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This book was written in prison. It has, therefore, the advantages as well as the disadvantages of prison-work. It had the benefit of the collaboration of many friends but it suffered from the absence of easy accessibility to source-materials, and reference-books.

This study was begun, in the middle of May 1941, at the suggestion of Sjt. P. H. Patwardhan in the Yervada Prison. From the first day his collaboration has been most valuable and his contribution often very original. In Yervada, besides Sjt. Patwardhan, M. Harris, Mustafa Fakihi and Dr. Antrolikar gave us ungrudging help.

In July 1941, Asoka Mehta and P. H. Patwardhan were released, re-arrested and taken to the Nasik Road Central Prison. In Nasik, the manuscript was subjected to the stimulating criticism of Mr. Yusuf Meherally, and Professors R. M. Gole and M. L. Dantwala. They gave to the book their time and energy without stint. Our friends have thus written this book for us! It has been an essay in group-work: an exhilarating experience that has left in us a nostalgic touch for the prisons! The manuscript was completed on the 24th of October 1941.

The tedious work of getting books, of looking up the references, of checking the quotations, was taken off our hands by Smt. Manik Patwardhan and Smt. Vasanti Shroff.

The book would not have been what it is without the sustained interest taken in it by Minoo Masani.

Bombay, January 1, 1942

ASOKA MEHTA
ACHYUT PATWARDHAN

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A discussion of India's political future has always had for a background the relations between its two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims. Few questions in this country have aroused such intense passion and controversy as the communal question. In recent years, especially, the communal problem has almost come to overshadow the Indian political scene, so much so that an attempt at its solution has become the paramount need of the day.

The present study has been called "The Communal Triangle in India", and the title is meant to be self-explanatory. Even a superficial examination of the question reveals its triangular aspect. The three parties to it, the Hindus, the Muslims and the British, have each played a certain part and have each got a definite responsibility to bear, in giving the communal problem its present form. To treat the communal problem merely as a question of Hindu-Muslim adjustment is to view it out of focus, as the third party, the British Government, has played a great, and oftentimes a decisive part in Hindu-Muslim relations. It will be one of the chief tasks of the present work to examine the communal problem in this triangular setting.

We have stated that the Hindus, the Muslims and the British Government constitute the three arms of the communal triangle. From other considerations also, the question assumes a triangular shape. The political arm of the triangle is generally the best known, since it is the most obvious. But complex problems do not always admit of simple and cut-and-dry explanations. While the political aspect has an importance all its own, it is by no means the only aspect of the communal problem.

There are other forces whose influence must be adequately appraised. One such is the sociological basis of the communal problem. The other is the irrational factor whose place in human affairs has begun to receive a good deal of attention from political psychologists in recent times. From this point of view, the three arms of the communal triangle are the political, the sociological and the irrational pulls working on our society for the last hundred and fifty odd years.

In the examination of the nature of all these forces and their inter-actions, will be found a clue to the solution of the communal problem. Only such a comprehensive survey of the communal triangle would enable us to understand it correctly. Such a task, it will readily be conceded, is by no means easy.

The writing of this book has been an act of faith. In a world enveloped in the holocaust of war, the politics of power have overshadowed every ethical consideration and swept into the background every ideal that made life meaningful and exciting. Brute force and a widespread appeal to the baser passions and interests of mankind on the one hand, and the tragic working of Imperialism on the other, have brought about, for the present at any rate, the triumph of unreason, and a general sense of frustration. But periods of high tension are invariably succeeded by those in which a new psychological stock-taking takes place, and reason begins again to function in a calm atmosphere.

India could hardly escape the larger world reactions and her politics in recent years show traces of an unresolved conflict. The present writers firmly believe this to be a passing phase. But the best preparation to understand the present and welcome the future is not simply to mark time but to make a resolute attempt to examine our present discontents.

The communal question has exercised the minds of Indian statesmen for well over a generation, and a fresh approach, rooted in objectivity, based on sober facts, unimpeachable documentation and devoid of any pre-

possession has become a most pressing need. The present volume is offered as a small contribution towards this end.

CHAPTER II

HINDUS AND MUSLIMS : A HISTORICAL SURVEY

Over a thousand years separate us from the first Muslim contact with India. As we review the period we see wave upon wave of the foreigners pouring into this land of milk and honey as peaceful traders or proud conquerors. They fight and subdue the native races after prolonged and bitter conflicts. But soon the magic of the land casts its subtle spell around them. Even during the period of conflict an unseen process of assimilation becomes discernible which like a tiny rain drop changes the harsh contours to an agreeable shape. Conflicts end in co-operation, and co-operation brings into being a new synthesis with a fine blending of the rivers and pastures of Hindustan and the arid splendour of the deserts of Central Asia. Grace and dignity become the hall-mark of this new synthesis which is the Hindu-Muslim culture.

The history of a thousand years supplies more evidence to prove this than to prove the opposite tendency of wars and conflicts. What is surprising in the Hindu-Muslim contact is not the fact that it resulted in conflicts and antagonisms—those were as inevitable as the later struggle for power between the Indians and the British. The important and significant fact, often forgotten, is that the Hindus and the Muslims composed their antagonisms and evolved a new culture. We get a correct perspective on that evolution when we compare it with the achievements of the similar Indo-British contact. That contact is now more than three hundred years old but it is barren of any creative synthesis which can be described as Indo-British culture. The Englishman is as much of a foreigner to-day as he was then, and he has

carefully preserved his separate identity, by a caste system as rigid and uncompromising as any practised in India. As against this, if we look at Hindu-Muslim relations through the perspective of centuries, which is the only true perspective of history, the conflicts appear in a form diffused; the affinities stand out in bold and clear outline.

Strange as it may seem, the first Muslim contact with India was a peaceful one. Long before they came as invaders from the North-West, the Muslims had established trade settlements in the South with their distinct culture-pattern.

The Arabs had commercial relations with India long before they embraced Islam and the Muslim Arabs inherited the legacy of their pagan forbears: trade routes and sea-commerce with India. There was, for instance, a brisk trade in horses. Ten thousand horses were annually exported from Fars to Malabar, their total value amounting to 2,200,000 dinars. Demands of trade brought small communities of Muslim settlers to the Malabar coast. To encourage trade, and in keeping with the then prevalent policy of religious toleration and eclecticism, the Muslims were not only welcomed and allowed to build mosques but even to carry on religious propaganda. Before the arrival of Malik Kafur's army into the South, Mussalmans had established their settlements in important centres of trade; they had entered into dealings with people living around them; and from this intercourse of Arabs and Tamils a number of communities of mixed descent, like the Ravuttans and the Labbes, had arisen.

Not only had the Muslims spread over the whole coast but they had also acquired influence in politics and society. Marco Polo describes Taqi-ud-din as the minister and adviser of King Sundar Pandya. He was succeeded by his son, Siraj-ud-din, and by his grandson, Nizam-ud-din in the same position. The Pandya ambassador to Kublai Khan (1286) was Fakhr-ud-din Ahmed. So complete was the identity of interest that waves of Muslim invasion were resisted by Indian Mussalmans along with the Hindus. The army of Malik Kafur was opposed

by Raja Vir Ballal who included in his contingents 20,000 Mussalmans.

With the passage of time this fact becomes increasingly noticeable. The annals of Muslim rule in India are full of dynastic, not religious wars. On the historic battlefield of Panipat, Babar faced the armed might of a Muslim opponent, Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. It was not any religious *elan* but the superiority of the mobile cavalry column over the ponderous might of infantry and elephant corps that brought victory to the Moghul invader. History repeated itself when the Afghan Sher Shah overwhelmed the forces of Humayun.

Nor was it different in the South.

In spite of the fact that the Vijayanagar kingdom was continually at war with the neighbouring Muslim Kingdoms, there appears to have been great religious tolerance and great appreciation of each other's cultures. The Adilshahi Sultans of Bijapur and Nizamshahis of Ahmednagar freely patronized Maratha Chiefs, and employed Hindu officers for their administration and Hindu troops in their armies. The latter (Nizamshahu of Ahmednagar) gave great impetus to the Marathi language by making it the language of their official transactions. The Hindu rulers of Vijayanagar reciprocated these feelings; they took Muslim troops in their employ, encouraged Muslim traders and built mosques for their worship¹

And the long drawn-out contest between the Mughal Emperors and the Bahamani Kingdoms of the South is conclusive proof of the dynastic and non-religious character of these wars.

In religious matters also a *via media* was gradually discovered. Long before Akbar, Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-1470) of Kashmir was famed alike for his tolerance and learning. He repealed the odious *jaziya*, while his scholarship and sympathy were reflected in his own translations of several Sanskrit works into Persian. Towards the close of the fifteenth century, another remarkable king, Alaudin Husain Shah (1493-1519) of Gaur, the first king of the Husaini dynasty, inaugurated a new era in Bengal. A generous patron of art and literature, his

¹ Tarnchand: *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, pp. 250-51.

sympathetic policy made for reconciliation among the different classes of his subjects.

The same policy was followed by Sher Shah (1486-1545). Unmindful of the advice of the *ulema* he pursued a policy of religious toleration and equal justice among his subjects.

To encourage education among his Hindu subjects he granted them *wagfs* and allowed them a free hand in their management. For his liberal and beneficent policy he was liked by his subjects of all castes and creeds.²

The enlightened tolerance of Akbar the Great is too well known to need special emphasis but one may safely infer that the success of his policies was in a large measure due to this long tradition behind them and because they were in tune with the general temper of the time in our country. And Akbar's achievements were indeed stupendous.

It is worth remembering that at a time when Europe was plunged into strife of warring sects, when Roman Catholics were burning Protestants at the stake, and Protestants were executing Roman Catholics, Akbar guaranteed peace not only to 'warring sects' but to differing religions. In the modern age, he was the first and almost the greatest experimenter in the field of religious toleration if the races to which it was applied and the contemporary conditions be taken into account.³

In spite of vacillation, the fundamental trend of Akbar's policy was never reversed under subsequent Mughal Emperors. Prof. Sharma concludes his specialised work on the subject with the following words :

In Europe it was the period when political authorities—whether ruling princes or kings in Parliament—were busy dictating to their subjects even the variety of religious belief they were to hold. Those who governed on behalf of Edward VI, for example, said that the religion of the English people should be Protestant and England became Protestant. Mary came after him and as if by magic, England reverted to Roman Catholicism. With Elizabeth the wheel turned again and Eng-

² Ishwari Prasad : *History of Muslim rule in India*, p. 333.

³ Sri Ram Sharma : *The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors*, pp. 59-60.

land emerged Anglican from the struggle.....In the sixteenth and seventeenth century the religious belief of their subjects was very much a concern of governments. The Mughals, therefore, proved an exception when they left the religious beliefs of their subjects alone. They passed no Acts of Supremacy, they enforced no Thirty-Nine Articles, so far as the beliefs of the preponderant majority of the population were concerned. Even for the Muslims all that they did was to punish apostasy and extort outward conformity in certain matters of public conduct.⁴

Toleration, along with cultural blending and racial interpenetration, soon led to syncretism in religion and philosophy. The invaders settled down in the country, and in common with the conquered, mellowed under the Indian sun. Time and new traditions wore down the barriers between the two communities. Muslim courts that extended their patronage to Hindu as well as Muslim scholars and courtiers became the meeting ground of Hindu and Muslim cultures. The Hindu mastered the intricacies of Persian and Arabic, the Muslim men of letters were captivated by the ageless charm of Sanskrit.

The two most illustrious names that come to mind in this connection are those of Amir Khusrau and Prince Dara Shikoh.

Khusrau was the most famous poet of his time and undoubtedly the most brilliant man of letters at the court of Delhi, during the Khilji and the Tughluq dynasties. He was tutor to the eldest son of Emperor Balban and was held in high favour. A prolific writer, he enjoys wide popularity even to the present day. He not only supported the Hindi language, but himself wrote in it.

Prince Dara Shikoh, the elder brother of Emperor Aurangzeb, was an accomplished scholar and a great admirer of Hindu philosophy and Sanskrit learning. It was the Persian translation of the Upanishads made under his auspices that opened to the scholars of the West, this great treasure of Indian philosophy and created a desire for greater exploration of Hindu Culture. Under his patronage several famous Sanskrit works were trans-

⁴ Sri Ram Sharma : op. cit., pp. 200-201.

lated into Persian including the *Bhagwad Gita* and the *Yoga Vasistha*. He himself also wrote a number of learned works and collected around him a notable band of Sufi scholars, with the purpose of building a bridge between the Hindu and the Muslim cultures. Such examples can be multiplied almost indefinitely.⁵ Earlier the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* had been translated into Persian under orders of Akbar, as also quite a number of other Sanskrit works.

Clashes were there, but the waters of life were rounding them and the "blooming buzzing confusion" was getting a new integration. Men arose on all sides who could think in terms commensurate with the new environment. The tendency was so universal that even the intellectual renaissance that preceded the rise of the Maratha Power did not escape its influence.

The severity of the monotheistic creed of the Muhammadans was distinctly impressed upon the minds of these prophets (Kabir, Nanak and others). The worshippers of Dattatraya or the incarnation of the Hindu Trinity, often clothed their God in the garb of a Muhammadan Faqir. This same effect was at work with greater effect on the popular mind in Maharashtra, where preachers, both Brahman and non-Brahman, were calling the people to identify Rama with Rahim, and ensure their freedom from bonds of formal ritualism and caste distinctions, and unite in common love of man and faith in God.⁶

Nor was the debt one-sided. Islam penetrated Hindu thought in a variety of ways. Even if we consider the influence of Islamic thought on the development of the philosophies of Shankar and Ramanuja as unproved, we cannot ignore the ferment that the meeting of Rama and Rahim created, that sought numerous and persistent outlets. Kabir and Nanak, Tukaram and Chaitanya testify to the creative power of the contact of the two religions.

Thus, on the philosophical heights of mysticism, where man wrestles with the problem of his relation to

⁵ cf. *Hindus and Mussalmans of India* by Atulanand Chakravarty.

⁶ Ranade : *Rise of the Maratha Power*, pp. 50-51.

the universe, the Hindu and the Muslim met on common ground. The impulse of that meeting spread to the broad masses of Indian humanity and made them a single people.

No less fruitful was the impact of a foreign medium on the native languages of India. We have already noticed how the Bahamani Kingdoms gave a great impetus to the development of the Marathi language. Bengali also received a similar stimulus.

The elevation of Bengali to a literary status was brought about by several influences of which Muhammadan conquest was undoubtedly one of the foremost. If the Hindu kings had continued to enjoy independence (because of their preference for Sanskrit) Bengali would scarcely have got an opportunity to find its way to the court of kings,

observes Dinesh Chandra Sen in his monumental *History of Bengali Language and Literature*.⁷

But the most remarkable development was that the Muslim scholars themselves began writing in the Hindi language. Akbar gave it very generous patronage and Birbal won the coveted title of *Kavi Raja*. Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khanan, one of Akbar's ministers, was a distinguished Hindi poet and his writings are still current. Ras Khan was another Muslim poet, who wrote in Hindi. Persian exerted a powerful influence on the Braja Bhasa and was itself enriched by many new words from Hindi.

From this union was born a new language spoken by the masses who were unacquainted alike with Sanskrit and Persian. Urdu, which was at first confined to the army and then spoken mostly in the North reached the South with Malik Kafur's invasion. In course of time it developed from a spoken dialect into a fine literary medium and to-day has one of the richest literatures in India.

As in religion and language, so in painting and architecture, new types were created which embodied the excellence of the traditional modes of both Hindus and Muslims. As Havell has pointed out:

⁷ page 10.

In all the Indian Muhammadan styles.....at Delhi, Ajmer, Agra, Gaur, Malwa, Gujarat, Jaunpur and Bijapur.....whether the local rulers were Arab, Pathan, Turk, Persian, Mongol or Indian, the form and construction in the domes of mosques and tombs and palaces, as well as the Hindu symbols which crown them; the *mibrabs* made to simulate Hindu shrines; the arches often Hinduised in construction, in form nearly always; the symbolism which underlies the decorative and structural designs.....all these tell us plainly that to the Indian builders the sect of the Prophet of Mecca was only one of the many which made up the synthesis of Hinduism; they could be good Muhammadans but yet remain Hindus.⁸

The Arabs who were the first to come to India greatly admired Hindu architecture. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni took with him hundreds of craftsmen to his capital city and from there several of them were despatched to the various courts of Central Asia. Referring to the fusion of the Hindu and Muslim styles in Gujarat, O. M. Moneer, of the Archæological Survey of India, says :

The style evolved for Islamic buildings in Gujarat is the product of the impact of two equally vital traditions, namely, those of the indigenous medieval Hindu architecture which had a brilliant record to its credit, and of that which had already created the Qutb Minar, the Masjid-i-Quwwat-ul-Islam and the Jamat Khana Masjid at Nizamuddin in Delhi. While sufficient local talent capable of great achievements in architectural forms had been inherited in Gujarat itself by the Mussalmans, they had also brought with them their builders trained in the school of the so-called early Pathan architecture of Delhi. These latter alone were able to give the Muslim designs of Gujarat buildings a breadth and spaciousness which were wanting in the otherwise magnificent Hindu fabrics of this area. The result is that of all the styles of buildings which developed under Muslim auspices in India, the most elegant, and withal the most characteristic, is the one associated with the buildings of the Muslim Kings of Gujarat.⁹

In Music too, the process of fusion is very noticeable. One of the most notable additions to the repertory of Hindu musical *ragas* is the *Khyal*, invented by Amir Khusrau and perfected by Sultan Husain Shah Sharqui of

⁸ *Indian Architecture*, p. 101.

⁹ *Revealing India's Past* (edited by Sir John Cumming), p. 73.

Jaunpur, another ruler who made himself an ambassador of better understanding between his Hindu and Muslim subjects. Common musical traditions now extend back to centuries and it is a commonplace to-day to find known Muslim and Hindu *ustads* having Hindu and Muslim disciples.¹⁰

This cultural blending prevented the Hindu, under Muslim rule, from becoming a political pariah. Even in the darkest periods of fanaticism, the position of Hindus was generally much better than that of most communities in Europe contemporary to them, whose faith differed from that of their rulers.

Even Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, who looted the famous temple of Somnath, did not hesitate to employ a Hindu Commander and a large body of Hindu troops in his expeditions against Muslims. General Tilak, in fact, suppressed the rebellion of the ruler's Muslim general, Niyaltigin. The Sultan's son, Masud, went a step further and appointed Tilak commander of all his Indian troops.

Akbar's Hindu military commanders are well known, but what is not so well known is that Aurangzeb also had in his employment a large number of Hindu officers, some of whom like Maharaja Jaswant Singh and Raja Jai Singh, besides holding the high rank among *Mansabdars*, were appointed Governors of Provinces.

It is interesting to note likewise that Shivaji also had in his employ quite a number of Muslim military officers. Some of them held important positions, like Generals, Siddi Hullal and Nur Khan. In Shivaji's Navy, there were at least three Muslim Admirals—Siddi Sambal, Siddi Misri and Daulat Khan.

In other branches of administration also, Hindus played a part, finding considerable employment in the

¹⁰One other factor that gave a fillip to the progress and extension of knowledge in this country deserves notice. It was the Muslims who brought paper to India. They in their turn had obtained it originally from the Chinese. The coming of paper removed quite a number of difficulties and by cheapening the cost of book production accelerated the spread of knowledge.

Revenue and Finance Departments. Sultan Mohammad Tughluq, who ascended the throne of Delhi in 1325, had many Hindus in his employ. One of the highest officers in his Finance Department was a Hindu, by name, Ratan. Akbar's celebrated Finance and Revenue Minister, Raja Todar Mal, introduced far-reaching changes in administration and was reckoned amongst the highest dignitaries of the State. Aurangzeb's Finance Minister, Ragh Nath was also a Hindu.

That these are not isolated instances is proved by an illuminating anecdote recorded by Sir William Hunter. Most of the Muslim nobles appointed Hindu bailiffs to attend to their collections from land and to deal with the peasantry.

So universal was this system that Akbar successfully defended the selection of a Hindu Minister of Finance by referring to it. On Todar Mal's appointment as Chancellor of the Empire, the Mussalman princes sent a deputation to remonstrate.

Who manages your properties and grants of land?
asked the Emperor.

Our Hindu agents, they answered.

Very good, said Akbar, allow me also to appoint a Hindu to manage my estates.¹¹

It would be correct to say that on the whole, in normal times, many Hindus occupied high positions and wielded great power. Not only in the Finance department, but in the Army also Hindus occupied a more exalted place than has been allotted to Indians today.¹²

So, in the perspective of centuries we see the Hindus and the Muslims successfully trying to replace conflict by co-operation, wars and strife by mutual understanding. The harvest they reaped of this wise tolerance was their richest treasure and has become our most cherished national heritage. To deny it is to throw away our glorious patrimony, with the reckless improvidence of the prodigal son.

There are many in this country to-day who deny this

¹¹ *The Indian Mussalmans* by Sir William Hunter, p. 157.

¹² cf. Professor Sri Ram Sharma, op. cit.

heritage and seek to press upon us conclusions that are not rooted in tradition and are founded at best on the half-truths of history.

What stands between the Hindus and Muslims, writes Dr. Ambedkar, is not a mere difference; it is an antagonism as distinguished from mere difference. This difference is not to be attributed to material causes. It is spiritual in its character. It is formed by causes that take origins in historical, religious, cultural and social antipathy of which political antipathy is only a reflection.¹³

This is a gross misrepresentation of facts and contrary to all accepted canons of human psychology and behaviour. To suggest that for a thousand years Hindus and Muslims lived together, not peacefully, but like Plato's team of horses one of which flies to the sun while the other draws towards the earth, is not only unhistorical but absurd, because that is not the way in which men live together or live creatively.

It may be argued, however, that we are most concerned with Hindu-Muslim relations, not as they existed in the distant past but as they have developed within the British period. To that period, therefore, we shall now turn and see how the British impact affected the two communities and influenced their relations.

¹³ Dr. B. R. Ambedkar—*Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 331.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM POLITICS

(1857—1940)

In the stirring days of 1857 the Indian Muslims played a very prominent part. The rebellion, however, did not succeed, and the strong hand of the victorious British fell heavily upon Muslim nationalists. The pre-Mutiny policy of suppressing the Muslims was now carried out with such thoroughness that at the end of it we find the Muslims of India, a proud and brave people, reduced to the position of illiterate masses with their spirit broken and their pride humbled to the dust.

During those dark years of the last century, the champion of the Muslims was Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. He found his community broken by the trials and tribulations of the Mutiny, and the stormy decades that succeeded it. Educationally backward and politically suspect, the once proud and distinguished rulers of India were being swept off the Indian stage. Sir Syed decided to devote his great talents to the awakening and unification of his community.

He was eminently fitted for the task. Of a distinguished ancestry—his maternal grandfather was Prime Minister to Akbar II—Syed Ahmad entered British service at an early age and was posted at Bijnor when the storm of the Mutiny burst upon India. During the Mutiny he stood by the Government and his tact and resourcefulness saved a critical situation and many English lives. When this fact became known to the Mutineers they looted his house and property at Delhi and caused him considerable financial damage.

- The following year he published *The Causes of the*

Indian Revolt in Urdu.¹ Government, he argued, was out of touch with public opinion and unmindful of it. No Indian was allowed in the Legislative Council and the Government had no other first-hand source of ascertaining public feeling. This, according to him, was the primary cause of the rebellion.

He is most known, however, for his efforts to promote Muslim education. His name is inseparably linked in the public mind with the great educational institution at Aligarh. His efforts to rouse his co-religionists from their lethargy and his powerful attacks on tradition brought upon him the bitter wrath of the orthodox Muslims who accused him of atheism and treachery to Islam. He was excommunicated and even threatened with assassination. Undaunted by all this opposition, he carried his plans to successful fruition and the M.A.O. College of Aligarh came into being.² A few years later he laid the foundation of the Muhammadan Educational Conference which has met fairly regularly ever since.

In his early days Sir Syed was a nationalist and a radical. As a government officer and then as a pensioner, he never hesitated to criticize the official machinery whenever he found such criticism called for. The behaviour of the English officers towards Indian often roused his indignation :

Now in the first years of the British Rule in India, the people were heartily in favour of it. This good feeling the government has now forfeited and the natives very generally say that they are treated with contempt. A native gentleman is in the eyes of any petty official, as much lower than that official as that official esteems himself lower than a Duke. The opinion of many of these officials is that no native can be a gentleman.

However good the intentions of the government with regard to the subjects may be, unless these officials give practical proofs thereof by kind treatment of the natives, the people will

¹ The title of the Urdu original is *Asbab-e-Bagawat* (1858). It was translated into English by Sir Auckland Colvin and Lt. Col. G. F. I. Graham and published in 1873.

² The full story is told in Maulana Altaf Hussain Halli's well known *Hayat-i-Javid*, the life of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in Urdu.

not believe in them. Theory and practice are not one and the same.....

He was also a champion of Indian demands in the Viceroy's Legislative Council.

In the word Nation, I include both Hindus and Muhammadans because that is the only meaning I can attach to it.

With me it is not worth considering what is their religious faith, because we do not see anything of it. What we do see is that we inhabit the same land, are subject to the rule of the same governors, the fountains of benefit for all are the same, and the pangs of famine also we suffer equally. These are the different grounds upon which, I call both these races which inhabit India by one word, i.e. *Hindus*, meaning to say that they are the inhabitants of Hindustan. While in the Legislative Council I always was anxious for the prosperity of this nation.

And often, in the vein of a poet, he used to call Hindus and Muslims two eyes of the beautiful bride that was India.

But by 1885, a sudden change came over this great man. He began to oppose almost every policy he had advocated earlier in his life. He took upon himself the odious task of opposing several demands of the Congress, including the one for the simultaneous holding of the I.C.S. examination in England and India.

Allama Shibli Numani, who for fifteen years was the colleague of Sir Syed at the Aligarh College and an eyewitness to this tragic transformation of a great personality, wrote about him as follows :

That powerful pen that could produce a book like *The Causes of the Indian Revolt* and who dared to publish it when men were being court-martialled; that lion of a man who, while opposing the Punjab University Bill, shattered every argument advanced by Lord Lytton and pressed in the course of three articles Indian demands in a language unequalled by the Congress, that fearless man who walked out of the Agra Darbar because Indians and British were not treated alike in the matter of the seating arrangements; that patriot who hailed the Bengalis as the pride of the country, thanks to whom ideas of freedom and nationalism could find expression in our midst; nature meant him to be leader of all India. But circumstances and his surroundings made him pull the Muslims back from playing their part in the nationalist movement. Why did it happen? What

were the reasons for it? What was it that so suddenly created this reversal? It is unnecessary to answer these questions now. Nay, to answer them might prove harmful to our cause. But surely the time for blindly following the self-same policy is over. The time for independent thinking has arrived.³

Whatever be Maulana Shibli's reasons for not clarifying the whole question then, time has answered it for us. It was the subtle influence exercised over the ageing leader by the European principals of the Aligarh College that was mainly responsible for the tragic change in Sir Syed Ahmad's politics.⁴ His trusting nature was cynically exploited to array him against Indian nationalism. He was misled into believing that while an Anglo-Muslim alliance would ameliorate the condition of the Muslim community, the nationalist alignment would lead them once again to sweat, toil and tears. He was further led to believe that supporting the Government was the surest way of making up the leeway for his community. As a result, his unique influence was used to keep the Muslims particularly in Northern India, away from the Congress. But there were not wanting influential Muslims who rallied to the Congress from its birth. Mr. Badr-ud-din Tyabji presided over the third Session of the Congress held in Madras in 1887. The Hon'ble Mir Humayun Jah, who attended the Session, gave a donation of Rs. 5,000. Mr. Ali Mohammad Bhimji, a prominent merchant of Bombay, toured the country to popularize the aims and objects of the Congress. This pro-Congress feeling was not confined to the educated *élite* or the merchant class only. Powerful support came from the *Ulema*. The advice of such outstanding divines as Maulana Rasheed Ahmad Gangohi, Maulvi Lutfullah of Aligarh and Mulla Mohammad Murad of Muzaffarnagar was that it was perfectly legitimate for the Muslims to join hands with their Hindu compatriots for bettering their worldly condition. The *Ulema* did not actually

³ Quoted by Maulana Syed Tufail Ahmed Manglori in *Mussalmanon ka Raoshan Mustakbil*.

⁴ See Ch. III.

participate in the work of the Congress because its proceedings were then conducted in English, a language which they did not understand.

Maulana Shibli's call to think independently and to give up the anti-national policy received influential support. Some of Sir Syed's life-long co-workers, like Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Khwaja Altaf Husain Hali and Nawab Vikar-ul-Mulk also shared Shibli's views, if not his vision. This fact is vouched by Nawab Vikar-ul-Mulk, the Secretary of the Aligarh College, who wrote in 1907:

By the closing years of the last century, several of the trustees of the Aligarh College had come to feel that Sir Syed's policy needed serious correction. It was their sense of gratitude to Sir Syed for his unique services to the community, which prevented them from opposing him openly.

But their patience was finally exhausted.

We felt that we must no longer allow our regard for and personal loyalty to, Sir Syed to stand in the way of our declaring our views and speaking out our mind in the interest of the community. Accordingly I wrote an article for publication in a Lahore journal and sent it to Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk and Khwaja Altaf Husain Hali for their approval and endorsement as it was intended to come in our joint names. But, in the meanwhile, we got the sad news of Sir Syed's death. In the face of the great blow the community had received in his death, the publication of the article was naturally abandoned.⁵

So, in those early years, Sir Syed's great influence kept many educated Muslims away from the growing Indian nationalism as embodied in the Congress. After his death towards the end of the century there arose the Hindi-Urdu controversy which acted as a fresh barrier. Some Hindus were seeking to replace the Persian script then universal in the courts throughout Northern India with the Nagari script. The Muslims resented this attempt to derogate the Urdu language from the position it had enjoyed for centuries. An agitation all over the

⁵*Vikar-i-Hayat*, p. 420.

United Provinces resulted in the organization of *Anjuman-e-Urdu*. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the then Secretary of the Aligarh College, became its President. The Government, however, was not anxious at this stage to see the Muslim discontent receiving organisational expression, and the Lt. Governor of the province himself went down to Aligarh to tell the trustees of the College that the Government would not countenance Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk's active participation in the script controversy. The Nawab Saheb would have to choose between the secretaryship of the College and the presidency of the *Anjuman*. It is interesting to note that the Government would not approve of the Muslims organising themselves when they wanted to do so, but only when officialdom thought that such an organization would help to further Government policies.

This became evident when in 1904 Lord Curzon put forward the project of dividing Bengal into separate provinces. He thought that the support of a Muslim organization in Eastern Bengal would be very useful to put his scheme through. This was all the more necessary since the Partition scheme was a retrograde move. As Curzon's biographer, Lord Ronaldshay, now Marquis of Zetland, (and himself an ex-Governor of Bengal and ex-Secretary of State for India) has pointed out:

The Lt Governor with his headquarters at Calcutta and Darjeeling, both far removed from the populous eastern districts with their own peculiar problems, could not possibly be expected to rule efficiently so vast an area. There were many even among the opponents of the scheme who were quite prepared to agree to the latter contention; but their remedy was a different one, and one to which Lord Curzon was resolutely opposed. They would substitute for the Lt. Governor of the province a governor with an Executive Council as in Madras and Bombay. A Viceroy who had long since urged—though without success—the reduction of Madras and Bombay to the status of other provinces was hardly likely to smile on any such proposal.⁶

The bitter pill was sought to be made palatable,

⁶ *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. II, 324.

therefore, by giving it a communal coating: in a special meeting convened for the purpose at Dacca, the Viceroy advertised the new province as a Muslim province. He succeeded in winning over Nawab Saleemullah Khan who was till then a staunch opponent of the Partition scheme and considered it as a "bestly arrangement." Soon after the Partition, the Government advanced to the Nawab Saheb a loan of £1,00,000 at a low rate of interest.⁷ But there were many Muslims who saw through the game. Nawabzada Khwaja Atikullah Khan, declared at the Congress of 1906:

I may tell you at once that it is not correct that the Muslims of Eastern Bengal are in favour of the partition of Bengal. The real fact is that it is only a few leading Muhammadans who for their own purposes supported the measure.⁸

Nawab Amcer Hasan Khan, the Secretary of the Central Mohammadan Association of Calcutta, also opposed the partition. In less than a generation history has vindicated their opposition.

The other move was more successful. A Muslim deputation headed by H. H. the Aga Khan waited upon the Viceroy in 1906. The very interesting story of the genesis of the Deputation is given in a later chapter, but its immediate success can be seen in the masterly summing up of their case by the Viceroy.

The pith of your address, as I understand it, [summed up Lord Minto] is a claim that any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality or a District Board or a Legislative Council, in which it is proposed to introduce or increase an electoral organization, the Muslim community should be represented as a community. You point out that in many cases, electoral bodies, as now constituted, cannot be expected to return a Muslim candidate, and if by any chance they did so, it would only be at the sacrifice of such candidate's views to those of a majority opposed to his community, whom he would in no way represent; and you justly claim that your proposition should be estimated not on your numerical strength, but

⁷ Gurumukh Nihal Singh : *Landmarks in Indian Constitution and Development* (1600-1919), p. 319.

⁸ Ibid. 268-69.

in respect to the political importance of the community and the services it has rendered to the Empire. I am entirely in accord with you.⁹

What a beautiful summing up this and what a masterpiece of equivocation and irony! The proud Muslims who a little over two generations ago were ruthlessly crushed under the Imperial heel, have suddenly become an important community which rendered great service to the Empire! The political importance of the community also was for the first time discovered and given special emphasis. The necessity for communal electorates was accepted as a matter of course; with their incorporation in the Morley-Minto Reforms they became the thin end of the wedge that was to drive the two communities apart from each other.

The success of the Deputation encouraged its promoters to start a separate organization for the Muslims. Accordingly Nawab Salimullah Khan issued invitations for a Conference at Dacca in 1906. On 30th December, 1906, the All-India Muslim League was founded. The aims and objects of the League were as follows :

“(1) To promote among Indian Moslems feelings of loyalty towards the British Government, and to remove any misconception that may arise, as to the intentions of the Government with regard to any of its measures, (2) to protect the political and other rights of the Indian Moslems and to place their needs and aspirations before the Government in temperate language; (3) so far as possible, without prejudice to the objects mentioned under (1) and (2) to promote friendly feelings between Moslems and other communities of India.”

Not all Muslims, however, were willing to follow the lead of H. H. the Aga Khan. While quite a number of influential Muslims had joined the Deputation to the Viceroy, it by no means commanded universal support. So important a figure as Nawab Syed Mohammad, who was actually in Simla when the Deputation presented the address to the Viceroy, refused to have anything to do with either. Nor did the League have a very smooth

⁹ J. Buchan : *Lord Minto*, p. 244.

career. Within a year there came into existence two Leagues, one headed by Mr. (later Sir) Mohammad Shafee and the other by Mian (later Sir) Fazle Husain. They were again united at the Aligarh Session but the phenomenon was to repeat itself in 1928.

In December 1908, the League session met at Amritsar under the presidentship of Sir Syed Ali Imam. Resolutions demanding the extension of communal representation to the Local Bodies, the appointment of a Muslim and a Hindu to the Privy Council, a share in the Services, and a resolution disapproving the attitude of the Indian National Congress on the Partition of Bengal were passed at this Session. In 1909, almost the same resolutions were repeated.

The year 1909-10 brought a marked change in the political life of the Indian Muslims. Thanks to an administrative *fracas* between the Secretary of the Aligarh College, Nawab Vikar-ul-Mulk, who was also the Secretary of the League, and Mr. Archbold, the Principal of the College, H. H. the Aga Khan, the President of the League, got its office transferred from Aligarh to Lucknow. The transfer terminated the domination of the European principals over the political activities of the Muslims. Freed from their apron-strings, the Muslims were not slow in asserting their nationalist stature.

None has criticized the sterile, lifeless politics of the League during this period more trenchantly than Maulana Shibli Numani. In course of an article in the *Muslim Gazette* of Lucknow he says:

The object of the Simla deputation was, and it was frankly expressed, to get a share for the Muslims in the political rights obtained by the Hindus. The League, to keep up appearances, passed some resolutions of national interest, but every one knows that it is rouge and not the natural bloom. Day and night its constant refrain is that the Muslims are oppressed by the Hindus and so they must be given safeguards. We do not under-estimate the importance of the Simla Deputation. It was the biggest show staged on the communal platform. But are these quarrels between the two communities to be called politics? If they are politics, the High Court is the foremost legislature! We enter the domain of politics when

we consider the part the people have to play in the administration of the country. Politics means deciding the mutual relations between the rulers and the ruled and not the petty quarrels of the ruled among themselves.

Politics is one of the greatest human urges. It is capable of evoking the noblest sentiments in man. It rouses nations into action and inspires men for suffering and the highest sacrifice. But have our politics evoked these qualities even in a single individual? Does anyone entering our political field feel even in the slightest degree that he is prepared for sacrifice? Does he find himself moved by a high ideal? Is there even one man among the many that crowd our political stage who is ready to devote his whole life to public service on a pittance of, say, Rs. 30 a month though he be a graduate or more? There are thirty such members of the Servants of India Society.

Men from all over the country offered their services when it was a question of waiting in a deputation on the Viceroy. But how many of them would have evinced the same eagerness if the deputation were to wait not on the Viceroy but on a petty official although the object of the deputation was equally, or perhaps more, important? Let us go a step further. Supposing there was the fear of a frown on the Viceroy's face, few would have come forward to join such a deputation. The fact of the matter is that these men are victims of self-delusion. A tree is judged by the fruit it gives. If our politics had been serious politics, they would have evoked a zest for struggle and a readiness to suffer and sacrifice for an ideal.

These words of Shibli are at once a masterly analysis and a poignant indictment. In political insight, in breadth of vision and in sturdy nationalism, Maulana Shibli was a peer of the tallest among the Hindus. As a scholar, too, his pre-eminence is undisputed. His books, both in Persian and Urdu, have received international recognition and his monumental history of Persian poetry, *Sha'ar-ul-Ajam* has been freely drawn upon by no less an authority than Prof. E. G. Brown of Cambridge in his *Literary History of Persia*. Shibli's equally famous *Sirat-un-Nabi* is a model of its type and an outstanding biography of the Prophet in the Urdu language. A widely travelled man, he also wrote the much praised *Safar Namah*, describing his tour of the Near and Middle East.

Shibli's influence on the development of Muslim nationalism in India is no less great. A friend and colleague

of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan at Aligarh, he did not hesitate to criticise his famous compatriot when he felt that Sir Syed's great name and influence were being misused by officialdom to check the growing nationalist movement and keep the Muslims out of its main current. His powerful pen chastised reactionary and obscurantist tendencies with unerring precision and he inspired a whole generation of Muslims, among whom must be included Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

Thus Muslim political consciousness owed not a little to Maulana Shibli's powerful pen. In the meantime other important events had occurred. The rendition of the Partition of Bengal (1911) came as a great shock to the Muslims as it was carried out without any reference to them. Nawab Salimullah Khan, who after his initial opposition was won over for the Partition scheme by Lord Curzon, felt so humiliated that he withdrew from politics. In his last important announcement as President of the Calcutta session of the League he gave vent to his disillusion and declared that the Partition had not relieved the hardships of the Muslims. This disappointment drove the Muslims to the main stream of Indian nationalism.

Certain events in Europe also helped to accelerate this tendency. In the early years of the century the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire made a successful attempt to free themselves from Turkish rule. In this they were greatly helped by England and Russia who had their own designs to pursue in the Balkan countries. It was only the triple rivalry of England, Austria-Hungary and Russia that kept "the sick man of Europe" in possession of Constantinople.

Then there was the Young Turk movement led by the famous triumvirate, Envar Pasha, Talaat Pasha and Djamal Pasha. Its initial success helped to radicalise Muslim politics in India also.

The aim of the Young Turk movement was to turn the feudal Ottoman Empire into a strong and liberal modern state. With that end in view its leaders carried out a successful palace revolution in 1908 and compelled

the Sultan to introduce certain liberal reforms as a step towards modernising Turkey. Their success, however, was short-lived. England viewed the new movement with suspicion. It did not suit her Imperial ends to have a strong and modern Turkey on the East Coast of the Mediterranean and in control of the Dardanelles. She therefore helped the Sultan to crush the Young Turk movement.

Both these events helped to swell the rising tide of nationalism among the Muslims of India.¹⁰ New stars were rising in the firmament; new voices, inspired by Shibli, were being heard. In 1912, Dr. Ansari led a medical mission to Turkey. The young Abul Kalam Azad launched his paper the *Al Hila* which was destined to have a historic career. It helped to liberate men's minds from fear and despondency and lifted them on to a higher plane of hope and courage. With the voice of Abul Kalam was mingled that of Maulana Mohammad Ali whose English paper, *Comrade*, and Urdu paper, *Hamdard*, earned a niche for themselves in the temple of our national journalism. These mighty currents swept through the League and refreshed its waters. At the Lucknow session, in 1913, the object of the League was amended to the "attainment, under the aegis of the British Crown, of Self-Government suited to India."¹¹ The next session of the League was attended by Dr. Ansari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan. This session laid special emphasis on the need of a closer *rapprochement* between the two communities.

August 1914 saw the beginning of the Great War and the world in a turmoil. Leaders of the masses once again came into their own. They dreamt of independence and planned their daring schemes. Shaikh-ul-Hind, Maulana Mahmood-ul-Hasan of Deoband, sent one of his disciples, Maulana Obedulla Sindhi, to Kabul to confer with the German and Turkish ambassadors there, and also to persuade the Amir to rise against

¹⁰ cf. *Sedition Committee (1918) Report*, pp. 173-179.

¹¹ Mirza Akhtar Hasan : *Tareekh-e-Muslim League*, p. 74.

the British. The Maulana dreamt of an independent Republic of India, with Raja Mahendra Pratap as its first President. Maulana Saheb and his colleagues, Maulana Husain Ahmad Nadvi and Maulvi Aziz Gul were, however, arrested and interned at Malta.¹² In May 1915, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali were also interned. So were Maulanas Azad and Hasrat Mohani. The Indian Mussalman had awakened from his fifty-year-old slumber.

The year 1915 is a landmark in the annals of the League. For the first time the League and the Congress held their sessions at the same place and at the same time. A large number of Congress leaders, among them Pandit Malaviya, Mahatma Gandhi, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, attended the session of the League. Its immediate result was the resignation of H. H. the Aga Khan as the permanent President of the League. The nationalist Muslims had at last triumphed and the League asserted its emancipation from the influence of Simla and Whitehall.

In pursuance of the resolution of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the League set up a committee to draft, in consultation with the Congress, a scheme of Reforms for India. As a result of these consultations an agreement was soon arrived at which has gone down in history as the Lucknow Pact. Apart from making inter-communal adjustments the Congress-League Pact also elaborated a scheme of Reforms. After demanding "That a definite step should be taken towards Self-Government by granting the Reforms contained in the Scheme," it was suggested "that in the reconstruction of the Empire, India shall be lifted from the position of a dependency to *that of an equal partner* in the Empire with the Self-Governing Dominions." In considering the terms of the Pact it is necessary to remember this Preamble.

The Pact conceded increased weightage with separate electorates to Muslims where they were in a minority in population or in voting strength. The following separate representation was agreed to :

¹² cf. *Sedition Committee (1918) Report*, op. cit.

Percentage of Elected Members

Punjab	50
Bengal	40
Bombay (with Sind)	33 ¹ / ₃
United Provinces	30 ^a
Bihar and Orissa	25
Madras	15
Central Provinces	15

A proviso was also added :

That no Bill, or any clause thereof, nor any resolution, introduced by a non-official member affecting one or the other community in the Legislative Council concerned, shall be proceeded with if three-fourths of the members of the community in the particular council, Imperial or Provincial, oppose the Bill, any clause thereof, or the resolution.

In the course of his Presidential Address to the ninth Session of the League at Lucknow, Mr. Jinnah said :

Absurd political maxims have been propounded and hurled, time and again, at the Indian people. They are well known to students of politics. It is said, for instance, that 'democratic institutions are unsuited to the genius of the East.' Is democracy unknown to the Hindus and Muslims? he challengingly asked and answered himself. Then what were the village *Panchayats*? What does the glorious past of Islam testify? No nation in the world can claim greater democratic spirit and traditions than the Muslims.¹³

Important resolutions endorsing the Pact, demanding the repeal of the Arms Act, the Press Act and the Defence of India Act, were passed. The Lucknow Session set a seal on the Hindu-Muslim concordat.

The new spirit that flowed through the League was seen in the choice of the president for the next session. Maulana Mohammad Ali, then in internment, was given the honour and voted the confidence of the Muslims. In his absence, the Raja of Mahamudabad presided over the Calcutta Session (1917). In the course of his address he said:

¹³ Translated from *Tarikh-e-Muslim League* by Mirza Akhtar Husain.

The interests of the country are paramount. We need not tarry to argue whether we are Muslims first or Indians. The fact is we are both, and to us the question of precedence has no meaning. The League has inculcated in the Muslims a spirit of sacrifice for their country as much as for their religion.

From the platform of the League Mahatma Gandhi and Mrs. Naidu supported a resolution demanding the release of the Ali brothers. The resolutions passed had a national rather than communal import.

The eleventh session of the League was held in December 1918 in Delhi. The printed speech of Dr. M. A. Ansari, the Chairman of the Reception Committee, was proscribed by the Government. A marked feature of this session was the re-emergence of the *Ulema* on the political stage. Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Kifayatullah, Maulana Ahmad Saeed were among the leading divines who participated in the proceedings. The League, at this session, demanded the application of the principle of self-determination to India.

1918 saw the end of the Great War. Expectations ran high. The Muslim world in general and India in particular, were astir with hope.

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War set in train by the German ambition, is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks and the setting up of national Governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations¹⁴

was the declaration of the Allies in 1918. But the peace brought tutelage and not freedom for the Holy Cities of Islam. The Khilafat was threatened with dissolution. A mighty wave of protest and indignation swept through India and the Khilafat movement was born. The Khilafat Conference declared for the Boycott of British Goods and Non-co-operation with the Government. It thanked Mahatma Gandhi and the Hindus in general for their sympathy and co-operation.

¹⁴ Quoted by Maude Royden in *The Problem of Palestine*.

The joint pressure of the Congress and the League in the Khilafat agitation was soon felt in high quarters.

Mr. Montagu and Lord Reading were both very much alarmed by the anti-Turkish policy of the British Government and Mr. Montagu decided on a bold and an unusual method of procedure. He authorized Lord Reading to send him a telegram which was immediately given to the press. In that telegram the Viceroy brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government 'the support which the Indian Moslem cause is receiving throughout India' and urging upon them 'the evacuation of Constantinople, the Suzerainty of the Sultan over the Holy Places, the restoration of Ottoman Thrace (including Adrianople) and Smyrna.' The telegram ended by saying, 'The fulfilment of these three points is of the greatest importance to India.'¹⁵

In 1919, the *Ulema* decided to form an association of their own to give clarity and point to their opinions and advice.

At the Khilafat Conference at Delhi in 1919, the *Ulema* felt that the Muslim divines of India whose collective power and influence had been shattered after the Mutiny of 1857 should again come together. Politics till now had meant flattery and expression of loyalty. The one who was the most loyal to the Ruling Power was considered to be the leader of the Muslims. That is why the *Ulema*, who hate flattery and sycophancy and who are accustomed to face tyrants for truth, kept away from politics. But now that Muslim politics have taken a turn for the better, the *Ulema* re-enter the field and the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind* is founded.¹⁶

Its founder, Maulana Mohammad-ul-Hasan, one of the most celebrated Muslim divines of this country, was a man of rare probity and vision. Arrested and interned at Malta for anti-Government activities during the war, he returned to India at the end of it with almost unequalled reputation and prestige. He immediately threw himself in the Khilafat and the Non-Co-operation movements and *Ulema* from every nook and corner of the country flocked around him.

In 1921, the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema* issued the famous *fatwa*,

¹⁵ Roy Smith: *Nationalism and Reforms in India*, pp. 318-319.

¹⁶ Translated from the Urdu proceedings of the *Jamiat*.

without a parallel in weight and character since the great rebellion of 1857. It enjoined upon the Muslims the duty of Non-Co-operation and called upon them to join in the boycott of elections to the Councils, Government schools and colleges and law courts, and to renounce all titles and ranks conferred upon them by the foreign Government. Four hundred and twenty-five eminent doctors of Muslim religious law lent their names to this *Fatwa* and another four hundred and seventy signatures were added to it soon afterwards. Thus was given to the Khilafat and the Non-Co-operation movements the imprimatur of high theological approval. Many of the leaders of the Jamiat faced imprisonment while thousands of Muslims left the country as *Muhajirins*.

Mohammad-ul-Hasan died shortly after and his mantle fell upon Mufti Kifayatullah, an erudite scholar and the chief theoretician of the organization. Under his leadership the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema* supported the Civil Disobedience movements of 1930 and 1932 and its leaders suffered repeated imprisonment. In 1939, it was one of the chief supporters of the Azad Muslim Conference at Delhi.

The *Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind* has consistently used its great influence to crystallize Muslim opinion against foreign rule. Its hold on the Ulema is largely due to its famous theological seminary at Deoband, the principal training college for Muslim divines in the country. Its present leaders include such important names as Mufti Kifayatullah, Maulana Ahmad Saeed, and Maulana Hus-sain Ahmad. Its headquarters are at Delhi.

But to resume our narrative. The Congress, the League, the Khilafat, and the *Jamiat-ul-Ulema*, all held their Sessions simultaneously at Amritsar in 1919 to deliberate over the massacre of Jalianwala Bagh. The President of the League that year was Hakim Ajmal Khan. Events followed events. The masses were in action again. Students boycotted Government schools and colleges; national institutions were being founded. One of the lasting contributions of this churning is the Jamia Millia Islamia.

The next session of the League presided over by Dr. Ansari, gave its full support and co-operation to the Congress programme of civil disobedience. In 1921, the League held its session together with the Congress at Ahmedabad. Maulana Hasrat Mohani, the President of this session landed himself in prison for the fiery eloquence of his impassioned address. In the course of it he said:

The Mussalmans should realize that by establishing the Republic of India, their gain will be twofold - firstly, as citizens of a democratic Republic they will enjoy equal rights and receive the same benefits as others, and secondly, by curtailing the British sphere of influence they will give the Islamic world the respite needed for the development of constructive activities. (Translated from Urdu).

In the meantime the Muslims embarked upon a plan of *hijrat* to Afghanistan as they felt they could not stay in India under the British, after the peace that England made with Turkey. The movement was started in Sind and spread to the North-West Frontier. A ghastly collision took place between the emigrants and the military at Kacha Garhi which exasperated the people and in the month of August (1920) it was estimated that 18000 people were on their way to Afghanistan. But very soon the Afghan authorities forbade the admission of *Muhajirins* and a set-back was given to the idea after a considerable loss of life and suffering.¹⁷

But the flood of popular enthusiasm could not last indefinitely. The inevitable low tide set in after the Chauri Chaura incident and its aftermath. The attendance for the League session at Lucknow in 1923 was so poor that the open session had to be abandoned for want of a quorum. The next three sessions were mainly occupied with the worsening communal situation. But essentially they were lifeless, for the old fire had gone out of them.

In 1927, the reactionary element, elbowed out for over a decade, made a bid to win back its supremacy in the League. The immediate cause was the appointment of the Simon Commission. As the Commission was boycotted by the whole of India, a breach was sought to be created by the

¹⁷ B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, p. 335.

recapture of the League. With that end in view it was invited to meet in Lahore. But the nationalist elements in the League were still strong enough to prevent so shameful a betrayal and the League Council fixed the next venue at Calcutta. On this, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Sir Mohammad Iqbal and others left the meeting. They organized a rival session at Lahore over which Sir Mohammad Shafee presided. It was attended by delegates from different parts of India: "the Punjab: 300; the U. P.: 21; the N.-W. F. P.: 12; Bombay: 6; Delhi: 6; Calcutta: 4 and Sind: 3; totalling 352."¹⁸ A resolution welcoming the Commission, moved by Mr. (later Sir) Zafrullah Khan, was passed at this rival session.

The accredited session met at Calcutta under the presidentship of Mr. M. A. Jinnah, where a resolution boycotting the Simon Commission was carried along with one demanding the release of prisoners detained without trial. The challenge of Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India to the Indian leaders to produce an agreed constitution was taken up. The Council of the League was asked to appoint a Committee that would take up with the Congress and other political organizations in the country, the work of drafting the constitution and of suggesting the necessary safeguards. It was further decided that the Committee should also participate in the National Convention to meet in the following March at Delhi.

The League session of December 1928 was adjourned and the remaining agenda was taken up at its continued session at Delhi in March 1929. The Shafee League at its session at Lahore had given a call for a Muslim All-Parties Conference. The League participated in it. The Conference rejected the Nehru Report which the Nationalist elements in the League were anxious to adopt with certain modifications. The rejection caused a schism. Mr. Jinnah further precipitated matters by adjourning the session *sine die*, without deciding the issue. The Nationalist Muslims were chagrined at these tactics

¹⁸ Mirza Akhtar : *Tarikh-e-Muslim League*.

and left the League to form a new party, the Nationalist Muslim Party. The League now passed completely into the hands of the Moderates. By 1933, the League had relapsed into the pre-1910 state.

In 1931 Nationalist Muslims from all parts of India met in conference at Lucknow. In his presidential speech, Sir Ali Imam said:

That day's big gathering reminded him of the Morley-Minto Reform days when the number of supporters of the joint Electorate Scheme barely exceeded the number of fingers on a man's hand. He himself belonged to that school of political thought, which laid great stress on Separate Electorates and was in fact a member of the deputation that waited on Lord Minto in 1906. But in the interval between 1905 and 1909, he had time to carefully study the question and definitely came to the conclusion that Separate Electorate was not only the negation of Indian Nationalism but also positively harmful to the Muslims themselves. As early as in 1909 he had raised a voice of protest against separation, but at that time his views were condemned both in the press and on the platform by the Musalmans almost to a man.

Sir Ali Imam went on to say: "If I were asked why I have such abiding faith in Indian Nationalism, my answer is that without that India's freedom is an impossibility. Separate electorate connotes negation of 'nationalism'." The President further stated that the Conference represented "the entire Muslim intelligentsia and consisted of people not wedded to the scheme of separatism. He, as president-elect of the Conference, had been flooded with messages from every corner of India from different leaders, who one and all insisted on the basic principle of Joint Electorates."¹⁹

Among the important resolutions passed at the Conference was one demanding a declaration of fundamental rights to be incorporated in the constitution. Another resolution strongly recommended the settlement of all outstanding questions on the basis of universal adult suffrage, joint electorates, and reservation of seats in Federal and Provincial Legislatures on population basis for mino-

¹⁹ *Modern Review*, May 1931, p. 611 et. seq.

rities of less than 30 per cent, with right to contest additional seats.

In the meantime, the All-India Muslim League session was held at Allahabad under the presidentship of Sir Mohammad Iqbal. The attendance which was less than seventy-five, was not enough to make up the quorum. The next session was equally uneventful. It met in a private house at Delhi. It was presided over by Mr. Zafrullah Khan and attended by about one hundred members.

It was obvious that the secession of the Nationalist Muslims and their active participation in the two Civil Disobedience Movements had sent League politics once again into the doldrums. The withdrawal of Civil Disobedience brought a reaction from the tension of the years 1930-1934. The League was reorganised, though the Nationalist Muslims did not return to its fold. Once again, it emerged into the political arena, with Mr. Jinnah as President.

The League Council met at New Delhi on 1st April, 1934. About forty members attended. Among other resolutions passed by the council was one accepting the Communal Award as far as it went until a substitute was agreed upon by the various communities. The same resolution further expressed the readiness of the League "for co-operation with other communities and parties to secure such future constitution for India, as would be acceptable to the country."

Summing up his impressions of the Council meeting, Mr. Jinnah said :

The League is perfectly sound and healthy and the conclusion I have come to is that Mussalmans will not lag behind any other community in serving the very best interests of India.

Condemning the White Paper as a "treacherous Scheme"
Mr. Jinnah continued :

India looks forward to a real, solid, united front. It is up to the leaders to put their heads together and nothing will give me greater happiness than bring about complete co-operation and friendship between Hindus and Moslems and in this

desire my impression is that I have the solid support of the Mussalmans.

The most important session of the League after this was the one held in Bombay in April 1936. In his presidential address, after condemning the new constitution forced upon India by the British, Sir Syed Wazir Hasan made a powerful plea for unity among all the communities of India.

In the higher interests of the country I appeal for unity not only between Hindus and Muslims as such but also between the various classes and different political organizations. Such a unity will not only make an ideal a reality but it will also give opportunity for political adjustment amongst all concerned. Even in the past there was no difference on essentials and there is none now. The differences in detail have ceased to exist. Is there any moral justification left for perpetuating differences, when the supreme need of the country in its struggle for freedom is unity?

He then suggested a four-fold programme on the basis of which a nation-wide movement could be organized and which would bring together various communities by creating mutual confidence. Describing the new Constitution (1935) Sir Wazir Hasan said: "... it will enchain and crush the forces making for democracy and freedom. The Muslim classes, the Muslim masses will suffer from the new scheme as much as any other section of the Indian people."

The most important resolution of the Conference was the one condemning and totally rejecting the Federal Scheme, contained in the Government of India Act, 1935, as calculated to thwart and delay indefinitely, India's goal of responsible government.

In 1937 the League struck a different note. At its annual session at Lucknow (15th to 18th October) the Rajah of Mahmudabad, in the course of his address of welcome said :

A delicate political situation has been created in our own country. The majority community refuses to recognize even the existence of the Muslim community as such and it refuses to work in co-operation with our leaders for national advancement.

Mr. Jinnah who presided over the session said that the League stood for full national democratic government for India and criticized the Congress for not keeping to its declaration of wrecking the new constitution and actually working it.

Coming events have already cast their shadow on the League proceedings. Mr. Jinnah, in the course of his address, said :

The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy, which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed governments in six provinces where they are in majority, they have by their words, deeds and programme shown that the Mussalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus.²⁰

On the 17th and 18th April, 1938, the League met in a Special session at Calcutta, Mr. Jinnah presiding. The note of the speeches was a growing opposition to the Congress and complaints against the tyranny of the Congress Raj. The refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries was advanced as proof that the Congress was out to crush the Muslims. In a powerful appeal to all the Muslims to unite in the name of Islam, Mr. Fazlul Huq told the audience that there was no hope of securing protection through Safeguards and added, "If Panipat and Thaneshwar must repeat themselves, let the Muslims prepare to give as glorious an account of themselves as their forbears."

The President underlined the points in Mr. Huq's speech. Describing the Congress High Command as a totalitarian and authoritative caucus, Mr. Jinnah characterised the Congress as a Hindu body out to crush all other parties in the country, particularly the Muslim League. In a clever passage Mr. Jinnah said that the League was not fighting for the Muslims alone but to

²⁰ *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II, p. 403.

guarantee security and a place under the Indian Sun to all other important minorities in India, which were threatened by the menace of the Congress.

At the Patna session of the League in December 1938, similar sentiments were expressed by Mr. Jinnah. According to him all attempts at a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question had broken on the rock of Congress Fascism. Mr. Gandhi had destroyed the very ideals with which the Congress started its career and converted it into a communal Hindu body. He ended the speech by appealing to the Muslims to develop their own national consciousness.

Criticising the Congress policy in the Indian States Mr. Jinnah said that it was a camouflage to secure numerical majority in the Central Legislature. If the Congress was determined to carry out its ulterior and sinister motive in the States he would have to come to the rescue of the Muslims in the States.

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met at Meerut in March 1939 and appointed a committee to examine the various draft schemes of constitutional reform put forward to secure the rights and interests of Muslims in India.

The result of the deliberations of the Committee is the now famous scheme of division of India into cultural zones and the establishment of a confederacy of India. The scheme was prepared by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad. The cultural zones were to be made as homogeneous as possible by transfer of populations. During the transitory period fullest safeguards were to be guaranteed to the Muslims and the Provincial Executives were not to be formed from the majority party alone.

In September 1939 England declared war on Germany and India became a participant by the Viceroy's declaration. In a statement issued from Delhi the Working Committee of the League demanded full satisfaction of the demands of Indian Muslims, before they could think of co-operating with the government in the war effort.

While the Muslim League stands for the freedom of India, the Committee further urge upon His Majesty's Government and asks for an assurance that no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All India Muslim League nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and British Parliament without such consent and approval.²¹

While the President of Muslim League was thus engaged in negotiating with the Viceroy, developments of a far-reaching nature engrossed the country's attention. Failing to secure from the British Government a satisfactory statement of their war aims, the All-India Congress Committee called upon the Congress Ministries in eight out of the eleven provinces of India to resign as a protest against this country being dragged into the War, without her consent. With this resolution the Ministries promptly complied. Faced thus with an unprecedented constitutional crisis, and finding it impossible to form any alternative ministry, the Governors of the different provinces suspended the constitution and resumed autocratic rule.

There was widespread expectation in the country that with the resignation of the Congress Ministries the League outcry about "Congress oppression of Muslim minority" would cease and all the communal heat that had been whipped up, would also automatically subside. Hopes, too, were being entertained that as a result of the forthcoming talks between Mr. Jinnah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, there would be marked improvement in the situation, and that a common policy against the British Government would be evolved. Mr. Jinnah, however, sprang a tremendous surprise upon the country by publicly instructing all the branches of the Muslim League to observe a "Deliverance Day" to celebrate the exit of the Congress Ministries.

The controversy that naturally followed this announcement, dashed all hopes of a Congress-League

²¹ From Resolution of the Working Committee of All India Muslim League, Delhi, 15th Sept., 1939.

rapprochement to the ground.

On the 23rd December, Lord Linlithgow, the Governor-General, in a letter to Mr. Jinnah observed :

His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim Community, to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views will be under-rated.²²

It was against this background that the 27th Session of the All-India Muslim League met at Lahore on 22nd March 1940 and subsequent days. On the eve of the session, the Punjab Government embarked on strong measures against the Khaksar organization. There were quite a number of clashes between the defiant Khaksars and the Police, and the latter opened fire, causing several casualties. This cast a gloom over the Muslim League Session, for it was a "Muslim Government," headed by one of the most prominent League leaders, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, that had adopted measures which resulted in the death of 30 Muslim Khaksars, besides causing injury to a large number. Those who had been crying day in and day out against the "oppression" of the Congress Ministries, found themselves in a most embarrassing position. Appearances however, were kept up, though the Punjab Premier prudently kept away from the session.

In his presidential address Mr. Jinnah once again harped on his favourite two-nation theory.

Islam and Hinduism he declared are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that Hindus and Moslems can ever evolve a common nationality. This misconception of one Indian nation, has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time.

²² In letter to Mr. M. A. Jinnah, December 1939. The full text of the correspondence is given in Indian Annual Register, 1940, Vol. 2, pp. 248-257. The resemblance between this and Lord Minto's reply to the Muslim deputation in 1906 is too striking to pass unnoticed.

To him the present unity of India was "artificial," dating only from the British period and maintained by the British bayonet. He declared that democracy was unsuited to India and that the "Muslims are a nation, according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state." He made an eloquent plea for strengthening the League organization. Mr. Jinnah concluded on a note of warning to the British Government, (the League Working Committee had already expressed its dissatisfaction with the Viceroy's reply at its meeting on Feb. 3, 1940).

I declare here that if any declaration is made by His Majesty's Government without our approval and our consent, Moslem India will resist it, and no mistake should be made on that score.

The Conference accepted Mr. Jinnah's lead, and on the following day adopted a resolution moved by Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Premier of Bengal, which despite its length deserves quotation in full :

While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October, 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940, on the Constitution issue, this session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October, 1939, made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered "de novo" and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geo-

graphically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States," in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.

Thus did the League accept the goal of Pakistan.

Three days before the Lahore meeting of the Muslim League, another great Muslim statesman, presiding over the 53rd session of the Indian National Congress at Ramgarh placed before his fellow-countrymen in bold and challenging words an ideal different from Mr. Jinnah's, the ideal of a one and indivisible India and of a people welded by common history and common effort into a common nationality.

It was India's historic destiny, [declared Maulana Abul Kalam Azad] that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil and that many caravans should rest here...One of the last of these caravans, following the footsteps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam. This led to a meeting of the culture-currents of two different races...Like the Ganga and the Jumna, they flowed for a while through separate courses; but Nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a *Sangam*.

The thousand years of our joint life has moulded us into

a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in the course of centuries. The cast has now been moulded, and destiny has set her seal upon it. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No fantasy or artificial scheming to separate and divide can break this unity."

A few weeks later the All-India Independent Muslim Conference met at Delhi, (April 27 to 30, 1940), under the Presidentship of Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, the present Premier of Sind. The Presidential Address was remarkable for the strong denunciation of the two-nation theory propagated by the Muslim League :

A majority of the ninety million Indian Muslims who are descendants of the earlier inhabitants of India are in no sense other than sons of the soil... The nationals of different countries cannot divest themselves of their nationality merely by embracing one or the other faith. Mr. Allah Bux described the bonds that in different walks of life unite the Hindus and the Muslims.... He contested the claim of the Muslim League to be the sole representative body of Indian Muslims, and strongly criticised the Pakistan scheme, which would result in putting the Muslims in an "isolation quarantine."

These views were reflected in the main resolution adopted by the Conference. Mufti Kifayatullah, President of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, moved the main resolution in which it was stated :

India with its geographical and political boundaries is an indivisible whole and as such it is the common homeland of all the citizens, irrespective of race or religion, who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the country contain the hearths and homes of the Muslims and the cherished historical monuments of their religion and culture. From the national point of view, every Muslim is an Indian.

It declared Muslim determination to fight shoulder to shoulder with their other countrymen for the attainment of complete Independence.

The next important resolution on the Pakistan ques-

²⁸ Presidential Address, Ramgarh Congress.

tion was moved by Maulana Habibur Rahman and read as follows:

This conference considers that any scheme which divides India into Hindu India and Muslim India is impracticable and harmful to the country's interests generally and those of the Moslems in particular... This Conference is convinced that the inevitable result of such a scheme will be that obstacles will be created in the path of Indian freedom and British Imperialism will exploit it for its own purpose.

As against this the Muslim League held its next session at Madras during the Easter holidays (April 12 to 15, 1941). Mr. Jinnah was again elected president. During the course of his address he said :

We do not want, under any circumstances, a constitution of an All India character with one Government at the Centre. We will never agree to that... We are determined to establish the status of an independent nation and an independent state in this sub-continent.

Pakistan had already been accepted as the goal at Lahore. At Madras, a change in the constitution of the League was effected and the goal of Pakistan was incorporated into the creed of the Muslim League.

Thus, in the development of Muslim political consciousness we see a sharp contrast between two conflicting viewpoints : the one trying to merge with the movement of Indian nationalism, the other trying to strike an independent and separate line of advance. Both have influenced the development of Muslim consciousness but their influence at all times has not been equally powerful. From 1916 to 1924 the nationalist tendency gained predominance at the expense of the separatist, during recent years the position has been reversed.

To understand this twofold development of Muslim political consciousness it will not be enough to read the history of the last few years only for that would lead us to conclusions which, though easy, will in the end vitiate our analysis of the problem. For the last hundred years and more there have been certain sociological and irrational forces working on the Indian polity and these in their turn have been profoundly affected by the poli-

cies pursued by the Government from time to time. We must examine them carefully if we want to understand not only why Muslim politics developed the way they did but also the much larger problem of Hindu-Muslim relationships.

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH ARM OF THE TRIANGLE

The modern state can determine the shape of a people's life in a sedulously inescapable manner. By means of hundreds of decisions, often trivial and insignificant, in themselves, vast changes, for good or evil, are achieved. Government policies are concerned with the interplay of complex and intricate forces. And when statecraft has to reckon with the meeting and crossing of two civilizations, whose outlook is not identical and whose interests are often in conflict, questions of far-reaching importance arise. It is the purpose of this chapter to consider one such question—the impress of British policy on the Communal Problem in India.

Well versed in the policy of *divide et impera*, the British soon after their arrival in India, made ready to apply its strategy to the situation in this country.¹ The two great communities of India, the Hindus and the Muslims, had evolved an attractive pattern of co-operation, not unmixed, naturally, with occasional notes of discord. With all their famed skill, which up till recently had made their diplomacy the most powerful in the world, the English rulers decided to put themselves between the Hindus and the Muslims and so create a communal triangle of which they would remain the base.

The conquest of India was followed by the organization of centralised control over the country. For its economic objectives the new government required a well-knit market. This meant in terms of public policy a

¹ "*Divide et impera* was the old Roman motto, and it should be ours." Mountstuart Elphinstone.

For the application of this principle in the conquest of India, cf. W. M. Torrens : *Empire in Asia* (1872).

strong unitary government, controlled from above and run by an efficient bureaucracy. But a strong centralised government, whose authority is felt with uniform pressure all over the land gives a common consciousness to the people and creates the possibility of an alternative popular focus of authority against the rule of an alien and irresponsible government.

That this was not an idle fear was proved in the Rebellion of 1857. The very unity of India, achieved by the government for state purposes, provided the basis of this challenge to its authority. The army, the instrument and expression of the new centralization, became the spearhead of the national revolt. The government was not slow to learn the lesson. Its policy henceforward was based upon a search of ways and means by which the administrative and economic unity of India could move hand in hand without their leading to political unity. Centralization was, therefore, coupled with policies working to a definite end: the preventing of the popular will of a united India gravitating towards an alternative centre of authority that would seek to replace the existing government.

The effects of the new policy were visible first in the entire reorganization of the Indian army. Before 1857, the Indian army was cosmopolitan in its composition.

In the ranks of the regular army [wrote Macmunn and Lovett] men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class or clan. In the lines, Hindu and Mohamedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment.²

This growing unity was considered dangerous. Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, who played such an important part in suppressing the Rebellion of 1857 and was subsequently made the Viceroy of India, was explicit on this point.

² Macmunn, Sir George and Lovett, Sir Verney: *The Armies of India*, pp. 94-95.

Among the defects of the pre-Mutiny army, unquestionably the worst, and the one that operated most fatally against us, was the brotherhood and the homogeneity of the Bengal army, and for this purpose the remedy is counterpoise; firstly the great counterpoise of the Europeans, and secondly of the native races.³

To remove the common sentiment in the army and to prevent the development of a sense of national solidarity, therefore, became the first concern of the Indian Government. The new plan of organization was clear-cut.

It (the army) is nearly grouped into battalions, companies, squadrons and sometimes even platoons of specified classes (based on tribal, sectarian and caste distinctions) according to a fixed ratio and no one who does not belong to one of these classes is allowed to enter the Army simply because he is individually fit. These groups are so arranged that they retain their tribal or communal loyalties and at the same time balance the characteristics and influences of one another.⁴

Outside the army also the Mutiny provided a valuable lever of counterpoise. Loyalty was rewarded and opposition was crushed. Government's great patronage was cleverly used to alter the alignments in the country in favour of the rulers. Divergent interests were fostered where found and created where absent. Separate and often conflicting points of allegiance fragmented the unity of India.⁵

The government could do this because it was, and still remains, the fountain of all authority, functioning through highly centralised control. All vital energy is concentrated into its hands. From there various currents are released which either refresh and strengthen the national life as a whole or feed the stagnant pools of communal and religious antagonisms. It is not accidental that after years of talk about reforms, in fact, half a

³ Quoted by Nirad C. Chowdhry in *Modern Review*, 1930.

⁴ Nirad C. Chowdhry : *Defence of India*.

⁵ cf. Colonel Chesney : *Indian Polity*.

Also Sir John Seely : *Expansion of England* : "You see the Mutiny in India was in a great measure put down by turning races of India against one another," p. 270 (New Eversley Edition).

century after Lord Ripon, the Central citadel of government power still remains untouched. Whatever changes have been introduced into the constitution have altered the contours of provincial, not central authority. This has helped the government to turn the attention of the people from the highest fortress, to less important provincial outposts and to divert popular energy in capturing them.⁶

This diversion has again helped government to loosen the unity of India. Democratic provincial governments, functioning under an autocratic central authority, have emphasized provincial antagonisms at the expense of the outlook of the Centre.⁷ People have started on a pursuit of shadowy freedom whose substance always eludes them and they try to compensate for their frustration by undignified squabbles over trifles that really do not matter. The wood remains invisible for the trees and the wide vision of the mountain peak is confined by the narrow limits of mosque and temple, of grants and guarantees.

Once again as a check to the historic loyalties of the people, the old territorial loyalties were split up into composite provinces while communal separatism was encouraged.

⁶ "They (Moderate Indian politicians) employed their energies in capturing the control of local bodies and municipalities and gain some proportion of responsible civil posts. They criticized the general financial policy, took up cases of racial injustice, and agitated for better educational facilities, but they seldom argued that such and such actions of the Government of India would make it difficult later to develop a national government." Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt : *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, p. 540.

⁷ The Joint Parliamentary Committee in paragraph 26 of their Report state : "We have spoken of unity as perhaps the greatest gift which British rule has conferred on India, but in transferring so many of the powers of the Government to the provinces and in encouraging them to develop a vigorous and independent political life of their own, we have been running the risk of weakening or even destroying that unity."

A further discussion of this point will be found in *India's Constitution at Work*, by C. Y. Chintamani & M. R. Masani, pp. 15-21.

But the policy of counterpoise showed most remarkable results in widening the gap between the two communities. The conditions also were very favourable. During the period following the assumption of responsibility by the British Crown a certain disparity between the relative positions of the two communities had emerged. Several factors had led to the development of this disparity.

Muslims as a rule had been attached to military careers. The new regime had, however, no use for them in the army. As Hunter pointed out:

The Army is now completely closed (to them). No Muhammedan gentleman of birth can enter the regiments..... A few Muhammedan gentlemen hold commissions from the Governor General, but so far as I can learn, not one from the Queen.⁸

Deprived of their traditional army careers it was extremely difficult for the Muslims to transform themselves immediately into civilian "Baboos." Thus the classes who had been in the forefront of society had to step aside and make room for the new English-speaking intelligentsia who could understand and help to work the new "system."

This new intelligentsia was mainly Hindu, for the Hindus had adjusted themselves to the British rule earlier than the Muslims. Again it is interesting to note, that for a variety of reasons, the Muhammedan rulers had also employed Hindus in the civil administration, particularly in the revenue department. Under the Moghuls, the Finance Minister was often a Hindu. And in those early days of British rule the principal, in fact the only, department of civil administration was the revenue department. All the other government departments with which we are now familiar were added later. All this made it easy for the Hindu intelligentsia to adapt themselves to the new situation, to retain their position and even to improve upon it. Thus the Hindu won a lead over his Muslim fellow-countryman in the matter of bureaucratic

⁸ Sir W. W. Hunter : *Indian Mussalmans*, (1871), p. 156.

preferments, and the government was not slow to take advantage of it.

But English education brought with it English ideas of freedom and democracy and under the inspiring leadership of a number of great men,⁹ the Hindus rapidly developed a national consciousness and began to ask inconvenient questions to the government. The Indian National Congress, though founded under government patronage soon became very critical of government policies. That the nationalist movement could constitute any danger to the stability of the government was revealed by the fiery eloquence of leaders like Surendranath Banerji. The theme may be perfectly innocuous like the demand for holding the civil service examination in India, but the new point of view and the new angle of approach mattered far more than their isolated expression through one grievance or another. Such eloquence might be harmless enough before the sedate Bengalees but what if its heady wine was poured upon the militant, unsophisticated and highly inflammable men of the North?

To counteract this disturbing tendency, the government now tended to draw the Muslims, so far looked upon with disfavour, under its protecting wings. The need once again was to create a counterpoise which would prevent the fusion of the two communities into a common nationalism. And as it turned out, the one man who carried this through with missionary zeal was neither a knight of the Empire, nor a hard-headed bureaucrat, nor an army officer, but a pedagogue. This was Mr. Beck, the young Principal of the newly started central Muslim educational institution, the Aligarh College.¹⁰

One of the first things Mr. Beck did was to secure editorial control of the *Institute Gazette* which was being conducted for years by Sir Syed Ahmad.

Sir Syed Ahmad was known to hold a high opinion of the Bengali Hindus. Their educational progress had

⁹ See the next Chapter.

¹⁰ For further material about Aligarh Principals see "*Mussalmanon ka Roshan Mustaqbil*" by Maulvi Syed Tufail Ahmad Manglori.

impressed him greatly. He often said that the Bengalis were the only section of the people of India of whom "we could legitimately be proud" and that it was due to them that "ideals of liberty and nationalism could progress in our country." Mr. Beck reversed this policy. In the "*Institute Gazette*" now appeared criticisms of the Bengalis and their political demands were characterised as anti-Muslim! This started a controversy in which the Bengali press was ranged against Sir Syed, who was supposed to be the author of the articles.

Mr. Beck assiduously tried to wean Sir Syed away from nationalism, to transfer his political attachment from the British Liberals to the Conservatives and to evoke in him an enthusiasm for a *rapprochement* between the Muslims and the government. He was singularly successful in his objective.

In 1887, three years after the foundation of the Indian National Congress, Sir Syed came out with a speech against that organization—his first important announcement on the subject.

As a result of Sir Syed's speech, the Muslims withdrew their support from the Congress, and opposed the principle of election in the governance of India. This started a serious political controversy. And in the next few years, the efforts of Sir Syed and Mr. Beck were mainly centred on the organization of Muslim opinion. The agitation against cow slaughter synchronized with these political events and helped to widen the divisions between Hindus and Muslims.¹¹

But there were many Muslims, merchants and *Ulema* for instance, who continued to support the Congress. Mr. Beck, therefore, had to intensify his sectarian activities. In 1889, Charles Bradlaugh introduced a Bill in Parliament with the object of conferring democratic institutions on India. Mr. Beck seized the occasion to make Muslims conscious of their separatism. He prepared a memorial on behalf of Indian Mussalmans opposing the Bill on the plea that the introduction of the democratic principle was unsuited to India, which was

¹¹ Sir Theodore Morrison : *History of the Aligarh College*.

not one single nation. He obtained 20,735 signatures for this memorial. It is impossible to say how many of these were obtained after explaining the implications of the memorial, but there is no doubt that Mr. Beck made full use of the Aligarh boys to collect them. He himself had taken a batch of them to Delhi. They went and stood near the Jumma Masjid on a Friday, after the prayer time, and obtained signatures by representing the memorial to be against Hindu efforts at stopping cow-killing!

Three years later, in December 1893, a purely Muslim organization, the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India, was founded. Its objects were: (1) To acquaint Englishmen in general and the Government in particular with the views of the Muslim community and to protect the political rights of the Muslims; (2) to support measures that would strengthen British rule in India; (3) to spread feelings of loyalty among the people and (4) to prevent the spread of political agitation among the Muslims.

Mr. Beck himself was the Secretary of this organization. In the course of his speech at the inaugural meeting of this body, he said:

The Indian Patriotic Association,¹² proved defective, when its activities assumed the form of popular agitation. Fifty associations were affiliated to it. Besides, it was not a purely Muslim organization. It had Hindu members also. We propose that the new association we are now forming, should affiliate no branches, hold no public meetings. The council of the Association should be entrusted with plenary powers¹³

Not satisfied with the enunciation of this undemocratic principle, Mr. Beck returned to his favourite subject in an article in an English journal.

The past few years have witnessed the growth of two agitations in this country: one, the Indian National Congress, the other, the movement against cow-slaughter. The former is

¹² A loyalist organisation that combated the growth of the Congress influence.

¹³ Re-translated from Urdu: *Musalmanon ka Rosban Mustaqbil*.

directed against the English, the latter against the Muslims. The objective of the Congress is to transfer the political control of the country from the British to the Hindus. It demands the repeal of the Arms Act, reduction of military expenditure and the consequential weakening of the frontier defences. Mussalmans can have no sympathy with these demands... In order to stop cow-slaughter the Hindus have gone to the extent of boycotting the Muslims..the result is seen in the sanguinary riots in Azamgarh and Bombay. It is imperative for the Muslims and the British to unite with a view to fighting these agitators and prevent the introduction of democratic form of government, unsuited as it is to the needs and genius of the country. We, therefore, advocate loyalty to the government and Anglo-Muslim collaboration.¹⁴

The unsuitability of the Indian genius for democratic forms of government is not, we thus learn, the original discovery of Mr. Jinnah.

In a speech in England, delivered under the auspices of Anjuman-e-Islamia, Mr. Beck declared that while Anglo-Muslim unity was a feasible proposition, Hindu-Muslim unity was impossible. It was inconceivable because of the ineluctable antagonism between the two communities, of historical memories, of custom and cultures. It was impossible, he concluded, for them to establish self-government or to work democratic institutions. The erudite Dr. Ambedkar in his *"Thoughts on Pakistan"* has evidently infringed the copyright of the late Professor Beck.

The culmination of this crusade was reached in the organization of the Anglo-Muslim Defence Association pledged to oppose the National Congress. The Congress opposition to the forward policy of the government on the North-West Frontier of India, and its insistent demand for the reduction in the Army Budget were stoutly resisted by the Defence Association.

Mr. Beck dominated Aligarh politics for full fifteen years. But in order that his policies should find lesser resistance among the Mussalmans, he worked, as far as possible, in the name and with the august authority of

¹⁴ Ibid.

Sir Syed. It was his signal triumph to have made Sir Syed oppose almost every proposal he himself had advocated for the greater part of his life.

Mr. Beck died in September 1899. The *London Times* paid him a glowing tribute and testified to the fact that his labours were not unknown in high quarters and were not without their blessings. Rightly did Sir John Strachey say :

An Englishman who was engaged in Empire-building activities in a far off land has passed away. He died like a soldier at the post of his duty. The Muslims are a suspicious people. They opposed Mr. Beck in the beginning suspecting him to be a British spy, but his sincerity and selflessness soon succeeded in his gaining their confidence.

The far-sighted Mr. Beck had not forgotten to arrange about his successor. Mr. Theodore Morrison who was for some time in charge of the London office of the Anglo-Muslim Defence Association, was the obvious choice for the now vacant principalship of the Aligarh College. He continued, though not with Mr. Beck's vigour, the old policy. He had little need to be particularly active, because his 'regime' saw a new controversy embroiling the Hindu-Muslim relations. It was the Hindi-Urdu question.

As we have already noticed, the Hindi-Urdu controversy led to the foundation of *Anjuman-e-Urdu*, with Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Secretary of the Aligarh College, as President. We also saw how the Lieutenant-Governor flatly told the Nawab Saheb, that he must choose between the secretaryship of the College and the presidentship of the *Anjuman*. It is interesting to note that such a ban on participation in political activities was never extended to the English principals of the College, who were "engaged in Empire-building activities in a far off land."

Mr. Morrison left the College in 1905 and the mantle of Mr. Beck fell, and in good time too, on Mr. Archbold, an ambitious Englishman fired with Mr. Beck's zeal to 'serve' the 'Muslim interests'! Ere long, he was presented with a great opportunity. This was the time when

constitutional changes were being considered. In a letter to Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk (dated 10th August, 1906) Mr. Archbold elaborated the idea of a deputation waiting on the Viceroy. He also informed the Nawab Sahab that the proposal had the blessings of the Government. In his letter he wrote :

Colonel Dunlop Smith, Private Secretary of His Excellency the Viceroy, informs me that His Excellency is agreeable to receive the Muslim deputation. He advises that a formal letter requesting a permission to wait on His Excellency be sent to him. In this connection I would like to make a few suggestions. The formal letter should be sent with the signatures of some representative Mussalmans. The deputation should consist of the representatives of all the provinces. The third point to be considered is the text of the address. I would here suggest that we begin with a solemn expression of loyalty. The Government decision to take a step in the direction of self-Government should be appreciated. But our apprehension should be expressed that the principle of election, if introduced, would prove detrimental to the interest of the Muslim minority. It should respectfully be suggested that nomination or representation by religion be introduced to meet Muslim opinion. We should also say, that in a country like India due weight must be given to the views of zamindars.

Personally I think it will be wise of the Muslims to support nomination, as the time to experiment with elections has not yet come. In election it will be very difficult for the Muslims to secure their due share. But in all these views I must be in the background. They must come from you.....I can prepare for you the draft of the Address or revise it. If it is prepared in Bombay I can go through it¹⁵ as, you are aware, I know how to phrase these things in proper language. Please remember that if we want to organize a powerful movement in the short time at our disposal, we must expedite matters.¹⁶

Accordingly an application was sent.¹⁷ A deputation

¹⁵ And Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk did prepare an address in Bombay in consultation with H. H. the Aga Khan (cf. Mohammad Mirza: *Mussalmanani-Hind ki Hayat-i-Siyasi*), Syed Ahmad Bilgrami and Sir Ali Imam were also most intimately associated with it.

¹⁶ Re-translated from Urdu.

¹⁷ The application was entertained only after the Viceroy was satisfied that the Deputation would in no way be critical of the Government. (cf. Mohammad Mirza : op. cit., p. 55).

tion of thirty-five members, with delegates from different provinces and headed by H. H. the Aga Khan waited upon the Viceroy and presented him an address, which probably came from the pen of Mr. Archbold, on behalf of the Muslims of India!

But in the meantime, in 1905, the Government had thrown a new apple of discord between the two communities in the shape of the partition of Bengal.

Bengal was the first province to shake off the stupor into which the country had fallen after its conquest. The ferment created by the lives and activities of men like Ram Mohan Roy and Ramkrishna Paramhansa marks the dawn of national awakening in Bengal. It voiced India's aspirations with unmatched eloquence. From it radiated a new light and a new strength. Bengal inspired and organized the country for its freedom's fight.

The Government was haunted by the menace of Bengal. At first the Bengalee Baboo was ridiculed. Then he was transformed into a designing schemer. Bengal's wings had to be clipped, its audacity rebuffed. In 1904, Lord Curzon hit upon the idea of partitioning Bengal to weaken it, especially to lessen the importance of Calcutta.¹⁸ It is not a mere accident that the focus of Indian nationalism emerged at the same centre where the Imperial regime was then located. It was this focus of emergent nationalism which was the main target of the partition for it would shift the centre of interest and

¹⁸ As far back as 1876, the Government of Bengal had introduced something like self-government in the Municipality of Calcutta. Fifty Municipal Commissioners were elected by the rate-payers of the town, and twenty-five were appointed by the Government. And in the words of Sir Anthony Macdonnell, who as the Governor of Bengal had seen their work, the Commissioners had "displayed a care and attention to their duties which is very meritorious and had in some cases risen to devotion." Lord Curzon, however, reduced the number of elected members to twenty-five, making it equal to the number of nominated members. The latter with the official Chairman, obtained the controlling power. "The administration of Calcutta," observes Romesh Chandra Dutt, "has deteriorated since this retrograde measure was passed." *India in the Victorian Age*, p. 458.

agitation from the national to the provincial sphere and from political rights to communal jealousies.

The scheme of partition was opposed all over Bengal, by Hindus and by Muslims, in the East and in the West. As an administrative measure it had no friend. The Great Curzon went in "purzon" to Dacca and offered to the Muslims in ingratiating terms a new province. If a Muslim province was to be created, why was it not created in the Punjab and the North-West, why vivisect a Province united by ties of history, language, customs and traditions?

The object of the measure was to shatter the unity and to disintegrate the feelings of solidarity which are established in the province. It was no administrative reason that lay at the root of this scheme. It was part and parcel of Lord Curzon's policy to enfeeble the growing power and to destroy the political tendencies of a patriotic spirit.¹⁹

The Muslims were cynically made a tool for imperial ends. The *Statesman* admitted as much in justifying the Partition the object of which was "to foster in Eastern Bengal the growth of Mohamedan power, which, it is hoped, will have the effect of keeping in check the rapidly growing strength of the Hindu community."

After twenty years of sedulous cultivation the plant of Muslim communalism at last began to blossom. When it became known that Reforms had become inevitable, an attempt was made to counteract them by driving a wedge between the two great communities. A careful study of relevant documents makes this conclusion irrefutable.

The implications of the Act of 1909 were well understood, even when its proposals were on the anvil. Lord Minto the Viceroy stated clearly that the Act was not meant to introduce the Parliamentary system and that the Government was "very anxious to avoid any appearance of Parliamentary franchise. I set my face against anything that might appear to resemble it. We did not want a Parliament at all; we wanted councils..but did

¹⁹ Sir Henry Cotton : *India in Transition*.

not want councils elected on Parliamentary lines.”²⁰

Since only consultative government was being introduced, Lord Minto argued that all interests should be represented. According to him the Muslims, the Zamindars and the commercial community were under-represented, while exactly the opposite was the case with the lawyers, and hence the need for balance.

But the Viceroy's efforts met with widespread opposition: *The Statesman* of Calcutta pointed out:

In the House of Commons, in the Chamber of Deputies, in the American House of Representatives the lawyers are in a majority. The Maharajas and great zamindars often speak sensibly, but they have not the intellectual force by which the lawyer can produce conviction. By endeavouring to increase the number of landholders, therefore, the Government are seeking to strengthen the representation of a class unqualified by the objects which a legislature is intended to serve, at the expense of a class which has everywhere demonstrated its competence. *They aim at substituting those who cannot criticize for those who can*²¹ (italics ours).

Representation of special interests was added on as a further check. The Government of India's despatch (1909) on Reforms makes a revealing observation:

None of the local governments suggest any practical arrangement for the representation of Indian Commerce by means of election, but we are disposed to think that if two permanent seats are assigned to that interest, associations in course of time will be formed which will be sufficiently stable and representative of being utilised as electoral agencies.

Recognise an interest as an electoral unit before it is organized or even articulate!

But the *pièce de resistance* of the Act of 1909 was the introduction of Separate Communal Electorates for the Muslims. Even a habitual supporter of the administration like *The Statesman* raised its voice in protest:

Even more questionable than the efforts of the Government to aggrandize the landed interests is their courting of Moham-

²⁰ Quoted by Gurumukh Nihal Singh: *Landmarks in Indian Constitutional and National Development*, (1600-1919), p. 403.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

medan support.....we view with grave concern the action of the Government in selecting one section of the population for differential treatment such as is not tendered to any other portion.....The more carefully the Council Reforms mooted by the Government of India are considered the more apparent does it become that the Scheme amounts to little else than the provision for including in the Legislative Councils more land-owners and more Mohammedans.

It is now well known that Lord Minto was the real author of the scheme of Separate Electorates. In 1907, Sir Harold Stuart of the Government of India, published a scheme of Reform with the theory of "Counterpoise of native against native" as its essential basis. "It embodied proposals so reactionary, so objectionable, so harmful to the country, that no good word for it was said by any man worthy of mention anywhere in India."²² The officials of the Madras Government went even further and actually suggested separate representation for every caste and occupation!

The Muslim Deputation to the Viceroy, led by His Highness the Aga Khan was itself organized from Simla. Maulana Mohammad Ali described it as a "command performance."²³ Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has recorded his opinion that it was officialdom that was responsible for the demand as well as the actual introduction of separate electorates. "The Mohammedan leaders are inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials, and these officials have pulled wires at Simla and in London and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and Mohammedan communities by showing the Muslims special favours."²⁴ Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India, who himself favoured joint electorates with reservation of seats, was to declare later that it was the Viceroy who "first started the Muslim hare with his early speech about their extra claims."²⁵

The Lucknow Pact however, brought about an agree-

²² Ramsay Macdonald : *The Awakening of India*, p. 176.

²³ Presidential Address, Cocanada Congress.

²⁴ Ramsay Macdonald, op. cit.

²⁵ Viscount Morley : *Recollections*, Vol. 2, p. 325.

ment between the Congress and the Muslim League, and thus put a term, at least for a time, to the government's policy of thwarting one community with the other.

The Government, however, tried to sabotage the understanding by once again resorting to the well tried policy of offering more to the Muslims than what they got under the Pact. The Government of India in their criticism of the Lucknow Pact observed :

The Mohammedan representation which the Pact proposes for Bengal is manifestly insufficient. It is questionable whether the claims of the Mohammedan population of Eastern Bengal were sufficiently pressed when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are a conspicuously backward and impoverished community. The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them and we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests are generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot to them 44 instead of 34 seats (due to them under the Pact).

The solicitude of the Government for the poor Muslims of Bengal was touching and the offer of generous security to them very creditable indeed !²⁶

Is it not surprising, however, that the solicitude is confined only to giving electoral weightage ! The Muslims of Bengal are, in sooth, impoverished. According to Sir John Megaw, a former Director General of Public Health in India, out of every 100 inhabitants of Bengal only 22 are well nourished, 47 poorly nourished and 32 badly nourished. (The corresponding figures for the whole of India are 39, 41 and 20). The Muslim peasants of Bengal are not just "impoverished"; they go *famished*. What has the benign Government done for them ? The peasantry pays Rs. 17 crores in rent to the zamindars of which only Rs. 4 crores reach the Government coffers. It is the Government itself which has created and maintains these parasitic landlords, sucking the life-blood of

²⁶ It is pertinent to point out that the responsibility of depressing the conditions of the Muslims of Bengal is the Government's. cf. W. W. Hunter: *The Indian Mussalmans*, pp. 143 et. seq.

the peasantry. What is the use of granting weightage to the impoverished Muslims if they are debarred from reducing this dead weight on their backs?

Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, in their Report expressed themselves in principle against communal electorates. But a characteristic caveat was entered:

Much as we regret the necessity, we are convinced that so far as the Mohamedans at all events are concerned, the present system must be maintained until conditions alter, even at the price of slower progress towards the realization of a common citizenship. But we can see no reason to set up communal representation in any province where they form a majority of the voters.²⁷

But the very report gave separate electorates to the Sikhs and agreed to communal representation to Muslims in the Punjab where they were a majority. The Franchise Committee extended separate electorates to Indian Christians in Madras, to Anglo-Indians in Madras and Bengal and to Europeans in all the provinces except the Punjab and the Central Provinces. The Joint Select Committee was not satisfied with this parcelling of the electorate. It, therefore, recommended reservation of seats for non-Brahmins in Madras and Bombay. The price of slower progress which Montagu was prepared to pay for all these reservations and separations, of course, staggers imagination, but the deliberate extension of the principle which was admitted to be opposed to the growth of democratic self-government can scarcely be accidental.

The Montford Reforms were an effort to rally as many people as possible to the Government and create a façade of democratic government while completely withholding responsibility at the centre. The Lucknow Congress had united the Extremists and the Moderates, the Montford Reforms divided them again. This was not accidental, but the result of a carefully worked out plan. Mr. Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, in his Scheme of December 12, 1917 records: "A new organisation of Indians to be collected, assisted in every possible way

²⁷ *Report*, para. 231.

by the Government, for propaganda on behalf of our proposals and to send a delegation to England to assist us." He discussed the matter over with Mr. (later Sir) Bhupendranath Basu and Sir S. P. (later Lord) Sinha. "We talked about the formation of a Moderate party; they were very enthusiastic, and talked about editing newspapers and so forth. I think they mean business." And indeed they did, for in a short while, the Moderate Party was born.

Not only did the Government attempt to wean away the Muslims, they also worked to divide the Hindus. The rise of the Non-Brahmin movement bears traces of official inspiration. In Madras, the Justice Party furnishes a good instance in point.

An illuminating piece of evidence [wrote C. Y. Chintamani] was furnished during the examination by Lord Sinha of Sir Alexander Cardew, who was so prominent in the Government of Madras in these years, before the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill of 1919. Sir Alexander having emphatically denied that the Government of Madras had at any time done anything to stimulate the growth of the Justice Party, Lord Sinha confronted him with a passage in an official resolution which bore the signature 'A. G. Cardew,' with the result that the witness had to look small and give up his assertiveness.²⁸

One striking fact about the Non-Brahmin movement is that it consists only of Non-Brahmin Caste Hindus, whose attitude towards the "depressed classes" is as objectionable and reactionary as that of the orthodox Brahmins. And still they call themselves the *Justice Party*!

The Reforms of 1919 introduced dyarchy—a division in the administration. But in actual practice it was 'heads I win, tails you lose!' Sir K. V. Reddi (Madras) made the agonising confession:

I am a Minister of Development minus forests. I am Minister of Industries without factories, which are a reserved subject, and industries without factories are unimaginable. I am Minister of Agriculture minus Irrigation..... I am also Minister

²⁸ C. Y. Chintamani: *Indian Politics since the Mutiny*, pp. 116-17.

of Industry without electricity, which is also a reserved subject. The subjects of Labour and Boilers are also reserved.²⁹

This engaging frankness explains the purpose and principle of the division of Government. It was yet another clever counterpoise.³⁰

Advantage was taken of the electoral divisions by endowing the Governors with residual and arbitrary powers. Through various checks and balances, they thus emerged as the fountain of initiative and authority. Nationalism exhausted its strength against this intricate pattern of concessions, checks and counterpoise.

The early twenties, notwithstanding these precautions, witnessed an unparalleled coalescence of the strength of the two communities and a release of mass energy. The Congress came within an inch of success.

The Government reacted to these extraordinary developments by, among other things, tightening the political rein and loosening the economic. The question of political reforms was shelved and the years were only rich in inquiries and investigations, which produced reports of a score of Committees and Commissions that covered all the major problems of India. The attention of the people was sought to be side-tracked into the innocuous channels of inquiries.³¹ The political thread

²⁹ Quoted by B. Shiva Rao and D. Graham Pole : *Problems of India*, p. 40.

³⁰ See Dr. K. B. Krishna : *The Problem of Minorities in India* for more material on the theory of counterpoise.

³¹ 1920-21 Acworth Committee on the Railways.

1921-22 Indian Fiscal Commission.

1922-23 Inchcape Retrenchment Committee.

1923-24 Indian Mercantile Marine Committee.

1925-26 Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee.

1925 Indian Economic Enquiry Committee.

1925 External Capital Committee.

1926 Indian Currency Commission.

1926-28 Royal Commission on Agriculture.

1927-28 Indian Roads Committee.

1929-31 Indian Banking Enquiry Committee.

1929-31 Indian Labour Commission etc. etc.

Very little has been done to implement the findings and sug-

was taken up when the atmosphere was once again surcharged with communal tension. The tight rein was then loosened and the loose one drawn taut. The thirties, studded with political happenings, are barren in economic enquiries.

But these are minor acts of the drama. The period was to witness more audacious moves of checkmate and counterpoise.

The civil apparatus of the government was mainly manned by the Hindus, for reasons already discussed. In this there lurked a danger to the government, ever haunted by the fear of non-co-operation. The Muslim element in the military apparatus was therefore increased.

Communal Composition of the Army

	% in 1914	% in 1918	% in 1919	% in 1930
Sikhs	19.2	17.4	15.4	13.58
Punjabi Muslims ..	11.1	11.3	12.4	22.6
Pathans	6.2	5.42	4.54	6.35
Gurkhas	13.1	16.6	12.2	16.4
Garhwalis	1.9	2.3	2.7	5.6
U. P. Rajputs ..	6.4	6.8	7.7	2.55
Hindustani Muslims	4.1	3.42	4.45	...
Brahmins	1.8	1.86	2.5	...
Marathas	4.9	3.85	3.7	5.33
Madras Muslims	3.5	2.71	2.13	...
Tamils	2.5	2	1.67	...

The table brings out in an unmistakable manner the fact that the communal composition of the Indian army has been undergoing a profound change. Punjabi Muslims and Pathans are gaining ascendancy. The Sikhs have been reduced from the first to the third place while the Madrasis, particularly Brahmins, have been nearly eliminated.

This was not the first time that the communal composition of the Indian army was altered. Before the Mutiny the Muslims were distrusted and high caste

gestions of these enquiries. For a revealing case study see Asoka Mehta : *Indian Shipping*.

Hindus were preponderant in the army, particularly of Bengal and North-Western Province. After the Mutiny they were almost eliminated and the Sikh element was increased. The formation of the Gadar Party in the U. S. A. and similar agitations among the Sikhs made the community suspect and their preponderance is now being replaced by that of the Mussalmans.

A wider berth than that provided by the separate electorates was sought to be given to communalism by means of the introduction of communal representation in the services. This policy, inaugurated in 1925, was elaborated in 1934. The Government Resolution assured the Minorities, such as the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled Europeans, who enjoy a great preponderance in comparison to their population in the services, statutory safeguards for their favourable position. It further assured the Minorities like Muslims and Harijans which are under-represented, reservations (25% to the Muslims, and $8\frac{1}{3}$ for other Minorities) in recruitment.

The Government of India Act (1935) appreciably widened the franchise. The percentage of the new electorate to the total population is 14. In fact 27.43 out of every 100 adult males in British India are today voters. Here was material that nationalism could mobilise. The Government, however, took good care to frustrate such efforts.

The electorate in 1919 was broken up into ten parts, now it is fragmented into seventeen unequal bits. Separate electorates were thrust, against their wishes, on women and the Indian Christians. The Hindu community was further weakened by giving separate representation to the scheduled classes. Divisions on the basis of religion, occupation and sex were made. Every possible cross-division was introduced.

The Muslims were given, under the Lucknow Pact, special weightage in the Provinces where they were in a minority. Separate electorates were accepted for the Punjab and Bengal because the Muslims agreed to forego their majority position. It was generally recognized that "to give Mohammedans a fixed and unalterable

majority—unalterable by an appeal to the electorate—would be unfair.³² Muslims, therefore, consented to joint electorates, provided their weightage in the minority provinces remained unaffected, and provided further that they were given in the Punjab and Bengal, representation on a population basis. The Government, however, gave them a statutory majority, weightage and also separate electorates.

Weightage was given to the Muslims even where they were in a majority. For instance, the average 'General' population for every rural seat in Bengal is 3,00,706 as against 2,42,168 for 'Mohammedans.' The average number of rural voters per "General" seat is 37,606 as against 29,596 "Mohammedans."

A further brake to the Nationalist forces was provided by the introduction of Second Chambers, in the major provinces, based on a high property franchise. The urge of the masses was to be checked at every turn.

For the first time responsibility was to be introduced in the Central Government. To reduce the weight of national forces, the Princes were induced to join the Federation. Their nominated *bloc* would stand as a bulwark against all thrusts of popular forces. The smallest constituency, that of the Princes—less than 700—was given the highest weightage. They were allowed to nominate members representing their people also. The States account for only 23% of the population of India, but their rulers are given 33% of voting power in the Lower and 40% in the Upper House of the Federation. The Princes certainly need protection!

The extension of the franchise and enlargement of responsibility have thus been effectively neutralized. A vast congeries of communities, classes and interests emerges to mock at the forces of Indian nationalism which practically becomes a refugee in a country given over to communalism.

Lord Minto had enunciated the important principle that 'the position of a community should be estimated

³² *Simon Commission Report*, Vol. II, p. 71.

not on its numerical strength but in respect of its political position and the services it has rendered to the Empire.' But how was this to be discovered? Lord Minto suggested no criteria by which either the "political position" of a community or its "service" to the Empire could be measured. The only way then is to attempt to understand the principle in the light of its actual application. Nowhere else can this be seen to better advantage than in the distribution of legislative seats in Bengal under the Communal Award given by the Prime Minister of England in 1933. The analysis throws a revealing light on the working of the Minto Doctrine.

In Bengal, according to the Census Report of 1931, Muslims constitute 54.8% of the total population and 51.3% of the adult population; the Hindus (General Constituency practically means the Hindus) constitute 44.8 and 48.3 per cent of the total and adult population respectively. The 199 seats divided between the two communities would be distributed as (i) 109 and 90 on the basis of total population or (ii) 103 and 96 on the basis of adult population. But actually the Muslims are given 119 and the Hindus, 80 seats. The minority community, that of the Hindus, was penalised and the majority community received a weightage.

The following table shows the scheme of weightage for various communities:—

<i>Community</i>	<i>% of total population</i>	<i>% of seats in the Assembly under the Award</i>	<i>Weightage %</i>
Muslims . . .	54.8	47.6	
Hindus . . .	44.8	32	
Indian Christians	0.3	0.8	300
Anglo-Indians . .	0.1	1.6	3000
Europeans . . .	0.01	25*	25000

(*Including representation given to European commerce.)

But this is not all. The Communal Award, we were told, was designed to solve the problem of Minorities in India. Actually it concerns itself as much with the Muslim majorities in Bengal, Punjab, the North-West Fron-

tier and Sind, as with the Muslim minorities within the other Provinces. And of course, it concerns itself with another Minority—the British. In Bengal though they are less than one-tenth of one per cent of the population, they are given 10% representation.

A posteriori, we can then conclude, that *the position of a community is estimated according to its opposition to nationalism and its strategic importance to the rulers.*

It is important to note that communal demands which checkmated nationalism were promptly accepted but any inroad on the quantum of Government's control was firmly resisted. The Aga Khan Deputation had asked for the appointment of a Muslim to the Viceroy's Executive Council (in case the single Indian member happened to be a Hindu). This demand was rejected off-hand as it affected the balance of power in the central government and increased the Indian element at the expense of the British.

Again, significantly enough, the Government accepted the Communal part of the Lucknow Pact of 1916, while ignoring its political demands. The Congress had reluctantly agreed to separate electorates, in the hope that an understanding with the Muslim League will pave the way for the grant of Responsible Government to which the Government was pledged after the War.

In the Montford Report, its distinguished authors expressed themselves against separate electorates, but nonetheless accepted them because of the Congress-League understanding. In 1933, the Communal Award was imposed upon the people for exactly the opposite reasons. In 1919 communalism was introduced because the two parties had agreed to it. In 1935, communalism was extended because the Hindus and the Muslims could not agree!

In the absence of agreement, where was the need for such an extension? Why could not the Government retain the *status quo*? Secondly, while there was a liberal distribution of Government largess on the communal front, it was parsimoniously withheld on the political. The veil of impartiality and pious platitudes indeed

begins to wear thin.

One of the most glaring examples of cynical diplomacy in the annals of British rule in India was provided by Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India, at the Third Round Table Conference in England. Responsible British Statesmen had repeatedly declared that the Communal Award given by the British Prime Minister would be replaced by any agreed settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, accordingly, convened a representative Unity Conference at Allahabad, and such good progress towards an agreement was made that it created widespread satisfaction in the country. On the two erstwhile controversial points of importance an amicable understanding was arrived at. It was agreed that the Muslims should have 32% of the British Indian representation in the Central Legislature, and secondly that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and made into an independent Governor's Province. Certain concessions to the Hindu minority in the new province were also decided upon and it was further agreed that Sind was to receive no subvention from Central revenues. The only point that remained was the quantum of representation of the two communities in Bengal. The main difficulty was that the European community in Bengal which, though a microscopic minority—'01 per cent of the population—had been given twenty-five thousand per cent over representation, naturally at the expense of Indian representatives. The Committee of the Unity Conference proceeded to Calcutta in the hope of finding a *via media* on the spot.

The British Government chose this psychological moment for making a new adroit move. Sir Samuel Hoare announced at the Round Table Conference that His Majesty's Government had decided to allot 33.1/3 per cent of British Indian seats to Muslims in the Central Legislature and not only to constitute Sind into a new Governor's Province but to provide it with adequate financial aid from the Central revenues. And nothing was said about any safeguards for the Hindu minority in the

new administrative area! The announcement came as a bombshell and made the deliberations of the Unity Conference superfluous, since the British Government had granted to the Muslims much more than what they had voluntarily agreed to accept! Sir Samuel's dramatic intervention, so accurately timed, once again came in the way of a new Hindu-Muslim Pact, whose contours had practically been decided upon.

But generally, intervention is not so crude and obvious—subtler methods are preferred. Lord Birkenhead, in a letter to the Viceroy, wrote:

I should advise Simon to see at all stages all people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly Muslims and depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with representative Muslims. The whole policy is now obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population, by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Muslims, and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing solid Muslim support and leaving Jinnah high and dry.³³

The last five words are significant. The importance of individuals is to be inflated or deflated to suit the exigencies of policy. The Aga Khan was 'weighed' up when it suited the Government, he is tossed aside since his advocacy of Joint Electorates with reservation. Mr. Jinnah was "left high and dry" when he opposed the Government's anti-national policies. With his conversion to Pakistan, he became *persona grata* with the Government.

This brief review of the policies pursued by the Government from time to time shows that its unchanging aim has been resistance to nationalism and disruption of the unity of the people. For the least concession nationalism has to exert powerful pressure. It took the Congress fifty years of unremitting toil and suffering before the Government thought it worth its while to recognise its status. But the susceptibilities of communal organizations of yesterday and the day before are

³³ Quoted by K. B. Krishna : "*The Problem of Minorities*," p. 308.

most anxiously respected and all constitutional progress is held up to please them.

Notwithstanding these varied manoeuvres, the spectacular success of the Congress in the Elections of 1936, and the coming to office of the Congress Ministers in eight out of eleven provinces showed that Nationalism succeeded in creating an alternative centre of authority. A competent receiver of bankrupt imperialism appeared. The polar opposite of Whitehall emerged at Wardha. The safeguards failed to offer security to the Government. A desperate move was needed. Mr. Jinnah, as the apostle of Pakistan, was, therefore, hailed as a god-send.

The opportunism of Government policies nowhere stands out so clearly as in relation to the short interlude of provincial autonomy. During the period when the Congress Ministers were in office the Governors could not find a single occasion to modify or alter the decisions of the Ministries in relation to the safeguarding of the interests of the Minorities. Before their resignation the Prime Ministers of the Congress provinces were directed by the Congress Parliamentary Board, to invite Governors of their respective provinces to suggest any friendly criticism with respect to policies and administration as affecting the Minorities and particularly Muslims. In not a single case could the Governors point out a lapse. This fact alone is enough to debunk the 'atrocities' scare. But when Congress is out of office, the Government spokesmen do not blush to twit the Congress on its failure to appease the Muslims.

The brief review of the part played by the Government in shaping Hindu-Muslim relations is, however, enough to prove to any unbiased student of Indian politics that the so-called Hindu-Muslim problem is a triangle. A hidden hand has played considerable part in intensifying discord and fomenting distrust. The idea of Pakistan is not new to the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy. Elsewhere we have mentioned the surprise felt by Mr. Edward Thomson when he found that Pakistan was being seriously considered in certain official circles. But as early as

1932, Mr. J. Coatman, C. I. E., dropped a hint about the future.

The creation of a strong, united India.....is day by day, being made impossible, and in its place it seems there might be brought into being a powerful Mohamedan state in the North and North-West, with its eye definitely turned away from India.....²⁴

It is for this reason that the Congress has always thrown out the challenge that the first condition for a speedy settlement of the Hindu-Muslim differences is that the third party of the triangle should withdraw unconditionally and give the two parties an honest chance to face each other's fears and demands.

To ignore the part played in it by the Government is to miss the very basis on which Hindu-Muslim relations have taken such a tragic turn. Any review of the subject is utterly incomplete until we have carefully weighed the contribution of a Beck or a Birkenhead, a Minto or a Macdonald in working up situations which have not helped the Muslim to discover the source of his inner strength, nor offered him any tangible advantage against the increasing inclemencies, mainly economic, of his environment. The "safeguards" protect nothing except the substance of Imperialism and privileges divorced from any pretence of merit.

Even so, if we explain our communal problem by making the Government alone responsible for it, we shall be giving ourselves a compliment which we do not deserve and credit the Englishman with an intellectual subtlety which he does not possess. The enormous success of the Government policies was possible because they worked in favourable soil, because there were fissiparous tendencies in our social structure which responded easily to Government treatment. We must examine the social forces acting on our body politic for the last hundred and fifty years to realise all the complexities of our communal problem.

²⁴ J. Coatman: *Years of Destiny—India*, 1926-32, pp° 230-39.

CHAPTER V

THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM : THE SOCIOLOGICAL CORE

Every government, no matter what form it assumes, profoundly affects the lives of its people. It ejects a stream of tendency into the social flux and builds up what for want of a better name we call national character. The impress of the British rule on our national life is unmistakable. Thanks to the peculiar character of that rule, our life has become an incoherent assemblage of old and new, of social modes that have lost their significance and new desires the fulfilment of which is thwarted for lack of a creative impulse from the centre.

We saw elsewhere how the Muslim invaders of India were finally assimilated by the dissolving magic of the land and became a part of our national heritage. In the early years of the British rule it was felt that the British too would enrich the nation's life in the same way. Most of the early British rulers of the country were captivated by its charms, and men like Mountstuart Elphinstone and Munroe became its sympathetic admirers.

Those hopes, however, were dashed to pieces, for the arrival of the steamship and the telephone removed the need for the Englishman to settle in this country. He started the novel experiment of governing India from Whitehall and his agents in the country refused to consider India as their home. That great refusal enabled the Englishman in India to retain his separate identity. He became the member of a Super Brahmanical caste conscious of its superiority over the "native" population and keeping itself proudly aloof from any contaminating contact with them. For him India became synonymous with the *khansama* who cooked his food, the *bearer* who looked after his personal comforts and the *syce* who look-

ed after his horses. These were also the people from whom he learnt what little Hindustani he knew. He used it sparingly and only when compelled to do so, which was mostly when he talked to his servants. At the office, thank God, he had a "Baboo" who understood the civilized English language!

As he refused to make India his home, the thoughts of the Englishman were always fixed on the little island across the seas and he longed for 'England's green and pleasant land' with a longing that was not without a touch of nostalgia. Obsessed with this Home-complex, the Englishman instinctively began to look upon India as a land of fortune, a great reservoir of wealth whose sluices ultimately emptied themselves on the lovely plains of Devon and East Anglia. Nothing Indian was good enough unless it supplied some British need. Provided one did not lose sight of this fact, in India one could do what one pleased. As Aldous Huxley has pointed out:

The ethical standards of Englishmen undergo a profound change as they pass from the essentially peaceful atmosphere of their own country into the conquered and militarily occupied Indian Empire. Things which would be absolutely unthinkable at home are not only thinkable but do-able and often done in India.¹

India is a vast country and the small ruling caste is always afraid of being overwhelmed by her teeming millions. Because they never allowed themselves to be assimilated by the land and its people, Englishmen have never really got rid of this fear. It is the kernel of all their policies which are one continuous effort to see that the peoples of India do not unite against the alien ruling caste.

That such a government of such a vast country, a government essentially foreign and with no support from the broad masses of the Indian people, is impossible on any other terms is recognized by most and frankly admitted by some Englishmen.

¹ *Ends and Means*, p. 18.

You see, the Mutiny was in a great measure put down by turning the races of India against each other. So long as this can be done, and so long as the population have not formed the habit of criticizing their Government, whatever it be, and of rebelling against it, the government of India from England is possible, and there is nothing miraculous about it. But, as I said, if the state of things should alter, if by any chance the population should be welded into a single nationality, then I do not say we ought to begin to fear for our dominion; I say we ought to cease at once to hope for it.²

In these words Sir John Seeley laid down what became the guiding policies of British rule in India: (1) to "turn the races of India against each other" and (2) to prevent the welding of the people into a single nationality.³

The rude impact of these policies was first felt by the Muslims for nearly a hundred years after the conquest, the British followed a policy of systematic suppression of the Muslim community.

It was Muhammadan power that the English were trying to break and replace.

It is a fact well worthy of notice, that the sovereign power in India on our arrival there was Suni, for with the single exception of the sepoy, the only men who have disturbed the internal peace of our Eastern Empire have been men belonging to a sect of Sunis.⁴

It was with the help of the Hindus that the English overwhelmed the Muhammadan power. Mr. S. C. Hill, in his long introduction to *Bengal in 1756-1757*, points out :

² Sir John Seeley : *The Expansion of England*, p. 270

³ Cf. S. D. Javadekar's brilliant book in Marathi *Adhunik Bharat* (Modern India), pp. 4-59

⁴ H. C. Bowen : *Muhammadanism in India*, (1873), p. 13.

cf. also, "I have every reason to think that the restoration of the gates of the temple Somnath has conciliated and gratified the great mass of Hindu population. I have no reason to suppose that it has offended the Mussalmans; but I cannot close my eyes to the belief that the race is fundamentally hostile to us, and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindus." Lord Ellenborough quoted by Major Basu : *Rise of the Christian Power in India*, Vol. V, p. 86.

Thus, we find that the partisans of the British were almost all Hindus or proteges of the Hindus...The fact that the commerce and manufactures of the country were almost entirely in the hands of the Hindus naturally brought them into close connection with the European merchants, who had settled in the country for the purpose of trade, and so produced a kind of tacit alliance based mainly upon their material interests.⁵

The Muslims of Bengal, first to come under the British rule, were a proud and militant people. The new government dealt them, in the very early days (1792), a well aimed and a powerful blow through the Permanent Settlement. Mr. James O'Kinealy, an authority on the Permanent Settlement, was constrained to observe :

It elevated the Hindu collectors, who upto that time had held but unimportant posts, to the position of landholders, gave them a proprietary right in the soil, and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Mussalmans under their own rule.⁶

Simultaneously in Bengal, and later all over the country, the Muslims were shut out of the army, "their *beau ideal* of a profession."⁷ The devastating result was that by 1870 Mussalman Houses of Bengal had either disappeared from the earth or had been submerged beneath the new strata of society which the new regime had developed, as is pointed out in a remarkable book : *Indian Mussalmans* written by W. W. Hunter of the Bengal Civil Service and published in 1871.⁸

This was no crusade against feudalism as the creation of Zamindars conclusively proves.⁹ This was no

⁵ Vol. I, p. xxiii.

⁶ Even so cautious a writer as Dr. Panandikar reviewing the developments observes : "It was a veritable social revolution affecting a large number of estates."—*The Wealth and the Welfare of the Bengal Delta*, p. 88.

⁷ H. C. Bowen, op. cit., 45.

⁸ pp. 130 et. seq.

⁹ About 20 per cent of the area in British territory is under permanent settlement. The population of this area is over 35 per cent of the total population of British India.

isolated attack against the old rulers. It was part of a deliberate policy to enfeeble a great community, to crush the spirit of a proud people. We prefer to let Dr. Hunter, an authority on the subject, speak about it :

There is no use shutting our ears to the fact that the Indian Muhammadans arraign us on a list of charges as have ever been brought against a Government. They accuse us of having closed every honourable walk of life to professors of their creed. They accuse us of having introduced a system of education which leaves their whole community unprovided for, and which has landed it in contempt and beggary. They accuse us of having brought misery into thousands of families, by abolishing their Law officers, who gave the sanction of religion to their marriage-tie.....They accuse us of imperilling their souls, by denying them the means of performing the duties of their faith. Above all, they charge us with deliberate malversation of their religious foundations; and with misappropriation on the largest scale of their educational funds In a word, the Indian Mussalman arraigns the British Government for its want of sympathy, for its want of magnanimity, for the mean malversation of their funds, and for great public wrongs spread over a period of one hundred years.¹⁰

State patronage was heavily weighted against the Muslims. The following table showing the distribution of Gazetted appointments (in 1871) though dealing with Bengal is symptomatic of the whole country.

¹⁰ *Indian Mussalmans.*

	<i>Europeans</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Musal- mans</i>	<i>Total</i>
Covenanted Civil Service	260	0	0	260
Judicial officers in the Non-regulation Dis- tricts	47	0	0	47
Extra Assistant Commis- sioners	26	7	0	33
Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors . .	53	113	30	196
Income-Tax Assessors . .	11	43	6	60
Registration Department	33	25	2	60
Subordinate Judges . .	14	25	8	47
Munsifs	1	178	37	216
Police Department . .	106	33	0	139
Medical Department	89	65	4	158
Department of Public Instruction	38	14	1	53
Public Works Dept. Engineering	154	19	0	173
Public Works Dept. Subordinate	72	125	4	201
Public Works Dept. Account	22	54	0	76
Other departments such as Customs, Marine, Survey etc. . . .	412	10	0	422
	1338	711	92	2141

The proportion of Muhammadans to Hindus is less than one-seventh. The proportion of Hindus to Europeans is more than one half, the latter of course holding all the superior appointments. The proportion of Musalman to Europeans is less than one-fourteenth or less than one-twentythird of the whole administrative body.

In fact there is now scarcely a Government office in Calcutta¹¹ in which a Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and mender of pens, concludes Dr. Hunter¹²

¹¹ Then the Seat of the government.

¹² Sir William Hunter, *op. cit.*, 167.

The professions have a similar tale to tell.

In the law their old training is now useless, as all Musalman polity has been done away with ; so that, from having almost monopolised the post of pleaders of the High Court, even as late as 1851, we find that out of 240 natives admitted between 1852 and 1868, there was only one Musalman.¹³

Muslims were deliberately excluded from government employment while Hindus were generally preferred.¹⁴ It was not for nothing that Dr. Hunter observed with a touch of bitterness that "A hundred and seventy years ago it was impossible for a well-born Musalman in Bengal to be poor; at present it is almost impossible for him to continue rich."¹⁵

Not only were the Muslims economically crushed, educationally and socially also their position was deliberately depressed by the Government. In 1870, the Muhammadan pleaders presented two memorials to the High Court pointing out that while closed days allowed to the Christians were sixty-two and those to Hindus fifty-two, only eleven were granted to the Muhammadans.¹⁶ The petitions were called forth by an order that the "Native holidays" observed by the High Court should be the

¹³ H. C. Bowen : op. cit., 45.

¹⁴ cf. "Recently, when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sundarbans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointments would be given to none but Hindus" *Darbin*, of 14th July, 1869.

¹⁵ op. cit., 155.

This condition was not peculiar to Bengal Mussalmans. cf. The despondency of the Orissa Muhammadans as mirrored in a petition to Queen Victoria. "Born of noble parentage, poor by profession, and destitute of patrons, the Orissa Muhammadans have been levelled down and down, with no hope of rising again... The penniless condition which we are reduced to, consequent on our loss of our former Government service, has thrown us into such an everlasting despondency, that we speak from the very core of our hearts, that we would travel to the remotest corners of the earth, ascend the snowy peaks of the Himalaya, wander the forlorn region of Siberia, could we be convinced that by so travelling we would be blessed with a Government appointment of ten shillings a week."

¹⁶ Formerly the sanctioned Muslim holidays were twenty-one.

same as allowed in the Government offices. In the Government offices no Muhammadan holiday was sanctioned at all!

But the greatest injustice to the Muslims was done in matters educational. Persian and Arabic were "utterly untaught" in the schools.¹⁷ The curriculum was so designed as to estrange rather than interest the Muslims.

Is it any wonder [wrote Mr. Hailey] that the Mussalmans have held aloof from a system which made no concession to their prejudices; which was in its nature unavoidably antagonistic to their interests, and at variance with all their social traditions?

While public instruction was "unsuited to their wants," the system of traditional education of the Muslims was denuded of all support. From time immemorial, the Princes of India had been accustomed to set apart grants of land for the education of the youth and for the service of the gods. When the British took over the charge of Bengal, according to the estimate of Mr. James Grant, a Revenue Officer, one-fourth of the whole province was transferred to temples or mosques or educational purposes on rent free tenure. Persistent efforts were made, since the time of Warren Hastings, to invalidate the grants and resume the lands. Finally in 1828, special courts were set up and in the next few years, with an outlay of £800,000 upon Resumption proceedings, an additional revenue of £300,000 a year was permanently gained by the State,¹⁸ and lost by the indigenous educational system.¹⁹

What escaped the greed of the Resumption officers was also not left in the hands of traditional teachers.²⁰ That too passed under Government control. The most glaring instance of this kind is the Hooghly Trust.

¹⁷ E. C. Bowen : op. cit., 40.

¹⁸ Representing a capital, at 5 per cent of £6,000,000.

¹⁹ Vide *The Friend of India* of 30-4-1846.

²⁰ cf. "Since then the profession of a Man of Learning, a dignified and lucrative calling under Native Rulers, has ceased to exist." W. W. Hunter : op. cit., 183.

Haji Mohammad Mohsin, "one of the most illustrious Indians of the eighteenth century"²¹ created a trust of his vast fortune, as well as that of his half-sister, Manu Jan Khanam, the income of which was to be used for educational purposes. In 1817, the control of the Trust passed into the hands of the Government who maintained from the income of the Trust the Hooghly College. "I find that, some few years ago," wrote Mr. H. C. Bowen in 1872, "out of three hundred who attended (the college), only three were Mohammadans." Worse still, the Trust was made to provide a comfortable berth to a Britisher—the principal, "ignorant of a single word of Persian or Arabic," drawing £1500 a year. Besides the appropriation of the accumulated fund (£1,05,700) in building the college, £5,000 were annually diverted to its maintenance. That is to say, out of an income of £5,260 it devoted only £350 to a little school, i.e. for Muhammadan education. What wonder if a pall of illiteracy settled over the Muslims?

Is it strange that after over a century of such determined persecution, the Muslims lost heart and felt submerged in hunger and humiliation? "They are," in the candid words of Dr. Hunter, "a race ruined under the British rule."

The Muslim League to-day is declaiming against the terrible "atrocities" committed by the Congress Governments, during the twenty-seven months that they were in office. It has, however, little to say about a government which during a period of nearly a hundred years has perpetrated every injustice against the Muslim community. The dissipation of the great Haji Mohammad Mohsin Educational Trust, the practical elimination of the Muslims from the army, the government services and the legal profession, the neglect of Arabic and Persian in Muslim schools with the deliberate purpose of spreading ignorance among the Muslims was not an achievement of the Congress but the British Government, which to-day is prepared to do anything to win the smiles of the

²¹ Sir Asutosh Mookerji : *Famous Letters and Speeches*, 624.

“great” Muslim community of India. You may take away by force all that a man possesses and then call him magnanimous, you may do everything to sink him into the mire of poverty and ignorance and then talk of his culture, you may utterly ruin him and then call him the member of a great community. You may do all these things in India for here unthinkable things are not only thinkable but do-able and often done.

This systematic suppression of the Muslim community went on till almost 1885. It naturally created a wide disparity between the two great communities of India; for what the Muslims lost, the Hindus gained. While a century of suppression had broken the great Muslim community, a century of government patronage had ended in the emergence of a collective consciousness among the Hindus. The pioneer work of men like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ramkrishna Paramhans, Dayanand Saraswati, and Justice Ranade gave to this emergent consciousness, the content and direction of nationalism. The Hindu community became increasingly critical of government policies. The Indian National Congress, though established under Government patronage (1885), became a potential danger signal. The government sought to counter it by transferring its patronage to the Muslims. In this sudden *volte face*, the disparity between the two communities, created initially by following certain policies, was exploited with great skill and to the utmost advantage. The old relations between the two communities which “were based on other considerations than religion”²² were now represented as always having been of mutual antagonisms and religious conflicts. With a show of impartiality, the government now came forward as the champion of a small and “a conspicuously backward and impoverished (Muslim) community” against the large Hindu population of the land.

But to resume our narrative. We have already seen how the Hindu commercial bourgeoisie of Bengal were used to crush the feudal Muslim aristocracy there. This

²² A. Yusuf Ali. *Cultural History of British rule in India*, p. 25.

policy was universally followed. The Jain and Hindu merchants in other parts of India vied with each other in helping the British to establish their rule in the country.

They were thought to be so important and treated with such confidence, that they had interviews with high British Officials on the very day of their arrival, just as men of high station go to receive a Governor or a Viceroy in these days.²³

As time went on and the British consolidated their position the need to depend upon the Hindu merchants to break the power of the feudal overlords of the country became less and less. By that time and particularly through the Permanent Revenue Settlement, a new Zamindari class was created in Bengal, and the United Provinces which depended for its lands entirely upon the British Government. This remnant of feudal society was now used to delay the emergence of a new Industrial bourgeoisie which was trying to come to the front in India. It is hardly an accident that a large part of British Industrial Capital in the country is invested in the Zamindari areas. The English businessman enjoys a prestige in Calcutta which he has never had in Bombay. That is so because he controls the British Industries in that area in which the surplus capital of the Zamindar is largely invested. It was also not for nothing that Mr. Archbold suggested in 1906 that in a country like India, weight must be given to the views of Zamindars.²⁴

The policy of putting up one Indian against another was fully exploited to put down the Mutiny and after. The exclusion of the Muslims from the army has already been noted. Till 1857 the Punjabi enrolment in the Bengal army was severely restricted by a Government order but after the Mutiny,

²³ T. S. Shejwalkar : *Native Support of the British Dominion in India*. (Reprinted from Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, Vol. I, Nos. 2-4, March 1940). Mr. Shejwalkar has given original and authentic *Sunnuds* granted by the British from time to time to Indian *Seibs*.

²⁴ See Ch. IV.

the gaps created in the Bengal army were at once filled up by the Sikhs and other Punjabis and hill-men who were eager for an opportunity for revenge. All these people had been conquered by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers and in their ignorance regarded these, rather than the handful of British, as their real enemies. The enmity was fully exploited by the authorities in suppressing the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reached Lord Dalhousie in England, he wrote that 'against Oude sepoys they may be confidently expected to fight like devils,' and, some time after, General Mansefield, the Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army, also stated that 'it was not because they loved us but because they hated Hindustan and hated the Bengal army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again for their freedom.'²⁵

Thus the separatist tendencies among the people of India were sedulously cultivated and adroitly exploited to assure the safety of the British Raj. The soil itself was, indeed, very suitable for such exploitation. After the break up of the Moghal Empire and due to the internal conflict of the Marathas there was no single power which could hold the vast country together and people's minds had already started moving in regional and communal grooves. At this psychological moment the British entered upon the Indian scene. Unwilling to make India their home but anxious all the same to govern it, their only chance of success was to accentuate the regional and communal grooves of Indian polity and so maintain their pivotal position in the government of the country. In this perspective, the enormity of what we have called their Great Refusal to settle in India, comes out in its stark reality. Had the British accepted India as their home and looked upon it not just as a land for plunder and rapine then their efficiency, their discipline, their sense of cohesion coupled with the grace, dignity and large hearted tolerance of the Indian life, would have created a nation of which the whole world would have been proud. But as birds of passage they came and as birds of prey they have remained, and the marks of their ravages have sunk deep into the face of this unfortunate land.

²⁵ Nirad C. Chaudhari : *Defence of India*, pp. 31-32.

The impact of the Great Refusal was felt by every facet of Indian life. In the early years of the British rule, the economic policy pursued was of arbitrary oppression and bordered on plunder. A contemporary account tells us :

It may with truth be now said that the whole inland trade of the country, as at present conducted...has been one continued scene of oppression; the baneful effect of which was felt by every weaver and manufacturer in the country, every article produced being made a monopoly, in which the English arbitrarily decided what quantities of goods each manufacturer shall deliver, and the *prices* he shall receive for them.²⁶

The hand of economic oppression fell heavily on the tillers of the soil—"debilitated by a fiscal system that was oppressive and depressing in its influence."²⁷ The burden of land revenue became so heavy that the peasants were nearly crushed under its weight. The government's preference for money economy and their withdrawal of patronage and ultimate suppression, under pressure from industrial interests in England, of the indigenous handicrafts, further worsened the plight of the people.

The devastating effect of this apathy and antagonism of the rulers is seen in the sudden decline of Murshidabad. In 1757 Clive found it a city "as extensive, populous and rich as the city of London, with this difference, that there are individuals in the first possessing infinitely greater property than in the last." After a few decades of British rule the prosperous and proud city of Murshidabad was reduced to the position of a struggling town.

These vast economic changes brought great hardships to the Indian masses and caused a great ferment of the collective mind. A similar ferment was also caused by the contact of East and West, the meeting of two cultures. But neither of these impulses found expression in political terms for a number of important reasons. The break-up of the old village economy was not followed by rapid industrialization which prevented the masses

²⁶ William Bolt in 1772.

²⁷ *Report of the Famine Commission* (1860-61), p. 21.

from finding effective channels of collective action. The new renaissance also petered out for a variety of reasons. For one thing, the arrogance of the conquering race, thanks to its novel experiment of governing India from abroad, never mellowed down to the creative level of give and take where equality creates understanding and a fruitful exchange of ideas. ~~In contrast with the great~~ cultural fecundity of the Muslim rule, the British conquest of India has proved culturally sterile.²⁸ It is not without significance that what little flowering of the cultural renaissance appeared in the early days of British contact was in those parts of India which were still free from British rule and where the two cultures could meet on terms of equality. The Lucknow court, for instance, opened up a new epoch in art and music and literature.²⁹ The new movement, based upon Urdu, the language of the people, reached down to the masses and invigorated them. It is not surprising that during the stirring days of 1857 Oudh gave the stiffest opposition to the British and the Mutiny there assumed the character of mass resistance.³⁰ The annexation of Oudh destroyed the court patronage and in its absence the nascent renaissance movement wilted.³¹

Elsewhere the economic ferment and the cultural

²⁸ cf. "Unfortunately it must be confessed that the last 150 years have proved the most disappointing, and in some ways the most sterile in Indian History." G. T. Garrat : *The Legacy of India* (1937), p. 394 et. seq.

²⁹ cf. "The Court of Wajid Ali Shah, whatever its faults in political or administrative sphere, was a paradise for arts of all kinds. Poetry, instrumental music, dancing, song and drama, were lavishly patronised.....In the Nawabi atmosphere of Lucknow, western art came not to rule but to collaborate and serve."—A. Yusuf Ali : op. cit.

³⁰ cf. "In four great provinces of our empire in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, in Bundelkhand and in the Sagar and Narbada territory *the great bulk of the people* rose against British rule."—Kaye and Malleson : *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. V, p. 293. (Italics ours.)

³¹ The British Government have continued to be miserly in the patronage of arts and crafts of India. Even in the building of New Delhi, on which over Rs. 140,000,000 were spent, only crumbs reached Indian artists and craftsmen.

men asserting complete equality among themselves, and drawn from the lower classes," conveys to us, at this distance of time, some idea of the popular and radical ethos of the movement.

In any other country such a movement would have acted as a tonic on the government and changed the very substance of its policies. In India, with an alien government based on the Roman principle of Divide and Rule, the movement met with severe repression. But, before it finally perished, it caused a mighty upheaval which offered the first and the most formidable challenge to the British rule in India. "Even in the case of the Mutiny, (Sir John) Kaye tells us that 'undoubtedly the prime movers in the rebellion (of 1857), and those who most zealously fanned its sparks into flames, were Musalmans' and these Musalmans were undoubtedly Wahabis."⁵

The significance of the Mutiny, of course, is much wider than this. It has remained an epoch-making event in the history of India under British rule because it was a grand alliance among the peoples of India to overthrow that rule. In it the Great Mughal and the Peshwa, Hindus and Muslims alike, forgot their quarrels and fought shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy.⁶ Their blood that flowed and mingled at Lucknow and Cawnpore and Jhansi and no less in the eternal city of Delhi proved once again the essential unity of India.

Even after the Mutiny came to a sad end, many men such as Jaffir of Thaneshwar, joined the widespread Wahabi confederacy to test the possibilities of secret conspiracies. For years the Wahabis kept up a state of war on the frontier, drawing resources in men and money from all over the country and testing to the full the capacities of the new rulers. It is not for nothing that Dr. Hunter opens his book on this note:

⁵ H. C. Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁶ cf. "In ill-discipline, bitterness of feeling against their masters, and confidence in their power to overthrow them, there was nothing to choose between Hindu or Mussalman"—Colonel Chesney : *Indian Polity*.

For years a Rebel Colony has threatened our Frontier; from time to time sending forth fanatic swarms who have attacked our camps, burned our villages, murdered our subjects, and involved our troops in three costly wars. Month by month, this hostile settlement across the border has been systematically recruiting from the heart of Bengal.....The bleak mountains which rise beyond the Punjab are united by an unbroken chain of treason depots with tropical swamps through which the Ganges merges into the sea.

The collapse of the Mutiny and the swan-song of the Wahabi movement coincided with another expression of the general economic discontent, the Indigo Riots (1859-60). So important was this upheaval that the Royal Institute of International Affairs has described it as "a landmark in the history of Indian nationalism."⁸⁷

All these movements testify to the great ferment brought about in Indian society by the impact of the British rule. Every time a renaissance movement seeped down to the masses it ultimately sought expression in political terms. Even when started as a movement for religious reformation, as in the case of Wahabism or Arya Samaj, the moment it percolated to the common people, it invariably evoked in them a common consciousness that soon developed into some form of nationalism. An alien government with no roots in the soil not only fostered no such renaissance movement but met its every expression with nothing but suspicion, opposition and finally, ruthless suppression. To prevent the emergence of national cohesion and consciousness among the people, the Government had always to oppose and suppress all renaissance movements.

The post-Mutiny years were dark and gloomy for the people of India. The Mutiny confirmed and intensified the British in their racial arrogance and exclusiveness, like "a garrison occupying a country which might break out in a sudden rebellion."⁸⁸ The Mutiny burdened the country with the cost of its suppression, nearly Rs. 40

⁸⁷ *Nationalism* : by a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 154.

⁸⁸ Thompson and Garratt : op. cit.

for instance, were originally no other than the trade guilds that the British power destroyed. These "came into being spontaneously and themselves evolved the laws by which their activities were governed."⁴³ With the destruction of the trade and merchant guilds the castes ceased to fulfil any useful social purpose and became a dead-weight on society at large. A national government fully alive to the needs of changing times would have brought about the necessary transformations. A foreign government moved by no impulse other than that of profit and power not only left them alone but gave a solemn undertaking that they would not be interfered with. Thus in the midst of far-reaching economic changes that should have affected every walk of life we see the beginning of a social ice age. Institutions that had served their purpose, customs that were ridiculously out-moded, religious superstition that should have given place to the development of civic and secular virtues, all these were perpetuated by a government that did not want its people to think and act as a nation.

So the popular ferment caused by British rule found two contradictory expressions. One, an all-embracing nationalism which could offer nothing but blood, sweat and toil, always facing the determined opposition of the government and making a slow and painful progress through the tangles and thickets of communal rivalries and religious antagonisms. The other, easier and in the situation created by the British rule almost natural, through communal channels. Not only there is, here, no opposition from the government but this second tendency has always enjoyed its support and good-will. To all those who sacrificed the interests of the nation to the interests of the community Government offered prizes in the form of separate electorates, special representation, a percentage in the prize posts of Government and seats on the executive councils. They basked in the sunshine of this patronage, and its warmth

⁴³ Lord Zetland quoted by Reginald Reynolds in *The White Sabirs in India*, p. 178.

brought significance to their frustrated lives.

The patronage of communal activities has grown side by side with the growth of national sentiment in India. In 1909, the electorate was split up into four communal and class electorates, in 1918, it was fragmented into ten parts, and in 1935, the number has been raised to seventeen. This fragmentation not only obstructed the emergence of national cohesion but has proved to be socially reactionary. With the spread of education, some of the backward classes among the Hindus were trying to raise their status by changing the nomenclature of their castes. Thus the *chandals* became *Nam-sudras* and then sought to become Brahmins. Many, including *Rajwanshis* became *Kshatriyas* and so on. The age-old process of assimilation was getting accelerated. But the government policy reversed the gear. "The tide began to turn as soon as it was fully realized that there were to be special privileges for the depressed classes. Those who were trying to rise up, hastily commenced climbing down."⁴⁴ The extension of the communal principle from electoral representation to the Services is a further proof of the Government's support of centrifugal tendencies.⁴⁵

Another trait of British rule has indirectly helped to widen the gulf between the communities. Barring important and lucrative posts of the higher ranks, the administrative services are mostly manned by Indians who come from classes which had early adapted themselves to the demands of the rulers. They are the operative machinery of government and the visible and concrete symbol of government authority. The bewildered citizen cannot always see the invisible hand that guides them and he blames the *Mamlatdar* or the Deputy Collector, with whom he comes in constant contact, for all his

⁴⁴ Mr. Thompson, the Census Commissioner for Bengal, quoted by Dharendraanath Sen in *The Problem of Minorities*, p. 435.

⁴⁵ For a note on communal representation in the Services see Appendix No. 1.

manifold ills.⁴⁶ The fact that the officer very often belonged to a different community not only did not improve matters but actually added fuel to the fire.

Against this background, is it any wonder that the Indian unrest sought expression through communal rather than national channels, that in the bewildering mosaic of caste and creed and community the people lost sight of the national perspective, and that, faced with severe government repression on the national front they sought refuge in the affairs of caste and community and confined their vision within the parochial walls of narrow communalism?

In the baffling maze of Indian history under British Raj we are able to discover two distinct threads by which the Indian community sought to re-establish a pattern for its daily life. The national awakening and unrest following the British conquest first dashed itself against the armed might of the British Raj. Defeated and repulsed and severely punished, it turned to caste and religion to satisfy its inner hunger. Here, under government patronage, it acquired strength and gave meaning and significance to thousands of frustrated lives. Government policies, clearly understood and intelligently pursued, at last bore fruit. To-day, India is becoming a land of communal organizations and communal loyalties and rivalries in the midst of which the voice of the nation is struggling to make itself heard and understood. With clever checkmate and counterpoise the British Government has tried to sidetrack the wrath of the people from itself to the communal plane.

⁴⁶ cf. "The Englishman proceeding to India may expect to see his own countrymen everywhere, and above all in the offices and buildings of Government, in the law courts, and on the magisterial bench. As a matter of fact, except in the great cities, he will rarely come across an Englishman at all. I once visited a city of 80,000 people in which there were only two official Englishmen, both of whom happened to be away." Lord Curzon in an address entitled "*The Place of India in the Empire*" delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institute in 1909. Quoted by H. C. Mukerji in the *Modern Review*, May 1941.

Thus, the social, economic and political forces working on Indian Society have created a situation whose keynote is frustration. British rule is largely responsible for the social stagnation, economic debility and cultural indifference that constitute the frame-work of our lives. It is our political subjection, and particularly the peculiar character of the British rule in India, that provides the third dimension to this framework.

The obvious reaction to the situation is to mobilise opposition to British rule, to make India's freedom the fulcrum of all our constructive efforts. But this is a strenuous adventure. Not a few, therefore, shrink from a frontal attack on the regime and seek, not always consciously, an alternate outlet. Two facts, the subtle character of the British exploitation, and the Indian personnel of the lower administrative apparatus of Government, help to blur the conflict between Britain and India. By an easy transition, the reaction to life's frustrations expresses itself in antagonisms *inter se*: Hindu-Muslim, Brahmin-Non-Brahmin, Touchable-Untouchable. Such side-stepping of resistance to British rule gains in momentum as it does not usually remain unappreciated in government quarters. The reaction to British rule has thus assumed two forms—anti-imperialist and inter-communal.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMUNAL PROBLEM : THE IRRATIONAL FRINGE

The Hindu-Muslim problem can never be understood until we recognize it as a triangle of which the Government forms the third and, in some ways, the most important side. From another point of view also the problem assumes a triangular shape. We have so far examined the political and sociological pulls working on the Hindu-Muslim relationships, but these by themselves will yield an incomplete analysis unless the irrational pull, always important in human affairs, is given due and adequate consideration.

It is one of the most interesting phenomena of Indian politics that all the smaller minorities in the country—Parsees, Sikhs, Indian Christians—do not feel that their special communal interests will be jeopardized in a democratic Indian State. Along with others they have made valuable contributions to Indian national life but they have never asked for safeguards and they have never held up India's advance towards freedom for the sake of their special communal interests. Nor have the Hindu minorities in Bengal and Punjab demanded any special safeguards for themselves.¹ It is one of the two major communities of India that is haunted by a feeling of insecurity and has demanded adequate protection for its special interests.

Every effort has been made to allay the feelings and every device of human ingenuity employed to protect and safeguard the Muslim interests. Not only have all these devices failed but the feeling of insecurity has grown with the growth of the safeguards and increased with the increase of protection. As Babu Rajendra Prasad has

¹ cf. M. N. Dalal : "*Whither Minorities ?*" pp. 157-158.

pointed out :

Separate electorates and weightage in representation for the Muslims came to be looked upon as *something* sacred which could not or should not be touched. Today.....it is said that the safeguards have not been of any use to them...and what has long been stuck to has proved a broken reed. It is, therefore, suggested that the whole theory of protection has absolutely a wrong psychological basis.²

The wrong psychological basis is apparent elsewhere also. It would be very interesting to find out, for instance, what an important part "feeling" has played in Muslim politics. In 1905 the Muslims developed a feeling of insecurity and demanded safeguards to protect their interests. Since about 1938 they have developed a feeling that they are a separate nation and are therefore demanding a separate state for themselves. Now, feeling being an abstract term is not very easy to define. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "conviction not based solely on reason," and it also gives a psychological definition of the words as "sensation or desire or emotion (not perception or thought)." The emphasis on emotion as against thought in both these definitions is significant.

Most abstract words are woolly and, therefore, dangerous. They can rouse emotions without stimulating thought and create "convictions not based solely on reason." Of all the weapons invented by man the deadliest perhaps is abstract words. The history of modern Europe can supply all the necessary evidence to prove this.

In politics which after all is the science of public affairs, it is extremely important to give as concrete a content as possible to all abstract words and phrases. Otherwise they may persuade a whole lot of people to die for honour when it might be far more important to live with it, and to go crazy in the name of national sentiment without thoughtfully discovering its concrete social content. In politics, therefore, mere feeling can never be

² *Pakistan*, pp. 6-7.

enough. It must always be tested against the touchstone of facts and realities.

It can be argued that because the Muslim feeling of insecurity was never properly tested and examined, because the abstract was not turned into concrete, it has developed into a neuropathic sentiment fed largely on abstract fears and suspicions and made to appear plausible by its own irrational logic.

Consider for instance, the demands for safeguards put up by the Muslims from time to time. The demand was first made in 1905 and incorporated in the Reforms of 1909. Those reforms gave the Muslims the right of separate representation in addition to their vote in the general constituencies.³ The Muslims thus got a second vote through separate electorate.

In the Reforms of 1919, in pursuance of the Congress-League Pact, the percentage of separate Muslim representation in the Legislatures was increased. The following table shows the difference :

Legislatures	Percentage of Muslim seats to the total elected members	
	1909	1918
British India ..	18.5	34
Assam ..	18	35.5
Bengal ..	18	40.5
Bihar & Orissa ..	19	25
Bombay (with Sindh)	19	35
Central Provinces ..	19	13
Madras ..	19	14
Punjab ..	19	48.5
United Provinces ..	19	30

³ And the franchise was very favourable to them. To become a voter, the Muslim had to pay income-tax on Rs. 3,000/- a year, while non-Muslims on Rs. 300,000 a year. It was enough for a Muslim graduate to have a standing of three years to become a voter, while the non-Muslim was required to have thirty years standing.

While the Muslims gained substantial weightage,⁴ they gave up the right to vote in the General Constituencies that they had enjoyed so long. In dropping it they lost an important leverage and began to isolate themselves from the rest of India. The effects of this isolation were, however, not immediately felt because the Congress boycott of the Councils and its rejection of ministerial offices under the Montford Reforms placed the Muslim *bloc* in an unexpected position of vantage. In U. P. for example, where the Hindus constitute 86% of the population, during the years 1921-1935 there has been only one Hindu holding the office of Home Member, and that only for two years. As against this, there have been three Muslim Home Members for an aggregate of twelve years and one Muslim Acting Governor of the Province—the Nawab Saheb of Chhatari.

Even during the *interim* arrangements in 1937, when the Congress had refused to accept office, many of the Hindu majority provinces had Muslim premiers. The Congress boycott of Councils and offices had thus veiled the isolation that the policy of separate electorates was bringing for the Muslims.

In 1935 the isolation was increased. The new Government of India Act separated Sind from Bombay and in the Punjab and Bengal conceded a virtual statutory majority to the Muslims. These changes weakened the bonds of association and mutual dependence between the representatives of the two communities. The springs of safeguards were being compressed for action.

⁴ Muslim representation in proportion to their population suffered in Bengal and the Punjab by 24 and 9 per cent but improved in other provinces by 63 to 249 per cent.

Legislature	Percentage of Muslim members to the total elected members	
	1919	1935
Bihar	25	26
Bombay	35	17
Central Provinces	13	13
Madras	14	13
Orissa	...	7
United Provinces	30	28
Assam	35 5	32
Bengal	40 5	47
Punjab	48 5	48
N. W. F. P.	..	72
Sind	...	55

A glance at the table above shows that the Act of 1935, in response to the Muslim demand, has so regrouped the provinces, that of the eleven provinces, in four definitely and in the fifth probably, there would be predominantly Muslim Governments and in the remaining six the government would be predominantly Hindu. This arrangement was the logical and inevitable outcome of the growing separation of the two communities, insisted upon by the Muslim League. If, on the other hand, with communal electorates composite provinces like Bombay with Sind had been maintained composite governments would have become necessary, and no one community could have established a dominant voice in the administration of a province. If, again, after the provinces were redrawn on communal lines, joint electorates were established, the rift between the two communities could have been stopped and the provincial governments would have been composite in character. But provincial separation on communal lines coupled with electoral separation was bound to lead to two zones in so far as the predominance of the one or the other community in the new governments was concerned. And from that angle the arrangement was not inequitable. From the point of view of

population, 74 per cent of the Muslim population is under "Muslim government" and 26 per cent is under "Hindu government." The corresponding figure for the Hindus are 19 and 81. As regards the number of voters in the two communities, the position is even more satisfactory—22 per cent of Hindus are under "Muslim government" and 23.6 per cent of the Muslims are under "Hindu government."⁵

One would have hoped that this arrangement would satisfy the Muslims and at last give the quietus to the ghost of insecurity. But that was not to be. In the following year Mr. Jinnah came out with the demand for a fifty per cent share in the governance of the country. One of Mr. Jinnah's *Fourteen Points* had laid down that "adequate and effective representation to minorities in every province" should be given "without reducing the majority of any province to a minority or even equality." The new demand meant that the Hindus would be reduced to equality or even turned into a minority.⁶

By 1940, even the fifty-fifty demand had become obsolete. On 23rd March of that year the Muslim League served the first notice of partition on the country by announcing its demand for "Independent States" in the areas in which the Muslims are in a majority; that is, in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India. The "feeling" of insecurity had driven the Muslim League into the arms of Pakistan.⁷

⁵ This classification into "Hindu" and "Muslim" provinces is not of our making but it is implicit in the whole logic of safeguards.

⁶ It is interesting to note that in the electoral classifications, Hindus do not appear. They are lumped with the smaller minorities : Parsees, Jains, Buddhists, Jews, under a common label called "General Constituencies." If Mr. Jinnah's claims means 50 : 50 share between Muslims and non-Muslims, the latter will get a wider connotation than "General" as Sikhs, Christians, Anglo-Indians etc. will be covered by it. The Hindu share would therefore be smaller than the Muslim. Safeguards bulge into salients which bite deep into the rights of the majority.

⁷ The following Persian couplet, quoted by Maulana Shibli in discussing the politics of the League admirably sums up the results of the policy of safeguards :

In this brief analysis of the safeguards we see the working of a very interesting psychological phenomenon. The acceptance of safeguards to protect the Muslim interests began to isolate the Muslim community from the rest of India. The sense of isolation only helped to increase the feeling of insecurity which again sought safety in further safeguards. But the feeling could not be dispelled. On the contrary, at every step it seems to have gripped the Muslim League more firmly than ever, and like the witches in *Macbeth*, is driving it on from one impossible position to another. Caught in the coils of its irrational logic the Muslim League is driven to seek an escape in the desperate measure of Pakistan. Will Pakistan finally lay the ghost of insecurity? One cannot definitely say but if the history of the past thirty-five years is an indication, then one can make a shrewd guess as to the future. Feelings and appetites grow by what they feed on and their satisfaction is often vainly sought and hardly ever found.

Even to-day the appeal of the Muslim Leaguers is to vague and abstract emotions and feelings. Even when Pakistan has become the creed of the Muslim League its contours are still delightfully vague and the conception undefined. Once again no concrete proposal is allowed to appear which can embody in visible shape an airy abstraction. Once again "feeling overshadows thought and creates conviction not based solely on reason."

If we trace a curve of the working of the irrational factor we find that its influence is at its highest just before constitutional changes and at low levels after Reforms have been enacted. That this should be the pattern of the graph is obvious. Just after new safeguards have been obtained the sense of insecurity at least for a time,

*"Khast-e-Awwal Choon Nobad Maimar Kaj
ta Surayya mi Rawad Diwar Kaj."*

(The wall that grows and meets the stars
A master mason's pride and wonder
Will show above a bend from far
If a wrongly placed little brick lies under).

gets dulled. Such was the period between 1933 and 1937, that is, between the announcement of the Communal Award and the initial assumption of governmental responsibility by the Congress in six provinces. The Act of 1935 had conceded all the extreme demands of the Muslims and the hope was entertained that the fear of insecurity would now cease to haunt the margins of Moslem thoughts.

But the hope was not fulfilled. After the Congress ministers assumed office, the cry of Muslim suppression and the atrocities committed against the Mussalmans became more insistent than ever. Then came the European war which altered the whole situation in 1939.

The outbreak of war and the resignation of Congress ministries brought the Indian constitutional issue once again to the forefront. Immediately the irrational curve leaped up. The Muslim League had to make its demands before the constitutional question could be settled. The demand for Pakistan was made on 23rd March, 1940. The Muslim League as we shall see, could demand nothing less than a separate state for the Muslims, but the date too is very significant. It fits into the irrational curve and gives us a glimpse into the working of League politics.

As against the policy of safeguards it was believed by many that the communal problem would be solved through the economic approach. The communal agitation was confined to the upper and middle classes and did not really touch the masses.

Further, the great Depression of 1929-33, strengthened the belief that the people had become more conscious of their economic interests. It was hoped that economic alignments would cut through the communal entanglements, and discover class loyalties in the place of communal antipathies. The communal problem, though bristling with difficulties, appeared to be entering the region of its solution.

Two books, one by a Muslim and the other by an American long resident in India, published in this period struck the same note and offered a similar analysis of

Hindu-Muslim problem.

The British colonial world attributes the problem to religious fanaticism of Indian masses; Indian nationalism considers it as a creation of British imperialism. The whole social system of India needs a radical transformation and the complete emancipation of the country is but a step towards the disappearance of the Hindu-Muslim conflict..... The lack of homogeneity in the development of Hindu and Muslim sections of the Indian bourgeoisie is at the root of the conflict between Muslims and Hindus.⁸

The analysis and the prognostications of a Christian missionary, offered three years later, were equally in terms economic :

There is scarcely a communal disturbance in the rural areas in which the thread of economic oppression cannot be distinguished in the tangled skein of causes..... A Hindu agriculturist will find himself more akin to a Muslim agriculturist than to a fellow Hindu industrialist; the interests of the workers and the interests of the employers are certain to cut across communal lines.⁹

But only three years after the lines quoted above were written, a huge procession of Muslims paraded the streets of Bombay protesting against the Congress government for its levy of a Property Tax. The tax was meant to finance the Government's prohibition programme and its incidence was confined to a small number of property-owners of all communities. The Muslim masses whose religion forbids the use of alcohol protested against this tax on property in the name of their community! Communal cohesion proved stronger than the community of economic interests. Why did the economic motive fail? Why did not class loyalties rise superior to communal antipathies?

The Muslim League puts the responsibility on the twenty-seven months of Congress rule.

⁸ Rahmat Ali : *Contribution à l'Etude du Conflit Hindou-Musulman*, (Paris, 1933), pp. 10, 140.

⁹ Clifford Manshardt : *The Hindu-Muslim Problem*, (London, 1936), p. 54.

In the provinces with large Hindu majorities the Congress held sway, [writes a member of the "All India Muslim League Council] and found itself installed in absolute power. The character of the Congress as a purely Hindu body was thoroughly exposed, for purely Hindu governments were established in these provinces. The inclusion in the Congress ministries of one or two Muslims who deserted their own parties from motives of self-aggrandisement did not in any way alter the exclusively Hindu character of these ministries. The safeguards provided in the constitution for the protection of interests of the minorities were left in cold storage as a result of the 'Gentleman's Agreement' between the Congress and the British Government. The Congress were given a long rope to pursue their nefarious designs of establishing their domination and reducing the Muslims and all other non-Congress elements to the position of helpless serfs. Thus the Muslims and other minorities were kept out of all share in administrative power and governance.¹⁰

The passage bristles with misstatements. Even a tyro in politics knows that no provincial government "installed" under the Act of 1935 had "absolute power." In fact Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Prime Minister of Bengal, himself stated that under the New Constitution there would be neither Hindu Raj nor Muslim Raj but British Raj.¹¹ Of the six Muslim Ministers in the "Hindu Provinces," three were elected on the Congress platform and two were independent members who later joined the Congress Party as did some members of other communities also. The same thing happened to the League. Quite a number of legislators elected independently and quite a few who had actually defeated the League candidates in the election, subsequently joined the League and became its passionate advocates. It is good to remember in this connection that Mr. Fazlul Huq got himself elected to the Bengal Assembly by defeating Sir G. Nizamuddin, the leader of the Muslim League in Bengal at that time. The sixth Muslim minister, though originally elected on the Muslim League platform, resigned his seat from the U. P. Legislative Assembly, and stood again as a Congress

¹⁰ Jamiluddin Ahmad : *The Indian Constitutional Tangle*. (Lahore, 1941), pp. 3-4.

¹¹ *The Indian Annual Register* 1937, Vol. 2, p. 411.

candidate in the bye-election that ensued. A League rival had been put up for the bye-election; but he was defeated by an overwhelming majority. The charge therefore of "desertion" of their parties is, to put it mildly, ridiculous.

But what is of interest here is the grievance that "the Muslims were kept out of all share in administrative power and governance." It is the old story again. This arrangement, as we saw above, is implicit in the new safeguards. Actually 74 per cent of the Muslim population was under Muslim Governments and still this grievance is made! Of the 71 ministers of the eleven provinces, 26 were Muslims, 10 of other minority communities and 35 Hindus; of the thirty-five Ministers in the "Hindu Congress Provinces," six were Muslims and five of other minority communities. Sometime later the Congress formed Coalition Ministries in two more Provinces, the North-West Frontier Province and Assam. That increased the number of Muslim Ministers still further. In the N. W. F. Province three out of the four Ministers including the Prime Minister, Dr. Khan Saheb, were Muslims, while in Assam there were three Muslim and five non-Muslim ministers. These figures easily disprove the sweeping and fantastic assertions made by the League apologists.¹²

The whole passage, however, is an admirable illustration of the working of the irrational factor in politics. Abuse begins where argument ends, and vigour of language often compensates for poverty of thought. In a well-known book, Peter Drucker offers a remarkable

¹² A comparison of the distribution of ministerial portfolios, including both the Executive Councillors and Ministers under the Montford Reforms yields interesting results. Of the total of 41, there were 11 Europeans, 16 Hindus, 10 Muslims and 4 belonging to other communities. Even if the inflated British share is discounted there were 16 Hindus as against 14 Muslims and other minority representatives. After the Act of 1935, there were 35 Hindus as against 36 of the various minority communities. These figures conclusively show how hollow and groundless is the "oppression of minorities" scare that has been set going.

interpretation of our times. Some of his observations help us to explain the Muslim League attitude. "A creed that exhausts itself in denial can only turn its failure to create a positive satisfaction into additional 'proof' that a further denial is necessary, valid and right."¹³ Such is the psychology of the irrational!

In the failure of the economic approach the Congress is to some extent responsible but that responsibility certainly does not lie in the direction suggested by Mr. Jamil-uddin Ahmad. In 1936-37 the Congress sought to work the economic approach. The economic content of the Congress programme was deepened by the inclusion of the agrarian resolutions.¹⁴ It also launched upon a pro-

¹³ *The End of Economic Man*, p. 204.

¹⁴ Resolution 12, Lucknow Congress 1936.

Agrarian Programme : The Congress is of opinion that the most important and urgent problem of the country is the appalling poverty, unemployment and indebtedness of the peasantry, fundamentally due to antiquated and repressive land tenure and revenue systems and intensified in recent years by the great slump in prices of agricultural produce. The final solution of this problem inevitably involves the removal of British imperialistic exploitation, a thorough change of land tenure and revenue systems and a recognition by the State of its duty to provide work for the rural unemployed masses. The Congress therefore calls upon each Provincial Congress Committee to make recommendations in detail to the Working Committee by August 31, 1936, having particular regard to the following matters.

(1) Freedom of organization of agricultural labourers and peasants.

(2) Safeguarding of the interests of peasants where there are intermediaries between the State and themselves.

(3) Just and fair relief of agricultural indebtedness including arrears of rent and revenue.

(4) Emancipation of the peasant from the feudal and semi-feudal levies.

(5) Substantial reduction in respect of rent and revenue demands.

(6) A just allocation of state expenditure for the social economic and cultural amenities of villages.

(7) Protection against harassing restrictions on the utilization of local natural facilities of their domestic and agricultural needs.

(8) Freedom from oppression and harassment at the hands of Government officials and landlords.

(9) Fostering industries for relieving rural unemployment.

gramme of 'mass contact.' But this new policy was not vigorously pursued. The economic approach unfortunately received a very half-hearted trial, the worst that any policy can receive. To an extent, its ineffectiveness is traceable to this initial lukewarmness.

The Provincial elections marked the high-water mark of popular enthusiasm. A new hope of political and social redress bestirred the masses. The formation of popular ministries in general and of Congress ministries in particular released an abundance of mass energy. Its waves were felt even in the proverbially stagnant waters of the Indian States. But the expectations of the masses could not in the nature of things be fulfilled. The tasks the new ministers had to perform were Herculean in their magnitude, and the ministers could not fulfil them for the power they possessed was only of outward seeming. Many items of revenue and expenditure were outside their control. Unfortunately also the ministers did not take the people sufficiently into their confidence and explain to them the limitations of office. On the other hand, they were anxious to give the people an impression that the constitution was working smoothly and that the ministries had come to stay. When, therefore, the people found that the Ministers could not do much to relieve their burden, a reaction naturally set in. High hopes were followed by disillusionment. The anti-imperialist reaction suffered a set-back. Popular enthusiasm once again returned to the communal front. The Congress could not check this reaction effectively as it was in office.

The acceptance of office by the Congress blurred the sharp outlines of the conflict between the Government and the Congress. For half a century Congress had been the Opposition to foreign rule in the country. When suddenly, it assumed the reins of office, the public mind

Most Provincial Congress Committees made thorough inquiries and prepared Agrarian Reports. The Report of Agrarian Conditions in U. P. and Maharastra have been printed separately in a book form and are available at the A. I. C. C. Office.

was lulled and it started thinking of Congress Ministries as the *de facto* ruling power, little remembering that the Reforms had not transferred any real power at all and the Congress objective in accepting office was to wreck the constitution. The anti-imperialist front could not escape the logic of this very peculiar situation. There were not wanting in the country clever men of easy conscience who were prepared to exploit it for what it was worth. They now came forward as the leaders of the down-trodden masses and started attributing to the Congress all the sins of the foreign government. After fifty years of continuous and uncompromising opposition, the Congress, for a brief period of twenty-seven months seemed to be working hand in glove with the British Government. For the Congress, their brief experiment in co-operation with the British proved a little too costly; it drew all the anti-Congress elements in the country together. A moment of friendship endangered an epoch of opposition!

The situation was very cleverly utilised by the leaders of the Muslim League who were waiting for some such thing to happen. In the recent victories of the Congress they had sensed the biggest menace to their own importance, especially since the Congress appeal was infiltrating to the Muslim masses in an ever larger measure.¹⁵ They

¹⁵ "One of the most remarkable signs of the times is the ferment among the Muslims of India, both the intelligentsia and the masses. Muslim young men and old and the Muslim press are full of self-analysis and the desire to get out of the communal rut and line up with the forces of freedom and progress is strong within them. They see how the Congress has swept away Hindu Communal organization, how it has captured the imagination of the masses and they feel a little desolate and left out. They want to share in the triumphs of today and tomorrow and are prepared to take their share of the burdens also. And so this election and our campaign, though they resulted in the loss of Muslim seats as a rule, have been a triumph for us even in regard to the Muslims. They have gone some way to lay the ghost of communalism. It is for us now to go ahead and welcome the Muslim masses and intelligentsia in our great organization and rid this country of communalism in every shape and form." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's Presidential Address at the National Convention, Delhi, 19th March, 1937.

now made a heroic effort to recover their lost position. They started by complaining of the treatment meted out to the Muslims in Congress Provinces; they dropped vague hints of Congress "atrocities" and, cleverest of all, they began to speak not in the name of the Muslims alone but of all the other minorities which were said to be meeting with similar treatment in the Congress Provinces. One cannot escape the conclusion that this appeal to the irrational fears of the people was both deliberate and calculated, made by leaders who were fully conscious of what they were doing and who were themselves not its victims.

They were helped in this by the natural reactions of the Muslims to the Hindu caste system. A Muslim could not reside in a Hindu locality or eat or drink in a Hindu household no matter how cultured and educated the Muslim may be. The natural reaction to this Hindu exclusiveness is, of course, one of dislike and resentment but what is natural is not always rational. And it is easier to exploit a person's natural resentment by giving it an irrational emotional appeal than to remove it by reason and argument.

When the Congress was boycotting the Councils, many Muslim leaders had obtained positions of power and prestige in default, particularly in the Hindu majority Provinces. The acceptance of ministerships by the Congress pushed them off these positions of vantage. Again, in the Muslim majority Provinces, in Bengal and the Punjab particularly, the Congress was the main opposition party to the Muslim Governments. Analysis of their personnel and policies shows that their real character is reactionary and not Muslim. The Bengal ministry, for instance, includes three Muslim Nawabs and two Hindu Rajas. It was feared that the Congress opposition if it pressed for a radical programme would be in a position to gather enough support to oust them. It was this fear that drove the Premiers of Bengal and the Punjab into the League at its Lucknow session in the autumn of 1937.

The League too was on trial. It had received

virtually all the safeguards it had asked for. It had built its mansion on the separatist consciousness of the Muslims, stimulated by the growing doses of safeguards and various other devices. Now that the full quota of safeguards had been received, three courses were open to the League. One, to recognise the fact that the main obstacle in the progress of the people was British rule and turn its energies against it. That is, to turn its inter-communal tension into anti-imperialist. Two, to accept the safeguards as adequate and settle down to work the New Constitution. Three, to harp on the old string, declare the safeguards inadequate and once again raise the ghost of insecurity. The acceptance of the first alternative would have meant a virtual *merger* with the Congress—an anathema to most of the League-leaders; the second would have slowly turned the edge of popular discontent against themselves and their separatist policy. The third escaped the dilemma and yet retained the appeal and prestige of the League.

But what was to be the next demand? Separate vote, separate electorates, separate provinces, statutory safeguards, all had been asked for and given. The next logical step, if it had to be taken, was to demand separate states. This is implicit in the logic of Muslim League politics. The League must perpetually keep on raising its demand if its appeal to the masses is to remain unaffected. If the demands are not continuously screwed up the tension threatens to snap. This is an additional proof of the irrational nature of their appeal. The only thing the League cannot allow is a real solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem, because that would cut the ground from under its own feet.

The threatened economic approach of the Congress had menacing potentialities for the League. Class loyalties might cut across communal divisions. If the League was to survive, it must mobilise mass enthusiasm or perish. The safest way was therefore, to raise the demand for Pakistan embodying the idea of a separate Muslim nationalism.

Reactionary nationalism, to succeed against the

of economic radicalism, has everywhere relied on the irrationality in men. And thanks to a long history of safeguards, irrationality of this kind was already cultivated. The League had not to start from scratch. Luckily also for the League there is now a technique of irrational appeal.¹⁶ In the world's political laboratory the necessary recipe is available. All that the League had to do was to copy it.¹⁷ The first thing to do is to give the demons of economic insecurity and social frustration, concrete and personified forms. So scapegoats who could be made responsible for all the ills of the Muslims had to be found. They could then be made targets of persistent and virulent attack and a mass psychology of hatred and oppression created. In course of time, the common object of hatred unites a community, for people who agree on nothing else will often agree to hate together. The scapegoats chosen by the League were the Congress and its leader, Gandhi. A cry of oppression and tyranny was raised in season and out of season, as long as the Congress was in office. When the Congress Ministries resigned, a special "Deliverance Day" was celebrated.

Since Mahatma Gandhi is the most important leader of the Congress, he became the second target of attack. He is represented as a slimy scheming individual, who

¹⁶ cf. Peter Drucker : *The End of Economic Man*.

Osborn : *The Psychology of Reaction*.

Hermann Rauschning : *Hitler's Revolution of Destruction*.

¹⁷ cf. "Above all, there is a rough parallel between the Sudetan movement in Czechoslovakia and the advocacy of partition in India. ...The entire course of events was fully reported and closely observed in India. The progress of the Sudetan demands from a larger share in administration and policy to a repudiation of minority status, the claim to separate nationhood, the denial of Czechoslovak unity, charges of atrocities and oppression unsupported by evidence, the demand for frontier revision, the advocacy of a virtual partition together with the claim of 50 per cent share in the residual central organization—all these features in the Sudetan movement in 1936-38 found their counterpart in the resolutions of the Muslim League in 1939-41. In fact, some of the phrases employed are identical"—Prof. Beni Prasad in *Hindu-Muslim Questions* (Kitabistan, 1941), pp. 71-72.

with diabolical cunning frustrated the destiny of the Muslim people. The Congress and the Mahatma are represented as baulking the Muslims at every turn. The fight against them becomes the main object of the movement. A persecution complex is transformed into a political ganglion. Every safeguard that is tried and thrown away becomes an additional proof that the "Hindus" and "their political organ, the National Congress, and its leader, Gandhi" are deadly enemies against whom complete isolation behind sovereign Muslim States remains the only hope of survival! Such a holy crusade against "oppression," the propagation of such a gigantic lie, becomes possible only if it is organised and led by a great and charismatic leader. The masses hail him as a deliverer and follow him with enthusiasm and acclaim. Such a leader is absolutely necessary to this technique; he is the very fulcrum of it. It was the good fortune of the League that it found in Mr. M. A. Jinnah—an incorruptible, capable and power-intoxicated man—such a Leader. The whole movement hinges on him—the all-highest and the always-right. It is the successful evocation of a *Quaid-i-Azam* that has brought to the League's daring experiment the measure of success it has hitherto achieved.

But the whole movement, not being the authentic article, offers no lasting satisfaction to the despairing masses. Like the red Queen in *Alice in Wonderland*, it has to run faster to keep to a spot. It is of the essence of the irrational appeal that the tension it evokes can be kept up only by continuous acceleration of the drive against the demons. This explains the increasingly intransigent attitude of the League. Old tirades against the Congress and the Hindus fail to perpetuate the old tension—newer arguments have to be brought out, the more absurd the better. Such is the genesis of formulations like : *Bania Imperialism*.¹⁸

¹⁸ "The Wardha brand of Imperialism is of a peculiarly insidious and dangerous nature. Compounded of cunning hypocrisy and metaphysical hocus-pocus, it has a monstrous texture. Its exponents profess altruism and tolerance but bigotry and selfishness is

Such an irrational appeal has, it must be admitted, succeeded in rallying a large section of Muslim opinion behind the League. In the Muslim majority Provinces the absurdity of such arguments is too patent to be easily believed. Hence we notice the fact that the League propaganda has made greater headway in the Muslim minority Provinces than in the others. The success has come, to no small extent, because of the mood in which a generation of emphasis on separatism has put the Muslims and made them highly responsive to irrational stimuli.

It is not that all who flock to the League believe in all this. Some of course believe in it and are intoxicated by it. But for many it is a synthetic enthusiasm accepted because it fills life's void with some significance. Not a few support it because they do *not* believe in it. For them it is a gigantic bluff that is to yield them further concessions and not lead to the unwelcome partition.

But this appeal to feelings and emotions and the irrational in man, how long can it succeed and where will it end? It is easy to play with words and emotions but if the game is carried too far, words and emotions begin to play with you. Pakistan and the Muslim Nation are high sounding slogans and evoke a mighty response. But once Pakistan becomes an accomplished fact, the inexorable logic of the movement will drive it on to the vision of a world destiny of Islam. What form that destiny will assume and how it will be accomplished are matters not of the present but of the future. But we must give this vision our passing attention before we proceed with our analysis.

the very substance of their being. After centuries of application the Europeans have made the practice of hypocrisy a fine art but even with them hypocrisy is after all a pose. The hypocrisy of Wardha politicians has weird and terrifying aspects. It blasphemes the heavens with its assumption of an air of spirituality; it dumbfounds those against whom it is practised by appearing as an incarnation of protest against falsehood and insincerity, it defies analysis by entering the very being of its perpetrators: it ceases to be a pose and assume objective existence." (*Pakistan a Nation* by El Hamza, 1941, p. 111). No wonder the writer hides his identity under the brave cloak of anonymity!

CHAPTER VII

THE MUSLIM "WORLD-VISION"

For the last two years the Muslim League has pressed the claim for a separate Muslim State commonly known as Pakistan. Apart from its practical advantages, it is maintained that it would give a sense of spiritual fulfilment to Muslim masses in India who are captivated by the Islamic world vision, a *Weltanschauung*, to which it will give the purple panoply of an independent sovereign state. A detailed exposition of this view is found in "Punjabi's" *Confederacy of India*.

The Muslims cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam, religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. Religion and politics are inseparably associated in the minds and thoughts of all Muslims.... Their religion includes their politics and their politics are a part of their religion. The mosque not only constitutes a place of worship but also the Assembly Hall. They are born into a system. The system is not thrust on them. Religion and politics are the same to them. Hence Hindu-Muslim unity or nationalism, signifying homogeneity between them in all non-religious matters, is unimaginable. The Islamic polity in which religion and politics are inseparably united requires perfect isolation for its development. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam and can never be fruitful.¹

Till the passing of the Government of India Act (1935) the Muslims had never put forward such a claim. On the contrary every demand for safeguards was reinforced by a vehement assertion of India's destiny as a united nation. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had pointed out almost half a century ago :

¹ pp. 88-89.

Those who live in any particular country constitute a nation.....Hindus and Muslims are religious terms. Hindus, Muslims, Christians who live in this country constitute one nation. When they form a nation, their civic interests must be the same.....The time has passed when inhabitants of a country professing different religions were considered *separate nations*. (Translated from Urdu).²

And as late as the first Round Table Conference, Mr. Jinnah asserted that they had gathered together at St. James's to see the birth of a new Dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Like the revelation of St. Paul, Pakistan has suddenly heard the call of the wandering Islamic Soul.

As we saw in an earlier chapter, even during the hey-day of Muslim rule in India this voice of the Islamic Soul was not heard by the rulers. Uninitiated as they were, they did not see the Muslim world vision and give it a visible shape and substance in the form of an Islamic totalitarian State. Actually, they fostered racial mingling and cultural fusion.

The Islamic world outside India seems to be equally unfortunate. Unmindful of the "system" into which "they are born" the Muslim nations of Central Asia have sought political articulation in the form of separate nation states. From Morocco to China national loyalty is independent of religious beliefs. The great Ottoman Empire, which combined in the Calif the Emperor and the High Priest and was the symbol of the unity of Islamic world, foundered on the rock of nationalism. Again, the fact that even after the rebirth of Turkey under the dynamic leadership of Kamal Ataturk no attempt was made to unite the Arab States, has an undoubted significance.³ The constant rivalry of the Middle Eastern

² *Collected Speeches*, p. 167.

³ A realistic answer to the contention that 'Islam is not only a religion but also a fatherland' was given by Kamal Ataturk in the following words: "The dream of the centuries, cherished by Muslims, that the Caliphate should be an Islamic government including them all, has never proved realizable. It has become rather a cause of dissensions, of anarchy, of the war between the believers. Better apprehended, the interests of all has made clear this truth: that the

States and their inability to come together even in the face of a common danger proves that to Muslims of Central Asia their separate political identity as Turks or Persians, Afghans or Egyptians, Arabs or Syrians is more important than their community of faith. This fact is even more pronounced in China and Russia. Accent has shifted from religion to nationality. But some of our Muslim friends in India seem to think otherwise.

Islamic political problems are everywhere of an allied nature. Liberation of one Muslim country will directly affect another. The fate of Muslims in India will have direct repercussions in other parts of the world, particularly in the Western provinces of China and Southern and Eastern parts of Russia, where Muslims are in a majority. Acceptance of minority status within the subcontinent of India will besides sealing once for all the fate of 90 million Muslims in India lead to permanent enslavement of 30 millions of Muslims in Soviet Russia and 50 millions (sic) in Western China.⁴

The fact that Muslims in Russia and China are slaves seems to be a special revelation granted to their Indian brethren.

Milton said that whenever God wanted to reveal some special scheme to men on earth he revealed it first to His own Englishmen. Muslims in India share this peculiarity with God's Englishmen, for, outside the Muslim League, politics are everywhere secular and the vast majority of Muslims seem not to have noticed the truth that "Islamic polity in which religion and politics are inseparably united requires perfect isolation for its development."⁵

As it happens, the days of theocratic states are gone. In the modern world of nation-states, a theocratic State will always be at a disadvantage. The European Reformation proved once for all that the Leviathan has to seek

duty of the Muslims is to arrange distinct governments for themselves. The true bond between them is the conviction that 'all believers are brethren'—quoted by Zakī Alī: *Islam in the World*, p. 92.

⁴ *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*, with a preface by Mr. M. A. Jinnah, p. 61.

⁵ Punjabi, *op. cit.*

its vital impulses in sources other than religious. And today, in a world governed by *Real Politik*, where and how can any Islamic State find that "perfect isolation" needed "for its development"? No State in the world today can hope to plough a lovely furrow and burst the pod of its own distinctive peas.

Punjabi seems to be conscious of the weakness of his case. Like many men in a similar predicament he tries to hide his weakness under swagger. "It would be impossible for us to maintain for long, in an un-Islamic world, our ideal Islamic State. As such we shall have to advocate world revolution on Islamic lines."

Everybody today wants a world revolution to propagate his pet idea. It is the latest carrot that draws the human donkey. It is the intoxicant of an age where annihilation of distance and extension of credulity move hand in hand.

But one cannot make a revolution as one makes cheese. It may successfully hide for a time a reactionary paper scheme under the camouflage of ultra-radicalism but in actual practice it requires a powerful base to work from and an explosive ideology as its driving force. To realize its vision of a world revolution the Islamic State will have to be as powerful as Nazi Germany that has humbled empires before our eyes. No matter how Promethean Pakistan may be this seems to be a matter beyond its strength. And what of the explosive ideology? Will the banner blazoned with the magic symbol of Islam collect under it all the Islamic States? To answer yes is to sail in paper boats and hope to circumnavigate the globe.

So Pakistan cannot supply the base for an Islamic world revolution, and religion can no longer supply its dynamics. In the context of the military and political forces of today it is an impossible adventure. In equipment, organization and technical efficiency the Muslim States of the world today are inferior to France, perhaps even to Poland. It is ridiculous to expect Pakistan to acquire that efficiency and equipment which are the basic pre-requisites of modern warfare. To refuse to learn from the fate that has recently overtaken countries like Syria,

Iraq and Iran and cast its shadow on Turkey is to mortgage the future of ninety million men—so that a few may get the chance of playing with politics in the present. Far from sounding the tocsin of Islamic imperium, Pakistan, once separated from the rest of India, will only become a pawn in the struggle of the Great Powers.

Let us see how these Great Powers tried to handle similar problems in Europe and what were its consequences. Before the Peace of Versailles, European Minorities were hardly a major political problem. It is true that at the Congress of Berlin (1878) the Sublime Porte was compelled to concede certain rights to its Christian minorities. But a sustained interest in Minorities was not possible for powers that were themselves multinational. Nationalities were in such a medley in Central and South Eastern Europe and were so embedded in the fabric of the Romanov, Hapsburg and Ottoman empires that to touch the question was to provoke an instantaneous explosion.

Secondly, the European Powers were more concerned with the maintenance of the 'Balance of Power.' Russia's championship of the orthodox Christian subjects of the Turkish Empire was resisted by the Sultan with British help, and Russian Pan-Slav sympathies in South Eastern Europe dashed themselves against the solid wall of the Teutonic alliance of Germany and Austria.

But this balance of power was very precariously maintained. Irredentism strained it and the minorities became a powerful lever of disturbance. Prof. Earnest Barker has well described the situation :

Three stages may be traced in the development of such movements (as the Pan-German and Pan-Slav). In the first, the philologist forms a conception, based upon simple facts of community existing between different Teutonic or Slavonic languages. In the second, the publicist misinterprets the conception into the entirely different and unfounded idea of community of blood or race. In the third, the politician accepts the mis-interpretation, and using propaganda to kindle a feeling of mutual sympathy between the different members of this or that group, he seeks to translate a supposed unity of blood into the actual unity of a great state. The conception

of the scholar, perverted by the publicist and harnessed to practical objects of the politician, may thus become dynamite for the explosion of an existing system of states.⁶

Interest passes into irredentism, which in its turn, shades off into imperialism.

The match that ignited the European powder magazine in August 1914 came from Russian Pan-Slavism. During the war and particularly after the collapse of Czarism, the Allied Powers exploited the principle of national self-determination, ostensibly to solve the problem of European minorities but really to disrupt Germany's multi-national allies and chiefly to provide an idealistic garb for their imperialist aims.

Unfortunately, the remedy proved worse than the disease. Though the Peace of Versailles gave birth to a litter of 'national' states, the minority problem was not solved. Ethnology defied the statesmen who settled the boundaries of the new States. Small enclaves of Minorities, potential danger signals for the future, remained in almost every new state. Though these Minorities were given special rights under the supervision of the League of Nations, the pre-Versailles states escaped that supervision. The neglect of the German minority in Italian Tyrol convinced the Succession States that the new policy was only another ruse of the Great Powers to keep them on leash.

The Versailles Peace had chopped off slices of Germany to give economic security and strategic safety to the new states. In Hitler's hands these slices turned into swords. The very weapon of nationalism which had shattered the German resistance was now turned against the Allied Powers to tear up the Versailles Treaty and give Europe a new blood bath in which most of the nation states have been wiped off the map of Europe.

The technique followed by Hitler has now become common knowledge. German minorities, like the Sudetan Germans in Czechoslovakia, were first used to weaken the surrounding states. Later, national feelings of weaker

⁶ *National Character*, p. 25.

and unsatisfied minorities were inflamed to break up inconvenient states : Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and Croats in Yugoslavia. Minorities gave Hitler the key to his destiny.

So we see that nation-states, evolved to satisfy the claims of Minorities, became only a weapon in the armoury of Great Powers, to be used, with characteristic cynicism, in their unending contest for supremacy.

Mr. Jinnah, in his Presidential address at the Madras session of the League (1941), pointed to the fate of Yugoslavia and ominously declared that, like Croatia, Pakistan would get its separation, if not from Britain, then from some other obliging Power. Is Croatia of today a blue print of tomorrow's Pakistan, a state that is going to realise the Islamic *Weltanschauung*? As we have already pointed out, it is easy to talk the language of revolution and strike the Feuhrer's attitude but at the end of the road one will not meet the star and crescent in a field of green but another Croatia—a puppet state dropped by the way from the political trimmings of a War Lord's uniform. Pakistan, in the stress of the modern world, will not meet an imperial destiny but a vassal's fate. A shell of wonderful tint and shape, maybe, but it hides, not a pearl but a tear drop.

CHAPTER VIII

EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM

Weltanschauung is the apotheosis of nationalism. To understand it we must examine the idea of nationalism as it has developed in Europe during the last hundred years or so. This is all the more necessary since all arguments for Pakistan ultimately rest on the theory of nationality.

A nation has been defined¹ in a variety of ways but no definition is accepted as final. That is because a nation is not a fixed and an unchanging unit but a historical product born out of the conflicting forces of the past, subject to the political and spiritual turmoil of the present and capable of future transformations by the ebb and flow of circumstances. To give a precise definition of such changing and rather elusive concept is extremely difficult. We shall, therefore, take a bird's-eye view of history and see how "the basic group-affinity" which we call nationality has expressed itself at different periods and in different countries.

Such a historical approach is necessary, for history is to a student of politics what a laboratory is to a man of science. It provides him a frame of reference with which to test the validity of political ideas. From history then we have to find out how and at what time the group-feeling called nationality first became conscious and vocal. We have, for instance, in *Atbarva Veda*, which even at

¹ cf. "Nationality is an illusive idea difficult to define. It cannot be tested or analysed by a formula..."

— Ramsay Muir.

Lord Bryce disclaims his ability to define nationality but says, "You can recognize it when you see it."

"It is a spiritual concept"—Alfred Zimmer.

the lowest estimate is 4,000 years old, the famous *Prithvi Sukta* or hymns of praise and gratitude to Mother Earth. The content of some of these hymns is strikingly similar to that of some of the modern national anthems. But will that justify us in attributing a feeling of nationality to the Aryan *Rishis* who sang those hymns? Certainly not, for it would be absurd to call this simple love of Mother Earth patriotism or attribute any national feeling to it. Within historical time also men have lived together, built kingdoms and destroyed them without ever becoming conscious of the idea of nationality. We have, therefore, to find out how and when this consciousness grew and achieved expression. For, though a feeling of kingship must have existed among men since the very beginning of society, its attempts at self-expression have differed from time to time and from group to group. That is inevitable because every group does not develop on a uniform pattern. Social organization, religious and artistic ideas, which differ from one community to another, profoundly affect the modes of group expression. As Franz Boas has pointed out:

It is to be expected that kin systems, customs and attitudes will not generally maintain a consistent relationship as they repeatedly occur from tribe to tribe. The reasons for lack of uniformity and inconsistency are diverse, not only do they depend upon the social organization itself, but organization, in its turn, influences and is influenced by all other phases in the life of a tribe, economic, artistic and religious. A kinship system, although in itself complicated and composite, is nevertheless only an elaborated detail of the larger pattern of each culture.²

The idea of nationality could therefore arise only when society had reached a certain culture-pattern.

Moreover, if nationalism is evoked by a given culture-pattern, that pattern itself begins to change under the influence of nationalism. Hence, to view the idea of nationality as an absolute and unchanging concept is to turn a flowing brook into a stagnant pool. When we

² Franz Boas : *General Anthropology*, p. 458.

lose sight of the inner content of an idea, truth of the past becomes an orthodoxy of the present—and a fetter on the future. To abstract formulation of ideas, therefore, we must bring the astringent touch of reality.

If we look at the old European System we find that, in it, the rights of nationality were neither recognized by governments nor asserted by the people. The interests of the reigning families regulated the state frontiers and a princess often carried a whole province as part of her wedding portion.

The culture-pattern needed to evoke the idea of nationality was first achieved in England, France and the Netherlands. Under the Tudors England for the first time came under a strong centralized government and witnessed an extraordinary outburst of national energy which is commonly known as the English renaissance. In language and literature, in art and architecture, in every department of life, Englishmen came forward and vied with one another to win for England the first place in the comity of Europe. The quarrel with the Pope set the seal on England's separate consciousness and a nation came to life. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution the national idea grew into full manhood in the nineteenth century.³

In the rest of Europe the idea developed more slowly. It required a momentous event, either a great wrong or a historic tragedy, to lift the idea to the plane of an ideal. The three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) carried out with cynical disregard for its people's feelings by Prussia, Russia and Austria brought to life the theory of nationality in Europe by converting a dormant right into an aspiration and a sentiment into a political claim.

The principle which this partition has generated, to which the Revolution had given a basis of theory, which had been lashed by the Empire into a momentary convulsive effort, was

* The words nationalism and nationality are hardly to be found in their modern sense before the 19th century, except in a few isolated examples, cf. G. Weill: *L'Europe du XIX Siècle et l'idée de nationalité*, Introduction, pp. 2-6.

matured by the long error of the Restoration into a consistent doctrine, nourished and justified by the situation in Europe.

Thus, in a single sentence, Lord Acton, one of the great thinkers of the last century, has traced the growth of the national idea in Europe.⁴

Among the many achievements of the French Revolution we must include the broadening of the idea of nationality. It linked up the idea permanently with the theory of popular sovereignty.⁵ It showed the need for nation-states to realize the sovereignty of the people.

Napoleon was the first European statesman to realize the potentiality of the national idea. His spectacular victories were due to the fact that to the people of Europe he appeared as its embodiment. His defeat too became a foregone conclusion the moment he began to trample the idea underfoot. The battle of Jena turned Prussia into a great nation and the Moscow campaign brought Russia into the field of European nationalities.

The victors of Waterloo, who gathered together at the Congress of Vienna (1815) refused to learn the lesson from Napoleon's downfall. Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, who dominated the Congress, did his best to suppress the forces of nationalism released all over Europe by Napoleon's victorious armies. As a bulwark against the national idea he created the Holy Alliance between the three multi-national, autocratic empires of Europe, the Hapsburg, the Hohenzollern and the Romanov. But this attempt too was doomed to failure for the idea of nationality that the Holy Alliance sought to suppress was essentially a progressive force. It stood for constitutional government, industrial development and inter-state understanding. Its creed, in a word, was Liberalism.

The restoration of 1815 could only retard but was unable to prevent the triumph of nationalism. The forces of revolution, though veiled from sight, continued in

⁴ *History of Freedom and other Essays*, p. 283.

⁵ *Abbé Siéyès : Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État*, published on the eve of the Revolution in 1788.

active operation underground and their eruption in 1848 was marked by volcanic intensity. In Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany, the revolution of 1848 embraced two distinct movements, one constitutional, the other, national. The one sought to achieve the emancipation of the individual, the other, that of the nation. The freedom of the nation group from foreign domination was eagerly sought because it promised individual freedom and satisfied the needs of industrial economy. In other words national freedom became an inspiring ideal because of its content of economic advancement and individual freedom. This inspiration was so powerful that the next thirty years saw the emergence of eight new nation-states in Europe. The period between 1840 and 1870 has been rightly called the nationalist era of European History.

This nationalism came to full flowering in the Scandinavian countries. They established estates that guaranteed individual freedom and social well-being to their citizens. The crisis that overtook them came in a form to which we shall revert presently.

In the meantime a different type of nationalism was rapidly coming to the fore-front in Germany. It acquired the prestige of success with the emergence of the victorious German State under Prussian leadership in 1871. The history of German nationalism is a good illustration of how different culture patterns profoundly affect the content of the national idea. A feeling of Pan-Germanism had existed among the Germanic states under the Holy Roman Empire. Again, because of the lack of interest in politics, the German national movement inevitably expressed itself through a cultural renaissance. "More than anywhere else, nationalism in Germany aspired to be not only a political programme but a complete philosophy of life."⁶ For the cultural renaissance brought into prominence such things as race, language and cultural conditions which the German people owned

⁶ *Nationalism* by a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 41.

in common. Under its influence the Germans gradually became conscious of a separate destiny long before a centralized national state could give it visible expression.

This tendency was further intensified by the rise of a new school of history and the movement which came to be known as *Historismus*. The historians of this new school emphasized national differences and presented a new picture of the past, present and future destiny of the German people. They looked upon German traditions and customs, German laws and institutions as the expression of German individuality which, though it may undergo a temporary eclipse, could never really die and must come into its own at some time or the other.

Finally Hegel's theory of the State profoundly affected the development of German nationalism. To Hegel the State was the visible symbol of the Absolute and the state law the expression of the Moral Law of the universe. The individual, therefore, best realized himself by merging his individuality into the State.

Hegel's belief in war further coincided with the bureaucratic and army traditions of Prussia which ultimately became the embodiment of German nationalism. So, side by side with the liberal nationalism of England and France, there arose a variation of it in the very heart of Europe. It glorified the state at the cost of the individual and accepted force as the only method of settling international disputes.

So we see that the national idea in Europe developed on two distinct lines. One embraced democracy and liberalism, the other, force and authority. Nowhere was the contrast so striking as in Italy and Germany. Historical conditions in both the countries were very similar but they evolved different ideologies in the struggle for unification and independence.

Italian nationalism was inspired by Mazzini who was a true liberal. "God," he used to say, "has engraved a message on the cradle of every nation which it has to give to the world." His nationalism was not exclusive; it was informed with a moral purpose. It had meaning as a new "tie" for humanity and the emphasis was always

on its "fraternal and liberal development."⁷ In the name of nationality itself he denounced the narrow spirit of nationalism and "the stupid presumption on the part of each people that they are capable of solving the political, social and economic problems alone; and their forgetfulness of the great truth that the cause of the peoples is one."⁸ For him, nation-states, by making possible the combination of freedom and regulation in large, self-conscious communities, were playing an indispensable part in enabling the human society to sweep away the remnants of feudalism and reach a higher degree of development.

German unification was brought about from above. Bismarck baptized the new nation with the words: "The German Empire must be built up not by the permeation of ideas but by the achievement of the sword." He brought about a liberal conservative alliance whose unwritten condition was that the Conservatives should accept and work for national unity and the Liberals should abandon the substance of democracy. As already pointed out, the peculiar circumstances of German national revival, combined with the genius of its philosophers, particularly Hegel and Fichte, produced a most complete and uncompromising philosophy of nationalism. Its emphasis has always remained on "the achievement of the sword."

The dissimilarity between the two ideologies has been strikingly brought out in a comparison of Bismarck, the maker of modern Germany and Cavour, the maker of modern Italy.

Both had the same end in view; the one sought the unity of Germany, and the other the unity of Italy. Both were confronted by the same foe; Austria was an obstacle to Prussia no less than to the expansion of Piedmont.....The differences in the main were twofold. In the first place Cavour was a liberal and Bismarck was a reactionary. The former was the leader of the constitutional party in Piedmont, the cardinal tenet of his political faith being the

⁷ Mazzini : *Italy, Austria and Papacy*, pp. 71-73.

⁸ G. Mazzini : *Faith and the Future*, Preface to the 1850 edition.

belief in free institutions.....Bismarck, on the other hand, appears to have believed that force rather than ideas constitute the basis of Government, and he built up a strong military monarchy in Prussia upon the ruins of the political system..... In the second place, Cavour was prepared to merge Piedmont in Italy, while Bismarck could never be got to sink Prussian individuality in German nationality. Italy absorbed Piedmont, whereas Prussia has absorbed Germany.⁹

It was in the heyday of nationalism that Mill and Mazzini came forward, the one as its theoretician and the other as its prophet. Both insisted that the boundaries of the nation and the State must be coterminous. "It is a general condition of free institutions" says Mill, "that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."¹⁰ Nationalism is emphasized because it is the means to an end and not an end in itself. It is worth men's allegiance because it is "a general condition of free institutions;" it is attractive not for itself but because of its content of democracy. It is important to point this out because though the doctrine of nation-states has survived into the twentieth century, the emphasis is often forgotten.

But by 1870 the economic forces released by the industrial revolution were demanding attention from the theory of nationalism. In those European countries where national forces were still struggling for state-hood adjustments with the economic conditions had to be realized. After an exhaustive survey of the whole situation, the Royal Institute of International Affairs has briefly summarized the different patterns of nation-development in Europe.

In some cases, notably in Italy, Poland and Hungary, nationalism was associated with the upper and middle classes and although some of the leaders like Mazzini and Pilsudski may have desired a certain amount of social reform, the nationalist movement on the whole aimed at combining political change with the maintenance of the existing social system. In other cases, such as Finland and the Czech territories, the basis of the

⁹ E. Lipson : *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 79-80.

¹⁰ *Considerations of Representative Government*.

nationalist movement was to be found in the middle classes. The middle classes were not strong enough to carry nationalist movements to victory by themselves and always had to seek reinforcements in the countryside among the peasantry. Most of the other movements conformed to the pattern of the agrarian or peasant nationalism. The agitation for national liberty was closely linked with and derived its driving force from an agitation for a redistribution of land.¹¹

In countries which had already developed into nation-states, the economic development made liberalism, an inadequate creed. It had either to broaden internally—by extending democracy from political rights to economic advantages—into social democracy, or expand externally as imperialism. Nationalism was also capable of development in both these directions. There was thus a duality in nationalism. Its dynamics could be made to serve either democracy or imperialism.

The Scandinavian nation-states resolved the economic contradictions by expanding internally, while the Western States sought a solution in imperial adventure. The contrast was ably sketched by J. A. Hobson in his pioneer study of *Imperialism* published in 1902.

A nation may either, by following the example of Denmark or Switzerland, put brains into agriculture, develop a finely varied system of education, general and technical, apply the ripest science to its special manufacturing industries, and so support in progressive comfort and character a considerable population upon a strictly limited area; or it may, like Great Britain, neglect its agriculture, allowing its lands to go out of cultivation and its population to grow up in towns, fall behind other nations in its method of education and its capacity of adapting to its uses the latest scientific knowledge, in order that it may squander its pecuniary and military resources in forcing bad markets and finding speculative fields of investment in distant corners of the earth, adding millions of square miles and of unassimilable population to the area of the Empire.¹²

But Imperialism could not solve the internal economic problem. It created "two nations between whom there could be no intercourse or sympathy: the Rich

¹¹ *Nationalism*, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

¹² *Imperialism*, pp. 92-93.

and the Poor.”¹³ There were thus created under imperialism two nations in every country and two countries in many States; one free, the other unfree.

Moreover, imperialism, tied to the politics of power and profit, created international rivalries and the constant threat of war.¹⁴ To meet the challenge, nationalism had to ally itself with militarism and express itself in terms of self-defence or self-aggrandizement. In either case it becomes perverted and has to give up its democratic content. For both ultimately mean war—and modern war requires a highly efficient fighting machine the creation of which is impossible without the sacrifice of the political and social gains of democracy.

The small nation-states of Northern Europe collapsed precisely because they could not meet this challenge of war. For over a hundred years as we have seen the Scandinavian countries maintained their sovereignty and social gains of democratic nationalism. But they were baffled by the challenge of war which was not of their own making and were finally swallowed up in the conflicts between the two giants—the imperialist states of Western, and the militant nationalist states of Central Europe.

The submerged nationalities of Europe which, even in the twentieth century, were still struggling for freedom did not feel the challenge of war as relevant to their freedom. On the contrary they looked to some cataclysmic event like war to deliver them from their bondage. These small nationalities were embedded in the vast fabric of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and the Ottoman empires. Unwilling to merge their separate nationalities into the respective empires, they were powerless by themselves to tear the fabric into its multiple threads of nation states. A major European war was required to destroy the empires and free the submerged nations.

Even so, these submerged nationalities could be-

¹³ Benjamin Disraeli, *Sybil*.

¹⁴ cf. Harold Laski · *The Dangers of Being A Gentleman and other Essays*, pp. 204-205 (1940 edition).

come free only with the help of some great Power, mostly either England or France. And that help and assistance became decreasingly disinterested. This was conclusively proved by the Peace of Versailles. The war that preceded the peace was fought for the principle of self-determination. The Peace applied the principle only to that part of Europe which was under the control of the defeated Central Powers. In the last analysis it became only a cloak under which Britain and France wanted to hide their policies of revenge and self-aggrandizement. Again, thanks to the ethnological confusion in Central and Southern Europe the consistent application of the principle to those areas was well-nigh impossible. It would have meant a redivision of the twenty-eight existing states of Europe into sixty-eight!

The effects of the Great War and the bad Peace which followed were soon felt all over Europe. The disturbed countries could not settle down. Dwindling employment and the lowering of the standard of life raised the spectre of insecurity which haunted men's minds. Throughout the whole of Europe, in big states as well as small, men and women demanded desperate measures to save a situation that was getting too complicated for their comprehension. In Great Britain, Germany and France governments fell before the demand and were replaced by others which were prepared to apply measures like autarchy, exchange control and armaments regardless of their effects on international relations. The demon of insecurity was exorcised by sharpening international rivalry, which, in its turn, intensified national feeling. Inflamed nationalism deepened the shadows of war.

The smaller European states created at Versailles fared even worse. Too small as economic units to meet the social demands of the people, they were large enough to be constantly vexed by the minority question. They sought a solution of their problems by methods even more drastic than those used by the older and larger European States. During the years 1920-35, in Italy and Germany as well as in the smaller States like Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, dictatorships appeared with a mandate to sacrifice

individual liberties for the sake of achieving stronger internal cohesion. These national dictatorships of post-War Europe did not start with any consistent system of political ideas. They arose out of an attitude to life which was essentially activist and anti-rational.

Already before the war economic individualism in the form of *laissez-faire* was yielding ground to socialism and collectivism—both in theory and practice. The post-War dictatorships capitalized the tendency for the benefit of autocratic and intolerant nationalism. The clearest expression of this brand of nationalism was of course to be found in Germany. "Fascism," says Hitler, "is against all individualist abstractions founded on a materialist basis of the type of the 18th century. It is not the individual but the nation which is at the centre of the Law."¹⁵ The merging of the individual into the nation is one of the outstanding characteristics of the new totalitarian nationalism. It is the basic idea in which all other elements of national dictatorships are cemented. It justifies the interference of the state in every sphere of individual and public life. With it Hegel's Absolute has come to birth once again in Berlin.

The sinister shadow of war has proved favourable to the development of militant nationalism in Europe. But militancy has robbed nationalism of the idea of liberty and made it the handmaid of tyrants. Free institutions have disappeared, one by one; the individual is gobbled up by the nation. Hegel's nationalism has emerged triumphant in Hitler. The twentieth century nationalism differs from the nineteenth, not so much in the nature of sentiments it evokes, as in its intensification of state life and the political and economic environment in which it operates. It also appears more dangerous for two other reasons, the disappearance of the empty spaces of the earth and the immense destructiveness and the all-embracing character of the modern war, its altogether-ness. Bismarckian nationalism of the last century culminates in modern totalitarianism.

¹⁵ From a speech delivered on 10th March, 1933.

In Hitler's march to the totalitarian ideal, democratic nationalism has suffered a permanent black-out in Europe. The three partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century gave birth to the idea of nationality which sought expression through a sovereign nation state; its partition in the twentieth by Hitler and Stalin definitely ended the era of small sovereign nation-states. The wheel of time has come full circle and closed a great chapter in the history of political ideas.

We have tried to take a bird's-eye view of the phases of the growth of the national idea, particularly in Europe. We have seen that it is not an isolated political or psychological phenomenon. It is rather a special case of the more general and permanent problem of group-integration and social articulation. We have also seen that national movements, as we understand them to-day, would not have been possible in the absence of capitalism and the industrial revolution.

The national idea takes its colour from the geographical and economic setting, social origins and political environment of a people. Its expression changes from country to country and period to period. It has been the greatest unifying force as also an unrivalled disintegrating acid. It has glorified human personality and reduced man to the insignificance of an atom. It has made men brave and cowardly, noble and treacherous. It has inspired heroism and barbarous cruelty. It is, indeed, a powerful group emotion, but like all human emotions it must be judged by its fruit and not by its root.

There is a moral and political country, in the language of Burke, distinct from the geographical and which may possibly be in collision with it. Nationalism has a meaning, it can enlist our allegiance, only when its political and moral boundaries are co-terminous.

CHAPTER IX

NATION AND STATE

We have traced briefly the history of the development of the idea of Nationality in Europe during the last seventy-five years. Nationality is something mysterious until we know the nature of its development. What it is and why it is, is by reason of its history. The rein is the whole of its colour and connotation. Its becoming is the clue to its being, and it is from that becoming that we must wrest its secret.

We saw that though the sentiment that supplied the basic urge to nations to move towards statehood was everywhere the same, its political expression and social dynamics varied from country to country. There were two distinct and divergent tendencies: The Mazzinian and the Bismarckian. The first believed that "in principle, nationality ought to be to humanity that which division of labour is in workshop—the recognized symbol of association."¹ The other, the Bismarckian, believed that the conflict of nationalities is a law of life and development of history. "The corollary of this view is mercantilism, the system of national policy which interprets progress in terms of Power and jealously seeks to combat the progress of other states."² In the flow of events the Bismarckian variety has triumphed. Its very success, however, has proved to be the defeat of the theory of nationality.

We propose in this chapter to analyse very briefly the inter-connection between the concept of the nation and the State in Political Theory and find out why Mill's "theory of nationality" has failed.

¹ G. Mazzini quoted by Alfred Cobban : *Dictatorship*.

² E. Lipson, *op. cit.*, 264.

Historians of Nationalism have pointed out that in the eighteenth century the nation is, in a sense, the creation of the State, in the nineteenth century the State has been created by the nation.³ It was a powerful central government that welded different peoples of Britain and Gaul into conscious nations of England and France. But in the Central and Eastern Europe, it was the nations that have struggled for the panoply of statehood. This significant transformation is also evident in political theory.

The concept of sovereignty as developed by its early exponents like Bodin and Hobbs was looked upon as a handy justification of their autocratic power by the rulers of Europe. It was Rousseau who put in this juristic concept a mystique of national unity with his theory of General Will. In place of coercion from above he offered the idea of the General Will—a communal emotion which would bind classes with conflicting interests into the service of the nation, a divinity in which each individual had his part. Rousseau could not, however, give any concrete embodiment to his idea of the General Will. This want was supplied by Burke. For Burke the consciousness of the constitution, the traditional rights and duties of Englishmen, the living presence of a rich national culture were not abstractions but real existences suffused with the warmth of ardent patriotism and the glow of moral sentiment. In Burke the corporate life of England became a conscious reality. The State assumed meaning only to the extent to which it embodied this consciousness of corporate life. Hegel further developed Burke's ideas into a general system of social evolution. But to Hegel a state was not merely an instrument of national unity but was fundamentally the power to make the national will effective at home and abroad. The emphasis, with him, shifted from states creating nations to nations evoking states.⁴

It was in this context that the fervent pleas of Mill and the lyrical enthusiasm of Mazzini for nationalism

³ cf. C. A. Macartney : *National States and National Minorities*.

⁴ cf. G. H. Sabine : *A History of Political Theory*, pp. 575-647.

made their bow on the stage of history. It immediately became axiomatic that every nation must be a state. "It is a general condition of free institutions," says Mill, "that the boundaries of the State should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." It was confidently presumed that the articulation of the "civilized world" in nation-states would guarantee democracy and social progress at home and international peace abroad. This was too superficial a belief based mainly on an over simplification of facts. Mill was one of the main theoreticians of English Liberalism. He fondly believed that with the coming of national freedom and representative institutions of the type of England or France, the Liberal vision of "freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent" would be realized at least in the European World. It was not then realized that England and France could create the illusion of gradual progress because of their very peculiar circumstances. It was the tribute that flowed from their vast Empires in Asia and Africa that was sustaining their Liberalism at home. Representative institutions by themselves were not sufficient; something more was necessary to guarantee the substance of 'free institutions.' Mill did not take note of the fact that nations had after all to live in a world of international anarchy. When two nations meet one must dominate the other. Formation of nation-states was powerless to diminish the threat of war. Actually, it made war only too imminent.

But this was the era of English Liberalism. Mill's theory of nationality was the corollary of his liberal faith. Mill himself was, however, conscious of the inadequacy of the political theory of English liberalism, and had begun to realize that it did not square with facts. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century English Liberalism, in spite of its desperate efforts to swim with the tide of events, was finding it hard to keep on top. Instead of advancing to a new stage of universal freedom it only succeeded in retaining freedom in those countries where it existed before the coming of industrialism. Elsewhere capitalism and progress were harnessed to the chariot of

old absolutist order. Even in countries like England and France, in spite of their far-flung Empires and also because of them, the effects of unrestrained industrialism were giving rise to grave misgivings.⁵

The growing threat of class-war was bringing about transformations in the character of the State. Representative institutions were less and less regarded as instruments for the destruction of vested interest and privilege and more and more as the means for removing social friction and providing essential services for business organization. The state, therefore, according to this new theory was not a necessary evil, nor yet a police man to protect the natural rights of property, but an *instrument of positive good* essential to the well-being of its members.⁶

This tendency was further developed and strengthened in the growth of Political Idealism—from Hegel to T. H. Green and Bosanquet—in Europe. Earlier, every progressive thinker had tried to tear away the mystery surrounding sovereignty and to display government as a piece of machinery made by human beings for human use. The Idealists, however, reversed this process. Decrying the materialism of the utilitarians they robed the state once more in the mystique of *meta-politics* and showed it as an emanation of universal reason. For the divine right of Kings they substituted the divine nature of the State and degraded the individual into an effluence of

⁵ In 1841 the Report of a Royal Commission appointed to investigate the coal mining industry shocked all England with its revelations of brutality in the employment of women and children in barbarously long hours of work and in the prevalence of revolting conditions of labour both sanitary and moral. See Edward Carpenter "Towards Democracy." "Oh England I weep for thee." cf.—The attacks of Carlyle, Ruskin and William Morris against industrialism and laissez-faire on moral or aesthetic grounds. Karl Marx—Communist Manifesto 1848. "Workers have no fatherland."

⁶ In the judgment of A. V. Dicey, English legislation passed out of the control of one purpose into the control of another about 1870.

Law and Public Opinion in England during the 19th Century (1905), Lecture VII.

this *Civitas Dei*.⁷ Such a view was bound to hasten the decay of international democracy and harden the demands of absolute national sovereignty. As the nation-state was the supreme expression of the human spirit, any attempt to look outside it or beyond it would amount to treason.

Thus as nationalism lost its early implication of democracy and individual rights and as industrialism passed out of the stage in which free market was its main objective, the idealized state became a suitable vehicle for conservative or reactionary nationalism.⁸

Idealism also gave a veil of decency to economic and industrial interests that were exploiting the idea of Empire for the furtherance of their aims.⁹ It embittered international relations all the more and made wars inevitable.¹⁰ This explains why, when war broke out in 1914 (and again in 1939) every European nation reacted in the same way. The nation-state retained the unswerving obedience of the vast masses of its population. Few voices were heard questioning the validity of its claims or the justice of its cause. Each nation fought strictly in self-defence and even more significantly accused its enemies of moral guilt in doing the same. For the first time in history whole peoples fought one another and served willingly, not their religion, nor their prince, nor yet the cause of freedom, but the mysterious entity—the Nation.

By insisting that every nationality should constitute a state, possibilities of federal expansion are ruled out.¹¹

⁷ R. H. S. Croseman : *Government and Governed*, p. 198.

⁸ G. H. Sabine : *A History of Political Theory*, p. 645.

⁹ Curzon dedicated one of his books to "those who believe that the British Empire is under Providence the greatest instrument for good that the world has ever seen." *Problems of the Far East*. (London 1894), dedication. And Cecil Rhodes in his will suggested "the formation of a kind of secular church for the extension of the British Empire."

¹⁰ cf. L. T. Hobhouse : *The Metaphysical Theory of State*.

¹¹ Proudhon in a long polemic against nationalism, written in the middle of the last century, pointed out that the alternatives were federalism and Cæsarism. "Instead of pushing the people in the

A world of competing nation states, each of which is a law unto itself, produces a civilization incapable of survival. For the law between these states is the law of the jungle. It is instinct at every point with hate, fear and insecurity. War is the only final term in the series which poisons the atmosphere of peace. There is no limit to the things a state may do save its own power to accomplish them. And behind that will are ranged the profound and irrational impulses of nationalism, which supply it with an emotional force largely blind to the ideas of right and wrong.

Sovereign nation states inexorably led to the shambles of war. "Transformation of the nation into the sovereign state", says Professor Gilbert Murray, "was the flaw of the nineteenth century system." But in the twentieth century it has become a veritable calamity. Prof. Laski points out "that we must spend the twentieth century learning to think in international terms, in building as best as we may, the organs of that international community every year of delay in whose coming brings us so much nearer the disaster."¹² The facts drive us to envisage the nation-state not as a sovereign community but as a mere province in the "*Civitas-maxima*" of mankind.

It was this realization which compelled Woodrow Wilson to couple his theory of national self-determination with some form of collective security. The real condemnation of the Versailles Treaty lies in its reducing the latter to a mere farce. By introducing mandate system and by making special provisions for recognising "regional understanding like the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant of the League of Nations it was perverted from becoming an instrument of collective security and resulted in the domination of the victorious Powers."¹³ We

path of federation which is that of all political and economic liberty, they are being intoxicated with gigantic utopias and directed towards the sham of Cæsarism." *On principe fédératif* (1863), 189-90.

¹² H. J. Laski : *The Danger of being a gentleman and other essays*, p. 194 (1940).

¹³ D. N. Pritt : *Must the War spread*, 68. Article of the League

have seen how the nation-states of Europe had to make desperate efforts to establish some sort of social stability and political security. A realistic map of Europe would have shown not a number of different independent states with their own frontiers, but a few great powers with their zones of influence and satellite states. The fiction of the equality of nations was annulled by the fact that the Great Powers in a world of legalized lawlessness could impose their will upon their weaker neighbours and thus exploit the League machinery, each for its own designs. The last war brought the financial control of the world in the hands of small groups of people who belonged to victor powers. In such a situation the political equality of the members of the League was of little significance when not only the financial control but the military and naval power was monopolized by France and England.

In the theory of international law all sovereign states are equal and independent. The common man is often imposed upon by this and regards the theory as a reality. In the best of times it has been a respectable fiction. But in recent years, with the increasing breakdown of international morals and the growing complexity of industry, commerce and finance "small states have become more and more the dependents or 'clients' of the large states."

Covenant runs as follows: "Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as the treaties of arbitration or regional understanding like the Monroe doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace."

Likewise in the American Kellogg Pact for the outlawing of war accommodation had to be made for British susceptibilities. "The language of Article 1" Sir Austen Chamberlain informed Mr. Kellogg "as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. H. M. Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence....."

The states referred to were not actual parts of the British Empire but nominally independent nations, for example, Iraq and Egypt.

weapons. The resources of the one and the aspirations of the other are derived from some external source and the consequence is that the country becomes the instrument and scene of contests in which it is not interested.¹⁵

The transformation of nations into sovereign states has made the need for transcending nationalism very insistent. Federalism or neutrality while they provide greater security or more breathing time fail to meet the mortal challenge of war. Political theorists are, therefore, urging men to slough nationalism and move towards an international order. Nationalism has foundered on the rock of war. For the Mazzinian Ideal, in particular, the world has become, in the tragic words of Trotsky, "a planet without a visa."

The history of nationalism teaches us that it is no longer possible or desirable to have one state for one nation. Secondly, nationalism, if it is to survive, must learn to expand federally. The twentieth century experience drives us to the conclusion that the days of sovereign unnational states are now over. They endanger liberty and democracy and breed war. Whatever world order may emerge out of Hitler's war, federal and democratic or imperialist and totalitarian, it will certainly not be of the nation-state type; for sovereign nation states whether big or small can no longer survive even if they were to spend their whole substance in meeting the challenge of war.

The need for federal expansion is imperative. "Union Now" indeed! But it is not possible until nationalism gives up Imperialism and prefers to expand internally along the lines of social democracy that guarantees economic sufficiency and individual freedom. But this by itself will not be enough. The Oslo States tried it but could not thereby escape the war-deluge. It will be possible only if humanity integrates towards a new citizenship and becomes peace-conscious to the extent of being prepared to take the risk of peace. Historical exigencies allowed Bismarckian nationalism to triumph over the Mazzinian. But to-day if nations have to sur-

¹⁵ Lord Acton : *History of Freedom and Other Essays*, pp. 290-295.

vive nationalism must turn to the exiled alternative, with one addition: *A peaceful response to the challenge of war.* This is the task before creative nationalism. "For creative nationalism depends, as the history of nations makes plain on the achievement of a unique advance of universal significance by a particular people."¹⁶ It has to realize that freedom is indivisible. It has to concern itself mainly with the "well-being" of the wide masses of the people, and create a society based on social justice. It has to preserve the democratic method and treat the individual as an end in himself. Only thus can unity of purpose be created and national freedom ensured.

¹⁶ John Middleton Murry : *The Defence of Democracy*, p. 69.

CHAPTER X

TWO NATIONALISMS IN INDIA

We are now in a position to examine the movement of Indian nationalism and the kind of State into which that nationalism would in the end seek its culmination. The enquiry is not easy but the development of communal organizations in recent years and their attempts to base their agitation on what they call national sentiment has brought into sharp relief the various contradictory strands in what was loosely described as Indian nationalism. We shall have to examine them very carefully before we can separate the genuine variety from its spurious manifestations.

During the last few years the Muslim League has started to assert that the Muslims in India are a separate nation. With equal emphasis the Hindu Mahasabha insists on the separate nationality of the Hindus. Mr. V. D. Savarkar, presiding over the Hindu Mahasabha session held at Ahmedabad in 1937, had said, "India cannot be assumed to-day to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and Muslims in India." The Muslim League seriously came out with its theory of Two Nations in India late in 1938. Not only do the two organizations believe that there are two nations in India but that their particular politics represents the only national movement in the country. In October 1938, Mr. M. A. Jinnah pointed out, "no honest man who has studied the policy and programme of the League can conscientiously and truthfully say that it is anything but fully national and most progressive."¹ In December 1938,

¹ Presidential Address, Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference.

the Mahasabha passed a resolution declaring "that it is the only national organization in the country and that there is no other national politics than that of the Hindu Sabha."²

Side by side, the claims of the Indian National Congress to be the national organization were challenged and the Congress was dubbed by the League as "a communal organization inimical to Muslim interests."³ The Mahasabha denounced Congressmen as "hypocrites" and guilty of "treachery to the Hindus."⁴

In the meantime the Congress was not idle. The Working Committee of the Congress in December, 1938 "resolved that for the purposes of article V(C) the following organizations are declared as communal organizations :

- (1) The Hindu Mahasabha
- (2) The Muslim League."⁵

Article V (c) of the Constitution reads :

No person who is a member of any elected Congress Committee can be a member of a communal organization, the object or programme of which involves political activities which in the opinion of the Working Committee are anti-national and in conflict with those of the Congress.

Thus we find these three different organizations in the country, each claiming to be national and dismissing the other two as communal. How has this confusion arisen?

The leaders of the Congress were not unaware of the rival currents in Indian nationalism. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in a letter written in May 1933, reviewed the non-co-operation Movement of 1921 and pointed out that besides what he preferred to call real or Indian national-

² Nagpur Session. Resolution VIII.

³ Resolution of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League Committee, 8th April, 1939

⁴ Mr. V. D. Savarkar, Presidential Address of the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha Conference (February, 1939).

⁵ Proceedings of the Working Committee, 11th to 16th December, 1938.

ism which embraced both Hindus and Muslims, there were at least two other nationalisms: Hindu and Muslim.⁶ The strength of the 1921 movement lay in the fact that for a time the three separate strands ran parallel to one another. "The general Muslim outlook was thus one of Muslim nationalism or Muslim internationalism, and not of true nationalism. For the moment, the conflict between the two was not apparent." On the other hand, the Hindu idea of nationalism was one of Hindu nationalism. It was difficult to separate this from true nationalism because India is the only home of the Hindus and it was easier for them to "appear as full-blooded nationalists than for the Muslims, although each stood for his particular brand of nationalism."

Time has proved this analysis to be correct. During the past five years the three streams that had run parallel in 1919-21 have flowed wide apart. They have also achieved clearer articulation and become mutually exclusive.

In its extreme form this religious or communal nationalism seeks to destroy not just the separate consciousness of the other community but the community itself! Mr. Fazlul Huq, for instance, said that if Mohamad Bin Kasim, an eight-year old lad with eighteen soldiers could conquer Sind, then surely nine crores of Muslims could conquer the whole of India.⁷ Lala Hardayal went further and advised, "If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert (them and) all the mountain tribes."⁸

In every detail of their activity the League and the Mahasabha reveal such mutually destructive attitudes. "The All-India Muslim League shall make every effort to make Urdu the universal language of India."⁹ "The Hindu Mahasabha declares that Hindi (not Hindustani—

⁶ *Glimpses of World History*.

⁷ The Indian Annual Register, 1938, Vol. II, p. 356.

⁸ Quoted by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 123.

⁹ Resolution of the Lucknow Session of the League, (October, 1937).

rather 'Sanskritnishta' Hindi) that is based on, and drawing its nourishment from, Sanskrit vocabulary is and rightly deserves to be the National Language and Devanagari as the National Script of Hindustan."¹⁰ This ineluctable conflict on the question of India's *lingua franca* is symptomatic of a general contradiction all along the line.

The Sind Muslim League Conference (October, 1938) urged Muslims to wear Khadi and Swadeshi cloth manufactured by Muslim weavers, encourage Muslim shopkeepers and secure employment for their co-religionists. The Mahasabha called upon the Hindus to "purchase from Hindu shops only."¹⁰ Swadeshi too has thus been communalized!

Another interesting fact may be noted. During the last three years both the League and the Mahasabha have grown on cleverly organized "atrocities campaigns." The League was the first to do so. Mr. Jinnah declared in 1937, "Hindus where they are in a majority are attempting to force upon the Muslims *shree* lotus, and *Bande Mataram* as the national anthem and Hindi as the national language."¹¹ The League discovered in this atrocity scare an unrivalled potentiality and has used it to the full since then. The atrocities complained of have been more imaginary than real. The most persistent charge made has been that of tyranny of Hindus over Muslims in the Hindu majority provinces. These atrocities have never been proved but the danger was implicit in the constitution of 1935 and particularly in the Communal Award. Pandit Malaviya had given the warning as early as 1934. He said :

At present we are living under one government, of course a foreign government, but what shall we get by means of this communal electorate? Not a Government by the people, for the people and of the people but a Government of one community over another. In the Punjab, it will be a Government

¹⁰ Resolution of the Nagpur Session of the Hindu Mahasabha, December 1938.

¹¹ Presidential Address, All Bengal Muslim Conference, October 1937.

by Muslims of Hindus, and in the United Provinces it will be a Government by Hindus of Muslims. It will not be democracy. It will be a special kind of despotic Government. It will be tyranny of one community over another and it is this despotism which the Communal Award seeks to instal.¹²

The Mahasabha instead of trying to explain the situation in this way, adopted, in its turn, the "atrocities" stick to beat its drum with. It strongly condemned "the reactionary, one-sided and oppressive policy followed by the Punjab Government"¹³ and condemned "the most reactionary anti-Hindu policy of the present Huq ministry in Bengal."¹³

So intransigent an attitude makes reconciliation between the two communities well-nigh impossible. Both the organisations therefore lay great stress on what one might call the hostages theory. Mr. Savarkar, for instance, said at Nagpur :

When we will be in a position to retaliate and do retaliate the Muslims will come to their senses in a day. We shall not only save Hindu rights and honour in Hindu provinces but in provinces where we Hindus are in a minority, knowing that every attempt to tyrannize the Hindus is sure to recoil on themselves and react for the worse on Moslem interests in all India—the Moslems will learn to behave as good boys.¹⁴

The League's retort, though phrased less offensively, means almost the same thing.

The non-Muslim minorities will be given full protection with regard to their religion, language and culture like Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim Governments for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action.¹⁵

It would be possible to prolong this list of 'conflicting parallelisms' indefinitely but we will conclude with two more examples, one minor yet interesting, the other major and significant.

¹² Presidential Address, Congress Nationalist Party Conference, Calcutta, August 1934.

¹³ Resolution, Bengal Hindu Mahasabha Conference, Feb., 1939.

¹⁴ Presidential Address—December 1938.

¹⁵ M. A. Jinnah, *India's problem of her future constitution*, p. 41.

In 1938 Mr. Savarkar had declared: "The Hindu nation will knock on the head any political demand that claims 'one Moslem three votes!' and 'three Hindus one vote!'"¹⁶ Mr. Jinnah, referring to Gandhiji's remark, "I cannot be frivolous when I talk of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah. He is my brother," bitingly observed, "The only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one."¹⁷

The second example is far more significant. Both the League and the Mahasabha had, till recently, completely neglected the people of the Indian States. As powerful people's movements grew up among them and as they began to turn to the Congress for inspiration and guidance, the communal organizations took fright. There was always a possibility of the State's people obtaining a share in the representation of the States to the Federal Legislature. The League policy of non-intervention changed forthwith and the Mahasabha also gave up its neutrality. But this was done in a characteristically one-sided way. The League stood by the old policy so far as States with Muslim rulers were concerned while it encouraged interference in States with Hindu rulers. Agitation was welcomed in Kashmir and Jaipur, while popular unrest in Hyderabad was sternly denounced. The Government was called upon to put a stop to these "mischievous and dangerous activities."¹⁸ The Mahasabha, conversely, warmly supported agitation in "Muslim States" (States with Hindu majority and Muslim rulers) like Hyderabad and Bhopal, while it frowned upon the popular demands in "Hindu States" (States with Muslim majority and Hindu rulers) like Kashmir and Travancore.¹⁹ Neither of the two organizations, it is pertinent to note, was moved by genuine sympathy for the democratic cause of the State's people but was motivated, primarily if not exclusively, by opportunist consi-

¹⁶ Presidential Address at Nagpur.

¹⁷ Presidential Address at Lahore.

¹⁸ Resolution at the Calcutta Session of the League (1939).

¹⁹ Resolution at the Nagpur Session of the Mahasabha (1938).

derations.

This indifference to the democratic rights of the people is by no means accidental. It is evident in the League's claim to represent all the Muslims in the country. "The mere fact that a person is born to, or professes, the faith of Islam does not surely mean that he must also conform to the political policy and programme of the Muslim League."²⁰ But the League insists on such conformity and denies Muslims outside the League, say in the Congress, any representative character. Mr. Jinnah, in a letter to Mr. Subhas Bose (2nd August, 1938) wrote :

Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Mussalmans of India.....as members of the Congress they have disabled themselves from representing, or speaking on behalf of, the Muslim community.

This want of faith in democracy coupled with distrust of the masses is responsible for the League's opposition to the Congress plan for a Constituent Assembly. The Congress favours such an Assembly, elected on adult suffrage, for framing the constitution of a free India. It has agreed to separate electorates for such minorities as desire it, and has laid down that matters relating to minority rights must not be settled by a majority vote. They must be settled by agreement, or, if unfortunately agreement is not possible on any particular matter, then by an impartial tribunal.²¹ But the League rejects this solution and contemptuously asks: "Is an Assembly elected on adult franchise a practical proposition in a vast sub-continent like India with its teeming millions, ignorant, illiterate, steeped in apathy, superstitions, parochial jealousies, caste and religious prejudices?"²² It caps this argument by dismissing democracy as rule "by sheer force of numbers."²³

The Hindu Mahasabha has never made such a clear-cut declaration against democracy mainly because in the

²⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Eighteen Months in India*, p. 164.

²¹ cf. J. Nehru, *The Unity of India*, pp. 385-86.

²² Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, op. cit., p. 54.

²³ Ibid—p. 40.

circumstances it has no need to do so but its whole technique is permeated with an unmistakable anti-democratic bias.²⁴

To this distrust of democracy must be added a predilection for violence. Mr. Savarkar considers "the struggle carried on by the armed Hindu revolutionaries more effective" than "the unarmed agitation carried on by the Congressite Hindus."²⁵ Similarly when Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru complained to a leader of the League that no responsible Muslim Leaguer had condemned the violence perpetrated by a League volunteer on a Congress Muslim worker, he was told, "I may tell you in this case that we instituted an inquiry into this incident and found that the volunteer in question had sufficient provocation to justify the act!" Jawaharlal was constrained to ask, "Do you think that a provocative remark is enough to justify stabbing?"²⁶ In the same correspondence Jawaharlal Nehru repeatedly pointed out that incitements to violence had been and were frequent. The following well-known observation of Mussolini will, we are sure, find general support in our communal circles: "However much violence may be deplored, it is evident that in order to make our ideals understood, we must break refractory skulls with resounding blows."

In an unarmed country like India the propaganda for violence is naturally directed to the psychical rather than physical plane. Here also, without trying to be original, the two organizations have taken a leaf out of Hitler's book. Describing the Nazi technique of psychical violence, Hermann Rauschning writes :

Hostility to the things of the spirit, indifference to truth, indifference to ethical conceptions of morality, honour and equity—all the things that arouse the indignation of ordinary citizens in Germany and abroad against certain National Socialist measures—are not excrescences but the logical and inevitable outcome of the Nationalist Socialist philosophy—, of the

²⁴ cf. S. R. Javadekar—*Adhunik Bharat* (Marathi), p. 622.

²⁵ Presidential Address at Nagpur (1938).

²⁶ Nehru-Nawab Ismail correspondence. Dr. Ambedkar (*Muslim Gangsterism*).

doctrine of violence. This hostility to the intellect, to individualism and personality, to pure science and art is not the arbitrary invention of a particularly vicious system of racial philosophy but the logical outcome of the political system of revolutionary action with violence as its one and only historic motor.²⁷

According to this technique "the true elite is entirely without scruples and without humanitarian weakness and it is the duty for every elite to undergo training in brutality."²⁸ Obviously in such an *elite* there is no place for an individual who tries to direct his actions by a reference to his conscience. The atrocities scare raised by our communal organizations, their cheap emotionalism, their recurrent appeal to race and religion, their distortion of history is nothing but an attempt to rape the minds of men by appealing to their narrow, sectarian and baser instincts. We scan in vain the annals of the League and the Mahasabha for any genuine solicitude for the masses. Nor is this surprising, for their policies and philosophies are oriented towards power and not towards human welfare.

It would be wrong to seek a justification for this aggressive, perverted and sabre-rattling sentiment in the name of Renan as Dr. Ambedkar has tried to do.²⁹ Renan's idea of nationality, as he insisted in his famous essay, *Qu'est ce qu'une nation?* is essentially spiritual.³⁰ He would repudiate forthwith both Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Savarkar as his spiritual progeny. Their spiritual ancestor is Trietschke for whom the state is identified with power and power is moralized by the assumption that it is a condition of upholding and spreading a national culture.

Communal nationalism, when properly examined, appears to gravitate towards the Bismarckian variety. "The fact of nationality as urgently separatist in character"³¹ is obvious in the case of the Muslim League. Nor

²⁷ *Germany's Revolution of Destruction*, p. 30.

²⁸ *Ibid*—p. 33.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

³⁰ *Discours et Conférences*, pp. 306-307.

³¹ H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 220.

is the exclusiveness of Hindu nationalism as embodied by the Mahasabha difficult to discern. Both exalt a community over the country and crave for it the panoply of state-hood. While both Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Savarkar swear by nationalism, they have no use for its concomitant, democracy. Such undemocratic nationalism can only think in terms of imperialism as the 'arrogance'³² of the Mahasabha towards the Muslims testifies, or in terms of disintegration, as the League's tactics towards the Hindu nation disclose.

Both the League and the Mahasabha have great belief in militarism. The Hindu Mahasabha has actually set up a board called the *Hindu Militarization Mandal*. But the belief in militarism is tied up with its inevitable consequences. Both the League and the Mahasabha will soon seek what Prof. Laski has aptly called "the obvious indicia of self-sufficiency" and the search for them must "spread nationalism from political into the economic sphere."³³ That means curtailment of economic welfare and abridgment of the political rights of the people. That is the inescapable *internal development* of Bismarckian nationalism. In such a context, in the regime of communal nationalism, democracy, peace and social welfare will be among the early casualties. It cannot retain the parts and reject the sum.

One would naturally expect such aggressive and incompatible nationalisms as those of the League and the Mahasabha to be locked in a deadly combat. One would also expect them to be ceaselessly fighting the foreign rule that throttles the Hindus and Muslims alike. But experience has belied both these expectations. Even after they have become conscious of their national destiny, neither the League nor the Mahasabha has to its credit a single act of resistance to the foreign government. The heated discussion at the Madura Session of the Mahasabha on the resolution of Direct Action and its ultimate rejection throw a flood of light on the Mahasabha's atti-

³² cf. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, op. cit., p. 268.

³³ Alfred Cobban, *Dictatorship*, p. 215.

tude to this vital question. The proceedings of the Muslim League are similarly full of threats and warnings which have never materialized into a direct frontal attack on the British Government. Mr. Jinnah warned the British of the dire consequences that would follow if the Arabs of Palestine were not given a square deal. Having a shrewd estimate of the fighting quality of the League, the British Government dealt with the Palestine Arabs as they pleased. Similarly, not all the resolutions of the League could prevent the British from occupying Syria, Iraq and Iran. The communal leaders have generally shone, in the words of the late Sir C. Y. Chintamani, as "Field Marshals of the Platform," while the Congress still continues to bear the brunt of Government repression.

Secondly, far from being locked in a deadly combat, these two organizations which are anathema to each other gave a touching display of collaboration and understanding on a very significant occasion. That was on 22nd December, 1939, when the League and the Mahasabha together celebrated the "Deliverance Day"³⁴—not deliverance from a hundred and fifty years' of foreign rule but deliverance from the rule of democratic Governments established by the Congress for the previous twenty-seven months! It is important to point out that when the celebration of Deliverance Day was in full swing the Governors of the various provinces had already assumed full control of affairs and the rule of untempered autocracy had set in. Neither the League nor the Mahasabha found in this fact anything to protest against. Perhaps a hundred and fifty years of autocratic rule has inured them to its rigour, and habit has at last developed into character.

In yet another characteristic the League and the Mahasabha show unmistakable kinship. That is in their

³⁴ "I wish Mussalmans all over India to observe Friday, 22nd December, 1939, as the day of deliverance and thanksgiving—as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function.....thanksgiving for being delivered from the unjust Congress regime."—M. A. Jinnah.

consistent opposition to, and criticism of, the Congress. As if the Congress is responsible for the poverty, illiteracy and subjection of the Indian people!

On such close examination communal nationalism betrays its real character. Though it talks the language of blood and iron, its actions nowhere reveal that consistent and ruthless opposition to a foreign power which was the fulcrum of Bismarckian nationalism. Thus, communal nationalism, though it professes belief in violence and is undemocratic can hardly be described as genuinely Bismarckian. At best it is a spurious outgrowth of the principles enunciated by Bismarck, and its real objective is to get to the seats of power by deluding the masses into a false belief as to its radical character.

For both the League and the Mahasabha have discovered that they can grow only at the expense of the Congress. They can of course accept the other alternative and grow at the expense of the foreign Government. But that, at all times, is a strenuous adventure and eventually it would knock the basis out of their organizations and turn the footlights away from "the Field Marshals of the Platform." Besides, the war has given them a rare opportunity to inflate their own importance. Mr. Jinnah said as much early in 1940:

It will be remembered that up to the time of the declaration of war, the Viceroy never thought of me but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone—I have been the leader of an important party in the legislature for a considerable time, larger than the one I have the honour to lead at present, the Muslim League Party in the central legislature. Yet the Viceroy never thought of me before.³⁵ Mr. Savarkar has pointed out how it was in the context of the war crisis that Government unlearned the old equation, 'Congress plus League is equal to the Indian people', and learnt the new one, 'The Hindu Mahasabha, the League and the Congress are equal to the sum total of Indian representation.'³⁶

Against this background, the attempt to discredit

³⁵ Presidential Address to the Lahore Session of the Muslim League, March, 1940.

³⁶ Presidential Address, Madura, December, 1940.

the Congress is not surprising for that is the only way in which the League and the Mahasabha hope to gain significance for themselves. They live on the Congress like philologists on a poet. In the past four years the Congress has been under their ceaseless fire. And their criticisms have been mutually destructive. On 15th October, 1937, Mr. Jinnah declared at Lucknow :

Since they (the Congress) have formed the governments in six provinces where they are in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown that the Muslims cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands.

On the same day, Bhai Parmanand in a speech at Karachi observed :

There are the Congress Ministries in office in the six Hindu provinces while Muslim ministries have been formed in the remaining four or five provinces. The attitude of the Congress Ministries in the Hindu provinces is to me a very puzzling one. While the Muslim Ministries are quite free to look to the interests of their communities without any regard for the Congress or the Hindus, the Congress Ministries are wedded to their pro-Muslim Congress programme, and are ever alert in their attempts, to appease the insatiable Muslim communal hunger. It is clear to any impartial observer that the Hindus in the Muslim provinces have to combine themselves under the banner of a Hindu party if they want to protect their interests and live with honour and self-respect³⁷.

The same contradictory criticisms were levelled at the Congress for its policy of supporting and guiding the States' people's movement for reforms and responsible Governments. The Mahasabha denounced it in the following terms:

³⁷ Presidential Address to the Sindh Hindu Conference. Cf. "Is it not a fact that in provinces like Bengal, Frontier, Sindh and even in a province like United Provinces where the Hindus are in majority are faring under the Congress Government worse than they did before the provincial autonomy was inaugurated."—V. D. Savarkar in his Presidential Address to the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha Conference (February 1939).

The Hindu Mahasabha declares that the Congress policy is one of coercion and interference in the internal administration of Indian States, under the plausible slogan of responsible government, is not genuine, and inasmuch as the Congress activities in the matter are restricted to and concentrated only in the Hindu States to the practical exclusion of Muslim States like Hyderabad, Bhopal, Bhawalpore, Rampore, Malerkotla, etc. and therefore it declares that such activities of the Congress are of the nature of harassment and that it is nothing short of abuse of its power to instigate troubles particularly in the case, of such advanced and well-governed Hindu States as Travancore Mysore, Baroda etc.³⁸

The League, on the other hand, denounced the Congress interference in States as anti-Muslim. Mr. Hassan Imam moving a resolution on States at the Patna Session of the Muslim League (December 1938) said that the Congress was interfering directly and indirectly in some States, where the Hindus were in majority "with ulterior motives." Various allegations were made against certain states, especially Hyderabad, because it was governed by a Muslim Ruler, but the Congress had nothing to say on Muslim complaints against Kashmir that has a Hindu ruler.

Every act of the Congress appears to the Mahasabha as anti-Hindu and to the League as anti-Muslim. It is through such mendacious twists and turns that they hope to draw support and strength for themselves.

For both the League and Mahasabha, Indian history for the last thousand years is of one conflict and strife, which offers only a legacy of hostility, a tradition of war. They are anxious for the Congress to fade out, so that they might continue this tradition and lead it to some definite issue. But while this contemplated war of attrition between the two communities wages, what will happen to India's struggle for freedom? This internecine war will undoubtedly work out to the advantage of the Third Party. Thus commu-nationalisms are only spuriously Bismarckian.

³⁸ Resolution passed at the Nagpur Session of the Hindu Mahasabha (December, 1938).

II

Dr. Ambedkar, another important leader of a 'minority community', has recently come out with philosophical justification and political support for Pakistan.³⁹ He has ascribed the emergence of Muslim separatism to two main causes. The first reason is the 'atrocities' of the Congress governments.

Two years and seven months of Congress rule have completely disillusioned the Muslims and have made them the bitterest enemy of the Congress. The Muslim League has asserted that under the Congress regime the Muslims were actually tyrannised and oppressed. Two committees appointed by the League are said to have reported on them.⁴⁰

It is rather unfortunate and not a little surprising that Dr. Ambedkar who has gone into such minute details of the other aspects of the communal question in general and the Muslim case in particular, has not cared to ascertain whether any *prima facie* case exists against the Congress.

The League has frequently levelled the charge of "Zoolam" against the Congress regime. But, so far, these charges have neither been investigated nor proved. Mr. Fazlul Huq threw out a challenge to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that he (Mr. Huq) would prove the charges. Pandit Nehru had agreed to go round with Mr. Huq, as the latter had suggested, to ascertain the truth. But for reasons never fully made known Mr. Huq did not fulfil the engagement.

On 5th October, 1939, Babu Rajendra Prasad, the then President of the Congress, sent a letter to Mr. Jinnah in which he said:

In the resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League, passed recently in Delhi, reference has been made to Provincial Governments. It is stated that provincial autonomy in several provinces has resulted in the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities whose life and liber-

³⁹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*. (Thacker and Co., Bombay 1941.)

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

ty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces. We feel that these charges are wholly unfounded.....The Governments concerned have enquired into the matter whenever such charges have been made and have denied them. On a previous occasion we expressed our willingness to have any specific instances investigated by impartial authority. We feel strongly, and I am sure you will agree with us, that such charges, when seriously made, should be inquired into and either substantiated or disproved. We would like this course to be adopted with regard to any specific instances that are put forward. If you agree we could request the highest judicial authority in India, Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of the Federal Court, to inquire into this matter.

Mr. Jinnah, however, refused to accept the suggestion. He wrote back

The matter is now under His Excellency's (Viceroy's) consideration, and he is the proper authority to take such action and adopt such measures as would meet our requirements and would restore complete sense of security and satisfaction among Mussalmans in those provinces where the Congress ministries are in charge of the administration.

In less than three weeks the Congress ministries resigned on the war issue, and there was no occasion of knowing what His Excellency thought of Mr. Jinnah's charge sheet against the Congress. Later on Mr. Jinnah came out with a demand for a Royal Commission to inquire into the charges, a demand that was rejected by the Government and that found no support in any other quarter. The "atrocities", therefore, remain to this day an uninvestigated and unproved allegation.

Dr. Ambedkar's other reason for the growth of Muslim separatism is both more interesting and more important. It adumbrates the attitude not only of the Muslims but also other minorities !

The Muslims and other minorities care more for the recognition of their self-respect at the hands of the Congress. They have their pride which they will not yield for gold. The Congress must prove its *bonafides* by recognizing them as free and equal partners and agreeing to share power with the effective

representatives of the minority communities.⁴¹

This statement deserves our closest attention. The first question that has to be considered is, who are the minorities? Mahatma Gandhi has answered it in the following terms.

They are religious, political and social: thus Mussalmans (religious); Depressed Classes (Social); Liberals (political); Princes (Social); Brahmins (Social); Lingayats (Social); Sikhs (Social?); Christians—Protestants and Catholics—(religious); Jains (Social?); Zamindars (political?).....The Congress has been obliged to deal with every one of the groups I have mentioned. My list is not exhaustive. It is illustrative. It can be increased *ad libitum*.⁴²

Are all these minorities to be treated as "free and equal partners" with whom power is to be shared?

Perhaps it will be argued that power is to be shared not with minorities in so wide a sense but with the 'effective representatives' of important minorities. Who are "the effective representatives of the minority communities"? Let us take the great Muslim community. Was the League to be accepted as its effective representative? The results of the General Elections of 1937 did not at the time warrant such a conclusion for those results, as the following table shows, reveal the strength of the League representatives in the various Provincial Councils:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Muslim League</i>	<i>Other Muslim Groups</i>
Madras	11	17
Bombay.. ..	20	9
Bengal . . .	40	77
United Provinces .	27	37
Punjab .. .	1	83
Bihar	Nil	39
Central Provinces ..	"	14
Assam .. .	9	25
N. W. F. Province .	Nil	36
Orissa	"	4
Sind . . .	"	36
Total .. .	108	377

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² *Harijan*, 16th October, 1939.

Surely on this record the League could not be accepted as the effective representative of the Muslim community. It will not be disputed, we hope, that 'the effective leaders' of a community must enjoy the support of the majority of that community.⁴³

There is yet another and greater difficulty. Did Dr. Ambedkar sit in the Legislative Assembly of Bombay as 'the effective representative' of the Scheduled Classes or as the leader of the Independent Labour Party that sought the franchise of the people and aspired to replace the Congress Government with its own? How is the Congress, or any one for that matter, to free the political from the Communal strand?⁴⁴

Even in the case of the Muslim League this distinction is not without a meaning. As a Madras Government Despatch says :

It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the division (between the League and the Congress) is purely communal and regardless of political principles. If the two contending parties were to be described in political parlance, they might be called respectively progressive and ultra-radical. The methods of the two parties differ widely in practice and give rise to a number of points on which there are acute differences in the angle of vision.⁴⁵

Has the ultra-radical Congress to share power equally

⁴³ "Under the existing Constitution 480 seats are reserved for Moslems out of a total of 1581 in all the eleven Provincial Legislative Assemblies in British India. Out of these 480 seats the Moslem League has been able to secure only 104 seats representing 4.6 per cent of the total Moslem votes (total Moslem votes, 7,319,445; Moslem League votes 321,772). In four of the Provinces (Sind, Punjab, N. W. F. P. and Bihar) the Muslim League was not able to get one representative elected." R. Palme Dutt, *India Today*, p. 420.

⁴⁴ But since the failure of the Cripps proposals Dr. Ambedkar has gone a step further. In a speech at the All India Depressed Classes Conference in July, 1942, he demanded that in any future constitution that may be framed for India, the Depressed Classes must insist on political separation. "A separate settlement of villages for Depressed Classes must be their aim, for which a budgetary provision of Rs. 20,00,000 in each province must be allowed. Their educational grant must be fixed by the Constitution."

⁴⁵ Quoted by K. B. Krishna in *Problem of Minorities*, p. 45.

with the "progressive" League and the seemingly super-radical Independent Labour Party? And how is this *tour de force* to be achieved?

It is at the same time interesting to note that those who are now asking for a Government by the group system, vehemently opposed that system when they were themselves in office the Raja of Bobbili, a leader of the Justice Party of Madras made the following remarks in 1934. He said:

In the interests of our country, I desire that you should realize the implications of provincial autonomy and how it should be worked. I think it would be most unfortunate if instead of a clear-cut party system, opportunities were available for the formation of a ministry under a group system. Whether we are in power or opposition, it would be against national interests to encourage or any way countenance the group system which will work greater havoc than even dyarchy.⁴⁶

But when the Congress, to avoid the 'havoc', formed party governments, it was denounced, among others, by the Justicites as "totalitarian"! And in 1940, the South Indian Liberal Federation, which is how the Justicites now call themselves, passed a resolution demanding a separate State of Dravidistan.

Again, if the Congress is to share power, is it not entitled to seek a prior agreement on policies and programmes so as to assure disciplined functioning and strength? Has not the appeal of the Congress for such an agreement been cold shouldered by the communal parties? And have they not, when the Congress sought to establish direct contact with the voters over the head of the communal leaders, denounced it as the 'disrupter of the solidarity' of the minority community concerned? The Congress is asked to share power without any understanding among the co-sharers about its use. Such a sharing of power would certainly reduce the Government, in the words of Kennedy, to "a strange and fortuitous Noah's Ark."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Presidential Address, South Indian Liberal Conference, Madras, September 1934.

⁴⁷ *Essays in Constitutional Law*, p. 100.

Another significant fact may here be noted. None of the aggrieved parties shows any genuine concern for the fundamental needs of the masses. Their sole preoccupation is with the sharing of power for the actual conquest of which they will give no help and make no sacrifices. They dismiss the Congress method of direct action as "suicidal and futile"⁴⁸ but have no alternative line of attack to offer. The truth of the matter seems to be that Messrs. Jinnah, Ambedkar and Savarkar are anxious to wrest power not so much from the alien rulers as from the Congress.

How else can one explain their anxiety to see the Congress fade away—to cease to be what it is? Says Mr. Savarkar:

So long as there are separate electorates for the Moslems and the general which in fact means the Hindu one, then let the Moslem League and the Hindu Mahasabha participate in the elections and let the Congress stand supremely aloof as a truly Indian National body which can never condescend to identify itself with any particular communal electorate.

In the very next breath, however, he invites the Congress to identify itself with the Hindu cause.⁴⁹ The League is equally anxious to make the Congress a Hindu body. "If the Congress continues to act on the advice of Muslim Congressmen, there is sure to be a civil war in India" threatens Mr. Khalq-uz-Zaman, a leader of the League.⁵⁰ If the Congress remains national there will be a civil war in India and if it becomes communal who can deny that shadows of conflict will lengthen across the country? Such then is the ultimate and inescapable logic of communal nationalism. It solves the problem neither of national freedom nor of national poverty. It has no answer to the challenge of war. It opens a perspective not of peace and progress but of civil strife.

⁴⁸ Mr. Jinnah's speech at the Lucknow Session of the League, October, 1937.

⁴⁹ Presidential Address, Calcutta Session of the All India Hindu Mahasabha, December, 1939.

⁵⁰ Lahore Session of the League, March 1940.

III

As against the League and the Mahasabha, the Indian National Congress embodies an ideal of nationalism which is rooted in the true Indian tradition and is pregnant with great promise for the future. It has a record of effort and achievement extending over a period of half a century by the side of which all communal organizations in the country pale into insignificance.

From its very inception the Congress has stuck fast to one or two basic principles. Its doors are open to all Indians, no matter to what caste, community or province they belong. It is a fact not without significance that its earliest Presidents included a Hindu, a Parsee and a Mussalman respectively. Side by side with this all-embracing supra-racial and religious characteristic, the Congress has always advocated the ideal of democracy for the future Indian State.

Vaguely felt and tentatively expressed to start with, this ideal in course of time acquired a deep social content and a moral urge. Mahatma Gandhi expressed the quintessence of this democratic nationalism in his opening speech at the second Round Table Conference :

The Congress represents in its essence the dumb and semi-starved millions scattered over the length and breadth of the land in its seven lakhs of villages. Every interest which is worthy of protection has to subserve this interest and if there is genuine and real clash, I have no hesitation in saying on behalf of the Congress that the Congress will sacrifice every interest for the sake of the interests of these dumb millions.⁵¹

This, of course, is no flourish of a demagogue but the deeply sincere sentiment of one who spoke as the tribune of a people.

Originally representing the new intelligentsia, the Congress succeeded in broadening its basis by identifying itself with the widest interests and well-being of India's millions. This is effectively expressed by a simple fact. The British Rule, in the earlier stages was known

⁵¹ *Nation's Voice*.

as the '*ma-bap sarkar*', supposed to look after the welfare of the Indian people. To-day, even the Government have dropped all such pretensions and, in a like proportion the Congress has earned the right to speak for the voiceless people. This change is the outward expression of a profound political development which is organically linked up with the growth of a new kind of nationalism which has put on the pedestal a new idol: the *Daridra-narayan*.

The Congress has sought to become a faithful reflection of the freedom urge of the Indian people, and it has consciously striven to nurture this urge in all its protean manifestations. And in so far as it has attempted to be true to the inarticulate needs of a down-trodden people, it has deepened its peculiar concept of nationalism. The pledge of Independence that is solemnly renewed on 26th of January every year since 1930 embodies in words true and firm the substance of Congress nationalism.

We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people to have freedom and enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life, so that they may have full opportunities of growth.

We believe also that if any Government deprives the people of their rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or abolish it. The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses and has ruined India economically, culturally and spiritually.

We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and attain *Puran Swaraj* or Complete Independence.

We recognize that the most effective way of gaining freedom is not through violence.

India has gained strength and self-reliance and marched a long way to Swaraj following peaceful and legitimate methods and it is by these methods that our country will attain independence.

We believe that non-violent action in general and preparation of non-violent direct action in particular requires the successful working of the programme of Khadi, Communal harmony and removal of untouchability. We shall seek every opportunity to spread good-will among fellowmen without distinction of caste or creed. We shall endeavour to raise from ignorance and poverty those who have been neglected and

to advance in every way the interests of those who are considered to be backward and suppressed.

Like all human endeavours, the Congress efforts to put this lofty ideal into practice have not always been successful, but to the extent to which it has remained true to it, it has won the faith and allegiance of the people of India.

The fundamental technique of this nationalism is *Satyagraha* which demands constant revivification through a continuous identity with the masses.⁵² It has, therefore, to be anchored in democracy. The ultimate sanction of Congress nationalism being peaceful but resolute mass action, it has pledged itself to democracy and to attend to the social needs of the masses. To the extent it succeeds in infusing in the people the spirit of *Satyagraha*, it will build up a democracy which will be free alike from imperialist ambition and plutocratic domination. To the extent it swerves from this path and this ideal, it will weaken itself.

But India is a land of many people and Indian democracy must be sufficiently broad-based to win the confidence of all. Not unconscious of this fact, the Congress has always adopted a generous policy towards the minorities. Its recent resolution on minority rights (1938) declares that

Its primary duty and fundamental policy is to protect the religious, linguistic and cultural rights of the minorities in India, so as to assure them in any scheme to which the Congress is a party the widest scope, for their development, and participation in the fullest measure in the political, economic and cultural life of the nation.

It is only through a liberal, democratic policy inform-

⁵² "In South Africa, where I had the privilege of associating with thousands of our countrymen on most intimate terms, I observed almost invariably that the greater the possession of riches, the greater was their moral turpitude. Our rich men, to say the least, did not advance the moral struggle of passive resistance as did the poor. The rich men's sense of self-respect was not so much injured as that of the poorest." Mahatma Gandhi quoted by S. R. Javadekar in *Adhunik Bharat*, p. 608.

ed with a social urge that the Congress can hope to enlist the allegiance of the people.

So broad-based, Indian nationalism cannot be uni-national. "India, whether regarded from a physical or intellectual point of view, is herself the great exemplar of the doctrine of the One in Many which her philosophers proclaimed to the world."⁵³ With this significant sentence Havell begins his great book on Aryan rule in India and it really strikes at the heart of the Indian question. India, with her rich diversity, cannot be a nation in the narrow European sense. It would be unwise for her to strive to be so as her great poet-philosopher once pointed out :

If we cherish the desire of paying our all to buy a political nationality it will be as absurd as if Switzerland had staked her existence on her ambition to build up a navy powerful enough to compete with that of England.⁵⁴

India can survive and realize her destiny only if she gives to her many strains a common political receptacle. The subtle veracity of the Indian nation quivers delicately and mercurially between the overstatement of Muslim League separatism and the understatement of the Mahasabha's Hindu exclusiveness. It is on that veracity that the Congress seeks to build its house of freedom with many mansions.

The democratic nationalism of India must recognize in her diversity its greatest source of strength. This can only be done by respecting the integrity of every tradition that has lighted the path of our countrymen. This is the basis of the Fundamental Rights, to be incorporated in the Constitution, which guarantee to each citizen a common charter of liberties. Further, Indian nationalism recognizes the need for nations to expand into peaceful federal unit. Only so, as Jawaharlal Nehru has pointed out again and again, we may hope to establish a sane world order. Secondly, such federal expansion eschews violence and is, therefore, the denial of all mer-

⁵³ E. B. Havell, *The History of Aryan Rule in India*, p 3

⁵⁴ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism*, p. 108.

cantilist adventures. As Mahatma Gandhi put it recently in his own inimitable way, Indians will go to Burma, but they will do so without guns. The prospect of federation further reduces the danger of one nation tyrannizing over another.

That the federal idea is not the idle dream of a political visionary but sound politics will be obvious to any one who cares to give serious thought to recent European history. Outside peaceful federal expansion there seems to be no escape from the dilemma that is to-day facing sovereign nation states. It is no longer sound politics to say that every separate nation must be a separate State. One may even go further and submit that every national idea must expand within the context of the federal idea and that very few nations can afford to be separate national units. If they insist on moving in that direction their future will not be that of freedom but of vassalage. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has correctly pointed out in what direction our national movement must progress if it has to become a part of the new world Order.

If this new World Order or Federation does not come in the near future we should like to be closely associated in a federation with our neighbours—China, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Persia.⁵⁵

Such an ideal of nationalism can meet the challenge both of the League and the Mahasabha and also of men like Dr. Ambedkar who, in the name of Sidgewick, try to confuse the issue of India's political status and her future. If India is a land of many nationalities it does not follow that each such nationality must enjoy the luxury of a separate sovereign State. It is the essence of wisdom to learn from the mistakes of others and we must not build our house of freedom on the sands of exploded political theories. To demand a separate State for a separate nation and to quote Mill in support of that demand is to make the error of yesterday the law of to-day and the ultimate arbiter of our political destiny. One need not doubt that it will end only in disaster.

⁵⁵ *The Unity of India*, p. 389 (Indian edition).

For, as we saw in an earlier chapter, only that nationalism can survive in the stress of the modern world which embraces federalism, is anchored in democracy and has an answer to the insistent challenge of war. The *Satyagraha* technique gives to Indian nationalism as embodied by the Congress not only a firm foundation in democracy but opens up, by its insistence on non-violence, valuable possibilities of an answer to the modern challenge of war. In the present context of world interdependence no nation can really escape that challenge and to meet it with violence is for most nations an impossible adventure. At worst it means total annihilation, at best a total denial of that individual freedom and economic well-being which alone make nationalism an ideal worthy of our loyalty. Moreover, the development of mechanized and total warfare has deprived war of all the glamour of chivalry and turned it into a mad fight between rival brute forces from which all moral and ethical considerations have to withdraw themselves. Lincoln condemned slavery because it degraded the master as much as the slave. The same could be said of modern warfare, for no matter how just your cause may be, war in the end will degrade it. One cannot fight the enemy without improving upon the enemy's weapons.

The technique of *Satyagraha* meets all these difficulties and yet does not become helpless for it combines the peaceful basis of constitutional agitation with the courage, discipline, self-sacrifice, and militant obduracy of war. It gives to every individual spiritual and moral sanctions in his fight for freedom and peace in a world ridden down by material considerations.

To conclude, we can say that the national idea as embodied and expounded by the Congress includes the Mazzinian ideal and has its own contribution to make in offering a solution to the challenge of war. Mazzinian nationalism which failed all over Europe has at last embodied itself in the Congress. Gandhiji, the architect of the Congress as we know it to-day, seems to have been conscious of this as early as 1908. He wrote in that year:

Italy of Mazzini still remains in a state of slavery. At the time of the so-called national war, it was a game of chess bet-

ween two rival kings with the people of Italy as pawns. The working classes in that land are still unhappy. The condition of the people in general still remains the same. I am sure you do not want to reproduce such a condition in India. I believe you want the millions of India to be happy, not that you want the reins of government in your hands. You will admit that people under several Indian princes are being ground down. The latter mercilessly crush them. My patriotism does not teach me that I am to allow people to be crushed under the heel of Indian princes if only the English retire. I should resist the tyranny of the Indian princes just as much as that of the English. By patriotism I mean the welfare of the whole people...⁵⁶

In these lofty words is summed up the quintessence of Indian nationalism by one who stands to-day as its unchallenged exponent.

⁵⁶ *Hind Swaraj*, pp. 97-100 (1938 edition).

CHAPTER XI

HINDU COMMUNALISM

I

In the making of the communal triangle in India, the Hindu strand has played no inconspicuous part. Hindu communalism has been both an irritant and a reaction to Muslim communalism. It cannot be denied that the two communalisms have fed and fattened on each other. Each has provided the *raison d'être* and the stimulus needed for the other.

It has often, and very ably, been argued that Caste, the core of the Hindu social system, and Democracy or Nationalism go ill together.¹ Historians have argued that it was the handicap of social articulation into caste system that was responsible for the collapse of the Hindu polity facing the Islamic invasion.² Without delving into the past, we can briefly state the main criticisms levelled against the caste system from a national or democratic point of view.

Caste has proved to be the greatest fissiparous force known to politics, splitting politics into introspective and egocentric groups which find a great difficulty in adjusting themselves to society. Caste contracts the sympathies of the people instead of expanding them and considerably circumscribes the social commerce between citizen and citizen. Moreover, caste as the dominating institution has set the fashion and tone for all forms of social organization, so that society has tended to become ever more divided and sectionalised. The Muslims, Christians and even the Britishers in India have been influenced by the caste-spirit

¹ cf. K. M. Panikkar : *Caste and Democracy*.

² cf. H. G. Rawlinson : *India*, 211-12.

and have failed to prevent that pattern from asserting itself in their social life. Caste thus exercises a pervasive influence in India.

After the Muslim invasion of India, the Hindu society unable to assimilate the invaders, that is, unable to assign them a place in the hierarchy of castes, placed them outside the pale—alien and untouchable. Eight hundred years later, it gave the same response to the British occupation. But so long as Muslims were the ruling class they could not feel and, therefore, did not resent the social exclusiveness of the Hindus. But when they lost their political power, the social insularity of the Hindus proved very galling to the Muslims. These reactions were further strengthened by the revivalist movements that grew up among the Hindus and Muslims in the last three generations or so. This aspect of the communal problem has been fully treated in a book recently published by a well-known Ahrar leader³ and deserves our attention.

Musalman of the Aryan race, Musalmans of the Sufi cult, Musalmans of the High Houses, Musalmans of good education were treated alike as untouchables of the Hindu society. You may be a pucca nationalist and a four-square Gandhite, yet you will be treated as an untouchable as soon as you announce to a Hindu that you are a Musalman. However justified the Hindus feel and however innocent they plead in their treatment of the Musalmans, in justice they cannot blame the latter if they cultivate an ill-feeling towards them.⁴

There is, indeed, an element of exaggeration in the above cited passage but there is also an undeniable core of truth. Hindus do not always realise what damage they do to themselves and to others by their attitude of social exclusiveness, whose worst expression is untouchability. Gandhiji is not unaware of this aspect of the problem and its relation to the communal disharmony. In a recent issue of the *Harijan*, he wrote: "I regard untouchability as the root cause of our downfall and Hindu-Muslim discord."⁵

³ *Pakistan and Untouchability* by Ch. Afzal Haq (Maktaba-e-Urdu, Lahore).

⁴ *Ibid.* 47.

⁵ The *Harijan*, dated 25th May, 1940.

While it cannot be gainsaid that the Hindu society, if it is to function without friction in a democratic world-order, needs an egalitarian orientation, it is swinging to the other extreme to argue, as Dr. Latif does,⁶ that the Hindu society is incapable of this achievement. It is unfortunate that Muslim resentment to Hindu exclusiveness should express as a counter-exclusiveness.⁷ Only to the extent we permit free cultural commerce and social intercourse among the people shall we succeed in solving the communal problem.

II

In an earlier chapter we have argued that there are two "Nationalisms" in India. Dr. Beni Prasad in his recent book comes to the same conclusion and designates the two tendencies, "for the sake of convenience, modernism and revivalism." "From their inter-action and from the accompanying political reaction, arose the Hindu-Muslim problem in its present phase," thus observes Dr. Beni Prasad.⁸

Another writer, discussing the communal problem, has drawn similar conclusions:

This reaction to slavery in subject countries took two forms ... Thus, on one hand there arose the movements for Back to the Vedas in India, glorification of Darius and Pahlvi movement in Persia, the Pan Turanian movement in Turkey and Back to Confucius in China...

It was inevitable for this school to express its political

⁶ Syed Abdul Latif : *The Muslim Problem in India*, 4-9.

⁷ cf. "Two Maulvis arrived in Jabbi village, Shahpur District..... They advised the Muslim villagers to boycott the non-Muslim shops and to oppose others making use of the water in the village spring. Inevitably a minor skirmish resulted followed by a compromise proposal conceding the non-Muslims the right to draw water but denying them the right to wash in the locality. When the intolerable terms were taken exception to by the non-Muslim leader as being stringent, the Muslims were excited and some of them chased him and savagely stoned him to death"—Kaundinya : *Federation or Partition*, 37.

⁸ *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, 19.

ferences that were or are still held.”¹⁰ If this is true then we get a glimpse of the psychological atmosphere in which the Hindu Mahasabha as we know it to-day came into existence.

There seems to be no agreement on this date but there is no doubt that the first important session of the Hindu Mahasabha was held at Benares in 1923. Pandit Malaviya presided over the session. “Rules of the Mahasabha were amended and draft resolutions were prepared. Provincial and branch Hindu Sabhas now began to be organized.”¹¹

In December 1924, the Mahasabha met in special session at Belgaum. The Session was held in the Congress pandal, attended by prominent Congress leaders among whom were the Ali brothers, Dr. Mahmood, M. Hasrat Mohani and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Again, Pt. Malaviya presided.

Answering the criticism that the Mahasabha was a communal organization, the President said:

It would be a shame if any Hindu opposed the National Congress. Their object was to supplement and strengthen the Congress. The necessity for organizing the Mahasabha had arisen because the Congress being a political body could not deal with questions which affected various communities in social and other non-political spheres.

Emphasizing that the Mahasabha was essentially a cultural movement, Pandit Malaviya laid stress on the fact that it “believed in non-violence and to kill sentiments and prejudices by love and not force.”¹²

We see here that Pt. Malaviya is anxious to point out that the Mahasabha is not a political but a cultural movement and that in political matters it would take its queue from the Congress.

One of the resolutions passed at the Session, however, strikes a slightly different note.

¹⁰ Foreword to *A Review of the History and the Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement*, by Indra Prasad, Published by the Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹² *Indian Annual Register*, 1924, Vol. II, pp. 484-85.

The Sabha would not only be confined to the social and religious uplift of the Hindus, but would also focus and express Hindu opinion in political problems.

A very thin line divides expression of opinion and formulation of policies and the Mahasabha, as we shall see, was to get a distinct political colour within the next few years.

Sir P. C. Ray perhaps feared as much, for, at the next session of the Mahasabha which met at Calcutta, he, as Chairman of the Reception Committee, advised the Hindu Mahasabha "to confine its activities to the reform of internal abuses and to the consolidation of the different sections and castes of Hindu community."¹³

Lala Lajpat Rai, in his presidential address, warmly supported the nationalist policy so far followed by the Hindus. He said that they were striving for a national government founded on justice to all communities, all classes and all interests. He also insisted that the Hindus must on no account give up the Congress and said, "the Hindu Sabhas should make no encroachment on the province of the Congress, except so far as purely communal questions are concerned."

In the meantime the Suddhi and Sangathan movement was already increasing the tension between the two communities. And the fact that the movement had a distinct political bias made the tension worse.¹⁴ Secondly, the Congress approach to communal questions being fundamentally different from that of the Mahasabha, a parting of the ways was inevitable. In the nature of things there can be no purely communal questions in this country. Communal threads are closely woven into the whole fabric of our national life and our attitude to the communal question is bound to colour

¹³ I. A. R. 1925, Vol. I, p. 377.

¹⁴ cf. "In a country like India.....Suddhi movement ceases to be merely theological or dogmatic one, but assumes the wider significance of a political and national movement"—V. D. Savarkar: *Introduction to A Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha*—11-12.

our attitude to the larger political and national questions.

And this is what happened to the Mahasabha also. Though Mr. Kelkar, who presided over the Calcutta session of the Mahasabha, re-emphasized the cultural regeneration of Hindu society as the main object of the Mahasabha, in the following year at Delhi, the Mahasabha took an important political decision. By then the Congress had given up non-cooperation and started the Swaraj Party. The Delhi Session of the Mahasabha passed a resolution on council entry and authorized the organization that "it should take all proper steps which include running of its own candidates where necessary to safeguard Hindu interests."

Pt. Motilal Nehru submitted a note at this Session in which he strongly deprecated this departure in the policy of the Mahasabha and pointed out how the Mahasabha had no political programme of its own but brought "together under its banner political parties as wide apart as the poles." He said:

How then can it possibly perform the functions of a political caucus! The eligibility of candidates for elections is not to be judged by their political convictions, but by degree of solicitude they show to protect communal interests. It is obvious that an extreme non-co-operating Congressman may have it in the same degree as an ultra loyalist.

This sound analysis of the politics of a communal party has remained true of the Hindu Mahasabha. Beyond passing a resolution on "Purna Swaraj" the Mahasabha has evolved no method of political action and because its attitude to the communal question is diametrically opposed to that of the Congress, it has been driven into a position from which it is forced to oppose the Congress all along the line.

At a special session at Gauhati, the Mahasabha passed a resolution expressing its abhorrence at the murder of Swami Sradhdhanandji. By another resolution it called upon the Hindus to "refrain from doing anything which may be reasonably calculated to retard the growth of a uni-

ted Indian nation."

For the next few years the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha were completely overshadowed by the tremendous upheaval that shook the country in connection with the Simon Commission agitation. In that unprecedented national upheaval the voice of communalism became silent.

With the announcement of the Communal Award and the resumption of parliamentary activities by the Congress, communal activities once again came to the forefront. Mr. N. C. Kelkar, who presided at the Delhi Session of the Mahasabha in 1932 condemned the Communal Award and the boycott of Councils: the one because it was unjust and the other because it was suicidal.

In the next year the Hindu Mahasabha came out in open opposition to the Congress. In that year the Mahasabha met in Session at Ajmer. Bhai Parmanand presided. In his presidential address he said:

I feel an impulse in me that the Hindus will willingly co-operate with Great Britain if their status and responsible position as the premier community in India is recognized in the political institutions of new India.

The only method of compelling Great Britain to do so was to strengthen the Sangathan movement.

The Chairman of the Reception Committee attacked the Congress policy and said that the present political plight of the Hindus was due to the confusion in the brains of the Congress leaders and added that if the Hindus persisted in following the Congress they would be dashing their heads against the rocks.

Resolutions deprecating class war and deciding to capture the legislatures were passed at this Session.

On 8th July, 1934, the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha met in New Delhi. It congratulated Pandit Malaviya and Mr. Aney for leaving the Congress Parliamentary Board. The basis of the election manifesto drafted by the Committee was opposition to the Communal Award.

At its 1935 Session at Cawnpore, the Hindu Mahasabha

passed a resolution declaring the inability of the British Parliament to frame a constitution for India and, therefore, calling upon the Emperor of India to do so with the help of the Indian people. This was suggested as the correct alternative to the impractical method of a Constituent Assembly.

During Christmas 1937 the Mahasabha met at Ahmedabad. Mr. Savarkar defined the aim of the organization as

The maintenance, protection and promotion of the Hindu Race, Hindu culture, and Hindu civilization and the advancement of the glory of Hindu *rashtra*, and with a view to secure them, the attainment of *Purna Swaraj*, i. e., absolute political independence for Hindustan by legitimate means.

In a lengthy presidential speech at the next Session in Nagpur, Mr. Savarkar elaborated his theory of a Hindu nation and said:

Our politics hereafter will be purely Hindu politics fashioned and tested in Hindu terms only, in such wise as will help the consolidation, freedom, and life-growth of our Hindu Nation.

To realize this end he exhorted all Hindus to unite and capture power from the *Congress* (Italics ours) which was becoming increasingly anti-Hindu. The method to chastise Congress nationalist fad and to raise Hindudom to a powerful position in the land was,

(1) Boycott the Congress, (2) Don't vote for the Congress ticket, (3) and vote only for a confirmed and merited Hindu nationalist.

Next year, at Calcutta, Mr. Savarkar repeated the sentiments of the previous year and defined Hindu by the now famous couplet

आसिषु सिषु पर्यन्ता यस्य भारत भूमिका ।
पितृभूः पुण्यभूश्चैव स वै हिंदुरिति स्मृतः ॥

He also gave detailed definitions of Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom. There was the usual criticism of Congress policies.

This short account of the Hindu Mahasabha would be sufficient to bring out its true character. Its whole pers-

pective is warped by its communal bias. It is interesting to point out how as the years advanced it became more and more a political body and forgot its cultural activities. To take a single instance, Gandhiji alone has done more for the cause of the Harijans than all the professed champions of Hindutva and Hindudom. In this connection, the activities for Mr. V. D. Savarkar before and after he became the president of the Hindu Mahasabha, reveal the basic antagonism between communal organizations and progressive political and social action. It is hardly an accident that with his assumption of the presidentship of the Hindu Mahasabha, Mr. Savarkar put a stop to his virulent campaign against untouchability.

In political matters the Mahasabha's attitude is equally warped. Instead of a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution for India, it suggests the novel alternative of the Emperor of India framing it with the help of the Indian people! The suggestion is so absurd that we need not even mention it but it helps us to realize the puerile politics that is absorbing the Mahasabha's attention. Secondly, it is significant to point out that the Mahasabha is thinking all the time in terms of capturing power from the Congress. As if Congress is the fountain of power in this country.

Such a warped perspective seems to be inevitable in a communal organization that begins to dabble in politics, for politics whose motive-spring is the interest of a community and not the basic social urges of the people, inevitably leads to racial arrogance, communal exclusiveness and narrow particularism. The Hindu Society in all conscience needs to be rejuvenated and reorganized. To talk of a Hindu nation with several million Harijans and Non-Brahmins straining at the leash is to show a poor conception of the very idea of nationality. This rejuvenation of the Hindu society will not be achieved by abusing either the Congress or the League or any other party for that matter. As a recent book on Pakistan points out¹⁵ it will be achieved only by young men inspired with a missionary zeal who dedicate themselves to the task of removing the black spot

¹⁵ S. L. Karandikar—*Pakistanche Sankat*, Chap. 13.

on the Hindu Society. We have no doubt that in course of time such men will come to realize that the basic problems they have to tackle in this country are not peculiar to the Hindu community alone but they are problems that face the people of India as a whole. They will then get a broad perspective of the condition of our people and devise adequate and effective political weapons to achieve their salvation.

The Hindu Mahasabha seems to be uninspired by this deep social urge. Otherwise it is impossible to explain its opposition to the various activities of the Congress which seek to bring a ray of hope and light into the otherwise wretched lives of our dumb millions. Actually, the Hindu Mahasabha is wedded to the politics of power and in its effects to capture power it sees in the Congress an adversary even more formidable than the British Raj in India.

So our two communal organizations come to the same end by devious paths. We see them both engaged in the unenviable task of undermining what little strength the Congress has built up over a long period of struggle and achievement, while the British Raj, from the heights of Simla, smiles a smile that is not without appreciation and encouragement.

CHAPTER XII

THE MOVEMENT FOR PAKISTAN

Mr. M. A. Jinnah has published a collection of articles by himself and his colleagues, that embody, according to him, "well-considered views" "that will make a considerable contribution towards the clarification of the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League."¹ In so authoritative a book, the genesis of Pakistan is given in the following words:

The Idea of Pakistan, it is well known, originated in the brain of the late Hazrat Allama Iqbal. It at once met with hostile criticism and even ridicule. It was said that the Poet Philosopher of Islam had, like all other poets, allowed his imagination to run away with his reason; that the idea was no more than a poetical flight and that it had no practical value. It was, however, conveniently forgotten that a man like Iqbal was not a mere poetaster; he was something more than that..... He was the mirror of his age. He was the mouthpiece of the highest aspirations of his people.²

Edward Thompson had held a similar view about the genesis of Pakistan. And he once said so in *The Observer*, but Iqbal promptly corrected him.

Iqbal was a friend, and he set my mis-conception right [writes Mr. Thompson.] After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming 'on my vast, undisciplined and starving land' he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Muslim community. 'But I am the President of the Muslim League and it is therefore my duty to support it.'³

The whole movement for Pakistan is permeated with

¹ *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, Preface.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

³ Edward Thompson : *Enlist India for Freedom*, 58.

such wishful thinking and obvious contrariness, but it is directed with a definite end in view.

That end is the conquest of power. Taking a cue from recent European developments, the leaders of the Muslim League have been following a certain technique for the conquest of power. The first step in this technique is to make extravagant demands.

In 1928, the Muslim demands were formulated in what later came to be known as the Fourteen Points. *Inter alia*, it was suggested that the "only form of government suitable to Indian conditions is a federal system, with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent states." This demand for a loose federation was coupled with a very remarkable proviso:

And whereas it is essential that the Constitution should provide that no change in the Indian constitution shall, after its inauguration, be made by the Central Legislature except with concurrence of *all* the States constituting the Indian Federation (*Italics ours*).

Any one state could, thus, exercise a Polish veto! No federation in the world has such a constitutional provision. One can provide for $2/3$ or $3/4$ majority or for a two-thirds majority of the "Hindu" as well as the "Muslim" states separately, but to insist on concurrence of *all* the states is to put a premium on obduracy.

This is no isolated instance of unreasonable demands. In 1934, the Government issued Orders fixing the proportion of various communities in the Services. The working Committee of the All India Muslim Conference expressed their disapproval because

The Government has failed to protect service interests, justice and fair play so far as Muslims are concerned inasmuch as it has fixed Muslim representation at 25 per cent on a population basis, and not on the basis of their representation in the Legislature, that is $33.1/3$ per cent.

That a community should get weightage in the Legislature is one thing, that it should enjoy the weightage in services also is unconscionable. The League's demand for a fifty per cent share in the governance of India is a develop-

ment of this old tendency.

The technique has received great finesse at the hands of Mr. Jinnah. An example or two will make this point clear. In 1935, Mr. Jinnah and Dr. Rajendra Prasad had prolonged negotiations on the Communal question. An agreement was arrived at, but it fell through not because "Congressmen were not agreeable, but because those leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha on whose signature Mr. Jinnah insisted were not agreeable."⁴ The Congress pressed the League to accept the agreed formula and gave the assurance that "the Congress would fight those Hindus who were opposed to it." "But this was not considered enough by Mr. Jinnah and as it was impossible to fulfil his demand that the Hindu Mahasabha should also join, the matter was dropped."⁴ In 1935, therefore, Mr. Jinnah was not satisfied with the credentials of the Congress to represent the Hindus. Endorsement of the Mahasabha was needed over and above agreement by the Congress.

By 1938, however, the Congress had become, for Mr. Jinnah, a Hindu organization. He invited Mr. Gandhi, the leader of the Congress, to represent "Hindus throughout the country."⁵ By 1941, the characterization of the Congress had again changed. It no longer represented "Hindus throughout the country," it now represented "none but the high caste Hindus."⁶ The representative character of the Congress changes according to the needs of the League's politics of power.

From 1935 to 1941, the Congress has gained in mass support and has widened its basis. "The high-caste Hindus" are, if anything, drifting to the Hindu Mahasabha, which has gained in strength considerably in this period. In the face of these developments the League's changing characterizations of the Congress are all the more significant.

There is one continuous thread running through the

⁴Dr. Rajendra Prasad's Press Statement quoted in the Indian Annual Register, 1937 (Vol. I), pp. 229-31.

⁵Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence, p. 87.

⁶Jamil-ud-din Ahmad: *op. cit.*, p. 81.

otherwise chequered history of the League. It is the search for safeguards for the Muslims, as they are in a minority in India. But now that the League has discovered that the Indian Mussalmans are a separate nation, it turns round on the Congress and attacks it for referring to the Muslims as a minority !

According to the Congress phraseology, minority and Muslims have become synonymous. Why not call Hindus a minority because they are a minority in the N. W. F. P., Baluchistan, Sind, the Punjab, Bengal and Kashmir ? The Congress by constantly treating the Muslims as a minority has admitted the fact that India is not a nation.⁷

The corner-stone of the whole edifice of the safeguards was that the Muslims are a minority community in India. It is to-day shown as a mill-stone put by the Congress round the Muslim neck !

The best *exposé* of its technique is, however, to be found in a critical analysis of the recent propaganda of the Muslim League.

In 1936, the League passed a comprehensive resolution on the new constitution framed by the Government of India Act of 1935. Referring to the Provincial part of it, the resolution reads as follows:

The League considers that having regard to the conditions prevailing in the country, the provincial scheme of the constitution be utilized for what it is worth, in spite of the most objectionable features contained therein, which render real control, responsibility of Ministry and Legislature over the entire field of government and administration nugatory.

It is worthy of note that the League did not then believe

⁷ *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, p. 125.

Also cf. J. Ahmad : op. cit., 49 : "The reference to minorities (in the Congress proposals) is a pure deception. For one thing, they (the Congress) presume to speak of the ninety million Muslims as a mere numerical minority like other small groups in the country; whereas Muslims claim and rightly claim to be a nation."

It is interesting to note that as late as October 1937, Mr. Jinnah had "presumed to speak" of the Muslims as a minority : "The All India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of Mussalmans *and other minorities* effectively." (*Italics ours*).

that any real power, for good or evil, was transferred to the popular ministers.

The next important document of the League was its Election Manifesto (June 1936). Summing up the League's position it said:

The main principles on which we expect our representatives in various Legislatures to work will be (1) that the present provincial constitution and the proposed central constitution should be replaced immediately by democratic self-government, (2) and that in the meantime, representatives of the Muslim League in the various Legislatures will utilize the Legislatures in order to extract the maximum benefit out of the constitution for the benefit of the people in the various spheres of national life. The Muslim League Party must be formed as a corollary so long as separate electorates exist, but there would be free co-operation with any group whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League Party. The League appeals to the Mussalmans that they should not permit themselves to be exploited on economic or any other grounds which will break up the solidarity of the community.

The League, however, forgot its promise of "democratic full self-government" on the morrow of the elections. In 1940, Mr. Jinnah wrote: "Western democracy is totally unsuited for India and its imposition on India is the disease of the body politic."⁸ The second pledge too, fared little better. Opposition to the Congress was organised not because it neglected to "extract the maximum benefit from the constitution for the uplift of the people"—this part of the programme was virtually ignored by the League—but because of 'atrocities' against the Muslims. We have already seen on what flimsy a basis the whole campaign of "atrocities" has been built up.⁹

⁸ *Time and Tide*, 19th January, 1940.

⁹ In a statement issued in this connection Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said, "...I may briefly say that during all this period no complaint which came to my knowledge went without being critically inquired into. All my colleagues.....know to what degree my attitude has remained strict and uncompromising in these matters..... it was not uncommon for me to go through the files of such affairs personally and strictly to examine them on every point." cf. *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* by Mahadev Desai (George Allen Unwin 1941) pp. 147 et. seq.

The real cause of annoyance was the formation of party governments by the Congress in the provinces. But if there were no coalition ministries, the League has to shoulder its share of responsibility. It failed to carry out the third pledge made in the Election Manifesto. Given a common political and economic programme and policy, co-operation with the Congress was not difficult. Pandit Nehru had assured as much:

The Congress has gone to the Assemblies with a definite programme and in furtherance of a definite policy. It will always gladly co-operate with other groups, whether it is in a majority or a minority in an Assembly, in furtherance of that programme and policy. On that basis I can conceive of even Coalition Ministries being formed.¹⁰

He made great efforts to establish such an agreement with the League. In November 1937 he wrote to Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan, a leader of the League:

I do not quite know what our differences are in politics. ... What are the specific policies and programmes or principles of the Congress with which you do not agree? You will remember that you and Khaliq-uz-zaman told us that you agreed with the Wardha programme of the Congress. This is a pretty comprehensive programme which includes almost everything that we stand for.¹¹

The Nawab Saheb gave a cleverly evasive reply.

You have very kindly asked me to define our points of difference, but I think having regard to our readiness to work in the Legislature on the basis of the Wardha programme which, as you say is fairly comprehensive, it is now for you to point out where you still differ from us.¹²

Pandit Nehru drew blank from Mr. Jinnah. In exasperation he wrote to the latter:

I am afraid our letters to each other repeat themselves. I go on requesting you to tell us what exactly are the points in dispute.... But what are these matters which are germane?

¹⁰ Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence, p. 72.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

¹² Ibid., p. 11.

It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so I deserve to be enlightened.¹³

To this passionate outburst Mr. Jinnah replied: "Perhaps you have heard of the Fourteen Points."¹⁴ "The Fourteen Points" rejoined Pandit Nehru, "were somewhat out of date. Many of their provisions have been given effect to by the Communal Award and in other ways."¹⁵ The League President's reply to this can be summed up in a sentence: "We can go on multiplying the list!"¹⁶ The League ignored the outstretched hand of the Congress because it had other plans up its sleeve.

In June 1938, the League presented the following eleven demands to the Congress:

1. The *Bande-Mataram* song should be given up;
2. Muslim majorities in the provinces where such majorities exist at present must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustment;
3. Muslims' practice of cow-slaughter should not be interfered with;
4. Muslims' right to call *Azan* and perform their religious ceremonies should not be interfered with in anyway;
5. Muslims' personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute;
6. The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the Constitution by a statutory enactment;
7. The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award, and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism;
8. Statutory guarantee should be given that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed;
9. Representation in local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and popular strength;
10. The Tri-colour Flag should be changed or alternatively the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance;
11. Recognition of the League as the one and only authoritative and representative organisation of the Indian Muslims.

¹³ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 58.

It will be noticed that the sting is in the tail. The most important—and a novel—demand is the last one. It soon became the Big Stick of League propaganda. The demand was soon turned into an assertion of fact and the Congress was denounced for not honouring it!

The President (of the Andhra Muslim League Conference) referred to the attempts on the part of the Congress to create a split among the Muslims by weaning some of them from the Muslim League. The attempt on the part of the Congress to enrol more Muslims as Congressmen was bound to be considered a hostile act aiming at the disintegration of the Muslim solidarity.¹⁷

Mr. Jinnah too declared:

The Congress attempt under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Mussalmans is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Mussalmans and is an attempt to detach them from their accredited leaders.¹⁸

The League put up a notice: "Keep away from the Muslim Community", and took its stand by it. This position, however, is not as innocent as it looks. It does not refer to cultural or religious solidarity but to political. It denies the right of every Mussalman to join any political organisation he likes. He can be represented by the League alone! It deprives other political parties from influencing the Muslims. Worst of all, this demand would spell the doom of Indian nationalism.

The Congress cannot admit the argument that it must not function in a particular religious group. For if it does so, it ceases to be national. If it does so, it must also retire from other such groups and ultimately it must fade away.¹⁹

In just over a year the League thus belied the promises made in its Election Manifesto. For their implementing would have led to a road parallel with the Congress. The League was not prepared to follow that road. It had there-

¹⁷ The Indian Annual Register, 1939 (Vol. I), 371.

¹⁸ Presidential Address to the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League (1937).

¹⁹ Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence, p. 18.

fore to discover an alternate lever of power. It found it in inflaming Muslim separatism.

The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so feminine in their nature and attitude that their activities and thoughts are motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment. This sentiment, however, is not very complicated but very simple and complete The proof of this brilliant knowledge of the primitiveness of the great masses was to be found in the atrocity propaganda.²⁰

These words of Hitler could have been written for the Muslim League. From 1937-1938, a brilliantly organised campaign against the Congress ministries for their alleged atrocities against the Muslims was carried on. The stage was set for the next move.

In October 1938, the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference, presided over by Mr. Jinnah, passed the following resolution:

This Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determinations of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations, viz., Federation of Muslim States and Federation of Non-Muslim States

The Lahore resolution of March 1940 merely reiterates this demand in precise terms. But both resolutions are equally vague about the schemes of partition. For these schemes—that are to ensure “the unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations”—we have to skim through the voluminous literature produced by the adherents of the League, some of it semi-authoritative, some without the *imprimatur* of the League but none without interest and relevance. This literature deals with the plans of partitioning India, and each plan has somewhat different

²⁰ Adolf Hitler : *Mein Kampf*, 237-8 (Reynal and Hitchcock edition).

schemes to offer. We shall not here examine in detail the various schemes, as that has already been done by Dr. Rajendra Prasad.²¹ We are here anxious to find out how far these schemes ensure the objectives set out in the resolution.

"Punjabi," offering his scheme of the Confederacy of India, adds:

This idea of a binational, trilingual and quinquepartite confederation may be novel, and unprecedented in history, but it is not unpracticable. A reduced Hindu minority and the Kashmir State with a Muslim population and a Hindu Raja in the federated North-West will form a guarantee for the security of the Muslim minority and Hyderabad State with Hindu population and a Muslim Nizam in Hindu India, and *vice versa*.

The entire scheme is thus based on a theory of hostages.

Dr. Abdul Latif has elaborated a scheme of dividing India into cultural zones and then confederating them.²² He envisages a wide-scale transfer of population to make the zones homogeneous. Apart from the North-Western and the Eastern States the scheme demands the creation of two more states for the Muslims. The great bulk at present living in the United Provinces and Bihar, numbering about 12 millions, may be concentrated in "a block extending in a line from the eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow, rounding up Rampur on the way." This is the Delhi-Lucknow State.

The Moslems below the Vindhya and Satpuras are scattered all over the South in colonies of varying size and exceed 12 millions in number. For them a zone is to be carved. Such a zone the Dominions of Hyderabad and Berar may provide with a narrow strip of territory restored to them in the South, running down via Kurnool and Cuddapah to the City of Madras. There is an influential school of thought among the Muslims who prefer to have an opening to the Western Coast via Bijapur. Such a strip with an opening to the sea will be found necessary to settle the large Moslem mercantile and marine community living for ages on the Coromandal and Malabar Coasts.

²¹ Pakistan (Pub. Allied Publishers, Bombay).

²² Muslim Problems in India.

The assignment of such a large block of territory to a small number of Mus' ms, only about 12 millions, is justified on the ground that the Muslims of Southern India have shown phenomenal increase in population, during the last few decades, and "their future expansions to be kept in view." Moreover, the Muslims of the North East and Delhi-Lucknow Blocks, confined within narrow zones, should have in this area provision made for their surplus population of the present and the future. Dr. Latif's scheme, thus, adumbrates a sort of *lebensraum* for the Muslims in India. And it proposes to annex the ports of Calcutta and Madras for the Muslim zones!

The Aligarh scheme (prepared by Professors Syed Zafrul Hasan and Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri of Aligarh) also asks for an independent and enlarged Hyderabad (Berar and Karnatak to be restored to it). The demand for Pakistan thus spreads from North-West and North-East to the South also. The Professors, however, have two new suggestions. First, all the towns of India with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a Borough or a Free City with a large measure of autonomy.

Since the authors have compared Hindus and Muslims to Czechs and Sudetan Germans, one may compare these free cities to Danzig, and one can only hope that it is not intended that history should repeat itself and India see a war.....to free the so-called 'free cities'—the Danzig—of India.²³

When Franco's columns marched from four sides on Madrid, he is reported to have boasted that he had a Fifth Column in the beleaguered city. The Aligarh professors have taken care to arrange for such Fifth Columns. Even after partition, they claim that in Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as a separate nation and an accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of these Mussalmans. The League will thus not only carve out independent states but also possess organized, irredentist minority groups in every part of Hindustan. It is interesting to note that there is no men-

²³ Rajendra Prasad : op. cit., pp. 39-40.

tion of similar rights in the case of Hindus living in the Muslim States.

The various schemes proposed have, therefore, not been evolved "in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian Continent"²⁴ but for other ulterior aims. Nor is there a word in these schemes regarding matters cultural, economic and social.

This ideological extravagance does not remain unreflected in the day-to-day politics of the League. In 1938, a bill dealing with local bodies was introduced by the Congress Ministry in the Bombay Legislative Assembly. It provided for separate electorates but an option was given to the people concerned to adopt a joint electorate, if they so chose. This was in accordance with No. 5 of the Fourteen Points, which laid down that,

Representation of Communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorate as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate.

This bill, however, was vehemently opposed by the League group in the Assembly and the retaining of the option clause was made one of the atrocity charges against the Congress!

Like the beans stalk in the fairy tale, the League's demands grow by leaps and bounds and, chameleon like, they defy description. Ere they have been defined they have changed and grown! This is one of the fundamental characteristics of the League's technique of agitation. In 1936, the Muslim League Party was "formed as a *corollary*

²⁴ Resolution of the Sind Muslim League Conference.

"That two nations" will continue to plague India even after partition is evident from the following conversation with Mr. Jinnah reported by Edward Thompson: "Two nations, Mr. Jinnah, confronting each other in every province, every town, every village." "Two nations confronting each other in every province. Every town. Every village. That is the only solution." "That is a very terrible solution, Mr. Jinnah!" "It is a terrible solution. But it is the only one."

so long as separate electorates exist.”²⁵ By April 1938, the League claimed “the status of complete equality with the Congress.”²⁶ In August 1938, the League was declared to be “the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Mussalmans of India.”²⁷ In October 1938, came the suggestion for two federations in India.²⁸ Early in 1939, Mr. Jinnah made a claim for a fifty per cent share in the governance of India—this was the price demanded for not disrupting the unity of India. In September 1939, a further step was taken. It was declared that Muslim India was

Opposed to the domination of the Hindu majority over mussalmans and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India and is irrevocably opposed to any ‘Federal objective’ which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the people of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state.²⁹

The time was now thought to be ripe to come forward with the demand of Pakistan. The League propagandists had prepared the ground and the Government was not unresponsive.³⁰ In March 1940, therefore, the famous Lahore resolution was passed. In the considered view of the League “no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims” that failed to constitute the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India into “Independent States.”

In April 1941, the League at its Madras Session, made Pakistan the creed of the Muslim League. It also extended

²⁵ The League’s Election Manifesto (1936).

²⁶ M. A. Jinnah’s Presidential Address to the Special Session of the All India Muslim League at Calcutta.

²⁷ Mr. Jinnah’s letter to Sjt. Subhas Bose, the then President of the Congress.

²⁸ Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference.

²⁹ Resolution of the Working Committee of the League.

³⁰ cf. “I was astonished last autumn (i.e. August-September, 1939) to find that certain official circles were keen on the Pakistan idea”—Edward Thompson: *op. cit.*, 59.

the scope of the Lahore resolution to non-Muslims, such as the Dravids, when it raised the demand for a separate state of Dravidistan. In October 1938, at the Sind Provincial Muslim League Conference it was suggested that "India may be divided into two federations, viz., Federation of Muslim States and Federation of non-Muslim States." In 1941, the non-Muslim states were to be further divided into two federations: the Aryan and the Dravidian. This extension of the sphere of influence of the League was very subtly and cleverly carried out. At the Calcutta Session of the League Mr. Jinnah had observed:

The Muslim League is not only carrying on a struggle for the Muslims but it maintains that all other important minorities must have the same sense of security and a place under the sun of India where they will enjoy the rights and privileges as free citizens and not be ground down by caste tyranny and caste rule.

This general statement was given a point and thrust to prepare the ground for demanding Dravidistan. At the Madras session of the League the *Quaid-e-Azam* derisively declared:

Imagine what that three per cent of the high castes (Brahmins) can do by skilful manoeuvring and by skilful methods of electioneering. Three per cent of them have secured a majority rule. Is this democracy?

A movement that was started to maintain the solidarity of the Muslim community ended in invading the integrity of the Hindu community. By disintegrating India, League imperium is to be established.

The same finished mastery is seen in the "sales-talk" of Pakistan. It is offered to the public with all kinds of inviting arguments—not a few of them conflicting and mutually destructive!

The purpose of propaganda [wrote the master propagandist, Hitler] is not to interest a few *blase* masters, but to convince the masses.....Thus the slogan has to be illuminated from various sides, but the end of every reflection has always and again to be the slogan itself.²¹

²¹ Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf*, p. 239.

And this has been the governing idea in all propaganda for Pakistan.

The most difficult obstacle to surmount is to overcome the opposition of the Sikhs to a separate Muslim State. In such a state the Sikhs would be in a minority. It is the position of India repeated, with Muslims cast in the role of the Hindus and the Sikhs as the principal minority. Unblushingly the League uses the very arguments that it has vehemently denounced when they came from the hapless Hindus !

The Punjab can play no important part in a United India where its interests will be inadequately defended at the Centre and where it will lose its present position as an independent economic unit. The creation of bigger Punjab with natural expansion in the North-West and South, so as to include Kashmir, the Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, is in reality the regeneration of the old historical kingdom which the Sikhs tried to keep united in their time of glory and which now will be supported by the combined might of Muslims and Sikhs. A true Punjabi should always try to place the interests of his country first and should never agree to see his country fall from its real position.³²

To say, however, that United India is in reality the regeneration of the old historical kingdom which the Muslims tried to keep United in their time of glory and which now will be supported by the combined might of Hindus and Muslims, is to the League a rank heresy. A Leaguer would lose his temper if he is advised that a true Indian should always try to place the interests of his country first and should never agree to see his country fall from its real position. But such is the temerity of the League that this very advice is offered by it to the Sikhs.

For the purpose of Pakistan, religious differences, considered socially most significant in the case of India, are slurred over and instead racial homogeneity is emphasised.

There is an important Hindu minority in Pakistan. The Pakistan Hindus are true children of the soil and are of the same race as their Muslim fellow countrymen.....Sikhs are

³² *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, p. 69.

typical Pakistanis.³³

When, however, Indian nationalists refuse to underscore religious differences and italicize the racial homogeneity of Hindus and Muslims in most parts of India, the argument is considered most execrable by the Leaguers.

Psychological differences between rice-eating Southerners and the wheat-eating Northerners are made much of to prove the case for partition. But in the alchemy of Islam these stupendous differences melt away and the rice-eating Bengali and wheat-eating Punjabi evince a sense of solidarity that a Southerner and a Northerner are never supposed to experience!

The greatest vagueness is deliberately maintained on the central issue of Pakistan. While footlights are kept playing on it, its content is never defined. At the Madras session of the League when its creed was changed to Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah in working up the Conference to a fever-heat, declared:

Let me tell you as clearly as I can possibly do so that the goal of the All-India Muslim League is that we want to establish a completely independent state in the North-West and the Eastern zones of India, with full control finally of defence, currency, exchange, etc. We do not want under any circumstances a constitution of an all India character with one Government at the Centre. We will never agree to that. If you once agree to it, let me tell you that the Muslims would be absolutely wiped out of existence

In a different atmosphere, perhaps one of doubts and misgivings, only three months before, another leader of the League had struck a different note.

If the Lahore resolution was examined calmly and carefully, it will be found that all it does is to group the provinces in which Mussalmans are admittedly in a majority in zones which will be sovereign. The units comprised in these zones will be autonomous which would be sovereign. These units will, therefore, retain their present character and complexion. There is going to be no exchange of populations or migration of Mussalmans from other parts of India to these zones.....It may be the application of the word 'Sovereign' to these zones (that) creates misgivings in their (non-Muslims') minds. This

³³ El Lamza., op. cit., pp. 35-36.

too is not a new idea which should cause any surprise to non-Muslims. If the demands which Mussalmans formulated when the constitutional issue came into fore-front, first in connection with the Simon Commission and later in connection with the Round Table Conference, are carefully examined, it will be found that they have all along been asking for a federation of fully autonomous states, which very nearly means the same thing as sovereignty. It may be pointed out that there is nothing in the resolution to prevent these sovereign states confederating with other sovereign states. If goodwill prevails and suspicions are dissipated, I have no doubt that some kind of confederation will come into being.³⁴

In the same breath the League talks of separation, confederation and federation! This sounding of different notes at different times is not accidental. It is a part of a deliberate and well-planned propaganda.

This propaganda has two aims: to attract diverse elements of Muslim society to the League and to throw the enemies into confusion.³⁵ To achieve both these ends contradictory notes have to be struck. As a Nazi propagandist once said at a present gathering: "We do not want high prices, we do not want low prices, we do not want stable prices, we want National Socialist prices," and got a tremendous ovation, so the Leaguers declare: "We do not want federation, we will not have confederation, we might not press for separation but we must have Pakistan."

This elasticity of creed is balanced by rigidity of organisational control. That the League alone represents the Muslims is, therefore, the keystone of its political arch. With it, as in all similar movements³⁶ organisation replaces creed.

The rise of Hitler and particularly his great diplomatic coups in Europe after 1937 have exercised a great and pervasive influence on the politics of the Muslim League. It

³⁴ Nawab Muhammad Ismail Khan's Presidential Address to the United Provinces Muslim League Conference (December, 1940).

³⁵ cf. "How shall I press my will upon my opponent? By first splitting and paralysing his will, putting him at loggerheads with himself, throwing him into confusion."—Hitler quoted by Rauschning in *Hitler Speaks*, p. 220.

³⁶ cf. Peter Drucker: *The End of Economic Man*—Passim.

hopes, *a la* Hitler, to rise to power by disintegrating India.³⁷ Everything must subserve that one end. The League stands neither for communal rapprochement nor for constitutional settlement until its strategy of disruption makes it the master of the situation. All its talk of representing the Muslims and claiming for them a separate state, all its talks of Congress atrocities, all its warnings and threats, its every move and gesture are nothing but a clever manoeuvre to reach the citadel of power. That is the end of all ends and the ultimate justification of the movement for Pakistan. The rest are trinkets with which to deceive an ignorant and a credulous multitude.³⁸

³⁷ cf. "Mr. Jinnah has now come out in his true colours; no scheme of government will satisfy him even for the period of the war unless it is in furtherance of the disruption of India...The suspension of the Constitution in seven provinces, in six of which the Hindus are in a majority has deprived them of political power and influence. If by intransigence and threats the stalemate is prolonged till the end of the war, the chances of the Hindus ever regaining political power will be very greatly reduced. Meanwhile efforts should continue to form an Anglo-Muslim alliance under the emotional stress of war and every endeavour should be made to divide the Hindus further by Mr. Jinnah appearing as the champion of the Scheduled Castes or of the Justice Party or of any other party that may be willing to come under Mr. Jinnah's wings. By this process of political arithmetic, Mr. Jinnah will not only represent the 100 million Muslims but 60 millions of Non-Brahmins of Southern India, in fact, the majority of the inhabitants of Hindustan.....It is political prudence to lay emphasis on things that divide, to ignore those that unite, so that there may be no political settlement of the country and Mr. Jinnah may continue to be overlord of India."—Statement of the Standing Committee of the Non-Party (Sapru) Conference. Also cf. "My impression is that he (Mr. Jinnah) does not want a settlement till he has so consolidated the position of the League that he can dictate his terms to all parties concerned including the rulers"—Mahatma Gandhi in a letter (dated 25th January 1941) to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

³⁸ The recent talks between Mr. C. Rajagopalachari and Mr. Jinnah drives us to the same conclusion. In the talks Mr. Jinnah put it down as a condition of negotiations, the prior acceptance by the Hindus (*i.e.* the Congress, according to Mr. Jinnah) of his demand for Pakistan. So the Congress Leaders as the representatives of the Hindus, meet Mr. Jinnah not to discuss the Hindu-Muslim problem but to hear him define, if he so chooses, his demand for Pakistan which all this while he has deliberately kept vague.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CONSEQUENCES OF PAKISTAN

In the absence of an authoritative scheme of division of India, it is difficult to envisage its consequences except in broad and general terms. The Muslim League has preferred to be vague about the details of partition, perhaps to escape any scrutiny of its probable consequences. But no serious student of the situation can evade this enquiry, for the bulk of the Indian people should not be invited to embark on so great an adventure until they are convinced that it leads to the Promised Land.

We found the extreme demands of Pakistan, to be fraught with incalculable mischief. They open a perspective of hate and fear that will end in the disintegration of India and an intensification of her political and social *malaise*. But even if we ignore the extremer demands of Pakistan and take only the milder versions into serious consideration we do not escape the presentiments of disaster. They, too, are not free from harmful consequences. Partition, far from solving it, complicates the Hindu-Muslim problem, and postpones the day of India's political deliverance. It brings no balm for the sores of the body politic but pours upon them acids of disintegration.

Partition of India into three or more independent states is calculated to improve the position of the Muslims. But a careful analysis will show that it is likely to create new difficulties that will worsen the status of the Muslims all round and particularly so in the minority provinces. Even in the North Western and Eastern provinces which under any scheme of federation would enjoy a large measure of autonomy, the predominantly Muslim population will suffer a set-back, once these provinces are turned into independent states. Mr. Allah Bux, the Premier of Sind, has voiced the feeling of his province in the following words:

The North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind which now enjoy comfortable majorities in autonomous provinces helped by the Centre financially and in the matter of defence would not care to exchange their present position for a minority in another unit, though overwhelmingly Muslim.¹

The Eastern State with its teeming population and slender resources will be, in the apt words of Mr. Allah Bux, "an isolation quarantine."

But the brunt of the separation will really fall on the Muslims of the provinces where they are in a minority. The inflamed Hindu feeling will never agree both to partition and also to safeguards for Muslims in the new Hindu State. The basis of safeguards is a common state, a common nationality. If that is denied and disrupted, the claim for safeguards will not be entertained. If safeguards are adequate for two crores of Muslims left in "Hindustan" they ought to be more than adequate for the nine crore Muslims of India—that is how a Hindu will argue. Once Muslims disrupt India and create separate state(s) of their own, they will forfeit the right to separate channels of self-expression in the Hindu state. Pakistan will be agreed to, if at all, only on the condition that in 'Hindu-stan' the duality of culture and of nationality are given up. Such an attitude of the Hindus may appear unreasonable and 'atrocious' to the Muslim League but here we enter the twilight zone of Hindu "feelings." Separation and safeguards will assuredly not go together.

The Muslims of 'Hindu-stan' will not only be politically badly off compared with their position today, but their entire status is likely to suffer. Dr. Rajendra Prasad has brought out this point in sharp relief in his little book on Pakistan:

In the United Provinces and Bihar, the Muslim minorities provide a highly cultured class, in no way inferior in intellect, education, culture and even wealth to the Hindus—only they are less in numbers than the Hindus. Are they to be left at the mercy of the Hindus? Is it not a fact that these provinces also supply a large proportion of the Muslim intelligentsia of

¹ The Indian Annual Register (1940, Vol. I), 326.

the country? What is going to happen to them?²

The *élite* and the ideologues of the League, mostly drawn from these provinces, will find themselves alien and un-wanted in 'Hindu-stan.' Nor will they be particularly welcome in the Muslim states if the present hostility of the Bengali Muslims towards their non-Bengali co-religionists is any indication of the future.³

It is possible to improve the situation by arranging an exchange of population. It would remove many causes of irritation and give all the states homogeneous populations. Dr. S. A. Latif has suggested this plan in his book *Muslim Problems in India*. But the exchange would affect, as has been calculated by 'Punjabi' in his *Confederacy of India*, nearly two-thirds of the total population of India. It will mean uprooting humanity on a scale unattempted in history. It is likely to provoke great popular opposition and cause tremendous misery. Such a Pharaonic *tour de force*, if carried out against the wishes of the people concerned, will bring no peace. And even if the people are favourable to such a large-scale migration it will produce a crop of new difficulties, such as the disposal of immovable property, that will exacerbate the relations between Pakistan and 'Hindu-stan,' and provoke new conflicts.

If there is no exchange of population, a large non-Muslim element will remain in Pakistan. (It is impossible to calculate its size until the League chalks out the boundaries). Unless the League intends to look upon this minority with a blind eye, how will it succeed in evolving an Islamic polity? The Hindu-Sikh elements in Pakistan will demand statutory rights and mandatory safeguards that will put a brake on the Islamisation of the new state. And if it is to miss that final consummation why vivisect India?

The partition of India will not remove obstacles to the growth of uni-national state. The complexities will remain as obstinate as to-day.

The North West region is, undoubtedly, an extensive tract;

² *Pakistan*, p. 30.

³ cf. Fazlul Huq's statement published in the *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, dated 11-9-1941.

but apart from this and a common religion of a majority of the inhabitants there is nothing else that is common. There are at least five languages spoken within the area; and historically it can hardly be claimed that they have even been one. Those who will constitute this state, e.g., the Sikhs and the Muslims, the Pathans and the Punjabis, the Baluchis and the Sindhis, have never had any stable government before the establishment of British rule in that tract, and some of them have more bitter memories of each other's dealings in the not very distant past than what perhaps exists in any other part of the country.....If the North-West region is considered to be so doubtful a proposition.....the Hindu federation is a greater absurdity.⁴

The complexities are embedded in the very fabric of India; if they are to be resolved through partition every thread that forms the substance of its texture will have to be torn apart.

Dr. Latif sponsors Pakistan because he hopes that, besides other things, it will allay suspicion between the two communities. Perhaps it is best to quote his words:

If India is freed from British domination, the Hindus fear that there might again be an extension of the Muslim political influence from the North-West, on which side there is a block of Muslim countries extending right upto the Atlantic, a block that is gradually acquiring a pan-Muslim consciousness that might one day set in motion new forces calling for a re-adjustment or redistribution of power between the different parts of the world.....On the other hand, the Muslims could not but feel that the acquisition of such power (the controlling voice in the internal administration of India) would place them for ever under Hindu subjection and allow them little chance for independent existence on their own cultural lines. The suspicion on either side is a genuine suspicion, and will need to be permanently allayed if India should achieve lasting peace and happiness.⁵

He offers his scheme of separate cultural zones as the means of dissipating these suspicions. It is, however, difficult to share his optimism and follow his reasoning. Hindu suspicion—if we accept Dr. Latif's statement about

⁴ Dr. Rajendra Prasad: op. cit., 31-2.

⁵ Muslim Problems in India, 23.
El Hamza, *Pakistan: A Nation*.

it—is not likely to be allayed by the emergence of a new Muslim state in the North West. It would transform a menacing “influence” into a menacing power, a hostile community raised to the position of a hostile state. Pakistan far from clearing the inter-communal atmosphere will thicken the miasma of misunderstanding.

Economically too, both the states will be worse off because of separation. India's economy is a composite one. A Muslim publicist has tried to make much of the difference between wheat-growing Pakistan and rice-growing “Hindu-stan,” between the camel economy of the North-West and the coconut economy of the South ! If he had given a moment's dispassionate thought to the subject he would have realised that in this variety lies India's strength. The resources of one state, e.g., coal, will be needed to utilize fully the resources of the other, e.g., jute. Only by combining all the resources of India can we hope to solve the problem of our poverty. Our vast country is so rich in economic diversities that we have no need either of conquest or of *lebensraum*. But that need will arise the moment we split up our country into a number of small states and the satisfaction of that need will not be realised except in terms of war.

In the absence of a clear scheme of partition, it is difficult to assess the resources of the new states. Again, the statistics available are by provinces and it is impossible to get a correct picture from them because many ‘Hindu’ districts will after partition, be removed from the present provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. In the case of Bengal, the statistics are completely vitiated because they include the vast industrial output of Calcutta, which by no principle of equity can go to the Eastern Muslim state. The inclusion of Calcutta area in the statistics of Bengal make them utterly unreliable for a correct picture of the resources available to the Eastern Pakistan. It is impossible to disentangle the figures for Western-“Hindu”-Bengal and the Eastern-“Muslim”-Bengal.

In the statistical appendix to this chapter an attempt has been made to show the distribution of resources to the extent it can be done with statistics as they now stand.

Tables I to III have been prepared on the basis of the present provincial boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal. Tables V and VII are also prepared on the same basis, while Table IV and VI are about the Muslim territories that will be left after the predominantly Hindu tracts have been separated from the North-Western and Eastern States. The difference is not negligible. In agriculture the difference is far from small while in industrial production it is staggering. The figures in tables I to III, because they have not been sorted out on the basis of the probable boundaries of the communal zones are necessarily tentative. The economic resources of Pakistan cannot be based upon them. In the final analysis, the figures are likely to be heavily weighted in favour of "Hindu-stan."

The North-Western zone possesses 15 per cent of the seasonal and only 9.7 per cent of the perennial industries. Of these the former employ 15 per cent of the workers engaged in seasonal factories and the latter only 4 per cent of those engaged in perennial factories all over India. The Eastern zone too, after the predominantly Hindu Calcutta area is removed from it, will be no better situated than the North-Western State. In agriculture, the area under cultivation per head in "Hindu-stan" will be one acre, while in Pakistan it will be three-fourths of an acre.

The following tabulated description of the division of resources offers a rough and ready picture:

Food Grains : Distinct advantage with 'Hindu-stan'.

Oil Seeds : Pakistan very deficient.

Sugar : Substantial advantage with 'Hindu-stan.'

Cotton : Substantial advantage with 'Hindu-stan.'

Jute : Slightly favourable to Pakistan.

Coal : Favourable to "Hindu-stan."

Iron-Ore : } Practically the whole

Manganese : } supply in 'Hindu-stan.'

Thus Pakistan will not only be poorer with regard to agricultural products, its industrial potentialities also will be greatly curtailed. Deficiency of iron and coal will cripple industrial development. To tap the alternate source, hydro-electricity, will be very costly. Leaving aside the disputed Jute industry, Pakistan will be without cotton,

textile, sugar, iron and steel, and chemical industries.

Let us now consider the financial implications of partition. Several constituents of the proposed State of Pakistan will be what are known as deficit provinces. Their financial stability depends on the subvention from the centre. By 1942, Sind and the N. W. Frontier Province will have received several crores of rupees from the Centre. After partition, the Pakistan Centre will have to bear the whole of the burden.

With the separation of the predominantly Hindu areas from the Punjab and Bengal, the position of Pakistan will be worsened. According to Dr. Ambedkar's calculations, their revenues will be halved.⁶ To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Pakistan and the Eastern Muslim state will be Rs. 60 crores *minus* Rs. 24 crores (revenues of predominantly Hindu areas), i.e., Rs. 36 crores, the revenues of "Hindu-stan" will be Rs. 96 crores *plus* Rs. 24 crores, i.e., 120 crores. Not only will the revenues of Pakistan be limited but their main sources will be inelastic, like land revenue, while elastic and expanding sources, like customs and income tax, will be meagre. (See Table VIII in the Appendix to this chapter.)

It is interesting to note that the *per capita* burden of taxation in Pakistan is already higher than the corresponding figure for "Hindu-stan", Rs. 7.5 as against Rs. 5.3. The trappings of statehood will greatly enhance this burden.

There is yet another complicating factor. In the Muslim zones capital is concentrated mostly with the Hindus.⁷ The Hindus of North-West Frontier Province, for instance, contribute 80 per cent of the Income Tax. In Bengal, nearly three-fourths of the revenue comes from them, while approximately 87 per cent of the legal, 80 per cent of the medical and 83 per cent of the Banking, Insurance and Exchange business is in Hindu hands. The predominance of Hindus in the major cities of the proposed state

⁶ B. R. Ambedkar : op. cit., p. 65.

⁷ cf. *India's Problem of Her Future Constitution*, p. 35.

of Pakistan has its own significance.⁸ The pivotal position of Hindu moneylenders in the villages of the Punjab has been noted and deplored for over half a century.⁹ If these monied interests are maintained, will it not mean the perpetuation, in one form or another, of the "Bania imperialism" against which the Leaguers hurl their wrath?

Of course, it can be said that these Hindu moneylenders and capital holders will be expropriated. But any move for expropriation will bring Pakistan into conflict with "Hindu-stan" which will be anxious to guard the interests of the Hindu minority in the Muslim state. Limited resources, lack of capital, and shrinkage of credit caused by the break-up of India as a whole, will make it well-nigh impossible for Pakistan to start an industrial programme or to so reorganise its economy as would be able to combat and overcome the challenge of corrosive poverty. Not that the Hindu state will be free of these problems. As a matter of fact partition will harm both the states. It will not solve the problems of either. It will create a legacy of bickering and estrangement between the two communities. It will plunge the two states in a sea of hatred and fear from which they will find it difficult to emerge.

The determination of the new boundaries will create a crop of difficulties. Vital differences will arise on which both the sides are likely to be adamant. Will Calcutta with the industrial ring around it be included in the Hindu State or the Muslim State? It was in the Hindu zone in the last partition (1905) of Bengal. Will the Hindus be reconciled to its loss this time? And will not the Muslim state *minus* Calcutta feel like a body without the head? Is any agreement possible on the question? Or take the question of Hyderabad. Will the Hindus ever agree to the League's demand of setting it up as a Muslim state? There is no hope of solving these questions amicably. Each commu-

⁸ The percentage of non-Muslim population is 70.8 in Hyderabad (Sind), 53.1 in Karachi, 60.1 in Sukkar, 66.7 in Bannu and 45 in Dera Ismail Khan.

⁹ cf. S. S. Thorburn: *Mussalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab* (1882).

nity will consider the demands of the other as extravagant and impossible, and each will be astonished at the wilful denseness of the other in not appreciating its most reasonable demands. This will lead to repeated crises. Moderates in both the camps will yield place to extremists. Already one notices such a development in both the communities. The movement towards *intransigence* in both the camps will be accelerated. Because of the embedded complexities of the situation created by the common and mutually exclusive claims, attempts at dividing India will progressively transfer the initiative to the extremer sections of the two communities.¹⁰

Even after partition, *enclaves* of the other community will remain in both the Hindu and the Muslim states, whose peace and safety will be jeopardised by the ever present danger of irredentism. Fear and distrust with their child, terror, will rule the land. The strain of irredentism will be inescapable because even after partition, the League hopes to organise and lead the Muslims left in "Hindustan." The Hindus are sure to counter this demand with a similar claim. Both states will thus be cursed with a well-knit minority of doubtful loyalty to the state. It will need more than human wisdom to resist the temptation of using this weapon to undermine the strength and cohesion of one state by the other.

Both the states will try to foist the responsibility of every failure on the alien group within the State. It will inevitably become the personification of the demonic forces —of all the ills that the State will be unable to cure. Every estrangement between the State and the minority will have unfortunate repercussions on the relations between the two states. Mistrust will poison the wells of our common life.

The new states, Hindu and Muslim, born in conflict, living in a climate of hostility and cursed with dangerous Fifth Columns, to borrow a convenient current phrase, will have to spend their substance on military preparations. Partition will destroy the natural and scientific frontiers of

¹⁰ For interesting parallels, cf. Crane Brinton: *The Anatomy of Revolution*, pp. 148-212.

India and substitute instead highly vulnerable frontiers which history testifies to have constantly shifted. The open frontiers, in a climate of hostility, will be a source of fear and a temptation to aggressive action. War will be Nature's revenge on man for breaking up an organic whole.

Partition cannot be carried out without conflict, separation cannot be maintained without friction, and in such an atmosphere no state can hope to achieve the ends it seeks to realize.

With small erelaves of *alien* minorities in both the States, the inter-communal problem, now raised to the position of rivalry between neighbouring State, will be incapable of settlement except by war. To cure a wind we are calling for a whirlwind!

But these are considerations for the future when Pakistan becomes an accomplished fact. In the meantime what about the present stranglehold of the British on Hindus and Muslims alike? The partition cry has a meaning only if it were to lead to a new type of approach to the question of attaining India's freedom. In the absence of such an approach Pakistan becomes a negative move. It weakens the existing offensive by diverting public interest from the main antagonism of "Britain *versus* India."

The fact is that whatever form of government or constitutional arrangements we want in this country, if they are to be based on the people's consent, then we can never get them as long as the British are masters in our house. No matter how violently we disagree on everything else we have to agree on this crucial point and create a united national front if India is ever to be free.

One thing remains to be said. In discussing the consequences of Pakistan we enter the penumbra of both Muslim and Hindu irrationalism. In the heat of partition no side may be expected to maintain a sense of proportion. In the dust of violent controversy raised by claims and counter-claims, by threats and warnings, reason will be dumb. The fate of this country will not be decided by sober statesmen but by extremists on both sides, intoxicated with an idea. The faith of the Muslims in a separate sovereign

state will be countered by an equally strong faith of the Hindus in the essential unity of India. Such faiths cannot be reduced to the test of cold reason and logic. At innumerable points it touches the irrational fringe of human consciousness and it is quite possible that once the irrational gets control of their thoughts, men will rather agree to suffer the shame and misery of a foreign rule than compose their differences and derive strength in unity. That is a prospect which no Indian worthy of his salt can contemplate without being deeply moved by what this great country is, has been and ever more will be.

CHAPTER XIV

EPILOGUE

I

Our analysis of the communal problem leads us to certain conclusions which may supply the bases for a lasting solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem in India.

We have pointed out that the problem as it confronts us to-day is largely a creation of the British. The peculiar character of their rule in India compelled them to pursue certain policies which have helped to widen the gulf between the two communities and there is no hope of bridging that gulf as long as the character of that rule does not alter.

If both Hindus and Muslims realize this fact and agree that the supreme need of the country is freedom from foreign domination, a need which must take a precedence over every other, we shall then have taken a long step towards the solution of the communal problem. For, and let us make no mistake about it—neither the Hindus nor the Muslims by themselves can achieve the freedom of this country. It is quite possible that the British may, as a counsel of despair, agree to create a Muslim State in the Northern regions of India and agree to separate Pakistan from Hindustan. But this separate Muslim State will never be a free gift from the magnanimous British but only the conditional transfer of insignificant power. Burma did not become free because Burma was separated from India. To hope that Pakistan will meet with a different fate is to show political ignorance.

On the other hand, it will be equally suicidal for the

Hindus to strike an attitude and say to the Muslims, "If you come with us, then with you, if you do not, then without you, we shall march towards freedom." The experience of the past few years does not warrant this optimism. The Hindu Mahasabha, obsessed by its fear of Muslim domination, is driven more and more into the arms of the British Raj. There is hardly a single instance when the Hindu Mahasabha has launched a frontal attack on the British rule in this country. Its energies are wasted in futile criticism of the Congress and the Muslims, and it seems to have put its faith of deliverance in the little Hindu Kingdom of Nepal. Were it not so tragic, it would be amusing to listen to the President of the Hindu Mahasabha talking of the armed forces of the Hindu king of Nepal swooping down to the plains of the Ganges to deliver the Hindus from the oppressive tyranny of the Muslims. The Hindus and Muslims, in short, have to fight shoulder to shoulder if they want to win independence for this country.

Against this background we are able to get a correct perspective on the communal problem and its adjustment appears to be surprisingly easy. Once the Hindus and the Muslims are agreed upon the question of freedom and prepared to create a united front on this vital issue, all other questions become matters of detail. Suffering commonly borne and victories jointly achieved will forge new links that will bind Hindus and Muslims together as with hoofs of steel. Mutual trust and goodwill, realized during the course of the struggle, will replace suspicion and fear, and, with the third party out of the way, an agreement will not only be possible but actually arrived at.

That is a consummation devoutly to be wished and to bring it nearer will be the responsibility mainly of the Hindus. Every minority problem is really a problem for the majority and the Hindus, being the bigger of the two communities, they will have to make maximum concessions to allay the suspicions and fears of the Muslims and bring them in line with the national movement for freedom. Gandhiji's offer of a blank cheque to the Muslims does not appear so ridiculous after all, for it is the result of a long

chain of reasoning whose basic assumptions are that we want freedom from British rule more than anything else, and that even to think of winning that freedom is impossible unless Hindus and Muslims are prepared to fight for it together. The Congress has been conscious of this all along and has refused to fight its battles by any kind of alliance with the British arm of the communal triangle. Many so-called thinking men have blamed the Congress for its uncompromising attitude on this issue.

If the Congress leaders were to say to the British Government, 'Use your influence in collaboration with us to prevent this disintegration into unmanageable sectionalism, help us to keep India together, and we shall discuss with you the constitutional measures involving no doubt appreciable sacrifice and concessions on the part of the Hindu majority,' that would be a powerful appeal.¹

This passage from a recent book is indicative of the British Government's anxiety to come to an arrangement with the Congress provided it agreed to give up the United Hindu-Muslim front.

II

Closely allied to this basic question of our freedom is the form of the free Indian State of the future. Obviously, here too, we shall have to agree that the State will be a loose type of democratic federation with maximum powers vested in the federating States. This by itself will be a guarantee that in those States where the Muslims are in a majority, Muslim interests will be automatically safeguarded. In States where they would be in a minority, special provisions could be introduced in the Constitution which would guarantee them their cultural and religious freedom. Similar rights could also be guaranteed to the Hindu minorities in the North. A Charter of Fundamental Rights can adequately serve this purpose but that Charter will have to be a democratic Charter, for, in spite of its numerous short-

¹ *India and Democracy* by Sir George Schuster and Guy Wint, 354.

comings, democracy alone seems to be capable of achieving economic equality without destroying that individual freedom which enables men to develop a creative personality.

So our ideal will have to be a free and democratic State functioning primarily for the economic well-being of the masses and for freedom 'in the widest commonalty spread.'

Various details of adjustment could of course be suggested but these belong, as Prof. Laski rather happily pointed out, to the art of government rather than to its theory. Once the Hindus and Muslims gain mutual trust and confidence, they will certainly pursue the art with eminent skill and great success.

III

One cannot lay too much emphasis on the need for this fundamental agreement on the principles of freedom and democracy for lately it has become fashionable to maintain that democratic forms of government are unsuited to Indian conditions. We may perhaps set aside the League propaganda against democracy as smacking too much of an agitational flavour but the utterances of a critic like Sir George Schuster deserve more serious notice. Says Sir George:

Broadly then, it seems clear that the system of Parliamentary democracy such as that which has been developed and worked hitherto in England (essentially on a two party system) is not likely to be suited to Indian needs—certainly not for the Central or Federal Government and probably not for the provinces either.²

Sir George Schuster has arrived at this conclusion from a close examination of the working of the provincial governments under the 1935 Act and of the very significant part the Congress played in it. Annoyed with the Congress's handling of its ministries and probably shocked by its attitude to the war crisis, both Sir George Schuster and Mr. Guy Wint have come out with the thesis that the

² Sir George Schuster, *op. cit.*, 376.

Congress itself does not believe in democracy and that its tenure of office has at last revealed its true character as also the fact that democracy is not suited to India.

So long as parliamentary regime means Congress Raj, Congress is content with parliamentary institutions : the test would come if with a swing of public sentiment, Congress faces the prospect of prolonged exile from office.⁸

The gravamen of the charge against the Congress is that by establishing an extra-parliamentary caucus to control its ministries by making government by any other party impossible, by showing a flippant lack of responsibility both to the Crown and to the people in working the parliamentary programme, and, above all, by leaving the minorities discontented, the Congress proved its inability to accept and work the genuine parliamentary tradition.

This is a serious indictment which merits some consideration. One may point out to start with that to draw an analogy between the full-fledged Parliament of Great Britain and its pinchbeck prototypes in the Provinces of India is, to say the least, unfair. As Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru recently pointed out, it is ridiculous to talk of a Parliamentary programme unless there is a Parliament. What he meant to say was that genuine parliamentary government has never been established in this country. The Parliamentary programme as followed by the Congress was never an end in itself but only a strategic move in its general anti-imperialist front. In these circumstances it was necessary to establish rigid control over the parliamentary activities of the Congress and the question of responsibility to the Crown simply did not arise. As for responsibility to the people, the Congress cannot fulfil that responsibility unless it is given an opportunity to do so by holding fresh elections. Englishmen grown up in the democratic tradition should hardly find it difficult to concede this since it is the only accepted form of judging a people's confidence in a democratic way.

Finally, of course, there are our indispensable Minori-

⁸ Guy Wint, *op. cit.*, 167.

ties. As we have already pointed out, the Governors of the Congress provinces could not point to a single instance where the interests of the minorities were adversely affected by the policies pursued by the Congress governments. The Minorities were dissatisfied for reasons other than that democracy had failed in the provinces.

Sir George Schuster further assumes that a democratic government is possible only with a two-party system. There seems to be hardly any basis for this assumption. Even if we leave out the recent experience of parliamentary government in England, we could always point out to America where governments drawn from the same political party have functioned for a number of years together. But no one on that account has suggested that democracy is unsuited to America.

The one test of democratic governments would appear to be that if one government loses the confidence of the people or their elected representatives, it should be possible for an alternate government to take charge of the administration. Such questions as the number of parties in a country or the existence of a party caucus are really not germane to the discussion. Even British Parliamentary parties are governed by a party caucus so as to secure disciplined party action. The Congress Parliamentary parties only followed this general practice and when they resigned from the Assemblies they did not stand in the way of the formation of alternative governments.⁴ If such govern-

⁴ "Mr. Amery continually declares the fact that unlike our own political parties, Congress puts party before the state and showed this when they formed ministries from their own supporters, Muslim and other, after winning the 1937 elections. Congress acted within their rights and exactly as they thought they were intended to act. When has any British political party won an election and then invited its defeated opponents to sit in its cabinets? Secondly when the Congress Working Committee pulled out its ministries this was Fascism and Totalitarianism. In what way, again, did it differ from British practice? I will not go into the question of Trade Union influence on Labour political action but refer only to a celebrated meeting at the Carlton Club (October 19th, 1922), when the Chief Whip "brought the party together with a snap" and the meeting, by what Lord Birkenhead styled: "an act of monumental folly and

ments did not materialize, it is certainly not the fault of the Congress. In such circumstances, the correct parliamentary procedure is to ask for fresh elections and not question a party's faith in democracy.

The fantastic statement of Guy Wint, analysing the attitude of the Congress to parliamentary government, hardly deserves any notice. Suffice it to point out that since 1919, the Congress has been in office only once and its voluntary resignation from that responsibility does not quite prove that it equates parliamentary government with Congress Raj.

The truth of the matter seems to be that both Sir George Schuster and Mr. Guy Wint were a little frightened by the great democratic upheaval in India which put the Congress in power in the majority of the provinces. Otherwise they could not indict a whole people and say that they were unfit for democratic forms of government.

But to pursue the argument a little further, if democracy is unsuited to India, then what is the alternative? Sir George is inclined to look with favour on a scheme suggested by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan by which the Cabinet at the Centre will be selected from a small council of thirty or forty men who will represent all the important interests in the country. On this basis the Council will, as Birrell once said of the House of Lords, "represent no one but themselves and they will have the full support of their constituencies." And the pivotal position in this arrangement will always be held by the Crown or the Crown's representative in India. Sir George Schuster admits as much when he says :

I believe that the presence of some impartial arbitral authority may provide the key to the whole communal problem. I be-

ingratitude" pulled Conservative ministers out of Cabinet. I think you will find that Congress leaders have acted remarkably as our own leaders act, with the added consciousness that they are striving desperately to make an Indian nation and to leave it free, whereas we have long ago won our freedom."

Edward Thompson, in the *New Statesman and Nation*, 9th August, 1941, p. 137.

lieve that in the long run this can be best secured by developing the function of the British Crown.⁵

That is really the crux of the problem for it expresses the real difference between Sir George Schuster and the Congress. The Congress does not visualize the British Crown having any place in the government of this country while there are people who still believe that the crown will have an important function to perform in the future government of India.

Finally, we must remember that the immediate problem facing the Congress is not one of democracy or totalitarianism but of freedom for the country from British Raj. If, as Guy Wint suggests,⁶ the Congress is not a homogeneous organization but a body of miscellaneous opinion held together by their common opposition to the British Raj, then, as soon as that opposition is over and India becomes free, the Congress will fall to pieces and the various groups in it may seek fresh party alignments and party labels. When that happens, the Congress will no longer be there to impose its totalitarian will upon the Indian people and the stage will be clear for sober statesmen to try all the constitutional experiments they want to in a spirit of sweet reasonableness. But to start with an assumption that democracy is unsuited to India and cite as proof the record of the Congress in office is an exercise in logic whose soundness may be seriously questioned.

So, all things considered, it seems best to nail our flag to the mast of democracy for other courses are fraught with dangers which may rob us not only of democracy but also of the ideal of freedom.

IV

These political considerations will help us to eliminate the British arm of the Communal Triangle but the problem has a social basis to the solution of which we must all contri-

⁵ Op. cit., 439.

⁶ Op. cit., 166.

bute our small quota. For here we enter into the region of that small and often imperceptible acts whose cumulative effect goes to produce what one might call social atmosphere. And here once again the wisdom of Gandhiji's attitude becomes apparent. As he has repeatedly pointed out we cannot solve the communal problem by pacts and guarantees but only by a change of heart wherein the goodwill of millions of Hindus and Muslims comes into full play and removes all the smaller obstacles that make an understanding difficult. And in this sympathetic approach, the responsibility, to start with, rests upon Hindu shoulders. It would be of little use if we sing the praises of the great tolerance and all-embracing universality of the Hindu religion and nowhere show it in actual practice. Distrust is really both the cause and result of fear and we are afraid of what we do not know. A Pathan looks far more formidable in Gujrat than he is ever likely to do in the Frontier Province and the only way to get rid of the Pathan complex, if one may be allowed to use such a phrase, is to get to know the Pathan better.

The most obvious method of increasing our friendship with our Muslim neighbours is an intelligent understanding of their customs, culture and language. It would be far more profitable to explore the very fruitful contact of Hindu and Muslim cultures than to learn by rote the names of all the wives of King Henry VIII. But such knowledge is not possible unless it is specially sought for and we have all to make a definite effort to acquire it. It is amusing to see people who spend a life-time in learning bad English, raise a hue and cry at the mere mention of Persian or Urdu. Acutally Persian or Urdu would be easier to master for an average Indian than the intricacies of an utterly foreign and really difficult language like English. Not that there is anything wrong in learning English but what is important here is the correct perspective which helps us to put first things first.

A number of similar suggestions could of course be made. Communal contacts, exchange of students between Hindu and Muslim schools and universities, mere travel from one end of the country to another would all

help us to get rid of our prejudices and reveal to us the rich diversity of our great country. In such an enlarged perspective Hindus and Muslims will not appear as incompatible alien groups but the proud possessors of a common national heritage.

V

Along with such an effort at cultural understanding we must try to reach the masses and win their sympathy and allegiance to our political ideal. In spite of the tremendous following that the Congress has won among the common people, it touches merely the fringe of even the Hindu masses and its contact with the Muslim rank and file is really negligible. Much was expected of Jawaharlal's scheme of Muslim mass contact, but for reasons not yet known the Muslim mass contact Committee never published its report and the work was only half-heartedly taken up and never resolutely pursued. We feel that here there is a very fruitful channel of approach which is not adequately explored.

For, actually, the problems that are facing our masses are more or less identical and an attempt at their solution is bound to cut across divisions on communal or religious lines. The much talked of and little practised economic approach, if boldly planned and intelligently pursued, is sure to yield valuable results. As our masses become more and more conscious of the root cause of their poverty and suffering they are bound to follow the lead that seeks to destroy the main cause of their manifold ills. In fact, the economic approach can open up a valuable line for a closer contact with the Muslim masses and in the end convince them of our sincerity and good faith.

But it will be useless to expect quick results and one should be prepared for initial disappointments. For all said and done, Indian masses, Hindus and Muslims alike, are still the slaves of caste and creed and religion and they should not be expected to give up the habits of a life-time, habits, too, which carry a deeply religious tinge, in the space of a few months or years. But one must persevere and

derive both hope and courage from the magnificent achievements of men like Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. His single-minded devotion to the cause of the Muslim masses in the Frontier Province has won for him among them a position unchallenged and unassailable by any of his rivals in the political field.

VI

As has been pointed out by many writers on the subject, the Muslims in India are not a minority in the strict sense of the term. Their numerical strength is substantial and they are spread all over the country. This means, in political terms, that the Muslim agitation for Pakistan is really a struggle for power in the government of the country. In no other way is it possible to give a rational basis to the otherwise harmful movement of Pakistan, or the League's distrust of democracy and majority rule. There is of course no doubt that the Muslims must be given a stake in the country by leaving open for them avenues to the seats of power. And here we wish to submit that such avenues could be discovered without resorting to the desperate measure of Pakistan. As we have pointed out in an earlier chapter, even to-day the majority of Muslim provinces are governed by predominantly Muslim cabinets and it could be possible to make these provinces even more homogeneous by a few readjustments of the existing provincial boundaries. Under any constitution these provinces will have Muslim ministers. With a charter of fundamental rights, with equal representation in the Federal Senate to all the federating states, as in the U. S. A., the power of vetoing a measure provided a sufficient number of states want it, and an independent judiciary with powers to examine and interpret executive decisions from the constitutional standpoint will keep the Centre sufficiently elastic and free from the danger of one community dominating another.

Such an arrangement is likely to give the Muslims all the guarantees they desire and it will also save this country from the calamity of a partition. Difficulties of course

there will be, but since the alternative is so disastrous we have to come together in a spirit of compromise and goodwill.

In a famous passage on the American Colonies, Burke pointed out that what binds men together is not facts and legal rights and guarantees, but ties of blood and country, of joys and sorrows commonly shared, of the invisible memories that time weaves into the fabric of a peoples' lives. These are the chords that bind men together and ultimately sustain them.

Such invisible chords of blood and memory sustain us also. To millions of Indians all over the country, India, one and indivisible, is not just a geographical fact but an idea with subtle spiritual and emotional overtones. From the peak of Kanchanjunga to the waves that lap the shores of Dhanuskoti, in every stone and river-bed, in every nook and corner where the spirit of man has impressed itself upon the spirit of nature, the Indian sees the stamp of his national heritage and hears the mysterious music of Hindustan. Hindus and Muslims alike have heard this music and caught its strains in imperishable verse and song. To the strains of that music we have to set our hearts and face the future with hope and confidence.

APPENDIX I

COMMUNALISM IN THE SERVICES

The declaration of the Charter Act of 1833, that no native of India "should by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the said Company" remained a pious wish until the passage of the Government of India Act of 1870. Section 6 of that act, provided that natives of India of "proved merit and ability" might be appointed to civil posts without taking the usual examinations in London. The drafting of the necessary rules which was delayed till 1879 provided that one-sixth of the recruits for the Indian Civil Service each year should be statutory natives of India, appointed by the Governor-General in Council on the nomination of the Provincial governments. The rules, however, were not given a fair trial. In 1886, a Commission on Public Services was appointed. According to the official interpretation of their recommendations not one-sixth of the annual recruitment but of the Indian Civil Service posts in 1892 were reserved for Indians. In actual practice the recommendations were further whittled down. Although the rule required that 108 posts should be reserved for statutory natives, the Secretary of State listed only 96 and the number was later reduced to 61, the places eliminated being those that were most important and most remunerative.

In 1892, the following was the position of Indianization of the Services.¹

¹ Calculated on the basis of Mr. G. K. Gokhale's evidence before the Welby Commission, cf. Reply to Question 18331.

Drawing salaries between Rs. 5000 and Rs. 10,000 a year				Drawing salaries of Rs. 10,000 a year and upwards		
<i>Indians</i>	<i>Eura- sians</i>	<i>Euro- peans</i>		<i>Indians</i>	<i>Eura- sians</i>	<i>Euro- peans</i>
421	96	1207	Civil Department	55	10	1211
25	26	1699	Military	1	1	854
85	39	549	Public Works	3	4	239
4	3	22	Incorporated Local Funds	1	...	9
			Railways	0	...	105
555	164	3477	Total	60	15	2313
12.8	4	83.2	Percentage of the Total	2.5	0.625	96 875

A fresh enquiry was made by the Islington Commission twenty years later, in 1913-15. They found little improvement.

	<i>Indians</i>	<i>Anglo- Indians</i>	<i>Europeans</i>
Rs. 200 a month and upward	4573	1593	4898
Rs. 1,000 a month and upward	142	71	1565
Rs. 3,000 a month and upward .. .	0	1	96

There were at that time (1913) about 100,000 domiciled Europeans in British India, 102,000 Anglo-Indians, and 242,000 Asiatics, which means that 1 out of every 45 members of the domiciled community and 1 out of every 64 Anglo-Indians held a fairly lucrative government job, whereas the proportion of Asiatics was about 1 to 53,000.*

* William Roy Smith : op. cit., 209-10. cf. "By 1915 only five

The Montague-Chelmsford Reforms brought about immediate and far-reaching changes. Nearly 200 European officers retired on proportionate pension, as they believed that the Reforms changed the conditions of service, in the first year of the new constitution. By 1924, the number had increased to 345. The number of new entrants also fell. The average annual recruitment in London for the Indian Civil Service for a series of years before the war was 53, of whom 93.4 per cent were British and 6.6 per cent were Indian. During the three years from 1921 to 1923 inclusive, there was an annual average of 20 British and 21 Indians, but the real difference was still greater because some of the British who qualified for appointment did not actually join the Service. There was almost a complete cessation of European recruitment for the Indian Medical, Educational and Agricultural Services.

In 1924 a Commission, presided over by Lord Lee of Fareham, suggested that in the Indian Civil Service, 20 per cent of the posts should be filled by promotion from the Provincial Service, 40 per cent by direct recruitment of Europeans and 40 per cent by direct recruitment of Indians. In the Indian Police Service, the parallel figures were 20, 50 and 30 respectively. Provincial recruitment was recommended for the Transferred Departments, i.e., the Education, Agricultural, Veterinary, the Indian Engineers and the Forest (75 per cent Indian and 25 per cent European) Services.

This very year also saw the introduction of communal ratio in the Services. The practice was given statutory recognition by a resolution published in the Gazette of India Part I (July 7, 1934). According to the rules published in the Gazette for Services recruited on an All-India basis "25 p.c., of all vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment of Indians, will be reserved for Muslims and 8 $\frac{1}{3}$ p.c., for other minority communities." Other rules provided that these percentages would not be disturbed. Similar rules were provided for "Services recruited locally."

per cent of the Service (I. C. S.) were Indian"—Thompson and Garratt: *op. cit.*, 538.

The effect of these policies on the growth of communal feeling is too obvious to need an elaborate emphasis. It may be argued that the distribution was made in perfect good faith but even the best of motives have ultimately to be judged by their results. Secondly, thanks to a very large percentage reserved for Europeans, the field was already narrow. It was now further fragmented. As the prizes became fewer they became more attractive and in the end caused more bitterness.

APPENDIX II

COMMUNALISM AND RECENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES

It is interesting to observe how communal politics have influenced British policy on India. Recent statements of British spokesmen show that, far from disapproving communal intransigence, the Government have not hesitated to adopt the arguments of the communalists for baulking the constitutional advance of India. There is also in evidence a conscious effort, on the part of the Government, to riggle out of their past promises to end the process of India's constitutional development by the establishment of a free dominion governed by a democratic constitution.

Rebutting such an accusation, Sir Samuel Hoare in a speech in the House of Commons (on October 26, 1939), observed:

We have shown our good faith in the matter. We showed it when we made the Communal Award. At that time supposing we had wished to divide and conquer we might have very well said, 'settle your communal differences first, until you have settled them there can be no constitutional advance.'

Later events and utterances, however, indicate the emergence of such a wish to divide and conquer.

The Government of India Act of 1935, notwithstanding the safeguards and special responsibilities with which it is riddled, is unmistakably patterned on parliamentary democracy. The Instrument of Instructions to the Governors clearly shows that the new constitution envisaged what Professor Dicey has called the Cabinet System. The Government seem to have soon realised that such a constitution, in spite of its many checks and counterpoises, would make Indian nationalism inconveniently strong.

It appears that the extravagant utterances of the communalists offered them the sorely needed avenue of escape. The absence of communal harmony had long been used to equip the Governors and the Viceroy with special responsibilities, but not for denying a democratic form of government. Let us watch the retreat from it as recently executed.

The Viceroy, anxious to get a united support for the Government's war effort, was content to give, in his pronouncement of October 18, 1939, "a clear assurance that full weight would be given to their (i.e., the minorities) views and their interests in any modification (of the constitution) that may be contemplated."

This same point was phrased differently and more shrewdly by the then Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, in his statement to the House of Lords, made on the same day as the Viceroy's pronouncement. He said that "there is on the part of the minorities insistent demand for safeguards against consequences which, *rightly or wrongly*, it is feared may result from the unfettered domination of the majority."¹ (*Italics ours*).

As the war progressed, rather unfavourably, and the prospects of persuading the Congress to walk into the Government's parlour receded, the British utterances dropped the earlier hesitation and vagueness. On August 8, 1940, the Viceroy declared in his much boosted announcement :

It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in Indian National life. Nor could they be parties to coercion of such elements into submission to such a government.

¹ For over a generation, responsible Britishers have consistently refused to say whether the communal fears are rightly or wrongly held. As an instance of this wonted *non possumus* attitude cf. Sir T. W. Holderness : *Peoples and Problems of India* (Home University Library, 1912) "Rightly or wrongly the Muslim leaders believed that any system of popular representation which did not make special provisions for Muhammadans as a separate community would be injurious to their interests" (p. 246).

Was the government under the Act of 1935 such a government? Were "such elements" coerced under it during its operation for just over two years in seven out of the eleven provinces of India? Why did not the Governors intervene? Why have they kept silent on these acts of injustice? Have the allegations of "such elements" been made "rightly or wrongly?" The Viceroy naturally did not care to answer such incidental queries.

But the answers are implicit in the shift in the attitude to the Act of 1935 that has taken place during the crucial months of the recent constitutional *impasse*. The Viceroy, who in October 1939 could "reaffirm his belief in the essential soundness of the 1935 Act," in August 1940 discovered that it "could no longer serve the purpose for which it was originally designed." He further declared, in the same speech, that the next step "did not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it was based."

It was during this period that the new Secretary of State for India, Mr. Amery, discovered that "in religious and social outlook, in historic traditions and culture, the difference between them (the Muslims) and their fellow countrymen goes so deep, if not deeper, than any similar difference in Europe." He appreciated "their quarrel with the existing scheme of the Act that it would give too great powers to a Hindu majority at the Centre." "They claim," he further observed, "the right in any constitutional discussions to be regarded as an entity."

Mr. Amery was not slow in upholding this claim. On August 14, 1940, he opined that the "decision by majority is not so much of the essence of democracy as a political convenience." In order further to justify the minority's intransigence and thereby to fetter the rights of the majority, Mr. Amery raised the former to the status of "an entity" and degraded the latter to "a mere numerical majority." As if there are other than "mere numerical" majorities! And the claims and fears, *rightly or wrongly* held, of "an entity" are deemed more important than the rights of "a mere numerical majority!"

At their Lahore Session, March 1940, the Muslim

League took up the hint so broadly dropped and at last passed its resolution on Pakistan. In August 1940, Mr. Amery gave it his covert approval by declaring: "It may, indeed, prove to be the case it is by *entirely novel departures* from the existing scheme—that an agreement can be reached, which is unattainable within the frame-work of the existing Act." The League responded to this by incorporating the Pakistan demand in its creed and by adding to Pakistan the demand for a separate Dravidistan also. •

To this, Mr. Amery, in his turn, responded in his speech of 22nd April 1941, with the words: "The Indian Statesmen need not be bound by a system of government at the centre contemplated in the Act (1935) or by relation between the centre and the provinces." Federation idea is thus being adroitly jettisoned and the door opened for various fantastic schemes of Pakistan, Dravidistan, etc.

Majority rule, when expressed through the Congress, does not suit the Muslim League.² It does not suit the Government either. This convergence of the League and the British standpoints is well brought out in Mr. Amery's speech of 18th November, 1941:

Rightly or wrongly, the experience of the Provincial self-Government on British parliamentary lines has convinced the Moslems and the states that they cannot submit to any central government for India in which the executive is directly dependent on a Parliamentary majority, *which if provincial experience is any guide would be an obedient mouth-piece of the Congress High Command. (Italics ours).*

Mr. Amery has learnt from the Provincial experience the same lesson as Mr. Jinnah. Both want to wriggle out of the logic of Parliamentary rule.

² Compare the League's benevolent neutrality towards the new non-Congress ministry in Orissa.

APPENDIX III

PAKISTAN

In the *Encyclopædia of Islam* (Supplement No. 4, page 174, 1937) the following explanation is offered of the word *Pakistan*:

“Pakistan means the land of the Paks. The word Pak—pure, clear—is not adequately translatable into English. Since it stands for all that is noble and sacred in life for a Muslim. The name Pakistan, which has come to be applied—though not officially—to the five Muslim Provinces in the North-west of the present-day India, is composed of letters taken from the names of her components, Panjab, Afghans (North-West Frontier Province of which the inhabitants are mainly Afghan) Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan, and was given to these territories by C. Rahmat Ali, founder of the Pakistan National Movement, in 1933, with a view to preserving their historical, national and political entity as distinct from Hindustan proper.....”

APPENDIX IV

TABLE I

Production of Minerals—1936
(Quantity in Thousand Units)

Minerals	British India	Eastern Zone	North-Western Zone	Total of the two Zones	Hindustan
Coal .. .	20,586	6,668	160	6,828	13,758
Petroleum (Gallons)	69,242		4,397	4,397	64,845
Chromite (Tons)	28	.	21	21	7
Iron-ore (Tons) ..	1,376	.		.	1,376
Manganese Ore (Tons)	625	..	.. ,	..	625

TABLE II
Seasonal Industries 1937

Industry	British India		Eastern Zone		North Western Zone		Total of the Two Zones		Hindustan	
	Number	Workers	Number	Workers	Number	Workers	Number	Workers	Number	Workers
Food, drink, tobacco ..	1,286	144,217	282	22,832	51	3,080	333	25,912	952	118,305
Chemicals, dyes etc. ..	23	2,313	1	195	.	..	1	195	22	2,118
Paper and Printing ..	..	..	..	.	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gins and Presses ..	1,838	146,909	77	19,322	417	39,345	494	58,667	1,344	88,242
Miscellaneous	21	981	..	.	13	457	13	457	8	524
GRAND TOTAL	3,168	294,420	360	42,549	481	42,882	841	85,231	2,327	209,189

TABLE III
Perennial Industries 1937

Industry	British India		Eastern Zone		North Western Zone		Total of the Two Zones		Hindustan	
	No.	Workers	No.	Workers	No.	Workers	No.	Workers	No.	Workers
Textiles ..	674	807,527	168	319,252	86	10,836	254	330,088	420	477,439
Engineering ..	836	201,301	266	78,160	97	18,949	363	97,109	473	104,192
Minerals and Metals ..	126	50,923	10	17,442	50	2,487	60	19,929	66	30,994
Food, drink, tobacco ..	1,249	78,645	391	23,740	84	4,696	475	28,436	774	50,209
Chemicals, dyes, etc. ..	510	53,977	101	16,374	28	2,564	129	18,938	381	35,039
Paper and Printing ..	446	47,892	116	16,867	41	4,239	157	21,106	289	26,786
Process relating to wood, stone glass, etc. ..	314	40,811	50	7,073	23	3,053	73	10,126	241	30,685
Gins & Presses	184	27,649	33	19,563	4	188	37	19,751	147	7,898
Process relating to skins, hides, etc. ..	43	11,816	8	3,531	3	135	11	3,666	32	8,150
Miscellaneous	155	44,353	54	19,099	27	7,503	18	26,602	74	17,751
GRAND TOTAL	4,537	1,364,894	1,197	521,101	443	54,650	1,640	575,731	2,897	789,165

TABLE

Classification of the Area—1936
(Acres in Thousand)

Zone	Forest	Not available for cultivation	Culturable waste other than fallows	Current fallows	Net area sown	Total
British India	89,173	155,004	154,302	48,638	231,885	679,002
Eastern Zone	820	5,345	2,789	1,940	18,491	29,457
North Western Zone ..	2,275	23,253	20,188	7,577	22,226	75,717
Total of the Two Zones	3,095	28,598	22,977	9,517	30,717	105,174
Hindustan	86,078	126,406	131,325	39,121	191,168	573,828

TABLE V

British India	89,173	155,004	154,302	48,638	231,885	679,002
Eastern Zone	4,455	9,692	5,950	4,691	24,466	49,255
North Western Zone ..	3,046	29,350	22,731	8,736	34,935	98,780
Total of the Two Zones	7,501	39,042	28,663	13,427	59,401	148,035
Hindustan	81,672	115,962	125,639	35,211	172,484	530,967

TABLE VI
Area under Crops and Specification of Crops—1936-37
 (Acres in Thousand)

Zone	Food-Grains				Oil-seeds	Sugar	Fibres		
	Rice	Wheat	Cumbu or Baj- ra (mil- let)	Gram (Pulse)	Total		Cotton	Jute	Total
British India	69,455	25,250	11,451	15,796	2,04,036	4,285	15,357	2,540	18,658
Eastern Zone	16,718	133	..	...	18,216	266	...	1,962	2,002
North Western Zone ..	1,182	8,257	2,066	2,077	17,839	295	3,062	...	3,081
Total of the two zones ..	17,900	8,390	2,066	2,077	36,055	561	3,062	1,962	5,083
Hindustan ..	45,241	16,860	9,385	13,719	1,67,981	3,724	12,295	578	13,575

TABLE VII

British India ..	69,455	25,250	11,451	15,796	2,04,036	4,285	15,357	2,540	18,658
Eastern Zone	21,993	150	2	242	23,725	355	58	2,155	2,255
North Western Zone ..	2,221	11,396	3,781	5,138	28,634	626	3,824	...	3,877
Total of the two zones ..	24,214	11,546	3,783	5,380	52,359	981	3,882	2,155	6,132
Hindustan ..	45,241	13,704	7,668	10,416	1,51,677	3,304	11,475	385	12,526

TABLE VIII

Province	Revenue raised by Provincial Government from Provincial sources		Revenue raised by Central Government from Central sources	
	Rs.		Rs.	
Madras . . .	16,13,44,520		9,53,26,745	
Bombay . . .	12,44,59,553		22,53,44,247	
Bengal . . .	12,76,60,892		23,79,01,583	
U. P. . . .	12,79,99,851		4,05,53,030	
Bihar . . .	5,23,83,030		1,54,37,742	
C. P. and Berar . .	4,27,41,280		31,42,682	
Assam . . .	2,58,48,474		1,87,55,967	
Orissa . . .	1,81,99,823		5,67,346	
Punjab . . .	11,35,86,355		1,18,01,385	
N. W. F. . . .	1,80,83,548		9,28,294	
Sind	3,70,29,354		5,66,46,915	

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