenics found its natural medium of expression in the polemics of the *Jukes*, the *Kallikaks*, the *Nam family*, and a host of similar studies in which physical, mental, moral, and social deficiencies were regarded as interchangeable in the operation of the hereditary pattern. One point, however, was clear—that the disorganization of society was the direct outgrowth of deficiencies in the biological make-up, passed on from generation to generation through heredity.

The development of mental testing by the psychologists not only gave further proof of the wide variation in individual capability but provided a technique by which the unfit could be differentiated "scientifically" from the fit. No longer did the eugenist have to defend his confusion of moral, physical, social, and mental traits in his determination of who were unfit, for now with the aid of mental tests he could make his differentiations solely

in terms of the mental, which he had always posited as basic to all other traits except the physical.

The basic fallacy in the biopsychological approach lies in the failure to recognize in the social situations which it tries to explain a part of the causal pattern that gives rise to the social variants which are assumed to be biological in character. The role of heredity is taken for granted in advance of knowing specifically what is inherited. More recent research into the mechanism of heredity shows quite clearly the process by which physical characteristics are passed from one generation to another through the operation of hypothetical units, the genes, within the germ plasm. But to assume, as has so often been done, that vice and crime are the inevitable consequences of certain hereditary psychological traits transmitted through the germ plasm in the same way as is eye color taxes one's credulity to the breaking point. One might as well be asked to believe that a son's liking beefsteak as does his father is the result of the operation of biologically transmitted psychological traits.

A third approach to the study of social disorganization is the geographical. In many respects this is the logical antithesis of the biopsychological approach, since it assumes that the constituent make-up of the individual is of little or no consequence in comparison to the influence of geographical factors. From this standpoint the superiority of culture or the backwardness of peoples is due to geographical factors of which the most important are the relief of the land, bodies of water, climate, soil, minerals, natural flora and fauna, temperature, natural changes of seasons, phenomena of gravitation, storms, earthquakes, sea currents, rainfall, and altitude.

Some of the forms of social disorganization which have been explained in terms of the operation of geographical factors by adherents to this school are crime, cultural retardation, illiteracy, suicide, divorce, and insanity. As in the study of the relationship of geography to social organization, the fallacies of this approach have grown out of the failure to compare more widely

the social situations as they occur historically and contemporaneously under a given set of geographical conditions and because of the confusion of many features of the social environment with the natural. Thus, for example, the cultural retardation of the Kentucky mountaineer, consisting as it does of moonshining, feuding, illiteracy, poverty, insanitary living conditions, and so on, is the result of social isolation much more than of topography as Huntington assumes.[1] The topography of Switzerland is much more rugged!

Geography no doubt does set limits to man's ingenuity, but nowhere does it in any sense determine the patterns of social maladjustment. In fact, if it can be said that geography plays a direct role in determining human behavior, it is at that level where no culture exists, and under those conditions there can be no social disorganization. The geographical approach is, therefore, as sterile as its logical antithesis, the biopsychological.

A fourth approach to social disorganization may be called the cultural since it attempts to explain social problems in terms of cultural entities or processes. Thus the various forms of social disorganization represent institutional malfunctioning. Crime and poverty, for example, are the natural outgrowths of the capitalistic system which segregates the holding and control of property in the hands of the entrepreneur at the expense of the laborer, who is forced into deprivation and crime by the selfishness and brutality of the capitalist. Or a less extreme illustration is that of the attempts to show the relationship of divorce to the business cycle. In this latter instance the implied theory is clear; namely, that the malfunctioning of one institution gives rise to either an improvement or disturbance in the functioning of a related institution. The recent widespread interest in the effects of the economic depression upon various forms of social disorganization represent this aspect of the cultural approach.

The cultural approach, however, is not confined to the meth-

[1] See chapter III of part I, book II, of Jerome Davis, Harry E. Barnes, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 227-237.

odology of the inter-relationship among the various social institutions. This frame of reference has seemed to some to be too subjective in character. Accordingly, some writers have attempted to so define the process out of which social disorganization arises that it will not be necessary to introduce evaluative notions as criteria of what does and what does not represent a social problem. Their answer is the cultural-lag frame of reference.

The concept of cultural lag as developed by Ogburn is based upon the distinction between material and nonmaterial culture. The material culture of a people is made up of the goods which they possess and use—tools, machines, implements, utensils—every material object, in fact. The nonmaterial culture, on the other hand, consists of folkways, mores, techniques, philosophies and beliefs, knowledge, and the arts. Material culture, according to this point of view, changes readily in response to human inclination and curiosity through the processes of invention and borrowing. The advantages of new tools, new methods of production, and new vehicles of transportation are more or less obvious, depending upon the multiplicity of social contacts, and are accepted with little or no resistance. Changes in material culture, however, necessitate related changes in nonmaterial culture, in morals, in ethics, in religion, and in the whole framework of social institutions and relations.

Thus social maladjustment is the consequence of delay in the reciprocal changes in the dependent part of culture necessitated by discoveries and inventions in material culture.[2]

According to this point of view, the disorganization of the modern family is the result of a lag in the continued operation of, and the failure to develop appropriate substitutes for, the old folkways and mores governing family relations. These patterns of family relationship developed under conditions in which the family was a self-sufficient group, making its own clothes, raising its own food, providing for its own recreational, educational, and religious needs within the home, etc., all under the direction of the

[2] See William F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 200-201.

male head of the household. Any break in the family relationship threatened the security of each of its members. Modern industrial organization, representing as it does the invention of a host of material traits, has completely changed the basic function of the family and necessitates the development of new patterns of relationship which harmonize with the changes in material culture. The absence of or slowness in the development of these related nonmaterial elements is what makes for the social problem, family disorganization.

There is a disposition among some cultural sociologists to broaden the concept, cultural lag, to include lack of harmonious functioning between any two associated culture traits.[3] This broadening of the conception, however, tends to take the differentiation of social problems back into the subjective realm from which the concept, cultural lag, was intended to rescue it. At best, the concept serves to relate social disorganization to the processes of social change but fails to offer any clear explanation of the causal factors in the various aspects of social disorganization except the blanket formula implied in the assumed differential rates of culture change.

A third version of the cultural approach has been developed in detail by Thomas and Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant*. This may be called the culture-conflict version. Thus the social disorganization of the immigrant community is the result of conflict between the cultures of the Old and the New Worlds in which the control of the primary group breaks down. Not infrequently this conflict finds expression in relations between the older and the younger generations, in which the older generation clings to the patterns of the Old World while the younger generation assimilates readily at least some of the more apparent patterns of the New World. Accordingly, social disorganization becomes a social problem when changes resulting from the

[3] See, for example, Malcolm M. Willey, "Society and Its Cultural Heritage," part IV, book II, Jerome Davis, Harry E. Barnes, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 579-580.

conflict go on too rapidly so that the existing social structure is impaired in advance of the development of new elements to take the place of the old.[4]

But whatever the particular version of the cultural approach, the basic pattern remains the same. Social disorganization arises out of a breakdown in the functioning of parts of the cultural organization with reference to one another. In the version which emphasizes institutional malfunctioning, it is assumed that the basic conditions under which a particular institution developed have changed without the accompanying required change in the institution itself—and hence social disorganization. The version of cultural lag finds that these basic conditions consist of other aspects of culture, whereas the cultural malfunctioning version fails to make clear the nature of these conditions and their relationship to the whole of social organization. The culture-conflict version conceives of the elements as consisting of separate cultural systems which come into contact with each other and produce conflict. Nevertheless, the basic assumption is that social disorganization is *sui generis* and provides the matrix out of which personal disorganization develops. The explanation of social disorganization lies in the historical context in which cultural change takes place.

However, none of the various approaches to the study of social disorganization so far described come essentially to grips with the fundamental problem of the relationship between individual and social disorganization. This was left to the philosophically organic approach developed particularly in the writings of Charles H. Cooley and his followers. In fact, in the solution offered to the question of the inter-relationship between personal and social disorganization lie the distinctive characteristics of the philosophically organic approach.

Basic to Cooley's point of view is his microscopic-macroscopic

[4] See William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant* (revised edition), vol. II, pp. 1127-1133; Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 926.

conception of the relationship between society and the individual. In the Cooley formulation, both are but different aspects of one and the same thing, social life. When one views social life from the point of view of the discrete units of which it is made up, he sees the individual. When, on the other hand, his view is that of the collectivity, he sees society. Society and the individual are thus complementary aspects of a larger reality which incorporates both.

> A separate person is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from persons. The real thing is human life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say a general, aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words "society" and "persons" do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing, the relation between them being like that between other expressions one of which denotes a group as a whole and the other the members of the group, such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students, and so on.[5]

From this standpoint personal disorganization cannot be said to grow out of social disorganization or social disorganization out of personal disorganization, since both are inextricably bound up together. Thus to Cooley personal disorganization without its corresponding social disorganization is a contradiction in terms. Thus social disorganization is both cause and effect, but the same can be said for personal disorganization. Social disorganization leads to the breakdown in institutional controls and allows man's elemental nature to function again, unrestrained by social patterns. But on the other hand, it is the formalism of institutional controls which function externally upon the individual leaving him internally without guidance that develops into social disorganization in which the institutional patterns lose their effectiveness. The sequence of personal-social disorganization becomes, then: individualized responses out of which develops a conscious-

[5] Charles H. Cooley, Robert C. Angell, and Lowell J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, p. 71. By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, publishers.

ness of common needs → institutional organization for the more efficient realization of these needs → formalism in institutional forms due to a breakdown in the adaptive process → loss of internal control over the individual → disorganization of institutions or of society → reinstatement of immediate human nature with its natural impulses → reorganization of institutional forms, thus completing the cycle and starting over again.[6]

The microscopic-macroscopic approach provides a more complete conceptual framework in terms of which to interpret the facts both of personal and of social disorganization than any of the other approaches presented. Yet it is not entirely a satisfactory theoretical construct. Among its deficiencies are: (1) Its failure to relate the development of institutions to the process of innovation, although it is implied that the process of organic growth has something to do with this. (2) Its tendency to couch in moralistic terms the formalization of institutional patterns. (3) Its delimitation of the word, disorganization, to a complete breakdown in institutional control, although incipient disorganization is recognized in formalism. (4) Its assumption of a pristine beginning to the new cycle out of which reorganization develops.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Whatever the imperfections in the philosophically organic approach, it laid the foundations for a more thorough and sound point of view. Its basic postulate of the interdependence of culture and human nature is sound doctrine and must be incorporated into any satisfactory formulation of the nature of social and personal disorganization. Human nature is the reflection of culture in the responses of the individual mechanism. Culture consists of those responses which are common to the members of a group and which are passed from generation to generation. Culture is to the group what habits are to the individual.

Social organization, in turn, consists of the co-ordination of in-

[6] See *Ibid.*, pp. 402-415.

dividual responses as a consequence of the operation of conventionalized patterns of consensus and control. Personal organization refers to the co-ordination and integration of the attitude systems within the personality. Any change in the cultural context which impedes or destroys the functioning of the patterns of co-ordination which constitute the social order represents social disorganization. Analogously, any form of variant behavior which disturbs the integration of the attitude systems within the personality represents personal disorganization.

In a society in which the personal organization of each member is a direct counterpart of the social organization, there cannot be social disorganization, social change, or personal disorganization. Social change and social disorganization imply some break in the cultural context, some disturbance in the equilibrium among the various aspects of the culture pattern. But a society without social change and disorganization never exists, if for no other reasons than the appearance of hereditary variants and the failure of the imitative process to produce exact counterparts to the culturally defined response.

Thus social change, social disorganization, and personal disorganization all have their genesis in the variant behavior of individuals. In the simpler societies, however, variations in behavior growing out of the hereditary and imitative processes are so minimal that, upon the part of the group, there is little or no awareness of their existence. Consequently new co-ordinations are achieved both for the society and for the individual with a minimum of stress and strain.

In complex societies this tendency toward spontaneous variation in behavior becomes further accentuated by the operation of at least three sets of factors: (1) the specialized functioning inherent in complex societies, (2) the family as a culture-defining agency, and (3) cultural participation outside the particular social order. The result is the generation of a wide variety of variant response patterns out of which develops disorganization both of the social order and of the individual.

No individual in complex societies ever does, or ever can, learn all the culturally defined responses. Specialized selection takes place along class, sex, and vocational lines particularly. These specialized patterns have often been referred to as the social roles. Thus, since the individual functions in the social order in terms of the selective character of his culturally defined responses, the personal organization of no individual can ever be the exact counterpart of the social order.

The family functions as a culture-defining agency in at least two respects. It interprets and distills the general culture complexes of the group in its own peculiar fashion under conditions of high emotionality. The result is a varying degree of attachment to the family definitions which in extreme form defies all attempts at redefinition, however much variance there may be with what is generally accepted. Furthermore, the position of the child himself, his status and role in the family group, acts as a defining mechanism.

In addition to these internally operating selective processes, many individuals in complex societies live a part of their lives, either actively or imaginatively, in other cultures. This is accomplished through travel or by means of distant communication. The consequence is that these individuals are not the sole product of a single culture. Their life organizations may have little counterpart in the social organization of the particular society with which for the moment they are associated. Nevertheless, their variant responses may have much to do with disturbing the equilibrium inherent in the social order.

Variations in personal organization thus appear spontaneously and become the source of innovations introduced into the cultural medium. Some innovations receive ready acceptance, because they are related to those aspects of culture which lie outside or are not an integral part of an institutional pattern. Thus new gadgets for the automobile find ready acceptance as compared to a suggestion that the engine be placed over the rear, rather than over the front, axle. The introduction of the ordinary gadget

necessitates little or no change in the basic pattern of the automobile, whereas the change in the position of the motor would require considerable change. Nevertheless even such seemingly insignificant innovations as the various gadgets represent tend to have a cumulative effect, which in time tends to disorganize not only the automobile complex but the larger transportation pattern of which it is a part. In the field of language this same differential may be illustrated in the comparatively ready acceptance of the simplified spelling of a few much used words as compared to the resistance to the introduction of a new language such as Esperanto.

Innovations in the mores and in ideas and beliefs invariably meet with some social disapproval unless they are of such minimal character as not to be recognized as variations from the accepted pattern. There are at least three reasons why this is true. First, it is ordinarily difficult to demonstrate the utility of the new mos or belief as compared with the old. Second, the utility of innovations in the realm of the nonmaterial is frequently a function of the understanding of the new response. In contrast, the new mechanical invention can often be used as readily by those who have no understanding of it as by those who are thoroughly familiar with its operation. Third, culture traits in the realm of the nonmaterial become identified with personality, particularly with that part developed in the primary group under conditions of high emotionality. Thus the whole core of values has an emotional entrenchment which makes the individual impervious to innovations except as they can be brought to harmonize with this value pattern. To suggest that a man give up this entrenched value system, or any part of it, is equivalent to attacking his personality and his integrity.

When innovations meet with social disapproval, the individual is faced with three alternatives: revamping of the discordant elements to the degree that their variance is no longer apparent, the seeking out of others who themselves have incipient trends in the same direction, or the retreat into a subjective world. In simple

societies the first alternative is most commonly, if not always, chosen. Social change is not eliminated, but it takes place by such minute increments that there is no realization that anything is happening. Thus there is no appreciable disturbance in the co-ordination of individual responses, and social change is essentially of the same order as that growing out of readily acceptable innovations. In so far as there is social and personal disorganization, these represent preparative stages for changes in social and personal organization.

When, on the other hand, the innovator finds his "heresy" encouraged by a sympathetic audience, he resists the constraining influence of the larger group and tends consciously to accentuate the variant response, rather than to minimize it. This, of course, is only possible in sufficiently large and complex societies, such that corresponding variations appear simultaneously in more than one person. The nature of these sympathetic groups varies all the way from the spontaneous, undisciplined associations, such as artist colonies, to the highly integrated cult or sect, such as a missionary or revolutionary society. The character of this sympathetic-audience group depends largely upon the nature of the resistance which a particular society sets up. If resistance is organized along the lines of social stratification, the tendency is for the sympathetic group to take on sectarian and cult forms of organization. But this is equivalent to saying that the innovation is more directly contrary to the institutional patterns in vogue in a particular society.

Corresponding to the character of the sympathetic-audience group which promotes the development of cultural innovations are varying degrees of social disorganization. Innovations supported by spontaneous, undisciplined associations do not lead to violent disturbances in the social order, since if they represent persistent trends in variation, they soon become incorporated in the social order by accretion. This may be illustrated by what happened in the case of the theory of evolution in the United States. If, on the other hand, such innovations do not represent

any persistent trend toward variation, the innovation runs its course, so to speak, and then is displaced by some other similar or closely related innovation. This is to be illustrated in the fads and fashions in dress and music of contemporary life which grow out of ennui and make change an end in itself.

Innovations which meet with organized resistance, on the other hand, tend to result in marked social disorganization. The development of the sect or cult form of audience-support for the innovation tends to lead to violent conflict between the sect and the defenders of the social order. In this conflict situation, the seeds of the disintegration of the social order tend to germinate more completely than could have been possible had the innovations been accepted. This grows out of the fact that the sect encourages a more sweeping range of variations than it set out at first to accomplish, in response to the tendency upon the part of the social order to resist all change, whether or not an integral part of the initial innovations promoted by the cult. The consequence is that, no matter which group wins, the new social order which develops is far from that envisaged by either.

Not all positive response to social disapproval, however, results in attempts to define the variant behavior in terms of the welfare of the group. Instead, the variant response may remain unchanged in its initial hedonistic form, and, in so far as there is any appeal for approval from a sympathetic audience, it is upon the basis of common, hedonistically defined attitudes. Thus in delinquency and crime, the advantages of the variant response are defined exclusively in terms of the individualized desires of the innovator. In segmental behavior, these hedonistic definitions are in terms of elemental appetites and passions. And yet without a sympathetic audience of individuals similarly inclined, this type of social variant would be constrained to the accepted patterns of conduct, except to the extent to which he was able to retreat into complete social isolation.

If the innovator in the face of social disapproval retreats into a subjective inner world, his innovations lose their social character

and become enmeshed in the development of mechanisms which tend further to insulate him from the normal influences of group life. In the vernacular, he goes insane, and because of complete disability to care for himself or because of the danger that he may harm others, he has to be locked up in an institution. Many others, however, show many of the same trends in response but not to the same extreme degree and are looked upon, accordingly, as disorganized personalities. This type of personal disorganization does not have its counterpart in social disorganization, though it is quite true that the cult or sect leader often seems to possess many of the characteristics of the disorganized personality. In fact it may be that ability—however acquired—to translate one's variant response into activity patterns such as to win group approval which marks the difference between the sane and the insane.

Thus basically all personal organization tends to vary from the culturally approved pattern. So long as the variations are only slight, however, they do not enter into the awareness of others or of one's self. Nevertheless should they occur with sufficient persistence and regularity, they may result in social changes which in time may result in marked shifts in the social order. In any case they represent incipient social disorganization. As variations from the approved pattern become more clearly defined, they meet with social disapproval varying all the way from tolerant skepticism to moral indignation. If this disapproval is met positively by attempting to find approval among those whose own divergencies—though possibly not so definitively developed—are in harmony with one's own, the result is to attempt consciously to introduce a new element into the social order. Social disorganization is the inevitable result until such time as the new behavior pattern loses group support or becomes incorporated into the social order. When, however, social disapproval of variations is met negatively by retreat into a world of phantasy or into a world of individualized response, there is no corresponding social disorganization, except to the extent to

which the individual becomes a burden upon, or a threat to, the safety of society and its members. The culmination of this type of variation is the complete disappearance of all culture counterparts in the behavior of the individual and the regression to the animal level.

This point of view does not deny the causative role of social disorganization in the production of personal disorganization. Innovations which produce a break in the mesh of cultural relations provide a more favorable background for the appearance of other variations of a related character. Furthermore, discordant elements in the social order, particularly in complex cultures, only accentuate the disturbance created by the sheer inability of each person to incorporate all the individual counterparts of the social organization into his personality. In fact there is always the probability that some personalities will be constituted chiefly of the discordant elements alone, the harmonious elements having dropped out in the selective process.

All social change thus involves some social disorganization. Nevertheless it seems more fruitful to conceive of social disorganization as having to do with those aspects of social change which result in some sort of disturbance and revamping of the social institutions and of the patterns of interrelationship between them. In the same way the social responses of the individual are always in flux, but again it is only as changes take place in the individual's patterns of adjustment to social situations which arouse social disapproval that one may speak of personal disorganization.

PHASES OF PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION

All personal disorganization, accordingly, represents behavior upon the part of the individual which deviates from the culturally approved norm to such an extent as to arouse social disapproval. This social disapproval may express itself in a wide variety of degrees, and the individual may react to the social definition of his behavior in a variety of ways. These two aspects in their

variations may be used as the basis for differentiating types of personal disorganization, though it should be quite clear at the outset that such a differentiation is only a convenient methodological device. Social reality presents an endless confusion of varying degrees of social disapproval and of individual responses to social definitions, not only from time to time but in any particular period.

For convenience, then, social disapproval may be differentiated into that which is mild and that which is marked and sometimes violent. In turn individuals respond either positively or negatively to social disapproval. Positive response leads to the seeking out of others who also manifest trends in the same direction. Negative response results in the building up of a world of phantasy or finds expression in regressive behavior.

The most apparent phase of personal disorganization in complex societies is that in which there is mild social disapproval to which the individual responds positively. This is the realm of the inventor, whether he works with material objects or with techniques and beliefs. All inventions are met with some skepticism. This type of personal disorganization tends to be confined to a relatively small segment of the person's response patterns and therefore the innovation which it represents does not, seemingly at least, deeply disturb the social order. In general, this probably explains the fact that social disapproval is mild.

The second aspect of personal disorganization is that in which there is marked or violent social disapproval and yet individual positive response. This type of social innovation tends to result in the organization of cults or sects. The consequence of the organization of those who are in sympathy with the innovation into the militant minority of the cult or sect is to bring into sharper relief the essential conflict between those groups who support and represent the existing social organization and those who oppose it.

One of the most striking consequences of cult or sect organization is the way that, in the conflict between the cult organiza-

tion and those groups which find themselves the particular recipients of the benefits of the established order, support is solicited from those groups whose interests and inclinations are not essentially identified with either group. Thus the conflict becomes highly institutionalized and channels the expression of a wide variety of personal variation little if at all related to the initial pattern. The result is the creation of forms of social disorganization which have no counterpart in the personal disorganization of all the members of either the sect or that group defending the established social order. This is why it has so commonly happened that after the successful culmination of a revolution there follows a period in which the victors fight among themselves, not infrequently with as much violence as they had previously fought the common enemy.

In the process of cult and sect organization, the objective may be defined in either of two ways. Thus in rebellion, whether upon the part of adolescents or adults, the objective is defined in terms of the welfare of the larger group rather than in terms of the restricted advantages of the cult or sect. In crime or delinquency, on the other hand, the objective is defined exclusively in terms of the criminal group itself and tends to be along hedonistic lines. This is also the realm of segmental behavior in which elemental appetites and urges exclusively dominate the personality, resulting in sexual license, prostitution, and the like. Likewise, much of the individual response in domestic discord belongs in this realm, since much of the person's rebellion is against the institutional controls of the family pattern which define the respective roles of the marriage partners in the relationship.

The third and final aspect of personal disorganization is that in which the individual's response to social disapproval is subjective. Thus the person retreats into an individually defined inner world, and his innovations lose their social character and become enmeshed in the development of mechanisms which further insulate him from the normal influences of group life. This

type of personal disorganization finds its extreme development in the psychoses through which the individual seeks to escape from the web of social relations and in suicide in which he abandons further attempts to meet social demands.

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III

The Inventor and the Innovator

THE INVENTOR, or innovator, is a person who introduces into man's responses to his environment new tools, new techniques, or new ideas. These innovations may be the result of recombining old traits into new forms or of the discovery of new facts and relations in nature. To the average person, the word invention suggests such innovations as the development of the electric-light bulb by Edison or the wireless by Marconi. In contrast, the finding of the American continent by Columbus and of the planet, Neptune, by Galle are looked upon as discoveries. But in the latter instance, if it had not been for the invention of the Copernican theory of the revolution of the earth and the planets around the sun which made it possible for Adams and Leverrier to compute, with the aid of the gravitational theory of Newton, the probable course of the unknown planet, this discovery would probably have not been made until much later. It is in this way, then, that discovery and invention go hand in hand.

In view of the close interrelationship between invention and discovery, it will not be necessary for the purposes of this discussion to distinguish between the two. Accordingly, the word, invention, will be used in a general sense to cover all variation from the accepted pattern of response if the amount of variation is sufficient to be recognized by the group and if the variation is internal to the group rather than brought in from the outside.

However, not all innovations come under the definition of in-

vention just given. Many represent borrowings from other cultures, and, while new to the group, they do not represent any creative process on the part of the person who acts as the agent in introducing the borrowed trait to a particular society of which he may, or may not, be a member. Nevertheless, the relationship of a borrowed trait to the culture of a particular group is fundamentally no different from that of the invention. The words invention and innovation may be used interchangeably, therefore, to cover all variations of personal response from the accepted pattern so long as these are recognized by the group and do not represent the resurrection of old responses no longer in favor. Thus the farmer who constructs a cradle with which to cut his wheat although he lives in a society where that method of harvesting has long since been abandoned is not an inventor or innovator in the sense of the word as used here. If cradling were introduced as a part of an old settlers' celebration or as a new sport, it would represent an invention.

The distinguishing mark of the invention, therefore, is that, for the inventor at least, it has some characteristics of superiority and is not simply an inferior substitute which one is constrained to utilize because of the influence of forces beyond his control. Thus it belongs on the positive side of variations from the norm rather than the negative.

The inventor and innovator, accordingly, is a nonconformist, because he seeks to substitute for the old and accepted forms of behavior new responses which he has developed out of his attempts to adjust to the demands of group life or has borrowed from another culture. The attitudes of the group vary all the way from a tolerant, and even sympathetic, skepticism to the most violent social disapproval. The inventor who makes but slight changes in the accepted pattern finds ready acceptance for his innovations once he demonstrates their utility. Thus in automobile construction the high-tension magneto found ready acceptance as a source of electrical energy for ignition purposes as over against the older combination of low-tension magneto

and dry batteries. But in turn the former gave way quite as readily to the combination of a generator and storage batteries. On the other hand, there are indications that free-wheeling represented no such increased utility but won its acceptance as a novelty and selling point.

Accordingly, in so far as innovations become a part of the general current of social change concerned with style and fashion, newness (if the innovation does not depart too radically from the accepted pattern) becomes an end in itself and furnishes its own rationale. Thus the innovation provides a ready outlet for the incipient rebellion which arises naturally out of ennui and the contradictory stimuli of modern life. And yet, even in the field of style and fashion, some innovations, for all their newness, meet with social disapproval but in time may find acceptance only to lose their appeal to those who formerly championed their cause. Witness the current trend away from the simple skirtless woman's bathing suit to skirted models reminiscent of a decade ago. Exhibitionism and rebellion thrive upon uniqueness, and once the gamut has been run, there is little left to do but repeat the cycle, always introducing minor variations.

The degree of personal disorganization of the innovator varies correspondingly with the degree of social disapproval which his invention arouses. In the field of technology, for example, to say that the inventor is personally disorganized seems to contradict the facts suggested by the ready acceptance of his inventions and the encouragement given him by society. Many of these attain considerable social prominence and acquire considerable wealth. But more careful analysis will reveal that these individuals fall into either of two groups: those whose inventions were numerous but minor in character; and those who made revolutionary inventions early enough in life to profit from them in later life after they had finally met with social approval. The first group represent a minimum of personal disorganization, and the second group mislead one owing to the organizing effects upon the person of social approval. Furthermore, the disorgan-

ized phases of the person are so highly compartmentalized and offset by the most orthodox responses in other phases of social relations that the illusion is created of the complete absence of personal disorganization.[1] Nevertheless, for every inventor who wins social eminence, there are many more who remain obscure, partly because the degree of personal disorganization does not permit them to translate their innovations into popular utilitarian patterns.

When one turns from the field of technology to that of ideas and beliefs, the degree of personal disorganization of the innovator becomes more marked. Here again, however, sympathetic audiences may become so large that their tendency to give ready approval with a minimum of demonstration of usefulness overshadows general social disapproval which becomes apathetic in the presence of erudite innovations unless dramatized by the opposition. The idea of relativity as developed by Einstein found ready acceptance both in scientific and nonscientific circles, though it is probably quite as revolutionary in character as the idea of evolution as formulated by Darwin. Yet in the latter instance the idea met with marked social disapproval even in scientific circles owing to its dramatization by the opposition as meaning that man had descended from the monkey rather than from a paradisiacal Adam fashioned in the image of his Creator.

INVENTION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

If the inventor and innovator is a nonconformist, under what conditions does he appear and what are the situations which are favorable for his development? What also determines which innovations are accepted by a particular society, since not all ever are? In fact, it is doubtful if the majority of innovations find acceptance within the lifetime of the inventor, which from the

[1] In a study of 371 inventors whose biographies appear in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, Sanford B. Winston found the group to be highly mobile, a characteristic of the nonconformist.—"Bio-Social Characteristics of American Inventors," *American Sociological Review*, vol. II (December, 1937), pp. 837-849.

standpoint of this analysis is what is important rather than whether or not they are eventually accepted.

Explanations of invention usually fall within the range encompassed by the "great man" theory on the one hand and the "social necessity" theory on the other. The "great man" theory in its essentials is simply that great men produce great things. The great inventions of history, from this point of view, were the unique contributions made by men who possessed the peculiar characteristics needed for making that particular invention and without which the invention would never have been made. The source of these peculiar traits was generally attributed either to heredity or to accident.

The "social necessity" theory, on the other hand, disclaims the importance of the particular inventor, contending that had not he made the needed innovation, someone else would have done so. This doctrine is embodied in the aphorism, "Necessity is the mother of invention." Given the need for a particular innovation, the agency through whose efforts it would find expression would forthwith appear. Obviously, nothing could be further from the truth. Indians of the wild-seed area of central and southern California lived a precarious and niggardly life under conditions where agricultural inventions would have been advantageous in insuring a more dependable food supply;[2] the American Indian so outnumbered the earlier European settlers that had "necessity" provided him with weapons equal to those of the white man he would not have had to submit to white domination.[3]

The inadequacy of the "great man" theory is quite as apparent as that of the "social necessity" explanation. Leonardo da Vinci was probably the first person to conceive of a flying machine,

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[2] See Clark Wissler, *The American Indian*, for an account of life in this culture area.

[3] S. C. Gilfillan adds further confirmation to this generalization, when he concludes: "Under conditions of stability, the most necessitous countries, like Amazonia and India, are the least inventive; and Switzerland, whose needs might be considered as least, invents the most."—*The Sociology of Invention*, p. 48.

and he undoubtedly had the genius to develop his notion into a successful device, but he did not do so because of his lack of the mechanical and engineering skills necessary. These he could not have because they were still to be developed through a long sequence of mechanical invention of which the invention of a light-weight internal-combustion engine was one of the necessary elements. This background of accumulated culture which provides the necessary ingredients to the successful development of any mechanical contrivance into a workable form is what is commonly known as the cultural base. Many an inventor receives credit for innovations which were not original with him at all but were originated by another, who was handicapped by the absence of the proper cultural base. The availability of the necessary auxiliary knowledge enables the inventor to put the innovation into a useful or demonstrable form. Thus the idea of organic evolution made its first appearance in early Greek philosophy but had to wait until the science of zoology and botany were sufficiently developed to become the basis for Darwin's demonstration of its plausibility as a frame of reference for the interpretation of biological observations. Einstein could never have developed his theory of relativity without the background provided by the Michelson-Morley experiment and Fitzgerald's explanation and the non-Euclidean geometry which grew out of the geometrical investigations of Gauss and Reimann.[4]

In fact Gilfillan goes so far as to say that, "There is no indication that any individual's genius has been necessary to any invention that has had any importance." [5] Thus he contends that whenever a craft has progressed to the point when the time is ripe for the appearance of the new device, if one human instrument does not arise to the occasion another will. This he says is attested to by the many instances of inventions made by more than one person of which Ogburn lists 148.[6] Thus after review-

[4] See George H. Mead, *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 256-258, and E. W. Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, pp. 316-343.
[5] Gilfillan, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[6] William F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 90-102.

ing the activities of the so-called great men in the history of the invention of the ship, Gilfillan concludes:

> . . . . that the many, many services rendered by each genius show by their very number that they are not of a unique and indispensable order, but such as are commonly rendered by a number of smaller men together—or by one genius instead of another. . . . If there were some desired discovery so difficult, so recondite that only five men in the world had the intellect and the preoccupations which would lead them to it—not one of those geniuses would be necessary for the invention, since any of the remaining four would find it instead, if one were removed. . . . On the one hand, modern history gives no reason to think that any invention would be worth making, in an age when it was so difficult and recondite, so far from contemporary practice, that only five men in the world could be expected to make it. . . . On the other hand, there are not one, but millions of practical problems to be solved, a number far greater than the total of potential inventors.[7]

A more adequate theory lies somewhere in between the extremes marked by the "great man" and "social necessity" theories. There is no doubt but that the innovator is the deviator from the modal person in any society and probably possesses superior characteristics along some line, but not all persons of superior capability are innovators. The accumulated culture of a society determines the nature and direction of invention but does not itself assure further development. Greek and Roman civilizations achieved a notable level of cultural development which provided a base for further development by other social groups, particularly those of the north of Europe and of America.

Every major invention is based upon the accumulated results of the past into which have gone the efforts of countless innovators. Few innovators, if any, can claim more originality for their efforts than the addition of a relatively small number of elements to the comparatively complex pattern of the finished

[7] Gilfillan, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-75. By permission of the author and copyright owner.

product. This fact is brought out in Bogardus's description of the invention of the steam engine by Watt:

> The invention of the steam engine goes back to the aelipile—an instrument illustrating the expansive force of steam generated in a closed vessel, and escaping by a narrow aperture—made by Hero of Alexandria in the second century, B.C., to the type of steam windmill that was worked out by G. Branca about 1629, to the steam apparatus which was manufactured by the Marquis of Worchester in 1663, to the application of steam power to various kinds of machines by Thomas Savery about 1700, to Papin's idea of the piston, to Newcomen's piston engine, a model of which Watt was repairing when in 1763 he set to work to eliminate the waste of steam due to alternate chilling and heating of the cylinder. With this problem in mind, Watt worked for six years before he had perfected the separate condenser in 1769, the date at which it is popularly said that the steam engine was invented.[8]

Thus in a general way there is much to be said for the notion that the prerequisites for inventions are: (1) persons whose life organizations impel them toward variant responses—so-called dominant individuals, (2) an existing cultural base out of which to select the elements to be combined into a new pattern, and (3) a felt need or demand for change.[9] To this Folsom would add the absence of obstacles which might hinder the invention.[10]

But while the nature and function of the cultural base is quite clear, the character of the so-called dominant individuals is not. What are the significant ingredients of the personality of the inventor? How does the inventor differ from the general population out of which he arises? What are the social conditions out of which the characteristic traits of the inventor are fashioned?

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INVENTOR

One of the most common assertions about inventors is that they have superior mental ability. Ogburn points out that the dis-

[8] Emory S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, p. 400. Copyright, 1924, D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc.

[9] Cf. E. T. Hiller, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 340.

[10] Joseph K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress*, p. 47.

tribution of inherent mental ability corresponds closely to the normal probability curve and holds that inventors are found in the upper portion of the curve but offers no proof to support his contention.[11] Rossman, drawing upon data secured from questionnaires returned by patent attorneys and directors of research and development of large corporations and from conversations [12] with inventors concludes that perseverance, imagination, and originality are the most common traits of inventors.[13] These traits and others of less importance, he assumes to be based upon inherent capacities and tendencies.

In support of his contention that inventiveness is inherited, Rossman cites statistical findings from his study of 710 inventors. These findings have to do with the occupations of the fathers of inventors and with the inventiveness of relatives and children of inventors. Of the fathers, 33.3 per cent belonged to the professional group, 35.5 per cent to the commercial class, 16.2 per cent were skilled laborers, and 15 per cent were farmers.[14]

Inventiveness of children was reported by 41.7 per cent of the inventors Rossman studied. (See Table I.) Of the 263 instances where inventiveness was not determined, constituting 37 per cent of the total, 96 inventors had no children, 88 had children too young to determine their inventiveness, and 79 failed to supply information. Nearly 40 per cent of the inventors had relatives who were inventors of which 68 per cent were ancestors. Of the children of inventors having inventive ancestors, 54 per cent were inventive, 45 per cent of those whose inventive relatives were other than ancestors were inventive, and 35.6 per cent of those having no inventive relatives. Rossman concluded, accordingly, that the nearer the relatives who are inventors the more likely are the children to show inventiveness.[15]

[11] Ogburn, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[12] It is not clear whether these were systematic interviews or conversations of a more informal sort. In fact, the data may have been based upon the return of questionnaires. See Joseph Rossman, *The Psychology of the Inventor*, p. vi.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 41 ff.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-190.

TABLE I

INVENTIVENESS OF RELATIVES AND OF CHILDREN OF INVENTORS [16]

INVENTIVENESS OF CHILDREN	TOTAL		INVENTIVENESS OF RELATIVES					
			Inventive				Noninventive	
			Ancestors		Others			
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	710	100 0	189	100 0	91	100 0	430	100 0
Inventive	296	41 7	102	54 0	41	45 0	153	35 6
Noninventive	151	21 3	13	7 0	19	20 9	119	27 7
Indeterminate *	263	37 0	74	39 0	31	34 1	158	36 7

* Includes all cases in which there were no children, where the children were too young, and where there was no reply

Winston's findings confirm and add to some of the conclusions of others. He found that inventors live extraordinarily long lives; marry later than the general population, but earlier than other highly trained groups; have both a high marriage and a high remarriage rate; have more than the average amount of education; come from a socioeconomic level above the average, move frequently; and have occupations other than inventing—in manufacturing and engineering and closely related fields.[17]

Carr found that the professional classes contributed four and a half times their quota, that invention began relatively early (mean age at first invention, 24.4 years), tended to be repeated many times (mean number of patents per inventor, 18.2), and continued for some time (mean length of productive period, 16.2 years), but that productivity declined with age (correlation between age and number of patents per year of patenting activity, $-.592 \pm .040$). He also found a high correlation between the total patents obtained per person and his rate of productivity ($+.916 \pm .009$) which he interpreted as indicating that the more productive inventors are more productive because they work

[16] Adapted from Table 17 in Rossman, *ibid*, p. 189.

[17] Sanford B Winston, "Bio-Social Characteristics of American Inventors," *American Sociological Review*, vol. II (December, 1937), pp. 837-849

harder as well as because they have been inventing longer. Carr found, furthermore, that the number of children of inventors was highly correlated with their productive rate ($+.878 \pm .014$), and this he said indicated either that large families stimulate inventiveness or that both are expressions of the same conditioning factors.[18]

However, such studies of the inventor deal with those persons who are concerned with activities designed to change the material culture of a people. They leave out of account the many individuals who introduce changes into the techniques, the philosophies, and beliefs. Studies of eminent men, on the other hand, have included the inventor in the field of mechanical objects and also have covered a much larger range in which the man of letters, the scientist, and the man of affairs have shared in the spotlight.

GENIUS AND INVENTION

Studies of notables on the whole have made the assumption that eminence is hereditary. and that intelligence is associated with the social scale. Thus Ellis studied the social origin of men of eminence whose biographies appear in the English *Dictionary of Biography* and found that the upper and professional classes contributed 63 per cent of the men of genius, though this group constituted only 4.46 per cent of the population. In contrast, the artisan, labor, and industrial classes which constituted 84 per cent of the population contributed but 11.7 per cent of eminent men.[19]

Cattell, in an analysis of the social origin of persons whose autobiographies appear in *American Men of Science*, found that 43.1 per cent of American scientists come from the professional class, although this group constitutes but 3.1 per cent of the

[18] Lowell J. Carr, "Study of 137 Typical Inventors," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XXIII (1929), pp. 204-206.

[19] Havelock Ellis, *A Study of British Genius*, pp. 66-80.

population; manufacturing and trade contribute 35.7 per cent, while making up 34.1 per cent of the population; the agricultural class contributes 21.2 per cent, though constituting 44.1 per cent of the population; while the day laborers and domestic servants have contributed not a single scientist.[20]

Visher, drawing his data from *Who's Who in America*, calculated the number of notable men for each 10,000 persons of the class of their origin and obtained the following rates: unskilled laborers, 0.13; skilled and semiskilled laborers, 4; farmers, 9; business men, 80; professions (except clergy), 142; and clergy, 315.[21] Clarke, restricting himself to men of letters, found that the professional classes contributed 49.2 per cent of those of known origin, commercial classes 22.7 per cent, agriculture 20.9 per cent, and the mechanical, clerical, and unskilled classes 7.2 per cent.[22]

Results from other studies might be cited, but they would only add to the general statement that the higher social classes contribute a higher proportion of eminent men than they constitute in the population as a whole. Nevertheless there are three inherent fallacies in these analyses: (1) eminence is not determined by any objective criteria, (2) no account is taken of the influence of social stratification itself upon eminence, and (3) the notion of the superior intelligence of the eminent is based upon circular reasoning.

First, anyone who is at all familiar with the process by which persons receive invitations to submit sketches to *Who's Who in America*, for example, must concede that greatness is far from being an objective affair. Persons in the spotlight of public attention or those who know the right people are favored. No set

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[20] J. McKeen Cattell, *American Men of Science*, third edition, pp. 783, 784.

[21] Stephen S. Visher, "A Study of the Type of the Place of Birth and of the Occupation of Fathers of Subjects of Sketches in Who's Who in America," *American Journal of Sociology;* vol. XXX (1925), p. 553.

[22] Edwin L. Clarke, "American Men of Letters," *Columbia University Studies*, vol. LXXII (1916), pp. 74-75.

of objective criteria is used as a basis of determining what persons are to be included and who are to be excluded.[23]

Secondly, social stratification itself is one of the causal factors in determining eminence. The opportunities to achieve prominence vary for members of different social classes, the extent of the influence of this factor depending partly upon the rigidity of the class system. Schneider's study of British men of eminence has brought this out clearly. The yeoman-farmer class produces more eminent men in the ministry than elsewhere. Almost half of the eminent nobility achieve fame in the law and in politics. In contrast, the laborer and servant class achieves eminence primarily in the fields of art and letters.[24]

This causes the author to conclude:

> The data . . . show that fame and social origin go together; the activity-choices which an individual makes are limited by the social class into which he is born. The son of a baron does not become famous as an artist no matter what the opportunities for personal distinction in this field may be; neither does the son of an artist aspire to political leadership however troublous the times. The activity-choice of both the baron's son and the artist's son are channelized by the conditions associated with the phenomena of class and cast.[25]

In another study this same writer shows that the number of persons who achieve fame in a particular field varies with the times.[26] War produces an abundance of eminent soldiers and sailors. The rapid growth and movement of the population from the country to the city, which stimulated an expansion in agriculture in the first half of the nineteenth century, produced an

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[23] Stephen S. Visher says: "Careful studies suggest that about as many persons who are not sketched in *Who's Who* merit inclusion as well as do the average of those sketched. Furthermore, about 10 per cent of those sketched do not have any clear right to be sketched."—"Geography of American Notables," *Indiana University Studies*, vol. XV (June, 1928), p. 5.

[24] Joseph Schneider, "The Definition of Eminence and the Social Origins of Famous English Men of Genius," *American Sociological Review*, vol. III (December, 1938), pp. 834-849.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 839.

[26] Schneider, "The Cultural Situation as a Condition for the Achievement of Fame," *American Sociological Review*, vol. II (August, 1937), pp. 480-491.

abundance of botanists. Thus it is apparent that, regardless of the intellectual abilities of the members of a particular class, the social situation determines their relative opportunity for fame. Accordingly, it is only as the social usefulness of a particular class changes that the differentials in opportunity shift.

This brings one to the third fallacy in which the superior intelligence of the eminent is arrived at by circular reasoning. Thus the eminent are said to have superior intelligence because they have achieved fame, and at the same time their eminence is attributed to their superior intelligence!

With the development of intelligence tests, results obtained by the use of this device have been brought to the rescue to show that this last objection is not valid. Terman studied the occupational background of gifted children as determined by the intelligence quotient and found that the professional classes contributed 1003 per cent of their quota in terms of the proportion of professional persons in the population from which the gifted children came; public service 137 per cent; commercial occupations 128 per cent; whereas the industrial classes contributed but 35 per cent.[27] Accordingly, these results have been interpreted to show that high intelligence is associated with high occupational class and is passed hereditarily from generation to generation.

Unfortunately for this interpretation of Terman's findings, there is little evidence to indicate that intelligence tests are measures exclusively of inherited ability. Klineberg found that the intelligence quotient of Negro children in Harlem was higher than that of Negro children of the same age and economic class in the South and that this quotient increased with the length of residence in New York up to five or six years.[28] Mead's study of Italian children showed that the intelligence quotients increased progressively with the amount of English spoken in the home.[29]

[27] Lewis M. Terman, *Genetic Studies of Genius*, pp. 568-570.

[28] Otto Klineberg, *Race Differences*, pp. 185-186.

[29] Margaret Mead, "Group Intelligence Tests and Linguistic Disability Among Italian Children," *School and Society*, vol. XXV (1927), pp. 465-468.

Results of the army tests of immigrant men show a progressive increase in test scores with increase in the length of residence in the United States.[30] Such results lead to the inevitable conclusion that factors other than heredity enter into the intelligence scores determined by administering the standard mental tests.

That intelligence tests reflect the social milieu is to be expected upon the basis of a logical analysis of the mental testing process. However much one would wish to determine the innate ability of the individual to solve problems without drawing in any way upon what he had learned, there can be no way of devising such a test for the simple reason that what is innate and what is acquired are not clearly differentiated in the psychic make-up of the individual. What one does at best is to set up a standardized set of problems which cover the whole field of adjustment processes in which intelligence is thought to function and submit these problems to the person to be tested. In solving the problems presented, the patient will utilize any innate capacity which seems to have any bearing upon the situation plus any past experience which has left any trace upon his mental makeup of such a character as to be useful in solving the problem in hand. No amount of mental gymnastics will serve to differentiate between the relative contributions of these two factors to the solution of the test problems.

One must conclude, nevertheless, that eminence reflects some positive deviation from the norm, whether as the result of superior heredity or of opportunity is of little importance so far as this discussion is concerned. What is more important is the fact that the eminent are not always innovators but may have achieved distinction through leadership along conventionally established lines. The traits of the conventional leader and the innovator are confused where eminence is the basis for the selection of persons for study, and the source of the materials itself (bio-

[30] R. M. Yerkes (editor), "Psychological Examining in the U. S. Army," Memoirs of the *National Academy of Science*, vol. XV (1921), pp. 701-704.

graphical or autobiographical) is not conducive to a realistic analysis.

In spite of the deficiencies in the basic materials upon which research has been based, there is much evidence to indicate that the inventor and innovator is essentially a nonconformist. His nonconformity is more marked if he is connected with innovations outside the field of the mechanical, as is to be expected in view of the widespread social hospitality to innovations in material culture and the techniques and beliefs closely related to it as compared to the relative resistance to innovations in the remainder of nonmaterial culture.[31] Nevertheless, the nonconformity of the inventor, in whatever field may be his operations, is never as marked as that of the rebel and social disapproval is not so violent. The consequence is that personal disorganization covers a wide range from that which represents the slight nonconformity which brings mild social disapproval (at its minimal stage represented by tolerant skepticism) to marked deviation from the conventional social pattern which arouses the most intense disapproval of the group. The innovator, accordingly, is but the lower end of this progression and should be understood as such. His personal disorganization tends to be restricted to a narrow field of adjustment patterns and to become compartmentalized to such an extent that there is little or no potentiality that other fields will become involved.

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[31] Sanford B. Winston says: "In comparison with other eminent groups, however, it appears that inventors tend to be more similar to the general population than are groups characterized by scholastic and scientific achievement."—"Bio-Social Characteristics of American Inventors," *American Sociological Review*, vol. II (December, 1937), p. 849.

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IV

The Nonconformist and the Rebel

PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION, as has already been pointed out, varies all the way from those personal patterns of response which differ but slightly from the norms of the group to those patterns radically at variance from these norms. Variation, however, is not a matter of objective measurement, but instead the nature of the variation (i.e., whether it is expressed overtly or covertly) and the degree of social disapproval constitute the differentia of the varying degrees of personal disorganization.

In contrast to the inventor and the innovator, the rebel and the revolutionist arouse marked social disapproval. It is quite true that the rebel may also be an innovator, since he deviates positively from the accepted norm and he attempts to rally others to his cause. That is, his rebellion is actively defined, and he seeks social approval within the limits set by his variant behavior. He is in marked contrast, therefore, to the person who retreats from social relations into a subjective world.

The rebel may define his rebellion, however, in two widely contrasted ways. He may define it hedonistically in terms of the satisfactions of his own immediate impulses, or he may pattern it along social-welfare lines. If the definition is a hedonistic one, this type of rebellion includes the forms of behavior ordinarily referred to as criminal. If, on the other hand, rebellion is basically defined in terms of social welfare, this takes a variety of forms all the way from the nebulous revolt of youth to the

more complex and integrated forms expressed in radicalism and Bohemianism.

Rebellion of the social-welfare type in contemporary society is primarily concerned with the introduction of variations into nonmaterial culture, since on the whole it is here that marked social disapproval to innovations is found. Nevertheless, at the lower end of the progression, social disapproval may be little different from that found toward the inventor, particularly if the rebel is an adolescent or if the innovation is concerned with some esoteric sphere of nonmaterial culture. At the other end of the scale, social disapproval may become as violent as is response to the most repugnant crime. In this latter instance, society may rally all its forces and deal violently with the rebel, taking his life, torturing him, or throwing him into prison. The rebels of yesteryear were always treated thus, though they often became the prophets of a new era in subsequent years.

ADOLESCENT REBELLION AND THE REVOLT OF YOUTH

Adolescence, that period from puberty to physical maturity,[1] has long been thought to represent a period of high emotional tension in which there occurs marked personal disorganization and not infrequently some disintegration of personality. The classical theory was developed by G. Stanley Hall and may be identified as the "storm-and-stress" conception of adolescence.[2]

The "storm-and-stress" theory is premised upon the assumption that the onset of puberty initiates a period of physical and mental change unlike anything which has taken place earlier or will take place once the course has been run and completed with maturity. It is assumed that the predominate factor in this period is the appearance and maturing of the sexual instinct. Maturation of the sexual instinct, with its physical evidences of sexual

[1] Beginning at about twelve years in girls and fourteen years in boys and continuing until about twenty-one years.

[2] G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. II, pp. 555-589.

potency, brings into consciousness, it is assumed, the sexual functions and transforms the individualistic boy and girl into social beings, dependent upon the favorable opinions of others:

> The boy suddenly realizes that his shoes are not blacked, or his coat is worn and dirty, his hair unbrushed, his collar, necktie, or cap not of the latest pattern, while girls love to flaunt new fashions and color combinations, and have a new sense for the toilet.[3]

This development of social consciousness tends to result in cyclical fluctuations in mood. Praise and attention produce optimism in which the pleasurable emotions run riot. In turn, defeat, criticism, and neglect give rise to pessimism and melancholy. It is these swings from one extreme to the other which are thought to characterize the adolescent.

Another aspect of the maturation of the sexual instinct, according to this point of view, is the rapid expansion in the scope and character of mental life. The senses become more acute and the imagination is quickened. This leads to the rapid development of ambition and the planning of great enterprises, not infrequently in the direction of patriotic services and social reforms. Adolescence is the period of high idealism in which the barriers of the adult world are looked upon with contempt and lightheartedness. Nothing is recognized as too difficult to accomplish.

The picture of adolescence presented by the "storm-and-stress" psychologists has some basis in fact, but it also contains fallacies. Its premise that childhood is an idyllic period is not borne out by the facts. Childhood also is fraught with mental conflicts of essentially the same nature as adolescence.[4] Many child psychologists question whether childhood is ever a happy period. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes, but this should not lead to the conclusion that childhood conflicts are of no great moment, for in them, the psy-

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 364-365.

[4] See, for example, John J. B. Morgan, *The Psychology of the Child.*

choanalysts have shown, are the seeds of much of the mental disturbances of later life.[5]

It is true, of course, that adolescence is marked with rapid physical and glandular growth. Not only does the size of the skeletal form change rapidly, but there are changes in bodily contour and in the size of many of the organs. The heart, for example, doubles in size between the tenth and the sixteenth year. The glands of internal secretion such as the thyroid and the pituitary, as well as the gonads, become exceedingly active.[6] But to assume that there must be concomitant disturbances in the emotional life is erroneous.

Furthermore, the psychoanalysts have demonstrated that the sexual development of the individual is not identical with the rapid growth and maturation of the gonads and the external sex organs. Sexual experience begins early in the life of the individual, changing its form of expression from time to time. And if adolescence is marked by a heightening of conflict growing out of the maturation of the sexual functions, the studies of Mead would seem to indicate that this is the result of contemporary cultural patterns which make of sex something mysterious and disrespectable.[7]

One must conclude, accordingly, that there is no radical break between the period of childhood and of adolescence. The child grows by imperceptible degrees into adolescence and as imperceptibly passes on into adulthood. The sequence is a continuous process in which the transitions are made gradually and, while following a similar pattern, progress by varying degrees of speed. Thus one child will show the maturity at eight or ten which another does not attain until fourteen or fifteen, and the range at which adulthood is achieved is very wide indeed. Accordingly,

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[5] See, for example, William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 168-189.

[6] Cf. Augusta F. Bronner, "Emotional Problems of Adolescence," in *The Child's Emotions*, Chicago Association for Child Study and Parent Education, pp. 216-217.

[7] Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* and *Growing Up in New Guinea.*

while in general it may be said that adulthood is achieved somewhere within the span from eighteen to twenty-five, there are many instances of cases in the Freudian literature of persons essentially adolescent, if not infantile, though of middle age.

There are, however, two problems which confront the individual during the period of adolescence. These are: the emancipation of the person from the home and his family and the establishment of heterosexuality.[8] Both of these problems create major conflicts under conditions where their solutions are not readily achieved. On the other hand, in those cultures in which there are no barriers to the ready and spontaneous solution of these problems, mental conflict is at a minimum, so far as one can judge from the facts of primitive life.[9]

In the present connection only the first problem need concern us, leaving the second for discussion in its relationship to segmental and regressive conduct expressed in homosexuality and sexual perversions. The problem of the emancipation of the individual from the family is important, because it is out of the efforts of the individual to find a solution to this problem that the revolt against authority develops. It is this revolt against authority which constitutes the foundation of much adolescent rebellion.

Basic to the emancipation of the child from the home is the expansion of the social contacts of the adolescent through greater participation in community life and the preparation for a vocation. The educational process in which training becomes more specialized and more closely related to vocational necessities, both in high school and in college, opens up new areas of knowledge removed from parental backgrounds and brings the adolescent not infrequently into conflict with what for the child was the source of all knowledge, the parent.

The increasing imperativeness of love and companionship interests in members of one's own age group leads inevitably to the

[8] Frankwood Williams, *Adolescence: Studies in Mental Hygiene*, pp. 101-120.
[9] Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa.*

development of alliances outside the home. To the extent to which the person is made to feel that his changing loyalties are dishonorable, the resulting conflicts between the child and the parents are reflected in the personality of the young person and find expression in symbolic rebellion, even if on the surface there is conformance to the demands of the parent. Thus the adolescent may, and often does, become negativistically inclined toward all authority, rebelling at every turn. It has been suggested that this pattern is basic to the hobo, many criminals, and all sorts of radicals and to the seeking of new stimulation in drugs and drink, in travel, and in artistic, scientific, and philosophical activities.[10]

Closely allied to the rebellion against authority, and yet not necessarily an essential part of it, is the idealism which characterizes the adolescent. The adolescent develops a great zest for the interchange of ideas and, having achieved a new point of view, often seeks to share it with others. Thus he attempts to convert others, whether in the field of religion, politics, ethics, economics, dress, manners, or what not. Not infrequently this evangelism begins with members of his own family. Nothing leads more readily to negativistic response patterns than an air of intolerance and superiority on the part of the parents toward whom this evangelistic effort is directed.[11] It is this situation, essentially, out of which grows the so-called conflict between generations as other adults become the substitutes for the parents.

The idealism which has so often been thought to characterize the adolescent, however, is not typical if by this one means that the majority of adolescents are idealistic. Only a comparatively small proportion shows marked evidence of this idealism, and it probably reaches its maximum between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. Nevertheless, as would be expected, the adolescent is more susceptible to new ideas than are adults, if for no other reason than because he has not become so habituated. Also, to

[10] Kimball Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 247-248.
[11] Leta S. Hollingworth, *The Psychology of the Adolescent*, pp. 162-163.

the adolescent the old ways symbolize little of security and achievement, since he has yet to benefit from them. Having little by way of accomplishments upon which to base his claim to superiority, he must of necessity base his claims upon what the future will bring. Accordingly, he directs his efforts toward new goals rather than toward the retention of those which he already has.

The degree of personal disorganization represented in adolescent rebellion, however, should not be overemphasized. The normal tendency is toward some departure from the socially approved pattern, but even when expressed in revolt against authority or in idealistic patterns, the variant impulses are shortly harnessed, and the rebel, having had his fling, becomes the pillar of society. In fact only too often, those whose adolescence has represented the widest break with the old become the staunchest apologists for the status quo and the loudest critics of the young through the utilization of the mechanism of projection.[12]

Nevertheless, adolescence provides the proving-ground for the development of reformative patterns of conduct, though the roots are probably in childhood experiences. It is in this way that adolescence marks a stage in the development of the more marked forms of rebellion toward which society manifests pronounced social disapproval. And it is adolescence and the experiences of childhood which hold the key to the explanation of why rebellion finds expression now in mobility and migration, now in hoboism, now in radicalism and Bohemianism, and so on.

MIGRATION AND MOBILITY

Migration, according to the classic theory, is caused by the operation of economic factors. These factors find expression in

[12] In projection, those qualities of which one is ashamed are projected upon other persons in order to solve the conflict which would otherwise arise within the personality. Thus the man who was given to petty thievery in early youth and has now become a respectable citizen becomes highly intolerant of the same practice in other youths, a device for making amends through banishing the unpleasant memories from consciousness.

one form in which an increase in density of population necessitates migration in search for additional natural resources required for subsistence.

In a second form it finds expression in response to the business cycle in which economic depression exerts pressure to cause migration to areas which promise greater economic opportunities. In any case the migration takes place in response to a decrease in the standard of living on the part of the society as a whole or some part of it and to stimulated resistance on the part of some members to retain or regain their old standard by moving elsewhere.

A third phase of the classic theory is the assumption that migration takes place in response to the anticipated economic advantages which may be gained even under conditions where increase in the population is of little moment and the business cycle does not produce reduction in the living standards. Migration of this source is ordinarily thought to be associated with the upward swing of the business cycle and is often associated with the discovery of natural resources, such as that of gold in California in the 1850's, and the rapid expansion of industrial development, as represented in the cityward movement of population in the United States in the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Yet every American school boy knows that America was settled by pioneers who came to escape religious persecution in England and on the European continent. And once the democratic form of government was assured by the successful completion of the Revolutionary War, other groups migrated to the United States to enjoy political as well as religious freedom. Reinhardt and Davies have analyzed this phase of American settlement:

> . . . The Cavalier migrations to Virginia were stimulated largely by the early successes of the English Puritan rebels in their struggle against monarchy. The New England migrations, in turn, were stimulated largely by a reversal of this same struggle. French Huguenots sought refuge in America from the persecutions incident upon

the successes of monarchy and the older forms of religion in their land. The German settlers of New York and Pennsylvania came largely from the Palatinate areas devastated by prolonged religious wars. The later Scotch-Irish immigrants, so indispensable as pioneers on the Appalachian frontiers, fled from economic tyranny of the English government. . . .[13]

Some writers have tried to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory views by proposing an eclectic theory of migration. According to this latter point of view, migrations result from two sets of factors, one set of which operates as a "push" and the other set as a "pull." Thus economic depressions, religious and political persecution, overpopulation, exhaustion of natural resources, and so on constitute the "pushes" which initiate migrations. The prospects of financial success, of recognition, and of wider range of opportunities for development constitute the "pulls" which stimulate migration.

None of these theories, however, contribute particularly to an understanding of selective migration. Except where whole peoples migrate, the conditions of both the "pushes" and "pulls" tend to be constant for many more persons than those who actually migrate. The foregoing explanations, therefore, are not satisfactory so far as the response of the individual is concerned. This the rural sociologists have appreciated in their search for an understanding of the migration from the country to the city which has characterized contemporary American life.

During the second decade of the twentieth century the notion became quite well established that the city was draining the country of its most capable and promising elements. The isolation of rural life, with its lack of modern conveniences, was no match for the seductive charms of the city. The more promising of the younger generation, therefore, left the farm for the city, leaving behind the less capable, less ambitious.[14]

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[13] James M. Reinhardt and George R. Davies, *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, pp. 382-383. By permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., publishers.

[14] See, for example, Edward A. Ross, "Folk Depletion as a Cause of Rural

Sorokin and Zimmerman, upon the basis of studies in Minnesota, came to the conclusion that there is little evidence to show that the city attracts from the country those who are better physically, mentally, or socially.[15] Upon the basis of their findings, they formulated a law of rural-urban social selection which asserts that cities attract those elements lying on both sides of the mean, leaving those in the middle to the country.[16] This notion has been reformulated to mean that those who, either because of inferiorities or superiorities, are poorly adapted to the social requirements of any locale tend to migrate.

Gist and Clark, in a study of the residence of persons who had been given intelligence tests as high school students in rural communities scattered throughout the state of Kansas, found that those who had established urban residence (i.e., lived in cities of 2,500 population or more) were, on the whole, of higher I.Q.[17] Thus the mean I.Q. of the rural group was 94.78 as compared with 98.26 for the urban group, a difference of approximately 3.5 in favor of the urban migrants. In general, the distribution curves of I.Q.'s of both those who remained in rural communities and those who moved to urban areas are essentially the same shape except that the urban distribution approaches a little more closely the normal curve of error, whereas the rural curve is somewhat skewed toward the higher I.Q. classes.[18] The net results seem to indicate, therefore, that migrants come from all I.Q. groups, but the higher groups contribute a disproportionate number in comparison to those who do not migrate.

The results of Gist and Clark's study seem to show that in-

Decline," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XI (1916), pp. 21-30.

[15] Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carl C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, p. 582.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 574.

[17] Noel P. Gist and Carroll D. Clark, "Intelligence as a Selective Factor in Rural-Urban Migrations," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLIV (July, 1938), pp. 36-58.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

telligence, as measured by the use of mental tests,[19] is only one of the selective factors involved in rural-urban migration, since in even the highest I.Q. group, i.e., 125 and over, only half of these individuals migrated to urban areas.[20] These results, accordingly, are not contradictory to the hypothesis that it is the restless, discontented, and less well-adapted persons in a particular cultural situation who migrate, and if these show a somewhat higher level of I.Q., this is a part of the larger pattern of rebellion against the restrictions imposed by the social situation of origin. This conclusion is confirmed in part by the findings of Whetten and Mitchell, who found that net migration from a rural town in Connecticut from 1930 to 1937 resulted in an appreciable decline in the single, divorced, separated, and widowed, as compared to the married.[21] On the whole, these categories represent some degree of personal disorganization and may be interpreted as showing a tendency for those elements in the population less adapted to the stable conditions of a rural community to migrate in favor of others attracted by rural stability and conformity.

Studies of the movement of notable persons also confirm the hypothesis, since they show that the great majority achieve distinction in states other than of origin and also that they move much more frequently than the general population.[22] From this point of view, the migrant is the restless individual who breaks with the pattern of the locale of origin and seeks other places for the development of his tendencies toward variant behavior. Historically this has meant pioneering into undeveloped areas; contemporaneously this means moving to urban areas where there is less restriction upon conduct.

[19] Gist and Clark do not assume that mental tests measure inborn intelligence. See *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[21] N. L. Whetten and Don Mitchell, "Migration from a Connecticut Suburban Town, 1930-1937," *American Sociological Review*, vol. IV (April, 1939), pp. 178-179.

[22] Sanford B. Winston, "Bio-Social Characteristics of American Inventors," *American Sociological Review*, vol. II (December, 1937), pp. 839-840.

The personal disorganization of the migrant, therefore, is of essentially the same order, on the whole, as that found in adolescence in that it represents some break with the established order but is not of the sort which tends to arouse particularly strong social disapproval, except in unusual cases. In fact migration itself not infrequently provides an escape from social disapproval, since the migrant often finds some cultural area in which his variant behavior meets with social approval. Thus the personally disorganized of one area determine the social organization of another.

If, on the other hand, no congenial cultural habitat is found as the consequence of migration and movement becomes an established pattern of response, the consequence is a type of mobile person who shows little attachment to any social milieu. It is this type of person who often becomes a marginal man, deviating from the culture of his origin and unable through movement to find a hospitable culture.

THE MARGINAL MAN

Park has defined the marginal man as "one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures." [23] Thus marginality is the result of conflicting strains of cultural experiences which unfit the person from participating effectively in either of the cultural groups, both of which have determined his personal organization. Identification with one group as opposed to the other is made impossible by his inability to accept one cultural pattern and reject the other and by the social disapproval with which he is met on the part of both groups.

It is customary to distinguish between the "stranger" and the marginal man. The stranger is, as Simmel has pointed out, the person in whom are united the near and the far. The stranger is the potential wanderer whose present spatial position is fixed, but

[23] Robert E. Park, Introduction to Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man*, p. xv.

who, because of his origin elsewhere, has not become wholly identified with his present locale. Because he is not rooted in his present cultural locale, he achieves an objectivity denied those who have always been a part of the group. The consequence is that his relations with the members of the group are impersonal, and he reserves for himself the freedom of movement which makes it possible for him to be in a group but not of it.[24]

The stranger is thus free from the pull of divided loyalties to the culture of origin and that of residence. In his emancipation from the former, he has not substituted the latter as the focal point of attachment. He shows little concern for status in the new group and maintains his intermediary role, typically that of a trader who performs a useful function which, on the whole, the members of the group are incapable of performing as well as he. When his position in this intermediary capacity is questioned, he is always ready to move elsewhere. Should he, however, eventually aspire to become a more integral part of the group and find himself unacceptable in a more intimate relationship, he evolves into the marginal position.[25]

Stonequist differentiates two types of marginal men, the racial hybrid and the cultural hybrid. Racial hybridism is found wherever there is intermarriage and interbreeding between racial groups of different social status; cultural hybridism is the outgrowth of conflicting cultures.[26]

The half-breeds who exhibit marginality are of two types: (1) those who are not accepted by either racial group and (2) those who are identified with the inferior racial group but aspire to status in the superior. Where interbreeding occurs between members of two racial groups, each of which looks upon itself as superior and is therefore highly ethnocentric, the tendency is for the half-breed to find himself ostracized by both groups.

[24] Georg Simmel, *Sociologie*, pp. 685-691, translated and quoted in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 322-327.

[25] Everett V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man*, pp. 177-178.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-9.

Thus the half-breed has no place in the social structure of either group and his position tends to be an inferior one. If one of these racial groups is dominant politically over the other, as in the case of the English in India, the half-breed aspires to be identified with the dominant group and may achieve such status precariously through "passing," if his physical traits are such as to cause him to be readily accepted as of English descent.

The social situation of the second group of racial hybrids is that in which the position of one racial group is inferior to that of another and is so looked upon by the members of the less-privileged group. Under these conditions, the inferior group apes the culture of the superior, though its members are excluded from participation upon an equal plane. The half-breed, accordingly, finds himself identified with the inferior side of his ancestry, but rebels against it more vigorously than the full-bloods of his inferior racial group. Again, if physical heritage has not marked him as belonging to the inferior group, he is tempted to "pass." But this potentiality only adds to the precariousness of his situation by causing the members of his inferior-ancestry group to suspect him of passing, whether he actually does so or not. The consequence is that he, like the half-breed of the first type, tends to have little status in either of the racial groups to which he belongs by biological inheritance. This ostracization is, of course, a reflection of the jealousy experienced by every full-blood member of the inferior race, and it may be intertwined with compensatory behavior on the part of the inferior group in which their distinctive racial traits become aggrandized as symbols of their belonging. This type is represented by the mulatto in America, who, whether he is extremely light in color or not, is tempted to pass as a white man. He is deterred, however, by the fear of being found out and embarrassed with loss of status in both the white and the Negro groups.[27]

The cultural hybrid occupies a marginal position because he is the product of two cultures. These divergent cultures produce

[27] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 10-53.

in the person uncertainty of status and allegiance. The consequence is the development of three types of marginal man: (1) the person who becomes identified with the superior or dominant cultural group, scorning the inferior or subordinate heritage; (2) the person who finds himself unable to identify himself with either of the groups, both of whose cultures are incorporated in his personality; and (3) the person who is thrown back upon the inferior group, seldom from choice but commonly because of deep-seated prejudices which exist between the two groups in conflict which become the basis of his rejection upon the part of the superior group.

Where the cultural hybrid becomes identified solely with the dominant group, he does so at the expense of his emotional attachment with the inferior. In order to facilitate the repression of his feelings of inferiority growing out of his divided heritage, he tends to overcompensate and to develop exaggerated traits which symbolize his allegiance to the superior group. Thus the superpatriot is often a cultural hybrid; and the most zealous churchman is often the converted unbeliever.

In the second group are all those persons who find it difficult to identify themselves with either cultural group to which their mixed heritage would associate them. Thus they often tend to pass rather freely from one group to the other, yet not feeling quite at home in either, or else to renounce both groups with equal vehemence. In any case they do not have the unqualified social approval of either of the groups from which their cultural heritage has come, and they may have the violent social disapproval of both.

The third group is not unlike the first in many respects, except that compensation is patterned in terms of the norms of the inferior group, and there often is a deep feeling of self-pity and self-sacrifice involved in their identification with the inferior group. This feeling of self-pity and self-sacrifice is often interspersed with emotions of rebellion and distaste for the position which they occupy, followed by the exaggerated development of

those traits which characterize the culture of the inferior group by way of making amends for their heresy.

In addition to the types of cultural hybrids already described, there are a number of further situations in which are produced persons whose position is marginal for other reasons than that they were born into, and grew up under, a duality of cultural milieux. These are the situations in which there has been in the life experiences a change from one cultural setting to another, the second being in conflict with the first. These persons may be called cultural pseudohybrids and are the outgrowths of the struggle between religions, between social classes, between country and city, between nations, and between sexes.[28]

It is necessary to distinguish between the cultural hybrids and the cultural pseudohybrids, since the social situations out of which the two develop are fundamentally different. This does not mean that the form of personal disorganization is essentially different, for in many respects the patterns of the cultural pseudohybrid are analogous to those of the true cultural hybrid. The most striking differences grow out of the fact that, to the cultural hybrid, duality of cultural contacts has been constant from birth and therefore has been the background of development throughout the most formative years. Marginality, therefore, inevitably characterizes every individual who develops under these conditions, though it may express itself more markedly in some than in others. As for the cultural pseudohybrid, a part of the individual's life has been under one culture, and conflict arises later as the person is introduced into a second cultural medium. This introduction into a second cultural complex is fundamentally of the same character as that of the introduction of the individual into the school group and later, during the period of adolescence, into the adult world. Normal growth in the complex modern world involves many such transitions, and in the process there is little personal disorganization in the large majority of cases. Marginality, therefore, is not an inevitable consequence of the

[28] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 4.

process but is largely a function of the sharpness of transition and of the amount of social disapproval encountered in favor of or against the transition.

The transition from the lower classes to the upper develops the marginal man typified in the parvenu. The parvenu in his ostentatious display of jewelry, of clothes, of bankroll, and what not is but overcompensating for his feelings of inferiority which link him to his humble background. Much of the incessant drive of the successful businessman represents the struggle for power with which to compensate for social inferiority of birth.[29] This is perhaps the most fundamental reason why he displays such intolerance toward those less fortunate than himself. Nothing is more flattering to the human being than to be led to believe that he has, through his own unusual efforts, been able to raise himself by his own bootstraps from the humblest of conditions to a position of power and universal recognition.

The extremes to which the process of overcompensation may go is well illustrated in the following description:

> For several seasons I was assigned to the famous "Twentieth Century Limited," the crack train of the New York Central Railroad between New York and Chicago, and the most famous train as well as the fastest in the world. It was on this train that I used to encounter and study a famous captain of industry who exemplified the grandiose. It was his custom to have his valet and personal physician accompany him on all his trips. Before leaving his hotel he would always telephone the chief red cap and inform him of his intention of leaving that day on the "Century." The chief red cap, knowing that there was a big tip in store for him, would make the necessary preparations. He would pick about six or eight of his tallest and handsomest red caps and wait the arrival of the famous captain of industry. The famous captain of industry would always pick the psychological moment to put in his appearance. He invariably remained in the foyer of the station until about three minutes before the scheduled departure of the Century. Then the

[29] It is the collapse of this protective mechanism in radical business reverses, perhaps, which accounts for the suicides which follow closely upon business failure, a phenomenon which occurs with increased frequence in periods of economic depression.

chief red cap would lead the procession to the train, on his arm reposing the overcoat of the famous captain of industry. The six or eight red caps, each with one bag or coat or an umbrella, would follow single file, and behind them came the pompous gentleman with his valet and personal physician. Of course, when he entered the train everyone was wondering who could this man be who was so great that even the chief red cap, another exalted being, would deign to stoop and carry his coat. When the luggage was properly placed in the stateroom the famous man would walk into the body of the car and in full view of the other passengers pull out a large roll of bills and give each red cap a new five-dollar note and the chief red cap a twenty-dollar note. Just before the train pulled out it was his custom to give the messenger boy several self-addressed telegrams to be delivered at the various stations where the train stopped en route. He would bribe the train stenographer to walk through the entire train paging him upon receipt of one of these telegrams. Even though I had never heard of psychiatry at that time, these actions appeared strange and unnatural to me. On one such trip I asked the young doctor just why his employer craved so much limelight, and he informed me that as a youth this famous man had known nothing but the direst poverty and want. He also told me that the man was now impotent and his actions were designed to compensate for this condition.[30]

The modern world, making possible as it has the employment of women outside the home and the decline of functions in the home, has unsettled the woman's world. The position of many women as a consequence becomes marginal. Opportunities are open for employment in industry, business, and government, yet to continue careers after marriage meets the disapproval of men who resent this encroachment upon what has been traditionally the man's world and encounters the outraged resentment of other women less venturesome who are jealous of the freedom of the career woman. This type of woman has been called the "gunpowder" woman by a popular writer.[31] Even the husbands of

[30] Edward M. Swift and Charles S. Boyd, "The Pullman Porter Looks at Life," *Psychoanalytic Review,* vol. XV (July, 1928), pp. 401-402.

[31] Pearl S. Buck, "America's Gunpowder Women," *Harper's,* July, 1939, pp. 126-136.

these women often lend their support, tacit or otherwise, to the disapproval of others.[32]

In the transition from the country to the city there tends to develop at times considerable marginality. The rural migrant finds himself on occasions the butt of the city man's jokes and the object of attitudes of amused superiority and is uncomfortable in the role of the recipient of what he considers to be the rude stares of the city dweller. The result is that he often becomes, for a time at least, as highly self-conscious in the presence of the urbanite as he is bewildered by the amazing sights which he sees on every hand.[33]

More pregnant with potentiality for marginality than any other situation, however, is migration from one country to another having a markedly different culture such as in the recent immigration to the United States. Here was a transition not only from the country to the city but also, after the period of greatest plasticity had passed, from one culture pattern to another. The result was that the transition necessitated change not only in the more routine patterns of response but in the patterns of language, of vocational adjustment, and even of mores. The natural consequence was that the person would become confused, if not disillusioned, in the new land.

One of the first consequences of migration is the loss of status which the immigrant suffers as the "greenhorn" in the new land. In his country of birth, his language, dress, interests, vocational training, social ritual, and customs were the stock in trade by which he secured and maintained his status in the group. In the new land, he finds that these bring him the derision and contempt of the natives and the superior condescension of even those of his own countrymen who have preceded him. If he was trained in the professions in the "old" country, he finds that his lack of proficiency in the new language stands as a barrier to following

[32] Cf. Stonequist, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6; Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family*, pp. 111n., 268-269; Ernest R. Groves, "The Psychology of the Woman Who Works," *Family*, vol. VIII (May, 1927), pp. 92-97.

[33] Stonequist, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

his profession. He is forced by circumstances to begin his life over again, taking up a trade or occupation for which he has neither respect nor interest beyond that of making a living. Even though he is eventually successful, the hardships which he has suffered, the sacrifices he has had to make, the loss of sentimental values, and the regretful memories of home conditions now idealized in retrospect cause him to feel that he has lost his life.[34]

Sentimental attachments to the homeland, stimulated particularly by crises in world affairs, which bring the immigrant into sharp conflict with the natives, accentuate the natural tendencies to feel that he does not "belong" and add to his marginality. Under the pressure of social disapproval, he may try to hide his identity as an immigrant by changing his name and moving into a nonimmigrant community only to find that mannerisms and accent of speech betray him. Or if successful in "passing," his fear of being discovered and his feeling of disloyalty to his group make him an unhappy man analogous to the racial hybrid who passes.

The children of immigrants are likely to be little less inclined toward marginality than the immigrants themselves because of the conflict in character of the culture of the parents and the native culture. Being native born, they tend to take for granted the customs and institutions of the land of birth and to look with scorn upon the vestiges of old world traits in their parents, but this loyalty seems in conflict with that to the land of their ancestry. The result is that they find themselves pulled in two directions. This conflict is accentuated when the second generation is the object of race prejudice, for then their tendencies toward assimilation arouse the anxiety and opposition of their parents, while their lack of assimilation exposes them to the antipathies of the natives.[35]

Stonequist finds that there is a typical life cycle of the marginal

[34] Cf. Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, pp. 43-118; Stonequist, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-96.
[35] Stonequist, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-106.

man. In this life cycle, he differentiates three phases: (1) a phase in which he is not aware that the conflict between cultures embraces his own career, which is analogous to the period of childhood in the normal genetic development of the individual; (2) a phase in which he becomes conscious of the conflict between cultures, which is analogous to adolescence; and (3) the final phase in which his adjustments or lack of adjustment becomes crystalized, which phase is analogous to the accommodations of maturity.[36]

Since the individual has not yet become conscious of conflict in the first phase, marginality has its beginning in the second phase. It does not reach full development, however, until attempts at adjustment become patterned along consistent lines. This patterning of response may lead to a successful adjustment, which so long as it functions, brings to an end the person's marginality. On the other hand, the pattern achieved may be such as to make for a more effective orientation in his social milieu and yet fail to completely free the person from the conflict out of which grew his marginality. These persons continue in a marginal role, though their accommodation to the internal conflict prevents disorganization of the personality. Should no consistent pattern of accommodations develop, the personality becomes thoroughly disorganized, and may even show tendencies toward disintegration.[37]

Whatever the nature of the social situation out of which marginality arises, the chief trait of the marginal man is his ambivalence of attitudes and loyalties growing out of the conflict between the two cultures which he has incorporated into his personality. The consequence is that he is not at home in either and is constantly being required to make decisions and choices in favor of one or the other cultural patterns, which in the nature of things he is incapable of making. The resulting nervous strain not only increases his self-consciousness but gives rise to feelings

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

of personal inadequacy and the development of an inferiority complex. In turn, in his struggle to find situations in which he can excel, he tends to overcompensate in ways which make his social position more precarious.[38] His salvation lies in the development of an intermediary role in which he is identified with neither of the conflicting cultures but is able to view them objectively and perform a function comparable to that of the stranger. Under these circumstances, personal disorganization is not eliminated, but status is achieved in a marginal group which is partly, although not wholly, in conflict with the larger social order.

THE CASUAL LABORER

Closely related to the adolescent rebel and to the marginal man is the casual laborer or hobo. The hobo is also a migrant, but, unlike the pioneer and the immigrant, he does not find a relatively permanent place in any cultural area. In fact, it is his very detachment from any specific locale which constitutes his chief characteristic. And because of his detachment, he makes few concessions to the prevailing cultural norms. Consequently though he lives in a community, he does not become a part of it. Of necessity he may and often does perform useful functions, working in the harvest field, delivering advertising matter from door to door in the city, or building railroads into new territory, but he is always on the move and without destination. The wanderlust has become for him a vice in which his rebellion against the social order finds no clear-cut patterning but remains amorphous and transitory.

Anderson, upon the basis of his personal experiences with hobos in which he lived with them and obtained much autobiographical material, has classified the factors which make for hoboism as: (1) seasonal work and unemployment; (2) industrial inadequacy; (3) defects of personality; (4) crises in the life of

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 144-154.

the person; (5) racial or national discrimination; and (6) wanderlust.[39]

Seasonal work and unemployment is further differentiated by Anderson into: seasonal occupations, local changes in industry, seasonal fluctuations in the demand for labor, and periods of unskilled labor which excites the imagination of the foot-loose man and the boy. Local changes in industry, such as the depletion of a timber area, the exhaustion of a vein of ore, or the movement of a factory from one location to another, disrupt the routine of the wage earner and set him adrift. Seasonal demands for labor in industries encourage the ebb and flow of labor from place to place, searching for work not affected by seasonal demands or work at a different point in the seasonal cycle. Periods of unemployment disorganize some individuals through the "stress-and-strain of uncertainty and deprivation" and the break in the routine of work, and they become hobos.[40]

Industrial inadequacy, aside from personality defects, Anderson classified into: physical handicaps caused by accident, sickness, or occupational diseases; alcoholism and drug addiction; and old age. Accidents, both industrial and nonindustrial, leave the worker handicapped in competition with others and therefore forced to accept employment in work which is intermittent in character. Sickness and occupational diseases throw the worker out of employment and render him unfit for the type of labor which he has become accustomed to performing. Alcoholism and drug addiction decrease the economic efficiency of the worker and render him less well adapted to group relations, partly because of the drain upon his earnings and partly because of the social stigma attached to excessive drinking and the use of drugs. Old age results in loss of regular employment and, in the absence of family attachments, sends the man on the road if his individualism rebels against the almshouse.[41]

[39] Nels Anderson, *The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man*, p. 61.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 61-65.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

Defects in personality, Anderson divides into: feeble-mindedness, constitutional inferiority, emotional instability, and egocentricity. Feeble-mindedness encourages hoboism, because it necessitates a low-grade economic adjustment characteristic of the casual laborer. Emotional instability and egocentricity provide the basis for becoming easily disgruntled upon the job and to quitting upon the slightest pretext. Rebellious to routine, the emotionally unstable and egocentric develop a philosophy of rationalizing their moving from one job to another as providing independence and opportunity to learn about other kinds of work.[42]

Crises in the life of the person which result in hoboism run the gamut of family conflict, feeling of failure, disgrace or embarrassment, and fear of punishment for some legal offense. Thus conflict between parent and child sends the boy upon the road; quarreling of husband and wife causes the husband to become a hobo; death of parents sends children adrift; embarrassing situations, such as being jilted or wrongly accused of some crime, provide incentives for leaving the local community in the maintenance of self-respect; and escape from punishment for some misdemeanor, such as failure to pay alimony or responsibility for the pregnancy of a woman, makes flight the natural course and initiates hoboism.[43]

Discrimination in industry upon the basis of racial or national traits tends to result in a descent from regular to casual employment and so encourages hoboism.

And finally, the wanderlust, stimulated by the experiences of some admired relative or friend or by the glamour of the road portrayed in folktales, contributes its part to the causation of hoboism.[44]

Parker looked upon the hobo as a victim of a civilization which represses expression of the normal instincts in labor which is

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 70-77.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-81.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 81-85.

monotonous, dirty, mechanized, mechanically simplified, insecure, or servile. The result is that the hobo tries to compensate for this thwarting of his nature through the overdevelopment of the wander instinct which is common to all individuals but under normal conditions does not gain undue importance as compared to the other instincts.[45]

Basically, Parker found the hobo little different from other dissatisfied laborers except that, in compensating for feelings of inferiority which are the result of thwarting of many of his instincts, the hobo concentrates upon satisfying one instinct, the wandering. Thus in Parker's conception, the hobo is at one with a number of other misfits. This Parker expresses in the following statement of his thesis:

> The importance of the following descriptions of the innate tendencies or instincts lies in their relation to my main explanation of economic behavior which is:
>
> First, that these tendencies are persistent, are far less warped or modified by the environment than we believe, that they function quite as they have for several hundred thousand years, that they as motives in their various normal or perverted habit form can at times dominate singly the entire behavior and act as if they were a clear character dominant.
>
> Secondly, that if the environment through any of the conventional instruments of repression such as religious orthodoxy, universal mental discipline, economic inferiority, imprisonment, physical disfigurement, such as short stature, hare lip, etc., repress the full psychological expression in the field of these tendencies, then a psychic revolt, a slipping into the abnormal mental functioning, takes place, and society accuses the revolutionist of being either willfully inefficient, alcoholic, a syndicalist, supersensitive, an agnostic, or insane.[46]

More specifically, however, the hobo represents one type of balked laborer which Parker describes as following one of two lines of conduct in response to the repressions of society:

[45] Carleton H. Parker, *The Casual Laborer and Other Essays*, pp. 48-49.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, publishers.

First, either weakens, becomes inefficient, drifts away, loses interest in the quality of his work, drinks, deserts his family, or,

Secondly, he indulges in a true type-inferiority compensation and in order to dignify himself, to eliminate for himself his inferiority in his own eyes, he strikes or brings on a strike, he commits violence or he stays on the job and injures machinery, or mutilates the materials; he is fit food for dynamite conspiracies. He is ready to make sabotage a part of his regular habit scheme. His condition is one of mental stress and unfocussed psychic unrest, and could in all accuracy be called a definite industrial psychosis. He is neither willful nor responsible, he is suffering from a stereotyped mental disease.[47]

While the instinctual explanation of Parker is hardly to be accepted, there is no doubt but that he shows a fundamental understanding of the hobo's personality. In his rebellion against the routine, not only of industry but of ordinary life, the hobo is the arch individualist and therefore a man without a cause and without a country. He has, as Parker has pointed out, "sacrificed the human need of association and organization to a romantic passion for individual freedom." [48] The consequence is that he cannot be organized successfully even in his own interests. He differs from other rebels in that he shows little interest in developing a sympathetic group, for he has no creed, no code of rebellion, no program of social change. He wants only to be left alone to follow his own fancies and to move about at will. In this he is at one with the Bohemian. He is, in fact, the Bohemian in the ranks of the common laborer.[49]

There are, of course, intellectuals in the ranks of the hobo. These, however, are not representative but instead are Bohemians who have taken to the road. In training and capability, they do not belong to the hobo class, and their association with the true hobo tends to be short lived. Representative of this group in the past have been Jack London, Harry Kemp, Walt Whitman, Vachel Lindsay, and O. Henry.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 49. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, publishers.
[48] Robert E. Park, "The Mind of the Hobo," chapter IX in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, pp. 158-159.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 158-160.

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V

The Reformer and the Revolutionist

THE PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION of the reformer and the revolutionist, or radical, is much more marked than that of the adolescent, the marginal man, and the hobo, because the pattern of response is more consistent and persistent. The consequence is a greater degree of social disapproval, which finds its counterpart in the more extended efforts upon the part of the reformer and the radical to win social approval and in a more consistently organized attempt to mobilize a sympathetic group through which to promote the cause.

The reformer and the radical contrast with the adolescent, who has no program in his revolt against the older generation and who, because so much of his rebellion is a negativistic protest against the status quo, tends to shuttle from one antipathy to another. In this the adolescent has much in common with the Bohemian. A lack of consistent program is also characteristic of the marginal man, except in the intermediary role where he achieves consistency, unless it is the pattern exhibited by the dominant group in which he aspires to be identified but which he never entirely achieves except at the sacrifice of internal harmony.

The reformer has been variously defined as the reclaimer of the old and as a part radical. According to the first point of view, the reformer seeks to reconstruct social conditions in conformity with the mores. While the radical is concerned with reconstructing the social order along lines differing from those which

prevail at a particular time, the reformer seeks to bring the behavior of individuals and groups into harmony with the traditional standards which society accepts in theory but fails to live up to in practice. Thus the reformer from this point of view is essentially the evangelist preaching repentance.[1]

The program of the reformer is either that of calling to the group's attention the fact that its members are honoring the mores only in the breech (or at least some portion of the group membership is so doing) or that of reconstructing certain administrative and institutional activities which are carried on presumably within the framework of the mores but which actually do violence to them. Reformers who advocate law enforcement, economy in government, more strict divorce legislation, elimination of graft in politics, and so on belong to this category.

From the second point of view, the reformer, a part radical, differs from the radical in that he advocates reconstruction of only a specific segment of the social order, rather than the whole. In this attempt he does not question the general pattern; he so models his reform that not only does it fit smoothly into the larger social order, but it fits more consistently than the phase which he would replace with his reform. Much of the propagandizing of the reformer is devoted to emphasizing that his proposal will make the existing social order a more effectively operating mechanism, whereas the practice which it would replace constitutes a dangerous threat to the social order itself. The position of the reformer is therefore difficult to attack without at the same time attacking the social norms which the reformer is attempting to make more realizable. Accordingly, the reformer enjoys a respectability denied the radical and revolutionist and is able to carry his campaign for group support out into the open. The

[1] Cf. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 934, and Edward B. Reuter and Clyde Hart, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 520-521.

radical and the revolutionist, in contrast, are frequently forced to operate under cover.[2]

From the standpoint of variance from the general practice, there seems to be little reason for restricting the conception of the reformer to either of the two points of view already presented. What differentiates the reformer from the conformist is the fact that he advocates changes in collective behavior from the currently practiced pattern whether in the direction of reviving old practices or of introducing new ones. In either case he attempts to strengthen the social order either by showing that certain practices have grown up insidiously which are out of harmony with it and therefore there should be a return to earlier practices or by showing that certain new practices need to be incorporated into collective behavior in order that the basic patterns of the social order may be more effectively instrumented. There are, in other words, both conservative and radical reformers.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE REFORMER

Fundamentally, radical and conservative reformers have much in common. Both feel the imperative need for some marked change in social practices. The difference lies in the direction which the two feel that change should take—the development of new patterns or the revival of the old. Nevertheless, the social experiences of the conservative reformer and the radical reformer are quite different.

The classic explanation of the reformer is that he is one who sees more clearly than the average man the inconsistencies which have developed in social relationships. His keen sympathy makes the wrongs and thwarted interests and ambitions of others his own. He identifies himself with the victims of the social situation and formulates a plan for action. Thus the abolitionists ob-

[2] Cf. Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," chapter 22 in Robert E. Park (editor), *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 269-270.

served the incongruity between the position of the slave and the doctrine of freedom and liberty incorporated in the federal constitution and embarked upon a program designed to abolish slavery.

This explanation seems to fit the case fairly well when the reformer belongs to a different social class than do the persons whose lot he attempts to better. And yet even here it is not clear why the social insulation which protects all but a few of the members of the more fortunate social class fails to function in these particular instances. Perhaps the determining factors are, then, those which produce reformers from within a social group.

A second explanation of the genesis of the reformer is that his desire to reconstruct a part of the collective behavior of the group grows out of personal discontents resulting from persistent blockings in the achievements of satisfactions by the reformer himself. In seeking for an explanation of these blockings, he hits upon some feature of the social order which becomes the object of his attack.

Not infrequently these blockings take on symbolic significance. The person who experiences marked disillusionment in adolescence at finding that his parents were not the omnipotent creatures he had earlier assumed them to be, becomes the radical reformer in adulthood. He identifies the beneficiaries of the particular part of the social order which he believes needs reconstruction with the dominant parent, usually the father, and develops ways of circumventing them by changing the social pattern.

It is clear that both explanations need to be combined in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory. Undoubtedly, some personal discomfort lies at the basis of all radical reform, but this blocking of normal channels of expression may be experienced either directly or vicariously by the person. But whatever the source of the discontent, the desire for social approval leads to the analysis of the social situation, however partial that analysis may be, and the formulation of a basis for protest in such terms as to win

sympathetic approval upon the part of some group. And since the reformer seeks only a reconstruction of a segment of social behavior within the larger pattern which he expresses allegiance to, some social approval is generally forthcoming.

The genesis of the conservative reformer is quite different. There are reasons to believe that the tendencies of human beings to project their own deficiencies and delinquencies upon others are at the root of this type of reform. Thus the conservative reformer shows many of the manifestations of the religious convert whose acceptance of salvation is in response to a deep-seated sense of guilt. Accordingly, the conservative reformer turns to a program of revival of patterns of yesterday in atonement for his fall from grace.

The tendency of the radical reformer to attack a segment of the social order while accepting other phases of it has been brought out in a study by Lundborg in which he gave a questionnaire to two hundred students containing twenty questions each on religious, political, economic, and moral issues. If radicalism were a homogeneous phenomenon, it would be expected that a person who was radical upon one set of issues would also be radical upon all sets. This, however, was not the case, since only 1 per cent of the students were clearly radical on as many as 5 per cent of the issues, though over half the students were quite radical 1 per cent of the time.[3]

Much the same conclusion may be drawn from a study by Vetter in which he tested about a thousand students in three colleges, one in New York City, another in upper New York state, and the third on the west coast. Questions covered the political, economic, and moral fields. On the whole, the students were very conservative towards free mating, the powers of the Supreme Court, and naval armaments and only slightly less so towards divorce. In contrast, they swung over to a liberal position on birth control and academic freedom. For the New York City

[3] See discussion of factors in radicalism in Gardner Murphy, Lois Barclay Murphy, and Theodore Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, pp. 813-846.

group, the "average" student held one reactionary opinion, twelve conservative opinions, five neutral opinions, fourteen liberal opinions, and two radical opinions out of the thirty-six issues upon which he was asked to express an opinion and failed to answer two.[4]

On the other hand, Harper's study of the attitudes and beliefs of American educators would suggest that the inconsistency which seems to characterize the radical as indicated by tests of college students may not be so true of adults who have passed the less stable period of college life. Having established the interdependence of his statements by a group of "expert" judges, Harper calculated the mean number of inconsistencies for the various gradations of "liberalism" with the following results: [5]

Liberalism Score	Mean Number of Inconsistencies
40	10.5
50	7.5
60	6.0
70	3.4

From these results it would appear that inconsistency decreases as "liberalism" increases. Nevertheless, there is little indication that inconsistencies do not remain, though with less frequency, with the higher degrees of "liberalism." This, however, may simply mean that the extreme "liberal" is approaching more nearly the traits of the revolutionary who differs primarily from the radical reformer in that his program of change is all encompassing, rather than segmental.

Because of his segmental approach to the social order, the reformer, whether radical or conservative, is more clearly the product of a specific time and place. His program is rooted in a particular era and a specific locale and therefore is much more

[4] G. B. Vetter, "The Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes and the Related Personality Factors," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. XXV (1930), pp. 149-189.

[5] M. H. Harper, "Social Beliefs and Attitudes of American Educators," *Teachers' College Contributions to Education* (1927), no. 294.

subject to the vicissitudes of style and fashion than is that of the revolutionist. Thus there are styles in reform much as there are in dress. The era of the muckrake gives way to the decade of rebellion against Main Street and its Babbitts only to be succeeded in turn by the depression-created salvation of capitalism.[6]

But whatever may be the general pattern and the content of the reform program at a particular time, the techniques of the reformer are essentially the same. In the first place, he always portrays the present as a crisis. More objectively considered, the condition which the reformer would change has existed for some time. It came into existence not suddenly but gradually, and the climax which the reformer describes is a figment of the imagination. Slavery existed long before the first abolitionist; it was the publication of Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* which constituted the crisis. Graft and corruption were an old story under the rule of Tammany in New York City; the campaign of John Purroy Mitchel precipitated a crisis. The saloon had flourished for decades as an integral part of the American scene before the lecture on temperance at Hillsboro, Ohio, by Dr. Dio Lewis of Boston, on the night of December 23, 1873, initiated the women's temperance crusade out of which developed the Women's Christian Temperance Union. Nevertheless, the reformer, whether he consciously realizes it or not, is probably utilizing a technique essential to the success of his program. It is only as he is able to impress upon others the necessity of immediate action that he can arouse sufficient support to make his plans workable.

Closely related to the crisis presentation is the categorical position of the reformer. He takes it for granted that he is right and that he has arrived at a superior, and even the only, solution to the problem. Therefore, if one differs with him, then that person is wrong. There can be no compromise with the opposition, just as there can be none with truth. In his defense of his position, the reformer knows all the answers, and those who advocate

[6] For a historical account of cycles of reform in the United States, see Lillian Symes and Clement Travers, *Rebel America.*

moderation are members of the opposition, masquerading in sheep's clothing.[7]

THE BOHEMIAN AND THE REVOLUTIONIST

Fundamentally, the Bohemian and the revolutionist have much in common with the reformer, particularly with the reformer who espouses a radical rather than a conservative program. As has already been pointed out, the revolutionist differs from the reformer in that he wishes to reconstruct the social order rather than change some segment of it. This difference, however, has wide-reaching consequences, since it arouses much more intense opposition and disapproval upon the part of many of the members of the group and creates out of this disapproval some of the most important characteristics of the revolutionist.

Like the reformer, the revolutionist believes that he has arrived at a superior view. In this he is as uncompromising as the reformer, if not more so. Furthermore, he believes that he is ahead of his time or at least comes to that conclusion as the aftermath of the antipathies expressed toward him by others of his social milieu. He categorically condemns everything that is old, since to him the fact that a practice, a technique, or a belief arose and gained acceptance in the past is in itself proof that it was a function of a past situation which no longer exists and cannot, therefore, be effective in the present. Such practices, accordingly, stand only as impediments to the reconstruction of the social order along more desirable lines.

Unlike the radical reformer, the true revolutionist is seldom the apostate. It is not clear why this is true unless it be that the reformer identifies himself less completely with the group whose cause he espouses than does the revolutionist, and that accordingly duality in personality trends is more probable. Nomad has eloquently described this process in the proletarian reformer:

> Like Faust, the rebellious and self-taught ex-worker has two souls dwelling in his breast. Taken as a group, he is originally, like the

[7] Cf. W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*, pp. 5-6.

worker, at the bottom of the social ladder. He shares the worker's hatred and resentment against a system that denies him the good things of life. Side by side with the worker he struggles against privilege and thus develops all the heroic qualities which that struggle calls forth. But his interests are not identical with those of his humbler associates. He has his education, his invisible capital, which, sooner or later, as the struggle progresses, enables him and his social group to rise to a position of comfort within the existing or the "transitional" system—while the worker is told to expect it only under "pure socialism," which only his grand-children may live to see. Along with the flame of revolt, a fire less sacred burns in the heart of the leader—the lust for power and its material rewards. Gradually his personal, group, and class interests prevail with him over those of the laboring masses; and his mind, always ready to rationalize his desires, is forever finding convincing arguments to justify his new course. Having achieved recognition, influence, or power, the apostles of yesterday become apostates, the tribunes turn traitors, and the rebels—renegades.[8]

And yet there is reason to believe that there is a type of emotional radical whose radicalism arises out of personal discomforts and adolescent rebellions, who espouses the cause of the revolutionists, and who vacillates from one revolutionary program to another. He is not a revolutionist in a true sense since he espouses reform programs and revolutionary programs with equal enthusiasm. In part, undoubtedly, his rebellion represents a bid for attention through negativistic behavior, as a French writer long ago recognized:

There are some men who delay becoming religious and pious till the time everybody openly avows himself irreligious and a free thinker, for as this has then become vulgar, they will be distinguished from the crowd. In so serious and important a matter singularity pleases them; only in trifling things, of no consequence, they follow the fashion and do what others do; for all I know they consider it somewhat courageous and daring to run the risk of what may happen to them in the next world.[9]

[8] Max Nomad, *Rebels and Renegades,* pp. vi-vii. By permission of Macmillan Company, publishers.

[9] Jean de la Bruyère, *The Characters,* translated by Henri van Laun, pp. 461-462.

This tendency to pass from one position to another is the characteristic of the Bohemian. In his discussion of Bolshevism, Spargo has graphically portrayed this characteristic:

> If we take the group of American intellectuals who at present are ardent champions of bolshevism we shall find that, with exceptions so few as to be almost negligible, they have embraced nearly every "ism" as it arose, seeing in each one the magic solvent of humanity's ills. Those of an older generation thus regarded bimetallism, for instance. What else could be required to make the desert bloom like a garden and to usher in the earthly Paradise? The younger ones, in their turn, took up anarchist-communism, Marxian socialism, industrial unionism, syndicalism, birth control, feminism, and many other movements and propagandas, each of which in its turn induced ecstatic visions of a new heaven and a new earth. The same intellectuals have grown lyrical in praise of every bizarre and eccentric art fad. In the banal and grotesque travesties of art produced by cubists, futurists, et al., they saw transcendant genius. They are forever seeking new gods and burying old ones.[10]

Spargo explains this phase of behavior by relating it to emotionalism, often bordering upon hysteria, which in the past has characterized religious movements.[11] Rice, however, suggests that the explanation lies in the fact that the "radical's" identification with a cause is primarily an emotional phenomenon which tends to lose touch with his reasoning process. The program, therefore, serves principally as a vehicle for the expression of impulses and emotions, and the tenets of the movement are accepted as a matter of faith. And since the selection of a particular cause is a fortuitous matter, this emotional identification tends to run its natural course, after which it becomes reconditioned to another cause.[12]

But whatever the explanation, the facts are quite clear that the

[10] John Spargo, *The Psychology of Bolshevism;* quotation from an adaptation in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 911. By permission of The University of Chicago Press, publishers.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 911.

[12] Stuart A. Rice, "Motives in Radicalism and Social Reform," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXVII (January, 1923), pp. 577-585.

Bohemian's life organization, as Thomas and Znaniecki have pointed out, is one in which there is no systematization of attitudes and the person remains open to any and all influences. His choice of life schemes depends upon some momentary influence which appeals to some part of the personality without involving the rest of it. Inconsistency is the essential characteristic of his behavior, and he shows a high degree of adaptability. This adaptability, however, leads not to any new systematic life organization but only to a provisional patterning.[13]

This instability of life organization differentiates the Bohemian from the revolutionist. The revolutionist represents a more stable life organization, protected from the onslaught of criticism by an ideological system. This ideological system of the revolutionist is not in any true sense the cause of his rebellious behavior but is instead a system of rationalizations by which his behavior is made to appear logical, consistent, and justifiable. As such it is impervious to attack in the same way as is any religion or philosophy. Once its basic tenets are granted, the rest follows as a matter of course. Those basic tenets, in turn, are no more open to logic and reason than the basic philosophical assumptions which all men form in the process of making rational their relationship with the universe and their fellow men, whether they call it science, religion, metaphysics, or what not.[14]

It is this imperviousness to conviction of the irrationality of his views which condemns the revolutionist in the eyes of his opponents and sometimes leads to the conclusion that the revolutionist is insane. Superficially, there seems to be some basis for this conclusion. The revolutionist invariably feels himself persecuted even though he suffers no bodily violence. Ideas of persecution are common in certain types of psychoses. The revolutionist has faith in his program and also in himself as a prophet.

[13] William I. Thomas, and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant* (revised edition), vol. II, pp. 1853-1855.

[14] Cf. A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method*, pp. 177-178.

Delusions of grandeur are characteristic of many forms of insanity. One cannot convince the revolutionist of the error of his program, and again it is characteristic of the insane that they are not amenable to reasoning. And yet it is doubtful if the parallel is anything more than a superficial analogy.

The revolutionist is not insane in the usual sense of the word unless it can be said that all rebellious behavior represents insanity. In this sense, the revolutionist is at one with genius in whatever field it may develop. As the result of barriers set up by society in the field of behavior, some individuals resort to flights into phantasy and thought. If they are able to attack these barriers in some practical way as the result of their flight into the imagination, they become the prophets of a new age. When they fail to do so, society locks them up and calls them insane.

The revolutionist is a product of the social milieu, and his rebellion is a function of the social order in which there are substantial barriers to the realization of impulses and wishes which are generated in social life. Edwards has expressed this in terms of the wishes of new experience, security, recognition, and response described by Thomas and Znaniecki:

> A stable and contented society is one in which these four elemental wishes find adequate expression through existing institutions and practices. An unstable and revolutionary society is one in which they do not. All revolution may thus be conceived of as due to the repression of one or more of these elemental wishes, and the violence of any revolution is, it is assumed, proportional to the amount of such repression. A study of the life-histories of the members of any violently revolutionary group will show numerous instances of the repression of these elemental wishes by the practices and institutions characteristic of the society in which the revolutionists live. A revolution may be regarded as one of these mutations of society which involve the destruction of those institutions of a given society which interfere with the attainment of one or more of the four fundamental wishes.[15]

[15] Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, pp. 3-4. By permission of The University of Chicago Press, publishers.

THE REVOLUTIONARY CYCLE

Revolutions are commonly thought of as involving violent overthrow of the social order, and some of the most striking historical revolutions have been accompanied with considerable violence. Violence, however, is not the necessary accompaniment of revolution but arises because of the resistance of the controlling classes of that society who, by their conservatism and their violent treatment of the revolutionist, stimulate and encourage, if not necessitate, violence upon the part of the group who are in sympathy with the revolutionist. In fact, the greatest social revolution of modern times, the so-called industrial revolution, was accompanied with little violence, and what little occurred was spontaneous and unorganized. Thus the amount of violence in any revolution is directly proportional to the degree of resistance to change and to the extensiveness of repression of the elemental wishes.[16]

Another mistaken notion about revolutions is that they develop suddenly and rapidly. This is far from the truth. Edwards contends that no revolution has ever developed in less than three generations. His explanation of why at least three generations are necessary is that enough time must elapse since an institution has ceased to function appropriately so that there are no longer alive persons who themselves have ever experienced its successful functioning.[17]

Revolution develops out of restlessness which finds expression in a wide variety of ways. This restlessness is at once the cause of discontent and the consequence of it. The upper and middle classes travel to escape the boredom of conventional existence, the lower classes as an escape from the barriers to opportunity. Both achieve some degree of freedom from the sentimental attachments which bind one to the status quo. Gradually more and more persons come to feel that their desires and ambitions are being thwarted. Unrest is communicated from person to

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-14.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

person much as is the vague alarm out of which develops the milling of cattle. Out of this forms a certain amount of sympathy among those experiencing the restlessness which grows out of repression, but as yet there is no common realization of the nature of the difficulty.[18]

Eventually, out of the background of discontent, appear intellectuals who give expression to their discontent and the social unrest which they share with others not so vocal; these are the prerevolutionists. They diagnose the situation and formulate programs designed to reform the old order. They make the less vocal conscious of their common cause. They attack the group in control upon the theory that good men will change everything. This position shortly becomes untenable. Then a single institution and the persons in control of it become the point of attack. There is a great deal of discussion and attempts at reform. These attempts, however, are checkmated by the controlling group. The conflict becomes more bitter, with recrimination on both sides. Out of the emotional violence of the conflict develops the oppression psychosis in which discontent with the social order turns to hatred of the dominant class who stand in the way of reorganization and are now looked upon as responsible for the social order itself.[19]

As it becomes more clear that compromise is out of the question, there comes to be fabricated the social myth which projects into the future a social order in which all the repressed wishes will find realization. This becomes the ideal and the motivating force which drives the revolutionary group to acts of heroism and sacrifice in order that the ideal may be realized. The revolutionary movement becomes a religion where heresy and defection are no longer tolerated. Thus the social myth constitutes a system of collective representations which gives direction and consistent patterning to the purposes and common motivations

[18] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 23-32.
[19] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 38-56.

expressed in the esprit de corps and morale of the revolutionary group.[20]

The outbreak of the revolution begins with some act, relatively unimportant in itself but symbolic of the cleavage between the revolutionary group and those who would preserve the old social order. It brings into the revolutionary camp a large group of persons who up to that moment have remained on the side lines. This intermediate group want something done, but they want it done peacefully and gradually. The revolutionists combine with the moderates, because it is only by so doing that they can recruit strength enough to overthrow the conservatives. The moderates take control in instituting reforms and in persecuting the conservatives until they have been driven into hiding, if not out of the country. Thus the conservatives become vindictive and attempt to rally outside support to their cause. This acts to alienate them more sharply with the moderate group and to make impossible any form of co-operative activity in the future.[21]

In the true revolutionary cycle, the next phase is the wresting of control from the moderates by the revolutionary group which has capitalized upon both the successes of the moderates and the impatience of the masses to realize the revolutionary ideal. The successes of the moderates in completely eliminating the conservatives as an effective group and the righting of the more obvious abuses of the old social order have reassured those who doubted if the time were right for change. The satisfactions obtained in the successes of the moderates whet the appetite for more change and bring into the revolutionary camp many who were inclined to be more moderate at first. Shortly the radicals outnumber the moderates and take over control.

It is true, of course, as Edwards points out, that this wresting

[20] See Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, for a discussion of the functions of social myths. Also Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-96.

[21] Cf. Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-126.

of control from the moderates upon the part of the radicals is not always the sequence. The moderates may be able to retain power; or the conservatives, particularly if they can obtain outside reinforcements, may overthrow the moderates. The moderates retain power only if they follow a consistent program of reform. Ordinarily, the moderate group is made up of diverse elements who are not agreed upon a consistent course of action. The result is that dissension arises within the rank of the moderates, and reform becomes haphazard as control breaks down. This gives the radicals the opportunity to seize power. Or the moderates temporize with the conservatives, alienating the radicals. Thus encouraged, the conservatives may seize power, and the revolution is temporarily aborted. Such seizure of control upon the part of the conservatives, however, leads invariably to the initiation of a new revolutionary cycle, since it reinstates the old order and does not remedy any of the conditions out of which revolutionary activity developed.

As the rule of the moderates disintegrates, the radicals take control in a maze of confusion and inefficiency. Their boldness and assurance reassures the masses and obtains for them the support necessary for successful completion of the revolutionary cycle. Nevertheless, the situation now calls for drastic action if the revolution is to succeed. There can be no temporizing with the moderates who now have lost their prestige. Success depends upon acting with consistency and conviction, and this requires the institution of autocratic control. But autocratic control can operate effectively only when exercised by a small group. Under such conditions personal jealousies inevitably arise. To make it possible to ignore the demands of the larger group for voice in the control now in the hands of a militant minority, an outlet for the passions of the masses must be furnished in such a way as to leave unhampered the control of the revolutionary clique. Thus arises the reign of terror in which popular vengeance is wrought upon those who openly oppose the new regime and upon certain individuals who become the scapegoats for the old order.

The emotional excesses of the reign of terror, however, provide their own antidote. Fatigue sets in, and gradually all classes subscribe to the revolution. When the conservatives and the moderates no longer challenge the control of the revolutionaries, they are admitted under the guise of converts to the new order. A new equilibrium is achieved somewhere between the extremes of the old order and the social order envisioned in prerevolutionary days. Gains are accomplished, but they are largely those representing the interests of the great majority who were never fundamentally identified with either the conservatives or the radicals.[22]

Thus fundamentally what appears to be the extreme variation from the social norm in the behavior of the revolutionist is largely a reflection of the marked social disapproval which his variations engender. Social disapproval only adds to the blockages out of which the variations arise and stimulates their development into more diverse forms. Forbidden, the imaginative processes of the revolutionist cannot be translated into the realities of the social situation. Permitted opportunity to demonstrate their effectiveness, they find realization in social patterns which do not differ radically from the old except where a period of marked resistance has slowed down the natural process of adaptation.

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[22] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 186-209.

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VI

The Juvenile Delinquent

No FIELD of personal disorganization has received more attention than that of crime and the criminal, and yet nowhere is there more confusion regarding the fundamental character of the problem. Much of this confusion has grown up as the result of the legalistic approach, which has always been dominant in this field and still continues to thrust all analysis into the straight jacket of legalistic metaphysics, which assumes the homogeneity of all violations of the law in spite of the fact that the law itself has been constrained from time to time to admit the heterogeneity of crime.

A crime, according to the legalistic approach, is any act in violation of the law. If, however, the law is not enforced by the group whose function it is to do so, or if public opinion does not sanction such a law and its enforcement, the violating act is of little more than academic interest. Much the same thing may be said for those crimes which are not, for one reason and another, reported to the police and the courts. Accordingly, from the standpoint of the study of crime, only a part of all the violations of laws become the subject of analysis. Ordinarily, one thinks of the word crime as synonymous with this smaller group of violations of the law. And on the whole, there is probably little objection to this practice.

The criminal, then, is the person who commits a crime, but not all crimes are known to the police, and one has to be caught and convicted to be a criminal. But many more persons are apprehended by the police for alleged crimes than are convicted; those

not convicted are not criminals. Furthermore, many convictions are for violations of minor statutes—the traffic laws, for example—and those who violate these laws are not criminals. This line of argument leads inevitably into a differentiation of what the more and less serious violations are, and the conception of what constitutes serious misconduct varies in part from time to time.

It follows that the legalistic definition is not a satisfactory basis upon which to proceed to study either crime or the criminal. A more satisfactory definition of crime identifies the word with any violation of the mores (including the statute law if in harmony with the mores). Then, a criminal or a delinquent (if one wishes a word less harsh in connotation) is a person who has violated the mores. But even with this definition, the homogeneity desired has not been achieved.

One of the constituent parts of behavior in violation of the mores is the infractions of strangers. If an American were arrested in England for driving upon the right side of the road instead of on the left, his explanation that he did not know English custom was at variance with American would probably be accepted by the arresting officer as liquidating the offense. Conduct of the stranger in accord with the mores of his country but contrary to the mores of the country in which he happens to be is not ordinarily considered criminal unless there is evidence that the person is aware of the variance or is grossly negligent under conditions where the average person would inquire into possible variance in mores.

Secondly, the behavior of incompetents in violation of the mores is not ordinarily considered criminal. Children, the feeble-minded, and the insane are incapable of committing crimes in the same sense as do adults, the normal-minded, and sane persons. Such distinctions have become an integral part of modern legal practice, incorporated into the law itself and sanctioned by public opinion. Even induced incompetence, such as that created by excessive drinking and the use of drugs, is often

looked upon in much the same way and makes the act either non-criminal or mitigates the severity of it.

Third, behavior which is accidentally or unwittingly in violation of the mores is ordinarily not considered criminal. Thus killing another person with a gun thought to be unloaded or unwittingly appropriating another's property such as a hat or a coat does not constitute criminal behavior. To be criminal implies some recognition on the part of the person that his behavior is at variance with the mores. In other words, the criminal act belongs in the category of conduct in which behavior is self-conscious and the person feels the need for surreptitiously circumventing the restraining influence of the group.

It should be quite clear that the three types of pseudo crimes mentioned do not represent personal disorganization and are not therefore of concern to the sociologist. They do not represent personal disorganization, because while society does not condone the acts, it looks upon them as inevitable and to be approached by other methods than the deflation of status of the person. There is no expression of hostility toward the person with its counterpart of self-regarding and self-depreciating attitude on the part of the individual who has violated the mores. Furthermore, the explanation of each of these forms of violations is a simple matter. In the first class, the person has simply lacked the opportunity for becoming aware of the divergence in customs, or if aware, the contrary pattern was so habituated that it operated automatically. In the second class, the explanation is a matter of accounting for the nature of the incompetence which made possible the violation on the part of the person without his realizing that he was going contrary to the mores. It is here that the psychologist finds his most appropriate locale for the exercise of his particular techniques and point of view. In the third class, the fortuitous combination of circumstances furnishes the only explanation required.

The administrator or the jurist will need to know all that can be learned about violations of the mores of the character in-

volved in these three classes. One of his first tasks will be to differentiate between these three classes and to recognize that crimes properly so called belong outside these three groups. But it does not lead to clarity of analysis to lump all violations of the mores together and to approach the whole as if one were dealing with a homogeneous phenomenon. In fact the violations of the mores which lie outside the three groups already described are so different in character that a different word might well be coined for them, or at least for the person who is the agent of the act.

"In this treatment the term delinquent will be used to mean the person who knowingly, intentionally, and self-consciously violates the mores of the society to which he belongs. The delinquent is the person who is guilty of misconduct and not misbehavior. He is a person who violates the mores of the larger group while realizing that he is doing so. Conduct has been defined by Park:

> Human beings, so far as we have yet been able to learn, are the only creatures who habitually pass judgment upon their own actions, or who think of them as right or wrong. When these thoughts about our actions or the actions of others get themselves formulated and expressed they react back upon and control us. That is the reason we hang mottoes on the wall. That is why one sees on the desk of a busy man the legend "Do it now!" The brutes do not know these devices. They do not need them perhaps. They have no aim in life. They do not work.
>
> What distinguishes the action of men from animals may best be expressed in the word "conduct." Conduct as it is ordinarily used is applied to actions which may be regarded as right or wrong, moral or immoral. As such it is hardly a descriptive term since there does not seem to be any distinctive mark about the actions which men have at different times and places called moral or immoral. I have used it here to distinguish the sort of behavior which may be regarded as distinctly and exclusively human, namely, that which is self-conscious and personal. . . .[1]

[1] Robert E. Park, *Principles of Human Behavior*, quoted in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 189. By permission of The University of Chicago Press, publishers.

Therefore, it is characteristic of the delinquent that he recognizes the social disapproval of his behavior, not alone in retrospect but during the very process itself; otherwise his behavior is no different from that of the insane person. This conception of delinquency has nothing to do with the doctrine of free will which is implicit in legal terminology but simply recognizes the fact that the fundamental characteristic of one group of violations of the mores is that the behavior is self-conscious and recognized by the person as socially disapproved. How he justifies his conduct and, in association with others like himself, develops a philosophy of justification as an out-group is one of the most interesting and significant aspects of delinquency, the understanding of which depends upon a recognition of the distinction between behavior and conduct.

THE JUVENILE OFFENDER

The juvenile delinquent has for some time been recognized in contemporary legal procedure as somewhat different from the adult delinquent. This has not always been so but has resulted out of a slow movement covering a period of a little over a century. Prior to that time children were tried and convicted of violations of the law in the same way as adults, except that a child under seven years of age was not regarded as responsible and therefore could not commit a crime and between the ages of seven and fourteen might not be able to distinguish between "right" and "wrong."

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, after the minimum age at which a child could be held responsible for his actions had been raised in general from seven to ten years, separate courts for the hearing of juvenile offenders were widely established, the age span ranging all the way from ten to a maximum of sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen, or even to twenty-one years. These courts operate under chancery jurisdiction and represent an extension of the principle of guardianship of the state previously exercised by chancery courts. Thus the estab-

lishment of juvenile courts represented an extension of the chancery principle to include violations of the law by the juvenile along with its jurisdiction over questions of dependency, neglect, and incorrigibility. The question of the possibility of nonresponsibility, previously determined by the criminal courts, became the basic task of the juvenile court.[2]

It is of course true that the possibility of nonresponsibility in the commission of criminal acts had long been a recognized principle in the court treatment of adults. But whereas the adult was presumed to be responsible for his acts, the juvenile was thought much less likely to be, particularly if he approached the lower limit in age. And as time went on, the point of view that he was not in a strict sense accountable for his delinquent behavior became well established. More and more emphasis came to be placed upon careful investigation of the factors making for delinquency upon the assumption that the treatment called for was some sort of remedial program rather than punishment. The consequences of this point of view were the introduction of a wide variety of evidence and the encouragement of research into the causes of juvenile delinquency.

One may differentiate three points of view in the study of the juvenile delinquent: (1) the physiological, (2) the psychological, and (3) the sociological. Each of these has its distinctive points of departure and its characteristic basic assumptions regarding the nature not only of delinquent behavior but of nondelinquent behavior as well. Each also has made its contribution to the clarification of the problem of delinquency.

From the physiological point of view, delinquency is the consequence of deficiencies in the physiological make-up of the individual. These deficiencies range all the way from atavistic physical anomalies of Lombrosian character to the malfunctioning of endocrine glands. The explanations of the presence of these deficiencies vary from hereditary and prenatal conditions

[2] Cf. Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (third edition), pp. 302-315.

to the operation of the physical environment upon the development of the physiological organism.

Healy found that 7 per cent of the delinquents studied were epileptic, although he did not consider this the sole factor in delinquency in these cases.[3] Others, however, have not been so cautious. Burt found that 70 per cent of the cases he studied were suffering from bodily weakness and ill health and concluded that these conditions were important factors in delinquency.[4] Healy concluded that physical ailments were a major factor in 4 per cent of his cases and a minor factor in six times as many cases.[5] The same writer also found that underdevelopment and overdevelopment of adolescence were major causes of delinquency in a large proportion of cases.[6] Heredity has been considered a factor in delinquency by many writers, including Healy [7] and Burt,[8] but it was left to the students of crime to consider heredity a major factor.[9] Grimberg found the explanation of delinquency in the malfunctioning of the endocrine glands which produces emotional instability and is congenital in character.[10]

The biological explanation of delinquency may be resolved into three aspects. The hereditists assume either that delinquent behavior is a unit character passed from one generation to another through the germ plasm or that delinquency is the result of some unit character but is not itself one. No biologist of any standing at the present time would entertain any assumption of the inheritance of delinquency as a unit character, and this explanation may be dismissed without further consideration, since

[3] William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 416.
[4] Cyril Burt, *The Young Delinquent*, p. 239.
[5] Healy, *op. cit.*, p. 130; compare William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals*, pp. 44-46.
[6] William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, pp. 145, 236.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-200.
[8] Burt, *op. cit.*, pp. 578-579.
[9] Charles Goring, *The English Convict*, p. 369; Johannes Lange, *Crime and Destiny;* Ernest A. Hooton, *Crime and the Man.*
[10] L. Grimberg, *Emotion and Delinquency.*

only physical traits are recognized as inheritable and delinquency is not a physical trait. As for the second version of the hereditary theory, there is no doubt about the possibility of inheritance of such traits as epilepsy and certain physical defects. It is doubtful if the malfunctioning of endocrine glands could be inherited in the strict sense of the word, but it may be congenital. But in any case, such congenital and inherent traits, like the physical deficiencies of ill health and malnourishment and the physical excesses of overdevelopment, can be related to delinquency in one of two ways. They may produce a condition in which the person is incapable either of acquiring or exercising the ability to make moral judgments, or they may become the basis for compensatory behavior.

Conditions of biological character which make the person incapable of acquiring the ability to make moral judgments cannot be said to be causes of delinquency as a problem in conduct. As has already been pointed out, to include nonconduct problems as a phase of delinquency leads only to confusion in analysis. The fact that the person behaves contrary to the mores of the group is wholly fortuitous, since there is a complete absence of differentiation in the character of responses, and the individual behaves upon an animal plane without self-consciousness and conception of social demands. Conditions which result in excess emotional or physical activity cannot be said to be causally related to delinquency, since not all such persons are delinquent. In the same way, physical conditions which become the basis of compensatory behavior cannot be said to be causal unless all such compensatory behavior is delinquent in character, which it is not. The forms of compensation are socially defined, and compensation arises in response to certain physical traits but does not arise in response to others because of the attitudes of persons in a particular social group; what attitude is taken is the result of cultural conditioning. The consequence is that the physical factor gets its causal character out of the cultural setting and not out of

the physiological. Physiologically the trait is colorless and has no delinquency significance; culturally the physical factor becomes the symbol of social patterns and may become the basis of misconduct.

The psychological point of view takes the position that delinquency is the result either of deficiencies in the psychological make-up of the individual or of the malfunctioning of his mental processes. These defects and anomalies range all the way from the mental deficiencies of feeble-mindedness and imbecility, through personality quirks, to psychotic conditions. Here again the explanations of the presence of these psychological factors vary from the strict hereditist position to consideration of the environmental factors.

The psychological factor which has received the widest acceptance as a cause of delinquency is that of feeble-mindedness, which has generally been assumed to be hereditary in character. To Goddard goes the responsibility for the vogue for this explanation of delinquency. Nearly all delinquents, Goddard declared, are of low mentality, a large proportion of them within the limits of feeble-mindedness.[11] Terman has concurred with this explanation.[12] Others, while not discarding feeble-mindedness as a cause of delinquency, limit its scope. Healy and Bronner concluded that feeble-mindedness was five to ten times more frequent among delinquents than in the general population, constituting for their own group of cases about 14 per cent.[13] Slawson found that among some fifteen hundred delinquent boys tested, slightly over 13 per cent were feeble-minded.[14] Burt could find but 8 per cent of the delinquents he tested who were mentally defective but concluded nevertheless that mental deficiency, since it occurred five times as often in his delinquent

[11] Henry H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence*, pp. 73-74.
[12] Lewis M. Terman, *The Measurement of Intelligence*, pp. 7-12.
[13] William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals*, pp. 150-151.
[14] John Slawson, *The Delinquent Boy*, p. 160.

group as in the normal school population, was a notable factor in the causation of delinquency.[15]

Other psychological factors which have been given particular attention are emotional instability, adolescent instability and impulses, extreme social suggestibility, and mental conflict. Thus Healy and Bronner found adolescent instability to vary from 15 to 21 per cent.[16] Slawson found that less than 16 per cent of delinquents tested for emotional stability were above the median for an unselected group used as a control. He concluded that the delinquent group showed on the average a very decided degree of emotional instability as compared to the general run of boys.[17]

Other writers have moved in the direction of, or completely to, the psychiatric position, which assumes that delinquency is caused by psychotic or quasi-psychotic conditions. Healy and Bronner found that the percentage of psychopathic personalities varied from about 30 to 60 in terms of whether the persons had been arrested once, twice, three times, or four or more times. Thus they concluded that there is a close connection between psychopathic personalities and recidivism.[18] Epidemic encephalitis has been said to leave in its wake tendencies toward delinquency.[19] In a somewhat similar way, Ebaugh found that chorea is associated with delinquency.[20] On the whole, however, psychopathy has not been advanced as strongly as an explanation of juvenile delinquency as it has of adult delinquency.[21] Undoubt-

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[15] Burt, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

[16] Healy and Bronner, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

[17] Slawson, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[18] William I. and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *The Child in America*, pp. 452-453.

[19] M. Molitch, "Chronic Post-Encephalitic Behavior Problems," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XCI (January, 1935), pp. 843-861.

[20] Franklin G. Ebaugh, "Neuropsychiatric Aspects of Chorea in Children," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. LXXXXVII (October 2, 1926), p. 1083.

[21] For example, 88.3 per cent of all offenders admitted to the Illinois reformatory, 1919-1929, were diagnosed to be psychopathic personalities. A study of 1,216 inmates of jails and penitentiaries in New York state in 1924 showed 42.2 per cent as having psychopathic personalities.—Cf. Edwin H. Sutherland,

edly this is largely because of the fact that psychotic conditions do not generally appear until late in adolescence.

Closely related to but not necessarily a part of the psychiatric approach, is that of psychoanalysis. According to this approach, delinquency is one of the many consequences of the conflict between the instinctual and infantile impulses of the individual (primarily sexual in character) and the repressive regulations set up by society. These instinctual strivings, if improperly directed, find expression in neurotic and criminal behavior. Thus the rebellion of the delinquent against society and its rules is analogous to his rebellion against the paternal authority and the denial of love and satisfactions in early childhood. Alexander goes so far as to posit a criminal character as one of the four types of personality.[22] In this type of personality, the antisocial impulses normally inhibited find expression in the delinquent behavior. Adler would add to this the interpretation of delinquency as compensatory behavior for organ inferiority.[23]

In part the difficulties with the psychological approach are at one with those of the biophysiological. In so far as delinquency results from feeble-mindedness and psychotic conditions which make the individual incapable of exercising the judgment necessary to distinguish between what society approves and what it condemns, the problem is not that of true delinquency. This aspect of the psychological approach can therefore be dismissed in the same way as has been its analogous phase of the biophysiological approach.[24] On the other hand, when the psychological factors derive their character from early childhood experiences which fail to produce the inhibition and control over impulses normally exercised, and yet social demands are recognized, such traits become descriptive of true delinquent behavior but are not

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Principles of Criminology (third edition), p. 110, and William I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *The Child in America*, p. 113.

[22] Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub, *The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public.*

[23] Alfred Adler, *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, pp. 307-317.

[24] See pp. 107-108.

explanatory. The explanation must lie in the differential conditions and circumstances out of which the psychological traits find delinquent expression. The extent to which the traits analyzed are not peculiar to delinquency, such as emotional instability, psychopathic personality, and the like, can be explained only by the life experiences which brought about the expression of the trait in delinquent rather than nondelinquent activities. Much the same comment must be made in connection with instinctual impulses of the Freudians. These impulses are not found only in the delinquent but are general, as is characteristic of psychological traits and processes. The consequence is that the psychological approach leads to pertinent materials in the understanding of delinquency only to the extent to which it provides an account of the psychic make-up of the individual as one of the dual aspects of personality genesis.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

The sociological approach assumes that delinquency is the result of the operation of environmental rather than organic forces. It begins with the premise that the organic character of the individual is constant whether he is delinquent or nondelinquent and that misconduct arises out of differentials in environmental pressures. In its simplest form, these pressures are thought to be phases of the physiosocial environment: the types of homes individuals live in, congestion of population, overcrowding, and inadequate playgrounds. As the approach has become more refined, it has recognized the dominance of the psychosocial environment: the influence of abnormal family relationships, of gangs, etc. Sometimes these social relationships have been considered with reference to the structure of the community and have given rise to the ecological variation of the sociological approach.

Breckinridge and Abbott found that 76 per cent of delinquent boys and 89 per cent of delinquent girls come from poor and

very poor homes.[25] Fernald and her associates found that from 46 to 62 per cent of the homes of delinquent girls were poor and very poor.[26] Burt found overcrowding to be 1.32 times as frequent in the homes of delinquents as in those of nondelinquents.[27] Healy concluded that home conditions constituted 19 per cent of the major and 23 per cent of the minor factors in delinquency.[28] Sheldon found a correlation of —.70 between delinquency and home ownership.[29]

Broken homes, Shideler estimated, are more common to delinquents than to the general child population in the ratio of 2 to 1.[30] Slawson would reduce this ratio to 1.5 to 1,[31] and Shaw and McKay would reduce it further to what they consider a relatively insignificant figure, 1.18 to 1.[32] Healy and Bronner found extreme lack of parental control to characterize the homes of 23 per cent of the delinquents in one series and 46 per cent in another. The latter series was more thoroughly studied than the former, and this may account for the difference.[33] Burt concluded that vice and crime were present in the homes of delinquents five times as frequently as in homes of nondelinquents.[34]

The immigrant family has been considered an important factor in the causation of delinquency. Thomas and Znaniecki found

[25] Sophonisba Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, p. 72.

[26] Mabel R. Fernald, Mary H. S. Hayes, and Almena Dawley, *A Study of Women Delinquents in New York State*, p. 216.

[27] Cyril Burt, *The Young Delinquent*, p. 85.

[28] William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, pp. 130-131, 134.

[29] Henry D. Sheldon, "Problems in the Statistical Study of Juvenile Delinquency," *Metron*, vol. XII (1934), pp. 201-223.

[30] E. H. Shideler, "Family Disintegration and the Delinquent Boy in the United States," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol. VIII (January, 1918), p. 715.

[31] John Slawson, *The Delinquent Boy*, pp. 354, 366.

[32] Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on the Causes of Crime*, no. 13, vol. II, pp. 261-284.

[33] William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, "Youthful Offenders," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXII (July, 1916), p. 50.

[34] Burt, *op. cit.*, pp. 578-579.

the breakdown in control in the Polish immigrant family the source of the delinquency of the second generation.[35] Sutherland came to the same conclusion with regard to immigrant groups in general.[36] This breakdown in control varies, of course, for different immigrant groups in the degree to which the old and the new cultures are divergent in character. This undoubtedly accounts for the varying rates of juvenile delinquency among different nationalities.

Gangs have been said to constitute an important causal factor in delinquency. Shaw and McKay found that 88 per cent of the boys brought into the Juvenile Court in Chicago had had companions in their delinquency.[37] In Healy and Bronner's studies, the percentages of delinquencies caused by bad companions vary from 55 to 64.[38] Thrasher found that many of the gangs he studied were engaged in delinquent activities.[39] Motion pictures were an important factor in 10 per cent of the delinquent boys and 25 per cent of the delinquent girls studied by Blumer and Hauser.[40]

Recently a great deal of attention has been given to the ecology of delinquency. Shaw and his associates showed that not only do delinquency rates reach their highest point in the areas surrounding the business district in Chicago, but these rates decline with a high degree of regularity as the distance from these central areas increases. This pattern was found to have been constant over a period of thirty years. Since the nationality of the population in the areas of highest delinquency had completely changed in the period, the authors came to the conclusion that neighborhood disorganization holds the key to an under-

[35] William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant* (revised edition), vol. II, pp. 1794-1798.
[36] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (third edition), p. 162.
[37] Shaw and McKay, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-199.
[38] William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals*, p. 281.
[39] Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, pp. 385, 386.
[40] Herbert Blumer and Philip M. Hauser, *Movies, Delinquency and Crime*, pp. 198-199.

standing of delinquency.[41] In a later study Shaw and McKay turned their attention to six cities scattered through the United States and varying considerably in size and found that the ecological patterns of delinquency were essentially like that in Chicago.[42]

It is clear from the range and nature of factors considered important from the sociological point of view that its distinctive feature is an externalization of the causation of delinquency. The earlier developments of this approach were sentimental and evaluative in point of view and tended to concentrate upon features in the economic and physical character of the environment. More recently, however, the various aspects of social relationships have received major attention. Nevertheless, factors continued to be unitary and segmental in character. The ecological approach represented a move toward the recognition of a more complex pattern in the social and cultural situation of the neighborhood.

In general, the sociological approach has the virtue of recognizing the conduct character of delinquency. It has failed, however, to provide an adequate frame of reference for the delineation of personality trends which find expression in delinquent activity. Even community and neighborhood patterns, complex though they are in contrast to the simple and didactic character of such factors as broken homes, lack of parental control, and home ownership, fail to provide an organic picture of the lines of genesis of delinquency, largely because they do not provide the differentia through which some persons in these community situations become delinquent and others do not.

Accepting for the moment the need for a more comprehensive point of view which is to be still more clearly defined, what light do the traits which characterize the delinquent throw upon the nature of the problem and the needs involved in the reformula-

[41] Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas.*

[42] The cities studied were: Philadelphia, Pa.; Richmond, Va.; Cleveland, Ohio; Birmingham, Ala.; Denver, Col.; and Seattle, Wash. See Shaw and McKay, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-188.


tion of a more adequate approach? What are the methods which seem best adapted to the needs of the psychocultural approach?

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT[43]

Every study of juvenile delinquency in which both sexes have been included has shown a disparity of female delinquents varying from about one and one-half to nine males to one female. This disparity is brought out in the Chicago Social Disorganization Study which shows a slightly lower ratio than for the United States as a whole. (See Chart I.) Three explanations may be

CHART I

SEX OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE COURT, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1935; JUVENILE COURT CASES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1935



advanced to explain this disparity. In most cultures, girls are more thoroughly surrounded by restrictions than are boys. A greater premium is placed in general upon conformance of girls to the social norms of conduct, and deviations are not tolerated to the same extent as in boys. The consequence is that from the earliest moment the girl is taught to conform to the wishes of

[43] Data in the following pages have been taken from the writer's study of social disorganization in Chicago, 1929 to 1935, except where otherwise noted, and will be referred to simply as the "Social Disorganization Study."

the older male generation in particular and to all elders in general. The girl's whole regimen is designed to make her adapted to social requirements, sensitive to social disapproval, and versed in the devices for securing satisfactions within the framework of socially approved patterns.[44]

The second explanation is closely allied to the first. In the past at least, girls have been less active than boys. In consequence they lacked the vitality and the energy which often led boys into delinquency. The result was that the range of delinquent behavior open to the girl was not as great as that for the boy. Since her activities in general were more restricted, it was only natural that she would have fewer opportunities for delinquency. The fact that gangs are much less frequent among girls than among boys bears out this interpretation. The result of the new freedom for the girl is difficult to predict, but it would seem likely that as girls participate more and more in all the activities of boys, the disparity of female delinquents is likely to be reduced.

A third explanation of the disparity is to be found in a differential attitude toward the female delinquent and toward the male. Methods of control utilized with reference to the female are likely to be less formal than those used with the male delinquent. The result is that sex may, and probably does, operate as a selective factor in determining whether legal processes are resorted to in disciplining the delinquent. Girls are not so likely to be taken into court as are boys. This conclusion is brought out by the fact that, in general, studies of problem children who have not had court contact show less disparity of females than studies of court cases.[45]

Delinquency is generally thought to increase with age, and


[44] Cf. Robert Clark, "A Direct Study of the Child's Sentiment of Honor," *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. XLII (July, 1932), pp. 454-461.

[45] Cf. W. E. McClure, "Characteristics of Problem Children," *Journal of Juvenile Research*, vol. XIII (April, 1929), pp. 124-140; William E. Blatz and E. A. Botts, "Behavior of Public School Children," *Pedagogical Seminar*, vol. XXXIV (December, 1927), pp. 556-582.

data for cases handled by juvenile courts usually reveal some tendency for the larger proportion of delinquents to be toward the upper end of the age limit. Thus in Chicago the highest proportion of cases by age is for the fifteen-year-olds, although the proportion of sixteen-year-olds is only slightly smaller. (See Chart II.) Since the juvenile court has jurisdiction only to

CHART II

AGE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: JUVENILE COURT AND BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935



seventeen years of age, the number of delinquents older than sixteen years declines rapidly but does not entirely disappear until twenty-six years. The boys' court, on the other hand, theoretically beginning at seventeen years, has its largest proportion of cases at that age, these constituting 27.6 per cent. The proportion of eighteen-year-olds, however, is only 0.5 per cent less than the seventeen-year-olds. Truancy is most frequently encountered at fifteen years and is similar in this respect to juvenile court cases. The percentage of truants declines radically after the peak at fifteen years, but this is probably due to the fact that the compulsory school law on the whole does not apply to children sixteen years old and over.


Thus each of the three series shows characteristics which may easily be ascribed to the legal or administrative limits. The

juvenile court cases decline slightly with the final year of theoretical jurisdiction and radically thereafter; the boys' court cases decline gradually from a peak the first year of jurisdiction to the final year, and then drop radically; the truancy cases reach a peak at the final year of jurisdiction and then drop off radically. This raises the question as to what the natural tendency toward delinquency by age would be if a single agency functioned until the age of majority. Since the bases of operation of the three agencies studied are so different in character, it is not possible to combine the three series into a single series so far as the absolute figures are concerned. This may be done tentatively with the relative figures, the percentages.

When the relatives of the three series are combined (see Chart III), the results seem to confirm the conclusion that delinquency

CHART III

MEAN PERCENTAGES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO BY AGES: JUVENILE COURT AND BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935



reaches its peak early in adolescence, since the age at which the greatest percentage of delinquencies occur is fifteen. The curve itself is fairly regular on both sides of the peak, approximating the normal distribution curve. The combination of boys' court cases with truancy cases results in a bimodal distribution and may be disregarded, since it is quite clear that these two series do not present an adequate picture of juvenile delinquency. The com-

bination of the juvenile court and truancy cases is definitely skewed to the lower end of the age scale, and since this is determined largely by the legal limit of jurisdiction, this combination adds nothing. This leaves a fourth combination to be considered, namely that made up of juvenile court cases and boys' court cases. The result of this combination results in an even closer approximation to the normal distribution curve, but now the peak has moved to seventeen years. Since the juvenile court series contains both sexes and the boys' court only one, this suggests the possibility that the peak of juvenile delinquency is somewhat later than fifteen years for boys. How much later cannot be determined, since there is no way of knowing the extent to which boys are increasingly brought into other courts as they approach in age the limit of jurisdiction of the boys' court. Since undoubtedly the peak age in the juvenile court is determined by the tendency to take cases into the boys' court as the age limit is approached, it seems logical that a similar tendency might easily be the situation in regard to boys approaching the age of maturity.[46]

[46] This conclusion is further borne out by data reported in 1935 to the children's bureau by 364 courts, 357 reporting boys' cases and 305 reporting girls' cases. U. S. Children's Bureau, *Juvenile Court Statistics*, Bulletin No. 245, p. 27:


Age of Child	Total		Age Under Which Court Has Original Jurisdiction							
			16 years		17 years		18 years		21 years	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Total...	60,480	10,995	27,426	3,446	13,250	1,568	15,830	4,934	3,974	1,047
Under 10...	3,255	362	1,891	157	478	44	814	144	72	17
10.....	3,176	245	1,792	103	582	30	726	100	76	12
11.....	4,454	352	2,501	150	884	46	973	145	96	11
12.....	5,929	652	3,229	277	1,245	88	1,287	253	168	34
13.....	8,388	1,196	4,610	471	1,772	178	1,732	467	274	80
14.....	11,140	2,214	5,804	904	2,477	329	2,408	834	454	147
15.....	12,916	3,007	6,738	1,203	2,904	412	2,629	1,172	645	220
16.....	6,779	1,731	475	110	2,713	396	2,711	998	880	227
17.....	3,581	1,019	126	19	64	8	2,363	769	1,028	223
18 and over.	389	117	15	3	18	6	126	39	230	69

If the peak age of seventeen years is accurate, this would suggest that much of juvenile delinquency is a phase of adolescent rebellion. It is at this age that the discipline of the school ends and the transition between a regimen dominated by school activities to one of a work routine begins for the great bulk of juveniles in the groups from which the delinquents come.

Closely related to the age of the juvenile delinquent is the

CHART IV

GRADE IN SCHOOL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: JUVENILE COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935




grade in school. For both the juvenile court and the truancy series, the peak grade is the same, eighth, if one disregards the abnormally large number of truants in the first grade. (See Chart IV.) Since the larger proportion of both the juvenile delinquents and the truants are fifteen years old, these results do not indicate any marked retardation in schooling, assuming that the normal age for the completion of the eighth grade is fourteen.

Some retardation in school is likely to be the normal consequence of the same factors which cause juvenile delinquency, since delinquent activities tend to leave less time for school work and to divert the attention of the person from it.[47]

Race and nativity have generally been conceded to constitute differential factors in juvenile delinquency. Thus it is not uncommon to find that Negroes and the children of immigrants contribute a disproportionate number of delinquents. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the native whites of foreign and mixed parentage constitute more than 50 per cent of the cases of juvenile delinquency (see Chart V), although only

CHART V

RACE AND NATIVITY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS CHICAGO: JUVENILE AND BOYS' COURTS, 1929 TO . 5



about 37 per cent of the population belong in this category. Almost one-quarter of the juvenile delinquents are Negro, although this racial group constitute only about 7 per cent of the total population. Whereas the total population is 35 per cent native white of native parentage, only about 17 per cent of the

[47] The means of grades in school for both series are: juvenile court, 7.3; truancy, 4.8.

juvenile delinquents belong to this group; of foreign-born whites, a group making up about 20 per cent of the total population, a still smaller portion, approximately 3 per cent, are juvenile delinquents.

It is of course true that such comparison of the percentage distributions of juvenile delinquents and of the total population by race and nativity groups may be misleading because of variations in the age distributions. So long as differences in percentages are not regarded with tôo high a degree of exactitude, this is not likely to be fallacious except in one instance, that of the foreign-born whites. Here it is quite apparent that the proportion of persons falling within the delinquent age group who are foreign-born whites is far below that for the total population.

The assumption that the relatively inferior showing of Negroes and of whites of foreign and mixed parentage as compared to the native-born whites of native parentage and of the foreign-born whites is related in any sense to the racial character of these groups and indicates that race is a causally significant factor in juvenile delinquency has been generally discarded by reputable researchers in this field. Most commonly the disproportionate number of delinquents of second-generation immigrants has been interpreted as one of the consequences of the break between the old and the younger generation which is a commonplace among all immigrant groups. Likewise, the disproportionate number of Negro delinquents reflects the disorganization and low economic status of the Negro in the city.


The indirect causal consequence of race and nativity categories is attested by the wide difference in proportionate shares contributed by each of the categories found from place to place and from time to time. This may be illustrated in the present instance by comparing the proportions contributed by each group to the juvenile court in contrast to the boys' court. In the boys' court there were more white delinquents of foreign and mixed parentage as compared to the juvenile court, fewer whites of

native parentage and of foreign birth, and fewer Negroes. Each of these differences is statistically significant.[48]

The broken home is generally regarded as an important factor in juvenile delinquency. The proportion of delinquents coming from broken homes has ranged from 30 to 60 per cent with a tendency to cluster around 40 per cent.[49] In the Social Disor-

CHART VI

FAMILY RELATIONSHIP IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



ganization Study, 60.4 per cent of the delinquents were living in homes with both parents, although in 0.8 per cent of the cases there had been no legal marriage. (See Chart VI.) These facts alone, however, do not mean very much, since the family relationship is not known for the group from which delinquents come.

A number of attempts have been made to compare the proportion of delinquency cases coming from broken homes with a control group either of nondelinquents or of a general school

[48] The measure of statistical significance used is the improbable error of the difference between percentages, i.e., 2.5757 standard errors. The larger proportion of boys' court cases in which there was no record of nativity and the fact that the juvenile court series includes girls as well as boys may in part account for the differences in percentages between the two series, though it is doubtful if it does so entirely.

[49] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (third edition), p. 158.

population. Thus Slawson found 1.5 times as many broken homes among delinquents in New York institutions as compared to a New York City public school of the lowest social status.[50] Burt found broken homes to be about twice as frequent among English delinquents as among a control group.[51] Shaw and McKay, however, found that the proportion of broken homes varies considerably for different national, racial, and age groups and concluded that this must be taken into account when comparisons are made. Accordingly, when they compared a group of delinquent boys with a group of school boys proportionally of the same age, nationality, and racial complexion, they found that the broken home was present in the delinquent group only 1.18 times as often as in the control group. Upon this basis they concluded that the broken home is relatively insignificant as a factor in delinquency.[52] A study of delinquent girls by the same method, however, yielded a somewhat higher ratio of 1.49 to 1.[53]

The suggestive influence of the delinquent conduct of other persons has been emphasized by many writers.[54] One of the sources of this influence is the delinquent behavior of members of the individual's own family, particularly that of brothers and sisters. Ordinarily, where attention is given to this influence, the number of instances of delinquency of siblings is counted regardless of whether these delinquencies preceded or followed the cases studied. Since delinquency of a brother or sister after the delinquency of a particular person is of questionable causal significance, these have been omitted from Chart VII. The delinquencies of siblings, accordingly, are those which preceded

[50] John Slawson, *The Delinquent Boy*, p. 354.

[51] Cyril Burt, *The Young Delinquent*, p. 92.

[52] Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on the Causes of Crime*, no. 13, vol. II, pp. 261-284.


[53] Margaret Hodgkiss, "The Influence of Broken Homes and Working Mothers," *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, vol. III (March, 1933), pp. 259-274.

[54] See for example, William Healy and Augusta F. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals*, p. 104; S. Drucker and M. B. Hexter, *Children Astray*, pp. 99-140.

that of the person brought into court and included in the Social Disorganization Study. Approximately 20 per cent of the delinquencies had been preceded by one or more delinquencies of siblings. (See Chart VII.) Of these siblings, the greater portion

CHART VII

PREDELINQUENCY OF SIBLINGS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



were brothers; such cases appeared roughly five times as frequently as those of sisters. This disparity between female siblings and male siblings may, of course, reflect in part the corresponding disparity of female delinquents, if it is assumed that girls are more likely to be influenced by the delinquencies of sisters and boys of brothers, but this could not be the only explanation since the ratio of delinquent brothers to delinquent sisters is somewhat higher than of male to female delinquents.

The relationship between delinquency and order of birth is a matter upon which there is considerable contradictory information.[55] The most carefully done piece of work upon the problem is that of Sletto, who came to the conclusion that order of birth is of considerable importance, older boys and girls having a higher delinquency rate than younger boys and girls. Fur-


[55] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (third edition), pp. 167-168; Gardner and Lois Barclay Murphy and Theodore M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, pp. 348-362.

thermore, he found that girls who have brothers but no sisters are more likely to be delinquent than girls who have sisters but no brothers. Thus a girl who has no sisters tends to approach the delinquency standard of her brothers. The boy who has sisters but no brothers, however, does not seem to be comparably affected.[56]

In Chart VIII it is apparent that delinquency is more frequent

CHART VIII

ORDER OF BIRTH OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



among oldest children than among youngest, since both would occur with equal frequency in any unselected group. The difference of 4.8 per cent is much too large to have occurred by chance.[57] When it comes to the in-between and the only children, since no appropriate control is available for comparison, no generalization may legitimately be made.

Two explanations may be offered with reference to the predominance of oldest as compared to youngest children among delinquents. First, this preponderance may represent the tendency of all older children to become delinquent as the conse-

[56] R. F. Sletto, "Sibling Position and Juvenile Delinquency," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIX (March, 1934), pp. 657-669.


[57] The improbable error of the difference between percentages is approximately 1.5 per cent.

quence of less attention on the part of the parents in supervising their behavior. Second, it may represent a rebellion on the part of the child against the loss of his position to the younger child in the affection and solicitude of the parents, which finds its expression in delinquent behavior.

A comparison of the type of offense of different age groups of delinquents reveals that some types remain relatively constant whereas others change. (See Chart IX.) Thus larceny, sex

CHART IX

OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE AND BOYS' COURTS, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




offenses, and burglary are much more frequently the offenses of juvenile court cases than boys' court cases. In contrast, robbery is more commonly the offense of boys' court cases than juvenile court cases. Since robbery necessitates more aggressive behavior, for it means taking greater chances, it is understandable why it should be more common in the older age group; whereas larceny and burglary involve less risk and decline in favor of other offenses of which robbery may be one. The decline in sex of-

fenses is probably a reflection of the diminution in sexual curiosity in the older age group, although it may reflect nothing more than the fact that the juvenile court series contains female cases where sex offenses are likely to predominate. The increase in disorderly-conduct charges, on the other hand, suggests the possibility that the differences between the two groups is primarily an administrative matter and of no significance so far as an understanding of the delinquent is concerned. In fact some difference in frequency of certain offenses is inevitable, since the boys' court is restricted in jurisdiction to misdemeanors, cases of the more serious offenses being tried in the criminal court to which a relatively smaller number of juvenile cases are transferred.

Chart X shows the proportion of recidivists to first offenders

CHART X

TYPE OF OFFENDER IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN CHICAGO: BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935



in the boys' court and among truants. The two series are not strictly comparable, since in the boys' court a first offender repeating within the calendar year was counted as both a first offender and a recidivist. In fact if these duplications are counted only as the latter, as was done in the truancy series, the proportion of recidivists is approximately 31 per cent. Thus there is a striking similarity between the two series in the ratio of first offenders to recidivists.


THE ECOLOGY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The ecological factor has become of increasing concern to researchers in the field of juvenile delinquency. The ecological factor is not a simple unitary unit such as the factors already discussed but instead represents a pattern of factors, often referred to as the social or cultural situation. In this sense the ecological approach represents an attempt to transcend the didactic segmental analysis which has dominated research in juvenile delinquency and to see the problem in terms of a larger whole. This larger whole or social situation is basically a matter of the neighborhood and community patterns which determine the character of the social contacts of the juvenile. Into this pattern enter the play and gang activities of the juvenile, the character of which is determined by the patterns of conduct which prevail within the community. The ecological approach considers these community patterns in terms of the spatial arrangements which result out of the competitive process.

The most apparent aspect of the ecology of delinquency is the absence of uniformity in rates throughout a particular urban community. Nevertheless this lack of uniformity is not a haphazard matter but is instead a highly patterned affair in which delinquency rates progressively decrease toward the periphery of the larger community. Thus in general the greater the distance from the center of the community the lower the delinquency rates.[58] (See Charts XI and XII.) This decline in rate may in part be a function of the administrative process in which the formal procedures of the court are more frequently taken in cases of delinquent conduct toward the center of the community and less frequently toward the periphery. It is generally recognized that in stable, organized communities there is a tendency for delinquent conduct to be handled informally by the parents and by social institutions, whereas the same conduct in disorgan-


[58] Cf. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on the Causes of Crime*, no. 13, vol. II, pp. 23-188.

CHART XI



ized communities would invariably be taken into court. It is doubtful, however, that the wide range in delinquency rates could be accounted for in this way, and the pattern observed

CHART XII



must conform in general to a real situation in which actual occurrences of delinquency are more prevalent as the distance from the periphery of the community increases. However, whether

or not the ratio between delinquent acts and court-reported delinquencies remains constant for all parts of the city cannot be said.

A second aspect of the ecology of delinquency is that, though the delinquency rate increases from the periphery to the center of the city, it does not do so arithmetically. Instead, rates increase slowly at first, then more rapidly, and end in a rapid upward movement as the center of the city is reached. This pattern of increase is relatively the same for both juvenile and boys' court cases, as well as for other indices of social disorganization.

A third aspect is that, though the ecological pattern is relatively constant, significant changes take place from time to time. This fact has generally been ignored in ecological studies and may properly be deferred until a subsequent chapter in which both crime and delinquency rates will be compared. There it will be possible to consider the fourth aspect of the ecology of delinquency, namely, the fact that the pattern of general rates is not necessarily the patterns obtained when delinquencies are broken down into subgroups.

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VII

The Adult Delinquent


FUNDAMENTALLY, the adult delinquent differs from the juvenile in that he is older and his rebellious pattern of personality is more firmly established. His acts of rebellion cover a wider range and tend to include violations of social norms seldom if ever found among juveniles. This wider range of offenses makes it hazardous to compare adult with juvenile delinquents, since the more heterogeneous categories tend to show the greatest expansion at the expense of the more homogeneous. Nevertheless, certain contrasts may be pointed out for what they are worth, retaining the classification of offenses appropriate for charges against juveniles but not so adequate for adults. (See Chart XIII.)

In general, adult arrests show increases in the following categories: disorderly conduct; assault; possessing, receiving, and selling stolen goods; murder and manslaughter; and miscellaneous. (Compare Charts IX and XIII.) Disorderly conduct increased consistently with the sequence in age groups, from 21.9 per cent for juvenile delinquents, to 40.4 per cent for boys' court cases, to 50.2 per cent for adult arrests.[1] Assault does not show as consistent a movement, the percentage of juvenile delinquency cases (2.6) being higher than of boys' court cases (1.9) but lower than of adult arrests (3.0). Possessing deadly weapons can be said to have increased in the adult series as compared with

[1] It should be kept in mind that adult arrests overlap the boys' court series since 10 per cent of all arrests, except for the more serious felonies, fall into the age group normally brought into the boys' court.

CHART XIII

OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST ADULTS: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



the juvenile only if boys' court cases are disregarded, the sequence being 0.4, 1.7, 0.6 per cent. Murder and manslaughter show an increase from 0.1 per cent in the juvenile delinquency series to 0.4 per cent in adult arrests. There are no such cases in the boys' court, since these are heard in the criminal court. Sex offenses show an increase from juvenile delinquency (10 per cent) to adult arrests (13.5 per cent). Boys' court cases contain a much smaller percentage of sex offenses, but this is probably due to the fact that the offenses of females are largely sexual in character. In fact, if half of the charges against female juvenile delinquents were for sex offenses, this would leave no such charges against the males. And again, assuming that 21 per cent of all female arrests are for sex offenses, as is true in a sample of women's court cases, would mean that 12.4 per cent of the charges against males are for sex offenses. The miscellaneous group shows a consistent progression from the juvenile group to the adult (5 to 8.8 to 23.1 per cent).

Offenses showing decreases are larceny; robbery; burglary; and possessing, receiving, and selling stolen goods. Larceny declines radically in the adult group from 32.6 per cent for juvenile

delinquents to 22.3 per cent for boys' court cases to 5.6 per cent for adult arrests. Robbery decreases less consistently: 2.8, 10.6, 1.5. Burglary constitutes 21.5 per cent of the charges against juvenile delinquents, 7.4 per cent of boys' court cases, and 1.2 per cent of adult arrests. Possessing, receiving, and selling stolen goods drops to 0.6 per cent in adult arrests from 2.9 per cent for juvenile delinquency and 2.4 per cent for boys' court cases.

Caution is essential in the interpretation of these comparative results, since a number of administrative factors operate to interfere with the comparability of the data. This is most apparent in the marked increase in the disorderly-conduct charges among adults as compared to juvenile cases. Adults are arrested upon charges of disorderly conduct without restraint, not infrequently for want of evidence to support more serious charges, whereas in the juvenile court the tendency is to make the charge more specific in character, partly because of the greater ease with which evidence may be obtained. Furthermore, the increased opportunities for violation of the law to which the adult is subject and the expanding potentiality of ingenuity in the adult result in the appearance of offenses by adults which have no counterpart in juvenile delinquency. These offenses tend to fall into the miscellaneous category and account for the increase at this point. This increase in the variety of offenses, coupled with the greater caution of adults in committing the more simple and more easily detected crimes, results in decreases in such categories as larceny, robbery, and burglary.

The ratio between the sexes is very much the same, whether the offenders are juveniles or adults. Males achieve their highest proportion in cases of contributing to delinquency. The male percentage of total arrests made is next highest, that of truancy follows, and then comes their proportion in juvenile court cases. (Compare Charts I and XIV. The range here is only 8 per cent. The proportion of males in juvenile court cases, however, is 4 per cent lower in Chicago than in the United States.)

Both juvenile and adult delinquents seem to be quite similar in

CHART XIV

SEX OF ADULT DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY, 1929 TO 1935; ARRESTS, 1930 TO 1935





CHART XV

YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF WOMEN IN WOMEN'S COURT: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935




educational achievement, judging from the data on juvenile court cases, truancy, and women's court cases. (Compare Charts IV and XV). The larger proportion of juvenile court cases falls into the eighth-grade category as do truancy (if one disregards the larger proportion in the first year) and women's court cases. The mean grade in school (completed in the women's court cases, in process of completion in juvenile court and truancy

cases), is of course higher for adults than for juveniles as would be expected of an older group.[2]

Adult delinquents also show a close similarity to juvenile delinquents in the proportion contributed by each of the racial groups for which data are available. Thus, 72.9 per cent of all adult arrests are of white persons as compared to 74.9 per cent of juvenile court cases and 78.5 per cent of boys' court cases; 67.8 per cent of cases of adults' contributing to delinquency were white. In contrast to these four series, the proportion of white

CHART XVI

RACE AND NATIVITY OF ADULT DELINQUENTS: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



persons in the women's court is markedly lower.[3] (Compare Charts V and XVI.) The proportion of Negroes is correspondingly similar except for the women's court cases, where they exceed the proportion of whites. When the whites are differentiated into the native and foreign-born, marked differences appear between arrests and juvenile delinquency, but this probably reflects the disparity of the foreign-born in the younger ages of the population.

[2] The means are: juvenile court, 7.33; truancy, 4.81; women's court, 7.95.


[3] This is a reflection of the higher proportion of females to males among arrests of Negroes in comparison to arrests of whites.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ADULT DELINQUENT

Age has long been considered to be a factor in delinquency of the adult as well as of the juvenile. This grows out of the well-established fact that crime rates are higher for some ages than for others. Chart XVII shows the crime rates by age groups of three different series of adult delinquency. In each of these series, the peak of the crime rate is for the age group, twenty to twenty-four years, though it is more pronounced in the contributing-to-delinquency series than for the other two. For women's court cases the rate for the age group, twenty-five to twenty-nine years, is only slightly below that of the twenty to twenty-four years age group. There are also other differences, the most important of which is the fact that the arrest-series rates do not drop off so rapidly as do those of contributing-to-delinquency and women's court cases, once the peak has been reached.[4]

CHART XVII

ADULT DELINQUENCY RATES IN CHICAGO BY AGE GROUPS: 1929 TO 1935




While it is necessary to

[4] Cf. Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (third edition), pp. 95-97.

exercise some caution in interpreting the abrupt rise in adult delinquency rates from the first age group to the peak in the second, owing to the fact that there is some overlapping of the juvenile and adult series, it is to be expected that crime rates would be highest in the period of early adulthood.[5] At this time the individual is freed from the controlling influences of the home and the neighborhood. He is expected, if not compelled, to exercise his own initiative in working out his adjustment to the economic environment. His physical strength and his venturesomeness are at their maximum. He is willing to take chances which a few years later he would consider foolhardy. His basic drives, particularly sex, are especially imperative. As age increases, all the qualities which distinguish the young adult decline in intensity. Furthermore, he becomes detected, or learns more cleverly to escape arrest, or abandons the career of crime entirely. All this results in a progressive and marked decrease in crime rates with the increase in age.[6]

CHART XVIII

ARRESTS BY NATIVITY PER 1930 POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935




Cultural differences as reflected in the country of birth of the delinquent seem to be of some significance in the understanding of adult crime. Thus in Chicago for the years, 1930 to 1935, the

[5] The mean ages of the three series are: arrests, 31.8; women's court, 30.7, contributing to delinquency, 32.3.

[6] Cf. Sutherland, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

CHART XIX

LENGTH OF CHICAGO RESIDENCE OF WOMEN IN WOMEN'S COURT: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935




arrest rate was higher for the native-born whites than for the foreign-born with but two exceptions, Spaniards and Greeks (see Chart XVIII). The Jewish and Canadian rates were the lowest. When the Jewish rate is revised by eliminating 25 per cent as probably below 15 years of age (this is the ratio in the total population), this group ranks next to the lowest. In an ascending order the remaining countries of birth are: England, Rumania, Scotland, Netherlands, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Hungary, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy, and Lithuania. In general, the arrest rates are lowest for those groups who were born in countries most closely related culturally to the United States, and the highest for those more culturally remote.

It is sometimes assumed that the comparatively recent arrivals within a community are largely responsible for adult delinquency. Women's court cases, however, do not seem to show this. While it is true that almost one-half (44.7 per cent) of all women brought into the Chicago court had lived in the city less than fifteen years, the peak of percentages by five-year intervals of residence is at ten to fourteen years and not at zero to four years. (See Chart XIX.) However, the mean length of residence of 15.45 years as compared to the mean age of 30.73 years indicates that a large proportion were not born in Chicago.

CHART XX

MARITAL STATUS OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



Studies of crime generally show a disproportionate number of single persons as compared to the population of the same age range. This fact is borne out by the data on contributing to delinquency. Thus 49 per cent of the offenders are single, although this group constitutes but 32.6 per cent of the population fifteen years old and over. (See Chart XX.) The proportion of divorced also exceeds that in the population, while the widowed contribute considerably less than their share. It must be kept in mind, of course, that the several marital-status groups are not comparable with respect to age distribution, and this may in part account for the differences. In general, the single are younger than the married, and both are younger than the widowed.

One cannot be sure, however, that contributing to delinquency is representative of adult delinquency. Of all charges in this group of cases, 58.7 per cent are for some sort of sex offense. This suggests the possibility of bias in spite of the facts that the sex ratio and age distribution are essentially the same as for arrests. Yet when rates are calculated by marital status, these are found to be lowest for the widowed, next lowest for the married, next for the single, and highest for the divorced.[7] This is in substantial agreement with rates of commitment to prisons

[7] The rates per 10,000 persons, fifteen years old and over, of the same marital status are: widowed, 2.3; married, 3.7; single, 9.6; divorced, 12.6.

and reformatories in the United States in 1923, except for transposition of the widowed and married rates.[8]

THE ECOLOGY OF ADULT DELINQUENCY

Shaw and his associates have established quite conclusively that delinquency rates decline from the center of the larger community to its periphery.[9] This decline is not regular in every direction, and the patterns of rate variations differ for the various groups into which delinquents may be classified.

The most striking difference between the patterns of arrests and of contributing to delinquency is found when one disregards the lowest 5 per cent of the rate range—arrests are scattered throughout the city of Chicago, whereas cases of contributing to delinquency are confined almost entirely to the deteriorated third of the city.[10] (Compare Charts XXI and XXII.) Furthermore, while proportionally the range in rates is essentially the same for both arrests and contributing to delinquency, the area which is in the upper three-quarters of the range of contributing-to-delinquency rates is much more highly concentrated than the corresponding area of arrests. Contributing to delinquency, accordingly, seems to be confined to areas of low moral standard, as might be expected since the great majority of such cases involve some infraction of the sex mores.


Comparison of arrest patterns for the two sexes also shows some striking differences. Female arrests are even more restricted in area than cases of contributing to delinquency when the lowest 5 per cent of the rate range is disregarded, as they are confined roughly to one-fourth of the city, this area being almost identical with that falling within the upper three-quarters of the

[8] See Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[9] Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas;* Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, *Report on the Causes of Crime,* no. 13, vol. II.


[10] In interpreting contributing-to-delinquency rates, it is necessary to remember that the South Chicago Municipal Court district is not represented in this series.

CHART XXI




range of male-arrest rates. (Compare Charts XXII and XXIII.) But whereas the ratio of male to female arrests is roughly 6 to 1, the maximum rate of male arrests is about three times that of

CHART XXII




female arrests. This means that proportionally the peak rate is higher for female than for male arrests. Thus, areas differ more radically for female than for male delinquency. (Compare

CHART XXIII




Charts XXIII and XXIV.) This result is in accord with the common observation that the more strict the social controls, the greater will be digression once those controls have lost their

CHART XXIV



effectiveness. Since women are more restricted in their conduct by community pressure than are men, it would follow that sharper differences in the breakdown of community control


CHART XXV



would be found in the conduct of women than of men, and these results seem to bear this out.

This tendency for female delinquency to increase rather

CHART XXVI



slowly at first, beginning at the periphery of the city and moving toward the center, and then increasing very rapidly within a relatively short distance to a comparatively higher peak than for

male delinquency is paralleled by the arrests for gambling and for sex offenses. (See Charts XXV and XXVI.) Of the two, gambling shows a somewhat greater concentration than sex offenses. Both, however, disregarding those areas having rates falling within the lowest 5 per cent of the range, are confined to the central business district and the areas immediately adjacent, plus the deteriorated Negro areas to the south. Thus, both gambling and sex offenses are almost entirely confined to the "moral" areas of the city.

It is significant also that the contributing-to-delinquency pattern is similar in many respects to the pattern of arrests for sex offenses. However, a few peripheral communities have comparatively high rates of contributing to delinquency but not of sex offenses. These exceptional communities are industrial areas which have experienced a rapid growth in population. The general correspondence of contributing-to-delinquency rates to sex-offense rates is to be expected, since almost 59 per cent of all cases of contributing to delinquency are based upon sex offenses.[11]

This evidence leads to the conclusion that while delinquency

[11] The offenses of persons charged with contributing to delinquency in Chicago, 1929 to 1935, are as follows:

Offense	Number	Per Cent
Total	1,612	100.0
Encouraged stealing in child	74	4.6
Harbored child	311	19.3
Drugs and liquor offenses	70	4.3
Sex relations	536	33.3
Minor sex offenses	157	9.7
Rape and attempted rape	196	12.1
Incest	6	.4
Homosexuality	51	3.2
Miscellaneous	13	.8
Aiding and Abetting	1	*
No record	197	12.2

* Less than .1 per cent.


rates involving offenses against property and the person are radically higher in areas of central location than in those peripherally located, the contrast is not so sharp as where delinquency takes the form of offenses against the moral code.

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES

Casual comparison of delinquency-rate maps with other series readily gives the impression that all are alike in that rates tend to be high in central locations and decline toward the peripheral communities. Nevertheless, these general resemblances vary a great deal in detail as can be seen from the fluctuations in the coefficients of correlations.

CHART XXVII

CORRELATION OF MEAN ARREST RATES WITH OTHER MEAN RATES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 *



* Mean rate of crime is for the period, 1930 to 1935; women's court, October, 1933 to 1935; illegitimacy, 1933 to 1935.

The correlations between arrests and the three delinquency series of juvenile court cases, boys' court cases, and contributing to delinquency are all fairly high, ranging from .66 to .87. (See Chart XXVII.) The relationship between arrests and the other three delinquency series is as high or higher than that between

the three series themselves.[12] This, of course, may be due to the greater stability of the arrest rates, since these are based upon a larger number of cases. In any case the difference is not very great, and one can legitimately conclude that all series of delinquency have much in common, but nevertheless they are far from being identical in character. This lack of identity in character does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the causal factors are largely different for the various series. What is more likely is that such insignificant features as sex and sex ratio account for the variations.

Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that nondelinquency series should, on the whole, be as highly correlated with arrests as other series of delinquency. Bastardy is moderately correlated with arrests, illegitimacy, and suicide moderately or somewhat more so, insanity markedly correlated, and nonsupport even more closely related. In fact, the correlation between nonsupport and arrests is so high as to lead to the conclusion that 72 per cent of the causal factors are common to both series. This, however, may mean nothing more than that the economic status of communities plays a large and predominant role in determining both arrest and nonsupport rates. Since the nonsupport series represents complaints, the character of which is closely related to the economic level, this explanation has some plausible basis, particularly in view of the fact that the economic factor is of much less importance in each of the other series correlated with arrests, except insanity, and their coefficients are all substantially lower.

When maps of the several series are compared with these correlations in mind, it becomes apparent that the higher coefficients between arrest rates and some of the nondelinquency series, as compared to the delinquency series (except women's and boys' courts which are intercorrelated with arrests), mean a wider dispersion of crime and of the nondelinquency forms of social

[12] The coefficients of correlation by pairs are: juvenile delinquency and boys' court cases, $0.66 \pm .07$; juvenile delinquency and contributing to delinquency, $0.63 \pm .07$; boys' court cases and contributing to delinquency, $0.69 \pm .06$.

disorganization. This means that the other delinquency series are largely confined to the moral regions of the city, i.e., to those areas in which a divergent moral code prevails from that which characterizes the community as a whole.[18]

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[18] See Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie, *The City*, p. 45.

VIII


Economic Conditions and Crime

THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS play a prominent role in the causation of crime is an assumption which has been made time and again. In part this conclusion grows out of the fact that a portion of crimes represent the appropriation, or attempt to appropriate, the economic goods of another. This leads to the conclusion that the motive for the crime was economic. Not all crimes, however, are clearly concerned with the appropriation of the property of another person but instead represent offenses against the person or against public order or public morality. Nevertheless, it may be held that basically the motive to many of these crimes is economic. Ordinarily homicide, for example, is considered a crime against the person, yet it may grow out of a quarrel about property rights. Again, prostitution would ordinarily be considered a crime against public morals, yet from the standpoint of the female it results in some eonomic gain. One may conclude, therefore, that much of crime in which there is no appropriation, or attempt to appropriate, property is economic in motivation. From this standpoint the problem of analysis is simply that of differentiating between those crimes which are motivated directly or indirectly by economic desires and those which are not.

It may be contended that to say crime is economically determined to the extent to which it is motivated by desires for satisfactions secured directly or indirectly through the acquisition of economic goods, overlooks the fact that all persons desire such

CHART XXVIII

JUVENILE, ADOLESCENT, AND ADULT CRIME: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



satisfactions but not all commit crimes. The answer is either that such desires are not as strong in some persons as in others, or that some persons already possess or can easily acquire without committing a crime a greater amount of the desired economic goods. This leads to the contention that it is the unequal distribution of property which is largely responsible for crime.

The conclusion that economic conditions in the form of differential distribution of property and goods influence criminality has grown out of the use of three methods of investigation, according to Ploscowe.[1] These methods are: (1) comparison of countries, or parts of a country, where differing degrees of prosperity are found; (2) comparison of the amount of crime in the different economic classes of the population of a country; and (3) comparison of the fluctuations in criminality with those in the economic life of the country.[2] Of the three, the second and third methods give the most satisfactory results, and


[1] Morris Ploscowe, "Some Causative Factors in Criminality," *Report on the Causes of Crime*, National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, no. 13, vol. I, pp. 1-161.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

these findings may be combined into the formulation of a general hypothesis to the effect that, if those parts of the population whose economic level is low are more given to criminality than those whose income is higher, criminality will increase with an economic depression and decrease with the improvement of economic conditions.

CHART XXIX

COMPARISON BETWEEN RECIDIVISM AND FIRST OFFENSE RATES OF BOYS' COURT CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



Upon the assumption of the relationship between crime and economic conditions as formulated above, the Social Science Research Council has had prepared a monograph [3] in which is set up a series of subsidiary hypotheses which can, in part, be tested with data from the city of Chicago. For this purpose, three series have been selected from the six analyzed in the preceding chapters because only these three cover a comparable period and have sufficient cases annually to insure a fair degree of stability in the yearly data.


The first hypothesis is that criminality within a community increases during the crisis of a depression.[4] The evidence is in part contradictory. Arrest rates show a consistent decline throughout the period. (See Chart XXVIII.) When one con-

[3] Thorsten Sellin, *Crime in the Depression.*
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

sults the reports of the police department for 1929, it is quite apparent that this downward trend began in 1929 rather than in 1930. Boys' court cases, on the other hand, confirm the hypothesis, increasing with the depression and decreasing with the improvement of economic conditions. The juvenile court series shows in contrast a fairly consistent upward trend throughout the period. This raises the question of whether or not these trends reflect in part changes in administrative practices within the period under study. If juvenile delinquency and arrests are compared, the answer, if the hypothesis is assumed to hold, is that the trends in administrative practices have been in opposite directions. This explanation is hardly plausible, for both trends show a relatively high degree of regularity which is difficult to account for by assuming that the true trend of crime would show an upward and downward movement, implying that the ratio between violations of the law and recognized crimes went through a cycle which reversed its direction during the period under study.

CHART XXX

SEX OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIMES IN PERCENTAGES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




When it comes to the boys' court series, the question of the influence of administrative policy may again be raised, since these results are contradictory to both the juvenile delinquency and arrest series. In part the answer seems to be that the upward

swing of the boys' court series is due to changes in administration, since the arrest rates for males seventeen to twenty years old follow in general the trend of all arrests, except that the rates for 1931 and 1932 are somewhat above the 1930 rate. Rates for the last three years, however, move decidedly downward.

CHART XXXI

NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED BY SEX PER 1,000 PERSONS SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER OF LIKE SEX: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



Further light may be thrown upon the boys' court series by breaking down the trends in terms of whether or not the cases represent first offenses or repeaters. On the whole, the first-offense trend is downward after a peak is reached in 1930, whereas the recidivist trend is clearly upward to a peak in 1932 and then downward with the improvement in economic conditions. (See Chart XXIX.) From this it would seem that the consequences of the depression are reflected only in recidivism, first offenses in the boys' court being of substantially the same pattern as are arrests as a whole.


SEX AND AGE OF DELINQUENTS

A second hypothesis may be formulated to the effect that those groups in the population most affected by the depression will turn to greater criminality.[5] While men and women may be about equally involved in the depression, at least greater eco-

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

CHART XXXII

MEAN AGE OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIMES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



nomic responsibility will fall upon men. It would be expected that the ratio of males to females would, for adults at least, be disturbed in the direction of a decrease in the proportion of females with the trough of the depression and a swing back to the original trend with the improvement of economic conditions. The movement in percentages seems, however, to have been upward, except for the two years of the Century of Progress Exposition when there was some decline in the proportion of female arrests. (See Chart XXX.) That this decline reflected administrative policy is suggested by the fact that the rates of female arrests show a fairly consistent downward trend (Chart XXXI), the angle of downward movement being somewhat greater than that for males.


In the ratio of males to females in juvenile delinquency, the trend in percentages is in the opposite direction to that for arrests, females showing consistently a decline in percentage. Since this group is made up of persons too young to be affected in a differential way according to sex, as the hypothesis assumes, these results do not have any bearing upon the hypothesis in a strict sense but do raise the question of the relation of age groups to the trend in the ratios between the sexes.

If the entire period under discussion is assumed to represent the depression, the trend in mean age would seem to bear out the second hypothesis. The mean age increases slightly more

than three years within the period, suggesting that crime had become more prevalent among the older age groups upon whom undoubtedly the depression bore heaviest. (See Chart XXXII.) However, why more than two-thirds of this change should occur in the last year is not at all clear.

CHART XXXIII

NUMBER OF MALE ARRESTS BY AGE GROUPS: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



In contrast to an increase in the mean age of persons arrested, the mean ages of boys' court cases and of juvenile delinquents remained fairly constant throughout the period as would be expected. In so far as there was any change, it was in the juvenile delinquency series, where the mean age increased until 1932 and declined thereafter, but it is doubtful if this change was substantial enough not to be explained by chance.

Changes in mean age, however, when calculated without regard to sex may conceal differentials between age groups. A comparison of rates for arrests of males between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one with those for arrests of males twenty-one years old and over suggests that this is true. The rates for the older group moved rather consistently downward, whereas the younger group showed some increase in rate until 1932, after which there was a pronounced drop, becoming more abrupt at the end. (See Chart XXXIII.) The general level of the rates for the two groups, however, was essentially the same except for the marked divergence both in 1930 and 1935 when the rates


for the younger group were considerably lower than those for the older.

NATIVITY AND DELINQUENCY

The second hypothesis may be tested further with respect to race and nativity groups, since in a general way such groupings correspond to economic levels. Examination of the percentages of arrests of foreign-born whites, native whites, and Negroes reveals: (1) a fairly consistent ratio of arrests of foreign-born whites; (2) a gradually increasing upward movement in the ratio of native whites until 1934 with a slight drop thereafter, and (3) a slowly declining downward movement in the ratio for Negroes, gathering momentum to a low in 1934 and moving somewhat upward in the final year. (See Chart XXXIV.) Since the Negro group would be expected to be affected more severely by the depression than the native white, these results seem to bear negatively upon the hypothesis.

CHART XXXIV

PER CENT OF ARRESTS BY RACE AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935




The percentages of boys' court cases by race and nativity groups contradict, on the whole, the findings in the arrest series. (See Chart

XXXV.) The Negro trend in percentages was fairly consistently upward; the foreign-born trend was as consistently downward. The ratios of native whites of foreign and mixed parentage and of those of native parentage moved in general in opposite directions—the foreign and mixed parentage group moving upward with the depression and settling back to the old level.[6] When all native whites are taken together, the direction of movement was essentially upon a constant level except for a drop from 1929 to 1930 in contrast to the upward movement in the crime series. Thus the Negro trend and that of the native whites of foreign and mixed parentage are fairly consistent with the hypothesis.

Turning now to juvenile delinquency, the evidence again becomes in part contradictory in character. The movement of

CHART XXXV


RACE AND NATIVITY OF DEFENDANTS IN PERCENTAGES: BOYS' COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



[6] The true character of these movements is not revealed until adjustment is made for the radical change in the percentages of cases in which there was no record of nativity of whites. Adjusted percentages for the three white-nativity groups were made by distributing the whites of no record of nativity

CHART XXXVI

RACE AND NATIVITY OF DEFENDANTS IN ADJUSTED PERCENTAGES: BOYS' COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



the percentages of native whites of foreign and mixed parentage was consistently downward, whereas trends of both the Negro and the native whites of native parentage were fairly consistently upward. (See Chart XXXVII.) The Negro trend verifies the hypothesis, if one assumes that the period under study ended before any consequences of improved economic conditions could be felt. The trends of the native white of native parentage and of native whites of foreign and mixed parentage contradict the hypothesis.

It may be argued, however, that percentages may be misleading because of shifts in the proportions of the several racial and nativity groups within the population from time to time. Thus it may be contended that, since the trend of the arrest rates was downward throughout the period under study,


between the three groups where nativity was given in the ratios of whites of native parentage, of whites of foreign-and-mixed parentage, and of foreign-born whites for each of the years. (See Chart XXXVI.)

those groups most affected by the depression would show less decline than those least affected. Again the findings are contradictory in character. The decline is least in the case of the foreign-born white, greatest in the case of the Negro, and intermediate for the native white. (See Chart XXXVIII.) Upon the basis of the hypothesis it would seem reasonable to expect that the decline would instead have been greatest for the native white, intermediate for the foreign-born, and least for the Negro.

A third hypothesis may be formulated to the effect that a depression will bring about an increase in the percentage of offenses which most clearly result in some economic advantage.[7] It would be expected, therefore, that there would be an increase in crimes against property, such as burglary, robbery, auto thefts, larceny, gambling, embezzlement, etc. (See Chart XXXIX.) Arrests for auto theft increased rapidly in the depression, only to

CHART XXXVII


RACE AND NATIVITY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN PER CENT: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



[7] Sellin, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115.

CHART XXXVIII

NUMBER OF ARRESTS BY RACE OR NATIVITY PER 1,000 PERSONS OF LIKE RACE OR NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



decline rapidly, possibly because of a concerted drive on the part of the police to reduce the number of automobiles stolen. Burglary increased somewhat and declined with the improvement of economic conditions. Embezzlement showed a general tendency to decline throughout the period. Larceny and robbery both showed slight tendencies to increase with the depression and decrease as economic conditions improved, but the changes were not great. Gambling, on the other hand, definitely declined. (See Chart XLI.) Nevertheless, crimes against property on the whole increased with the depression and decreased as economic conditions improved.


Crimes against property in boys' court cases followed essentially the same pattern as did adult arrests. This was also true of crimes against morals. (Compare Charts XXXIX and XL.) Crimes against the person in boys' court cases dropped off appreciably in the early part of the depression, only to increase later to a higher level, in comparison to the early increase in the adult arrest series, which was followed by a fairly consistent decline thereafter.

In general, while offense rates showed a fairly consistent de-

cline throughout the period under consideration, arrests for auto theft, burglary, larceny, and robbery lagged behind those offenses of little or no economic motive but joined the general trend with the improvement of economic conditions. Embezzlement moved with the general trend, while gambling declined more rapidly. Gambling, along with sex offenses, declined in 1935 to a rate of scarcely one-third the 1930 rate, whereas the general rate declined approximately 40 per cent.

CHART XXXIX

PER CENT OF NUMBER OF ARRESTS BY CAUSE AND BY YEARS: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



ECOLOGY OF DELINQUENCY

The connection between city areas and the various forms of crime and delinquency has been amply established.[8] Therefore, the pattern of rates, declining from the center to the periphery of the city, needs no further demonstration. But the question, "Are these rates affected by a depression, and if so to what extent?" has not been answered. This brings one to the formulation of a fourth hypothesis to the effect that those areas hardest hit by the depression would show the greatest increase in crime and delinquency.

[3] Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas.*

CHART XL

OFFENSES OF DEFENDANTS IN PERCENTAGES: BOYS' COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




CHART XLI

NUMBER OF ARRESTS PER 1,000 PERSONS SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER BY SELECTED OFFENSES: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935






CHART XLII a




Arrest rates, while conforming in general to the concentric-circle pattern, show a few exceptions. These exceptions are in the form of high rates in outlying industrial districts and so do

CHART XLII b




not in any way go contrary to the general hypothesis, since these areas, as well as those in the central part of the city, represent low-income levels. These outlying industrial areas

CHART XLII c




showed a consistent decrease in arrests throughout the period, 1930 to 1935. (See Chart XLII a-c.) So far as the general pattern is concerned, the most striking thing is a 25 per cent drop

CHART XLIII a




in the peak rate from 1930 to 1932, followed by an increase of 15 per cent in 1935. This increase, however, is confined to the central business district and to the immediately adjacent areas to

CHART XLIII b



the northwest, west, and south; the remainder of the rates shrank consistently along the lines established from 1930 to 1932. Thus those areas hardest hit by the depression did not show an

CHART XLIII c



increase in rate until economic conditions had improved, and then the upward movement was confined to a relatively small area.


Boys' court rates changed in pattern very slightly from 1929

to 1932 except in the deteriorated areas surrounding and including parts of the central business district, where the peak rate was 50 per cent higher in 1932 than in 1929. (See Chart XLIII a-c.) For the rest of the city there was substantially no change. By 1935, however, rates had declined, even in much of the deteriorated areas, to leave a highly concentrated area, including the central business district and the immediately adjacent areas to the northwest, west, and south, in which a radical increase in rates rose to a peak two and one-fourth times that in 1932.

Juvenile delinquency rates in the earlier part of the period did not conform as closely to the concentric-circle pattern as did arrest and boys' court rates, the center of the pattern being pulled southward from the center of the city into the Negro district, and high areas appeared in industrial communities on the periphery of the city. (See Chart XLIV a-c.) In fact, in 1929 the highest community rate was in one of these outlying industrial districts. By 1932 a general decline in rates had taken place except for the Negro district; the peak rate had dropped approximately 20 per cent; high points in outlying industrial areas had practically disappeared; and the deteriorated areas of comparatively high rates to the west had become segregated from the south-side Negro district by intervening lower rates. By 1935, however, the pattern had changed radically to conform more nearly to that of concentric semicircles. In addition to the change in pattern, a general increase in rates had taken place, the greater part of the change being concentrated in the deteriorated areas of the city, rising to a peak twice that in 1929.


Returning now to the hypothesis that those areas most affected by the depression will show the greatest increase in crime and delinquency, what are the net results of these findings? Arrest rates moved in a direction opposite to what would be expected if the hypothesis held, except for a highly concentrated, centrally located area, and here the increase lagged behind economic conditions. Boys' court rates moved smoothly up and down with business conditions so far as the deteriorated areas

CHART XLIV a




were concerned, except that in the most highly deteriorated areas the upward movement went on unabated as economic conditions improved, as might easily be anticipated, for these areas

CHART XLIV b




would tend to be the last to benefit from an improvement in economic conditions. The depression seems to have been accompanied, on the other hand, with an initial decline in juvenile

CHART XLIV c




delinquency rates in much of the deteriorated area, only to show a radical increase in rates in the deteriorated areas and a smaller increase elsewhere as economic conditions improved.

CHART XLV a




When one differentiates between male and female arrests, the most striking features of the changes in ecological patterns are: (1) the consistent shrinkage of the relatively high-rate areas of

CHART XLV b




male arrests throughout the period; (2) the 10 per cent increase in peak rate of male arrests from 1932 to 1935 after a 25 per cent drop from 1930 to 1932 (see Chart XLV a-c); (3) the essen-

CHART XLV c



tially constant peak rate for female arrests throughout the period; (4) a radical shrinkage in the area of relatively high rates of female arrests, particularly after 1932. (See Chart XLVI a-c.)


CHART XLVI a



Thus, if with some lag, crime increased in the extremely hard-hit areas, the increase involved males and not females.


Turning now to two series of offense rates, both of which

CHART XLVI b




might be thought to be closely related to economic conditions, a number of interesting trends are found. Sex offenses (excluding rape) show essentially the same pattern of rates as female of-

CHART XLVI c



fenses, a consistently shrinking pattern, except that the peak male rates also declined, whereas the peak female rates remained constant. (See Chart XLVII a-c.) Sex offenses, even when they


CHART XLVII a



involve men, are chiefly related to prostitution, and it might be expected that economic pressure would increase the arrest rate.


Gambling rates also show a more marked decline than the

CHART XLVII b




general male rates, the areas of relatively high rate shrinking radically to be confined almost exclusively in the central business district and the three adjacent areas to the north, west, and south.

CHART XLVII c




(See Chart XLVIII a-c.) The peak rate, however, increased to two and one-third times the 1932 peak rate, which had declined about 20 per cent from 1930 Thus it would seem that the de-

CHART XLVIII a



pression was accompanied by a consistent decline in gambling, which continued with improvement of economic conditions except for those areas hardest hit, where a marked increase occurred.


CHART XLVIII b



CORRELATION BETWEEN SERIES

It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that the yearly rates of the three indices of crime and delinquency do not always

CHART XLVIII c



move together. The question of the degree of correlation may now be considered.

The coefficient of correlation between yearly arrest rates and

boys' court rates is .74. In contrast, for arrests and juvenile delinquency, the coefficient is —.83; and between juvenile delinquency and boys' court cases, —.92. All coefficients would indicate a fairly high degree of common causal factors, but these operate negatively upon juvenile delinquency.[9]

Correlations of community rates seem to indicate a closer connection between the three series, though varying considerably from year to year. Thus the coefficients of correlation between community rates of arrests and boys' court cases for each of the years from 1930 to 1935 are .84, .85, .90, .88, .93, and .70.[10] The coefficients for arrests and juvenile delinquency during the same period are .43, .79, .48, .88, .35, and .61.[11] Those for boys' court cases and juvenile delinquency for the period, 1929 to 1935, are .39, .38, .76, .56, .88, .39, .20.[12] Thus it would seem that though in general the three forms of delinquency are ecologically fairly highly correlated, this similarity of character increases with the depression and declines with improvement of economic conditions.

The most important finding of this study may now be summarized:

1. General delinquency and criminal trends, if responsive at all to the depression, are not directly sensitive to the downward and upward movements of economic conditions.

2. There seems to be no clear differential between the responses to the depression by different economic classes, as would be expected if it were assumed that those groups hardest hit by the depression would turn to crime in greater numbers.

3. The assumption, however, that a depression would result in an increase in offenses of economic motive seems to be valid in part, though gambling and embezzlement seem to be exceptions.

[9] The three coefficients should not be too rigorously interpreted since their standard errors are relatively large, being, respectively, ±.19, ±.12, and ±.06.

[10] Corresponding standard errors are ±.03, ±.03, ±.02, ±.02, ±.01, and ±.05.

[11] The standard errors are ±.10, ±.04, ±.09, ±.02, ±.10, and ±.07.

[12] The related standard errors are ±.10, ±.10, ±.05, ±.08, ±.03, ±.10, and ±.11.

Thus those offenses where the economic returns are more assured and immediate (burglary, larceny, and robbery) are most responsive to the depression.

4. There are changes in the correlation of community rates for the three pairings of the three series which seem to indicate that the economic factor becomes more important during the depression and declines in importance with improvement in economic conditions.

5. Further refinements need to be made in the calculation of rates in order to bring out more conclusively the relationship between the depression and crime. A few suggestions along this line would be:

(a) Calculation of rates by age groups or for a standard population.

(b) Conversion of community rates into percentages of the rate of the city as a whole in order to bring out more clearly the differential effects of the depression.

(c) Rates in mobile areas are relatively too high when calculated in terms of the customary population base, i.e., the number of persons residing in the area upon a given day. Any correction, however, will involve adjustment of the rate of each community in terms of a mobility index. Unfortunately the development of such an index seems to be remote at the present time.

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IX

The Social Psychology of Delinquency

THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY of the delinquent, whether juvenile or adult, had its beginning in attempts at statistical analysis. The unit of such analysis has fluctuated between the offense and the offender. W[illegible]n the time factor has been the dominant feature of the a[illegible]sis, the tendency has been to place chief emphasis upon th[illegible]haracter of the offense rather than upon that of the offender. Where the approach has been nonhistorical, the emphasis has been placed necessarily upon the individual offender. The highest [illegible]e of statistical analysis of the offense has been achieved wh[illegible]coefficients of correlations have been found between a seri[illegible] of index figures representing the prevalence of offenses and i[illegible]lices of other prevailing conditions thought to be of some signi[illegible]cance in the causation of crime. The highest type of analysis of the offender has been achieved when substantial differences have been found in the attributes of the offender in comparison to the nonoffender.

In respect to all historical studies, certain methodological difficulties operate to invalidate in part the results of such studies. Comparisons of crime rates between political areas, whether countries, states, cities, or other such units, tend to be misleading because of the variance in legislative and administrative practices. Not only does what constitutes a crime or delinquency vary from one political jurisdiction to another in terms of the legal definitions in vogue, but administrative practices produce variations as well. In fact these practices vary so greatly that there is little

assurance, even within an area in which the legislative factor is constant, that what is considered a crime or a delinquency, or a particular type of delinquency, remains constant from time to time or from one part of the area to another.

Variations in legislative definitions are more or less obvious in character, and little more need be said than to call attention to their existence. Variations in administrative procedure, however, are not so easily observed and are more commonly neglected than are those attributable to legislative action. Crimes known to the police, for example, will vary in frequency in terms of the industriousness with which the police look for crimes and in terms of the extent to which they follow up crimes reported to them. The number of traffic violations will vary in terms of the number of police assigned to traffic control and with the policy in regard to whether violators should be arrested or merely warned except in extreme cases. The amount of gambling reported to the police will vary in terms of how active the police are in making arrests upon complaints made to them. If arrests are seldom or never made upon complaints of persons in the neighborhood in which the gambling occurs, complaints will be discouraged. Furthermore, the activity of the police will be determined in part by the operation of the courts. If complaints against the operation of gambling places are usually dismissed by the court, the police will cease making arrests and discourage persons from making complaints. These variations are, of course, greater for misdemeanors than for felonies.

These variations operate not only for crimes known to the police but for arrests as well, and in part for the same reasons. In addition the volume of arrests varies in response to police policy. This police policy in turn is often a reflection of public opinion or of the desire of an administrative official to profit politically. When public attention is directed upon some situation considered undesirable, it is often good politics for the police to make arrests of persons responsible for the situation or, if these persons are too influential or too difficult to find, to arrest

others in their stead. The consequence is a "crime wave," produced by an increased public attention to a situation which has existed for some time and by an increased activity on the part of the police in this regard. As an election approaches, the number of arrests for misdemeanors, particularly, is likely to decline in order to insure public support of the administration, unless there have been charges of laxity on the part of the police, which is often counteracted by a police drive of arrests of a sort which the public approves. Again, a police chief may for a time, at least, consciously control the volume of arrests in such a way as to make it look as if crime progressively drops off, by the simple expedient of diminishing the number of more or less indiscriminate arrests made for the purpose of inconveniencing rather than convicting the persons. Thus, following a series of spectacular raids upon gambling houses by which the chief of police dramatizes his serious interest in law enforcement, he may progressively reduce the number of arrests made for a time, even without reducing the number of raids, by confining his arrests more and more to those directly responsible for the operation of the houses. More often, however, he reduces the number of raids as well; but in either case he builds up a record of having largely eliminated that type of crime.

The consequence of the operation of all these variations in police practice is to make of arrest data an uncertain index of the prevalence of crime. Convictions of crimes, however, are no better, because here the same variations operate, and in addition there are other variables to be taken into account. The number and character of convictions is dependent in part upon the co-operation between the police and the prosecuting attorney and that between the court and the prosecuting officer, as well as upon the effective operation of the jury system and the extent to which graft enters into the whole matter of court operation. A prosecuting attorney, for example, may make for himself an enviable record by the simple expedient of bargaining with the suspect as to what charge shall be brought against him to

which he will plead guilty. In this way the attorney may trade murder with a plea of not guilty for manslaughter with a plea of guilty. The consequence is that he is assured a conviction, but enumerations of convictions by offenses will show a decrease in the more serious offenses and increase in the less serious. Under these circumstances, however, the total convictions may show a decided increase, even in the face of a constant volume of arrests.

Data showing the volume of commitments have to run the gauntlet characteristic of crimes known to the police, arrests, and convictions, plus further variations induced by delays resulting from appeals to higher courts and by the administration of probation where the law leaves any discretion to the presiding judge. The consequence is that Sellin has formulated a general criterion of the validity of a measure of crime to the effect that, "The value of a crime rate for index purposes decreases as the distance from the crime itself in terms of procedure increases." [1] According to this rule, crimes known to the police would constitute the most satisfactory measure of the prevalence of crime, arrests would come next, convictions next, and commitments would be the least reliable. There are reasons to believe, however, that arrests are quite as satisfactory as crimes known to the police, if not more so. While there undoubtedly is considerable variation in the ratio between crimes known to the police and the frequency of arrests from time to time and from place to place, it is also true that the number of persons who commit a particular crime varies considerably. This raises a grave doubt that it is the crime which is the appropriate unit, particularly since some types of crimes are largely one-person affairs, whereas others are group acts. It would seem more logical, therefore, to choose the individual offender as the unit, rather than the crime, and to look upon arrests as the preferable source of data, rather than crimes known to the police.

The consequence is, therefore, that all historical analyses of delinquency must proceed upon questionable ground except to the

[1] Thorsten Sellin, *Crime in the Depression*, p. 74.

extent to which it can be assumed that the legislative and administrative factors remain constant and comparable from year to year and from place to place. Obviously, the second requirement is more difficult to achieve than the first and consequently historical analyses had better be confined to locales under the same legislative jurisdiction. Even with this restriction, the difficulties involved are sufficiently great to require the exercise of a great deal of caution in the interpretation of data. On the other hand, many of the inherent difficulties in the historical type of analysis can be avoided through the use of nonhistorical methods.

NONHISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Nonhistorical analysis must of necessity utilize sources of data other than crimes known to the police. It is the characteristics of the offender which become the center of interest, whether as a person arrested, convicted, or committed. Here it would seem that the arrested person is likely to be more representative of the delinquent than the person convicted or the individual committed to prison. It is, of course, true that some persons are arrested who are innocent of any delinquency. But it is also true that many factors operate to bring about the nonconviction and noncommitment of persons quite as guilty and quite as deserving of penal service as those who are convicted and committed. Consequently, unless the police are conspicuously prone to arrest persons with little presumption that they may have committed a crime, the arrest group is more likely to be representative than any other of all the varieties of crimes committed.

At best, however, the total of persons arrested and brought into court constitutes something less and something more than the total delinquents in a particular place at a particular time. Some persons arrested are innocent of any wrongdoing, and many crimes go undetected, and if detected the person responsible for the delinquency is never found, or if he is, protection of one kind and another prevents his arrest. How these factors operate may be illustrated in the case of racial groups.

Crime studies have generally shown the Negro to have a higher crime rate than other racial groups.[2] And yet there are many reasons to doubt that the Negro is more inclined to crime than other racial groups. In the first place, the Negro crime rate shares with those of the Mexican, the Indian, the Chinese, and the Japanese the distinction of being higher than that of native-white persons. As a general rule, minority racial groups have higher crime rates than the larger, more dominant racial groups. In part this is one of the consequences of the lower economic status of the minority racial groups. The Negro shares with other minority racial groups the misfortune of belonging largely to the lower economic level of society. The consequence is that he is less cunning in concealing his delinquency and less able to defend himself when innocently arrested. Furthermore, he has neither the foresight and ingenuity to select delinquencies which are more difficult to detect nor the opportunity to do so if he desired.

In contrast to the Negro, the members of the dominant white upper class are in a position to profit by delinquent acts which are not readily detected and to hire legal assistance through which they are able to violate the law in spirit but yet technically stay within it. And if they should violate the law, they can more readily escape arrest once that violation has been discovered. Furthermore, they are less likely to be arrested innocently because of the repercussions which may follow, due either to their financial ability to bring suits for false arrest or pressure in other forms upon officialdom over which they have much control as a class, both directly and indirectly.

When the Negro commits a crime, it tends to be of the sort which is readily detected, and arrests follow in short order. If the witnesses are of the white group, erroneous identifications are easily made and seldom questioned with the same degree of doubt which would be exercised if the person under suspicion were white or if the witness were of the same color. Use of the

[2] Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology*, third edition, pp. 120-121.

"third degree" is resorted to with impunity in an effort to obtain confessions from Negroes. The police are supported by public opinion in the belief that if the Negro arrested is not guilty of this particular crime, he is probably guilty of others and might just as well be imprisoned for this offense as for any other. In consequence, the Negro becomes the ready victim of police drives and of police budgets which demand so many arrests by district each month. Testimony before the Seabury Commission in New York City indicated that policemen in certain districts who had not yet achieved their monthly quota of arrests would go to Harlem and enter any colored house or apartment making arrests indiscriminately because they thought colored people had less chance in court.[3]

The consequence is that race prejudice, financial ability, the inclination of some neighborhoods to handle a part of its delinquency extralegally (particularly in the case of the juvenile delinquent), the tendency of police to make indiscriminate arrests for political purposes or as ways of carrying out policies in contravention of the law (breaking up strikes and public gatherings; discouraging the influx of hoboes and of persons likely to become indigent; etc.), and a host of other factors which do not operate equally for all groups make of all the indices of crime an inadequate measure of the amount of delinquency. Nevertheless, these sources of data, however inadequate, are the only ones available at the present time for studies of delinquency. Therefore, if any attempt is to be made at scientific analysis of delinquency, it is necessary to utilize these sources as best one may, paying due regard in the process to the inherent deficiencies of the data with which one works.

What the analyst has to show, accordingly, is not that his data cover all crimes committed or even all types of crimes committed but that the characteristics of the known offenders are

[3] Sutherland, *ibid.*, pp. 121-122. Also see Thorsten Sellin, "The Negro Criminal," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. CXL (November 1, 1928), pp. 52-64.

essentially those of the unknown offenders and that the so-called offenders are actually delinquents. This is a large order and can be achieved under some conditions with much more assurance than under others.

Assuming that the analyst has taken all the possible precautions to insure the representativeness of his body of data, what can he hope to achieve by way of understanding the delinquent? What methods of analysis will yield the most cogent results? In so far as these results are in part unsatisfactory, is this caused by the fundamental inadequacy of the methods utilized or by an inherent deficiency in the materials with which the analyst starts? In so far as difficulties arise out of inadequacies either in methodology or in factual observation, what, if anything, can be done about it?

RATES OF DELINQUENCY

One of the most common types of statistical analysis is achieved through the comparison of rates. When this is the approach, the crucial question is, what is the most appropriate base in terms of which to calculate rates? Assuming the most homogeneous situation (i.e., an area in which the legislative and administrative factors are constant), one sets out to classify a body of data about delinquents in as many ways as possible and to calculate whenever possible the rates for each of the classes in terms of suitable base units so that these may be compared and may become the basis of generalization. Suppose one starts with a differentiation in terms of the sex of the person. Obviously, the ratio of female delinquents to the total population of the area would not be an appropriate rate. While the ratio between male and female births is substantially constant and only slightly in favor of male births, there are many other factors in community life which make for divergencies in this ratio.[4] Relatively new communi-

[4] In Chicago, for example, according to the 1930 census, 50.66 per cent of the total population was male, and yet the percentages of males in the seventy-five communities ranged from 45.39 in Kenwood to 79.76 in the Loop.

ties are likely to have an unusually large proportion of males, particularly if located upon frontiers. An old community which is declining in population is likely to have an excess of females since they are less able to leave in search for greater opportunity. It is essential, therefore, that the divisor be in each instance the number of persons of the same sex as are the delinquents.

But suppose our delinquents do not cover the entire age span. Then it follows that the basal unit must likewise cover only the age span covered by the delinquency data. But the age span itself may be comparable and yet the distribution of persons by age either in year or five-year units may vary quite radically. Under these circumstances the sex group which has as its source of delinquents a preponderance of persons in that age group in which delinquency is most prevalent will have a seemingly higher delinquency rate. Consequently, in order to insure comparability in rates it will be necessary to calculate them in terms of more homogeneous age groups than the larger age span, such as five- or ten-year intervals. But what is true of age groupings is true also of marital status, of economic level, of educational achievements, and so on. But since many of these variations are unknown in the population, there are limits to the process of refining the basal unit in terms of which rates are stated. The result is that much of the difference found in delinquency rates reflects nothing more than variations in the proportions of attributes within the population from which the particular class of delinquents comes and of that population constituting the source of the delinquent group. This generalization holds quite as well, whether the analysis takes the form of comparing rates, percentages, or means or of using any of the measures of association, such as the coefficients of contingency and of correlation.

In order to anticipate the possibility that variations discovered in statistical analysis reflect nothing more than those which characterize the larger population from which the delinquents come, some analysts have introduced control groups of nondelinquents.

The basic assumption in this approach is that if there are differences in the characteristics of delinquents and nondelinquents, these will constitute, or be related to, the causal factors in delinquency. Such controls have been chosen in various ways, either by securing juveniles in general or nondelinquent juveniles from what is thought to be the same social strata in the population represented in the delinquent group or by matching each delinquent with a nondelinquent just like him in every respect except one. Where general groups of juveniles or of nondelinquents have been used, it has usually been thought necessary to correct the data further by artificially making constant at least such apparent factors as age, sex, and nationality. As this process continues until all factors except one are made constant, the results achieved are identical to those obtained through the matching process. At best, the final statements of relationship resolve into those of the relative importance of a factor at a time in the delinquent and control groups. Such results are essentially upon a par with those of the use of partial correlations and reveal possible causal elements individually considered, but they do not result in an understanding of the larger causal pattern.

At best, accordingly, statistical analysis represents a segmental approach in which the atomistic units of common sense become the elements in the causal complex of juvenile delinquency. Whether one can hope to gain through this approach sufficient understanding of the delinquent to become the basis for control is one of the major controversial issues in the field of criminology. Because of the recognition of the limitations of statistical analysis, the case-study approach has been developed.

THE CASE-STUDY APPROACH TO DELINQUENCY

The introduction of the case-study approach to the study of delinquency represents the transition from attention to delinquency to attention to the delinquent and from punishment to therapy. This approach arose not so much as a theoretical protest against the limitations of the statistical approach but as a point of

view toward delinquency in harmony with the attitude taken toward disease. Thus the case-study approach owes its inception to the fact that a physician, William Healy, became interested in juvenile delinquents and sought to understand them in the same way in which any physician would attempt to diagnose the physiological ailments of his patients. For each delinquent it was necessary to have a case history in which was recorded all the information obtained about the individual. These case histories included family history, developmental history, home and neighborhood environment, mental and moral development, physical measurements, medical examination, mental tests, psychological analysis, and description of delinquencies. Upon the basis of this factual account, Healy arrived at a diagnosis of what he considered to be the primary cause of the delinquency and also at one secondary cause.[5] Subsequently, the "boy's own story" was added to the case history, consisting of either the results of a personal interview with the delinquent or his autobiography written under the guidance of the investigator. With this later development, the analysis was extended to include several causal factors, and the distinction between primary and secondary causes was dropped.[6]

The addition of the delinquent's own story to the case history formed the bridge for the passage from the case study made up of multiple segments to a consideration of the delinquent's life experiences as an organic unit. This transformation was initiated by Shaw who made of the delinquent's own story the core of his case studies.[7] In *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career,* the sequence from his petty stealing under the tutorship of an older delinquent, through his participation in the activities of a delinquent gang, to his complete identification with the criminal world as a careerist is portrayed as the delinquent himself looks

[5] See William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent.*
[6] See Judge Baker Foundation, *Case Studies.*
[7] See Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career* and *The Jack Roller.*

back upon its development during his incarceration. The general result of this portrayal is to delineate a process of interaction between the individual and his cultural environment in which the attitudes of delinquency are generated. In this process, the individual is initiated first into the practices and lore of the petty and occasional delinquent whose delinquencies provide additional thrills and risks to those which characterize play activities. Gradually, the individual becomes a professional criminal, participating in full in the traditions of the criminal group. Thus delinquency like any other cultural heritage is passed on from one generation to another in which the generations are the succeeding steps from the novice to the professional. As is characteristic of the life history, however, two important questions are left unanswered. First, if delinquency is in the traditions and mores of the culture, why is it that not all persons in contact with these groups become delinquent? Secondly, why is it that on occasions types of crimes are committed which are at variance with the code of the criminal group?

In the case of Sidney Blotzman, discussed in *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, an older brother is not delinquent. In fact, according to Shaw, Abe "is in most respects a model person. He has always been sympathetic and obedient to his mother, has attended school and the synagogue regularly, has never participated in delinquent practices, has made every effort to dissuade Sidney from delinquency, and has worked regularly from the age of twelve, contributing his earnings to the mother."[8] Thus the conduct of the two brothers is about as divergent as is possible. It may be said that this divergency is the result of differences in contacts of the two brothers, and this is essentially Shaw's explanation. But the explanation of how these contacts were established in terms of the deterioration and disorganization of the neighborhood in which the family lived is not convincing, since Sidney's brother, Abe, also lived there.

[8] Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, p. 43.

Nor is the further explanation in terms of the inferior economic status and the desertion of the father which necessitated the mother's going to work convincing, since again not all children under these circumstances become delinquent. What seems to be of more importance is the personality pattern determined in early family interaction, a pattern which is suggested in the materials but relatively undeveloped, as is characteristic of life-history documents.[9]

This brings one to the second question which finds apt illustration in the case of Sidney. His final crime was that of rape which was contrary to the code of the criminal gang to which he belonged and resulted in his being run out of the clubhouse where he had taken refuge after the crime. Shaw's explanation is that Sidney did *not* fully realize the moral import of his behavior at the time. This explanation is accepted by Burgess and interpreted as the outgrowth of the fact that Sidney's personality was that of a precocious person who tends to react to life situations in a rationalistic way, being relatively immune to more subtle suggestions, and therefore tends to take an individualistic outlook upon life. This would explain the acceptance of part of the traditional code of the criminal group and rejection of other elements in it.[10] But if this selection is a matter of personality pattern, then it follows that the selection of the traditional practices and code of the criminal group in contrast with that of the larger social order is also a function of the personality development which receives its initial definition in the interaction between the members of the family. Thus it follows that the answer to both of the questions raised by the incompleteness of the life history turns out to be the same.

The life history as a form of case study contributes, then, to the development of a partial organic analysis. Its incompleteness lies in the fact that the life-history technique does not facilitate sufficient understanding of the development of personality. This

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 224-234.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-251.

incompleteness is the consequence of emotional blockings which stand in the way of the revelation of some of the most significant elements in the development of personality, even where there is no conscious censoring of materials, and of the inherent difficulties involved in finding a vocabulary in which to express the interaction which takes place in the intimate family group. The natural consequence is, therefore, to overemphasize the influences of neighborhood and communal forces because these are more elaborately described since they are basically related to the overt, rather than the covert, processes.[11]

In contrast to the situational approach to the organic conception of the delinquent, the analyses of Alexander and Healy are based upon the explicit assumption that a study of the development of the dominant trends in personality is essential for an understanding of the selective influences of the social environment.[12] Thus there is no denial of the influence of what Sumner would call "out-groups" within the community whose code of conduct is at variance with the larger social order. And it follows also that in those parts of the community—the deteriorated areas—in which this "out-group" is proportionally larger, the rate of initiation into delinquency will be greater than in other communities in which there is less manifestation of delinquent traditions and practices. Nevertheless, so long as there are individuals, who, living in these areas, do not become delinquent, it will be necessary to explain the process by which selective response to the environment takes place, and this will be found to lie in the personality trends developed in the intimate life experiences of the family group.[13]

However, in accepting in general the methodological point of view expressed by Alexander and Healy, it is not necessary to accept as well the psychoanalytic ideology. This ideology is

[11] See Shaw, *Brothers in Crime*, for a more complete development of the situational approach in which all attempt at understanding the development of personality as it is related to delinquency is abandoned.

[12] See Franz Alexander and William Healy, *Roots of Crime*.

[13] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 274-275.

based upon the assumption that man is born with certain instinctual demands which seek direct gratification until these are redefined and redirected in terms of the social order. This social order imposes itself upon the individual as a series of restrictions and renunciations designed to provide future and indirect satisfactions which furnish greater pleasure than those obtained in the direct gratification of the instinctual demands. Social behavior from this point of view represents a complicated balance between gratifications and denials, and those individuals whose experiences have been such that they have not accepted these restrictions or, having accepted them, have not found the substituted gratifications forthcoming may and often do become delinquent.[14]

All that is necessary to assume is that there is no clear-cut delineation in modern society between what is right and what is wrong, different groups having contradictory codes. Behavior tolerated and even encouraged in some groups is condemned and suppressed in others. The first experience of the child in this respect is found in the family where he is often subjected to contradictory codes and in addition finds himself encouraged to behave in a way which is contradictory to what will be permitted subsequently in the larger social order. Thus the little boy is drilled in defending himself indiscriminately with his fists, only to be told later in adolescence that a gentleman does not fight. Or the pampered child is first told by the favorite parent that he must not do certain things but when he resists is permitted to do them. The consequence is that one must accept the basic psychoanalytic doctrine and for the roots of delinquency must look to the early experiences of the individual in which his personality pattern is laid down in early social interaction, but this does not imply that the notion of conflict between society and the instinctual demands of the individual (chiefly erotic and destructive) is basic to the doctrine.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DELINQUENCY

This brings one back to the question of how the ecological approach is oriented with reference to the more complete organic point of view. In terms of its development, the ecological approach has grown up in conjunction with, and as a part of, the situational approach to delinquency. The situational approach represents a partial but incomplete development of a point of view in which the individual delinquent is looked upon as an organic whole. Ecological analyses buttressed the basic assumption of the situational approach that delinquency is the result of the segregation and isolation of groups of individuals who develop a lore and tradition of delinquency. Therefore, the explanation of the delinquency of a particular person lies in his contacts with, and participation in, the cultures of these groups. This contact and participation is facilitated in the disorganized areas of the city, because of the influence which these groups exercise in fostering a community spirit which tolerates and encourages the development of delinquent practices.[15]

In order to evaluate the contribution and role of the ecological approach in understanding delinquency, one must examine the basic features of the method. In the first place, the whole conception of the axial pattern of delinquency, in which the incidence of delinquency is high in the deteriorated areas at the center of the city and progressively declines toward the periphery, is built upon rates represented by the number of delinquents reported for a particular period of time to the potentially delinquent population as of a particular day.[16] But the population as of a particular day is no more an accurate measure of the potentially delinquent population if people move in and out of the area within the period of study than the level of water in a tank

[15] Cf. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career*, p. 229, and *Brothers in Crime*, pp. 350-360.

[16] These periods are ordinarily years or multiples of years, and the same individual may or may not be counted again if he repeats within the period.

into and from which water is constantly entering and leaving is a measure of how much water the tank has contained for a particular period of time. To compare the rates of delinquency in two communities and conclude that the difference represents a greater prevalence of delinquent behavior in one as compared to the other may be quite as fallacious as saying that one village consumes more water than another (both having standpipes of exactly the same size) because upon a particular day it was found that the level of the water in one standpipe was a foot lower than in the other. The important thing one needs to know is how much water flows through each standpipe, if he would determine the differences in the consumption of water between the two villages. In the same way, in order to satisfactorily determine the differential incidence of delinquency, one needs to know the ratio of delinquents within a period to the potentially delinquent population for the same period. Otherwise, the variations in rates may but reflect the differential movements of population within the several areas.[17]

It is true that it does not seem plausible to assume that the wide variations in rates from the central areas of the city of Chicago, for example, to the peripheral areas can be wholly accounted for in terms of mobility, since this would mean that, judging from the wide variation in yearly arrest rates during the period, 1930 to 1935, the mean length of residence in the peripheral communities would have to be at least some one hundred times as long as in the central areas. This is outside the range of plausibility, and so one may rightly conclude that the variations in rates is not wholly a reflection of mobility.

In addition to the difficulties involved in the absence of a proper base in which to express rates, the legal character of the materials used as an index of delinquency operates in much the same direction to accentuate unduly the rates in the central areas. In the case of juvenile delinquency, there is considerable evi-

[17] Cf. Frank A. Ross, "Ecology and the Statistical Method," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XXXVIII (January, 1933), pp. 507-522.

dence to indicate that the probability of court contact is much greater for juveniles living in deteriorated areas than in the better organized areas upon the periphery, given the same kind of delinquent conduct. The boy who steals in the suburban community is disciplined by neighborhood agencies and the family except in unusual instances; whereas in the disorganized areas, since these sources of discipline are lacking or relatively ineffective, the court is more readily called in as an instrument of control. A part of the variation in rates, therefore, may reflect little more than differences from area to area in the ratios between the number of juveniles who violate the laws of the community and the number who appear in court.

When one turns to adult delinquency, a closely related difficulty appears, the probabilities of arrest are not constant from one area to another. White-collar crimes elude the police and the courts much more readily than do the delinquencies of the lower classes, as Sutherland has pointed out.[18] In part this is due to the fact that the white-collar delinquent operates in areas where it is more difficult to detect delinquency and where, with the assistance and advice of legal counselors, he is able to take advantage of the lack of clarity of expression of the statute law even though the mores are quite clear upon the matter. Furthermore when he is detected, he more readily avoids arrest by exercising his prerogatives as a member of the ruling class, which includes making restitution and inducing his influential friends to bring pressure in his favor. Such delinquencies as short weights in stores, commercial bribery, violations of the food and drug laws, thefts and embezzlements by clerks and accountants, stock frauds, political chicanery, and fee-splitting of doctors do not come to the attention of the police and the courts so readily as do murders, assaults, robberies, sex offenses, and drunkenness, which characterize so frequently the delinquencies of the lower classes.

[18] Edwin H. Sutherland, "White Collar Criminality," *American Sociological Review*, vol. V (February, 1940), pp. 1-12.

Thus ecological studies of delinquency reflect the influence of the selective operation of the competitive process, but not always in the way assumed by those who have utilized this approach. In this competitive process those individuals who are at a disadvantage no doubt are segregated in the deteriorated areas of the city. Since delinquency represents the violation of the social order, a social order in which protection of property rights bulks large, the discontented elements, who have no stake in upholding the social order or for some reason consider the rules as a restriction upon their conduct, will congregate in these deteriorated areas since here they can maintain themselves most readily.[19]

In addition to the relationship to the segregation of the delinquent population, high-delinquency rates in deteriorated areas reflect the competitive process in another way. Individuals of lower economic status are more subject to arrest and prosecution than are the delinquents of the higher economic classes. White-collar crime is much more widespread than is generally recognized, because law enforcement, the courts, and the police are on the whole under the control of the upper classes. Furthermore, their connections, prestige, and economic ability to secure legal advice make them more immune to the rigorous controls exercised upon the lower classes. Differential rates of delinquency therefore reflect in part, no one can say how much, this wide variance in probability of detection, arrest, and prosecution associated with economic status.

Consequently, the ecological approach tends to lead to fallacious conclusions with regard to the nature of delinquency by failing to take due account of the unreliability of crime as it is defined in the legal process as an index of violation of the mores. The natural tendency under these circumstances is to overemphasize the importance of communal forces in the forms of the breakdown in neighborhood control, the influence of delinquent gangs, and the general confusion in moral standards which char-

[19] Cf. Franz Alexander and William Healy, *Roots of Crime*, p. 274.

acterizes mobile societies, because these happen to be associated with the deterioration of certain areas of the city as a consequence of the transition from one use of land to another as a part of the competitive process. The forces which operate in the determination of personality, essentially alike in both the deteriorated and undeteriorated areas, are neglected for the more spectacular collective aspects of delinquency. This leads to the observation of collective delinquency in the form of the activities of gangs which then becomes the explanation of the delinquency of the individual, whereas it is but the collective aspect of that individual behavior. The crucial factors are lost in the maze of elements which are not in and of themselves of particular significance.

The basic fallacy of the ecological approach lies in the fact that a part of delinquency as indicated by legal indices is an index of economic status rather than of violation of the mores. This aspect cannot be explained by relating it to the competitive process of which it is an index. If ecological studies of delinquency are to be significant, they will have to be based upon indices which are related directly or indirectly to the competitive process and are not merely incidents of that process as it is reflected in the operations of the police and the courts. Or, in the absence of such indices, it will be necessary to limit the analysis to those characteristics which are free from the influence of economic status. Thus in some communities, juvenile delinquents who are oldest children in their families are more prevalent than delinquents who are youngest. In other communities, the relationship is reversed. Now, it cannot be assumed that this is in any way an index of economic status or that in the potentially delinquent population there will be a preponderance of either oldest or youngest children. The explanation will have to be sought in the familial situation surrounding the development of the personality of the child which has operated in producing the characteristic personality trends represented in delinquent behavior. This familial situation may then be related to the com-

petitive process, directly or indirectly, and may lead quite legitimately to an ecological explanation.

This leads to the conclusion that the ecological approach can at best be but an adjunct to case analysis. The delinquent, like ever member of society, is an individual who has and desires to keep status and a role in the group. His conception of what constitutes the desired role and of the ways in which status may be obtained and maintained once secured is laid down in familial interaction. Basic to the delinquent pattern is a rebellion against the restrictions and restraints imposed by a part of the familial milieu but not shared in by another part, this latter part condoning active disregard for the patterns of conduct demanded by the first.

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X

Personality Disorganization

ALL PERSONS live in a world peculiar to themselves, in which the objects, including persons, have meanings which find no identical counterpart in the universe of anyone else. These meanings develop out of the social experiences of the individual, which are always unique in some respects and yet which contain many elements identical with those of others. The consequence is that the world of each individual is both unique and like that of many other persons. The common character of the cultural milieu makes for uniformity; whereas the peculiar combination of the genes, together with the unique conditions under which the constitutional equipment is defined by the cultural milieu, function to make for singularity.

One may speak of this contrast between that which is peculiar and that which is common in the world of each individual as the hiatus between the private and the public worlds. Thus in part the individual accepts the public world defined for him by the cultural milieu and in part he rejects it, substituting instead an individualized definition. Personalities differ in the extent and character of this hiatus and in the attitude of society toward these differences. When the individual abandons all attempt to make his private world function as an instrument in his adjustment to the public world he is judged insane. When he both abandons and still attempts to bring the two into some kind of working arrangement, there is conflict and personality disorganization.

Personality disorganization, however, is but a part of the larger

process of the genesis of personality. To understand how personality becomes disorganized is also to understand how it becomes organized. Or to put it differently, how is it that the cultural milieu brings the private world and the public world into close correspondence in some instances, and a hiatus of varying extent and character occurs in others? What are the forces which operate to determine whether or not, in the light of experiences which bring this hiatus into view, the individual abandons the drive to adjust the differences or gives up the effort?

THE GENESIS OF PERSONALITY

It is a truism that the individual is born with a repertoire of potentialities in the sense that heredity provides him with the basic organic materials out of which may be fashioned a wide variety of responses to his environment. It is the cultural medium which determines the character of these responses inasmuch as culture consists of response patterns achieved out of trial and error and communicated from one generation to the next. For example, each individual is born with the plastic materials out of which speech develops, but the language he acquires depends upon the peculiar channelizations which constitute the vocalization patterns of the culture into which he is born.

The first source of channelization, the initial source of cultural influences, is the family. It is the family which provides the individual with the first definition of the public or social world, giving character and form to the big, blooming, buzzing confusion which William James has rightly said characterizes the world into which the baby is born.

At first the baby seems to lead a vegetative existence in which the satisfaction of elemental desires is his only concern. The sources of these satisfactions have little externality in that there seems to be little or no recognition of the relationship between the inner satisfaction and the external world from which it comes. Shortly, however, he comes to recognize that there are forces outside himself which can be manipulated in his own in-

terests. His cry is no longer an undefined emotional release for his discomfort but a call for someone to pick him up. In the process of definition of others about him he also becomes conscious of himself as apart from them. Slowly he learns that he has a role to play in the domestic drama as defined for him by the gestures of the members of the family.

The consequence is that the first conception of himself which the individual achieves is that defined for him by the family group. It is here that he develops a personality and achieves status. He is no longer an organic entity whose only concern is the satisfaction of physiological demands, but a person whose responses bring approval or disapproval. Slowly he has acquired the faculty of self-regarding as a counterpart of the regarding responses of others toward him.

What, then, are some of the factors which play a prominent part in this definition of the individual's conception of himself within the family group? It is this definition which is basic to the personality pattern and operates as a selective instrument in determining the character of the cultural milieu. It is also this definition which ultimately determines the character of the individual's response to the hiatus between his private and the public world.

Of primary importance in the determination of the role of the child within the family is the order of birth. The first-born child has the unique experience of first being the only child and subsequently having his place as the center of attention usurped by another. And while at first he tends to rebel against this usurpation, this loss of attention is compensated for shortly by the responsibilities he is permitted to assume and the dominance he is allowed to exercise over his younger brothers and sisters from time to time. The consequence is that dominance and responsibility are the outstanding traits of the oldest child, though often colored by tendencies toward introspection and lack of self-confidence which hark back to his dethronement by the next-born.

The last-born child, on the other hand, has the unique experience of never having to give up his place as the center of attention. He is encouraged to remain young and to avoid responsibilities. His derelictions are excused upon the ground that he is too young to know better. Concessions are made for him, and he comes to assume they will always be forthcoming. Even his brothers and sisters must bow to his will. His is the superordinate position in the family circle with every member his vassal. All of this results in the development of aggressiveness, linked with irresponsibility, as the outstanding characteristic of his role.

The in-between child has never received the exclusive attention of his parents, and what attention he has received was soon diminished by the appearance of a contender for whatever prerogatives he may have achieved. His position is therefore an inferior one of being subjected to the dominance of the oldest child and having to cater to the youngest. If sacrifices need to be made, he is expected to make them. The compensating feature of his role is that he is not encouraged to develop high expectations and he therefore does not suffer the disappointments of those who expect much and realize little.

The role of the only child is a fusion of that of the oldest and the youngest. This results in an ambivalence which is characteristic of this role. Since he is the first-born, he is encouraged to grow up and assume responsibilities. But being the youngest child, he is also encouraged to remain young and dependent. Aggressiveness is encouraged by his occupation of the center of the stage, so long as it contains the token of dependency.

Order of birth, however, has superimposed upon it a host of factors which modify and even negate its influence in the determination of role. One of these factors is the custom of primogeniture, by which the eldest son is singled out for special consideration as the successor to his father. Thus to the eldest son falls the obligation to carry on the father's occupation or that to which he has aspired if he has not been successful in achieving the vocational adjustment desired. The role of the oldest child

as determined by order of birth is, if a son, strengthened by the principle of primogeniture.

. . . The oldest child usually has the role of one who is taken for granted as conforming to the traditional role of the child, whatever that may be for the particular cultural group. For example, in one cultural group this may mean carrying on the trade of the father even though it may not carry with it a great deal of prestige. Thus in general the American farmer has wanted his oldest son to be a farmer. In another group, it may not mean carrying on the trade of the father, but that glorified by the particular cultural group. The Jewish tailor, for example, does not wish his son to carry on his trade, but dreams of his being a learned man, a lawyer, or a doctor. Many an Italian immigrant laborer, likewise, dreams of producing a Caruso.[1]

Consequently, the order of birth is strengthened by the principle of primogeniture but negated in part if the first-born is a girl. That is, order of birth still functions in defining the relative roles of the sons in the family, but sex as an element in the principle of primogeniture enters in to modify the influence of order of birth. Should only a girl, or girls, be born into a family, under conditions of feminine emancipation, the only girl, or oldest girl, may find herself cast into the masculine role of the first-born and strive to realize the ambitions which would have fallen to a son had there been one.

Sex of the offspring may modify the influence of order of birth in other ways. Thus in families in which the first-born child or children are girls, the first-born of the sons, regardless of order of birth so far as all children are concerned, tends to conform to the traditional role of the first-born. Or if the only boy in a family of girls is the youngest or next to the youngest, his role becomes defined similar to that of the only child in which ambivalence is the most characteristic feature.

In addition to sex, a host of factors operate to modify the influence of order of birth. Frailty of physique may necessitate

[1] Harriet R. Mowrer, "A Psychocultural Analysis of the Alcoholic," *American Sociological Review*, vol. V (August, 1940), pp. 546-557.

greater care and solicitude or call out sympathetic and compassionate attitudes upon the part of the parents. Behavior, often accidental, symbolizing superior or inferior ability becomes the basis for differential treatment, augmenting or weakening the influence of order of birth. Thus the child who learns to walk earlier than most children is a budding genius, and the child whose learning to talk is retarded is not considered as capable as his brothers and sisters. Physical appearance, particularly of the head and face, calls out similar variations in response. The attractive child is made over by relatives and friends to the delight of the parents. The ugly child is shunned, and the attitudes of friends and relatives are colored by commiseration.

"My playmates teased me about being pigeon-toed. They went to dancing school, while I did not. I used to hear the neighbors remark about how pretty Loraine and Irene were, but they only told me that my teeth were crooked, and said it was too bad. Older brothers are not addicted to flattery. If I had not felt that I was homely, I might have grown up less awkwardly, and a little more happily." [2]

Resemblances to parents and to more distant members of the family likewise play a part in the determination of role. "The boy looks just like his father," or "the girl looks like her mother," strengthens tendencies already present to cast the child into the pattern of the parent's role. The child whose physical traits or mannerisms resemble a favorite grandparent or aunt or uncle finds himself similarly cast. But this is also true of the child who resembles the "black sheep" of the larger family; he grows up under the shadow of the fears that he will be just like this offender against the self-esteem of the family.

The many factors operating to determine role, however, do not necessarily operate to the same extent or in the same way so far as the attitudes of the two parents are concerned. There is seldom the clear-cut definition of role which the foregoing analysis would seem to imply, since differentials in parental at-

[2] Manuscript.

titudes may lead to the child's developing one role with reference to one parent and quite a different one with reference to the other. The result is an ambiguity in the individual's conception of himself which has to be taken into account. Furthermore, while siblings often tend to take the cue from the parents, they do not always do so. When siblings respond to a child in quite a different way from that of the parents, further ambiguity is generated. In many instances a child may receive preferential treatment from a brother or sister, rather than from a parent, and this further complicates his conception of himself.

So far little attention has been given to the ways in which the individual is treated by the community and to the influences of this treatment upon his conception of his role, except in so far as this communal treatment has been translated into the attitudes of the members of the family. On the whole, communal roles make for adjustment of personality to the extent that they further entrench the role developed in the family if it were favorable, strengthen that part of the ambiguous role which the person found most satisfying, or provide a more favorable role in substitution for the inferior position in the family. It is, then, the transition between family and communal contacts and group membership which becomes the testing ground of the individual's personality, determining the character and extent of personality disorganization.

MENTAL CONFLICT AND PERSONALITY DISORGANIZATION

Mental conflict is the key to the understanding of personality disorganization. In the process of disorganization, the contending elements in the personality come into conflict, and the consequences of this struggle consist of the frustrations which accompany the active attempts to bring unity out of disunity or the eventual retreat into a subjective world.

The source of this conflict lies in two directions. First, as has already been pointed out, the parents are not necessarily united

in their conception of role and treatment of the child. When differences exist, these tend to find confirmation in the attitude of siblings. But even though there is unity in the defining attitudes of the members of the family, if the child has inferior status he tends to compare his own position with that of siblings and to develop feelings of inferiority for which he compensates by building up a counterconception of himself in which are incorporated the attributes of the envied sibling.

Secondly, communal contacts seldom completely confirm the role achieved in the family, particularly when this role has been a superior one. Some control can be exercised by the individual in the selection of groups in which to function, but this selection is limited at best. The result is that he bows inevitably to the role-defining character of group membership and incorporates within himself roles at variance with that achieved in the family.

Personality, then, in its broadest sense refers to the sum and organization of the various roles which the individual plays in group life. Its unity consists in the fact that each and all of the roles are reflections of the behavior of a single biological organism. Its parts are multiple as a consequence of the multiplicity of groups to which the individual belongs and in which he lives up to the expectations of the other members of each group. When he no longer plays the role assigned and expected of him in a particular group he becomes an outcast, and unless he makes amends, he loses membership in that particular group. Thus his role refers to that pattern or co-ordination of attitudes which in a particular group secures and maintains for him status in that group. Each role, accordingly, involves a different pattern of attitudes.

All the roles of the individual, however, are not of equal importance in the struggle between the various parts of the personality which constitutes mental conflict. Roles achieved in the family have a priority throughout life as compared to the roles achieved in the community. Thus the role achieved in the family performs a policing function, attempting to bring the

various conflicting elements into some kind of working equilibrium. In the field of moral judgments, the activities of this role take the form of evaluating the conduct of the person in communal contacts. This is the conscience of common sense and the censor of Freudian analysis. In the realization of communal roles, this role defined in the family judges the satisfactoriness of communal contacts. Failure to realize in communal contacts the superior role achieved in the family leads to criticism and dissatisfaction. Even when status is achieved in communal relations superior to that in the family group, doubt and fear upon the part of the family role make the new integration of attitudes precarious and threaten continued status in the communal group.

How this family role operates as a dominant element in the personality organization has been described by Harriet R. Mowrer as follows:

> It is the function of the dominant role . . . to bring into working accord the other roles within the personality. Thus the dominant role makes for consistency and unity within the personality by its dynamic direction of accommodation. It is this consistent organization and form of behavior taken by the personality as a resultant of the interaction between the dominant role and the other roles which constitutes the *pattern of life*. But not only is there an attempt to achieve unity for the present, but also throughout the life span of the individual. This results from the fact that accommodations accomplished between the various roles tend to persist and to furnish the basic patterns for future adjustments between roles.[3]

Conflict between the several roles making up the personality is inevitable. Thus, what differentiates one personality from another is not that one is free from conflict and the other is not but the character of the accommodation achieved between the several contending roles. That is, the kind of pattern of life is the element differentiating the organized from the disorganized, the adjusted from the unadjusted, the sane from the insane.

Furthermore, there is nothing pathological in mental conflict

[3] *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, p. 37. By permission of the American Book Company, publishers.

itself. The very essence of a reflective life implies conflict. As the smooth flow of habitual responses is interrupted by the appearance of new and strange elements in the field of experience, conflicting impulses are precipitated into functioning, and the individual is compelled to make some accommodation. This accommodation is spoken of as choosing between alternatives. Choosing thus consists of following one impulse and abandoning the other, of satisfying one wish and denying the other, unless both impulses, or both wishes, can be realized at the same time, which is unlikely.

But accommodation is not limited to choosing between alternatives. Some compromise may be achieved in which both impulses or wishes are achieved in part. Thus the individual may have the impulse to interrupt work at four o'clock and go for his favorite drink. But to do so will mean that he will not be able to finish the task he has before him, which he very much wants to get done and can complete if he does not go for the drink. So he decides to defer his drink until dinnertime. Thus he is able to finish the task and have his drink as well.

But though choices and compromises are readily made so long as the conflict is between impulses or wishes of little fundamental importance, when the need for accommodation involves the several roles of the personality, the task is much more difficult. Because of the emotional character of the roles, rational solutions to the conflict such as have been described are not so readily forthcoming. Instead, the individual resorts to nonrational solutions, the character of which impedes or interferes with social adjustments. Outstanding among the nonrational solutions to conflict are processes of dissociation, repression, and escape response.

MENTAL CONFLICT AND DISSOCIATION

The hallmark of dissociation is the compartmentalization of the personality. That is, conflict is avoided by never permitting one role to come into contact with another role. The personality

is blocked off into discrete units, each of which carries on an independent existence. There is no conflict because there is no contact.

Dissociation differs widely in the complexity of the pattern, from doing two tasks at a time to the intricate patterns of so-called multiple or alternating personalities. The first type of dissociation is largely a matter of the independence of habit systems, although it may manifest itself in the doing of two unfamiliar tasks at the same time.

The expression of dissociation in the so-called cases of amnesia (more accurately, fugues) is familiar to everyone who has read the newspaper. A prominent man suddenly disappears and is subsequently found wandering about with no recollection of his name, his family, his home, or the details of his former life. His behavior has in it many of the characteristics of the sleepwalker. He moves about in space in a more or less planless way and carries on a vegetative existence unhampered by memories. Investigation usually reveals that prior to the fugue the individual had been confronted with personal problems of a particularly distressing nature; the fugue eliminates the necessity of further attempts at solution of conflict. There is often evidence that the amnesia is in part voluntary in character and that the patient could recall more than he does, but this does not change the essential character of the condition. Incompleteness of true amnesia only means the individual has been but partially successful in accomplishing complete dissociation.

The fugues differ from other forms of dissociation, particularly the various forms of dual and multiple personality, in that the fugue state is transitory in character and simple in its behavior manifestations. Suggestion and hypnosis readily lead ordinarily to the disappearance of the fugue state and the reestablishment of the customary self. Nevertheless, the fugues in many respects resemble the simpler forms of dual personality.

The simpler forms of dual personality may be illustrated by the

classic case of the Reverend Ansel Bourne reported by William James.[1] The Reverend Ansel Bourne went to a bank in Providence, Rhode Island, and drew out all his money. He was last seen entering a streetcar. Two months later in a Pennsylvania town, a man who called himself A. J. Brown woke up one night in a fright and asked where he was, saying that he was the Reverend Ansel Bourne. Told that he was A. J. Brown, the proprietor of a small shop, he had no memory of this part of his life. All he could recall was his life as a clergyman, ending with the episode of withdrawing his money at the bank and entering the streetcar. In this instance the "Brown" personality was as short-lived as many a fugue state. There is no evidence of its recurrence, and yet it must have had some existence prior and subsequent to the Pennsylvania episode, even if wholly in the unconscious.

Further variations in the simpler forms of dual personality find expression in automatic writing observed so frequently in cases of hysteria. If a patient of this sort is engaged in conversation by a second person and at the same time a third person, placing a pencil in his hand and a sheet of paper before him, whispers in his ear he may be induced to answer a series of questions in writing without interrupting the stream of conversation. The patient, under these circumstances, is aware neither that he is being questioned by the third person nor of the writing experience. Similar behavior may be observed in spiritualistic mediums who under the proper conditions produce written reports which seem foreign to themselves and are therefore attributed to the spirit of some deceased person. In these latter instances the automatic behavior may involve other forms of language response, and it is automatically induced rather than deliberately stimulated by the investigator. Nevertheless, the pattern of dissociation is clear in which there are recurrent episodes of behavior which the in-

[1] *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 391-393.

dividual does not identify with himself, but which clearly are of another personality or self which carries on an existence essentially independent of the dominant personality.

A very similar type of dissociation is represented in the so-called cases of somnambulism in which the patient from time to time interrupts the flow of responses to his immediate surroundings to dramatize an episode in his life which marked the denouement of an earlier pattern of social adjustment emotionally satisfying to him. This type of dissociation may be illustrated by the classic case of Irene described by Pierre Janet.[5] Irene was very much attached to her mother and went through a harrowing experience nursing her during the illness which led to her death. Subsequently, all memory of this experience was lost, and she denied that her mother was dead, although admitting that her relatives had told her that such was the case. But in the midst of the activities of her subsequent orientation, sewing, carrying on a conversation, etc., she would often stop abruptly and relive the scene of her mother's fatal illness and death with all the adroitness of an accomplished actress. This episode was highly stereotyped in pattern, and when once completed, Irene would resume whatever activity it had interrupted as if nothing had happened in the interval. She showed no familiarity with what had taken place, the episode producing no awareness of break in her current orientation.

Dissociation in somnambulism differs from automatic writing in the symbolic and stereotyped character of the secondary self. Thus the somnambulistic episodes are but a shadow of the self which is no more but which survives in its psychically immunized compartment and is permitted no further change.

In multiple personalities there are both the recurrence which characterizes the somnambulistic and automatic episodes and the more variable and less stereotyped response which characterizes the automatic episodes. Furthermore, there is a reality and com-

[5] *Major Symptoms of Hysteria*, pp. 111-112.

pleteness of character to the several personalities which is in part lacking in the cases of somnambulism and automatic patterns of response. The individual appears to be several persons oriented within his immediate surroundings. But he is not always the same person and there is little way of telling which of the personalities will be encountered at a particular moment.

One of the best-known cases of multiple personality is that of Miss Beauchamp studied by Morton Prince.[6] Earlier, there were but two personalities, B_1 and B_3. B_1 was on the whole the dominant personality, the Miss Beauchamp in what seemed to be her most normal state. B_3 was Sally, a mischievous imp who took delight in embarrassing B_1. She would write B_1 impudent notes and leave them where they would be found when B_1 returned to dominance. Or she would play practical jokes upon B_1 such as unraveling her knitting and winding the yarn over the furniture of the room.

B_1, in contrast, was a timid, submissive individual, highly religious, altruistic, and suggestible. She tired very easily and led a life of semi-invalidism. In contrast to the irresponsibility of Sally, B_1 was conscientious and dependable but tended to withdraw from social contacts. B_2 appeared only under hypnosis and was not clearly differentiated from B_1.

B_4, on the other hand, was aggressive, given to violent outbursts of temper, quarrelsome, and intolerant. She was energetic and active, as contrasted with the passive character of B_1 and wanted always to be on the go. She was irreligious, vain, and headstrong. In fact B_4 was in almost every respect the antithesis of B_1.

Throughout most of the period of Prince's contacts there was a constant struggle between B_1, B_3, and B_4 for dominance within the personality. At times this struggle was chiefly between B_1 and B_4, at others, between B_1 and B_3. There were instances in

[6] *The Dissociation of a Personality.*

which one personality knew the others and other instances in which each knew nothing of the others. Prince was able eventually to achieve a cure of the dissociation by producing a synthesis of personalities B_1 and B_4, in the process eliminating Sally, B_3.

Thus the outstanding characteristics of Miss Beauchamp are the alternating personalities, each essentially complete and consistent within itself, and the varying degrees of compartmentalization achieved from time to time. Each personality was relatively well integrated and at times became dominant over the others.[7]

Dissociation, however, is seldom complete and has to be buttressed by the process of rationalization. Rationalization refers to the process by which the mind, sensing that its conduct (projected or accomplished) is in conflict with the canons of social approval as reflected within its conscience, goes about redefining the act in such a way as to make it seemingly merit social approval. In this way the contradiction in the two opposing elements, that part of the personality which has already done or wants to do a thing and that part which disapproves of the thing already or about to be done, is concealed. Thus the businessman may engage in practices quite within the code of commerce, and yet these same practices may conflict with the private code which he follows in his dealings with his friends and members of his family and which is sanctioned by the church to which he belongs. He proceeds to justify his commercial conduct by pleading that it is not unethical so long as it is in the interests of a good cause, the support of his family and of his philanthropies. Or the farmer sues the railroad company for destroying through a fire set by a locomotive the crop which the chinch bugs had already eaten and rationalizes his conduct upon the grounds that had the chinch bugs not arrived first, the crop would have been

[7] For more recent descriptions of multiple personalities, see Henry H. Goddard, *Two Souls in One Body?* and S. I. Franz, *Persons One and Three.*

burned and, anyway, the railroads had swindled the public out of millions of dollars in their acquisition of rights of way. Or the citizen conceals from taxation certain articles of private property upon the ground that the government would not hesitate to overtax him if it had the opportunity.

Even the delusions of the insane are brought into line with the dominating trend in the personality in the same way in which sane individuals rationalize. Thus the man who is convinced that his wife is going to murder him looks upon her solicitations as a cloak to conceal her design, and the absence of solicitations clearly shows her intentions.

It is the function, then, of rationalization to permit tendencies in conflict with the dominant element in the personality to find expression if they can be so defined as to obscure the conflict. Husbands desert their wives because of "bad housekeeping," and wives leave their husbands because of "abuse." Delinquents absolve themselves of unworthy motives by pleading that they were influenced by "evil" companions; lifelong Republicans or Democrats cite the virtues of the party platform to explain their allegiance (although the notions of the contents of the platform cannot be verbalized). Baptists explain their religious affiliation by glorifying the creed, and Negro-haters justify their prejudice by citing "facts" to show racial inferiority.

All this, however, does not mean that all rationalization is pathological. In view of the tendency of every individual to rationalize at times, it would seem that such behavior is essential to human adjustment. The test is not so much the fact that the individual is rationalizing but the character of the behavior permitted by rationalization and the frequency and completeness of the rationalizations. In many instances, rationalizations are but polite formulas, much like the glowing comments about the party made to the hostess by a guest taking his leave. He only half believes them at best, and he is satisfied if his hostess half believes them.

REPRESSION

Repression eliminates conflict by a frontal attack by the dominant self in which there is an attempt to eliminate the conflicting element. Thus the offending element is denied expression in conscious behavior, but unfortunately it is not eliminated. Instead, it is banished into the unconscious from where it can escape only indirectly and in disguise. And while this seems at first blush to be a mystical statement of theory, there is much evidence of seemingly irrational behavior which can be made intelligible only by the acceptance of the notion of the unconscious.

The notion of the unconscious, however, is not the sole property of the theory of repression. This notion was implied, if not directly stated, in the discussion of dissociation. When dissociation is complete the individual can be conscious of but one personality at a time. What becomes of the other personality? The only reasonable answer is that it is still quite as much a part of the larger personality as ever, but it is no longer in consciousness. The same is true of automatic writing. The psychic processes involved in automatic writing are ample proof that the human organism can function in psychological ways which do not involve consciousness. At best, consciousness can have in it only a minimum of the psychological responses of which the individual is capable.

The idea of the unconscious is oriented in the nature of the psychological processes. It finds confirmation in the everyday experiences of everyone. It is a corollary of the very nature of consciousness itself. In its analysis one rightly begins with the nature of consciousness, tracing through from the readily analyzable material of introspection to the inference of the unconscious.

If one examines his mental processes, he finds that perceptions, ideas, past experiences, plans of activity, and images of future and past satisfaction flow in an endless stream throughout his waking hours. This is the stream of consciousness so cogently

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described by William James.[8] The content of consciousness at a particular time is a reflection of the activities and needs of the moment. As habits no longer meet the needs in a situation, consciousness turns to the solution of the problem. Possible solutions are examined and rejected until one is found which stands the test of scrutiny, and consciousness turns to the putting of the plan into operation. This is the process of thinking and reasoning. But not always are solutions forthcoming; or if there are, none seems satisfactory. In the absence of a forthcoming solution, the most prominent element of consciousness is the confusion of feelings which pervade it. These emotions find expression in the attitudes of frustration, indecision, self-inculpation, resignation, determination, faith, and the whole gamut of affective reactions. At other times the mind engages in a more or less spontaneous and undirected recall of past experiences with little or no logical sequence, and we have what is called revery. Or the desires and wishes are projected into a nebulous plan with little or no idea that it will eventuate into activity and we have daydreaming.

But whatever the content of the stream of consciousness at a particular moment, it is quite clear that this content must be drawn from a larger reservoir. That memories of past experiences must be some place when not in consciousness seems to be a logical inference. Perceptions of yesterday cannot be lost when not in consciousness, because they appear again from time to time.

This reservoir of past experiences has been called the foreconscious and is that part of the psyche which can be brought into consciousness as the need arises. Consider, for example, the multiplication table. It is thoroughly a part of the individual's mind, and yet it is in consciousness only when needed for the solution of some mathematical problem. But who has not had the experience of the multiplication table playing tricks on him and giving him the wrong answer or no answer at times? Or

[8] *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 224-290.

the familiar experience of introducing one's best friend and being unable at the moment to recall his name? Or again, attempting to recall some idea which you have made use of again and again only to have it elude you for days and turn up suddenly under the most unexpected circumstances? But suppose this resistence to recall should continue indefinitely. Is that any reason to believe that the experience has been eliminated? Particularly since one cannot be sure that it will not eventually come into consciousness again!

But one asks, how does one know that the experience which resists recall is of any significance in behavior so long as it is out of consciousness? This may be answered in terms of tests to which anyone may subject himself. Thus take some prejudice or aversion which one has experienced for so long that he seems always to have had it. Now let him in introspection revive as much of his earliest experiences as possible, jotting these down in notes upon a piece of paper without too much attempt to direct the course of recall. If he will do this over some period of time under conditions which make for relaxation and will use the notations made as stimuli to further explorations, he may eventually uncover the forgotten experience out of which the prejudice or aversion grew. If not that particular one, certainly others will come to light. He must then assume that traces of these experiences would have still been there had he not entered into this explorative venture.

The notion of the unconscious is but an extension of the foreconscious in which the resistance to recall has been increased beyond that which characterizes the foreconscious at most. This resistance, furthermore, takes on an active character in contrast to the passive nature of the fading of memory. But this is only a matter of degree.

This raises another question with regard to the nature of the unconscious. Must experiences first be in consciousness before they can become a part of the unconscious? The answer is that they need not be and this again conforms to everyday experience.

Consider for example the act of intuition. An individual predicts an event before it occurs, or he infers the background of a situation without having observed it. Yet if he is asked how he arrived at the intuition, if he gives an honest answer, it can only be that he does not know. Or, the spiritualist medium writes a message in a language which she herself cannot understand. The only plausible explanation of all these phenomena is that certain observations in the form of cues or past experiences never in the field of consciousness have somehow made an imprint upon the mind and have become the basis for responses in quite the same manner in which recallable experiences operate.

The unconscious differs from consciousness and the foreconscious as White has pointed out in that it is an explanatory, not a descriptive, concept.[9] Furthermore, the foreconscious is accessible to the individual, whereas the unconscious is not. And when the unconscious is brought to awareness through investigative techniques,[10] it seems strange and unacceptable to the individual whereas the foreconscious is perfectly familiar. But again these differences are relative in character in that some parts of the unconscious can be recalled, if one but learn the proper techniques, and some of the content is more acceptable than other parts.

The notion of the unconscious, then, is a fundamental inference from the kind of behavior which one observes in human beings. It provides the basic framework in terms of which to understand a host of human responses which otherwise would have to be relegated to the realm of spiritism, clairvoyance, and supernaturalism. Not the least of these are the observations of human behavior which find ready understanding under the concept "repression."

In repression the dominant personality or self exercises its po-

[9] William A. White, *The Mechanisms of Character Formation*, pp. 35-61.

[10] It is not necessary for present purposes to go into an analysis of these techniques, which may be differentiated into the method of free-association, dream-interpretation, and direct questioning. See English Bagby, *The Psychology of Personality*, pp. 54-68.

licing function and settles the issue in conflict by banishing the element in conflict with it. The consequence is that only the dominant self finds expression directly. The subservient element in the personality is not denied all expression, but if it is to find expression, it must do so in a form which is not recognized by the dominant self. This indirect expression takes the form of seemingly being in harmony with the dominant self and thus is able to "escape" from the unconscious to which it has been banished.

Again, the operation of the dominant self as a censor is in accordance with the common experience of everyone, if he will but analyze his experiences. Who has not had the experience of forgetting an appointment which was in some respect distasteful to him; for example, a dental appointment? That part of the personality which dislikes the pain and discomfort of the dental chair sees to it that the appointment is forgotten and the unpleasant experience avoided. This does not mean that all forgetting is purposeful, as the Freudians sometimes seem to imply. Much forgetting is the consequence of the fact that the experience scarcely entered consciousness in the first place. Nevertheless, there is also a great deal of purposeful forgetting in which consciousness is freed from the many elements of everyday existence which are distasteful to the dominant self. Some of this distaste is scarcely more than a mild disturbance or distraction in the even flow of experiences along a consistent course; other responses of distaste arise out of a background of the most intense aversions and fears and find solution in the vigorous policing action on the part of the dominant self.

Repression takes a wide variety of forms of which three may be differentiated for the present purposes: (1) symbolization, (2) reinforcement or reaction formation, and (3) projection.[11] Each of these forms finds ready illustration in the experiences of the average person who is not essentially disorganized, since re-

[1] Cf. Bernard Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, pp. 89-126.

pression is not carried to the extremes which one finds in personality disorganization and disintegration.

Symbolization as a form of repression represents the expression of the repressed element in a disguised form by which it is able to evade the censoring operation of the dominant personality. That is, the discordant element finds expression in a way which will be condoned by the dominant self. Nevertheless, beneath this disguise will be found the offending element if one will but look into the unconscious by the appropriate techniques.

Jung cites a case of a man who expressed extreme annoyance at a certain church bell. It so happened that this particular set of bells was famous for its beauty. The reaction of the objector was all the more singular for this fact. This aroused the curiosity of the friend to whom the remark had been made, and he immediately set about to get at the basis for the response. He found that his friend and the pastor of the church were rivals in the field of amateur poetry, and both had recently submitted poems in a contest. The prize had gone to the pastor, rather than to the man who was annoyed at the bells. Thus he expressed his chagrin for having lost the contest by venting his spleen upon the bells rather than upon the pastor of the church. His dominant personality, in which were incorporated ideals of fair play, would condone violent depreciation of the bells but not of the pastor.[12]

Harriet R. Mowrer tells of a husband who, while taking a bath, asked his wife to bring him a suit of underwear and, upon her comment about the large number of pimples upon his back, flew into a rage complaining that his underwear was wrinkled. He left the home that evening, giving as his reason his wife's neglect of his interests as evidenced by the wrinkled condition of the underwear she had brought him. Investigation into the background of this behavior revealed that the husband interpreted his wife's remarks about the pimples upon his back as equivalent to accusing him of having had extramarital relations

[12] *Ibid*, pp. 73-74.

and thereby contracting a venereal disease. But rather than place himself in the position of falsely interpreting his wife's remark or face the issue if his interpretation were true, he expressed his anger and antagonism in terms of her neglect of her wifely duties as evidenced in the wrinkled condition of the underwear, a form of expression more congenial to the dominant personality.[18]

Thus the symbolic behavior often seems incomprehensible, and even irrational, to one who does not know the basis for this type of expression. But when the character of the discordant elements is understood, the form of expression is quite in accord with the needs set up by the dominant self. In this expression, forms of behavior sanctioned by the dominant self become the disguise for the discordant elements, and conflict is thereby avoided.

In reaction formation the policing power of the dominant self is reinforced by strengthening the elements antithetical to the discordant ones. In this way the dominant self is able completely to repress the conflicting impulses, but at the sacrifice of balance in the dominant self. Distortions develop in the personality in the form of persistent and vigilant policing activities such as to seriously interfere with the normal processes of adjustment.

Reaction formations find expression in a wide variety of ways. The hostile wish against a parent is offset by excessive anxiety for his welfare. The socially shy person who aspires to be the vivacious social butterfly develops an exterior of ritualistic, boisterous good fellowship. The person who in his boyhood was given to petty thieving becomes meticulously exacting in later life and thereby makes amends for his youthful indiscretions. The overly prudish individual who feels himself irresistibly fascinated by the thought of promiscuous sexual relations becomes a saver of "fallen" women. The man who has achieved success the "hard" way becomes the inflexible taskmaster and thereby liberates himself from his lowly origin by repressing sympa-

[18] *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 162-163.

thetic understanding which would imply recognition of his own struggle.

Reinforcement or reaction formation also finds expression in more extreme forms, often verging on or constituting a part of pathological behavior. Thus many patients suffering the last stages of tuberculosis or cancer show an elation which completely shuts out all recognition of the seriousness of their condition. In other instances stereotyped responses of a compulsive character appear. The washing mania commonly observed in psychotic behavior in which the individual experiences an irresistible desire to wash his hands at every moment of the day strengthens the role of the individual who has sinned and will have no more of it. English Bagby describes the case of a patient who felt compelled to bite his hands.[14] This hand-biting performance was in response to conflict created by some past sin. Through this compulsive act, the patient was the better able to banish the disturbing element by lacerating the "flesh which is weak."

In projection the discordant element is regarded as outside the personality, and the individual reacts to it as if it belonged to another real or imaginary person. In this way the dominant self refuses to recognize the existence of the subservient element as a part of the personality. Thus a man with dishonest tendencies becomes obsessed with the idea that his fellow workmen are all trying to rob his employer and keeps a close watch of everything they do. And the parvenu talks much about the "bounders" who do not know their place. Or the person who himself has a fault or deficiency of which he is ashamed is intolerant of the same defect in others.

Perhaps it was Adam in the Garden of Eden who first utilized the mechanism of projection when he made the excuse that Eve tempted him to eat the apple, which caused them both to be driven forever out of the Garden. At any rate, human beings ever since have been blaming their own failures upon fate, their

[14] *The Psychology of Personality*, pp. 7-12.

fellows, and their enemies. By projecting their derelictions, their prejudices, or their aversions upon others, they have absolved themselves of any need for self-criticism. Thus the second World War is the consequence of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles according to Hitler, forgetting the rape of Belgium and of northern France, or for that matter the treaty which in 1871 concluded the Franco-Prussian War.

Perhaps the most colorful expression of projection is to be seen in cases of so-called "old maid's insanity," in which an unmarried woman of considerable age and blameless reputation falls in love with a man and begins to complain that he follows her about and she fears will abduct her by force. (Sometimes, according to her report, he makes indecent advances or even rapes her.) Investigation reveals that the man has no interest in her and is hardly aware of her existence. The whole relationship has been reversed, and the interest which the woman herself experiences is projected upon the man in question.

A further process of resolving conflict is through the utilization of escapes. In this process the individual attempts to eliminate conflict by escaping from a socially prescribed role to a role which is more congenial to him. Thus the individual who finds the responsibilities of adulthood repugnant to him retreats into an infantile role in which others take responsibilities for him. Or the individual who feels inferior attempts to escape his inferiority by the development of a reconstructed social relationship. These escape patterns run the gamut from the use of socially approved devices for securing the preferential treatment desired to attempts to reconstruct the social milieu either along wholly private lines or by attempting to superimpose this reconstruction upon the social milieu.

Central in the escape process is the use of certain socially approved responses by which the individual is permitted to reinstate the favorable role in communal relationships which he had in the early family. The most common of these devices are pseudo illness and drink. Through pseudo illness or through drink

the individual strives to achieve a position and status in nonfamily relations which he is not at first accorded but which he had in his early family life. These devices are utilized by those persons who had, in whole or in part, superior roles in childhood but who are not so readily accorded this superior position in communal relations.

The use of pseudo illness as a device for escaping obligations, responsibilities, and duties is a common experience. No excuse is more acceptable for failure to conform to expectations and live up to one's obligations than illness. Therefore everyone on occasion uses the plea of illness as an excuse for failure to meet his social obligations, particularly when those obligations happen to be distasteful. Thus the person who feels that he ought to accept an invitation, but does not want to do so, telephones at the last minute that because of a headache he will not be able to come to the party. And if nature is kind and co-operative, he may actually have a headache as a consequence of worrying about how to avoid having to go. Consequently, illness even under the most ordinary conditions may be real, not feigned, but it is functional, rather than organic. That is, the discomfort which the individual experiences is psychic in origin and not physiological. This justifies its being called pseudo illness.

In pseudo illness, as has been suggested, nature often co-operates to produce the symptoms which resemble illness. In the first place, the desire to avoid the situation which is intolerable readily directs one's attention to what would otherwise be the normal functioning of the organism. The beat of the heart becomes stronger from concentrating attention upon it; head noises are increased thereby; miscellaneous pains in the body which otherwise would be scarcely noticed are magnified by becoming the center of attention. In addition, the emotions of anxiety, fear, and worry interfere with the digestive processes, produce headaches, and create palpitation of the heart. All this becomes the basis for special consideration upon the part of others which ordinarily would not be secured. It is only a step from the com-

mon experience of everyone to the systematized pattern of the hypochrondiac.[15]

Excessive drinking performs a function similar to pseudo illness. The moderate or casual drinker uses alcohol because he likes the taste or because he likes the fellowship of others who like the taste. His drinking is temperate, and if by chance he should drink too much, he learns from experience how much he can tolerate. But not the habitually excessive drinker. The excessive and habitual drinker has a purpose to achieve which can be accomplished only by the indulgences which he is permitted by those about him. Under the influence of liquor, allowances are made for his conduct which would not be made otherwise, and others become more responsive to his wishes than they would ordinarily be. In this way he strives to achieve the preferential position and role in communal contacts which he was accorded in his early family relationships.

Escape both through pseudo illness and through drink represents attempts upon the part of the individual to reinstate in adult relationships the superior role achieved in the family group. This does not mean, however, that such techniques have not been used in achieving the initial preferential role in the family. Childhood drinking is of course excluded by cultural controls as a device for this purpose, but pseudo illness is utilized. In fact invariably it will be found that the adult who escapes through pseudo illness had utilized this device within the family group to strengthen the pattern of preferential treatment and to insure against his loss of the superior role in the family group, particularly where it is threatened by any ambiguity in the attitudes of the various members of the family.[16]

The use of phantasy, on the other hand, seems to grow out of dissatisfaction upon the part of the individual with the role granted him in the family group. Thus by invidious comparison

[15] Cf. Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 88-108.

[16] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 109-124.

with the roles of siblings or by the ambiguity which grows out of differential attitudes upon the part of the two parents, the child constructs a conception of himself and his role at variance with that accorded him in family interaction. He sets out, accordingly, to achieve this role both in childhood and in his adult social relationships through the various forms of phantasy available to him.

In general, phantasy tends to take two forms. In the first form the individual works out an imaginary reconstruction of his social milieu in such a way that he can realize the desired role. Daydreaming is one of the many ways of achieving this reconstruction. Sometimes, particularly in the child, daydreaming is little more than a temporary substitute for more active efforts to realize the desired role. At other times, however, it becomes entrenched as the habitualized device.

Daydreaming may develop spontaneous patterns or utilize those which are ready-made. When ready-made patterns are utilized, the individual identifies himself with the desired role as portrayed in the pattern, the hero or heroine in the motion picture, the novel, or the drama. Again, this is a matter of common experience, shared by everyone. Or he may give to the spontaneous patterns a socially approved definition and produce works of art. Always, however, he recognizes the gulf between the social definitions of his role and the phantasy definition.

Or, he may reconstruct his social milieu by verbally portraying himself to others as he would be accepted by them. Much so-called lying and bragging belong in this category. It is not so much that he is trying to deceive others, but that he is trying to convince himself that the situation is as he describes it, and he hopes to find in the attitudes of others the confirmation of this desire.

In more extreme cases, the individual loses his ability to differentiate his world of daydreams, his private world, from the world as socially defined by others about him. He retreats completely into a subjective environment constructed to his own wishes and

abandons all attempt to win social approval for himself in the desired role. This is what happens in varying degrees in all the cases of insanity. Many other persons exhibit essentially the same behavior but are able to give it a social setting, and although they may show some disorganization of personality, they do not completely lose their ability to make themselves understood and in part accepted by those with whom they have contact.[17]

The second form which phantasy takes is that in which the individual sets out actively to achieve the superior role to which he aspires. This is the field of what Adler has called compensatory behavior. These individuals are not content with a subjective realization but must have social approval, however precarious this approval may be. Thus, like the actor on the stage, the individual takes on the mannerisms and assumes the character of the role to which he aspires.

Compensation, according to the Adlerian doctrine, is based upon feelings of inferiority. Every individual strives for superiority, but the person whose organs are inferior will feel himself inadequate for this struggle. The pampered child, realizing his dependence upon another person, also feels inferior much as if he suffered from organ inferiority. The neglected child, whether because he is illegitimate, ugly, or unwanted, experiences a deep-seated feeling of inferiority. The common attribute of all these persons is a feeling of insecurity and inadequacy. Their strivings to overcome feelings of inadequacy and insecurity are never more than partially successful, because they are never able completely to identify themselves with any group and its purposes. That is, their own personal ambitions always take precedence over the social welfare of the group. Because of this failure to merge self-interests with group interests, they continue to feel inferior no matter what to the outsider seems to be their achievements.[18]

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 125-132.

[18] Cf. Alfred Adler, "The Structure of the Neurosis," *International Journal of Individual Psychology*, vol. I (July, 1935), pp. 3-12.

The outstanding characteristic of attempts to act out the phantasy role, then, is precariousness. This is the outgrowth of the fact that the individual is never able completely to achieve the role to which he aspires, because, first, he is seldom able to entirely convince himself that the early family group was wrong in assigning him to the role he occupied in that group and, second, any obstacles or rebuffs met with in his attempts to achieve the superior role are looked upon as persecution. Thus he both rebels against and acknowledges the virtue of his defeats.

Like daydreaming, compensation may utilize ready-made as well as the spontaneously generated patterns. Thus some actors in the field of the drama become so identified with the role in the play that they are scarcely able to realize when the dramatic production begins and ends. The stage gives them an opportunity to realize the compensatory role. This was recently illustrated by the performance of a famous actor who so thoroughly enjoyed an autobiographical role into which he was cast that he made so many spontaneous variations in his lines as to cause difficulty for the other members of the cast. Again, the same utilization of ready-made patterns may be seen in the behavior of many cult leaders who have claimed to be reincarnations of persons long since deceased.

All escape mechanisms, accordingly, function as devices for the solution of conflict. The degree to which conflict is eliminated is a variable matter. If the technique utilized is subjective and is carried far enough, as in the dementia praecox psychosis, conflict seems to be completely eliminated. More often, only moderate success is achieved. When the compensatory forms are used, complete elimination of conflict may also be achieved, as one observes in the psychosis of paranoia and possibly in those cases in which the individual is able to find a group which will without reservation grant him the superior role desired, such as may be the case of Hitler at the present time.

Furthermore, the daydreaming and compensating forms of phantasy may exist side by side. That is, the same individual

may utilize both to some degree. This may be illustrated in the individual who "puts on airs" and adopts mannerisms of members of a class higher than that to which he belongs. Yet, he recognizes his own behavior for what it is worth and when told to "be himself" readily and good-naturedly drops the mannerisms. With this "rude awakening" he again drops back into the day-dreaming expression of the desired role which for a moment he expressed more actively.

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XI

The Unadjusted Personality

WHILE CONFLICT is the key to personality disorganization, the utilization of the nonrational techniques is not of itself the differentiating element between the adjusted and the unadjusted personality. Most individuals utilize the nonrational techniques at times, and by the same token unadjusted personalities on occasion utilize the rational techniques. Nor can the differential element be conflict itself, since this is the direct counterpart of the multiple group relationships of the individual.

It is necessary at the outset to recognize that individuals vary in the amount of conflict which they experience, in the techniques they utilize in the solution of conflict, and in the degree to which they utilize particular techniques. In other words, personalities range all the way from the highly integrated to the completely disintegrated. The most highly integrated personalities are those whose conceptions of their roles are in every respect identical with that of every group in which they are members. In turn, the most highly disintegrated personalities are those whose conceptions of their roles are contrary to the definitions of the groups to which they belong, if they can be said to have group membership. Or to put it differently, the complete correspondence of the individual's private world with the public world is the hallmark of a highly integrated personality. Conversely, those persons who have developed private worlds wholly apart from the public world are highly disintegrated—insane in the common language.

Between these two extremes lies a wide variety of personality patterns showing varying degrees of organization and disorganization. Seldom, if ever, is there complete integration. While extremely disintegrated personalities seem to be more common, these are negligible in number compared to the multitude of persons between the two extremes. Only a small proportion of even the so-called insane achieve complete isolation from the disapproving gestures of others about them.

Personalities between these two extremes can be roughly divided into three classes. There are, first, the adjusted personalities who constitute the upper portion of the range. Then there are the unadjusted personalities in the middle of the range. Finally, there are the maladjusted personalities at the bottom of the range.

Personalities are made up of multiple roles which reflect the various groups of which the individual is or has been a member. But in this plurality of patterns of co-ordinations of attitudes and habits through which the individual secures and maintains status in particular groups, some roles are more important than others. The earliest role which the child played in the family if it was satisfactory tends to be the dominant role in the personality. If this earliest role was unsatisfactory, through invidious comparison the antithesis of the family role may become the dominant one. Again, when different members of the family reacted to the child differently, but with no difference in acceptability, two roles may be dominant. In any case the dominant role is a reflection of the early family experience of the individual.

The dominant role in the personality functions to co-ordinate the several roles which constitute the totality of the personality. That is, it polices them and strives to effect some sort of working equilibrium between the conflicting elements. This accommodation among roles is the pattern of life, and the type of personality is a function of the adjustment devices which constitute the basic elements in this pattern. Thus the personality is adjusted if these basic elements in the pattern of life consist of workable

(socially acceptable) techniques for meeting the crisis situations in the social relationships of the individual which threaten to disrupt the accommodation among the several roles. The distinguishing characteristic of the adjusted personality is that socially approved, rather than substitute, adjustment devices are utilized in achieving and maintaining status in group relations. In fact the degree of personality adjustment is largely a matter of the facility with which the individual can move from membership in one group to another and be accepted in terms of his conception of his role.

Personalities become unadjusted when the form of accommodation between the various roles is such as to interfere with the social adjustment of the individual. That is, in attempting to solve the problems of accommodation among roles, the individual resorts to techniques which elicit social disapproval and which therefore interfere with, rather than facilitate, social adjustment. The individual finds himself unable to re-establish the equilibrium among roles in a socially approved fashion. This failure may vary all the way from the momentary and temporary to the persistent and chronic. So long as the individual does not give up the attempt to achieve an accommodation in spite of his failure to accomplish this goal, he is unadjusted but not maladjusted. The personality of the unadjusted is disorganized but not disintegrated.

When the individual abandons the campaign for achieving social approval and retreats into a subjective world he has become maladjusted, or insane. But again there is a wide gradation in the degree of abandonment of the campaign for social approval. Thus in the neuroses the individual has abandoned the struggle only in part, whereas in the psychoses there has been complete abandonment. Furthermore, the psychoses seem to be set off from the neuroses by certain bodily changes which a beneficent nature has furnished to facilitate this complete abandonment of further attempts to bring into accommodation the conflicting roles of the individual.

TYPES OF UNADJUSTED PERSONALITIES

With this distinction between adjusted and unadjusted personalities, one is in a position to differentiate the several types of disorganized personalities. Although other types may be discovered in the future, the following have been differentiated: conflicting roles, dual roles, the pseudo ill, phantasy roles, the alcoholic, the suicide, the sexual variant, the neurotic, and the psychotic. Only the first four of these types will be considered in this chapter, since subsequent chapters will be devoted to the rest.

The conflicting-roles type of personality is one in which conflict is so great that the individual is not able effectively to adjust to the demands of social relationships. This is either because this type of person is unable to arrive at solutions to conflict or because before he has done so other problems arise which demand his attention. Consequently, he seems torn by conflict at every point, unable to accomplish any satisfactory adjustment to even the simplest of problems. His personality is ambiguous, undefined, and unintegrated. He is spoken of as one who does not know his own mind.[1]

In the conflicting-roles type, the personality tends to be made up of two clearly defined roles, neither of which is able to dominate the other. The consequence is that the individual vacillates between two courses of conduct. This conflict of roles may have its origin in the ambivalent definition of role in the family, or the second role may have been acquired in the early communal experiences of the person.

Thus the only child, because of the ambivalence in attitudes of the parents toward him in encouraging him to be both dependent and independent or because of one parent's emphasizing sharply differentiated, if not contradictory, traits and interests, tends to develop the conflicting-roles type of personality. Children born to intermarriages, because of their marginality in par-

[1] Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 51-52.

ticipating in two cultural groups without being unequivocally accepted by either, tend to be of this type. Illegitimacy, likewise, produces much the same results.

Adoption also may be the basis of the duality which is characteristic of the conflicting-roles personality, particularly when contacts continue between the adopted child and the real parent or parents. In one case, for example, a man, who as a child was taken to be reared by an aunt and uncle following the death of his mother when he was born, and who later was legally adopted, as an adult vacillated between using the name of his father and that of the uncle. Although in Europe he used the name of his uncle, when he immigrated to America he took his father's name. Nevertheless, his insurance policies continued to bear the name of his adoption. Yet he professed to despise his father who had never been interested in the children of his first marriage. (He had remarried and had children by the second marriage.)

In fact any condition in the early life of the individual which results in the definition of roles of essentially equal strengths, may result in this type of unadjusted personality. In the following case the second contending role was developed in the community.

Mr. E. was the next to the youngest of seven children consisting of four girls and three boys. The youngest child, a boy, was the favorite, but all the boys were preferred to the girls. All the children were brought up in the orthodox traditions of their parents in which learning was revered. Mr. E. had a private tutor who taught him language and religious philosophy, in imitation of his father who had considerable prestige in the community as a learned man although he never supported his family and lived upon an allowance given him by his wife's wealthy parents.

At the age of sixteen, Mr. E. left home and joined a group of young radicals who advocated free love, atheism, and the doctrine that no one should live upon anything other than his own labor. All of this was quite contrary to his upbringing. A little later he became involved in revolutionary activities, but while the ideas of the radical group inflamed him, he never felt that he could make any

sacrifice for them and consequently looked upon them more as a hobby than anything else.

Shortly before coming to America at the age of twenty, Mr. E. married a wealthy girl whose family helped them to make the trip. But life in America was disappointing. In order to support his family he was forced to work at the trade of presser which he had learned in Europe in line with the philosophy of the radical group to which he belonged, although he had never expected to make use of this training. But he rebelled against the conditions under which he had to work and eventually his wife's family furnished him the money to establish his own tailoring business, but this soon failed and he shifted back to working as a presser.

Not long after the birth of the first child, Mr. E.'s wife died. He went to live with his oldest sister who kept roomers. It was there that he met his second wife who had become very much attached to his baby daughter. Consequently, out of "self-sacrifice" he married his second wife. At first he did not want to have a conventional ceremony but when his bride insisted he readily consented.

Shortly after his second marriage, Mr. E. began working as a life insurance salesman, in which he was quite successful for a time, advancing to the position of office manager. Then he embezzled some of the funds of the company and lost his position. He went back to working as a presser, but a little later, he was selling insurance again. Later he became involved in another fraudulent transaction and lost his position. Following an interim as a presser he secured another position selling insurance.

In the meantime, Mr. E. became acquainted with a Mrs. A., a married woman with four children. He fell in love with her and shortly he left his wife and went to live with Mrs. A. Somewhat later both Mr. E. and Mrs. A. returned to their respective families. Yet neither wanted to give up the other. But neither did Mr. E. want to give up his wife.[2]

Thus the characteristic feature of Mr. E.'s personality is his inability to choose between two contradictory courses of conduct. This is the outgrowth of his early experiences in which the conventional and orthodox behavior of his family were in direct contradiction to the beliefs of the radical group of young people with whom he came in contact in the community. Be-

[2] Adapted from Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-66.

cause the radical group believed that one should live only by the "sweat of his brow," Mr. E. learned a trade. But a trade was beneath the dignity of what the family had taught him, and he made a conventional marriage to a girl of a wealthy family to escape the necessity of following his trade.

Later, however, immigration to America made it necessary to resort to employment in his trade in order to support his wife and himself. But he was dissatisfied and tried other things, finally becoming an insurance salesman; later an executive. In the meantime, his wife died and he remarried. He embezzled company funds and lost his position. He reverted to working as a presser. Loss of his insurance position meant loss of status and so he dropped his membership in a lodge he had joined in the role of a conventional business man. Shortly he was selling insurance again and, losing his position once more for dishonest practices, he reverted to employment as a presser, only again to find employment later as an insurance salesman.

In his marriage the same conflict occurs. Though he was conventionally married, he had promiscuous sexual relations much in keeping with the free-love code of his radical philosophy. He fell in love with a married woman and left his wife to live with her for a while. But he soon went back to his wife and family because he could not make a choice. And so he finds himself attached to two women and unable to choose between them. He can neither give up his marriage with his wife because it satisfies the demands of his conventional self nor give up his clandestine love affair because of the demands which his unconventional self makes upon him. He is always in turmoil, unable to work out an adjustment of the conflict between the two selves which constitute his personality.[3]

DUAL ROLES

The dual-roles type of personality differs from the conflicting-roles type in that dissociation has to some degree made it possible

[3] Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-68.

for the two (there could be more than two) essentially equal roles to function without interference with each other. That is, both roles find expression in the behavior of the individual without creating conflict. The absence of conflict in the dual-roles type of personality is of course a relative matter, some patterns approaching the conflicting-roles type. Furthermore, complete absence of conflict between roles is probably relatively rare, although rationalization often operates to obscure the contradictory character of the two roles sufficiently to reduce recognition of their divergent nature to a minimum.

The dual-roles type of person is, accordingly, more two persons than one. Each self tends to adjust to its peculiar set of social conditions and the individual lives in two worlds apart. The individual shifts back and forth from one role to the other without any apparent realization on his part that he is doing so. This is essentially characteristic of Mr. K.:

Mr. K. was the oldest of four children, two boys and two girls. His father was a Rabbi and also held a government position. Mr. K. as the oldest son was given rabbinical training until he was sixteen years old. Some time before this his father had died and his mother remarried; marrying a man who was in a wholesale business. The stepfather was in poor health and went to a German spa for his health, taking Mr. K. with him. The stepfather returned home after a few months, but left Mr. K. in Germany to learn to be a business man, apprenticing him to a firm which manufactured flashlights. Three years later he returned home and was conscripted into the Russian army in which he served four years. He finally escaped and returned to Germany where he became a furniture salesman. In his business Mr. K. had contacts with both Jews and non-Jews and as a result lost his orthodoxy. In fact he became less and less identified with Judaism.

Upon the death of his stepfather, Mr. K. received an inheritance and left Germany for America, settling in New York City. His first employment was as an auctioneer at which he was quite successful. His sister was also in New York City but she disowned him as a brother. After five years he became ill and an "old maid" took care of him. When he asked to pay for her services, she proposed marriage. After the marriage he immediately left New York to get

away from her, later explaining that the whole thing was a frame-up and it was a bigamous marriage, but she could not prove its legality.

In Chicago, Mr. K. first worked as a furniture salesman but shortly went into business for himself. Here he made contacts through the orthodox synagogue to which he went to say a prayer upon the anniversary of the death of his father. Through these acquaintances he met his second wife, and after a few weeks' acquaintance they were married but not before she had given him her savings with which he started a furniture store.

Domestic discord developed early in marriage. Mr. K. complained of his wife's lack of intellectual interests and inferior education and the inferior status of her family; Mrs. K. of his unscrupulous business dealings, his contacts with other women, and his antagonism to her orthodox practices and beliefs. Mr. K. failed in business several times, but always managed to re-establish himself. These failures he attributed to his unhappy married life. On one occasion he spent three months in jail on a forgery charge. On many occasions he augmented his sales with women customers by pretending to take a personal interest in them and promising marriage, even going so far as to have illicit relations with them.

At times Mr. K. takes considerable interest in his four children; at other times he is either indifferent or calls them "sheenies," as much as to deny that he is their father. He objects to the orthodox religious training which his wife gives the children and yet he himself never misses, each year saying the orthodox prayer obligatory upon the oldest son upon the anniversary of his father's death.[4]

Duality of role in the case of Mr. K. developed out of the divergence in his orthodox training to become a rabbi and his later business training in which his contacts were with reformed Jews and with non-Jews. These contradictory roles furnish the background for the understanding of all his subsequent experiences. He is both a Jew and a non-Jew; a respectable business man and a trickster; a man who is fond and proud of his family and a footloose Don Juan whose affairs with women are proverbial. Even his own conception of himself contains these contradictory elements: he is the black sheep of the family and he is a gifted per-

[4] Adapted from Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-84.

son with wide experience and cultivated tastes who has never had a chance. His idea of a good drama is one in which people fight and become reconciled, in which the characters are Jewish and non-Jewish, such as *Abie's Irish Rose*.

Mr. K.'s first marriage was to his landlady who had nursed him through an illness, and he rationalizes his desertion by contending that she did the proposing and, since he was indebted to her, he could hardly refuse. But he said it was a bigamous marriage, whereas it was his second marriage which was bigamous.

Mr. K.'s second marriage is the essence of orthodoxy since his wife came from an orthodox family and he met her through his contacts at the orthodox synagogue. Nevertheless, he objects to the orthodox training his wife gives his children and says that he is a Christian and they are Jews. He has illicit relations with Jewish women which he rationalizes as part of his sales technique, all in the interest of increasing his business for the sake of his family.

Thus the two roles—one the unscrupluous, Protestant, single man, the other the orthodox, married Jew—are permitted to find expression side by side except as dissatisfaction in marriage upon the part of his wife tends to threaten the functioning of the Jewish personality.[3]

PSEUDO ILLNESS

Not all persons who experience conflict between roles utilize the mechanism of dissociation but develop escape devices instead. Perhaps this is explainable in that the contending roles are not always equally desirable. The consequence is that the individual tends to seek opportunities for the functioning of one role to the exclusion of the other and to develop devices for accomplishing this purpose. One of these devices is the use of pseudo illness to elicit opportunity for the expression of the desired role.

This device is much more commonly utilized by women than by men. This is readily understandable, since according to the

[3] Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-87.

cultural conception of women, they are less robust than men, and to be feminine is to be occasionally ill. In contrast, men are culturally defined as robust, virile individuals. Masculinity means freedom from the weakness of body which is characteristic of the female, and illness symbolizes lack of robustness. The man, accordingly, who is always ill is only half a man at best. With this premium upon robustness, men will less often utilize pseudo illness since it means loss of status.[6] Women, on the other hand, do not lose status and are thereby encouraged to adopt pseudo illness as a technique for solving conflict. In fact the woman who is never ill is likely to be looked upon as too masculine.

Pseudo illness seems to develop out of the early experiences of the individual. Thus the pampered child often early develops symptoms of pseudo illness to protect his preferential position whenever there is the slightest threat to it. After having been given his own way in every respect in the early family until the role has become habituated, he rebels against any suggestion of change in the form of the assumption of responsibilities. Having successfully utilized this technique in the family group, he quite naturally turns to it in communal contacts the moment there is any threat to his preferential position.

The use of the mechanism of pseudo illness seems to grow out of two sets of circumstances. In the first place, the child may be the youngest, or have the role of the youngest, and be given preferential treatment because of the fact that no other child displaces him as the center of attention and solicitude upon the part of the parents. Secondly, because of frailty a particular child may require greater attention and care while quite young, and this pattern, having been established, tends to continue. In both sets of circumstances a conception of role is developed which may be threatened in communal contacts and if threatened tends to result in some sort of effort to reinstate the preferential role. Pseudo illness is only one of these devices, and its selection is

[6] For a typical case of the masculine use of pseudo illness see Harriet R. Mowrer, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-238.

probably either an accidental or an experimental matter. That is, the child experiences minor illnesses, observes their beneficient results, and more or less unconsciously has his attention directed toward his bodily functions whenever there is any threat to his preferential role. Or he may spontaneously try first one device, then another before he finally adopts pseudo illness.[7]

How pseudo illness develops as a device in the drive to reinstate the early preferred role in subsequent contacts may be illustrated in the case of Mrs. X.:

Mrs. X. was the in-between child in a family of three children, one girl and two boys. She early became the spoiled child in the family, preferred and catered to by the mother. When the mother became conscious of her easy and over-indulgent attitudes toward her daughter, she would sometimes try to be more strict in her discipline, but Mrs. X. would resort to temper tantrums and thus get her own way. Thus in describing these tantrums, Mrs. X. said, "I used to scream and the neighbors would come to look at me to see what was the matter. Then my mother gave in."

Mrs. X. went to work in a department store upon completing the eighth grade in school. She was a popular girl, attending many dances and parties, and was considered attractive. She was quite romantic, much given to reading love stories and imagining herself married to a fine, wealthy man. If marriage meant anything else she felt that she would rather remain a child.

Mr. and Mrs. X. grew up in the same neighborhood and Mrs. X. was the chum of Mr. X.'s sister. Because Mr. X.'s mother had another girl picked out for him to marry, the family objected to his marriage to Mrs. X. As a consequence of this objection they broke off their engagement but subsequently renewed it. There was considerable intimacy during this latter period and Mrs. X. became pregnant. Discovering this they were married immediately with the approval of Mrs. X.'s mother, but Mr. X.'s parents were not at the wedding.

Because of a feeling of disgrace, Mrs. X. discontinued all contacts with her friends after her marriage and refused to go out of the house except upon rare occasions. When her husband, three days after marriage, said that he was going to see his family, Mrs. X. had her first "spell." She screamed and cried, complaining that she was

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

ill and should not be left alone. Mr. X. went anyway and his mother told him that after marrying into such a family he could not expect much out of marriage. As time went on, not only did Mrs. X. repeat these spells of screaming and crying whenever Mr. X. went to visit his family, but she went to bed complaining of illness whenever he planned to go out with his men friends. A little later she began calling him home from work. If he did not come promptly in response to her call, she had the neighbors call him for her. When he would reach home he would find her moaning with her head wrapped in towels. She complained of headache, backache, weakness, and general pains. Nevertheless, none of the ten physicians who examined her at various times in response to these complaints over a period of years were able to find any physiological basis for her complaints.

Complaining that housework and the care of her children were too strenuous for her, Mrs. X. has been able to avoid these responsibilities. When the family income was adequate they have had a maid. When unable to employ a maid, Mr. X. and the children have done the housework. Even the slightest performance about the household upon the part of Mrs. X. causes her to "collapse." [8]

Thus Mrs. X. is able to escape the responsibilities of marriage and family life by resort to pseudo illness. This enables her to become the center of attention as she had been in her early family relations in which her mother catered to her at every turn. Pregnancy prior to marriage and the consequent loss of status only made more imperative the unfaltering and undivided attention of her husband. Therefore Mr. X.'s visits to his parents were to be avoided at all costs since they had opposed the marriage.

Mrs. X., as is true in all cases of pseudo illness, is able to achieve in part the preferential role of childhood. But this reinstatement is only partial because it is obtained under duress in which the wife's position in the family is contrary to the cultural pattern without the physiological findings which would justify this variation. Furthermore, many of Mrs. X.'s "spells" have in them suggestions of punishment of her husband for his responsibility

[8] Adapted from Harriet R. Mowrer, "Sex as a Factor in Domestic Discord," *American Sociological Review*, vol. I (April, 1936), pp. 255-259.

for her early pregnancy. Not only does she project her own responsibility in the matter upon her husband, but she makes him do penance for both his and her infraction of the mores by demanding incessant attention and subjection to her wishes.[9]

THE PHANTASY LIFE-PATTERN

In escape through pseudo illness the superior role achieved in the early family is reinstated in adult relationships as a consequence of the natural tendency to accord the ill person consideration and sympathy. Thus the function of the mechanism of pesudo illness is to permit the individual to escape the responsibilities and obligations of adult and communal relationships. In escape through phantasy, on the other hand, it is the inferior role in the early family group which is repugnant to the individual and from which he wishes to escape. His campaign, therefore, is designed to construct a role more satisfactory to him, either through the elaborate fashioning of the private world out of the inner arena which characterizes a part of every individual's environment or through active efforts to achieve the role by finding some group which will treat him in a way to confirm the desired conception of himself.

Three situations in the early family relationship seem to be productive of the use of phantasy. First, there is the unwanted child whose position is inferior; second, the child who has an orphan role; and third, the child whose position is fluctuating and uncertain because of the differential attitudes upon the part of each parent so that so far as one is concerned his position is superior and certain whereas with reference to the other it is inferior and uncertain.[10] Under these conditions the child escapes through phantasy into the superior role.

While either imaginary or active efforts to reconstruct the environment in the interests of the desired role may differentiate

[9] Harriet R. Mowrer, *ibid.*, pp. 269-271.

[10] See Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, p. 127.

subclasses of the phantasy type of unadjusted life pattern, in many instances there is an intermingling of these two devices. This is the most characteristic feature of the case of Mrs. G.:

Mrs. G. was the middle child in a family of five children, one boy and four girls. The boy was the youngest of the children and was sufficiently separated by age that her contacts were almost exclusively with her sisters. Of the three sisters she liked the oldest one most, who assisted her mother in bringing up the rest of the children. It was the youngest sister, however, who received the most attention and Mrs. G. always felt jealous of her.

Mrs. G.'s father when the girls were young was quite affectionate, always giving them cookies and kissing them goodnight. Mrs. G. was very fond of him. But as they grew older, he became stern and strict in his discipline, permitting no infraction of his commands. Mrs. G. often cried at his neglect and tried to break down his coldness by pleasing him. She always loved her father more than anyone else in spite of his treatment of her.

As a girl, Mrs. G. had to wear the cast-off clothes of her older sisters, but the younger sister never wore anything she had outgrown. This she resented very much. Nevertheless, she was an active girl and had many contacts. She liked to swim, skate, and dance, particularly the last, and to sing and play the piano. She was good looking and the neighbors often complimented her for this.

Mrs. G. went to school until the sixth grade. Then she got a job to help supplement the family income. She liked to go to school since the teachers always liked her. What she liked about school was to recite. She attended night school a short time to learn shorthand and typing, but soon lost interest and gave it up.

Mrs. G.'s jobs varied but none of them required any particular skill and her wages were moderate. She gave all she earned to her mother who returned enough for carfare and lunch. She was often ashamed of her clothes and envied her sisters who contributed less of their earnings. Her mother praised her as her best daughter but this only meant that she was taken advantage of. She always got along well with her mother but it was her father she was most fond of.

Mrs. G.'s first love affair began when she was fifteen. This was with a medical student somewhat older than herself. She went with him for two years and they petted a great deal. He gave her his

fraternity pin, but there never was any definite plan of marriage although she always felt that they would have a beautiful home some day. But his sister who was sending him through medical school felt that he was giving her too much attention and made things so disagreeable for both of them that she magnanimously gave him up. It was shortly after this that she married Mr. G.

Marriage with Mr. G. was a stormy affair. Mr. G. was very good to her and at times they got along together very well, but she could not forget the physician with whom she was still in love. In fact she saw him the next day after she was married and upon many occasions subsequently throughout her married life. Many of these contacts, however, were either entirely imaginary or dressed up in her imagination. Thus he called upon her at the hospital when she had her first baby and asked her to bring the baby to see him when she got well. That meant that he wished the child had been his own. She went to his office for medical advice but failed to pay for it and he brought suit. The suit, she said, was for breach of promise to marry him. The physician married a woman older than himself and that showed that he was still in love with her. In her phantasy she was always being made love to by the physician and taking every opportunity to have contacts with him.

Mr. G. was always kind and thoughtful and Mrs. G. often felt ashamed of herself for the way she treated him. And she liked the children, but often found herself being mean to them and then feeling sorry but never seeming able to show any feeling for them. On the other hand, her husband was entirely unable to understand her behavior. At times she seemed affectionate and at other times cold. She tells him that she goes out to one place and then later he finds that she went someplace else. She leads him to believe that she has contacts with another man (the physician) and creates a scene if he says anything. Yet she is jealous of even the most casual contacts he has with other women. At times she complains of pains in her head and in her heart. Then she gets disgusted with herself and talks of suicide. It is at these times that she feels repentant and wishes she could love her husband.[11]

Throughout life Mrs. G. has rebelled against the role she has been given in her social relationships and has tried to escape it. She desired the affection and solicitude of her father, and he was

[11] From the clinical files of Harriet R. Mowrer.

indifferent or stern in his attitudes toward her. Her mother showed some tendencies to prefer her, but these she discounted because it seemed that her other sisters had better clothes and more freedom. The result was that she sought response and attention outside the family—at school, in the neighborhood, and in the community. Always she aspired to rise above her surroundings. And so she fell in love with a medical student and saw herself in her imagination his wife with nice clothes and a fine home. But when the affair did not work out, she married for spite a man she considers inferior. She never quite concedes herself married, however, and goes on partly in her imagination and partly in actuality continuing her relations with the physician. Thus the first child is identified with the physician and he is unhappy in his marriage. In her imagination it is always the physician who makes the advances, although in reality it is she who makes them.

Nevertheless, the phantasy role is never completely realized. If it were she would belong in the category of the psychotic. Instead, conflict continues. In her relations with her husband she feels unfaithful to her lover, the physician. In her relations with the physician (both real and imaginary) she feels ungrateful to her husband who is very good to her, so good in fact that sometimes she wishes he would treat her cruelly and ignore her wishes. Out of this eternal conflict she develops headaches and pains in her heart which leave her weak as a way of liquidating her rebellion against her "conventional" role in marriage. Following these episodes she is remorseful and repentant and talks of suicide.

This precarious feature is characteristic of the phantasy-role type of personality, whether the effort to elude the undesirable role is through imaginary reconstruction or compensatory efforts. Circumstances and incomplete realization of the phantasy-role are always throwing the individual back into the role from which he desires to escape. In the absence of organic assistance, which in other cases provides aids in the development of psychoses, the phantasy-role type of unadjusted personality continues his pre-

carious existence, now trying, now failing to capture the desired role.

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XII

Alcoholism and the Alcoholic

THE DRINKING of alcoholic liquors is deep-seated in the cultural pattern of Western civilization. The man who drinks is in no wise going contrary to the social sanctions even in those states in the United States which have prohibition. The trespasser is the one who sells intoxicating liquors in prohibition states, not the one who drinks them, so long as his drinking is in the privacy of his home. He transgresses against the social order only when he flouts his drinking before others who may prefer to abstain. He who abstains does so not because the mores forbid drinking, but because of personal preference permitted by the mores. To put it differently, even in prohibition states drinking is a folkway, and it is only its public consumption and sale which offends the mores.

This ambiguity in attitude toward liquor in prohibition states is but an accentuation of that which prevails throughout the United States. On the one hand, liquor is the symbol of good fellowship; on the other, the treacherous leech which insidiously sucks the marrow out of man's moral framework and leaves him debased and degenerate. How deeply imbedded in contemporary culture is this ambivalence of attitude can be seen by the most casual examination of the contemporary scene.

The custom of drinking together to symbolize common feeling and unity is almost universal in present-day culture. The businessman celebrates the conclusion of a business deal with a drink.

The host serves drinks as a mark of hospitality. Weddings are celebrated by toasts to the bride and groom; the birth of a baby, victory in war or in sport, future success and achievement, all these call for the common enjoyment of liquor. Even in death the bereaved turns to the cup to dull the pains of sorrow. Disaster and disappointment find their solvent in alcohol. Joy and happiness find elevation and release at the hands of this magic libation. He who refuses to have a drink and be a good fellow spurns the camaraderie of his fellowmen and sets himself apart as superior or eccentric. Even in the Christian church oneness between God and those who serve him is symbolized in the ceremonial sharing of the cup of wine. Thus imbedded in the culture pattern is the notion that in alcohol is magic which, in sorrow and in joy, in elation and in depression, in rebellion against the misery of travail and the restraints which hem one in, frees the human spirit and permits it to soar into the heavens unhampered by the ills of the flesh. Thus as Myerson has said: "As it is the chief chemical solvent in the laboratory, it is extolled as the chief social solvent of everyday life." [1]

But in contrast to this lyrical praise of alcohol is the counterpart of vituperative condemnation of its insidious depravity. It is one of the most potent sources of immorality. Under its influence even the most virtuous man gives way to sexual license and bestiality. It is like a cancerous disease eating at one's entrails from which there is no escape once it has established a hold. Modesty and decorum flee before it; indecency and impropriety spawn in their stead. Even the very pleasures which alcoholic drinks seem to foster are a delusion and a snare because they serve only as bait to the trap of alcoholism. Once one has fallen into this trap, there is no escape from the debauchery into which it leads him. Thus the innocent are besmirched with the filth of the pigsty into which they have fallen, and the strong are

[1] See Abraham Myerson, "Alcohol: A Study of Social Ambivalence," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), p. 15.

plumped into the gutter as sniveling and sodden dregs of humanity.[2]

But for the scientist there can be no wavering between the antithetical claims made for alcohol, from joy and the pleasures of life on the one hand to depravity and degeneration. Alcohol produces certain physiological effects upon the organism which no one can deny. Tasks requiring skill are not as well done under the influence of liquor. The individual is more reckless and less considerate of both his own safety and that of others when he has been drinking. Also, his reflexes function more slowly as the consequence of alcohol. He may not live so long, as the studies of Raymond Pearl suggest.[3] Thus the virtues of abstinence suggest a parallel to the aphorism that married men live longer, to which a wag has retorted, "It only seems longer."

On the other hand, some of the world's best literature has been written under the influence of alcohol. Men have risen to heights of daring and heroism; they have achieved eloquence; they have endured pain and discomfort through the beneficent effect of alcohol upon the human system. Alcohol serves as a food and, although it is of the fuel type, furnishes energy under conditions where haste is imperative. Accordingly, it is not the use but the abuse of alcohol which is of social concern.

In the discussion of alcoholic consumption, one often loses sight of the fact that human beings seldom, if ever, consume pure alcohol. In most of the wide varieties of liquor which people drink, there are many other elements in addition to alcohol. The alcoholic content itself varies from about 3.5 per cent for some beers to about 50 per cent in whisky.[4] Even those drinks which have the highest alcoholic content often have in them other ingredients more harmful to the human system than the alcohol

[2] Cf. Myerson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.
[3] *Alcohol and Longevity.*
[4] A few fortified liquors contain more than 50 per cent alcohol, but these are not widely consumed.

itself, as for example the fusel oil in raw whisky and the oil of wormwood in absinthe. Consequently, in the discussion of alcoholic liquors it is necessary to take into account not only the alcoholic content but also the other ingredients. From this standpoint, it is quite clear that much of the experimental study of the effects of alcohol upon the human system is of little consequence, because the amounts of alcohol ingested under experimental conditions have little relationship to the amount consumed in the drinking of alcoholic liquors.


The fact is that little is known about the deleterious effects, if any, of the consumption of alcoholic drinks in moderate amounts, even as a habitual practice. But this is of little or no importance for the present purposes, since in spite of the ambivalent attitudes in our culture toward the consumption of alcoholic liquors, moderate drinking is on the whole condoned and the individual who participates is not considered in any sense endangering the social order so long as this does not become a contributory factor in some other infraction of the mores. For example, the person involved in a traffic accident is condemned for driving his car too soon after his consumption of liquor and not for the drinking itself. A gentleman knows how to handle his liquor, and the infraction of the mores is in not being a gentleman in this regard. This holds for drunkenness as well.

The social variant, therefore, is the individual who drinks to excess, not the moderate, casual drinker. In his moderate drinking the casual drinker may occasionally become drunk, but since this is not the purpose of his drinking, excess is the consequence of social compulsions and does not become habitual. The true alcoholic drinks to excess as a habitual practice in which his drinking is marked with an impatience in the consumption of liquor. His purpose in drinking is to get drunk, and the quicker the better. Consumption of liquor which does not produce drunkenness is wasted effort, for he seldom, if ever, enjoys the taste or the milder effects of liquors. He drinks to set himself off apart from the rest of the group and not to become fused into a

common psychological whole, as is the motive of the casual drinker.

CHART XLIX

DEATHS CAUSED BY ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION IN THE EXPANDING REGISTRATION AREA AND IN THE ORIGINAL REGISTRATION STATES, 1900 TO 1938 *



* Data from Calvin F. Schmid, "Mortality from Alcoholism in the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), p. 436.

ALCOHOLISM IN THE UNITED STATES

How many alcoholics are there in the United States, and what are the differential conditions under which they develop, are questions which have only partial answers. In general, there are two sources of information bearing upon these questions: (1) certificates of death in which alcoholism is reported as either the primary or secondary cause and (2) the diagnoses by psychiatrists in public and private sanitariums for the insane.

For the period, 1900 to 1938, there has been a fairly consistent, though irregular, decline in deaths from alcoholism in the United States. (See Chart XLIX.) This trend has paralleled the general death rate and is therefore a part of this larger phenomenon, the explanation of which has little bearing upon the present problem. More significant are the fluctuations within this period. In general, the fluctuations prior to 1917 seem of little importance, but in this year began a radical drop in the alcoholic death rate. This drop reached its lowest point in 1920, and thereafter the rate went up until 1927 and 1928, after which it declined again until the end of the period.

One may break up the movement of the alcoholic-death rate beginning in 1917 to the present time into three phases: the period of decline from 1917 to 1920, the period of increase from 1921 to 1927, and the period of decline thereafter. The first period quite obviously corresponds with the increased restrictions upon both the manufacture and sale of liquors as an outgrowth of wartime effort. The second period reflects the increased consumption in spite of prohibition, but it undoubtedly reflects as well the harmful character of much of the bootleg liquor. The decline since 1927 and 1928 is undoubtedly in part the consequence of diminishing ability to purchase alcoholic drinks because of the economic depression, but this is only part of the explanation as can be seen by the fact that the rate continued to decline in the face of the repeal of prohibition and subsequent economic recovery, although not without some irregularities in movement.

The consequence of this analysis is to leave somewhat obscure the question of the prevalence of the alcoholic. Restrictions upon the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors were undoubtedly associated with a decrease in chronic alcoholism in wartime, but not in peacetime. Therefore the conditions of war may be the explanation and not prohibition. Increase in the alcoholic-death rate during the bootleg era probably reflected some increase in chronic alcoholism, but how much one cannot tell, since one has no assurance that the ratio between chronic alcoholism and death from alcoholism is constant for the two periods of bootleg and nonbootleg liquor. The poisonous character of much of the bootleg liquor is generally conceded, and this alone would increase the death rate.

Nevertheless, two characteristics of the alcoholic-death rate may contribute some understanding to chronic alcoholism. First, there is the differential between the two sexes. For the five-year period, 1934 to 1938, 87.9 per cent of the deaths from alcoholism were of males, leaving only 12.1 per cent females.[5] Thus the male death rate is approximately seven times the female rate. This reflects the current cultural pattern in which excessive drinking is more condoned in males than in females. This may be seen from the fact that the ratio of alcoholism by sex varies greatly from country to country. In England, the ratio is two men to one woman; in Switzerland, twelve to one, and in Norway, twenty-three to one.[6] The alcoholic, accordingly, is more often a man than a woman because a man is less likely to lose status in his social relationships as a consequence of his excessive drinking than is a woman.


Secondly, alcoholism varies for different age groups. (See Chart L.) In general, the alcoholic-death rates for both males

[5] See Calvin F. Schmid, "Mortality from Alcoholism in the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), pp. 435-436.

[6] See Karl M. Bowman and E. Morton Jellinek, "Alcoholic Addiction and Its Treatment," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. II. (June, 1941), p. 142.

CHART L

Mortality Rates by Age and Sex for Alcoholism: United States, 1934 to 1938 *



* Data from Calvin F. Schmid, "Mortality from Alcoholism in the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), p. 438.

and females are alike in that both show a radical upward movement to what seems to be essentially a plateau, and subsequently a decline in rate. The plateau for women is from thirty-five to fifty-four years, whereas for men it is from forty-five to sixty-four. Thus the period of maximum rates is reached for women fifteen years earlier than for men. Since these are death rates, this contributes little to the understanding of the variations in age at which alcoholism develops. One cannot even be sure that there is any difference between males and females in this respect, for variations in the length of time between becoming alcoholic and death as the result of excessive drinking may occur. Accordingly, because of the less robust constitution of women, the period of excessive drinking which leads to death may be shorter than in men.


Turning to the diagnosis of alcoholism among admissions to hospitals for the insane, data from the state of Massachusetts may be taken as illustrative of this type of analysis. Dayton has calculated the rates for the period, 1917 to 1933, dividing the admissions into those in which the diagnosis was an alcoholic psychosis and those in which the diagnosis was alcoholism without psychosis.[7] The alcoholic-psychosis rates reached a low in 1920, (see Chart LI) corresponding to the low the same year for deaths from alcoholism. The Massachusetts data, however, do not show the pronounced peak in 1927 to 1928 as do the death rates, but instead from 1921 go off upon an irregular plateau. The curve of rates of alcoholism without psychosis resembles in part the alcoholic-psychosis pattern, the most striking difference being the decided upward movement from a more regular plateau beginning in 1931. Since prohibition was not repealed until December, 1933, this could not account for this upward movement. The result is that these data add little to the understanding of the historical factors in alcoholism.

When one turns to the diagnostic rates by sex, the hypothesis

[7] Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, pp. 468-475.

CHART LI

ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION IN FIRST ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS FOR THE INSANE: MASSACHUSETTS, 1917 TO 1933 *




* Data from Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, pp. 468-475.

proposed to explain the difference in the alcoholic-death rates curves, namely, the peak at a younger age for females as compared to males as a consequence of less robustness, seems to be substantiated. The peak of the rates of alcoholic psychoses is at the same age for both males and females, namely, between the ages of forty and fifty. (See Chart LII.) But some time must elapse between becoming alcoholic and developing an alcoholic psychosis. The rates of alcoholism without psychosis, therefore, are closer to the onset of alcoholism and suggest that the peaks of the two curves come during the previous ten-year interval. The female peak actually comes at the same time for both alcoholic psychoses and alcoholism without psychosis, but the difference between the rates for the two age groups, thirty to thirty-nine and forty to forty-nine years, is so slight and the shapes of the male and female curves so similar that one may doubt the stability of this difference. It

CHART LII

ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION IN FIRST ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS FOR THE INSANE BY AGE AND SEX: MASSACHUSETTS, 1917 TO 1933 *



* Data from Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, pp. 464-467.

seems to be quite clear, however, that the onset of alcoholism is later for females than for males from all of the data presented. In view of the greater social control exercised upon women in regard to drinking, this is what one would expect to find.

Further characteristics of the alcoholic are brought out in Dayton's analysis of data from Massachusetts.[8] Thus all first admissions with psychoses were differentiated into the abstinent, the temperate, and the intemperate. In general, these data show a somewhat lower percentage of intemperates for persons who have had high school and college education and a somewhat higher percentage for those with less than common school. Persons having had common-school education constitute an intermediate group in this regard, the ratio of intemperance being essentially the same as of abstinence. For marital status, intemperance is more frequent than abstinence among the married, the widowed, and the divorced; less frequent among the single. This characteristic of the single is more pronounced among the females than among the males. Furthermore, married women are more likely to be intemperate than married men. The foreign-born are more intemperate than the native-born of native parentage, the former group exceeding in proportion of intemperance as compared to abstinence about as much as the latter is in deficit. The native-born of foreign and mixed parentage are intermediate between these two extremes.

Nativity and education reflect the economic level and suggest that alcoholism is more characteristic of lower economic levels than higher, a generalization which is in harmony with common observation. But as in the case of mortality rates, since the data are of persons suffering from psychoses, these data may indicate not greater intemperance among the lower economic classes but greater deleterious effect of the liquor consumed. Likewise, the greater intemperance of the married, widowed, and divorced may reflect little more than the fact that these groups are older on the

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 182-202.

whole than the single and therefore may be but a reflection of the age factor. On the other hand, this fact suggests confirmation of the point of view developed out of case analysis, that alcoholism represents an escape from responsibility, and these responsibilities are likely to be greater for the married than for the single.

On the whole, the analysis of alcoholism through the use of mortality rates and rates of admissions to hospitals for the insane does not provide anything more than the most generalized setting for the understanding of the alcoholic. It is necessary to turn to the study of alcoholics as a personality type before one can approach the understanding of why some persons become alcoholic and others do not.

THEORIES OF ALCOHOLISM

Theories of alcoholism can be divided conveniently into the physiological, the psychological and psychiatric, the psychoanalytic, and the psychocultural. Not infrequently there is considerable overlapping of these several points of view, but on the whole the basic patterns are clearly differentiated. Each proceeds from a basic postulation about the motivation of human behavior and attempts to understand the alcoholic in terms of this theoretical framework.

In describing the physiological view, it is necessary to differentiate at the outset between those studies which attempt to arrive at an understanding of the physiological effects of alcohol upon the human system and those which seek to furnish an explanation of alcoholism. Studies in the first group give little or no attention to etiology of alcoholism but are content to determine experimentally the effects produced upon physiological functioning or to reconstruct by an analysis of pathological findings the processes of physiological change which take place under the influence of alcohol. The studies in the second group, on the other hand, propose to explain why some persons become alcoholic and others do not.

Basic to the physiological view is the assumption that in some individuals there is a physiological demand for alcohol. The origin of this demand has been variously explained. One explanation is that, due to hereditary differences, physiological tolerance varies from individual to individual. Thus those persons who have a low alcoholic tolerance are not liable to become alcoholics, since the physiological mechanism protects them from excessive drinking.[9] Of the high-tolerance group not all become alcoholic. It is quite apparent that this version of the physiological view does not explain alcoholism but only sets off a group of individuals who are ineligible for alcoholism.

Another version of the physiological view is that, as a consequence of moderate drinking, the organism becomes physically dependent upon alcohol. This physical dependence has been variously explained. One explanation is made in terms of the chemical influence upon metabolism; another emphasizes the result of an accumulation of toxins which create a pathological drive for drink.[10] Here again the theories are incomplete in that they do not give an explanation of why some persons who drink become alcoholics and others do not.

A third version is the allergic theory of alcoholic addiction. According to this theory, alcoholism is the result of increased sensitization to alcohol as the consequence of drinking over a period of time. Thus the manifestations of alcoholism are the counterparts of the paroxysms (asthmatic attacks, gastrointestinal upsets, skin eruptions, etc.) which follow the inhalation or ingestion of certain proteins to which the organism is sensitive. Accordingly, the difference between the alcoholic and the non-alcoholic moderate drinker is this excessive intolerance for alcohol. This seems to be the low alcoholic-tolerance theory in reverse in which an acquired intolerance makes one alcoholic rather than protecting him from addiction. One writer has said that this theory is but another name for the concept of habitua-

[9] See Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

tion,[11] whereas another regards it as an explanation of alcoholic complications.[12]

The physiological views, therefore, give primary concern to the consequences of drinking but throw little light upon the origin of the drinking. It is well recognized that many of the complications which accompany excessive drinking have a physiological basis. Even in the absence of symptoms of such extreme forms of debilitation as delirium tremens and Korsakoff's psychosis, the alcoholic is invariably in poor physical condition. In part this is the consequence of the substitution of alcoholic liquors for food with the resulting deficiency in the vitamin B complex.[13] But all this is a consequence of excessive drinking and not the cause of it.

Psychological and psychiatric views of alcoholism vary all the way from attempts to explain the alcoholic in terms of the possession of certain traits which make for instability and erratic behavior to theories that alcoholism is the consequence of a particular type of constitutional make-up. Since psychological and psychiatric theories are numerous, it will be possible to review only a few illustrative of this range in variation.

Wittman found that the alcoholic is comparatively weak in restraint, mental poise, and stability, which makes for difficulty in control of his moods and desires and their overt expression. He is somewhat more conceited, selfish, and antisocial than the average person and more given to broad swings in mood. In these swings, he goes from extreme optimism accompanied with pronounced tendencies toward talkativeness and activity to pessimism and gloom in which he becomes taciturn, passive, and apprehensive. His strong paranoid tendencies, expressed in suspiciousness, stubbornness, scorn for the views of others, self-

[11] *Loc. cit.*

[12] E. Morton Jellinek and Norman Jolliffe, "Effects of Alcohol on the Individual," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), p. 136.

[13] See Norman Jolliffe, "The Influence of Alcohol on the Adequacy of the B. Vitamins in the American Diet," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), pp. 74-84.

conceit, and confidence in his own ideas, distinguish him from the average individual.[14]

In a later portrayal of the alcoholic, Wittman made some revisions and additions. Thus the alcoholic is differentiated from so-called normal individuals by the fact that he grew up in a family in which the mother was domineering, though he idealized her, and the father was autocratic and was feared by the alcoholic as a child. Strict unquestioning obedience was demanded of him in family life and little freedom was allowed. Out of this background he developed a feeling of insecurity evidenced by insistent feelings of need for religious security and strong feelings of sin and guilt. He shows marked interest in members of the opposite sex and has many love affairs, but when he marries is unsuccessful. While he lacks in self-confidence, he shows marked ability to get along with others and be accepted by them. He suffers from occasional depression and periods of marked unhappiness. His emotional level is keyed-up, and his work is done under high nervous tension. His love for the maternal parent is much greater than for the paternal.[15]

Neither of these portrayals do more than describe the alcoholic, although the conditions under which the personality of the alcoholic develops are suggested. Other writers, however, go more directly to the problem of explanation. According to Strecker, the alcoholic is a person who cannot face reality without the use of alcohol and yet can never adequately adjust to reality so long as he drinks. Excessive drinking furnishes an escape from the innate feelings of inferiority and insecurity. Social shyness gives way to euphoric gregariousness. The contradiction between his conception of himself as a potential superman and his lack of social accomplishments is attributed to his

[14] See Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117 for summarization of Wittman's study.

[15] Mary P. Wittman, "Developmental Characteristics and Personalities of Chronic Alcoholics," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. XXXIV (July, 1939), pp. 361-378.

alcoholism. Thus his ego is protected from recognizing its limitations. His emotional immaturity is permitted to continue into adulthood by evasion. Alcohol permits wish-fulfillment without the necessity of growing up. In this alcoholism is at one with all neurotic manifestations.[16]

Many writers have looked upon the alcoholic as a psychopathic personality, to which they have applied the term, dipsomaniac. According to this notion, alcoholism is the outgrowth of two constitutional deficiencies. The first deficiency is a weak personality organization which invites alcoholism because of its basic volitional inadequacy. This basic deficiency is sometimes thought of as entirely congenital and at other times as an expression of a nonspecific heredity. The second deficiency which characterizes the psychopathic personality is a constitutional disposition toward a low degree of tolerance for alcohol.[17] These two deficiencies combine to make the psychopathic personality particularly susceptible to alcoholism.

This view of the alcoholic as a psychopathic personality is the natural outgrowth of psychiatric experience which has to deal with many forms of psychopathic behavior in which alcohol is associated. Alcoholism thus becomes one of the expressions of psychopathology and is explained within the essential framework of other forms of psychopathic behavior. And since heredity has often played an important role in this explanatory framework, the linkage of alcoholism to a congenital disposition is quite in harmony with the general pattern of analysis. With a growing tendency to delimit the hereditary explanation in this field, this point of view has declined in importance or received considerable modification such as in the work of Strecker in

[16] Edward A. Strecker, "Some Thoughts Concerning the Psychology and Therapy of Alcoholism," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, vol. LXXXVI (August, 1937), pp. 191-205; also Edward A. Strecker and Francis T. Chambers, *Alcohol: One Man's Meat.*

[17] Cf. Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

which the hereditary factor is given a role along with a number of other factors.[18]

In addition to subscribing on the whole to the psychopathic personality explanation of alcoholism, the psychoanalysts have given their theories a particular twist consistent with the general psychoanalytic doctrine of the libidinal basis of all psychopathy. The result has been the development of a wide variety of theories, all of which show some relationship in basic structure. Of these three will be differentiated: the Adlerian or individual psychology view, the theory of the relationship between homosexuality and alcoholism, and the "suicide" theory.

From the Adlerian point of view, alcoholism is to be classed with other neurotic manifestations as an escape from challenge and possible defeat. Thus the alcoholic is either unable or unwilling to assume duties and obligations and protects himself through the formula of becoming the victim of what he regards as a mysterious addiction which absolves him from all responsibilities. Thus the alcoholic is exclusively interested in himself, expects appreciation for a task before he has performed it, and professes deep concern for others, particularly members of his own family, but unfortunately his addiction to drink prevents him from performing his duties. These traits he shares with all neurotics.[19]

The psychoanalytic theory which seeks to explain alcoholism in terms of homosexuality was first formulated by Abraham,[20] but many others have contributed to it. Essentially it is a theory of masculine, and not feminine, alcoholism. According to this theory, alcohol dispels disgust which is a manifestation of the repression of homosexual tendencies. In this way the male who

[18] See Edward A. Strecker, "Some Thoughts Concerning the Psychology and Therapy of Alcoholism," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, vol. LXXXVI (1937), pp. 191-205.

[19] Alexandra Adler, "The Individual Psychology of the Alcoholic Patient," *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, vol. III (July, 1941), pp. 74-77.

[20] Karl Abraham, "The Psychological Relations Between Sexuality and Alcoholism," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, vol. VII (1926), p. 2. Also in *Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 80.

has not completely sublimated his instinctive homosexuality removes the barrier of socially imposed inhibitions and gives direct expression to his homosexual desires. This is evidenced in the widespread practice of drinking among groups of men. But this release of homosexual tendencies is only a part of the function of alcoholism. It also facilitates transference by overcoming the individual's feeling of sexual impotency. The consequence is that the male becomes more sexually potent and masculine under the influence of alcohol. But alcoholism soon becomes a substitute for heterosexual contacts with the result that sexual potency declines. This gives rise to a sense of guilt which is displaced upon women and accounts for the characteristic jealousy of the alcoholic.[21]

But the sexual instinct or libidinal urge, according to psychoanalytic doctrine, is paired with a death or destructive instinct. This has given rise to the suicide theory of alcoholism. Thus according to Menninger, who has most cogently formulated this theory, alcoholism is a substitute for suicide and serves the function of self-punishment for feelings of guilt. These feelings of guilt arise as a counteractant to the individual's strong erotic tendencies, and alcoholism becomes the punitive substitute for suicide. In this way the alcoholic is able both to relieve his sense of guilt through a modified form of self-destruction and at the same time to avoid the complete destruction which he fears and yet feels he must impose upon himself in order to absolve him of his feelings of guilt.[22]

In addition, but related to the theories already discussed, are a number of eclectic theories of which that of Seliger may be taken as an illustration. According to this writer, the individu-

[21] Cf. William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 406-407; Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125; Nolan D. C. Lewis, "Personality Factors in Alcoholic Addiction," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), pp. 30-31.

[22] See Karl A. Menninger, *Man Against Himself*, pp. 160-184; also summarized in Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

al's excessive indulgence in alcohol may be explained by any of these reasons: as an escape from life situations which he cannot face, as a manifestation of a maladjusted personality, as a progressive development from social to pathological drinking, as a symptom of a major abnormal mental condition, as an escape from pain of an incurable physical origin, and as a symptom of a constitutionally psychopathic personality.[23]

THE PSYCHOCULTURAL THEORY OF ALCOHOLISM[24]

The psychocultural theory of alcoholism, as developed by Harriet R. Mowrer, looks upon alcoholism as an escape mechanism by which the individual seeks to reinstate in adult social relationships a preferred superior role achieved in the early family group. In this respect it has much in common with the other frequently encountered escapes of pseudo illness and phantasy. Nevertheless, it develops out of a somewhat different set of familial relationships, and this in part explains why the individual turns to alcoholism as an escape rather than to these other devices.

This theory questions some of the major premises of many of the theories already discussed. Thus it would discard any explanation in terms of constitutional factors. Variations in constitutional background cannot be denied, but these are nonspecific in character. Neither is alcoholism related to the cultural and economic level. Clergymen's sons vie with those of the laborer for acceptance into the ranks of the alcoholic. In fact in comparison to a control group chosen from the same universe, the economic status of the alcoholic is somewhat higher, in spite of considerable shifting from one occupation to another.

[23] Robert V. Seliger, "The Psychiatric Treatment of the Alcoholic Addict," *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, vol. III (July, 1941), p. 81.

[24] The subsequent exposition is taken almost entirely from the analyses of Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 109-124; "A Psychocultural Analysis of the Alcoholic," *American Sociological Review*, vol. V (August, 1940), pp. 546-557; and "Alcoholism and the Family," *Journal of Criminal Psychopathology*, vol. III (July, 1941), pp. 90-99.

Thus economic instability, rather than a particular level, would seem to be characteristic of the alcoholic, but this is clearly a consequence of the personality pattern and not a causal factor.

Much has been made of the male alcoholic's tendencies to drink with members of his own sex and of the fact that alcoholism is much more common among men than among women. Both of these facts are interrelated and grow out of the cultural pattern which has in the past, more than in the present, condoned drinking among men and condemned it among women. Men drink exclusively with men only when drinking is restricted to men and not as an expression of homosexuality. Furthermore, the fact that the public drinking establishment has often had a brothel connected with it is overlooked. Drinking is a symbol of adulthood and of masculine virility in our culture.

The notion that drinking results in an elevation of the emotions and furnishes an escape from the rebuffs and inhibitions of everyday experiences into an Elysian world seems hardly warranted by the facts. Some persons, it is true, become more talkative, more sociable, and more bold under the influence of liquor; but others become more taciturn, unsociable, and morose. In fact, about all that can be said is that the emotions, whether negative or positive in tone, tend to become exaggerated as a consequence of drink, the particular form being an accentuation of the dominant trends in the personality make-up.

Some writers have contended that alcoholics more likely than not have been the only children or youngest in their families. The facts do not always support this contention. Where they would seem to warrant this conclusion, they leave out of account the fact that a person may have the ordinal position of youngest or only child and yet not have the roles ordinarily attached to persons of these birth-order categories. What seems to be characteristic of the alcoholic is that, whatever may have been his order of birth, his role in the family has been ambiguous in that his status was superior and assured with reference to some member of the family and uncertain and challenged by

another member. Thus alcoholics often show a strong dislike or hatred for the father, marked jealousy and dislike for a brother who is thought to be favored by the father, and strong affection and attachment for the mother or a sister who has favored them.

The characteristic feature of the alcoholic personality, then, is this ambiguity in role. Because whatever superior position he may achieve is not without its challenged aspect, the alcoholic places great premium upon the favored role which he carries over into adulthood. His alcoholism, accordingly, is an attention-getting device, a way of winning social status by subterfuge. And as in nonalcoholic behavior, this can be accomplished by ingratiating and obsequious behavior or by braggadocio and boastfulness. This would account for what seem to be contradictory attitudes taken by alcoholics which have so puzzled the analysts and led to the positing of a dual effect of alcohol upon the personality.[2]

Because of the precarious character of his superior role, achieved in the early family group, the alcoholic tends to make greater demands for reassurance and unequivocal signs of superior status than can ever be realized in adult social relationships. In part this is the consequence of his own incipient expressions of lack of assurance and in part the result of placing too much emphasis upon the more transitory symbols of status.

The alcoholic, then, achieves through his drinking a preferential role which he cannot attain otherwise. Members of his family make plans for him; friends cater to him; and even strangers give him consideration which he would not receive when sober. As a consequence of the plans made for him in an effort to help him overcome his "desire for liquor," the alcoholic occupies once more the center of the stage. Encouragement and solicitude in conquering "demon rum" strengthen his "will

[2] See, for example, Abraham Myerson, "Alcoholism: A Study of Social Ambivalence," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), p. 19; Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

power" and for a time a cure seems to have been effected. The focus of attention shifts from the alcoholic and his heroic fight, with the result that he relapses once more into drinking. His relapse marks the denouement of the drama in which he played the leading part, and the only device with which he is equipped to meet the crisis in his campaign for status is to get drunk again.

The characteristic features of the alcoholic as a personality type are illustrated in the case of Mr. George:

Mr. George was the youngest of a family of five children, three boys and two girls. When he was a child, his mother worked outside the home, and he was left to the care of a sister, eight years older than he. This sister was very good to him, and he was very fond of her.

Mr. George's older brother was the favorite of the parents, particularly of his mother. This brother could do no wrong and was always consulted by the parents. Mr. George was always jealous of this older brother who he felt received undue consideration from the parents. Mr. George often felt that his own solicitude for his parents, which he felt exceeded that of the other children, went on the whole unrewarded. His mother often remarked that he was the best-hearted of any member of the family, and his reward was that he was the only one who ever paid his board. As a youngster Mr. George often helped his father at work, but when the father died his will designated the older brother to settle the estate, and as a consequence Mr. George failed to receive a square deal.

At the age of fifteen, Mr. George had to leave school because his father said that he could not afford to send him longer. At that time Mr. George was in high school. His first job was an apprenticeship to a window trimmer. He worked at this trade until shortly before his marriage. At that time he went to work for his older brother, who acted as the agent and wholesale outlet for a meat packing company. His first job was a shipping clerk, but later he became the driver of one of the trucks which made deliveries to retail stores. He did not like to work for his brother, who was always calling attention to the fact that he was trying to make a man of Mr. George. But though his brother would never give him a chance, Mr. George continued to work for him until the brother died and the business was sold. After that he worked chiefly as a bus and cab driver, but his employment became more irregular due to his drinking.

While still living at home, Mr. George caused his family, who were very religious, a great deal of concern because of his contacts with "infidels." Not only his male companions were nonreligious, but the girls he dated as well. He belonged to several athletic clubs and won some prominence as a boxer. In his boxing matches he was known as "Riley, the fighting Irishman." As the result of his unorthodox behavior he came to be regarded as the black sheep of the family. Nevertheless, he got a great deal of satisfaction out of these contacts because here he amounted to something.

Mr. George would have liked to have been a physician or a lawyer, but he never had the opportunity. He was the only one of his family to be born in this country and to graduate from grammar school, and therefore he could have been something different if the family had not kept him down, particularly his older brother. When his older brother started in business, Mr. George was promised that he would be given an important place in the firm, but the promise was never fulfilled. This brother always wanted everyone in the family to bow to him because he made more money than the rest. He boasted that he took care of the whole family and always made Mr. George feel inferior.

At the age of twenty-six, Mr. George married a girl approved of by his mother. He married her partly because he liked her and partly to please his mother who had been so much disturbed by his dating nonchurchgoing girls. Two months following their marriage, Mr. George came home drunk. He began drinking, he said, as he made his rounds upon his brother's truck, because a butcher who went with him drank. Later as he made collections for the meats he had delivered, he found that drinking with his customers was good business.

As time went on, his drinking bouts became more frequent, although there were intervals when as the result of concerted family action, he would give up drinking for a time. As his two children became older they began to feel ashamed and disgraced by their father's drunkenness. The oldest girl complained that her girl friends' fathers did not act like hers, and he often embarrassed her before her boy friends who came to the house. His wife found the increasing irregularity of income irritating.

In addition to dissatisfaction with the irregular income and the embarrassing conduct caused by drunkenness, Mrs. George had become discouraged about his ever reforming, as she thought he would during the earlier part of their marriage. He seldom tells her any-

thing about what he does any more and they never go out together. He complains at times that she is going out with other men since she does not have sexual relations with him any more. He protects his ego by rationalizing that he has never had a chance, and that his older brother is to blame for everything.[26]

It is apparent from the foregoing account that Mr. George's role in the early family was inferior so far as his parents were concerned. Yet with reference to his older sister he was the favorite. This produced the precariousness of role characteristic of the alcoholic personality. Throughout his life he attempted to achieve the position he held with reference to his older sister in his contacts with his parents and the larger family group and later in his communal contacts. Since he was unable to win a position in the eyes of his mother superior to his older brother through his solicitous behavior (contributing to the family income, buying her silk dresses, etc.), he turned to tabooed behavior (contacts with "infidels" of both sexes, boxing, etc.) as a way of securing attention and expressions of concern.

While Mr. George was able to maintain his position as a boxer, he seems to have been able to achieve the desired superiority to which he aspired so far as communal groups were concerned. During this period he seems to have been contented and comparatively well-adjusted. However, when this no longer furnished the recognition which he desired, he turned to drink as a device for securing attention. It is significant that his drinking began soon after his entering the employ of his older brother, who had always taken a domineering attitude toward him and of whom he was jealous. It was also at about the same time that he made one last bid for the unchallenged affection of his mother by marrying the girl she wanted him to marry.

Marriage relations ran the typical course. At first plans for Mr. George's rehabilitation were optimistically entered into by his wife and the larger family group. The attention and reassurance obtained in this way, however, was in part counteracted by

[26] From the clinical files of Harriet R. Mowrer.

his employment by the older brother who always treated him as an inferior. Later, finding other employment, he was able, with the facilitating action of the family council, to give up drinking for a longer period than previously. Nevertheless, this was only a temporary accomplishment, and as family vigilance relaxed, he was drinking again. His drinking soon lost him the respect of his children which only increased his feeling of inferiority. His wife refused more frequently to have sexual relations with him, and he came to feel himself less adequate when they had relations. Typically he projected this feeling of inadequacy upon his wife in his accusations of infidelity.

Thus the very device by which Mr. George strived to achieve superiority betrayed him. This was due to the fact that drinking had not one but two consequences, diametrically opposed to each other. On the one hand, drinking initiated family conferences and plans whereby Mr. George achieved some temporary attention. But it was attention out of sympathy and not out of appreciation. Furthermore, each time that the vigilance of the family was relaxed, Mr. George's return to drinking resulted only in increased feeling of inferiority.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF ALCOHOLISM

Alcoholism, accordingly, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, and much of the confusion in the analysis of the problem has grown out of this fact. An important role in this confusion has been played by the acceptance of three types of evidence as criteria of alcoholism: the data of physiological pathology, the facts of psychological disfunction, and the variant sociopsychological response to the cultural environment. Thus are on the one hand the impaired functioning of the organs of the body and of the sensory and motor responses and on the other the problem which arises out of the alcoholic's inability to consistently assume the responsibilities of social relationships.

Throughout the literature the distinction is invariably made between those alcoholics whose addiction is accidental and the

consequence of moderate drinking over a long period of time and those who utilize alcoholism as a substitute sociopsychological mechanism of response.[27] This distinction seems to be in part a reflection of the confusion among manifestations already pointed out. But the cultural setting has also had something to do with this notion in the historical development of the idea that alcoholic drinks, except those in which the alcoholic content was so small as to be essentially negligible, are detrimental to the human system, and in the resulting tendency to attribute to alcohol almost any pathological finding that happened to be associated with drinking.

The role of alcohol in the pathology of the digestive, circulatory, and nervous systems of the body is far from being clear. Much of what was once taken for granted is being questioned today. Even cirrhosis of the liver, once thought to be entirely due to alcoholic addiction, is now conceded to be often found in the absence of the use of alcohol. In so far as disturbances of the circulatory system are the consequence of the excessive consumption of alcoholic drinks, the explanation seems to be that the alcoholic tends to substitute liquor for other foods and the consequence is that his diet becomes deficient in vitamin B_1. The results, then, are no different from those which would be produced if the diet were markedly deficient in vitamin B_1 for other reasons.[28]

The effect of alchohol upon the nervous system is likewise obscure. While in the past many writers have attributed a host of psychotic manifestations to alcoholism as the sole etiological element, the tendency at the present time is to regard the effects of alcohol as secondary to the constitutional character and personality make-up of the individual.[29] And since when there are

[27] See Bowman and Jellinek, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[28] See Norman Jolliffe, "Vitamin Deficiency and Liver Cirrhosis in Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), pp. 516-557, (March, 1941), pp. 726-750.

[29] Cf. Bowman and Jellinek, "Alcoholic Mental Disorders," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. II (September, 1941), pp. 312-390.

marked evidences of psychological deterioration it is comparatively difficult to obtain a clear clinical picture of the personality as a developmental affair, the temptation is to regard the consumption of alcohol as the cause of the deterioration rather than as one of the many manifestations of personality disorganization.

In general, it seems that the effects of alcohol upon the physiological and neurological systems are the consequence of the toxic attack upon the body tissues and the disturbance in metabolic balance. This effect is undoubtedly related to the individual's physiological tolerance and consequently may occur under conditions of what are generally regarded as normal drinking. The role of fusel oil in bootleg liquor, as well as of other poisonous substances, is essentially of the same significance as the occasional consumption of alcohol beyond the restrictions of physiological tolerance or the gradual cumulative effects which are the functions of a particular constitutional character. However, such pathological findings as may be found in the course of moderate drinking are on a par with the metabolic disturbances in diabetes and the death of individuals as the consequence of accidental poisoning. No psychosocial problem is involved, and to include such cases along with those in which there is alcoholic addiction leads only to confusion in analysis and obscures the understanding of the alcoholic.

Thus it follows that from the standpoint of personal and social disorganization the personality organization of the alcoholic is the paramount problem. This pattern of organization is one in which the variant behavior of the individual takes the form of adjusting to the demands of the social order through the use of the substitute mechanism of drinking, which is equivalent to active phantasy or compensation, in which the alcoholic is able to achieve a temporary enhancement of status through the accentuated attention and concern of those about him, particularly the members of his family, his intimate associates, and relatives.

But within the acceptance of the underlying notion of the alcoholic as a type of disorganized personality, some writers have

insisted that alcoholism may serve two functions. Thus Davidson has said that the individual may resort to alcoholism either for its pacifying effect upon physiological and psychological tension or for its stimulating effect which assists in meeting unpleasant situations.[30] From this standpoint drinking is both a regressive and compensatory mechanism, comparable to pseudo illness and passive phantasy on the one hand and to active phantasy and compensation on the other.

It is quite true that rationalizations of alcoholics and the observations of human derelicts who are alcoholic would seem to substantiate the need for this twofold classification. But the rationalizations of the alcoholic are notoriously misleading, as Harriet R. Mowrer has pointed out.[31] As for the human derelict's seeming desire to retreat from the world into a stupor through the use of alcohol, this seems to be but the expression of the tendency in the case of all the irrational solutions of conflict to take on a compulsive character when they are utilized over a long period of time. Thus the fact that the individual seems to enjoy the stuporous state into which alcohol introduces him is no assurance that at the outset the primary function of alcoholism was not to secure attention and to enhance one's status and thereby achieve the superior role which throughout his life history had been precariously realized. And while personality studies in the future may necessitate the differentiation of a second type of alcoholic personality, whose use of alcohol is equivalent to the drug addict's utilization of drugs, there is little available data upon which to base this view at the present time. For the present, the assumption of homogeneity of alcoholics as a class seems to be warranted by the facts at hand, and the burden of proof will fall upon those who would differentiate a second type.

[30] See Nolan D. C. Lewis, "Personality Factors in Alcoholic Addiction," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (June, 1940), p. 37.

[31] "A Psychocultural Analysis of the Alcoholic," *American Sociological Review*, vol. V (August, 1940), pp. 554-555.

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XIII

Segmental Behavior and the Sexual Variant

PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION may find expression in the exclusive domination of the personality by the elemental appetites and desires. One or more of the segmental wishes, usually only one, becomes the focus of the personality organization. The principal wishes of this segmental character are those growing out of hunger, thirst, sex, and the cravings for rest and sleep. Over the expression of the wishes of hunger, thirst, and sex, particularly, society exercises its most persistent control. A complex series of definitions by which these wishes become socialized has been elaborated. In this process of socialization, variations take place, and this gives rise to the variant behavior with which this chapter is concerned.

The cravings for rest and sleep lead to variant behavior, but these variations are not looked upon with as much social disapproval as are variations in the expression of hunger, thirst, and sex. "Laziness" is of course generally disapproved, but in a mild fashion except as it leads to indigence. This social attitude toward the segmental satisfactions of the craving for rest is in part the result of the high placè leisure has been given as the basic condition for the development of the fine arts and as a symbol of high status. Furthermore, the satisfactions of the segmental desires for rest and sleep are solitary in character, and

while they mark the individual off from the group, they do not interfere with society and its purposes.

The segmental desires of hunger, thirst, and sex tend to find more gregarious expression. The consequence is a more elaborate development of ritual and conventionalized patterns of expression which become incorporated into the matrix of the social organization. Behavior, therefore, which disregards these social definitions arouses social disapproval, sometimes even out of all proportion to the social consequences of the variation.

Segmental behavior tends to arise in two ways: (1) as an interruption in the normal processes of growth and development and (2) as a regression to a simpler level of adjustment. In the development of the sex impulse, for example, the normal pattern is from narcissism to homosexuality to heterosexuality. Some individuals, however, never achieve the final stage of development or may never pass from the first stage. Other persons pass through the normal sequence and then later revert to an earlier stage. This latter represents regressive behavior.

It is characteristic of segmental behavior that, whether it has its origin in the interruption of the normal sequence of development or in regression to an earlier stage of expression of the elemental desire, the particular appetite in question becomes the dominant focus of the personality. The social world of the individual becomes centered about the satisfactions of this desire. But social disapproval may be so strong that the only outlet available is through the indirect channels which furnish an outlet for repression, described in Chapter X. Thus the prude and the zealous reformer who make amends for their own guilt feelings by saving others from the sins of sexual license have in common an interest in sex out of all proportion to its normal role in social life. Both, however, have given socially approved definitions to their segmental desires.

Other individuals, on the other hand, seek out those in society who are dominated by the same segmental desires and so insulate themselves against the disapproval of the larger society in much

the same way as the delinquent seeks sympathy and understanding in the underworld. But their segregation is often much less complete than that of the criminal, because their variant behavior is less obtrusive in character or under the proper conditions is tolerated if not condoned. Such behavior may, of course, involve innocent and unwilling participants under which conditions the position of the individual is that of the criminal so far as the larger society is concerned, and this may even isolate him from all social approval, however restricted in scope. Thus the rapist is often condemned alike by the larger society and by the criminal elements with which he may have been associated in other delinquencies.

Historically, segmental behavior has developed into highly extended forms about each of the three most important of the elemental wishes. In the modern world, however, sex has tended to become singled out for more extended development than hunger and thirst. It has often been said that this is the consequence of the elaborate taboos in modern culture which hem in the expression of the sex drive. Certainly the taboos have been strong, but only the future can tell what the present trend toward a more frank recognition of the role of sex will have upon the amount and forms of variant behavior in this realm.

Variation in sexual conduct, however, is not alone the cue to the sexual variant. Sexual practices vary considerably within the range of social approval. Thus sexual irregularity in men is condoned so long as it is heterosexual in character and occurs prior to marriage. Yet not every man enters into such sexual relationships, and of those who do, some restrict their sexual contacts to prostitutes, whereas others engage in clandestine affairs. Furthermore, practices in courtship, generally referred to as petting, often involve much sex play, if not actual sexual intercourse. In this latter realm, society at least is tolerant of extreme variations so long as pregnancy does not result, and the behavior is looked upon by the individuals concerned as a prelude to their marriage.

Not only is a wide range in sexual practices the norm, but what is condoned varies greatly from group to group within a society. Thus many groups, particularly rural and immigrant, look upon sexual relations within the courtship period as quite the accepted thing. If pregnancy results the marriage is immediately consummated and no attention is given to it. It is only when one of the persons refuses to carry out the marriage plans that the disapproval of the group is aroused. Other groups, on the other hand, place a high premium upon virginity in both the male and the female, although on the whole this attitude is not widespread in American culture.

Neither is the occasional violation of the sexual mores the cue to the sexual variant. The man whose sexual conduct rather infrequently violates the mores or whose variant behavior is confined to the period of adolescence, after which he conforms scrupulously to the rules of society, is not regarded as a sexual variant. And while the woman's position is a little more precarious, adolescent indiscretions if not too extreme are generally overlooked if followed by a conventional marriage.

When, on the other hand, variant sexual behavior becomes the dominant part of the personality pattern of the individual, society takes a more pronounced stand. In fact it is the individual's definition of the sexual impulse and of its satisfactions at variance with the socially approved definition which leads to its segmental character and results in its dominant role in his life organization. This is the true sexual variant who everywhere is regarded with social disapproval.

INDICES OF SEXUAL VARIANCE

How widespread segmental behavior is in the sex realm may be determined by the analysis of the various indices of sexual variance. There are, in the first place, those cases of sexual variance which come to the attention of the police and the courts. Sex offenses constituted 10 per cent of the charges in the Juvenile

Court of Cook County for the period, 1929 to 1935. But in the Boys' Court of Chicago at the same time, only 1.7 per cent of the charges were for sex offenses. When one turns to adult delinquency, 13.5 per cent of all arrests by the police of Chicago within the period, 1930 to 1935, were for sex offenses. Of these arrests, 13.7 per cent were women, and 20.8 per cent of these were charged with sex offenses. Adults brought into the Chicago Court of Domestic Relations for contributing to the delinquency of minors were charged with sex offenses in 58.7 per cent of the cases. Thus it is quite clear that sex offenses constitute an appreciable part of the violations of the mores, so far as such violations come to the attention of the courts and the police.

When one turns to the field of the disintegration of the family, he finds again evidence of the role which sex violations play in the pattern of variant behavior. In Cook County for the period, 1930 to 1935, adultery was the grounds for 1.7 per cent of the divorces granted. But in view of the rapid decline in the percentage of adultery from 12.7 in 1919, it is reasonable to believe that the true percentage is considerably higher than the results for the five-year period would indicate. Thus the decline in adultery as a grounds for divorce probably represents a decrease in the inclination to use this charge, rather than any marked change in the prevalence of marital infidelity.

Davis's study of college women would seem to indicate rather widespread sexual variance in the form of homosexuality. Among the single women who returned her questionnaire, 50.4 per cent said that they had experienced intense emotional relations with other women.[1] The percentage of the married women who had had the same experience was somewhat lower, being 30.6 per cent.[2] Not all of these, however, admitted that the relationship had been carried to the point of overt homosexual expression.

[1] Katherine B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women*, p. 247.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

In fact only one-half of the single women who had experienced intense emotional relations with other women said that this relationship had found expression in homosexual behavior.[3]

Indices of sexual variance are, accordingly, highly variable in and of themselves. This is the direct consequence of the taboo which is placed upon sexual variance in our society. But what is more important is the understanding of the social circumstances out of which the sexual variant develops. What are the forces which lead to segmental behavior in one individual and not in another? How is the particular character of the segmental behavior determined?

In the case of homosexuality, Terman and Miles have a partial answer to the foregoing questions. The homosexual male may take either the passive or active role in the relationship. According to these writers, he tends to be consistent in his selection of role, and his characteristics vary accordingly. The passive male homosexual is feminine in mannerism, speech, and walk. Occasionally he masquerades as a woman and sometimes legally marries a man. His tastes run to good literature, music, and entertainment. His childhood fairly early showed an inversion of interests, attitudes, and activities. Approximately 13 per cent of the group studied were only children, and 30 per cent were first-born.[4]

Factors in the early family situation which seem to be important in the explanation of the homosexual tendencies are: an overly emotional mother who was unusually demonstrative of her affection for her son; a father who died when the child was quite young or if alive was away from home a great deal and who was cold, autocratic, and even brutal in his treatment of the son; treatment of the son by the mother as if he were a girl with little encouragement or opportunity to associate with boys in


[3] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[4] Lewis M. Terman and Catherine C. Miles, *Sex and Personality*, pp. 239-258.

their rougher and more vigorous activities; "overemphasis upon neatness, niceness, and spirituality." [5]

In contrast, the active male homosexual is masculine in char-

CHART LIII

ILLEGITIMACY RATES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935; UNITED STATES, 1917 TO 1938 *



* Data for the United States from the Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1938*, vol. I, p. 8.

acteristics, his traits being essentially the same as for males in general. The active female homosexual is also masculine in interests and activities, having essentially the same characteristics as high school boys.[6] Of the cases studied of both sexes, there was nothing to indicate any physiological basis for the variant behavior, and this is the major contribution of the study. As for

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 284-320.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 255-258, 557-559.

the other traits, these do not in any sense differentiate the homosexual from other persons who do not fall into this category, since many effeminate men and masculine women are heterosexual in the sense in which these writers use the term homosexual. Thus while some of the differentiating traits and elements in the social situation out of which homosexuality develops are suggested, the distinguishing characteristics and their genesis are far from clearly defined.

ILLEGITIMACY AND THE UNMARRIED MOTHER


Another form of sexual variant is the woman who gives birth to a child outside of marriage, often called the unmarried mother. How prevalent are unmarried mothers may be determined in part by analysis of the rate of illegitimate births. Chart LIII suggests that the trend is upward for the period, 1917 to 1938, the illegitimacy rate having doubled in twenty-one years. The Chicago rates suggest some deviation from this movement, but the periods of the two series are short. The bastardy rates—based upon the number of men prosecuted in the Court of Domestic Relations for support of their illegitimate children—show considerable irregularity of movement which reflects the legal character of the data. Nevertheless, these data provide information for the supplementation of the data on the birth records with regard to the characteristics of the unmarried mother.

Not all "unmarried" mothers are unmarried. In fact in bastardy cases 24.5 per cent of the mothers are married but not to the father of the child involved. (See Chart LIV.) Over 5 per cent have been previously married. Thus while illegitimacy is primarily a matter of sexual irregularities of single women, a substantial proportion of such irregularities involve married women, and therefore suggest something more than an occasional violation of the sex mores upon their part.

Illegitimacy rates vary considerably by age of the mother. Thus for Chicago the illegitimate birth rate rises abruptly to a peak in the age-group of 15 to 19 years and thereafter drops

CHART LIV

MARITAL STATUS OF MOTHER IN BASTARDY CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



somewhat less abruptly to a lower level than that at which it started, ending within the age-interval of 35 to 44 years. (See Chart LV.) The bastardy rate also rises to an abrupt peak, but its ascent begins about five years later and the peak is correspondingly shifted to an age-interval five years higher. The decline from this peak is even greater than for illegitimate births, though less abrupt in character, continuing until the age interval of 55 to 64 years. Since this curve extends considerably beyond the child-bearing age, this suggests the explanation of the divergency between the two curves. Bastardy suits may be brought against the father of the child at some time removed from the year of birth. In fact the absence of suits by mothers under fifteen years of age, although some of the unmarried mothers are less than fifteen years old as indicated by the illegitimate-birth rates, suggests that the year of birth of the illegitimate child and the year of suit for bastardy are not likely to be the same in many instances. But of course this variation in the two curves may also mean that selection takes place in what unmarried mothers bring legal pressure upon the fathers of their children for support. Whether this selection is upon the basis of economic level or of the cultural character of the area is not clear from the facts available. It may be in terms of the disposition upon the part of

CHART LV

RATES OF BASTARDY AND ILLEGITIMACY BY AGE OF MOTHER
ILLEGITIMACY: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935
BASTARDY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART LVI

EDUCATION OF MOTHER IN BASTARDY CASES: CHICAGO, 1931 TO 1935




the mother to keep her child rather than place it in an institution for adoption.

Illegitimacy is often attributed to the unfavorable hereditary

and social background of the unmarried mother.[7] If one can judge from the grade completed in school by mothers in bastardy suits, this seems hardly an accurate characterization. The highest ratio of bastardy cases by grade completed in school by the mother to females of like educational accomplishment is for the interval, ninth to tenth grades; in other words, the first two years of high school. (See Chart LVI.) It may be contended, of course, that since the compulsory-education law requires school

CHART LVII


ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS BY COLOR AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935



attendance until the age of sixteen which would normally mean completion of one or two years of high school, these rates throw little light upon the economic status of the unmarried mother. Conceding this, one is still impressed with the deviation in the conventional picture of a woman who falls prey to sex advances

[7] Percy G. Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother.*

CHART LVIII



because of low mentality and lack of sophistication which is generally associated with illiteracy and lack of education.


Illegitimacy, however, is not uniformly found among all

groups. Particularly is this true when the country of birth is taken into account, as may be seen from Chart LVII. The highest rate is among persons of the nonwhite groups born in the United States. This is primarily the Negro group, since the other nonwhite groups constitute a negligible part of the population. This high rate reflects the fact that in this group illegitimacy does not have the same meaning that it has for the white population. While there undoubtedly are factors other than this differential in cultural definition operating, this is undoubtedly the most significant. The rate of native whites is the next highest except for those who were born in the Latin countries of Spain, Portugal, and France. Again the explanation probably lies chiefly in the variations in the cultural significance of illegitimacy.

Variations are also found in the illegitimacy rates from community to community. Thus there are communities in Chicago in which the illegitimacy rate is negligible. (See Chart LVIII.) The rate in the Loop district is comparatively high, achieving a peak which is five times the general rate for approximately nine-tenths of the total area of Chicago. On the whole, the high rate area is confined to the disorganized areas of the Loop and the surrounding territory, reaching into the Negro areas as would be expected from the high rate in this group. A secondary high peak is achieved upon the northern periphery, but this is misleading since it reflects the presence of an institution for unmarried mothers to which come many pregnant women from outside Chicago to give birth to their babies. What the true rate of this area is cannot be determined so long as birth records do not show how long the mother has lived at the address at which the child is born. Community illegitimacy rates are distorted in many instances by the influx of expectant unmarried mothers who seek the anonymity of a large city.

In comparison with illegitimacy rates, bastardy rates are free from the influence of the transient unmarried mothers from other communities who seeks to conceal their variant behavior. The

CHART LIX



community pattern of illegitimacy in terms of this index is considerably simplified. (See Chart LIX.) This delimitation of area in which illegitimate rates are of any consequence, however,

reflects the distorting influence of economic conditions. This pattern suggests the possibility that it is only within a relatively limited part of the city that unmarried mothers keep their babies in the face of the taboo against illegitimate children, since here community pressure is essentially nonexistent. There must, however, be other factors operating, the nature of which cannot be determined through statistical analysis.

In order to understand the unmarried mother, accordingly, it is necessary to go beyond the discrete and formal data with which a quantitative analysis of traits and rates is concerned. What is it that differentiates the unmarried mother as a personality type? What are the experiences which incline her to look upon sexual expression in a somewhat different light than other members of her sex whose conduct is within the restrictions of the moral code?

Before turning to the personality of the unmarried mother, the problem of the unmarried father needs to be taken into consideration. He is seldom considered, because from the standpoint of the mores, he is permitted a wider range in sexual conduct. Yet his conduct may represent the expression of segmental behavior more often than that of the unmarried mother whose violation of the mores is often of the occasional and accidental sort, representing but a slight deviation beyond the range in sexual conduct condoned by society. This does not mean that the unmarried father is always a sexual variant in the sense that his personality has become dominated by the elemental sexual impulse, but it does imply that a larger proportion of unmarried fathers than that of unmarried mothers will fall into this category.

The forms of illegitimacy also vary considerably as Kingsley Davis has pointed out.[8] Along with these variations in form goes a series of differential attitudes upon the part of society. The first form is that in which illegitimacy is the result of sexual intercourse between two unmarried persons, exogamously and en-

[8] "The Forms of Illegitimacy," *Social Forces*, vol. XVIII (October, 1939), pp. 77-89.

dogamously within the restrictions of the marriage mores. This type of illegitimacy may be divided into subtypes in terms of the conditions under which illegitimacy occurs in the order of decreasing disapproval: (1) casual and promiscuous sexual relationship, (2) continued relationship without an intention of marriage, (3) so-called common-law unions, and (4) betrothal.

The second type of illegitimacy is that which results from sexual intercourse between an unmarried woman and a married man. On the whole, this type of illegitimacy meets with greater social disapproval than the first form. Nevertheless, social disapproval is not so great as toward the third type of illegitimacy in which the sexual relationship is between a married woman and an unmarried man. The fourth form of illegitimacy is that in which both persons are married but not to each other. Here the disapproving attitude of society is not clearly defined.

Types five, six, and seven all represent violation of the incest taboo. All are more vigorously disapproved by society than the first four types. The conditions under which sexual intercourse takes place are: brother-sister incest, father-daughter incest, and mother-son incest. Of the three, perhaps that of brother-sister incest meets with somewhat less social disapproval than father-daughter and mother-son incest.

The two final types of illegitimacy, both of which are comparatively rare, are the consequences of sexual relations (1) between members of different castes which are in violation of the rule of caste endogamy, and (2) between a member of a celibate class and a noncelibate. Social disapproval is particularly strong against both types of relationship.[9]

But while the differentiation of types is logically defensible, it does not facilitate the distinction between the sexual variant and the occasional and fortuitous violator of the sexual mores. Furthermore, social disapproval has little relationship to this distinction. Yet the understanding of the personality of the sexual

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-88.

variant necessitates the recognition of the role of segmental behavior in illegitimacy.

THE UNMARRIED MOTHER AS A SEXUAL VARIANT

Not all unmarried mothers, then, are sexual variants. The fact of giving birth to an illegitimate child is not of itself significant as a cue to sexual variance. Nor for that matter is the absence of illegitimacy proof that the person who engaged in illicit sexual relations is not a sexual variant. What does differentiate the unmarried mother as a sexual variant is the fact that the sexual impulse has become the dominant element in the personality, and whatever explains this fact will throw light upon the development of the personality of this type of individual.

Undue parental emphasis upon sex undoubtedly plays an important part in the development of the sexual variant. This may take the form of calling attention to the vile, dangerous, and filthy character of sex at every opportunity. Thus sex may be so emphasized by the puritanical and maladjusted mother in her efforts to protect the daughter against the "evil" designs of men that the curiosity of the girl is aroused and the prohibited world becomes all the more attractive. Particularly is this true when there is conflict between the mother and daughter, and as a consequence the girl finds an outlet to her rebellion against the mother in the exploration of the forbidden world of sexual adventure.

Sex may also be brought to the attention of the girl by having a sexual connotation read into her behavior by a parent. Thus the normal tendency of adolescent girls to become interested in their own bodies and to make themselves attractive to the other sex may be so defined. Particularly is this true when there has been sexual irregularity in the background of one or both parents. Thus the husband and father who has forgiven his wife for her illicit affair before marriage is often overly concerned about the moral conduct of his daughter, seeing in even the most innocent interests in her appearance and in members of the other sex re-

minders of her mother's sexual delinquency, and chides the daughter accordingly. The girl finds it impossible to escape the identification with her mother's earlier sexual conduct and herself becomes delinquent, realizing those traits which her father has in part attributed to her as he warned her against them. Even when the illicit relationship has been between the mother and father, because of the double standard of morality the situation may be substantially the same as that described, the father incessantly warning the daughter that she is just like her mother was, without himself taking any responsibility for the tabooed relationship.

Exaggeration of sex in the mind of the girl may grow out of uncertainty about her paternity, either real or imaginary. Thus the "adopted" girl whose paternity is often discussed may resort to an affair. Or the girl who worries and frets about whether or not she is her father's daughter may become sexually delinquent because sex becomes so out of balance in the focus of attention. In fact any situation which is such as to arouse in the girl's mind doubts as to whether either parent is her own may give rise later to sexually variant behavior. This is illustrated in the case of Jane:

"My mother never cared for me to have pretty things. I was a sensitive child. I always thought my mother was against me. I have always thought that she didn't care so much for me. One thing, I was born while my father was in the army. She probably didn't want me. She gave me to a nurse who took care of me for three years—then my aunt took care of me for two years. When my father came from the army, my mother lived with him again and she had another child. She cared more for him. He died and after that I overheard my mother say, 'If it had to be, it is too bad that it wasn't Jane instead of Robert.' I never got to play or go to parties like other children.

"My mother always wanted me to be in her house and help her like a maid. She never wanted me to have pretty things. I had to wear my cousin's old clothes. When I got older, I tried to dress up. When I would buy things to wear, she would take them away from me. I remember once I bought a shirt waist and invited some girls

to the house. My mother came out wearing the shirt waist. She was always jealous of me. She used to hit me and the neighbors used to say I certainly couldn't be her child. I often wondered if she really was my mother and asked my father about it. I never felt that I could tell her anything.

"Girls were afraid to come to my house on account of my mother. I didn't have a place that I could call a home. Whenever I had a chance, I read books—mostly love stories. I liked to live in a dream world. I remember reading, 'The Fighting Chance'; it made a great impression upon me. Whenever my mother found my books she burned them up. I was romantic and liked to think that some day a wonderful man would come along and take me away from my unhappy home. I thought that he would be tall and dark. I never had many love affairs. My mother didn't want me to marry for love. It had to be a rich man. I was in love with a boy but she picked out a man for me and tried to make me marry him. I ran away from home for two weeks and stayed at my aunt's house." [10]

Later Jane married but was unable to adjust to marriage and separated from her husband. During this period she became promiscuous and gave birth to a child.

To what extent the female sexual variant is of the phantasy type is difficult to say, but her conduct often suggests this possibility. This is illustrated in the following case:

"As far back as I can remember I always liked pretty things. I was very fond of my father and he liked me; that is, he was proud of me. I was the oldest and rather intelligent for my age and always kept myself clean and nice. He always stood by me. When I couldn't get pretty things any other way, my father was the one who sneaked them to me. I never could get along with my mother. She never understood me. I never felt that I could confide in her. She always opposed everything I ever did or ever thought about. When I wanted something so badly, I refused to eat a meal. My father always noticed this and managed somehow to get the thing and slip it to me.

"I remember so well how I always loved beautiful things; for example, I remember when I was just a young girl I had some embroidered underwear. At that time most girls were wearing plain underwear. I had just one suit but washed it out every night. My

[10] From the clinical files of Harriet R. Mowrer.

mother would say to me, 'Respectable girls don't wear embroidered underwear. Respectable girls don't take a bath every night and spend so much time taking care of their body.' This was what my mother always told me.

"I remember very well when they were wearing a certain kind of a ribbon hair dress. I thought I would give almost anything if I had such a beautiful head dress. I didn't eat a meal or two and my father slipped me some money to buy one. Then one day I wore it. My mother immediately started calling me names and telling me that it wasn't respectable to wear such things. She pulled it off of me and tore it to pieces. I screamed and became hysterical. I was taken to the Juvenile Detention Home. I was fourteen years at that time, but I was told that was a delinquent department and that I did not belong there. Before I was sent home, however, I was examined by the judge, who gave me a mental test. He told me that I passed one hundred per cent plus. He said to my mother: 'Your daughter is a genius. All she needs is the right environment.' Then he said that he wasn't going to send me home but sent me to the B—Club. Everyone at the B—Club liked me. Miss A., who was head of it, said that she would like to adopt me. I was always so lively. Then I had a scrap with Miss R. and went home.

"As a girl I never liked to work. I didn't like store work or factory work. I didn't like the surroundings and I never wanted to associate with the girls there. In fact, as a girl I had very few girl friends. I always wanted to associate with someone better and older than the ones I met while working. Then I started boarding out because I could not get along with my mother. Boarding doesn't furnish much of a home life. I met the boys and girls on the corner. I had lots of boy friends but the girls didn't like me; I just didn't seem to impress them.

"I was sent to the Detention Home two or three times. One time I called the superintendent a liar and was sent to the House of Refuge until I apologized. I was examined there and found to be virtuous but it was there that I became wise. I heard so much. The place was full of delinquent girls. I left there on February 24th and got into trouble the first of April. I was confined in the Y— Home. Just previous to this my father committed suicide by drinking poison. That was a blow to me. I really loved my father. He seemed to be the only person who understood me. I never was able to confide in my mother. I remember it was my father who had to explain to me about my menses. My mother never even did that. My father had

been so proud of me. I told him that I was pregnant. Others have told me that they think he committed suicide because of my trouble, but I don't think that was true because he didn't blame me and must have felt proud when he learned that he was going to be a grandfather, as he loved children.

"After my confinement in the Y— Home, my mother told me she would take me home if I gave the baby away. I refused as I really liked my baby. I was given a home with a woman who heard of my predicament through the papers. I thought I was really going to have a home but found out that all she wanted was a maid. I was working so hard and one day collapsed. I was found by the telephone man and sent to the hospital. After that I was sent to the country. Mrs. R., a wealthy lady, took a great interest in me. I was really perfectly happy. I had my baby, my board was being paid, and I had a dollar a week spending money. My mother did not let me come to see her, but my sisters came to see me and were fond of my baby. At that time an elderly man wanted to marry me. Then I met Mrs. D. She sent me a package of beautiful clothes. I was so touched by the whole thing because up to this time everyone had condemned me and made me feel like I had committed a great crime. I felt that I could hold my head up. Mrs. D. was the first one who helped me to hold my head up and made me feel that I was a human being.

"Soon after this I saw my future husband whom I had known for a couple years. He said, 'I suppose you are married?' I said, 'Yes, but I am not living with my husband.' He immediately asked to see me. That Sunday he came out, but I told him that I could not go out because I had no one to leave the baby with. He said, 'Why, we're going to take the baby along.' I felt so happy because I thought, 'Here is a man who is not ashamed to take the baby along.' He understood the situation. A few weeks later he asked me to marry him and I consented. I really never loved him. I guess the only reason I married him was because he was so kind to me."

This marriage culminated in a divorce twelve years later. The period of married life was broken by frequent separations. These were brought on by constant quarreling between Mr. and Mrs. H. about Mrs. H.'s contact with men. In each instance the men with whom Mrs. H. had contact were of a higher social class, one being an orchestra leader, another a physician, etc. Throughout the time she was married to Mr. H., she continued to be interested in the father of her first child, who had been ordered by the court to sup-

port the child. This and her other numerous contacts resulted in constant suspicion and jealousy on the part of Mr H., which was finally brought to a head by his suit for divorce on the grounds of adultery. The custody of the children, including the stepson, was given to Mr. H. The story of how Mrs. H. had been trapped in an apartment with another man as told by Mrs. H. was dramatically featured in the press. Mr. H., a salesman of electrical appliances, was portrayed in his wife's story as a wealthy electrical engineer whom she would always love.[11]

Not all unmarried mothers are of the phantasy type. Others have achieved a low level of adjustment in which the satisfactions of the sexual impulse are as casually sought as are the satisfactions of the elemental desires of hunger and thirst. To such individuals the sexual taboos have no meaning, and their conduct is more amoral than immoral. Either because of the lack of the higher capacities upon the basis of which all social restraints depend, or because of having grown up in a social environment in which no social taboos exist against the unrestrained expression of the sex appetite, such individuals know no restraint except those which nature herself dictates.

THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

The complementary aspect of the unmarried mother is the illegitimate child. The illegitimate child is not necessarily either the offspring of a sexual variant or one himself, although he may be both. Since the incident of conception outside of marriage is no guarantee of the segmental character of the sexual relationship, not all mothers of illegitimate children are sexual variants. Furthermore, illegitimate birth does not inevitably lead to sexually variant behavior although the tendency is strong in that direction, particularly if the child is a girl. This results from two propelling forces in modern society; namely, the tendency for the illegitimately conceived girl to be assumed to become in-

[11] Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord,* pp. 129-131 and 131n. Reprinted by permission of the American Book Company, publishers.

evitably sexually uncontrolled as was her mother, coupled with the tendency for men to show less restraint in making advances to her if her illegitimacy is known to them. This second factor is undoubtedly in part the consequence of the first, but it also reflects the current mores which consider violations of the sexual mores involving members of one's own group more serious than if they involve persons belonging to the out-group.

Furthermore, the loss of status which characterizes the position of the illegitimate is a strong propelling force in the direction of sexual variance. Since no matter how virtuous he may be, his position is precarious and inferior because of the circumstances of birth over which he had no control; virtue itself has no rewards. The compensation, therefore, which society sets up to offset the sacrifices the individual may make in conforming to the mores, are not forthcoming to the illegitimate. In fact the rewards seem entirely in the opposite direction, for since no one will credit him with being other than immoral, he might at least have what satisfactions can be obtained. This undoubtedly explains why so often one finds that the illegitimate child is the offspring of an illegitimate.

But whether the fact of illegitimate birth leads to sexual variance, it almost invariably leads to mental conflict if the child is aware of his unconventional conception. If his mother subsequently marries, his position is invariably inferior to the children born to the legitimate union. To both the mother and her husband, the illegitimate child stands as a reminder of past indiscretion. This is reflected in the attitudes of both persons toward the child and in turn finds its counterpart in the attitudes of the other children. Even though attempts are made to hide the irregular paternity of the child from his half-brothers and half-sisters, the unending watchfulness upon the part of the "parents" and relatives leaves its own telltale mark.

Whether the mother subsequently marries or not, the position of the illegitimate is not essentially changed, except that his precarious position may be limited to his contacts outside the imme-

diate family group. And even if he is adopted, his uncertain paternity is not always escaped as a source of mental conflict.

If the illegitimate child is a girl, she finds her position particularly difficult as she enters adolescence and the possibilities of marriage confront her. Not infrequently she feels that she cannot become too seriously involved in a love affair because of the fear of what might happen should she reveal her socially disapproved paternity. And yet she fears marriage without making this revelation. The consequence is that she either attempts to avoid permitting any affair to become too serious or, when it does, breaks off without explanation and suffers alone the consequence of her behavior. But this situation itself is conducive to her own sexual variance, since it suggests the obtainable transitory satisfactions which can be had out of each affair in lieu of the unprocurable marriage.

Thus, in general, while the illegitimate child does not invariably become a sexual variant, she is subjected to an additional set of forces in this direction in comparison to legitimate children. These additional factors are the consequence of the inferior social position of the person of illegitimate birth. And since the sexual mores are more rigorous in their demands upon the female than upon the male, a greater stigma attaches to the female than to the male illegitimate. This leads to a more pronounced interest in sex and by negative suggestion to greater tendency of female illegitimates toward sexual variance.

PROSTITUTION AND THE PROSTITUTE

Prostitution is sometimes spoken of as the world's oldest professian. Historically there have been few if any cultures which have not had prostitution, if one disregards preliterate societies which seem to have been relatively free from this type of sexual variance. It is spoken of as a profession because, unlike other forms of sexual variance, the segmental development of the sexual impulse is for an ulterior purpose, rather than for the satisfactions which directly accrue from the sexual experience. That is, the

bartering of sexual access is the economic stock in trade with which the prostitute supports herself.

Professional prostitution is, then, an economic phenomenon. Whatever factors operate to increase or decrease the demand determine the extent of prostitution. But this does not explain who it is that becomes the prostitute. This is a matter of the forces which act selectively upon the female population to make prostitutes of some and nonprostitutes of others.

Most writers have conceded that the mental and temperamental characteristics of the prostitute constitute a part of the causal sequence. Thus the League of Nations' Advisory Committee on Social Questions found that a third of the women described in the cases submitted to the Committee were either mentally abnormal or subnormal. Nevertheless, temperamental factors were constant for both the normal and subnormal groups. Outstanding in this temperamental make-up were traits likely to cause unhappiness and failure: excessive restlessness, lack of self-confidence, high degree of introversion, lack of affection, defiance of authority, and irascibility. Only a third of the women had had happy homes. Of those who had experienced an unhappy childhood, some were illegitimate and orphans, brought up by strangers or relatives. Others had lost one parent. Still others had grown up in homes torn by domestic discord, conflict between parents and child, neglect, lack of control, drunkenness upon the part of the father, and excessive discipline, all of which had been a constant source of unhappiness and friction.

These mental and temperamental factors constituted the background out of which arose later conditioning factors. Few had been successful or satisfied with their employment. Most of the women had had no vocational training and therefore were engaged in unskilled work, changing positions frequently. A third of them had married, generally when they were young and prior to their becoming prostitutes. Hardly any of the marriages were successful. Many of the women were described as lazy and dominated by a desire for luxury, this latter the conse-

quence of a strict upbringing which made the pleasures of life seem all the more desirable.

The conditions of employment itself were sometimes a predisposing factor. For most of them, hours were long and wages low. Furthermore, about half of the women had first found employment in domestic service where they were constantly thrown into contact with people who lived more luxuriously and comfortably than they. The result was to develop discontent with their social situation, from which prostitution offered an easy escape.

According to the women themselves, poverty was the most common cause of their entrance into prostitution. Sometimes their poverty was attributed to low or irregular pay. In other instances the necessity of supporting dependents, sometimes their own children, was the primary cause of their impecunious condition. Then there was the attraction and coercion exercised by the prostitute world. Some became prostitutes in response to the persuasion of procurers, others because they had fallen under the influence of pimps. A few had been seduced and forced into prostitution. Some had applied for employment and found themselves in houses of prostitution. Many had friends who were prostitutes and had become envious of their freedom, their clothes and jewelry, and the gay and easy life of the profession.[12]

Unfortunately, the reasons given by women for turning to prostitution would, at best, be rationalized accounts, because of the tendency of the prostitute, like others who violate the mores, to justify their conduct by defining it in socially approved terms. No explanation illustrates this rationalizing process better than that of poverty. Society is inclined to mitigate if not condone almost any infraction of the mores under conditions of poverty.

As for the traits which the interpreters of the case records considered significant, these are not peculiar to the prostitute and therefore throw little light upon the genesis of the variant be-

[12] League of Nations' Advisory Committee on Social Questions, *Prostitutes: Their Early Lives*, pp. 64-67.

havior. Such an analysis as is necessary for an understanding of the genesis of the attitudes and mechanisms out of which sexually variant behavior develops is not to be found in questionnaires filled out by the prostitute herself or by the worker in an agency or institution having contact with the sexual variant.

While it is true that all professional prostitutes have a service to sell, the character of this service is a highly variable commodity. Types of prostitutes vary all the way from the harlot, whose only stock in trade is sexual access, through the geisha, whose commodity is much more complex than simple sexual contact, to the come-on girl, who uses her sexual appeal as a supplement to her more legitimate services.

The true harlot, under conditions where prostitution is not too rigorously repressed, is the inmate of a house. Her contacts with men are casual and brief. Sexually she is usually frigid, and her blandishments are crude and unconcealed. She was the "painted lady" of the past, readily recognized for what she was. Currently her technique of announcing herself to likely prospects has become more subtle as she has become a "street walker" and no longer the inmate of a brothel. She frequents those areas where the population is mobile, and she passes, except for those who use her services, as an unescorted woman no different from many another whose morality is unquestioned.[13] This type is illustrated in the case of Dorothy:

Dorothy is twenty-one years old, very erratic in her behavior, and has spells of being immoral and indulging in other misconduct. On one occasion she stole jewelry belonging to a friend of the family and when asked why she did so said, "Because I wanted to wear it." Dorothy was sent to an institution for delinquent girls during adolescence and spent several years there. Her stepmother was responsible for her incarceration, charging Dorothy with various delinquencies. Immorality began about six months ago when she began going out and "picking up" men on the street and in public places. At one time she stayed in one of the city parks for a week, having sexual relations with many men. She is very hysterical, un-

[13] Cf. Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago*, pp. 54-58, 155-159.

stable, and cries a great deal. She is despondent much of the time and complains that everyone is against her, particularly her sisters with whom she refuses to have any contact.

Dorothy's father is not interested in the children of his first wife who has been dead for a number of years. He lets these children take care of themselves, showing interest only in the children of his second wife. The stepmother was cruel to her stepchildren, finally driving them from the home. She was particularly cruel to Dorothy and finally succeeded in having her committed to the institution for delinquent girls. Dorothy suffered from enuresis as a child and has never completely overcome this habit. Her foster-mother often whipped her for her incontinence until she became unconscious.

Dorothy was released from the institution for delinquent girls to which her stepmother had her committed when she was seventeen at the instance of one of her sisters. She then lived with a married sister for some time. Her married sister found Dorothy very difficult to get along with. She was impudent, insolent, and rebellious and refused to do as she was told. She soon began to take an interest in men, flirting with anyone she met and making dates with strangers. Whether she had sexual intercourse with any of these men at this earlier period the sisters do not know. Her sisters had no intimation of immorality until they found some contraceptive preparations in her suitcase.

When reprimanded for her sexual delinquencies, Dorothy at first denies any misconduct, then becomes sullen and insolent, even insulting. Then after a period of moping, during which she often sits in a chair by the hour, sometimes holding a book in her hand, looking at it for a few minutes then laying it down, repeating this over and over again, she suddenly bursts into tears and asks forgiveness. Loudly she promises to reform. In a short time after making this promise and receiving the forgiveness of her sisters, she is off again with another man.[14]

While Dorothy had not yet progressed to the point where her only interest in men was a commercial one, the indiscriminate and temporary character of her contacts suggests this as the natural course of development. Furthermore, Dorothy's background represents what is probably a common factor in the development of the harlot. Her position in the family was de-

[14] Manuscript.

cidedly inferior, and she felt that everyone was against her. The indifference of her father and the intolerance and cruelty of her stepmother, coupled with her incarceration in an institution for delinquents, made her rebellious against all social norms. But over against this rebellious attitude, there is the strong desire for sympathy, understanding, and social approval. This is evidenced by the fact that at times she would use baby talk and in other ways act like a baby when she was reprimanded. Also her dramatic outburst of tears and repentance show this deep-seated desire for affection and sympathy. There seems little doubt, therefore, that in part her flirtations and contacts with men were substitutes for the more common sources of love and affection, as well as a source of money with which to buy the things which she desired.

Thus it is probably the unusual case in which the harlot's segmental behavior is exclusively commercially defined at the outset. This would account for the fact that seduction and illicit relations which for some fortuitous reason do not eventuate in marriage so often constitute the background out of which prostitution is said to develop. It also accounts for the hold of the *souteneur* upon the prostitute whose demand for affection and sympathy becomes completely differentiated from the sex impulse. Frigidity is nature's device for facilitating this differentiation.

THE GEISHA

As Reckless has pointed out, the prostitute no longer depends upon her peculiar physical appearances, symbolized in the "painted lady," as her modus operandi in making herself recognizable to her clientele, and she has become in appearance no longer different from the average woman. With this change in outward characteristics her whole technique has also been reconstructed. In the past, and still in the present so far as the harlot continues to exist, the emphasis was upon the satisfaction of a biological impulse; now sex is associated with witty com-

panionship, flattery, sympathetic understanding, and similar satisfactions. Many of the features of the response relationship have been taken over by the geisha type of prostitute, who dresses with restraint and good taste, makes herself attractive but not obvious, listens to the tired business or professional man talk about himself for hours, and gives him attention and understanding. In this way she is a greater rival to the wife than in the past, when the relationship with the prostitute was compartmentalized to include only sex with no affectional satisfaction.

The geisha girls are independent of all the compulsions traditionally associated with the so-called "slavery of prostitution." They maintain their own homes, often furnished in good taste. Sometimes they are "married" and have an understanding with their "husbands" that they are not to interfere with their business. But always their stock in trade is the facility for furnishing to their clientele satisfactions which normally are obtained in the family relationship in which sexual satisfaction plays but a minor role in the larger pattern of response.

Unlike the harlot, whose contact is brief and casual, the geisha is a companion for the night, and many of her clientele return again and again. The husband who is constantly quarreling with his wife, the man whose wife is too busy with the affairs of her children or her social obligations to listen to his views on current affairs, and the unattached man whose social contacts are almost entirely masculine find in the geisha a sympathetic and appreciative audience. In fact, she superficially possesses many of the traits which have historically been attributed to women—wit, charm, tact, considerateness, self-effacement, and deference—unaffected by the current trend toward equality between the sexes. And while all this she gives for a price, this is rarely apparent in her technique.

In this transition from the harlot to the geisha, the "call girl" occupies an intermediate position. In fact many a geisha may have started as a "call girl," built up a clientele upon the basis of her desirability as a companion, and graduated into the upper

levels of the geisha class. Typical of the "call girl" is Millicent, portrayed in Reckless's book:

Millicent has been a prostitute for twelve years. She started at the age of sixteen under the tutelage of another girl, who taught her how to pose as a guest at a hotel and solicit in the lobby. After a year she was caught and sentenced to a penal institution for a year. When she was released, she went to another city and started a house. Here she made considerable money as the entrepreneur. Moving again she was not so successful and soon joined a burlesque troupe. Later she came to Chicago and worked as an entertainer in night clubs and cabarets. Here she found the hours long and tiresome, and although the pay was good, her expenses were high, since an entertainer must have many clothes.

Quitting the entertainment game, Millicent established herself in an apartment. Here she lived with Buddy, who drove a cab at night and did not interfere with her affairs. Buddy had also been an entertainer, saved some money, and opened a smoke shop with a little gambling on the side. But his health broke down, and his physician advised him to get an outside job, so he became a cab driver. When Millicent took him in he was badly run down, but under her care he quickly regained his health.

At first Millicent depended upon cab drivers to bring her patrons, paying them a percentage of what she collected. But she found them poor judges of clientele; they were unable to distinguish between prospective customers, plain-clothes men, and reformers. Nevertheless, for some time Millicent depended upon them to bring her customers. And some of the men they brought were very high class. In fact on one occasion she was able to make a good deal when two professional men came up to her apartment and mistook her for a hostess and asked her to call in some girls. This she did and gave them a percentage of what she took in. One of the girls was suspicious that she had received more for the girls' services than Millicent acknowledged and reported her to the police. After that she moved to another apartment.

Millicent had been married twice and divorced both her husbands. Her first husband was cruel and so she left him. The second was green but suddenly became sophisticated and took to leading a fast life and taking dope. Millicent sent him to a hospital twice to be cured, and the last time he promised he would never take dope again. But he soon was doing it again and so she left him.

Now that Millicent is in her new apartment she is going to operate differently. There will be no commission to cab drivers. Instead she will depend upon her old reliable friends who pay well. And she will take them out to a place "that's as safe as a church." [15]

Like the "call girl" the highest type of geisha is likely to lead a precarious life. While she has her physical attractiveness, she can cope with the fluctuations in her income which are a necessary part of her profession. But as time goes on, it becomes necessary to work out some more stable source, a liaison with a man who maintains her as his mistress, a marriage, or some other sources of income which will eventually take the place of her sex favors. Otherwise she tends to be thrown back into some of the lower forms of prostitution.

The geisha may have been or may become a "come-on girl." To the "come-on girl" the sale of sexual favors is an avocation and not a vocation. Her chief function is to provide the female companionship which acts as a stimulant to business in hotels, taverns, and night clubs. She may in part be an entertainer who divides her time between participating in or providing some entertainment feature and providing companionship to those who solicit her company in their recreational pursuits. In so far as she may also be a prostitute this is incidental to her other functions.

Closely related to the "come-on" girl are the show girl, particularly of the chorus, and the night-club entertainer who supplements her income by bartering her sexual favors. This she may do either in exchange for an actual monetary consideration or for the good time provided by her male companion of the evening. The taxi dancer and the dance instructress in the public dance hall may also fall into this category. In fact this type under modern conditions is recruited from almost every vocation in which women are habitually in contact with men under conditions of mobility and anonymity.

[15] Adapted from "Millicent's Own Story" in Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago*, pp. 146-151.

The "convention" girl, including both the professional and the amateur geisha, is scarcely a homogeneous type. These operate in hotels in which conventions meet, sometimes depending upon the impersonal character of the lobby in which to make their contacts, sometimes at the beck and call of the cab driver or other persons in and around the hotel who act as go-betweens. She may live in the hotel itself under the guise of a guest. While she is often a professional, there are those whose primary object is adventure.

The "charity" girl is not unlike all the various types whose livelihood does not depend upon the income obtained in the form of money, presents, or "good times." Her chief characteristic is that she receives no tangible return for her sexual favors, although she is often the recipient of entertainment. Often she is a habitué of Bohemian areas and finds in the excitement of promiscuous male companionship a source of adventure and a substitute for the more enduring heterosexual relationships.

Finally, there is the "kept" woman who is no longer promiscuous in her sexual contacts and has escaped from the economic uncertainty of her sister sexual variants. Not always, however, is she recruited from the host of promiscuous women, for she may have been or still be married to someone else. Like the geisha's, her hold upon her clandestine lover is seldom exclusively sexual, and the impediment to a conventional marriage may be the legal or social obstacles to obtaining a divorce either by her or by the man who maintains her. Nevertheless, in some instances the stability of the illicit relationship is dependent upon its unconventional character, although this may or may not be appreciated by either of the two persons involved.

THE MASCULINE COUNTERPART TO THE FEMALE SEXUAL VARIANT

Discussions of prostitution and illicit sexual relationships seldom include any attention to the masculine side of the phenomenon. Yet in large part the character of promiscuous sexual re-

lationships is determined by the demands made by the male. This neglect is largely the consequence of the double standard of morality, which condones a wider variance in sexual satisfactions in men than in women. In this sense prostitution is the direct outgrowth of the double standard, which has fostered the demand while condemning the source of its satisfaction.

The historical notion that the young man must be permitted to "sow his wild oats" placed a premium upon segmental expression of sex at least for the time being. Many groups (college fraternities, for example) still consider it a part of the male's initiation into adult life to have contacts with prostitutes. Sometimes this attitude is extended to include the sexual exploitation of feminine members of one's own group if this is possible. Prestige thus in such masculine groups is dependent in part upon the individual's sexual conquests.

Furthermore, the social pattern of conventions, fairs, and expositions both facilitates and stimulates sexually variant behavior upon the part of men and in turn creates a demand. Adventure and release from the controls of the primary group under conditions when the normal sources of female companionship are absent lead to promiscuity in heterosexual contacts. This tendency is often accentuated by the unsatisfactory character of the marriage relationship itself, the continuance of which is often the consequence of legal and social pressure.

Much of the sexual variance which arises out of the premarital experimentation of youth, as well as that which represents a rebellion against the restrictions imposed by an unsuccessful marriage, is transitory in character and even if recurrent does not lead to a high degree of segmentalization. Nevertheless, some of the variant behavior initiated under these conditions becomes so dominant in the personality as to lead to the development of the more pronounced type of sexual variant. Social conditions which result in the segregation of large groups of men as are found in army camps during wartime tend to accentuate the development of sexual variants.

This extreme type of male sexual variant may be illustrated in the case of Mr. Weston:

"I married a pretty girl. She had affairs with other men. I divorced her. People looked at me. They felt sorry for me. A friend said he'd fix it for me with a nice woman in a town sixty miles away. I married her, this Nora. I didn't like her, but I was young. I wanted a woman.

"Two times I left her—went thirty or forty miles away. A divorce, that was easy then. Why didn't I get one!

"I came to New York. My brother sent me money. I stayed in New York a year, working in the distillery business. Then I went to Philadelphia. This Nora, I didn't want to bring her here. I had women; plenty of chances to live in free love. I was going to other women. Then a man said to me. 'Bring your wife here. You've had two wives already. Do you want a third wife?' I brought her here and it cost me plenty. I fixed a nice home in Philadelphia. I stayed there seventeen years. I had a house of my own; my own business; an insurance policy; and two bank accounts. I belonged to four organizations. Oh, I was a man! I had friends. They knew this Weston. He was a man. This Nora, I was ashamed of the way she looked but I treated her good.

"This Nora she was like a rag. Since you want to know, I'll tell you. She was no good. Fine places she sent me to. I went to places before she came; after she came. Why not? There was life inside of me.

"I came to Chicago. Two years I stayed in Chicago. Then Nora came. She still was no good. Called me dirty names and told the children things about me. She drove me to other women. When she drives me away I find places; nice girls, plenty of girls. You know when I'm looking for another woman, I find one. I am not a young man, but I am just like a boy; that much life in me.

"When I get tired I leave home. I bought a ticket to Omaha on the bus. From there I started out on the highway. I got a lift to the next town. I worked two weeks in a little town in Nebraska in the summertime. It took six months traveling to get to San Francisco. I just start out sometimes on the highway or in a freight. I stand in the middle of the road and stick out my hand. It's easy to get a lift. I do other work when I can't do my own work. When I do all in that town, I get a ride to the next town. Sometimes a freight train takes me on two hundred miles. I travel from one town

to another. From San Francisco I went to Alaska. From there I went to Seattle, then to Spokane, and from there to Minnesota. I have a good time. I like to live; sleep good and have a woman. I am a happy man. On the road I had plenty of women. In Pueblo I was looking for a woman in a hotel. I found a girl—French—like a picture. These girls, they like me. My blood is hot. I am a man; a respectable man. I am very careful not to get a disease.

"In St. Louis, one woman wanted to live with me in free love. I thought, 'I can't stand to be in trouble.' I knew one man living in St. Louis who was living with a girl and had a child. After his wife came to St. Louis, Oh boy! I don't want any of that trouble.

"If I had $10,000 I would give half to my wife for a divorce and get me a nice little home and a nice wife, and be home all the time. I would like to travel with a nice wife to California; eat under a tree and be out of doors.

"I am a happy man; I sing. I used to sing when I was in St. Louis. Once I was at a nice home. They said to me, 'Mr. Weston, give us a song.' After that they bothered me to death to sing. The working men say when I come to the shop, 'When you come, you make it happy here. You sing. You smile.' I am still a young man. I have life inside. I tell you the truth. I am a man who likes to live." [16]

Another type of sexual variant is that in which the sexual behavior represents a breakdown in personal organization and the individual turns to sexual satisfactions much as others turn to drink or drugs. Thus as a consequence of frustration, he attempts to substitute the elemental satisfactions of the sex appetite for those of the social wishes. In part he is able in this way to express his revenge upon the social order for his frustrations and in part to regress to a simpler level in which elemental satisfactions become self-sufficient.

But not all sexual variance reaches these extreme forms of development whether in the male or in the female. In fact as was pointed out in the early part of this chapter, many of the forms of sexual variance are scarcely different from the variations in sexual conduct which fall within the range of condoned behavior. Their significance lies in the fact that these intermediate

[16] From the clinical files of Harriet R. Mowrer.

forms represent the intermediate stages in the development of the more extreme forms.

In addition to the more commonly recognized indices of sexual variance, there are other forms which are less apparent in their import. Thus the so-called respectable single woman's behavior may be segmental in the sense that undue emphasis is placed upon her lack of opportunity for sexual expression, with the consequence that even the innocent courtesies of men are interpreted as sexual advances. This type of development finds its extreme expression in so-called "old maid's insanity" in which spinsters of unquestionable reputation suddenly make accusations of men showing them undue attention. This type of person is generally not sufficiently attractive to men to have married. Nevertheless, she is a potential sexual variant in that she often tends to become involved under conditions where others would not. Thus she may become the paramour of the man who has little intention of divorcing his wife and yet desires an outlet for his sexual expression other than a professional prostitute.

In understanding the sexual variant, it is necessary to keep in mind the wide range in variation and the inaccuracy of social judgment as a cue to what constitutes the sexual variant. Thus the woman who gives birth to an illegitimate child may be from the standpoint of her sexual conduct little different from many other women, and yet there is a wide difference in the degree of social disapproval. Also the sexual conduct which is condemned in one sex is condoned in the other, and yet from the standpoint of the degree of segmentalization both may be alike. Furthermore, the illegitimate child is often made a sexual variant by the attitude of society that he must be one, whereas in the absence of this compelling definition he would be no more likely to develop segmentally than the general run of his fellows.

When it comes to the analysis of the genesis and development of the personality of the sexual variant, this heterogeneity of character of the data available obscures the essential mechanisms which operate. Furthermore, the social stigma placed upon many types of sexual variants in our society constitutes a strong

impelling force toward such conduct and at the same time stands in the way of a scientific understanding of this type of personality. Nevertheless, it is clear that the sexual variant is a type of disorganized personality and that the distinguishing feature of this type is the dominant role which the sexual appetite plays in his conduct.

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XIV

The Suicide

PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION covers a wide range of patterns from those persons who because of mental conflict lead lives of mild frustration and social inefficiency to those who eliminate themselves from society or become such liabilities that they have to be cared for either privately or publicly. Thus in its extreme form, personal disorganization finds expression in suicide or in psychopathic behavior.


Suicide, as a form of personal disorganization, is not a homogeneous phenomenon as many writers have assumed. Two forms of suicide can readily be distinguished: (1) suicide representing the desire of the person to end his life, and (2) suicide representing attempts upon the part of the person to attract attention as a device for securing sympathy or of obtaining control over those around him. Persons in this latter group end their lives only because of miscarriage of their plans, since the suicide attempt represents an escape mechanism, best understood in its relationship to temper tantrums, drink, phantasy, and pseudo illness. This latter form does not represent the extreme personal disorganization involved in suicides of the first type which grow out of a genuine desire to end one's earthly existence. The genesis of the suicidal impulse will be different in these two groups of cases, and the first group represents on the whole a more extreme form of personal disorganization than the second.

In view of the kind of data with which one has to work in the analysis of suicide, however, it is difficult to differentiate at all

times, or even most of the time, between the two types of suicide. This derives from the fact that the suicidal impulse is difficult to detect in advance of the act. There is little opportunity for ob-

CHART LX a

SUICIDES PER 100,000 POPULATION *




* Data from Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 375.

taining firsthand information except in those cases where documentary evidence has been left by the suicide or where the act itself has been thwarted and the individual can be studied.

Through this process, sufficient materials can be got to demonstrate the validity of the distinction between the two types, but

CHART LX b

SUICIDES PER 100,000 POPULATION *



* Data from Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 375.

there is at present no way of determining the ratio between them. Consequently, any statistical analysis must operate in terms of suicides in general without regard to the differences in genetic background.

THE SUICIDE TREND

The first problem which confronts one in the analysis of suicide is whether or not there is an increasing tendency upon the part of individuals to commit suicide. Cavan in her book, *Suicide*, is impressed with the general upward trend of suicide both in the United States and in foreign countries.[1] Her data, however, cannot be said to bear out the hypothesis that modern life uniformly tends to result in an increasing tendency toward suicide, although for most of the countries of the world for which data are available this seems to be true. Nevertheless, there are exceptions in which the trend has been generally downward as in the cases of Sweden and Denmark, in spite of the fact that in closely adjoining countries such as Norway and Germany the trend has been clearly upward. (See Chart LX a-c.)

When one turns to the United States, however, it is clear that, whatever the foreign situation, the trend is upward. This upward movement is relatively small when compared with the cyclical fluctuations, particularly for the first two decades of the twentieth century. (See Chart LXI.) Since 1920, however, the upward movement has been more pronounced. The fluctuations around the trend are well defined throughout the period, and this has led to speculation about the relationship between business conditions and suicide.

Ogburn and Thomas found a comparatively close correspondence between fluctuations in the suicide rate in the United States and in business conditions, suicides increasing with business depression and decreasing with prosperity.[2] Thomas found that the same relationship holds for England and Wales, although the correspondence is not quite so marked.[3] The increase in suicide during depression periods Thomas explains as a consequence of

[1] Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, pp. 5-6.


[2] William F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas, "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Sept., 1922, reprinted in Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, p. 73.

[3] See *ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

unemployment and pauperism in the working class and of enforced liquidation and business failures in the upper classes. She

CHART LX c

SUICIDES PER 100,000 POPULATION *



* Data from Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 375.


also thinks that restriction of marriage and the increase in illegitimacy may have something to do with the matter. This latter interpretation seems to have been based entirely upon the fact that the marriage rate decreases with depression conditions and

illegitimate births increase. It is quite possible that both are co-ordinate consequences of depression conditions along with suicide, rather than causal to it.

Although the trend is substantially the same, and the cyclical

CHART LXI

SUICIDES PER 100,000 POPULATION IN REGISTRATION STATES




* Data for urban and rural areas from Louis I Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 390.

fluctuation is highly synchronous, suicide rates vary from rural to urban areas as one might anticipate upon the assumption that social and personal disorganization is greater under urban conditions. (See Chart LXI.) Comparison of the two series also reveals that although the cycles are essentially parallel, changes from year to year tend to be somewhat more pronounced for urban than for rural areas. This may be the consequence of greater stability in economic conditions in rural areas, or it may

CHART LXII

SUICIDE RATES IN CHICAGO AND THE UNITED STATES



indicate that economic forces play a less prominent role in the causation of suicide under rural than under urban conditions.

When one turns to a single urban community, he finds that fluctuations from year to year are more pronounced than for the United States as a whole. Thus in Chicago in 1929, the suicide rate was even below that for rural United States. The peak of suicides during the depression, however, represents four times as great an increase in rate in Chicago than in the United States as a whole. (See Chart LXII.) This further confirms the hypothesis of greater sensitivity of the suicide rate to economic conditions in urbanized areas.

SEX AND SUICIDE


Studies of suicide have invariably shown that males are more likely to commit suicide than females. In general, the male suicide is from two-and-a-half to four times the female rate, but the ratio is not constant for a particular area from time to time. Thus in Chicago, the mean annual male rate was 2.4 times the female rate for the period, 1919 to 1921, and 3.5 times the female rate for the period, 1929 to 1935. (See Chart LXIII.) Within the latter period, the yearly ratios varied from 2.4 to 4.3.

But while the male suicide rate exceeds the female rate by several times, there is evidence that females attempt unsuccessfully to commit suicide more frequently than do males. A study of attempted suicide by Lendrum in Detroit showed that the annual mean female rate was 35.5 per 100,000 females ten years old and over as compared to 18.4 for the male population within the same age range.[4] This reversed relationship between the sex rates does not necessarily mean, as Lendrum interprets it, that women are less successful in committing suicide than men.[5] It probably reflects the greater tendency for women to use attempts at suicide more frequently as a device for controlling social situations in their favor in much the same way in which complaints of illness are used.

[4] F. C. Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XIII (November, 1933), pp. 479-500.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 481.

CHART LXIII

SUICIDE RATES BY SEX AND YEARS: ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER PER 100,000 PERSONS, CHICAGO, 1919 TO 1921;* ANNUAL MEAN AND YEARLY NUMBER PER 100,000 PERSONS, SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



* Data for Chicago, 1919 to 1921, from Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 80.

Since there is so much difference between the male and the female suicide rates, this raises the question of whether this divergence is constant at all ages or more characteristic of some ages than others. The data in Chart LXIV reveal the latter to be true. Until the twenties, there does not seem to be any great difference in the rates by sex. During the twenties, the female rate tends to reach a plateau, whereas the male rate continues on its rapid upward course. The male rate in the later years of life is approximately nine times the female rate.[6]

Characteristically enough, for attempted suicide the higher rates are for the younger ages for both males and females, the female curve reaching its peak at twenty to twenty-four years and the male curve in the following five-year age group. (See Chart LXV.) This is suggestive of adolescent instability in which the individual is more likely to utilize attempts at escape from the responsibilities of maturity by reinstating an earlier preferred role.

The higher male suicide rates for later years seem to be due to the fact that fewer considerations are given men than women. Women more often receive the care and assistance of relatives, neighbors, and others, than do men, and this would be expected to decrease the tendency toward suicide. This difference is also reflected in the higher number of male attempts at suicide in the years beyond forty-five.

MARITAL STATUS AND SUICIDE

There is also considerable variation in the suicide rate in terms of marital status. Thus the single have the lowest rate and the divorced, the highest. (See Chart LXVI.) The fact that the married and the widowed have higher rates than the single, is not surprising, however, in view of the tendency for suicide rates to increase with age, for on the whole both these marital groups will be older than the single, the widowed being the oldest of the

[6] Cf. Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 314; Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 44.

CHART LXIV

ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY AGE AND SEX PER 100,000 PERSONS OF GIVEN AGE GROUPS: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART LXV


ATTEMPTED SUICIDE BY AGE AND SEX PER 100,000 POPULATION: DETROIT, 1927 TO 1930 *



* Data from F. C. Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XIII (November, 1933), p. 481.

CHART LXVI

Annual Number of Suicides per 100,000 Persons by Marital Status *




* Male and female rates for Chicago, 1919 to 1921, from Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 319; for Minneapolis, 1928 to 1932, from Calvin F. Schmid, *The Saga of Two Cities*, p. 373.

three. The higher suicide rate of the divorced cannot be explained wholly in terms of age, since the mean age of this group is likely to fall somewhere between that of the married and the widowed. This probably means that the divorced group are more personally disorganized, and this leads both to divorce and to suicide.

CHART LXVII

ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER OF ATTEMPTED SUICIDES PER 100,000 PERSONS BY MARITAL STATUS AND SEX: DETROIT, OCT. 3, 1927 TO FEB. 27, 1930 *



* Data from F. C. Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XIII (November, 1933), p. 481.


Not only is the suicide rate of the divorced higher than for any other marital group, but it is relatively higher for females than for males. Thus whereas in Minneapolis the rate for divorced males is only about one-and-a-quarter times the rate for widowed males, the female divorced rate is twice the widowed rate. This suggests the hypothesis that age is a much more significant factor in the male suicide rate, whereas marital status is probably the more important factor so far as females are concerned.

In attempted suicide, on the other hand, while the male rates progress from the single to the married, to the widowed, to the divorced, as do the male suicide rates, the divorced rate is only slightly larger than the widowed rate. (See Chart LXVII.) In contrast, although the rank of the female suicide rates is the same as that for male suicides, the attempted suicide rate of widowed

females is the lowest for any marital group and the divorced rate is three times the married rate, which is the nearest ranking marital group. This would further confirm the conclusion already suggested; namely, that marital status is more important than age in the explanation of female suicide rates.

CHART LXVIII

SUICIDE BY RACE AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935, AND 1919 TO 1921 *



* Rates for 1919 to 1921 (male, female, and both) from Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 80.

The connection between suicide and race and nativity has long been a matter of interest. Cavan concludes that race as an index of temperament is not important since countries having the same racial composition, such as (1) Sweden, Norway, and Denmark or (2) Australia and England, have such widely divergent rates, while France and Italy in recent years have approximated the rates in the Nordic countries.[7] Nevertheless,

[7] Cavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-37.

the several race and nativity groups in the United States have different suicide rates. In general, the foreign-born whites have the highest rate, except for the Orientals whose numbers are so small as to make doubtful the reliability of these rates. The Negro rate is the lowest, with the second generation of immigrant whites tending to approach more closely the native whites than the stock from which they come. (See Chart LXVIII.) [8]

THE ECOLOGY OF SUICIDE

Cavan has shown that the suicide pattern was somewhat irregular for Chicago in 1919 to 1921, though with some tendency toward higher rates with increasing mobility and social disorganization.[9] The mean suicide pattern for the period, 1929 to 1935, however, portrays a rather high degree of regularity in which the suicide rate progressively declines in all directions from the central business district toward the periphery of the city. (See Chart LXIX.) This axial pattern reveals only slight irregularities, chiefly in the form of four relatively small areas which have somewhat lower rates in the midst of areas of uniformly high rates. Three of these areas seem to have no distinctive characteristics in comparison to the surrounding areas which would explain their lower rate. The fourth is in the heart of the Negro community on the South Side and since the Negro rate is somewhat lower than the white rate, a lower rate would be found for this location.


[8] It is also significant to note that whereas the foreign-born whites have the highest suicide rate and the Negroes the lowest, for attempted suicide the Negroes have a rate which is approximately twice that for both native- and foreign-born white, according to Lendrum's data:

Nativity and Race	Annual Mean Number per 100,000 Persons *
Native White	22.7
Foreign White	22.9
Negro	58.0

* Adapted from F. C. Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XIII (November, 1933), p. 481.

[9] Cavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-105.

CHART LXIX



There is another irregularity in the form of two peripheral communities of somewhat higher rates than is to be expected at these locations. Both of these communities are highly industrial-

ized, but in this respect they do not differ essentially from adjacent communities. One, Clearing, has a median length of residence somewhat less than communities adjacent to it which have lower suicide rates; but the other, Garfield Ridge, is not essentially different in this respect from adjoining communities having lower suicide rates. The population of Clearing is approximately 47 per cent native-born white of native parentage, whereas this nativity group constitutes only about 20 per cent of the population of Garfield Ridge. Adjoining communities fall within this range, and consequently little significance can be attached to this characteristic. In fact there is little in the censuses of 1930 and 1934 to account for the unexpected higher rates in these communities.

The upshot of this statistical analysis of suicide is to show the relationship between a variety of social conditions and suicide. In general, this relationship can be summarized by saying that all those conditions which result in the atomization of the individual tend to lead to an increase in suicide. Thus the trend of increasing suicide and the lower rates of rural as compared to urban areas reflect the historical process of liberating the individual from the close control of the community. The fluctuations in the suicide rate in consequence of economic cycles reveal the highly individualistic significance which economic adjustment has taken in modern society. The higher rates of suicide of males as compared with females, of the old as compared with the young, of old men as compared to old women, of divorced as compared to married, all these reflect the individualization of responsibility which characterizes modern life. The close connection between social disorganization and suicide, of mobility and self-destruction, as revealed in the ecological study, shows the effects of social isolation as one of the consequences of atomization of the individual under urban conditions.

Nevertheless, the trend toward individualization in modern life does not provide in and of itself a satisfactory explanation of suicide. Individualization of behavior is a condition which is

experienced universally in varying degrees, and yet not everyone commits suicide. Even under those conditions in which social behavior has become individualized to the highest degree, only a comparatively small proportion of individuals commit suicide. It is necessary to examine the differential responses which individuals make to what seem to be common social conditions in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of suicide. This leads to a consideration of the inner constitution of the individual and the forces which give rise to suicidal impulses.

THEORIES OF SUICIDE

Theories of suicide can be divided into two groups, the psychological and the sociological. The psychological theories have almost without exception stemmed from the writings of Freud and represent, therefore, the "new" psychology rather than the orthodox psychological approach. The analysis of suicide by Freud himself furnishes the background out of which to understand the variations upon the common pattern of psychological analysis.

Freud postulates two contradictory wishes to which all behavior may be traced, the will to live and the will to die. This death wish, however, can be turned upon one's self only by identification with someone else whom the individual has experienced a desire to kill. But not all suicide represents the fulfillment of the death wish alone. The ego wish, particularly as it is in part made up of the sex wish, may also become a part of the suicide pattern, especially with reference to the means of suicide. Thus to poison one's self is to become pregnant; to drown is to bear a child; and to jump from a height is to deliver a child.[10]

Menninger expands upon the analysis suggested by Freud by breaking down the death wish as it operates in suicide into three related components: (1) the element of dying, (2) the element of killing, and (3) the element of being killed. Accordingly, in

[10] William Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, and Anna M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 396-397.

the absence of a wish to die or of a wish to kill in which the hated person has become incorporated into one's self, the suicidal impulse takes the form of extreme submission in which the individual obtains masochistic satisfaction.[11]

Suicide, according to Roalfe, represents either the desire to kill another person or to escape an objective or subjective problem. When the individual is frustrated, the natural impulse is to destroy that which is responsible for this frustration. Society, however, denies to the individual the immediate realization of this wish. But because the wish to destroy is denied direct expression, this does not eliminate it from continuing to function in the unconscious. Since the responsible agent cannot be destroyed, the wish finds realization in the killing of one's self as a substitute for the killing of another, or in cases where the hated individual dies from other causes, in identifying one's self as responsible for this death and expiating the guilt by killing one's self. This portion of the theory is simply a restatement of Freud's notion, but Roalfe goes on further to develop an extension to the theory by recognizing a second aspect of suicide in which the individual utilizes self-destruction as an escape mechanism. Thus suicide as an escape, according to Roalfe, represents the expression of the inherent desire in all persons to avoid the difficulties and problems of life by a return to the uterine condition in which needs were supplied and no responsibilities existed. When difficulties in the environment threaten or when one's unconscious threatens to burst into consciousness, releasing desires and emotions which are unacceptable, the person is tempted to escape through self-destruction. Fainting also accomplishes the same result, but its effects are only temporary.[12]

Dublin and Bunzel attempt an eclectic analysis of suicide which incorporates all the elements of the psychological analyses.

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[11] Nolan D. C. Lewis, "Studies in Suicide," *Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. XX (July, 1933), pp. 262-263.

[12] William R. Roalfe, "The Psychology of Suicide," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. XXIII (April-June, 1928), pp. 59-67.

According to this formulation, suicide develops out of the same motives which lead to mental disease, viz., (1) fear and anxiety, (2) feelings of inadequacy and inferiority, (3) hatreds and hostilities, and (4) feelings of guilt. As a consequence of repression, these emotions take on exaggerated importance and result in behavior which to the normal person seems illogical.[13]

The operation of abnormal fears in the genesis of suicide, Dublin and Bunzel illustrate in cases of actophobia (the fear of high places) in which the individual satisfies his impulse for safety by jumping off the high place and thus satisfies his timidity at the sacrifice of his life. Or, again, the fear of death becomes so terrifying that the individual comes to prefer suicide to the hazards of living. Or vague anxieties arise, and the individual is impelled toward a regressive flight into death which promises peace and protection. In much the same way hypochondriacal fears, the general fear of insanity, and the fear of the consequence to others of one's own aggressive instincts lead to escapes through self-destruction.[14]

Feelings of inadequacy and of inferiority, according to this eclectic theory, interfere with social contacts and result normally in compensatory efforts in the direction of overcoming the deficiency or abnormally in the development of antisocial conduct. If the feelings of inadequacy are so great, however, that the individual is unable either to compensate or overcompensate for it, suicide may result from the depression which follows the effort. Or when overcompensation takes the form of exhibitionism, excessive utilization of this mechanism may lead to suicide as the final dramatic attempt in the individual's struggle for attention and importance.[15]

Hatreds and hostilities function in the motivation of suicide through the mechanism of introjection in which a motive originally directed outward becomes directed inward. As a conse-

[13] Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, pp. 281-282.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 282-288.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 288-290.

quence, the suicide strives through his act to hurt those he loves in revenge for their failure to live up to his expectations and demands.[16] Feelings of guilt lead to suicide when the impulse to retribution for wrongdoing, whether real or fancied, becomes so strong that self-destruction seems the only adequate solution.[17]

Williams finds hatreds and hostilities basic to all suicide. In individuals who have suicidal tendencies, he finds a strong narcissistic component in the personality which is unable to accept defeat and fights against reverses. The consequence is that he either develops an overwhelming feeling of unworthiness or an intense desire for revenge upon those who are responsible for his frustrations. If blame for disappointments is fixed upon others, in the absence of direct outlets, he turns to ways of embarrassing or hurting these persons indirectly by turning upon them the onus for his self-destruction. The manner in which this destruction is carried out, accordingly, depends upon whether the individual believes himself wronged or to have done wrong himself. When it is the former, the act is generally carried out openly and dramatically; whereas when it is the latter, he goes about it more or less quietly.[18]

Sociological theories of suicide may be illustrated by the writings of Durkheim[19] and Cavan,[20] whose ideas in their general import have much in common, though differing in details. In general, the sociological approach emphasizes the role of group solidarity upon the individual life organization. Elements in the social situation leading to a breakdown in the close identification of the individual with the group and its purposes throw the individual back upon his own resources, inducing conflicting attitudes out of which the suicidal impulse develops.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 290-297.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.
[18] E. Y. Williams, "Some Observations on the Psychological Aspects of Suicide," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. XXXI (October, 1936), pp. 260-265.
[19] Emile Durkheim, *Le Suicide.*
[20] Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide.*

Durkheim's analysis of suicide is predicated upon his general sociological theory of the reality of the social order apart from and above the individuals who make up a particular society. The explanation of suicide, accordingly, lies in the understanding of two sets of factors: (1) the suicidal currents which at times constitute a part of the collective consciousness and (2) the relationship of the individual to the social order. The understanding of the suicidal currents and their relationship to the collective consciousness constitutes the sociological analysis; whereas the understanding of why some individuals commit suicide and others do not under the same conditions of the collective consciousness leads to the psychological analysis of the causes of suicide. Thus suicide is caused by the suicidal currents which vary from group to group in inverse correlation to the strength and solidarity of the social group.[21]

The causes of suicide from the standpoint of the individual are, on the one hand, the breakdown in group restraint and, on the other, the intensity of group control over the individual. Basic to Durkheim's classification of suicides is this polar conception in which the egoistic and the anomic suicides are the consequence of the breakdown in group control and the altruistic suicides are the results of the intensity of group control.[22]

Under the head of altruistic suicides, Durkheim includes: (1) suicides in primitive societies of the old and sickly men, of women on the tombs of their husbands, and of dependents upon the tombs of their masters; (2) suicides in savage societies for futile motives; (3) suicides connected with religious fanaticism; and (4) in modern times, the suicides of soldiers who undertake tasks in war which mean certain death.

Egoistical suicides are the consequence of the isolation of the individual from the group so that he no longer participates to any appreciable degree in its collective consciousness. Protes-

[21] Cf. Charles E. Gehlke, "Emile Durkheim's Contribution to Sociological Theory," *Columbia University Studies*, vol. LXIII, pp. 74-75.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

tantism tends to result in a higher rate of suicide than some other religions because of the strong individualistic philosophy incorporated into it. Marriage, to the extent to which it introduces the individual into a familial society of high social cohesiveness, tends to lessen the prevalence of suicide. Likewise periods of social movement in which there are impelling demands for social participation such as are found in wartime result in a decrease in suicide; whereas all those factors which tend to break down the control of social bonds, such as divorce and the disintegration of family ties, result in increased suicide.

The anomic suicides are the consequence of catastrophic disturbances in the social order in which social control breaks down and the individual is freed from the social rules. Under these conditions the limits to individual desires imposed by the social equilibrium and the moral order give way, and the result is the development of desires beyond any possibility of satisfaction. Economic crises represent a disturbance of this sort in which the significant element is not the impoverishment of the individual or the uneasiness created, but the resulting disturbance in the collective control of the wants of the individual.[23]

Cavan looks upon suicide as one of the several ways individuals seek to solve the problems which arise in the process of social adjustment. Some of the solutions to crises are of such a nature that the individual is permitted to lead an efficient, normal life; in other instances, the failure to resolve crises through normal techniques leaves the individual dissatisfied, restless, and inefficient in his social adjustment, i.e., a personally disorganized individual. This personal disorganization finds expression in a variety of ways, such as alcoholism and drug addiction, sexual perversion, delinquency, insanity, and suicide.[24]

Fashioning her analysis upon the pattern of the act, Cavan differentiates five types of personal disorganization, each of which

[23] Cf. Gustavo Tosti, "Suicide in the Light of Recent Studies," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. III (January, 1898), pp. 464-478.

[24] Cavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-147.

may lead, but does not necessarily do so, to suicide. These types are: (1) the unidentified craving, (2) the recognized wish, (3) the specific wish, (4) mental conflicts, and (5) the broken life-organization.

The first type, the unidentified wish, is that in which dissatisfactions and disappointments are ill-defined. In this pattern the predominant element is an attitude of weariness toward life. The second pattern, the recognized wish, is characterized by the recognition of one's failure and seeming inability to realize some intense elemental need, such as a home, prestige, a job, status, or wealth. The identification of this elemental need with some specific person or object is the earmark of the pattern of the specific wish. With the increased specificity of the wish, the chance of fulfillment becomes diminished, and the consequence is to increase the disorganization of the personality. The fourth pattern, mental conflicts, is characterized by the fact that the cleavage is no longer between the wish and obstacles to realization, but instead between sets of impulses which are themselves in conflict. As a consequence of these conflicting impulses, such as the conflicting loyalties of the marginal man or the variance between the elemental cravings and socially imposed responsibilities, the inner life of the person becomes one of ceaseless turmoil. The fifth pattern, the broken life-organization, is that in which the life structure of the individual gives way under the impact of external circumstances beyond his control (economic failure, death of a loved one, insanity, ill-health, etc.). Under these circumstances, life loses its meaning and the suicidal act becomes a logical conclusion to the disorganization of personality. These several types Cavan considers but stages in the process of personal disorganization, a process which may be interrupted at any point by suicide.[25]

The combined import of these various theories of suicide, whether psychological or sociological, is that self-destruction is one of the consequences of the disorganization of personality.

[25] Cavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-177.

The explanation of the disorganization of personality which precedes suicide is found in the elemental mainsprings of human behavior by the psychologists, in the operation of the social order upon the individual by Durkheim, and in the ineffectual solution of the problems of social adjustment in the analysis of Cavan. While thus disagreeing with regard to the essential character of the causal factors in self-destruction, all agree that a part of the problem of explanation consists in the differentiation of types or patterns of suicide.

TYPES OF SUICIDE

Attempts to differentiate types of suicides have not been very successful, and yet it is clear that suicides fall into two distinct classes. These classes may be called the situational and the escape patterns. Each class presents a wide range of subpatterns, the character of which can only be suggested in the light of present knowledge.

Situational suicide ranges all the way from those forms which eventuate out of a highly emotional state upon the part of the suicide in which his determination to kill himself is of an impulsive and often compulsive character, to those which are the result of a calm, deliberate, calculating plan. The distinguishing feature of all these patterns is that death is intended, rather than an accidental feature of the behavior. In general, the range in situational patterns is associated with the natural history of life experiences.

Much has been written about adolescent suicide as if it were somehow more abnormal than any other form. This attitude is readily understandable since adults are inclined to look back upon childhood and youth as the happiest period of life. To adult eyes the adolescent suicide seems so out of keeping with the realities of that period of life that each case takes on an exaggerated importance. Consideration of the rates of suicide among adolescents, however, reveal that they are invariably comparatively insignificant. (See Chart LXIV.) Thus the rate for males

from fifteen to twenty years old is only about one-fifth the rate for the succeeding age group and one-fiftieth that finally achieved in old age. In the case of females, the contrast is not quite so great, but even here the rate of the first five-year period of adulthood is two-and-one-half times that of the preceding five years of adolescence. But it is also true that the female rate never achieves a height beyond about five times the rate for the adolescent period from fifteen to twenty years.

The chief characteristic of adolescent suicide is its impulsive and compulsive character. This is the direct consequence of the nature of the adolescent experience. Adolescence marks the transition from the cloistered world of childhood to the responsibilities of adulthood. The communal status of the person becomes more clearly differentiated from that he has in the family, and the individual finds himself confronted with a world of increasing complexity. Whereas during childhood, social contacts tend to be limited by the bounds of the community and neighborhood and restricted to persons of essentially the same age, adolescence results in a widening of contacts both spatially and in terms of age ranges, particularly under urban conditions. In consequence status becomes more precarious and the emotional life of the individual is subjected to greater stresses and strains than he has experienced in childhood. It is quite natural, then, that the adolescent would on occasion resort to suicide as a consequence of fear and insecurity. The fear of the dark which nearly every child normally experiences gives way in adolescence to the fear of the unknown. Disappointments and frustration reveal a hostile world such as the child seldom experiences. The problems of life rise like a tidal wave upon the ocean engulfing all within its course. The adolescent, like the adult, turns to suicide as a solution to the emotional conflicts which arise out of the hiatus between the inner aspirations and the outer realizations.

It matters not that the problems which motivate the adolescent to suicide seem of minor importance to the adult, for to the for-

mer they appear quite as unsolvable as do those which lead the adult to suicide. Furthermore, the essential character of the emotional state is little different except in its intensity and impulsive character from that which may be found in adult suicide, particularly in the earlier periods of adulthood. But if this is true, it is only because adolescence is marked with greater extremes of emotionality and impulsive behavior than the later stages of life, whether with regard to the pleasant or the unpleasant.

Guilt and revenge also play a role in the suicide of adolescents as they do in adulthood. With the transition to a less circumscribed social world, it is to be expected that converging, and even contradictory, codes of behavior would become incorporated into the personality as a consequence of diverse and divergent group membership. But whereas the adult tends to develop some facility in solving these conflicts through either the mechanisms of dissociation or repression, the adolescent finds himself on occasions torn by pangs of conscience. In the earlier stages of contrition and remorse, the suicidal impulse insidiously weaves its way into the befuddled mind of the individual.

Revenge finds expression in adolescent suicide in the knowledge that those persons whom the suicide holds responsible for his unhappiness will suffer as a consequence of his act. Thus the individual who rebels against the inattention and discipline of his parents or other intimate associates or the diminishing love of a sweetheart sees in suicide opportunity for revenge by making those persons suffer who are contributory to the suicide act.

At the other extreme of the situational pattern, are those persons who commit suicide by means of a deliberately conceived plan in which the emotions play little part. This type of suicide is characteristic of old age in which the individual calculates the assets and liabilities of further existence. Whereas youth is concerned with developing a philosophy of life, old age becomes absorbed in working out a philosophy of death. Prestige and

status contract, at first imperceptably but later at an increasing rate. Associates belonging to one's own generation vanish from the scene of life one by one until the person finds himself living in a world dominated by a generation with which he has never been completely en rapport. Add to this the hazards of economic crises, disease, and of waning energy which make it difficult for one to participate in the activities of life about him, and suicide becomes the natural solution except as the individual is deterred by fear of the hereafter.

In between the impetuous suicide of youth and the measured suicide of old age lies a wide variety of patterns in which are incorporated varying degrees of plan and impulse, of methodical calculation and explosive release. The consequence is a wide variety of motives brought on by the crises of life in which reverses in the economic and affectional relations of the individual probably play the dominant roles.

ESCAPE PATTERNS

The escape patterns of suicide are characterized by the fact that to the individual they represent means of avoiding the customary responsibilities of social life, which the Freudians have called "flight from reality." Here again there is a wide range in pattern, from those cases in which suicide is but an accidental result of a miscarriage in plans designed to control a situation in the interests of avoiding responsibilities to those cases in which suicide constitutes the denouement of a phantasy drama. Thus in all the escape patterns of suicide, phantasy constitutes the basic pattern into which suicide and threats of suicide are woven.

Where suicide and threats of suicide are used as devices to control social relationships in the interest of avoiding responsibilities and reinstating a preferred role, it is customary to find this type of escape linked with others, such as illness and drink. Suicide, because of its reflection upon the character of those intimately associated with the perpetrator, tends to be the final resort in a

sequence of other escape devices, which, because they have been utilized so often, have lost much of their original effectiveness. How this pattern originates and unfolds is illustrated in the case of Mrs. Hall.

Mrs. Hall was the youngest in a family of nine children. Because her mother was a delicate woman, Mrs. Hall lived the first six years of her life with an aunt. When she returned to live with her own family she had little in common with her brothers and sisters but became the favorite of her father. While her father was a strict disciplinarian, he spent a great deal of time with Mrs. Hall, talking to her about what he had read. As a consequence, Mrs. Hall became very much interested in reading books, and to this she attributed the fact that she had little in common with her brothers and sisters who were not interested in reading. She did no housework, and she was made to feel that she was brighter than her brothers and sisters. Yet, she often felt that she was misunderstood by the members of her family, though her father always let her have her way except for contacts with boys as she grew older. Nevertheless, she never confided in her father and carried on a clandestine love affair for seven years with a neighbor boy without her father's knowledge. This was culminated when she found that her sweetheart had been unfaithful to her. At this time she thought of suicide, but decided instead to leave the small community in which she had grown up.

Mrs. Hall had a cousin in a distant city with whom she had been upon amiable terms in her childhood. Since her father had died shortly before the denouement of her love affair, she turned to this cousin for help, asking that he send her money to join him, which he did. Six weeks after her arrival, they were married, although Mrs. Hall expressed some hesitancy in this move. But since she was not able to find work as she had expected to do and her cousin was the only person she knew in the new environment, marriage seemed the most plausible thing under the circumstances, in spite of the fact that she was not in love with him.

A year after marriage, the first child was born. Mrs. Hall hated her baby and at first refused to take care of it. She felt hurt and disappointed to find the baby the center of attention and solicitude which she herself craved. The result was intense jealousy at seeing the baby the recipient of the petting which she had had as a child

and still felt was her due. The consequence was that she complained constantly of backaches and weakness which interfered with her doing the housework.

In response to recurrent complaints of weakness, dizziness and pains, Mrs. Hall was repeatedly under the care of physicians. In this way she was able to escape doing housework and disciplining her children. When domestic problems became too heavy and complaints of illness were no longer as effective as they once were, Mrs. Hall would threaten to commit suicide. In fact, upon one occasion when restricted finances threatened to make it no longer possible to employ a maid, she made a pretense at committing suicide. She called her physician and said to him: "Mrs. Hall is very sick. Come over right away." When the physician arrived, he found the apartment filled with gas from the kitchen stove which Mrs. Hall had turned on.[20]

In the case of Mrs. Hall, suicide and threats of suicide were devices used in a persistent drive to reinstate a more desirable role, that of childhood, and to offset the normal demand for the assumption of adult and marriage responsibilities. In other instances, the escape pattern is that of phantasy in which the individual strives to realize some projected role developed in the imagination as an escape from the undesirable position into which he has been placed. Suicide in this pattern represents the response of the individual to the collapse of this endeavor in which, in a fit of despondency and as a consequence of frustration, the person gives up the campaign of living. Or, as some documents seem to suggest, the person becomes so completely absorbed in the phantasy role that he no longer is able to differentiate between the real and the unreal. Under these circumstances, suicide becomes the means by which the uncomfortable requirements of reality are made forever impotent. In death, accordingly, in conformity with the cultural pattern which posits surcease of life's disappointments and tribulations, the individual hopes to realize more thoroughly the phantasy role for which he has striven.

[20] Adapted from Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 243-246.

A classic case of suicide in its relation to the phantasy role is that of Miriam Donaven:

Miriam Patterson seems to have been rather an ordinary girl who grew up in a rapidly growing midwestern metropolis. Her father and mother were divorced when Miriam was eight years old, but she continued to live in the "small-townish" residential community in which she was born until her marriage to Alfred Donaven.

Alfred and Miriam met at a high school dance when Miriam was nineteen and Alfred twenty. Alfred's background seems to have been very much like that of Miriam except for a somewhat more puritanical up-bringing, the rigors of which, being a male, he was able to escape through the conveniently culturally approved double standard of his time. After a five-month's acquaintance, Alfred and Miriam were married and moved to a rapidly deteriorating residential area. Here the first disillusionments of marriage were experienced. Alfred did not conform to the romantic ideal of a husband fostered by the popular literature of the time. Neither does it appear that Miriam lived up to the role of a wife as defined in the expectations of Alfred and reinforced in the conventional attitudes of his mother. Miriam disliked housework, and yet she was little prepared for remunerative activities which might have provided an outlet for her nervous energy and bolstered Alfred's not too adequate income.

After a few months of marriage, Miriam became pregnant. Alfred did not want a child yet and so she had an abortion. Later she regretted this step whenever Alfred was inattentive and forgot it when her husband was solicitious. Periods of estrangement followed others of contentment. Quarrels became more violent and occurred more frequently. Miriam went to work in a department store and there stole things for Alfred in an ever increasing effort to win more attention. About this time they took in a roomer, and Miriam developed a casual interest in him which irritated Alfred. Quarrels came to involve some physical conflict. At times they became so estranged that they scarcely spoke to each other for days, and upon one occasion Miriam left for a day. Miriam had an escapade with a "pick-up" acquaintance, and soon after this she and Alfred talked about divorce. After this one flirtation followed another. They moved to another part of the city. Shortly in the new surroundings, Alfred left Miriam but later returned, following an orgy of dissipation and adventure upon Miriam's part. Alfred had

his adventures with other women. They quarreled and made up, yet never seemed to be able to make a final decision. Miriam's flirtations seem to have represented attempts to taunt Alfred for his inattention. Finally, however, there was little left of the marriage, and after some mutual bargaining in which Alfred threatened to leave and Miriam left, to return later, Alfred agreed to give Miriam cause for divorce. But before this had been accomplished, Miriam thought of killing first Alfred and then herself, even expressed the second in a letter to her mother. Divorce ended the relationship five years after marriage, but not without an interlude in which Alfred returned for a short time after months of separation.

After Alfred and Miriam separated, Miriam turned to prostitution to supplement the support given her by her husband. This she continued after the divorce until she finally entered into a free alliance with Robert Timmins, a married man who lived a double life. With this alliance began again a struggle to rebuild a romantic relationship. In this second attempt the same essential sequence of contentment and dissatisfaction was reproduced which had characterized her life with Alfred. At times, she achieved the romantic ideal in her relationship with Robert Timmins; at other times she felt neglected and despaired of being able to "hold" her lover. She tried to persuade Robert to divorce his wife and marry her, but he refused to do so. On occasions they quarreled about his inattention, his refusal to give up his wife, and his selfish refusal to see her side of the relationship. Slowly she saw him drift from her, yet was unable to do anything about it. Finally, he told her that this relationship could go on no longer, and she carefully planned both his and her death. Consequently, three years after her divorce to Alfred Donaven, Miriam shot first her lover as he lay in bed and then herself beside him. Both bodies were later discovered lying much as if in sleep as Miriam had planned it.[27]

Thus the diary of Miriam Donaven reveals suicide as the denouement of a long struggle to achieve and maintain a phantasy role in which there are suggestions that in the end Miriam may have reached the stage where differentiation between reality and unreality was far from clearly defined. In death, accordingly,

[27] Adapted from Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, revised edition, pp. 231-251.

she strives to achieve a oneness with her lover denied her in life. Suicide represents the supreme effort to realize the phantasy role in one conclusive act from which there can be neither recourse nor retraction.

In other instances, suicide is not so much the supreme effort to achieve the phantasy role as it is the coolly calculated hazard of its collapse. The adventurer whose successes are based upon a campaign of fraud and deception commits suicide with the same cool abandonment which has characterized his cunning in compounding a phantasy role. Striking and notorious cases are those of Ivar Kreuger, the Swedish match king, and of Philip Musica, who as F. Donald Coster became president of a large wholesale drug company. Both persons through unscrupulous manipulation of the property of others were able to rise from obscure backgrounds to positions of power and importance. Others may commit suicide in a fit of despondency or of remorse when adversity bring to naught their efforts or their malefaction is discovered, but the adventurer type seems to take suicide in stride with the same cool calculation which has characterized his opportunism in the fabrication of his phantasy role.

SUICIDE AND INSANITY

Some suicides are, of course, linked with insanity. The resemblance between the phantasy roles in suicide and the delusions of the insane suggests a possible linkage between the two. Here the act of suicide is but a part of the larger pattern of the psychosis. Some writers have been inclined to assume that a large proportion of those who commit suicide were insane. This assumption seems to be based upon the further assumption that no one in his "right" mind would kill himself except under circumstances so unusual that it might be expected that anyone would do so. There is no doubt but that the line between the psychosis and the mental condition out of which suicide eventuates is in many instances a nebulous one, but this is hardly an

adequate basis for the conclusion that insanity invariably precedes suicide any more than that it invariably precedes delinquent behavior.

As to the proportion of suicides which develop out of psychoses, there has been a wide range in estimates. Cavan cites estimates ranging from 15 to 30 per cent.[28] Any attempt to deal thus with the problem, however, is sheer speculation. Only as it can be shown that the individual who commits suicide had been known to have shown symptoms of a psychosis, as evidenced by a diagnosis by a competent psychiatrist, can there be any assurance that the person was psychotic. Unless such is the case, it cannot be assumed upon the basis of the testimony of relatives and friends that the development of a psychosis constituted the prelude to suicide. It should be kept in mind, however, that situational suicides range all the way from highly emotional responses to the crises of life to the essentially cool and deliberate reactions. In the highly emotional types, the feature which seems to differentiate the suicidal episode from the psychosis in which extreme emotionality is the predominant feature is the comparative absence of a progressive fixation of pattern. Furthermore, there is lacking the delusional and hallucinational content which characterizes so much of insanity. When it comes to the phantasy types, on the other hand, the differentiating characteristics are more difficult to define. The subjective expression of phantasy clearly tends toward insanity, but when this is the pattern, suicide is highly improbable. But in those cases in which there are efforts to realize the phantasy role, there is the suggestion that the psychosis is more characteristic of those cases in which failure is the outstanding feature of the campaign; whereas if some success is the keynote, the act of suicide is more likely to follow as the aftermath of a phantasy role fully or partially realized.


In so far as there are suicides among persons who have been diagnosed insane, the evidence seems to confirm the foregoing

[28] Cavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-140.

conclusions. Dublin and Bunzel present data upon this problem (see Chart LXX) which show high rates of suicide among insane patients suffering from involutional melancholia and the manic-depressive psychoses. Since these two types of psychoses

CHART LXX

SUICIDE AMONG PATIENTS WITH MENTAL DISEASE: NEW YORK STATE HOSPITALS, 1919 TO 1929 *



* Data from Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 311.

are characterized by episodes of marked depression in which fears of impending danger and of guilt are common, it is not surprising that suicide is more common among patients suffering from these psychoses. Furthermore, the fact that the manic-depressive psychoses show swings from the phases of depression to lucid phases of hyperactivity would lead to the expectation that patients suffering from this psychosis would be less likely to commit suicide than those suffering from involutional melancholia, and this is what the data show. Furthermore, dementia praecox represents

of all psychoses the most marked tendency toward the subjective expression of phantasy. It would be expected that suicides would be lowest in this diagnostic group, and again these data confirm this expectation.

SUICIDE AND CULTURE

In the analysis of the subjective aspects of suicide, the part which culture plays in providing the background out of which the subjective elements may develop is not to be denied. These cultural elements act both as compelling and deterring forces upon the impulses of the individual.

The relationship between culture and suicide in certain oriental countries is so widely known that it needs only to be mentioned. Hara-kiri in Japan and the suttee in India have in the past been socially approved patterns of behavior, operating with such compelling force that the individual had little recourse but to conform. Accordingly, members of the upper castes in Japan who suffered disgrace were constrained to do the honorable thing and commit hara-kiri. In much the same way, upon the death of her husband, a woman in India cast herself upon the funeral pyre of her husband as the final demonstration of her loyalty to him. In each of these instances, the cultural pattern acted as a compelling agent.

More commonly, perhaps, culture acts not so much as a compelling agent but in the form of taboos against suicide. In both the development and enforcement of these taboos, institutional religion has played an important role. Christianity in its ideology of a hereafter in which the individual will be rewarded or punished for his conduct on earth has operated to deter the individual from self-destruction, which the church has defined as self-murder. The Catholic Church has reinforced the threat of eternal punishment by refusing to the suicide the privilege of a church burial. Orthodox Judaism forbids the burial of the suicide in the same cemetery with those who die a natural death. The consequence is that in those groups which closely adhere to

these religious beliefs the suicide rate is comparatively lower than among disbelievers. .

The operation of culture as a compelling device or in the form of a taboo, however, is direct and relatively apparent. Perhaps more important under modern conditions in which the institutional pressures tend to lose their effectiveness, are a host of indirect influences ranging all the way from the technological transformations of modern culture to some of the elements of its ideological character.

Historically, the character of the world and of many of its cultures facilitated and encouraged a type of behavior which served as a substitute for suicide. The individual who suffered disgrace in his immediate environment could abandon it and all his former associates and go to a new locale where he could begin life over again. In this beginning of life anew in a strange community, he lost his old role much as does the victim of amnesia. France in her development of the Foreign Legion as an instrument of colonial expansion took advantage of this tendency. In much the same way, individuals who have found modern culture too demanding have retreated to isolated out-of-the-way places to escape the rigors of the contemporary complexities of life for the pristine simplicity of romantic islands of the South Seas.

With the decreasing significance of geographical isolation, such retreats to new surroundings tend to lose their effectiveness. Consequently, certain areas of large cities become the natural habitat for those persons who would bring to an end their previous identity. Under conditions of anonymity the individual may be completely able to blot out the past quite as effectively as if he had committed suicide. In this way Bohemian areas in the city perform the function which was once the prerogative of strange and exotic lands.

In contrast to the religious ideologies which tend to act as deterrents to suicide, cultures which present death as the gateway to another life in which the unhappiness of the present is absent

stimulate the suicidal impulse. Not infrequently those religious ideologies which condemn suicide become the sources for this notion of a millennial hereafter and thus lead under certain conditions to a state of mind which makes suicide possible. The widespread practice of burial in which persons intimately related are laid side by side further stimulates the notion of the desirability of death, since it is thus that those separated in life are once more united. In this way many cultures provide the essential materials out of which the individual is facilitated in the development of plans for his own death.

Suicide is also facilitated by the current attitudes regarding the inheritance of suicidal impulses. Persons whose relatives have committed suicide sometimes become so obsessed with a fear that they themselves will commit suicide that the obsession itself eventually propels them to take their own lives. In somewhat opposite fashion, the general disposition of most individuals to excuse the act of suicide as forced upon the person by his family or others to whom he was intimately associated or obligated provides a ready basis for rationalization by the person contemplating suicide.

Furthermore, social patterns which place a high premium upon social status and at the same time make it comparatively difficult to acquire and maintain, provide the framework for the development of the suicidal impulse. Loss of status, insecurity of status, and social inadequacy place strains upon the personality in proportion to the premium placed upon status in a particular culture. All those aspects of culture which make it possible for individuals to suffer radical losses of esteem without providing the corollary patterns of face-saving facilitate suicide. Thus the disgrace of having attempted suicide often provides the compelling element in the second attempt.

But cultural patterns, no more than inherent drives or wishes, offer a satisfactory explanation of suicide. The crucial elements in the process lie in the differential experiences in the life adjust-

ment of the individual, particularly in the development of role in the family group.

FAMILY ORGANIZATION AND SUICIDE

Familial experience lays down the basic pattern of the personality. In interaction between the members of the family (parents and siblings), the individual develops a conception of his role which determines how he will respond to future group situations. In this basic experience the potentialities for or against suicide are laid down. Some individuals develop what seems to be an unlimited facility for meeting adversity, whereas others do not. Some individuals solve the problem of transition from the family to nonfamily groups, because they have developed in the family experience those adaptive mechanisms required for an effective solution of life problems. Others fail to solve the problem of transition, because they have developed, in the definition and maintenance of their roles in the family, mechanisms which lead to ineffectual social adjustment. The life patterns of these latter individuals are characterized by the use of escape responses in the maintenance of the early familial role.

The escape-response type of suicide is fairly well understood in its relationship to the wide range of escapes which individuals utilize in their attempts to reinstate their earlier preferential roles or to refashion them along more satisfactory lines through the technique of phantasy. The problem encountered in the understanding of this type of suicide lies in the explanation of why one escape is utilized rather than another. On the whole, it seems probable that the dangers involved in suicidal attempts encourage the use of other escapes. Otherwise, the selection of suicidal attempts seems to be hit upon in a more or less accidental fashion as is generally true of all the several kinds of escapes.

When one comes to what in this discussion have been called situational suicides, the relationship between the development of

personality in the family and suicide is not so clear. And yet it is this phase of life experience which operates to the greatest differential degree in defining the cultural milieu. Unless it can be assumed that the potentialities of suicide are generated in the basic pattern of the personality, the explanation will have to be wholly in terms of the external factors in the physical or social environment. If this latter assumption is made, then suicide becomes wholly incomprehensible since there is ample evidence of uniformities in the natural and social environments which produce suicide in a comparatively small group of individuals and not in the rest.

The crucial problem in the analysis of suicide, therefore, lies in the development of techniques for obtaining more intimate understanding of the development of the suicidal impulse. Statistical analyses help to define the problem and to present cues to the understanding of the differential character of the social milieu. Only in case studies, however, is it possible to trace out the typical lines of genesis of the suicidal act.

However, there seems little reason to expect that case studies of persons who have attempted to commit suicide and failed will suffice. Since failure to carry through the suicide plan generally means that the person did not mean to commit suicide anyway, studies of these cases, though important, will throw little light upon the situational suicides which are the least understood. What would seem to be needed, therefore, is the development of a technique for the study of personality disorganization of such breadth and compass that it would include many cases in which suicide and attempts at suicide are incipient. Such an approach would have as one of its outstanding advantages that it would provide the basic data for determining the factors making for the channeling of personality disorganization into suicide and attempts or threats of suicide, rather than into other forms of expression.

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XV

The Disintegration of Personality

PERSONALITY DISORGANIZATION, as has already been pointed out, is the consequence of conflict among the several aspects of the personality. In the drive toward unity, patterns of accommodation among these aspects are achieved which impede, rather than facilitate, the individual's adjustment to his social environment. The consequence is the development of a core of covert and inner responses which defy group demands for social approval, dislocating the individual in the social order. When this dislocation becomes so great as to interfere markedly with the person's ability to support himself or to take care of his essential bodily needs, so that another has to care for him as he would for a person who is ill, or he becomes likely to injure or shock the sensibilities of other persons, he is regarded as having a mental disease.

While the origin of this naturalistic conception of mental disease is relatively old, having been first formulated by Hippocrates, the father of medicine, it did not find widespread acceptance until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Research in the anatomy and physiology of the brain led to the discovery that destruction of tissues in this area results in a breakdown in bodily functions, though the functioning organ itself shows no pathology, and this discovery gave rise to the physiological conception of mental disease.[1] According to this view, mental dis-

[1] Cf. Bernard Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, pp. 2-9.

ease is simply an extension of physical disease, the seat of the difficulty lying in the nervous rather than in the muscular tissues.[2]

The physiological conception of mental disease dominated medicine throughout the nineteenth century. And while it became increasingly necessary to recognize the existence of mental anomalies for which no pathological basis could be found, the medical fraternity continued to insist that for every "psychosis" there is a "neurosis," meaning that back of the psychotic manifestations there must be a neurological basis in the form of impairment or lesions in the nervous system.[3]

The continued investigations of Charcot and the Nancy School of Psychology into the realm of hysteria and hypnotism in particular clearly established the psychological approach.[4] The work of Freud and his followers extended the realm of the abnormal until it pressed hard upon the normal. Manifestations of nervous instability, particularly in the forms of hysteria, anxiety, compulsive behavior, obsessions and phobias, came by common consent to be referred to as neuroses. The old distinction between the neuroses and the psychoses became in part reversed, the first term referring to the less intense psychopathic conditions which often do not disqualify one from meeting the minimal requirements of group life.

As it became increasingly apparent that many of the socially incapacitating psychotic conditions could not be readily related to some organic condition, a distinction between the organic and functional psychoses came into common usage. According to this view, some psychoses are the consequences of structural impairment of the nervous system, whereas others represent disturbances in the functioning of the mental processes for which no basis can be found in the structural make-up. Thus psychoses which can be traced to brain injuries, toxic infections, glandular

[2] Cf. Madison I. Bentley and E. V. Cowdry (editors), *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, p. 1.

[3] Cf. I. S. Wechsler, "The Neurologist's Point of View" in Madison I. Bentley and E. V. Cowdry (editors), *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, p. 39.

[4] See Pierre Janet, *Major Symptoms of Hysteria* and *Psychological Healing*.

disturbances, bacterial infection, etc., are organic; the others are functional. In spite of the charges frequently made that such a distinction is of no fundamental significance since it resolves itself into differentiating between those types of psychoses for which the etiology and pathology is known on the one hand and unknown on the other, it still persists in the literature.[5] This persistence grows out of the refusal upon the part of many psychiatrists to accept the neurological point of view, preferring instead a psychological approach.

This sharp demarcation between those who look to organic bases for all the forms of psychotic behavior and those who consider the mental symptoms and indicators as diseases of the mind has produced a wide range of compromises between these two extreme points of view. Thus the eclectic is likely to look upon the problem of psychiatry as that of the study of personality disorders in which the individual is considered as a dynamic system of adaptive mechanisms which may be interfered with by both physiological and psychological processes.[6] From this point of view, the distinction between the organic and functional psychoses is a heuristic device dictated by therapeutic knowledge rather than the acceptance of a dualistic solution to the ancient metaphysical problem of the relations of body and mind. If psychotic conditions yield to medical treatment, the organic explanation is accepted tentatively for the control which it gives over the psychosis, without commitment to any theory of the ultimate neurological character of the condition. If, under other circumstances, psychological therapy seems to promise greater chances of success, then the psychological point of view becomes the tentatively accepted frame of reference, without implying a complete disregard for the possibility of structural changes in the nervous system.

[5] See Abraham Myerson, "Medical Psychiatry," in Madison I. Bentley and E. V. Cowdry (editors), *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, pp. 33-34.

[6] Cf. Charles Macfie Campbell, "Clinical Psychiatry," in Bentley and Cowdry (editors), *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, pp. 14-27.

Whether one accepts either of the two points of view, the neurological or the psychological, or turns instead to some form of eclecticism, he is confronted with problems unless he refuses to recognize some of the phases of mental disorder. This solution, nonrecognition, can most readily be maintained consistently from the neurological approach by confining one's analysis to those types of cases in which appear sensory and motor disorders, because here the inference of neural impairment in the absence of definite pathological evidence is most easily maintained. Or, again, the person whose approach is psychological may decline to recognize those forms of mental disorder clearly correlated with organic impairment by contending that the mental symptoms are incidental to the physiological malfunctioning and therefore belong to the category of physical disease.

The eclectic, on the other hand, finds no ready solution for the diversity in character of the data with which he has to deal. He cannot assume with the "organicist" that with the aid of more precise techniques of pathological study (possibly the development of a more powerful microscope), he will be able to resolve all forms of mental disorder into neural impairment. Neither can he assume with the "functionalist" that eventually he will be able to show that the data of pathology are only corollary to the mental disorder, providing in part the constitutional background out of which the disorders of personality functioning develop. Whatever formulation he may adopt for solving the inherent parallelism in his data, he will find himself at times hard pressed to reconcile the facts with his theories. Nevertheless, he can maintain some unity of approach by defining the problem of mental disorder as one of personality disintegration in which the causal elements consist of combinations of constitutional and environmental factors. According to this point of view, the role of the organic, whether in the form of hereditary make-up, of injuries, or of diseases of the nervous tissue, is no different in the abnormal than in the normal. The factors which decide the issue are those which define and channel these organic materials

in the social milieu. Any satisfactory explanation of mental disorder, accordingly, will turn upon those differential social experiences which for a particular organic make-up result in normal behavior in some instances and abnormal in others.


With this statement of tentative point of view in mind, what light do the data available about mental disorders throw upon the causes of personality disintegration?

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INSANE

Statistical studies of insanity rates have invariably shown an increase in the number of patients in hospitals for the insane. Thus in the United States there was an increase from 64 patients per 100,000 population in hospitals for the insane in 1880 to 295 in 1939; i.e., an increase of 461 per cent in 59 years. (See Chart LXXI.) This general observation has led to the assumption

CHART LXXI

MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES PER 100,000 POPULATION, 1880 TO 1939 *




* Data from Bureau of the Census, *Mental Patients in State Hospitals, 1926-27*, p. 6; *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Diseases, 1933*, p. 16; *Patients in Mental Institutions, 1938*, p. 22.

that mental disease is increasing at an alarming rate. Analysis of mental disorders in Massachusetts hospitals for the insane, however, shows that for the period, 1917 to 1933, first admissions increased from 83 to 85 per 100,000 population, an increase of 2.4 per cent for the period as compared to an increase of 26.4 per cent for the number of hospital patients per 100,000 population.[7] The increase in ratio of hospital patients to population, accordingly, reflects much more the tendency for patients to remain longer in hospitals than any increased tendency toward mental disorder.

Studies of patients in public hospitals have generally shown an essentially equal distribution between males and females. However, data from the Cook County Psychopathic Hospital, where patients are kept only temporarily, show that the male rate is approximately 50 per cent higher than the female. (See Chart LXXII.) Thus it would seem that the equality of the sexes in the

CHART LXXII

MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES PER YEAR BY SEX: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



resident population of public hospitals for the insane is due to the fact that women remain in hospitals for longer periods of time than men, whether because of differentials in the death rate or in the recovery rate or because of some other factor is not clear.[8]


Age is an important factor in the onset of mental disorder. In

[7] Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, p. 437.

[8] Neil A. Dayton also found the admission rate higher for males than for females, the ratio being 6 to 5 in Massachusetts for the period, 1917 to 1933. —*New Facts on Mental Disorders*, p. 7.

CHART LXXIII

MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES PER YEAR BY AGE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



general, the rate by age groups increases fairly rapidly from puberty to the age of forty, only to remain fairly stationary until about sixty, after which it starts upward again, increasing with momentum as age advances. (See Chart LXXIII.) Thus mental disorder is much more characteristic of old age than has often been assumed.

White has related the age rates of mental disorder to the physiological crises of puberty and adolescence, of puerperium, of climacteric, and of senium. Except for the senium, he contends, each of these epochs indicates serious deficiency in capacity for biological adjustment.[9] This does not seem to be a very plausible explanation, since the insanity rate of middle age is higher than in puberty and adolescence, and unless this can be shown to be largely a female rate, it can hardly be explained in terms of deficiency in capacity for biological adjustment. It is true, however, that the periods of most rapid change in rates correspond to those crisis periods in the social adjustment of the individual, the transition periods from dependency to independence and from the peak of social usefulness to complete retirement from social activities and re-


[9] William A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry* (eleventh edition), p. 44.

sponsibilities. Consequently, there seems to be little reason to appeal to a biological explanation when a social interpretation would serve as well if not better.

Race also seems to be a factor in insanity rates, the Negro rate being one and a half times that of whites. The rate for all other racial groups is appreciably lower than the white rate. (See Chart LXXIV.) In interpreting these data, however, it must be

CHART LXXIV

YEARLY MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES BY RACE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



kept in mind that the white population on the whole is of a higher economic level, which would mean that a considerable portion of mental disorders of white persons would not come to the attention of a public institution. If one assumes that the ratio between public and private cases found by Faris and Dunham[10] holds generally, and that all the private cases are white, this would add another 780 cases to the 3,681 and result in a rate of 19 per 10,000 population, fifteen years old and over, a rate still less than two-thirds the Negro rate. Thus there seems little doubt that Negroes are more likely to become insane than white persons.


Marital status seems to be a factor in insanity, since the rates by

[10] Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*, pp. 188-191.

marital conditions vary considerably. (See Chart LXXV.) The insanity rate is highest for the divorced and lowest for the married. The fact that the rate for single persons is higher than that

CHART LXXV

MARITAL STATUS OF INSANITY CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



for the married does not necessarily mean that marriage tends to prevent insanity. It may mean only that less stable personalities tend to remain unmarried. This interpretation seems all the more plausible when one observes that the divorced have the highest rate, suggesting that when the unstable personalities marry, they tend to get divorces, personality disorganization being an important factor in domestic discord.[11] It must be kept in mind, however, that on the whole the divorced, like the widowed, tend to be somewhat older than the single and the married, and since the insanity rate is higher for older groups this would account in part for the higher rate of the divorced.


The diagnostic rates vary greatly from 56 per 100,000 persons seventeen years old and over for dementia praecox to .05 for amnesia. (See Chart LXXVI.) Approximately half of the cases, however, are included in two groups, dementia praecox and alcoholism. Add four more diagnostic groups—senile dementia, paresis, cerebral arteriosclerosis, and manic-depressive psychoses —to these two highest groups, and one has accounted for three-fourths of all the cases.

[11] See Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord.*

Other studies have brought out the importance of additional factors. Important in this connection are the findings of Clark, who has shown the relationship between economic status and the

CHART LXXVI

INSANITY RATES BY DIAGNOSIS: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




insanity of males.[12] Standardizing the age distribution of each of the occupational groups which serve as a scale of socioeconomic status, Clark found that the higher the socioeconomic status the lower the rate of insanity. (See Chart LXXVII.) This was found to be true regardless of race and nativity, though the spread in rates was somewhat greater for the native whites than for the foreign-born whites and the Negroes. The progression is not always uniform for all groups, however, and in a few instances the order has been altered in the foreign-born white and Negro groups. These findings suggest that mental disorder may

[12] Robert E. Clark, "The Relationship of Occupation to Mental Disorder," *Bulletin of the Society for Social Research*, December, 1939, pp. 7-8.

CHART LXXVII

Socioeconomic Status and Mental Disorder: Chicago, 1922 to 1934*



* Data from Robert E. Clark, "The Relationship of Occupation to Mental Disorder," *Bulletin of the Society for Social Research*, December, 1939, p. 8.

arise in part out of the insecurity and frustrations of social life, in view of the fact that insanity is more common in those economic levels in which remuneration is low, tenure is insecure, and there is little or no opportunity for independent and creative activity.

Rates, however, mean little in the understanding of the factors which produce mental disorders. Part and parcel to the understanding of the genesis of personality disintegration is the differentiation of the types of mental disorder.

TYPES OF MENTAL DISORDER

The problem of classifying mental disorders is a perennial one, and it tends to find as many solutions as there are writers upon the subject. In spite of the wide variety of classifications put forth, there is a considerable recurrence of terms and a certain amount of standardization of conception of the more commonly observed types. These types run the gamut from the mildly incapacitating forms to those in which there is complete disintegration of the mental make-up of the individual. In a general way, this range is paralleled by a progression from functional disturbances to organic disturbances.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there is no clearly defined dividing line between the normal, the psychoneurotic, and the psychotic. Nevertheless, there are points in the continuum at which one can say with assurance that certain manifestations are clearly psychoneurotic in character, whereas others are clearly psychotic. The psychoneuroses represent the exaggeration, deficiency, or distortion of the normal in so far as these deviations involve only a part of the personality. When the whole of the personality is involved, it is customary to refer to the condition as a psychosis.[13]

In order to portray this progression from those mental disorders which deviate only slightly from the normal to those radically different, it will be necessary to describe only a minimum number of forms or types: the psychoneuroses, paranoia, manic-depressive psychoses, schizophrenia, involutional melancholia, senile dementia, toxic psychoses, cerebral arteriosclerosis, and paresis.

THE PSYCHONEUROSES

In the differentiation of the psychoneuroses, the functional-organic problem which has played such a prominent role in the differentiation of the psychoses is reproduced in miniature. The

[13] Cf. Roy M. Dorcus and G. W. Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 265.

forms range from neurasthenia, which is often thought to be organic in etiology, through the hysterias to psychasthenia, which is generally conceded to be functional in character. Some writers, it is true, are inclined to merge neurasthenia and psychasthenia, the symptoms of both being very similar in many respects, and the differentiation being based upon what in many instances are hypothetical organic conditions. Consequently, those who are inclined to assume an organic basis for all forms of mental disorder find little reason for differentiating between these two forms any more than do those who assume that all mental disorder is fundamentally psychic in character.

The characteristic symptom of neurasthenia is the mental and physical exhaustion of the patient. This exhaustion often results in irritability so that the minor set-backs of everyday life upset him completely and leave him depressed. This fatiguability makes it difficult for the patient to concentrate his attention for any period of time upon any single task or set of experiences. What seem to be amnesias appear but in actuality these lapses result from the small attention given the event in the first place rather than from forgetting.[14]

Thus the physical discomfort of the individual becomes the center of his attention, and it is difficult to interest him in anything not related to this discomfort. He shows little spontaneity, and both the motor and ideational processes are slowed down. Not infrequently, the neurasthenic shows evidence of anesthesia, paresthesia, or hypochondria. Preoccupation with the functioning of his body leads to the exaggeration of the sensations which normally accompany the functioning of his organs and in turn to the generation of fear. This fear, developing as a consequence of excessive attention to physiological processes, results in further mental and physical exhaustion and not infrequently produces further disturbances in the bodily functions.

The neurasthenic's constant reference to bodily functions as

[14] Cf. White, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

the source of his discomfort has led to the notion that this psychoneurosis is fundamentally organic in genesis. Consequently, in the absence of clearly defined organic symptoms, it is often assumed that obscure disabilities resulting from infections or other bodily disturbances are responsible for the nervous and physical exhaustion which leads to preoccupation with bodily sensations which otherwise would be neglected. Nevertheless, there is much evidence to indicate that it is emotional strain over problems involving social adjustment which is basic to the exhaustion so characteristic of neurasthenia. It is this realization that has led some writers to consider fear as basic to both neurasthenia and psychasthenia.[15] From this standpoint the distinction between these two forms of psychoneuroses, if such a distinction need be made, lies in the imputed source of the disturbances, whether within the organic functioning of the body or in the environmental media.

The hysterias lie midway between the neurasthenias with their symptomatic reference within the organism and the psychasthenias with their symptomatic reference in the environment. Or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that in the continuum of the psychoneuroses from the neurasthenias at one extreme to the psychasthenias at the other, the hysterias occupy an intermediate zone, tending to split into two groups, one in the direction of the neurasthenias and the other in the direction of the psychasthenias.

That part of the hysterias most closely related to the neurasthenias is characterized by overactivity in one form or another. The patient suffering from hysteria is hysterical in the general sense of the word. He is given to fits of laughter or of crying under conditions which would not ordinarily lead to such excessive emotional outbursts. Or he gives vent to his spleen in temper tantrums. Thus the characteristic feature of this part of hysteria is the explosive overemotionality of the person.

[15] See Joseph Jastrow, "Clinical Psychology and the Psychoneuroses" in Bentley and Cowdry (editors), *The Problem of Mental Disorder*, pp. 314-326.

Closely related to overemotionality are the hyperesthesias and the tics and epileptic seizures. The involuntary contractions of the muscles in the epileptic fit represent the climax to the drama of rebellion against the environment for the frustrations expressed in irritability, egocentricity, sensitiveness, and rage, all of which tend to form the personality background for the seizures.[16] The coma stage following the rhythmic contraction and relaxation of the muscles links the phases of hysteria expressed in overactivity with those in which dissociation is the distinctive pattern.

The forms of hysteria related to the psychasthenias, accordingly, are characterized by the association mechanism which underlies and determines the mode of expression. On the one hand, blockings of the impulses of the person are met with emotional outbursts finding expression in a wide variety of ways; on the other, with a compartmentalization through which the blocked impulses are permitted to find expression negatively. This ambivalence of expression is, in fact, characteristic of behavior in rage which now finds expression in violent reaction against the restrictive source and now blanches and becomes impotent in the face of hampering and restraining influences.

These latter forms of hysteria are represented in the anesthesias, in trance behavior, somnambulism, functional paralysis, amnesias, functional blindness and deafness, and the so-called multiple personalities. Thus a part of the personality not recognized by the conscious self dominates the personality at times, permitting expression of the blocked impulses in forms which do not disturb the tranquility of the dominating aspect of the personality. The emotional strain reaches the limits of endurance and through a dissociative eruption finds release in avenues which free the person from the psychic exhaustion of the psychasthenic.

Thus in hysteria the field of consciousness becomes restricted, parts of what would ordinarily be found there tending to become dissociated, particularly in those forms more nearly related to the psychasthenias than to the neurasthenias. The psychic traumas

[16] Cf. Dorcus and Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 289.

in the psychasthenias in contrast tend to dominate the whole of consciousness and to lead to what may be described as emotional exhaustion. Here the characteristic feature is the obsessive and compulsive character of the behavior. This behavior finds expression in a wide variety of ways, the various forms becoming the basis for the differentiation of subtypes, of which the so-called anxiety, depression, fatigue, and compulsion neuroses and the many phobias are the most important.

The phobias, or morbid and abnormal fears, get their names from the classes of objects in the environment which incite them. While fears and phobias may occur in regard to any feature of the environment, the most common are claustrophobia, the fear of closed places; acrophobia, the fear of high places; agoraphobia, the fear of open places; hematophobia, the fear of blood; ochlophobia, the fear of crowds; misophobia, the fear of contamination; and zoöphobia, the fear of animals or of a particular animal. The individual is ordinarily quite aware of the irrational character of his fear but is unable to overcome it. The consequence is the generation of feelings of incapacity and inability to cope with the environment, leading to psychic depletion.

The several neuroses are not unlike the phobias, except if anything they tend to be more all-pervading of the mental processes. Thus in the anxiety neurosis, anxious expectation and apprehension color the whole of the psychic life of the individual. No undertaking is free from it, and the activities of those close to one are fraught with worry and fear as to what may happen. The natural impulse in response to worry and anxiety is to try to do something to prevent the feared thing from happening. This feverish battering against an unseen barrier may go on unceasingly in some persons. In others, however, it gives way to depression and defeatism. As this becomes the dominant feature of the psychic state, it is often referred to as the depression neurosis.

There are those cases in which the individual is obsessed with a fear that he will do something or that something will happen to him which he dislikes. He may have the obsession that he is go-

ing insane or that he will, if the opportunity offers, commit suicide or kill someone. This is closely related to the compulsive neuroses in which the individual carries out an act which he recognizes as irrational or socially undesirable, but which he feels compelled to perform. This latter form of the neuroses is best known in the form of kleptomania, the irrational impulse to steal. Whatever form compulsive behavior takes, it seems to represent a substitution for the behavior which the individual is trying to resist. Thus the compulsive behavior becomes the behavioristic antidote for the fear which finds its expression in the obsessions, anxieties, and depressions of the related neuroses differentiated by those emotional patterns.

The basic element in the psychasthenias is the emotion of fear, just as in the hysterias, the basic emotions are rage and anger. But fear is also the basic emotion in the neurasthenias. Thus as was pointed out earlier in this discussion, the chief difference between the neurasthenias and the psychasthenias lies not in the fact that there is any fundamental difference in behavior manifestations, but in the fact that in the neurasthenias the reference is to the organism as the source of the symptoms, whereas in the psychasthenias it is outside the organism in the environmental media.

Nevertheless, though the behavior manifestations in both the neurasthenias and the psychasthenias are of the same order, the main distinction lies in the fact that the fears which underlie the basic response of the neurasthenic are conditioned by organic factors, which, though real, are exaggerated, partly as the result of the depletion of energy which results from the bodily condition itself and partly as the consequence of the nervous exhaustion caused by the fear response. In the psychasthenic the basic fears arise out of the personality pattern.

PARANOIA

There has been much discussion in psychiatric circles as to whether or not paranoia is a distinct type of psychosis. This controversy grows in part out of the fact that the most charac-

teristic symptoms of paranoia, delusions of persecution and hallucinations of hearing, are found in almost every type of psychosis. As a phase of other psychoses, however, these paranoid states are transitory and do not show the systematic development which characterizes true paranoia.[17] Thus, so far as those psychoses other than dementia praecox are concerned, there seems little difficulty in the way of differentiating these paranoid states as a part of a larger disorder from the more systematized and fixed delusional patterns which characterize the personalities of some individuals. When it comes to differentiating between true paranoia and the paranoid form of dementia praecox, however, the task is not easy.

In general, the disposition has been to take those cases showing symptoms of paranoia in which there is no evidence of organic psychoses and to differentiate these into true paranoia and dementia praecox in terms of whether or not the paranoid condition is associated with marked intellectual impairment. Since there are no generally accepted criteria of what constitutes intellectual impairment, this differentiation is not very satisfactory. There is no doubt but that intellectual impairment without any apparent organic basis is the most striking characteristic of dementia praecox; it is an impairment only in the sense that the personality lacks effective orientation in the world of reality, rather than a consequence of degenerative changes in the brain.

The most striking difference between paranoid dementia praecox and paranoia is the fact that the intellectual impairment of the latter is restricted within a definite delusional system, whereas in the former, it tends to be diffused throughout the whole of the mental life.[18] Thus in the earlier development of paranoia, except in that range of response in which his delusions are called into operation, the individual seems to be quite sane. For this reason the earlier writers often referred to it as monomania, and White considers paranoia a "circumscribed psychosis," while recogniz-

[17] William A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry* (eleventh edition), p. 133.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

ing that fundamentally the condition pervades the whole of the personality even though much of this involvement is not readily apparent.[19]

The typical feature of the true paranoiac is the systematic delusional system in which the delusions of grandeur, of persecution, and of reference are the most common. In general, paranoia tends to have its beginning in delusions of reference in which everything which occurs about the person is interpreted as having some relation to him. He begins to notice that his friends do not address him as cordially as they have in the past; that strangers look at him out of the corners of their eyes and talk about him when they think he is not looking. Every accidental misfortune is interpreted as a deliberate attempt to embarrass or injure him. Thus the delusions of persecution arise. At first the paranoiac cannot be sure that the seemingly persecutory behavior is directed toward him, but soon he is reassured by voices which tell him what the disparaging remarks about him are. Thus he is informed of the plots which are being made against him and he asks the question, Why should he be persecuted in this fashion? The answer is supplied in the delusions of grandeur. He is a great personage, a genius, a Napoleon, the scion of a royal family.[20]

Paranoiacs have been classified into the eccentrics and the egocentrics. The former are made up of a wide variety of cranks and fanatics inordinately interested in the affairs of others. The egocentrics are self-centered, their delusions being about their own personalities. These may be differentiated into: the persecuted, the exalted, the litigious, the religious, the amorous, the jealous, and the hypochondriacal. The persecuted are incessantly harassed by enemies against whom they often seek vengeance. The exalted have grandiose delusions of their superior abilities

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

[20] Cf. Roy M. Dorcus and G. W. Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 246.

and frequently think they are prophets or reincarnations of famous personages. The litigious find a natural outlet to their delusions of persecution and of grandeur in writing threatening letters and bringing legal suits against the victims of their delusions. The religious claim direct communication with God and take on Messianic roles. The amorous fall in love without the slightest evidence of reciprocation and ardently press their suits in the face of lack of interest and persistent discouragement. The jealous paranoiac sees in every move of those closest to him, his wife, his sweetheart, his confidants, evidence of unfaithfulness. The hypochondriacs worry incessantly about their health and blame the physician for failing to discover the cause of their illness.[21]

Characteristic of all egocentric forms of paranoia is the fact that the individual is often led to violence in his revenge upon the person or persons he considers responsible for his predicament. Thus in contrast to the dementia praecox psychotic, who flees from reality into a dream world of his own making, the paranoiac fights against what he interprets to be the hampering features of his social environment. This feature makes of paranoia a compensatory type of response.

MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSES

The manic-depressive psychoses are characterized by radical swings from excitement and elation to depression and acute melancholia. And while in some cases there may be only one phase, either the depressed or the elated, the most characteristic pattern is the alternation from one state to the other, though the patterns of alternation may vary. In all the patterns, except the circular, the attacks of depression and/or of elation are interspersed with periods of normality. There is little indication of mental deterioration, the psychosis manifesting itself chiefly in the emotional reaction of the individual. Thus the most apparent mani-

[21] Cf. Fred A. Moss and Thelma Hunt, *Foundations of Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 493-500.

festation is that of emotional extremes under conditions where there is nothing in the environment to justify the emotional outbursts.

The chief feature of the manic or elated phase of manic-depression is the flight of ideas, accompanied with psychomotor and emotional excitement. Ideas follow each other in rapid succession and the individual attempts to carry them out with the utmost of dispatch. Activities are carried on with jovial good humor so long as there are no obstacles; when these appear, however, the patient may show considerable irritability and impulsive anger.

Three varieties of the manic phase have been differentiated in terms of the degree of swing from the normal in sequence of ideas, the succession of activities, and the emotional level. These have generally been called hypomania, acute mania, and hyperacute mania, though there is never any sharp dividing line between the three varieties or any invariable relationship in the degree of deviation from the normal in each of the fields of psychological functioning. In general, the hypomanic stage is characterized by a hilarious good humor in which the individual goes from one activity to another without evidence of the fatigue which would accompany such rapid transitions in the normal person. In the acute manic stage the patient's attention becomes more distractible and his activity greatly increased. Interference with either the flow of ideas or of activities often brings on violent responses both in language and muscular behavior. Because of the seeming lack of connection between his language responses and stimuli, the speech tends to be incoherent and there may be evidence of hallucinations. In the extreme stage of hyperacute mania the individual becomes delirious. His talk becomes wholly incoherent and his activity violent and frenzied. In this condition the patient is both a danger to himself and to others and unless restrained is likely rapidly to reach a stage of physical exhaustion which may result in serious physical impairment.

In contrast to the flight of ideas, the euphoria and irritability,

the impulsiveness and overactivity, which characterize the manic phase, the depressed phase is marked by a dearth of ideas, melancholia, and sluggishness of activity. Again three stages may be differentiated: simple retardation, acute melancholia, and depressive stupor. In simple retardation, the thoughts and activities of the individual are slower than normal, and there is an air of uncertainty and doubt which pervades the whole psychological functioning of the individual. In acute melancholia, the patient gives way to greater self-depreciation; he feels himself to have committed an unpardonable sin and to be therefore unfit to live. This leads to refusal to eat and sometimes to suicidal attempts. His speech is halting and often so constricted as to become an unintelligible murmur. Small tasks require extremely painful efforts, and he gives little attention to what goes on around him. In the final stage of stuporous melancholia, it becomes impossible to elicit any response from the individual. Consciousness becomes extremely clouded, and no attention is given anything except his delusions of sin and self-inculpations.

Various aspects of the manic-depressive psychosis resemble closely other psychoses. The depressed or melancholic phase, for example, is very much like involutional melancholia, the differentiating feature in the absence of previous episodes of mania being the age of the individual. The onset of involutional melancholia is always in the period of life in which the activity of the sex glands is diminishing. Where age does not make for differentiation, glandular treatment will ordinarily result in improvement in involutional melancholia, but not in manic-depression.

The melancholic phase of the manic-depressive psychoses is also sometimes difficult to differentiate from the anxiety and depression neuroses. The most striking difference between the two lies in the fact that the neurotic individual tends to blame others for his unhappy situation, whereas the depression in the manic-depressive psychosis is one of self-inculpation and remorse.

In the earlier stages particularly, it is often quite impossible to differentiate the manic-depressives from the catatonic forms of

dementia praecox. Onset under the age of twenty suggests dementia praecox; in the thirties, manic-depression. Evidence of a shut-in type of personality prior to the onset of the psychosis points to dementia praecox, whereas radical swings in mood suggests manic-depression. Likewise early confusion and peculiar reactions are more likely to point to dementia praecox, while moodiness suggests manic-depression. With the lapse of time following the first onset, differentiation becomes easier, since dementia praecox tends to become chronic and shows evidence of mental deterioration, whereas manic-depressive psychoses exhibit no mental deterioration and the episodes are interspersed with lucid intervals.

DEMENTIA PRAECOX

The term "dementia praecox" literally means early madness or the precocious loss of mind. Because this psychosis is not restricted to adolescence as was once thought, and because the dementia is often more apparent than real, this term has been criticized, and it has been suggested that the term "schizophrenia" be used instead. Schizophrenia literally means a splitting of the personality, the most striking cleavage being between the emotional and the ideational processes.

The hallmark of schizophrenia, accordingly, is the shut-in character of the personality, in which the individual becomes self-absorbed, emotionally indifferent to his surroundings, and progressively shows mental deterioration. Thus the patient becomes strikingly indifferent and apathetic toward occurrences which previously had called out emotional responses and seems completely lost in a world of phantasy in which he loses all ability to differentiate between what is real and what is imaginary. Not only is there a complete contradiction between the emotional response and the occurrences of everyday life, but the ideas which in the normal person are associated with emotional reactions are expressed by the schizophrenic without the slightest trace of emotion. Thus the schizophrenic will tell of harrowing experi-

ences of the past, or of the plot which his enemies are working out to harass him, without the slightest trace of emotion. Or the emotional responses may find expression in the opposite connections from that normally experienced so that the schizophrenic laughs under conditions which normally would elicit grief and cries when others would be happy. But more commonly, the affective reaction is absent or inadequate, or if there is marked emotionality, it appears under conditions where there is no apparent reason for its appearance, or under conditions where the schizophrenic had previously shown a particular emotional response, he now shows the opposite emotion.

Four types of dementia praecox may be differentiated: simple, hebephrenic, paranoiac, and catatonic. In each the basic reaction pattern is the same: the escape from the unbearable circumstances of the environment into a fanciful world created by the individual, or regression to a childish level of response.

In the simple type of dementia praecox there is a decided lack of ambition, the individual tending to shift from one activity to another, showing little enthusiasm for any. The patient withdraws within himself, taking little interest in what goes on about him, becomes careless in his personal appearance and decidedly lacking in sociability. In spite of the disorganization of thinking, there is likely to be little, if any, loss of memory. Much of the individual's talk tends to be rambling with a tendency toward reverie. The whole pattern is that of a shy, seclusive, sensitive person, who, though oriented in time and place, recognizes what occurs in the outer world but identifies himself with it so little that his emotional response is dulled and apathetic.

The hebephrenic type is marked by silliness of behavior and incoherence in action, speech, and thought. Delusions and hallucinations are frequent, and they are always of the unpleasant type. Voices call the patient disagreeable names and accuse him of sin. He may sit all day and carry on a conversation with imaginary voices, interspersed with silly laughter for no apparent reason. The delusions and hallucinations, however, are transient

and superficial. The talk tends to be incoherent and accompanied with posturing and gesturing; the behavior is bizarre and fantastic, often taking impulsive and childlike forms.

The paranoid forms of dementia praecox resemble in many respects true paranoia and are usually differentiated from the latter by the fact that the delusions are not so highly systematized but instead are transitory and tend to be fantastic and bizarre. Furthermore, there is evidence of mental deterioration in the paranoid type of dementia praecox but not in true paranoia. This deterioration is accompanied with the emotional apathy characteristic of all forms of dementia praecox. Sometimes the delusions of the paranoid are accompanied by hallucinations, and when these are found they tend to be of a grandiose character.[22]

The catatonic type of dementia praecox is differentiated from the other forms chiefly by the motor symptoms. The onset of this form tends to be in a fit of depression, followed by excitement, which gives way a little later to a stuporous condition. It is this stuporous condition to which has been given the picturesque term, "lead-pipe" response, inasmuch as the patient in this state can be made to take grotesque positions and postures, remaining in the position until fatigue produces a relaxation in the posture. Nevertheless, there is much about the mutism and rigidity which is artificial, for subsequently the patient often tells in detail what has gone on around him during the stuporous phase when he seemed so disoriented. In other cases, the catatonic stupor is marked with negativism and muscular tension. If he is asked to open his eyes, he closes them. Any attempt to move any part of the body is met with marked resistance.

During the excited stage of catatonia, the movements of the patient seem to be senseless and unmotivated. In this condition he may harm anyone who happens to be in his way as he excitedly goes through a series of stereotyped movements both in overt and vocal behavior, but these assaults seem to be unmotivated. When asked why he does these things, he either does

[22] Cf. William A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry* (eleventh edition), p. 213.

not answer at all, or if he does the answer is ludicrous and senseless.

INVOLUTIONAL MELANCHOLIA

Involutional melancholia is a mental disorder in which marked depression is the chief characteristic. It is generally distinguished from the depression phase of manic-depressive psychosis by the fact that it is of the anxiety type rather than passive and the onset is during the involutional period, usually between the ages of forty and fifty in women and fifty and sixty-five in men. Since involutional melancholia occurs at the time when the sex glands cease to function, response to glandular treatment will serve to differentiate this condition from the manic-depressive psychosis.[23]

The onset of involutional melancholia is generally gradual, and the chief early symptoms are sadness, pessimism, tendency toward fatiguability, insomnia, and loss of appetite. These early symptoms precede the more pronounced evidences of depression. As the disorder becomes fully established, the individual develops a morbid fear of impending danger. Commonly the background for this fear is delusions of sin. All sorts of occurrences in the past experience of the patient are reviewed and become the unforgivable sins for which anxiety is expressed. These delusions lead so frequently to attempts at suicide that every case of involutional melancholia may be considered a potential suicide. On the motor side, the symptoms vary from mere restlessness to extreme agitation in which the patient paces the floor, moans, wrings his hands, pulls his hair, bites his lips, and bemoans the state of affairs.

While the most common types of delusions are those of sinfulness and self-accusation, other types are ideas of grandeur, of persecution, of unreality, and of hypochondria. These latter delusions generally indicate mental deterioration and are usually found only in cases of long standing or associated with marked

[23] Fred A. Moss and Thelma Hunt, *Foundations of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 483.

arteriosclerosis. In the earlier stages the patient usually shows good insight, orientation, and memory, though his mental processes are slowed down and he often shows marked inability to perform volitional acts.

SENILE DEMENTIA

The dementia of the aged is not unlike in many respects the precocious dementias, and it has frequently been held that there is no difference between the two types of psychoses except that in senile dementia mental deterioration comes at the time when the physical capacities of the individual are declining. Generally, the possibility of senile dementia is entertained after the individual has passed the age of sixty, and it is, in fact, only an exaggeration of the fate of everyone whose life is sufficiently prolonged. Its chief symptoms are a gradual decline in the retentive ability, the memory being more acute for remote than for present events, a general reduction in mental capacity, and a tendency to become more self-centered in interests. Not infrequently this disorientation is accompanied by depressions, irritability, confusion, and paranoid trends. Change becomes more and more intolerable, and the individual demands the same kind of food and the same comforts which he has enjoyed in the past, becoming very irritable at any break in the routine. His speech consists mainly of reminiscences which he recounts over and over again. Progressively the patient lives more and more a vegetative existence, showing no mental initiative and less and less orientation toward his immediate surroundings.

Upon the background of deteriorating mental functions, there often occur delusions and hallucinations. The delusions tend to be paranoid in character, but they lack the fixity and systematization characteristic of paranoia. The emotional attitude toward the content of the delusions tends to be silly rather than vital in character, the account having the marks of a formula instead of portraying a conviction. Where there are hallucinations, these are generally of hearing and of vision.

CEREBRAL ARTERIOSCLEROSIS

Cerebral arteriosclerosis is difficult to differentiate from the senile dementias when it occurs in the senile period, as it so often does. Frequently this psychosis has its beginning with an apoplectic or epileptic seizure. The patient thereupon loses his ability to concentrate. His attention wanders and he finds this disability a source of worry and anxiety. His memory becomes impaired as in senile dementia, the more remote events standing out clearly but the present fading rapidly. Frequently this is accompanied by marked emotional instability, the patient crying one moment and laughing the next, showing considerable friendliness now, followed suddenly by great irritability. At times consciousness may be clouded and confused, and at others there is evidence of depression and of suspicion.

THE TOXIC PSYCHOSES

Whatever the role of drugs in the diagnosis of personality disorganization, there can be no doubt about the psychotic effects of continued use in large dosages. The most common of the toxic disorders are those following the chronic use of alcohol, opium and its various derivatives, and of hashish. The hypnotics, being much more restricted in use, may for the present purposes be disregarded, although the mental disturbances caused by them are not essentially different from those found where the more common drugs are used.

Mental disorders induced by alcohol may take a variety of forms some of which undoubtedly represent the superimposition of alcoholic symptoms upon the basis of other psychotic conditions. And even when the possibility of the intertwining of other psychotic conditions with the effects of alcohol has been eliminated, some writers contend that anomalies in the personality make-up account for all the alcoholic psychoses except acute and pathological intoxication.[24] For the present purposes three clinical types may be differentiated in which the continued use of

[24] William A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry* (eleventh edition), p. 204.

alcohol plays an important role: chronic alcoholism, delirium tremens, and Korsakoff's psychosis.

Chronic alcoholism, or alcoholic dementia, is characterized by gradual deterioration of the intellect. In this process of deterioration, all the mental capacities of the individual are involved, but most markedly those of memory. As in all dementias, the loss in memory is more pronounced for recent than for remote events. In addition, impairment of the intellect manifests itself in the poverty of ideas, decline in the capacity of attention, and poor judgment. The individual's behavior tends to be governed by every passing idea or mood, he becomes shiftless and irresponsible, blames others for his own deficiencies, and sinks slowly into a state of permanent mental enfeeblement. The mental picture is paralleled with physical symptoms, chief among which are tremors, circulatory and gastrointestinal disorders, paresthesia, cirrhosis of the liver, gastritis, and generalized arteriosclerosis.[25]

Delirium tremens, or acute alcoholic delirium, is an episodic psychosis associated with chronic alcoholism. Its chief symptoms are a tremor involving particularly the small muscles of the hand, face, and tongue and a delirium of acute hallucinatory confusion. The mental features of the delirium are not unlike those found in the delirious states resulting from acute infectious fevers. The individual is confused to an extreme degree, so that at the height of an attack he shows complete disorientation. The hallucinations are generally of an unpleasant character in which loathesome animals play a prominent role. Most commonly the patient looks upon these animals as threatening him and is in constant motion protecting himself from their depredations. In other cases, however, he may look upon their antics with calm equanimity and show little of the restlessness and pressure of activity ordinarily associated with delirium tremens.[26]

[25] See Roy M. Dorcus and G. W. Shaffer, *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 207-208.

[26] White, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-268.

Chronic alcoholic delirium, or Korsakoff's psychosis, frequently has its onset in symptoms not unlike those of delirium tremens. The delirium, however, instead of clearing passes into a state of amnesia. The gaps created by the amnesia are then filled in by retrospective falsification. While the symptoms are sometimes observed independently of chronic alcoholism as the result of profuse hemorrhage, typhoid fever, malaria, influenza, and lead poisoning, the psychosis occurs most frequently in association with prolonged excessive drinking and is more common in women than in men. The gaps in memory are filled in by all kinds of fabrications which are recounted in great detail and with apparent lucidity. While on the whole these pseudo reminiscences are unstable and fleeting, some of them may become quite fixed and stable. Often the content of the retrospective falsification can be determined by leading questions, the patient being led to make almost any statement no matter how contradictory. The patient is totally disoriented in time and place, though he answers all questions put to him without seeming awareness of any memory difficulty.

Opium and its derivatives are the most common causes of drug addiction. The typical symptoms of this type of drug addiction are the decline in the ability to concentrate, the loss of memory, and a total indifference to things around the individual. The patient loses ambition and all sense of responsibility. There is considerable fabrication and lying, and the consuming drive becomes that of obtaining the drug. To this end the addict will go to great extremes, often resorting to stealing and even murder if necessary. He develops ideas of persecution and becomes suspicious of everyone about him.

When the addict is deprived of the drug certain characteristic symptoms of withdrawal appear. He becomes excessively fatigued and appears on the verge of collapse. Muscular tremors appear and the body may tremble all over. The patient is unable to sleep, becomes extremely restless and obsessed with a fear of impending danger. This picture of abject misery is complicated

by horrible hallucinatory experiences and is sometimes of such severity as to eventuate in complete physical collapse which may prove fatal.

In contrast to the general depressant effects of opium, hashish tends to produce stimulating effects much as does cocaine. The individual becomes violent, exalted, and quarrelsome. He boasts and defies authority. He often has delusions of an exalted sort, accompanied by ideas of persecution. Like the opium addict, he becomes morally calloused and cunning in his drive to obtain the drug. Eventually he shows symptoms of moral degradation, loses ambition, and gives way to reckless and irresponsible behavior. Unpleasant hallucinations occur, and the delusions which in the earlier stages were temporary become permanent.[27]

PARESIS

Paresis, or general paralysis, is an organic disease of the brain which develops as a consequence of syphilitic infection. While syphilis causes other types of psychoses, paresis is the most common. In general, the involvement of the cortical tissues is inflammatory and degenerative in nature and manifests itself in a progressive mental deterioration, accompanied by definite physical signs and serological evidence of the presence of the Treponema pallidum, the microorganism responsible for syphilis. Paresis most frequently develops between the ages of thirty-five and fifty and has its beginning somewhere between ten and twenty years following syphilitic infection. It occurs about three times as frequently in men as in women, which some authorities have interpreted as due to the comparative immunity of women to syphilitic infection during the period of pregnancy.[28] However, the relatively higher frequency of syphilis in men than in women is probably a more plausible explanation.[29]

Mentally, the most characteristic symptom of paresis is the

[27] See Fred A. Moss and Thelma Hunt, *Foundations of Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 335-338.

[28] White, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

[29] See Moss and Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

change which takes place in the personality and character traits of the individual, sometimes going so far as to represent a complete reversal. The well-dressed business man becomes slovenly in his personal appearance; the astute financier suddenly enters into questionable relations with strangers or shows markedly poor judgment in business deals; the morally upright man suddenly becomes involved in rape, theft, embezzlement, or licentious conduct. General mental deterioration accompanies the alterations in personality and character. The individual finds it difficult to apply himself to his work for any period of time without undue fatigue. There is a progressive loss of memory both for immediate and remote events. Upon this pattern of progressive deterioration of the mental capacities and functions is superimposed, in many cases, a system of delusions and hallucinations, which provides the basis for differentiation of types of paresis.

In the simple demented type, the chief characteristic is the progressive mental deterioration already described. As the mental faculties degenerate, the behavior becomes foolish and the ideas absurd in the extreme, but there is little or no evidence of delusions or hallucinations.

The expansive type of paretic is characterized by more active symptoms and by delusions of grandeur. This is the classical form of general paralysis. Usually, the patient experiences a feeling of well-being and self-satisfaction out of keeping with his surroundings. His grandiose ideas are absurd in character and are expressed exclusively in superlatives. But his delusions lack systematization, and there is evidence that the patient himself does not take them very seriously, for while he boasts of his wealth and power, he seems completely satisfied to scrub floors or perform other routine tasks wholly out of keeping with his ideas of grandeur.

The agitated or excited type is not unlike the expansive, except that there is increased motor unrest and the delusions tend to produce anger, rather than pleasure. The patient suffers from insomnia and is easily irritated. When he becomes enraged, as he

sometimes does, he may butt his head against a wall, tear up his clothing, and even attack anyone about him.

Anxiety and apprehension characterize the depressed type of paretic. Delusions are frequent and take the form principally of hypochondriacal ideas, often bizarre and grotesque in character, such as the notion that the individual has no stomach, soul, head, or heart and is in fact dead.

But whatever the type, the dementia and confusion progress along with a continuous decline in the physical condition of the patient. There is an increase in motor in-co-ordination, the light reflexes in the pupils are lost, the tremor of the tongue which resulted in only an occasional and scarcely noticeable slurring and indistinctness of pronunciation gives way to the omission, duplication, or transposition of syllables in such a way as to distort the words completely. Seizures resembling apoplexy and epilepsy mark the beginning of the second stage of development. These seizures are not likely to be permanent, but they leave the patient worse in his general physical and mental condition. In the final stages, motor in-co-ordination becomes so great that the patient cannot walk alone. His memory fails him entirely, and all control over his bodily functions disappears. His speech becomes incoherent, seizures become more frequent, and unless some other malady kills him first, he finally passes into a coma and dies.

In the absence of serological findings, the differentiation of paresis from other psychoses is often very difficult and sometimes impossible. Nevertheless, the progressive deterioration in motor co-ordination and speech strongly suggest the infectious base and indicate the need for laboratory tests in order to confirm the diagnosis.

From the description of the several types of personality disintegration, it is clear that the causal factors in mental disorder vary all the way from those which can be defined in organic terms to those which can only be described with reference to the psychological functioning of the organism in response to the en-

vironmental media. Historically, the study of mental disorder has been dominated by the medical fraternity, the classification of types representing an extension of the disease concept. More recently an alternative approach has been developed which emphasizes the causal influence of the social situation.

THE ECOLOGY OF PERSONALITY DISINTEGRATION

Although the hypothesis that the social situation operates in the causation of mental disorder did not have its origin in, nor is it coterminous with, the ecological approach, the most convincing demonstration of this hypothesis has been from the ecological point of view. It can appropriately be said that it is only in such studies that the approach in terms of the social situation has been other than speculative in character.

The hypothesis most representative of the ecological approach is that formulated by Faris and Dunham.[30] This hypothesis may be paraphrased somewhat as follows:


Since communication is essential for normal mental life, factors in the social environment which impede communication and thereby produce social isolation make for mental breakdown. Consequently, mental disorders seem to be associated with mobility and heterogeneity of the population where life-conditions are complex and precarious, since it is under these conditions that the social relations of persons are disturbed.[31] It is this disturbance in social relations, then, which the ecological analysis of mental disorders attempts to discover by an analysis of differentials in the essential character of social conditions in various parts of the city.

In this approach to understanding the genesis of mental disorder, however, it is quite apparent that although the general pattern of rates of mental disorder is essentially that of concentric circles, with rates high in the center of the city and de-

[30] Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas.*


[31] See Ernest W. Burgess' statement of this hypothesis in the Introduction to Faris and Dunham, *ibid.*, pp. xii-xiii.

CHART LXXVIII



clining toward the periphery (see Chart LXXVIII), each psychosis presents its own peculiar pattern. It would seem, therefore, that it is to a series of different combinations of social fac-


CHART LXXIX



tors that one will have to look for an explanation of each of the types of psychosis.[32]

[32] See Faris and Dunham, *ibid.*, p. 170.

CHART LXXX



The toxic psychoses, alcoholism and drug addiction, are most prevalent in the center of the city, being associated in general with rooming-house areas and the more deteriorated immigrant


and Negro areas. (See Chart LXXIX.) But this fact alone does not tell the whole story, since four-fifths of the range in rates is confined to about one-seventh of the total area of the city. The toxic psychoses, accordingly, seem to reflect the disorganization of social life in areas in transition in which the social contacts of the individual are unstable and he is subjected to a multiplicity of disorganizing forces. This result is essentially that found by Faris and Dunham.[33]

Psychoses caused by syphilis show an even higher degree of concentration in the rooming-house and the more deteriorated Negro areas, with some extension into the more deteriorated immigrant areas, than in the case of the toxic psychoses. (See Chart LXXX.) In this series, however, the range is about half that of the toxic psychoses, but here again approximately four-fifths of the range is confined to about one-seventh of the area of the city. While this one-seventh of the city area is in general the same for both the toxic psychoses and those due to syphilis, the two areas are by no means identical as can be seen by comparing Charts LXXIX and LXXX. Again the pattern is essentially that of Faris and Dunham, who have, however, confined their analysis to general paralysis, whereas in this study juvenile paresis and cerebral syphilis have been added.[34] Since, however, the number of cases of juvenile paresis and of cerebral syphilis is small in comparison with the number of cases of paresis, there is little or no error in comparing the present findings with those of Faris and Dunham. Besides the high-rate area in the center of the city, there are also two comparatively small peripheral high-rate areas centering in the communities, Ashburn and Burnside, both of which are industrial, the first chiefly native and the second, immigrant.

Convulsive disorders and organic brain diseases also show a pattern closely like that of the psychoses due to syphilis so far as the upper four-fifths of the range is concerned. (See Chart


[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 110-123.
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-133.

CHART LXXXI




LXXXI.) Since it is rather difficult to conceive of the conditions of social life being responsible for the development of these psychoses, the explanation may be the tendency for persons mani-

CHART LXXXII




festing incipient symptoms of these psychoses to drift into the more deteriorated areas of the city. If this were the explanation, then their residence under conditions of isolation and instability

CHART LXXXIII



of contacts would be a consequence of the organic factors producing the psychosis rather than the cause. If this is the explanation of the convulsive disorders and organic brain disease,

CHART LXXXIV



could it not also explain the prevalence of alcoholism, drug addiction, and the psychoses due to syphilis, since all show essentially the same pattern? This explanation becomes strengthened


when one compares the pattern of mental deficiency (see Chart LXXXII), since here again the area of the upper four-fifths of the range is similar in size and shape to those for the toxic psychoses, the convulsive and brain-disease psychoses, and the psychoses due to syphilitic infection.

It is quite true, of course, that all these psychoses have been attributed by some psychiatrists to organic causes. Furthermore, there is little doubt but that neural deterioration tends to be common to all. This fact, however, is not sufficient reason to conclude that all are organic and constitutional in origin. In fact, when one considers the pattern of the psychoses of old age, it is only as attention is restricted to the upper half of the range that the pattern is comparable so far as the central area is concerned. (See Chart LXXXIII.) For the rest of the pattern there is little similarity, and yet again one is dealing with a group of psychoses which are generally considered as clearly organic in origin as are those with which they are compared. If the drift theory is the explanation, with the psychoses considered, then why should it not hold for the psychoses of old age?

The next step is to see how the patterns of psychoses ordinarily considered functional in character differ from or resemble the patterns of the so-called organic psychoses. Most common of the functional psychoses are the several types of dementia praecox and the related psychoses of catatonic state of excitement and paranoia.


In a general way the pattern of dementia praecox and related psychoses (see Chart LXXXIV) is the typical pattern of the other psychoses already considered. Again, rates in the upper four-fifths of the range tend to be confined to a fraction of the area of the city, but in this instance a somewhat larger proportion was found than in the other groups considered, except the psychoses of old age. This larger fraction of the area, however, is the consequence of the fact that a peripheral area is included within the upper four-fifths of the range, since the central area within this end of the range is essentially the same size as that for

CHART LXXXV



the so-called organic psychoses except the psychoses of old age. When, however, the pattern of the upper seven-eighths of the range is considered, one finds that this area, constituting roughly

CHART LXXXVI



a third of the city, divides the whole into two areas approximately equal in size lying to the north and to the south, in which variations in rates are confined to the lower eighth of the range. In

this respect the nearest approach in pattern is that of the psychoses of old age in which, similarly, a high-rate band sweeps across the city in a southwesterly direction, in this instance constituting the upper three-fourths of the range.


Following the procedure of Faris and Dunham, the pattern of the cases without psychoses (see Chart LXXXV) may be compared with the dementia-praecox pattern, since this group is likely to be made up largely of mild functional disorders resembling or related to dementia praecox. The highest rate is achieved in the Loop, although the dementia praecox pattern shows a somewhat higher degree of concentration in the central area than the "no psychoses" pattern. Nevertheless, the pattern of cases without psychoses more closely resembles dementia praecox than it does the organic psychoses, with the psychoses of old age occupying an intermediate position.

The patterns of borderland psychoses of constitutional psychopathic inferiority, psychopathic personality, and the psychoneuroses (see Chart LXXXVI) resemble hardly at all either the functional or the organic patterns. Of all the patterns, it is here that one finds the highest degree of concentration of rates, the area within which are confined the upper four-fifths of the range constituting not more than one twenty-fifth of the entire area of the city. This portion of the pattern is approximately the same as that part of the city in which home ownership falls below 10 per cent.

The final series is that of the manic-depressive psychoses. (See Chart LXXXVII.) This pattern Faris and Dunham have called random.[35] The present study, however, does not seem to bear out this characterization, though it is quite clear that the pattern has little in common with any of the other patterns. Yet it seems to be, essentially, the concentric-circle pattern with a break in the upper four-fifths of the range. Thus the high-rate area, resembling the cross section of a funnel, with its widest dimensions along the lake front, is broken on the South Side by a

[35] Faris and Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*, pp. 63-81.

CHART LXXXVII



low-rate area made up of communities of low economic and cultural levels. Faris and Dunham found that manic-depressive psychoses tend to come from areas with a fairly high cultural level.[36]

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Results do not bear out this association since this intervening low-rate area of communities of low economic and cultural levels seems to have more in common with some of the deteriorated areas adjoining the central business areas on the west and northwest, which are within the higher-rate zone, than with some of the more stable residential communities which fall within the same rate zone. The low rates in some of the more stable residential communities may, of course, reflect the tendency for private hospitals to care for a larger percentage of cases in these areas as Faris and Dunham suggest.[87]

Thus in general it may be said that, while the ecological approach offers suggestions about the influence of social factors in the causation of the functional psychoses, it throws little light upon the nature of these influences. This may in part be the consequence of the acceptance of the customary differentiation of psychoses upon the basis of symptoms rather than upon etiological elements. This suggests an inquiry into the basic patterns of classification of the psychoses and the postulates out of which arises the differentiation between the organic and functional psychoses. In order to do this, it is necessary to define the problem in terms of the larger setting in which suicide as a form of personality disintegration is taken into account.

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[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

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XVI


Economic Crises and Personality Disintegration

AN ALTERNATIVE to the ecological approach as a method of determining the influence of the social situation in the causation of mental disorders is the analysis of data in terms of the time sequence. And since economic conditions often have been assumed to play an important role in the pattern of social influences, analysis of the relationship between the business cycle and personality disintegration seems to offer opportunity to test this hypothesis. Since, as has been pointed out in Chapter XIV, suicide has much in common with insanity, both representing extreme forms of personality disorganization, these two series can legitimately be analyzed together in their relationship to economic crises.

But while theoretically it would be expected that an economic crisis would produce essentially the same effects upon the disintegration of personality in so far as the disintegration might be caused by social psychological forces, examination of the general trends during the period, 1929 to 1935, reveals a wide divergence in the two series. In general, the two trends move in opposite directions. (See Chart LXXXVIII.) The insanity rate decreases toward the middle of the period, the height of the economic crisis, and increases at the end as the crisis subsides. In contrast, the suicide rate increases toward the middle and decreases at the end. Thus the suicide trend is essentially what one

CHART LXXXVIII

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY AND SUICIDE PER 10,000 PERSONS TWENTY YEARS OLD AND OVER: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



would expect upon the basis of the hypothesis proposed, whereas the insanity trend is directly opposite the expected result.

The problem may be posed. How can these contradictory results be explained without discarding the hypothesis? The most plausible explanation is that the response to crises through suicide is more direct and abrupt than through insanity. If this were true, then it might be argued that what appears to be the trough in the cycle for the period of economic stress is but the beginning of an upward cycle which reaches its apex either at the end of the period, or later, and then moves downward as time goes on.


A second explanation is that insanity, unlike suicide, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, and therefore the general cycle is not a fair index of the influence of an economic crisis. Thus it may be pointed out that the general insanity rates are made up of such diverse elements as: (1) psychoses caused by infections such as syphilis which ordinarily do not produce the psychoses except after some interval of years after infection; (2) psychotic conditions attributable to toxic materials such as alcohol and drugs, the supply of which may be radically disturbed by economic conditions and legal and administrative procedures; as well as (3) psychoses which are, quite conceivably, fairly responsive to critical conditions in the social milieu.

Furthermore, the index of insanity could conceivably be influenced by a tendency for cases which otherwise would go to private sanitariums to be referred under conditions of economic stress to a public institution such as the Psychopathic Hospital. The result, however, could be in an increase in rate rather than the decrease observed. Perhaps any increased tendency to refer cases to a public institution as a consequence of the lowered economic ability to give them private care is counteracted by administrative pressure to limit the intake as a consequence of the exhaustion of hospital facilities and the contraction of funds for public care. To what extent these two opposing forces would tend to equalize each other cannot be determined, and consequently it will be necessary to assume for the moment that the influence of either is effectively offset by the influence of the other.

In contrast to insanity, there is little reason to believe that the suicide rates are affected by administrative procedures. There is, of course, a tendency when influential persons are involved to minimize the number of suicide verdicts, but this would result only in tempering the upward swing in so far as a larger proportion of suicides might occur among influential groups during a depression than normally. Thus it seems clear that suicide represents the cycle expected according to the hypothesis of the

CHART LXXXIX

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY AND SUICIDE BY SEX PER 10,000 PERSONS SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER OF LIKE SEX: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



relationship of personality disintegration to economic crises. This cycle may be used as the hypothetical pattern with which to compare the rates of insanity for the various categories, some of which may show closer conformance to what is hypothetically expected than the general rates themselves.


Since in our culture, responsibility for support of the family largely devolves upon the male, it would be expected that this sex would be more influenced by the stresses of an economic crisis than the female. This is what the suicide rates show. Rates for both sexes show a fair degree of upward swing, but the male peak is substantially higher than the female. (See Chart LXXXIX.) In the insanity series, on the other hand, because of the irregularities in the rates from year to year, the female rates suggest a slightly upward linear trend, leaving the downward and upward cycle of the general rates entirely a matter of male insanity. It may be significant that in so far as there are irregularities in the movement of rates from year to year, particularly in that for 1932, the movement is in opposite directions in the two series. In fact the upward and downward movements are so uniformly in opposite directions for the two series as to suggest that the downward movement of insanity may in part be the consequence of the utilization of suicide as an escape from the stresses of the economic crisis in substitution for insanity.

Comparison of sex rates assumes a constant differential of economic responsibility which may not be justified. Even though, culturally, married men are more often the source of economic support than married women, there may be little or no differential so far as single men and women are concerned. This line of reasoning suggests that marital condition should be taken into account, upon the assumption that the strains of an economic crisis will be greater for those persons whose marital conditions are such as to entail responsibilities for others in addition to their own welfare.

Suicide rates for each of the marital conditions (see Chart XC) show substantially the same pattern as the general rate, the

CHART XC

NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY MARITAL CONDITION PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE MARITAL CONDITION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




greatest difference being the degree of upward swing in the middle of the period. The widowed show the least upswing proportionally, the married come next, followed by the divorced, with the greatest manifested by the single group. This is somewhat counter to the hypothesis and suggests that the instability of the younger age group is more important than the matter of economic responsibility. The factor of relief may of course have something to do with this, since on the whole the single are less well provided for than the other marital groups. The order of the marital groups themselves with reference to the degree of upswing suggests the legitimacy of the latter hypothesis. Relief tends to be more generously given where there are households to maintain. Accordingly, it would be expected that the divorced would be intermediate between the single and the married since many of these persons would be childless. It may also be significant that, although the single show a more radical upswing than the divorced, the latter cycle moves upward a year earlier than the single.

When one turns to the insanity rates by marital condition (see Chart XCI), he finds that the several cycles are, on the whole, closely parallel to each other, although the divorced cycle tends to break radically upward from the others toward the end of the period. Nevertheless, there are some differences in the proportional drop in the midst of the economic crisis and the order from the least to the greatest downswing from the level established by the end rates is: widowed, married, single, and divorced. Thus the order is the same as for suicide except that the single and the divorced have changed positions, and the cycle is the reverse of the suicide cycle.

The suggestion that the greater fluctuation of the suicide rates of single persons in comparison with the married is largely the result of the instability of younger persons is hardly substantiated when one compares rates by age groups. The least marked upswing for any of the ten-year age groups is for the group of those fifteen to twenty-four years old. (See Chart

CHART XCI

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY BY MARITAL CONDITION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




XCII.) The greatest upswing of the cycle is found in the next age group. Thereafter, there is somewhat less upswing for the next age group, followed by a slight increase in the upswing, and continuing at that level until seventy-five and over, when the upswing is less marked, dropping back to the cycle of the

thirty-five to forty-four age group. In general, there is a fair degree of uniformity in the shapes of the several cycles, though the age groups, sixty-five to seventy-four and seventy-five and over, both show some decline in rate from 1929 to 1930 before the upward swing; whereas all the others move upward in 1930, and there is a tendency progressive with increased age for the cycle to end in 1935 at a lower point than where it started in 1929. This would seem to indicate that it is in those years when the individual is adjusting to increased responsibilities that the stresses of an economic crisis are most likely to lead to suicide.

CHART XCII

SUICIDE RATE PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE AGE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



The age groups showing the most marked response to the economic crisis when one turns to insanity, however, are quite different from those in the suicide series. (See Chart XCIII.) The degree of downward movement in the insanity rates at the peak of the crisis declines with each ten-year age group until that of forty-five to fifty-four years, after which the

CHART XCIII

INSANITY RATES PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE AGE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART XCIV


NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES BY RACE PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE RACE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



degree increases, reaching its maximum amount for all ages at seventy-five years old and over. Thus it seems to be those persons at the two ends of the age range who are most affected by economic crises, but the movement is downward in every instance as has been consistently true throughout for the insanity series. But whereas the suicide age-group cycles end progres-

CHART XCV

NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY NATIVITY PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



sively lower with the increase in age, the insanity age-group cycles end increasingly at a higher level with increase in age.

Another differential in the rates of personal disintegration is to be found among the several nativity and racial groups. Here for the insanity series, it is necessary, owing to the paucity of information, to restrict the analysis to a comparison of the white and Negro rates. Both groups are in fact very much alike except for the fact that the downward cycle is somewhat more pronounced in the case of the Negro group which also shows a slightly greater upward movement in the trend line. (See Chart XCIV.) This suggests that the Negro group is slightly more sensitive to fluctuations in the business cycle than the white as might be expected, since the latter group is on the whole more secure economically. This hypothesis is borne out by the variations between the suicide rates for the two groups where the Negro cycle is much greater in sweep than that of the whites

of native parentage. (See Chart XCV.) The native whites of foreign and mixed parentage and the foreign-born whites show cycles having about the same depth as the whites of native parentage, but in each instance the peaks are delayed by from two to three years in comparison to the peaks of both the Negro and the whites-of-native-parentage groups. This latter differential suggests the hypothesis that the immigrant groups (the first generation more than the second), being more accustomed to hardships than the native population, are not so immediately sensitive to economic stress. Why the Negro group do not show the same delayed response, since their economic experiences would seem to have more closely resembled those of the immigrant groups than those of the native white, may be explained by the fact that this resemblance is more of an illusion than a reality. The larger proportion of the Negroes in Chicago are of Southern birth, and to them migration to the North has meant an immediate increase in standard of living. Since a large proportion have migrated relatively recently, the depression would constitute a greater strain upon this group than upon the immigrant whose residence in the new land is of longer duration.

THE HETEROGENEITY OF INSANITY

It has already been suggested that insanity is not a homogeneous phenomenon and that this may in part explain the differences between the suicide and insanity cycles. If this is true one would expect to find considerable variation in the cycles of the several diagnoses, and this is, in fact, what is found. These cycles vary all the way from that of drug addiction, which very closely resembles the suicide cycle, to the cycle of cases in which no psychosis was found, which is essentially the reverse of the suicide cycle, through a wide variety of patterns including the epilepsy rates which suggest a trend line rather than a cycle and several curves such as that for the psychoneuroses in which there is a pronounced upward swing to the end of the period, suggesting that the cycle has not yet been completed.

The correspondence between the drug-addiction and suicide cycles immediately suggests a fundamental resemblance in these two forms of personal disorganization. Both provide ready means of escape from the mental strain created by an economic crisis. The correspondence conversely between the "no psychosis" and the suicide cycles, on the other hand, suggests that the "no psychosis" cycle is a consequence of the effect of the economic crisis upon administrative procedures in which diagnosis becomes more rigid in the face of curtailed funds and shows nothing of any consequence about personal disorganization. The lack of cyclical movement in the epilepsy curve suggests that organic and constitutional factors are reflected in some diagnoses rather than the stresses of social life.

These variations in the cycles of the several diagnoses suggest, then, the possibility of differentiating between those psychoses which are biophysiogenic, i.e., resulting from hereditary factors, injuries, diseases, toxic conditions other than those induced as escape mechanisms, senility, etc., and those psychoses which are psychosociogenic, i.e., developing out of personal disorganization. Presumably an economic crisis would have no immediate effect upon the genesis of the biophysiogenic psychoses, although it might have a delayed effect by making the person more susceptible to disease and to disturbances of the physiological functions; whereas the psychosociogenic psychoses would show an immediate response.

However, in the differentiation between the biophysiogenic and the psychosociogenic, it must be kept in mind that correspondence between the cycles of economic conditions and of psychosis rates is no assurance in itself that a particular psychosis is psychosociogenic. Economic conditions may affect the psychosis rates in any of the following ways: (1) By increasing in times of prosperity the inclination and ability of families to care at home or in private sanitariums for their psychotic members, and decreasing this inclination and ability in times of depression. This factor would be of more importance in those psychoses


which incapacitate the individual rather than make him a danger either to himself or to others. (2) By increasing or decreasing the ability of the person to obtain toxic materials, such as drugs and alcohol. (3) By indirectly affecting administrative procedures, particularly in the direction of more rigid diagnosis as funds are curtailed and hospital facilities are exhausted in periods of depression. (4) By creating stresses and strains within the personality of the individual so that he becomes disorganized and finally psychotic. Only when there is good reason to believe that the effects of an economic crisis in the genesis of a particular psychosis are of this last character, can the economic crisis be assumed to cause a psychosis of the psychosociogenic category.

In general, however, the disturbing influences of economic conditions would be expected to be reflected in marked deviations from a trend line which would be more or less that of those psychoses which are clearly biophysiogenic. This is, in fact, what the data reveal when one combines the rates of epilepsy, of somatic disease with psychosis, and of cerebral arteriosclerosis, all essentially biophysiogenic in character. The result is a pattern which shows slight fluctuation up and down throughout the period but involves no essential change in direction except for a slight upward angle in the straight-line trend. (See Chart XCVI.)

The rates of insanity cases with no psychosis and of a group with miscellaneous psychoses, none of which occurs often enough to be taken alone, drop down during the depression and then move upward to a level at the end of the period about the same as that at the beginning. (See Chart XCVII.) This group is made up largely of borderline cases which would likely be affected by changes in administrative procedures, and this would probably account for the variation in pattern from the expected crest cycle. In general, the cycle of psychopathic-personality rates is of the same pattern, though with much more erratic fluctuations from year to year. This type of psychosis, because

CHART XCVI

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



of its indeterminate character, is probably more sensitive likewise to administrative procedures.

CHART XCVII

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART XCVIII


DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



The psychoneuroses and paranoia rates increase radically, the most pronounced upward movement in each instance coming after 1931. (See Chart XCVIII.) This suggests the first half of

CHART XCIX

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



a clearly defined crest cycle, incompleted because of the delayed response to the economic crisis. If this assumption were to be substantiated, this would lend credence to the inference that these psychoses are psychosociogenic. Catatonic state of

excitement and involutional melancholia seem of essentially the same pattern as the psychoneuroses and paranoia, except that the upward movement begins earlier in the period, suggesting that these two types of psychoses are more sensitive to economic conditions than the types which they resemble in terms of the character of the cyclical movement and their psychosociogenic character.

Senile dementia, dementia praecox, and the manic-depressive psychoses are clearly closely related as indicated by the close resemblance in patterns, as is generally conceded in psychiatric practice. But since in each instance the fluctuations are not particularly radical from year to year, it is possible to interpret the curves in two ways. (See Chart XCIX.) All show an upward trend for the period and it may be contended that this is all that they show. Still there is some suggestion that there is a common cyclical movement, an incomplete crest cycle beginning after 1931. This suggested upward movement is a little more pronounced in the case of manic-depression than in either of the other two types of psychoses, although senile dementia is intermediate between dementia praecox and manic-depression in this regard. Nevertheless, this evidence suggests that psychosociogenic factors play a part in the genesis of these types of psychoses in spite of the trend in psychiatry to assume their biophysical origin.

This inference of the psychosociogenic character of dementia praecox and senile dementia is all the more confirmed by the definite upward movement in the trends, whereas Dayton has shown both psychoses to have decreased consistently in Massachusetts for the period 1917 to 1932. This interpretation of dementia praecox cannot be accepted without first eliminating the possibility that in psychiatric practice there has developed a consistent tendency to place more of the doubtful cases in the manic-depressive group than in that of dementia praecox. Dayton thinks that this interpretation is a dangerous one. Better medical care of children, he thinks, has lessened the physical

strains upon the younger population and thus reduced the incidence of dementia praecox.[1] In fact Dayton's data suggest the pertinence of the rejected explanation, since if one examines the year-to-year movements in the two series, he finds that in the sixteen instances of paired movements, eleven were in opposite directions, four were parallel, and in only one instance did both curves move in the same direction. Upon the basis of this analysis, therefore, it would seem more plausible to assume that much of the up-and-down fluctuation in the incidence of dementia praecox is a consequence of a fluctuation in the diagnosis of manic-depression and vice versa.


In the Chicago data, however, there is no such inverse relationship between the dementia praecox and the manic-depressive series, both moving in the same direction each year, though not always in proportionate amounts. It seems safe to assume, therefore, that administrative procedures do not play any appreciable role in the fluctuations in these two series and that the upward movement is a consequence of the influence of economic conditions causing increased social-psychological stress which, though slow in showing its effect, is the explanation.

Dayton reveals his predilection to interpret functional psychoses wherever possible as organic in origin in his discussion of his data upon senile psychoses. He suggests that these psychoses may be due to infection, although he recognizes that some would explain the decrease in rate in terms of improvement in diagnosis which results in an increase of cerebral arteriosclerosis.[2] Dayton's data in fact strongly suggest this hypothesis as he himself admits, but he is reluctant to accept this interpretation. Data for Chicago, however, suggest that senile dementia is much more closely related to dementia praecox and manic-depressive psychoses and possibly to involutional melancholia than to cerebral arteriosclerosis. In fact Dayton's data suggest this latter connection, since both the curves for senile psychoses and involutional

[1] Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, p. 359.
[2] *Ibid.*

CHART C

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



melancholia show marked increases during the First World War and the postwar period, with a tendency to level off after that. Add to this the upward movement in Chicago during the depression and the connection between these two groups of psychoses, and social-psychological stress becomes difficult to deny.

The psychoses caused by syphilis show considerable variation in pattern in spite of the fact that all are alike in etiology. (See Chart C.) Paresis shows a consistent decline throughout the period with comparatively small fluctuations from year to year; juvenile paresis goes up to a peak in 1930, down to a low in 1933, and then up to the end of the period; syphilis of the central nervous system shows what seems to be the first half of a crest cycle. Since the onset of paresis, the more common of these three psychoses, varies considerably in time after syphilitic infection, it is difficult to determine whether or not economic conditions are of any causal significance, particularly since the economic cycle itself is probably shorter in length than the range of variations in onset. Furthermore, the trend toward more widespread use of prophylactics and the early treatment of syphilitic infection would tend to obscure the relationship. While there is no doubt about the biophysiogenic character of paresis, this does not preclude the possibility that illicit sexual contacts may be increased in periods of social-psychological strain induced by economic crises, leading to an increase in the psychoses caused by syphilis, unless decreased ability to purchase such illicit outlets counteract that tendency. In fact this is exactly what the cerebral syphilis curve suggests. In this latter instance the period of onset is sufficiently short, varying from six months to four or five years, so that the period of onset is probably within the range of the cycle. The consequence is that this curve suggests a crest cycle, the crest of which has been delayed two or three years from the crest of syphilitic infection.

Feeble-mindedness and mental deficiency show a fair degree of correspondence to the biophysiogenic pattern, as would be expected. (See Chart CI.) Since there is little reason to anticipate administrative disturbances which might affect the incidence of these cases, even when the deficient mental condition is accompanied by psychotic episodes, the explanation of these psychotic symptoms is a matter of biophysical genesis and is in no way related to the economic crisis.

CHART CI

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART CII

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




The toxic psychoses of alcoholism and drug addiction are essentially opposite in cyclical character, drug addiction showing a crest and alcoholism a trough cycle. (See Chart CII.) The decline of alcoholism during the depression and its increase with prosperity is probably nothing more than a reflection of the economic ability to purchase alcoholic drinks. How much repeal had to do with the upward movement of the curve is difficult to say, since it would be expected that the lowering of the cost of intoxicating liquors would have essentially the same effect as increasing prosperity, and in this instance both occurred simultaneously. The drug-addiction cycle, however, is not so readily explainable in economic terms, since if ability to pay, rather than desire growing out of crisis conditions, governs the incidence of drug addiction, as it seems to have alcoholism, this cycle should have been of the trough type also. Thus it would seem that drug addiction is clearly psychosociogenic in character, probably more so than the data reveal, since economic ability to purchase drugs would tend to exert a depressing influence upon the impulse to turn to drugs as an escape from the crisis engendered by the depression.

ECOLOGY OF PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION

When one turns to an analysis of the change in ecological patterns during a period of economic crisis, one finds further confirming evidence of the hypothesis that insanity and suicide reflect the effects of economic conditions upon personal disorganization.


Insanity, as has been pointed out in Chapter XV, declines in general from the center to the periphery of the city. This pattern remains essentially constant throughout the period of study, except for two peripheral areas, which, for a part of the period, show higher rates than adjacent or surrounding areas. The first of these exceptions is that of Ashburn, an area of predominately native-born population belonging to the lower middle class. Here the rates in 1929 and 1932 were three times those of the

CHART CIII a




adjacent areas. (See Chart CIII a-c.) In 1935, however, the rate in this community had dropped to about one and a half times that of the adjacent areas, but at the same time it had be-

CHART CIII b




come submerged into a general bond of communities on the periphery of Chicago, stretching all along the southwest, south, and extreme southeast sides.

CHART CIII c




The second exception to the general pattern of declining rates from the center to the periphery is to be found in the case of Burnside, an immigrant community of laborers, where in 1929

CHART CIV a




the rate was twice that of the surrounding area. In 1932 the rate had become the same as that for the surrounding area, but in 1935 the 2 to 1 ratio had been re-established.

CHART CIV b



But while, except for the deviations described, the pattern had remained substantially constant throughout the period of study, the range in rates in the center of the city had changed consider-


CHART CIV c



ably. The peak rate had increased approximately one-fifth by 1932 and two-thirds by 1935.


Comparison of the rates of married persons (Chart CIV a-c)

CHART CV a




with the general rate brings out two interesting facts: (1) The peak rates of married persons is fairly uniformly a quarter higher than the general rates. (2) The general rates increased gradually

CHART CV b




from the periphery to the center of the city, whereas the rates of married persons increased very slowly at first only to gain momentum and go up more rapidly than the general rates. This

CHART CV c




means, then, that although for the city as a whole the rate of insanity among single persons is above that among the married, in some communities in the higher brackets the relationship reverses.

CHART CVI a




Calculation of rates by sex reveals a number of variations from what is found for insanity in general. (See Charts CV a-c and CVI a-c.) In the first place, the ecological patterns, though

CHART CVI b




fairly constant from time to time, are not so regular in character as for the general rates. The greatest divergency is to be found in the rates of female insanity in which a number of areas of low

CHART CVI c




rates are surrounded by somewhat higher rates. The most marked contrasts, however, are between the male and the female patterns. The female rates remained substantially unchanged

CHART CVII a




throughout the period, except for the central business district and the immediately adjoining areas. Here the rate increased to a point in 1932 of two times the 1929 rate, only to double again by

CHART CVII b



1935. In contrast, the male rate (exhibiting a slight tendency to shrink in spread in 1932 only to expand in 1935 somewhat beyond the 1929 lines) showed an increase in the central business


CHART CVII c



district of only 10 per cent in 1932 and an additional 50 per cent in 1935.


Insanity rates for cases of alcoholism and dementia praecox

CHART CVIII a




show some divergency from the general pattern, the most striking features of this difference being a greater spread of the higher rates out from the center of the city and the presence of more

CHART CVIII b




high areas at or near the periphery of the city. (See Charts CVII a-c and CVIII a-c.) These, in general, tend to be predominately immigrant areas except for Ashburn, already de-

CHART CVIII c




scribed, which had a relatively high dementia-praecox rate throughout the period but a low rate of alcoholism. In general, both the dementia-praecox and alcoholism patterns re-

CHART CIX a




mained constant throughout the period so far as the major portion of the city is concerned. Marked shifts occurred chiefly in the central areas, being more extreme in the case of dementia

CHART CIX b



praecox than of alcoholism. The alcoholism rate dropped in 1932 to half what it was in 1929 in the central business district, the rates declining outward more gradually than in 1929. In

CHART CIX c



1935, however, the pattern was essentially again that of 1929, the peak rate being a little higher. The dementia-praecox rate in the central areas, on the other hand, showed an increase at its

peak of about 40 per cent in 1932 over the 1929 rate. This increase was highly concentrated in the central business district. In 1935 the rate had approximately doubled that for 1932, and in general higher rates prevailed over a larger area spreading out from the central business district, particularly to the west and south into the low-income areas.

The suicide pattern in 1929 showed little of the progression from high rates in the center of the city to low rates on the periphery. Instead, areas of deterioration and of stable residential type showed essentially the same rates. (See Chart CIX a-c.) Even the three points of highest rates have little in common. The highest rate occurred in an outlying industrial, immigrant community. Two centers show the next highest rates: one a disorganized cosmopolitan area on the near south, and the second an outlying, substantial, middle-class, residential community of single homes. By 1932 the pattern had become more nearly that of concentric circles, with its center in the downtown business district, except for a group of relatively high rates sweeping across the southwest periphery, achieving the highest rate for the year in Ashburn. Again, industrial, workingmen's areas are linked in this band with middle-class, suburban residential areas. The peak rates had become from two to five times those in 1929. By 1935 the pattern had come to more nearly approximate that of 1929, except that the peak-rate areas had shifted from the outlying locations to the central business district with a rate about 20 per cent higher than the highest in 1929 and six times the rate in the same area in that year.

CORRELATION OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Correlation of insanity rates with suicide rates for the period, 1929 to 1935, gives a coefficient of $-.72$. Without adjusting for the number of paired rates, the coefficient of determination is approximately .55. Thus about half of the variance in the two series is negatively associated, and since it is hardly plausible to

assume that either insanity or suicide is one of the causal factors in the other, the best one can say is that about half of the causal complex is common to both phenomena, but that these common causal elements operate in opposite directions. The standard error is comparatively high, however, and the true coefficient of determination may be considerably lower than these results indicate.[3]

Comparison of rate maps suggests that whereas historically the correlation of insanity and suicide is negative, for any particular year the community rates may be positive. This is, in fact, what the coefficients of correlation reveal, except for the first year of the period, when the coefficient is so low as to be unreliable. The series of coefficients of correlation from 1929 to 1935 are: +.20, +.84, +.78, +.54, +.53, +.76, and +67.[4] Thus, except for 1929, those communities having high insanity rates have high suicide rates as well and those having low insanity rates also have low suicide rates.

The economic depression, then, produces a decrease in insanity and an increase in suicide. In insanity the decrease at the bottom of the business cycle is primarily that of those forms developing out of personal disorganization, such as dementia praecox, alcoholism, etc., the biophysiogenic types remaining fairly constant in rate. Since most forms of psychosociogenic insanity probably require some time for development out of personal disorganization, whereas suicide may develop more rapidly, this negative correlation between insanity and suicide does not necessarily mean that the economic depression has had opposite effects. There may be instead a lag between economic conditions and insanity.

Whatever may be the differentials in the operation of the eco-

[3] The standard error of the coefficient of correlation is ±.15. The coefficient of correlation is too high because of the small number of paired items. Correcting for this, the coefficient becomes −.68 and its corresponding coefficient of determination approximately .46.

[4] The standard errors of the coefficients are respectively: ±.11, ±.03, ±.04, ±.08, ±.08, ±.05, and ±.06.

nomic depression to produce insanity on one hand and suicide on the other, the effect tends to be the same for all classes of marital condition except the divorced. Rates of divorced persons are consistently upward for the insane and more radically increased at the peak for the suicide.

The effect of the depression upon suicide seems to be primarily a matter of its effect upon males. since the female rate remained substantially constant throughout the period. Both sexes are affected in essentially the same way so far as insanity is concerned.

All racial and nativity groups seem to be affected in relatively the same way by the depression both in the cases of suicide and insanity, except that Negro insanity shows a more radical upward trend with the improvement of economic conditions.

The most pronounced change produced by the depression upon community insanity rates is the progressive increase in rates in the centrally located areas of Chicago. Suicide rates show no such constancy of pattern, possibly due to the relatively small number of cases in 1929 and 1935.

For the city as a whole, the insanity rate is higher for single than for married persons. This relationship, however, is reversed for centrally located communities; i.e., the central business district and the areas surrounding it.

Community rates of insanity and of suicide show a relatively high positive correlation for each year except 1929. It would seem, then, that either those factors which produce insanity also cause suicide, or that the same selective processes operate to attract or repel both those persons who commit suicide and those who go insane.

It would seem, accordingly, that the net consequence of an economic crisis is to increase the amount of personal disorganization in the form of suicide and thus to depress somewhat the amount finding expression in psychoses after which the insanity rate slowly rises. Thus the quick effect of the economic crisis finds its expression in suicide and the more delayed in insanity.

This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the greatest change in rate of suicide is for the single, who, on the whole, are younger; whereas among the most pronounced upward trends in the psychoses making up the insanity group are those of senile dementia and involutional melancholia, both psychoses of old age. In so far as the effects of economic crises result in exchange of expression from insanity to suicide, this is upon the part of the younger group who are less stable and therefore show ready response to changed conditions, whereas the older group tends to respond more slowly but quite as persistently, if not more so, once the disorganizing effects have become established.

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XVII

Family Disintegration

FAMILY DISINTEGRATION first impinges itself upon the attention of students of social problems in the form of the disruption of marriage relations expressed in divorce and desertion. Since society looks upon the institution of the family and marriage as the proper device for the satisfaction of the sex impulse and the care of the children which may result from this satisfaction, any break in the marriage relationship is frought with dangers to the institution.

The disruption of the family relationship, however, is but the climax of a long series of conflicts which have threatened the unity of the family. This is equivalent to saying that what is of more fundamental importance than the disruption of family relations, which finds expression in divorce, separation, and desertion, is the long sequence of conflict between husband and wife which has finally reached a climax in the abandonment, temporarily or permanently, of the marriage relationship. This sequence of conflict may appropriately be called family disorganization.

Family disorganization as a process takes several forms of which the conflict between husband and wife is only one. In addition to this form of family disorganization, there are those of parent-child conflict and those of conflict between siblings, all of which have their locale within the family relationship. In the same way the concept, family disintegration, can quite appropriately be extended to include the climaxes of these addi-

tional forms of family disorganization. And while all three may have some aspects in common, each will also manifest characteristics which are peculiar to it.

Fundamentally all forms of family disorganization represent variant behavior in which the individual rebels against the socially approved regulations regarding the family relationship. In this, family disorganization is at one with the other forms of hedonistically defined rebellion against a part of the social order, except that here much conflict may be in aspects of the family relationship which are not covered by specifically defined rules of conduct. Conflict in these areas of spontaneous response is apt to become extended into those areas specifically regulated or to become identified with these areas so that the individual tends to rebel against the whole of the relationship.


FACTORS IN MARRIAGE DISINTEGRATION

Though family disintegration is readily recognized as the climax of a process, there is still the possibility that an analysis of the character of the families which reach this climax may offer something in the way of understanding the forces which operate to produce this climax. The ready accessibility of the facts of desertion and divorce make this a tempting field for the analyst who would understand the process of domestic discord. What light, then, do the data regarding the dissolution of marriage throw upon the causes of conflict in marriage relations?

The first kind of data which is likely to come to one's attention is that which somehow reflects cultural variations. Since cultural changes take place historically within a country, the analysis of divorce trends provides more than a predictive device. The trend in divorce is related to other general movements in cultural change and may be assumed to be one of the consequences of these historical changes. Thus for the United States as a whole, the divorce rate was seven times as great in 1937 as in 1870. (See Chart CX.) This increase in the divorce rate is somewhat misleading, since it is partly attributable to the particular kind of

CHART CX

DIVORCE RATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO 1937 *



* Data from reports of the Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce*, except for estimated rates for 1933 to 1937 from S. H. Stouffer and Lyle M. Spencer, "Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 188 (November, 1936), and "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLIV (January, 1939), p. 552.

rate (the ratio of divorce to the total population); nevertheless when another ratio is selected (that of the number of divorces per hundred marriages), the rate in 1937 was slightly more than three times the rate in 1887. No matter how one expresses the divorce rate, there has been a consistent and appreciable upward trend within the period for which reliable data are available.

When one examines the historical period in which this radical

change in the divorce rate took place, he finds it one of great transformations. It was during this period that the frontier passed and population movements changed their general direction from into the West to into the cities. There were rapid industrial expansions, and an increased tempo of inventions. Through the rapid expansion of newspaper circulation, supplemented later by the radio and the motion picture, the limits of the world in which the average individual lived were pushed out far beyond the confines of the local community. As part of this liberation of the individual from the restraints imposed by tradition, women became emancipated far beyond the dreams of the early feminists: they found employment in increasing ratio outside the home, they adopted modes of dress which were more revealing and less restraining, their code of conduct suffered radical change.

With such revolutionary changes paralleling the increase in the divorce rate, the natural conclusion would seem to be that these changes are a part of the disorganizing influences which have disrupted the family and made it less stable. But can one be sure that these historical changes in the basic social patterns of society are the only changes operating which might materially affect the divorce rate? Is it not possible that changes in legislation governing the conditions under which divorces may be granted and changes in the interpretation of existing legislation upon the part of the courts may not have had considerable influence upon the increase of divorce? Or is it not possible that, with the increasing facility of transportation, larger numbers of persons living in states with comparatively severe divorce legislation established residence in other states more liberal in their requirements for the purpose of dissolving their marriages? In so far as any of these influences were operating within the period under discussion, and all of them were, the divorce rate would increase, and yet this aspect of the change would not in any way imply any fundamental change in the stability of the family. It is quite apparent, accordingly, that it is only as changes in the


divorce rate exceed what might be accounted for in terms of changes in the legislative and administrative conditions under which divorce is granted and in the mobility of persons for purposes of obtaining divorce from states having conservative legislation to those more liberal in their regulations governing divorce that one can take the increasing divorce rate as an index of increasing family instability.

Comparison of social changes in various countries of the world suggests that all are subject to many of the same influences though not necessarily to the same degree. Or to put it differently, all seem to show much the same trend in development, as in the transition from a handicraft to an industrial economy, but some countries show a more complete transition than others. Is it not possible, then, to arrive at the influences of changing social conditions upon the stability of the family by comparing divorce rates of countries showing the development of these influences to varying degrees? Thus if those countries having reached the higher stages of social change have higher divorce rates than those less advanced in the generalized cultural transformations taking place throughout the world, the conclusion would seem to follow that these social changes are responsible for the increasing instability of the family if the divorce rate is a reliable index.

So far as reliable data are available, the United States has the highest divorce rate of any country of the world. (See Chart CXI.) Since the United States has been the scene of radical social changes, as radical if not more so than in any other country of the world, the fact that the divorce rate is higher would seem to confirm the conclusion that there is a close relationship between the stage of social change and the stability of the family. But when one examines more carefully the varying rates of different countries, he becomes somewhat sceptical of this conclusion, since he finds that countries essentially alike in terms of social conditions vary considerably in divorce rate. Then when trends are compared, particularly between the United States and

CHART CXI

Number of Divorces per 100,000 Population in the United States and Certain Foreign Countries, 1901 to 1929 *



* Data from reports of the Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce;* Edward B. Reuter and J. R. Runner, *The Family*, p. 210; Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, p. 33; Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, p. 33.

Japan, this scepticism is substantially increased. No country in the world, perhaps, has shown as rapid and radical a transformation in recent history as has Japan. In less than a century (seven decades) this country has been transformed from a feudal to a modern society. And yet in spite of having gone through a process of transition comparable to much of the Western World, the divorce rate has declined instead of increased. Thus again the possibility that increased divorce may reflect in whole or in part changes in legislative and administrative processes, rather than any substantial change in family stability, has to be considered. Therefore any dependence upon divorce rates between countries would seem to be of doubtful value in the search for the causes of family instability.

This conclusion seems to be further substantiated when one compares the divorce trends of the several countries. In general, two countries involved in the First World War, France and Germany, showed considerable irregularity in movement; the rate of divorces dropped off during the war and then moved to a higher level after the war but shortly exhibited some tendency to decline. Belgium probably experienced much the same irregularity as evidenced by the high peak after the war followed by a tendency to decline (the absence of the drop in 1916 was probably due to the absence of a rate for that year comparable to France and Germany). This common pattern of movement is probably the consequence of a marked reduction in administrative procedure so far as the divorce courts were concerned and of the relieving of the pressure for divorce resulting from the enforced separation of husbands and wives because of army service. In many instances this undoubtedly meant only a deferment of divorce action and a consequent increase of divorces in the early years of peace. The German rate moved upward after that year, and the fact that all three countries showed a parallel decline until 1927 would suggest the probability of a movement similar to Germany's in France and Belgium. Thus, factors other than the operation of a social change upon the

stability of the family are apparent in the movements in these three countries.

The case of two countries not involved in the First World War, Denmark and Switzerland, is somewhat different. Both have shown a consistent upward trend, although for Switzerland the divorce rate dropped slightly during the war period. It might be argued that, since these two countries were not involved in the First World War, the divorce trend would not be affected by any disturbance in the administrative process comparable to that experienced in those countries which were involved. Thus it might be said that these two countries may be taken as a fundamentally truer picture of the divorce trend upon the European continent in response to the movements of social change to which all are subjected. When one considers that Denmark introduced divorce by mutual consent shortly after the end of the First World War (and yet the trend seems not to have been disturbed in comparison to that in Switzerland where no comparable change in legislation occurred), the case for the thesis that increasing family instability is a part of the broader patterns of social change becomes more convincing.

The analysis of comparative divorce data leads to the following conclusions: First, differentials in the divorce rates themselves are of little significance as a basis of determining the causes of family instability. Such differentials reflect the varying attitudes of the peoples of different countries toward the legal recognition of marriage disintegration, and there is little or no reason to believe that a constant ratio between the number of cases of marriage disintegration and divorce holds for the several countries.

Second, the parallel character of divorce trends throughout the world, except in Japan, points to the conclusion that the increasing legal dissolution of marriage is part and parcel of the pattern of social change. That it is an inevitable part, however, is difficult to say in view of the opposite trend in Japan. While there is a close parallelism in the development of Japanese culture within the last century and in the transformations in Western

culture of a somewhat longer period, the Japanese have retained many of their Oriental characteristics which may have considerable bearing upon their divorce trend.

Third, granting that the trend toward increasing divorce is either a part or the consequence of basic cultural changes, this does not necessarily imply that the stability of the family is declining and that this decline is the result of the disorganizing influence of cultural change. It may well be that what is happening universally is a progressive reduction in the ratio between the number of cases of marriage disintegration and the legal recognition of the reality of these situations through divorce.

DIVORCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES


One of the first requirements in the selection of divorce data as a basis for determining the causes of family instability is that these data be taken from an area sufficiently homogeneous in legislative and administrative background that observed differences may not be explainable in terms of heterogeneity in this respect as was the case in the comparison between countries, particularly so far as the rates of a single year are concerned. This suggests the possibility of comparing divorce rates of different sections of the United States in terms of rates either of a state or of combinations of states, whichever seem to serve best as a basis for the differentiation of areas of diverse social conditions.

Comparison of divorce rates by states immediately brings out a wide diversity. (See Chart CXII.) Divorce rates for 1932 varied all the way from no divorces in South Carolina to 428.9 per 10,000 population in Nevada. In both of the extremes the explanation is simple. There are no divorces in South Carolina because that state has no law under which divorce may be granted. Nevada has a high divorce rate because of its liberal residence requirement which encourages persons from other states having stringent legislation to go to Nevada for divorces. Other states, notably Idaho and Arkansas, have recently liberalized their residence requirement to match that of Nevada but

are not so popular as Reno, which has been longer established as a divorce mecca. Under the circumstances it is quite apparent that there is little or no relationship between the stability of the family and the divorce rates of these four states.

CHART CXII

DIVORCES PER 1,000 MARRIED POPULATION: UNITED STATES, 1932




Comparison between rates of the remaining states shows considerable variation in adjoining states whose social conditions are essentially alike (e.g., Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina), and in other states having essentially similar liberal divorce laws (e.g., Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin), whereas other states having severe divorce laws have approximately the same rates (e.g., New York, District of Columbia, and North Carolina). Similarity in divorce legislation does not guarantee, of course, that the legal situation is constant, since administrative procedures may vary so greatly as to obscure largely the similarity in legal definition. Nevertheless, on the whole the higher divorce rates are to be found in those states having the less stringent legislation. The result is that the connection between family stability and the divorce rate is again obscured in very much the same way that it is in the comparison between the rates of various countries.

Furthermore, when rates are considered in terms of the sections

CHART CXIII

NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100 MARRIAGES IN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1887 TO 1932



of the United States, higher rates are found in the less industrialized parts. Thus the geographic divisions of the Pacific, the West South Central, and the Mountain states have higher rates than any other divisions. These facts are contradictory to the assumption that increasing family instability is one of the consequences of the transition from an agricultural and frontier to an industrial economy. Again this raises the question of the reliability of the divorce rate as a measure of family instability.

If the transition from an agricultural and handicraft economy to an industrial economy has resulted in breaking down the stability of marriage, rural divorce rates should be lower than

urban rates. This is in fact what the data show, the rural rate in 1932, the latest available, being approximately one-third the urban rate. (See Chart CXIII.) When the trends for the two areas are compared, however, this divergence in rates turns out to be of rather recent origin. The two trends were substantially together until 1916 from which time they have diverged markedly. For a period of less than two decades only, the urban and rural rates have been appreciably different. How does one reconcile this fact with the hypothesis of the close connection between increasing industrialism and increasing instability of the family?

The period in which the urban and rural divorce rates were substantially the same is in general that of the influx of immigrants into the United States, particularly into urban centers. Large groups of persons from cultures in which divorce was frowned upon were constantly being added to the urban population, and this would counteract the tendency toward increase in the divorce rate. Immigration dropped off during the First World War and became stringently regulated shortly after. With this "ruralizing" influence in the urban area removed, the divorce rate diverged sharply from the rural.

Since the rural areas chosen for this analysis were in the same states as the urban areas, the legislative situation throughout the period would be the same for both urban and rural areas. While there is no guarantee that no differentials exist between the administrative procedures of rural as compared to urban areas, it would seem that here is a demonstration of the influence of cultural changes which may be called "urbanization" upon the legal recognition of marriage dissolution and in part upon the stability of the marriage relationship. Furthermore, since the change which is expressed in the term, urbanization, is largely a consequence of the transition from an agricultural and handicraft economy to an industrial economy, the comparison between rural and urban trends within a country would seem to substantiate more nearly the hypothesis that modern instability of marriage is one of the consequences of this transition than it would any of the other approaches to this conclusion.


VARIATIONS IN MARRIAGE SITUATIONS

But whatever may be the relationship between changes in the basic patterns of social life and the instability of the marriage relationship, the causal elements in the complex situation are still unrevealed, since not all marriages in urban areas are dissolved by divorce, which has been the index of marriage instability. Theoretically it is possible, of course, that no marriage in urban areas has the stability of the general run of marriages in rural areas, but no statistics of divorce can demonstrate this generalization. The most that can be said is that a larger proportion of urban marriages show instability as compared to rural marriages. What the differential elements are which cause some marriages to end in the divorce court and not others is a matter upon which the cultural-change explanation throws little light. It is necessary to turn to analysis of the character of the marriages which end in divorce in the search for the differentiating factors.

Analysis of divorce data may be made in terms of any political unit for which data are available. In the United States, the Bureau of the Census has collected data for the period, 1887 to 1932, except that no data were collected for the years, 1907 to 1915 and 1917 to 1921, within that period. Wide variations in legislative definition and administrative practices between states and within the same states from time to time make the data for the United States as a whole somewhat less satisfactory than those from a single state. Furthermore, although the legislative definition is constant throughout a state for a particular time (although it may vary from time to time), there is little assurance that a like constancy exists for the administrative practices of different court jurisdictions. Therefore, analysis in terms of a single court jurisdiction is likely to be more satisfactory than if several are involved. Data from the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County, Illinois, serve as well as those from any other source in supplying the necessary constancy of legislative and administrative situations for an analysis of the differential factors

CHART CXIV

COMPLAINANT IN DIVORCE SUITS: COOK COUNTY, 1919 TO 1935




which characterize the marriages which end in divorce and those which do not.

Examination of divorce statistics reveals at once that considerable difference exists in the proportion of suits filed by the wife as compared with those filed by the husband. In general, the ratio is approximately 3 to 1. (See Chart CXIV.) This does not mean that the husband is the more likely to be responsible for the conflict which arises in marriage or that the wife is less persevering in her efforts to work out an adjustment. The ratio reflects the traditional pattern of chivalry and the lines of least resistance. Divorce historically resulted in less loss of status to the man than

CHART CXV

DIVORCE AND NONSUPPORT CASES BY FIVE-YEAR PERIODS OF MARRIED LIFE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




to the woman, and as a consequence men often defer to the interests of their wives even in divorce. Furthermore, the traditional freedom of movement of the man makes him the logical person to take the initiative in desertion, and the general character of his physique makes him more convincing as the source of cruelty than as the recipient. The ratio is thus but a reflection of the differential roles in society of members of the two sexes and throws no light upon the causation of marriage instability.

Not only is the wife much more often the complainant in divorce suits than the husband, but the ratio seems to have changed further in her favor in more recent years. This may reflect the trend toward divorce by mutual consent in which the husband co-operates with his wife, permitting her to obtain the divorce upon the less embarrassing charges of cruelty and desertion which operate in her favor.

CHART CXVI


MEAN YEARS OF MARRIAGE IN FAMILY DISINTEGRATION: CHICAGO, 1919, 1921, 1929 TO 1935



Length of marriage has often been taken as an index of its increasing stability. The conclusion that time itself is on the side of marriage stability is a natural inference from divorce statistics which invariably show that something more than half of the divorces granted are to couples who have lived together less than five years. (See Chart CXV.) Cases of nonsupport in the Court of Domestic Relations do not reveal such a high proportion in the first five-year interval of married life. This suggests the possibility either that the stability of marriage is partly a matter of

CHART CXVII


NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN DIVORCE AND NONSUPPORT CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




income level, since nonsupport cases are from the lowest economic levels whereas divorce cases come from those groups above this lowest stratum, or that in this low-income group the greater dependence upon the income of one person operates to discourage a break in marriage relations regardless of the conflicts involved. This latter interpretation finds some support in the changes in the mean length of married life. (See Chart CXVI.) During the depression the mean length of married life increased

CHART CXVIII

CHILDREN AND DIVORCE BY YEARS OF MARRIED LIFE: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1935






for both the divorce and nonsupport groups but declined somewhat as the depression ended.

A widespread and persistent notion is that children make for greater marital happiness. This is based upon the fact that in about two-thirds of divorce cases there are no children reported. (See Chart CXVII.) In some of these cases there have undoubtedly been children, but they are now mature and therefore not reported in the divorce record. In by far the greater part of this group, however, no children have been born, and hence the conclusion that had there been children there would have been no divorce. When, however, nonsupport cases are compared with divorce, one finds that a much smaller proportion of these couples are childless, and this leads one to suspect much more that economic level may affect the matter of childless marriage than that childlessness is the cause of domestic conflict. This conclusion is further borne out by the decrease in childlessness up to twenty years of married life, after which there is an increase. (See Chart CXVIII.) This increase after twenty years of marriage means little, since the probability is that if there were children they frequently would be of age and not reported in the divorce complaint. This decrease in childlessness to the twentieth year of married life and increase thereafter is paralleled by the mean number of children at each of the five-year periods. Thus, while children may act as a deterrent to divorce action in some instances, there is nothing to indicate in these data that childlessness is one of the causes of domestic discord. About all one may say by way of generalization from divorce data is that the longer couples are married the less likely they are to get a divorce and the more likely they are to have children.

Children do play some role in determining whether the husband or the wife will be the complainant. Thus, as may be seen in Chart CXIX, childlessness is higher in those suits in which the husband is the complainant. Not only does this indicate that the mean number of children is smaller when the husband is the complainant because of the larger proportion of childlessness, but

CHART CXIX


NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY COMPLAINANT IN DIVORCE CASES: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1930 TO 1935



also for those cases in which there are children the mean number is larger when the wife is the complainant. This may, of course, reflect nothing more than a general inclination of the court to favor the wife as the complainant when children are involved in

CHART CXX

DIVORCES CLASSIFIED BY GROUNDS: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1919, 1929, 1935




the dissolution of the marriage and the tendency for this practice to carry over more persistently when there are several children than when there are few.

The grounds upon which divorce is granted have often been considered of some significance in the understanding of the conflict which has led to marriage disintegration. It has been well established that in the comparison of divorce data from state to state differences in the frequency with which divorce is granted upon what appear to be common grounds show little about the causes of divorce; they instead reflect variations in the definition of these grounds, either in legislation or administrative practices, or are functions of the range of choice of grounds provided in a particular state. However, this does not preclude all use of such data so far as a particular judicial district is concerned. In fact, shifts in the proportions of divorces granted from time to time within such an area, as are revealed in Chart CXX, call for some explanation and may throw some light upon the process of marriage disintegration. The first shift which comes to one's atten-

CHART CXXI

PER CENT OF ALL DIVORCES GRANTED FOR PRINCIPAL GROUNDS: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1919, 1929 TO 1935




tion is that in the percentages of divorces granted upon the grounds of desertion. Here the movement is not in a single direction, but instead first decreases and then increases. This change is shown in greater detail in Chart CXXI in which it is quite clear that the decline in the percentage of divorce granted for desertion persisted until 1931 when an upward movement set in. The rise in the percentage of divorces granted for desertion is clearly a reflection of the legislative act changing the definition of the time element from two years to one year, since it was in this year that the legislature changed the divorce law. Thus the increase in the percentage of desertion cases is clearly the reflection of the change in the legal definition. This, however, does not explain the decline previous to the liberalization of the law, which seems to reflect an increasing reluctance upon the part of persons desiring divorce to wait the two years required and the utilization of other charges whenever possible.

Decline in the proportion of divorces granted upon a particular ground means of necessity an increase in the proportion of another or others unless some new cause has been introduced, as has not been true in Illinois. Examination of Chart CXXI will readily show that none of the major grounds except cruelty could have been the recipient of this shift. In fact the pattern of change in the percentages of divorces granted upon the grounds of cruelty has been essentially the reverse of that for desertion. This leads to the conclusion that many cases in which desertion was the charge in the earlier period might quite as appropriately have been prosecuted upon the charge of cruelty and were so prosecuted under the pressure to hasten the divorce process, or that judges became more lenient in their definition of cruelty, admitting evidence of mental as well as physical cruelty, or that there was an increase in perjured evidence.

It is quite clear that though substitution of cruelty for desertion may explain the decrease in desertion as a charge, the phenomenal increase in desertion cannot be accounted for alone in terms of the reversal of this process. The percentage of divorces granted for cruelty in 1935 became substantially what it had been in 1919, a drop of 14 per cent, but the percentage of desertion cases increased 5 per cent more than this. Furthermore, in the period, 1919 to 1930, the percentage of cruelty cases had increased 13 per cent rather than the 5 per cent decline in desertion. Consequently, it seems probable that in part cruelty was the recipient of pressure from other quarters within this period, pressure which, with the liberalization of the time interval in desertion, became shunted into this channel. The charge which most clearly shows this is that of adultery which has shown a constant decline in percentage throughout the period under discussion. Since of all the legal causes of divorce the greatest social stigma is attached to adultery, this trend clearly indicates a progressive disinclination to utilize this charge and to substitute whatever other charge or charges seem to be the most acceptable at the moment. Thus, an increasing tendency to seek divorce

CHART CXXII

NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY GROUNDS IN DIVORCE CASES: COOK COUNTY, 1930 TO 1935



out of some sort of mutual agreement appears to be reflected in the trend in adultery cases.

The net result of these changes in the frequency of the use of the principal charges in divorce cases suggests that divorce has become more and more a matter of mutual consent and agreement. The natural tendency under these conditions is to select that charge which will lead to as little embarrassment for the defendant as possible, so long as this does not involve deferring the divorce too long after separation.

The grounds for divorce are also linked with the number of children in the family, and since it hardly seems possible that the charge or the basic situation underlying the charge could be in any sense the cause of the size of the family, the most plausible explanation is that the size of the family has something to do in the selection of a particular complaint. Thus childless marriages more commonly result in charges of desertion and less commonly in charges of drunkenness, with cruelty and adultery intermediate between these two extremes. (See Chart CXXII.) Or to put it differently, the range is from a mean of .47 children in deser-

tion cases to .83 children in cases when drunkenness is the charge, with cruelty (.57 children) and adultery (.59 children) in between. The larger percentage of childlessness in desertion cases suggests that in the absence of children, and when they are fewer in number, the pressure to hasten divorce action is not so great, since alimony is less likely to be an important consideration. The smaller proportion of childlessness and the corresponding larger mean number of children in cases of drunkenness suggest that this charge is more frequently used by that part of the population which is more likely to have larger families or else that drunkenness and the inclination to have large families are both consequences of common factors.


Analysis of the relationship among legal causes of divorce at a particular time, from year to year, or in connection with other characteristics of divorce reveals indirectly some of the attitudes which prevail in society toward the dissolution of marriage through this process but does not throw much light upon the process of marriage disorganization. Nevertheless, the fact that shifts take place in the conceptions of a social group toward the dissolution of marriage and the conditions under which divorce is sought suggests that these changes may not be uniform for all parts of the social group and that an analysis of such differentials will in part throw light upon the causal factors.

Religious affiliation also has persisted in the minds of many persons interested in the family as a causal factor in the disorganization of marriage. The customary conception is twofold: First, some religious affiliations because of the emphasis of the church upon the sanctity of marriage lead to greater family stability. Secondly, marriage between persons affiliated with different faiths complicates the problem of marriage adjustment by providing the background for conflict over religion.

Divorce records in the United States do not contain the religious affiliation of the persons seeking divorce. Data from the Court of Domestic Relations in Chicago, however, show the religious affiliation of both husband and wife in nonsupport suits.

CHART CXXIII

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES IN NONSUPPORT CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




The first fact about religious affiliation which stands out is that more than 80 per cent of the couples (see Chart CXXIII) are alike in their religious affiliations. Furthermore, the religiously homogeneous marriages are essentially equal in proportion for both Catholic and Protestant groups, although the Catholic Church places greater emphasis upon the sanctity of marriage than do Protestant churches in general. It is also interesting that intermarriages between Catholics and Protestants constitute a group somewhat more than 40 per cent of the number in either of the two religiously homogeneous groups. This substantial percentage of intermarriages tempts those who are convinced in advance of the undesirability of such marriage practices to conclude that differences in religion create conflict. Such statistical findings, however, do not lead to any such conclusion, since in the absence of facts concerning the distribution of religious affiliation of husbands and wives in the population from which nonsupport cases come, there is no way of knowing the extent to which the distribution varies from that of all marriages within

this particular social class, economically the lower in the population.

Somogyi has analyzed the factor of religion with reference to divorce in Hungary.[1] By analyzing the variations in the distribu-

CHART CXXIV

ENDURANCE OF MARRIAGE AMONG COUPLES OF LIKE AND UNLIKE NATIONALITY BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: COURT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, CHICAGO, 1921 *



* Data from Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, pp. 105-106.

tion of the several religious groups by occupations and by rural-urban residence, he comes to the conclusion that these variations could account for the differences in the divorce rates more plausibly than religious affiliation.[2] These findings confirm a similar conclusion arrived at by the present writer from an analysis of homogamous and mixed marriages with reference to nationality

[1] Stephen Somogyi, "Differential Divorce Rates by Religious Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. XLVI (March, 1941), pp. 665-685.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 685.

and religiously homogamous and mixed marriages within each of these nationality groups. Within the group of intermarriage between persons of different nationality, the distributions by length of married life for the three most common religious affiliations, both Protestant, both Catholic, and one Catholic and the other Protestant, are substantially alike. (See Chart CXXIV.) When comparison is made between these three groups among marriages between persons of the same nationality, substantial differences appear between the Catholic and Protestant groups, but when homogamous and mixed nationality groups are compared within a religious group, the only significant differences are in the Catholic. This suggests, therefore, that the nationality factor is more important than religion, but it in turn may be a function of some other characteristic or characteristics which have not been taken into account.[4]

SEASONAL AND CYCLICAL VARIATIONS IN DIVORCE

Other writers have approached the analysis of divorce from a somewhat different point of view and have attempted to find the causal pattern in the fluctuations in the phenomenon of divorce, rather than in the characteristics of the persons seeking divorce or of the marriage situation as revealed in the suit. Thus it has been contended that divorce is related to the season of the year and to the business cycle.


Examination of the number of divorce libels filed each month reveals two peaks and three low points. (See Chart CXXV.) One of the low points is in February, and since no adjustment has been made for the differences in the number of days the courts operate from month to month, it seems a natural conclusion to attribute this low point to the shortness of this month. This leaves, then, peaks in March and October and troughs in July and December. Since Christmas intervenes between the peaks of October and March, one is tempted to conclude that this has something to do with the decline in the number of divorce libels

[4] Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, revised edition, pp. 104-107.

at this time of the year. If the Christmas spirit lessens the tendency toward conflict in marriage, then perhaps there is something in the summer season which produces the same result and explains the trough in July. Of course, as Hexter, points out,

CHART CXXV

LIBELS IN THE SUPERIOR AND CIRCUIT COURTS: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1890 TO 1924



divorce libels filed in the summer season will not on the whole be given an earlier hearing than those filed in September and October, and besides the lawyers are out of town on vacation. Nevertheless, he feels confident that there is a real slump in the summer.[4]

[4] Maurice B. Hexter, *Social Consequences of Business Cycles*, p. 99.

Comparison of the seasonal fluctuations in the filing of libels other than divorce brings out an interesting contrast. Both patterns are essentially alike except at two points. The Christmas spirit explanation seems to be as good as any for the low point in the divorce-libel curve in December as compared to the intermediate or normal position of the curve of all other libels. But when one turns to the summer section of the two curves, he finds the peak of the curve of all other libels opposite the low point in the divorce-libel curve. How can a part of the drop in divorce libels be the result of the fact that lawyers are on vacations? It would seem to be more plausible to say that since they are so busy filing other libels, which under court rules must be filed before a summer deadline in order to be placed upon the autumn calendar whereas divorce libels can be placed upon the calendar at any time, divorce libels are deferred if possible. This suggests that the most important element in the seasonal fluctuations of divorce is the character of the judicial process, and until one can be sure that there is anything left after this has been allowed for, there is little need for further explanation.

Analyses of the relationship of divorce to the business cycle have yielded varying results from the absence of connection to a comparatively high degree of synchronization of movement in the cycles of the two series. Thus Ogburn and Thomas calculated the correlation between divorces granted and business conditions as represented by an index made up of nine elements.[5] For the period, 1867 to 1906, these writers found a coefficient of correlation of .70. When divorces lagged one year, the coefficient dropped to .58. This would seem to indicate a comparatively close and immediate connection between divorce and business conditions. But when a series for a somewhat longer period of time was obtained for the thirteen states of Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New

[5] William F. Ogburn and Dorothy S. Thomas, "The Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Sept., 1922, reprinted in Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, pp. 66-68.

Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, the coefficient of correlation shrank to .33.

Hexter correlated the cycles in divorce libels in Boston with the U. S. Bureau of Labor's index of wholesale prices and obtained much lower coefficients, approaching zero for synchronous pairings and reaching a *negative* correlation of .31 with divorce lagging twenty-four months. While Hexter used monthly data, his periods were short, the highest coefficient being obtained for a period of six years. But the smallness of all his coefficients, fluctuating from .11 to —.31, suggests that there is no connection between divorce in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and business conditions in the United States.[6]

Thomas found that there is no correlation between divorce in England and business conditions for the period, 1854 to 191 , for synchronous pairing of indices or when the divorce rate was lagged one, two, and three years. When, however, she broke up the period into three approximately equal parts, coefficients were found ranging from .26 for divorce rates during the period, 1858 to 1875, lagging three years to —.36 for divorce rates during the period, 1876 to 1894, lagging three years. Thus Thomas's coefficients cover a wider range than Hexter's although the latter paired his indices by both leading and lagging the divorce rate twenty-three and twenty-five months respectively. Furthermore, in Hexter's analysis as in Thomas's the highest coefficients invariably were found when only a segment of the entire period was used and with divorce lagging two years or more. In each instance the coefficient is *negative*, whereas the Ogburn and Thomas study yielded a comparatively high positive coefficient for synchronous items and a somewhat lower coefficient when the divorce rate was lagged one year. The relatively high standard errors of the coefficients in the analyses of Thomas suggest that she is right in saying that there is no connection between divorce and business conditions in England and Wales.[7]

[6] See Maurice B. Hexter, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-159.

[7] Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, pp. 90-92.

The same considerations would lead one to conclude that this would be as true of Hexter's findings. This raises the question of how much the coefficient of correlation between business conditions and divorce may be a function of the method of analysis. At any rate, it seems clear that Hexter's use of the Bureau of Labor's index of wholesale prices in the United States as a measure of business conditions in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, is not likely to give a very sensitive index. Consequently, it seems justifiable to ignore the findings of Hexter in this regard and accept those of Ogburn and Thomas so far as the United States is concerned.

Assuming, then, some appreciable connection between the business cycle and divorce, the question of interpretation arises. Divorce entails additional expense to the complainant in the form of legal fees and court costs, and this in times of business depression is likely to act somewhat as a deterrent to filing suit for divorce. For the husband, there is also the possibility that the wife will ask for alimony, and this will also act as a deterrent upon suits by the husband when business conditions are unfavorable, although the wife may not be so greatly affected.[8] There is not, however, any reason to believe that marriage adjustment itself is related to the cycle in business conditions, even though there is a connection so far as divorce rates are concerned.

From the analysis up to this point, it is apparent that data upon the disintegration of the family, whether of divorce or nonsupport, throw little light upon the stability of marriage because of the many administrative and legal factors which operate differentially. The operation of these legal and administrative factors produces variations not only in the rates of different areas but in the characteristics of the marriage situations out of which the divorce action eventuates. In spite of these difficulties, may there not be some procedure by which significant understanding of marriage stability may be achieved through the analysis of family disintegration? If the administrative and legal factors

[8] Cf. *Ibid.*, p 67.


could be held constant for different areas or for the same area at different times would this not eliminate many of the shortcomings of the analysis of social disintegration? The ecological approach [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] areas of a city by natural areas [illegible] which there are [illegible] Chicago reveals wide differences within a single [illegible] These [illegible] are heard with no reference to the [illegible] part of the city in which they occur. These differences [illegible] the administrative [illegible] Delinquency rates, accordingly, [illegible] disorganization [illegible] marriage relationships that [illegible]

[illegible] most striking [illegible] natural areas [illegible] Chicago. Hegewisch and Arc[illegible] Hyde Park [illegible] both [illegible] rates [illegible] over 1000 per [illegible] [illegible] 1934–36. The areas [illegible] for the same period [illegible] eighteenth and [illegible] areas having [illegible] rates. The two areas [illegible] in the range of [illegible] are in peripheral [illegible] suggesting that the [illegible] might be [illegible] which in fact it is. (See Chart CXVI.) The distribution of rates within this range, however, is [illegible]ed, there being only four other communities which had rates above 75 and all being below 100. Of these four the area which had the highest rate is the heterogeneous area of the Near North Side with its Gold Coast, Bohemia, Hobohemia, and Little Sicily, contributing in radically varying degrees to the general rate of the whole community. The other three areas, Woodlawn, Uptown, and Ashburn, are all communities which in one way or another have experienced a radical transition in their way of life, the first two changing from essentially stable middle-class residential areas to communities dominated by sub-

CHART CXXVI




business centers of rapid expansion, the third from a rural community into an industrial area

As has already been pointed out, however, any dependence

upon the divorce rate alone for an index of family disintegration tends to exclude from consideration those persons in the population who cannot afford divorce. Nonsupport rates complete the picture and again reveal wide diversity between areas. Two areas, Riverdale and Hegewisch, had not a single case of nonsupport in the seven-year period, 1929 to 1935. In part, this is the consequence of the fact that, on the whole, nonsupport cases in this and several adjoining areas are generally heard in the local police court which operates in this area upon an unspecialized basis. Since to include cases from this court would introduce administrative differentials, only those cases reaching the Court of Domestic Relations have been included in the rates. And while the total number of cases from this overlapping of jurisdiction has been decreased by the presence of this local court, nevertheless other communities within its district have contributed to the Court of Domestic Relations total, and, furthermore, diminishing rates surrounding the police court jurisdiction suggest that the general pattern would not have been greatly disturbed had it been possible to add the comparable cases heard in the local police court. At any rate, three communities (Edison Park, Beverly, and West Pullman), not affected by this overlapping of jurisdiction, had yearly mean rates of 2 or less per 10,000 married persons. The highest rate was 33 for Douglas, predominately Negro, a rate some fifteen times the lower end of the range. The consequence is that the spread in rates from the two extremes is proportionally that found in divorce, but the distribution of rates does not show the extreme skewness of the divorce rates. In fact whereas in the divorce series there is only one rate in the upper two-thirds of the range, in the nonsupport series approximately one-third of the communities had rates within the upper two-thirds of the range.


The pattern in Chart CXXVII is quite different from that in Chart CXXVI in many respects although in general it may be said to represent an expansion of the central core of high family disintegration from the central business district into the deterio-

CHART CXXVII



rating ("blighted") areas surrounding it. The outlying areas of high divorce are low in nonsupport, except for Ashburn which maintains essentially the same position in the nonsupport pattern which it occupies in the divorce pattern.

CHART CXXVIII



If one combines nonsupport and divorce cases into a common index of family disintegration, the result is perhaps a more accurate portrayal of the variations in the disorganization of marriage


than either of the indices alone portrays. (See Chart CXXVIII.) The range in family disintegration rates is from 15 (Hegewisch) to 300 (Loop) per 10,000 married persons, the upper end of the range being twenty times the size of the lower. Only two communities (Near North Side and Ashburn) besides the central business district fall within the upper two-thirds of this range, two of the four which fell within the same proportional part of the divorce range.

It is quite clear, accordingly, that the disintegration of the family is closely related to the urbanization of life, since the most urbanized areas are also those which have the greatest family disintegration. Urbanization of life means multiplicity of contacts, casual and specialized relations in which only a segment of the personality is involved, freedom of the individual from the control of the primary group exercised through gossip and community status. Under these conditions the family is subjected to a series of stresses and strains, as is every other phase of human relationships, unknown under the simpler conditions of rural life, and its instability is thereby increased.

Not only does urbanization result in greater disintegration of the family, but many of the basic characteristics of disintegrated families are affected. Thus, whereas the husband is the complainant in only about one-fourth of the divorce suits for Chicago as a whole, there is a wide variation between communities. (See Chart CXXIX.) In part, ratios above that for the city as a whole seem to be associated with the higher rates of divorce, but there are notable exceptions, as comparison of Charts CXXVI and CXXIX will reveal. On the other hand, areas in which the ratios are decidedly below the city norm are invariably either peripheral or near-peripheral in location and therefore are characterized by rural attitudes in which the wife's status is placed in greater jeopardy if she is the defendant in a divorce suit.


The percentages of childlessness also vary considerably from community to community from the normal two-thirds for the city as a whole. (See Chart CXXX.) In general, areas of rela-

CHART CXXIX




tively high childlessness in divorce suits are those of extremes so far as location is concerned. Thus the highly urbanized areas present high percentages along with peripheral areas which are

CHART CXXX



more rural in character. The explanation of the high percentages in these peripheral areas is probably a reflection of the large proportion of marriages of relatively short duration in the popu-

CHART CXXXI



lation, since the younger age groups predominate in these areas. The larger percentages in the more urbanized sections probably reflect the tendency toward fewer children in these areas. There

is, however, one notable exception, namely the central business district in which childlessness in divorce cases is low. It will be recalled that the percentage of suits filed by the husband was highest for the city in this section. This suggests that divorce in this area is largely a migratory phenomenon in which the husband leaves his wife and children in some other part of the city and establishes his residence in the central business district.

Further variations are found in the per cent of divorces granted upon the grounds of desertion. While for the city as a whole, approximately two-thirds of all divorces were granted for desertion, there are areas substantially above and below this proportion. (See Chart CXXXI.) Since these variations are more or less random in character, the explanation of them is obscure.

Further relationship between the character of areas and the rate of family disintegration may be obtained by correlating community rates with such data about the communities which the United States census provides. These correlations have been calculated by pairing the family-disintegration rate and the divorce rate with census data.[9]


The mean age of the population is greater in about the same areas which have the highest divorce rates, although the coefficient is moderate. (See Chart CXXXII.) This is to be expected in part since, with a high mean age, the proportion of the population who are married is larger, and therefore the probability of divorce is greater. Adding nonsupport rates to divorce to give a general rate of family disintegration reduces the coefficient somewhat and suggests that differences in age distribution do not sufficiently explain the relationship between divorce and mean age. High mean age may and often does denote small families, and therefore it seems likely that the correlation between the divorce rate and the mean age reflects the correlation between

[9] The family-disintegration rate is for 1929 and is the number of cases of divorce and nonsupport per 10,000 population; the divorce rate is a mean for the years, 1929 to 1930, and is expressed in ratio to the total population.

small families and divorce, the coefficient being reduced when nonsupport cases are added, since these cases come from areas of large families. This interpretation is confirmed when the divorce rate is correlated with the size of the family as reported by

CHART CXXXII

CORRELATION OF CENSUS VARIABLES WITH DIVORCE AND FAMILY DISINTEGRATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1930



the census. This leads to the conclusion that not only are families in divorce cases small (two-thirds childless as has been pointed out) but this smallness of the disintegrated family is but a reflection of the smallness of all families in these areas which contribute greatest to the divorce total.

Family disintegration is more prevalent in those areas in which there is greater variability in the size of the family. If variability

is taken as an index of heterogeneity, this would suggest that homogeneous areas have less family disintegration than do the areas of heterogeneous character.

By and large, the areas of high divorce are also those in which reside the larger proportion of the divorced in the population. The relationship is reduced when nonsupport cases are added, since neither the divorced nor those who seek divorce live in the areas from which the bulk of the nonsupport cases come. These results show that if there is movement into the more disorganized areas in advance of divorce, this movement is not reversed after the divorce has been obtained.

Thus family disintegration is one of the consequences of the forces which operate in the urbanization processes of city life. The most striking feature of the divorce pattern is that the rate is highest in those parts of the city which are most urbanized—hotel and rooming-house districts, the more congested apartment areas of the middle and upper classes. This does not mean, however, that the economic level of the community is one of the determining factors in family disintegration. Areas of high mean rental and of high mean values of owned homes do not always have high divorce rates, particularly if they are in sections of the city which are peripheral to the central business district and to the lake front. Furthermore, slum areas and communities undergoing rapid transition, either in terms of the use of the land or of population elements, tend to have high nonsupport rates and must be added to the pattern of family disintegration. Wherever, accordingly, the process of urbanization breaks down the patterns of tradition, either as a consequence of social disorganization or as the result of a changed way of life, the family relationship becomes less stable. Thus family disintegration is but a part of variant behavior which characterizes those areas in which the individual tends to find satisfaction in hedonistically defined forms instead of in conformance with the culturally defined pattern.

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XVIII

Family Disorganization

As HAS BEEN pointed out in the preceding chapter, analysis of the data of family disintegration throws little light upon the processes involved, which come to a climax in the dissolution of marriage. Similar analysis of the climaxes of the other forms of family disorganization, parent-child conflicts and sibling conflicts, would likewise reveal little of fundamental understanding of these aspects of family disorganization. And all this because both are concerned with the analysis of finished products, dramatic occurrences in which the family has lost its identity. But the sequence of conflicts which stand as a series of steps to the final denouement is left untouched and unapprehended. Basically this is the heart of the problem.

Not all conflict in family relations, whether between husband and wife, parent and child, or siblings, represents family disorganization. Some conflict is inevitable and is merely the reflection of the fact that there is a differentiation of persons in the relationship without which each individual would have no independent psychic existence. But this conflict finds expression within the defining and accommodating patterns of the social order and does not in any sense threaten the security of the sanctioned relationship. It is only as the conduct of the individual is directed into hedonistically defined channels and challenges the socially generated patterns of accommodation that we have family disorganization.

Variant behavior in family relations is not coterminous with

variability in the character of the relationship. The cultural pattern establishes limits within which a wide range of variability may exist without in any way implying a break in the sanctioned pattern. And while it is difficult to make the differentiation between those variations in the character of the family relationship which do and do not imply eventual break in the cultural pattern, nevertheless the difference exists and has to be taken into account in any analysis of family disorganization.

Furthermore, variant behavior itself as it finds expression in family disorganization belongs to two categories. First, there is that type of variant behavior which derives its character out of hedonistically defined impulses and attitudes. Social approval is ignored or rebelled against, rather than supplicated. This type of variant behavior has much in common with that in delinquency except that the attitude of society is more tolerant. Secondly, there is that type of variant behavior which is the natural extension of personality disorganization. The forms of expression of personality disorganization in family relations are as varied as the types of personalities involved in the relationship.

THE DOMESTIC DISCORD PATTERN

This distinction between the two types of variant behavior as reflected in the marriage relationship is essentially parallel to the differentiation which Harriet R. Mowrer makes between domestic discord which arises out of the marriage situation and that which arises out of personality disorganization.[1] Thus on one hand, the determining elements in the domestic discord patterning arise out of the character of the needs for adjustment initiated by marriage; whereas on the other they are premarital in origin and are corollary to the disorganization which takes place in other phases of social adjustment.

In a sense, all domestic discord is the consequence of personality elements, since in these instances in which conflict arises out of the marriage situation, the conflicting elements are the con-

[1] *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, p. 149.

sequences of differentials in the personality make-ups of the two individuals concerned. That is, conflict is the result of clash in attitudes and wishes of the two persons and these have grown out of their cultural experiences, chiefly prior to marriage. But no basic elements in the relationship between the various parts of the personality which constitutes the pattern of life are involved. While the source of the conflicting elements is chiefly in the experiences of the individual prior to marriage, experiences subsequent to marriage may play an important role in the causative pattern.

The basic patterns of the clash in marriage relations are the same regardless of the source of the elements which function in the relationship. Thus the disorganization of personality represents a superimposition upon the basic structure, complicating the pattern but in no wise altering its essential character. It is quite appropriate to begin the analysis of domestic discord with the differentiation of patterns which constitute the substructure of all domestic conflict.

A number of attempts have been made to differentiate the basic patterns of marital conflict. The range in the number of proposed patterns has been from three to thirteen. Burgess, who initiated the analysis of patterns under the term, "tensions," differentiated seven. These he called economic, sex, health, respect, cultural, temperamental, and pattern of life.[2] The present writer reduced the number to four which he described as incompatibility in response, economic individualization, cultural differentiation, and individuation of life patterns.[3] Kreuger expanded the classification to thirteen which he called economic, occupation, response (sex), control (positional relationship of members to each other), status (positional relationship of the family in social participation), culture, philosophy of life, temperament, health, individual capacities and abilities, appetites and habits,

[2] See Ernest R. Mowrer, "The Study of Family Disorganization," *Family*, vol. VIII (May, 1927), pp. 83, 85-87.

[3] *Family Disorganization*, pp. 196-215.

personal-behavior pattern, and age.[4] Folsom reduced the number to three: noninterpersonal frustrations, love frustrations, and inferiority frustrations.[5]

All of these classifications were developed out of sketchy case studies in which the range of data obtained varied considerably. In contrast, the differentiation of patterns developed by Harriet R. Mowrer out of her clinical experiences with a comparatively large number of cases furnishes a more satisfactory background for the understanding of domestic discord.[6] The patterns in this differentiation are sex conflict, response conflict, and cultural conflict.

THE SEX-CONFLICT PATTERN[7]

Modern marriage has become an arrangement in which the basic satisfactions are those which result from the intimacy of association. Thus the desire for love, affection, understanding, preferential treatment, sympathy, sexual identification through mutual satisfaction, and emotional identification and incorporation becomes the basis for success or failure in marriage. This desire is for "response," and in it are merged a wide range of impulses and wishes including that of sex.

But while the sex impulse and its satisfactions are in many instances under modern conditions a part of the larger pattern of response, there are conditions under which sex becomes differentiated from the rest of the response relationship. That is, the desire for sexual release becomes set off apart from the desires for love, affection, and comradeship and has little meaning beyond the segmental satisfactions of the craving itself. Under these conditions, one can quite appropriately speak of sex as contrasted to response conflict. In making this distinction, how-

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[4] E. T. Kreuger, "A Study of Marriage Incompatibility," *Family*, vol. IX (April, 1928), pp. 53-60.

[5] Joseph K. Folsom, *The Family*, pp. 468-472.

[6] *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord*, pp. 149-212.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 149-169; also "Sex as a Factor in Domestic Discord," *American Sociological Review*, vol. I (April, 1936), pp. 252-263.

ever, it should be kept in mind that this differentiation between sex and response is seldom complete, varying all the way from complete dissociation to complete identity. Under conditions of complete identity, sexual contacts and satisfactions symbolize the exclusive character of marriage relations and become at one with the satisfactions of response which derive from that relationship.

Sex as differentiated from response conflict has its origin in the differential character of the sex impulses of husband and wife. On the whole, except for the factor of periodicity, whatever differences exist are the consequences of the cultural experiences of the individual, rather than a matter of physiology. In American culture the inequalities of sex are rapidly breaking down, and as a consequence the differential cultural factors which operated in the past to sublimate the natural sexual impulse in women are less potent. Nevertheless, many women still continue to enter marriage somewhat handicapped by the low repute in which the female sex impulse has been held.

In contrast to women, men have always held less puritanical attitudes toward sex. And while sex may not have always been a subject for frank discussion and respectable treatment, nevertheless its satisfactions and demands were taken as inevitable. This differential in attitudes and conception of the sex impulse was rationalized in terms of physiology and conventionalized in the double standard of morals.

The consequence of this differential conditioning of the two sexes has been that women on the whole enter marriage with less preparation for the sexual relationship than do men. Initial sexual relations frequently result in shock to the wife and the strengthening of the notion that the sexual relationship is a one-sided affair. It is this outlook which makes it possible for the wife to use acquiescence in sexual relations as a control device for getting her way in other aspects of marriage relations, a practice invariably resented by the husband for its symbolic implication of the breakdown in mutuality.

Even in the absence of aversions toward sex, initial sexual rela-

tions are likely to be unsatisfactory for the wife in terms of the physiological character of sexual release. But even here it is difficult to differentiate between what is basically biological in character and what is a consequence of social conditioning. There is no evidence that this condition is universal, and this leads one to doubt the biological explanation. Nevertheless, failure to experience satisfactory release of the sexual impulse leads to emotional upsets in the wife and to bitterness and resentment which find expression indirectly in a wide variety of ways.

Fear of pregnancy often makes the sexual relationship an unsatisfactory and precarious aspect of marriage. Disinclination to make the sacrifices necessitated in many instances by childbirth and fear of the pain and discomfort involved lead to resentment and incrimination, each blaming the other for the situation out of which the fear has arisen. The pains and experience of confinement and childbirth often further accentuate this initial fear or, in the absence of it, become the subsequent source. Knowledge of contraceptive techniques often helps to counteract this tendency toward sexual conflict, but so long as these are not infallible, some conflicts of this character will continue to arise.

Knowledge of sexual irregularities prior to marriage, particularly upon the part of the woman, frequently becomes the basis for intense sexual conflict. Not infrequently these experiences are resented by the marriage partner, particularly where he is a virgin, but even in the presence of common sexual irregularities, conflict often arises. Frequently this conflict takes the form of jealousy of any contacts upon the part of the marriage partner with members of the opposite sex and the suspicion of continued sexual irregularities even in the absence of the slightest shreds of evidence. Feelings of inferiority in the sexual relationship under these circumstances become projected upon the marriage partner in the form of suspicions and accusations. Even when sexual liberties prior to marriage have been restricted to the two persons themselves, sexual conflict often arises and takes the same form

as that where the persons have been other than the marriage partner.

But sexual conflict does not necessarily arise out of dissatisfactions in the sexual relationship itself. In fact conflict in any other aspect of marriage may find expression in the sexual relationship. Or what is perhaps more common, dissatisfactions in sexual adjustment find expression in other areas of relationship. Sexual conflict seldom stands alone as the sole expression of domestic discord but becomes intimately tied up with the whole of the marriage relationship. Particularly is this true so far as the response realm is concerned where sexual dissatisfactions both symbolize and are symbolized by conflicts in the response relationship.

THE RESPONSE-CONFLICT PATTERN[8]

Response conflict represents that failure to achieve identity of purpose and understanding which the marriage relationship implies under modern conditions. In its most complete development, the response realm incorporates not only the tender emotions of love and affection, but the sex impulse itself except to the extent to which cultural conditioning has produced dissociation unknown in the inherent nature of man. But it is also important to recognize that cultural development has redefined the character of the inherent sexual impulse into a wide variety of indirect expressions, some of which have largely if not completely lost their sexual connections. Consequently response may and often does stand alone without any sexual counterparts as may be seen in many response relations outside of marriage.

In response conflict, accordingly, in so far as sex conflict can be thought of as apart from the wider range of conflicts in response relations, it is significant as symbolic of these broader dissatisfactions. In fact it is only as there is a merging of sex and response that sexual conflict is likely to threaten the stability of

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-190.

marriage. Complete dissociation between sex and response upon the part of both persons makes it possible for dissatisfactions in the sexual relationship to be offset by sexual contacts outside marriage, as has so frequently happened in the past.

Accord in response relations has to be achieved quite as much as in the sexual realm. And in the same way, differences in the specific character of the response desires as defined by previous experiences require accommodation. This process begins in courtship and becomes more imperative in marriage.

The problem of accommodation in response relations may, in many instances, be of quite a different character from that in the sexual realm. Invariably each individual has found some satisfaction for the desire for response in his social relationships prior to marriage—parent-child relationships, sibling relationships, intimate friendships, and so on. Marriage implies, in large part, the substitution of the marriage relationship for these other sources. Elements which interfere with or impede this process of substitution give rise to conflict in response relations.

It is the impeding character of familial attachments which gives significance to the so-called "in-law" problem. Unless attachments to one's family give way in the marriage relationship and permit the substitution of the husband or wife as the primary source of response satisfaction, conflict develops. Where close contacts continue, the marriage partner's position tends to become an anomalous one. He finds himself at once treated both as a stranger and taken for granted. Since he is now a member of the "family," little effort is made to facilitate his adjustment to the family milieu; yet such efforts would be forthcoming if he were an "outsider." Nevertheless, much of family interaction goes on upon such a level as to be incomprehensible to him in spite of the fact that he is assumed to play a part in it since he is a "member" of the family. His position is thus made doubly insecure and the husband-wife relationship becomes secondary to the familial relationship.

If a person to whom the marriage partner is attached resents

the marriage and looks upon the newcomer as a rival for the affections of the marriage partner, the conflict situation is accentuated. Under these conditions the rivalry between the two persons for the response of the third becomes so intense that any seeming preferential treatment of the familial member of the triangle implies betrayal of the marriage partner and is so interpreted. In the face of such strong attachments, the marriage partner often turns to the object of his attachment for advice and encouragement which, in the nature of the marriage arrangement, the person he has married has a right to expect. Thus the personality of the spouse suffers deflation, and the marriage relationship loses that monopolizing character which is the core of the response relationship.

Attachments to one's children also may result in response conflict. This is more common in the case of the wife than of the husband, largely because her relationship to household duties brings her into closer contact with the children, particularly when they are quite young. She may turn more and more to her children as a source for the satisfaction of the desire for response, leaving the husband with little or no source of satisfaction. Under these circumstances, the natural tendency is for the husband to turn eventually to other sources outside the marriage for response, and the marriage relationship loses much if not all of its significance to him.

Furthermore, differences in the strength and the character of expression in the response impulse give rise to conflict. Seldom have the conditioning experiences of early family life been uniform in the definition of the wish for response. Dissatisfactions therefore develop out of these differences and project themselves throughout the marriage relationship. In the absence of substitute satisfactions, the tendency is to work out some accommodation to these differences. Nevertheless, substitute sources of satisfaction, if not present in earlier attachments or within the family itself, are frequently developed. Or the gulf provided by conflict in response relations leads to a differentiation of

interests and contacts out of which develops further estrangement. This differentiation of interests and contacts, though closely related to response conflict, leads to what may be appropriately called cultural conflict.

THE CULTURAL-CONFLICT PATTERN[9]

Cultural conflicts arise out of differences in the cultural experiences of the two persons in the marriage relationship. These differences may exist at the time of marriage or be acquired out of the differential contacts of the persons subsequent to marriage. In either case their significance lies chiefly in their symbolization of absence of and barriers to identity in marriage relations. That is, they threaten or obstruct sympathetic understanding for many of the memories and meanings of present experiences upon the part of the other person. The consequence is that much of life experience continues to be a lonely affair, from which the individual attempted to escape through marriage.

Cultural differences, however, do not function uniformly in the production of conflict. Much depends upon the emotional setting of these differences. A strong dislike held by an individual toward experiences may be shared by the other person, in spite of the fact that he has never actually had similar experiences. Such aversions do not lead to cultural conflict, unless the other person accepts the difference in experience with condescension or if a strong feeling of inferiority on the part of the person who has had the disliked experience projects upon the marriage partner his own condescension toward it. But aversions and prejudices are not always shared by both persons. Furthermore, the individual in the face of mutual prejudices may find himself torn by conflict into denial of the prejudice in order to preserve his self-respect.

Differences in the mores of the groups in which the two persons have grown up tend to produce conflict in so far as these patterns of sanctioned conduct are identified with the personality

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-212.

and act as a unifying element to give meaning to life. If, on the other hand, the individual has accepted the mores of his group as merely instrumental devices for the regulation of social relationships and he has no particular attachment to them, such differences do not give rise to cultural conflict to any greater degree than differences in folkways which may result in minor tensions but are not otherwise significant, except as they come to symbolize more fundamental conflicts in the response realm.

It is, in fact, the symbolic character of cultural conflict from which it derives its primary significance. Thus while it is conceivable that differences in cultural background to which both individuals are closely identified might give rise to domestic discord and become the source from which conflict spreads, what is more common is that conflict arises in other realms, particularly response, and finds expression in cultural differences. Cultural differences furnish to the individual both a convenient scapegoat and a rationalization of more basic elements.

The symbolic role of cultural differences in domestic discord may be illustrated in the racial intermarriage situation. As a consequence of intermarriage, the couple tends to have a marginal position, although often seemingly accepted by whichever group has an inferior position in society. The result is that friends, relatives, and acquaintances tend to look upon both persons with suspicion and condescension, but this attitude is accentuated toward the outsider. Attachments to one's own group impede and interfere with accord in response relations in essentially the same way as attachments to members of one's family. In fact, such attachments have both a generalized and a particularized character. In the first place, because of insecurity in his own group one often experiences some feeling of inferiority for which he compensates through attitudes of magnanimity. This is the generalized phase. Secondly, his attachments to members of his own family, who in part participate in group disapproval of his marriage, become all the more important to him. This constitutes the particularized aspect. The inevitable conflict in

the response realm characteristic of all marriages becomes defined in terms of the differences in cultural backgrounds, even in the absence of essential differences.

Likewise, differences in cultural experiences resulting from long separation or divergence of contacts over some period of time provide a ready basis for rationalizing either the incomplete character of accord in the response realm prior to the acquisition of the divergent cultural elements or the imperceptible disintegration of that accord which had been achieved. The cultural differences become the convenient explanation of the invidious differences between the present character of the response relationship and the idealized pattern of the past.

These, then, constitute the basic patterns of domestic discord. Few, if any, cases of domestic discord reveal a single pattern. What more commonly happens is that these basic patterns are intertwined into a complex system of interrelationships. In turn these interrelationships are modified by the introduction of the varying patterns of personality organization of the two persons in the marriage.

When the personalities of the marriage partners are adjusted, the patterns of personality organization can for analytical purposes be ignored and only the three basic interaction patterns be taken into account. When there is personality disorganization, on the other hand, the pattern of the unadjusted personality is superimposed upon the basic background of domestic discord, further complicating the character of the marriage-adjustment process.

PERSONALITY TYPES AND DOMESTIC DISCORD [10]

Since the marriages in which both personalities are disorganized would not change the basic character of the pattern of domestic discord, one may conveniently restrict his analysis to the portrayal of the patterns in which a single personality type functions and that in terms of but one member of the marriage union.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-145.

The problem, then, is to see how the interjection of a particular kind of personality disorganization of one marriage partner results in the complication of the domestic discord patterns already described.

Personality disorganization, as has already been pointed out in Chapter X, is basically a matter of social adjustment. Whatever facilities or impediments the personality organization offers in adjusting to the demands of social life are going to operate in a similar fashion in the marriage situation which is but a part of a larger social relationship. And while it is true that the marriage relationship has elements which are in a sense peculiar to it, this leads only to an accentuation of the factor of personality disorganization in the adjustment process.

When the marriage relationship involves a mate of the conflicting-roles type of personality disorganization, the ambivalent attitudes toward the marriage partner impede particularly the matter of response accommodation. Under these circumstances, the individual cannot become wholly identified with the marriage partner, because he is not able to make up his mind that the person he married is the one he wanted to marry. Previous love affairs thus stand in the way of accommodation because of their identification with one of the contending roles. In turn, the present marriage is one between one role in the personality which is at loggerheads with another, or others. Subsequent love affairs reflect the partiality of choice involved in the present marriage. All of this the individual is conscious of in an ill-defined way, and his own feeling of infidelity results in constant turmoil within himself. He finds himself torn between two love objects, one of whom may be only a memory, unable to make a choice with any more facility than he has when confronted with the other problems of life.

The complications which conceivably can develop in marriage under these circumstances are legion, but the basic patterns can be charted. There is the partial dissatisfaction with the marriage upon the part of the disorganized person. Not only is

tension created by the inability to make a choice but also the feeling that one ought to choose, with its subsequent drive toward rationalization which will protect the ego. From the standpoint of the marriage partner, the relationship is quite as unsatisfactory. At times he feels himself quite fully identified with his mate and at others as if he were a complete stranger. Thus even from the standpoint of the marriage partner, the relationship is partial in character and involves only one role of the personality.

In the dual-roles type of personality, the duality in love object does not hamper the relationship with the marriage partner so long as there are no derivative contacts between the marriage partner and the second role. That is, the marriage as a relationship between only one role and the particular partner, and if social compartmentalization parallels psychic dissociation, there need be no discord. This parallelism in compartmentalization, however, is seldom established or, if established, tends to break down shortly. The duality leads to endless complications and results in rebellion upon the part of the marriage partner.

In some instances this rebellion of the marriage partner is the consequence of the fact that within marriage contacts themselves, the same role is not always involved. But more often than not, the "other" role becomes involved in contacts with members of the opposite sex and gives rise to suspected or actual infidelity. As this comes to the attention of the marriage partner, it tends to break down whatever accommodation has been achieved in the relationship.

Escape through illness accentuates the problem of marriage adjustment in a wide variety of ways. In the first place, there is the matter of sex adjustment. Since the illness-escape type of personality is chiefly characteristic of women, it tends to accentuate the puritanical attitudes toward sexual relations which characterize members of this sex. This is further complicated in the sexual realm by the fact that any discomfort in sexual relations or childbirth is avoided as part of the escape pattern. In the same way the responsibilities of marriage and the family are

avoided, thus throwing a greater burden upon the husband. In the response realm, greater demands are made, and there is less reciprocity. If satisfaction to these demands is not immediately forthcoming, intense jealousy is the consequence.

While on the whole the very nature of the complaints of the wife are such as to arouse sympathy and tolerance, their constant recurrence in the face of medical treatment eventually arouses grave doubts in the mind of the husband. Not infrequently escape through illness is buttressed by the use of other escapes, temper tantrums, accusations of lack of sympathy, or refractory behavior. When there have been no inhibitions toward sexual relations, or whatever inhibitions existed have broken down, sexual response may become accentuated as a symbol of attention and affection and may lead to intense sexual desire, beyond the ability of the husband to satisfy. The consequence is to make the marriage relationship a wholly one-sided affair in which accommodations, in so far as they are achieved, are at the sacrifice of the higher- for lower-level satisfactions.

The pattern of domestic discord is complicated by the drink-escape type of personality in very much the same fundamental way as the illness-escape pattern, although the details vary largely as a consequence of the difference in the sex pattern. Since this escape is more common of husbands than of wives, whereas the opposite is true of the illness-escape type, tensions centering around the economic adjustment of the family are accentuated. In a sense this is symbolic of the contrast in the two types of patterns.

Escape through illness often produces tension in regard to the economic adjustment of the family because of its incessant drain upon the resources of the husband, but it seldom threatens the source of income as does escape through drink. Escape through illness upon the part of the husband, however, would present essentially the same pattern as escape through drink. The differences in the two escape patterns are a reflection of the respective social roles of men and women. Since adulthood and re-

sponsibility are for the married woman largely functions of the household, the demand for preferential treatment and facilitation in the escape from these responsibilities will be demanded primarily from members of the household, the husband being expected to play the major part in this facilitation. The husband, on the other hand, because of his traditional social role, makes greater demands upon nonfamily contacts for preferential treatment and facilitation in the escape from responsibilities, particularly in his vocational and professional relationships. The result is that the marriage relationship becomes the recipient of the disorganizing character of nonfamilial frustrations to a larger degree in escape through drink than through illness. This is, however, an incidental and not a fundamental difference.

In addition to the economic conflict created by the excessive drinking upon the part of the husband, the behavior of the husband under the influence of drink tends to be repulsive and degrading from the standpoint of both the wife and the children. Erratic treatment of the children, often including threats of or actual brutality, gives rise to hostility in the child. Added to this is the disrespect and disgust which comes from the lowered status of the child in the community as the consequence of having a "drunken" father. These attitudes become reflected in those of the wife and reinforce those more directly generated. Thus in the sexual realm, under the influence of drink the husband's advances become offensive. Likewise prolonged excessive drink tends to produce sexual impotency which accentuates the basic feeling of inferiority and leads to dissatisfaction upon the part of the wife as well. Thus under the influence of drink, the husband loses that reciprocity of attitude essential to marriage adjustment and becomes excessively attention-demanding in either a domineering or a supplicating manner.

Escape through phantasy has much in common with the other escapes through illness and drink so far as the personality is concerned, but the relationship with the marriage partner is some-

what different, and hence the domestic discord pattern takes on a somewhat variant character. In so far as the marriage partner is identified with the role from which the individual is attempting to escape through phantasy, many of the individual's attitudes are corollary to those which he takes toward the inferior role itself. The tendency is therefore to project upon the marriage partner his rebellion against the inferior role and to make of her the scapegoat for his failures in phantasy achievement. Furthermore, in so far as there is any achievement of the phantasy role, however precarious this achievement may be, behavior patterns appear at variance with those anticipated by the marriage partner and are often antagonistic to her. Here the character of the cultural and response conflicts which arise is not unlike that in situations in which the conflicting-roles type is involved, except to the extent that phantasy is successful, the marriage partner is alienated by the strangeness of the role, and when unsuccessful, the individual projects his resentment upon the marriage partner.

In so far as the achievement of the phantasy role leaves out of account the marriage partner, as it often does, contacts are likely to be in part with members of the opposite sex, and this gives rise to infidelity or to suspicions of unfaithfulness. This, then, becomes the source of sex conflict. In fact the exploitation of sex is often a device utilized by the individual in achieving the phantasy role, a utilization which is segmental in character and does not imply any unfaithfulness upon his part in spite of the marriage partner's interpretation to the contrary. In other instances, escape from the marriage relationship is quite as imperative as escape from the rest of the inferior role. But even marriages in terms of the phantasy role seem not to be any more successful than the stability of the role itself. Precariousness of achievement leads to erratic behavior as a consequence of the fear of deflation and makes response accord difficult to achieve.

Family disorganization, however, involves aspects of the family relationship other than that of the husband and wife. Of par-

ticular importance because of its relationship to other forms of personal and social disorganization is the conflict between parent and child.

PARENT-CHILD CONFLICT

Parent-child conflict is from the standpoint of the Freudians grounded in the Oedipus and Electra complexes in which the child of one sex is inclined to love the parent of the opposite sex and hate the parent of the same sex.[11] This tendency is strengthened by the parent's inconsiderateness or inclination to restrict the activities of the child of the same sex.

Parent-child conflicts, however, are not always between individuals of the same sex. Conflicts also arise in the family between the father and the daughter, mother and son, and in fact between both parents and the child regardless of its sex. This anomaly the Freudians are also able to explain, tracing it to one of two sources. First, a general tendency toward homosexuality in the child may cause him to prefer the parent of the same sex and, accordingly, hate the parent of the opposite sex. Thus we have the inversion of the Oedipus complex. Or the child may develop a hatred for the parent of the opposite sex, for whom at first he has only love, as a reaction to the natural tendency of the parent to display affection toward the other parent. Thus conflict arises out of jealousy on the part of the child for what from the child's view is undue attention given by the parent he loves to the parent he hates and looks upon as a rival.[12]

The Freudian explanation, however, is too simple and states too much in terms of instinctual sexual demands. Rather than conflict arising out of the inherent character of the child, it would seem instead to reflect the social matrix into which the child is born. On the whole, parents prefer children of the opposite sex, largely as the consequence of their own heterosexu-

[11] See J. C. Flügel, *The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family*, pp. 12-18.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

ality. In so far as a parent is in love with his marriage partner, he sees more in the offspring of the opposite sex which reminds him of his mate than in the child of the same sex. He may, of course, hate his marriage partner, but it is seldom that there is no ambivalence in his attitudes which may become the basis for even stronger affection for the child of the opposite sex as a substitute for the marriage partner because of the real or imputed resemblance to that part of the disliked mate for which he has a strong affection.

Nevertheless, any child regardless of sex may arouse antagonistic attitudes in the parent or be treated differentially by him. The child's initial antagonism, accordingly, is but a reflection of the antagonism of the parent. Neither are the restraints upon his impulsive activities the source of antagonism except as these restrictions are exercised in an unsympathetic or differential way, and as such they represent again the parent's antagonisms. The cultural pattern, however, enjoins common treatment to all children regardless of sex, with the result that differential and antagonistic attitudes represent variant behavior upon the part of the parent. A minimum of variant behavior, however, is tolerated and even assumed in actual practice, so long as it is offset by a ritualistic denial of its existence.

A second source of parent-child conflict lies in community relationships. After the child starts to school the parents find themselves confronted with a host of rivals for the affection and loyalty of the child. There had been community contacts prior to the entrance into the school situation, but these had been much less complete and compelling than they become with the school experience. The child up to this time has had to depend primarily upon the treatment accorded his brothers and sisters as his standard of judgment. Now he has superimposed upon this standard the treatment which he is accorded by other persons outside the family and the observed relationship between his playmates and their parents. Any sharp variances lead to dis-

satisfaction upon his part and to antagonisms toward his own parents. This is the source of what has often been dramatically called the "conflict between generations."

Myerson has developed the notion of conflict between generations particularly with reference to the strains and stresses between parents and children incident to immigration in which the children assimilate the culture of the new land while the parents hold on tenaciously to that of the homeland.[13] This identification with two different cultures throws into sharper relief the universal tendency toward conflict between generations.

The conflict between generations is the inevitable result of two elements in the parent-child relationship. In the first place, the child is inducted through the school into a cultural pattern somewhat at variance with that of the parent. This is one of the inevitable consequences of social change. But this induction into a changed pattern is not wholly a matter of school contacts. Changes have also taken place within the community in which the parent's participation has been partial. That is, some innovations he has accepted readily, whereas others he has resisted and often has developed strong antagonisms toward change in this regard. These antagonisms are highly personal in character and seem basic to his own feeling of integrity and self-respect. This is to say that these emotions are closely identified with his early experiences most of which have long since been forgotten. The child, however, has no way of appreciating this differential attitude of the parent toward innovations and looks upon the whole matter as irrational indeed. He is buttressed in this response by the support he receives in his contemporary group, which accepts all innovations with little or no resistance.

The second element in the conflict between generations is the inevitable development from dependence to independence. The cultural pattern demands of the child that he grow up and take on

[13] Abraham Myerson, "The Conflict between the New and the Old Generations," *Family*, vol. III (November, 1922), pp. 163-165; *Social Psychology*, pp. 563-567.

responsibilities. These responsibilities are made attractive to him by the privileges which accompany them. Nevertheless, the privileges are more readily accepted than the responsibilities. Consequently, the child often is torn by ambivalent attitudes. He both wants to establish his independence and is afraid to do so. This fear he projects upon the parents as much as to say they were responsible for his dependence in the first place. But the conflict is not so much a revolt against parental control and dominance as it is against the childhood self from which he must escape.[14]

This normal conflict between parents and child in the drive toward the independence of adulthood may be accentuated by the attitudes of the parents which discourage growing-up. Parents often deny the adolescent the privileges accorded by other parents. In every respect they often continue to treat them as children, inferior in knowledge, skill, and experience. They continue to play the part of the all-wise, all-knowing persons, as they were regarded by the helpless child. Adolescent erudition, skill, and judgment are accepted in good-natured tolerance so long as dissociated from a problem for which the parent is seeking a practical solution, and the child is reminded of that biblical wisdom which for him has become modified to, "A savant is not without honor except in his own family."

A further source of conflict grows out of the tendency of some parents to project upon the children their own wishes and desires, particularly those which have met with frustration. Thus the father who of necessity gave up his ambition to become a lawyer to be a bank teller insists that his son study law, whether or not he shows any aptitude or interest in the profession. The mother who gave up a musical career to marry resolutely insists that her daughter follow the regimen of training for the opera regardless of the child's disinclination. Young has analysed two further types in addition to projection upon the child of the unfulfilled vocational ambitions of the parent: that in which the

[14] Cf. John Levy and Ruth Monroe, *The Happy Family*, pp. 6-17.

child is subjected to a regimen of intellectual training in an effort to generate a precocity which will amply compensate for the felt deficiency in the parent's own training; and that in which the child ritualistically achieves a higher social level as expressed in a college education and in the international marriages of the parvenu.[15]

A further source of conflict is those conditions under which the so-called "unwanted" and "adopted" complexes develop. Children conceived prior to marriage and illegitimate children find themselves the recipients frequently of the antagonisms which are the counterparts of the guilt feelings of the parents or parent. Other children not so unfortunate in their paternity find that they are unwanted or adopted the explanation for what seems to be neglect either in comparison to the treatment accorded their contemporary friends by their respective parents or in the differential way in which they are treated as compared to their brothers and sisters. Not infrequently, this attitude of being unwanted or adopted arises at the time of the birth of a brother or sister when the new-born child becomes the center of attention and interest and there is an abrupt diminution in the attention given the older child.

CRISES AND PARENT-CHILD CONFLICTS

Further sources of conflict in parent-child relations are to be found in a series of crises which disturb the relationship. One of these crises is the death of one of the parents and the instability of the relationship which it portends. Particularly is conflict likely if the child is placed either with relatives or in a temporary foster home. Such placement is resented as a threat to the security of the parent-child relationship. But whatever alienation results from partial separation is ordinarily mild in comparison to the resentment which results from the remarriage of the parent. The stepparent is resented not only as a rival for

[15] Cf. Kimball Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 374-378.

the exclusive affection of the parent but also out of loyalty for the parent who is dead.

Divorce, likewise, is a frequent source of parent-child conflicts. This crisis in the family relationship often entails either some choice between the two parents or a dividing of time between the two. If the child is taken to live exclusively with one parent, he may not wholly accept the inferior position in which the other parent is placed as a consequence of the arrangement. Or if he divides his time between the two parents, he finds himself coerced into the role of a diplomat, refusing to be a party to the carrying of reports about the activities of the other person, or into participating in the recriminations which are not always ended with divorce. Even if he shares an equal affection for each parent, he is likely to resent the position into which divorce has placed him and to develop antagonistic attitudes toward both. Or, as a consequence of his refusal to become a pawn in the continued conflict between the parents, he may suffer the resentment of one or both.

Domestic discord is not unlike divorce in its effect upon the relations between parent and child. In fact many of the conflicts characteristic of family situations broken by divorce are accentuated in domestic discord. Thus the bid for the support of a particular child in the conflict with the marriage partner is even more intense than when there has been divorce. The parent tends to turn to the favorite child for encouragement and sympathy in his conflict with the marriage partner. This automatically makes the child a foe of the other parent, heightening whatever conflict there may have been in the parent-child relationship. Thus domestic discord tends to strengthen whatever tendencies there are toward favoritism or dislike. On the other hand, the child may find himself torn by conflicting loyalties and unable to identify himself with either side in the parental conflict, and as a consequence he becomes alienated from both. At first he often sees both sides, but when he finds that this judicial attitude

is resented by each parent, the child develops a psychic barrier of isolation which protects him from the emotional stresses and which in turn makes for conflict between both parents and himself.

Furthermore, the parent often sees in the facial expressions, physical traits, and mannerisms of the child similarities to those of the marriage partner. This becomes the basis for antagonism toward the child or for the heightening of whatever antagonisms were already in existence. In other instances, these reproductions in the appearance and behavior of the marriage partner may characterize in part the favorite child, leading the parent to an overly solicitous and censoring attitude which turns the child from him. The consequence is that the child is forced unhappily into the role of the other parent and is alienated from the one who would otherwise be the favorite.

Courtship and marriage often create crises in the relations between parent and child, particularly when there has been strong attachment and identification. Thus as marriage seems imminent, the parent often becomes acutely critical of the characteristics of the child's spouse-to-be, this becoming the basis of conflict between parent and child. Even when this parental objection is successful in preventing marriage, it often leaves tension in its wake. If marriage eventuates in spite of parental objection, this tension tends to continue, since the parent is antagonized by the appearance of a rival for the affections of the child to whom he is very much attached.

SIBLING CONFLICT

Another phase of family disorganization, conflict between siblings, has its origin chiefly in the differential attitudes of parents toward their children. As a consequence of favoritism, siblings develop antagonisms which under certain circumstances become very acute. The conflicts between siblings over the family inheritance are proverbial, but they could not have happened but for earlier sibling conflict.

Sibling conflict is, from the standpoint of the Freudians, the normal development out of the conditions of family life. The birth of a younger child leads to the generation of feelings of neglect as a result of the necessary division of attention. The younger child finds the older already in possession of prerogatives and privileges of which he becomes jealous.[16] But unless this natural tendency is buttressed, as it so often is, by preferential attitudes and treatment upon the part of the parents, it is of little consequence in the generation of sibling conflict.

Domestic discord is a potent source of sibling conflict, because to the extent that the children become identified with one parent as against the other, they tend to be thrown into hostile camps. The result is that the conflict between husband and wife has its counterpart in the relations between siblings. Such conflict is, however, but an accentuation of that which grows out of differential treatment.

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION AND DELINQUENCY

Delinquency is both a phase of family disorganization and a consequence of it. As conflict between parent and child leads to such acts as incorrigibility and running away from home, delinquency becomes an aspect of family disorganization. More frequently the delinquent behavior is with reference to community rather than family relations and therefore is a consequence rather than a phase of family disorganization.

Parent-child conflict frequently leads the child into delinquent behavior by making his position with the family itself so precarious that he goes outside for attention, affection, and encouragement. For the boy, this often means participating in the activities of a gang in which he achieves status and the sympathetic companionship denied him in the family. The girl finds in sex delinquency the affection which she has wished for but been denied in her relations with the members of her family.

Furthermore, the revolt of the child against the authority of

[16] See J. C. Flügel, *The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family*, p. 19.

the parent often becomes the basis for revolt against all authority. Any individual, therefore, who stands in the relationship of authority, such as a school teacher or policeman, becomes a person to be outwitted and discomforted. In turn all codes of conduct are to be broken whenever the opportunity arises because of identification with those in authority. In so far as his delinquencies lead to embarrassment of the disliked parent, the child often experiences sadistic delight in the parent's discomfort. In fact in some instances, because of ambivalence in his attitudes even toward the hated parent, he may enjoy the negative attention he receives from the parents as a consequence of delinquency. Thus the negative becomes a substitute for the positive attention which he desires but which is not forthcoming.

When the character of the family relationship has been changed by separation, divorce, or desertion, the boy particularly is deprived of a pattern of masculinity. He turns to gang exploits as a protest against this absence of a masculine pattern within the family relationship.[17] But the sexual exploits of girls may also represent the absence of masculine contacts and stand as a protest against a situation in which little opportunity is provided for the development of heterosexual emotions.

The withdrawal of the favorite parent from the home leaves the child whose position is inferior with reference to the remaining parent in a precarious position. In so far as there has been compensation in the preferential treatment of one parent, the deprecatory attitude of the other parent is bearable. When this compensatory feature has been removed, the only alternative may seem to be in delinquency. Even when the conduct of the child has been exemplary previously, it may give way under these circumstances to erratic and irrational efforts at compensation. This is essentially the pattern in the case of Ann:

Ann, age 15, of superior intelligence, is failing in school in all of her studies, dresses flashily to attract attention, and goes with boys

[17] Cf. Floyd Dell, *Love in the Machine Age*, pp. 209-224.

of questionable reputation. The mother complains that the girl is lazy and incorrigible.

Mrs. X., the mother, had an unhappy home life as a child due to domestic conflict between her parents. Her mother, an active and dominating woman fifteen years younger than her husband, told Mrs. X., her favorite daughter, all her domestic troubles. Mrs. X. became closely identified with her mother, admiring her and hating her father. In spite of her feeling that she never could care for a man, Mrs. X. married a distant cousin. Marriage, she felt, was the conventional thing. Sexual intercourse occurred a short time prior to marriage. Her husband, a man with little financial status, but ambitious to study and to become a geologist, she characterized as inferior and shiftless like her father—a man who liked books and did not earn much money.

Categorizing her marriage situation as similar to her mother's, this, then, became the pattern into which many aspects of her own marriage relationships were made to fit. Attempts at sexual adjustment were characterized by inhibitions, avoidance, pent-up emotions and tensions, force and resentment. Uppermost in Mrs. X's mind was the thought, "I must not get pregnant for I will want to divorce him." Mr. X., on the other hand, because of his wife's coldness and insinuations, was beginning to hate her.

Into this psycho-cultural situation the daughter was born fifteen months after marriage. At first Mrs. X. showed some liking for the child. Mr. X. criticized the details of his wife's care of the baby, accusing her of responsibility for the child's lack of robustness. He thus early became the child's champion on many occasions.

Sex and response conflict continued. Mrs. X. complained of nervousness. Mr. X. said that the circumstances of their relationship caused him to regard his wife in no different light from that of a prostitute.

Two years later a boy was born. At this time Mrs. X. gave up thoughts of divorce and assumed an attitude of martyrdom. Economic and cultural conflicts became more pronounced. Mrs. X. went to work, saying that her husband's earnings were inadequate. She belittled all his attempts at advancement and relegated him to the inferior position of doing much of the housework in the home. Before their friends she pointed out his faults and failures and impractical ideas. In order to rationalize his inability to get ahead, Mr. X. became more and more absorbed in his books in preparation for a better job which he never secured. What initiative he earlier

possessed, he had lost and there was no longer any attempt to face reality.

As Ann grew up she became more and more identified with the father. Her physical characteristics and mannerisms all seemed to remind Mrs. X. of her husband. The girl's interests also were those of Mr. X.—she was quiet, uninterested in athletics, fond of reading, and a dreamer.

A year ago Mrs. X. forced her husband to leave the home, keeping the children with her. Antagonism between Ann and her mother has become exaggerated by the father's absence from the home. Mrs. X. has relegated Ann to the same position which Mr. X. formerly held. She disparages her continually by identifying her with the father ("You are just like your father; you will never get ahead."). Ann is assigned the same menial tasks, the performance of which always meets with criticism and discouragement. Her reading, even though it includes her school assignments, also is identified with that of the father. Her security is threatened by reminding her that she is dependent upon her mother because the father is too inadequate to support her, but that nevertheless she will be sent to him.

During this time an even closer attachment has developed between the son and mother. His capacities and traits are pointed out as superior to those of Ann. Mrs. X. looks upon the traits of her son as similar to her own and finds him more sympathetic and understanding, even speaking of him as being like a mother to her. There is intense conflict between the two children, Mrs. X. taking sadistic delight in displaying her preference for her son. His wishes are deferred to and his opinion sought. Mother and son frequently carry on conversations when Ann is present, in a universe of discourse of which she is not a part.

It is clear that the breakdown in Ann's school adjustment becomes intelligible as a response to a family situation in which she becomes the scapegoat of her mother's antagonism toward her father. Into this interactional situation enters a multitude of factors, many of which antedate even the birth of Ann. The most significant of these factors are Mrs. X.'s identification with her mother as against her father; the re-enactment of her early family pattern in her own marriage; sexual relations prior to marriage which symbolized a threat to her dominance and became the basis for sadistic attitudes toward her husband; Mr. X.'s tendency toward subjective adjustments, intensified by his wife's critical and depreciative atti-

tudes toward him; intense domestic discord early in the marriage into which situation the birth of a child became another obstacle to separation and was resented as such by the mother; early identification of Ann with the father as he becomes her champion; close attachment of mother to her son; Ann's inferior role, crystallized when the father is forced to leave the home, resulting in attitudes of complete defeat toward her school work and impulsive and irrational attempts at compensation.[18]

Thus Ann's delinquency can be understood only in connection with, and as the outgrowth of, the conflict between husband and wife. The seeds of the delinquency had been laid in this conflict and were brought to fruitage with the withdrawal of Ann's father and champion from the home. As the home situation became more and more intolerable, Ann sought in contacts outside the family to compensate for the attention denied her, but which she had previously received from her father.

The family provides the locale in which variant tendencies find expression in the conflict between husband and wife and in turn provides the matrix out of which develops the variant behavior of the child. Two essential characteristics of the family account in large degree for its role in the patterning of variant behavior. In the first place, because of the cloistered character of the family relationship, hedonistically defined impulses and attitudes find expression without the constant and immediate restraints exercised through social disapproval. Social disapproval may and often does function in the long run, but it is delayed and partial in character. Secondly, the family provides the interpretative mechanism through which much of culture is transmitted to the next generation. This interpretation is often inconsistent and at variance with the patterns of the larger group, and behavior tendencies are generated which find expression in variant response. The result is that marked and persistent conflict in mar-

[18] Harriet R. Mowrer, "Study of Marital Adjustment as a Background for Research in Child Behavior," *Proceedings of the Society for Research in Child Development*, vol. II (1936), pp. 115-116. Also in *Journal of Educational Sociology*, vol. X (April, 1937), pp. 487-493.

riage relations accentuates what may be considered the normal tendencies toward the development of variant behavior in the child. This, in turn, finds expression in the several forms of variant behavior analyzed in the previous chapters.

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XIX

The Pattern of Personal and Social Disorganization

CASUAL INSPECTION of the community-rate maps for the several series suggests that, on the whole, those communities having high rates in one series are also high in all other series; and conversely, those communities which have low rates in one series are low in all. This suggests that there is a pattern of personal and social disorganization, and that the several series are but imperfect reflections of this pattern. Do all of the series reflect this general pattern equally well or are some series better indices than others?

One method of answering the above question is to examine the simple coefficients of correlation between the annual mean community rates of each of the possible pairings of series. When this is done, one finds that the highest coefficient of correlation is between arrests and women's court cases. But these two series are intercorrelated, since, except for the fact that the women's court series covers a shorter period of time, all complaints in the women's court are also included in the arrest series. The highest coefficient between independent series is that for arrests and nonsupport (.90). The next highest coefficient is for divorce and suicide (.89). The rest of the series follow in the order of the size of the coefficient: boys' court and nonsupport (.88), women's court and insanity (.87), juvenile delinquency and nonsupport (.87), bastardy and divorce (.83), contributing to de-

linquency and nonsupport (.82), illegitimacy and arrests (.64). Thus each of the eleven series under consideration, excluding illegitimacy, is determined two-thirds or more by elements common to some other series.


In the pairings which yield high coefficients, some series appear more frequently than others. Thus nonsupport is found in four pairings, and arrests in two. But the second pairing in which arrests enters yields such a comparatively low coefficient (.64) in comparison to the others that one is probably justified in disregarding this. Nonsupport, on the other hand, yields coefficients in excess of .81 in each of the four pairings. This would indicate that more than two-thirds of the factors which produce nonsupport are common to contributing to delinquency, juvenile delinquency, boys' court cases, and arrests.

Since contributing to delinquency, juvenile delinquency, boys' court cases, and arrests are all relatively highly correlated with nonsupport, does this mean that these series are all essentially alike in causation? The coefficients for all the possible pairings of these four series are as follows: boys' court cases and arrests, .87; contributing to delinquency and arrests, .74; contributing to delinquency and boys' court cases, .69; juvenile delinquency and boys' court, .66; juvenile delinquency and arrests, .66; and contributing to delinquency and juvenile delinquency, .63. All of these pairings, except for the first, yield lower coefficients than each of these series did with nonsupport. But boys' court cases and arrests overlap in that the former constitute a part of the arrest series. Therefore the remaining series of delinquency do not share among themselves as high a proportion of common elements as each does with nonsupport.

Correlation between annual mean community rates, however, reflects only those common elements which are relatively stable and neglects those which fluctuate from time to time. When the pairing for each series which yields the highest coefficient of correlation is calculated between both the annual mean community rates and the yearly community rates, considerable varia-

CHART CXXXIII

CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF BASTARDY AND DIVORCE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



tion is found, and the patterns of the yearly rates vary. For this analysis it will be necessary to drop the women's court and the illegitimacy series, since both cover a relatively short period.

The patterns of year-to-year correlation fall into three groups:

(1) the upward-trend pattern, (2) the zigzag pattern, and (3) the crest-cycle pattern. The upward-trend pattern is represented in the correlations of bastardy and divorce (see Chart CXXXIII) and of suicide and divorce (see Chart CXXXIV). In 1929, the correlation between community rates of bastardy and divorce was twenty points below that for the period, 1929 to 1935. In 1935, however, the coefficient was twelve points higher for the community rates of that year than for the mean rates of the period. This suggests the possible hypothesis that the economic depression had in part the effect of forcing unmarried mothers of a somewhat higher economic level (comparable to the divorce group) to seek assistance of the Court of Domestic Relations in coercing the fathers of their children to contribute to the support of their offspring.

The pattern of the yearly coefficients of correlation for suicide and divorce, however, shows a much more pronounced trend. But this trend never reaches a level above the coefficient for the mean rates. Furthermore, the fluctuation in yearly coefficients is within a range larger than the magnitude of the coefficient of the mean rates. This suggests that one of the effects of the economic depression was to bring into close relationship two series, which prior to this time and under conditions of economic prosperity are scarcely related. A possible explanation of this increased relationship may be an increase in the role of personal disorganization as one of the causes of divorce, thus making divorce in part a consequence of personal disorganization along with suicide.

The zigzag pattern is represented in a single pairing, namely that between juvenile delinquency and nonsupport. Here the year-to-year movement in the magnitudes of the coefficients of correlation is well below the correlation of mean rates (see Chart CXXXV). Since no consistent direction of movement is revealed in this instance, it would seem necessary to look to minor obscure fluctuations affecting both series in order to explain these results. There was in the midst of the period a change in the

CHART CXXXIV

CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF SUICIDE AND DIVORCE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935





CHART CXXXV


CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NONSUPPORT: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



administration of both the Court of Domestic Relations and the Juvenile Court, and this may account in whole or in part for the fluctuations in the relationship between these series.

CHART CXXXVI


CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY AND NONSUPPORT: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



The essential character of the crest-cycle pattern is that the magnitudes of coefficients increase to about the middle of the period and then decline at the end to a level about the same as

CHART CXXXVII


CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF BOYS' COURT CASES AND NONSUPPORT: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



that from which they started. This pattern is represented in the correlations between contributing to delinquency and nonsupport, boys' court cases and nonsupport, insanity and nonsupport,

CHART CXXXVIII


CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF INSANITY AND NONSUPPORT: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



and arrests and nonsupport (see Charts CXXXVI, CXXXVII, CXXXVIII, and CXXXIX). In view of the fact that this cycle is approximately parallel to the depression cycle, this suggests

CHART CXXXIX


CORRELATION BETWEEN COMMUNITY RATES OF ARREST AND NONSUPPORT: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935



that economic conditions became an increasingly more common element in the relationship of nonsupport to contributing to de-

CHART CXL

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF BASTARDY AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



linquency, insanity, arrests, and boys' court cases, respectively, as the depression reached its maximum and then declined as a common element as business conditions improved.

PATTERNS WITHIN PATTERNS

Differentiation of patterns of correlation may be of little consequence if other series, correlating almost as highly as the series which shows the maximum coefficients, reveal divergent trends,

unless these divergent trends also reveal some consistency of relationship. The extent of internal consistency of the patterning can be tested by taking into account all of the pairings as well as that which yields for each series its maximum coefficient.


Of the upward-trend patterns, one may first consider the correlation of bastardy with each of the other series. As has already been pointed out, the maximum correlation is with divorce. But four more series show coefficients of .60 or more. (See Chart CXL.) These are boys' court cases, arrests, suicide, and insanity. For each of these series except insanity, the pattern is in general an upward trend to 1934 after which there is a varying degree of drop. This suggests that the pattern may actually be a crest cycle of greater length than those previously considered. Nevertheless the interpretation already suggested would still hold, namely that the depression somewhat expands the economic level of unmarried mothers who institute bastardy suits in the Court of Domestic Relations. The three remaining series show a random or zigzag pattern.

The converse relationship between divorce and the other series, in addition to bastardy, again corresponds to the pattern of the upward-trend movement with once more some tendency to drop after 1934, although this is not so pronounced as in the preceding pattern. (See Chart CXLI.) Here the series having coefficients of .60 or more are the same as previously, and the upward movement is on the whole more pronounced. Again the three series whose coefficients are below .60 (contributing to delinquency, nonsupport, and juvenile delinquency) present zigzag patterns.

Considering the relationship of suicide to the other series, it is quite clear that, except for insanity, all those whose coefficients are approximately .60 or more (arrests, though actually one point below .60 may legitimately be included) show upward trends to 1934 with varying degrees of downward tendency in 1935. (See Chart CXLII.) These results would lend confirmation to the increased role of personal disorganization in the causation of these

CHART CXLI


CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF DIVORCE AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



forms of disorganization except for the insanity series, and here the results at first seem contradictory. But although insanity itself is an index of personality disorganization, when one recalls that suicide may often substitute for other forms of personal disorganization under economic stress (see Chapter XVI), the present results lose their contradictory character. As in the upward-trend patterns, nonsupport, contributing to delinquency, and juvenile delinquency all show random movements.

CHART CXLII


CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF SUICIDE AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



The single case of the zigzag pattern, juvenile delinquency and nonsupport, is homogeneous in the way in which all coefficients move up and down in a random fashion regardless of the magnitudes of the correlation of the annual mean rates, except for contributing to delinquency. (See Chart CXLIII.) This latter relationship, which is essentially of the trough-cycle type, probably reflects the tendency of economic stress to disturb the ratio of sex offenses between the two series.

CHART CXLIII


CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



In the crest-cycle patterns, the common element in the maximum correlations was nonsupport. The extent to which other series whose coefficients equal or exceed .60 conform to the crest pattern set by nonsupport shows considerable variation. In the correlations with contributing to delinquency, three of the five series whose mean correlations are above .60 vary from the crest cycle. Arrests cases present a zigzag pattern; boys' court cases a

CHART CXLIV

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




downward-trend pattern; and juvenile delinquency, as has already been pointed out, a trough cycle. (See Chart CXLIV.) Since contributing to delinquency is made up largely of sexual offenses, these results would harmonize with the hypothesis that economic conditions constitute the disturbing element in the relationships.

The correlations of annual mean rates between boys' court

CHART CXLV


CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF BOYS' COURT CASES AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



cases and each of the other series yield coefficients approximately within the .60-and-up range in every instance. But the patterns vary for the annual correlations throughout the conceivable range. Nonsupport, arrests, and insanity show crest cycles; bastardy a trough cycle; contributing to delinquency a downward-trend movement; divorce and suicide an upward trend; and juvenile delinquency a zigzag pattern. (See Chart CXLV.)

CHART CXLVI

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF INSANITY AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935




The increasing and decreasing influence of economic stress seems to be the explanation so far as nonsupport, arrests, and insanity are concerned. The upward trends in the coefficients of divorce and suicide with boys' court cases suggests that, like arrests, the factor of personal disorganization has become an increasingly important element.

The coefficients of correlation between mean rates of insanity and the other series are all, with the exception of juvenile delin-

CHART CXLVII

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF ARRESTS AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935




quency, above the .60 minimum. In this pattern each, except bastardy, belongs essentially to the crest-cycle type of movement. (See Chart CXLVI.) Thus, here is conclusive confirmation of the increasing and decreasing role of economic stress in the relationship of the several series to insanity rates.

The correlations of arrest rates with other indices of disorganization are all above .60 so far as the mean rates are concerned.

CHART CXLVIII

CORRELATION OF COMMUNITY RATES OF NONSUPPORT AND OTHER INDICES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935



Only three pairings conform to the crest cycle, namely those with nonsupport, boys' court cases, and insanity. (See Chart CXLVII.) The remainder are all of the zigzag type in which the relationship is obscure.

The composite pattern in which nonsupport is considered the independent variable yields five coefficients which exceed .60. These are for the series: arrests, boys' court cases, juvenile de-

linquency, insanity, and contributing to delinquency. All of these yield crest cycles except juvenile delinquency. (See Chart CXLVIII.) The economic hypothesis seems to be the explanation except for juvenile delinquency, which conforms to its usual zigzag pattern.

Thus three hypotheses have been suggested to explain the three patterns most commonly observed: (1) the increased role of personal disorganization as the explanation of the upward-trend pattern; (2) the disturbance in the administrative procedure in the case of the zigzag pattern; and (3) the influence of the depression cycle upon the crest-cycle pattern. The most important correlation patterns of the upward-trend type are: bastardy with divorce, boys' court, arrests, and suicide; divorce with boys' court, arrests, and suicide; suicide with arrests and boys' court. The zigzag pattern is essentially characteristic of juvenile delinquency and each of the other series except contributing to delinquency. The crest cycle is found in the correlation of contributing to delinquency with boys' court and nonsupport; boys' court with nonsupport, arrests, and insanity; insanity with each series except juvenile delinquency and bastardy; arrests with nonsupport, boys' court, and insanity; nonsupport with arrests, boys' court, contributing to delinquency, and insanity.

THE MOST REPRESENTATIVE SERIES

In the analysis of the correlation patterns, the number of series relatively highly correlated with a particular series varied considerably. Not only was there considerable variation in the number of pairings which resulted in coefficients of .60 or more, but also the spread of the curves between the highest and lowest levels varied widely. This suggests that some series are, on the whole, correlated with other series more closely than are others. Taking, then, the range in mean coefficients for each series as an index of homogeneity in correlation, the rank from the most homogeneous to the least is as follows: arrests, illegitimacy (both of equal rank), insanity, boys' court, women's court, contribut-

ing to delinquency (the last two of equal rank), bastardy, nonsupport, divorce, and juvenile delinquency. That is, the difference between the highest coefficient of correlation between the annual mean community rates and the lowest increases in the order of the series as given above. Thus arrests and illegitimacy are most homogeneously correlated with each of the other series and juvenile delinquency least.

A series which is most homogeneously correlated with all other series, however, is not necessarily the most representative, since its range may be high or low in the scale. What is important is the general tendency to correlate high with all series. This tendency may be determined by summing up the rankings of each series in each of the series of pairings. Thus if in the pairings of women's court cases, arrests are more highly correlated than any other, while in the pairings of boys' court cases arrests are next to the highest, the combined rank will be three for these two series of pairings. If this process is continued to include all series of pairings, the composite rank of each series may be obtained. The order of these composite rank sums from the smallest to the largest is as follows: arrests, women's court cases, boys' court cases, insanity, nonsupport, contributing to delinquency, divorce, suicide, bastardy, illegitimacy, and juvenile delinquency. In other words, if one wished to substitute a single series for all the rest, arrests would be most satisfactory and juvenile delinquency least satisfactory.

Since, however, the three series which rank highest are overlapping in that both women's court cases and boys' court cases are included in the arrest series, this interrelationship might contribute to the high rank of the arrest series. With this in mind, the composite rank sums were calculated leaving out of account the boys' and women's court cases. The order—arrests, nonsupport, insanity, contributing to delinquency, divorce, suicide, bastardy, illegitimacy, juvenile delinquency—is substantially as before. Arrests, accordingly, is without question the best single

index of personal and social disorganization of the several series considered. This would seem to mean, then, that the pattern of personal and social disorganization is determined by those basic forces and conditions which produce adult delinquency.

But to say that those forces which produce adult delinquency also cause the other forms of personal and social disorganization implies that one is dealing with a common pattern and the several indices are but concrete expressions of it. Since all of the series with which this correlation analysis is concerned have a common legal and administrative base, the data having come from public records, one is confronted with the problem of whether or not this accounts for the common character of the several forms of personal and social disorganization.

THE PATTERN OF PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION

Case analysis, however, supports the conclusion arrived at through correlation analysis. That is, case studies often reveal that the individual has expressed his basic personal disorganization in various ways at various times. The traditional notion that each form of personal disorganization constitutes a separate entity is nowhere borne out. Thus the delinquent may also be a homosexual or may manifest some other form of segmental behavior; the radical may show psychotic trends; and the alcoholic may eventually turn to suicide. In fact there is no form of personal disorganization of which the personally disorganized individual is not potentially capable.

Neither is it true, as often assumed, that one form of personal disorganization leads to another in some sort of invariable sequence. All the forms of personal disorganization are potentialities and may find expression in sequence or simultaneously, but not necessarily in the same sequence in all cases or always in the same combinations. In other words, all forms of personal disorganization are but varied expressions of the basic pattern.

If all the varied forms of personal disorganization are but the

expression of a common pattern, why is there such variety in expression? How does one account for the observed fact that some forms of personal disorganization seem to have a greater affinity for one another? What are the factors which determine the channels into which the basic personal disorganization of any individual will find expression?

In part the answer to all these questions has already been given in Chapter II. That is, the attitude of society toward variant behavior and the response of the individual to social disapproval lay the groundwork for the basic types of personal disorganization. These types have been differentiated into active rebellion against the social order, the goal of which is defined in terms of social welfare; active rebellion directed toward hedonistically defined goals; and the subjective withdrawal from participation in the social order. Thus the variety and affinity of forms of expression grow out of the fundamental characteristics of human nature with its basic hereditary pattern, upon which is superimposed the communicated and accumulated experiences of the group. The consequences of this duality of background to human nature lead to the polar definition of behavior between that which is hedonistically and that which is socially defined. In turn, man, as a consequence of his communicative faculties which permit and facilitate the substitution of inner functioning for overt response, may carry this process of substitution to such lengths that it virtually displaces all overt behavior. Thus, out of a second potentiality of human nature, a second polarity in human response is born.

But the basic polarity and ambivalence in the potentialities of human nature, both with reference to the definition of goals and the direction of behavior, does not offer any explanation of why some persons respond actively rather than subjectively and in terms of socially defined objectives rather than hedonistically defined goals. The explanation lies in the forces which determine the genesis of personality. This is to say that no understanding

can be had of the fundamental patterns of individual response without an understanding of the typical lines of personality development, which lead in some instances to personal organization and in others to personal disorganization.

THE GENESIS OF PERSONAL DISORGANIZATION

It has been the function of each of the chapters which have preceded to analyze each of these typical lines of personality development as they eventuate in the several types of disorganized personalities. This analysis, however, is far from being complete, so far as many of the details are concerned, which is to be expected in the light of the limitations upon present-day knowledge in this field. Nevertheless certain things stand out which are of fundamental importance in the understanding of personal disorganization.

It is quite clear that the basic pattern of personality is laid down in the family experience. In the interrelationship among the members of the family, variant behavior develops. Here the selective processes through which culture operates differentially upon each individual first begin to operate. Here also the basic biological urges are given definition, with regard to both the kinds of satisfactions sought and the ways for achieving these satisfactions. Thus the individual's conception of himself and his techniques of maintaining this conception if it is satisfying to him or of escaping it if unsatisfactory are the consequences of this family experience.

Personal organization or disorganization, then, is largely the consequence of whether or not these early family experiences equip the individual for functioning as a member of nonfamily groups in a way that meets with social approval. If in the family relationship the individual's wishes have been so defined that they can find socially approved outlets and if the personality structure is such as to facilitate such satisfactions, the person achieves a high degree of social adjustment and a corresponding

personal organization. If, on the other hand, the converse is true, the individual is personally disorganized to the extent of the lack of social adjustment.

When the individual's life pattern is such that he rebels against some of the elements in the social order which are regarded by society as relatively sacred and yet retains his social-welfare orientation, he becomes the reformer or the radical, depending upon the breadth of his rebellion. Nevertheless, he remains attuned to the demands of the group that his wishes be socially defined and realized. This orientation sustains him so long as he can find others who sympathize with him and thus compensate for the social disapproval of the larger group. If, however, he finds no sympathetic audience and his rebellion is sufficiently entrenched, he tends to become more and more subjective in his response and eventually may become thoroughly disintegrated.

Other individuals may have developed some degree of facility in social adaptation, but it has been achieved at the sacrifice of a socially approved definition of their wishes. Consequently, their hedonistically defined wishes interfere with social adjustment except among others of their kind. Thus these persons rebel against the social order in the satisfaction of their hedonistically defined wishes and yet recognize its efficacy in the excuses which they make for their variant response. They find in their social situations unique features which justify their variant responses rather than call for a program of social reconstruction. This is the pattern of the delinquent, the segmental variant, and so on and is the outgrowth of deep-seated negativism.

Still other individuals have developed response mechanisms, which, though effective in some groups, are handicaps in others. Generally, the definition of wishes is not essentially different from that found in many adjusted personalities. The techniques for realization of the wishes, however, impede the person's social adjustment, because they relieve him of assuming his full responsibility in co-operative activity. This is the basic feature of

those forms of personality disorganization which result from the use of the host of escape mechanisms which characterize the alcoholic and the neurotic.

Finally, other individuals retreat from the needs of winning social approval into a subjective world of their own construction. This does not mean that all subjective response implies personality disorganization. Subjective response itself is man's most effective technique for the realization of satisfactions in social relationships. But when the technique becomes the substitute rather than the implement for the realization of social approval, it defeats its own ends and results in the withdrawal of the individual into social seclusion and social maladjustment. The consequence in its extreme forms is the complete loss of social orientation—the development of the psychoses.

Thus the basic pattern of personal disorganization is a continuous progression from active rebellion against the social order directed toward various socially and hedonistically defined goals, to the complete retreat into an inner world in which the rebellion is subjectively expressed. The individual masters his world or he retreats from it, and he is personally organized or disorganized to the extent to which his attempts at mastery meet with social approval and his subjective responses function as implements in his attempts to receive social approval rather than substitutes for it.

In turn social disorganization is the collective aspect of personal disorganization. Or, to put it into other words, social disorganization is the breakdown in the patterns of social control and in the rules of co-operative activity. In final analysis, it is the contradictory character of individual activity in certain realms of collective endeavor which constitutes social disorganization. Thus when certain persons no longer recognize the individual claims which others have upon property, a claim based upon collective experience and providing the basis for collective endeavor, their deviant behavior represents individual responses

which we call, in the mass, delinquency (a form of social disorganization), and in the concrete, manifestations of personal disorganization of a delinquent.

Many persons may manifest the deviant responses which characterize any or all of the types of personal disorganization, and yet these manifestations may be so minimal in character as to be of little consequence in interfering with social adaptation. Or the same individual may manifest the kinds of deviant behavior which are characteristic of more than one type of disorganized personality. Types thus are abstractions based upon the form of personal disorganization which tends to dominate some disorganized personalities and not others. Thus it is necessary to recognize the dynamic relationship between the several forms of personal disorganization and the complexity of the causal factors out of which deviant behavior develops.

The most pressing need in the study of personal and social disorganization, therefore, is for comparable studies from the point of view of personality development. These will trace out the typical lines of genesis of deviant behavior from their inception to their incorporation into the personality as its dominant feature. In this study, however, factors making for personal organization will have to be taken into account quite as much as those making for disorganization. Consequently such studies will contribute quite as much to the understanding of the organization of personality as to its disorganization.

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Appendix

TABLE I

SEX OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE COURT, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1929 to 1935; TRUANCY IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1935; JUVENILE COURT CASES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1935

SEX	CHICAGO JUVENILE DELINQUENTS		CHICAGO TRUANTS		JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN UNITED STATES [1]	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	7,445	100.0	5,726	100.0	55,693	100.0
Male	5,943	79.8	4,679	81.7	46,814	84.1
Female.....	1,499	20.1	902	15.8	8,879	15.9
No record.....	3	*	145	2.5.	....	...

* Less than .05 per cent.

[1] Data based upon reports from 68 courts. United States Children's Bureau, *Juvenile Court Statistics*, Bulletin No. 245, p. 29.

TABLE II

AGE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: JUVENILE COURT AND BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935

AGE	JUVENILE COURT		BOYS' COURT		TRUANCY	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	7,445	100.0	35,223	100.0	5,726	100.0
5	1	*	-	-	4	.1
6	1	*	-	-	7	.1
7	3	*	-	-	31	.5
8	5	.1	-	-	75	1.3
9	9	.1	-	-	132	2.3
10	67	.9	-	-	216	3.8
11	210	2.8	-	-	318	5.6
12	475	6.4	-	-	444	7.8
13	923	12.4	2	*	552	9.6
14	1,594	21.4	7	*	1,168	20.4
15	1,981	26.6	67	.2	1,926	33.6
16	1,867	25.1	510	1.4	662	11.6
17	267	3.6	9,735	27.6	94	1.6
18	20	.3	9,532	27.1	18	.3
19	9	.1	8,404	23.9	7	.1
20	2	*	5,548	15.8	-	-
21	3	*	1,070	3.0	-	-
22	1	*	207	.6	-	-
23	1	*	33	.1	-	-
24	4	.1	20	.1	-	-
25	1	*	4	*	-	-
26	-	-	1	*	-	-
27	-	-	1	*	-	-
No record	1	*	82	.2	72	1.3

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE III

MEAN PERCENTAGES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO BY AGES: JUVENILE COURT AND BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935

AGE	THREE SERIES COMBINED	JUVENILE AND BOYS' COURTS	JUVENILE COURT AND TRUANCY	BOYS' COURT AND TRUANCY
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
5	*	*	*	*
6	*	*	*	*
7	.2	*	.3	.3
8	.5	*	.7	.7
9	.8	*	1.2	1.2
10	1.6	.5	2.4	1.9
11	2.8	1.4	4.2	2.8
12	5.7	3.2	7.1	3.9
13	7.3	6.2	11.0	4.8
14	13.9	10.7	20.9	10.2
15	20.1	13.4	30.1	16.9
16	12.7	13.3	18.4	6.5
17	10.9	15.6	2.6	14.1
18	9.2	13.7	.3	13.7
19	8.0	12.0	.1	12.0
20	5.3	7.9	*	7.9
21	1.0	1.5	*	1.5
22	.2	.3	*	.3
23	*	*	*	*
24	*	.1	*	*
25	*	*	*	*
26	*	*	...	*
27	*	*	...	*
No record	.3	.1	.7	.7

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE IV

GRADE IN SCHOOL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: JUVENILE COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935

GRADE	JUVENILE DELINQUENTS		TRUANTS	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total.....	7,445	100.0	5,726	100.0
1.....	6	.1	1,285	22.4
2.....	20	.3	453	7.9
3.....	101	1.4	284	5.0
4.....	230	3.1	291	5.1
5.....	504	6.8	389	6.8
6.....	788	10.6	613	10.7
7.....	1,095	14.7	711	12.4
8.....	1,277	17.2	774	13.5
9.....	928	12.5	390	6.8
10.....	410	5.5	88	1.6
11.....	87	1.2	...	...
12.....	17	.2	...	...
13, 14.....	1	*	...	...
Special.....	301	4.0	...	...
No record....	1,680	22.6	448	7.8

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE V

RACE AND NATIVITY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: JUVENILE AND BOYS' COURTS, 1929 TO 1935

RACE AND NATIVITY	JUVENILE COURT		BOYS' COURT	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total.....	7,445	100.0	35,223	100.0
Native white of native parentage.....	1,309	17.6	5,673	16.1
Native white of foreign and mixed parentage.....	3,756	50.4	18,736	53.2
Foreign-born white.....	237	3.2	894	2.5
Negro.....	1,863	25.0	7,381	21.0
Other races.....	4	.1	7	*
White, no record of nativity...	254	3.4	2,349	6.7
No record of race and nativity.	22	.3	183	.5

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE VI

FAMILY RELATIONSHIP IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

FAMILY RELATIONSHIP	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	7,445	100.0
Parents living together	4,439	59.6
One or both parents deceased	1,323	17.8
One or both parents remarried	1,040	14.0
Parents separated	420	5.6
Parents divorced	143	1.9
Parents unmarried	57	.8
One or both parents insane	17	.2
No record	6	.1

TABLE VII

PREDELINQUENCY OF SIBLINGS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

PREDELINQUENCY OF SIBLINGS	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	7,445	100.0
Brother or brothers	1,215	16.3
Sister or sisters	225	3.0
Both brothers and sisters	82	10.1
Neither brothers nor sisters	5,266	70.5
No siblings in family	677	9.1

TABLE VIII

ORDER OF BIRTH OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

ORDER OF BIRTH	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	7,445	100.0
Oldest	1,783	24.0
In-between	3,412	45.8
Youngest	1,347	18.1
Only	677	9.1
Not recorded	226	3.0

TABLE IX

OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: JUVENILE AND BOYS' COURTS, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

OFFENSE	JUVENILE COURT		BOYS' COURT	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	7,445	100.0	35,223	100.0
Disorderly conduct	1,638	22.0	14,262	40.4
Larceny	2,426	32.6	7,862	22.3
Robbery	206	2.8	3,734	10.6
Burglary	1,600	21.5	2,596	7.4
Malicious mischief	269	3.6	956	2.7
Possessing, receiving, or selling stolen goods	217	2.9	829	2.4
Assault	195	2.6	654	1.9
Sex Offenses	754	10.1	614	1.7
Possessing deadly weapons	29	.4	599	1.7
Miscellaneous	105	1.4	2,138	6.1
Not recorded	6	.1	979	2.8

TABLE X

TYPE OF OFFENDER IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN CHICAGO: BOYS' COURT, 1929 TO 1935; TRUANCY, 1935

TYPE OF OFFENDER	BOYS' COURT		TRUANCY	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	35,223	100.0	5,726	100.0
First	25,198	71.5	3,749	65.4
Recidivist	10,025	28.5	1,947	34.0
Duplicate of first	2,849	8.1	....	...
Others	7,176	20.4	....	...
Not recorded	.....	...	30	.6

TABLES XI AND XII

ANNUAL MEAN RATES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	JUVENILE COURT, NUMBER PER 10,000 PERSONS 10 TO 17 YEARS OLD	BOYS' COURT, FIRST APPEARANCES PER 1,000 MALES 17 TO 20 YEARS OLD
All Chicago	23.5	13.7
1. Rogers Park	9.7	3.4
2. West Ridge	5.2	4.4
3. Uptown	16.7	7.7
4. Lincoln Square	6.1	5.9
5. North Center	9.1	8.5
6. Lakeview	13.8	8.7
7. Lincoln Park	22.2	13.7
8. Near North Side	37.9	31.6
9. Edison Park	1.8	3.0
10. Norwood Park	8.1	5.7
11. Jefferson Park	8.1	9.8
12. Forest Glen	9.0	5.6
13. North Park	3.0	3.3
14. Albany Park	8.2	3.9
15. Portage Park	10.6	6.0
16. Irving Park	7.2	6.5
17. Dunning	10.2	9.0
18. Montclare	12.4	6.6
19. Belmont Cragin	16.8	11.3
20. Hermosa	11.8	7.5
21. Avondale	12.6	7.1
22. Logan Square	20.1	13.6
23. Humboldt Park	17.2	11.4
24. West Town	30.8	23.4
25. Austin	11.5	7.7
26. West Garfield Park	14.3	10.1
27. East Garfield Park	41.3	21.0
28. Near West Side	63.8	48.8
29. North Lawndale	21.5	10.7
30. South Lawndale	17.6	9.4
31. Lower West Side	32.9	25.1
32. Loop	35.9	92.8
33. Near South Side	48.0	31.0
34. Armour Square	38.6	34.5
35. Douglas	121.5	57.6
36. Oakland	77.8	31.4
37. Fuller Park	27.7	28.6
38. Grand Boulevard	109.2	44.8
39. Kenwood	8.8	6.1
40. Washington Park	96.8	38.9

TABLES XI AND XII

ANNUAL MEAN RATES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY BY COMMUNITIES CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (CONCLUDED)

	COMMUNITY	JUVENILE COURT NUMBER PER 10 000 PERSONS 10 TO 17 YEARS OLD	BOYS' COURT, FIRST APPEARANCES PER 1,000 MALES 17 TO 20 YEARS OLD
41	Hyde Park	12 3	5 9
42	Woodlawn	27 4	1 7
43	South Shore	5 1	3 9
44	Chatham	10 8	5 0
45	Avalon Park	3 7	2 0
46	South Chicago	25 1	3 0
47	Burnside	32 7	6 6
48	Calumet Heights	13 8	3 7
49	Roseland	8 7	2 5
50	Pullman	20 1	5 6
51	South Deering	28 6	2 2
52	East Side	15 6	2 9
53	West Pullman	5 2	3 7
54	Riverdale	16 7	1 4
55	Hegewisch	17 1	1 7
56	Garfield Ridge	23 5	18 2
57	Archer Heights	9 7	16 2
58	Brighton Park	23 6	17 0
59	McKinley Park	13 0	13 6
60	Bridgeport	24 6	24 8
61	New City	44 6	23 8
62	West Elsdon	21 8	13 5
63	Gage Park	13 5	10 7
64	Clearing	21 0	13 7
65	West Lawn	11 4	10 9
66	Chicago Lawn	12 1	11 1
67	West Englewood	14 3	13 6
68	Englewood	18 4	14 4
69	Greater Grand Crossing	14 8	7 5
70	Ashburn	31 8	11.1
71	Auburn Gresham	3 6	7 7
72	Beverly	1 4	2 3
73	Washington Heights	6 1	4 4
74	Mount Greenwood	8 6	14.0
75	Morgan Park	19 1	13.5

TABLE XIII

OFFENSES CHARGED AGAINST ADULTS IN CHICAGO: WOMEN'S COURT, 1933 TO 1935;[2] POLICE ARRESTS, 1930 TO 1935

OFFENSE	WOMEN'S COURT		POLICE ARRESTS	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	7,608	100.0	73,271	100.0
Disorderly conduct	4,613	60.6	36,783	50.2
Larceny	551	7.2	4,111	5.6
Robbery	....	...	1,135	1.5
Burglary	....	...	859	1.2
Possessing, receiving, or selling stolen goods	17	.2	415	.6
Assault	169	2.2	2,168	3.0
Possessing deadly weapons	....	...	453	.6
Murder and manslaughter	....	...	310	.4
Sex offenses	1,586	20.8	9,923	13.5
Gambling	....	...	3,414	4.7
Traffic violations	108	1.4	9,593	13.1
Miscellaneous	207	2.7	3,894	5.3
Not recorded	357	4.7	213	.3

TABLE XIV

SEX OF ADULT DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY, 1929 TO 1935; ARRESTS, 1930 TO 1935

SEX	CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY		ARRESTS	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	1,612	100.0	73,271	100.0
Male	1,413	87.7	63,176	86.2
Female	198	12.3	10,068	13.7
No record	1	*	27	*

* Less than .05 per cent.

[2] Records began October 1, 1933, and sample included all women whose surnames began with the letters, A through J.

TABLE XV

EDUCATION OF WOMEN IN WOMEN'S COURT: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935

YEARS OF SCHOOLING	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	7,608	100.0
None	12	.2
1	18	.2
2	69	.9
3	147	1.9
4	304	4.0
5	306	4.0
6	434	5.7
7	491	6.5
8	1,774	23.3
9	1,196	15.7
10	643	8.5
11	266	3.5
12	132	1.7
13	68	.9
14	38	.5
15	6	.1
16	15	.2
17	3	*
No report	1,686	22.2

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE XVI

RACE AND NATIVITY OF ADULT DELINQUENTS IN CHICAGO: ARRESTS, 1930 TO 1935; WOMEN'S COURT CASES, 1933 TO 1935; CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY, 1929 TO 1935

RACE	POPULATION, 1932 (ESTIMATED)		ARRESTS		WOMEN'S COURT		CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	3,305,606	100.0	73,271	100 0	7,608	100.0	1,612	100.0
White	3,046,083	92.1	53,452	72.9	3,444	45.3	1,093	67.8
Native-born	2,321,279	70.2	42,149	57.5	...	.	.	
Foreign-born	724,804	21.9	11,303	15.4				
Negro	235,338	7 2	18,256	24 9	4,088	53.7	233	14.5
Other	24,185	.7	1,438	2 0	14	.2	6	.4
No report.			125	.2	62	.8	280	17.4

TABLE XVII

ADULT DELINQUENCY RATES IN CHICAGO BY AGE GROUPS: 1929 TO 1935

AGE	POPULATION (1932 ESTIMATE)	ARRESTS		CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY		FEMALE POPULATION (1934)	WOMEN'S COURT CASES	
		Mean Number per Year	Yearly Mean Number per 10,000 Population	Mean Number per Year	Yearly Mean Number per 100 000 Population		Mean Number per Year	Yearly Mean Number per 10,000 Female Population
Total	3,305,692	12,211.1	36.942	230.286	6.966	1,627,335	2,536.000	20.778
15-19	287,394	785.5	27.332	21.571	7.506	144,788	70.000	6.444
20-24	309,844	2,300.7	74.243	56.714	18.304	162,006	583.333	48.009
25-29	316,916	2,248.0	70.933	39.286	12.396	162,552	583.333	47.849
30-34	300,091	1,875.8	62.251	25.571	8.521	146,785	377.333	34.276
35-44	577,158	2,895.0	50.160	19.286	6.683	280,806	206.333	19.596
45-54	396,143	1,467.7	37.143	11.214	5.676	188,857	68.000	9.600
55-64	213,464	452.5	21.198	4.357	4.083	104,904	21.000	5.338
65-74	106,299	98.3	9.313	1.714	3.226	55,537	5.500	2.640
75 and over	32,835	11.3	3.452	.286	.870	19,514	.333	.227
No record	3,651	76.3	209.531	13.714	375.631	1,512	320.002	821.871

TABLE XVIII

ARRESTS BY NATIVITY PER 1930 POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935

NATIVITY	NUMBER PER 10 000 POPULATION
Total	292
United States	
White	283
Negro	1,005
Austria	66
Belgium	131
Canada	21
Czechoslovakia	62
Denmark	58
England	28
Finland	98
France	133
Germany	67
Greece	495
Hungary	105
Ireland	79
Italy	229
Lithuania	246
Netherlands	52
Norway	80
Poland	223
Rumania	46
Russia	104
Scotland	49
Spain	746
Sweden	96
Switzerland	72
Yugoslavia	157
Jewish, native and foreign *	21
All others	96

* 1931 estimate from *American Jewish Yearbook*, vol 40 (1938 to 1939)

TABLE XIX

LENGTH OF CHICAGO RESIDENCE OF WOMEN IN WOMEN'S COURT: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935

LENGTH OF CHICAGO RESIDENCE	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	7,608	100.0
0-4	1,046	13.8
5-9	1,173	15.5
10-14	1,190	15.6
15-19	787	10.3
20-24	710	9.3
25-29	404	5.3
30-34	272	3.6
35-39	160	2.1
40-44	130	1.7
45-49	53	.7
50-54	21	.3
55-59	12	.2
60-64	1	*
65-69	3	*
No report	1,646	21.6

* Less than .05 per cent.

TABLE XX

MARITAL STATUS OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

MARITAL STATUS	POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1932		CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	2,543,817	100.0	1,612	100.0
Single	831,000	32.6	791	49.0
Married	1,478,377	58.2	553	34.2
Widowed	194,400	7.6	46	2.9
Divorced	33,500	1.3	37	2.3
No record	6,540	.3	185	11.6

TABLES XXI THROUGH XXVI

ADULT DELINQUENCY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	ANNUAL MEAN ARRESTS PER 10,000 POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1930 TO 1935	ANNUAL MEAN CASES CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY PER 100,000 MALE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1929 TO 1935	1935			
			Female Arrests per 10,000 Female Population 17 Years Old and Over	Male Arrests per 10,000 Male Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Gambling per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Sex Offenses per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over
All Chicago	44.3	17.7	8.8	66.9	1.2	3.7
1. Rogers Park	16.5	10.5	1.1	31.0	.4	.8
2. West Ridge	13.4	1.9	1.2	16.4	...	.6
3. Uptown	39.1	13.4	14.9	56.8	2.0	4.6
4. Lincoln Square	18.6	8.8	...	42.2	1.1	1.4
5. North Center	25.6	6.8	2.7	32.6	1.1	.8
6. Lakeview	38.5	11.7	8.3	57.6	1.4	1.8
7. Lincoln Park	46.4	24.3	9.2	70.0	1.2	4.8
8. Near North Side	110.3	34.5	31.4	149.0	3.5	13.5
9. Edison Park	9.2	7.3	...	...	...	...
10. Norwood Park	17.3	2.6	1.8	24.3	...	.9
11. Jefferson Park	22.7	17.1	1.4	34.3	...	1.4
12. Forest Glen	19.2	...	...	31.5	3.1	...
13. North Park	15.6	...	...	38.0	...	...
14. Albany Park	23.5	6.7	2.3	42.7	1.4	1.7
15. Portage Park	21.0	8.2	.4	27.3	.2	1.2
16. Irving Park	20.8	10.1	2.0	35.4	.4	1.0
17. Dunning	26.6	17.9	2.8	37.8	...	...
18. Montclare	27.3	3.3	...	19.0	...	...
19. Belmont Cragin	27.6	5.0	.9	34.5	...	.4
20. Hermosa	20.8	6.1	...	22.8	.6	...
21. Avondale	27.2	12.0	1.7	39.6	2.0	.3
22. Logan Square	33.6	12.6	1.7	45.8	.6	1.4
23. Humboldt Park	27.3	11.3	2.1	40.7	1.2	1.2
24. West Town	62.2	10.3	5.6	104.0	1.9	2.2
25. Austin	22.4	9.2	1.3	38.1	1.0	.5
26. West Garfield Park	35.0	6.8	5.4	65.5	2.6	1.7
27. East Garfield Park	52.3	24.6	12.6	77.4	2.1	5.5
28. Near West Side	172.0	43.9	64.5	183.6	3.0	22.0
29. North Lawndale	44.0	10.4	4.6	72.3	1.8	2.6
30. South Lawndale	21.8	8.4	1.7	31.3	.2	.5
31. Lower West Side	57.1	34.9	5.8	91.5	1.3	4.3
32. Loop	389.8	67.2	175.1	497.6	88.1	55.0

TABLES XXI THROUGH XXVI

ADULT DELINQUENCY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Continued)

COMMUNITY	ANNUAL MEAN ARRESTS PER 10,000 POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1930 TO 1935	ANNUAL MEAN CASES CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY PER 100,000 MALE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1929 TO 1935	1935			
			Female Arrests per 10,000 Female Population 17 Years Old and Over	Male Arrests per 10,000 Male Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Gambling per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Sex Offenses per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over
33. Near South Side.	216.9	90.0	17.6	194.0	3.4	8.5
34. Armour Square.	105.0	26.6	17.6	111.5	1.4	11.3
35. Douglas.....	222.3	59.2	45.1	230.0	.9	26.0
36. Oakland.....	89.1	48.0	12.4	122.1	...	8.6
37. Fuller Park.....	69.5	19.7	6.9	90.4	...	4.5
38. Grand Boulevard	132.1	37.3	34.0	142.9	1.4	12.1
39. Kenwood.....	29.2	7.2	9.8	27.6	1.0	3.0
40. Washington Park	116.5	45.5	35.8	128.9	2.0	11.0
41. Hyde Park.....	20.3	13.1	3.0	31.1	1.7	...
42. Woodlawn.....	40.1	26.9	11.7	58.4	1.7	4.3
43. South Shore.....	15.4	3.9	.9	21.4	.7	.8
44. Chatham.....	21.3	7.2	.7	27.3	.7	...
45. Avalon Park ...	18.4	...	...	25.0	...	1.4
46. South Chicago..	63.3	6.9	8.5	81.6	.3	1.1
47. Burnside.....	61.5	12.2	...	121.1	...	...
48. Calumet Heights	48.4	...	...	68.5	2.2	2.2
49. Roseland.....	21.9	2.5	.6	30.7	.3	...
50. Pullman.....	58.3	...	9.9	69.2	...	...
51. South Deering...	52.8	5.3	4.4	56.8	...	...
52. East Side.....	29.9	...	1.9	38.3	...	1.9
53. West Pullman...	25.8	1.3	...	41.3	1.6	1.0
54. Riverdale.....	25.2	...	...	46.4	...	...
55. Hegewisch.....	31.8	...	...	42.6	...	...
56. Garfield Ridge..	37.8	26.7	...	33.4	...	...
57. Archer Heights..	31.3	9.6	...	41.0	...	1.8
58. Brighton Park...	38.9	19.4	1.3	54.7	...	1.6
59. McKinley Park..	37.6	18.8	1.5	59.6	...	2.9
60. Bridgeport.....	55.7	19.1	3.2	94.9	.9	2.5
61. New City.....	65.6	30.7	5.6	95.5	.9	.9
62. West Elsdon....	48.0	14.4	...	62.0	...	5.5
63. Gage Park.....	22.3	6.1	.9	33.3	.9	...
64. Clearing.....	26.6	34.4	5.7	26.6	...	...
65. West Lawn.....	28.0	17.3	3.1	48.4	...	...
66. Chicago Lawn..	17.7	9.5	...	18.8	...	.3
67. West Englewood.	25.4	14.8	.9	32.9	.4	.7

TABLES XXI THROUGH XXVI

ADULT DELINQUENCY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	ANNUAL MEAN ARRESTS PER 10,000 POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1930 TO 1935	ANNUAL MEAN CASES CONTRIBUTING TO DELINQUENCY PER 100,000 MALE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1929 TO 1935	1935			
			Female Arrests per 10,000 Female Population 17 Years Old and Over	Male Arrests per 10,000 Male Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Gambling per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over	Arrests for Sex Offenses per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over
68. Englewood	28.2	16.2	1.9	27.1	...	.8
69. Greater Grand Crossing	23.5	13.3	.9	25.0	.2	.2
70. Ashburn	62.7	...	...	51.3	...	...
71. Auburn Gresham	18.0	3.3	1.3	20.0	.2	.2
72. Beverly	10.7	...	...	13.9	...	...
73. Washington Heights	14.8	4.1	1.4	14.5	...	...
74. Mount Greenwood	22.0	70.1	...	15.3	...	...
75. Morgan Park	23.6	2.9	3.7	27.4	1.0	...

TABLE XXVII

CORRELATION OF MEAN ARREST RATES WITH OTHER MEAN RATES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 [3]

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION
Juvenile delinquency	.66 ± .06
Boys' court cases	.87 ± .03
Contributing to delinquency	.74 ± .05
Women's court cases	.92 ± .02
Nonsupport	.90 ± .02
Insanity	.80 ± .04
Divorce	.73 ± .05
Suicide	.71 ± .06
Family disintegration	.74 ± .05
Illegitimacy	.64 ± .07
Bastardy	.62 ± .07

[3] Mean crime rate is for the period, 1930 to 1935; women's court, October, 1933 to 1935; illegitimacy, 1933 to 1935.

TABLE XXVIII

JUVENILE, ADOLESCENT, AND ADULT CRIME: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PER 10,000 PERSONS 10 TO 17 YEARS OLD	BOYS' COURT CASES PER 1,000 BOYS 17 TO 20 YEARS OLD	ARRESTS PER 1,000 PERSONS 21 YEARS OLD AND OVER
1929	17.3	38.1	
1930	19.5	51.0	113.2
1931	21.3	54 9	98.2
1932	18.1	55 7	87.7
1933	23.7	48 8	81.0
1934	32 0	27.0	78.6
1935	38.2	31.3	68.3

TABLE XXIX

COMPARISON BETWEEN RECIDIVISM AND FIRST OFFENSE RATES OF BOYS' COURT CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	NUMBER PER 1,000 BOYS, 17 TO 20 YEARS OLD	
	First Offense	Recidivism
1929	32.2	5.9
1930	41.3	9.7
1931	39.5	15.4
1932	37.1	18.6
1933	32 0	16.8
1934	15.5	11.5
1935	21.5	9.8

TABLE XXX

SEX OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIMES IN PERCENTAGES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	ADULT ARRESTS		JUVENILE DELINQUENTS	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1929			75.5	24.5
1930	86.6	13.4	74.0	26.0
1931	85.3	14.7	77.3	22.7
1932	85.4	14.6	78.8	21.0
1933	89.1	10.8	81.6	18.3
1934	88.8	11 2	83 6	16 4
1935	81 7	18.3	82 8	17.2

TABLE XXXI

NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED BY SEX PER 1,000 PERSONS SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER OF LIKE SEX: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE
1930	110.5	17.6
1931	97.8	17.3
1932	88.3	15.2
1933	81.5	9.8
1934	78.5	9.8
1935	66.9	8.8

TABLE XXXII

MEAN AGE OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIMES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	ADULT ARRESTS	BOYS' COURT CASES	JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
1929	....	18.76	14.61
1930	33.45	18.84	15.01
1931	33.40	18.90	15.13
1932	33.40	18.83	15.28
1933	33.60	18.88	15.02
1934	34.25	18.96	15.06
1935	36.55	18.94	14.99

TABLE XXXIII

NUMBER OF MALE ARRESTS BY AGE GROUPS, CHICAGO: 1930 TO 1935

YEAR	NUMBER PER 1,000 MALES 17 TO 20 YEARS OLD	NUMBER PER 1,000 MALES 21 YEARS OLD AND OVER
1930	84.5	113.2
1931	93.8	98.2
1932	94.2	87.7
1933	86.1	81.0
1934	77.3	78.6
1935	53.5	68.3

TABLE XXXIV

PER CENT OF ARRESTS BY RACE AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1930 TO 1935

RACE AND NATIVITY	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native white	56.0	55.4	56.6	57.9	61.7	59.6
Foreign-born white	15.1	16.0	14.3	16.3	15.6	15.3
Negro	26.6	26.6	27.0	23.9	20.6	22.8
All others	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.1
No record	.1	.1	.2	.2	.2	.2

TABLE XXXV

RACE AND NATIVITY OF DEFENDANTS IN PERCENTAGES: BOYS' COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

RACE AND NATIVITY	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native white of native parentage	21.1	19.5	12.2	12.8	17.2	15.2	16.1
Native white of foreign and mixed parentage	53.5	47.5	56.3	57.0	50.9	53.9	52.3
Foreign-born white	3.6	2.6	3.4	2.5	1.9	1.4	.9
Negro	19.5	18.3	20.2	20.9	22.8	23.8	23.0
Other races	.1	...	...	*	*	...	...
White, no record of nativity	1.8	11.0	7.2	6.2	6.3	5.1	6.9
No record	.1	1.0	.4	.2	.6	.3	.6

* Less than .1 per cent.

TABLE XXXVI

RACE AND NATIVITY OF DEFENDANTS IN ADJUSTED PERCENTAGES: BOYS' COURT, CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

RACE AND NATIVITY	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native white of native parentage	21.7	22.6	13.4	13.9	18.8	16.3	17.7
Native white of foreign and mixed parentage	54.6	54.0	62.0	61.9	55.5	57.8	57.5
Foreign-born white	3.7	2.9	3.8	2.7	2.1	1.5	1.0
Negro	19.5	18.3	20.2	20.9	22.8	23.8	23.0
Other races	.1	...	...	*	*	...	...
No record	.1	1.0	.4	.2	.6	.3	.6

* Less than 1 per cent.

TABLE XXXVII

RACE AND NATIVITY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN PERCENTAGES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

RACE AND NATIVITY	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Native white of native parentage	16.2	15.9	14.3	17.4	17.1	18.4	20.8
Native white of foreign and mixed parentage	55.2	54.3	54.4	50.9	50.9	49.7	43.8
Foreign-born white	3.9	4.6	4.3	3.1	1.8	2.6	2.8
Negro	20.9	20.9	24.2	25.5	26.2	25.4	28.5
Other races	...	...	...	...	.2	.1	...
White, no record of nativity	3.3	3.8	2.5	2.8	3.4	3.4	4.2
No record	.6	.5	.3	.3	.4	.4	...

TABLE XXXVIII

Number of Arrests by Race or Nativity per 1,000 Persons of Like Race or Nativity Chicago, 1930 to 1935

Year	Native Born White	Foreign Born White	Negro
1930	39	29	188
1931	34	29	160
1932	31	25	145
1933	28	28	112
1934	28	26	92
1935	23	24	87

TABLE XXXIX

Per Cent of Number of Arrests by Cause and by Years Chicago, 1930 to 1935

Offense	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Auto theft	7	1 5	1 2	9	8	4
Assault (aggravated)	2 0	2 4	2 1	2 0	2 0	2 1
Assault (other)	9	9	8	8	8	8
Burglary	8	1 1	1 3	1 5	1 4	1 1
Disorderly conduct	52 3	45 4	49 0	48 6	50 8	57 0
Drug laws	2	3	5	3	3	1
Embezzlement	1 5	1 8	1 4	1 3	1 5	1 6
Forgery and counterfeiting	1	1	1	1	2	1
Gambling	6 4	6 0	6 1	3 3	1 2	3 1
Larceny	3 7	4 7	5 5	5 2	4 3	4 7
Liquor laws	1 6	9	8	5	3	4
Manslaughter	2	2	1	1	2	2
Murder	2	3	3	4	3	2
Rape	2	3	2	2	3	2
Robbery	1 2	1 6	1 6	1 7	1 7	1 6
Sex offenses	16 9	15 2	13 5	11 5	10 1	9 8
Stolen property (buying, etc)	4	7	6	.6	6	5
Traffic violations	7 9	12.8	10 5	17 8	19.7	12 8
Weapons (carrying, etc.)	6	9	7	5	7	3
Miscellaneous	2 1	2 5	3 0	2 4	2 6	2 9
No record	2	3	4	3	3	2

TABLE XL

Offenses of Defendants in Percentages: Boys' Court, Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Offense	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Burglary	5.0	7.6	6.2	8.5	7.3	9.5	7.9
Contributing to delinquency	.3	.6	.2	.3	.1	.4	.4
Disorderly conduct	50.9	44.4	32.8	33.0	38.6	43.9	47.6
Drug and liquor laws	.2	.2	.1	.7	*	.1	.3
Inflicting bodily injury	1.6	1.6	.9	1.3	2.6	3.2	2.6
Larceny	21.8	15.8	29.1	28.2	21.4	15.7	17.6
Malicious mischief	4.3	2.5	1.2	3.2	3.2	1.9	2.5
Possessing deadly weapons	1.2	2.4	1.6	1.5	2.0	1.4	1.0
Possessing, receiving or selling stolen goods	2.6	5.1	2.7	1.5	1.2	.6	1.0
Robbery	7.3	9.2	12.3	10.5	15.0	10.2	7.2
Sex offenses	3.0	2.0	.7	1.2	1.2	2.2	2.4
Miscellaneous	.9	5.5	4.8	7.8	4.8	7.0	6.9
No complaint	.1	.3	...	.1	...	.2	.1
No record	.2	2.1	6.7	1.6	2.0	3.0	1.9

* Less than 0.1 per cent.

TABLE XLI

Number of Arrests per 1,000 Persons, Seventeen Years Old and Over, by Selected Offenses: Chicago, 1930 to 1935

Year	Auto Thefts	Burglary	Embezzlement	Gambling	Larceny	Robbery	Sex Offenses
1930	.47	.52	.99	4.2	2.4	.79	10.9
1931	.89	.66	1.06	3.5	2.7	.95	8.8
1932	.63	.65	.75	3.2	2.9	.85	7.0
1933	.40	.67	.61	1.5	2.4	.79	5.2
1934	.33	.63	.68	.5	1.9	.73	4.4
1935	.16	.41	.59	1.2	1.8	.56	3.7

TABLE XLII

ADULT ARREST RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1930, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER			COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER		
	1930	1932	1935		1930	1932	1935
All Chicago	64.7	51.9	37.4	39. Kenwood	33.6	32.3	17.5
				40. Washington Park	143.8	128.7	79.5
1. Rogers Park	10.9	14.5	14.6	41. Hyde Park	24.1	22.5	15.2
2. West Ridge	13.8	12.1	8.4	42. Woodlawn	51.2	39.1	33.5
3. Uptown	40.3	37.7	34.5	43. South Shore	20.1	15.3	10.0
4. Lincoln Square	17.3	15.9	19.9	44. Chatham	29.3	24.6	13.4
5. North Center	29.2	20.3	17.5	45. Avalon Park	25.6	19.8	12.6
6. Lakeview	47.0	37.7	31.4	46. South Chicago	92.6	54.7	47.5
7. Lincoln Park	57.7	44.7	39.2	47. Burnside	61.2	73.9	65.9
8. Near North Side	150.4	125.0	96.8	48. Calumet Heights	60.9	47.0	35.1
9. Edison Park	22.2	5.3	...	49. Roseland	30.4	19.7	15.8
10. Norwood Park	18.1	21.0	13.1	50. Pullman	38.2	41.5	40.6
11. Jefferson Park	26.8	27.0	17.8	51. South Deering	63.4	60.4	32.6
12. Forest Glen	25.9	10.3	15.6	52. East Side	34.5	25.7	20.7
13. North Park	10.0	9.6	17.0	53. West Pullman	35.3	27.6	21.2
14. Albany Park	22.4	19.3	21.7	54. Riverdale	34.0	23.2	24.1
15. Portage Park	23.7	22.5	13.7	55. Hegewisch	23.5	42.2	21.3
16. Irving Park	21.7	17.4	18.1	56. Garfield Ridge	67.8	33.2	17.6
17. Dunning	23.6	25.8	20.7	57. Archer Heights	37.9	37.1	21.1
18. Montclare	33.9	30.5	9.5	58. Brighton Park	55.3	35.9	28.6
19. Belmont Cragin	30.9	30.5	17.7	59. McKinley Park	51.1	35.8	30.8
20. Hermosa	25.3	23.7	11.3	60. Bridgeport	88.6	62.2	19.0
21. Avondale	27.6	29.5	20.3	61. New City	89.0	65.1	51.0
22. Logan Square	35.7	34.2	23.4	62. West Elsdon	57.7	42.2	33.0
23. Humboldt Park	38.7	31.0	21.3	63. Gage Park	24.3	23.5	17.3
24. West Town	67.5	61.1	56.7	64. Clearing	33.9	39.2	16.5
25. Austin	30.0	20.7	18.6	65. West Lawn	39.5	18.5	26.1
26. West Garfield Park	47.2	23.1	34.0	66. Chicago Lawn	27.5	18.5	9.2
27. East Garfield Park	68.4	58.3	44.4	67. West Englewood	34.0	30.3	16.6
28. Near West Side	214.7	191.1	135.7	68. Englewood	45.4	30.9	14.0
29. North Lawndale	48.5	42.5	38.4	69. Greater Grand			
30. South Lawndale	22.0	25.0	16.0	Crossing	39.5	21.7	12.5
31. Lower West Side	59.4	60.7	50.8	70. Ashburn	62.2	65.5	23.6
32. Loop	498.6	372.0	433.7	71. Auburn Gresham	22.6	20.1	10.3
33. Near South Side	276.1	244.7	108.5	72. Beverly	10.1	10.7	6.4
34. Armour Square	158.0	128.7	73.6	73. Washington			
35. Douglas	301.8	240.7	138.1	Heights	13.7	15.2	7.7
36. Oakland	123.3	76.4	65.2	74. Mount Greenwood	39.6	13.5	7.9
37. Fuller Park	104.6	76.5	30.1	75. Morgan Park	22.8	25.9	14.8
38. Grand Boulevard	199.3	139.7	85.1				

TABLES XLIII AND XLIV

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO 1929, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	JUVENILE DELINQUENCY			BOYS' COURT		
	Number Cases per 10,000 Population 10 to 17 Years Old			Number First Appearances per 1,000 Males 10 to 17 Years Old		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
All Chicago	17.3	18.1	38.2	321.9	371.2	214.5
1. Rogers Park	6.0	1.9	15.3	1.0	1.0	.7
2. West Ridge	9.5	...	5.9	1.0	.8	.8
3. Uptown	8.7	9.9	30.4	1.7	1.5	1.6
4. Lincoln Square	2.1	4.3	8.7	1.3	1.5	1.0
5. North Center	5.2	8.9	16.6	1.9	1.6	.7
6. Lakeview	10.0	14.7	19.4	1.5	2.3	1.0
7. Lincoln Park	16.4	7.4	49.1	2.1	2.8	2.3
8. Near North Side	23.2	29.8	70.2	6.0	6.3	5.0
9. Edison Park	13.8	...	...	...	.8	.7
10. Norwood Park	4.8	17.5	20.0	3.0	1.0	.2
11. Jefferson Park	4.3	6.0	8.9	3.4	1.7	1.0
12. Forest Glen	...	15.9	15.0	...	...	.7
13. North Park	7.6	...	6.6	1.1	.3	.7
14. Albany Park	1.3	4.1	20.8	.6	1.0	.5
15. Portage Park	6.1	7.4	18.9	2.1	1.0	.8
16. Irving Park	5.8	7.2	9.9	1.6	1.5	.9
17. Dunning	9.6	8.5	7.7	2.3	1.8	.7
18. Montclare	23.3	...	6.8	2.6	...	...
19. Belmont Cragin	15.0	6.1	19.3	2.7	3.0	1.1
20. Hermosa	16.0	9.5	34.8	1.1	1.4	.9
21. Avondale	7.0	5.8	19.4	1.8	2.1	.7
22. Logan Square	24.4	11.2	29.1	3.0	3.2	1.9
23. Humboldt Park	19.1	11.3	30.8	2.2	3.0	1.4
24. West Town	17.5	25.6	53.7	5.0	5.6	3.1
25. Austin	10.3	4.8	18.7	1.5	2.1	1.1
26. West Garfield Park	8.2	8.6	20.0	1.7	2.4	1.7
27. East Garfield Park	25.4	41.8	47.3	3.9	6.2	4.0
28. Near West Side	47.8	60.5	79.1	8.6	12.0	6.4
29. North Lawndale	26.9	17.1	21.0	2.2	2.6	1.0
30. South Lawndale	7.7	6.8	26.4	2.5	1.8	1.0
31. Lower West Side	18.5	27.5	54.5	5.4	6.5	3.0
32. Loop	...	...	...	18.5	19.4	40.0
33. Near South Side	47.1	18.7	161.7	9.6	10.5	4.3
34. Armour Square	17.5	18.0	64.9	5.6	7.5	5.5
35. Douglas	66.8	83.9	201.5	13.9	14.1	8.2
36. Oakland	35.5	27.7	183.2	7.1	9.3	4.9
37. Fuller Park	16.1	16.9	48.6	4.6	7.0	1.7
38. Grand Boulevard	73.4	76.0	188.9	10.3	12.3	7.9

TABLES XLIII AND XLIV

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO 1929, 1932, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	JUVENILE DELINQUENCY			BOYS' COURT		
	Number Cases per 10,000 Population 10 to 17 Years Old			Number First Appearances per 1,000 Males 10 to 17 Years Old		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
39. Kenwood	20.6	5.6	...	1.9	1.9	2.0
40. Washington Park	54.9	57.9	143.4	6.6	8.9	8.7
41. Hyde Park	5.1	22.3	21.5	1.4	.8	.9
42. Woodlawn	13.8	26.6	43.8	1.7	2.7	3.0
43. South Shore	5.3	5.5	5.6	1.1	.6	.5
44. Chatham	12.5	4.9	23.8	.9	.3	1.7
45. Avalon Park	8.3	...	...	...	.3	.6
46. South Chicago	15.5	20.2	52.7	.7	.3	1.1
47. Burnside	102.6	13.5	14.1	...	.6	4.7
48. Calumet Heights	8.9	17.6	14.2	1.5	.4	.7
49. Roseland	4.6	6.2	15.8	.4	.5	.5
50. Pullman	4.5	...	...	...	...	4.2
51. South Deering	20.2	25.8	31.2	.3	.3	1.5
52. East Side	2.2	3.8	11.7	1.3	1.0	.6
53. West Pullman	...	6.1	8.8	.5	.4	1.4
54. Riverdale	...	39.8	49.3	...	...	2.0
55. Hegewisch	54.3	18.0	11.9	...	1.1	.8
56. Garfield Ridge	39.7	48.0	21.3	2.7	2.8	3.8
57. Archer Heights	10.3	5.7	6.3	4.6	4.4	1.6
58. Brighton Park	6.3	18.1	45.1	3.3	4.1	2.3
59. McKinley Park	6.9	4.9	21.0	1.7	2.3	2.1
60. Bridgeport	25.3	15.8	40.8	5.1	6.0	3.0
61. New City	22.7	29.4	49.4	4.7	6.5	2.8
62. West Elsdon	48.5	...	...	2.9	2.6	1.5
63. Gage Park	3.6	13.5	22.8	2.6	1.8	1.6
64. Clearing	24.4	...	12.4	1.4	1.5	4.1
65. West Lawn	6.6	12.3	28.7	3.0	2.3	.7
66. Chicago Lawn	6.0	16.9	9.4	2.6	2.9	1.4
67. West Englewood	4.1	9.5	35.7	2.9	3.1	1.9
68. Englewood	13.8	10.7	32.0	3.6	4.2	1.9
69. Greater Grand Crossing	9.6	8.5	24.9	1.5	1.6	1.1
70. Ashburn	...	...	...	2.7	...	21.1
71. Auburn Gresham	2.9	1.4	8.1	1.7	2.0	.6
72. Beverly	10.2	...	...	.5	.4	.2
73. Washington Heights	...	10.7	7.3	1.0	.9	.6
74. Mount Greenwood	...	...	14.0	.8	1.9	2.2
75. Morgan Park	27.8	24.8	27.0	1.7	5.6	1.5

TABLES XLV AND XLVI

FEMALE AND MALE ARREST RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO 1930, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	FEMALE ARRESTS			MALE ARRESTS		
	Number Cases per 1,000 Females 17 Years Old and Over			Number Cases per 1,000 Males 17 Years Old and Over		
	1930	1932	1935	1930	1932	1935
All Chicago	17.6	15.2	8.8	110.5	88.3	66.9
1. Rogers Park	3.2	3.1	1.1	20.8	28.6	31.0
2. West Ridge	2.7	...	1.2	26.0	25.4	16.4
3. Uptown	13.0	20.3	14.9	70.1	57.2	56.8
4. Lincoln Square	2.1	1.1	...	33.8	32.3	42.2
5. North Center	5.5	1.7	2.7	52.7	39.0	32.6
6. Lakeview	12.9	15.9	8.3	82.2	60.9	57.6
7. Lincoln Park	11.9	12.3	9.2	100.7	76.0	70.0
8. Near North Side	55.5	53.2	31.4	230.4	184.2	149.0
9. Edison Park	...	...	...	58.6	16.0	...
10. Norwood Park	2.0	3.9	1.8	34.3	38.5	24.3
11. Jefferson Park	3.0	5.8	1.4	48.5	47.0	34.3
12. Forest Glen	7.3	...	...	43.4	20.5	31.5
13. North Park	4.7	...	...	15.7	20.7	38.0
14. Albany Park	4.2	3.3	2.3	41.8	36.6	42.7
15. Portage Park	3.5	4.7	.4	43.6	40.4	27.3
16. Irving Park	2.7	1.2	2.0	41.2	34.3	35.4
17. Dunning	4.9	6.2	2.8	41.1	44.4	37.8
18. Montclare	3.6	...	...	61.8	59.8	19.0
19. Belmont Cragin	1.5	3.9	.9	58.8	56.4	34.5
20. Hermosa	2.3	3.5	...	44.4	43.8	22.8
21. Avondale	4.6	3.5	1.7	50.8	56.2	39.6
22. Logan Square	3.9	5.7	1.7	67.0	62.9	45.8
23. Humboldt Park	6.0	4.3	2.1	69.9	57.1	40.7
24. West Town	11.2	8.5	5.6	117.9	108.9	104.0
25. Austin	2.7	1.3	1.3	59.3	41.9	38.1
26. West Garfield Park	5.7	3.2	5.4	89.1	44.0	65.5
27. East Garfield Park	12.6	17.5	12.6	120.9	98.2	77.4
28. Near West Side	69.9	75.5	64.5	317.3	271.2	183.6
29. North Lawndale	7.7	5.0	4.6	87.9	79.3	72.3
30. South Lawndale	2.3	4.3	1.7	39.6	43.5	31.3
31. Lower West Side	8.1	9.8	5.8	103.0	105.2	91.5
32. Loop	70.4	80.4	175.1	600.7	439.9	497.6
33. Near South Side	166.8	174.2	17.6	349.4	294.5	194.0
34. Armour Square	72.7	24.0	17.6	219.4	203.5	111.5
35. Douglas	145.3	103.6	45.1	449.6	372.8	230.0
36. Oakland	49.3	18.3	12.4	191.4	133.8	122.1
37. Fuller Park	9.0	6.8	6.9	192.7	140.8	90.4
38. Grand Boulevard	104.0	64.5	34.0	297.9	220.1	142.9

TABLES XLV AND XLVI

FEMALE AND MALE ARREST RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO 1930, 1932, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	FEMALE ARRESTS			MALE ARRESTS		
	Number Cases per 1 000 Females 17 Years Old and Over			Number Cases per 1 000 Males 17 Years Old and Over		
	1930	1932	1935	1930	1932	1935
39 Kenwood	14 1	23 1	9 8	57 8	43 7	27 6
40 Washington Park	69 7	80 2	35 8	220 7	180 4	128 9
41 Hyde Park	8 2	6 2	3 0	43 3	42 7	31 1
42 Woodlawn	6 9	13 6	11 7	96 8	66 4	58 4
43 South Shore	1 4	1 8	9	42 2	31 5	21 4
44 Chatham	3 6	2 9	7	56 0	47 6	27 3
45 Avalon Park	2 8			48 9	39 8	25 0
46 South Chicago	13 3	12 4	8 5	175 1	95 9	81 6
47 Burnside	11 0			103 2	136 1	121 1
48 Calumet Heights	22 4	4 5		94 5	85 4	68 5
49 Roseland	11 2	3 4	6	40 8	34 9	30 7
50 Pullman	10 5	5 2	9 9	58 4	70 6	69 2
51 South Deering	10 3		4 4	99 8	105 8	56 8
52 East Side	3 9	1 9	1 9	61 6	46 6	38 3
53 West Pullman	5 8	3 4		60 6	48 9	41 3
54 Riverdale				61 7	43 1	46 4
55 Hegewisch	5 1	5 0		36 4	72 2	42 6
56 Garfield Ridge	18 7	5 9		111 5	57 5	33 4
57 Archer Heights		4 1		70 9	66 8	41 0
58 Brighton Park	10 1	5 5	1 3	95 6	63 6	54 7
59 McKinley Park	7 4	4 5	1 5	91 2	65 5	59 6
60 Bridgeport	16 2	6 3	3 2	152 6	113 1	94 9
61 New City	19 2	16 2	5 6	145 2	107 6	95 5
62 West Elsdon	14 0	26 1		93 9	55 7	62 0
63 Gage Park	1 9	1 0	9	45 2	44 7	33 3
64 Clearing	6 5	18 5	5 7	54 6	56 1	26 6
65 West Lawn	7 4	3 5	3 1	68 9	32 8	48 4
66 Chicago Lawn	1 1	4 0		55 5	33 2	18 8
67 West Englewood	3 6	3 2	9	63 0	56 9	32 9
68 Englewood	6 4	3 1	1 9	84 1	59 1	27 1
69 Greater Grand Crossing	2 6	3 1	9	80 4	40 7	25 0
70 Ashburn				105 3	120 5	51 3
71 Auburn Gresham	3 3	3 7	1 3	42 8	37 4	20 0
72 Beverly				22 1	23 3	13 9
73 Washington Heights	3 2	3 0	1 4	24 3	27 9	14 5
74 Mount Greenwood				75 0	25 8	15 3
75 Morgan Park		2 1	3 7	47 2	51 9	27 4

TABLES XLVII AND XLVIII

OFFENSE ARREST RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO
1930, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	SEX OFFENSES			GAMBLING		
	Number Cases per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over			Number Cases per 10,000 Population 17 Years Old and Over		
	1930	1932	1935	1930	1932	1935
All Chicago	10.9	7.0	3.7	4.2	3.2	1.2
1. Rogers Park	.4	2.2	.8	1.3	.4	.4
2. West Ridge	1.1	...	.6	1.4	1.0	..
3. Uptown	7.0	7.2	4.6	3.9	2.9	2.0
4. Lincoln Square	2.5	.8	1.4	2.5	.3	1.1
5. North Center	3.1	2.8	.8	.3	.3	1.1
6. Lakeview	7.2	6.8	1.8	4.8	2.9	1.4
7. Lincoln Park	8.5	9.1	4.8	4.1	1.3	1.2
8. Near North Side	33.3	30.1	13.5	12.0	6.9	3.5
9. Edison Park	2.8	. .	...	...	...	...
10. Norwood Park	1.1	1.0	.9	...	...	...
11. Jefferson Park	3.6	7.0	1.4	1.4	...	...
12. Forest Glen	7.3	...	...	...	...	3.1
13. North Park	1.2	...	...	1.3	1.2	...
14. Albany Park	1.7	.7	1.7	.7	2.2	1.4
15. Portage Park	2.4	2.1	1.2	1.8	.4	.2
16. Irving Park	3.4	2.4	1.0	.8	.6	.4
17. Dunning	.8	.8	...	...	...	...
18. Montclare	3.5	1.7	...	...	...	...
19. Belmont Cragin	3.0	1.4	.4	1.0	.2	...
20. Hermosa	2.3	1.7	...	...	.6	.6
21. Avondale	3.5	1.5	.3	2.1	.3	2.1
22. Logan Square	4.1	3.4	1.4	.6	.9	.6
23. Humboldt Park	3.9	1.9	1.2	2.1	1.6	1.2
24. West Town	5.9	4.5	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.9
25. Austin	2.9	.8	.5	2.5	1.9	1.0
26. West Garfield Park	3.4	1.1	1.7	3.4	1.1	2.6
27. East Garfield Park	8.1	5.8	5.5	6.6	3.3	2.1
28. Near West Side	41.3	29.1	22.0	11.1	5.4	3.0
29. North Lawndale	4.2	3.7	2.6	4.0	1.3	1.8
30. South Lawndale	2.8	.7	.5	1.1	.7	.2
31. Lower West Side	6.1	2.4	4.3	1.2	.7	1.3
32. Loop	46.2	13.9	55.1	46.2	35.7	88.1
33. Near South Side	80.1	73.0	8.5	16.9	7.8	3.4
34. Armour Square	29.5	12.9	11.3	4.3	12.2	1.4
35. Douglas	85.0	42.0	26.0	30.3	37.0	.9
36. Oakland	23.2	6.4	8.6	9.9	6.4	...
37. Fuller Park	14.0	8.7	4.5	3.2	5.5	. .
38. Grand Boulevard	57.4	28.8	12.1	25.1	23.3	1.4

TABLES XLVII AND XLVIII

OFFENSE ARREST RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO 1930, 1932, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	SEX OFFENSES			GAMBLING		
	Number Cases per 10,000 Population 17 Years and Over			Number Cases per 10,000 Population 17 Years and Over		
	1930	1932	1935	1930	1932	1935
39. Kenwood . . .	6.5	7.8	3.0	1.8	2 8	1.0
40. Washington Park	38.8	37 3	11.0	17.4	20.4	2.0
41. Hyde Park . .	4 3	2 9		1.0	.5	1 7
42. Woodlawn . . .	10.9	6.7	4.3	3.9	3.5	1 7
43. South Shore	1.6	1.1	.8	.3	.5	.7
44. Chatham	2.3	.7		.4	.7	.7
45. Avalon Park	1.4		1.4	1.4		
46. South Chicago	9 3	2.2	1.1	1.9	.8	.3
47. Burnside	10 2			.		
48. Calumet Heights	4.2		2 2			2.2
49. Roseland	3 0	2 3		.7	7	.3
50. Pullman .	6.7					
51. South Deering	8.5	4.2			2 1	
52. East Side	4.5	2.7	1.9	.9		
53. West Pullman . . .	2.7	1.6	1.1	1.6	.5	1.6
54. Riverdale .		11.6				.
55. Hegewisch .	4.3	2 2				. .
56. Garfield Ridge .	5.9					. .
57. Archer Heights .	2.1		1.8			.
58. Brighton Park . . .	5 8	1.7	1.6	.3		.
59. McKinley Park .	6.5	4.4	2.9	. .	7	
60. Bridgeport . . .	8.2	4.5	2.5	2.3	2.7	.9
61. New City . .	9.7	5.7	.9	1.1	.6	.9
62. West Elsdon	12.8	.	5.5			. .
63. Gage Park	1.4	.5		.	.5	.9
64. Clearing . .	5.6	2.8				. . .
65. West Lawn	5.4	1.7			1.7	. . .
66. Chicago Lawn	3.3	1.5	.3	.3	.6	. .
67. West Englewood . .	3.8	.7	.7	1.6	2.0	.4
68. Englewood .	5.6	2.8	.8	1.1	.5	.
69. Greater Grand Crossing . .	3.4	.9	.2	1.8	.5	.2
70. Ashburn . .	.	.		.	.	. .
71. Auburn Gresham	2.4	1.4	.2	1.0	.7	.2
72. Beverly	.		. .	. .	. .	. .
73. Washington Heights	1.6	.	.	.8		. .
74. Mount Greenwood			. .	.		
75. Morgan Park		2.2	.		3.2	1.0

TABLE XLIX

Deaths from Alcoholism per 100,000 Population in the Expanding Registration Area and in the Original Registration States, 1900 to 1938 [4]

Year	Expanding Registration Area	Original Registration States*	Year	Expanding Registration Area	Original Registration States*
1900	6.4	6.4	1920	1.0	1.2
1901	6.0	5.0	1921	1.8	1.9
1902	6.1	5.2	1922	2.6	3.3
1903	6.6	6.1	1923	3.2	4.3
1904	5.8	5.2	1924	3.2	4.5
1905	6.2	5.9	1925	3.6	5.1
1906	6.4	6.3	1926	3.9	5.3
1907	7.3	7.4	1927	4.0	5.4
1908	5.0	5.1	1928	4.0	5.3
1909	5.1	5.5	1929	3.7	5.2
1910	5.4	5.6	1930	3.5	4.7
1911	4.9	5.3	1931	3.3	4.7
1912	5.3	5.9	1932	2.5	3.4
1913	5.9	6.6	1933	2.6	3.6
1914	5.0	5.4	1934	2.9	3.7
1915	4.4	4.8	1935	2.6	3.2
1916	5.8	7.4	1936	2.9	3.5
1917	5.2	6.4	1937	2.6	3.1
1918	2.7	3.0	1938	2.0	2.5
1919	1.6	1.8			

* The New England States, New York, New Jersey, Indiana, and Michigan.

[4] Adapted from Calvin F. Schmid, "Mortality from Alcoholism in the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), p. 436.

TABLE L

DEATHS FROM ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX: UNITED STATES, 1934 TO 1938 [5]

AGE	MALE	FEMALE
0-4	0.1	*
5-9	0.1	*
10-14	0.1	*
15-19	0.2	0.1
20-24	0.9	0.3
25-29	2.4	0.6
30-34	5.9	1.0
35-39	8.0	1.5
40-44	9.5	1.5
45-49	11.5	1.5
50-54	11.9	1.4
55-59	10.8	1.0
60-64	11.5	1.0
65-69	10.2	0.7
70-74	7.8	0.4
75-79	6.2	0.3
80-84	4.7	0.4
85 and over	3.5	0.4

* Less than 0.1.

[5] Adapted from Calvin F. Schmid, "Mortality from Alcoholism in the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcoholism*, vol. I (December, 1940), p. 438.

TABLE LI

ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION IN FIRST ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS FOR THE INSANE: MASSACHUSETTS, 1917 TO 1933 [6]

YEAR	ALCOHOLIC PSYCHOSES		ALCOHOLISM WITHOUT PSYCHOSIS	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1917	33	8	2.0	2.0
1918	23	4	2.0	1.0
1919	22	4	1.0	0.4
1920	10	1	0.9	0.1
1921	14	2	1.0	0.2
1922	23	3	2.0	0.3
1923	26	3	2.0	0.1
1924	30	3	1.0	0.2
1925	25	3	3.0	0.5
1926	22	3	2.0	0.2
1927	28	2	3.0	0.1
1928	26	3	2.0	0.2
1929	28	3	2.0	0.3
1930	25	3	3.0	0.5
1931	30	3	4.0	0.9
1932	27	4	7.0	0.8
1933	25	3	9.0	0.7

TABLE LII

ALCOHOLISM PER 100,000 POPULATION IN FIRST ADMISSIONS TO HOSPITALS FOR THE INSANE BY SEX AND AGE: MASSACHUSETTS, 1917 TO 1933 [7]

AGE	ALCOHOLIC PSYCHOSES		ALCOHOLISM WITHOUT PSYCHOSIS	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
10-19	3	0.8	0.8	..
20-29	125	15.0	27.0	3
30-39	439	61.0	60.0	13
40-49	550	95.0	60.0	14
50-59	497	71.0	53.0	8
60-69	316	37.0	18.0	2
70-79	100	21.0	14.0	1
80-89	18	...	...	..

[6] Adapted from Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, pp. 468-475.
[7] Adapted from Neil A. Dayton, *New Facts on Mental Disorders*, pp. 464-467.

TABLE LIII

Illegitimacy Rates United States Registration Area, 1917 to 1938, [8] Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Year	United States	Chicago	
	Illegitimate Live Births per 1,000 Live Births	Bastardy Suits per 10,000 Females 17 Years Old and Over	Illegitimate Live Births per 1,000 Live Births
1917	20 2		
1918	19 4		
1919	23 6		
1920	24 9		
1921	26 6		
1922	25 8		
1923	25 2		
1924	25 9		
1925	25 3		
1926	25 6		
1927	29 0		
1928	32 8		
1929	33 9	3 35	
1930	34 7	3 60	
1931	37 5	2 49	
1932	41 0	2 88	
1933	41 8	3 46	29 0
1934	41 0	3 34	29 0
1935	41 1	2 80	27 0
1936	39 8		
1937	40 2		
1938	41 1		

TABLE LIV

Marital Status of Mother in Bastardy Cases· Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Marital Status	Number	Per Cent
Total	2,654	100 0
Single	1,796	67 7
Married	651	24 5
Divorced	83	3 1
Separated	8	3
Widowed	59	2 2
No record	57	2 2

[8] Bureau of the Census, *Vital Statistics of the U S, 1938*, vol I, p 8

TABLE LV

Rates of Bastardy and Illegitimacy by Age of Mother: Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Age of Mother	Yearly Mean Number Bastardy Cases per 10,000 Females, 1932	Yearly Mean Number Illegitimate Births per 10,000 Females, 1934
Average	22.3	37.4
10-14	...	6.2
15-19	18.6	113.1
20-24	59.2	82.1
25-29	35.7	26.6
30-34	23.8	16.4
35-44	11.6	4.8
45-54	5.2	...
55-64	1.6	...

TABLE LVI

Education of Mother in Bastardy Cases: Chicago, 1931 to 1935

Grade Completed	Number per 10,000 Females 18 Years and Over of Like Educational Status
1-4	5.91
5-8	15.97
9-10	31.02
11-12	8.97
13 and over	2.67
No record	214.38

TABLE LVII

ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS BY COLOR AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1933 TO 1935

NATIVITY AND COLOR	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 POPULATION 15 TO 44 YEARS OLD
Total	28.9
United States	
White	18.2
Others	99.2
Ireland	6.2
England, Scotland, and Wales	5.3
Germany	4.3
Austria	5.3
Other German countries	6.1
Hungary	3.3
Russia	2.3
Poland	2.0
Czechoslovakia	4.4
Lithuania	2.6
Other Slavic countries	...
Scandinavia	3.1
Italy	1.1
Other Latin countries	21.5
Other foreign countries	8.9

TABLES LVIII AND LIX

ANNUAL MEAN ILLEGITIMACY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	MEAN NUMBER ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS PER 100 BIRTHS 1933 TO 1935	MEAN NUMBER SUITS FOR BASTARDY PER 10,000 FEMALE POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER 1929 TO 1935	COMMUNITY	MEAN NUMBER ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS PER 100 BIRTHS 1933 TO 1935	MEAN NUMBER SUITS FOR BASTARDY PER 10,000 FEMALE POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER 1929 TO 1935
All Chicago.....	2.8	4.7	29. North Lawndale....	1.1	1.8
1. Rogers Park..	1.2	.9	30. South Lawndale....	1.9	2.6
2. West Ridge. .	.5	.8	31. Lower West Side.....	2.7	5.7
3. Uptown.....	2.9	1.7	32. Loop.....	13.6	84.6
4. Lincoln Square	1.0	1.0	33. Near South Side.....	22.8	12.4
5. North Center.	1.2	1.3	34. Armour Square.....	4.0	8.8
6. Lakeview	2.4	1.7	35. Douglas.....	16.5	15.6
7. Lincoln Park..	2.6	2.7	36. Oakland.....	4.7	7.8
8. Near North Side..... ..	5.6	3.6	37. Fuller Park...	2.9	3.6
9. Edison Park..	..	1.3	38. Grand Boulevard....	11.6	15.0
10. Norwood Park	2.1	.8	39. Kenwood.....	2.9	1.7
11. Jefferson Park.	.8	2.2	40. Washington Park.....	8.9	12.3
12. Forest Glen...	1.3	1.8	41. Hyde Park.. .	3.1	1.5
13. North Park...	23.5	..	42. Woodlawn....	2.9	2.2
14. Albany Park..	1.2	1.0	43. South Shore..	1.1	.5
15. Portage Park..	.9	1.2	44. Chatham.....	1.0	1.1
16. Irving Park...	.9	1.2	45. Avalon Park..	.2	.8
17. Dunning.....	.6	.7	46. South Chicago	2.0	.9
18. Montclare....	.7	1.5	47. Burnside.....	1.5	1.5
19. Belmont Cragin	.4	1.8	48. Calumet Heights.....	2.5	.6
20. Hermosa.....	.4	1.6	49. Roseland.....	1.7	1.0
21. Avondale.....	.7	1.8	50. Pullman.....	1.1	..
22. Logan Square	1.4	2.5	51. South Deering	1.1	.7
23. Humboldt Park	1.2	1.3	52. East Side.....	1.1	.6
24. West Town...	2.2	3.7	53. West Pullman	1.1	.8
25. Austin.....	1.1	1.4	54. Riverdale....	.4	..
26. West Garfield Park.....	1.1	1.3	55. Hegewisch. .	.7	1.4
27. East Garfield Park	2.1	2.9	56. Garfield Ridge	1.2	.8
28. Near West Side.....	6.2	8.6			

TABLES LVIII AND LIX

ANNUAL MEAN ILLEGITIMACY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	MEAN NUMBER ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS PER 100 BIRTHS 1933 TO 1935	MEAN NUMBER SUITS FOR BASTARDY PER 10,000 FEMALE POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER 1929 TO 1935	COMMUNITY	MEAN NUMBER ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS PER 100 BIRTHS 1933 TO 1935	MEAN NUMBER SUITS FOR BASTARDY PER 10,000 FEMALE POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER 1929 TO 1935
57. Archer Heights	2.3	5.9	68. Englewood	1.4	2.4
58. Brighton Park	6.7	3.4	69. Greater Grand Crossing	1.0	1.9
59. McKinley Park	1.0	2.6	70. Ashburn	..	..
60. Bridgeport	1.5	3.4	71. Auburn Gresham	.4	1.3
61. New City	2.6	9.1	72. Beverly	.3	.3
62. West Elsdon	2.4	3.7	73. Washington Heights	.3	.4
63. Gage Park	1.3	1.4			
64. Clearing	1.1	2.6	74. Mount Greenwood	.7	4.0
65. West Lawn	.7	2.9			
66. Chicago Lawn	1.0	1.5	75. Morgan Park	3.9	3.5
67. West Englewood	1.1	1.8			

TABLE LX

SUICIDES IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1910 TO 1930 [9]

COUNTRY	NUMBER SUICIDES PER 100,000 POPULATION										
	1910	1912	1914	1916	1918	1920	1922	1924	1926	1928	1930
United States (Registration)	16.0	16.0	16.6	14.2	12.2	10.2	11.9	12.2	12.8	13.6	15.6
England & Wales	10.0	9.9	10.0	7.3	7.5	9.0	10.0	9.6	11.4	12.4	12.7
Scotland	6.1	5.9	5.5	4.6	3.9	4.9	5.6	7.4	8.7	9.8	10.2
Irish Free State	3.1	3.7	2.9	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	2.8
North Ireland	...	3.9	2.3	3.2	3.7	2.7	4.5	5.4	5.0	5.1	4.9
New Zealand	10.1	11.9	12.6	13.4	10.2	11.2	13.1	12.2	11.3	14.5	13.5
Australia	11.8	13.6	13.0	11.7	9.9	11.9	9.6	11.2	11.8	10.1	14.6
Germany	21.6	22.5	21.5	17.5	15.3	21.3	21.5	22.8	25.9	24.9	27.8
Italy	8.4	8.5	8.9	6.9	7.5	7.3	8.1	9.5	9.6	9.5	9.6
Switzerland	22.7	23.3	24.3	20.4	19.7	22.6	23.8	23.5	25.9	25.6	26.1
Holland	6.2	6.0	6.0	5.7	7.1	7.3	6.2	6.2	6.6	6.8	8.1
Sweden	18.1	18.3	15.9	13.2	10.0	14.7	14.4	14.5	13.8	14.0	15.0
Norway	6.3	6.6	5.1	4.6	3.8	5.0	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.6	7.2
Denmark	19.1	18.2	18.6	15.7	12.8	14.3	14.5	13.6	15.9	17.6	17.6
Spain	...	4.6	5.9	6.1	6.6	5.1	5.1	6.3	3.8	5.8	3.5
Japan	18.5	18.2	20.3	17.4	17.9	18.5	19.5	18.6	20.0	21.1	21.6

[9] Adapted from Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p. 375.

TABLE LXI

SUICIDES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900 TO 1938 [10]

YEAR	NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION		
	Registration Area	Urban *	Rural †
1900	10 2	11 8	8 3
1901	10 4	11 7	8 7
1902	10 3	11 7	8 5
1903	11 3	12 8	9 4
1904	12 2	13 9	10 1
1905	13 5	15 0	11 6
1906	12 8	14 9	10 4
1907	14 5	16 7	11 9
1908	16 8	19 6	13 7
1909	15 9	19 0	12 6
1910	15 4	17 9	12 4
1911	16 2	19 2	12 6
1912	15 6	18 2	12 7
1913	16 0	18 6	12 1
1914	16 7	19 5	12 8
1915	16 8	19 2	13 3
1916	15 1	17 0	10 9
1917	14 7	16 2	10 4
1918	13 4	14 2	10 5
1919	12 7	13 6	9 5
1920	11 3	12 0	8 5
1921	13 9	15 0	10 1
1922	13 4	14 3	9 5
1923	13 1	14 2	9 3
1924	13 5	14 7	9 8
1925	13 8	15 0	9 5
1926	14 3	15 6	10 1
1927	14 9	16 2	10 7
1928	15 6	17 1	10 7
1929	16 2	17 4	11 0
1930	17 7		
1931	19 0		
1932	19 9		
1933	18 5		
1934	17 2		
1935	16 2		
1936	15 9		
1937	16 9		
1938	17 7		

* Cities of 10 000 or more inhabitants
† Remainder of registration area

[10] Urban and rural rates from Louis I Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not To Be*, p 390

TABLE LXII

Suicide Rates in Chicago and the United States, 1929 to 1935

Year	Chicago		United States
	Number per 100,000 Population	Number per 100,000 Population 20 Years Old and Over	Number per 100,000 Population
1929	7.7	11.3	16.2
1930	8.8	13.1	17.7
1931	14.9	22.0	19.0
1932	13.9	20.4	19.9
1933	14.7	21.3	18.5
1934	13.4	19.4	17.2
1935	6.3	9.0	16.2

TABLE LXIII

Suicide Rates by Sex and Years: Chicago, 1919 to 1921, 1929 to 1935

Year	Male *	Female *	Male Rate Divided by Female Rate
Annual mean, 1919 to 1921	21.3 †	8.9 †	2.4
Annual mean, 1929 to 1935	24.8	7.1	3.5
1929	16.5	6.3	2.6
1930	20.2	7.1	2.8
1931	35.5	10.1	3.5
1932	34.4	7.9	4.3
1933	40.5	9.9	4.1
1934	32.0	8.5	3.7
1935	17.6	5.5	3.2

* All rates represent the number of suicides per 100,000 persons of given sex, seventeen years old and over, except for the 1919 to 1921 rates, where the total number of persons of a given sex was used as the base.

† Rates taken from Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, p.80.

TABLE LXIV

ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY AGE AND SEX PER 100,000 PERSONS OF GIVEN AGE GROUPS CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

AGE	BOTH SEXES	MALE	FEMALE
10-14	47	52	42
15-19	1 64	1 43	2 04
20-24	5 90	7 28	5 03
25-29	9 33	12 01	7 16
30-34	10 47	14 29	6 90
35-44	13 14	19 10	7 02
45-54	25 02	39 49	7 89
55-64	35 07	58 36	9 86
65-74	39 38	71 36	12 02
75 and over	36 55	72 90	9 15

TABLE LXV

ATTEMPTED SUICIDE BY AGE AND SEX DETROIT, OCT 3, 1927, THROUGH FEB 27, 1930 [11]

AGE	ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION	
	Male	Female
Average	18 4	35 5
10-14	6	2 5
15-19	7 7	66 5
20-24	23 8	106 8
25-29	33 9	75 8
30-34	29 1	40 5
35-44	27.0	28 1
45-54	23 8	11 6
55-64	17.8	12 2
65-74	19 4	4 9
75 and over	9.5	7 1

[11] Adapted from F C Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol XIII (November, 1933), p 481

TABLE LXVI

ANNUAL NUMBER OF SUICIDES PER 100,000 PERSONS FIFTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX AND MARITAL STATUS: CHICAGO, 1929 to 1935; MINNEAPOLIS, 1928 to 1932;[12] CHICAGO, 1919 TO 1921[13]

MARITAL CONDITION	CHICAGO, 1929 to 1935	MALE		FEMALE	
		Minneapolis	Chicago	Minneapolis	Chicago
		1928 to 1932	1919 to 1921	1928 to 1932	1919 to 1921
Single	10.2	45.2	21.5	7.2	9.5
Married	15.0	40.8	27.4	16.4	12.5
Widowed	27.5	91.8	77.5	24.2	15.5
Divorced	42.2	112.2	146.5	50.8	53.6

TABLE LXVII

ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER OF ATTEMPTED SUICIDES PER 100,000 PERSONS BY MARITAL STATUS AND SEX: DETROIT, OCT. 3, 1927, THROUGH FEB. 27, 1930[14]

MARITAL CONDITION	MALE	FEMALE
Single	13.9	33.7
Married	22.5	40.5
Widowed	27.5	19.4
Divorced	30.7	120.5

[12] Calvin F. Schmid, *The Saga of Two Cities*, p. 373.

[13] Ruth Shonle Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 319.

[14] Adapted from F. C. Lendrum, "A Thousand Cases of Attempted Suicide," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, vol. XIII (November, 1933), p. 481.

TABLE LXVIII

SUICIDE BY RACE AND NATIVITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935, AND 1919 TO 1921[15]

RACE AND NATIVITY	ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1929 to 1935	ANNUAL MEAN NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION 1919 to 1921		
		Both Sexes	Male	Female
Total	15.5	15.2	21.3	8.9
Native white of native parentage	7.5	11.1	13.6	8.6
Native white of foreign and mixed parentage	9.8	8.5	10.9	6.3
Foreign-born white	25.7	28.8	41.4	14.2
Negro	5.6	7.7	12.5	2.9
Chinese	...	65.0	...	...
Other races	14.6	...	...	...

[15] Data for 1919 to 1921 from Cavan, *Suicide*, p. 80.

TABLE LXIX

ANNUAL MEAN SUICIDE RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER SUICIDES PER 100,000 PERSONS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER	COMMUNITY	NUMBER SUICIDES PER 100,000 PERSONS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER
All Chicago	15.5	38. Grand Boulevard	7.6
		39. Kenwood	23.1
1. Rogers Park	13.7	40. Washington Park	6.8
2. West Ridge	10.1	41. Hyde Park	18.4
3. Uptown	20.2	42. Woodlawn	17.9
4. Lincoln Square	12.7	43. South Shore	9.9
5. North Center	9.9	44. Chatham	10.6
6. Lakeview	20.5	45. Avalon Park	11.7
7. Lincoln Park	21.6	46. South Chicago	13.0
8. Near North Side	32.9	47. Burnside	19.5
9. Edison Park	17.9	48. Calumet Heights	11.5
10. Norwood Park	4.0	49. Roseland	10.2
11. Jefferson Park	11.5	50. Pullman	9.3
12. Forest Glen	22.9	51. South Deering	8.3
13. North Park	9.8	52. East Side	14.8
14. Albany Park	13.8	53. West Pullman	8.7
15. Portage Park	11.9	54. Riverdale	...
16. Irving Park	12.4	55. Hegewisch	14.6
17. Dunning	18.3	56. Garfield Ridge	21.6
18. Montclare	16.1	57. Archer Heights	5.1
19. Belmont Cragin	10.9	58. Brighton Park	14.6
20. Hermosa	10.2	59. McKinley Park	5.8
21. Avondale	12.3	60. Bridgeport	16.4
22. Logan Square	12.2	61. New City	12.0
23. Humboldt Park	12.9	62. West Elsdon	...
24. West Town	16.9	63. Gage Park	12.6
25. Austin	11.5	64. Clearing	22.7
26. West Garfield Park	10.1	65. West Lawn	9.0
27. East Garfield Park	13.1	66. Chicago Lawn	10.7
28. Near West Side	22.3	67. West Englewood	11.6
29. North Lawndale	11.2	68. Englewood	17.6
30. South Lawndale	16.2	69. Greater Grand Crossing	14.6
31. Lower West Side	27.2	70. Ashburn	61.0
32. Loop	144.5	71. Auburn Gresham	11.4
33. Near South Side	37.9	72. Beverly	11.9
34. Armour Square	24.2	73. Washington Heights	17.8
35. Douglas	11.1	74. Mount Greenwood	6.0
36. Oakland	24.1	75. Morgan Park	7.3
37. Fuller Park	23.6		

TABLE LXX

SUICIDE AMONG PATIENTS WITH MENTAL DISEASE: NEW YORK STATE HOSPITALS, 1919 TO 1929 [16]

PSYCHOSIS	NUMBER PER 100,000 PATIENTS		
	Both Sexes	Males	Females
Total	42.3	61.5	25.2
General paralysis	50.9	68.1	....
Alcoholic	39.5	54.7	....
Manic-depressive	124.3	233.4	71.0
Involutional melancholia	300.8	546.4	207.5
Dementia praecox	20.9	33.4	9.6
All others	33.4	52.0	28.0

TABLE LXXI

MENTAL PATIENTS IN STATE HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880 TO 1939 [17]

YEAR	NUMBER PER 100,000 POPULATION
1880	63.7
1890	107.6
1904	158.0
1910	173.0
1922	203.7
1923	207.3
1926	216.3
1927	217.9
1928	222.2
1929	225.6
1930	229.0
1931	236.4
1932	245.0
1933	257.1
1934	263.1
1935	269.1
1936	276.2
1937	282.9
1938	288.2
1939	295.3

[16] Louis I. Dublin and Bessie Bunzel, *To Be or Not to Be*, p. 311.

[17] Bureau of the Census, *Mental Patients in State Hospitals, 1926 to 1927*, p. 6; *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease, 1933*, p. 16; *Patients in Mental Institutions, 1938*, p. 22.

TABLE LXXII

MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES PER YEAR: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

SEX	MEAN NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 POPULATION 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER
Male	21.0
Female	14.3

TABLE LXXIII

MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES PER YEAR BY AGE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

AGE	MEAN NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 POPULATION SAME AGE
Total	13.0
10-14	.3
15-19	5.3
20-24	10.5
25-29	13.8
30-34	16.5
35-44	19.6
45-54	20.9
55-64	21.1
65-74	25.9
75 and over	79.6

TABLE LXXIV

YEARLY MEAN NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES BY RACE: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

RACE	MEAN NUMBER PER 10,000 POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER
Total	17.0
White	20.6
Negro	31.4
All others	3.5

TABLE LXXV

MARITAL STATUS OF INSANITY CASES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

MARITAL STATUS	YEARLY MEAN NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER
Total	16.86
Married	13.93
Single	18.58
Divorced	30.31
Widowed	24.75
No record	198.32

TABLE LXXVI

INSANITY RATES BY DIAGNOSIS: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

DIAGNOSIS	YEARLY MEAN NUMBER CASES PER 100,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER
Total	176.51
Dementia praecox	55.92
Alcoholism	30.36
Senile dementia	15.67
General paresis or paralysis	11.70
Arteriosclerosis, cerebral	8.96
Manic-depressive psychosis	8.65
Drug addiction	4.84
Organic brain disease	4.56
Paranoia	3.64
Epilepsy with psychopathic episodes	2.42
Mental deficiency with psychosis	2.26
Central nervous system lues	2.15
Mental deficiency	1.63
Psychoneurosis	1.51
Feeble-mindedness with psychosis	1.39
Involutional melancholia	1.21
Psychopathic personality	1.15
Presenile psychosis	.94
Epilepsy without psychosis	.89
Somatic disease with psychosis	.64
Catatonic state of excitement	.49
Juvenile paresis	.16
Constitutional psychopathic inferior	.08
Amnesia	.05
All others	5.24
Undiagnosed psychosis	2.42
No psychosis	5.91
No record	1.45

TABLE LXXVII

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND MENTAL DISORDER: CHICAGO, 1922 TO 1934 [18]

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AS INDICATED BY OCCUPATIONS	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 MALES OF SAME OCCUPATION		
	Native White	Foreign White	Negro
Large owners, major executives, major salesmen	36	32	...
Small tradesmen, office employees, clergy, teachers, subexecutives, engineers, semiprofessionals, artists	75	58	65
Police, firemen, minor governmental employees	88	114	108
Salesmen	121	109	246
Semiskilled and skilled craftsmen	122	124	153
Barbers, domestics, waiters	253	158	271
Unskilled, peddlers, errand boys	309	255	246

[18] Robert E. Clark, "The Relationship of Occupation to Mental Disorder," *Bulletin of the Society for Social Research*, December, 1939, p. 8.

TABLES LXXVIII THROUGH LXXXVII

ANNUAL MEAN INSANITY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER OF CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS OF DESIGNATED AGE GROUP									
	Total Number, 20 Years Old and Over	Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, 20 to 64 Years	Psychoses due to Syphilis, 30 to 64 Years	Convulsive Disorders and Organic Brain Disease, 15 to 64 Years	Mental Deficiency, 10 to 54 Years	Psychoses of Old Age, 55 Years and Over	Dementia Praecox, 15 to 64 Years	Without Psychoses, 15 Years and Over	Borderland Psychoses, 10 to 64 Years	Manic-Depressive Psychoses, 20 to 64 Years
All Chicago...	19.4	4.0	2.2	.8	.6	18.2	5.9	.6	.2	.9
1. Rogers Park....	8.0	.8	1.0	.2	.1	9.6	2.9	.3	.2	.8
2. West Ridge.....	7.1	1.2	.4	.1	.2	12.3	2.3	.2	.1	.6
3. Uptown.....	13.8	2.8	2.3	.7	.2	12.1	4.2	.5	.2	1.1
4. Lincoln Square..	10.4	1.2	2.0	.5	.2	11.9	2.8	.3	.2	.8
5. North Center...	14.8	2.6	1.5	.8	.2	11.8	5.9	.3	.1	.9
6. Lakeview.....	15.3	3.3	2.0	.7	.4	11.4	5.0	.4	.2	1.0
7. Lincoln Park....	21.0	3.9	2.6	1.0	.7	21.0	6.6	.7	.4	1.2
8. Near North Side.	30.6	.9	2.9	1.2	.8	26.1	8.9	.9	.6	1.3
9. Edison Park....	8.4	1.1	.5	.7	...	11.5	4.1	...	...	.4
10. Norwood Park..	10.3	1.4	1.3	.4	.4	14.8	3.1	.1	.1	.7
11. Jefferson Park...	12.3	1.6	1.0	1.2	.2	14.0	4.1	.9	.1	.6
12. Forest Glen.....	8.8	.5	...	.9	.4	16.1	3.4	...	...	2.0
13. North Park.....	9.3	1.1	1.0	...	.7	4.9	4.0	...	.6	.9
14. Albany Park....	11.5	.6	3.2	.4	.3	13.1	4.9	.2	.1	1.2
15. Portage Park....	11.8	1.4	.9	.6	.4	14.5	4.2	.4	.1	.6
16. Irving Park.....	10.7	1.1	1.7	.6	.3	1.9	3.4	.2	.1	.8
17. Dunning.....	13.6	1.2	1.0	.3	.3	25.0	4.8	.5	.1	1.2
18. Montclare.....	15.6	3.0	1.7	.2	.2	15.2	5.8	.8	...	.7
19. Belmont Cragin.	12.2	2.3	.7	.6	.2	14.8	4.5	.5	.1	.8

TABLES LXXVIII THROUGH LXXXVII

ANNUAL MEAN INSANITY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Continued)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER OF CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS OF DESIGNATED AGE GROUP									
	Total Number, 20 Years Old and Over	Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, 20 to 64 Years	Psychoses due to Syphilis, 30 to 64 Years	Convulsive Disorders and Organic Brain Disease, 15 to 64 Years	Mental Deficiency, 10 to 54 Years	Psychoses of Old Age, 55 Years and Over	Dementia Praecox, 15 to 64 Years	Without Psychoses, 15 Years and Over	Borderland Psychoses, 10 to 64 Years	Manic-Depressive Psychoses, 20 to 64 Years
20. Hermosa	12.2	1.3	1.0	.3	.5	12.5	5.4	.1	.1	.3
21. Avondale	12.4	1.8	1.6	.6	.5	11.0	4.7	.4	.1	.6
22. Logan Square	15.4	3.6	1.2	.5	.5	17.1	4.7	.4	.2	.7
23. Humboldt Park	14.7	1.9	1.7	.7	.5	16.2	5.7	.4	.1	.7
24. West Town	27.5	7.1	2.5	1.2	1.0	23.9	8.6	.9	.2	1.1
25. Austin	13.5	2.5	1.4	.6	.3	11.7	4.6	.3	.2	1.0
26. West Garfield Park	16.1	3.4	1.5	.6	.4	12.4	4.9	.6	.2	1.5
27. East Garfield Park	22.6	4.7	3.5	1.1	.3	20.1	6.8	.7	.3	1.5
28. Near West Side	46.1	10.3	5.0	1.8	1.7	43.4	10.8	1.2	.4	1.2
29. North Lawndale	17.6	1.7	1.4	.8	.7	12.7	7.2	.6	.2	1.2
30. South Lawndale	15.7	2.8	1.3	.6	.6	16.1	5.7	.6	.2	.6
31. Lower West Side	26.7	9.2	2.0	.7	.5	20.9	8.2	.8	.2	1.2
32. Loop	108.9	24.0	11.1	3.2	3.8	55.0	39.3	4.2	1.7	4.0
33. Near South Side	65.5	22.6	12.8	1.5	2.8	61.9	14.5	2.5	1.1	2.1
34. Armour Square	34.3	8.3	4.5	1.4	1.4	39.0	9.8	1.1	.2	.9
35. Douglas	45.0	11.6	9.2	2.6	2.3	61.7	11.8	1.2	.7	.8
36. Oakland	33.7	10.6	5.6	1.1	.6	27.8	7.8	1.5	.4	.9
37. Fuller Park	29.6	5.9	2.9	.8	1.2	34.8	6.1	.4	.2	.9
38. Grand Boulevard	29.4	5.5	6.2	1.4	.9	51.7	8.8	1.0	.3	.6

TABLES LXXVIII THROUGH LXXXVII

ANNUAL MEAN INSANITY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Continued)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER OF CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS OF DESIGNATED AGE GROUP									
	Total Number, 20 Years Old and Over	Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, 20 to 64 Years	Psychoses due to Syphilis, 30 to 64 Years	Convulsive Disorders and Organic Brain Disease, 15 to 64 Years	Mental Deficiency, 10 to 54 Years	Psychoses of Old Age, 55 Years and Over	Dementia Praecox, 15 to 64 Years	Without Psychoses, 15 Years and Over	Borderland Psychoses, 10 to 64 Years	Manic-Depressive Psychoses, 20 to 64 Years
39. Kenwood	14.4	2.6	1.2	.5	.1	11.7	4.4	.5	.4	1.2
40. Washington Park	26.7	3.8	5.7	1.2	.7	47.2	7.5	.8	.3	1.0
41. Hyde Park	12.7	2.1	1.4	.5	.1	11.0	4.4	.3	.3	.9
42. Woodlawn	18.9	3.7	2.1	.6	.4	15.3	6.0	.7	.3	1.4
43. South Shore	9.3	1.1	.8	.3	.2	9.4	3.0	.2	.3	.7
44. Chatham	9.7	1.7	.8	.4	.3	11.9	2.7	.4	.1	.5
45. Avalon Park	11.2	2.2	2.1	.4	...	17.3	2.7	.5	.2	1.0
46. South Chicago	14.2	3.8	1.2	.4	.5	15.5	4.5	.5	.2	.5
47. Burnside	26.6	3.6	5.4	1.7	.5	14.0	7.0	1.2	.5	.7
48. Calumet Heights	13.0	3.4	.9	.3	.5	13.4	4.5	.5	...	.6
49. Roseland	12.9	3.1	1.6	.6	.3	11.8	3.6	.2	.1	1.0
50. Pullman	19.2	3.0	.9	.6	...	12.6	9.4	.5	...	.7
51. South Deering	14.4	3.4	1.3	...	.4	18.6	5.2	.2	...	.6
52. East Side	15.6	2.8	.9	.6	.6	13.2	4.8	.3	.1	.9
53. West Pullman	14.8	2.6	.8	.7	.7	12.9	5.8	.5	.2	.2
54. Riverdale	10.8	...	...	...	...	...	4.2	...	...	3.4
55. Hegewisch	14.1	4.2	1.4	.2	...	21.3	5.5	.5	...	...
56. Garfield Ridge	23.7	3.8	1.2	.3	1.1	25.4	10.7	.9	...	.8
57. Archer Heights	17.5	4.4	2.1	.5	.4	34.8	4.7	.9	.2	.3
58. Brighton Park	17.3	3.3	1.8	1.0	.5	15.7	6.1	.4	.1	.8
59. McKinley Park	21.9	7.6	2.4	.4	.2	15.7	5.6	.4	.2	1.8

ANNUAL MEAN INSANITY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER OF CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS OF DESIGNATED AGE GROUP									
	Total Number, 20 Years Old and Over	Alcoholism and Drug Addiction, 20 to 64 Years	Psychoses due to Syphilis, 30 to 64 Years	Convulsive Disorders and Organic Brain Disease, 15 to 64 Years	Mental Deficiency, 10 to 54 Years	Psychoses of Old Age, 55 Years and Over	Dementia Praecox, 15 to 64 Years	Without Psychoses, 15 Years and Over	Borderland Psychoses, 10 to 64 Years	Manic-Depressive Psychoses, 20 to 64 Years
60. Bridgeport	25.9	7.4	2.3	1.1	1.2	21.8	7.1	.4	.2	.9
61. New City	22.6	7.1	2.6	1.0	.8	20.4	6.5	.6	.2	.7
62. West Elsdon	19.8	4.6	...	...	1.1	8.4	10.1	...	...	...
63. Gage Park	12.7	2.2	.8	.3	.2	15.4	4.3	.4	.1	.9
64. Clearing	9.6	2.0	1.2	.7	...	11.6	1.4	.7	.3	...
65. West Lawn	22.7	2.8	3.3	.6	.8	31.3	9.0	1.5	.2	1.2
66. Chicago Lawn	14.9	2.4	1.1	.2	.4	13.0	4.6	1.0	.2	.4
67. West Englewood	15.8	3.6	1.5	.5	.4	15.4	4.9	2.4	.2	1.0
68. Englewood	17.4	3.4	2.2	.7	.5	16.8	5.6	4.1	.4	1.0
69. Greater Grand Crossing	12.9	2.1	1.3	.4	.3	14.7	3.6	1.5	.3	1.2
70. Ashburn	41.9	6.2	9.8	...	...	23.5	16.2	...	...	...
71. Auburn Gresham	12.2	2.0	1.0	.5	.2	12.5	3.7	2.0	.3	.5
72. Beverly	8.2	1.4	1.6	.2	...	11.1	1.5	.6	...	.6
73. Washington Heights	11.2	1.4	1.7	.5	.5	8.8	3.0	.5	.4	.7
74. Mount Greenwood	20.3	1.4	.9	1.1	1.0	17.7	8.0	.4	...	1.4
75. Morgan Park	15.9	1.8	.8	.7	.7	20.9	4.9	.4	.2	.5

TABLE LXXXVIII

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY AND OF SUICIDE PER 10,000 PERSONS, TWENTY YEARS OLD AND OVER: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	INSANITY	SUICIDE
1929	19.8	1.13
1930	18.5	1.31
1931	16.0	2.20
1932	18.9	2.04
1933	16.7	2.13
1934	21.0	1.94
1935	22.1	.90

TABLE LXXXIX

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY AND SUICIDE BY SEX PER 10,000 PERSONS, SEVENTEEN YEARS OLD AND OVER, OF LIKE SEX: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	INSANITY		SUICIDE	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1929	21.8	13.8	1.65	.63
1930	20.3	13.8	2.02	.71
1931	17.8	11.9	3.55	1.01
1932	20.2	14.9	3.44	.79
1933	18.5	12.6	4.05	.99
1934	23.1	16.0	3.20	.85
1935	24.6	16.6	1.76	.55

TABLE XC

NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY MARITAL CONDITION PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE MARITAL CONDITION CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	MARITAL CONDITION *			
	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed
1929	.75	95	2 14	2 11
1930	75	1 20	5.11	1 93
1931	1 36	2 00	5 78	3 42
1932	1 31	1 76	5 67	3 29
1933	1.40	1 94	5 88	3 00
1934	1 12	1 81	2 15	3 53
1935	48	78	2 40	2 00

* Includes only the population, fifteen years old and over

TABLE XCI

NUMBER OF CASES OF INSANITY BY MARITAL CONDITION PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE MARITAL CONDITION IN CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	MARITAL CONDITIONS *			
	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed
1929	20 4	14 7	23 1	23 7
1930	18 8	13 4	26 6	24 2
1931	15 6	11 7	25 1	21 7
1932	17 8	14 5	29 9	23 0
1933	15 7	12 3	24 2	22 4
1934	20 0	15 4	40 6	28 4
1935	21.7	15 6	52 8	29 7

*Includes only the population, fifteen years old and over

TABLE XCII

Suicide Rate per 10,000 Persons of Designated Age Group: Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Age Group	Rate per 10,000 Population						
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
15-24	.30	.32	.49	.42	.48	.41	.26
25-34	.54	.79	1.56	1.26	1.15	1.19	.43
35-44	.89	1.20	1.62	1.58	1.69	1.54	.69
45-54	1.61	1.99	3.42	3 16	3.39	2.68	1.25
55-64	2.39	2.94	4 71	4.50	4.66	4.07	1.75
65-74	3 21	2.88	4 85	4.89	4.84	4.97	1.91
75 and over	4.02	1.94	4.35	4.26	4.64	3.93	2.17

TABLE XCIII

Insanity Rate per 10,000 Persons of Designated Age Group: Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Age Group	Rate per 10,000 Population						
	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
15-24	9 33	7.93	6.51	7.94	6.58	8 48	8.51
25-34	16.92	14.79	12.42	14.60	12.58	16.90	17.76
35-44	21.02	20.52	17.71	19.77	16.68	20.01	21.43
45-54	19 80	21.40	18 75	21.81	18.14	22.24	23.58
55-64	21.99	18.63	15.84	19.25	21.47	25.78	24.39
65-74	22.15	21.43	20.73	25.68	23.83	31.42	35.47
75 and over	41.92	28.08	31.73	42.64	40.31	52.73	55.41

TABLE XCIV

NUMBER OF INSANITY CASES BY RACE PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE RACE· CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	RACE	
	White	Negro
1929	12 5	22 9
1930	11 9	20 2
1931	10 3	19 3
1932	11.9	26 3
1933	10 6	21 7
1934	13 3	30 3
1935	14 1	30 5

TABLE XCV

NUMBER OF SUICIDES BY NATIVITY PER 10,000 PERSONS OF LIKE NATIVITY· CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

YEAR	NATIVITY			
	Native White of Native Parentage	Native White of Foreign and Mixed Parentage	Foreign-born White	Negro
1929	32	30	1 67	.12
1930	33	.49	1 93	21
1931	.81	.81	3 02	85
1932	58	80	3 17	72
1933	.70	.99	3.31	.50
1934	.54	.92	3.23	.38
1935	.28	.49	1.40	.29

TABLES XCVI THROUGH CII

DIAGNOSTIC RATES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

DIAGNOSIS	AGE GROUP	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 DESIGNATED AGE GROUP							
		1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	Total
Alcoholism	20-65	4.16	3.06	2.87	2.88	2.98	4.30	4.30	3.49
Arteriosclerosis, cerebral	45 up	3.19	2.35	2.61	3.33	2.85	3.45	2.59	2.91
Catatonic state of excitement	15-55	.01	.04	.05	.10	.04	.06	.09	.05
Central nervous system lues	30-65	.19	.16	.15	.23	.33	.71	.70	.35
Dementia praecox	15-55	6.66	6.53	5.51	6.09	4.96	6.52	7.36	6.22
Drug addiction	20-65	.61	1.02	.76	.76	.45	.14	.15	.56
Epilepsy with psychotic episodes	10-55	.20	.28	.20	.28	.20	.28	.24	.24
Epilepsy without psychosis	10-55	.11	.06	.08	.04	.09	.10	.12	.09
Feeble-mindedness with psychosis	10-55	.22	.02	.05	.13	.20	.24	.10	.14
General paresis or paralysis	30-65	2.22	2.15	1.75	2.12	1.93	1.80	1.70	1.95
Involutional melancholia	45-65	.16	.48	.35	.48	.50	.54	.84	.48
Juvenile paresis	10-20	.07	.14	.07	.05	.02	.05	.09	.07
Manic-depressive psychosis	20-65	.91	.81	.68	1.19	.99	1.11	1.26	1.00
Mental deficiency	10-55	.28	.14	.16	.19	.07	.13	.16	.16
Mental deficiency with psychosis	10-55	.14	.22	.26	.28	.16	.20	.32	.22
Organic brain disease	15-75	.31	.31	.42	.43	.44	.61	.60	.44
Paranoia	30-65	.26	.24	.10	.44	.42	.91	1.14	.60
Presenile psychosis	45-65	.19	.36	.28	.41	.60	.44	.34	.40
Psychopathic personality	10-65	.18	.09	.07	.15	.06	.09	.10	.10
Senile dementia	65 up	25.35	23.93	21.70	25.14	26.21	32.03	36.03	27.26
Somatic disease with psychosis	20-75	.09	.08	.06	.07	.05	.08	.06	.07
Undiagnosed psychosis	10-65	.18	.24	.25	.22	.21	.19	.25	.22
Psychoneurosis	15-55	.09	.10	.10	.17	.31	.39	.02	.17
All others	15 up	.81	.66	.39	.52	.37	.52	.24	.50
No psychosis	15 up	.86	.68	.40	.45	.30	.40	.88	.57
No record	15 up	.11	.16	.17	.17	.14	.14	.08	.14

TABLES CIII AND CIV

INSANITY RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 PERSONS 20 YEARS OLD AND OVER			NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 MARRIED PERSONS		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
All Chicago.....	19.8	18.9	22.1	13.8	13.6	14.2
1. Rogers Park.....	7.7	8.3	8.3	5.1	5.3	3.6
2. West Ridge.....	8.4	4.9	7.5	5.5	1.9	4.8
3. Uptown.....	12.9	14.7	14.8	8.9	11.9	10.1
4. Lincoln Square.....	12.0	8.8	11.2	7.7	6.9	9.0
5. North Center.....	17.8	15.4	16.6	11.5	12.5	13.1
6. Lakeview.....	16.6	14.7	18.5	11.8	12.6	15.3
7. Lincoln Park.....	20.5	21.7	26.3	15.7	17.9	20.1
8. Near North Side....	35.3	25.9	32.4	31.0	22.2	21.2
9. Edison Park.....	5.9	8.4	10.5	...	11.1	3.6
10. Norwood Park.....	9.4	7.5	10.0	7.6	7.3	12.5
11. Jefferson Park.....	17.4	10.8	15.3	9.3	4.0	6.9
12. Forest Glen.....	8.1	3.6	6.5	...	4.8	14.4
13. North Park.....	8.2	6.4	9.7	9.3	1.8	10.5
14. Albany Park.....	11.5	10.7	14.5	7.1	9.0	7.5
15. Portage Park.....	13.3	11.4	14.3	10.4	8.0	12.0
16. Irving Park.....	9.8	10.2	13.7	7.6	7.9	11.4
17. Dunning.....	12.7	14.0	13.5	8.9	7.3	8.7
18. Montclare.....	16.0	11.1	13.8	18.0	12.2	9.5
19. Belmont Cragin.....	12.7	12.2	14.2	10.1	9.7	12.9
20. Hermosa.....	13.3	9.3	10.9	9.4	5.1	7.6
21. Avondale..... ...	14.1	14.8	18.7	7.1	10.7	15.4
22. Logan Square.....	20.3	12.9	17.0	16.2	9.5	11.1
23. Humboldt Park.....	14.9	15.8	17.2	12.4	10.8	10.8
24. West Town..... ..	32.9	27.2	30.5	25.3	21.5	23.8
25. Austin.....	12.3	13.8	18.3	8.0	9.4	10.9
26. West Garfield Park..	17.3	17.2	18.4	12.5	27.5	12.8
27. East Garfield Park...	22.8	21.7	25.8	18.2	17.9	15.1
28. Near West Side.....	44.6	46.7	56.0	28.5	29.7	33.9
29. North Lawndale....	17.3	16.8	17.6	9.6	9.8	11.4
30. South Lawndale....	13.4	17.2	16.3	11.3	11.5	11.4
31. Lower West Side....	26.6	23.0	30.2	20.1	19.4	22.9
32. Loop.....	92.6	119.4	168.6	129.4	150.0	174.5
33. Near South Side....	65.0	71.2	65.0	53.9	69.7	33.3
34. Armour Square.....	32.4	27.4	55.1	21.3	29.1	39.7
35. Douglas.....	44.3	51.5	63.0	32.6	35.2	32.7
36. Oakland.....	32.2	32.2	36.7	22.5	30.2	19.6
37. Fuller Park.....	24.8	25.3	30.7	17.0	25.0	18.9
38. Grand Boulevard....	28.5	31.6	35.4	18.2	22.5	19.0
39. Kenwood.....	16.5	16.3	23.4	18.0	12.2	20.2
40. Washington Park....	27.6	34.0	38.0	16.1	19.4	21.1
41. Hyde Park.....	13.3	14.4	15.9	8.8	10.9	8.5

TABLES CV AND CVI

COMMUNITY RATES OF INSANITY BY SEX: CHICAGO, 1929, 1932, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 MALES, 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER			NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 FEMALES, 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
41. Hyde Park	17.8	14.8	22.5	8.5	12.8	9.6
42. Woodlawn	21.0	19.8	29.4	13.5	17.8	21.8
43. South Shore	14.3	12.5	9.9	7.4	7.4	8.7
44. Chatham	11.6	12.1	8.1	4.5	8.6	7.5
45. Avalon Park	29.0	11.4	8.3	11.2	11.3	8.6
46. South Chicago	17.4	13.1	19.2	11.0	9.6	13.4
47. Burnside	38.2	18.1	34.6	22.5	10.8	31.0
48. Calumet Heights	19.4	4.1	17.1	13.4	13.5	...
49. Roscland	17.6	10.2	26.9	6.9	10.8	9.6
50. Pullman	18.9	12.4	18.4	32.2	10.3	29.8
51. South Deering	24.6	21.9	18.9	5.4	24.3	8.8
52. East Side	16.4	8.6	20.1	19.5	9.7	19.4
53. West Pullman	15.1	15.3	16.5	5.9	13.7	15.4
54. Riverdale	...	21.6	23.2	...	25.2	25.2
55. Hegewisch	20.9	16.1	23.6	5.2	5.0	14.3
56. Garfield Ridge	11.5	36.6	19.1	25.9	11.8	32.2
57. Archer Heights	16.3	11.1	20.5	4.7	24.7	14.6
58. Brighton Park	15.6	17.8	17.4	10.3	18.7	7.8
59. McKinley Park	23.7	24.2	21.8	10.5	14.9	20.8
60. Bridgeport	23.9	25.2	32.3	17.4	19.5	19.2
61. New City	26.0	25.4	33.9	12.9	12.6	16.4
62. West Elsdon	12.1	33.4	...	29.3	13.0	35.2
63. Gage Park	7.4	11.9	12.6	8.0	8.6	7.4
64. Clearing	9.8	15.3	10.6	13.4	18.5	5.7
65. West Lawn	32.2	9.8	21.2	11.6	27.6	28.1
66. Chicago Lawn	13.1	14.0	13.7	7.3	9.2	7.6
67. West Englewood	22.4	18.2	18.9	10.2	7.7	11.0
68. Englewood	25.9	23.2	22.4	13.1	8.9	12.8
69. Greater Grand Crossing	11.6	16.2	20.2	7.6	10.8	10.4
70. Ashburn	33.0	40.2	51.3	52.4	47.8	...
71. Auburn Gresham	20.8	11.2	11.4	8.6	8.3	11.9
72. Beverly	15.9	4.2	17.9	5.8	1.8	13.6
73. Washington Heights	14.9	9.3	11.6	3.3	7.5	13.6
74. Mount Greenwood	9.8	...	...	22.2	18.9	41.4
75. Morgan Park	16.9	11.3	21.1	17.7	18.6	20.6

TABLES CVII AND CVIII

COMMUNITY RATES FOR SELECTED DIAGNOSES IN INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929, 1932, 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES OF ALCOHOLISM PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER			NUMBER CASES OF DEMENTIA PRAECOX PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
All Chicago.....	3.6	2.5	3.7	5.9	5.5	6.6
1. Rogers Park.....	.2	.6	1.0	3.4	3.2	1.9
2. West Ridge.....	1.5	.3	1.9	2.9	1.7	1.6
3. Uptown.....	1.7	1.2	2.1	4.2	4.2	4.5
4. Lincoln Square.....	1.1	...	2.2	4.2	2.2	3.9
5. North Center.....	1.7	2.5	2.8	7.2	6.4	4.2
6. Lakeview.....	1.9	2.5	3.8	5.1	3.7	5.0
7. Lincoln Park.....	3.7	2.9	2.5	5.7	5.1	8.1
8. Near North Side....	6.9	5.0	7.7	11.7	6.0	7.6
9. Edison Park.....	...	...	...	2.8	...	7.4
10. Norwood Park.....	2.2	1.0	.9	...	2.0	3.7
11. Jefferson Park.....	1.5	...	.7	5.8	4.9	3.4
12. Forest Glen.....	...	...	...	...	...	3.1
13. North Park.....	...	...	2.3	2.6	1.2	4.5
14. Albany Park.....	.5	.7	.2	4.2	3.9	6.1
15. Portage Park.....	1.4	.9	1.8	3.6	4.5	4.3
16. Irving Park.....	.4	.6	1.8	3.4	2.6	4.0
17. Dunning.....	1.6	2.3	1.4	5.9	6.0	3.4
18. Montclare.....	1.8	5.1	3.2	9.1	1.7	6.3
19. Belmont Cragin.....	2.8	1.9	2.2	3.6	5.7	6.0
20. Hermosa.....	.6	.6	2.3	4.7	2.9	2.3
21. Avondale.....	.6	1.5	2.9	6.5	3.8	6.9
22. Logan Square.....	5.4	2.4	2.8	5.2	3.6	5.5
23. Humboldt Park.....	2.3	1.1	1.6	4.7	5.3	5.7
24. West Town.....	7.1	4.5	8.4	8.9	9.0	7.2
25. Austin.....	2.3	1.3	2.7	3.7	3.9	5.5
26. West Garfield Park..	3.1	1.9	1.4	5.4	4.3	4.9
27. East Garfield Park..	4.4	4.4	4.3	5.2	6.6	7.8
28. Near West Side.....	9.5	7.4	10.1	3.0	11.0	14.5
29. North Lawndale....	1.5	1.0	1.6	7.1	6.6	7.5
30. South Lawndale....	1.9	2.4	2.5	4.5	4.8	4.7
31. Lower West Side....	7.9	5.8	6.8	6.9	7.5	9.5
32. Loop.....	17.0	9.9	20.8	32.9	47.6	83.3
33. Near South Side....	8.5	9.1	11.9	8.5	10.4	20.4
34. Armour Square.....	13.0	3.6	7.8	5.8	5.7	12.7
35. Douglas.....	10.3	8.6	11.5	8.6	9.4	17.7
36. Oakland.....	7.9	4.5	6.4	6.3	5.5	6.4
37. Fuller Park.....	5.4	3.3	2.2	4.3	9.8	8.9
38. Grand Boulevard....	5.3	2.0	6.8	8.8	9.2	9.8
39. Kenwood.....	.4	3.7	1.0	5.3	3.7	8.5

TABLES CVII AND CVIII

COMMUNITY RATES FOR SELECTED DIAGNOSES OF INSANITY: CHICAGO, 1929, 1932, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES OF ALCOHOLISM PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER			NUMBER CASES OF DEMENTIA PRAECOX PER 10,000 PERSONS 17 YEARS OLD AND OVER		
	1929	1932	1935	1929	1932	1935
40. Washington Park....	3.6	2.3	5.7	10.2	8.9	11.9
41. Hyde Park.....	2.4	.8	3.2	5.1	5.8	5.5
42. Woodlawn.....	2.3	1.2	4.7	5.9	6.7	8.8
43. South Shore.....	1.0	1.0	1.0	4.3	2.3	4.3
44. Chatham.....	1.9	1.8	1.1	1.9	1.8	2.8
45. Avalon Park.....	2.8	...	...	1.4	5.7	4.2
46. South Chicago.....	2.7	1.7	2.8	6.0	4.7	4.6
47. Burnside.....	5.2	4.9	9.4	...	4.9	14.1
48. Calumet Heights....	8.3	2.1	2.2	4.2	4.3	2.2
49. Roseland.....	2.4	2.0	4.1	4.4	3.9	4.8
50. Pullman.....	2.2	...	2.4	19.9	4.6	12.0
51. South Deering.....	4.3	2.1	4.1	6.4	12.5	4.1
52. East Side.....	1.8	3.7	3.8	5.3	.9	9.4
53. West Pullman.....	3.3	2.2	2.7	3.8	5.9	6.4
54. Riverdale.....	...	...	...	...	23.2	12.1
55. Hegewisch.....	4.2	6.7	2.4	10.4	...	2.4
56. Garfield Ridge.....	3.1	...	7.6	3.1	8.3	7.6
57. Archer Heights.....	6.6	2.0	1.8	...	9.8	10.6
58. Brighton Park.....	3.1	1.3	3.8	4.2	9.3	3.8
59. McKinley Park.....	7.2	2.9	5.9	1.4	8.0	6.6
60. Bridgeport.....	6.4	5.1	6.9	5.2	7.5	8.4
61. New City.....	6.4	5.9	4.8	5.5	5.3	7.7
62. West Elsdon.....	...	6.0	...	13.2	12.0	16.5
63. Gage Park.....	1.0	.9	2.3	3.4	3.7	3.2
64. Clearing.....	5.7	...	2.8	2.8	2.8	5.5
65. West Lawn.....	...	1.7	3.1	9.3	3.4	13.8
66. Chicago Lawn.....	2.1	.9	1.4	4.8	6.7	5.0
67. West Englewood....	4.3	3.4	2.2	5.0	3.4	5.3
68. Englewood.....	2.6	1.7	3.7	6.5	5.0	5.8
69. Greater Grand Crossing.....	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.0	3.6	3.5
70. Ashburn.....	...	...	...	20.2	21.8	...
71. Auburn Gresham....	2.4	.9	2.1	4.4	3.8	4.8
72. Beverly.....	2.1	...	1.8	2.1	...	3.7
73. Washington Heights.	.8	1.5	2.1	3.3	...	3.5
74. Mount Greenwood..	...	...	...	10.4	...	8.0
75. Morgan Park.....	1.2	2.2	2.9	3.5	3.2	6.9

TABLE CIX

Suicide Rates by Communities Chicago, 1929, 1932, 1935

	Community	Number Cases per 10 000 Persons 20 Years Old and Over		
		1929	1932	1935
	All Chicago	12	21	9
1	Rogers Park	7	14	11
2	West Ridge	11	25	10
3	Uptown	16	29	16
4	Lincoln Square	12	18	6
5	North Center	12	15	9
6	Lakeview	15	21	13
7	Lincoln Park	16	25	5
8	Near North Side	26	49	10
9	Edison Park	30		
10	Norwood Park			
11	Jefferson Park	25		7
12	Forest Glen			33
13	North Park	14	13	
14	Albany Park	19	23	8
15	Portage Park	5	23	2
16	Irving Park	6	17	13
17	Dunning	27	25	15
18	Montclare	20		
19	Belmont Cragin	11	13	12
20	Hermosa	25	19	
21	Avondale	9	22	6
22	Logan Square	12	19	8
23	Humboldt Park	4	13	14
24	West Town	13	25	6
25	Austin	8	11	11
26	West Garfield Park	6	20	9
27	East Garfield Park	7	17	13
28	Near West Side	21	38	9
29	North Lawndale	11	14	10
30	South Lawndale	10	26	6
31	Lower West Side	21	40	11
32	Loop	12	119	71
33	Near South Side	34	55	35
34	Armour Square	32	31	
35	Douglas	8	14	3
36	Oakland	8	47	
37	Fuller Park	12	48	
38	Grand Boulevard	2	14	3
39	Kenwood	9	19	10
40	Washington Park	6	9	9
41	Hyde Park	10	33	15
42	Woodlawn	6	22	9
43	South Shore		15	7
44	Chatham	4	19	7
45	Avalon Park		30	15
46	South Chicago	12	21	6
47	Burnside	59		
48	Calumet Heights	22	23	
49	Roseland	11	14	
50	Pullman			
51	South Deering			
52	East Side		10	10
53	West Pullman		12	6
54	Riverdale			
55	Hegewisch	23		
56	Garfield Ridge		32	
57	Archer Heights		23	
58	Brighton Park	8	26	4
59	McKinley Park			16
60	Bridgeport	6	30	4
61	New City	16	14	12
62	West Elsdon			
63	Gage Park	5	16	15
64	Clearing		61	
65	West Lawn	20	18	17
66	Chicago Lawn	10	19	12
67	West Englewood	12	12	14
68	Englewood	16	20	10
69	Greater Grand Crossing	17	14	15
70	Ashburn		245	
71	Auburn Gresham	3	13	12
72	Beverly		21	
73	Washington Heights	36	41	15
74	Mount Greenwood			
75	Morgan Park			

TABLE CX

Divorce Rate in the United States, 1870 to 1937 [19]

Year	Number per 100 000 Population	Number per 100 Marriages
1870	28	
1880	39	
1887		5 8
1890	53	6 2
1900	73	8 1
1906	84	8 5
1916	112	10 8
1922	136	13 1
1923	149	13 4
1924	151	14 4
1925	153	14 8
1926	155	15 0
1927	162	16 0
1928	163	16 6
1929	166	16 3
1930	156	17 0
1931	148	17 3
1932	128	16 4
1933	*131*	*15 0*
1934	*161*	*15 6*
1935	*171*	*16 6*
1936	*184*	*17 2*
1937	*193*	*17 5*

[19] Data from Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce, 1932*, p. 12, except for italicized rates which are from estimates by S A. Stouffer and Lyle M Spencer, 'Marriage and Divorce in Recent Years," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol 188 (November, 1936), p 58, and "Recent Increases in Marriage and Divorce," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol XLIV (January, 1939), p 552

TABLE CXI

NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1901 TO 1929 [20]

COUNTRY	1901	1906	1911	1913	1916	1921	1922	1927	1929
U. S.	70	84			112		136	162	166
Japan	140	136	113		109	94	92	79	
Switzerland	30	38	43		40	51	54	62	
Germany	14	20	24		15	63	58	58	62
Denmark	15	23	27		31	42	39	55	
France	23	27	37		11	83	71	45	
Belgium	12	9	14	16		49	49	31	

[20] Data compiled from reports of the Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce;* Edward B Reuter and J. R. Runner, *The Family*, p. 210, Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, p. 33, Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, p. 33.

TABLE CXII

NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 1,000 MARRIED POPULATION BY STATES AND BY GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS, UNITED STATES, 1932 [21]

DIVISION AND STATE	RATE	DIVISION AND STATE	RATE
Total	3 0	District of Columbia	0 6
		Virginia	2 7
New England	2 2	West Virginia	1 7
Maine	3 5	North Carolina	1 1
New Hampshire	3 1	South Carolina	
Vermont	2 4	Georgia	1 9
Massachusetts	2 0	Florida	4 6
Rhode Island	2 6	East South Central	3 0
Connecticut	1 6	Kentucky	3 6
Middle Atlantic	1 2	Tennessee	3 8
New York	9	Alabama	2 0
New Jersey	1 5	Mississippi	2 3
Pennsylvania	1 4	West South Central	3 0
East North Central	3 4	Arkansas	5 0
Ohio	3 7	Louisiana	1 6
Indiana	4 2	Oklahoma	5 7
Illinois	3 4	Texas	5 6
Michigan	3 5	Mountain	7 1
Wisconsin	1 9	Montana	4 6
West North Central	3 4	Idaho	4 6
Minnesota	2 4	Wyoming	6 2
Iowa	3 1	Colorado	4 6
Missouri	4 7	New Mexico	4 1
North Dakota	1 5	Arizona	4 6
South Dakota	2 4	Utah	4 6
Nebraska	2 4	Nevada	102 3
Kansas	3 8	Pacific	4 9
South Atlantic	1 9	Washington	4 8
Delaware	1 7	Oregon	3 8
Maryland	2 4	California	5 2

[21] Data from Bureau of the Census, *Marriage and Divorce, 1932*

TABLE CXIII

Number of Divorces per 100 Marriages in Rural and Urban Areas of the United States, 1887 to 1932

Year	Total United States	Rural *	Urban *
1887	5 8	4.4	4 7
1891		5.0	4 4
1896		5.6	5.9
1901		6.6	6.9
1906	8.5	6.6	6.1
1916	10 8	7.3	8.5
1922	13.1	7.2	12.4
1923	13.4	7.7	12.6
1924	14 4	7.7	15.0
1925	14 8	7.8	14.9
1926	15 0	8.4	15.2
1927	16 0	7.8	16.9
1928	16.6	8.7	18 2
1929	16.3	7.8	17.7
1930	17.0	8.3	18.9
1931	17 3	7.4	19.1
1932	16.4	6.4	19.0

* The Urban Area consists of the counties in which are located the ten largest cities according to the census of 1920, the Rural Area consists of the ten "most rural" counties in the states in which are located these ten largest cities

TABLE CXIV

COMPLAINANT IN DIVORCE SUITS: COOK COUNTY, 1919 TO 1935

COMPLAINANT	1919		1929		1930		1931		1932		1933		1934		1935	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total.....	6,082	100.0	8,914	100.0	7,321	100.0	6,954	100.0	5,409	100.0	5,991	100.0	7,273	100.0	7,225	100.0
Husband...	1,615	26.6	2,128	23.9	1,669	22.8	1,624	23.4	1,178	21.8	1,380	23.0	1,684	23.2	1,729	23.9
Wife.....	4,467	73.4	6,786	76.1	5,652	77.2	5,330	76.6	4,231	78.2	4,671	77.0	5,589	76.8	5,498	76.1

TABLE CXV

Divorce and Nonsupport Cases by Five-Year Periods of Married Life: Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Duration of Married Life	Divorce		Nonsupport	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
All cases	44,430	100.0	12,968	100.0
0-4	23,688	53.3	4,250	32.8
5-9	10,626	24.0	3,161	24.4
10-14	5,114	11.5	2,186	16.9
15-19	2,573	5.8	1,389	10.7
20-24	1,365	3.1	756	5.8
25-29	510	1.1	268	2.1
30-34	165	.4	83	.6
35-39	52	.1	56	.4
40 and over	7	*	23	.2
No record	330	.7	796	6.1

* Less than .1 of one per cent.

TABLE CXVI

Mean Years of Marriage in Family Disintegration: Chicago, 1919, 1921, 1929 to 1935

Year	Divorce	Nonsupport
1919	7.45	...
1921	...	7.84
1929	6.67	9.37
1930	6.68	9.29
1931	6.84	9.01
1932	6.83	9.75
1933	6.85	10.08
1934	7.00	9.90
1935	6.94	9.94

TABLE CXVII

Number of Children in Divorce and Nonsupport Cases: Chicago, 1929 to 1935

Number of Children	Divorce		Nonsupport	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	44,430	100 0	12,968	100 0
0	29,147	65 6	2,538	19 6
1	9,346	21 0	3,953	30 5
2	3,925	8 8	2,891	22 3
3	1,253	2 8	1,633	12 6
4	471	1 1	947	7 3
5	175	.3	467	3 6
6	74	2	261	2 0
7	55	1	149	1 1
8	7	*	80	6
9	3	*	25	.2
10	1	*	9	*
11-13			16	1

* Less than 1 of one per cent

TABLE CXVIII

Per Cent Childlessness and Mean Number of Children by Years of Married Life in Divorce Cases Cook County, Illinois, 1935

	Duration of Married Life in Years							
	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20 24	25-29	30-34	35-39
Per cent childlessness	78	58	51	38	51	65	84	86
Mean number of children	.26	.62	.90	1 38	.93	.54	.40	.29

TABLE CXIX

NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY COMPLAINANT IN DIVORCE CASES COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1930 TO 1935

NUMBER OF CHILDREN	COMPLAINANT			
	Husband		Wife	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	19,264	100 0	30,909	100 0
None	6,639	71 2	19,816	64 1
1	1,606	17 3	6,942	22 5
2	670	7 2	2,840	9 2
3	229	2 5	855	2 8
4	73	8	294	1 0
5	27	3	100	3
6	17	2	42	*
7	2	*	14	*
8	1	*	4	*
9			1	
10				
11			1	*

* Less than 0 1 per cent

TABLE CXX

DIVORCES CLASSIFIED BY GROUNDS· COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1919, 1929, 1935

GROUNDS	1919		1929		1935	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	6,094	100 0	8,914	100 0	7,223	100.0
Desertion .	3,044	50 0	4,096	46.0	4,631	64 1
Cruelty	1,672	27 5	3,459	38 8	1,952	27.2
Drunkenness	371	6 1	737	8 3	341	4.7
Adultery	783	12 7	407	4.6	104	1 4
Conviction of felony	54	0 9	58	0 7	67	0.9
Cruelty and drunkenness	57	0.9	60	0.7	26	0.4
Desertion and cruelty	24	0 4	17	0 2	16	0 2
Bigamy	12	0 2	29	0 3	15	0 2
Impotency . . .	17	0 3	10	0.1	7	0.1
Attempt to take life.	5	0.1	22	0.2	3	*
Desertion and adultery.	17	0.3	4	*	4	*
Desertion and drunkenness	11	0.2	5	0.1	7	0.1
Cruelty and adultery	13	0.2	5	0.1	2	*
Other combinations	8	0.1	5	0.1	48	0 7
No record.	6	0.1				

* Less than 05 per cent

TABLE CXXI

PER CENT OF ALL DIVORCES GRANTED FOR PRINCIPAL GROUNDS· COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1919, 1929 TO 1935

GROUNDS	1919	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Desertion . .	50	46	45	50	59	62	64	64
Cruelty . .	28	38	41	36	31	30	27	27
Adultery .	12.7	4 6	3.7	2.5	1.9	1 8	1.3	1.4
Drunkenness. .	6.1	8.3	7.5	6.2	5.1	4.1	4.5	4.7

TABLE CXXII

NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY GROUNDS IN DIVORCE CASES COOK COUNTY, 1930 TO 1935

NUMBER OF CHILDREN	DESERTION		CRUELTY		ADULTERY		DRUNKENNESS	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	23,037	100 0	12,811	100 0	850	100 0	2,172	100 0
None	15,802	68 6	8,166	63 8	533	62 7	1,168	53 9
1	4,726	20 5	2,811	21 9	190	22 4	532	24 5
2	1,740	7 6	1,270	9 9	78	9 2	283	13 0
3	510	2 2	369	2 9	44	5 2	108	5 0
4	169	7	125	1 0	3	3	48	2 2
5	56	2	42	3	2	2	20	9
6	25	1	18	1			11	.5
7	8	*	8	*			1	*
8	1	*	2	*			1	*

* Less than 1 per cent

TABLE CXXIII

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES IN NONSUPPORT CASES CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF HUSBAND AND WIFE	NUMBER	PER CENT
Total	12,968	100 0
Both Protestant	4,987	38 5
Both Catholic	4,707	36 3
One Protestant, other Catholic	2,019	15 6
Both Jewish	709	5 5
One Catholic, other not reporting	101	8
One Protestant, other not reporting	95	.7
One Protestant, other Jewish	56	4
One Catholic, other Jewish	42	.3
Miscellaneous combinations	77	5
Not reporting	178	1 4

TABLE CXXIV

ENDURANCE OF MARRIAGE AMONG COUPLES OF LIKE AND UNLIKE NATIONALITY BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: COURT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, CHICAGO, 1921 [22]

YEARS OF MARRIED LIFE	CATHOLIC				PROTESTANT				CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT			
	Like		Unlike		Like		Unlike		Like		Unlike	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
Total	667	100.0	344	100.0	711	100.0	303	100.0	141	100.0	244	100.0
0-4...	236	35.2	188	54.7	350	49.3	150	49.5	81	57.5	131	53.7
5-9.....	157	23.6	85	24.7	169	23.7	79	26.2	20	14.2	54	22.1
10-14.....	143	21.4	41	11.9	78	11.0	35	11.5	22	15.6	25	10.2
15-19	68	10.2	15	4.3	60	8.4	23	7.6	8	5.7	17	7.0
20-24	41	6.2	10	2.9	23	3.2	7	2.3	5	3.5	7	2.9
25-29	10	1.5	3	0.9	14	2.0	4	1.3	4	2.8	5	2.1
30-44.	8	1.3	1	0.3	10	1.4	5	1.6	...	...	3	1.2
Not reporting...	4	0.6	1	0.3	7	1.0	...	...	1	0.7	2	0.8

[22] Adapted from Tables XXXI and XXXII in Ernest R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, pp. 105-106.

TABLE CXXV

LIBELS IN THE SUPERIOR AND CIRCUIT COURTS: COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1890 TO 1924

MONTH	ALL LIBELS EXCEPT DIVORCE		DIVORCE LIBELS	
	Number	Per Cent Deviation from Monthly Mean	Number	Per Cent Deviation from Monthly Mean
Mean Number per Month	40,501	0 0	13,963	0.0
January...	40,348	−0 6	13,620	−2.4
February .	35,538	−12 0	12,837	−8.0
March	40,510	0 0	15,430	+10.5
April	37,563	−7.2	13,814	−1.1
May.	39,310	−2.9	14,393	+3.1
June.	41,299	+2 0	13,782	−1.3
July	50,897	+25 6	12,797	−8.4
August	39,007	−1.2	13,862	−0.7
September.	36,665	−9 7	15,366	+12.0
October .	43,273	+6 8	15,887	+13.8
November	40,717	+0 2	13,893	−0.5
December	40,885	+0.9	11,868	−15.0

TABLES CXXVI THROUGH CXXVIII

ANNUAL MEAN FAMILY DISINTEGRATION RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 MARRIED PERSONS		
	Nonsupport	Divorce	Family Disintegration
All Chicago	11.1	37.7	48.8
1. Rogers Park	3.7	43.9	47.7
2. West Ridge	4.2	32.8	37.2
3. Uptown	6.9	75.5	82.3
4. Lincoln Square	10.5	36.0	46.0
5. North Center	8.4	35.2	43.8
6. Lakeview	8.6	63.5	72.2
7. Lincoln Park	12.8	60.1	72.9
8. Near North Side	14.4	93.2	107.6
9. Edison Park	2.1	19.0	21.1
10. Norwood Park	6.6	19.5	26.1
11. Jefferson Park	7.5	21.3	28.8
12. Forest Glen	2.7	18.8	21.5
13. North Park	4.9	23.5	28.4
14. Albany Park	6.1	28.4	34.5
15. Portage Park	7.3	25.5	32.8
16. Irving Park	6.8	30.0	36.9
17. Dunning	6.8	19.4	26.2
18. Montclare	11.4	26.1	37.6
19. Belmont Cragin	8.0	25.0	33.0
20. Hermosa	5.1	23.9	29.0
21. Avondale	10.4	28.8	39.2
22. Logan Square	12.6	34.4	47.0
23. Humboldt Park	11.4	32.1	43.6
24. West Town	22.9	31.3	54.2
25. Austin	6.8	31.8	38.6
26. West Garfield Park	10.8	44.2	55.0
27. East Garfield Park	15.3	58.2	73.4
28. Near West Side	24.8	43.6	68.4
29. North Lawndale	13.9	33.2	47.1
30. South Lawndale	10.8	27.5	38.3
31. Lower West Side	21.0	31.8	52.8
32. Loop	28.9	271.4	300.3
33. Near South Side	31.2	70.0	101.2
34. Armour Square	19.5	28.3	47.8
35. Douglas	32.7	32.8	65.5
36. Oakland	24.7	63.5	88.2
37. Fuller Park	23.6	26.4	50.0
38. Grand Boulevard	29.7	50.7	80.4
39. Kenwood	8.4	68.2	76.6
40. Washington Park	30.4	58.9	89.2

TABLES CXXVI THROUGH CXXVIII

ANNUAL MEAN FAMILY DISINTEGRATION RATES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	NUMBER CASES PER 10,000 MARRIED PERSONS		
	Nonsupport	Divorce	Family Disintegration
41. Hyde Park	6.8	63.2	70.0
42. Woodlawn	15.8	78.4	94.1
43. South Shore	3.0	40.6	43.6
44. Chatham	4.2	29.5	33.8
45. Avalon Park	1.1	27.5	28.6
46. South Chicago	0.9	21.2	22.0
47. Burnside	3.2	26.2	29.4
48. Calumet Heights	1.9	28.0	29.9
49. Roseland	2.1	25.4	27.5
50. Pullman	0.5	26.9	27.4
51. South Deering	1.0	24.5	25.5
52. East Side	1.2	21.4	22.6
53. West Pullman	1.9	20.6	22.5
54. Riverdale	...	32.3	32.3
55. Hegewisch	...	14.7	14.7
56. Garfield Ridge	13.0	26.6	39.6
57. Archer Heights	13.2	14.6	27.8
58. Brighton Park	15.4	27.9	43.3
59. McKinley Park	17.8	23.8	41.6
60. Bridgeport	25.3	37.3	62.6
61. New City	21.7	25.7	47.4
62. West Elsdon	18.0	20.5	38.6
63. Gage Park	10.1	22.5	32.7
64. Clearing	7.5	31.2	38.7
65. West Lawn	11.0	26.1	37.2
66. Chicago Lawn	6.7	28.2	34.9
67. West Englewood	12.4	29.0	41.4
68. Englewood	15.4	35.5	55.0
69. Greater Grand Crossing	7.7	35.7	43.4
70. Ashburn	25.2	85.8	111.0
71. Auburn Gresham	8.0	21.7	29.8
72. Beverly	1.7	20.7	22.4
73. Washington Heights	6.6	19.8	26.4
74. Mount Greenwood	9.2	20.2	29.4
75. Morgan Park	10.0	24.4	34.4

TABLES CXXIX THROUGH CXXXI

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVORCE CASES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1935

COMMUNITY	PER CENT SUITS FILED BY HUSBAND	PER CENT CHILDLESSNESS	PER CENT DECREES GRANTED FOR DESERTION
All Chicago	24	68	64
1. Rogers Park	14	65	61
2. West Ridge	18	54	66
3. Uptown	26	73	68
4. Lincoln Square	15	65	71
5. North Center	12	65	51
6. Lakeview	20	75	65
7. Lincoln Park	19	74	67
8. Near North Side	26	80	67
9. Edison Park	..	67	50
10. Norwood Park	8	62	69
11. Jefferson Park	40	47	53
12. Forest Glen	..	80	20
13. North Park	..	57	64
14. Albany Park	20	70	57
15. Portage Park	21	60	59
16. Irving Park	19	70	63
17. Dunning	12	65	62
18. Montclare	44	78	67
19. Belmont Cragin	30	70	62
20. Hermosa	18	71	71
21. Avondale	16	69	57
22. Logan Square	22	56	59
23. Humboldt Park	18	65	61
24. West Town	27	59	63
25. Austin	19	63	68
26. West Garfield Park	24	62	58
27. East Garfield Park	30	69	68
28. Near West Side	35	62	64
29. North Lawndale	21	61	61
30. South Lawndale	25	59	53
31. Lower West Side	26	64	59
32. Loop	51	76	61
33. Near South Side	25	46	71
34. Armour Square	43	76	71
35. Douglas	44	76	71
36. Oakland	35	73	75
37. Fuller Park	29	86	71
38. Grand Boulevard	36	79	80
39. Kenwood	28	73	68
40. Washington Park	37	76	77

TABLES CXXIX THROUGH CXXXI

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVORCE CASES BY COMMUNITIES: CHICAGO, 1935 (Concluded)

COMMUNITY	PER CENT SUITS FILED BY HUSBAND	PER CENT CHILDLESSNESS	PER CENT DECREES GRANTED FOR DESERTION
41. Hyde Park	24	70	65
42. Woodlawn	25	69	68
43. South Shore	16	75	63
44. Chatham	20	65	62
45. Avalon Park	28	56	39
46. South Chicago	23	55	68
47. Burnside	...	60	80
48. Calumet Heights	...	100	50
49. Roseland	18	51	56
50. Pullman	22	33	44
51. South Deering	50	67	67
52. East Side	21	79	57
53. West Pullman	32	68	68
54. Riverdale	25	100	50
55. Hegewisch	50	50	50
56. Garfield Ridge	29	71	71
57. Archer Heights	10	50	30
58. Brighton Park	27	55	75
59. McKinley Park	17	50	72
60. Bridgeport	26	68	51
61. New City	17	58	58
62. West Elsdon	...	100	100
63. Gage Park	14	72	61
64. Clearing	25	88	50
65. West Lawn	18	55	55
66. Chicago Lawn	15	63	61
67. West Englewood	29	59	63
68. Englewood	22	65	61
69. Greater Grand Crossing	30	63	68
70. Ashburn	...	75	49
71. Auburn Gresham	25	58	53
72. Beverly	25	50	90
73. Washington Heights	9	41	73
74. Mount Greenwood	20	60	60
75. Morgan Park	17	61	72

TABLE CXXXII

CORRELATION OF CENSUS VARIABLES WITH DIVORCE AND FAMILY DISINTEGRATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1930 [23]

CENSUS VARIABLE	FAMILY DISINTEGRATION, 1929		DIVORCE, MEAN 1929 TO 1930	
Mean age of population	.361	± 100	.580	±.077
Variability in age	− 519	± 084	−.700	± 059
Per cent population 21 years old and over	488	± 088	.671	± 063
Mean size of family*	−.574	± 077	−.616	±.072
Mean size of family (excluding one-person families)	− 493	± 087	−.530	± 083
Variability in family size	624	± 070	538	± 082
Variability in family size (excluding one-person families)	.486	± 088	.375	±.099
Divorced persons per married persons	.360	±.101	.519	±.084
Per cent divorced in adult population*	.562	± 079	.680	± 062
Mean rental	.050	± 120	.420	±.095
Per cent families having radios	−.248	± 108	−.162	±.124
Per cent illiteracy	−.106	± 114	−.293	± 106
Per cent males	.073	±.115	.179	±.112

* Adult population means all persons fifteen years old and over.

[23] Divorce rates are the mean number per 10,000 population for the years, 1929 to 1930, family disintegration rates are the number of divorce and nonsupport cases per 10,000 population. Each Personian coefficient of correlation is followed by its standard error.

TABLES CXXXIII THROUGH CXXXIX

CORRELATION OF MEAN ANNUAL COMMUNITY RATES OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE									
	Arrests	Women's Court	Boys' Court	Juvenile Delinquency	Contributing to Delinquency	Nonsupport	Divorce	Bastardy	Illegitimacy	Insanity
Women's court	.92	.	.	.	.		.	. .	..	...
Boys' court	.87	.78					.		.	. .
Juvenile delinquency	.66	.53	.66	..	...	. .	. .	..	...	...
Contributing to delinquency	.74	.75	.69	.63	...	...	...	...	...	...
Nonsupport	.90	.72	.88	.87	.82	...	...	...	...	...
Divorce	.73	.80	.60	.22	.47	.34	...	...	...	...
Bastardy	.62	.61	.76	.36	.42	.58	.83	...	...	...
Illegitimacy	.64	.64	.51	.46	.64	.63	.39	.48	...	...
Insanity	.80	.87	.81	.52	.71	.84	.75	.61	.53	...
Suicide	.71	.76	.59	.14	.42	.44	.89	.62	.34	.77

TABLES CXL THROUGH CXLVIII

CORRELATION OF YEARLY COMMUNITY RATES OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE AND YEAR		DEPENDENT VARIABLE							
		Arrests	Boys' Court	Juvenile Delinquency	Contributing to Delinquency	Nonsupport	Divorce	Bastardy	Insanity
Boys' court	1930	.84	.	. .	...	...	..	.	...
	1931	.85	. .	. .	.	...	...	..	...
	1932	.90	...	.	.	...	..	. .	...
	1933	.88	...	. .	.	...	...	...	...
	1934	.93	. .	.	...	...	...	. .	...
	1935	.70	...	..	.	. .	.	...	...
Juvenile delinquency	1929	. .	.39	...	...	...	..	...	...
	1930	.43	.36	...	...	...	...	...	...
	1931	.78	.71	...	.	...	...	...	...
	1932	.48	.56	...	...	...	...	...	...
	1933	.88	.88	...	. .	..	...	...	...
	1934	.35	.39	...	...	...	...	...	...
	1935	.61	.20	...	...	...	...	...	...
Contributing to delinquency	1929	...	.60	.45	...	...	...	...	...
	1930	.53	.44	.32	...	...	...	...	...
	1931	.60	.51	.43	...	...	...	...	...
	1932	.48	.39	.24	...	...	...	...	...
	1933	.46	.38	.25	...	...	...	...	...
	1934	.56	.36	.64	...	...	...	...	...
	1935	.53	.26	.73	...	...	...	...	...
Nonsupport	1929	...	.50	.54	.39	...	...	..	...
	1930	.60	.66	.62	.46	...	...	...	...
	1931	.66	.83	.75	.54	...	...	..	...
	1932	.73	.79	.46	.55	...	...	...	...
	1933	.78	.67	.66	.47	...	...	...	...
	1934	.64	.75	.72	.77	...	...	...	...
	1935	.55	.65	.53	.31	...	...	...	...
Divorce	1929	...	.56	.17	.46	.63	...	...	...
	1930	.67	.63	.15	.32	.32	...	...	...
	1931	.63	.57	.52	.40	.25	...	...	...
	1932	.34	.55	.13	.18	.38	...	...	...
	1933	.69	.57	.58	.05	.57	...	...	...
	1934	.81	.80	—.02	.28	.40	...	...	.
	1935	.57	.94	.02	.13	.43	...	...	..

TABLES CXL THROUGH CXLVIII

CORRELATION OF YEARLY COMMUNITY RATES OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: CHICAGO, 1929 TO 1935 (Concluded)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE AND YEAR		DEPENDENT VARIABLE							
		Arrests	Boys' Court	Juvenile Delinquency	Contributing to Delinquency	Nonsupport	Divorce	Bastardy	Insanity
Bastardy	1929	...	.79	.12	.26	.18	.61	...	...
	1930	.86	.84	.25	.32	.47	.62	...	...
	1931	.75	.56	.63	.37	.30	.80	...	...
	1932	.79	.72	.33	.12	.53	.68	...	...
	1933	.85	.70	.65	.26	.74	.80	...	...
	1934	.94	.90	.15	.41	.56	.88	...	...
	1935	.59	.90	.01	.12	.40	.92	...	...
Insanity	1929	...	.77	.26	.41	.44	.06	.72	...
	1930	.66	.59	.38	.30	.60	.10	.61	...
	1931	.82	.61	.57	.49	.53	.64	.98	...
	1932	.93	.81	.33	.48	.79	.57	.80	...
	1933	.90	.86	.70	.52	.77	.70	.75	...
	1934	.92	.90	.35	.51	.73	.74	.88	...
	1935	.85	.89	.34	.43	.44	.82	.83	...
Suicide	1929	...	.07	—.19	.00	—.04	—.03	.06	.20
	1930	.78	.33	.29	.08	.53	.22	.30	.84
	1931	.46	.52	.45	.22	.36	.60	.46	.78
	1932	.35	.22	—.08	.18	.13	.24	.31	.54
	1933	.67	.44	.45	—.02	.49	.85	.84	.53
	1934	.82	.76	—.07	.19	.36	.86	.93	.76
	1935	.40	.62	—.05	.24	.16	.74	.65	.67

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