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whole, is now quite out of date. But the permanent interest of the subject has led me to print now, for the first time, and just as it was written, what here appears.

With the exception of a few clerical errors, and the simplification of some clumsy sentences, the *written* portion of the Lecture on Lally is also left unaltered. In lieu of any connecting remarks of my own, I may refer to the Indian Chapters in Lord Stanhope's History of England, which contain a clear, interesting, and animated sketch of the Rise of our Empire in the East.

A few paragraphs, omitted for want of space in the *Chronicle*, have been restored in the Review of Mr. Kaye's book.

I have been, for some time, lecturing on British Indian History at Radley. The lectures are extempore; but I have here added a few examination papers upon them, as germane to the contents of the present volume.

I am very sensible of the defects of this little book; yet not without hope that it may quicken, in some minds, an interest in subjects so important, especially to Englishmen, and so generally neglected, if not ignored.

CHRIST CHURCH,
March 16th, 1868.

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PRINCIPLES AND METHOD
OF THE
ENGLISH (CHURCH) REFORMATION.

(August, 1857)

PRINCIPLES AND METHOD
OF THE
ENGLISH (CHURCH) REFORMATION.

THE REFORMATION THE CHARACTERISTIC EVENT OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.—The Reformation was the great work of the Sixteenth Century. It far transcended indeed the limits of that age. It was the inevitable result of a state of things long antecedent to its actual ebullition. Its direct or indirect influence upon the character and fortunes of our race will be distinctly traceable to the end of time. And in a far more limited point of view,—looking only to the immediate series of transactions, occasionally at least, included under the name,—the Reformation was hardly complete by the year 1600. The century that had witnessed its birth closed amidst the convulsive struggles that in its maturity it had evoked. It had still to accomplish triumphs, sustain defeats, run out into excesses, endure the renewed trial of persecution from its enemies, and the more cruel danger of division and strife among its friends. But few of its later incidents were without their counterpart in the preceding period. And its great battle for existence had been fought out, not only on the theatre of the world at large, but

in the separate States of Europe. It had already disclosed incontrovertibly its general character and tendencies. It had asserted its position as one of the great and abiding agencies in modern society, one of the most powerful levers of modern civilisation. *On the whole, the Reformation may be considered not only to have arisen, but to have culminated, during the sixteenth century.*

ITS GENERAL AIM AND STANDARD, AS A RELIGIOUS CHANGE.—Its ostensible and most familiar character is that of a revolution in religion. And in this point of view it had a general aim: to remove from the Church and the theology of Western Christendom the accretions and parasitical outgrowths of the Middle Ages, and to restore them (as far as might be) to their pristine simplicity and purity.

And to a certain extent it had a general standard—the Bible—as the authorised and universally accredited account of Christianity from its origin.

So far the Reformation was one movement. But it was also several.

DIVERSITY OF ITS (a) Political and Social fortunes.—For although its proper subject-matter was theological; yet, from the impress left by Mediæval Sacerdotalism upon almost every sphere of human activity, and from the inevitable correspondence, inter-dependence, sometimes absolute identity, among every Christian people, of secular and spiritual interests, the Reformation also amounted to, or was inextricably bound up with, a most important political, social, moral, literary, even æsthetic crisis.

As such it shared, more or less, the vicissitudes of political circumstances, and the varieties of social and individual organisation and development.

Hence its special character, course, and ultimate fate, considered in this simply temporal

aspect, differed greatly in different countries, and among various sections of the same community.

(b) *Religious character and results.*—But again, even as a religious movement, and with reference to its effect upon the constitution, creed, worship, discipline, of the Christian Church, in the several countries where it established its sway, it was by no means homogeneous. It is unnecessary here to particularise the numerous causes of this divergence.

Though it may be doubted whether, on the whole, the differences at the time prevalent among the "Reformed" were wider than may be fully accounted for by the very dissimilar spirit in which they addressed themselves to the fundamental question of the Reformation, and the very unequal resources they brought to bear upon it.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE REFORMATION.—The solemn problem they were called upon to solve may be thus formulated:—Given, on the one hand, the Bible—on the other, the present state of the Christian World: how can the latter be best brought into essential conformity with the express injunctions or implied sanctions of the former?

This, again, involved two questions:

(1) What was to be the nature and extent of the desired Reform?

(2) By whom, as combining the authority, the proficiency, and the will, requisite for so arduous an undertaking, was it to be carried into effect?

GENERALLY ADMITTED NECESSITY FOR A REFORMATION.—None denied the absolute and immediate necessity for a Reformation. But the first steps taken in this direction naturally extended only to the amelioration or removal of the most pressing and glaring evils.

All could see that the licentiousness of the Clergy, and of the Popes themselves, the exactions of the Roman *Curia*, the inordinate wealth and arrogance of the Ecclesiastics, were wrong and pernicious.

Nor did it require any great amount of penetration or learning to discover, that the virtual autocracy long assumed by the Popes over the whole Latin Church, over National Churches, National Sovereigns, particularly in connection with the unscrupulous employment, for the confirmation of that autocracy, of the fearful weapons of Excommunication and Interdict, were equally opposed to the letter and to the spirit of the Gospel, as well as to the recognised course of early Church History.

THE CONCILIAR SCHEME OF REFORM.—Towards the close of the Middle Age, a growing, at length an imperious, desire was felt for a General Council of the Church, as the proper representative assembly or Constitutional Senate of Latin Christendom. By this convention Ecclesiastical abuses were to be taken into consideration, and searching remedies to be forthwith applied. Such a Council did at last meet. At Constance, and again at Basle, Papal and Sacerdotal immorality, and the extravagant claims of the Holy See engaged deep attention. Much was attempted, something done, for the improvement of the Church, if not for the direct promotion of evangelical religion.

DEFEATED BY THE POPES.—The Hierarchical Reform was in a fair way of accomplishment; but was thwarted, and finally miscarried, mainly through the opposition of the Popes.

The Successors of St. Peter, indeed, both then and subsequently, were the great obstacles to a Reformation. And Adrian VI., who offered a

single and bright exception to their general policy, succumbed almost *instantaneously* under the magnitude and fearfulness of the task that must devolve upon a "Reforming Pontiff."

Meanwhile, in England, repeated, and to a great extent *successful*, attempts had been made, by legislative enactments and other means, to resist the Papal tyranny, and to lessen the several evils above adverted to.

COMMENCEMENT OF A NATIONAL CHURCH REFORMATION IN ENGLAND. ANTIPAPAL AND ANTISACERDOTAL MEASURES.—In the time of King Henry VIII., the Conciliar Reform of the whole Latin Church was for the present hopeless. The need of a Reformation was more than ever felt. But the "Defender of the Faith," whatever indications he might have given (and he *had* given such) of an inclination to restrict the immunities and power of the Clergy, was at first too zealously, passionately, devoted to the Holy See, for the friends of the inevitable movement to expect any countenance from him. It was not only in his matrimonial relations, however, that "Bluff King Hal" experienced a total revulsion of feeling, and perplexed the world by the characteristic energy with which he pursued opposite lines of conduct. In the present case, it certainly was *not* without considerable provocation (whatever estimate we may nevertheless form of his personal character and consistency in the matter) that he became, from a chivalrous Champion, so resolute and successful an opponent of the Power his predecessors had so often held in check—the Power which was still limited by the inexorable Statutes of *Provisors* and *Præmunire*. In the history of the divorce litigation, or in the character of those who conducted the proceedings on the part of the Pope, were epitomised and exemplified most of

the glaring abuses, that had called forth so much complaint and opposition from former English Sovereigns and Parliaments. The King now once more shared, personified, perhaps exaggerated, the strong and hereditary national instinct of jealousy and animosity against Papal intervention in the affairs of his kingdom, and against the innumerable evils it entailed. The patience that had so long sought to palliate the mischief was at length exhausted; and it was determined to cut it away root and branch—to remove the source of it.

Thus the general circumstances of the times, the personal temper and inclinations of the king, and the national character, co-operated to produce this unsparing attack upon Papal and Sacerdotal assumption, cupidity, corruption.

The attack itself was, of course, in some respects, much more sweeping than the Hierarchical Reforms advocated at Constance and Basle. Yet, as in those cases, it was no mere revolt, no purely wanton exercise of power. It was conducted according to another, and extremely, though not (as has been often assumed) exclusively, English conception of a Constitutional Reform:—namely, that the whole nation as a Realm, comprising Spirituality and Temporality, was, and of old had shown itself, competent to administer its Church, as well as its State, affairs, and to effect, in each department, necessary Reforms, without any foreign intermeddling whatever.

THE IDEA OF A CONCILIAR REFORM STILL HAUNTED MANY MINDS.—Yet still the idea of a “Free General Council,” which might hereafter “tune the jarring strings of the Christian World,” was by no means universally abandoned—was frequently referred to; even after the arrogant pretensions of the *Pseudo*

General Council of Trent, and the dismembered condition of Christendom, (split up into separate Churches, each exclusively and jealously devoted to its own more or less peculiar system,) had relegated to a remote and contingent future all prospect of the meeting of such an assembly, or of its obtaining general recognition.

Thus were removed in England the most notorious and offensive corruptions of the Mediæval Church.

EXCESSES AND EXTRAVAGANCES TO BE EXPECTED, FROM THE NATURE OF THE MOVEMENT AS A REACTION.—It would have been strange indeed, especially in such an age, if this earlier, and (so to speak) more external phase of the great reaction had not itself been accompanied by extravagance and abuse. We are not now concerned to defend, or even to account for, such questionable stretches of regal or parliamentary authority. But it may be desirable to note the fact, that they *were* mainly acts of reprisal. If the royal supremacy was (especially at first) unduly exalted, it had long been, in many important particulars, unduly depressed. If the Clergy and the Monks were pitiably humiliated, and harshly, even cruelly, treated, this was not a little owing to their previous haughtiness, oppression, cruelty; as well as to the fact that they were still busily engaged in endeavouring to restore the old *régime*.

If Church property was ruthlessly plundered and squandered by laymen, had not the laity as a body long been taught, even by some of the more single-minded among the clergy, that they were made the constant and shameless spoil of avaricious priests, and profligate monks and friars? The long-deferred day of reckoning for injustice is wont to be a hard one.

A DOCTRINAL REFORMATION INEVITABLE.—But the movement though it might, and in England particularly did, commence with such measures as have now been alluded to, could not end there, however some, after going thus far, might wish to stop short. The quickened intelligence, the profounder Biblical and historical studies lately entered upon, gradually, very gradually in some respects, revealed to the more thoughtful and learned, and through them to a whole world beyond, the startling truth, that the popular religion was, to a great extent, not only unsanctioned by, but distinctly and emphatically opposed to, the Scriptures, and to the tenets and practices of the early Christian Church.

Indeed, in Germany the controversy early assumed a doctrinal turn, and the Papal Supremacy was not attacked until a late stage of the Indulgence discussions had disclosed the key-stone of the fabric assailed by Luther.

But in England also, when the above discrepancy had been once pointed out, an appeal to the Bible, as the standard of faith, discipline, and practice, though it might not immediately ensue, became inevitable; and was further promoted by the translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular languages, and their publication in a popular form. The most inveterate and obstructive Roman Catholic could not, without self-condemnation, object to consult what all regarded as the inspired records of the religion in its earliest form. Had then the meaning of the Bible been always clear and undisputed, the first of the two questions that, as has been observed, were raised by the proposition for a Reformation, would have been readily answered; and the nature and extent of the required changes would have been at once determined.

DIFFICULTY IN ASCERTAINING THE SENSE OF SCRIPTURE.—But, as was long after observed by the most philosophic of English Statesmen in recent times:—"The Bible, though a most sacred, is a most multifarious collection of the records of divine economy—a collection of an infinite variety of cosmogony, theology, history, prophecy, psalmody, morality, apologue, allegory, legislation, ethics; carried through different books, by different authors, at different ages, and, though shaped to the same holy end by the superintending and suggesting Spirit of God, with different purposes in view by the authors themselves. It is necessary to sort out what is intended for example, what only as narrative, what is to be understood literally, what figuratively; where one precept is to be controlled or modified by another; what is said directly, and what as an argument *ad hominem*; what is temporary, and what of eternal obligation; what appropriated to one set of men, and what to the general duty of Christians*."

HENCE, AN INTERPRETER OF SCRIPTURE NECESSARY.—Thus, to apply this standard successfully, further aid was required.

Was this to be obtained?

HUMAN LEARNING AND SCHOLARSHIP NOT ALONE SUFFICIENT.—Learning, scholarship, general mental cultivation at once suggest themselves. The contrast between scriptural and late mediæval religion, it could not be denied, had been in a great measure disclosed by them. Did not this imply their adequacy to supply the present desideratum? Plausible as the idea might seem, it did not meet with much encouragement even in the era of the "Revival of Letters." The most sensible men,

* Burke. *Speech on the Act of Uniformity.*

indeed, considered human learning a most important, an indispensable help, to the interpretation of Scripture. Many extreme persons, however, on both sides, regarded it coldly and doubtfully, if not with absolute abhorrence. The "invincibly ignorant" Roman Catholic bore it no good will for its recent handiwork, and the abyss of perilous speculation it seemed to have opened. The unlearned and the fanatic Biblicist mistrusted it as worldly, or scorned and denounced it as profane; and appealed to strong texts, which he proclaimed, with a confidence proportioned to his ignorance, to have been levelled against it. Few could contemplate the history and the issue of the long dominant Scholasticism, or the reveries of the revived Neo-Platonism in Italy, without some misgivings as to the amount of service ultimately to be expected in the way of Biblical interpretation from human learning alone. There was a general impression that it afforded, at least, too purely intellectual a criterion, if unaided and unsanctified by a higher and more distinctively religious influence.

Had such an influence been vouchsafed?

THE HOLY SPIRIT THE INTERPRETER.—No Christian could hesitate to admit, in one form or another, that the Spirit of God was the sure, the promised Interpreter.

THROUGH WHOM?—But who were the human depositaries of this supernatural aid?

It is evident that here we approach closely the second of the two questions that, as we have stated, naturally occurred, immediately that the necessity of a Biblical Reformation was admitted.

That second inquiry was:—By whom is it to be carried out?

Now those who enjoyed the privilege of so mysterious and effective a gift, as that of divine

illumination, would obviously be inclined to claim the right of enunciating and determining, if not of giving legal effect to, the requisite changes. Who then were they?

1. ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW.—The Catholic or Universal Church, said the Romanist, which, in that it is such, possesses the gift of Infallibility, and alone can, and ought to, decide religious questions.

But he meant the Latin Church exclusively; and that however narrowed, however corrupt and fallen. Nor did he clearly determine wherein the Infallibility was vested, whether in the Pope, or in a General Council, or in both conjointly. Meanwhile, the Popes had steadily resisted and turned the edge of Conciliar Reforms; and had set themselves against the movement precisely as it became the more inevitable. And this very claim of Infallibility obviously precluded all concession as to dogmas once formally sanctioned by Rome. While Rome had thus committed Herself to much that was anti-primitive and anti-scriptural. Accordingly, when the narrow, but not the less violently-convulsed Assembly at Trent did meet, after the disruption of Western Christendom, it reformed many practical abuses, but stereotyped in the Roman system the greater part of the doctrinal errors that had crept in during the Middle Ages, and perpetuated also many disciplinary grievances more or less essentially connected with the Trentine Formulary of Faith.

2. INDIVIDUALIST VIEW.—A second answer was:—Individual Christians, as thinking, speaking, acting, under spiritual guidance.

But this reference of the matter to a purely internal witness, cognisable by the individual alone, would not only have justified the eccentricities, and (to all but the mystic himself)

palpable follies and errors of the extremest mysticism; it was introducing a disintegrating principle, fatal to all permanent existence of a public ecclesiastical body; fatal also, as was clear in the case of the Anabaptists, to the security, if not the existence, of the civil authority, and therewith of society itself.

3. VIRTUAL VIEW OF THE CALVINISTS, &c.—A third answer was implied, perhaps, and acted on, especially at Geneva, rather than distinctly embodied in words.

Learned and able men, "Men of God" like the Jewish Prophets of old, or the early Apostles and Preachers of Christianity, had been providentially raised up to meet the crisis, and to expound, under spiritual aid, the true meaning of the Bible to their obedient National Church, if not to other bodies.

To a certain extent this view of the great Protestant Champions could not but command the assent of their local admirers and disciples, if not of the Reforming party everywhere. But it would have appeared more consistent and irrefragable, had the differences between Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, &c., even on points which they themselves considered most important, not to say fundamental, been less extreme and lasting.

GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THESE VIEWS BY THE ENGLISH REFORMERS.—In England on the whole, and in the long run, the tendency of the Church Reformation was to deny the absolute and independent validity of each of the above accounts; to allow that each was a reflection of a partial, if not a phase of the whole, truth. Accordingly, the endeavour was to assimilate, combine, and act upon these apparently hostile, but, as it was considered, not totally irreconcilable suggestions.

HOW FAR THEY WERE INCLINED TO ADMIT VIEW 1.—As to the first answer:—waiving the question whether the Universal Church at any time could be strictly said to be absolutely infallible; assuming that a particular Church could never lay claim to such infallibility; it appeared clear that while immediate Reform was imperative, the voice of the whole Church—even of the whole Latin Church—was, at present, simply unattainable; but that the Providence of God had watched over, His Spirit interfused in a striking and obvious manner, the early undivided Church; and that Her verdicts wherever pronounced, Her practice wherever ascertainable, must command great reverence; be practically, to say the least, the safest guide to the interpretation of disputed points in Scripture; as for the reason now stated, so for several others, which may be summed up in the maxim, that the stream is likely to be purest near its source.

THEY ACCEPTED THE AID OF SCHOLARSHIP AND LEARNING IN GENERAL.—We may remark, by the way, that the aid of learning and scholarship was here necessarily, as throughout the scheme of the English Church Reformation cordially, accepted.

HOW FAR VIEW 2.—As to the second answer, it was felt, that the individual is conscientiously bound to investigate “the reason of his hope”; that the internal witness of the Spirit must answer to the external testimony of the Church, as now to be carefully ascertained: that otherwise his creed, his religion, is a hollow pretence. But that while ignorance, passion, circumstances, might mislead him into confounding his own peculiarities with that internal witness, and thus produce a seeming variance between it and the external testimony; yet that there could in reality

be no discord between the "two voices"; and if he inquired rightly and far enough, and in the meantime lived conscientiously "up to his light," the harmony would be restored. While, on the other hand, he owed present obedience to his National Church, as well as deference to the large body of Reforming Divines who were engaged in solving the same awful problem as himself, with gifts and resources, cumulatively at least, far superior to his own.

HOW FAR THE INDIVIDUAL WAS TO OBEY THE CHURCH.—But to what extent did he owe this obedience and deference?

This was a question, of course, of peculiar delicacy and difficulty. We can hardly expect to find any very precise theory laid down, much less consistently and undeviatingly acted upon, during the crisis, or even after it was over. But as the movement proceeded, three virtual principles of the following kind appear to have been pretty generally accepted and enforced :—

(1) On matters not prescribed by the Church, opinion and practice are free.

How great was this concession can only be properly estimated by those who compare the Reformed with the Unreformed Church, and trace out in detail the immense extent to which the former *did* refrain from uttering Her voice, and obtruding Her authority, not merely as to matters of doctrine, but as to the concerns and occupations of daily life.

(2) On matter non-essential, however important or interesting in themselves, the individual may exert all lawful and constitutional means for impressing on the public mind his own sense of what is right, or even desirable; but he must not, though he may seek to have the law altered, break it while it stands; nor, when in a position

that demands his formal recognition of a doctrine or a practice that has received the public sanction, is he at liberty to reject it.

(3) He cannot renounce the great fundamental doctrines, received by the Church at large in all ages, or at least the cardinal doctrine of the Trinity, and whatever that necessarily implies, without converting his Christian liberty into license; without, in fact, renouncing his Christianity, and *ipso facto* proving that he is not enlightened by the Spirit of Truth.

On the whole then, as to the extent of private enlightenment, and the consequent relation of the individual to the National Church, the impression seems to have been, that the conscientious Christian would be enabled by the Spirit, not to pronounce with isolated and independent infallibility upon the sense of Scripture, but to assent sincerely and heartily to that interpretation which had from the first been, and was now once more to be, the generally accepted one.

THE SPIRIT NOT ONLY THE INTERPRETER, BUT THE REGENERATOR AND SANCTIFIER.—But that this superhuman aid was bestowed on him also, and at least equally, to produce in him holiness of life. Without this “fruit of faith” dogmatic truths, though in terms admitted, could not be really appreciated (“spiritually discerned”), and were not only worthless, but most perilous.

And this assistance he would now more than ever require, because as the perpetual supervision and all-embracing control of the priesthood were removed; along with the privileges he assumed the responsibilities, and incurred the peculiar dangers, of more independent moral agency.

HOW FAR THE ENGLISH REFORMERS WERE INCLINED TO ADMIT VIEW 3.—With reference to the third answer above given, which represented the

great reforming theologians as the authorised, and supernaturally guided expositors of Scripture; here again, the practical and comprehensive English mind was inclined to consider the statement as at once too broad and too narrow; but still as adumbrating, and with proper qualifications capable of expressing, what was felt to be an unquestionable and most important truth.

The Spirit of God was at length moving, with extraordinary and regenerative influence, upon the face of the long stagnant waters of the Church, and stirring them to their inmost depths.

And some divines there were, active on the side of Reform, who combined more or less pre-eminent moral and spiritual qualifications with conspicuous abilities, learning, and knowledge of the Scriptures. In such men, who that sympathised with the movement would not recognise its true representatives, and natural leaders? Nay more—would not in them discern the decided and visible manifestation and fruits of the divine agency?

But that such men were “inspired” in any wise to the same extent, or in the same manner, as the Prophets and Apostles of old, could not be admitted. Thus the statement was too broad. But it was also too narrow. It implied neglect of the Church at large, of the Church of old, of the individual Christian. The same gracious aid had not been denied to them.

THEY LAID MUCH STRESS ON THE AUTHORITY OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS.—And once more, it seemed to imply, it would be very likely in practice to involve, what Englishmen have always been peculiarly given to detect and resent—neglect of constituted authorities; a tendency to ignore, override, supersede, the “powers that be,”

and to forget that they are "ordained of God"; powers of both kinds, in fact as we have already said they were called at the time, the Spirituality and Temporality of the Realm.

ALTHOUGH THE PAPAL POWER HAD BEEN ABOLISHED, AS AN USURPATION.—It may be objected, that they who abolished so summarily, or at least adhered to the abolition of the Papal supremacy, should have been the last to raise such a cavil. But the exception only confirms the rule. The Papal claims had been constantly resisted, checked, regarded throughout as an usurpation, undermined both by law and by public opinion; they had gradually become intolerable; they were at last indignantly and thoroughly repudiated, and by Roman Catholics themselves, and bitter persecutors for the distinctive tents of Romanism. As Bramhall observes, with quaint point:—"Did Roman Catholics themselves find right and sufficient reason to turn the Pope out of England at the foredoor in fair daylight, as an intruder and usurper; and do they expect that Protestants should let him in again by stealth at the back door? It is true Queen Mary afterwards gave him house-room again in England for a short time. But he raged so extremely, and made such bonfires of poor innocent Christians in every corner of the kingdom, that it is no marvel if they desired his room rather than his company."

THEY HAD UNUSUAL CAUSE THEN TO SUPPORT HEARTILY THE ESTABLISHED AUTHORITIES, IN CHURCH AND STATE.—The reverence for established authorities, however, remained strong in the country; was probably greatly confirmed and strengthened by the fear lest reform should degenerate into revolution; and the purification into the destruction of existing institutions both

in Church and State. And the times offered abundant warning that this was no visionary fear. Sectaries, both at home and abroad, had already begun to question the first principles not only of Christianity, but of civil government. The Anabaptists and Levellers had run their wild course. The Pope, though rebuffed, was not unseated from the Throne of St. Peter. The Papal thunders were not silent; they might prove not ineffectual. The Papal party were secretly plotting or openly agitating for a Counter-Reformation. Amidst such perils a work directly and vitally affecting the temporal as well as spiritual condition and prospects, the political hardly less perhaps than the ecclesiastical relations of Englishmen, was to be conducted, completed, consolidated, in a country where—the Papal intervention apart—Church and State had long been not only most closely united, but, to a great extent, absolutely identified. Nor was there any lack of precedents derived from the most flourishing periods of the Church, for ecclesiastical reforms, and reassertions of primitive doctrine, being inaugurated and authoritatively enunciated by Christian Sovereigns.

THEY DID RECUR TO THEM, TO GUARANTEE AND PERPETUATE THE REFORMATION.—The nation and the Church accordingly fell back upon their several, yet united, constitutional agents, as the organs and ratifiers, if not the originators, of the required changes,

Sovereign, Parliament, Convocation :—these already existed as a fact, with provinces, however liable to confusion and mutual infringement, yet to a certain extent clear, as a fact also, and forming collectively the Supreme Civil and Ecclesiastical Authorities of the Christian Realm of England.

4. THE ENGLISH CHURCH REFORMERS' OWN VIEW.—In brief, then, combining these several elements to form an answer, as practically given on the whole to our original questions, by those who determined the course of the movement within that Realm:—Let the Reformation be based upon Scripture, as interpreted, where doubtful, by learned, able, and pious Reforming theologians; guided and controlled in their interpretation by the precedents of the early, undivided Church, so far as the latter are attainable by fair historical and moral evidence. Let measures be framed to bring the present Church as far as possible (*mutatis mutandis*) into accordance with the requisitions of Scripture, so interpreted; and let these measures be sanctioned by public authority, in Church and State. Lastly, conscientious inquiry, modest appreciation of his own advantages, as compared with those of the many eminent men similarly occupied with himself; faith in Divine assistance as befriending properly conducted public, not less than private investigations; finally, loyalty to the combined institutions in Church and State, under which he finds himself placed by Providence:—all these will jointly commend and certify to the individual the system of reform, proposed to be effected in the manner just stated. Where such is not the result; where the individual is still dissatisfied and unconvinced; the fault must be in himself. He must be insincere, presumptuous, uncharitable, or disloyal.

In that case he cannot justly complain if he is punished; not for the mere act of differing with a Church, but for violating so many plain obligations to conform to *such* a Church system, so carefully and temperately framed.

Such appear to have been, in the main, the

theory and practice of the English Church Reformation *at the time*.

SUBSEQUENT SPREAD OF PRINCIPLES OF BROADER TOLERATION.—No one at the present day advocates in England persecution or punishment for religious opinions, as such. Some are still disposed to visit with legal penalties religious practices that they consider involve immediate or remote danger to the established Constitution in Church and State. Many would withhold offices of responsibility from those, who, by their stand-point as inferred from their avowed principles, appear *ipso facto* incapable of fully and conscientiously discharging the duties of those offices. All would admit that there is a certain point—however difficult it may be to determine in a particular case precisely where that point is—at which it becomes absolutely necessary to “restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evildoers,” whether sheltering themselves under the plea of conscience and religion, or under any other less solemn but not more mischievous pretext.

PRESENT VIEWS OF CHURCHMEN AS TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE “SECULAR ARM.”—Churchmen themselves now feel that, granting the politico-religious body of which they are members—the English province of that Kingdom which is *in* this world and yet not *of* this world—was reformed on the right pattern, and by the proper authorities; and granting also, that between such a reform and any individual disposed to question its correctness, the balance of probability is immensely on the side of the National Church;—yet that men must be dealt with as they are, not as they ought to be:—that ignorance, dulness, a bad life, idiosyncrasy of mental or moral constitution, still more early education in a dissenting

community^b, may actually, whether they ought to do so or not, render an individual unwilling, if not unable, to accept the Church system.

That in such a case, to exact compliance, or an affectation of compliance, by legal penalties, is at once a crime and a mistake, and tends to destroy religion altogether.

That therefore, however obligatory the claims of the established Church upon the allegiance of the individual may be *in foro conscientie*; and however strongly he may still be bound to take them fairly, fully, and seriously into account as one great *fact*, one powerful element, in determining his religious convictions and practice: yet, after all, his adhesion or dissidence must be left to himself; and *if* he continue to dissent up to his last hour, none but the unerring eye of God can discern whether, and to what extent, he may really deserve censure;—none but the all-righteous Judge presume to absolve or punish the recusant.

^b Which, of course, raises on the other side a *primò facie* argument as to providential position.

THE SIEGE OF HONORE

IN RELATION TO

RECENT EVENTS.

(October, 1857.)

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RECENT EVENTS.

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1. *Oriental Memoirs.* By JAMES FORBES, F.R.S. &c. 4 vols. quarto. London, 1813.
 2. *Tracts on the Native Army of India.* By Brigadier General JOHN JACOB, C.B. &c. Bombay: Smith, Taylor, and Co., 1837.
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OUR ascendancy in India has been hitherto due to our moral rather than to our physical superiority; to the higher qualities that enable us to utilise with the best effect slender resources, rather than to the amplitude of the resources themselves—still less of that portion of them actually derived from home. Never as yet have our fellow-subjects here mastered the extent—however often and forcibly they may have been taught the nature—of the military might of England available within the three kingdoms.

But from the time of Clive onwards the foundations of our power were securely laid in the moral *prestige* which he established, and others amply sustained. The spell of a master-mind was laid in succession upon each of the enervated or half savage tribes with which we came into contact. And not only did they own subjection to British valor, British constancy,

British faith ;—but they became the willing, for a time the enthusiastic, instruments for extending the beneficent British sway.

At such a season as this, it is encouraging as well as profitable to look back into the past ; and, while the world is ringing with the fame of present heroic endurance and achievement on the part of our countrymen, to trace the resemblance, the identity, between the qualities that have won *them* renown, and rescued India from a demoniac *raj*, and those that of old, under Providence, conferred glory and power on the British.

“ Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona : ”

The Lawrences, the Neills, the Havelocks have had their worthy, if, now at least, less conspicuous predecessors ; the fruits of whose exertions we have long been enjoying, the memory of whose excellences we should not willingly let die.

Thus we feel that no apology is necessary for directing or recalling the attention of our readers to one of those gallant and spirited performances, that redeemed the rather waning reputation of the English during their first war with Sultan Tippoo.

To those who are acquainted with Mr. James Forbes' “ *Oriental Memoirs* ” the account of the siege of Honore will be familiar. To any reader who has never dived into that work we shall have rendered a real service, if our meagre abstract of a single chapter shall tempt him to the perusal of what (we can assure him) he will find a most readable and entertaining description of this part of India during the latter part of last century. There is, throughout the book, an archaic and rather Johnsonesque tone, both of thought and expression, which is far from unpleasing ; by con-

trast especially with the desperately facetious style in which so many travellers at present seem to consider it their duty—or their interest—to recount their experiences. We mention this characteristic, however, less on its own account, than as introductory to the remark in which, after arriving at the termination of the siege, the worthy author rather loftily points the moral of his story.

“The siege of Onora,” he observes, “contains an epitome of human nature; its little history exhibits a striking contrast between national and individual character, actuated by different motives, and pursuing different means—a contrast in which the British officer stands on an exalted pedestal, encircled by courage, honour, fortitude, and humanity; opposed to an Oriental tyrant, with a train of fear, distrust, chicanery, and the meaner vices.”

Mr. Forbes was a personal friend of Captain Torriano, the intrepid defender of the fortress; but the narrator's intimacy with the hero does not appear to have impaired, in any way, the candour and fidelity of the narration; although it must have greatly enhanced the pleasure of retrieving from oblivion the memory of conduct, on its own account, so well worthy of commemoration.

Mr. Cruso, who, as chief surgeon of the hospital in Honore, had ample opportunities, as will appear in the sequel, for forming a fair estimate of the several parties concerned in the siege, and of the real character of its incidents, composed a narrative, which, after his death, was entrusted to Mr. Forbes. Thus the latter was able to compose his very striking and graphic picture. And even in our reduced copy, the reader, as he detects innumerable traits sometimes

almost startlingly similar to those with which recent experience has made us so familiar, may gain a fresh illustration of the proverbial uniformity of Eastern story, since, hardly less than before, the intervention of our countrymen.

At the commencement of the year 1783, our mortal enemy, Tippoo, had just ascended the throne of his father. But the death of Hyder did not put an end to—hardly interrupted—the war which had been previously raging between the House of Mysore and the British. The plan of an active campaign had been projected by the latter; a campaign destined to open, in the West, with remarkable and facile success, but to be speedily chequered with severe disaster. General Matthews had been ordered to make a diversion in favour of the British operations in the Carnatic, by an attack on the Nabob's settlements upon the Malabar Coast. In pursuance of this arrangement, Captain Torriano had been directed to assail Honore. He did so; and after six days stormed the place. A few of the besieged perished in the assault, but the rest were treated with great clemency and consideration. All were set at liberty, except a few principal officers and the sick; the latter being carefully attended by the army surgeons. The victor was entrusted with the command of Honore, which was now made the chief magazine for the British forces in that part of the country. Its fortifications, its supplies, and its garrison were, however, as will be seen, little in accordance with the demands of so important a trust. But the touch-stone of valor can transmute a mud wall into a Gibraltar; and Torriano was in himself a host.

The Nabob's late killidar of the Fort had se-

creted his jewels during the siege by the English. Their whereabouts was disclosed to the British commander, who restored them to their delighted owner on his departure from Honore. A quantity of valuable articles of commerce, which had been buried in the recesses of the neighbouring woods, was similarly brought to the knowledge of Captain Torriano, and by him returned to the merchants to whom it belonged. Mr. Forbes mentions these circumstances because unauthorised rumour had, it appears, whispered a different tale.

Encouraged by this just and enlightened policy, the former inhabitants of the town, who had deserted it on the approach of the English, now began to flock back again. About this time, too, Fortified Island, at the mouth of Honore river, capitulated.

So far all went well. And tidings of more important successes were wafted from the upper country. The General was said to have forced his way over the Ghauts, and captured Bednore. It had in reality been betrayed to him. But soon came news of a different character. The Sultan's troops had stormed the pass of Hyder-Nugger, and dispersed a party posted at Ciddapore river. With what appeared to the British commandant at Honore lamentable and most culpable imbecility, a council of war had unanimously advocated the abandonment, as untenable, of the important post of Barcelore. The guns were spiked, the stores burnt, the ammunition destroyed. The English garrison pursued its miserable, disheartened, recreant way towards Honore. Torriano hastened to take all available measures for securing the safety of the fugitives, and their rehabilitation as soldiers within his walls. Boats were sent across the river to await their arrival, and

many stragglers were soon brought in. Others followed, who had with difficulty escaped the hostility of the neighbouring peasantry. They were supplied with money and other external comforts by the vigilant prudence of their deliverer.^a But it was his nobler function to revive the dying fires of their European energy, bravery, and constancy—to convert them (with one sad exception) from degraded runaways, into heroes all.

After a short respite he received from the Bednore Committee a requisition to evacuate and destroy Honore Fort. With this requisition he respectfully declined to comply. The order was directly contrary to those he had received from the commander of the army. He was convinced that its execution would be prejudicial to the public service. The loss of stores and provisions would be serious. With a soldier-like antipathy to being placed immediately under the galling fire of a committee, he requested that all future orders might come to him, if possible, through the Commander-in-Chief:—

“I am not at all apprehensive respecting the safety of Honore; which I will defend with fifty regulars and the recruits, while we have an army in the field.”

He was soon called upon to make his words good. The storm was fast brewing that ere long was to burst over the fragile Fort, and to try to the uttermost the metal of its defenders. Towards the middle of May, Lutoph Ally Beg, a veteran Persian officer in the Nabob's service, marched against Honore with 10,000 men:—

^a A modicum of tobacco for each European and Sepoy was not forgotten.

"And nearer fast, and nearer,
Doth the red whirlwind come;
And louder still, and still more loud,
From underneath that rolling cloud,
Is heard the^b trumpet's (?) war-note proud,
The trampling, and the hum."

The garrison was mainly composed of raw recruits, together with the English fugitives from Barcelore. But not a thought of surrender was harbored by the resolute commandant. And from the first he seems to have succeeded in infusing a portion of his spirit into his companions.

The first detachment of the enemy was encountered and repulsed in a reconnaissance, accompanied by a field-piece, and headed by Torriano himself. He soon after evinced his ultra-chivalrous humanity by embarrassing himself with more than 2,000 of the inhabitants of Honore, who had hitherto remained aloof from the place since its occupation by the English; but who now fled in terror from the merciless ferocity of the Sultan's army.

The same day the Persian General called upon him to surrender. The Nabob, it was intimated, had retaken Bednore—in Bednore had captured the flower of the British host; the bravest soldier's honor could receive no tarnish from his acquiescence in what was inevitable; Honore *must* fall. "To this a polite answer was returned." Prisoners taken in a second skirmish confirmed the menacing vaunt as to the capture of Bednore and the General's army. No reply was vouchsafed to a second and more imperative summons to surrender, backed by the assurance

^b Could we venture to term the din of tom-toms the "war-note proud" of the "Indian drum," the metre would not suffer by the change of a single word.

that the besiegers' fire was on the point of opening.

Accordingly, on the 10th of June, a battery of seven guns, twelve and eighteen-pounders, began to play upon the crumbling defences of the Fort.

"The rampart was narrow and bad; the high walls not more than three feet thick, generally more a mass of mud than of masonry, and through which an eighteen-pound shot easily passed."

The engineer and all the officers did their utmost to remedy these defects by field-works and other means. But the garrison did not tamely stand on the defensive. A bold and successful *sortie* was concerted, in which the enemy were completely taken by surprise, and driven from their batteries. Seven guns were spiked; and the sallying party, having in this attained their object, returned to the Fort, with only six men wounded. One of these, with both his thighs broken, was by accident left on the ground where he had fallen. The Persian General restored him to his companions. The commandant rewarded the bearers, and "sent a genteel present to Lutoph Ally in testimony of his humanity and politeness." *O si sic omnia!*

An attack upon a British picket led to another sally, in which the sêpoys "halted, and neither the example, menaces, nor encouragement of their officers could make them advance." The disturbing force of the enemy's charge disarranged at once this delicately adjusted state of equilibrium; the sêpoys retreated in hot haste, leaving their officers behind them. They were with difficulty rallied, and the pursuers repulsed, by the resolute support of the commandant, and the fire of his faithful attendant, the field-piece.

For some days subsequently the besiegers continued inactive; and the garrison had leisure to applaud the serviceable self-possession of an European artilleryman, and to execrate the wanton cruelty and barbarity of the enemy. A rocket had lodged in the wall of a powder-magazine within the fortress; but the imminent explosion was averted by the soldier, at the risk of his life, plucking out the missile. His hand was slightly burnt, but he received no other injury; and Torriano was not the man to leave such conduct unacknowledged. On the other hand three men from the neighbouring country, for having formerly rendered the English some service, were very significantly returned to the commandant of Honore, minus their hands.

On the 1st of July the breaching batteries reopened with terrible and prompt effect on the crazy ramparts. But, under cover of the night, the whole garrison labored unremittingly to repair the mischief done during the day.

Still the fire went on. Two of the English guns were damaged; a sergeant of artillery was killed; Torriano himself wounded.

The last circumstance occasioned an incident, the sequel of which is announced with quaint and not unamusing stateliness. Lutoph Ally had sent an old woman as spy into the Fort, to ascertain whether the wound just mentioned had proved fatal. After remaining there two days she was discovered, and returned to him with the request that "should he on any future occasion send female emissaries, they might possess more youth and beauty; that they should be well received, and returned to his camp with as much safety as the antiquated duenna who was then conducted out of the garrison."

Both the works and their defenders continued

to suffer severely from the enemy's fire, though the besieging force itself also sustained considerable injury. But the dangers lurking within the Fort were not less formidable than the onslaughts to which it was exposed from without. Desertion and pestilence embarrassed and threatened to nullify the operations of the Lawrence of Honore. Yet to yield—be far from him! Let the hospital surgeons look well to the sick, while *he* vindicates discipline and the soldier's duty by an example fraught with terror to the man that would be so base as to prove false to his salt. The troops off duty are paraded close to the breach—the deserter's Rubicon. Amidst the solemn roll of the dead-march, a detected culprit is there blown from the mouth of an eighteen-pounder.

At length, on the morning of the 24th of August, Captain Torriano received the formal terms of a cessation of arms, then recently concluded between the Sultan and the English Commander-in-Chief at Mangalore^c. As to Honore, it was therein stipulated that:—

^c We refrain advisedly from entering into the general events of the war, being anxious to fix attention on this too generally forgotten episode. But the following passage from *Mil's History* will remind the reader that the "starving out" system pursued by Tippoo's generals at Honore formed part of a settled policy, which, though thwarted at that place by the vigilant determination of Torriano, proved but too successful elsewhere. "At last a cessation of hostilities, including the garrisons of Honore and Carwar, was concluded on the 2nd of August. Of this agreement one important condition was, that the English garrison should three times a week be furnished with a plentiful market of provisions, at the rates of Tippoo's camp. This was evaded, and prices were daily in such a manner increased, that a fowl was sold at eight, and even twelve rupees; and other things in a like proportion. At last the market was wholly cut off; and horse flesh, frogs,

"A guard shall be placed in the Fort from the Sultan's troops, and one in the trenches, from the Fort, to observe that no operations are carried on, nor any works erected on either side.

"A bazaar, or market, shall be daily supplied to the Fort, containing all kinds of provisions, which the troops belonging to the garrison shall be allowed to purchase.

"Thirty days' provision may be received monthly from Bombay, but no military stores or ammunition will be allowed to enter the Fort."

snakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice were greedily consumed. Even jackals, devouring the bodies of the dead, were eagerly shot at for food. The garrison had suffered these evils with uncommon perseverance, when a squadron appeared on the 22nd of November, with a considerable army under General Macleod. Instead of landing, the General, by means of his secretary, carried on a tedious negotiation with Tippoo; and having stipulated that provisions for one month should be admitted into the fortress, set sail with the reinforcement on the 1st of December.* Even this supply was drawn from damaged stores bought of a navy agent, and of the beef and pork not one in twenty pieces could be eaten, even by the dogs. Another visit, with a similar result, was made by General Macleod on the 31st of December. The desertion of the sepoys, and the mutiny of the Europeans, were now daily apprehended; two-thirds of the garrison were sick, and the rest had scarcely strength to sustain their arms; the deaths amounted to twelve or fifteen every day; and at last, having endured these calamities till the 23rd of January, the gallant Campbell, by whom the garrison had been so nobly commanded, offered, on honorable terms, to withdraw the troops. The Sultan was too eager to put an end to a siege which, by desertion and death, had cost him nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so firm a foe; and they marched to Tellicherry, with arms, accoutrements, and honors of war."

* The armistice was to end the following day! Were there not Hewitts, as well as Lawrences and Havelocks, in the "brave days of old"?

Open fighting might be over for the present; but Lutoph Ally was far above the vulgar prejudice that language was given for any other purpose than to conceal our thoughts—and divert attention from our actions. Like a truly versatile genius, he, of course, hastened to make the best of the situation in which the armistice placed him, relatively to the uninventive and narrow British mind, which will persist not only in calling, but in thinking, a spade a spade, and an oath an oath. His notion of a treaty was very much that of certain "advanced" minds that, in the days of Thucydides, sustained the reputation of "*Græcia mendax*." He regarded it as a convenient entrenchment from behind which to attack an enemy unawares.

During the siege he had occupied with a small detachment the north side of the river bar, so as to secure the approach from the sea. He was now required to recal this party, as he showed no disposition to do so of his own accord. He *did* recal it, "pleading ignorance"; but soon after posted a fresh body of troops on the south side of the bar. Renewed remonstrances; renewed promises of removal, only partially fulfilled. The indignant British officer resolved to seek redress from the Commander-in-Chief. He could do so only through the Sultan's Halcarrahs.

At the same time he prudently availed himself of a feud between the Persian and his second in command, to extract what information he could touching the general course of the war, and the covert designs of Lutoph Ally.

Meanwhile neither cattle nor corn was supplied, or could be procured from without, for the use of the garrison. The crafty Persian was not improbably seconding his master's project of starv-

ing them into a surrender or evacuation of the fortress. Again Torriano protested; again transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief a pressing representation of his embarrassing situation. But no relief came from either quarter. The supplies in the Fort were almost entirely consumed. The Captain suspected that his letters to Mangalore had been detained by Lutoph Ally. This suspicion he now intimated to the latter, together with the announcement that, being cut off from external aid, he must seek it himself. He should send out a foraging party well-armed, as well as provided with money to pay for the necessary provisions. If their operations were opposed or interrupted, they would repel force by force. Should supplies from Bombay or Goa approach the entrance of the river, and the enemy attempt to intercept them, the garrison guns would open upon the offenders. In a word, if the treaty were broken, the blame must rest with the Sultan's General:

"The English had in all respects religiously kept their faith, while he had uniformly sported with his master's honor. The commandant was determined the men who had bled in defence of the fortress should not be starved out of it."

This fair warning was followed up by a party of European soldiers being forthwith posted at the north side of the bar, to command the entrance of the river. In return Lutoph Ally declared himself the very excellent friend of the garrison. Only do let them have a little patience! Letters from the Sultan would soon "terminate the existing difficulty." The English commander was a matter-of-fact man. He repeated his former statement, and added that—

"Lutoph Ally's adherence to the treaty would best prove the friendship he professed; his conduct, not his language, was the subject of complaint; while the former continued unreformed, no credit would be given to the latter."

This unmannerly speech from the rugged northern Islander was too much for the susceptible nature of the soft Asiatic. He yielded, with a tear no doubt, and hastened to remit supplies and still more affectionate messages. "The sheep were paid for;" the compliments too were accepted at their value.

But Lutoph Ally had another card to play; and here again his antagonist showed himself master of the game. In the English outworks stood two large vessels, which had belonged to Hyder Ally, and had been captured along with the Fort. The Sultan's commander now, on the purely gratuitous suggestion that his master's troops would shortly, according to the terms of a supposed treaty with the English, occupy Honore, requested that in the interval *he* might be allowed to take care of the ships, and build a shed in the Fort for the better preservation of them and of the stores which were once more to become the property of Tippoo.

"Lutoph Ally received for answer that, as he had informed the commandant the ships and arms, together with the Fort itself, were so shortly to be delivered up to the Sultan's troops, the compliance with his request was too trifling on the eve of such an important event; and that in the interim all possible care should be taken of the articles in question."

On the 27th September Mr. Cruso, from whose narrative, as has been mentioned, Mr. Forbes

in a great measure derived his materials, arrived at the mouth of the river; and, after some delay in the camp of the enemy, reached the Fort. He brought letters to Captain Torriano from General M'Leod, and from the defender of Mangalore, Captain Campbell, both highly laudatory of the exertions made for the retention of Honore.

But it now transpired that not a single letter entrusted to Lutoph Ally had reached its destination!

A new actor now appears upon the scene, with little variation however in the plot, or in the style of performance. There stands Torriano as before, resolved to hold his own against all comers; ready to fight, ready to observe treaties, but *not* ready to be overpowered either by open force or secret fraud; and so, on the whole, thinking it advisable to "sleep every night close to the principal breach"—and sleeping there accordingly until the end of the blockade.

But Lutoph Ally is gone. The Persian has now given place to a fresh commander, who comes, however, indoctrinated, like his predecessor, with their noble master's noble policy, and not less adapted, by nature and training, to carry it out.

In the middle of October, Torriano is congratulating the new officer, Maw Mirza Khan; putting him on his metal as "a gallant soldier;" and, with a prompt eye to business, expressing a strong hope that "the cessation of arms will in future be as closely adhered to, as it has been hitherto scandalously neglected."

Mirza, on his part, is quite overpowering in his professions of friendship. He cannot sufficiently admire the persevering courage of the garrison. How sad it is there has, as yet, been so little familiar intercourse between them and

the Sultan's army! This must now be set right! What the British officer says is quite true. (Why has he not sought a personal interview with his new friend?) Mirza means to do everything kind. *Of course* the treaty will be most punctiliously adhered to.

The upshot was, however, that, "after many other compliments and promises," Mirza declined doing anything at all, until a modest request from Tippoo himself had been first granted!

This turned out to be no other than a repetition of the former demand about the ships, with the not insignificant additional suggestion from Mirza, that he should be permitted to employ 400 men (within the English works!) in repairing the injuries they had sustained from war and weather. It is hardly necessary to add, that the sole result of this shallow artifice was a renewed disclaimer of this "condition subsequent" being appended to the armistice, and an urgent counter-requisition that "the article for supplying cattle should be immediately complied with." It was added, that if proper materials were sent into the Fort, they should be employed in repairing the ships.

In spite of this, Mirza still had the pertinacious impudence again to press his request. His former message could not have been understood, or it *must* have been complied with, as he doubted not the present one would be. Otherwise it was unreasonable to suppose he could be bound by the treaty! Charming illogic! Convenient inaccuracy of the Indian mind!

Now hear the British officer's characteristic response to this characteristic piece of Oriental diplomacy—observe plain, stout, erect Mr. Bull's attitude towards the insinuating, bowing, sinister-smirking gentleman in black:—

"Captain Torriano, justly incensed, desired the second emissary to acquaint his master that, conceiving the request to have been first made in obedience to the Sultan's commands, while his own mind reprobated his conduct, he had preserved great moderation in his answer, which he *flattered himself would have been ascribed to its true source, a personal delicacy to Mirza.* But since a repetition of the demand had been made, he deemed it an insolent puerility, so little becoming the character of Mirza, that he hoped he did not err in imputing it to the short-sighted policy and chicanery of the Brahmins by whom he was surrounded. That the proper time for restoring the ships would be when the Sultan's troops were able to take the outworks in which they stood; until that event, the commandant was determined, not only to keep possession of the vessels, but, if wood for fuel was not immediately supplied for the garrison, the ships would be broken up for that purpose."

Immediately after this unmistakeable appeal to natural equity and international law, Mirza, in that blissful state of invincible ignorance to which a man convinced against his will is proverbially prone, detained a boat sent from Honore to *Fortified Island, and defended the proceeding on the ground that, "as no anxiety had been expressed to continue on a friendly footing with him, no favours were to be expected."*

Torriano thereupon threatened to resume immediate hostilities if the lithe Mussulman did not observe the terms of the armistice. Then, as usual, the insoluble Eastern question was resolved. Swift conviction dawned on the mind of Mirza, when he found that he could neither intimidate nor cajole his equally bold and wary anta-

gonist. "The adoption of violent measures was far from his intention; he trusted there might be an immediate accommodation." This was—such being his altered disposition—easily effected, and "affairs went on smoothly until the 26th of October."

On the date just mentioned, a trusty spy,^d who

^d Mr. Forbes' sketch of this man and his operations is interesting, not only in itself, but as illustrating a peculiarity in the Hindoo character with which our readers must be familiar—the (to an Englishman at least) apparent *unaccountableness* of many of the good as well as bad actions of our impenetrable fellow-subjects. "Although the daring spy had to pass through the enemy's camps before Honore and Mangalore, he effected the purpose required by entering through a hole in the wall of the latter fortress, when strictly blockaded by Tippoo Sultan. The messenger returned with Colonel Campbell's answer, and being then desired to take whatever sum he thought proper, from a bag of venetians placed before him, he not only declined this mode of remuneration, but submitted it entirely to the generosity of the commandant; and further requested he would become his banker, declaring he would continue to serve him faithfully, and would never receive any reward until he might conceive he was suspected by the enemy, when he should avail himself of the fruit of his labours to such an extent as, in his opinion, he could carry off free from molestation. * * * He was a squalid, meagre figure, without the smallest appearance of enterprise, but possessing great acuteness and firmness of character. * * * The period at length arrived when he called upon the commandant, and informing him that he had reason to conclude himself suspected by the enemy of holding an intercourse with the Fort, he must consult his safety by a precipitate and secret flight. To this no objection could fairly be made. The garrison had essentially benefited in many instances by his firmness and fidelity, and he was entitled to trace out his own line of conduct whenever it seemed most advisable. On parting, Captain Torriano was not without anxiety for his safety; he told him the fate of Honore could not long remain undecided; that, should he survive until that period, it was his resolution to reward his services still further by settling on him a pension, provided he could contrive to join him in any of the Company's districts.

rendered many services during the course of the siege, brought in a letter from Colonel Campbell at Mangalore, containing a warning that a treacherous attack upon the Fort was in contemplation. Active precautions were immediately taken to frustrate it.

The following day brought "some provisions and a letter" from General M'Leod, who had just anchored off the port in a cruiser. We should be sorry to say anything disrespectful of a gallant officer. But certainly the General does appear at this time to have been leading very much the life of "a man about" India; sailing jauntily up and down the coast, "touching off" the straitened and eagerly expectant fortresses of Mangalore and Honore, and, far

He was then desired to remunerate himself to the fullest extent of his wishes, and ample means set before him for the purpose. He was, however, satisfied with little, saying that, in the event of his being seized, and much money discovered upon him, the very circumstance would prove his destruction. He then took his leave, and passed the English posts; but whether he succeeded in effecting his escape into the interior part of the country, or was taken in the attempt and put to death, has never been known, no tidings having ever been heard of him since that period." It is pleasing to contemplate—even in a spy—the spectacle of such rare fidelity. On the other hand, it was no doubt prudent not to go off, overloaded with cash, across the besiegers' lines; while he might safely reckon on future reward from the English. Still the question recurs, why did he expose himself to so many perils, and remain so "staunch" with so little certain profit? Was it from personal devotion to Torriano, or admiration of the British power generally? Or love of exhibiting and being applauded for his dexterity? Or was it from native nobility of character? Had national and religious hostility to Tippoo nothing to do with it?

from rendering them the succour that was due, and that they had every right to expect from him, putting them off once and again with minute remittances of food, and indefinite promises. So now Torriano confidently, though anxiously, tells him that "every exertion shall be made by his small garrison, and trusting in *him* for relief, they will not disgrace the British arms."

Mr. Cruso's professional character was of great service to the besieged, as it gave him ready access to the enemy's camp, and provided for Captain Torriano a medium of expostulation not the less efficacious because backed by the physician's admirable tact and medical reputation. About this time he attended Mirza for "a diseased leg," and applied a novel remedy. The Asiatic warrior seemed a good deal bitten by the Anglomania that at that period had taken such forcible possession of the future *Egalité* and other great people in France. He exhibited with pride—not improbably as a gentle hint—a pair of silver buckles made in the Sultan's camp after the English pattern. He longed to practise (in the censorial phrase of a venerable University Statute) "that absurd and proud custom of walking in boots." The judicious doctor took care to gratify him. On his next visit to the camp the follower of the Prophet was presented with "the best supply of those articles procurable in the garrison." It is to be hoped that they afflicted him with judicial corns!

Tippoo's General might, for his immediate purposes, profess sympathy with the beleaguered Britons; but he was not the less careful to stop their stipulated supplies: he might gladly accept

boots as an earnest, but (in his heart) it was only as an earnest of the more important acquisition that his arts, if not his arms, were soon to place in his own power.

Thus, all this time, the miseries of the garrison and the anxieties of the commandant were daily becoming more pressing, more overwhelming. So many desertions took place that, in order if possible to check the spread of disaffection among the better disposed, it was thought expedient to offer a free discharge to any sepoy "who should be so base as to request it." Rewards were also offered to those who should detect a deserter in the act of making off. Mirza, taxed with enticing away the native soldiers of the garrison, denied the charge; but added with affected compassion that—

"A few deserters had been brought before him, who, so far from being fit persons to entertain as soldiers, were miserable spectacles, famished with hunger," [who had brought them to this state?] "and sinking under disease. They laid their little all at his feet, and declared they only fled for the preservation of life, which they implored his leave to seek in a more healthy atmosphere. To these wretched beings he had granted a passage through his camp."

But in future he would restore all such, and would forbid his troops in Honore holding any communication with the garrison.

Still the evil continued and even increased. On January 11th, three veteran sepoys, two recruits, six artificers, with many non-combatants effected their escape. Next day nearly as many more. A Malwar recruit was taken in the act. The commandant declared that this man's life

should be spared if—and only if—no more desertions took place. Notwithstanding which declaration, six more went off immediately after, taking the sentry with them. Two days afterwards they were followed by a subedar and two regular sepoys, four officers, and three privates of the Malwars.

This sealed the ignominious fate of the reprieved prisoner. He was now hanged, as a conspicuous warning, in front of one of the batteries. Yet another desertion occurred the same evening!

Nothing can more forcibly represent either the straits to which the garrison were reduced, or the strength of that moral ascendancy which the dauntless commander still retained over the faithful few, than such facts, together with the appalling details of the ravages of pestilence and famine supplied by Mr. Forbes.

"Disease," he says, "was now so prevalent, that hardly one man in the Fort remained untainted; eight or ten died daily, and so soon became offensive that a number of graves were constantly kept in readiness; but the dogs, savage with hunger, generally tore up the dead bodies at night, and strewed the outworks with their mangled remains."

Another friendly message, received from one of the Sultan's officers who had formerly experienced acts of kindness from the English, warned the defenders of Honore against a treacherous assault that (it was hinted) would probably be made in the early morning. The deserters, it was intimated, had fully informed Mirza as to the state of things within the Fort. And yet this English-admiring, English-booted savage, calmly, studiously, persisted in perpetuating and aggravating the forlorn condition of those upon whom he lavished

so many sickening and insulting expressions of attachment; cat-like sporting with his victim, vulture-like gloatingly awaiting the agonised end, Nana-like turning treaties into decoys, and plighted troth into an engine of wholesale and hideous destruction!

But to continue our narrative. On one day ten sepoy's deserted; during the course of a single night seventeen soldiers of various descriptions, together with their families, in all thirty persons. Nor were these the last. But the most cruel and unguarded blow was now to fall. For once Torriano was completely and dreadfully surprised. A British ensign revealed the native blackness of his soul by joining the ranks of Mirza, and communicating to him "every intelligence he could desire!"

Still the brave commandant of Honore quailed not. Still he exemplified the half peevish, half admiring taunt of England's greatest foe—he "*would not* know that he was beaten." His walls gaping to receive the invader or emit the deserter—his single tower tottering to its fall—his scanty and worn-out garrison thinned and disheartened by those who were daily abandoning a desperate cause—a frightful plague raging in the town, "distending the bodies of the diseased by putrid air, so as scarcely to leave a trace of the human frame," and ever claiming more numerous victims—the enemy without powerful, pitiless, and unscrupulous—all communication with his countrymen cut off—his own spirits fainting under that hope deferred that makes the heart sick—wounded in his most sensitive part by the indescribable baseness of the British renegade—exultingly informed by his crafty enemy that Mangalore had at length succumbed to the same fate that was fast prostrating

Honore—invited to abandon his hopeless charge rather than fall an easy and prompt prey to a combination of dangers, each alone sufficient to overwhelm him :—what was his constant answer to the reiterated summons? “He would not, unless by express command of his superiors, surrender the Fort while a man adhered to his colours.”

The full heroism of this reply will better be understood if we subjoin (with some abridgment) Mr. Forbes' painfully vivid picture of the interior of Honore at this period of the blockade.

“The fortress exhibited a dreadful scene; the hospitals overflowed with patients in every stage of the horrid disorder already mentioned. The bodies of the diseased were for the most part so distended by putrid air, as scarcely to leave a trace of the human frame; and it was with difficulty a feature could be distinguished in the countenance; while their laborious breathing indicated every appearance of strangulation. The ear could no where escape the groans of the dying, nor the eye avoid these shocking spectacles; but why should language attempt to describe distress, which the conduct of the sufferers paints in more vivid colours? These poor wretches, formerly subjects of a sovereign whose soul never knew mercy nor felt for human woe, when the victorious flag of Britain first waved on the ramparts of Honore, fled to it as an asylum from the Sultan's oppressions, and received protection; yet now did these devoted beings, snatching a transient degree of strength from despair, crawl into the public road, and waiting there until the commanding officer went his evening rounds, prostrated themselves at his feet, imploring permission to quit this dreadful

scene, and, as a lighter evil, meet the vengeance of an incensed tyrant. Their prayer was granted, and the same principle of national honour, which originally insured them protection, was now extended for their safety. Proper persons were appointed to see them go out in small parties after it was dark, hoping by this precaution that such as were not too much exhausted to reach the enemy's lines unperceived might, from their deplorable condition, excite the commiseration of the sentinels at the outposts, and ultimately reach the distant villages. The following morning presented a dreadful spectacle. On the preceding evening, 88 of the inhabitants, men, women, and children, had been permitted to leave the Fort; but were so entirely exhausted that their route to the Sultan's trenches was traced by a line of dead bodies, with the more aggravated spectacle of living infants sucking the breast of their dead mothers."

Desertion, in spite of repeated and stringent efforts to check it, was still on the increase, and threatened the speedy dissolution of the attenuated and enfeebled body that was daily wasting away under its fatal virulence. But this was not all. The Europeans began to ask themselves—as *their countrymen have done since*—if so many sepoys thus consent to play the traitor, why should not all? At least where the force of circumstances has triumphed so often over the native character, what secure guarantee have we that any one individual black will prove in the end trustworthy? Are they not all the slaves of circumstance, rather than the pupils of reason, or the adherents to principle? Besides those who have fallen during the siege, a large portion of the native force which we lately

mustered in Honore has already "ceased to exist" as our soldiers—by no means absolutely. They are all gradually melting away. It is only a question of time. And will the remainder even bide their time, and go off quietly? The natives evidently think the term of our dominion here is at hand. They have a strong affection for the winning side. May they not be inclined to place themselves securely on that side by hastening the consummation?—May they not be disposed to propitiate the favor of the coming man by clearing away obstacles from his path, by "breaking the bruised reed?"

Hence from desertion sprang another evil—a general (and who shall say groundless?) suspicion of meditated treachery on the part of those sepoys who still professed to be "staunch." We need not reproduce the several stories which confirmed, or were suggested by, this suspicion. The reader will be able feelingly to imagine them. Of course the officers were to be assassinated, and the Fort delivered up to the enemy. Mr. Forbes is disposed to think this alleged project "altogether absurd and improbable." So it may have been; and yet (some will think) it may have been otherwise. Few at least will not be amused—on second thoughts grieved—at the benevolent credulity that finds it impossible to believe sepoys (even in the extremity of suffering) capable of such nefarious and unsoldier-like designs; and finds it necessary to account for any concession, on the part of the commanding officer, to such suspicions, and to apologise for the "prejudice" that generated them. Let the reader, however, judge for himself.

There appears, then, no doubt that—

"All the sepoys posted in the outworks, headed

by their jemautdar, had agreed to desert to the enemy the following night. The guards were directly withdrawn from the outworks, and the guns brought into the Fort. The jemautdar, suspected to be the ringleader, was put in irons, and sent into close confinement; where, conscious of his guilt, he committed suicide."

Mirza had, in the mean time, opportunely forgotten to relieve the guard, which, according to the terms of the armistice, was to be stationed in the Fort, and which had previously been so strongly suspected of tampering with the British sepoy. On Torriano's remonstrance at this juncture, he excuses himself on the ground that he "had only been prevented from doing so by a multiplicity of business." Every thing is true in a sense. Mirza is no doubt busy enough in his way. A European escort insists on escorting the hero nightly to his slumbers in the trenches. He himself places two loaded field pieces, guarded by soldiers with lighted matches, "immediately opposite the station; where they remained until the evacuation of Honore." Whereupon Mr. Forbes, with discriminating moderation, adds:—

"It is almost unnecessary to remark, that this step was taken for the sole purpose of dissipating the prejudices of the Europeans, which no argument could subdue. When it is considered that these prejudices originated entirely from fidelity and attachment to their officers, they will be found more deserving of applause than reprobation."

On the tone of feeling betrayed by this remark may it not be said "*Nous avons changé tout cela ?*"

Torriano shall now for a moment tell his own tale. The following extracts are from a letter

which he prepared to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief; but which, as will appear, was never received by that exalted official, who seems to have had a happy knack of assuming, without performing, the part of *Deus ex machina* throughout this weary siege. They depict with vigour and simplicity the man and the situation:—

“Regardless of my own fate, I cannot but acutely feel the sufferings of my brave comrades, who, although now greatly reduced in number, a prey to disease, surrounded by death, and deceived by fruitless promises of relief, still adhere to me.

“Within the short period of six weeks, five hundred persons, soldiers and natives, have fallen victims to a cruel pestilence which rages within these walls. Desertion nearly keeps pace with death; so serious and so incredible is the former, that amongst the number lately gone over to the enemy is a British officer.

“Mirza is daily urging us, in the strongest terms and most threatening manner, to capitulate.

“Every means in my power shall be exerted to defend this place while a grain of rice remains for subsistence; but I trust the British arms will not be so shamefully tarnished, as to admit this fortress unsupported to fall into the enemy’s hands. Of my few officers, death has deprived me of one, desertion of another; my garrison is reduced to sixty effective men. The quantity of provisions remaining in the Fort is very small, and great part of the rice is much damaged.

“The enemy have received a strong reinforcement, and the buxey informs me they are to be

increased by ten additional battalions; on their arrival more hostile measures will be adopted.

"I have great reason to be apprehensive for the safety of Fortified Island.

"I will not relinquish the hope that I shall not be left to a capitulation, even though accompanied by the best terms, and originating in the most absolute necessity."

Would it be easy to find a closer approximation than is here indicated, to the graceful Epicurean's ideal of Stoic fortitude?

"Justum et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni
Mente quatit solida: * *
* * * * *
Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinæ."

The scurvy now added its loathsome ravages to those of the previous disorder. Not a single European private or non-commissioned officer escaped its attack. A vegetable diet and exercise were prescribed as the best antidotes. Seeds, bought in the enemy's camp and planted in the Fort, soon clothed its desolate precincts with unwonted verdure. But many of the desponding patients, after a brief course of horticultural activity, relapsed into a stolid lethargy that would have well befitted the crew of the "Ancient Mariner," or Don Juan's companions after the shipwreck. Then skittles were tried; and such of the feeble sufferers as could keep their seat on horseback were lamentably paraded (like Shakespeare's dethroned Richard) on the few lean steeds that had not yet fallen a prey to the fierce hunger of the Europeans. In the end, the majority of

the English happily rallied: "only five out of thirty-five fell a sacrifice." But the less energetic native inhabitants and sepoy succumbed in great numbers.

Captain Torriano's misgivings as to the safety of Fortified Island were not without foundation. On the 4th of March it was attacked and captured by Mirza's orders, and its garrison transferred prisoners to his camp. There the native soldiers were induced to enter the Sultan's service; the British officers were plundered of everything except the clothes on their backs; and, through the medium of their infamous fellow-countryman, repeated but completely unsuccessful attempts were made to induce them to follow the example of their men. These and other particulars were shortly after ascertained from the officers themselves by the trusty spy already mentioned, who also brought an urgent request from them to the commandant, that he would interest himself for their liberation. But previously to this discovery, and immediately after the island fell into the hands of the Sultan's force, the indefatigable Mr. Cruso had gone off to Mirza with a determined remonstrance from Captain Torriano. On the first occasion he was put off; on the second delayed. At last the "gallant soldier" made his appearance, his face beaming with injured innocence, a lie—and a very full-grown one—in his right hand. The whole thing, of course, was quite a misconception. The English are so hasty and so harsh in drawing conclusions unfavorable to their "friendly" antagonist! Why should Mr. Cruso so bluntly forewarn him, that his present visit was not so much to know whether Honore was to be attacked, as to notify that the commandant was resolutely prepared to resist the expected assault?

Do let him listen to reason. A simple explanation of what had occurred would fully exculpate the speaker, and ought to satisfy the British officer. And then, with sleek and unfaltering mendacity, he foisted upon his impatient listener a story that, as the latter told him, should he repeat it at Honore, would cause his own veracity to be questioned. As a highly interesting specimen of Oriental Romance, founded (more or less) on facts, we give it entire. The facts themselves we italicise, that the reader may be convinced at a glance how unjust are certain imputations lately thrown upon the native mind, as deficient in the faculty of original composition:—

“Extraordinary as it may appear to those unacquainted with the duplicity and chicanery of the Indian character, Mirza positively denied having attacked the island; and gravely replied that the English officer commanding there had for some time given great disgust to his sepoy, by refusing them proper provisions, whilst he luxuriously feasted upon poultry and liquors sent from time to time for the use of the gentlemen at Onore. At the time his people were thus disaffected, this imprudent officer endeavored to seduce the wife of a naique, who was by caste a Brahmin, and at length had recourse to violence. On this outrage the husband flew to his comrades, interested them and their jemautdar in his cause, and they went in a body to the officer's quarters; where, remonstrating with a freedom which he construed into insolence, they were threatened with death. The aggrieved party had immediate recourse to arms, and attacked the officer, who was supported by half his garrison. *This occasioned the irregular fire heard at Onore.* While these mutual hostilities were pending, one of the

Sultaun's boats, accidentally passing Fortified Island, was hailed by the mutineers, who entreated to be taken on board. This being reported to Mirza, he sent over a messenger to the English officer to represent the folly of continuing at his post with only eleven men, recommending him to leave the island, and offering him every accommodation in his camp, until an opportunity presented for proceeding to an English settlement. The officer declined quitting the island, but desired Mirza would send over a sufficient force to take charge of the Fort; his request was complied with, and *these were the men who had been seen from the ramparts of Onore*. All this was related by Mirza in the gravest manner; and the jemautdar, the Brahmin naique and his wife, with five sepoy (tutored for the purpose, at the peril of their lives) were brought into the durbar, to corroborate Mirza's story. It is almost unnecessary to observe that the whole of this tale was a fabrication of the Sultan's officer to deceive the commandant."

That observant officer, General M'Leod, who in Mr. Forbes's picture of the beleaguered fastness seems evermore hovering in the middle distance, at this juncture (March 7th, 1784) transmitted from "on board the *Chesterfield* Indiaman, off Onore," another letter, "desiring to be informed of the state of the garrison, and offering his best services." Captain Torriano resolved in return to despatch the letter from which the above extracts have been made. But the Sultan's General was necessarily apprised of this communication. He professed entirely to approve of the letter and its object. But, as usual, he took care it should never reach its destination. How he contrived to satisfy M'Leod we are not informed.

"It will suffice to say that the commandant and garrison of Onore had the mortification to see the vessel sail away with the General, without the smallest relief to their distress." But, in accounting to the sufferers themselves for this bitter disappointment, there was an admirable occasion for what Mr. Grote would call "the development of the mythopœic faculty." Accordingly Mirza surpassed himself in the secunity and confidence with which he multiplied stories intended to reconcile the garrison to the frustration of their hopes.

"Deceitful as had been his conduct respecting the capture of Fortified Island, his behaviour with regard to the letter sent to General M'Leod exceeded it in folly, cruelty, and duplicity. The falsehoods he permitted to be told in his durbar, by boatmen and messengers tutored for the purpose, who were supposed to have been employed in the delivery of the letter, and *intrusted with a cool indifferent verbal answer, instead of a written reply to its interesting contents*, were uttered before Mr. Cruso in the gravest manner possible. The stories fabricated on this occasion by Mirza and his colleagues, to answer their own wretched purpose, would astonish and disgust a generous Briton, unused to such chicanery. They occupy many pages in the journal, but the detail would now have little interest."

His compatriot will blush to learn that even Mr. Cruso, who had so often shared the elevating society of the noble Mirza, still retained the same unfortunate predilections against that great man's flights of fancy.

"Hitherto," said the horribly practical Englishman, "he (Mirza) had been considered as profess-

ing a respect for the Onore garrison consistent with the sentiments of a liberal enemy; but where was that liberality and respect when, forgetting they had even the common feelings and understanding of men, he insulted them with such foolish and unfounded fictions? He then declared that if any chicanery had been used with Captain Torriano's letter, or any imposition practised upon the General, there was an end to every hope of the garrison leaving the Fort, consistent with that sense of honor and duty by which they had been hitherto actuated; and he would take upon himself to say the Fort would never yield to the Sultan until every European was cut to pieces."

The Mussulman drily answered, "We are not going to cut you to pieces."

For once Mirza had inadvertently committed himself to the statement of a literal fact. The end of this gallant little band, who had so long and so stoutly endured such an accumulation of trials and disasters, was not so to be. Nor yet was Mirza to triumph in his cruel purpose of reducing them by famine. In their hour of deepest dejection—when resistance was fast becoming impracticable, timely succour hopeless—when force and fraud, combined for their destruction, were hemming them in on every side—when surrender looked unlovely as ever in the eyes of him who had hitherto sustained their drooping spirits, but who now seemed doomed to prove anew that mortal man, however well he may deserve, cannot command, success—in such an hour (for the night is darkest before the dawning) the reviving light of liberty and peace burst suddenly upon the tottering defenders of the tottering fastness.

And never perhaps was a soldier's heart gladdened by a purer satisfaction than must have

been felt by the stalwart Torriano, as he read the undoubted and official tokens that war between his countrymen and the Sultan was at an end. The Madras Commissioners, who had been authorised to conclude the terms of peace, directed him—and this time there was no mistake, no forgery, no interception—“to deliver up Onore to the Nabob's officer, and to embark with the troops on the vessels now sent for that purpose.” Soon after, accordingly, arrived the ships that were to convey away the poor remains of a garrison originally deficient enough in numbers, conduct, and warlike experience; but which, rising with the emergency, nerved and sustained by the glowing yet steady enthusiasm of one man, had, for nearly a year, successfully resisted every effort of an enemy despicable only in his wickedness; and had entitled themselves and their ruined stronghold to be long cherished in the affectionate remembrance of Englishmen.

But not in the hour of exultation does the commandant relax his energies, or fail to guard with the same vigilance as ever, the interests of all—natives as well as Europeans—non-combatants alike and soldiers—entrusted to his charge. He extends his care to the very guns and stores, which, as we shall have occasion presently to notice, he succeeds in carrying off, although—

“Strange and reprehensible as it must appear, not one of these articles, nor the destiny of the inhabitants, had been mentioned either in the Commissioners' orders, or in the third article of peace, which they sent to the commandant.”

His first, and, it may well be believed, most welcome public task is to thank the military, who, having known with him the heaviness of the long

night, are now basking in the gladsome light of returning day. His acknowledgments are in the most hearty and unreserved terms:—

“Replete with the highest sense of gratitude to this garrison, the commandant in the warmest manner thanks the officers, heads of departments, non-commissioned officers, and privates of every corps, for their courage, toil, and conduct.”

He next pays his first visit to the antagonist whose Asiatic subtlety had been so often played off in vain upon his own British heart of oak, like Saladin's gliding scimitar against the resistless sweep of *Cœur de Lion's* massive straight-sword. “A plentiful supper, consisting of every dainty procurable;” a nautch performed by “the best dancing girls in the camp;” European military honors tendered by long rows of the Sultan's troops extending from the batteries to the durbār;—such is the rather hybrid ceremonial with which Mirza welcomes the defender of Honore; and, having up to this time done all he can to dishonor his master's name and his own, now affects to ignore, if not to obliterate, the memory of the recent past. Amidst the festivities an instructive fact is disclosed. Torriano asks after the British deserter. Mirza condemns his treachery with an energy and unction worthy of Pecksniff. He then proceeds to state that “the ignominious culprit is now in irons for misconduct lately committed in camp, and confined within a few yards of the spot where the feast is being held.”

So punishment, *not* with lame foot, had overtaken the man in whose “dead soul” all the endearing and sacred ties of patriotism had pleaded in vain.

"The wretch, concentr'd all in self,
Living, shall forfeit fair renown,
And, doubly dying, shall go down
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,
Unwept, unhonored, and unsung."

Premature fate! double death indeed to fall so low as to excite the moral sensitiveness of Mirza! Did pleasure or pain, a stern feeling of satisfaction that the traitor had so soon "gone to his own place," or sadness at the deep humiliation even of so degenerate a Briton, preponderate in the hearts of those who listened to this noteworthy piece of intelligence?

We have said that Torriano continued watchful for the safety of all those who had borne with him the brunt of adversity. This is amusingly illustrated in what we may call an after-piece to the general drama of the siege. Throughout this curious *jeu d'esprit* fresh traits of character are brought out on all sides. And although the chief actors and their leading principles of performance are still the same, yet their several parts are not a little different from those they formerly sustained; they sometimes even appear almost to change sides. Subordinates, too, and non-belligerents, now figure in a novel and ludicrous manner upon the scene, while the ostensible point in dispute between the still contending warriors has sunk from the possession of a fortress to—the custody of a lean and helpless Brahmin! Yet, after all, we have here but a comic reproduction of much that has already been exhibited in a graver form. Indeed, the general effect is something similar to that which we may fancy to have been produced by the grotesque Satyric Drama that, in Athens the Imperial, succeeded the solemn Tragic Trilogy, and exhibited the whilome heroes profanely

enacting parts more akin to that of Harlequin than to the province of the stately *Cothurnus*.

The Sultan's General secretes small parties of troops in various convenient lurking holes among the outworks. Cross-examined by the British officer, he, with unwonted candor, discloses the plain truth, and thus gains about as much as a confirmed drunkard by a single act of abstinence from the destructive bottle. He has orders—he is attempting—to secure divers brahmins obnoxious to Tippoo, and who have found refuge within Honore, in particular one Narrain Row, a brahmin of consequence. Torriano, regardless still of “humanity as well as national honor,” resolves “to shield them from the tyrant's vengeance.” So he too for once—in this scene “motley's the only wear”—resolves to “practise” (as Mr. Forbes benignly phrases it) “a virtuous deception.” Mirza need not trouble himself to watch for the brahmins. “Suspecting what would happen, they have made their escape.” But *ne sutor*. Alas for the clumsy Briton who tries conclusions in the art of even “virtuous” lying with the glib proficient of this “land of delusion,” in whom moral obliquity would seem to be constitutional, and an atmosphere of falsehood their congenial element! The presumptuous attempt fails as it deserves to do. Mirza is not to be so taken in. He replies that—

“The commandant of Onore is greatly misinformed, as he himself has taken such precautions that it is impossible for a man to have passed the camp without his knowledge.”

He, therefore, requests to be allowed to search the Fort and an off-flying gallivat. This is granted, after certain practical steps have been taken to render the search abortive—steps which

happily attain their end better than the previous verbal endeavor to throw Tippoo's bloodhounds off the scent. Dogs, however, though they may lose scent, don't, generally, at once give up the prize. Poor, panting, frightened Narrain Row about this time felt the full force of the metaphor. But we must not deny the reader the entertainment of tracing in Mr. Forbes's own narrative the tragi-comic vicissitudes of the persecuted brahmin's career at this trying crisis of his life:—

“When the search in the gallivat was ended, the wretched Narrain Row, terrified almost to stupidity, was sent on board, disguised as a Lascar, and shut up in a small dark place separated from the hold. The brahmin had not been there more than an hour, when Mirza informed Captain Torriano that, having in vain searched for him on shore, he must be permitted to place a guard on board the gallivat, until she sailed out of the river, to prevent the brahmin obtaining admittance. The commandant, having a point of consequence to carry for the Company, with Mirza, thought it prudent to grant his request. Narrain Row, whose weak frame and debilitated system rendered existence almost impossible in his close confinement in the hold of a gallivat, passed the Sultaun's centinel in his disguise of a Lascar, and was once more safely lodged in the Fort. There he remained till the day destined for embarking the private baggage, &c., and all but the men under arms. * * * Maw Mirza, in obedience to the Sultaun's orders, insisted on posting confidential persons to examine the contents of all chests and packages, and the countenance of every person who should embark. The keen vigilance of these examiners

suggested the idea of making it the instrument of their own deception. The venerable Vicar of the Romish church, lately deceased, had deposited in the Fort, with the commander's leave, several large chests filled with images and ornaments belonging to the Portuguese church at Onore; these were sent down to the beach with the greatest care, and particular orders given that the Sultaun's people should on no account be permitted to open them, except in the commandant's presence. The extraordinary magnitude of the chests, and the affected mystery of the attendants, did not fail to excite the expected curiosity. At length Captain Torriano arrived, and ordering the chests to be unlocked, instead of the expected brahmins, they turned out twelve images of the Apostles, with a number of Saints, all the size of life, and splendidly dressed. While the attention of the inspectors was thus engaged, the poor shivering brahmin, who had been waiting at some distance down the river, up to his chin in water, was received on board the *Indiaman's* pinnacle, and stowed away under some bullocks. The boat having been previously examined, rowed briskly under the batteries, and to the satisfaction of the whole garrison, carried him in safety on board the *Hawke*."

Eventually Mirza was persuaded to desist from further efforts to get him back, or to retaliate his escape on the garrison.

The other brahmins whom the Sultan honored with his deadly hatred were the next objects of the commandant's solicitude. An experimental project of passing one of them as an invalid soldier failed too signally to afford much encouragement for the repetition of such an expedient:—

"Mr. Cruso rolled a large bandage, dipped in turmeric, round his head, and placing him in a dooly, he made him swallow a strong emetic, with an intention it should operate at the time of his examination. Thus prepared, the brahmin was sent down to the hospital boat, the commandant keeping within view, to watch the success of humanity, and prevent mischief in case of failure. Fear, unfortunately, took such strong possession of the brahmin's mind, as prevented all power in the emetic, and the bandage proving too flimsy a disguise for the argus-eyes of the inspectors, he was challenged by name and instantly surrounded ;"

but was ultimately rescued by Torriano ; who, however, resolved to compass his benevolent purpose by one more stroke of Indian policy, before falling back on the genuine British bull-dog plan of action. He arrayed the cowering refugees in sepoy uniform, and marched them down among the other soldiers to the place of embarkation. Thus another virtuous deception was to inaugurate—if necessary, a display of force was to consummate—their liberation. They were "admonished to show no alarm, but in full confidence of support, to bayonet the first man who should attempt to seize them." The former part of this plan also failed, the pseudo-sepoys were recognised, "singled out to a man," and Torriano was required to deliver them up. We are not told that they ventured to make any use of the great weapon of modern infantry warfare. But the "support" was afforded them nevertheless ; and it did save them. Their benefactor's heroic resolution carried all before it.

"Resolving steadily to adhere to those honorable and humane principles that had hitherto

regulated his conduct, and determined that they should not be sullied by his last act on this ill-fated spot," he refused to surrender the wretched victims to the Sultan's barbarous vengeance; and once more risked his own and his brave garrison's safety, by chivalrously announcing his intention to cut the knot, if necessary, with the sword. Mirza yielded to this last flash of British fire, and the whole party were permitted quietly to embark.

The Commissioners, who had been appointed to arrange the terms of peace, and under whose orders the fort was now about to be surrendered, had made no stipulation as to the disposal of the guns and ammunition still within its walls. But he, who had in so many instances supplied by his own indefatigable vigilance the deficiencies of his instructions, was not inclined to abandon, without an effort to redeem them, such honorable memorials and fitting trophies of the defence. In this also he was successful.

"Fortunately, after a long altercation, which terminated in a handsome pecuniary gratification, this difficulty was surmounted, and the eighteen-pounder guns, field-pieces, running shot, shells, musquet-ammunition, and a quantity of powder, were shipped off, and a receipt obtained for some powder unavoidably left behind for want of a proper conveyance."

On the other hand he failed to procure the liberation of the officers from Fortified Island; and a fresh tissue of duplicity on the part of Mirza, who sought to detain for his own or the Sultan's use eleven fine horses belonging to the English officers, ended—to the amazement of the Asiatic spectators—in their owners' ordering them to be

shot there and then, rather than suffer them to fall into such unworthy hands.

For the closing scene we again recur to the picturesque narrative whence our hasty sketch is taken :—

“The guard was now ordered to leave the fort: while they were embarking, the Subáhdar Missauber, having locked the gates on the inside, at a signal made by Captain Torriano, struck the British colours, and coming through a sally-port, resigned the keys to the Saltaun's officer ordered to take possession; whose detachment waited without the outworks until this ceremony had taken place. The whole being now safely embarked, Captain Torriano followed with two chests of treasure belonging to the Company. Night coming on, they were obliged to anchor under the guns of the fort until daybreak, when the *Wolf* gallivat and all the boats proceeded over the bar; the officers embarked on board the *Hawke* Indiaman, and the whole fleet sailed for Bombay.”

We catch a final glimpse of the little band of rescued and laurelled warriors at sea, as still lingering round the spot that their fortitude has made illustrious, we watch them speeding, on the wings of the wind, to other scenes of honorable enterprise. Torriano is on deck, surrounded by his men. He is distributing prizes, promotion, and promises of further good things, which shall in time duly fall to the lot of those who have been constant to their duty throughout all trials. “The Subahdar Missauber” receives a pair of gold bangles; a pair of silver ones, and “a step” in the service are accorded to each of four sepoys. Most of the European soldiers too are made non-commissioned officers.

But while the *Hawks* Indiaman is sinking towards the horizon, and the defenders of Honore are about to vanish into infinite space, one natural question occurs—What will be Torriano's own prize?—how will his invaluable services be recognised and rewarded by his "Honorable Masters?" On the application of the Bombay Government, they will give him a Brevet-Majority. The reader will perhaps not think him overpaid by this liberal concession. However that may be, there can be little doubt that in the sympathy of warm-hearted friends, in the admiration of the nation whose high reputation he has so nobly sustained, above all in the cordial and ever present testimony of his own approving conscience, he will be amply rewarded for all he has endured and accomplished.

The siege of Honore is interesting and memorable on several accounts. The petty fortress was of no great importance in itself; and although the spectacle of so ably conducted and obstinate a resistance must undoubtedly have had a great moral effect both upon Tipoo and his subjects on the one hand, and on the other upon the British and their dependants, yet the general conduct and termination of the war were not largely influenced by this single struggle. The ultimate surrender of the place, although effected by open treaty, and neither by the arms nor the arts of the Sultan's general (and therefore no frustration of Torriano's aim, which was simply to hold it as long as he was required to do so) may yet have contributed to bury the memory of the defence in speedier and more general oblivion than would have overtaken it had Honore then continued in our own possession.

But within this limited and neglected sphere

much had occurred, which Mr. Forbes justly deemed not unworthy of finding a place in his description of Indian ways and doings; which, as will have been clear to the reader, presents many curious points of parallelism with recent proceedings and dispositions; and which, indeed, well merits the attention of every man who would study carefully the constitution and history of his species. The variety of incidents, (however trifling in themselves,) the constant play of feeling and character, the strange jumble of parties within the fortress, the magnanimity of the resistance, the breathless suspense as to its issue, sustained and heightened by so many alternating vicissitudes, the melodramatic interludes and canny *pourparlers*, in which the disciple of Æsculapius acquits himself so well in the capacity of diplomatist, the timid Brahmin cuts a sorry figure among the jolly tars, Roman Catholic Saints assume the unorthodox form of Brahmins, Mirza for once tells the truth, and Torriano virtuously condescends to father a "white lie," but, above all, the striking, perpetual, and total contrast between the British commander and his antagonists — render Mr. Forbes's chronicle of the blockade one of the most life-like and profitable of the many valuable pictures which he has bequeathed to posterity.

But Torriano is not only unquestionably the central figure in the group; around him gathers, for our present purpose, almost the entire interest. It is mainly because his character and conduct and those of Lutoph Ally and Mirza are so uniformly and diametrically opposed, and because these oppositions are brought out by so many touches, and in such bold relief, that we have thought it worth while to withdraw for a moment

the curtain that has long shrouded them from the eyes of all, save the few who, amidst the engrossing interests of the present day, care to revert to the time-worn portraits of the past.

Torriano throughout personifies duty, high moral principle, exemplary rectitude, both in the ends pursued and in the choice of means.

Lutoph Ally and Mirza typify as exactly a sordid and purblind expediency, vulgar passion and brutal appetite, base ends, base means.

In the former there is the utmost care to discharge, at whatever cost of personal exertion, suffering, danger, both the primary trust reposed in him as Commander of the fortress, and the ulterior, but to his mind equally imperative obligations, which arise out of that relation. Whatsoever power he has is, he judges, to be used for the advancement of what is absolutely, eternally right, and for the repression of what is not less absolutely and eternally wrong. He is not the mere defender of Honore, or the mere servant of the Company, but the champion of natural equity between man and man. "Regardless of his own fate," he is very zealous for the just rights of his employers, for the honor of England, for the sacred faith of treaties, and the equally sacred claims of humanity.

There is not a trace of all this in the character or conduct of his opponents. They appear practically unconscious that such a thing as a moral code exists, and has claims on man's obedience to its principles. They seem to be not so much *immoral* as simply and absolutely *nonmoral*. Their very highest conception of duty appears to be a servile conformity, for their own purposes f,

^f Thus when Mirza insists upon searching the fort and gallivat he observes to Torriano, "that although it is of little consequence to him whether Narrain Row is really

to the corrupt caprice of a despotic tyrant. Whatever thwarts his will must be openly opposed, or insidiously eluded, by any practicable means that a perfectly unscrupulous invention may suggest. Whatever he enjoins must be similarly promoted. So too when Mirza has to make a little play on his own immediate account. No feeling of shame or self-respect restrains him from the meanness of begging, and greedily accepting, favors from those upon whom he is inflicting the most dreadful and unmerited sufferings, and whom he is doing his utmost to betray and destroy. He is perfectly unabashed when the meshes of his sophistry are disentangled, and simply proceeds forthwith to spin a new and, if possible, a more deadly web. "Proper pride" he has none, though vanity apparently in great profusion. But it is quite unnecessary to pursue so ungrateful a subject. We have said enough to shew that Torriano and his rivals are wide as the poles asunder; that the difference between them is not so much one of degree, as of kind; that they are opposed, antipathetic, as light and darkness, day and night, truth and falsehood, good and evil. Both parties in their way (to use Butler's well-known distinction) follow nature—obey a real and imperious impulse within them—but in very different senses: the one is the bond slave of the lower and grosser parts of his nature, while the framework of a moral constitution seems utterly wanting, or hopelessly marred. He has but the cunning of the fox, the trickiness of the monkey, the vanity of the jay, the cringing fear of the cur, the ravenousness of the wolf. Such is his nature as disclosed in his conduct.

taken or not, it is of the first importance for him to prove that every effort has been exerted for that purpose."

The other keeps the lower part of his constitution in due subjection ; and obeying the suggestions of the higher and ruling principle, and thus giving due relative scope to each part, and absolute scope to his whole man, asserts that natural superiority which the "Lord of the Creation" was framed by his Maker to exhibit over the lower animals ; and which, even in this fallen and naughty world, virtue cannot but vindicate over vice, he who heeds over him who ignores and violates the peculiar attribute of the human race, the regular shapely figure of man over the maimed, distorted cripple, the *τετράγωνος ἀνὴρ ψόγου* ^g over the "rubbish of an Adam."^h

Nor is this all. The defence of Honore illustrates also what Butler has again so carefully pointed out,—the natural tendency of virtue, when opposed to vice, even in such a state as the present, not only to merit, but to achieve success.

The singleness and purity of Torriano's purpose gave a concentration and efficacy to his operations, which were wanting to those of Lutoph Ally and Mirza. Limiting himself to the pursuit of right ends by right means, and the principles of right being clear in his mind beforehand, he was able to act more promptly, more consistently, more indomitably, therefore more successfully than they. More promptly—for he need not pause, on each emergency, to cast up a long and intricate sum of chances, as to what was expedient, in opposition to what was right. And thus he had more leisure to watch and counteract the devious and uncertain moves of his antagonists. More consistently—for he wasted no exertion on what was wrong, and thus was not

^g Arist. *Ethic. Nic.* i. 10.

^h South. *Sermon* on "Man created in the Image of God."

compelled to retrace his steps, and make a "fresh start" in a contrary direction. More indomitably—for his will being regulated by an immutable criterion, external to himself and prior to his circumstances, was more unassailable, and therefore more indomitable, than that of those whose volitions were entirely dependent on personal and variable conditions.

And, generally, the "single eye" is likely to gain the day over the "double mind."

But not only in itself. It awakens moral sympathy in all who are susceptible of such an experience. In those who are not, or very imperfectly so, it still is apt to excite astonishment at a phenomenon to them so strange and unaccountable as the *seeming* spectacle of self-contained, self-sufficing, reserved power; which contrasting with their own wayward impulses and puerile self-stultifying devices, they are disposed to regard as something mysterious, appalling, super-human; and to fear it, to crouch before it, to confide in it, to obey it.

Thus, on the present occasion, was Torriano enabled, not only to act well and with happy effect his own personal part, but to secure the respect and co-operation of those under him, and to daunt and keep at bay the overwhelming forces of the enemy. In spite of any immediate disadvantages to which his upright course exposed him, he succeeded not only in contending at equal odds, but in overcoming the most serious and all but insuperable obstacles—in converting feebleness and timidity itself into strength and fortitude—in paralysing the immense material might that ought at once to have crushed him, but that never seems to have had the spirit to attempt a storm—and in retaining, despite the most horrible temptations, and the desertions

consequent upon them, the fidelity of so many naturally weak and wavering men, unshaken until the triumphant close of the blockade. And thus he verified the true old English proverb—"Honesty is the best policy." Only be it remembered, his own course was not honest because it was politic, but politic because it was honest. And the triumph of morality over selfishness, of reason over sense, and consequently the *ultimate expedience of his conduct*, would have been as real, as complete (though it would have lacked the vulgar test of success, the garish tinsel decoration that attracts the gross-minded), had he fallen a prey to the villainous machinations of enemies without or traitors within his feeble and shattered works—had he even, from a sense of *duty*, and from the humane regard for *others* which he so frequently evinced, followed at the eleventh hour the example of the gallant Campbell at Mangalore, and spared his few surviving soldiers, and the miserable remnant of those to whom he had in the first instance conceded so hospitable a shelter, the crowning horrors of downright starvation, or of indiscriminate massacre by a ruthless and exasperated foe.

" Ille potens sui
Lætusque deget, cui licet in diem
Dixisse Vixi : cras vel atra
Nube polum Pater occupato,
Vel sole puro ; non tamen irritum
Quodcumque retro est, efficiet."¹

Whereas, had Mirza or his sovereign's villainous design prospered for the time at Honore, as it had done at Mangalore, they would only not have borne about with them perpetually the self-torturing signs of conscience, because their moral sense was entirely blunted.

¹ Hor. Carm. iii. 29, vv. 41-6.

Torriano and Mirza have long paid the debt of nature. The scene of their obstinate rivalry, the place that once knew them so well, now knows them no more. Their very memory is all but forgotten. The crime-begotten, crime-sustained, dynasty of Mysore, after flaunting for a while its lurid splendors in the face of Heaven, "paled its ineffectual light" before the rising Orb of British ascendancy, and was extinguished in blood on the walls of Seringapatam. If indefatigable energy, fanatic enthusiasm, versatility almost European, wielding ample military resources, sustained by European alliances, could have averted the fall of the House of Tippoo, that House might long have outlasted his feverish dream of Empire. -But that wonderful fabric, which his father had founded, and which he strove so incessantly and so resolutely to consolidate, had no solid foundation; it was built on the sand. For its gates were set up in wickedness: it was cemented by no moral cohesion: it was extended in deliberate and systematic defiance of all law—human and divine. The imperial libertine revelled in moral anarchy; he studiously set at nought the eternal Order of the Universe; and that Order was too strong for him. He sowed the wind, he reaped the whirlwind; and he and his insolent and pretentious but unsubstantial device disappeared for ever in the hurricano.

We have thriven on an opposite system of action. The observance of moral obligations has been our strength, and the great secret of our success. In spite of conspicuous and lamentable shortcomings (for which we have every reason to humble ourselves in the dust) it is not too much to say, that, on the whole, the British Power in India has been

"among the faithless faithful only"—in that it has, in a manner and to a degree so incomparably superior, not only to any native government with which it has come into contact, but to any government whatever that has hitherto borne sway within the Peninsula, remembered steadily, and exercised faithfully, what a great authority¹ has declared to be the first and inalienable vocation of the State—to make the idea of right as between man and man dominant in the visible world. And not only between man and man as individuals, but not less between man and Itself. In its relations to its subjects, to its soldiers, to its enemies², what other Power has ever made any approach to the justice, the fidelity, the moderation, the humanity, so habitually practised by British Rulers, and stamped upon every feature of our administration?

And therefore we have prospered. And therefore, if we be true to ourselves and our own principles, we may trust assuredly, under Providence, to prosper once more.

And though we may suffer many inconveniences, incur much unpopularity, be exposed even to serious dangers, by persistence in the course that we have hitherto, in the main, pursued—though a servile and demoralised population, totally incapable of appreciating our principles, may misconstrue our humanity into dotage, our lenity into fear, our charitable dislike of universally distrusting our fellow subjects into puerile credulity, our allowance for their inevitable degeneracy into callous indifference (almost equal to their own) as to its existence, our very justice into a ground of offence, and a reason for wishing to banish us, as the low-

¹ Savigny *apud* Gladstone. *Letter on the Royal Supremacy.*

² "Would that it could be truly added," to our friends," [1868.]

mind man of old sought to banish Aristides—this may awaken regret, it should hardly surprise, certainly not alarm us. The great mass of the natives of India are familiar with but one aspect of our character: they know not, or they are too ready to forget, the full sweep of our principles, the vitality of our ruling energies, prompting us not only to recognise ourselves, but to exact from them also the recognition of moral realities, which they are slow to discern, and glad to forget.

They do not understand, that because we are merciful, and considerate, and humane, and truthful, and just, in a word because our *régime* is founded on, and guided by, moral principles—it is strong.

Neither do they comprehend that, because they are cruel, and ruthless, and sanguinary, and perfidious, and reckless of all but their own immediate aggrandisement, in a word because they are brutal and immoral—are they in comparison and in the long run, weak.

Therefore might they well imagine that a gigantic act of perfidy, unparalleled in the history of the world, appropriately accompanied by atrocities unprecedented (in the enormity of all their circumstances) even in the dark annals of Oriental Monarchies, would strike terror and dismay into their rulers, and hopelessly convulse the fabric of our Empire.

Wherein they have been mistaken—not for the first or probably for the last time. That fabric has stood the test, for it is founded on something more substantial than the shifting quicksand of an unscrupulous and simply selfish expediency.

Even where it has been most rudely shaken, no incompetent judges¹ pronounce that it has

¹ We allude more particularly to General Jacob's well-known Pamphlets.

been precisely because there we had partially degenerated from our own avowed and generally observed principles ; because there, with the best intentions, and in an excess of tolerance, we had ceased, in a measure, to assert that natural superiority which our antecedents and our position had conferred upon us in India ; because we had, to a lamentable and perilous extent, subordinated the prescriptions of right reason, the maxims of common sense, the moral instincts of Englishmen, to the drivelling, corrupt, encroaching, unmanageable, prejudices of our semi-barbarous subjects ; thus tending to debase the European without elevating the Asiatic, sapping the vitals of our own healthy beneficial power, leaving those to whom our unwise indulgence extended at liberty to display the fearful, ravening, suicidal fury of the monomaniac ; proving, even in our very faults, the greatness of Britain, and the necessity of re-assuming, in spite of our generous but somewhat morbid fear of tyrannising, more of the *quasi* omniscience, and the uncompromising attitude, of a Paternal Despotism.

The very extension of our Eastern Empire, and the relegation of our wars to a distant frontier, placed us, to a certain extent, in a false position relatively to the subject nationalities ; and contributed, in all probability, to precipitate the crisis. It threw us off our guard. All seemed so quiet within and around the limits of our older territory, danger from without so remote, that we were naturally enough disposed to imagine that our proper task was now rather one of consolidation and improvement, than of conservation, which might soon become but another word for reconquest. Accordingly, we have been quietly intent on the works of peace.

But in doing so we have prematurely relaxed our precautions. We have handled the trowel not unsuccessfully, but we have laid aside the sword too soon^m. We have put too much faith in the pacific and friendly professions of our *soi-disant* brethren. And, with all our good intentions, both we and they have suffered for it; we must retrace our steps, and resume our earlier, if not assume an even loftier tone, than we have ever yet held.

On this subject we may have much to say hereafter.

Meanwhile we will conclude a paper, which has already far exceeded its contemplated limits, with two simple observations, naturally arising out of what has been now written.

We maintain that Britons as a nation are a higher order of God's creatures *at present* than "the natives," in a manner and degree in which no native race surpasses other native racesⁿ.

And we must confess, remember, and act upon this at our peril, and at that of all our subjects.

Our second observation is but the complement of the first. To confess the malady is the first step towards its cure. In few words, then, we would express our belief, that this distemper of desperate moral lawlessness, this unchastened spirit, breaking in on the true constitution of man, tending to the wreck of his whole nature, under which the native races are suffering so fearfully, and of which late enormities, horrible, indescribable, almost inconceivable as they have been, were but exaggerated manifestations; that

^m This referred to the paucity of European troops in India, especially in the North, at the time of the outbreak. [1868.]

ⁿ We are, of course, speaking of races, not of individuals. We no more assert that every native is a Mirza, than that every Briton is a Torriano.

this distemper, however chronic, almost mortal, it may seem, is not past help; and that we are bound, by the strongest and most sacred obligations, to seek out and apply, at least to promote, the remedy. We have indeed been all along maintaining that our Indian Empire was acquired by, and is based upon, our moral superiority over our present subjects, to whatever causes that superiority is due, a question which, for the present, we purposely refrain from investigating. But to an unscrupulous reasoner, who should object that therefore our obviously advisable policy as rulers was to perpetuate the degradation of the natives, as an indispensable condition of our retaining our present supremacy, the answer would be short, but complete. We are bound by our own principles to do what is morally right, and leave the issue to Providence. But deliberately to refrain from improving the *morale* of our subjects, lest, in so doing, we might incur the loss of what some one (with a soul intent on rupees) has called "the *brightest* jewel in our Imperial Diadem," would be a proceeding as blind as iniquitous,—and, considering who we are, would outhrow a hundred-fold, in folly and wickedness, the licentious and suicidal career of Tippoo himself. We have not space, nor is it necessary, to point out *how* inexpedient such a course would be. The reader will at once discern for himself that it would be vastly so.

Nor will he fail to perceive that the moral elevation of the subject population, unlike the mere introduction of material improvements, the concession of political privileges, even the promotion of simply intellectual culture, would strengthen and multiply indefinitely the cords that at present attach the natives to our rule; for it would awaken in them, for the first time, intelligent admiration

of our system of government, lively sympathy with the principles upon which it is founded, deep and lasting gratitude for the inestimable blessings which it had conferred upon them. We are then bound, by duty and by interest alike, to attempt this great, and arduous, and (as to many, we fear, it will appear) almost, if not quite, hopeless work.

That every step of real progress in this direction must be attended with infinite difficulty, must be planted with the utmost nicety, must therefore be painfully slow and wearisome, is sufficiently obvious. The dreary catalogue of the foulest public and private enormities, with which Oriental History teems, coinciding too exactly with the sickening experience of daily life in India, with the voice of public opinion, native as well as European, and with the appalling revelations of the past half year, tend to produce in certain minds a sad impression, not only that the native character is hideously deformed, but that that deformity is destined to be permanent and incurable. However sorely tempted at times to acquiesce in so desponding a conclusion, we must repudiate it, as for other reasons (which we hope in due time to assign) so from the very fact with which we started, and which we have so repeatedly insisted upon, that however degenerate, however corrupt they may be, however far they have fallen below their proper sphere as men, and have adopted the habits and the feelings of the beasts that perish—they are men still. They are sorely diseased, but while there is life there is hope. Nature—and the God of nature—do nothing in vain. Even the withered grass, that during so many months seems to illustrate the “waste of nature,” bursts into fair verdure at the approach of the monsoon. Shall there be no

moral monsoon, no "times of refreshing," when the human wilderness shall cease to afflict the mind's eye, and shall blossom as the rose? We cannot believe that the Oriental Races were created to exhibit only, till the end of time, a painful parody of man's genuine career; an impracticable foil to the moral and political vitality of the West; a dismal Dance of Death throughout the rolling ages, till the weary pulsations of the Universe should be silenced for ever at the Crack of Doom.

αἴλιον αἴλιον εἶπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω.

PLANTERS VERSUS CIVILIANS,

IN CONNECTION WITH

THE MUTINY.

—
A FRAGMENT.
—

(December, 1857.)

PLANTERS VERSUS CIVILIANS,

&c.

The Mutiny of the Bengal Army. An Historical Narrative.

By one who has served under Sir Charles Napier.

* * * *

“I shall then ask if the people of England will permit this policy to be further carried out; whether they will allow India still to remain an appanage of the Civil Service? This noble country has been under the rule of that service for a century; the present insurrection is the inevitable result of that domination. They have had no root in the land, their interests have not been the interests of the people of India. We have lately seen how, in many parts of the country, the indigo planters, men like Mr. Venables, Mr. Saunders, Mr. Chapman, have actually not only held their own factories, but have rescued Magistrates and others from insurgents: in some instances the Commissioners have been compelled to invest them with magisterial powers. Whence was this authority derived? In what lay the secret of their immunity from outrage?—the answer is plain: they are the owners of the soil; their interests are the same as those of the population. These then are the men who ought to be made magistrates, in place of unfledged boys, ignorant

of the people, and imperfectly acquainted with the language of the country."

The confusion and haste—not to say the want of candour—betrayed by these remarks, must be patent at a glance. But let us examine them a little more closely. In the first place, the writer, by his eager exaggeration, overshoots his own mark. He wishes to prove that India is in the hands of incapables. But not contented with this, he assumes that their incapacity has been exhibited throughout the length and breadth of the land for a hundred years past. Thus his declamatory appeal to the people of England is rounded off into a form which makes it appear much stronger than the simple facts of history would warrant. For a hundred years has the solitary Upas tree of civilian domination overshadowed India, but the want of a sound root has threatened its fall before a sudden storm. The former part of this statement is, untrue, the latter gratuitous, but the whole sounds imposing, and may elicit assent from those who take no trouble to analyse it. The Service have *not* held "this noble country," and had leisure to try their experiment of administration undisputed within its borders for the last hundred years. During a considerable fraction of that period, they were supreme only in a comparatively small part of their present territory; and were fully occupied in contending for their very existence throughout a series of struggles, the pressing exigencies of which might well have excused an internal administration even very signally defective.

Most statements, however, may be regarded under more than one aspect. Were the one in question true, would it not prove too much? Or rather would not the truth of the former clause

inevitably lead us to mistrust that of the latter? Could any dominion, least of all such a one as that of which we are speaking, subsist peaceably for a century if it had had no solid foundation? If a task fraught with such peculiar and innumerable difficulties as the government of all India, or of any considerable portion of India, had failed after the lapse of a century; if the population and the armies had submitted to the civilian *régime* throughout that period; would not this afford strong ground for conjecturing that there must have been a tolerably sound basis for a dominion, which had until then succeeded in tranquillising, by means of a few thousands of Europeans, so many millions of barbarous, turbulent, or warlike natives? It is easy to note the faults and shortcomings of rulers. But it would be well, especially in a historian who affects judicial impartiality, to allow that the obnoxious Service deserve some forbearance, if not credit, for the good that they have accomplished—though in a more limited field than he assigns to them—as well as blame and punishment for the evil that he alleges they have occasioned. We are ourselves inclined to think with him, that they might and ought to have done much more towards the improvement of the population, and the encouragement of European settlers, than they have effected: but we are not disposed to underrate either the difficulties with which they have had to contend, or the amount of benefit which they have actually conferred—least of all the striking fact to which the pamphleteer draws our attention, that they have, during a period of great trial and danger, and of frequent warfare with external enemies of the most formidable character, maintained general peace, and the respect and obedience, if not the attachment of their motley

and corrupt subjects, throughout their dominions. Bare justice demands thus much at our hands; while we are far indeed from any disposition to become the blind panegyrists of the Civil Service or the Company.

The past then, we think, testifies eloquently against the writer's view, that the inevitable cause of the insurrection is to be sought in the circumstance, that the Civilians were not owners of the soil, and so had no root in the land. If so, surely it would have occurred before. That when it did happen, men of mature standing, and considerable personal energy and enterprise, as well as large employers of local labour, were better adapted to cope with it than "unfledged boys," might prove (what who would be disposed to deny?) that, times of revolution call for experienced pilots to "ride the whirlwind and direct the storm"—for agents very different from those who may be tolerably competent for ordinary duties in a season of tranquillity. It might prove also (what we at least should readily grant) that it is unwise to entrust a critical district to the exclusive care of such "*bipedes implumes*." It might, lastly, give reason to think, that if such a step were practicable on other grounds (as we believe it to be), it would not be amiss, in more quiet times, to enlist, to a certain extent, in the service of Government, those valuable qualities which have lately stood us in good stead, but which no true-hearted Englishman, whether in office or not, would have refused to display on behalf of his countrymen and the State in a season of emergency. But all this is far enough from establishing the assumption, that the sepoys naturally rebelled because the civilians were not owners of the soil; and that had they been its owners, the rebellion would not have been fomented.

As to "the secret of" the planters' "immunity from outrage," so far as they have enjoyed any such comparative immunity, it may probably, in no small measure, be traced, partly to their having more ample means and appliances for resistance than a solitary and slightly attended civilian; partly also to the very fact that, unlike him, they did not labour under the odium of being official men, impersonations of the Government against which the insurgents were in revolt, and accustomed to levy unwelcome contributions, or to wield the retributive sword of justice.

But, however much or little truth there may be in this hypothesis—or in the assertion which has given rise to it—and whatever the rather premature conclusions of the author may have been when his pamphlet was first published; we are hardly inclined to think that he would himself now assign so overmastering a part in the origination of the disturbance to the tenure of land, or to the fact that the migratory Civilians are less deeply embedded in rice fields or indigo plantations than the meritorious triumvirate whom he has selected for special commemoration. If his theory were true, why should not the rural population generally, who must most peculiarly have felt the false position, and groaned under the rule, of the civilian strangers, have taken a larger part in the insurrection? Whereas it cannot now be denied, that it has been, on the whole, and with exceptions mostly accountable for on other grounds, practically confined to the soldiers, as opposed to the general population, and to the Bengal in contradistinction to the other armies. If so, would the fact that the magistrates were rooted in the soil have given them a firmer hold on the affections or the allegiance of a demoralised and fanatical soldiery, intent on lust,

plunder, and the extermination of the Feringhee? We very much doubt it. On the contrary, it would not perhaps be difficult to maintain, that a permanently settled and growing body of Christians, thus manifestly taking substantial possession of the country, would have inflamed, if possible, yet more fiercely the foul passions which have lately been let loose upon our countrymen, and which have never raged with more terrible effect than when the two races have been brought into the closest relations—those of officers (with their families) and the sepoys under them. The author may indeed consider, that large bodies of European colonists planted throughout the land would have overawed the disaffected soldiers, and deprived them of the power and the daring, if not of the inclination to rise. But waiving at present the question, how far the Civil Service have prevented the influx of British settlers, we cannot believe that men so desperate and so determined in their perversity as the sepoys have shown themselves—such mere tools of agitators or abject slaves to the corrupt public opinion of their own licentious host—would have been deterred by such a circumstance, so long as such powerful influences on the other side incited them to rebellion and outrage.

That the mutiny was no mere accidental *émeute*—that longer heads than the soldiers' planned and started it—that our pre-occupation with the Persian (perhaps also with the Chinese) war, and the small number of British troops in India were taken into careful account—there can be little doubt. How far the secret emissaries of revolt were actuated by purely political considerations, how far by hatred of Christianity as a hostile and encroaching form of faith, how far (as General

Jacob assures us) by a firm belief that they were the forerunners of a new Avatar, who was to establish (we presume) the triumph of "absolute religion"—we shall not venture at present even to conjecture.

But the three great predisposing causes we believe to have been, first, the inapplicability of much of our recent Governmental policy both to the native character, and to our own inevitable position in India; secondly, the deplorable, to an English mind almost inconceivable, depravity of the raw material out of which our native forces are composed; thirdly, the most seriously defective system of organisation which had, of late years, gradually but fatally impaired the efficiency, and ruined the discipline, of the Army of the North.

The *modus operandi*, however, of all these three evils may, we think, be summed up under one head—a very English disposition to shirk the tone and conduct of the Despot, and to attempt to lead where driving alone is safe—or even practicable. There has been an inclination alternately to ignore and to exaggerate the immensity of the interval which separates us from the natives; but both tendencies have contributed to the same unhappy result. On the one hand we have been told;—moral suasion, the spectacle of English example, laws, institutions, will gradually awaken the sympathy, provoke the emulation, modify the peculiarities of the people of India: therefore rule them, in the interval, as mildly as possible; "encourage" them as much as possible; make them feel they are part and parcel of ourselves—our "fellow-subjects"—in a word, govern them, as far as possible, on the *primi inter pares* principle. On the other hand we have been assured;—the native character is too different from your own to afford any

hope that the two can be assimilated. You must not stretch it on a Prucrustes bed. You must "humour" it, and its manifestations, native prejudices and institutions. You must indulge your subjects in the same "liberty of conscience" of which you are yourselves so justly tenacious. You cannot "hold India" if you persist in kicking against the pricks of the native mind. Therefore be advised in time: rule mildly and forbearingly; enlist the interests of the dusky inhabitants on the side of English rule by toleration of their peculiarities; and encourage them to expect power, privilege, remuneration, under the liberal English *raj*.

Now we need not stop to disentangle this double quick-set fence of sophistry. Many had all along seen through it. But recent events have swept it away, it is to be hoped rather than expected, for ever. All can now glibly descant on the blindness, the inveterate obstinacy, &c. of the Indian Government, in favoring natives who were undeserving of favor, incapable of gratitude, extremely amenable to force. All can see that the strong right hand of Authority may be required to initiate extensive and imperative changes, which gentler influences may one day carry out, and can alone complete. Colonel Sykes himself would hardly (we presume) now be inclined to regard Nana Sahib and Latimer as actuated precisely "by the same spirit;" or as affording a perfectly satisfactory analogy for placing Europeans and Natives in India as much as possible upon a par.

But though a grave error of judgment has undoubtedly been committed; though we ought much more than we have done, in some cases to have ignored, in others actively opposed, instead of humouring, and giving even factitious strength

to, the irrational and demoralising traditions of a people feeble for good, powerful only for evil; yet it has been, *hitherto*, and while we were still hoping that mild means would gain the day, an error on the right side; a weakness, as all will now pronounce it who are not stone-blind to the lessons of experience, but still an amiable, and we repeat a very English weakness: one, moreover, so far from being confined to Civilians, shared (we believe) and advocated, at times most clamorously, not only by party feeling, but by most Englishmen out of, if not in India. If this be so, it would be as wrong to make their undue deference to this weakness, in time past, a ground for depriving the Civilians of their authority, as it would be to allow them to persist now in so out-dated a delusion; while the theory of their unfitness to rule because not the owners of the soil becomes, at most, an ingenious and superfluous conjecture, and will not bear the weight of the two corollaries, that *thence* has arisen the late rebellion, and *therefore* the Civilians ought no longer to be suffered to hover over India—like Mahomet's coffin—suspended between Heaven and Earth; strong neither in “the divinity that doth hedge a king,” nor in the vested right and sturdy qualifications of the landed interest.

We much doubt, then, whether the presence even of very large numbers of European colonists would have directly prevented the insurrection, although indirectly, no doubt, by their influence on the past action and tone of government, they might have obviated, by their closer relations with the natives, perhaps been better able to foresee, the storm.

But, on more accounts than one, we cannot agree with the following passage.

“Had independent Europeans been encouraged to invest their capital in the land of India, had not the terrors of subjection to a Hindoo or Mahometan magistracy been held over their heads to prevent such a catastrophe (to the Civil Service), had they been allowed the smallest exercise of political power, or had the way to that power been open to them, an independent body of landholders would have arisen, *who would have formed the connecting link between the Government and the natives.* and also have been able, from their numbers and organisation, to have checked any outbreak on the part of the people of the country.”

In the first place, it appears to us that, as we have already said, the rebellion would in all probability have occurred in spite of the colonists, although it might have been with their aid more promptly resisted and overcome.

It may reasonably be doubted too, whether, when a strong tide of emigration to India had once set in, we might not have been overrun with swarms of incapable colonists, in number not less than (as the writer holds) there are incapable Civilians; instead of the few resolute and valuable men whose superior energy and perseverance are at present, on his hypothesis, proof against the discouragement that keeps away the majority of those who would otherwise come hither.

But moreover, it is not fair to imply that the paucity of European settlers is due to the repellent influence of the Civil Service alone. Many other causes contribute to produce this (as to us it appears) undesirable result. The native population, with its stereotyped and to an Englishman most repulsive characteristics,

physical, social, intellectual, moral, and religious; the much greater diversity between English and Indian, than between English and ordinary Colonial agriculture; the fact that India is politically a Dependency and not a Colony, and an old and thickly-peopled country (which, though it may make labor cheaper, cramps the capitalist's energies and resources in other ways); above all climate, with the innumerable and terrible evils implied and threatened in that single word, are in themselves, nay the last alone is, sufficient to account for comparatively few Englishmen having hitherto been willing to enter upon the precarious and uninviting career of an Indian colonist. It may be worth while, in connection with climate, to point out a circumstance which might appear self-evident enough, but which our author can hardly have given due weight to the consideration of. In an ordinary colony an energetic Anglo-Saxon, even if a "gentleman," often works his way, literally, as so many have done not only in agriculture or sheep-farming, but at the diggings. Whereas it is of course simply absurd to conceive him undertaking to do so here. His only chance is to supervise the work of others; and suffer the inevitable loss and defalcations entailed by being *compelled to employ agents admirably adapted to create a stoppage of profits in transitu*, and workmen unrivalled perhaps in their various qualifications for "shirking the collar."

Lastly, most Englishmen (at least above the very lowest class) are certainly inclined to regard some approach to self-government, and constitutional influence over the measures of their rulers, as a natural inalienable birth-right. And many unprejudiced persons may, after weighing all the circumstances and arguments adduced in favour

of the present system, entertain (with ourselves) serious doubts how far it is necessary, expedient, even safe, for the interests of "Our Indian Empire" and all parties concerned therein, to condemn to such absolute political nullity as is now their fate, all Europeans not connected with the Civil Service. But at the same time, we cannot but think that the pamphleteer has very greatly under-rated the willingness of the much-enduring Anglo-Saxon to forego for a time his birth-right; to submit to political insignificance during a business career in India; in consideration of large returns, and with the prospect of spending the after time of his life, with augmented consequence, in a country where native insolence and civilian "exclusiveness" shall vex him no more; where the members of "Our Service" are as politically, not to say socially, insignificant, as they are here at times (but by no means so often as an over-sensitive nature is inclined to assume) unpleasantly consequential, perhaps even overbearing.

On the whole, then, we cannot at all admit, that the present insurrection is the inevitable result of the civilian discouragement of European colonisation.

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ROUGH NOTES
ON
CHRISTIANITY IN INDIA.

(March, 1860.)

CHRISTIANITY IN INDIA.

CHRISTIANITY was designed, and is destined, to be a Universal Religion.

But it has as yet made little *apparent* progress in the East:—even in our own Indian Empire.

This is, at first sight, most discouraging. Yet it must proceed from definite and assignable causes.

It becomes a duty, as well as a very interesting problem, to investigate these causes—and the means of removing them.

The subject is as difficult, delicate, and complicated, as it is interesting and important.

The facts of Eastern life are difficult to ascertain—and equally so to estimate fairly and critically.

Much misapprehension seems to prevail on the part even of educated, able, and experienced men.

And the mind of the general public seems to oscillate between extreme and unnecessary despondency, and an equally unreasonable and mischievous exaggeration of our successes hitherto,—especially a misapprehension as to the *nature* of our success.

Wide as the East is from the West, it could hardly, perhaps, be expected to be otherwise, *as yet*.

It is only by slow degrees, and by honest and careful contributions on the part of those who

have had experience of any such kind as qualifies them to form a judgment, and to give information on any part of the subject, that the truth can be known, and the public mind enlightened, and the public aims and conduct rightly directed.

It is unnecessary to enlarge on the appositeness of the present time for such an enquiry, considering our recent relations with India, China, and Japan ; not to mention the Turkish Empire.

There is a general resemblance throughout the East, as contrasted with the West, and always has been.

But, on the present occasion, it will be desirable, for various reasons, to limit the field of view mainly to India ; though the general problem may thus be in some respects illustrated.

I propose to explain, to the best of my power, and without controversial purposes :

A. What appear to me the chief causes of our slow and partial *avowed* success in the propagation of Christianity in India hitherto.

B. That however much the open triumphs of Christianity there may have been at times exaggerated, its silent and latent advance has been underrated ; or rather, the silent process of preparation for its ultimate recognition and triumph.

C. That, as we are in the most solemn manner bound not to exaggerate on *either* side ; we have ample reason, both to forbear over-complacency as to what has been already done, and, even humanly speaking, to refrain from despondency, as to the eventual triumph of our faith in India.

D. Our proper and wise course in relation to its extension at present, and for the future.

A.

OBSTACLES.

The most general reason why Christianity has not spread more in India hitherto is, because the fulness of the time for its spreading is not come.

The preparatory agents have not completed that task, the execution of which must issue in the more general success of missionary enterprise, or at least, must *precede* such success.

It is a mistake to suppose that an infusion of Bibles and other Christian literature simply—that isolated missionary efforts, however zealous, pure, and well directed—will or can *ever alone* accomplish the Christianising of India.

And it is a most un-historical blunder.

The early career of Christianity—the *Præparatio Evangelica*—the nature and mode of the early triumphs of the Cross—and the limitation, geographically and ethnically, of those triumphs, might teach us otherwise.

Extensive and momentous changes in—the general circumstances of the world—the dispositions, views, enterprizes of Englishmen—the political, material, social condition of India—the native mind and character—together with time sufficient for these causes to combine their action in—were, and still are, a pre-requisite—I do not say to the triumph of Christianity—but, to its having a chance, humanly speaking, of being fairly and, in its natural efficacy, effectively presented to the people of India.

And God works slowly through human instrumentality. Whatever may be thought of individual conversions—we have no right *à priori*—and no encouragement *on the whole* from history, to anticipate a sudden, genuine, and durable national conversion to Christianity.

Especially in the case of an Oriental people, and situated as are the Hindoos or Parsis.

Of the Mussulmans I shall say little—because I know little of them from personal contact and private confidence.

Obstacles classified under

1. The age when our Indian empire was acquired.

2. The brevity of our tenure hitherto.

3. Circumstances attending its formation:—and consequent peculiarity of our position as the ruling race.

4. The position and nature of the locality, including climate.

5. Our narrowness—lethargy—selfishness—want of faith—divisions; hence sectional efforts and consequent scandal—bad example in India [probably much overrated, both in itself and in its consequences]—and general shortcomings, speculative and practical.

6. The native mind, character, and institutions.

7. Bitter and hostile reminiscences connected with counterfeited or debased Christianity, Mahometanism, and Portuguese Romanism—

(Crosses still standing on the Esplanade at Bombay, at first sight a cheering, then a mournful object to a thoughtful mind.)

I. *The Age.* The typically wicked and spiritually lifeless *Eighteenth Century*—the age of Deism and of Voltaire—of Tom Jones and the Virginians—the age which froze Butler's style, drove Wesley from the Church by the hands of "orthodox" bishops—drove Gibbon to seek for awhile in the Roman religion what his own seemed quite unable to afford him—stamped Oxford as the grossest parody of a place of education—the age that feared above all things "enthusiasm", yet

exhibited an orgiastic furor for drinking, and boasted in abundance men mighty to mingle strong drinks—and erected “no heel-taps” into a paramount dogma, the violation of which was penal—the age when even the better spirits too often preferred, as in duelling, the law of honor before the law of God:—the age whose very allusions to the Deity, above all to our blessed Redeemer, in their chilling abstraction, sound to our ears almost profane—the age emphatically of Parliamentary Corruption—of Colonial and Dependential misgovernment—of ecclesiastical buckram and “dry bones”—of wholesale jobbery and profligacy:—the age, in a word, whose deepest rooted and most influential conviction across the Channel, according to Mr. Carlyle, might be said to hold sway here also—that pleasure was pleasant.

Doubtless there were yet many knees which had not bowed to Baal—many living witnesses to the truth and to the regulative and transforming power of the Gospel;—as Butler himself, Jones of Nayland, Bishop Wilson.

Doubtless, too, the Gospel was first preached in a most corrupt age, and among a most corrupt people.

But the extraordinary does not conform to the conditions of the ordinary dispensation. And, unless other circumstances are unusually favorable, it is not ordinarily to be expected, that the good fruit of Christian conversion should spring from the double corruption of eighteenth century laxity and stereotyped Indian idolatry and immorality.

However plentiful, however ripe, the harvest toward the sun-rising might appear; the earnest laborers were too few to do more than with difficulty cultivate some little plot of ground at

home, or sow good seed, that should spring up and bear fruit, when they themselves should be no more.

II. *The Brevity of our Tenure.* Compared with the long vista of Oriental History and tradition—and considering the fixity of life and ideas in the East—the contrast between the present and the future which we desiderate—the various difficulties we experience in telling effectually upon, or even in “getting at,” the natives and their mind—the gradual formation of our Empire, and the very recent acquisition of many Provinces—our long and constant pre-occupation with wars and preliminary administrative organisation—the late introduction of missionaries, and the discouragements often *not* maliciously nor unconscientiously thrown in their way—the still more recent development of a more systematic and general educational system (secular education being, as I endeavor to shew elsewhere, a precondition of effective missionary labor, and felt to be such by the missionaries themselves), and the partly remediable, partly inevitable faults of that system:—our occupation of India is but of yesterday.

[III. Postponed.]

IV. *Position and Nature of the Locality, including Climate.*

1. Remoteness of India.
2. Its immense Extent.
3. Isolation of our Presidencies.
4. And Provinces between Native States.
5. Natural obstacles—Ghâts and Rivers, &c.
6. Absence of roads, and bad conveyances.
7. Few good harbors on the coast.

8. Violence of the monsoon; and paralysing influence of the hot weather.

9. Circumscription of freedom of locomotion on the part even of natives, *à fortiori* Europeans, caused by the tyranny of the Sun [Moon?] and climate generally.

10. Bias towards *laissez faire*, on the part even of the naturally energetic and earnest; and as the alternative of ill health. "Life a burden" (*πόνος τοῦ βίου*), under the best circumstances, to many. How far connected with the conception of supreme bliss as annihilation—i.e. either simply ceasing to be the butt of painful influences—or as (taking Pantheism into account) becoming one with, and so controlling, or at least not controlled by the pain-bearing influences?

Resulting from the above in combination:—

(a) Comparative difficulty and slightness of communication with the Mother Country, on the part of the ruling race.

(β) Comparative difficulty and slightness of internal communication—and of *personal* intercourse.

Hence again:—

Points of contact between English at home and Anglo-Indians, and Anglo-India, being comparatively few. The Home public does not take so strong, habitual, genuine, intelligent, an interest in the welfare and improvement of India as it might otherwise do.

Distance may lend enchantment to the view of some, and strangeness, even repulsiveness, the same:—but this romantic and spasmodic affection poorly compensates for the steady, enlightened, practical, business-like interest of soberer and wiser men.

B. AND C.

HOPEFUL CONSIDERATIONS.

1. The West and the East must talk a common language, with mutual insight and sympathy, before the religion of the former can tell effectually upon the latter.

2. Our obligation towards India is an imperial and ethnical, rather than a private and individual one. It is *not* clear that we must, or ever can effectually begin the main work by individual conversions, rather than by a national discipline and education.

3. As compared with older and especially Romanist efforts, the elevation of our standard makes us both diminish the number of our converts, and mistrust them when made.

4. "Sin after Baptism" we are inclined to deem decisive against the reality of original conversion. Yet could St. Paul's own converts in the Corinthian Church have stood such a test of sincerity? And *does* he not consider them real converts, however weak and elementary? Must we not *à priori* expect a residuum of heathenism to crop out, the infirmity of nature to remain, "even in the regenerate?"

Yet this, like all general principles, is liable to great misconception and abuse.

5. There is much more *latent* Christianity than we are apt to imagine, and *latent* in several ways: at least in germ, and as shewing that the natives are on their way to the truth:

a. A believes in his heart that Christianity is a Divine Revelation, and intended to be universal, and destined to become so; but he cannot make up his mind, at least until a "more convenient season," to face the social penalties awaiting his conformity.

β. B believes Christianity to be a Divine Revelation for the European, but not for himself.

γ. C believes Christianity to be not only one of the forms, but the highest and best form, in which the Deity has spoken to man's soul; and that its practical fruits are superior, on the whole, to those of any other faith; that in Coleridge's phrase—One of the strongest proofs of Christianity is Christendom.

δ. D admires and esteems as preeminently excellent in its way the morality of the New Testament; recognises the Bible throughout as an ancient and valuable literary, philosophical, and historical contribution, supplying many important *facts* in human story; *principles* especially in ethical speculation; models of narrative, declamation, and argument.

How the native can advance thus far, without feeling himself *ipso facto* committed to a still further advance, I propose considering later, *à propos* of the inconsequence of the Indian mind and character.

6. A people must be expected to go through a long and complicated preliminary training, other than directly religious, before it can, humanly speaking, receive Christianity effectually and avowedly.

And this holds *most* strongly with *such* a people, so circumstanced, as the natives of India.

7. There is much in the native character which, when preliminary obstacles are overcome, would seem naturally and specially to adapt them to receive *such* a religion as Christianity.

a. Though artificially stereotyped, they are naturally *plastic* and inclined to become all things to all men—and, as such, to rejoice in the liberty and universal sympathy of Christianity.

β. Much of the Bible, as an Oriental book, is plain to them naturally, when, as naturally, it is obscure to us. Many of our supposed difficulties would not, and *do not*, puzzle them.

1. Illustrations from nature. 2. Allusions to social customs. 3. Detailed warnings against vices, which Christianity has expelled. 4. *To us* strange analogical reasoning, as, e. g. "Hagar, which is Mount Sinai," &c.—

would seem obvious, appropriate, and striking to them.

γ. Much of the Bible, e. g. St. John's opening verses on the *Λόγος*—his sublime mysticism, and St. Paul's quietest ideal, would seem not only more comprehensible by, but more congenial to, them than to unphilosophical, "*practical*" Protestants, great in industrial achievements, and in "material sublimity."

δ. Speaking generally—the native is as incapable of devotion to an abstract principle, or to such an abstraction as patriotism—as he is liable to have his admiration and attachment awakened by individuals who evince their (1) sincerity and truthfulness, (2) fairness of judgment, (3) power and will to sympathise with him, (4) self-sacrifice for his sake, (5) general purity and excellence. In a word—Hero-worship is the special and vehement propension of the native character.

In what case, when preliminary difficulties are removed, may it be confidently hoped that it will be more strongly evoked and rivetted, than in His case who meets all the above conditions in the most transcendent manner, and in Whom Hero-worship finds the true and only adequate Object it has been blindly and partially feeling after?

8. *Prima facie*, caste is the formal cause of Hindoo social life. Yet it is rather anti-social,

at least anti-political and anti-civic. It is *now* not only a principle of division from of old, of completed division once for all, but a perpetual and infinitesimal sub-divider. Can society cohere at all much longer, without some new and more rational and broader bond of union? Caste is plainly in its *dotage*, and whatever it may originally have meant and been—it is now an irrational tradition—a decomposer of society—an inconsistent, deceitful, and tyrannical plea for exemption from the obligations of subjects and the influences of reformatory efforts and ideas.

9. Are not the Sikhs a proof that the Hindoos are still, humanly speaking, capable of being disintegrated from caste life, and recombined energetically and vitally under another form of religion?

THE
BEARING OF SANSKRIT STUDIES
ON THE
SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN INDIA.

(January, 1861.)

THE
BEARING OF SANSKRIT STUDIES
ON THE
SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN INDIA.

IN order to clear up some important and very prevalent misconceptions as to the prospects of Christianity in India, and the office of Sanskrit Studies with reference to them, we must assume a more comprehensive point of view than that in which the subject is commonly surveyed, especially by excited and impatient religionists.

That India, starkly standing out in her intellectual, moral, social, religious deformity, should ever by the instrumentality of man, or otherwise than by the immediate and exclusive potency of the Divine Arm, be induced to bow her stiff and crooked neck to the blessed yoke of the Gospel—is often deemed by many who have been brought into the most prolonged, if not the most intimate contact with native character, an entire and (according to the temper of the critic) either a melancholy or a ludicrous delusion. With all deference to such experienced and confident judges, we by no means share their opinion.

On the contrary ; we have a firm and cheerful hope that, despite the little real progress which Christianity has yet made in the country, or has ever made in the East generally, despite our Saviour's awful query, "*When the Son of Man cometh, shall He find faith on the earth ?*" despite the peculiar, and to the eye of reason, at first sight, almost insurmountable difficulties to be encountered in the progress of the task ; not only will India be evangelised, and the Gospel become the predominant religion of the people ; but that this, like other great social consummations, will be effected by God's blessing crowning human endeavors, and bringing spiritual results out of labors often very far removed from the directly spiritual sphere.

But we feel equally convinced, that the peculiarity and complexity of the case require a no less peculiar and complex treatment ; that the inveteracy of the evil must prepare us to attend a tardy remedy ; that as a baleful and portentous superstition is not only prepared to dispute the progress of the Christian Faith ; but to stand its ground with the obstinacy of a system, which has for ages acted upon, warped, exercised the most minute and all-penetrative tyranny over the whole nature and life of the people ; and blocked up almost every avenue of approach to their mind and heart ; so we must not expect that the country will be evacuated by the enemy, and the strongholds of Unbelief be surrendered, simply by our displaying aloft the Banner of the Cross ; vindicating in argument the rightfulness of our Great Captain's and Sovereign's claim to the allegiance of His alienated subjects ; and then imagining, either with the religious enthusiast, or with the despondent sociologist, that "our strength is to sit still" and "see the salvation of

the Lord ;" that our part of the warfare is accomplished ; and that He whom we serve will finish the campaign, and secure the triumph, without our further cooperation in the details of the strife.

In short, we believe that India has been providentially committed to our management, not in order that we may evangelise the country by the mere proclamation even of the purest and most enlightened form of Christianity ; much less, by what is often too literally described as " the foolishness of preaching " on the part of the missionaries ; but that we may by various means, by agents often working independently of any such direct end, and by slow degrees, unwind that tangled skein of native life and character, which originally gathering round and connected by the central thread of heathenism, now imparts to that thread an altogether factitious and disproportioned power of cohesion. When this has been done, Christianity will, for the first time, come fairly face to face with Hindoo superstition : and if the latter have not in the interval evaporated of itself, the victory of the former, when rightly asserted, cannot then (in our opinion) be long doubtful.

In fact, we must both strive to disseminate enlightened and genuine, not sectarian and more or less spurious Christianity ; and also we must civilize, before we can hope generally, or even extensively, to Christianise : or rather, the two processes will and must proceed, are proceeding, *pari passu* ; inasmuch as every real advance in civilization is *pro tanto* and *ipso facto* an advance towards that state of things, when pure Christianity, no longer put aside, stultified, and deprived of its natural force by social obstructions of the most formidable character ; by wrong and ignorant methods of

procedure on our part; by practical hopelessness of attaining our end from experienced inefficiency in sympathising with and impressing the native mind and heart; by prejudices, suspicions, aversion, contempt, intellectual torpor and in consequence, on the part of the Hindoos; shall speak home to them "as a man speaketh to a friend," and obtain, for the first time, a really fair and friendly hearing.

Our duty is to facilitate the dissemination of the Gospel in India. The duty of the natives is to prepare themselves for its reception. But *we* are blindly striving to take a short cut to the discharge of our duty. *They* are blindly striving to evade a duty, of which they do not yet discern the true nature; nor its beneficent import, to their temporal not less than to their eternal interests.

Ignorance, the want of philosophical insight on the part of both peoples, at present occasions or perpetuates serious and (humanly speaking) insurmountable impediments to the progress of the good work.

We imperfectly understand, and still more inadequately allow for the obstructive effect of social circumstances and institutions; which lend (as it were) material force, solidarity, and tenacity to the argumentatively untenable cause of Heathenism. Consequently, we do not sufficiently appreciate the necessity of removing these (so to speak) secular outworks of superstition; before we can get within effective range of the superstition itself. Nor do we yet sufficiently understand, how under the unique circumstances of the case, these outworks can be most easily, skilfully, and successfully carried.

In spite of our long connexion with the country, this strange "upside-down" people is an

enigma to us, as the Egyptians of old were to the Greeks. We know not "where to have them," nor how to deal with them.

They have, like the same Egyptians, become petrified into forms of life and character so remote from our own, that community of nature seems almost destroyed; intelligent and calculable action upon them almost impossible.

Like mummies, they appear to us neither healthily alive, nor wholesomely buried beneath the ground which they have so long cumbered in vain: alive no longer to the impulses, rallying-cries, principles, which have most uniformly and powerfully affected ourselves; yet invested with a weird and charmed semblance of vitality; clinging to a hidden world of thought and feeling into which we cannot enter; swathed from of old, and capable of long outlasting the perhaps brief span of our historic existence in the future, under their antique cerements of hieroglyphic and monstrous pattern.

Our knowledge of them is perpetually turning out to be but surface knowledge; our very experience of them is for ever deceiving us: so that many who have known them long, and studied them most carefully have almost given up in despair the attempt to comprehend them; have concluded that either, like Pope's women, they "have no character at all;" that being "double-minded," they are "unstable in all their ways;" "unstable as water," and like it take, alternately, every impress which the gusts of circumstance trace for a moment on their mobile surface; that, in fact, the ever-shifting curtain of their phenomenal nature is the picture, and that there is nothing beyond; or, on the other hand, that that curtain, however much and often it wave to and fro obedient to external gales, is still ever-

more a dark, impenetrable, unlifted veil, shrouding from our ken the mysterious, incomprehensible, uncanny *real* nature, that lurks and works within.

We have no hesitation in saying, that after all our professed anatomisations and simple resolutions of native peculiarities, the master-key to the native character remains yet to be discovered, or at least disclosed to the world at large; the chasm between that character and our own is not yet bridged over: few Englishmen, even in India, have much deep and steady insight into it: the *mass* of the "home public" have advanced little beyond the stage of simple, uncritical wonder: while the self-styled "religious world" is involved in a hopeless abyss of self-complacent, fanatical, and pampered delusion on the subject of Hindoo idiosyncrasy,—as on most others.

This great bewilderment makes our judgments on native traits and conduct essentially, though not intentionally, untrue: we can appreciate and compare aright with our own, neither their strong nor their weak points, neither their excellences nor their defects; for want of a more catholic standard than any to which we have yet attained.

The same cause makes our best attempts at legislation and social amelioration in an unusual degree provisional in their character, and hypothetical in their effects; it greatly increases the difficulty of conducting properly the commonest transactions of life, where we have to act with, against, or upon natives: it causes the European's tongue to falter, and his heart to ache, with the sickening consciousness that he is engaged in a perpetual skiomachy, that he is mixing with a world of Gnomes and Ghouls: it paralyses, to an indefinite extent, what would otherwise be effective secular teaching: it plies the honest and experienced missionary with infinite anxieties

in addition to those which must ever attend his anxious labors; suggesting doubts, not only as to the reality and probable permanence of conversions, but as to the very language in which he should address himself to those whom he has gone forth to proselytise.

Now why is it that so much uncertainty, perplexity, contradiction still prevail among us, as to the genuine idiosyncrasy of the Hindoo; and as to the most appropriate, practicable, and effectual method of dealing with it? Why is it that we have theories without number, but most discordant; groupings of facts as discordant as the theories, and even more delusive, because making higher pretensions to veracity? Why is it that India, in this point of view, so well merits the name which the great crucial instance of the phenomenon extorted from the infallible *Times*—"The Land of Delusion?"

The natural and inevitable difficulties of the subject are undoubtedly great. The immense and complete contrast subsisting between the two nationalities at present, between Imperial England and crouching Hindostan; and the indisposition, if not the absolute inability of the latter to shed much light upon our path of enquiry; as well as many other obvious circumstances, must be taken into account. But it certainly appears to us, that over and above all these circumstances, we must place two most serious obstacles of our own creation. The method and the object of our speculations have, too often, been alike faulty. We have been too hasty, too confident, too sweeping in our generalisations from partial facts, often from vague and inaccurate reports; and our aim has, too often, been to establish a foregone and *doctrinaire* conclusion, where there is least scope for the

doctrinaire spirit; or worse still, to serve the interests of party; to snatch at reputation; to attract attention; even to gratify our antipathy to the native by a wanton and cruel exposure of his moral nakedness; rather than simply to arrive at truth ourselves, and to convey it clearly to others.

The fragmentary and occasional way in which Indian experience and literature have accumulated; the very obscurity which overhangs the subject; and the strong temptations held out by various interests in England to the promulgation of crude but uncompromising opinions upon this *true* "Great Asian Mystery;" have aggravated these tendencies. In the promiscuous and blind *mêlées* the indifferent combatant may contrive to keep his seat, may even, by a lucky chance, attain a transitory success.

Thus have the Hindoos been, one while, extolled as far more really civilised than ourselves; and, again, denounced as essentially and incurably barbarous, as "brutal to the core;" others, again, have concluded that they are, in truth, neither barbarous nor civilised; while a fourth authority would persuade us that they have been civilised *into* chronic barbarism. We have not time to dwell on these statements: and can only assert, without stopping to prove, that practical contradictions underlie what to some may seem mere logomachies, turning upon the equivocal sense of the word civilised.

They may, however, serve as a specimen of the hasty and inconsistent lessons, which our instructors upon Indian sociology would impress upon us.

But assuredly, it is not thus that we shall ever arrive at a just and working estimate of the natives; and come to feel towards them as "men

and brethren," which we must do if we are to convert them to the Gospel.

"Pater Ipse colendi
Haud facilem esse viam voluit."

There is no royal road, no short cut, to this any more than to any other branch of knowledge. Less, indeed here, than in almost any other case, is it safe or practicable to proceed *per saltum*.

India, and the Indian mind, are a world apart; a world more or less fundamentally akin to our own; but, through the powerful and continuous action of differencing circumstances in each case, wide as the poles asunder from it: a vast complex of most peculiar formation and organisation. No empirical methods, no *a priori* dogmatising, will suffice for its true analysis. In order here as elsewhere to understand the present and operate upon the future aright, we must first resolve the past. We must pursue the historical method; which alone can enable us to retrace the course of the national existence; to stand, at length (as it were) at the fountain-head of the national life; and thence, casting the eye of insight once more down the long vista of centuries, to note the advent, the action, the out-growth of each constituent element of the national character. We must forget the present, not less of India than of England, live only in the past; live through it, and down it: until the mind's eye, long accustomed to the twilight of the ages, (the twilight that yet lingers on the land of the Lotus, that land where more than elsewhere on earth

"All things always seem the same,")

adjust itself to the surrounding medium; acquire an interpretative second-sight, which only such training can impart: until, in this new field, we reap

the mature fruits of Niebührian acumen, and Groteian reconstructiveness: until, in fine, the philosophical study of the primeval speech and literature of the Hindoos, shall illustrate a thousand dark corners of the native mind; account for innumerable strange expressions, and stranger practices; restore many a missing link between humanity as we conceive of it, and humanity as we encounter it in India; and thus, at last, shall bring us once more into intelligent and sympathetic relations with our long estranged and much misunderstood brethren.

But the Hindoos, it will be objected, have practically no history. Though this is not quite true, yet the truth which it involves makes it all the more indispensable that we should prosecute our enquiries as far back as possible; to that remote period when a permanent form was, once for all, impressed on the native mind and life; a form which still remains substantially unaltered, at least un supplanted by any other: that we should go even further back still; to that yet more remote and pre-historic period, when the fossils of thought and feeling were deposited in the fluid strata of language; when institutions were yet unfixed; codes of law unthought of; philosophy unborn; mythology itself but in a chrysalis state, bursting into birth through the figures of speech naturally employed by an unsophisticated but highly imaginative people.

Comparative philology and comparative mythology have enabled us, for the first time, to penetrate the inner spirit of a period of human history, which had previously presented only an incongruous and unaccountable aspect; had seemed but a wild *Fata Morgana*, the offspring of a florid fancy, while man's reason was in abeyance. Their lessons are invaluable as aiding us to appreciate

the mental and moral structure of a people, among whom political history has been nought; mythology has continued dominant for ages; and has lent its sanction, and given its complexion to a sacerdotal system so intimately bound up with the whole genius of that people.

And as Geology, by disclosing the natural order of creation, and the normal distribution of strata, has helped us to a better understanding of the abnormal forms and confused congeries of rocks, with which we come into contact on the earth's crust at the present day; and has, moreover, enabled us to turn to all manner of practical and immediate uses the knowledge thus obtained; so the careful, profound, dispassionate, scientific analysis of the language, the religion, the theocratic institutes of India—*ab ovo*, may be expected to culminate not only in a far better and more exhaustive appreciation of that language, religion, theocratic system, than any which has as yet been possible; but in a consequent familiarity with the tone of mind and character, which were partly their cause, partly their effect; and which will be most serviceable to us as an initiation into the Oriental spirit; and as a guide in our intercourse with the natives, especially in relation to the *Præparatio Evangelica*—enlightening us as to the means whereby, the temper in which, the circumstances under which, we may best hope to undertake and prosecute with success, the complicated and solemn task.

Let us now consider the case of the natives. And we shall find, that they, too, eminently require the ministry of the same philosophical spirit to dispel the ignorance which as yet prevails among them as to our character and views; their own past history and relative place at present among the nations; the origin, develop-

ment, tendencies of their religion, and theocratic social system; the obligations implied in the strong yearnings of the more advanced and enlightened portion of them after progression, wisdom, and improvement in life.

They have mostly regarded us as animated only by the fierce lust of empire, or the more sordid love of material enjoyments and of pelf: as reckless of their welfare; hardly caring to conceal our lively contempt for them, and the complacent consciousness of our immense and indefeasible superiority over them; as equally unable and unwilling to comprehend and sympathise with them; as evincing, even in our comparatively disinterested approaches to them, and attempts to convert them to our own faith, a preposterous and obstinate misapprehension of their real nature; denouncing them as "all evil"; denying the lingering traces of a moral sense, the law which they yet feel to be written by the Almighty in their hearts, however faintly traceable; yet, not very consistently, threatening them with penalties which they do not feel they have deserved, unless they straightway perform the *duty* of adopting a course, for which they are not as a *people* (humanly speaking) ripe; and which, to adopt as *individuals*, seems to their tribal and gregarious instincts unnatural and monstrous.

And, accordingly, there is too much reason to fear, that they shrink from us and our plans for their improvement, with a mixture of suspicion, terror, aversion, astonishment, and reciprocal contempt. In such a frame of mind, sympathy with the *Sahib*, even the missionary *Sahib*, is out of the question; though such a frame of mind is, happily, not by any means universal. But we are speaking of general impressions.

Now the spectacle of a European steadily and

enthusiastically devoting himself to the study of their language, literature, antiquities, whole mind as revealed in the past, for their own sake; delivering a temperate judgment upon them; "neither aught extenuating, nor setting down aught in malice;" sympathising with them, and proving that he understands native affairs better than native authorities themselves do; could not but exercise a most beneficial and kindly influence upon the native mind; could not, in the long run, but dispose it to make some advances towards sympathy in return, to give us credit for being better and purer than it formerly thought us, to give more heed to our religious pleadings than it had hitherto done, to distinguish between fanatical and temperate advocacy of Christianity, to put more faith both in our professions, and in our prescriptions for the confessedly distempered state of the people; in short, could not but prepossess the native mind in favor of, instead of exciting its every fibre against the religion which we profess, rather than practise in India.

But this is not all. Such profound, critical, and genial researches into Sanskrit literature and antiquities will reveal to the educated natives the *ethnological* fact, that they are indeed our ancestral brethren, though long parted and much estranged: the *historical* fact, that when time was younger they were not so much unlike ourselves, and had a freer range of thought and action than their rigid tradition now allows them: the *philological* fact, that much of their mythology originated in language, figures of speech gradually hardening into accredited legends; the *literary* fact, that their cumbrous religious swaddling clothes were gradually devised for and accumulated upon them by man, acting apart from and destitute of Divine authority; that therein they have shared the fate

of other nations, whom similar human devices have hoodwinked for a time; but that, whereas they persist in still wearing these worn out rags of superstition, after they have served the turn which Providence designed for them in the infancy of society, they are behind the age of their own, as well as of the general world; and must go forward, if they would not go backward into irreclaimable childishness and simple dotage: the *moral* fact, that, nevertheless, certain true sentiments and ideas originally lay at the root of these humanly devised systems; and for a time gave them vitality, and a certain measure even of beneficial influence: the *social* fact, that their present life is marred, corrupted, honey-combed, by the continued subsistence of the outdated system, and the institutions and practices in which it is enshrined; and that, whereas their better men long for enlightenment of mind, energy of will, general elevation of character—individually; for social amelioration and political renaissance; only by the revivifying influence of such a system as Christianity can they hope effectually to aim at, and largely to enjoy these blessings.

Whence the transition to the *religious* fact will be easy; which it will then fall to the lot of the missionary to impart to ears and hearts very differently disposed from those to which he now mostly appeals. The religious fact (we mean) that Christianity, and that alone, is adequate to gratify fully the sentiments, to realise the ideas, which lie at the root even of their present corrupt religions: that the times of past ignorance God winked at, but now calls them everywhere to repentance: even the Unknown God whom they have been feeling after, grossly attempting to propitiate, in one perverted way or other, for ages; but who is now openly declared to them in *His*

simple Majesty as the true Avatar; the single God-Man who has ever visited the earth: whose way was made plain of old among the Gentiles by the instrumentality of Greek Philosophy, and Roman Government and Legislation; whose access to themselves has been correspondingly prepared by European thought, and the British *Raj*.

PASSAGES
FROM
COUNT LALLY'S
WAR IN THE CARNATIC.

(March, 1867.)

I.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE

OF

FORT ST. DAVID.

HISTORY never exactly repeats herself. But she is grimly ironical. She very frequently, indeed, presents pretty exact counterparts of a whole series of previous events, from the fundamental analogies of the general circumstances out of which each series springs. But she also delights, at times, in strange, even ludicrous inversions of the old order, as in the present instance. In the original war, Madras had first attracted attention by falling at once, and ignominiously before Labourdonnais. Then St. David's had maintained a gallant and successful defence. Finally, the English had failed in a precipitate and ill-conducted attempt on Pondicherry. In this last war with our great rivals, first Fort St. David's falls as abruptly and ingloriously as Madras before. Then Madras maintains, like St. David's formerly, a gallant and successful defence. Lastly, the English succeed in a deliberate and well-conducted attempt on Pondicherry. I may add, Lally's initial triumph was, in one sense, most complete. Fort St. David's falls to rise no more. The Exterminator came, saw, conquered, dis-

mantled, destroyed her. *Perierunt etiam ruina.* Yet how grimly ironical here too is history! This initial triumph, this extermination of the second maritime stronghold of the English in the Carnatic, this utter ruin of their fortunes on one spot, did but herald and symbolise the final and total defeat of Lally, the extermination of the military power of the French in the Carnatic, the utter ruin of their fortunes and political existence, the establishment and extension of those of their antagonists on the Indian Continent!

The short siege does not require a detailed narrative. But it is important to note how other circumstances contributed to give full effect to Lally's vigorous and masterful exertions, and the overwhelming ascendancy of his beleaguering force. An incapable man commanded in the town. The ramparts were too narrow, and were apparently shaken and injured almost as much by the recoil of their own guns, as by the enemy's shot. Ammunition was recklessly wasted in distant and ineffective firing, and when most wanted, fell short. The native troops deserted. The sailors, who had been left by the fleet to eke out the deficiency of the garrison, proved unmanageable as well as unserviceable. The enemy's shells destroyed the water supply. The English fleet, above all, was unable to relieve the place in time; retarded partly through the crazy condition and bad sailing of the Cumberland, a frequent source of trouble and delay in the naval operations. The French fleet was sighted; and terrified the council of war among the defenders into an immediate and unanimous determination to capitulate, rather than stand the brunt of an escalade, assisted by the French vessels, and by sailors ashore.

I have no wish to hurry unduly over events unfavorable or disgraceful to ourselves. But where the contest was, morally as well as materially, so unequal, it is idle to attempt to bring out prominently what has, in fact, few salient points. I may dismiss the subject with the reflection, that Lally's success, though great, creditable, and brilliant to the eye, was, on the whole, a Pyrrhus' victory. It naturally, but dangerously led him to underrate his antagonists. And the strain that he had put, both upon the French colonial government, and upon the natives in order to accomplish it, especially in such haste, (which probably meant—at all,) multiplied and intensified indefinitely the animosities against him, and the resistance to his high handed proceedings.

II.

TANJORE EXPEDITION.

His bickerings with the civilians continued; and his monetary difficulties pressed him hard, and threatened to arrest his further progress. What was to be done? The siege of Madras was obviously the great decisive measure to which his policy tended. And to throw his superior forces over the country around the capital seat of the English power, and thereby at once to cut off the revenues on which it depended, and to secure them for his own use; then to work gradually nearer and nearer towards the investment of the city, was the prudent and safe course. Prudent and safe, but therefore not suited

to his ardent disposition. He preferred to dash at money, as he had dashed at Fort St. David. And, if the English fortress had yielded so readily to the terror of his name, and the might of his arms, how should a native power of the fourth class resist him, now doubly terrible from his recent victory over Europeans? So he resolved to march upon Tanjore, and exact the full amount of a bond, given by the king in a former war to Chunda Sahib, transferred by the latter to the French, never redeemed, and amounting to upwards of £5,000,000 sterling. Almost emptying Pondicherry of its garrison, but leaving 600 men of his own regiment and a body of native troops, to protect it on the land side and to watch the English, and the French fleet to guard it from our own, he set off with the bulk of his army for the land of Promise, the fertile and rich Delta of the Cauvery. The faults of his character, and their disastrous results, were at once glaringly displayed. Though his heavy guns went by sea, he suffered miserably for want of means of transport. The natives kept out of his way, *as far as they could, not disposed to do coolie service*. He had, at first, few bullocks. The very sepoys, *dreading his forced labor, deserted*. The inhabitants, as he advanced, hid or removed their property. Though his troops scoured the country far around, and swept off cattle, which were sold largely but at nominal prices to supply his other wants, his men were more than half-starved. They had not a regular meal for a week. They found "paddy" in abundance sometimes, but for want of native ministry and native implements could not prepare it properly: so that Orme says, on one occasion, what might have sufficed for months availed only for a single repast. The profoundly muddy mouths of six-

teen rivers had to be painfully struggled across. Exhausted with fatigue, hunger, and disappointment, the troops fired the deserted huts of the natives, and nearly blew themselves up with their own gunpowder. Lally, by strong pressure, and from fear of his capricious violence, extorted from the Dutch and Danish settlements of Negapatam and Tranquebar powder, and some field pieces, but failed to squeeze either money or provisions out of them. Met by an ambassador with presents from the king, he haughtily refused to abate his demands, dismissed the envoy, rejecting the presents, and preferring to seize the town of Nagore, as "a material guarantee." And he proceeded to make the most of it as such; farming out the plunder and ransom of the town to the commander of the Hussars, (thereby laying himself open to a charge of jobbing,) dragging the tanks for concealed treasure, ransacking the houses for food, laying profane and looting hands on the very idols, hoping to find the brazen images of solid gold. Even this was not his worst feat. Finding, at Trivalore, that the Brahmins hung about inquisitively, probably anxious for the fate of their teraphim, he declared them to be spies, and blew away from his guns six of these twice-born god-like men!

Monacjee, meanwhile, the able Tanjorine general, drew out against him half the forces of the state. But his time was not come; he was compelled to retire. Lally pushed on towards the capital. The king had sought help in all quarters against the approaching invasion. The Nabob and the Presidency could spare none. Tondiman and the Marawers, though he was on bad terms with all three, lent him aid against what they could hardly fail to consider a common enemy. Calliaud misdoubted Tanjore's fidelity, or power

of holding out: but, as a compromise, sent provisionally 500 sepoys, with some European sergeants. Lally arrived; and the usual higgling commenced. After a mutual tender and decisive rejection of terms, Lally proposed to exact a large sum of money, the services of an auxiliary force to accompany him against Trichinopoly, and 10,000 pounds weight of gunpowder! The last demand his emissaries wisely suppressed, in the first instance. But their imperiously inconsiderate chief flew into a passion, and compelled them to return and announce their poverty of warlike supplies. Monacjee received the demand as an insult, and refused even to mention it to the king. At length the latter came to terms, and sent some of the cavalry, which he had agreed to furnish. But suspicious of his fidelity, Lally confined them, to their own terror, and the confirmation of a similar suspicion in the mind of the Maratha prince. Forbidding steps to be taken to restore confidence, he infused the last drop of bitterness into the cup of exacting hostility by an insult; and fixed the king irrevocably in the determination to resist to the utmost. He threatened in terms to carry the whole royal family away as slaves to the Mauritius. War then was once more the word. But the French themselves were ill prepared to wage it. They continued to suffer from want of provisions. Their siege train was long in coming. And when they did open fire, five days more were consumed in breaching the walls. Then the ammunition was nearly exhausted. The English fleet too was said to have gained another victory, and it was now making for Carical, to cut them off from their base there. In a council of war, the vast majority voted in favour of the inglorious step of raising the siege. This was soon known

to Monacjee. And, having opportunely received a second supply of 500 sepoy and some European artillerymen from Calliaud (now sure of his man) the spirited Tanjorine determined to insult the despair of the arrogant and baffled invader.

Leading out, and planting stealthily, a numerous and miscellaneous host of Tanjorines, English sepoy, European gunners, and colleries, he fell upon the French in several quarters at once. Great was the confusion; great the disgrace; not great the slaughter. For though Lally had been in great danger from a sudden and treacherous attack of a few men before the general engagement began, and had been overthrown and roughly handled, Soupire and D'Estaing rallied the army, and the troops in the trenches were not even assailed. But the French had no stomach to tarry longer at Tanjore. Abandoning and spiking their heavy guns, throwing their shot into wells, destroying much of their baggage, they decamped and retraced their weary way, harassed for a time by the very abjects—the colleries; longer by Monacjee and his regular forces; till, worn down with hunger, fatigue, and shame, they were fain to halt three days at Trivalore—a welcome and edifying spectacle, no doubt, of Divine vengeance to those whose holy men they had there slain.

III. SIEGE OF MADRAS.

PREFACE.*

THE following paragraphs formed part of a Lecture which I had the honor of delivering, last spring, at the Royal Artillery Institution. The general subject was "The British Conquest of the Carnatic;" and the lecture included a concise survey of the principal operations of the war in which Count Lally, undertaking to exterminate the English, after capturing and destroying Fort St. David, and unsuccessfully besieging Tanjore and Madras, was defeated at Wandiwash by Colonel Coote, and blockaded and compelled to surrender at Pondicherry. Several circumstances seemed to make it worth while to reproduce this very summary account of a siege which, in Orme's narrative, occupies some eighty 4to pages. An idea has prevailed extensively, that the Royal Artillery were not employed in India until recent times. This idea, incidentally refuted by a series of drawings executed by Lieut. J. Hunter, of that Corps, about the year 1790, and lately presented to the R.A. Institution by Br. Gen. Lefroy, here gives place to the fact, that Madras was defended by a body of Royal Artillerymen, under the active and able command of an experienced officer of that branch of the King's service. Again, though the sieges of Seringapatam were not less eventful either in themselves, or in their bearing on the growth of our power in India; they cannot vie with that of Madras either as an exhibition of our perilous situation in the East, or as integral and characteristic parts, on a new scene, of the long,

* [To the Siege, as printed last autumn in the Proceedings of the R. A. Institution.] 1868.

obstinate, and world-wide struggle between ourselves, and those whom, until very lately, it was the fashion to consider our natural enemies. Thirdly, as has been pointed out below, the siege of Madras was, under the circumstances, the *experimentum crucis* of the whole war. Had Madras fallen, as it so very nearly did fall, Lally's history and our own would alike probably have been much modified. Lastly, it is hoped that this short but (I trust), as far as it goes, faithful account of an achievement, in which their predecessors took so prominent a part, may serve to attract the attention of Officers of the Corps, who may not be familiar with the pages of Orme, to a work that possesses, in so high a degree, the indispensable qualities and exemplary merits of a Military History. Lally's own explanation, full of interest and now very scarce, is too long^b to quote^c.

And now, at length, the main action of the great war drama was to begin in earnest. The traditional foes were to be pitted, in their full might, and with the mutual display of their highest energies and subtlest skill, against each other. The Exterminator was to meet, face to face, men thoroughly determined *not* to be exterminated; but, under the experienced command of the veteran Lawrence, to retrieve the disgrace of Fort St. David, and to hold Madras against the French, as they had, again and again, against heavy odds, held Trichinopoly in former times.

On the 29th of Nov. 1758, the besieging army marched from Conjeveram. On the 4th of December Lally reconnoitred Chingleput, and,

^b [Rather—from its random assertions, raised questions, which I had not space to discuss; nor have I now time.] 1868.

^c Cambridge's *War in India* contains a useful working Journal of the operations, by Mr. Call, the Chief Engineer.

(adds Orme), "contrary to the sound rules of war, and perhaps his own conviction, determined to leave it in his rear."

It was, in fact, invaluable to the besieged as a *place d'armes* and rallying point for their outlying forces. As usual, the French commander was in a hurry to push on, when he could move at all. But Lawrence, though resolved not to engage in a general action, felt the importance both of giving confidence to his men, by not sheltering them too abruptly behind stone walls, and of gaining time, to facilitate the seasonable arrival of the fleet. He therefore made a stand first in the Choultry Plain, to the south-west of the city; then at the end of a sort of defile formed by enclosures on the south side of the main road towards Madras, and by the mound of a large tank, called the Meliapore, on the north of the road. Here he planted his field pieces; cut the mound, submerging the road; and skirmished with good effect for a time; whilst other approaches witnessed similar skirmishes. Gradually and coolly, and with little loss, he retired, withdrawing his various outposts as he went; and the English, fully mustered in the fort, looked out on the French army finally taking up its station in the Black Town. This the native quarter lay to the north and north-west of the fort, an open esplanade intervening; while of two rivers which met at the sea, to the south of the fort, the more northerly one swept round the Black Town on its west and south sides, and forming a morass there, sufficiently protected it from the probability of the enemy's directing their serious efforts in that quarter. Lally's own regiment was stationed near the sea, on the north of the Black Town; Lorrain, and the battalion of India, more to the west, in the centre of the city.

The flying natives sought shelter in the fort, but were refused admittance, and escaped into the country. Spies and some deserters apprised the English that the enemy had taken to plundering the town, and were already in a state of drunkenness and disorder. This seemed confirmed by what could be seen from the walls. Draper accordingly urged, and led forth the same night, a strong sally to beat up the quarters of the French, before they should have time to recover their discipline. Emerging from the fort on the west, followed later by a covering party under Brereton, which was to halt on the esplanade, the sallying force crossed the river, ascended a rising ground, penetrated up a long street into the heart of the Black Town, before the enemy were in any condition to oppose them. Lally's men were far away, most of them "reeling drunk." Lorrain drew up in a street parallel to that in which Draper was approaching, facing down the street, and with two or three platoons advanced to the opening of a cross street. The Indian battalion of Europeans seems to have been further off, or in worse plight than Lorrain; for they mustered slowly, in the rear of the other regiment. Lorrain had also four field pieces. Draper and his advanced grenadier corps received and returned the fire of the platoons in the cross street, but pushed on at once, leaving a party to seal this passage; and, on gaining the main transverse thoroughfare of the Black Town, discerned Lorrain on their left, presenting its naked flank. Instantly they faced and fired, aided by others as they came up; and the French suffered much from this, and more from the well served English field pieces, which drove them to cover in the houses; and though they turned their own guns and fired once, the gunners then

abandoned their pieces; and Draper, stopping his own fire, ordered the grenadiers to follow him, and seize the French artillery. But they had pushed on into an enclosure opposite; how far to escape the French fire, must be left to conjecture. Four men only followed Draper; and though he received from an officer who had stayed by the guns an offer to surrender himself and them, two of his four attendants being killed, and the others wounded, he was fain to return to his former station. Then the French emerged from their shelter, reinforced each moment by the gathering mass of the Indian battalion; the firing of guns and musketry raged hotly for twenty minutes; when Draper, afraid of being cut off by Lally's regiment from behind, notified a retreat; and the bulk of his party, abandoning their guns, pushed on for the esplanade. Here Brereton's covering force met them in good order; and thence they regained the fort; but in such a state of panic were many of the common men, that they scrambled over the glacis into the works. Lally's regiment, with Bussy at their head, gained the east entrance to the esplanade in time, but not in condition, to attack the retreating party; nor were they the more inclined to do so from the fact, that the fort guns commanded that open space. I said, Draper notified a retreat. No drummer appeared to sound one. Hence the grenadiers, sequestered in their enclosure, were unaware of it in time; and were compelled to surrender, as ignominiously as by the same number of men, (eighty) 8000 Beloochees were "cribbed, cabined, and confined," and paralyzed by Napier in the battle of Meeanee.

Many more English were killed in the houses, where their antagonists lay, killed also, beside them. Some 200 Europeans were slain or taken

on each side. The loss of the grenadiers, "the prime men of the garrison," was poorly compensated by the death of Saubinet, and the capture of *D'Estaing*, the only officer whom Lally seems to have cordially liked and trusted.

The area comprised within the original fortifications of St. George had been only fifteen acres. But latterly, and in anticipation of the present crisis, this space had been doubled, by an outer and more elaborate circuit of ramparts and bastions, on all sides except towards the sea; where a brick wall, four feet thick, with a battery of thirteen guns before the sea-gate in the middle of this wall, and a trench all along it, were the sole defences. From the proximity of the fort to the sea, no guns could reach the east side from the land; while the surf formed generally a tolerable security against a landing from the sea. The great danger, it will be seen as we proceed, was lest a force should come along shore, and attack the sea-gate. To guard against this, a *fascine* battery was erected close to the north-east angle of the old fort; and at each end of the new one a strong stockade, with a trench, ran out into the surf. Between the new and the old walls (*which were still retained*), on the west and south sides, intervened a wet ditch, part of the channel of a choked up bed of the adjacent river, which had been diverted for the purpose. The morass also has been already mentioned. Our chief business now is with the north side, where the brunt of the attack and defence was to be waged. The great glory of the new works was the royal bastion. This, completely embracing the old north-west bastion, had three faces; each grinning formidable defiance from many embrasures; the eastern face curving inwards, and confronting a similar face of the

demi-bastion, which partially covered the old north-east bastion, but left some of its guns free to range along the flank of the new work. A "blind" of earth had been raised to cover the exposed northern face of the old structure. A broad terrace (in non-military phrase) connected the royal with the demi-bastion. A trench, dry but deep and broad, and palisaded, ran in front of the whole line of defence on this side; which was completed by a strong north ravelin, opposite the curtain. I shrink from the perilous minutiae of *cuvettes* and *caponnières*, and other technicalities, the application of which I do not thoroughly understand; and need only indicate the position of Pigot's bastion and the north-west lunette, on the western side of the fort.

Though some time elapsed before the enemy were well supplied with ammunition, or even with guns (which they seem to have obtained mostly from their remaining men-of-war), they lost no time in constructing batteries, as follows. To the north, on the verge of the Black Town, and close to the sea, 500 yards from the fort, was raised what the English called Lally's battery, consisting of both cannon and mortars. While the latter threw shells into the town, and did much damage to the houses, the former bore chiefly on the *demi* and *old north-east bastions*; and, from an angle close to the sea, on the east face of the north ravelin. Four mortars were planted to the north of the burying ground. To the east of it, and named from it, another battery bore on the western face of the north ravelin, on the *demi*, and diagonally on the royal and old north-west bastions. The English styled the Lorrain a battery which enfiladed the royal, and sweeping the terrace on its eastern side commanded also the old north-east bastion;

while a return, on the north of the Lorrain, bore on the north-west face of Pigot's bastion. Lastly, the hospital ricochet battery sent its terrible leaping missives over the north-west lunette, the old north-west bastion, and on to the demi-bastion. On the bar to the south the French also planted some guns, more to intercept communications between the garrison and their friends without the walls, than to bear directly upon the works.

They then actively pushed on trenches from Lally's battery towards the main object of their attack, the north-east angle of the fort; and ere long, at the second "crochet" (or demi-parallel) constructed another battery, also of both cannon and mortars; the guns bearing mainly on the east front of the north ravelin, preparatory to the erection of the breaching battery, close up to the glacis of the chief angle of assault.

On the other hand, every effort was made to retard and frustrate their exertions. So vigorous and well-directed was the fire of the fort that it again and again silenced for awhile the enemy's guns. Cannon were dismounted and ruined rapidly and constantly on both sides; embrasures had to be closed for repairs; and the sturdy and frequent sallies of the besieged, the scantiness of artillery and ammunition on the part of the besiegers, and the too great elevation of their guns, rendered the progress of the attack for a time doubtful. But steadily and surely the French worked on at their trenches; and the second "crochet" was finished, and the advanced battery there erected, then damaged, and in a great measure disused.

The spirited sallies continued. Sometimes in small parties; sometimes in large bodies; now against a battery; then to interrupt the workmen at a trench; and again to fall upon a detachment,

spike up or carry away a field-piece or two on the south of the toyn ; or to communicate with and remit money to their out-skirmishers, who were operating on the rear of the French ; the daring Englishmen and Jemaul Saheb, the commander of the Sepoys, catching the hardy infection, distracted the attention, partially arrested the activity, disturbed perpetually the equanimity of their opponents ; who yet, on the whole, with a determined spirit equal to their own, pressed slowly but surely onward to the foot of the walls.

The Nabob, meanwhile, and his numerous *suite* relished the confinement and discomforts of a besieged town less and less daily. Soon, with the full consent of the English, and indeed to their relief, he departed, to find refuge in Trichinopoly ; and his followers were at once also got rid of. Pigot and his councillors were men wise in their generation. Yet it may be doubted whether they were clearly right in thus seeming to sanction the idea that Madras was not a secure place for their nominal sovereign. The king of Tanjore was certainly very unfavorably impressed by the departure of the Nabob ; and hesitated, on that account, to comply with Calliaud's pressing instances for a reinforcement. The hostile fleets, meanwhile, were far away. But the French had two men-of-war, and some smaller vessels. And an English Indiaman arrived, and after safely landing a quantity of treasure and stores, especially shells of large size, very opportunely, Ingliss, her brave captain, animated by the same daring spirit that glowed in the breasts of the whole garrison, though offered the option of retiring from the scene, or running his ship ashore, determined to hold his station off the port. And nobly he fulfilled that resolve. Though "stormed at with shot and shell" by both the men-of-war,

the batteries from the north, and the guns on the spit to the south, his masts and rigging shattered; his hull pierced again and again, sometimes by red hot shot, he held on; till one of the men-of-war and a sloop actually fled out of the road, for fear of his executing a plan to cut them out; and the guns on the bar being wanted elsewhere were withdrawn; when he had some respite from the general assault on his stout craft. A field-piece placed, instead of the heavier metal, on the bar checked, without preventing, communications between the town and their outlying forces.

The French had, by this time, seriously damaged the works on the north; and having reached the foot of the glacis, commenced their breaching battery there. And now the contest became most obstinate, desperate, and deadly. The fire of the besieged silenced for awhile the breaching battery; but, as before, for awhile only; though that battery, at first, as Lally's before, fired too high. The demolition of the works, the destruction of guns, the casualties among the besieged, went on apace. The French seized, and turned against the English, the stockade on the sea-margin. Determined attempts were made to recover it, but in vain. It was abandoned. *The French began to mine. The English countermined.* On both sides it happened that the mine, pushed on too rashly and too high, let in the daylight. But while the English took advantage of their opponents' mistake, and with musketry and grenades drove them back into their burrow; they succeeded in covering up their own opening, and taking a fresh start, without the false move being detected. And while the French exploded a mine, with little effect, on the verge of the salient north-east angle; the English finished leisurely their under-

ground chambers, much to their own satisfaction ; and lodged therein several hundred pounds of powder, for the warm and hospitable reception of the strangers, when they should make bold to cross the threshold of their honey-combed and tottering outworks. But an attack, along the shore, on the sea-gate, was now most immediately feared. They therefore, while repairing, as well as they could, but most inadequately, the injuries on the north-west face of the fort, reconstructed in haste the fascine battery, bricked up the sea-gate, opening a small wicket (as it were) on its side, threw out additional defences into the surf, and in more than one vigorous and obstinate sally overturned into the sea, or dragged into the covered way, the gabions which the French were accumulating at the stockade ; repulsing, and firing smartly and effectively on the working parties, and holding the post against reinforcements, until the task of demolition was well-nigh accomplished. A daring attempt by a French serjeant, with the promise of a commission if successful, to enter the works along the seaside was defeated, and the gallant serjeant mortally wounded in the affray.

So the terrible work went on. The English fleet still held aloof. Most of the houses in the town were in ruins, and " opened to the heavens." Much of the bastions was actually demolished ; and shot began to penetrate the merlons and gabions, and hit the defenders behind their faithless covering. Pigot had arranged a smart attack on the Black Town, to be carried out by Preston. But Preston could not carry it out ; could not even get into the fort to confer upon it. Calliaud was retarded in the south, and a general assault was now deemed imminent. Well had Lally done his part, in spite of all difficulties. And well had

his soldiers, at least, served him. But well too had the besieged fulfilled their task. No thought was among them—I do not say of yielding—but of ultimate failure. Hardly a murmur was heard, now that the timid, fidgety Nabob, and his troublesome followers, were out of the way. Cheering news too of Forde's victory had been received, and celebrated with the fire of the whole garrison, directed towards the French quarters. And they still hoped that the fleet would, ere long, turn their anxiety into triumph.

Lally held a council of war upon the advisability of storming forthwith, and himself declared in favour of that measure; but the officers pronounced against him. The breach was said to be practicable, but so much exposed to the enemy's fire as to be inaccessible. It was added spontaneously, that no good could come of prosecuting the attempt longer. Whichever opinion were correct, who does not pity and sympathize with poor Lally in this bitter moment? So near the crowning point of success, after such difficulties, so perseveringly overcome, after such exertions, so impossible to be renewed; to be warned off, by his own subordinates, from the desire of his eyes, the goal of his hard running! The end was indeed near. But not such an end as he had anticipated when he plunged head-long into the Anglo-Indian war of extermination, or when he stood triumphant on the site of the demolished ramparts of Fort St. David!

The end was near, and, as has so often happened both in India and elsewhere, when the operations of armies depend so much upon the movements of corresponding flotillas, there was a strong touch of the ludicrous in its abruptness. The English fleet was heard of, as approaching; was signalled, seen; and after an anxious night's

anticipation of a last sudden attempt at escalade, the morrow's light broke upon the landing of the ships, and the pouring forth from the fort of a teeming joyous concourse, to inspect the deserted works of the vanished foe. Not only hopeless of success, but fearful for themselves, they had decamped during the night, in too great haste to burn (as Lally had threatened) the Black Town, or even to remove their own sick; so badly provided with beasts of transport, as to allow upwards of fifty cannon, and ammunition in abundance, to fall into the hands of the English. They marched away, Orme adds, in rags, and without provisions; but exacted the latter, as they went, by force.

The following details, supplied by the same able and careful author, will give an exact idea of the activity of the operations, and the crucial character of the struggle, with reference to the general fortunes of the war:—

“The fort fired during the siege 26,554 rounds from their cannon, 7502 shells from their mortars, and threw 1990 hand grenades; the musketry expended 200,000 cartridges. In these services were used 1768 barrels of gunpowder. Thirty pieces of cannon and five mortars had been dismounted on the works. There remained in the fort, artillery sufficient for another siege, with 30,767 cannon balls, but only 481 shells, and 668 barrels of gunpowder.” As many of the enemy's cannon balls were found “in and around the works, or in the native town,” as the garrison had expended. The enemy consumed all the shells of the two first rates in the stores of Pondicherry, and threw of all sorts 8000, of which by far the greatest number were directed against the buildings.

"Of the European officers, one major, ~~three~~ two captains, six lieutenants, and four ensigns, were killed; one captain and one lieutenant died of sickness; 14 other officers were wounded, of whom some dangerously; and four were taken prisoners; in all 33. Of rank and file in the battalions of Europeans, and of the men belonging to the artillery, 198 were killed, 52 died in the hospital, 20 deserted, 122 were taken prisoners, and 167 wounded; in all 569; but many of the wounded recovered. Of the Lascars, who were natives assisting in the artillery, 9 were killed, and 15 wounded. Of the Sepoys, including officers, 105 were killed, 217 wounded, and 440 deserted. The loss in Europeans was more than reinstated by the troops brought in the ships."

The activity and judgment of the Governor were conspicuous throughout. Provisions had been abundantly laid up, and were regularly and methodically distributed by the well-trained civil officials. In every department, in fact, of the service, "all was emulation."

"All however acknowledged that the enemy, in proportion to their numbers, compared with the strength of the garrison and works, had pushed the attack with unremitting perseverance and endeavour, and the enemy equally respected the science and steadiness of the defence."

Orme then mentions the Company's officers who served zealously under "their preceptor in the siege," the veteran Lawrence; and adds the interesting fact that this was the first siege, whether offensive or defensive, in which Mr. Call, the chief engineer, to whose journal and plans the historian was probably much indebted, had

served. "Captain Hislop, who arrived with a company of the king's artillerymen, at the same time as Aldercron's regiment, was the senior officer in this branch; he had served in Bergen-op-Zoom. The Company's artillery, which furnished all the cannon and ammunition, was commanded by Captain Robert Barker; even the enemy acknowledged that the promptitude and execution of the fire from the fort was superior to their own: whatever guns or mortars were disabled on the defences, were immediately replaced by others prepared in store."

"Thus," he adds in conclusion, "every officer of distinction on the establishment of Coromandel was employed in the defence of Madras, excepting Captain Joseph Smith," who was in command at Trichinopoly.

The statistics on the French side are less precise. Orme estimates their force, on its advance from Conjeveram, at 2700 firelocks; and an intercepted letter of Lally's, towards the close of the siege, states that he had still 2000 Europeans; but on the spot seemingly not more than 1000 Sepoys.

On the whole, though the failure of this great undertaking was far from ending the war, it is not too much to say that it was "the beginning of the end;" for henceforth Lally was practically on the defensive.

IV.

THE BATTLE OF WANDIWASH.

Coote now determined to bring on a general action at once. After some preliminary skirmishing between the French and Maratha cavalry and his own reconnoitring party of sepoys, native cavalry and guns; and having in vain attempted, by halting his troops, in defiance, to draw the French out from their camp into the open, he executed a manœuvre which compelled them to form to the north-west of it, so as to prevent his engaging them with the great advantage of being flanked by the fort, as he came down slantwise from the same point of the compass.

The three European regiments of each nation confronted each other, those of the respective Companies in the centre, that named after the commander-in-chief, in each case, on the left, Draper's regiment and that of Lorrain on the right of either line. But Coote had formed a second line of the grenadier companies of his European regiments; and the cavalry were ranged as a third, the English troop in the centre, the natives on each of its flanks. He also distributed the sepoys on the flanks of the two first lines, except the companies with which he had preceded the army to the field, who with two guns remained apart on the left. In each army the field-pieces were disposed between and on the flanks of the European regiments. On the extreme right of the French was their numerous European cavalry; on their extreme left a tank, held by D'Aché's marines, and the Ganjam sepoys, with some guns: behind whom, in another

tank, were more sepoys; and the main body of that force was ranged along a ridge in front of the camp. Coote had sent back his baggage to a village on his now left rear. The hostile lines were not parallel, Lorrain and Coote's being closest together.

Lally, resolved to avail himself of his superiority in European horse, opened the engagement by a rapid circuitous dash at the English cavalry. Instantly, the native force scattered and fled to a man; the Englishmen stood firm; and before the detached sepoys could, as they were ordered, operate against the advancing squadrons, the latter were fired upon, checked, routed by Barker and his two well-plied guns, and dispersed over the plain, pursued by the English cavalry, and some of the fugitive native horse, far away towards the rear of the French camp. Meanwhile, a hot fire had been exchanged between the first line of the English and their antagonists; in which Lorrain was much galled, and impetuously followed Lally himself (who had escaped from the cavalry rout, as other leaders similarly circumstanced have in our own day escaped) to an attack on Coote's. Lorrain advanced in a column twelve in front; and pierced with desperate energy deep into Coote's, which had retained its first formation. But they fired too soon; while the reserved and well-directed discharge of the English line told fearfully upon them, both in front and on their flanks. Man to man, and bayonet to bayonet, the fierce conflict raged for a space; and then Lorrain fled tumultuously back to their camp. Pursuit, as premature, was forbidden; yet many *did* pursue, and had the French sepoys and the camp guard done their duty, the English might have paid dearly for indulging so common and so fatal a propensity.

On the left Bussy commanded. Lally seems next to have wavered between conferring with him, and endeavoring to urge on the main body of the sepoys on the ridge, who proved hopeless; and the distracted general rushed to the camp to rally the routed Europeans. About this time Coote (who, as he rode along the line, had narrowly escaped death from the unauthorised fire of some Caffres embodied in the Companies' Europeans) ordered Brereton, who commanded Draper's, to attack the tank on the French left. A shell had exploded a tumbril there, and killed and wounded eighty men; and the marines and sepoys were flying in wild confusion, in which those in the tank behind joined. The advanced tank was carried gallantly. But Brereton fell, as it best becomes a brave captain to fall, in his hour of triumph. The guns at hand were turned on the French. Their whole line was in imminent danger of being enfiladed. Bussy, in the act of bringing up Lally's regiment to the rescue, was dismounted and taken prisoner. English guns arrived, and plied the wavering body, till it too gave way and fled—though less precipitately than Lorrain had done. It was quickly followed by the India battalion in the centre, which had never *closed* with its opponents at all. Nor had the English grenadiers, nor their sepoys, been engaged. The three European regiments now advanced to the pursuit, which would have been far more telling, had not the French cavalry in some degree atoned for their earlier misconduct by mustering in the rear of their companions in disaster, and with some guns helped to detain the victors. Burning their camp, picking up, as they passed, their troops in the Pettah, the French army fled westward; rejoined, presently, by the Marathas, who had

contemplated the formidable strife from a safe distance. And though the English cavalry did little execution on the retreating host, Lally paused not, even to reinforce Chittapet, which, accordingly, at once became the first fruits of this great and decisive victory.

V.

BLOCKADE OF PONDICHERRY.

The last Act of the eventful Drama now opens. Coote prepared to invest Pondicherry. A few remarks are here requisite on the military topography of the scene

The town itself, like Madras, lay close to the shore, fortified on all sides; the sea-wall a provident construction of Dupleix's. The river of Ariancopang flowed into the sea on the south of the city; forming three islands at its mouth, St. Thomas, Sand Island, and Cocoa-Nut Island; with a spit of sand protruding by way of a raised bar. The fort of Ariancopang, the reduction of which had cost the English so dear in the former siege, stood some little way inland, on the south side of the river; and about three miles higher up, on the north bank, the fort of Villenore. A bound hedge of prickly cactus, as at Serin-gapatam and elsewhere in India, formed an outer line of defence five miles in circuit. It was strengthened by redoubts, the southernmost close to the river, and bearing its name; another called the Villenore, from its lying in the direction of that fort; a third, on a similar account styled the Valdore; and one due north of the town,

termed the Madras redoubt. Here the bound hedge ended, leaving an undefended interval towards the shore.

The Blancherie, a village slightly walled, and used, as its name denotes, for commercial purposes, intervened between the Madras redoubt and Pondicherry.

Causeways, lined with trees on either hand, ran from the Villenore and Valdore redoubts, the former through a village called Oulgarry, till met by a southern turn of the latter, when it branched into two parallel westward avenues, connected by the transverse continuation of the Valdore causeway. Between these parallel roads stood Perimbe, a village at the foot of a mass of swelling ground, which swept onward in a north-east direction towards the sea, intersected by gorges, and called the Red Hills.

On St. Thomas' Island was another redoubt; and three French ships of the line lay in the offing, to facilitate the introduction of supplies.

Coote commenced operations against the *Fort* of Villenore. It was reduced with little difficulty, the officer in command surrendering it in the very sight of the French army, headed by Lally in person, marching to its relief; and as Orme says, with the execration of every man in that army. Shortly after, Coote erected a large redoubt on the verge of the Red Hill immediately opposite, and encamped his army below at Perimbe, thus commanding the country from the river to the Red Hill, and easily able, by scouring that Hill, to interrupt the operations of the French foragers towards Thiagur and Gingee. The better to secure this object and his position generally, he also erected an advanced redoubt on a detached hillock, between Oulgarry and the Red Hill: and later a larger one, further

in advance and on the brow of the Red Hill itself, called the Tamarind redoubt. He also closed each of the parallel avenues already mentioned by works, corresponding to French defences of the same avenues against him lower down. And he seems to have pushed on to and occupied Oulgarry. He next persuaded the Admiral to land a number of marines for the purpose of attacking the fort of Ariancopang: but Monson, the next in command objecting, he desisted.

It was not, however, Lally's intention that the English should throw the toils round him unresisted. He resolved by one bold, and as far as I can judge well concerted scheme, to break out upon them at all points, and undo their work, if not disperse their army. To be clear, I must distinguish the several attacks.

1. The sepoys and marines were to issue, in a body, from the Valdore redoubt; then, dividing into three parties, the first were to assail the Tamarind redoubt, and, if successful, to cooperate with the second, who were to make at once for that on the hillock; while the third were to act as a reserve to the second main attack.

2. This was to be made by the regiments of Lorrain and Lally, (now mustering together only some 400 serviceable men,) who, from the Villenore redoubt were to fall upon the English at Oulgarry, and thus cut up what was at once the advanced post, and, in some sense, the centre of their position.

3. The French Company's Europeans were to cross from the south side of the river, and obliquely make good their way to the north-west, so as to assail, while the English were occupied elsewhere, the left rear of their army at Perimbe.

Lally, afraid of his plan being betrayed, closed the gates as usual in the evening; then, opening

them again suddenly after dark, proceeded to strike his last great blow for political existence in India. The Tamarind redoubt baffled the attack; that on the hillock was taken, with some guns. Very hard fighting took place at Oulgarry, naturally; for there "Greek met Greek;" the Europeans fought under the eyes of the commanders-in-chief. Lally, quite conscious of the greatness of the crisis, presides over the fray on horseback. Coote himself, equally impressed with the importance of the struggle then and there, leads up reinforcements, and the French are repulsed, but resist obstinately, and return to the attack. They seem indeed to have had, on the whole, decidedly the best of it at this point; and but for the mishap now to be noted, might have protracted the siege, if not compelled the English to raise, at least to suspend it. The India Battalion, apparently from mistaking their orders, and halting in a village nearer the river, instead of that of Villenore, were not up to time; and all was over elsewhere, before they could make their appearance against the English camp and main army. Lally, as usual, bitterly inveighed against the treachery of the *Company's* officer in command: but, though we may sympathise with the disappointment, we must not endorse an unproved charge. Shortly after, Coote, superseded by an accident, and the want of that quality in Monson, which made Outram serve under Havelock, retired to Madras, but allowed his regiment to remain. Monson at once organised an attack on Oulgarry and the Bound Hedge and its defences.

His plan was this. The assailing force was divided into a left and a right attack. The former was commanded, in chief, by Monson himself; and distributed into a van division, under Major Robert, and a rear under Major William Gordon.

Captain Stephen Smith had charge of the right attack. *He was to come down on the French at Oulgarry*; while the other force was to take a sweep over the Red Hill, and assail the Valdore redoubt, emerging from the gorge of the Hill nearly opposite that part; traversing, under some amount of cover, an enclosure; passing rapidly across the Valdore avenue, and assaulting the redoubt on the *left*, as being a less expected, and therefore less vigilantly guarded quarter. The cavalry, meanwhile, were to hover around the Ariancopang redoubt, and deter those there from succouring their friends elsewhere. This enterprise too was nocturnal.

1. The left attack, after proceeding some distance, was brought to a stand by the unwelcome discovery that *William Gordon* and his men were not at hand. They had, in fact, mistaken their way, and wandered down a wrong gorge into the plain to the south, where they succeeded, not in regaining their proper position, but (as will be seen) in arriving just too late to render a signal service elsewhere. But this was not the worst failure. When, on emerging into the plain, the grenadier companies in the van, (for Monson had determined to proceed without the rear, rather than risk the failure of the whole combination,) were to be led to the attack by Gordon's namesake, that gentleman, who had already proved a defaulter when wanted for a similar service at Wandiwash, once more was not forthcoming. Monson and he alone knew the artful route that was to be taken to the *left* of the redoubt. The troops therefore naturally, instead of covering themselves in the enclosure, pressed on straight up to the post, through a lane of some length, commanded by its cannon. Monson enraged rushed forward, but only to be struck down badly

wounded. So determined however, and so impetuous, were the grenadiers, that with a sudden dash they flung themselves at, over, into the work, before the enemy had time again to fire; and the redoubt was taken, and the Bound Hedge turned. Smith, meantime, after warily keeping his men under cover and unperceived as long as possible, fought his way also into the Oulgarry entrenchments; and drove out the regiments of Lally and Lorrain, who halted dubious on a hillock hard by. Why dubious? They had discerned a force advancing from the north, but unaware at first, as was Smith, whether they were French or English, paused till they ascertained that they were hostile, and that their own retreat to the town was now doubly threatened. Then they betook themselves in haste to Pondicherry. The new comers were William Gordon and his men, who a little earlier might, Orme thinks, have cut off Lorrain and Lally to a man. Smith now advanced, and occupied the Villenore redoubt. The cavalry had not shewn to perform their part at that of Ariancopang. But the *fort* of that name was shortly after evacuated, though the redoubt was held by the enemy some time longer. Thus the whole line of the Bound Hedge, except towards the Madras redoubt, was secured. Monson's wound was, *at first*, a double misfortune. It disabled him; and it left the general command in the hands of the incapable Robert Gordon. He at once proved himself as unfit for the chief, as he had already done for a subordinate office. He refused to follow Smith's sensible suggestion that the gorges of the redoubts should be entrenched towards Pondicherry; and the whole Company's European regiment act as a covering force at Oulgarry. He encamped the army in a swampy plain, liable to hopeless inun-

dation when the approaching monsoon should come on. Nothing but the desperate bravery and determination of the troops at the Bound Hedge prevented their losing again this hardly contested vantage ground. While Coote's first acts, on resuming the command, at the urgent request of Monson and the Governor of Madras, were to entrench the redoubts as Smith had suggested; to construct another to the north of the open interval near the Blancherie; and to remove the army to a high, and comparatively dry site, on the brow of the Red Hill, just north of the fortified hillock. Next he assailed and took, by a *coup de main*, the Madras redoubt. The French retired into the Bleaching Town. But when, in the evening, the sappers were employed in securing the new acquisition, a formidable attack was made by 400 Europeans and 600 sepoys, against whom were pitted only the three companies of sepoys who had taken the place. For Coote's orders to support them by a European force from his new north redoubt had been neglected. So the sappers and sepoys ran away emulously—at first. But then occurred one of the most remarkable incidents in Indian warfare. These same fugitive sepoys had been threatened by Coote himself with death, when they showed symptoms of shirking the contemplated attack on the fort they now quitted in such haste. Yet a staunch native officer was able to rally them now, and led them on again to attack the same fort, defended by double their own number of sepoys, and by an European force numerically superior to their own. And they actually succeeded in regaining the redoubt, and held it till succors arrived. The French, unable apparently to believe that the ally could really be the unsupported effort of such a body, retired once more into the walls of the Bleaching Town.

Coote also constructed posts and batteries on the Cocoa-Nut Island, the Sand Island, and two in succession on the spit of sand. Once he captured the work on St. Thomas' Island. But it was ingloriously wrested from him, through the misconduct of its defenders. Now, however, he was practically in possession of the whole land circuit of Pondicherry, and could starve it at his leisure, so far as supplies on that side were concerned.^d

The French fleet, meanwhile, was as anxiously looked for, as the English formerly at St. David's and at Fort George. Still there were the three ships in the road. The English fleet lay at Cuddalore, *watching its opportunity against them. It came.* Forty boats were manned, mainly by volunteers; at midnight they mustered at the Tiger, a vessel moored in the open, proceeded with precautions for silence and concert; surrounded and boarded on all sides two of the vessels; captured one with ease, the other on a second attempt; and the third ship was taken without a blow soon afterwards, as she was victualling in the Harbor of Tranquebar. Thus the investment was complete; and Coote could construct his batteries against the town, with entire security, if the fleet should not yet come up. But suddenly a fearful hurricane, in its circumstances and effects suggestive of that at Balaklava, swept over land and sea. Four vessels went aground, though the crews were saved. Three went to the bottom, with 1100 men! Others were seriously damaged, dismasted, dispersed.

^d Like Henry V. at Rouen, he abused his power by cruelly refusing a passage to a helpless mass of non-combatants. There was every excuse for Lally's not readmitting them into his famished capital; no valid one for Coote's forcing them back to suffer and die in the outskirts.

The works on land were almost ruined: ammunition and stores irreparably damaged: lives lost: soldiers seen scudding, as in the Crimea, lightly clad, *rejectis non bene armis*, to the shelter of masonry; the whole country was reduced to a swamp. Wherein lay the preservation of the English from the strong desire of the French to take advantage of their distress. But no artillery could move nor ammunition be kept dry, in such weather. And the authorities, both military and naval, promptly repaired the havoc that had been made. The last hope of Pondicherry was gone. The batteries opened and were answered. But feebler and feebler grew the response, till the English prosecuted their approaches almost undisturbed. The Exterminator's work was over. The French power in India was smitten with incurable atrophy.

Pitt and Coote, English valor, good conduct, and wealth, the indispensable and powerful co-operation of our fleet, on the one hand; and on the other, the preoccupation of Hyder with his own affairs in Mysore, the ill-success of the French arms in Europe and America, the consequent absence of their fleet from the scene of action in India, and the baleful predominance there of internal dissension, mismanagement, and corruption—had consummated the ruin of the once proud metropolis of Dupleix's contemplated empire.

Haughty and impracticable in his tone to the last, Lally surrendered; to experience (even after the victor had occupied the place, and had dropped a tear over the sad spectacle of his emaciated prisoners, and the fateful catastrophe of their wild but gallant general) renewed insults from his intractable and exasperated underlings; and to expiate, on a French scaffold, not surely

his own alleged treachery to the interests of a country which he had served too well though not wisely, but the accumulated mass of evil connected with the old *régime* at home, and the settlement in India, and the unpardonable crime of having commanded where France, smarting under repeated blows in other parts of the world, had sustained a scandalous, total, and irretrievable overthrow.

And we, who were the gainers by his faults, and who have risen upon that overthrow to Imperial greatness in the East, should of all men most compassionate his failings, and condone them in the memory of his cruel death; and solemnly ask ourselves, How have we used, how are we henceforth disposed to use, those vast opportunities, how to fulfil that heavy responsibility, which his ill-starred but not altogether inglorious career in part tended to devolve upon us?

Free as we are from many difficulties which beset his path, and prepared his failure, it may not be amiss to remember, that he was still, in no small measure, his own destroyer. The precipitancy, the arrogant temper, the superciliousness, above all the want of sympathy alike with Europeans and natives, of the Hiberno-Gallic soldier—are not without their moral for us.

The empire of India has never been won, could not have been won, by men animated by such a spirit. Baber and Acbar conquered, because they were generally just, considerate, generous and genial, as well as firm and prompt to strike, when striking was inevitable. In his faults, as in the catastrophe of the *raj* which he undermined, Lally recalls not a little the Mahmood Toghlaqs, and Auzungzibs, who again and again have shewn

MR. KAYE'S
LIVES OF INDIAN OFFICERS.

(September, 1867.)

how warily the Indian warrior and ruler should
pursue a track, which must ever peculiarly lie

“— per ignes
“Suppositos cineri doloso.”

MR. KAYE'S
LIVES OF INDIAN OFFICERS.

(September, 1867.)

MR. KAYE'S
LIVES OF INDIAN OFFICERS*.

Few compositions are more popular than the two Essays in which Lord Macaulay undertook to interest Englishmen in the earlier fortunes of our Eastern Empire. But, as time has moved on, though the stirring events that have since occurred in India have kept the national attention alive to contemporary history, and the opening of the Civil Service has diffused over a wider circle the interest taken in Indian affairs, a generation has arisen which is mostly as ignorant and regardless of the period immediately subsequent to that treated of by Macaulay, as his first readers were of the one which he popularized. The Indian Mutiny is still fresh in remembrance; the Affghan Catastrophe is already paling in the middle distance; and the events and characters, from the first accession of Lord Cornwallis to that of Lord Auckland, have become remote and comparatively historical.

The mass of readers, perhaps, has not much more disposition than formerly to occupy itself with professed histories of India; but it is otherwise in the case of well-executed biographies. And Mr. Kaye's previous Memoirs, together with

* *Lives of Indian Officers: Illustrative of the History of the Civil and Military Services of India.* By John William Kaye. (London: Strahan.)

his standard History of the War in Afghanistan, and his unfinished History of the Mutiny, have marked him out as by no means unworthy to continue the work which Macaulay began. It would be absurd, indeed, to compare the two writers. Waiving all question of natural powers or acquired graces, Mr. Kaye's *Lives of Indian Officers* differ essentially in their plan from Macaulay's papers. They are strictly biographical, while the others were, in a great degree, properly historical. They are original studies, but in quite a different sense from Macaulay's Essays. Except in the case of Martyn, Mr. Kaye does not enter into the labors of former biographers. And he writes mostly with the unpublished letters and journals of his subjects before him, and makes it his great aim, as he tells us, to allow them to relate their own history in their own words. This has been done very judiciously; and hence, although the author rarely gives set characters, he contrives to convey a singularly distinct impression of the personality of each of his heroes, as well as a graphic picture of the successive phases of his career. The work is not free from some sins against taste, which were very observable in the author's former writings; and to these he has added a disagreeable trick of employing a sort of Biblical slang, when ordinary English would be quite adequate to convey the same ideas. But it exhibits no abatement of his powers. His general style is vigorous, flowing, and animated. Sometimes he becomes almost eloquent, though with a touch of magniloquence; and he is never dull. His sympathies are many-sided; he can enter into all kinds of excellence. He betrays a tendency to exaggerate the stature of his heroes, and the importance of their achievements. But he is too frank, and too thoroughly

bent on conveying a faithful image, to conceal decided faults and unquestionable shortcomings. The shades of censure are often faintly visible ; but the lines are always perfectly intelligible to the instructed, and rarely obscure to the observant reader.

Mr. Kaye's subjects may be arranged in three groups, according to the period and events with which each name is particularly connected. Those in the first volume all belong to the time to which we have already adverted, as having become comparatively historical since Macaulay wrote. Cornwallis, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Martyn, and Metcalfe just span the gulf between the departure of Warren Hastings from India and Lord Auckland's advent. The second group is associated with questions springing out of the antagonism between England and Russia in Central Asia. Burnes explored the way, and was the first victim. D'Arcy Todd was appointed to secure Persia in our interest by organizing her army, and was afterwards diplomatically connected with the same Power. Eldred Pottinger, after arresting at Herat the wave of Persian invasion, flashed forth a Ney in the first stage of the terrific retreat. Conolly's fate was the *contre-coup* of our disasters in Afghanistan. The third group comprises three conspicuous and doomed heroes of the mutiny, though one of them is equally memorable on other accounts. Neill, who first broke the front of rebellion in the Lower Provinces, and who fell in the consummation of the triumph to which he had pointed the way ; Nicholson, who, after brilliant services elsewhere, was slain before Delhi ; and, lastly, Sir Henry Lawrence, whose heroic defence of Lucknow, and touching death within its walls, fitly close a long list of titles to fame. While the third of these groups awakens

the most recent and lively recollections, and the second assumes new interest from the present attitude of Russia, the first must, in the long run, claim the preference in importance as a collection of men whose united careers were coeval and intimately connected with the transmutation of our dominion, from a litigious and corrupt occupation of a few provinces, to the avowed and well-ordered sovereignty of the larger portion of the Peninsula.

Although so much that is valuable and original is given, there are some conspicuous omissions. The author promises hereafter a detailed life of Outram; and modestly excuses himself for not writing that of Monro on the ground that Mr. Gleig has exhausted the subject. Coote was not strictly a Company's officer, but an Anglo-Indian Temple of Fame ought not to dispense with a statue of one who was so long the life and soul of our Indian warfare, and who contributed so much to save and nurse our infant power. The most conspicuous omission, however, is that of Wellesley. The Wellesley Despatches, indeed, are their writer's best monument, but they have long been out of print; and in Mr. Pearce's *Memoirs and Correspondence* the original documents alone are of any value. The lives of Malcolm and Metcalfe are reduced copies of the author's previous biographies, skilfully executed, with the addition of a few new touches; and Martyn's character and career are treated with discrimination. Full justice is done to his affectionate nature, his self-sacrificing earnestness, and the pure, we had almost said the devouring flame of his spiritual enthusiasm. But, at the same time, the morbid self-questioning, the atrabilious irritability, and the tendency to see and cling only to the darker side of life, and to forego perfectly innocent and legitimate sources of

happiness ; as well as the false position in which the combination of the missionary's with the chaplain's functions involved him, are well brought out, and commented on with the good sense of a religious man of the world, and sometimes with a touch of excusable humor. Elphinstone is a new subject, and is worthily treated. We could have wished, indeed, for fuller extracts from the correspondence of one who, so eminent originally as a civilian, and afterwards as an author, was also for a long period the Nestor of Indian politicians, and doubtless expressed in his private letters many valuable opinions on matters of which he was so thoroughly competent a judge. The most noticeable feature of his administrative career was his great anxiety, in carrying out the settlement of the Mahratta country, not to depart too rapidly and extensively from native ways and institutions. Mr. Kaye characteristically claims for him as for Metcalfe military ability of a high order, veiled only by his great modesty. In particular, the victory which decided the Peishwah's fate is ascribed to his judicious arrangements. However this may be, it certainly seems to have stimulated Elphinstone's military imagination. If Gibbon, as he says, better understood Roman warfare from his militia exercises, more directly would the pen of the Indian historian seem to have drawn its inspiration from the field of actual battle. An illustration of this may be found in his description of the Mahratta advance, which Mr. Kaye quotes from a private letter (I. 270-1), compared with his account of the great battle of Paniput in his History of India.

But, on more accounts than one, the opening study is the most interesting and valuable in the first volume, and we are inclined to think in the whole work. Singularly enough, Lord Corn-

wallis's life has never before been written; and only within the last decade have his despatches, in a complete form and carefully edited, been given to the world. Yet the length and variety of his public service, the great and decisive events with which his name is associated, the beauty of his character, the singular harmony and completeness of his career, and not less the paradoxical aspect which many of its passages at first sight present, combine to impart attraction and importance to the subject. Mr. Kaye has drawn attention to another circumstance, which gives Cornwallis the first claim on his pen. It was he who, immediately by personal example and influence, and more permanently by his successful endeavors to place the regular pay of the officials on a proper footing, purified the public services of India, and "made the writing of such a book as the present possible and pleasant." Other circumstances no doubt co-operated to the same end. The corruption which preceded his term of office was due in part to the sudden exaltation of the English, and the natural tendency to abuse their victory, and become extortionate and self-indulgent tyrants; in part to an equally natural tendency in men of narrow intellects, unsustained by a strong public opinion, to sink towards the level of native morality; and in part again equally to the gross jobbery, profligacy, and irreligion prevalent at home. As time went on, and our political status in the East assumed a normal form, and public and private morality in England improved, the tone of Anglo-Indian society, and the conduct of public servants in the East, would doubtless have improved also. But, undeniably, Cornwallis struck at the root of the evil, because so long as the system of inadequate legitimate salaries was maintained, it could not but be

supplemented, after private trading and the open receipt of presents were prohibited, by underhand dealings and *cutput*; and thus the very conditions of the service corrupted its members and secured its inefficiency. Mr. Kaye contends that the permanent settlement of Bengal was not properly, at least originally, Cornwallis's own plan; but it cannot be doubted that he sanctioned as well as advocated it. He is perhaps rather too lenient as to the failure of the earlier advance on Seringapatam, which surely involved considerable and serious miscalculation; and but for the unexpected junction of the Mahrattas, might have been attended by most disastrous consequences. Nor has he settled satisfactorily the vexed question (so nearly touching the further question of his hero's ability to discern the proper measure of the exercise of his characteristic benevolence and mildness) whether, after humbling Tippoo, it was not, though a generous, a weak plan to leave him able to renew, as he was sure to do, the contest which had already cost us so much. We by no means pronounce that it was. For much was to be said against the policy of "thorough." But it would have been interesting to know the author's own mind on the subject.

Speaking generally, the second volume is chiefly interesting as descriptive of the feelings, conduct, and views of men who have gained a place in history from their conduct at particular crises. It is here that Mr. Kaye's well-selected and dovetailed original materials impart freshness, vividness, and point to stories the external aspect of which is already familiar. Nothing can be produced more pathetic in the way of prison experience and active-minded but patient fortitude than the letters and journals of Conolly; and the author's connecting narrative is in his happiest

vein. Though he tries hard to make a hero of Burnes, and though that ill-starred traveller and diplomatist undoubtedly possessed great qualities, the general effect of his history is disappointing and painful, without the redeeming circumstances that, in Conolly's case, excite so much admiration. Enterprising and energetic as Burnes was, it is impossible not to be strongly impressed with the conviction that his career, on the whole, was a failure, and that he was himself not a little to blame for that failure. He was most unfairly dealt with; his correspondence was garbled to suit a political scheme of which he did not approve, and to which his reports, fairly handled and interpreted, were opposed. But he had probably encouraged, if not originated, the idea of the Affghan connection, though he did not approve of throwing over Dost Mahomed in favour of Shah Sujah. He was placed in a very tantalizing and mortifying situation at Caubul, used but not fully trusted, responsible without definite functions, or an assured position commensurate with his expectations. But was he right in accepting a programme the hopelessness of which he must have seen from the first; and in committing himself and his reputation to a series of operations, which he could never have seriously expected to conduct to a successful termination, even if he retained the conduct of them long at all? His death was tragical and affecting. Yet even here his overweening confidence in his own special power of laying the troubled waves of Affghan passion precipitated a fate too probable from the first. Without any inclination to depreciate Pottinger's achievement at Herat, we could have wished that Mr. Kaye had noticed the different version of the story supplied by M. Ferrier in his *History of the Affghans*. The narrative before

us plainly indicates that there was little heart in the Persian warfare; and that the English, and Pottinger in particular, were popular with the Shah's army. But M. Ferrier goes further, and asserts that there was treachery in the Persian counsels; and that the jealousy (if we remember rightly) of the Prime Minister grudged and prevented his master's success.

D'Arcy Todd's life is rather, perhaps, a tribute to private or professional attachment than required by the importance of the subject.

Nicholson stands out in these pages, not undeservedly, as a magnificent picture of a soldier. His splendid *physique*, his amazing energy and promptitude, his gallantry, his magnanimity, and his winning ways both with officers and men, conciliated universal regard, and endeared him to the army in which he served with such distinction. But this was not all. He was one of the most signal examples of the power such qualities confer in dealing with wild natives; and he became equally distinguished as an administrator. A most grotesque but unmistakable proof of the ascendancy he acquired over the native character is supplied by Sir Herbert Edwardes, and quoted by Mr. Kaye. (p. 448.)

"A brotherhood of Fakeers in Hazareh abandoned all forms of Asiatic monachism, and commenced the worship of 'Nikkul Seyn,' which they still continue! Repeatedly they have met John Nicholson since, and fallen at his feet as their Gooroo (religious or spiritual guide). He has flogged them soundly on every occasion, and sometimes imprisoned them; but the sect of the 'Nikkul Seynes' remains as devoted as ever. 'Sanguis martyrorum [*sic*] est semen Ecclesiæ.' On the last whipping, John Nicholson released them, on the condition that they would transfer

their adoration to John Becher;—but arrived at their monastery in Hazareh, they once more resumed the worship of the relentless ‘Nikkul Seyn.’ ”

We would offer a few remarks on two passages in the conduct of Neill, which have naturally been much canvassed, his discussions with Havelock, and his peculiar specific for the punishment of the mutineers at Cawnpore. In the former case, we cannot but think that he was altogether and most seriously to blame, when he wrote the “wiggling” to his superior officer—and *such* a superior—that naturally and properly elicited what Neill himself calls “a terrific reply.” Mr. Kaye pleads faintly on his behalf, that the exceptional circumstances and the crisis instigated an outspokenness, that would at other times have been quite out of place. It is true that Neill had in his pocket the order that was to convert him into the commander-in-chief, on Havelock’s removal. But as yet Havelock was *not* removed; and was the last man, as Neill should have felt, to be shelved before his time, and taken to task by a subordinate, whatever that subordinate’s merits and expectations might be. And as to the crisis—that cuts two ways. It was all the more necessary on that account for Havelock to keep his own counsel, and to silence sternly well meant but superfluous and irregular, if not mischievous suggestions.

On the Cawnpore business we will only ask two questions.

Waiving the expediency, justice, and humanity of the punishment, as applied to the actual murderers of women and children; did he confine it to the actual murderers? And to the actual Hindoo murderers? It was certainly understood in India, at the time, that he did neither of these

things. Now the first question speaks for itself. And though the second is of little comparative importance, it is not without significance, when it is remembered that Mussulmans have no caste. The vile task of wiping up the blood would doubtless disgust them intensely. But as little as Christians would they feel, that their fate in the afterworld would be in any wise affected by it

A great name remains; too great to be summarily handled at the close of an article. Lawrence, on many accounts, deserves a separate place and treatment. We leave Mr. Kaye then, for the present; surprised that one who has been so long conversant with literature, and is himself a military historian of merit, should repeat (I. 239) Mr. Cobden's notorious blunder about "the works of Thucydides;" but grateful for what we trust is only an instalment, though a very considerable and valuable instalment, of a larger undertaking.

EXAMINATION PAPERS.

(1868—7.)

EXAMINATION PAPERS.

Indian Geography.

1. What circumstances give particular interest to the study of Indian Geography?
2. In what respects do the physical features of India resemble those of England?
3. Explain the different applications of the names Hindostan and the Deckan. What part of the country is commonly included in Central India?
4. Compare the Nile and its relation to Egypt with the Ganges and its relation to Bengal.
5. Where are the Aravulli Mountains, the Saut-poorra Range, the Neilgherris, the Runn, the Terai, the Great Indian Desert, and Adam's Bridge?
6. Enumerate the principal rivers that flow into the Bay of Bengal; and explain why they take that course, and form large Deltas.
7. Where are Trivandrum, Nagpore, Khatmandu, Baroda, Kurrachee, Multan, Masulipatam, Satara, Seringapatam, Trichinopoly? What is most noticeable about each?
8. Give some account of the Rajpoots, the Marathas, and the Gonds.
9. Mention, in their order, the chief towns on the Ganges, and on what particular account each is famous.
10. Describe shortly the Sunderbunds, the Concan, the Himalayas as seen from Nipal, and the Tanjore country.
11. What are the names of the tributaries of the Indus? Describe the character of that river, and of the country around it.
12. Where was our first settlement in India? What was the last Province annexed to the British dominion, and in what year? With whom, and how, was our last war concluded?

Anglo-Indian History (and Geography).

I.

1. On what accounts is *Anglo-Indian History* particularly worth studying?

2. What was the political condition of India at the death of Nizam ul Mulk?

3. Describe the character, designs, and resources of Dupleix.

4. Give some account of the theatre of war in the Carnatic; and sketch the general course of operations up to the death of Chunda Sahib.

5. Explain the imbecility of the English at the opening of the war.

6. Relate the capture of Devi-cotah, and the siege of Arcot.

7. Mention the several occasions on which Clive experienced remarkable escapes from imminent danger of death.

8. Give a short account of Labourdonnais, Chunda Sahib, Lawrence, and Bussy.

9. What important lessons might the English learn from the war in the Carnatic, to the surrender of the French force in the Island of Seringham?

10. What are the natural boundaries of the Deccan? Describe the course of the chief rivers that flow through it; and mention the principal towns on their banks, both before and after they leave the table-land.

11. Explain Bala Ghât, Punjab, Sunderbunds, Concan, Runn, Polygar, Nizam, Nabob, Rajah, Peishwa, Chout, Circar, Peon, Topaz, Monsoon.

12. Describe the general character of the country in Bengal, Guzerat, Ajmir, Travancore.

Anglo-Indian History.

II.

1. Sketch summarily the general course of operations in the Carnatic, from the resumption of hostilities to M. Godeheu's pacification.

2. Relate in detail the attempt of the French to escalade Trichinopoly; and Lawrence's attack on their camp and that of their allies.

3. Give examples of native cunning and perfidy during this period.

4. What was the general position of the English and the French respectively at the close of the contest?

5. Estimate the character and services of Duplex, Lawrence, Bussy, and Dalton.

6. Describe the Mahratha mode of warfare; and mention the several Mahratha Potentates, and the seat of the power of each.

7. Give an account of the action in which the Grenadier corps was cut off. What earlier and later catastrophes does it resemble, and wherein?

8. What circumstances favored Angria's piratical enterprises? Sketch the coast along which they extended, and mark his several strongholds.

9. Give some account of Monacjee, Nunjeraj, Laskar Khan, Mahomed Issoof, Poverio, De Cattans, Ponjapa.

10. Under what serious military disadvantages did the English labour throughout this war? Illustrate your answer from the events of the contest.

11. Exemplify and account for the imbecility of Mahomed Ali as a belligerent power.

12. What were the principal lessons that the English might learn from the circumstances and events of their wars in India hitherto?

Anglo-Indian History.

III.

1. Wherein did the final war with the French principally differ from the previous contests, in which the English had been involved, in the Carnatic?

2. Sketch and account for the character of Count Lally; and illustrate it by his conduct during his expedition to Tanjore.

3. Explain the prompt reduction of Fort St. David; and the failure of the siege of Madras.

4. Trace the connexion of nautical affairs with the fortunes of the war on land.

5. What were the political and military results of the recall of M. Bussy from the Deckan?

6. Give short notices of Calliaud, Robert Barker, De Leyrit, D'Estaing, D'Aché, Maphuz Khan, Basalut Jung.

7. Explain the object, and relate the course of Colonel Ford's diversion, to the capture of Masulipatam.

8. Describe the topography of Wandiwash; and discuss Major Brereton's unsuccessful attempt upon it, with special reference to his personal responsibility for the failure.

9. Give a general survey of the position of the belligerent powers, at the time of Coote's landing.

10. Draw an outline map of the Carnatic, marking the rivers, and the places most prominent during the English wars there.

11. Cite instances of French gallantry, ability, and good conduct, otherwise than in the field.

12. What were the most notable events in the history of Mysore, contemporary with Lally's career in India?

Anglo-Indian History.

V.

1. What were the occasions of our two first wars with Mysore ?

2. Explain and illustrate the advantages possessed by Hyder over the English in these wars. How far does the analogy of Jugurtha and the Romans hold good ?

3. Exemplify Hyder's abilities as a Statesman and Diplomatist.

4. Survey our relations with the Nizam, from the fall of Pondicherry to the opening of the Second Mysore War.

5. Describe Hyder's characteristic tactics ; and illustrate them from his principal engagements with the English.

6. Shew the faultiness of the general plan pursued by the English in the first war ; and the special incapacity evinced in Colonel Wood's operations.

7. What were the nature, extent, and objects of Hyder's devastation of the Carnatic, at the beginning of the second war ?

8. Relate Lieutenant Flint's services at Wandiwash.

9. Survey concisely Sir Eyre Coote's opening measures for reconquering the Carnatic, down to the attack on the Pagoda of Chillumbrum ; and account for the failure of that attack.

10. Describe, with a rough plan, the Battle of Porto Novo,

11. Trace the unfavorable influence of Mahomet Ali's political situation, character, and conduct, upon the course of our wars with Hyder.

12. Give some account of Fitzgerald, Orton, Fletcher, Swartz, Pimorin, Madow Row, Meer Sahib, Fuzzul Oolla Khan, Basalut Jung.

India (General).

1. In what respects has India been said to bear a striking resemblance to Italy ?

2. Draw an outline Map of the Peninsula ; marking the chief Provinces, Mountain ranges, and Rivers, and the following cities and towns : Delhi, Benares, Poonah, Goa, Pondicherry, Lucknow, Moorshedabad, Cuddalore, Surat, Arcot, Trichinopoly, Bednore, Seringapatam, Kurrachee, Dindigul, Bhurtpoor, the two Hyderabads, Lahore.

3. The names and relative situations of the principal Rajpoot States.

4. A short account of the origin, career, and peculiarities of the Sikhs.

5. The different members of the Mahratha Confederacy, with the capital city of each Mahratha Potentate.

6. Explain, with historical examples of their action, the several causes which thwarted the attempts of the French to establish an Empire in India.

7. Mention succinctly the chief military exploits of Clive.

8. Enumerate (1) the ambiguous or harsh deeds that sully the fame of Warren Hastings ; (2) his great qualities and achievements, as summed up by Macaulay.

9. Classify, in successive groups, our Anglo-Indian Wars ; and explain our accessions of territory as resulting from them.

10. Compare and contrast *briefly* the Pindaries, the Thugs, and the Dacoits, in their origin, their objects, their organization, their mode of operation, and in the plans severally adopted for their suppression.

11. Give some account of Dupleix, Bussy, the two Lallys, Omichund, Anaverdy Khan (his more correct designation?) Admiral Watson, Sujah Dowlah, Ragoba, Sir Eyre Coote, Meer Cossim, Angria, Sir Hector Munro, Colonel Baillie, Baron Imhoff, Chectoo.

12. Explain *Chout*, *Dewanee*, *Firman*, *Durrah*, *Batta*, *Sudder Adawlut*, *Supreme Court*, *The Regulating Act*, *Private Trade*, *The Subsidiary Alliance System*.

[This was a Paper set on a long half-year's Course of Lectures, in 1863. It was purposely made very comprehensive; so as to give sufficient choice of subject to those who had attended parts of the Course only.] 1868.